

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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10000/100/1
VOL. 1

146 pp

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DIARY
SEPT. 1943

146 pp

DIARY vol 1

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The Brindisi Diary is not a complete and connected story; it was compiled on a purely selective basis.

The correspondence of any one day was treated as a self contained item, the most important documents of the day were selected without reference to previous papers.

Nevertheless, although there was no specific building up of a particular subject, there are but few gaps in the matters of real importance and the thread of continuity is on the whole well maintained.

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THIS BOOK
CONTAINS
FROM 9-1943
TO Sept
CATALOGUE

SECRET

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22 Sep 44

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION

DIARY

SECRET

SEPTEMBER 12, 1943

General MacFarlane, General Taylor, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Murphy assembled at AFHQ, Tunis and received instructions relative to the Mission. (See Inclosures No. 1, 2 and 2a).

SEPTEMBER 13, 1943

The advance group arrived at Taranto (Grottaglie airfield) at 1300 hours. After some delay the party reached town and was installed in the Albergo Bologna. After dinner Admiral Power called and reported on the situation. Left Inclosure No. 3 describing his visit to Brindisi.

SEPTEMBER 14, 1943.

The party motored to Brindisi in the morning and where the members were received successively by General Ambrosio, Marshal Badoglio and the King of Italy.

After luncheon General MacFarlane and General Taylor conferred for about two hours with Generals Ambrosio and Rossi. Subjects discussed: (a) the proclamation of Admiral Da Zara to the Italian fleet; (b) the use of the Italian fleet in the defense of Corfu, Dalmatia, Corsica and Elba; (c) establishment of contact between Italian units and Allied commanders in the field; (d) condition of the Italian army; (e) Italian communications; (f) Italian ships in Spanish ports. (See Inclosures No. 4, 5 and 6.)

Air Commodore Foster and aide arrived with letters from Whiteley (Inclosures No. 6 a and 6b)

SEPTEMBER 15, 1943

General MacFarlane sent his first report to the C-in-C by Foster's B-25 to Tunis (Inclosure No. 7). Taylor added a letter to General Whiteley regarding supplies (Inclosure No. 8)

General MacFarlane and Taylor returned to Brindisi at 1130 hours where they conferred for about an hour with Generals Roatta and Rossi. Principal topics: (a) arrival of Duke D'Aosta (b) artillery for the British A/B Division; (c) Operation of Railways in southern Italy; (d) port labor; (e) the Bari radio; (f) possible operations in Northern Italy; (g) release of three Italian Battalions in Calabria; (h) Italian officers to assist in the collection of arms; (i) the relations between Allied troops and the Italian population. General MacFarlane accepted for study two aide-memoires; one a request for a reconsideration of the status of Italy; the other a request for a regularizing of requisitions.

MORE

DIARY - 2

In the afternoon, General MacFarlane with Messrs Macmillan and Murphy discussed the Italian status with Marshal Badoglio and General Ambrosio. Other topics; the Amgot lire; SOE and FWE work

General Taylor returned to Taranto at 1530 to receive the seaborne element of the Mission. General MacFarlane, Air Commodore Foster, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Murphy installed themselves in the Albergo Internazionale at Brindisi. (See Inclosures No. 9 and 10.)

SEPTEMBER 16, 1943

General MacFarlane, Air Commodore Foster and Messrs Macmillan and Murphy were received by the Crown Prince of Italy.

General Taylor brought the seaborne party to Brindisi. Party included Captain Ellery W. Stone USNR, to be head of communications section of the Mission, S/L Johnstone, Intelligence, and Lt. F.A. Rahter, to be AG of the Mission.

Messrs Macmillan and Murphy left for Tunis, taking the Mission reports attached as Inclosures No. 11 and 11a.

In the afternoon Generals MacFarlane and Taylor visited General Arisio, Commanding the Seventh Army, and Brigadier Palmer with relation to trucks and labor for the port of Taranto.

Admiral Peters had an interview with the Minister of the Marine (Inclosure No. 12).

Sq.Ldr. Johnson's directive is attached as Inclosure No. 13.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1943

General MacFarlane visited the 5th Corps Commander at Taranto in the forenoon.

At 1700, Generals MacFarlane, Allfrey, and Taylor called on General Arisio, Commanding the 7th Army at Francavilla. Topics discussed included: (1) labor for the Port of Taranto; (2) limitation on the movement of Italian troops; (3) the situation in the Balkans. General MacFarlane asked to be informed of the date of the proposed visit of Marshal Badoglio to General Eisenhower.

See Inclosures 15 - 20.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1943

Generals MacFarlane and Taylor in company with Lt. Col. Monfort visited the Bari radio station.

General Rossi and Admiral Galati called at 2000 hours to request authority to dispatch a PT boat to Corfu with orders and medical supplies for the Italian garrison; also a merchant vessel with naval escort to evacuate Italian troops from the mainland near Corfu to Italy. After telephoning Admiral Peters, General MacFarlane granted the authority desired.

See Inclosures 26 - 32.

DIARY - 3

SEPTEMBER 19, 1943

The Minister of the Marine called at 1000 and discussed the use of special torpedoes and motor launches by the Italian Navy against Allied shipping at Gibraltar.

General MacFarlane, Air Commodore Foster and Admiral Peters called on Marshal Badoglio at noon.

Brigadier Strong, Lt. Colonel Ford, General Lord Rennel and Brigadier General Holmes arrived.

Brigadier Strong called on General Ambrosio with General MacFarlane to discuss the organization of the Italian intelligence service.

See inclosures 33 - 39.

SEPTEMBER 20, 1943

Generals MacFarlane, Holmes and Rennell saw Marshal Badoglio in the morning about AMGOT matters.

Germans broke the Puglie aqueduct north of Potenza.

General Taylor took to Tunis Badoglio's address and a letter from the Chief of Mission to the C-in-C.

See Inclosures 40 - 47.

SEPTEMBER 21, 1943

General MacFarlane conferred with Marshal Badoglio with reference to the local acceptance of pounds and dollars pending the receipt of lira.

Air Chief Marshal Tedder arrived and visited the High Command in company with General MacFarlane and Air Commodore Foster. The latter was given operational control of the Italian Air Force.

Generals Rennell and Holmes departed.

General MacFarlane called on General Allfrey in Taranto.

General Taylor returned from Tunis.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

COPY

No. 1

1

Indorse!

12 September 1943.

SUBJECT: Instructions for Military Mission with the Italian Government.

TO : Lieutenant-General F.A. Mason MacFarlane.

1. The Italian Government, to whom an Armistice has been granted, is now established in the BRINDISI area.

The Commander-in-Chief has decided that a Military Mission shall be dispatched to the Italian Government.

You are appointed Head of the Military Mission and will assume your duties forthwith.

2. Object

The task of the Mission is to transmit the military instructions of the Commander-in-Chief to the Italian Government, collect and transmit intelligence, and arrange for such coordinated action as the Italian armed forces and people can be induced to take against the Germans.

In fulfilling this task you, and all members of your mission, will bear constantly in mind the extreme importance of inculcating in the Italian Government, armed forces and people, the will to resist and hamper in every way the German forces in Italy and the Italian possessions.

3. Composition

The Military Mission will consist of Naval, Ground Force and Air Sections. The heads of these sections will report to you on all matters of policy; on technical matters they may report direct to the appropriate service from which they are drawn.

The names of the heads of the sections will be notified to you in due course.

Attached is chart showing provisional organization.

4. Political Questions

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Attached is chart showing provisional organization.

4. Political Questions

The British Resident Minister in North Africa (Rt. Hon. H.W. MacMillan) and the U.S. Minister (Mr. Murphy) or their representatives, will be associated with your Mission, in order to make the necessary diplomatic contacts with the Italian Government. They will however report to you, and all instructions from the Allied Commander-in-Chief, on political as well as military questions, will be transmitted to them through you.

5. Communications

You will report to the Allied Commander-in-Chief. On matters affecting only one service, you may communicate with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, G.O.C. 15 Army Group and Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, as appropriate, with copies to AFHQ.

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You will not communicate direct with any agencies in Washington or London (e.g. War Department, Admiralty).

Suitable facilities will be provided for you by Chief Signal Officer, AFHQ.

6. Armistice Terms

Copies of the Armistice Terms, together with the political, economic and financial conditions referred to in para 12 of the Armistice Terms, are attached herewith for your information and guidance. The latter have not yet been presented to the Italian Government and you will not inform the Italian Government of their contents.

By command of General EISENHOWER;



W. B. SMITH,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

Attached:
Organization Chart
Armistice Terms

By command of General EISENHOWER:




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Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

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Head of Mission
Lt. Gen. McFarlane.

Associated Political Section
Representative: Mr. Murphy
Representative: Mr. McMillan

Naval Section

Two Officers of suitable
rank to be nominated by
CINC Med.

Air Section

Two officers of suitable
rank to be nominated by
Air CINC Med.

1 Section
for Officer
Photographers
List Clerks

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September 3rd, 1943

The following conditions of an Armistice are presented by

General DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces,

acting by authority of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain and in the interest of the United Nations, and are accepted by

Marshal PIETRO BADOLIO

Head of the Italian Government.

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.
2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny, to the Germans, facilities that might be used against the United Nations.
3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany.
4. Immediate transfer of the Italian Fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.
5. Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the needs of his military - naval program.
6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory, both islands and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as operational

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5. Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the needs of his military - naval program.
6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory, both islands and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.
7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

8. Issued 12/1/45

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8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.
9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.
10. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.
11. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.
12. Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Italy will be bound to comply will be transmitted at later date.

The conditions of the present Armistice will not be made public without prior approval of the Allied Commander in Chief. The English will be considered the official text.

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Marshal PIETRO BADOLLO
Head of Italian Government.

By: /s/ Giuseppe Castellano

GIUSEPPE CASTELLANO
Brigadier General, attached to
The Italian High Command.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
General, U. S. Army
Commander in Chief
Allied Forces.

By: /s/ Walter B. Smith

WALTER B. SMITH,
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff.

Present: /.....

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Present:

Rt. Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN
British Resident Minister, A.F.H.Q.

ROBERT MURPHY
Personal Representative of the
President of the United States

ROYER DICK,
Commodore, R. N.
Chief of Staff to the C. in C. Med.

LOWELL W. ROOKS
Major General, U. S. Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, A.F.H.Q.

FRANCO MONTANARI
Official Italian Interpreter

Brigadier KENNETH STRONG
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A.F.H.Q.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, A.F.H.Q.

FRANCO MONTANARI
Official Italian Interpreter

Brigadier KENNETH STRONG
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, A.F.H.Q.

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INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER OF ITALY

Whereas the Italian Government and the Italian Supreme Command acknowledge that the Italian forces have been totally defeated and that Italy can no longer carry on the war against the United Nations and have accordingly unconditionally requested a suspension of hostilities.

And whereas the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting on behalf of the United Nations are willing to lay down the terms on which they are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her Allies are not obstructed, and that Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with requirements of these Governments.

The following terms have been presented byduly authorized to that effect, and have been accepted byrepresenting the Supreme Command of the Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces, and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government.

1.

(A) The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally.

(B) Italian participation in the war in all Theatres will cease immediately. There will be no opposition to landings, movements or other operations of the Land, Sea and Air Forces of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Italian Supreme Command will order the immediate cessation of hostilities of any kind against the Forces of the United Nations and will direct the Italian Navy, Military and Air Force authorities in all

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(C) The Italian Supreme Command will further order all Italian Naval, Military and Air Forces or authorities and personnel to refrain immediately from destruction of or damage to any real or personal property, whether public or private.

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2. The Italian Supreme Command will give full information concerning the disposition and condition of all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces, wherever they are situated and of all such forces of Italy's Allies as are situated in Italian or Italian occupied territory.

3. The Italian Supreme Command will take the necessary measures to secure airfields, port facilities, and all other installations against seizure or attack by any of Italy's Allies. The Italian Supreme Command will take the necessary measures to insure Law and Order, and to use its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of the present instrument. Subject to such use of Italian troops for the above purposes, as may be sanctioned by the Allied Commander - in - Chief, all other Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will proceed to and remain in their barracks, camps or ships pending directions from the United Nations as to their future status and disposal. Exceptionally such Naval personnel shall proceed to shore establishments as the United Nations may direct.

4. Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will within the periods to be laid down by the United Nations withdraw from all areas outside Italian territory notified to the Italian Government by the United Nations and proceed to areas to be specified by the United Nations. Such movement of Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will be carried out in conditions to be laid down by the United Nations and in accordance with the orders to be issued by them. All Italian officials will similarly leave the areas notified except any who may be permitted to remain by the United Nations.

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5. No requisitioning, seizures or other coercive measures shall be effected by Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces or officials in regard to persons or property in the areas notified under Article 4.

6. The demobilization of Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces in excess of such establishments as shall be notified will take place as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

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7. Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries and transports will be assembled as directed in ports to be specified by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will be dealt with as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. (Note. If at the date of the Armistice the whole of the Italian Fleet has been assembled in Allied ports, this article would run - "Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries, and transports will remain until further notice in the ports where they are at present assembled, and will be dealt with as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.")

8. Italian aircraft of all kinds will not leave the ground or water or ships, except as directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

9. Without prejudice to the provisions 14, 15 and 28 (A) and (D) below, all merchant ships, fishing or other craft of whatever flag, all aircraft and inland transport of whatever nationality in Italian or Italian-occupied territory or waters will, pending verification of their identity and status, be prevented from leaving.

10. The Italian Supreme Command will make available all information about naval, military and air devices, installations, and defences, about all transport and inter-communication systems established by Italy or her allies on Italian territory or in the approaches thereto, about minefields or other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and such other particulars as the United Nations may require in connection with the use of Italian bases, or with the operations, security, or welfare of the United Nations Land, Sea or Air Forces. Italian forces and equipment will be made available as re-

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11. The Italian Government will furnish forthwith lists of quantities of all war material showing the location of the same. Subject to such use as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may make of it, the war material will be placed in store under such control as he may direct. The ultimate disposal of war material will be prescribed by the United Nations.

12. There will be no destruction of nor damage to nor except as authorized or directed by the United Nations any removal of war material,

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wireless, radio location or meteorological stations, railroad, port or other installations or in general, public or private utilities or property of any kind, wherever situated, and the necessary maintenance and repair will be the responsibility of the Italian authorities.

13. The manufacture, production and construction of war material and its import, export and transit is prohibited, except as directed by the United Nations. The Italian Government will comply with any directions given by the United Nations for the manufacture, production or construction and the import, export or transit of war material.

14.

(A) All Italian merchant shipping and fishing and other craft, wherever they may be, and any constructed or completed during the period of the present instrument will be made available in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the competent Italian authorities at such places and for such purposes and periods as the United Nations may prescribe. Transfer to enemy or neutral flags is prohibited. Crews will remain on board pending further instructions regarding their continued employment or dispersal. Any existing options to repurchase or re-acquire or to resume control of Italian or former Italian vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered during the war will forthwith be exercised and the above provisions will apply to all such vessels and their crews.

(B) All Italian inland transport and all port equipment will be held at the disposal of the United Nations for such purposes as they

given by the United Nations for the manufacture, production or construction and the import, export or transit of war material.

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(A) All Italian merchant shipping and fishing and other craft, wherever they may be, and any constructed or completed during the period of the present instrument will be made available in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the competent Italian authorities at such places and for such purposes and periods as the United Nations may prescribe. Transfer to enemy or neutral flags is prohibited. Crews will remain on board pending further instructions regarding their continued employment or dispersal. Any existing options to repurchase or re-acquire or to resume control of Italian or former Italian vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered during the war will forthwith be exercised and the above provisions will apply to all such vessels and their crews.

(B) All Italian inland transport and all port equipment will be held at the disposal of the United Nations for such purposes as they may direct.

15. United Nations merchant ships, fishing and other craft in Italian hands wherever they may be (including for this purpose those of any country which has broken off diplomatic relations with Italy) whether or not the title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise, will be surrendered to the United Nations and will be assembled in ports to be specified by the United Nations for disposal as directed by them. The Italian Government will take all such steps as may be required to secure any necessary transfers of title. Any neutral merchant ship, fishing or other craft under Italian operation or control will

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be assembled in the same manner pending arrangements for their ultimate disposal. Any necessary repairs to any of the above mentioned vessels will be affected by the Italian Government, if required, at their expense. The Italian Government will take the necessary measures to insure that the vessels and their cargo are not damaged.

16. No radio or telecommunication installations or other forms of intercommunication, shore or afloat, under Italian control whether belonging to Italy or any nation other than the United Nations will transmit until directions for the control of these installations have been prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Italian authorities will conform to such measures for control and censorship of press and of other publications, of theatrical and cinematograph performances, of broadcasting, and also of all forms of intercommunication as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may direct. The Allied Commander-in-Chief may, at his discretion, take over radio, cable and other communication stations.

17. The warships, auxiliaries, transports and merchant and other vessels and aircraft in the service of the United Nations will have the right freely to use the territorial waters around and the air over Italian territory.

18. The forces of the United Nations will require to occupy certain parts of Italian territory. The territories or areas concerned will from time to time be notified by the United Nations and all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will thereupon withdraw from such territories or areas in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The provisions of this article are without prejudice to those of article

by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Italian authorities will conform to such measures for control and censorship of press and of other publications, of theatrical and cinematograph performances, of broadcasting, and also of all forms of intercommunication as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may direct. The Allied Commander-in-Chief may, at his discretion, take over radio, cable and other communication stations.

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18. The forces of the United Nations will require to occupy certain parts of Italian territory. The territories or areas concerned will from time to time be notified by the United Nations and all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will thereupon withdraw from such territories or areas in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to those of article 4 above. The Italian Supreme Command will guarantee immediate use and access to the Allied of all airfields and Naval ports in Italy under their control.

19. In the territories or areas referred to in article 18 all Naval, Military and Air installations, power stations, oil refineries, public utility services, all ports and harbors, all transport and all intercommunication installations, facilities and equipment and such other installations or facilities and all such stocks as may be required by the

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United Nations will be made available in good condition by the competent Italian authorities with the personnel required for working them. The Italian government will make available such other local resources or services as the United Nations may require.

20. Without prejudice to the provisions of the present instrument the United will exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout the territories or areas referred to in article 18, the administration of which will be provided for by the issue or proclamations, orders or regulations. Personnel of the Italian administrative, judicial and public services will carry out their functions under the control of the Allied Commander-in-Chief unless otherwise directed.

21. In addition to the rights in respect of occupied Italian territories described in articles 18 to 20,

(A) Members of the Land, Sea or Air Forces and officials of the United Nations will have the right of passage in or over non-occupied Italian territory and will be afforded all the necessary facilities and assistance in performing their functions.

(B) The Italian authorities will make available on non-occupied Italian territory all transport facilities required by the United Nations including free transit for their war material and supplies, and will comply with instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief regarding the use and control of airfields, ports, shipping, inland transport systems and vehicles, intercommunication systems, power-stations and public utility services, oil refineries, stocks and such other fuel and power supplies and means of producing same, as United Nations may specify, together

and public services will carry out their functions under the control of the Allied Commander-in-Chief unless otherwise directed.

21. In addition to the rights in respect of occupied Italian territories described in articles 18 to 20,

(A) Members of the Land, Sea or Air Forces and officials of the United Nations will have the right of passage in or over non-occupied Italian territory and will be afforded all the necessary facilities and assistance in performing their functions.

(B) The Italian authorities will make available on non-occupied Italian territory all transport facilities required by the United Nations including free transit for their war material and supplies, and will comply with instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief regarding the use and control of airfields, ports, shipping, inland transport systems and vehicles, intercommunication systems, power-stations and public utility services, oil refineries, stocks and such other fuel and power supplies and means of producing same, as United Nations may specify, together with connected repair and construction facilities.

22. The Italian Government and people will abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and will carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations.

23. The Italian Government will make available such Italian currency as the United Nations may require. The Italian Government will withdraw and redeem Italian currency within such time-limits and on such terms as the United Nations may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during military operations or

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occupation and will hand over the currencies withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations. The Italian Government will take such measures as may be required by the United Nations for the control of banks and business in Italian territory, for the control of foreign exchange and foreign commercial and financial transactions and for the regulation of trade and production and will comply with any instructions issued by the United Nations regarding these and similar matters.

24. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with or dealings with or for the benefit of countries at war with any of the United Nations or territories occupied by such countries or any other foreign country except under authorization of the Allied Commander-in-Chief or designated officials.

25.

(A) Relations with countries at war with any of the United Nations, or occupied by any such country, will be broken off. Italian diplomatic, consular and other officials and members of the Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces accredited to or serving on missions with any such country or in any other territory specified by the United Nations will be recalled. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries will be dealt with as the United Nations may prescribe.

(B) The United Nations reserve the right to require the withdrawal of neutral diplomatic and consular officers from occupied Italian territory and to prescribe and lay down regulations governing the procedure for the methods of communication between the Italian Government and its representatives in neutral countries and regarding communications emanating

the United Nations or territories occupied by such countries or any other foreign country except under authorization of the Allied Commander-in-Chief or designated officials.

25.

(A) Relations with countries at war with any of the United Nations, or occupied by any such country, will be broken off. Italian diplomatic, consular and other officials and members of the Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces accredited to or serving on missions with any such country or in any other territory specified by the United Nations will be recalled. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries will be dealt with as the United Nations may prescribe.

(B) The United Nations reserve the right to require the withdrawal of neutral diplomatic and consular officers from occupied Italian territory and to prescribe and lay down regulations governing the procedure for the methods of communication between the Italian Government and its representatives in neutral countries and regarding communications emanating from or destined for the representatives of neutral countries in Italian territory.

26. Italian subjects will pending further instructions be prevented from leaving Italian territory except as authorized by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will not in any event take service with any of the countries or in any of the territories referred to in article 25 (A) nor will they proceed to any place for the purpose of undertaking work for any such country. Those at present so serving or working will be recalled as

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directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

27. The Military, Naval and Air personnel and material and the merchant shipping, fishing and other craft and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities or which is occupied by any such country, remain liable to attack or seizure wherever found in or over Italian territory or waters.

28.

(A) The warships, auxiliaries and transports of any such country or occupied country referred to in article 27 of the Italian or Italian occupied ports and waters and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of such countries in or over Italian or Italian occupied territory will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving.

(B) The Military, Naval and Air personnel and the civilian nationals of any such country or occupied country in Italian or Italian occupied territory will be prevented from leaving and will be interned pending further instructions.

(C) All property in Italian territory belonging to any such country or occupied country or its nationals will be impounded and kept in custody pending further instructions.

(D) The Italian Government will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Commander-in-Chief concerning the internment, custody or subsequent disposal, utilization or employment of any of the above mentioned persons, vessels, aircraft, material or property.

29. BENITO MUSSOLINI, his Chief Fascist associates and all persons

(A) The warships, auxiliaries and transports of any such country or occupied country referred to in article 27 in Italian or Italian occupied ports and waters and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of such countries in or over Italian or Italian occupied territory will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving.

(B) The Military, Naval and Air personnel and the civilian nationals of any such country or occupied country in Italian or Italian occupied territory will be prevented from leaving and will be interned pending further instructions.

(C) All property in Italian territory belonging to any such country or occupied country or its nationals will be impounded and kept in custody pending further instructions.

(D) The Italian Government will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Commander-in-Chief concerning the internment, custody or subsequent disposal, utilization or employment of any of the above mentioned persons, vessels, aircraft, material or property.

29. BENITO MUSSOLINI, his Chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with.

30. All Fascist organizations, including all branches of the Fascist Militia (MVSH), the Secret Police, (OVRA), all Fascist youth organizations will insofar as this is not already accomplished be disbanded in accordance with the directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

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Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as the United Nations may give for abolition of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and internment of Fascist personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist ideology and teaching.

31. All Italian laws involving discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinions will insofar as this is not already accomplished be rescinded, and persons detained on such grounds will, as directed by the United Nations, be released and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. The Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may give for repeal of Fascist legislation and removal of any disabilities or prohibitions resulting therefrom.

32.

(A) Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of or specified by the United Nations and any nationals of the United Nations, including Abyssinian subjects, confined, interned, or otherwise under restraint in Italian or Italian-occupied territory will not be removed and will forthwith be handed over to representatives of the United Nations or otherwise dealt with as the United Nations may direct. Any removal during the period between the presentation and the signature of the present instrument will be regarded as a breach of its terms.

