

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

10000/100/54

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

10000/100/54

SECURITY
OCT. 1943 - JAN. 1944

20A

SUBJECT:- Security in Taranto.

To:- Major-General K.W.D. Strong,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2 Section,
Allied Force Headquarters.
FOITALI.
ACC.
Comd. 52 Area.

HQ 2 District CMR.
2022/4.

8 Jan. 44.

11 JAN 1944

1747

72

1. In accordance with your letter B-389.506/50-C dated 14 Dec. 43, the required survey was made on 27 & 28 Dec. by

Major A.B. MATTHEI, G-2 I 2 District

Lieutenant I. McJ. OER, R.N.V.R., F.B.S.O. TARANTO.

(representing Lt. Com. COCHRANE, R.N.V.R.)

Captain A.R. BENNETT, Advanced G-2 (CI) Section, A.F.H.Q.

Captain R.M. ELMAN, Advanced G-2 (CI) Section, A.F.H.Q.

Lieutenant V.P. BIRCH, R.N., F.S.O. TARANTO.

2. Italian R.N. Arsenal (Dockyard).

a. This is completely enclosed by a high wall, and access can at present be gained only by five gates. This perimeter appears to provide adequate physical protection except at one point, by the Officers' Club, where the position is most unsatisfactory.

b. Gate No. 1, at the western extremity of the Arsenal, is used for entrance and exit by day and night.

Gate No. 2, by the Officers' Club, is used for exit only by day and night.

Gate No. 3, the Main Gate to the Arsenal, is used day and night, for entry and exit.

Gate No. 4, near the Eastern extremity of the Arsenal, appears to be used by day only for access to the Sports Grounds and Riding School which are situated there.

Gate No. 5, at the Eastern extremity, is open by day only, but there is a railway line entering alongside it which is in use by day only.

There are also two gates in the perimeter wall which are permanently closed.

c. All these gates are manned by C.C.R.R., of whom 350 are available for all Arsenal duties. One platoon of Royal Marines has recently been allocated to patrol and guarding duties, but they are stationed at Gates 1, 2 & 3 only. This leaves Gates 4 & 5 without any British supervision.

311.5 - Security

311.5 - Security

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c. All these gates are manned by C.O.R.R., of whom 350 are available for all Arsenal duties. One platoon of Royal Marines has recently been allocated to patrol and guarding duties, but they are stationed at Gates 1, 2 & 3 only. This leaves Gates 4 & 5 without any British supervision.

d. There are four types of Italian passes in use:

9721

- (1) White for civilian Arsenal workers
- (2) Red for contractor's workmen
- (3) Blue for civilian Arsenal clerks
- (4) Pink for day visitors

Passes 1, 2 & 3 are issued with unlimited validity, and a large number appear to have been current for several years.

All these passes are issued by the Italian Admiral commanding the Arsenal. New applications for passes are submitted to the C.O.R.R. for vetting. The P.S.O. states that he supervises this procedure.

Italian Service personnel are admitted on the strength of their identity documents, without Arsenal passes.

e. Recommendations.

- (1) Physical. The position at Gates 1, 3 & 5 is considered satisfactory.

...../cry.

11 JAN 1944
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At Gate 2 an alarm of barbed wire fencing (approximately 50 feet long and 8 feet high) is recommended in order to prevent access from the back doors and french windows of the Italian officers' club into the Arsenal. This will mean that Italian Officers coming from within the Arsenal will have to walk out of the adjoining Arsenal gate and round to the front door of the Club.

It is recommended that Gate 4 be closed permanently with adequate barbed wire.

(2) Guarding. It is recommended that British Port OMP should be on duty with the OC.MR. at all gates whenever open, and that a CWP patrol should be instituted by day and night within the perimeter to pay particular attention to sea-borne entry. Gates when closed at night should be guarded by British Military sentries, with Italians.

(3) Passes. In view of the fact that no confidence is felt in the existing system, it is recommended that a new system be instituted. The formal authority for issuing passes shall remain with the Italian Admiral Commanding, acting as Approved Authority on behalf of PORTAL. This will throw responsibility on to him and thus ensure his active co-operation. The new passes should be obligatory for all individuals of any nationality except Service personnel on duty.

All applications for passes should be made in writing on a standard form. Each application should be vetted by the Admiral through COS, after which he should endorse the application forms to the effect that this has been done. If all is in order he should then issue the passes on his own responsibility. The endorsed application forms should be sent to the PGO immediately the relative passes are issued, for scrutiny and filing. Any pass issued, with which the PGO does not agree, should be withdrawn forthwith.

British and Italian Service personnel on duty will be admitted on production of their Service identity documents.