(B) Persons of whatever nationality who have been placed under restriction, detention or sentence (including sentences in absentia) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the United Nations will be released under the direction of the United Nations and relieved from all

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(B) Persons of whatever nationality who have been placed under restriction, detention or sentence (including sentences in absentia) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the United Nations will be released under the direction of the United Nations and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have subjected.

(C) The Italian Government will take such steps as the United Nations may direct to safeguard the persons of foreign nationals and property of foreign nationals and property of foreign states and nationals.

33.

(A) The Italian Government will comply with such directions as the United Nations may prescribe regarding restitution, deliveries, services or payments by way of reparation and payment of the costs of occu-

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pation during the period of the present instrument.

(B) The Italian Government will give to the Allied Commander-in-Chief such information as may be prescribed regarding the assets, whether inside or outside Italian territory, of the Italian state, the Bank of Italy, any Italian state or semi-state institutions or Fascist organizations or residents in Italian territory and will not dispose or allow the disposal, outside Italian territory of any such assets except with the permission of the United Nations.

34. The Italian Government will carry out during the period of the present instrument such measures of disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization as may be prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

35. The Italian Government will supply all information and provide all documents required by the United Nations. There shall be no destruction or concealment of archives, records, plans or any other documents or information.

36. The Italian Government will take and enforce such legislative and other measures as may be necessary for the execution of the present instrument. Italian military and civil authorities will comply with any instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief for the same purpose.

37. There will be appointed a control commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

38.

(A) The term "United Nations" in the present instrument includes the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the control commission and any other authority

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36. The Italian Government will take and enforce such legislative and other measures as may be necessary for the execution of the present instrument. Italian military and civil authorities will comply with any instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief for the same purpose.

37. There will be appointed a control commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

38.

(A) The term "United Nations" in the present instrument includes the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the control commission and any other authority which the United Nations may designate.

(B) The term "Allied Commander-in-Chief" in the present instrument includes the control commission and such other officers and representatives as the Commander-in-Chief may designate.

39. Reference to Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces in the present instrument shall be deemed to include Fascist Militia and all such other military or para-military units, formations or bodies as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

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40. The term "War Material" in the present instrument denotes all material specified in such lists or definitions as may from time to time be issued by the control commission.

41. The term "Italian Territory" includes all Italian colonies and dependencies and shall for the purposes of the present instrument (but without prejudice to the question of sovereignty) be deemed to include Albania. Provided however that except in such cases and to such extent as the United Nations may direct the provisions of the present instrument shall not apply in or effect the administration of any Italian colony or dependency already occupied by the United Nations or the rights or powers therein possessed or exercised by them.

42. The Italian Government will send a delegation to the Headquarters of the control commission to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the control commission to the competent Italian authorities.

43. The present instrument shall enter into force _____ hours after its signature. It will remain in operation until superseded by any other arrangements or until the voting into force of the peace treaty with Italy.

44. The present instrument may be denounced by the United Nations with immediate effect if Italian obligations thereunder are not fulfilled or, as an alternative, the United Nations may penalize contravention of it by measures appropriate to the circumstances such as the extension of the areas of military occupation or air or other punitive action.

The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian.

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The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation, the decision of the control commission will prevail,

Signed on the _____ day _____ at _____ (Place)

(Signature)

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The following note is made as the result of the examination of documents in ARCHIVES Section.

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In the course of writing a brief history of the early days of A.C.C., it was necessary to refer to the INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER OF ITALY. The text to which reference was made was that in the Brindisi Diary i.e. the text which accompanied A.F.H.Q. letter of 12 September 1943 to Lt. General Mason MacFarlane, appointing him as head of the Military Mission.

A revision of the terms of the INSTRUMENT was approved by the United Nations, and the text of the revised terms was given in Freedom's cable 7824 of 7th November 1943 to Batina.

Comparison of this revised text with the text in the Brindisi Diary revealed that the latter was ~~not~~ the text under revision. The revised text indicates that the text under revision contained a preamble of six paragraphs, whereas the text in the Brindisi Diary contained a preamble of three paragraphs only. Brigadier Upjohn was consulted, and he produced in his files the text of an INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER OF ITALY containing a preamble of six paragraphs. In the absence of any additional information, it is assumed that the text revised by Freedom's 7824 is the text produced by Brig. Upjohn. This text has been checked against that in the Brindisi Diary, and it was found that discrepancies were confined to the preamble. The preamble of Brig. Upjohn's text is as follows:-

Whereas in consequence of an armistice dated September 3rd 1943, between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments on the one hand and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended

and the text of the revised terms was given in Freedom's cable 7824 of 7th November 1943 to Patton.

Comparison of this revised text with the text in the Brindisi Diary revealed that the latter was not the text under revision. The revised text indicates that the text under revision contained a preamble of six paragraphs, whereas the text in the Brindisi Diary contained a preamble of three paragraphs only. Brigadier Upjohn was consulted, and he produced in his files the text of an INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER OF ITALY containing a preamble of six paragraphs.

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Whereas in consequence of an armistice dated September 3rd 1943, between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments on the one hand and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United Nations on certain terms of a military nature;

And whereas in addition to those terms ^{it was also provided in the} ~~armistice~~ ^{it was also provided in the} said Armistice that the Italian Government bound themselves to comply with other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature to be transmitted later;

And whereas it is convenient that the terms of a military nature and the said other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature should without prejudice to the continued validity of the terms of the said Armistice of September 3rd, 1943, be comprised in a further instrument;

The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3rd, 1943, are the terms on which the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting on behalf of the United Nations are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these Powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these Governments.

These terms have been presented by duly authorized to that effect;

And have been accepted by representing the Supreme Command of the Italian Land, sea and air forces, and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government.

(End of preamble - no further discrepancies)

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21 Sep 44*

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that effect;

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(End of preamble - no further discrepancies)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ADVANCE COMBAT POST

Enclosure 2a

12 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Taylor. ✓

SUBJECT: Notes For Allied Military Mission.

1. ARMISTICE DOCUMENTS

A copy of the full length armistice terms (which have not yet been signed) has been furnished unofficially to General Castellano, and may have been sent to Italy by his staff officer who returned on 5th September.

The short armistice terms which were signed on 3 September were handed General 'C' officially and dispatched as above.

An aide-memoire, unsigned, dated 3 September, records action which it was unofficially agreed that the Italian Government and Forces would carry out prior to and after the proclamation on 8th September. A copy was furnished General 'C' and transmitted to Marshal Badoglio. A copy is attached, Enclosure A. Attention is directed to para. 6.

2. COMMUNICATIONS

You will be able to use:-

- a. 1 Airborne Division link via 15th Army Group.
 - b. On arrival, V Corps link via 15th Army Group, but at a later date possibly via Eighth Army.
 - c. Such naval signals facilities as are available via Cinc Med at Bizerte, later Algiers.
 - d. Clandestine S.O.E. link via S.O.E. Headquarters at Algiers. The code name for your station is 'Monkey' and it is presently located at Firdisi, presumably with Marshal Badoglio.
- Captain deHann, S.O.E., who is being instructed to report to you as interpreter, is in charge of this and several other clandestine radio parties. S.O.E. use special codes

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Captain deHann, S.O.E., who is being instructed to report to you as interpreter, is in charge of this and several other clandestine radio parties. S.O.E. use special codes and frequencies, and the portable field sets communicate only to Algiers, and not to each other or to army stations. They are therefore unsuitable for establishing direct communications within the country; but it is suggested that you keep one set for the time being so that you can relay messages to and from the others via Algiers without decoding and loss of time. It is however highly important that all the other S.O.E. radio parties be dispatched forthwith to such points as Rome, Florence and key centers in Northern Italy, while overland travel remains practicable. Captain deHann and his signals officer were sent in today to ensure that this policy is carried out without delay.

- e. Such special radio facilities as may be furnished for the sole use of the Mission. Details and time of arrival will follow as early as possible.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

3. MAPS

The following are supplied herewith:-

Italy & Balkans	1/1,000,000	2 Sets (Please pass one map to Mr. Murphy)
Italy & Balkans	1/500,000	1 Set
Heel of Italy	1/100,000	1 Set
Situation Map	-	1

4. PROGRAM FOR MOVE OF REMAINDER OF MISSION

a. Air Commodore Foster; has been requested to make the journey by air independently so as to arrive by night 13th September if possible.

b. Seven officers, 1 civilian and 28 enlisted men with about 4½ tons of baggage are due at AFHQ Liaison Detachment camp, Cassibile, Sicily (telegraphic address Fairfield Advance) noon 13th September. They will be moved on to Taranto by sea by first opportunity arriving possibly on the 14th but certainly not later than 15th. You will be advised of ETA as soon as definite.

This party will probably be accompanied by three Italian Staff Officers who are being returned by General Castellano as not required with his mission. Their names are:

Lieut. Col. Dueros Paolo
Lieut. Col. Chiaperelli Emilio
Comdt. Bristore Umberto

Arrangements will be made to ship in 4 cars (and possibly radio vehicles and a truck) as soon as practicable.

It is noted that the head of the mission desires a permanent guard attachment to be made available when this can be arranged.

5. INFORMATION FROM AFHQ

A special Situation Report will be dispatched to you daily giving the current situation in broad terms and our future intentions. The following telegraphic code names may be useful:-

AFHQ Command Post, (Amilcar) - No code name. Fairfield Rear is telephone address sometimes

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AFHQ Command Post, (Amilcar)	-	No code name. Fairfield Rear is telephone address sometimes mis-used.
AFHQ	-	Freedom (Algiers)
Tac HQ 15th Army Group	-	Pinbat (Bizerte)
Main HQ 15th Army Group	-	Pilpot (Cassibile, Sicily)
CinC Med, Bizerte) CinC Med, Algiers)	-	No code name.
Air Command Post	-	No code name. (La Marsa)

NOTE: It is requested that for the present messages for AFHQ be addressed:

To AFHQ Command Post
via Freedom

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6. COMPOSITION OF ITALIAN MILITARY MISSION AT AFHQ

See Enclosure E.

7. ALLIED PLANS AND BUILD UP

See 'Outline Situation Map', and estimate of Avalanche build up, Enclosure C. The build up indicated for Avalanche is a forecast dated 8th September. For the present progress will be much more rapid from Bizerte, Sicily and Tripoli, owing to comparatively light losses of LST's. However build up of the U.S. VI Corps from Oran depends on the use of MT ships using the port of Naples from about D + 12, and will be retarded if we fail to get the port in good time and in fair condition. The table is therefore only a very rough guide.

8. BROADCAST

Major Greenless, British Services, a technical expert on PWE Staff to General McClure has been sent to Taranto to inspect the powerful radio transmission station at Bari, and to assist in getting it serviceable as soon as we control the city. Great importance is attached to this station being available at the earliest date for use by the Badoglio government. Until it is available the PWE plan is for an Italian spokesman to broadcast from Palermo, the transmission being picked up and relayed by the powerful station in Algiers.

B. M. Archibald
B. M. ARCHIBALD,
Colonel,
G-3 Operations.

Encl:

- Encl A - Aide-Memoire, dated 3 Sept.
- " B - Composition of Italian Military Mission at AFHQ.
- " { C1 - Outline Situation Map &
C2 - Estimate of Avalanche Build Up
- " D1-2. List of Code Names
- " E - List of Commanders & Staff.

Attention

9. CODE NAMES

List of code names in current use for operations and for

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- " D.1-2. List of Code Names
- " E - List of Commanders & Staff.

Attention

9. CODE NAMES

A list of code names in current use for operations, and for principal places in Italy, is attached Enclosure D.

10. COMMANDERS AND STAFF

List of the names of some Commanders and Staff who will be in the heel is attached Enclosure E.

Bma

SECRET

(Italy's British MOST SECRET)

Enclame 'A'

BIGOT

MOST SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AIDE MEMOIRE

3 September, 1943.

Page One.

1.

This aide memoire enumerates the points which it has been agreed that the Italian Government will do everything possible to accomplish prior to the proclamation of an Armistice between the Italian Forces and those of the Allies, and other points on which action is to be taken subsequent to the proclamation.

2.

From the hour that the Armistice instrument comes into force until its proclamation :

(a) Take all possible measures to safeguard ALLIED prisoners of war. If GERMAN pressure to hand them over becomes too great they should if possible be released and succoured by the people.

(b) NO ITALIAN warships are to be allowed to fall into GERMAN hands. Arrangements must be made to insure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, immediately on declaration of Armistice. ITALIAN submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would be a revealing measure.

(c) No merchant shipping is to be allowed to fall into GERMAN hands. Merchant shipping in Northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports South of the line VENICE - LEGHORN. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

(d) GERMAN Forces should not be allowed to take over ITALIAN coast defences.

(e) Arrangements are to be made to be put in force at the proper time for ITALIAN organisations in the BALKANS to march to the coast, with a view to their being taken off to ITALY by the UNITED NATIONS.

3.

For the defence of ROME, in which one Allied Airborne Division (probably reinforced) is to participate, detailed plans will be completed and all preliminary preparations made, including the following :-

(a) Three key airfields in the vicinity of ROME to be effectively secured.

(b) Preparatory moves will be taken to insure that all avenues to ROME can be seized and blocked with the least delay.

(c) Agreed navigational aids for the Allied troop-carrying aircraft will be established.

(d) Full measures will be taken to insure that anti-aircraft fire is not opened on the troop-carrying aircraft. As far as possible neutralise GERMAN RDF stations.

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(d) Full measures will be taken to insure that anti-aircraft fire is not opened on the troop-carrying aircraft. As far as possible neutralise GERMAN RDF stations.

(e) Arrangements will be made for contact between Commander and Staff, immediately the division lands.

(f) Arrangements will be made for provision of all supplies required by the airborne division, exclusive of ammunition (food, trucks, possibly some medical assistance).

(g) Fighter groups selected by the ITALIAN Air Force to be retained to assist in defence of ROME.

4. Anticipating the need for lengthy communications which cannot be handled by the present link, arrangements will be made for a rendez-vous as required at times and places to be designated by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, and with recognition signals. Written messages

Page Two.

in code will be exchanged for onward transmission by hand of officer courier.

5. PROCLAMATION

At 1830 hours ROME time (1830 B hrs) of X day (X day will be communicated later but only a few hours in advance) following immediately after the announcement of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Force of the conclusion of an Armistice, which announcement will begin at 1815 hours ROME time, Marshal BADOLLO will proclaim the Armistice by every available means of public dissemination, by radio broadcast, by announcement to the press and foreign diplomatic corps, and by telephone and telegraph to all agencies of the ITALIAN Government and the ITALIAN Armed Forces. Included in this proclamation will be orders to the ITALIAN Armed Forces and people to cease all forms of resistance to the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS. At the same time instructions will be issued to resist and obstruct the operations of the GERMAN Forces in every possible way as long as they remain on ITALIAN soil.

6. POST-PROCLAMATION MEASURES:

From and after 1830 hours ROME time (1830 B hrs) X day the following measures are to be put in train, as rapidly as practicable:

(a) A ceasing of work by all personnel engaged in occupations which facilitate the maintenance, movement and/or operations of the GERMAN Armed Forces.

(b) So far as possible, the paralysis of all movement of GERMAN Forces throughout ITALY, especially in areas mentioned in sub-paragraph 'd' below, by the following means:

(1) By direct attacks on Headquarters and Command Posts of GERMAN military organisations.

(2) Cutting of GERMAN communications (telephone and telegraph, road and rail).

(3) Destruction by sabotage or other means of enemy motor transport.

(4) Ambushing Staff cars, dispatch riders and transport movement generally.

(c) The destruction of GERMAN aircraft, stores of petrol, oil, ammunition, etc, especially in areas mentioned in sub-paragraph 'd' and around BOGGIA.

(d) (1) ROME area

(a) The seizure of all communications running through the outskirts of the city to prevent the GERMAN occupying it or moving through it.

(b) Direct attack on GERMAN Headquarters at FRASCATI.

(c) Air defence of city.

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(a) The seizure of all communications running through the outskirts of the city to prevent the GERMAN occupying it or moving through it.

(b) Direct attack on GERMAN Headquarters at FRASCATI.

(c) Air defence of city.

(2) SPEZZIA Area

Maximum cover for the departure of the fleet.

(3) Between ROME and NAPLES

Interfere as much as possible with movement of GERMAN divisions located between ROME and NAPLES.

(4) NAPLES

Prevent destruction of port and shipping and hold port area if possible.

(5) TARANTO

Seize and hold port for entrance of UNITED NATIONS Forces.

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(6) BARI and BRINDISI/.....

Page Three

(6) BARI and BRINDISI

Same as TARANTO, but with priority to TARANTO.

(7) CALABRIA.



Cut off GERMAN Forces in the TOE of ITALY by blocking road and rail communications.


Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

107

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.





SECRET

G.S.O.P. 5301
ITALY

SCALE 1:3,000,000 or 48 MILES TO 1 INCH

MILES 20 0 30 40 60 80 100 MILES

**SITUATION MAP
AND**

**FORECAST OF BUILD-UP
(AS KNOWN AT A.FHQ. C.P. 12-SEP)**

Note: 1. Coastal Divs. shown only in islands
2. Buildups show only new formations;
there is also large movement of units and
elements to complete preceding Divs.
to full scale

**GERMAN DIVISIONS
(INC. ONE ARM'D)**

65-71-76-94-305

Parma 24 PZ.

Bologna

Florence

rh

Elba

DIV.

N DIVS.


STAL DIVS.


3 P.G. DIVISIONS

ROME

FOUR ITALIAN DIVISIONS


ONE BLUEGRASS DIVISION





TO: SALERNO

- One US Airborne Div. 14 Sep
- One Rct 45 Div. 15/16 Sep
- 3 US Div. plus Tk. Bn. 25 Sep/ 15 Oct
- 7 Arm'd. Div. 19/26 Sep.
- 34 US Div. 25/Sep/ 10 Oct.
- 1 US Arm'd. Div. 5 Oct



ENCLOSURE B

ITALIAN MILITARY MISSION AT ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PROPOSED COMPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN MILITARY MISSION AT ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

HEADQUARTERS OF THE MISSION.

LOCATION: AT ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

COMPOSITION: GENERAL IN CHIEF OF THE MISSION.
COLONEL, IN CHIEF OF STAFF.
OFFICER IN CHARGE OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.
OFFICER FOR GENERAL DUTIES.
AIDE DE CAMP TO THE GENERAL IN CHIEF OF THE MISSION.
OFFICER INTERPRETER TOTAL 7

DETACHMENTS.

AT ARMY GROUP HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL ALEXANDER.

STAFF COLONEL
SENIOR STAFF OFFICER

TOTAL 2

AT HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY.

2 SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS

TOTAL 2

AT HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY.

2 SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS

TOTAL 2

AT HEADQUARTERS AIR COMMAND.

SENIOR AIR FORCE OFFICER
SENIOR OFFICER OR CAPTAIN OF THE AIR FORCE

TOTAL 2

DETACHMENTS.

AT ARMY GROUP HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL ALEXANDER.

STAFF COLONEL
SENIOR STAFF OFFICER

TOTAL 2

AT HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY.

2 SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS

TOTAL 2

AT HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY.

2 SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS

TOTAL 2

AT HEADQUARTERS AIR COMMAND.

SENIOR AIR FORCE OFFICER
SENIOR OFFICER OR CAPTAIN OF THE AIR FORCE

TOTAL 2

AT NAVAL HEADQUARTERS

NAVAL CAPTAIN
2 SENIOR NAVAL OFFICERS

TOTAL 3

TOTAL OFFICERS 13

M.C.O.'s AND OTHER RANKS

AT MISSION HEADQUARTERS.

2 TYPISTS
1 DRAFTSMAN

TOTAL 3

WITH EACH DETACHMENT

1 TYPIST

TOTAL 5

TOTAL HCO's AND O.R.'s 8

MATERIAL REQUIRED AT ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

2 RADIO-TELEGRAPH STATIONS FOR MISSION HEADQUARTERS.
1 RADIO-TELEGRAPH STATIONS FOR EACH DETACHMENT

TOTAL 7

SEPTEMBER 10, 1943.

THE GENERAL,
CHIEF OF THE MISSION
(G. Castellano)

SIGNED

MATERIEL REQUIRED AT ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

- 2 RADIO-TELEGRAPH STATIONS FOR MISSION HEADQUARTERS.
- 1 RADIO-TELEGRAPH STATIONS FOR EACH DETACHMENT

TOTAL 7

SEPTEMBER 10, 1943.

THE GENERAL,
CHIEF OF THE MISSION
(G. Castellano)

SIGNED

SECRET - BIGOT

ESTIMATE OF AVALANCHE BUILD-UP - ALLIED FORCES

<u>Date</u>	<u>Increment</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Scales</u>
D day	-	One Bde Gp 46 Div) Two Bde Gps 56 Div) Two RCTs 36 Div) Two RCTs 45 Div) Four Tank Bns)	Assault
D + 1 to D + 3	Two Bde Gps 46 Div One Bde Gp 56 Div One RCT 36 Div	46 Div. 56 Div 36 Div Two RCTs 45 Div Four Tank Bns	Assault (one bde Light) Assault Light Assault Assault
D + 4 to D + 10	Elements 46, 56 and 36 Divs One RCT 45 Div One Tank Bn One armd regt 7 armd Div Elements four tank bns	46 Div 56 Div 36 Div 45 Div one armd regt 7 Arm'd Div Five Tank Bns	Light
D + 11 to D + 17	Balance 46, 36 and 45 Divs Balance 7 Arm'd Div (less elements) One RCT 34 Div	46 Div 56 Div 7 Arm'd Div (less elements) 36 Div 45 Div One RCT 34 Div Five Tank Bns	W.E. (War Establishment) Light W.E. T.O. T.O. Light W.E.
D + 18 to D + 24	Balance 56 and 7 arm'd Divs One RCT 34 Div One RCT 3 Div	46 Div 56 Div 7 Arm'd Div 36 Div 45 Div Two RCTs 34 Div One RCT 3 Div	W.E. W.E. W.E. T.O. T.O. Light Light

SECRET ENCLOSURE C-2 copy no. 6

3rd Revision - 8 Sept. 1943

Light
Assault
Assault36 Div
Two RCTs 45 Div
Four Tank Bns

One RCT 36 Div

D + 4 to
D + 10

Elements 46, 56
and 36 Divs
One RCT 45 Div -
One Tank Bn -
One armed regt -
7 armed Div
Elements four
tank bns

46 Div
56 Div
36 Div
45 Div
one armed regt
7 Arm Div
Five Tank Bns

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Light

D + 11 to
D + 17

Balance 46, 36
and 45 Divs
Balance 7 Arm Div
(less elements)
One RCT 34 Div

46 Div
56 Div
7 Arm Div (less elements)
36 Div
45 Div
One RCT 34 Div
Five Tank Bns

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

W.E. (war Establishment)
Light
W.E.
T.O.
T.O.
Light
W.E.

D + 18 to
D + 24

Balance 56 and
7 armed Divs
One RCT 34 Div
One RCT 3 Div

46 Div
56 Div
7 Arm Div
36 Div
45 Div
Two RCTs 34 Div
One RCT 3 Div
Five Tank Bns

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

W.E.
W.E.
W.E.
T.O.
T.O.
Light
Light
W.E. or T.O.

D + 25 to
D + 31

Balance 34 Div
One RCT 3 Div
One CC 1 Arm Div
One Tank Bn

46 Div
56 Div
7 Arm Div
34 Div
36 Div
45 Div
Two RCTs 3 Div
One CC 1 Arm Div
Six Tank Bns

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

W.E.
W.E.
W.E.
T.O.
T.O.
T.O.
Light
Light
W.E. or T.O.

SECRET - BIGOT

- 1 -

SECRET

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SECRET

SECRET - BIGOT

<u>Date</u>	<u>Increment</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Scalps</u>
D + 32 to	Balance 3 Div	46 Div)	
	Balance 1 Arm'd Div	56 Div)	
D + 50		7 Arm'd Div)	
		3 Div)	W.E. or F.O.
		34 Div)	
		36 Div)	
		45 Div)	
		1 Arm'd Div)	
		Six Tank Bns)	

NOTE: 1. 82 Airborne Div in reserve in SICILY.

2. Build up of 45 and 3 Divs from SICILY dependent on release of craft from RAYTOWN. Above estimate may be optimistic.

3. Further build up consists of French Corps from North Africa. Rate is dependent on allocation of shipping to SLAPSTICK.

Estimate: 2 Moroccan Div by D -- 73
3 Algerian Div by D -- 94

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No. 1 - D/C of 3
" 2 - Brig. Sugden
" 3 - General Rooks
" 4 - File

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DISTRIBUTION

Copy No. 1 - D/C of 8
" 2 - Brig. Sugden
" 3 - General Hooks
" 4 - File

SECRET

102

SECRET - BIGOT

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

SECRETAPPENDIX 'D' 1OPERATION CODE NAMES

HUSKY ✓ - Capture of Sicily.
 PRICELESS ✓ - All subsequent operations in Italy and large islands.
 AVALANCHE ✓ - Operation to capture Naples.
 DAYTON ✓ - Operation to capture toe of Italy.
 MUSKET ✓ - Capture of heel of Italy.
 MUSTANG ✓ - Overland operations Northward to capture Rome.
 GIANT TWO - A projected airborne operation near Rome, (cancelled).
 FIREBRAND ✓ - Capture of Corsica (by French forces).
 BRIMSTONE ✓ - Capture of Sardinia.

EXTRACT OF CODE NAMES OF PLACESIN COMMON USE

(See also full list attached).

<u>CODE NAME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>
FOURNE	- Brindisi
COLLINGSFIELD	- Bari
ELSTREE	- Taranto
FOXSTON	- Heel of Italy
HORRIFIED	- Sicily
PECAHY	- Crotone
PANTALOON	- Naples
SERNALINA	- Rome
WINDSOCK	- Italian Mainland

101

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

SECRET
(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
A.P.O. #464

12

August 24, 1943

CORRECTED COPY

CODE NAMES

APPENDIX NO. 2

to

ANNEX No. 1

to

Outline Plan, AVALANCHE.



1. Geographical Code for Operation "AVALANCHE".

a. There follows a list of place code names to be used in connection with the planning of Operation "Avalanche".

b. It is intended only to cover main places to which reference may be made. The code names will be used by this headquarters and its lower echelons, but in no case will they be used in relation with a higher headquarters. A lower echelon may use its own code names in addition, but only within the echelon.

c. The policy governing the use of these code names is as follows:

(1) Code names assigned to places in Operation "Avalanche" will be used instead of actual names in all messages and memos dealing with the operation up to D day.

(2) Code names will be used in conversation and telephone communications. Care will be taken to avoid other reference by which the code name may be identified.

(3) They will not be used for the marking of shipments.

(4) Appreciations, outline plans, appendices, and operation orders will be in clear.

(5) This list will not be shown to or discussed with anyone whose business does not require knowledge of it.

PLACE NAME TO CODE NAME

1. Geographical Code for Operation "AVALANCHE".

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PLACE NAME TO CODE NAME

PLACE NAME

ACERRA
AFRAGOLA
AGRI RIVER
AGROPOLI
ALBANOVA
AIENTO RIVER
AMAFI
ANGRI
ANILETTA
ANZI
ARIANO, IRPINO
ARIENZO S. FELICO
ARMENTO
ARZANO
ASCEA
ATENA LUCANA
ATRIPAIDA

CODE NAME

MEDFORD
MARIBORO
YOUNGSTOWN
RIFLE
ARLINGTON
BUFFALO
TIDMARCH
LONGVIEW
ADLENE
VICKSBURG
EVERETT
BROCKTON
SCRANTON
LEXINGTON
LACKATANA
DENISON
PLYMOUTH

PLACE NAME

AVELLA
AVELLINO
AVERNO
AVIGLIANO

BACOLI
BARAGIANO
BATTIPAGLIA
BASENTO RIVER
BELLA
BENEVENTO
BOCCA PICCOLA
BRADANO RIVER
BRIENZA
BUCCINO

CALITRI

CODE NAME

NEWBURYPORT
REDHILL
TAUHTON
CLARKSDALE

WAKEFIELD
LAUREL
WABASH
LARAMIE
HATTIESBURG
DINTY LAKE
KINSTON
BRIGHTON
SCOTTSBLUFF
HASTINGS

G-3	QPS	ORG	TNG	PLA	W.R.	NO. 3212
12				13	18	

100

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET

16-26-85-B

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET

PLACE NAME	CODE NAME	PLACE NAME	CODE NAME
CALORE RIVER	- DEPEN	NAPLES	- PANTALON
CANAVE DI PROCIDA	- WALTHAM	NISIDA	- WEBSTER
CANCELLO	- ADAMS	NOCERA INF	- SEATTIE
CAPRI ISLAND	- MARLOW	NOLA	- NEWTON
CAPRI TOWN	- HICKORY	OFANTO RIVER	- HOLLEY
CAPUA	- BOYLE	OGGIASTRO CILENTO	- AUSTIN
CASALNUOVO DI	- MILFORD	OTTAVIANO	- NEEDHAM
NAPOLI	- BEVERLY	PAGANI	- OLYMPIA
CASERTA	- LOTELL	PALINURO	- OLEAN
CASORIA	- LAREDO	PAIAMA CAMPANIA	- NORWOOD
CASTELLABATE	- FAYETTEVILLE	PAOLISI	- BROOKLINE
CASTELGRANDE	- BLAYNEY	PERDIFUMO	- WAGO
CASTELLAMARE DI	- TACOMA	PICENTINI MOUNTAINS	- KNOXVILLE
STABIA	- YAKIMA	PICERNO	- BUTLER
CASTEL SAN GIORGIO	- BEDFORD	PIETRAGALLA	- COLUMBUS
CAVA DE TIRRENI	- FREMONT	PIGNOLA DI LUCANIA	- NACHEZ
CIMITIE	- CHEYENNE	PISCIOITA	- MIDDLETOWN
CONTURSI	- CORIETO PERTICARA	POGGIOMARINO	- BELLINGHAM
EBOLI	- WILSON	POLLA	- AMARILLO
FISCLANO	- WENATCHEE	PONIGLIANO D'ARCO	- BAKER LAKE
FORENZA	- BILOXI	PONTECAGNANO	- SHELBY
FORINO	- PITTSFIELD	PORTICI	- WESTFIELD
FRATTAMAGGIORE	- MALDEN	POTENZA	- JIMFIELD
FRIGENTO	- FRANKINGHAM	POZZUOLI	- ROLVENDEN
FRIGNANO	- GREENFIELD	PRATOIA SERRA	- QUINCY
GIUGLIANO IN CAMP	- HOLYOKE	PROCIDA ISLAND	- SOUTHBRIDGE
GIUNGGANO	- OMAHA	RAPOLLA	- DULUTH
GOLFO DI NAPOLI	- SCANTLINE	RESINA	- VINCHESTER
GOLFO DI	- WILMINGTON	RIGNERO IN VULTURE	- FARBALUIT
POLICASTRO	- HARPSICORD	RIPACANDIDA	- HIBEING
GOLFO DI SALERNO	- FITCHBURG	RIVELLO	- BRISTOL
GROTTAMINARDA	- PORTREE	ROCCADASCERANA	- DANVERS
ISCHIA ISLAND	- TROY	ROCCADASPIDE	- DALLAS
LAGONEGRO	- KINGSPORT	ROCCAPIEMONTE	- VANCOUVER
LATTARI MOUNTAINS	- CASPER	ROCHETTA S.	- MEMPHIS
LAURENZANA	- CHATTANOOGA	ANTONIO	- ASHTABULA
LORIA	- BOSTON	ROCHETTA SCALO	- SEBOLINA
MADDALONI	- SALISBURY	ROME	- CAMBRIDGE
MALORI	- SALISBURY	ROTONDI	- BATAVIA
		RUTINO	- CALVESTON
		SALA CONSILINA	- VULPINE
		SALERNO	

STABIA	PERDIFUMO	WADG
CASTEL SAN GIORGIO	PICENTINI MOUNTAINS	KNOXVILLE
CAVA DE TIRRENI	PICERNO	BUTLER
CIMITILE	PIETRAGALLA	COLUMBUS
CONTURSI	PIGNOLA DI LUCANIA	NATCHEZ
CORLETO PERTICARA	PISCICOTTA	MIDDLETOWN
	POGGIOMARINO	BELLINGHAM
EBOLI	POLLA	AMARILLO
	POMIGLIANO D'ARCO	BAKER LAKE
FISCIANO	PONTECAGNANO	SHELBY
FORENZA	PORTICI	WESTFIELD
FORINO	POTENZA	DUNFIELD
FRATTAMAGGIORE	POZZUOLI	ROLVENDEN
FRIGENTO	PRATOLA SERRA	QUINCY
FRIGNANO	PROCIDA ISLAND	SOUTHBIDGE
GIUGLIANO IN CAMP	RAPOLLA	DULUTH
GIUNGLANO	RESINA	WINCHESTER
GOLFO DI NAPOLI	RIOMERO IN VULTURE	FARIBAUT
GOLFO DI	RIPACANDIDA	HIBBING
POLICASTRO	RIVELLO	BRISTOL
GOLFO DI SALERNO	ROCCABASCERANA	DANVERS
GROTTAMINARDA	ROCCADASPIDE	DALLAS
	ROCCAPIEMONTE	VANCOUVER
ISCHIA ISLAND	ROCHETTA S.	
	ANTONIO	MEMPHIS
LAGONEGRO	ROCHETTA SCALO	ASHTABULA
LATTARI MOUNTAINS	ROME	SEMOLINA
LAURENZANA	ROPONDI	CAMBRIDGE
LAURIA	RUTINO	BATAVIA
MADDALONI	SALA CONSILINA	GALVESTON
MAIORI	SALERNO	VULPINE
MARANO DI NAPOLI	S. ANASTASIA	MILTON
MARCIANISE	S. ANTONIO	LAWRENCE
MARIGLIANO	S. GENARO	
MEIFI	VESUVIANO	NORTHAMPTON
MINORI	S. GIORGIO A CREM	WEYMOUTH
MONTECORVINO	S. MARIA A VICO	DRAINFREE
ROVELLA	S. MARIA CAPUA	
MONTE DI PROCIDA	VETERE	ATTIEBORO
MONTELLA	S. MARTINO VALLE	
MONTESARANO	CLAUDINA	CHICOPEE
MONTESARNO	S. SEVERINO ROTA	SPOKANE
MONTESANO SULLA	LANZA	HORNELL
MARCELLANA	SAFRI	SCARSDALE
MONTESARCHIO	SARNO	DREMERSON
MURO LUCANO	SAURO RIVER	LITCONA
	SCAFATI	WORCESTER

SECRET

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SECRET

(FOUO IS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

BIGOT

PLACE NAME	CODE NAME	PLACE NAME	CODE NAME
SELE RIVER	- BRYAN	TORRE DEL GRECO	- TANSLEY
SOLOFRA	- CONCORD	TORRE ORSALA	- PEESKILL
SOMMA VESUVIANA	- NATICK	TRENTOLA	- HAVERHILL
SORRENTO	- BINGHAM	VALLATA	- GARDNER
SPINOSO	- RAWLINS	VALLI DELLA LUCANIA	- FREEPORT
STIO	- DUNKIRK	VENOSA	- MINNEAPOLIS
TANAGRO RIVER	- HELENA	VESUVIO MOUNTAIN	- JACKSON
TAURASI	- DEDHAM	VICO EQUENSE	- GOLDSBORO
TEGLIANO	- HOUSTON	VIETRI SUL MARE	- ASHEVILLE
TORCHIARA	- LELAND	VIGGLIANO	- ERIE
TORRE ANNUNZIATE	- BLEADON	VILLA LITerno	- ANDOVER
		VOLTURNO RIVER	- HACKENSACK

CODE NAME	PLACE NAME	CODE NAME	PLACE NAME
ABILENE	ANETTA	COLUMBUS	PIETRAGALLA
ADAMS	CANOCCELLO	CONCORD	- SOLOFRA
ALBANY	TORCHIARA	DALLAS	- ROCCADASPIDE
ALTOONA	SAURO RIVER	DANVERS	- ROCCADASCERANA
AMARILLO	POLLA	DEDHAM	- TAURASI
ANDOVER	VILLA LITerno	DENISON	- ATENA LUCANA
ARLINGTON	ALBANNOVA	DEFEN	- CALORE RIVER
ASHEVILLE	VIETRI SUL MARE	DINTY LAKE	- DENEVENTO
ASHTABULA	ROCHETTI SCALO	DULUTH	- RAPOLLA
ATIEBORO	S. MARIA CAPUA VETERE	DUNKIRK	- STIO
AUSTIN	OGILSTRO CILENTO	DURHAM	- MONTECORVINO ROVELLA
BINFIELD	POTENZA	ERIE	- VIGGLIANO
BAKER LAKE	POTIGLIANO D'ARCO	EVERETT	- ARIANO IRRINO
DATAVIA	RUTINO	FARIBAUT	- RIONERO IN VULTURE
BEDFORD	CIMITILE	FAYETTEVILLE	- CASTELGRANDE
BELLINGHAM	POGGIOMARINO	FITCHBURG	- GROTAMINARDA
BELMONT	MERCANISE	FRAMINGHAM	- FRIGENTO
BEVERLY	CASERTA	FREEPORT	- VALLI DELLA LUCANIA
BILOXI	FORENZA	FREMONT	- CONTURSI
BLEADON	TORRE ANNUNZIATE	GASTONIA	- MURO LUCANO
BINGHAM	SORRENTO	GALVESTON	- SALA CONSILINA
BOSTON	MADDALONI	GARDNER	- VALLATA
BOYLE	CAPUL	GLOUCESTER	- MINORI
BRAINERD	MELFI	GOLDSBORO	- VICO EQUENSE
BRAINTREE	S. MARIA A VICO		
BREMERTON	SARNO		
BRIGHTON	BRADANO RIVER		
BRISTOL	RIVELLO		

CODE NAME TO PLACE NAME

CODE NAME	PLACE NAME	CODE NAME	PLACE NAME
ABILENE	ANILETTA	COLUMBUS	PIETRAGALLA
ADAMS	CANCELLO	CONCORD	SOLOFRA
ALBANY	TORCHILARA		
ALTOONA	SAURO RIVER	DALLAS	ROCCADASPIDE
AMARILLO	POLLA	DANVERS	ROCCABASCIERANA
ANDOVER	VILLA LITERNO	DEHAM	TAURASI
ARLINGTON	ALDANOVA	DENISON	ATENA LUCANA
ASHEVILLE	VIETRI SUL MARE	DEPEN	CALORE RIVER
ASHTABULA	ROCHETTA SCALO	DINNY LAKE	DENEVERTO
ATLANTIC	S. MARIA CAPUA VETERE	DULUTH	RAFOLLA
AUSTIN	OGGIUSTRO CILENTO	DUNKIRK	STIO
BINFIELD	POTENZA	DURHAM	MONTICORVINO ROVELLA
BAKER LAKE	POMIGLIANO D'ARCO		
BATAVIA	RUTINO	ERIE	VIGLIANO
BEDFORD	CIMITILE	EVERETT	ARIANO IRPINO
BELLINGHAM	POGGIOMARINO		
BELMONT	MARCIANISE	FARIBAUT	RIOMERO IN VULTURE
BEVERLY	CASERTA	FAYETTEVILLE	C/STEIGRANDE
BILLOXI	FORENZA	FITCHBURG	GROTTAMINARDA
BLEADON	TORRE ANNUNZIATE	FRAMMINGHAM	FRIGENTO
BINGHAM	SORRENTO	FREEMONT	VALLI DELLA LUCANIA
BOSTON	MADDALONI	FREMONT	CONVERSI
BOYLE	CAPUA		
BRAINERD	MEFI	GASTONIA	MURO LUZANO
BRAINTREE	S. MARIA A VICO	GAINESTON	SALLA CONSILINA
BREMERTON	SARNO	GARDNER	VALLATA
BRIGHTON	BRADANO RIVER	GLOUCESTER	MINORI
BRISTOL	RIVELLO	GOLDSBORO	VICO EQUENSE
BROCKTON	ARENZO S. FELICO		
BROOKLINE	PAOLISI	GREENFIELD	FRIGNANO
BRYAN	SELE RIVER		
BUFFALO	ALFIO RIVER	HACKENSACK	VOLTURNO RIVER
BLAYNEY	CASTELLAMARE DISTABIA	HARPSICORD	GOLFO DI SALERNO
BUTLER	PICERNO	HASTINGS	BUCCINO
CAMBRIDGE	ROTONDI	HATTIESBURG	BELLA
CASPER	LAURENZANA	HAVERHILL	TRENTOLA
CHATTANOOGA	LAURIA	HELENA	TONAGRO RIVER
CHELSEA	MONTESARCHIO	HIBBING	RIFACANDIDA
CHESTER	MONTESARCHIO	HICKORY	TAURI TONIN
CHEYENNE	CORLETO FERTICARA	HOLLEY	OFANTO RIVER
CHICOPPEE	S. MARTINO VALLE	HOLYOKE	GIUGLIANO IN CAMF
	CAUDINA	HORNELL	SANZA
CLARKSDALE	AVIGLIANO	HOUSTON	TEGLIANO
		JACKSON	VESUVIO MOUNTAIN

BIGOT

SECRET

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SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET

CODE NAME	PLACE NAME	CODE NAME	PLACE NAME
JAMESTOWN	- MONTESANO SULLA MARCELLANA	RAILINS	- SPINOSO
KINGSFORT	- LATTARI MOUNTAINS	REDHILL	- AVELLINO
KINSTON	- BOCCA PICCOLA	REVERE	- MONTEMARANO
KNOXVILLE	- PICENTINI MOUNTAINS	RIFLE	- AGROPOLI
		ROLVENDEN	- POZZUOLI
LICKAHANNA	- ASCEA	SALEM	- MONTELLA
LARAMIE	- BASILICATO RIVER	SALISBURY	- MAIORI
LAREDO	- CASTELLARATE	SAUGUS	- CALITRI
LAUREL	- BARAGLIANO	SCANTLING	- GOLFO DI NAPOLI
LAWRENCE	- S. ANTONIO	SCARSDALE	- SAFRI
LEOMINSTER	- MARANO DI NAPOLI	SCOTTSBLUFF	- BRIENZA
LEXINGTON	- ARZANO	SCRANTON	- ARLENTO
LONGVIEW	- ANGRI	SEATTLE	- NOCERA INF
LOWELL	- CASORLE	SEHOLINA	- ROME
		SHELBY	- PONTECAGNANO
MAIDEN	- FRATTAMAGGIORE	SOUTHERIDGE	- PROCIDA ISLAND
MARLBORO	- AFRAGOLA	SPOKANE	- S. SEVERINO ROTA
MARION	- CAPRI ISLAND	SPRINGFIELD	- MONTE DI PROCIDA
MEDFORD	- ACERRA		
MEIROSE	- MARIGLIANO	TACOMA	- CASTEL SAN GIORGIO
MEMPHIS	- ROCCHETTA S. ANTONIO	TAUNTON	- AVERNO
MIDDLETON	- PISCIOSTA	TIDMARSH	- AMALFI
MILFORD	- CASALNUOVO DI NAPOLI	TANSLEY	- TORRE DEL GRECO
MILTON	- S. ANASTASI	TROY	- LAGONEGRO
MINNEAPOLIS	- VENOSI		
		VANCOUVER	- ROCCAPIEMONTE
NATCHEZ	- PIGNOLA DI LUCANIA	VICKSBURG	- ANZI
NATICK	- SOLLA VESUVIANA	VULFIE	- SALERNO
NORTHAMPTON	- S. GERARDO VESUVIANO		
NORWOOD	- PAMI CAMPANIA	WARASH	- BATTIPAGLIA
NEEDHAM	- OTTAVIANO	WACO	- FERDIFUMO
NEUBURYPOR	- AVELLA	WAKEFIELD	- BACOLI
NEWTON	- NOIL	WALTHAM	- CANAIE DI PROCIDA
		WESTER	- MISIDA
OLEAN	- PALINURO	WENATCHEE	- FISCLANO
OLYMPIA	- PAGANI	WESTFIELD	- PORTICI
OMAHA	- GIUNCIANO	WEXMOUTH	- S. GIORGIO A CREM
		WILMINGTON	- GOLFO DI POLICASTRO
PANTALOON	- NAPLES	WILSON	- EBOLI
PEEKSKILL	- TORRE ORSALA	WINCHESTER	- RESINA
PITTSFIELD	- FORINO	WORCESTER	- SCAFATI
PLYMOUTH	- ATRIPALDA		
			- GAVA DE TIRRENI

LEONHART	MARANO DI NAPOLI	SCOTTSBLUFF	ERITENZA
LIXINGTON	ARZANO	SCRANTON	ARMENTO
LONGVIEW	ANTRI	SEATTLE	NOGERA INF
LOWELL	CASORLE	SEMOLENA	ROME
MALDEN	FRATTAMAGGIORE	SHELBY	PONTECAGNANO
MARLBORO	FRAGOLA	SOUTHERIDGE	PROCIDA ISLAND
MARLOW	CAPRI ISLAND	SPOKANE	S. SEVERINO ROTA
MEDFORD	ACERRA	SPRINGFIELD	MORTE DI PROCIDA
MEIROSE	MARIGLIANO	TACOMA	CASTEL SAN GIORGIO
MEMPHIS	ROCHETTA S. ANTONIO	TAUNTON	AVERNO
MIDDLETOWN	PISCIOSTA	TIDMARCH	AMALFI
MILFORD	CASALNUOVO DI NAPOLI	TANSLEY	TORRE DEL GRECO
MILTON	S. ANASTASIA	TROY	LAGONEGRO
MINNEAPOLIS	VENOSI	VANCOUVER	ROCCAPIEMONTE
NATCHEZ	PIGNOLA DI LUCANIA	VICKSBURG	ANZI
NATICK	S. VESUVIANA	VULFINE	SALERNO
NORTHAMPTON	S. GEMARO VESUVIANO	WABASH	BATTIPAGLIA
NORWOOD	PRIMA CAMPANIA	WACO	FERRIDFUMO
NEEDHAM	OTTAVIANO	WAKEFIELD	BACOLI
NEUBURYPORT	AVELLI	WALTHAM	CANALE DI PROCIDA
NEWTON	NOLA	WEBSTER	NISIDA
OLEAN	PALINURO	WENATCHEE	FISCLANO
OLYMPIA	PACANI	WESTFIELD	PORTICI
OMAHA	GIUNGANO	WEYMOUTH	S. GIORGIO A CREM
PANVALOON	NAPLES	WILMINGTON	GOLFO DI POLICASTRO
PEEKSKILL	TORRE ORSALA	WILSON	EBOLI
PITTSFIELD	FORINO	WINCHESTER	RESINA
PLYMOUTH	ATREPAIDA	WORCESTER	SCAFATI
PORTHREE	ISCHIA ISLAND	YAKIMA	CAVA DE TIRRENI
QUINCY	FRATOLA SERRA	YOUNGSTOWN	AGRI RIVER

SECRET

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SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

BUTTBRESS - CORLETT
MUSKET - MUSTANG

APPENDIX "A"

GEOGRAPHICAL LIST

<u>PLACE NAME</u>	<u>CODE NAME</u>
ALEXANDRIA	CONY
ALGHERO	MARKBOAT
ALGIERS	LANGTREE
APOLLINO	GROCEBRIDGE
APRIGLIANO	CLOVERPORT
AQUINO	CURNEY
AUGUSTA	CLUTTON
AVELLINO	FEDHILL
BACINARA CALABRIA	GUTHRIE
BARI	COLLINSFIELD
BARIETTA	BIGBURY
BELVEDERE MARITTIMA	BLOFIELD
BENEVENTO	DINTYLAKE
BENGHAZI	CHIPAUNK
BILICO	BOSHAM
BIZENTA	AGOUTI
BOIE	EFFENDI
BOUGIE	LERRON
BOVA MARINA	DOYLESTOWN
BOVALINO MARINA	BOUGHTON

APRIGLIANO	CLOVERPORT
AQUINO	CURNEY
AUGUSTA	CLUTTON
AVELLINO	REINHILL
BAGNARA CALABRIA	GUTHRIE
BARI	COLLINSFIELD
BARLETTA	BIGBURY
BELVEDERE MARITTIMA	BLOFIELD
BENEVENTO	DIMYLAK
BENGHAZI	CHIFFUNK
BIANCO	BOSHAM
BIZENTA	AGOUTI
BOIE	EFFENDI
BOUGIE	LERRYN
BOVA MARINA	DOYLESTOWN
BOVALINO MARINA	BOUGHTON
BRIATICO	FERREBROOK
BRINDISI	BOURNE
CAGLIARI	LAZITONGS
CALABRIA	ENGLEWOOD
CANNITELLO	BOXWORTH
CAPO DELL'ARMI	COBBTOWN
CAPO COLONE	TWILLINGATE
CAPO S MARIA DI LEUCA	CAMERONLAKE
CAPO MURO DI PORCO	WELCONE

SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

<u>PLACE NAME</u>	<u>CODE NAME</u>
CAPO RIZZUTO	ALDERPOINT
CAPO SPARTIVENTO	GRAFTON
CAPO SUVERO	ECKLEY
CAPO TRIONTO	ELDON
CAPO VATICANO	FENHAM
CAPODICHINO	FLAXBOURNE
CAERI	MARLOW
CAPUA	BOYLE
CARISTA MARINA	GREENRIDGE
CARIATI	BRADSHAW
CASTELLAMARE DI STABIA	PLATNEY
CASTROVILLARI	STILLWATER
CATANIA	FUSTIAN
CATANZARO	BRAIDWOOD
CIAMPINO	TARBORO
CIRO	BRENTON
CISTERNA DI LITTORIA	BRAISHOTT
CIVITAVECCHIA	TOLMERS
COSENZA	COPPERFIELD
CROTONE	PECCARY
CUTRO	QUACCA
DEGLIOMANNU	HAMMOCK
DEL L'ANUOVA	MONGOOSE

CAPUA	BOYLE
CARINTA MARINA	GREERIDGE
CARLATTI	BRADSHAW
CASTELLAMARE DI STABIA	PLAYNEY
CASTROVILLARI	STILLWATER
CATANIA	FUSTIAN
CATANZARO	BRAIDWOOD
CLAMPINO	TARBORO
CIRO	BREITON
CISTERN. DI LITTORIA	BRAISHOTT
CIVITAVECCHIA	TOLLERS
COSENZA	COOPERFIELD
CROTONE	PECCARY
CUTRO	QUAGGA
DECEIMOMANNU	HAMMOCK
DEL L'ANNOVA	MONGOOSE
D'IDUELLI	LLAMA
DURAZZO	GREENWOOD
FOGGIA	JERBOA
FROSINONE	HYRAX
G.ETA	TREGARTH
GALLIPOLI	CYLINDER
GIBRALTAR	LENTON
GIOJA DEL COLLE	FLITTERHOUSE

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(Equals British MOST SECRET)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No. 785015

PLACE NAME	CODE NAME
GIOIA TAURO	HAMSTER
GOZO	BANJO
GROTTAGLIE	WALSBERG
ISCHIA	PORTREE
JOFFOLO	SARATOGA
LAMPEDUSA	PETWORTH
LECCE	GRASSYLAK
LIPARI ISLANDS	STREMLINE
LOCRI	CAMELSDALE
MADDALENA	DUFFEL
MALTA	FINANCE
MANDURIA	FOREBAY
MARINA DI VISO VALENZA	TIPTON
MARINA DI CATANZARO	CARBONDALE
MELITO DI PORTO SALVO	CEDARCREEK
MESSINA	QUILLETAL
MILAZZO	ANTITOXIN
MILIS	LOQUINE
MONASTIERE MARINA	EDITHBURG
MONOPOLI	BICHELL
NAPLES	PANTALOON
NICASTRO	CHARLIELAKE
NICOTERA	DYERSBURG
OLBIA	GREENLAW
ORAN	FASCIST
ORISTANO	CATFISH
OTRANTO	BONESBAY
PANTELLERIA	HOBGOELIN
PAOLA	CLEARLAKE
PELLARO	BECKENRIDGE
PHILIPPEVILLE	LAMBLEY
PIZZO	CARROLLTON

DOORI	CANESDALE
MADDALENA	DUFFEL
MAITA	FINANCE
MANDURIA	FOREBAY
MARINA DI VISO VALENZIA	TIPTON
MARINA DI CATALIZARO	CARBONDALE
MELITO DI PORTO SALVO	CEDARCREEK
MESSINA	CUMETAL
MILAZZO	ANTIOKIN
MILIS	AQUILINE
MONASTERACE LARINA	EDITHBURG
MONOPOLI	BICHHELL
NAPLES	PANTALOON
NICASTRO	CHARLIELAKE
NICOTERA	DYERSBURG
OLBIA	GREENLAW
ORAN	FASCIST
ORISTANO	CATFISH
OTRANTO	BONESBAY
PANTAFIERA	HOEGOBELIN
PAOLA	CLEARLAKE
PELLARO	BECKENRIDGE
PHILIPPEVILLE	LAMBLEY
PIZZO	CARROLLTON
POLICASTRO	CLEMENTSPORT
POMIGLIANO DARCO	BAKERLAKE
POTENZA PICENA	BINFIELD
PUNTA DELL ALICE	TWINSTEAD
PUNTA PEZZO	BAKESFIELD
PUNTA STILO	GRANTLEY
RADA DI TAORMINA (SICILY)	FEATHERHALL
REGGIO DI CALABRIA	INCISOR
ROCCELLA IONICA	WIDELASS
ROME	SEMOLINA

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SECRET
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(Equals British MOST SECRET)

<u>PLACE NAME</u>	<u>CODE NAME</u>
S COSTANTINO CALABRO	BEON RUDYARD
S GIOVANNI IN FIORE	BALDON
S LAURO MARCHESATO	EDNAM
S PANCRAZIO SALENTINO	FERNDOWN
SALERNO	VULPINE
SARDINIA	JACKSTAY
SCILLA	FAIRLAWN
SFAX	HASHISH
SICILY	MORRIFIED
SIDERNO MARINA	FLATLAKE
SIRACUSA	LADBROKE
SORRENTO	BINGHAM
SOUSSE	LAURACH
SOVERATO	VARNEY
SOVERIA MANFELLI	ERWOOD
SPEZZANO ALBAESE	PARLEIGH
STRONGOLI	GARFISH
TARANTO	ELSTREE
TERAOLI	BILSTON
TORRE ANNUNZIATE	BLEADON
TRIPOLI	CHILPANZTE
TROPEA	BICKLEY

JACKSON	FAIRLAWN	FLASH	HORRIFIED	FLATLAK	LADBROKE	BINGHAM	LAURACH	VINEY	ERWOOD	FAREICH	GARFISH	ELSTREE	BILSTON	BLEADON	CHILPANZEE	BICKLEY	LALDON	PENNYN	GRINSTEAD	FINCHLEY	HORNBLLOWER	ESTON
SCILLA	SPAX	SICILY	SIDERO MARINA	SIRACUSA	SORRENTO	SOUSSE	SOVERATO	SOVERIA MARELLI	SPEZZANO ALBANESE	STRONGOLI	TARANTO	TERIOLI	TORRE ANNUNZIATE	TRIPOLI	TROPEA	TUNIS	TUNISIA	VALONA	VIBO VALENTIA	VILLACIDRO	VILLA S GIOVANNI	

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(Equals British MOST SECRET)

APPENDIX "A"

ALPHABETICAL LIST

<u>CODE NAME</u>	<u>PLACE NAME</u>
AGOUTI	BIZERTA
ALDERPOINT	CAPO RIZZUTO
AMTITOXIN	MILAZZO
AQUILINE	MILIS
BALDON	S GIOVANNI IN FIORE
BAKERLAKE	POMIGLIANO DARCO
BAKERSFIELD	PUNTA PEZZO
BANJO	GOZO
BICKLEY	TROPEA
BICKINELL	MONOPOLI
BIGBURY	BARLETTA
BILSTON	TERIOLI
BINFELD	POTENZA PICENNA
BINKHAM	SORRENTO
BLAYNEY	CASTELLARE DI STABIA
BLEADON	TORRE ANNUNZIATE
BLOPFELD	BELVEDERE MARITTIMA
BONESBAY	OTRANTO
BOSHAM	BIANCO
BOUGHTON	BOVILLINO MARINA
BOUTON	BRINDISI

BUTPRESS - COBIET
MUSKET - MUSTANG

BAKERLAKE	POMIGLIANO DARCO
BAKERSFIELD	PUNTA PEZZO
BATJO	GOZO
BICKLEY	TROFEO
BICKNELL	MONOPOLI
BIGBURY	BARLETTA
BILSTON	TERIOLI
BINFIELD	POTENZA PICENA
BINGHAM	SORRENTO
BLAYNEY	CASTELLANARE DI STABIA
BLEADON	TORRE ANNUNZIATE
BLOFIELD	BEVEDERE MARITTIMA
BONESBAY	OTRANTO
BOSHAM	BIANCO
BOUGHTON	BOVILLINO MARINA
BOURNE	BRINDISI
BOXWORTH	CANNITELLO
BOYLE	CAPUA
BRADSHAW	CARLATTI
BRADWOOD	CATANZARO
BRAISHOTT	CISTERNA DI LITTORIA
BRECKENRIDGE	PELLARO
BRENTON	CIRO

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SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

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SECRET

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SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

<u>CODE NAME</u>	<u>PLACE NAME</u>
CAMELSDALE	LOCRI
CATERONLAKE	CAPO SARLA DI LEUCA
CARBONDALE	MARINA DI CATANZARO
CARROLLTON	PIZZO
CATFISH	ORISTANO
CEDARCREEK	MELITO DI PORTO SALVO
CHARLESLAKE	NICASTRO
CHILPANZEE	TRIPOLI
CHIPMUNK	BENGHAZI
CLEARLAKE	PAOLA
CLEMENTSPORT	POLICASTRO
CLOVERPORT	AFRIGLIANO
COBBTOWN	CAPO DELL' ARMI
COLLINSFIELD	BARI
CONEX	ALEXANDRIA
COPPERFIELD	COSENZA
CYLINDER	GALLIROLI
DIMVILAKE	BENEVENTO
DOYLESTOWN	BOVA MARINA
DUFFEL	MADDALENA
DYERSBURG	NICOPIA
ECKLEY	CAPO SUVERO
IRON RUDYARD	S COSTANTINO CALABRO

CHARLESLAKE	NICASTRO
CHILPANZEE	TRIPOLI
CHIPAUNK	BENGHAZI
CLEARLAKE	PAOLA
CLEMENTSPORT	POLICASTRO
CLOVERPORT	APRIGLIANO
COBBTOWN	CAPO DELL' ARMI
COLLINSFIELD	BARI
CONEY	ALEXANDRIA
COPPERFIELD	COSENZA
CYLINDER	GALLIPOLI
DINTYLAKE	BENEVENTO
DOYLESTONE	BOVA MARINA
DUFFEL	MADDALENA
DUNSBURG	NICOTERA
ECKLEY	CAPO SUVERO
EDMON RUDYARD	S COSTANTINO CALABRO
EDITHBURG	MONASTERACE MARINA
EDNAH	S MAURO MARCHESATO
ENTENDI	BONE
ELDON	CAPO TRIONTO
ELSTREE	TARANTO
EMERBROOK	BRIATICO
EMLENWOOD	CALABRIA

SECRET
(EQUALLY BRITISH AND SECRET)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CODE NAME	PLACE NAME
ELWOOD	SOVERIA MANTELLI
ESTON	VILLA S GIOVANNI
FAIRLAWN	SCILLA
FARLEIGH	SPEZZANO ALBANESE
FASCIST	ORAN
FETHAM	CAPO VATICANO
FERIDOWN	S PANCRAZIO SALENITINO
FINANCE	MALTA
FITCHLEY	VIBO VALENTIA
FLATLAKE	SIDERO MARINA
FLAXBOURNE	CAPODICHIINO
FLUTTERMOUSE	GIOJA DEL' COLLE
FOPEBAY	MANDURIA
FUSTIAN	CATANIA
GARFISH	STRONGOLI
GLUTTON	JUGUSTA
GRAFTON	CAPO SPARTIVENTO
GRANTLEY	PUGLIA STILO
GRASSYLAK	LECCE
GREENLAW	OLBIA
GREENRIDGE	CARLATA MARINA
GREENWOOD	DURAZZO
GRINSTEAD	VALONA
GROOMBRIDGE	APOLLINO
GUNMETAL	MESSINA
GURNEY	AQUINO
GUTHRIE	BAGNARA CALABRIA
HAFLOCK	DECIOMANNU
HAESTER	GIOJA TAURO
HASHISH	SPAX
HOBGOBLIN	PANTELLERIA
HORNLOWER	VILLACIDRO
HORRIFIED	SICILY

FLATLAKES	SIDERMO MARINA
FLAXBOURNE	CAPODICHINO
FLITTERHOUSE	GIOIA DEL' COLLE
FOHERAY	MANDURIA
FUSTIAN	CATANIA
GARFISH	STRONGOLI
GLUTTON	AUGUSTA
GRANTON	CAPO SPARTIVENTO
GRANTLEY	PUNTA STILO
GRASSYLAKES	LECCE
GREENLAW	OLBIA
GREENBRIDGE	CARLATA MARINA
GREENWOOD	DURAZZO
GRINSTEAD	VALONA
GRONDBRIDGE	ARPOLLINO
GURMETAL	MESSINA
GURNEY	AQUINO
GUTHRIE	BAGNARA CALABRIA
HADDOCK	DECEIMOMANNU
HASTER	GIOIA TAURO
HASHISH	SPAX
HOBGOBLIN	PANTELLERIA
HORNBLLOWER	VILLACIDRO
HORRIFIED	SICILY
HYRAX	FROSINONE
INICISON	REGGIO DI CALABRIA
JACKSTAY	SARDINIA
JERBOA	FOGGIA
LADSTONE	SIRACUSA
LALIDON	TUNIS
LALLELEY	PHILIPPEVILLE
LAUGHTREE	ALGIERS
LAURAGH	SOUSSE
LAZYTONGS	CAGLIARI

-3-
SECRET
(Equals British Lost SECRET)

95

SECRET
(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

<u>CODE NAME</u>	<u>PLACE NAME</u>
LENTON	GIBRAITAR
LERRYIN	BOUGIE
LLAMA	DJIDUELLI
MARKBOAT	ALGERO
MARLOW	CAPRI
MONGOOSE	DELIANUOVA
PANTALOON	NAPLES
PECCARY	CROTONE
PERRYIN	TUNISIA
PETWORTH	LAMPEDUSA
PORTREE	ISCHIA
QUACGA	CUTRO
REDHILL	AVELLINO
RUDYARD	S. CESTANTINO CALABRO
SARATOGA	JOFFOLO
SEMOLINA	ROME
STILLWATER	CASTROVILLARI
STREAMLINE	LIPARI ISLANDS
TABORO	CLIPINO
TETTERHALL	KADA DI TARMIA (SEUL)
TOLLERS	CIVITAVECCHIA
TIPON	MARINA DI VIBO VALENTIA
TREGARTH	GAETA
TWILLINGATE	CAPO COLONNE
TWINSTEAD	PUNTA DELL' ALICE
VARNNEY	SOVERATO

MONGOOSE	DELLA NUOVA
PANTALOON	NAPLES
PECCARY	CROTONE
PENURIN	TUNISIA
PETWORTH	LAMPEDUSA
PORTREE	ISCHIA
QUAGGA	CUTRO
REDHILL	AVELLINO
RUDYARD	S. COSTANTINO CALABRO
SARATOGA	JOIPOLO
SEMOLINA	ROME
STILLWATER	CASTROVILLARI
STREAMLINE	LIPARI ISLANDS
TARBORO	CIAMPINO
TETTENHALL	BAIA DI TORMIA (SOLLY)
TOLLERS	CIVITAVECCHIA
TIPON	MARINA DI VINO VALENTIA
TREGARTH	GAETA
TWILLINGATE	CAPO COLONNE
TWINSTEAD	PUNTA DELL' ALICE
VARNEY	SOVERATO
VULPINE	SALERNO
WALSENBURG	GROTTAGLIE
WELCOME	CAPO MURO DI PORO
WINDLASS	POCCILLA IONICA

-4-

SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

THE
W
O
L
F

Equals English: Most Secret

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)



BIGOT - BUTTRESS

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:      : SECRET :
: Auth: C-in-C AF:
: Initials:
:   30 July 43

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

30 July 1943.

B-589.505/6.

✓ GEOGRAPHICAL CODE FOR OPERATIONS
"BUTTFESS", "GOBELT", "MUSKET", and "MUSTANG"

1. Reference this Headquarters Memorandum E-389.505/6 dated 1943, subject as above.

2. The following should be added to Appendix "A" to the above memorandum:-

PLACE	NAME
1	1
2	2
3	3
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100	100

ADRIATIC SEA

ACROPOLI

ALBANTIA

AMCAT

ALBERTA

BAGNOL, T.

BATA

HELVEDEE MARTIN

BULGARIAN

CAPO PALINURO

CAPO S. VITO (ITALY)

CODE NAME

ANGEL ET TSU

RULE

SAVOYARD

PTTDJABSH

STAY ATTACHED

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

HARRINGTON

PRINTED AT THE

CTENDATE

INDEX

ONLINE

"BUTRESS", "GOBLET", "MUSKET", and "MUSTANG"

1. Reference this Headquarters Memorandum B-389.505/6 dated July 1943, subject as above.

2. The following should be added to Appendix "A" to the above memorandum:-

<u>PLACE NAME</u>	<u>CODE NAME</u>
ADRIATIC SEA	ANGLETISH
AGROPOLI	RIFLE
ALBANIA	SAVOYARD
AMALFI	TIDMARSH
AMANTEA	SHALLOW
BAGNOLI	WATERBURY
BAIA	HARMONIDE
BELVEDERE MARINA	RUNDALE
BULGARIA	GLENDAL
CAPO PALINURO	OXLEY
CAPO S. VITO (ITALY)	TUOHLES
CORIGLIANO CALABRO	TRAVESTY
CRETE	OXIDIZE
DODECANESE	ARABELLA
FERRARA	REBUNE
FLORENCE	THERMOSTATIC
GOLFO DI S. EUFEMIA	MUSTINGTOL
GOLFO DI CAETA	ROCKEARE
	Backwater

*Small scale operation by
VII Corps
seems chaotic (Equals British MOST SECRET)
of Messina on completion of Husky*

SC-3
OPS
ORG
TNG
PLA
W.R.
NO6846

94

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

P1020

SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

<u>PLACE NAME</u>	<u>CODE NAME</u>
GOLFO DI MANFREDONIA	WAGER
GOLFO DI POLICASTRO	WILMINGTON
GOLFO DI POZZUOLI	BREAM
GOLFO DI SALERNO	HARPSICORD
GOLFO DI SQUILLACE	ROXBELL
GOLFO DI TARANTO	PAWLETT
GULF OF NAPLES	SCAWLING
JUGOSLAVIA	VIRAGO
MANFREDONIA	ROWLEY
N. GREECE	CONCERTINA
PISA	SURSTINGLE
POZZUOLI	ROLDVENDEN
PUNTA LICOSA	ULTIMUS
ROMANIA	BLOODSUCKER
S. GREECE	ARCHIBALD
SAN BENEDETTO DEL TRONTO	CRONDALL
TORRE DEL GRECO	TANSLEY
TURKEY	STILETTO
VALONA BAY	FOULSHAM
"Heel" of ITALY (East of line TARANTO - MONOPOLI)	MOXTON
"Toe" of ITALY (South of line POLICASTRO - CATANZARO)	TILFORD

GULF OF NAPLES	SCANTLING
JUGOSLAVIA	VIRAGO
MANFREDONIA	ROWLEY
N. GREECE	CONCERNIA
PISA	SURCINGLE
POZZUOLI	ROLVENDEN
PUNTA LICOSA	ULTIMUS
ROUMANIA	BLOODSUCKER
S. GREECE	ARCHIBALD
SAN DEDENITO DEL TRONTO	CHONDALL
TORRE DEL GRECO	TANSLEY
TURKEY	STILETTO
VALONA BAY	FOULSHAM
"Heel" of ITALY (East of line TARANTO - MONOPOLI)	FOXTON
"Toe" of ITALY (South of line VICASTRO - CATANZARO)	TILE ID

By command of General EISENHOWER:

W. E. SMITH,
Major General, G.S.C., Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

W. D. Strong
K. W. D. STRONG,
Brigadier, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

SECRET

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

ENCLOSURE 'E'

Commander 1 Airborne Division

Air Adviser to C in C

Major General Hopkinson (seriously wounded)

Major General Browning (may be acting divisional commander on your arrival)

Brigadier Down

Brigadier Lathbury

- - -

- - -

Headquarters V Corps

Commander

P.G.S.

DA & QMG

GSOL

Major General Allfrey

Major General Huxley

Brigadier Audland

Lt. Col. Scott-Foster

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

MORTIMER T. ELLIOTT

Te: C, in C. Mod. (personal).

From: H.O. Wess

CONROY.

1. By 12/3/64. Received with ceremony and marked courtesy.
Declined BADOLLO's invitation to lunch.
2. Spent half hour with Minister of Marine making following points:
(a) Your satisfaction at manner in which Italian Navy carried out terms of armistice.
(b) German ~~at~~ submarines at PMA.
(c) Italian ships in Spanish waters.
(d) Necessity for Italians to fight at once against Germans.
3. Para 2 (b). All communications out ^{to} at PMA. Minister of Marine promised to make every effort to send by air orders for destruction of U-boats.
Para 2(c). No communication with Italian ambassador Madrid. I promised to pass a message to Madrid which he is sending to me.
Para 2 (d). Minister of Marine in complete agreement and anxious to have Italian non-of-war to operate.
4. Minister of Marine asked:
(a) What instructions had been issued for dismantling Italian non-of-war.
(b) Our policy regarding requisitioning Italian merchant vessels. I told him I would obtain this information for him.
5. In company with Minister of Marine I saw Marshal BADOLLO and repeated with emphasis the points made in para 2. Marshal BADOLLO informed me,
(a) That Germans had set up a puppet Italian Government in the North and he could not say whether Italian ambassador Madrid recognised Northern or BADOLLO Government but he assured me I should receive a message to transmit to Madrid.
(b) That ROOSEVELT CHURCHILL message would be broadcast to-day in Italian from Bari with Italian King's approval. He gave me a reply to ROOSEVELT CHURCHILL message to transmit to Germans.
(c) As regards kicking Germans out of Italy the Marshal evinced every desire to do so, Italians fighting with Allies.

Your satisfaction at manner in which Italian Navy carried out terms of armistice.
German at submarine at PMA.
Italian ships in Spanish waters.
Necessity for Italians to fight at once against Germans.

Para 2 (b). All communications out at PMA. Minister of Marine promised to make every effort to send by air orders for destruction of U-boats.

Para 2(c). No communication with Italian ambassador Madrid. I promised to pass a message to Madrid which he is sending to me.

Para 2 (d). Minister of Marine in complete agreement and anxious to have Italian non-of-war to operate.

Minister of Marine asked:
What instructions had been issued for disarming Italian

Our policy regarding requisitioning Italian merchant vessels. I told him I would obtain this information for him.

In company with Minister of Marine I saw Marshal BADOLLO and repeated with emphasis the points made in para 2. Marshal BADOLLO informed me.

(a) That Germans had set up a puppet Italian Government in the North and he could not say whether Italian ambassador Madrid recognized Northern or BADOLLO Government but he assured me I should receive a message to transmit to Madrid.

(b) That ROSSINI's message would be broadcast to-day in Italian from Bari with Italian King's approval. He gave me a reply to ROSSINI's message to transmit to London.

(c) As regards blocking Germans out of Italy the Marshal evinced every desire to do so, Italians fighting with Allies.

I believe both Marshal and Minister of Marine have every desire to lead Italians Forces against Germans in Italy but they have insufficient confidence in their following until there is greater evidence of Allied strength in Italy.

+ have completed arrangements to visit Marshal BADOLLO at Brindisi.

13th September 1943.

(b) Names of Italian non-of-war in Spanish waters.

M.O.S.T.-S.E.C.R.E.T.-T.E.L.E.G.R.A.M.

To- C. in C. Med.

From:-F.O."Z".

EMERGENCY

Following received from Head of Italian Government begins:-

To, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the U.S.A. and
WINSTON CHURCHILL, Prime Minister of Great Britain.

I thank you most warmly for the message which you, who direct the destinies of such great Nations, have been pleased to send me, in these hours so tragic for my country.

I place secure trust in your affirmation that the Anglo-American Armed Forces who have already disembarked at various points on the Italian Continent, will continue to pour in as numerous and as eager to help, as the situation so imperiously demands.

Our own armed forces, already tested and scattered in Italy and still more, outside Italy, cannot possibly unite and validly oppose, alone, the German forces. But everything that is possible is being and will be done with that same spirit and with that same tenacity which we displayed together on the battlefields of Italy and France during the last Great War.

I can assure you that the Italian People closely united around their King, and longing at the cost of any sacrifice whatsoever to achieve liberty and a peace with justice, will not fail manfully

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Our own armed forces, already tested and scattered in Italy and still more, outside Italy, cannot possibly unite and validly oppose, alone, the German forces. But everything that is possible is being and will be done with that same spirit and with that same tenacity which we displayed together on the battlefields of Italy and France during the last Great War.

I can assure you that the Italian People closely united around their King, and longing at the cost of any sacrifice whatsoever to achieve liberty and a peace with justice, will not fail manfully to carry out on this occasion their duty - their whole duty. We are not lacking in faith, and we will march with you, our American and British friends.

(Signed) Marshal BADOGLIO.

Il Capo Del Governo.

Al Signori,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
Presidente S.U.A.

WINSTON CHURCHILL,
Primo Ministro della Gran
Bretagna

Ringrazio vivamente per il messaggio che Voi, che dirigete i destini di così grandi Nazioni, avete voluto inviare a me, in queste ore tanto tragiche per il mio Paese.

Facile sicuro affidamento sulla Vostra affezione che le forze armate anglo-americane che già sono sbarcate in diversi punti del Continente italiano, seguiranno ad affluire numerose e sollecitamente come richiede imperiosamente la situazione.

Le nostre forze armate, già provate e disseminate in Italia e più ancora fuori d'Italia, non hanno la possibilità di ritirarsi e di validamente opporsi da sole alle forze tedesche. Ma tutto quello che è possibile e, e sarà fatto con quello stesso spirito e con quella stessa tenacia che esplicammo insieme sui campi di battaglia d'Italia e di Francia durante la grande ultima guerra.

Posso assicurarvi che il popolo italiano, tutto stretto attorno al suo Re, e che anela a costo di qualsiasi sacrificio a conseguire la libertà ed una pace con giustizia, non mancherà di fare virilmente il suo dovere, tutto il suo dovere in questa occasione.

La fede non ci manca, e marceremo con Voi, o amici americani e britannici.

Ringrazio vivamente per il messaggio che Voi, che dirigete i destini di così grandi Nazioni, avete voluto inviare a me, in queste ore tanto tragiche per il mio Paese.

Faccio sicuro affidamento sulla Vostra affettuosa che le forze armate anglo-americane che già sono sbarcate in diversi punti del Continente italiano, seguiranno ad affluire numerose e sollecitamente come richiede imperiosamente la situazione.

Le nostre forze armate, già provate e disaminate in Italia e più ancora fuori d'Italia, non hanno la possibilità di ritirarsi e di validamente opporsi da sole alle forze tedesche. Ma tutto quello che è possibile e, e sarà fatto con quello stesso spirito e con quella stessa tenacia che esplicammo insieme sui campi di battaglia d'Italia e di Francia durante la grande ultima guerra.

Posso assicurarvi che il popolo italiano, tutto stretto attorno al suo Re, e che anela a costo di qualsiasi sacrificio a conseguire la libertà ed una pace con giustizia, non mancherà di fare virilmente il suo dovere, tutto il suo dovere in questa occasione.

La fede non ci manca, e marceremo con Voi, o amici americani e britannici.

MARCELLO RADOGLIO

4

Enclosure 4

From Secretary to Flag Officer Commanding Force "Z".

To Naval Officer in Charge, TARANTO.

Date 13th. September 1943.

No. POZ. 2.

The Vice Admiral requests that you will deliver to General
attached
Mason MacFarlane, as soon as practicable the/translation of a letter
he has received from the Italian Commander-in-Chief TARANTO.

A. Kerns.
ADMIRAL'S SECRETARY.

*Communication
on action*

*It mes. ships. misinterpreted. 1. Debarri
stop to fit demands. watch*

hamp for all force

Went to N. port

2. 15. 1943

The Vice Admiral requests that you will deliver to General
 Mason MacFarlane, as soon as practicable the translation of a letter
 he has received from the Italian Commander-in-Chief TARANTO.

for kears.

ADMIRAL'S SECRETARY.

*Communication
 on card*

*It mes. ships. misinterpreted. 1 Deception
 stop to fit description*

hump to do zone

was S. A. not for

Admiral to Taranto

person of honor

*(Rhodes
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 Rhodes - now by
 Rhodes - now by)*

*Domini and
 Sulmich and
 Corvise*

*St. James
 to ship
 to ship
 to ship*

39

TARANTO, 13th. September 1943.

To, Vice Admiral Arthur POWER, representative of The Commander-in-Chief
of the Anglo-Naval Forces in the Mediterranean.

H.M.S. "PALADIN".

Subject:- Disarming of Italian troops by American Groups.

PERSONAL.

The Commanding Officer of the Royal Italian Navy at CROTONE
informs me that our officers, petty officers, seamen and soldiers,
trained and allocated for the defence of that sector, have been disarmed
by American soldiers passing through that area.¹¹

The Minister of Marine, whom I have informed of the above,
orders me to inform you, in order that you may communicate to the
Allied Commander, that the handing over of arms by our military could
only take place if the area were occupied by the Allied Forces;
moreover in such a case the Italian troops would have to re-enter
TARANTO.

(Signed) BRUTO BRIVONESI

ADMIRAL, Commander-in-Chief.
TARANTO.

Power

Subject:- Disarming of Italian troops by American Groups.

PERSONAL.

The Commanding Officer of the Royal Italian Navy at CROTONE informs me that our officers, petty officers, seamen and soldiers, trained and allocated for the defence of that sector, have been disarmed by American soldiers passing through that area.⁴¹

The Minister of Marine, whom I have informed of the above, orders me to inform you, in order that you may communicate to the Allied Commander, that the handing over of arms by our military could only take place if the area were occupied by the Allied Forces; moreover in such a case the Italian troops would have to re-enter

TARPANTO.

(Signed) Bruto HRIVONESI

ADMIRAL, Commander-in-Chief,
TARANTO.

3
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6- A + H-Q 1 hour
up: 10:00 & 11:00

x —
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of river, mar. 8.
over.

~~21 Sept.~~

~~Lamini~~

~~Disorder~~

~~Cute~~

Cum gratia
fading

2 Feb.

~~Catharina~~

Asper
fading

~~4 June~~

~~60 Laminis~~
~~partially~~

~~Cofa~~

1 Aug
partially

~~6 Dec~~

~~low rear~~

~~Rigano~~

~~Zara~~

no rear
glitter

21
Catharina
Hep
Tent

Catharina

4 free

~~Catharina~~
probably

Cofa 1 Apt in

6 Div

no new

Regano no new
Zara
glut
Apt
Apt

Caroline

Frederick

4 to

Catharina

Cow

Frederick
Vener

Frederick

Frederick

S. 13201.

NAVAL MESSAGE. ¹⁴For use in
Cypher or
Coding Office
only.

INDIRECT CYPHER

Inclosure 5 5Originators Instructions:
(Indication of Priority,
AIDAC, NOTWT
For Exercise).

IMMEDIATE

INTERCEPT GROUP.

TO:

C IN C MED

FROM: FOTA

C IN C MED RECYPHER AND PASS TO MADRID. PERSONAL
FROM GENERAL MACFARLANE FOR AMBASSADOR. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE
TO ITALIAN AMBASSADOR FROM MARSHAL BADOGLIO. REGNS.

REQUEST YOUR EXCELLENCY ARRANGE THAT ITALIAN MERCHANT SHIPS LYING IN SPANISH
PORTS BE PALCED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN A CONDITION TO SAIL COMMUNICATING BY THE
SAME CHANNEL AS THAT IN WHICH THE PRESENT SIGNAL ARRIVES THE NAMES AND WHEREABOUTS
OF THE SHIPS AND THE DATE OF READINESS ALSO COMMUNICATE WITH THE NECESSARY
SECURECY THE PORTS TO WHICH THEY WILL HAVE TO SAIL.

PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT. SIGNED BADOGLIO.....

T.O.O.

141809 B

P.F.P. LODGE

DUTY CYPHER OFFICER

CYPHER "D"

Book or Table to be used for		Initials of Cypherer or Coder.	Time of Receipt in Cypher or Coding Office.	Date.
Cyphering or Coding.	Recyphering or Recoding.			
			87	

S. 1320f.

NAVAL MESSAGE.

For use in
Cypher or
Coding Office
only.Inclosure 6Originators Instructions:
(Indication of Priority,
AIDAC, NOTWT
For Exercise).**IMMEDIATE.....NOT SECRET**

INTERCEPT GROUP.

TO:

G 1241 MED

FROM:

7045**YOUR 131556. MAG FARLANE HAS BEEN RADIOLED WHO DOES NOT (R) NOT APPROVE. WENTON DIRECT****FOR KARA ARRIVES IN PALSDIN AT NAIRA 1200/15.****TOO 141837B****FOXA (2)**

Book or Table to be used for		Initials of Cypherer or Coder	Time of Receipt in Cypher or Coding Office	Date. 86
Cyphering or Coding	Recyphering or Recoding			

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(Equals British MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ADVANCE COMMAND POST

Inclosure 6a

13 September 1943.

My dear General,

Pending first contact with you by signals, I am taking the opportunity to send today's sitrep to you by Foster.

He is also taking on two stenographers and their equipment. The main party (seven officers, one civilian and twenty six OR's), plus three Italian officers, leave Syracuse about noon tomorrow and should arrive at Taranto on the 15th. Certain vehicles are also being shipped by AFHQ via Bizerta.

The B-25 in which Foster travels will remain at its destination and is placed at your disposal.

AFHQ are arranging to supply your permanent interpreter as early as possible.

Marshal Badoglio has asked for a personal interview with General Eisenhower, suggesting it take place in Sicily. For your information the CinC is prepared to receive the Marshal, but in North Africa and not Sicily, and he is replying to this effect. ~~The meeting might well furnish the occasion for the signing of the full armistice terms.~~ *NO! [initials]*

You will see from the sitrep that anxious days are in store for us, but everything possible is being done to accelerate the rate of build-up by sea.

*yes [initials]
John Whitely*

Lieut General F. H. Mason MacFarlane, CB, DSO, MC
Chief of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian High Command.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ADVANCE COMMAND POST

13 September 1943.

SPECIAL SITREP NO. M.1

Personal for Lieut. General Mason MacFarlane.

AVALANCHE

General Clark and General McCreery report situation in 10 Corps sector of 5 Army front unfavourable. Enemy attacked and recaptured Pattipaglia 12 Sep, inflicting heavy loss on 56 Division. 46 Division holding ground but subject infiltration from North. Rangers no change. 6 Corps has withdrawn left flank to conform to 56 Division and as troops become available is taking over from right of 10 Corps. Elements 7 Armd Division beginning to arrive. Resumption of offensive dependent on further reinforcements and move of 3 U.S. Division from Sicily is being speeded up. One wing of day fighters operating from strips near Salerno. Hitherto enemy air action not heavy. Navy report port under gunfire and inoperative.

PAYTOWN

8 Army is striving to push on. Patrols reached Scalea T-53 and S. Sosti T-71 by 131140E hrs. 5 Division concentrated area Y-95 and 1 Cdn Div area Catanzaro Z-23 at 122200E hrs. Virtually no contact but Germans may hold position North of Scalea with one division while second attempts to intervene in Avalanche. 8 Army has sufficient landing craft to land small forces to turn enemy's flank.

SLAPSTICK

No substantial changes.

CORSICA

100 French landed at Ajaccio by small warship night 12/13 September, 800 and some guns due tonight in two destroyers, and it is hoped this will be continued nightly.

FUTURE INTENTIONS

To concentrate on critical build up of Avalanche using all available landing ships and craft, which are most suitable for quick turn round on short passage. In exchange certain U.S. combat loaders will be diverted to accelerate the build up into Taranto.

Please Acknowledge

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[Signature]

81

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(Equals British **MOST SECRET**)
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ADVANCE COMMAND POST

Indorse 6b

13 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Taylor

Subject: Notes for Allied Military Mission.

Reference memo same subject dated 12 September 1943.

1. Appendix D: Operation Code Names:-

Against "Capture of Heel of Italy" please delete "MUSKET" and substitute "SLAPSTICK".

2. Enclosure E: Commanders and Staff:-

Against V Corps ICS, delete "Major General Huxley" and substitute "Brigadier Huxley".

3. Add new Appendix F, attached.

B. M. Archibald

B. M. ARCHIBALD,
Colonel,
G-3 Operations.

Copy To:

G-3 AFHQ

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(Equals British **MOST SECRET**)

SECRET
(Equals British Most Secret)

APPENDIX F

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COPY NO. _____

13 September 1943.

NOTE ON BUILD UP OF 5 CORPS FORCES

1. 78 British Infantry Division will move across the Straits of Messina, probably starting within a few days time, and thence move over-land to 5 Corps area.
2. 8 Indian Division first echelon is at present due to arrive Taranto, probably about 24 September. Remainder will probably land at Brindisi. It is possible that the first echelon may also be diverted there.
3. It is believed that Taranto has only 3 alongside berths for unloading ships. As it will be difficult to spare many LCT from elsewhere for lighters, the policy is likely to be to develop Brindisi and subsequently Bari as main bases. Taranto may be used as a reinforcement (re-
placement) base.

there.

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placement) base.

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Inclosure 7,
Taranto,
14 September 1943

Dear General,

Got marooned on the landing ground and arrived yesterday but eventually reached Taranto and contacted Admiral Power.

Spent the day today at Brindisi.

First saw Ambrosio, then Badoglio and then the King.

Ambrosio. Intelligent, friendly but seemed depressed and lacking in enthusiasm.

Badoglio. Old, honest, friendly and said about the right thing.

The King. Very old and gaga.

Apart from having got the Fleet, I should describe the situation as unpromising. I don't find any evidence of inspired leadership or genuine enthusiasm. As I spoke to all, inclined to ascribe the present state of affairs to the short notice they were given of Avalanche.

Communications

These are lamentable. Brindisi is in touch with two Divisions in the toe and the heel, with Sardinia, with Cephalonia, uncertainly with Venice- and with nowhere else.

As against this, BaTi is functioning and gives good reception all over Italy.

Army

The following Divisions are in being.

(1)

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Mantova Division near Grotona
Piceno Division near Brindisi
Legnano Division (part of)
In the South---- North of Brindisi
Form coastal formations.

In Sardinia---- Four Divisions recuperating.

In Cephalonia-- One Division

In Dodecanese-- One Division

Ambrosio says that all the rest of the Italian Army is "surrounded by the Germans and finished". In fact, they can be written off.

- Of the Divisions still in being in the South.
- A. They have hardly any motor transport left.
 - B. They have practically no petrol.
 - C. Their armament is mostly 1918.
 - D. They only have their unit eschelons of armament.
 - E. They are very short of boots.

To sum up, they are practically immobile and have ammunition for about two days fighting.

The only reserves of ammunition appear to be the stocks we have captured in North Africa and Sicily. Ambrosio suggests that we should collect these and send them over. He would also like as many boots as we can send at once.

Even if we could do the shipping, Ambrosio says it would be no good trying to fetch Divisions from the Balkans as they are finished.

In the South, the Italians have no tanks at all.

He wants organized laborers very badly at Taranto and I am asking Ambrosio for 3,000 men tomorrow.

As regards employing the Italian formations in the zones we occupy:-

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I suggest that they should come under the orders of our Commanders on the spot. They amount in the South to 2 plus Divisions- immobile and very short of armament. They could be used for defense of airdromes, lines of communication and as laborers.

To keep the flag flying, they might be formed into a corps. (HQ Corps is at Brindisi) but it would be a corps of extremely low value.

Think it would be best to form this corps and put it under Monty for static use at ports and on lines of communication. I put all this tentatively to Ambrosio who was quite in agreement.

It does not look as if we shall get much Italian help in the air. Foster has just arrived and I am taking him out to Brindisi tomorrow and he will report results.

The two things we can do here to get maximum help out of the Italians are:-

1. SOE
2. P.W.E.

There is tremendous scope and a fruitful field for both. I have made the point that good sabotage of enemy communications and dumps etc. will damage Italians' towns far less than the alternative-bombing.

He must go flat out on SOE and P.W.E.

Apart from the Fleet, the genuine military help we are likely to get is going to be practically nil.

The Crown Prince is in Brindisi. I haven't seen him yet. The Duke of Aosta arrives here tomorrow to join the King.

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Mussolini who had been taken to the Abruzzi Country under a picked guard of 50 was rescued by a German raid of 500 paratroops of the 3rd German Paratroop Division. The guard failed to shoot him as ordered.

The Transport situation here is very bad. Practically no petrol and very few vehicles.

I am doing all I can to put some pep into the Italians but they are unlikely to cheer up when Avalanche goes well. They all say we should have attacked North instead of South of Naples. On this point, I tell them they know nothing about it and to shut up.

I hope to get the Mission installed in Brindisi tomorrow. I shall spend the day there in any case.

The Airborne Division made a very good impression. Hopkinson's death has been a tragedy.

Forgive this illegible scrawl but I've no facilities here yet.

Yours very sincerely,

Mason MacFarlane

P.S. Ambrosio says that there is little likelihood that the Italians' formations or units in German occupied Italy will fight against us except for Blackshirt ones which probably will.

(4)

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Inclosure 8

Taranto
15 September 1943

Dear General Whiteley:-

The receipt of your Special Sitrep of September 13 is acknowledged.

General MacFarlane is sending his first report to the C-in-C by this same courier.

While we do not know what is in our water shipment, the following is a partial list of supplies we know we shall need. Would you be good enough to have some one check and forward those items not included among those already sent?

- 200,000 Italian Lira
- 1 sedan
- 5 Jeeps
- Post exchange supplies for a detachment of 45 men to include tobacco, laundry soap, starch, shoe polish, shoe brushes.
- 1 case of scotch
- 1 case of gin
- Coffee
- Tea

This list looks a bit frivolous in spots but will have its uses in winning the war.

Foster and party arrived yesterday and are being taken to Brindisi today.

Our business is progressing subject to the limitations which General MacFarlane reports.

Sincerely,

/s/ Max Taylor

SECRET

Indirizzo 99APPUNTO PER IL GENERALE MAC FARIANE

Le clausole dell'armistizio, divulgate dalla radio anglo-americana, hanno dimostrato che l'Italia ha accettato la resa a condizioni molto dure ed onerose, specie per quanto riguarda la flotta.

Da sua parte il nuovo governo fascista ha annunziato - per fare breccia nell'animo delle popolazioni e delle truppe - che anche esso vuole la pace, ma a condizioni onorevoli.

E' assolutamente necessario ed urgente, perciò, che la parte anglo-americana specifichi pubblicamente che l'applicazione delle condizioni suddette era subordinata al successivo atteggiamento della parte italiana (inizio di applicazione leale - contegno delle autorità e popolazioni, ecc.).

Ad ogni modo, dato che i tedeschi, malgrado il corretto contegno degli italiani nei loro riguardi, dopo l'armistizio, sono passati ad inequivocabili atti di guerra su vasta scala, contro le FF.AA. e le popolazioni italiane, e dato che questi hanno virilmente reagito, il mondo dovrebbe conoscere che gli alleati considerano ormai l'Italia come uno Stato che collabora spontaneamente sul piano militare.

A tale scopo occorrerebbe che la parte alleata, con attiva propaganda, attestasse i nuovi orientamenti e le intenzioni degli alleati nei nostri confronti.

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15
ALD-MEMOIR FOR GENERAL MAC FARIANE

Incluse 10

N° 2

10
It happens that Anglo-american troops take directly possess of our military and civilian motor-cars, oils and petrols, leaving receipt and promising to give them back.

This is more than, being asked and with great sacrifice on our side, we have already given to ^{the} new Basis of Taran-
to.

If we go on with this system Italian troops will loose every possibility of operating. It is therefore necessary that Anglo-american forces ask regularly what they temporarily need.

September the 15th 1943.-

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September the 15th 1943.-

SECRET

Inclosure 11.

11

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFHQ 512

16 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ.

1. At my meeting with Ambersio and Rolatto yesterday Ambersio raised the question of the status of the Italian Army vis-a-vis the Allied Forces in the joint fight which is now commencing common enemy. I maintained that the present situation was far from clear and anomalous and that it required crystalizing on the lines that Italy was now fully in the war on the side of the Allies. I told him that this raised a bigger question on which we have not been empowered to give decisions. I asked for a clear expression of the Italian High Command's views on the subject and suggested that we discuss them later with Marshal Badoglio.

2. Later I saw Marshal Badoglio and Ambersio with Mr. MacMillan and Mr. Murphy and the Marshal gave a clear explanation of the Italian case which Messrs. MacMillan and Murphy will be able to present and discuss on their arrival in Tunis.

3. At this meeting we also dealt satisfactorily with the question of AMGOT Lira and stressed again the importance of SOE and PWE work here which seems to be fully realized by the Italians.

4. Glad to hear that Brigadier Strong will be here shortly. He will find the Italian Intelligence Service here functioning very sporadically.

Lieutenant General
Head of Mission

7/9

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Indorse 11a

11a

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

16 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ, Tunis.

1. Yesterday I had a long talk with General ^{Rolta} Rolatto, Chief of Staff. Later on I saw General Ambrosio with General Rolatto and finally Marshal Badoglio with Mr. MacMillan and Mr. Murphy.

2. I telegraphed you yesterday the situation regarding Italian troops in this area which is as follows:

Headquarters 7th Army (General Arisio) at Francavilla.
Headquarters 9th Corps (General Loricci) at Bari.
Headquarters 51st Corps (General DeStefani) at Brindisi.
Headquarters 31st Corps (General ^{Marcelli} Marcelli) at Calabria.

3. 9 Corps is static and contains only coastal troops. (I have asked Airborne Division to send a platoon to Bari to guard the all important wireless station against sabotage or raid).

a. 51st Corps is supposed to be mobile. In point of fact, it is far removed from being so. It consists of the Legnano Division in the Brindisi Area. This division is now practically up to strength. Also the Piacenza Division in the Francavilla Area which, with the approval of GOC Airborne Division is moving to an area about ten miles north of Francavilla as soon as possible.

b. 31st Corps comprises the Mantova Mobile Division which has had most of its transportation removed by the Germans. There are also some immobile coastal formations under command of this Corps.

c. There are also in Calabria three independent battalions of apparently fairly high Italian standard. These are one battalion (Nembo) paratroops and two battalions (815 and 816 AB).

4. The Italian High Command are most anxious to move these three battalions to the Taranto Area. They are also anxious to move the Mantova Division from Crotoni by sea to Taranto to join up with 51st Corps.

5. They wish to produce a Corps (51st) on our right flank to operate on our right up the eastern coastal sector.

6. I informed them that I would pass on their requests as also their request that we should stiffen up these defenses with either tanks or at least carriers.

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7. I have naturally stressed very strongly that no movements or operations can be undertaken by them except under the orders of the Allied Commander on the spot. This they fully realized.

8. The Command of all the troops in the heel of Italy Area is vested in the 7th Italian Army. I have arranged for liaison officers to be exchanged between this Headquarters and Headquarters our 5th Corps and No. 6 Base Sub Area, Taranto.

9. At the request of Commander, Airborne Division I have asked the Italian High Command to attach three groups of Italian Field Artillery to the Airborne Division. They have promised to comply as far as mobility permits.

10. The Italian High Command also wish their four mobile divisions to return from Sardinia to Southern Italy. I told them there was very little chance of this at the moment.

11. The ammunition situation on the Italian forces in Southern Italy may be rather better than they told me the day before yesterday. It appears that their used-to-be considerable stocks in the Area Brindisi - Bari which have been considerably depleted but there may be appreciable mounts left. I ought to have the fitters tomorrow.

12. As regards the suggestion that we should collect and forward to Italy stocks of ammunition captured by us in North Africa and Sicily. The Italian High Command request that they should be allowed to send some technical experts to help in sorting out what they most require. I told them that if we were able to comply with the request for ammunition we would certainly accept their suggestion regarding technical assistance. As regards reconstituting the Italian Army the High Command state that there would be little difficulty in producing men and that it was almost entirely a question of armament and munitions. They made two suggestions:

a. That we might be able to let them have captured German weapons and ammunition. I held out little hope on this point.

b. That we should let them have some of the prisoners we have taken and in the first instance certain staff officers of whom they were badly in need.

13. I had to listen to a long dissertation on the strategical situation by Ambersio. His principal point was that by a frontal advance from south to north through Italy we were in fact playing the enemy's game and that it was clearly indicated that we ought to make a landing in force on the eastern coast north of Rimini or at any rate far enough north to cut off the Germans in the center and south of Italy. Ambersio was anxious that we should use Bari as soon as possible as a port of disembarkation. Ambersio described an advance to be rough line Foggia - Naples as a small maneuver with a very limited objective.

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14. I listened patiently to his dissertation and said that I thought that in the absence of knowledge of most of the factors involved it was a good academic effort.

15. Ambersio stressed the point that Italy was now determined to fight to a finish and that the Italian forces would continue to fight even after Italy had been liberated. I said all the right things.

16. I spoke very straight to Ambersio and Rolatto on the following lines. I said that the apparently clumsy way in which they were writing off practically all the Italian Army but not in liberated territory made no sense at all. It was in fact utterly contrary to the spirit in which I imagined them to be cooperated. I told them that they must by every possible means keep these formations fighting and as far as possible direct their action. Bari radio ought to be in full blast all the 24 hours with encouragement and directives to their isolated forces and the civil population. I said I would try to produce some wireless sets to send out to such formations as were still making a fight and with which they had at the moment no communication. (I propose if you agree to use some of the six SOE sets which I am expecting for this purpose).

17. I also again stressed the extreme importance of organizing sabotage and propaganda on the most intensive scale as early as possible. I said that I hoped to produce in the near future a strong SOE and PWE team and that I was counting upon the Italian authorities to cooperate with this team to the maximum extent.

18. Ambersio appeared to realize very fully that I was insisting on him and his staff waking up and getting a real move on and he assured me that he would go flat out on all the points I had made.

Lieutenant General
Head of Mission

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S.1320c. (For use with S. 1320b).

NAVAL MESSAGE.

(Revised

October, 1935.)

Write across	C-in-C Med (R) C-in-C Med(A)	From F.O.T.A.	55
	MOST SECRET CIPHER	IMMEDIATE	
	Your 141916. I have reported to General MacFarlane at Brindisi today Thursday and interviewed the Minister of Marine.		60
	2. Minister of Marine represented that a memorandum by Commodore Dick exempted warships smaller than destroyers except submarines in ports south of latitude 42° from proceeding to British ports.		65
	3. Minister of Marine strongly urges that these vessels should continue to be used for fighting Germans and moving personnel in such localities as Corfu and the Dalmatian coast and also for support of troops at Bari and to northward.		70
	4. He also asks for all minor war vessels at Augusta to be sent to Taranto or Brindisi in order to operate in Adriatic.		75
	5. He asks permission to use minor war vessels at Palermo to operate from Maddalena and interrupt German communications between Corsica, Elba and Piombino which is very important in view of western half of Corsica being in Italian hands.		80
	6. I informed Minister that I would represent his requests but that it appeared to me impracticable that conduct of sea warfare in Mediterranean could be exercised by any authority other than you. He replied that as no Allied ships were on the scenes referred to he sought permission to use his own ships.		85
	7. Minister informed me that General Eisenhower had given permission for cruiser SCIPIO AFRICANUS and four destroyers to be placed at disposal of King of Italy. Cruiser, two corvettes and two torpedo boats are at Brindisi for this purpose. Request information whether they are to remain exempt from other orders.		90
	8. Whole matter resolves as to whether minor Italian war vessels are to be surrendered or used for war purposes under Italian command. As matter has been under discussion between British Mission and Italian Government and military policy is similarly affected I wait further instructions before		95
			100
			105
			110
			115
			120
			125
			130

60	your 141916. I have reported to General MacFarlane at Brindisi today Thursday and interviewed the Minister of Marine.
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100	8. Whole matter resolves as to whether minor Italian war vessels are to be surrendered or used for war purposes under Italian command.
105	As matter has been under discussion between British mission and Italian Government and military policy is similarly affected I await further instructions before implementing your 152127.
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115	
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130	
135	
140	T.O.O. 161707B Sep.
145	T.O.O.D. In Transit.
150	70 X

16 Sep 43

GENERAL DIRECTIVE TO BE FOLLOWED.

1. Obtain ruling & give instructions that all officers of the Italian I.S. in TURKEY, BALKANS & all other countries should co-operate fully & immediately with our service.
2. Any information in your possession obtained from your S.I. concerning the organization, personnel, activities & future plans of the German I.S. in Allied, occupied & neutral territories.
3. Are you aware of any Italian or German agent working in NORTH AFRICA at the moment? All particulars. By whom controlled?
4. a) Where are German I.S. (i.e. Abwehr & S.D.) H.Q. in ITALY?
b) Exact location of these.
c) Officers in charge and personnel in each place.
5. At what level was the liaison between the German I.S. & the Italian I.S. carried out?
6. Who were the principal German Liaison Officers?
7. a) What use did the German I.S. make of the corresponding Italian services?
b) What knowledge were they given of the personnel & agents of the various Italian I.S.?
c) Did they have access to all Italian records?
8. a) What did the German I.S. means of communication consist of?
b) Where had they W/T stations?
c) What use did they make of land lines for telegraphing?
9. Besides special personnel at each station did the German I.S. have any special mobile units at their disposal in ITALY?
10. Has the German I.S. made any arrangements for leaving behind an organization to carry out espionage & sabotage in case of Allied occupation of all or part of ITALY?
11. Ascertain urgently if S.I.M. have any reliable contacts with Croatian Peasant Party supporters in CROATIA.

- 4.a) Where are German I.S. (i.e. Abwehr & S.D.) H.Q. in ITALY ?
b) Exact location of these.
c) Officers in charge and personnel in each place.
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-2-

12. Have you still got C.E.As. under your control, either inside or outside your territory, whom we can use for deception purposes?
13. In connection with these C.E.As. it is of paramount importance that we be given call-signs, hours of transmission, frequencies, security checks, test questions and any change foreseen in these.
14. Have you German codes in your possession & are they aware of this?
15. Ascertain location of Italian Intercept stations for illicit W/T traffic.
16. How many British agents have been captured in ITALY, SARDINIA and occupied territories.
 - a). Names.
 - b). Where & how captured?
 - c). For what reason was suspicion aroused?
 - d). What has been their fate?
 - e). How many W/T sets were taken in undamaged condition?
 - f). Are you or are the Germans in possession of their codes?
 - g). Which of these agents have been or still are under enemy control?
17. A complete survey of all particulars of S.I.M. organisation, names of all S.I.M. officers & personnel, activities both in ITALY & in neutral & Allied countries, cover addresses, means of communication. All particulars of U.P.I. (Records required).
18. With what neutral countries do you collaborate and by what methods?

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18. With what neutral countries do you collaborate and by what methods?

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Indo 13a
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13a

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

DATE : 16 September 1943

TO : CINC A.F.H.Q.

PREC : IMMEDIATE

REF. NO.

CLASS: SECRET

MSG NO. 11

-----FOR CINC FROM MACFARLANE-----

ITALIAN NINTH CORPS COMMANDING ONLY STATIC COASTAL TROOPS HAS MOVED
TO BARI PD FIVE ONE CORPS NOW IN BRINDISI COMMANDS LEGNANO DIVISION
AROUND BRINDISI AND PICENO DIVISION IN FRANCAVILLA AREA PD WITH CONSENT
COMMANDER AIRBORNE DIVISION PICENO DIVISION IS MOVING A SHORT DISTANCE
TO THE NORTH PD ITALIANS WISH TO MOVE MANTOVA DIVISION FROM CROTONE
AREA TO TARANTO TO JOIN NINTH CORPS PD THEY WISH TO FORM A MOBILE CORPS
OF THREE DIVISIONS TO OPERATE UP THE COAST ON OUR RIGHT PD APPARENTLY
ITALIAN THIRTY ONE CORPS IN CALABRIA WILL BE LEFT WITH ONLY COASTAL TROOPS
PD ITALIANS HAVE PROMISED TO PROVIDE SOME ARTILLERY FOR AIRBORNE DIVISION
PD DON'T KNOW YET HOW MUCH PD ITALIAN AMMUNITION SITUATION MAY BE RATHER
BETTER THAN REPORTED YESTERDAY PD I WILL KNOW MORE ABOUT THIS TOMORROW

MACFARLANE

67

SECRET

SECRET

Indorse 136
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

136

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

DATE : 16 September 1943

TO : AFHQ

PREC :

REF. NO. M 102

CLASS: Secret

MSG NO. 17

In response to request for 3,000 soldiers for work in the Taranto Docks and for 300 lorries, Italians are providing about 2,000 soldiers and 1,000 civilians but only 50 lorries. Please inform MacMillan.

MacFarlane

SECRET

65

Indrone 13c
SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

DATE : 16 September 1943

TO : AFHQ

PREC : Most Immediate

REF. NO. M 101

CLASS: Secret

MSG NO. 16

For Mr. MacMillan from General MacFarlane

Not one AMGOT Lira in this area. Please arrange to fly at least fifty million lira to Brindisi or Crottaglie from Palermo at once. Understand group Captain Benson care of AMGOT Liaison Fifteenth Army Group can arrange. Most Urgent

MacFarlane

SECRET

Nota 3

15 settembre 1943

Indirizzo 14RICOSTITUZIONE G. U.

- 1°) Non avendo la possibilità di produrre munizioni italiane nell'Italia meridionale, non si può determinare il numero di unità da ricostituire, se non si sa quante e quali munizioni si trovino in Libia, Tunisia, Sicilia e Calabria.
- Prima cosa da fare, perciò, autorizzarci a censire, d'urgenza, tali munizioni, e metterle a nostra disposizione.
- 2°) Lo stesso si chiede per le munizioni ed armi germaniche che si trovino in detti scacchieri, ed in genere per tutto il materiale militare italo-tedesco ivi rimasto.
- 3°) Sulla base, grosso modo determinata, delle suddette disponibilità, e del vestiario ed equipaggiamento esistente nell'Italia meridionale o fornibile dagli anglo-americani, si fisserà il numero delle unità da ricostituire ed il programma di ricostituzione.
- 4°) Come personale, ufficiali e truppa, si ritiene conveniente utilizzare specialmente i prigionieri di guerra della Libia e Tunisia, appartenenti (per la truppa) all'Italia centrale e settentrionale.
- Come ufficiali si desiderano, prima di tutto, quelli di S.M. e quelli in servizio permanente, specie dei gradi inferiori.
- Naturalmente, per ragioni morali, si dovrebbero riconsegnare, in una certa proporzione, anche prigionieri di altre regioni e categorie.
- 5°) Nello stesso ordine di idee dovrebbero essere messi a nostra disposizione i prigionieri dell'Italia centrale e settentrionale, esistenti eventualmente in Sicilia e Calabria.

munizioni, e metterle a nostra disposizione.

- 2°) Lo stesso si chiede per le munizioni ed armi germaniche che si trovano in detti scacchieri, ed in genere per tutto il materiale militare italo-tedesco ivi rimasto.
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- 5°) Nello stesso ordine di idee dovrebbero essere messi a nostra disposizione i prigionieri dell'Italia centrale e settentrionale, esistenti eventualmente in Sicilia e Calabria.

note 3

15 September 1943.

Reconstitution of Italian units.

1) Since it is impossible to produce Italian ^{ammunition} ~~munitions~~ in Southern

Italy, it is not possible to determine the number of units which can be reconstituted, unless we know how many and what munitions there are in Libya, Tunisia, Sicily and Calabria.

The first thing, therefore, to do is to authorize us to make an inventory, urgently, of such munitions, and to put them at our disposal.

2) We ask the same for German ammunition and arms which are in the same area, and in general for all the Italo-German material which still remains there.

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in Libya, Tunisia, Sicily and Calabria.

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2) We ask the same for German ammunition and arms which are in the same area, and in general for all the Italian-German material which still remains there.

3) On the basis, approximately decided, of the above mentioned things available, and of the clothing and equipment available in Southern Italy and of that which the Anglo-Americans can supply us with, it will be possible to determine the number of

units to be reconstituted as well as the programme of reconstitution.

4) As for personnel, both officers and men, we consider it convenient to utilise especially the prisoners of war in Libya and Tunisia, belonging (as far as the men are concerned) to Central and Northern Italy. As far as officers are concerned, above all, we should like of those of the General Staff, and those who are career officers, especially those of the lower rank.

Naturally, for moral reasons, a certain proportion of prisoners of other categories and from other regions should be selected.

5) In the same way prisoners from Central and Northern Italy, at present or ultimately in Sicily and Calabria, should

Tunisia, belonging (as far as the men are concerned) to Central and Northern Italy. As far as officers are concerned, above all, we should like of those of the General Staff, and those who are career officers, especially those of the lower rank.

Naturally, for moral reasons, a certain proportion of prisoners of other categories and from other regions should be released.

5) In the same way prisoners from Central and Northern Italy, at present or ultimately in Sicily and Calabria, should be put at our disposal.

15
Indirizzo 15
NOTA URGENTISSIMA N° 5

- Nell'isola di Cefalonia

- iniziata battaglia tra italiani e tedeschi per il possesso dell'isola e quindi della baia di Argostoli.

Tedeschi impiegano numerosi Stukas; sarebbe urgente azione dell'aviazione alleata a sostegno delle truppe terrestri od anche invio al più presto possibile di truppe terrestri su navi da guerra.

- Il possesso della baia di Argostoli per la marina inglese sarebbe di capitale importanza.

- iniziata battaglia fra italiani e tedeschi per il possesso dell'isola e quindi della baia di Argostoli.

Tedeschi impiegano numerosi Stukas; sarebbe urgente azione dell'aviazione alleata a sostegno delle truppe terrestri od anche invio al più presto possibile di truppe terrestri su navi da guerra.

- Il possesso della baia di Argostoli per la marina inglese sarebbe di capitale importanza.

Third urgent note No. 5. (Translation).

In the island of Cephalonia.

A battle has started between Italians and Germans for the possession of the island and therefore of the Bay of Argostoli. The Germans are using numerous Stukas; it is a matter

of great urgency to have the support of the Allied Air Force on behalf of the land troops or also that allied troops should be sent to their assistance as quickly as possible on workshops.

The possession of the Bay of Argostoli is of the greatest importance for the British Navy.

W. H. H. W. H. H.

for the possession of the island and upon the way of transport.
The Germans are using numerous Stukas; it is a matter

of great urgency to have the support of the Allied Air Force on behalf of the land troops or also that allied troops should be sent to their assistance as quickly as possible on warships.

The possession of the Bay of Argostoli is of the greatest importance for the British Navy.

W. H. L. W. H. L.

Inclusione 16

16

COMANDO SUPREMO

REPARTO OPERAZIONI

Nota n. 6

P.L. 21, 11 16 Settembre 1943

OGGETTO : Operazioni in Egeo. =

Le truppe tedesche a Rodi hanno in complesso una forza ragguagliabile a 5 btg. in parte motorizzati ed in parte corazzati; un'aliquota di queste truppe é certamente impegnata per la sorveglianza delle truppe italiane; la difesa costiera non é efficiente; il campo di aviazione di Cattavia é riattabile in brevissimo tempo.

Pertanto sarebbe opportuno organizzare uno sbarco nella parte meridionale dell'isola sfruttando le truppe di Cipro e dell'Oriente; difficilmente in avvenire si ripresenteranno condizioni così favorevoli per procedere alla riconquista dell'isola il cui possesso é di importanza fondamentale per le future eventuali operazioni in Egeo. =

Supreme Command
Operations Section

16 Sept. 43.

MEMO No. 6.

SUBJECT:- operations in the Aegean. =

The German troops in the Rodi area have a total strength equivalent to 5 battalions partly motorised and partly armoured; a portion of these troops is certainly detailed for the surveillance of Italian troops; the coastal defence is not efficacious; the aerodrome of CATTAVIA can be reduced in a very short time.

Nevertheless it would be opportune to organise a landing in the central part of the island overcoming the troops of Cyprus and of the EAST. It is unlikely that the future will again present such a favourable opportunity to reconquer the island, whose possession is of fundamental importance for eventual operations in the Aegean. =

Speak Roata.

Nota n. 7

ALLA MISSIONE MILITARE ANGLO-AMERICANA

Si chiede l'autorizzazione di inviare urgentemente:

- una torpediniera ad Argostoli per aiutare quel presidio che lotta contro i tedeschi.
- una torpediniera ed una nave ospedale a Cattaro per imbarcare numerosi feriti.
- una nave mercantile con scorta a Corfù per portare in Italia 400 prigionieri tedeschi, che verrebbero consegnati agli inglesi, il Console di Germania a Corfù e moglie.

Con l'occasione si rappresenta la necessità di avere una autorizzazione generale per l'impiego urgente dei mezzi leggeri nei porti italiani, per esigenze del genere di quelle sopraportate, e che si manifestano da un momento all'altro.

Translation of
Note - No. 7

To the Anglo-American Mission. *For: R. 2*
We ask you to authorize ~~urgently~~ the sending of:

58

Starting pending instructions

17
Inclosure

- una torpediniera ad Argostoli per aiutare quel presidio che lotta contro i tedeschi.
- una torpediniera ed una nave ospedale a Cattaro per imbarcare numerosi feriti.
- una nave mercantile con scorta a Corfù per portare in Italia 400 prigionieri tedeschi, che verrebbero consegnati agli inglesi, il Console di Germania a Corfù e moglie.

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Translation of
Note - No. 7.

pending *Star, part*
pending
construction
To the Anglo-American Mission, Port of Corfu 2

We ask you to authorize ~~urgently~~ the sending of:

- a torpedo boat to Argostoli to help that garrison which is fighting against the Germans.
- a torpedo boat and a hospital ship to Cattaro to

embark numerous wounded.
- A merchant ship with an escort to Corfu to bring to Italy 400 Italian ~~German~~ German prisoners, who would be consigned to the English, as well as the German Consul at Corfu and his wife.

We take this opportunity of representing to you the
necessity of having a general authorization for the
urgent employment of light craft in Italian ports, for
necessities of the kind referred to above, which occur
from time to time.

Inclusione 18

COMANDO SUPREMO

Reparto Operazioni

Nota n° 8

P.M. 21 11 16 settembre 1943

Per impedire trasferimento unità germaniche dalla Sardegna in Corsica sarebbe opportuno, data impossibilità fare concorrere forze navali stretto Bonifacio, schierare isola adeguate forze aeree anglo-americane su seguenti aeroporti attualmente efficienti: Alghero et Borore - et Oristano et Zeppera et Decimo -

Riserva comunicare altri aeroporti sui quali sono in corso lavori riattamento.

Supreme Command.
Operations section.

MEMO N. P.

16 Sept. 43.

In order to prevent the transfer
from SARDINIA to CORSICA of
German troops it would be
opportune (since it is impossible
to allot Italian naval force to
the straits of BONIFACCIO) to provide
adequate allied air forces for
distribution on the following
aerodromes which are at present
in working order: ALGERO and
BOROKE - and OSTIANO and
ZEPHERA and DECIMO -

We can later indicate other
aerodromes on which ~~work~~ repairs
are at present in progress.

done

Inclusione 20 19
COMANDO SUPREM

19

REPARTO OPERAZIONI

P.M. 167, 16 Settembre 1943

Nota n° 2

In esecuzione delle condizioni di armistizio, fra le altre unità, è diretto a Malta anche il piroscafo "COSTANTE C" il quale aveva il seguente carico:

rico:

- 1000 fusti benzina,
- 410 tonnellate viveri,
- 5 " materiale sanitario,
- 2 " " automobilistico.

Trattandosi di materiale che in questo momento ci è di grande necessità e sul quale si faceva molto assegnamento, sarebbe desiderabile che detto piroscafo ritornasse, col suo carico, ad un porto italiano.

High Command.

Operations section.

P.M. 167. 16 September 1943.

Note no. 9.

(in execution of the conditions of the Armistice,

roscafo "COSTANTE C" il quale aveva il seguente ca-

rico:

- 1000 fusti benzina,
- 410 tonnellate viveri,
- 5 " materiale sanitario,
- 2 " " automobilistico.

Trattandosi di materiale che in questo momento ci è di grande necessità e sul quale si faceva molto assegnamento, sarebbe desiderabile che detto piroscafo ritornasse, col suo carico, ad un porto italiano.

High Command.

Operations section. P.M. 167. 16 September 1943.

Note no. 9.

In execution of the Conditions of the Armistice,

among other units, the steamer "Costante C" has ^{also} sailed to Malta.

This ship had the following cargo:

- 1000 barrels of petrol,
- 410 tons of food supplies.
- 5 tons of sanitary (medical) material.
- 2 tons of transport material.

55

As we are concerned with material which is badly needed at this moment, and on which we count a great deal at the moment, it would be desirable that the said steamer should return, with its cargo, to an Italian port.

no. 9000

Inclosure 20

20

S. 1320c. (For use with S. 1320b).

NAVAL MESSAGE.

(Revised

October, 1935.)

Write
across

IMMEDIATE.

MOST SECRET.

C. in C. Med. (R) C. in C. Med. (A)

From. F.O.T.A.

My 161707. Italian Supreme Command have sent further urgent requests for torpedo boats to be sent to Cattara, Corfu and Argostoli to embark wounded, 400 German prisoners from Corfu to be handed to British, and assist fighting in Argostoli. They also seek general authorisation for use of warships for similar quickly arising circumstances. I am replying that pending further instructions all Italian warships in Taranto, Brindisi and Bari other than Scipio Africanus and escort of four are to remain at those ports.

2. Merchant ships. Two at Taranto can go to sea. At Brindisi there is movement of merchant ships arriving and leaving for southern ports. They must move somewhere to clear port and only way to sail them to Malta is to requisition them under clause 5 of armistice conditions. Merchant ship policy must presumably be in accord with naval and military policy. With regard to latter, General MacFarlane is marking time pending news from McMillan and Murphy and is trying to keep what is left of the Italian Army alive and in good heart.

3. My impression is that removal of the remaining warships may cause cessation of present excellent co-operation in working dockyards and ports without which it is impossible to land troops quickly and supply army and later to develop Taranto Dockyard.

4. Italians stress importance of leaving their merchant ships in order to continue country's essential services and supply and move army. A portion might be requisitioned

5. Briefly, if remaining warships and merchant ships are taken they may down tools.

6. Request instructions re moving warships and requisitioning merchant ships.

T.O.O. 171153

Sec. 2

Log 1

SECRET

DIARY

21

Inclosure 21
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

DATE: 17 September 1943

TO : AFHQ

PRECEDENCE: MOST IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

RADIO STATION BARI HAS CEASED TRANSMITTING BY ORDER OF CAPTAIN WOOLSEY OF PWB PD HE STATES HE WAS SENT TO BARI BY FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP PD HIS REASON FOR DOING SO WAS THAT THE GERMANS MIGHT DESTROY OR CUT OFF THE POWER FOR THE STATION WHICH COMES FROM THE POWER STATION AT PESCARA PD THIS STATION AND ALSO TWO TRANSFORMER STATIONS ONLY SOME TWENTY MILES FROM BARI ARE IN GERMAN HANDS PD IT SEEMS TO ME THAT GERMANS WILL PROBABLY INTERRUPT SUPPLY OF POWER IN THE NEAR FUTURE WHATEVER WE MAY DO PD I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT BARI SHOULD COMMENCE BROADCASTING AGAIN AT ONCE AS ITS VALUE AT THIS MOMENT CAN HARDLY BE EXAGGERATED PD REQUEST EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONFIRMATION OF THIS ACTION WHICH AM NOW TAKING

REF002

52
1718208 37

AUTHENTICATED:

SECRET

SECRET
Indorse 22
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

DIARY
22

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION
TO : AFHQ

DATE: 17 September 1943
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

I HAVE SEEN A FURTHER URGENT REQUEST FOR HELP TO BE GIVEN TO ITALIAN TROOPS IN
CEFALONIA PD THEY ARE SAID TO BE UNDER HEAVY ATTACK FROM NUMEROUS STUKAS PD
ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HOLDING THE ISLAND

REFNR
003

17 1825B

AUTHENTICATED:

SECRET

52 2
51

SECRET

Indraw 24 23
INCOMING MESSAGE

23

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: Massingham

DATE: 171645B 1943

TO : CG FATIMA for attention of
General Mason MacFarlane Cite
NAGAP signed CG NATOUSA

CLASS: SECRET

PREC :

REF. NO. 6

State department requests if possible Italian Government should be invited to use their good offices at ATHENS to ensure ALEX LADAS C.M.A. GREEK subject C.M.A. now under sentence of death should if possible be en route to a place of safety from Germans and that he be released or at least have the execution postponed.

51

SECRET

24
Inclusa 24
18
COMANDO SUPREMO
Reparto Operazioni

P.M. 167, 13 17/9/1943

Nota n. 10

Data la particolare situazione in cui è venuto a trovarsi questo Comando, coll'Istituto Geografico Militare rimasto nella zona occupata dai tedeschi, si è esaurita completamente ogni dotazione cartografica.

Sarebbe desiderabile fosse fornita una dotazione di carte del territorio italiano alle varie scale, con particolare riguardo all'Italia Meridionale e Centrale, per la necessità di questo Comando e di quelli dipendenti.

Note n. 10

Considering the situation in which this Comando Supremo happens to find itself, because of the Military Geographical Institute being in the region occupied by the Germans, our supply of maps is entirely exhausted.

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Sarebbe desiderabile fosse fornita una dotazione di carte del territorio italiano alle varie scale, con particolare riguardo all'Italia Meridionale e Centrale, per la necessità di questo Comando e di quelli dipendenti.

Note n. 10

Considering the situation in which this Comando Supremo happens to find itself, because of the Military Geographical Institute being in the region occupied by the Germans, our supply of maps is entirely exhausted.

It would be most necessary to get a supply of maps of the Italian territory, on various scales, particularly of South and Central Italy, needed by this Comando and those which depend from it.

DIARY

25

SECRET
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 594

Inclusion 25 25

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

DATE : 18 September 1943

TO : FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 007

PREG : IMPORTANT

ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND REQUEST US TO SUPPLY MAPS OF ALL AVAILABLE SCALES
OF SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL ITALY PD SIGNED MACFARLANE PD THEY HAVE NONE LEFT
AND CANNOT REPLENISH PD WHAT CAN YOU PROVIDE QUERY

180930B

AUTHENTICATED:

49 40

SECRET

DIARY

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

Inclosure 27 26

26

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

DATE: 18 September 1943

TO : FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 008

PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE

VISITED COMMANDER ITALIAN SEVENTH ARMY WITH COMMANDER BRITISH FIFTH CORPS
LAST NIGHT PD LIAISON WELL ESTABLISHED PD SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY APPEAR TO
BE COOPERATING SATISFACTORILY UP TO DATE BUT WE HAVE BIG REQUIREMENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH TARANTO PORT AND IT IS TOO EARLY TO BE CERTAIN PD SIGNED
MACFARLANE PD POSITION OF COMMANDER FIFTH CORPS FULLY EXPLAINED TO COMMANDER
SEVENTH ARMY AND LATER TO GENERAL ROATTA PD BOTH UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT NO
REPEAT NO ITALIAN TROOPS CAN MOVE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF COMMANDER FIFTH CORPS
IN THIS AREA

1809 31B

AUTHENTICATED:

SECRET

DIARY

27

SECRET

Incluse 27
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

TO : EISENHOWER (PERSONAL)

REF. NO. 009

DATE : 18 September 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : IMMEDIATE

I REPEAT ITEM UNDERSTOOD FROM GENERAL ROATTA LAST NIGHT THAT THERE IS SOME IDEA THAT GENERAL AMEROSIO WITH HIS THREE CHIEFS OF STAFF MAY WISH TO VISIT ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS EITHER AT THE SAME TIME THAT MARSHAL BADOGLIO VISITS YOU OR SEPERATELY PD PLEASE LE ME KNOW IF YOU WOULD APPROVE THIS PD PERSONAL FOR EISENHOWER SIGNED MACFARLANE PD PLEASE ALSO SAY WHAT DATE YOU WISH TO RECEIVE MARSHAL BADOGLIO AND WHAT TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS YOU PROPOSE PD I REPEAT ITEM WOULD LIKE TO ACCOMPANY THE MARSHAL IF YOU APPROVE

AC

180932B

AUTHENTICATED:

SECRET

SECRET

DIARY

78

Indorse 2928
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

DATE: 18 September 1943

TO : FREEDOM

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REF. NO. 10

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

ITALIAN COMMANDER IN CORFU REPORTS GERMAN FORCES AT GOMENIZZA APPARENTLY
ASSEMBLED TO ATTACK CORFU ~~MINENTLY~~ PD HE URGENTLY REQUESTS SUPPLIES OF
FOOD AND MEDICAL STORES PD SIGNED MACFARLANE PD ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND
AGAIN REQUEST URGENTLY TO BE ALLOWED TO SEND TORPEDO BOATS SIRIO AND CLIO TO
CORFU

181202

010 24/28
24

AUTHENTICATED:

15 2
16
SECRET

DIARY

SECRET

*Indorse 20
29*

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION
TO : EISENHOWER (PERSONAL)
REF. NO. 011

DATE: 18 September 1943
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
PRECEDENCE: IMPORTANT

OUR POLICY REGARDING PERMITTING ITALIANS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR CORFU
AND OTHER ISLANDS IS APPARENTLY INCONSISTENT PD SIGNED MACFARLANE PERSONAL
FOR EISENHOWER PD WE ARE ENCOURAGING ITALIAN AIR FORCE TO DO ALL THEY CAN
AND THEY WILL OPERATE PD ON THE OTHER HAND ITALIAN NAVY HAVE BEEN REFUSED
PERMISSION TO LEAVE PORT PENDING REPLY FROM CINC MEDITERRANEAN TO FC TARANTO
PD PLEASE CLARIFY THIS SITUATION FOR ME AS IT SEEMS ILLOGICAL

181203B

115-941/29

17#

AUTHENTICATED,

45

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 14a
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
MARCH 10, 1926

¹⁸
①

Inclosure ~~27~~ 30 30

FROM: WAR DEPARTMENT

BUREAU

No 10.

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

From Massingham

For General MASON MACFARLANE.

Encl. British Area Commander TARANTO
is complaining that the local Italian
authorities are not giving him the
active support which he requires. Admiral
CUNNINGHAM is asking DUKE D'AOSTA
who is now in Sicily en route to

44.

STANDARD FORM NO. 14A
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
MARCH 10, 1926

(2)

FROM: WAR DEPARTMENT

BUREAU _____

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

TARANTO to take this matter up direct

— — — also Ungvár

43

NOTA N. 15 -

A seguito nota n.14 -

Il Comando dell'Isola di Corfù

- segnala che la presenza di 3.000 uomini, molti natanti ed una torpediniera nel porto di Gomenizza fanno ritenere imminente uno sbarco nemico;
- chiede urgenti rifornimenti di viveri e medicinali.

Si rappresenta al Generale Mac Farlane la necessità di intervenire urgentemente con aerei da bombardamento e di autorizzare (come già richiesto con la nota n.14) l'impiego delle torpediniere "Sirio" e "Clio" per il rifornimento dell'Isola.

31

Inclosure 31

18-9-43

- segnala che la presenza di 3.000 uomini, molti natanti ed una torpediniera nel porto di Gomenizza fanno ritenere imminente uno sbarco nemico;
- chiede urgenti rifornimenti di viveri e medicinali.

Si rappresenta al Generale Mac Farlane la necessità di intervenire urgentemente con aerei da bombardamento e di autorizzare (come già richiesto con la nota n.14) l'impiego delle torpediniere "Sirio" e "Clio" per il rifornimento dell'Isola.

NOTA N. 18

18 Settembre 1943 -

In esito al colloquio di ieri del Generale Mac Farlane col Generale Roatta, si precisa quanto segue :

1) - Nessuna notizia si ha della condanna a morte del greco Alex Ladof; comunque non si ha la possibilità di fare alcuna comunicazione in Grecia.

2) - Sarà molto gradita visita dello specialista di Gibilterra per le radio emittenti.

3) - Maresciallo Badoglio ha proposto al Generale Eisenhower un incontro, al quale dovranno presenziare i rispettivi Stati Maggiori.

Il Generale Eisenhower ha concordato nella proposta : l'incontro avrà luogo a Tunisi.

Si é in attesa di conoscere la data.

4) - Costituzione centri informazione e collegamento da dislocare nei territori italiani controllati da tedeschi:

- sono pronti 10 provetti radio-telegrafisti; il breve addestramento può essere iniziato anche oggi 18 settembre;

- gli apparecchi radio devono essere inviati all'Albergo Impero, in uso totale per questo servizio; il Tenente Mallaby é al corrente;

- si sta provvedendo per trovare 10 ufficiali da affiancare ai 10 radio-telegrafisti - costituzione quindi di 10 cellule di

32

Indirizzo B 32

- 1) - Nessuna notizia si ha della condanna a morte del greco Alex Ladof; comunque non si ha la possibilità di fare alcuna comunicazione in Grecia.
- 2) - Sarà molto gradita visita dello specialista di Gibilterra per le radio emittenti.
- 3) - Maresciallo Badoglio ha proposto al Generale Eisenhower un incontro, al quale dovranno presenziare i rispettivi Stati Maggiori.
Il Generale Eisenhower ha concordato nella proposta: l'incontro avrà luogo a Tunisi.
Si é in attesa di conoscere la data.
- 4) - Costituzione centri informazione e collegamento da dislocare nei territori italiani controllati da tedeschi:
 - sono pronti 10 provetti radio-telegrafisti; il breve addestramento può essere iniziato anche oggi 18 settembre;
 - gli apparecchi radio devono essere inviati all'Albergo Impero, in uso totale per questo servizio; il Tenente Mallaby é al corrente;
 - si sta provvedendo per trovare 10 ufficiali da affiancare ai 10 radio-telegrafisti - costituzione quindi di 10 cellule di informazione;
 - per ora le 10 cellule dovranno, nelle rispettive dislocazioni che si fa riserva di indicare a parte, costituire altrettanti centri di informazione; questi provvederanno al loro specifico servizio, all'eventuale collegamento con comandi di G.U. italiana.

liane, all'organizzazione in posto di sabotaggi agendo di iniziativa e secondo istruzioni che verranno date in relazione alla situazione di reparti italiani in posto che, di massima, dovranno effettuare i sabotaggi;

- fra tre o quattro giorni al massimo sarà pronto un sommergibile per l'avviamento delle cellule d'informazione; tale avviamento però potrebbe avvenire il giorno 21 od il giorno

22 p.v..

205

18 September 1943

The following is a summary of yesterday's conversation between General MacFarlane and General Roatta:

- 1) - No news has been received of the condemning to death of the Greek Alex Lados; however, there are no means of communications with Greece.
- 2) - The visit of the wireless technician from Gibraltar will be very welcome.
- 3) - Marshal Badoglio has proposed a meeting with General Eisenhower at which they will represent their respective General Staffs.

NO // General Eisenhower has agreed to the proposal: The meeting will
not yet // take place at Tunis.
fixed. The exact date has not yet been fixed.

- 4) - Constitution of intelligence and communication centers to be distributed in Italian territory controlled by the Germans.
 - 10 Wireless operators are ready; their brief training can be begun today, 18 September.
 - The wireless sets should be sent to the Albergo Impero and be assigned for the use of this service; Lieut. Malaby is in the picture.
 - We are engaged in finding 10 officers to work with the 10 wireless operators - thus constituting 10 intelligence cells.
 - The 10 cells will, in their respective areas which will be indicated separately, constitute as many intelligence centers; these will be responsible for their specific service, and for any necessary communications with headquarters of Italian formations, for the organization of sabotage on the spot, acting on their own initiative following the instructions which will be given in accordance with the situation of Italian units on the spot who, as a general rule, will carry out the sabotage.
 - A submarine will be ready in three or four days at most for the despatch of the intelligence cells; their despatch can therefore take place on the 21st or 22nd of this month.

Inclure 34 33
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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 191700Z 1943

TO: FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. **029**

PREC: PRIORITY

ONE PD REPLY YOUR SIGNAL MACMILLAN TOOK DETAILED REPORT FROM GREENLESS
ANSWERING MCCLURES QUESTIONS AND ENCLUSIVE TEXTS OF PROCLAMATIONS PD
TWO PD GREENLESS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHIEF OF MISSION HAS STARTED
AND IS DIRECTING BARI PROGRAM PD HE SECURED ARCH BISHOP OF BARI AND
RADIOGLIO FOR TODAY PD BELIEVE IT MOST IMPORTANT HE REMAIN HERE DURING THIS
CRITICAL PERIOD PLEASE INSTRUCT AGAIN PD THREE PD WAVES LENGTHS FOUR TWO
ZERO AND TWO TWO ZERO METERS POWER IS TWO ZERO KILOWATTS AND ONE KILOWATT
RESPECTIVELY BOTH TRANSMITTING AT ONE THREE TO ONE FOUR ONE FIVE CMA ONE
FIVE TO ONE FIVE THREE ZERO CMA TWO ZERO TO TWO THREE HOURS PD FOUR
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ARE DISTRIBUTING LEAFLETS OF THEIR OFFICIAL PROCLAMATIONS
IN THEIR PLANES IN NORTHERN AREAS INACCESSIBLE TO US PD PAPER URGENTLY
REQUIRED IF THIS SERVICE IS TO CONTINUE PD FIVE PD SOLE LOCAL NEWSPAPER
HAS NEWSPRINT FOR ONE ZERO DAYS ONLY PD TWO TONS BOBBIN EIGHT FOUR AND
ONE HALF METERS REQUIRED PD SIX PD DISK RECORDING MACHINERY REQUIRED FOR
GOVERNMENT PERSONALITIES

FOR HAZELTINE THRU MCCLURE FROM WILLIAMSON

AUTHENTICATED:

SECRET

191723B

38

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SECRET

DIARY

34

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 191430B 1943

TO: G-2 FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 028

PREC: PRIORITY

YOUR SIX ZERO ONE ONE DATED ONE SEVEN SEPTEMBER PD ITALIANS HAVE NO
REPEAT NO INFORMATION GERMAN DISPOSITIONS LATER THAN ORDER OF BATTLE
PROVIDED BY CASTELANO PD FOR HITCHENS FROM RENDELL SIGNED MACFARLANE PD
NEW PARA PD BRIGADIER STRONG CMA FOORD HAVE ARRIVED AND ARE MEETING
COMMANDO SUPREMO WITH VIEW TO ITALIANS ORGANIZING SOME INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM PD AT PRESENT NONE EXISTS

191605B
AUTHENTICATION:

SECRET

SECRET

Inclsure 35

DIARY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 19 September 1943

TO : AFHQ CP REPEATED AFHQ

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REF. NO. 027

PRECEDENCE: MOST IMMEDIATE

SAW MARSHAL BADOGLIO THIS MORNING PD SIGNED MACFARLANE PD HAVE SECURED
LETTER SIGNED BY MARSHAL FOR TRANSMISSION ITALIAN EMBASSY MADRID PD LETTER
WILL REACH JINC MEDITERRANEAN BY AIR THIS AFTERNOON PD I REPEAT ITEM
INFORMED MARSHAL THAT APPEARED TO BE DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE POPULATION
REGARDING DELAY IN GETTING RID OF OFFICIALS WHO HAD OPERATED UNDER FASCIST
REGIME PD MARSHAL SAID HE WAS CARRYING OUT A CLEAN UP TODAY AND WAS GOING
TO BARI TO BROADCAST THIS AFTERNOON

191320B

AUTHENTICATED:

353528

SECRET

DIARY

Indorse 37 36
SECRET

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

DATE: 190930B 1943

TO: FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 021

PREC:

I REPEAT ITEM VISITED BARI YESTERDAY AFTERNOON PD WIRELESS STATION
IS AGAIN WORKING UNDER DIRECTION OF PWB PD TOWN VERY FULL AND
CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF ITALIAN TROOPS IN THE AREA PD SOME OF THEM
COOPERATING WELL WITH OUR AIRBORNE PLATOON GUARDING RADIO INSTALLATIONS
AND WITH PHANTOM DETACHMENTS WORKING IN THE AREA PD WE ARE NATURALLY
VERY THIN ON THE GROUND IN THIS AREA AND ^{to} ~~EXT~~ ENCOURAGE ~~THE~~ THE ITALIANS
WHO ARE STILL VERY BEWILDERED AND DEMORALIZED I REPEAT ITEM HOPE IT WILL
BE POSSIBLE TO THICKEN UP OUR TROOPS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE PD I REPEAT
ITEM WILL PUT THIS QUESTION TO COMMANDER FIVE CORPS TODAY

191003B

AUTHENTICATED:

SECRET

35 2
34

SECRET

DIARY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Indra 37

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

DATE: 190925B 1943

TO: FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 018

PREC:

ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND HAVE REGISTERED THEIR REGRET THAT COMMANDER
BRITISH ONE THREE CORPS HAS FORBIDDEN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THREE
ONE ITALIAN CORPS AND SEVEN ITALIAN ARMY PD SIGNED MACFARLANE PD
ALSO THAT ITALIAN THREE ONE CORPS HAS BEEN ORDERED TO CATANZARO
TO REORGANIZE THE AREA PD I REPEAT ITEM REPLIED THAT THESE MEASURES
WERE DOUBTLESS OPERATIONALLY NECESSARY AND THAT IN THE MEANTIME
THEY MUST BE CARRIED OUT

191000B

AUTHENTICATED:

33

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SECRET

SECRET

AG FILE

38

Inclure 38

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

19 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ.

1. Attached is a memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army with reference to the Italian munitions in Sicily and Calabria.

2. The Allied Mission request information as to the intention of AFHQ with regard to this subject. If it is expected to make the stocks available to the Italian forces in the near future it appears desirable to acquiesce in their suggestion to send technicians to supervise the assembling and sorting of the stocks in our hands.

For the Chief of Mission:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., A.U.S.

1 Inclosure
Translation, memo Italian
C/S to Gen MacFarlane

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SECRET

FILMED AS FOUND
IN COLLECTION

STAFF R. ARMY
Operation Office

18 September 1943

R. 126N.

NOTE FOR GENERAL MAC FARLANE

The ammunitions that the divisions of the 51 C.A. now dispose of amount to

3 days effrage (1)

- In the advanced depots (coast), which are being pooled, there is not much.

The most important depots were inland, in localities which are now under

German control.

Therefore, it is not to be hoped that they will be found in good condition.

- It is therefore urgent to get Italian ammunitions from Sicily - Calabria -

The most useful ammunitions are the following:

- caliber 6,5 mm for automatic rifle;

- caliber 8 mm for Breda machine gun;

- caliber 8 mm for Fiat machine gun;

- ~~grenades~~ (hand);

- bombs 81 mm for bomb thrower, and cartridges to throw them;

- antiaircraft shells 20 mm;

- shells for antitank gun 47/32

- shells for gun 75/18

- ~~ammunition~~

- shells for 100/22

2 The ~~ammunitions~~ that the divisions of the 51 C.A. now dispose of amount to

3 days of life (1)

- In the advanced depots (east), which are being pooled, there is not much.

The most important depots were inland, in localities which are now under

German control.

Therefore, it is not to be hoped that they will be found in good condition.

- It is therefore urgent to get Italian munitions from Sicily - Calabria -

The most useful munitions are the following:

- caliber 6,5 mm for automatic rifle;
- caliber 8 mm for Breda machine gun;
- caliber 8 mm for Fiat machine gun;
- ~~(grenades)~~ (hand);
- bombs 81 mm for bomb thrower, and cartridges to throw them;
- antiaircraft shells 20 mm;
- shells for antitank gun 47/32
- shells for gun 75/18
- ~~shells for~~
- shells for 100/22
- shells for 149/19

The underlined items are just now the most important.

- Aft officers could be sent on the spot, by us, to choose the munitions in question, and make sure they are complete.

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(1) Day of firing (unfoc) (Italian):

Automatic rifle : 1200
Machine gun : 2000
Piece of ordnance small caliber: 250
Piece of ordnance medium caliber: 150

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

STAFF E. ARMY
Operation Office

18 September 1943

N. 126N.

Notes for General MacFarlane

* Thatammunitions that the divisions of the 51 C.A. now dispose of amount to 3 days of fire (1)

- In the advanced d.pots (coast), which are being pooled, there is not much.

The most important depots were inland, in localities which are now under

German control.

Therefore, it is not to be hoped that they will be found in good conditions.

- It is therefore urgent to get Italian ammunitions from Sicily - Calabria -

The most useful ammunitions are the following:

- caliber 6,5 mm for automatic rifle;
- caliber 8 mm for Breda machine gun;
- caliber 8 mm for Fiat machine gun;
- (grenades) (hand);
- bombs 81 mm for bomb thrower, and cartridges to throw them;
- antiaircraft shells 20 mm;
- shells for antitank gun 47/32
- shells for gun 75/18
- shells* 81
- shells for 100/22

- In the advanced depots (coast), which are being pooled, there is not much. The most important depots were inland, in localities which are now under German control.
- Therefore, it is not to be hoped that they will be found in good conditions.
- It is therefore urgent to get Italian ammunitions from Sicily - Calabria -

The most useful ammunitions are the following:

- caliber 6,5 mm for automatic rifle;
- caliber 8 mm for Breda machine gun;
- caliber 8 mm for Fiat machine gun;
- grenades (hand);
- bombs 81 mm for bomb thrower, and cartridges to throw them;
- antiaircraft shells 20 mm;
- shells for antitank gun 47/32
- shells for gun 75/18
- shells for 105
- shells for 100/22
- shells for 149/19

The underlined items are just now the most important.

- Apt officers could be sent on the spot, by us, to choose the ammunitions in question, and make sure they are complete.

(1) Day of fire (unfos) Italian:

Automatic rifle : 1200
Machine gun : 2000
Piece of ordnance small caliber: 250
Piece of ordnance medium caliber: 150

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SECRET

TRANSLATION

18 September 1943

NOTE FOR GENERAL MACFARLANE

The munitions which the divisions of the 51st Corps have amount to three days of fire (1).

In the advance depots on the coast which are in the course of organization there are not many stocks. As the most important depots are in the interior in areas at present controlled by the Germans, we cannot count on finding these in good condition.

To emphasize the importance of getting the Italian munitions from Sicily and Calabria the most useful lots are the following:

Caliber 6.5 mm for automatic rifle
Caliber 8 mm for the Breda machine gun
Caliber 8 mm for the Fiat 35 machine gun
Hand grenades
81 mm mortar shells and cartridges
20 mm AA shells
Anti-Tank projectiles 47/32
Projectiles for the 75/18 cannon
Shells for the 100/22 Howitzer
Shells for the 149/19 Howitzer

The underlined items are the most important for the moment.

It will be possible to send qualified Italian officers to the spot (i.e. Sicily and Calabria) to select the munitions and to assure that they are complete.

(1) The Italian day of fire (Unfec):

Automatic rifles	- 1200 rounds
Machine gun	- 2000 rounds
Light artillery, per gun	- 250 rounds
Medium artillery, per gun	- 150 rounds

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Chief of Staff

/s/ Roatta

SECRET

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
- Reparto Operazioni -

18 septembre 1943

NOTE POUR LE GEN. MAC PERLANE

- Les munitions dont disposent en ce moment les divisions du 51^e C.A. montent à 3 journées de feu (1).

- Dans les dépôts avancés (côte), qu'on est en train de réunir, pas beaucoup de disponibilité.
Les dépôts plus importants étaient à l'intérieur, dans des localités à présent contrôlées par les allemands.

On ne peut donc compter de les retrouver en de bonnes conditions.

- L'urgence est donc confirmée d'avoir des munitions italiennes de la Sicile - Calabre.-

Les munitions qui servent le plus sont les suivantes :

- calibre 6,5 mm. pour fusil-mitrailleur;
- calibre 8 mm. pour mitrailleuse Breda;
- calibre 8 mm. pour mitrailleuse Fiat 35;
- grenades (à main);
- bombes de 81 mm. pour lancebombes, et cartouches pour leur lancement;
- obus contraériens de 20 mm.;

- Les munitions dont disposent en ce moment les divisions du 51° C.A. montent à 3 journées de feu (1).
- Dans les dépôts avancés (côte), qu'on est en train de réunir, pas beaucoup de disponibilité.
Les dépôts plus importants étaient à l'intérieur, dans des localités à présent contrôlées par les allemands.
On ne peut donc compter de les retrouver en de bonnes conditions.
- L'urgence est donc confirmée d'avoir des munitions italiennes de la Sicile - Calabre.-
Les munitions qui servent le plus sont les suivantes :
 - calibre 6,5 mm. pour fusil-mitrailleur;
 - calibre 8 mm. pour mitrailleuse Breda;
 - calibre 8 mm. pour mitrailleuse Fiat 35;
 - grenades (à main);
 - bombes de 81 mm. pour lancebombes, et cartouches pour leur lancement;
 - obus contraériens de 20 mm.;
 - obus pour canon antichars 47/32;
 - obus pour canon 75/18;
 - obus pour obusier 100/22;
 - obus pour obusier 149/19.

Les voix souslignées sont, en ce moment, les plus importantes.

- 2 -

- Des officiers qualifiés pourraient être envoyés sur place, de notre part, pour choisir les munitions dont il s'agit, et s'assurer qu'elles soient complètes.

(1) Journée de feu (Unfoc") italienne:

Fusil-mitrailleur: 1200

Mitrailleuse : 2000

Pièce d'artillerie de petit calibre: 250

Pièce d'artillerie de moyen calibre: 150

LE CHEF D'ETAT MAJOR



(1) Journée de feu (Unfoc) italienne:

Fusil-Mitrailleur: 1200

Mitrailleuse : 2000

Pièce d'artillerie de petit calibre: 250

Pièce d'artillerie de moyen calibre: 150

LE CHEF D'ETAT MAJOR

Lucy

SECRET 39

DIARY 39

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 20 September 1943

TO : FATIMA (for Gen MacFarlane)

DATE REC'D: 201000B

Cite: FHCOS

JDJD 7074

Proceed as soon as possible to carry out your recommendation for organization of Italian Divisions in CALABRIA, TARANTO Areas into an Italian Corps to operate under command of Eighth Army. Probable missions are as you suggest, static defense of L of C, Ports, etc. Also will probably be required to perform some labor. Montgomery has been informed.

SECRET 27²⁶

SECRET

DIARY

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INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: G-2 FREEDOM

DATE: 201215B 1943

TO: FATIMA (Personal for
Mason MacFarlane signed
CinC cite FHGBI)

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

REF. NO. 7134

(? visit)
Date of Badoglio not fixed but unlikely before end of this week.
Ambrosio and his Chief of Staff should accompany Badoglio on his
visit - Fatima personal for Mason MacFarlane from G-2 Freedom signed
CinC cite FHGBI for personal attention of General MacFarlane from
Eisenhower cite FKDESC Reur 009 of 18 September to Freedom. Approve
your accompanying the Marshal. Strong will explain reasons.

SECRET

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SECRET

DIARY

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INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 191581B 1943

TO: FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 6752

PREC: PRIORITY

Please inform Badoglio and the King that according to the American representatives there the Italian missions both in Lisbon and Madrid are concerned - from Murphy signed Eisenhower for General Mason MacFarlane - over the absence of any knowledge regarding the present whereabouts of the Italian Government and the absence of definite instructions as to the line of policy they are to follow. The Ambassador in Madrid points out that a serious problem confronts him in Spain. There are 3,000 Italians in Madrid alone, and his staff. Including Consuls and Agents runs into the hundreds. Pressure is being brought to bear on the Consuls to declare for the Fascist Government by the Germans. Pressure has so far been resisted by all the Consuls who are awaiting instructions. Present indefinite status cannot however continue for long. The Ambassador has heard nothing since the government left Rome and *does* not even know who is the Minister Foreign Affairs. He is unable to answer the questions of the Italians in Spain who are equally without information and the Ambassador states that he must have some word quickly in order.

SECRET

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SECRET

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to unite them. He believes he can hold the majority in line if communications are established with his governmental though it is clear that some Italians in Spain will desert to the Fascist Regime. Direct courier service by plane from Gibraltar to the Seat of the Italian Government is solicited. Dajeta in Lisbon has asked that a message be communicated to the King to the effect that he and his collaborators are holding themselves at the King's disposal and awaiting his orders. Information is further requested concerning the King's general desire with respect to the functioning of the legation as well as any specific wishes he may have with regard to individual members of the Staff. It has also been suggested that Marshal Badoglio may wish to instruct Italian diplomatic organizations abroad to cooperate with the Allies and place all information concerning Germany at their disposal. Since it may be impractical for him to communicate direct with all Italian diplomatic agents, he may wish to communicate through the Italian Ambassador in Madrid, passing on through him his instructions and the terms of the Armistice for their guidance. The Italians missions have also pointed out that another serious matter is that whereas the radio from Northern Italy, and lately from Rome, assures Italians that the Fascist Government of Italy, no word has come from either the King or Badoglio on the other side, which is naturally disturbing to Italians abroad who feel in need of guidance.

Note: Dashes indicate word missing. Message center is asking for Service and will supply missing word.

SECRET

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SECRET

DIARY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE : 202000B 1943

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 039

PREC : URGENT

ITALIANS URGENTLY REQUIRE COPY OF LONG ARMISTICE TERMS PD FOR
GENERAL SMITH FROM STRONG SIGNED MACFARLANE PD CASTELLANO WISHES
REMAIN HERE UNTIL THEY ARRIVE PD CAN YOU FLY COPY EARLY TWO ONE
SEPTEMBER PD HOPE LEAVE HERE ZERO SEVEN ZERO ZERO HOURS TWO TWO
SEPTEMBER IF TERMS ARRIVE

202015 B

AUTHENTICATED:

SECRET

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SECRET

DIARY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

201417B

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 200950B 1943

TO : AFHQ CP REPEAT AFHQ

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REF. NO. 37

PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE

GENERALS RENNEL AND HOLMES HAVE ARRIVED AND WE ARE SEEING BADOGLIO THIS MORNING PD INFORM FIFTEEN ARMY GROUP PD TO AFHQ CP REPEAT AFHQ SIGNED MACFARLANE PD IN VIEW OF INFORMATION BROUGHT BY RENNEL I REPEAT ITEM AM INFORMING BADOGLIO THAT HIS VISIT TO GENERAL EISENHOWER IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE ABOUT THE END OF THE MONTH

AUTHENTICATED:

22
21

SECRET

SECRET

DIAHY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

201415B

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 201000B 1943

TO : AFHQ CP REPEAT AFHQ

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REF. NO. 35

PRECEDENCE: MOST IMMEDIATE

AM SENDING YOU BY AIR TODAY FULL TEXT OF MARSHAL BADOGLIO'S BROADCAST OF
YESTERDAY EVENING PD TO AFHQ CP REPEAT AFHQ SIGNED MACFARLANE PD BADOGLIO
HOPES IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BROADCAST THIS FROM ALLIED STATIONS AND WOULD
LIKE ONE MILLION LEAFLETS OF THE TEXT PRINTED AND SENT HERE FOR DROPPING BY
AIR

AUTHENTICATED:

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SECRET

SECRET

DIARY

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFO 512

20 September 1943

FROM: Military Mission (Naval Section).

TO : Admiral Peters, (F.O.T.A.).

SUBJECT: Italian Naval Ship Movements.

By direction of General MacFarlane, Note No. 19 of The Italian Supreme Command is forwarded herewith for your information.

ELIHU W. STONE
Captain, USNR

1 Inclosure
Note No. 19 of The Italian
Supreme Command.

SECRET

SECRET

NOTA N° 19

COMANDO SUPREMO

REPARTO OPERAZIONI

P.M. 21, 11 19 Settembre 1943.

Facendo seguito alla nota n° 9 si comunica che fra il 10 e il 12 corrente sono stati avviati a Malta da Bari, oltre al Piroscalo " COSTANTE C ", i seguenti altri:

- | | | |
|-------------|------------|--|
| - Piroscalo | PELAGOSA | - conferaggio e avena |
| - " | RINUCCI | - " 1067 ton. di <u>viveri</u> e materiali vari |
| - " | APUANIA | - con 70 ton. di <u>carne congelata</u> |
| - " | MONTERELLO | - " 354 ton. di <u>viveri</u> e materiali vari |
| - " | LUANA | - con 700 ton. di <u>munizioni</u> e <u>viveri</u> |

Stante la precaria situazione logistica delle truppe dislocate nelle Puglie e nella Calabria sarebbe di grandissimo interesse poter avere la restituzione di detti piroscali o per lo meno di una quantita di materiali corrispondenti al loro carico.

La questione interessa in modo particolare viveri e munizioni

/s/ (?)

12
16

SECRET

SECRET

DIARY

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

20 September 1943

FROM: Military Mission (Naval Section).

TO : Admiral Peters, (F.O.T.A.).

SUBJECT: Communication from The Italian Supreme Command.

By direction of General MacFarlane, Nota No. 22 of the Italian Supreme Command is forwarded herewith for such action as you deem appropriate.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR

1 Inclosure
Nota No. 22 of the Italian
Supreme Command.

SECRET

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SECRET

NOTA N° 22

19 - 9 - 1943

(Seguito Nota n°5)

Comando Presidio Cefalonia richiede urgente aiuto mezzi navali et aerei per ostacolare movimento natanti tedeschi che trasportano personale nell'isola.

Qualora il mantenimento dell'isola interessi il Comando Alleato occorre d'urgenza soccorrere il presidio; in caso contrario occorrera prevedere l'impiego del naviglio necessario per lo sgombero delle truppe dall'isola allorché la resistenza si dimostri non più possibile.

/s/ (?)

SECRET

47

*to Eisenhower
sgnd MacFarlane*

20 September 1943

1. Very glad to see the copy of your telegram to London and Washington shown to me by Rennel. I hope we can get a speedy answer on policy. It will help here a lot.
2. I am telling Badoglio that his visit to you probably won't take place now for about ten days.
3. Strong has arrived and is getting around. We had a long session with Ambrosio yesterday. The Italian intelligence organization is at the moment quite useless. All the personnel and documents were left behind in Rome. They are trying to build up an organization here but it won't be much good to us for sometime.
4. Rennel and Holmes have arrived. We had a long talk yesterday and agreed our policy and are seeing Badoglio - I hope - this morning.
5. As already telegraphed, I saw Badoglio again yesterday. He was as charming as ever and himself wrote to the Italian Embassy, Madrid, at once in his own hand.
6. He was looking much more tired and harrassed than the last time I saw him but he seems to have great powers of recuperation and went to Bari last night to do his broadcast reply to Mussolini's effort.
7. We can be one hundred percent certain of him and of Ambrosio. The later is very easy to work with and a very good Chief of Staff - but I think that there is little else to him.
8. Roatta will be O. K. as long as things go well. He is very talkative and easy to work with. He has no guts and crumples up at once if I have to be tough with him which is at times inevitable.
9. On the Navy and Air side cooperation appears to be going well. Within their limits, the Italian Air Forces are doing quite a lot in a small way - principally across the water from here.

10. On the Army side I am doing all I can to keep the little that is left going and to restore their self-respect.

They were delighted to send some Field Artillery to the Airborne Division and up at Bari are playing well with our Phantom detachments.

Frankly, however, from all I have seen they have nothing left alive fit to fight Germans, no tanks, antiquated and inadequate equipment, very little transport and no ammunition reserves.

They are themselves very keen to producing one corps of three divisions to join in the advance from here. They even suggested that this corps and our V Corps should operate under the Italian Army which is in these parts!!!

If in any way possible I think we should let them form their 51 Corps with at any rate the Legnano and Piceno Divisions. They will be best employed like all other Italian troops on labor, L of C or air-drome guards but there is a lot to be said from the morale point of view in favour of letting one corps go forward up the coast on our right when we advance. There is no other argument in favor of this!!

(Later) I have just got back from a long meeting with Badoglio with Rennel and Holmes. Badoglio had Count Aquaroni (Temporary Minister of Finance and Food) with him. He is quite useless and very talkative.

Rennel will tell you all about the meeting.

Our AMGOT proposals were accepted.

There was a long discussion about finances - the gist of which was:

- a. The urgent necessity for more AMGOT lira.
- b. A strong Italian request that Sterling lira rate of exchange should be made slightly more favorable to the Italians.
- c. The fact that, now that Mussolini and his Fascist government were presumably getting whole-hearted support from the Germans, Badoglio's effort would be much embarrassed if any undue restrictions were placed upon his government.
- d. Badoglio stressed the fact that he was terribly anxious to take part in the actual fighting of the Germans and spoke of not only producing a corps in this part of the world but of bringing over divisions from Sardinia and rearming the Italian Armies we have taken prisoner. He

mentioned also the reinforcements in men he was hoping to get from the Balkans and elsewhere. I am at the moment giving him no encouragement at all except a sympathetic hearing. I am gradually trying to convince him and his military advisors that any hope of restoring the Italian Army as a useful fighting machine in the way he suggests is entirely out of the question at the moment. I hope this will sink in in due course but as you can well understand I am refraining from pouring all the cold water these ideas deserve upon them.

I went to Bari yesterday and had a look at the wireless station which is now functioning once again satisfactorily. Bari is very full of people and there are a suitable number of rather useless Italian troops in and around the place. Of them there are some who are of a certain value. I saw our Airborne Platoon guarding the wireless and also a Phantom Detachment. Both in very good heart but both rightly anxious that we should show the flag rather more effectively in the Bari Area. There are a lot of doubtful down-hearted people in these parts.

I am seeing Charles Allfrey this afternoon and will mention this to him as also the fact that as soon as his build-up permits I think it would be well if he included Bari in his initial defensive dispositions. Firstly, this will create an admirable impression upon the population. Secondly, I am certain that we ought to use Bari as a port as soon as possible. And, thirdly, it will give him much more elbow room in which to make his concentrations.

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17

SECRET

DIARY

48

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM from Eisenhower
cite FHQCT. Report FREEDOM
and cite CinC Med. Ref. 010, 18/9.
TO : FATIMA for PERSONAL ATTENTION
of General Mason MacFarlane

DATE: 201520B 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC :

REF. NO. RELAY 381/20

Policy is to get Italian Naval Forces to secure points of strategic importance . Therefore Italian warships in Italy may be used to proceed Corfu or elsewhere but insure that Flag Officer Taranto is fully informed of these instructions and that any special orders which he may issue are complied with

NOTE: Dealy due to 2 Services on this Msg.

SECRET

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SECRET

DIARY

BIGOT

49

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 201227B 1943

TO: FATIMA for action rptd
AFHQ CP for information
signed CinC cite PHOCT
BIGOT

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

REF. NO.

Message starts.

1. Consider communications in following areas present good targets for demolition and sabotage of all kinds:

- (1) Pisa - Grosse to line especially 18 Kilometres North of Grosseto.
- (2) Siena - Empililne, particularly just North of Siena.
- (3) Florence - Arezzo near Pontassive.
- (4) Rimini - Fano in many places.

Interruptions any of these lines valuable but simultaneous. Dislocation all four would produce greatest results.

2. Satisfactory action against these lines will reduce amount of bombing necessary on near by Italian towns.

3. PWB have already broadcast to this effect. Glad if will ask Badoglio to urge Italians to cause dislocation by sabotage and strikes which if good results are achieved, would relieve us of the necessity of bombing which we greatly deplore. He might also specify other areas where good results could be obtained.

SECRET

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BIGOT

SECRET

DIARY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE :

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 048

PREC : IMPORTANT

GENERAL AMBROSIO AGAIN SUGGESTED THIS MORNING THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER
MAKING A LANDING ON THE EAST COAST TO PUT THE FORCE OF ABOUT ONE ITALIAN
REINFORCED REGIMENT INTO THE ABBUZI HILLS PAREN FOR FREEDOM RPT TO AFHQ
COMMAND POST SIGNED MACFARLANE PAREN WHERE THERE ARE MANY ITALIAN SOLDIERS
IN HIDING TO SYNCHRONIZE WITH OUR ADVANCE NORTHWARDS WHEN IT TAKES PLACE
PD I REPEAT ITEM HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED THIS PROJECT TO COMMANDER FIVE
CORPS

AUTHENTICATED:

211458B

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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SECRET

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SECRET

DIARY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE :

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 047

PRI: IMMEDIATE

I REPEAT ITEM SAW AMEROSIO THIS MORNING PD THE GERMANS HAVE CUT THE APULIAN AQUEDUCT AT PONTE ATELLA ABOUT TWO FIVE KILOMETERS NORTH NORTHWEST OF POTENZE PD FOR FREEDOM RPT TO AFHQ COMMAND POST SIGNED MACFARLANE PD THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND IS GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER THE RESULTING SITUATION AND STRICT WATER RATIONING IS BEING INTRODUCED IN THE LARGE AREA FED BY THE AQUEDUCT PD WITH RATIONING THEY DO NOT ANTICIPATE SERIOUS DIFFICULTY FOR ANOTHER FORTNIGHT PD THEY STATE THAT ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY ARE MOSTLY WELLS AND CONTAMINATED PD THEY ESTIMATE THAT THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE AQUEDUCT CAN BE REPAIRED IN FROM THREE TO FOUR DAYS IF NO FURTHER DAMAGE IS DONE PD AM INFORMING COMMANDER FIVE CORPS

AUTHENTICATED:

211457B

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

SECRET

SECRET

DIARY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE :

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 046

PREC : IMPORTANT

ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EARLIEST POSSIBLE
RECAPTURE OF THE ALTA MURA AND FOGGIA DISTRICTS AS THEY CONTAIN
THE BULK OF THE GRAIN RESERVES FOR SOUTHERN ITALY PD FOR FREEDOM
RPT TO AFHQ COMMAND POST SIGNED MACFARLANE PD AM INFORMING COMMANDER
FIVE CORPS

AUTHENTICATED:

211456B
F. H. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

SECRET

SECRET

DIARY

53

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE :

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 045

PREC : MOST IMMEDIATE

I REPEAT ITEM SAW BADOGLIO AND COUNT AQUERONI THIS MORNING PD I REPEAT
ITEM MADE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT UNTIL WE HAVE SUFFICIENT LIRA IN THE
COUNTRY CMA ALL FORMS OF STERLING AND DOLLAR CURRENCIES MUST BE ACCEPTED
AT RATES OF ONE HUNDRED AND FOUR HUNDRED RESPECTIVELY PD FOR FREEDOM RPT
TO AFHQ COMMAND POST SIGNED MACFARLANE PD THEY AGAIN MADE GREAT ARGUMENT
ABOUT THE RATE OF EXCHANGE BUT I REPEAT ITEM EXPLAINED THE POSITION TO
THEM AGAIN FULLY AND THEY CLEARLY UNDERSTAND IT PD BADOGLIO IS ARRANGING
FOR A PROCLAMATION WHICH WILL BE APPROVED BY ME TO BE PRODUCED AND
DISTRIBUTED ON POSTERS THROUGHOUT THE AREA AT ONCE PD THE ITALIAN MINT
IS STILL IN ITALIAN HANDS AND IS GUARDED BUT IT IS IN GERMAN OCCUPIED
AREA AND COMMUNICATION WITH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE

AUTHENTICATED:

211455B
F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

SECRET

SECRET

DIARY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFU 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 21/3/43

TO: AFHQ CP rpt to FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 044

PREC: IMMEDIATE

ESCAPED JUGOSLAV NAVAL OFFICER JUST ARRIVED HERE FROM SPLIT REPORTS
TWO DIVISIONS JUGOSLAV PARTISANS HOLDING SPLIT BEING SERIOUSLY HARRASSED
BY STUKAS FROM MOSTAR CMA ZAGREB AND ZEMUNIK PD FORTRESS AT ENTRANCE
TO KLIS HARBOR IS ALSO GIVING MUCH TROUBLE PD AIR SUPPORT ON ABOVE
TARGETS URGENTLY REQUIRED PD HE ALSO REPORTS ONE THREE THOUSAND MEN
ALL DISARMED ITALIAN BERGAMO DIVISION AWAITING SHIPS TO RESCUE THEM
PD IS THERE ANY OBJECTION TO PERMITTING ITALIANS TO TAKE AIR AND NAVAL
ACTION AS FAR AS CAN BE ARRANGED QUERY

DISTRIBUTION

AUTHENTICATED:

- 1 - Air Commodore Foster
- 1 - Admiral Peters - Taranto
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - AG Files

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

SECRET

SECRET

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outgoing
INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: *21/3/03*

TO : AFHQ CP REPEAT TO FREEDOM

CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET**

REF. NO. *043*

PRIORITY: **IMMEDIATE**

WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ME FOUR WAR CORRESPONDENTS ARRANGED INTERVIEW WITH
MARSHAL BADOGLIO THIS MORNING PD TO AFHQ CP REPEAT TO FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR
EISENHOWER FROM MACFARLANE PD IT IS CLEARLY UNSOUND THAT PENDING DECISIONS
ON POLICY BADOGLIO SHOULD AIR HIS VIEWS IN ANGLO AMERICAN PRESS PD
FURTHERMORE I REPEAT ITEM CONSIDER CORRESPONDENTS HAD NO RIGHT TO CONTACT
BADOGLIO WITHOUT MY PERMISSION PD I REPEAT ITEM HAVE THEREFORE FORBIDDEN
THE INTERVIEW AND SHALL ALLOW NONE UNTIL AFTER BADOGLIO HAS VISITED YOU PD
HOPE YOU AGREE

AUTHENTICATED:

SECRET

SECRET

DIARY

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE : 202300B 1943

TO : FREEDOM rpt AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 091

PREC : IMMEDIATE

YOUR NUMBER SIX SEVEN FIVE TWO PD HAVE SEEN BADOGLIO WHO HAS
WRITTEN A TELEGRAM TO ITALIAN AMBASSADOR MADRID AND ITALIAN
MINISTER LISBON PD FOR FREEDOM SIGNED MASON MACFARLANE PD
RENNEL IS TAKING TEXT OF TELEGRAM WITH HIM TOMMORROW FOR
ONWARD TRANSMISSION PD TELEGRAM IS ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY PD
INSTRUCT AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES IN MADRID AND LISBON TO
TELL ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES THAT BADOGLIO'S TELEGRAM IS ON
THE WAY

202330B

AUTHENTICATED:

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieut. General

SECRET

DIARY

57

28x

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
BRINDISI MISSION
APO 312

21 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Allied Force Headquarters Command Post.

I enclose herewith a telegram from Marshal Badoglio in Italian to the Italian Ambassador in Madrid and the Italian Minister in Lisbon.

Please forward by wire - MOST IMMEDIATE.

1 Incl.
Cy telegram in Italian.

Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

SECRET

58

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 20 September 1943

TO : FATIMA (for Gen MacFarlane)

DATE REC'D: 201000B

Cite: FHCOS

JDJD 7074

Proceed as soon as possible to carry out your recommendation for organization of Italian Divisions in CALABRIA, TARANTO Areas into an Italian Corps to operate under command of Eighth Army. Probable missions are as you suggest, static defense of L of C, Ports, etc. Also will probably be required to perform some labor. Montgomery has been informed.

*Monty
29 30
V Corps
Radio*

*MacFarlane
to Calabria
activity*

See above

*NO info
Andrew
for returned
men from
Albania*

Legge?

*11 am
252*

*note
for AOC*

*hurry up
9.1*

*Trani
2 hours
work*

SECRET

2

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
FAIRFIELD REAR
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

21 September, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Mason MacFarlane

Subject: Copy of Long Terms of the Armistice
for General Castellano.

My dear General,

1. We had a telegram from Strong this morning asking for a copy of the Long Terms of the Armistice for delivery to Castellano by the 21st.
2. Attached is a copy, and also a copy of a telegram sent by General Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will see from this telegram that General Eisenhower hopes to avoid the signature of the long terms.
3. I thought you should be aware of the exact situation because you may wish to give some indication of it to Castellano when handing over the copy. On the other hand, there is no guarantee the Combined Chiefs of Staff will approve General Eisenhower's recommendation.

Yes

J. F. M. Whiteley
J. F. M. WHITELEY
Major General
Deputy Chief of Staff

- 2 Incl.
- 1 - Copy of Long Terms
 - 2 - Copy of Message 502

*Wired the for
definite instructions*

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

AFHQ MESSAGE FORM

CALL	CIRCUIT No.	PRIORITY	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
	NR		
SPACES WITHIN HEAVY LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY			
FROM (A)	ORIGINATOR	DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN	
FAIRFIELD REAR		19 Sept 43	
FOR ACTION			
TO	FREEDOM	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS	
(W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)	SECRET	GR	
	Equals British MOST SECRET		
(REF No.)	502	(CLASSIFICATION)	SECRET

Edwin

Pass the following to Combined Chiefs of Staff:

My views are summarized as follows. In our future relations with Italy there are only two courses:

(1) To accept and strengthen the legal Government of Italy under the King and Badoglio; to regard this government and the Italian people as co-belligerents but with their military activity subject to my direction under terms of armistice, and I, of course, making such military, political and administrative conditions as I may find necessary from time to time. Included in these would be the imposition by directive of such clauses of the long terms as may be necessary from the supply, shipping, economic and other points of view under the authority of article 12 of the short terms.

(2) To sweep this government aside, set up an Allied Military Government of occupied Italy, and accept the very heavy commitments involved.

Of these two courses, on military grounds, I strongly recommend the first. Since as a co-belligerent it would necessarily declare war on Germany and on the Fascist Republican Government of Italy, it will be the natural rallying point for all elements desiring to fight against Fascism in Italy.

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

PRECEDENCE:

ORIGINATING SECTION:

CONTENT AND CLASSIFICATION AUTHENTICATED

BY:

NAME TYPED

TEL No.

THI OR TOR

Opr.

TIME CLEARED

[0 3 3 0]