It is strongly urged, however, that all Italian Service personnel should have standard identity documents in their possession before this or any other system can be effective. At present many have no identity documents in their possession.

3. Berths for Merchant Shipping.

a. These are grouped in four places:

Berths 1, 2 and 3

Berths 4 and 4A

Berths 5, 6, 7 and 8

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It is strongly urged, however, that all Italian Service personnel should have standard identity documents in their possession before this or any other system can be effective. At present many have no identity documents in their possession.

3. Berths for Merchant Shipping.

5. These are grouped in four places:

- Berths 1, 2 and 3
- Berths 4 and 4A
- Berths 5, 6, 7 and 8
- Berth 11 (New Landing Berth).

With the exception of 5, 6, 7 and 8 which are within the Arsenal, physical protection is everywhere inadequate.

Berths 1, 2 and 3 constitute the main merchant harbour, which handles freight, military stores, equipment and troops. Controlled entry and exit is by one gate which is open day and night. There is also a railway line entering at another point, near which uncontrolled entry is at present possible through a small coal siding, as well as along the line itself.

Berths 4 and 4A are situated alongside a main road, the Corso Vittorio Emanuele. There are two gates, and an entrance to an underground passage leading into the centre of the town.

The New Landing Berth is also alongside a main road, the Corso Garibaldi, and is open to all and sundry.

All gates except one at Berths 4 and 4A are manned by Italian Port Militia, who since the Armistice have been incorporated in the Port CO.M. There

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11 JAN 1944
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are 50 of these lower grade Italian port police available at TARANTO. Port GIP are stationed with them in each case, one per gate. GIP also patrol berths 1, 2 and 3, and are in attendance at the New Landing Berth during actual disembarkations.

1.

There are three types of pass in use in the Merchant Harbour:

- (1) Green cards issued by DADI to civilian dock workers, and over stamped by the PSC.
- (2) Passes issued by the Italian Captain of the Port to his own harbour officials and staff. These are also over stamped by the PSC.
- (3) Merchant Seamen's Shore Leave passes issued by the PSC. The SSIO's stamp also appears on these passes, as a disciplinary precaution.

Passes 1 and 2 are issued with unlimited validity, but holders of pass 1 are said to have their cases reviewed by DADI every 15 days. Pass 3 is issued for duration of ship's stay and the master is instructed to destroy them on departure.

Italian Service personnel are admitted on duty in forced bodies only. Individuals of this category require pass 2. It will be noted that this is in contrast to the system at the Arsenal.

2. Recommendations.

- (1) Physical. The position at berths 1, 2 and 3 is considered unsatisfactory. Fire is required between buildings at several places alongside the railway siding, and especially between a small Italian workshop and the railway sidings. It is considered that a barbed wire fence with a gate should be erected across the railway track entering the area. Total run of wiring required is about 75 yards, 8 feet high.

At berths 4 and 4A the gate at top of a flight of steps at the North End should be permanently closed and blocked with wire.

Wiring is also required to cut off the latrines from the underground passage to the centre of the town.

The pavement of Corso Vittorio Emanuele adjacent to the berth is considered to be inadequately separated by the present low railings. The remedy recommended is to put a wire fence along the pavement curb of this stretch of roadway, i.e. to cut off the west pavement and confine pedestrians to the other side of the road. The estimated length of 8 feet wiring is 400 feet.

The same requirements apply to the New Landing Berth, where about 100 yards of the North pavement or Corso Garibaldi should be wired off.

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The same requirements apply to the New Landing Berth, where about 100 yards of the North pavement or Corso Garibaldi should be wired off.

(2) Guarding. The present system of guarding by OMP and Port Militia is considered satisfactory, but it is recommended that a sentry should be stationed at all times day and night to guard the New Landing Berth.

(3) Passes. It is recommended that a system of issue by one authority only (with the exception of Shore Leave passes) be adopted, as suggested for the Arsenal. The appropriate authority in this case is the Captain of the Port.

4. Buffoluto Ferry.

This ferry, which works from within the Arsenal area, leaves every morning with about 4000 workers for the Buffoluto Powder Works, and returns with them every evening. There appears to be no good reason why it should be used by anyone else. The Buffoluto workers carry a permit in the form of a certificate of employment, 1877 of the management of the works, which is recognised as a pass to the ferry. At present traffic is controlled at the Buffoluto end by O.M.P. only, and at the Arsenal Gate (No. 1).

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(Equals British Restricted)

24 JAN 1944

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

file
AG 461-5 GBI-AGM

21 January 1944

SUBJECT: Security Danger of Wide Distribution Lists.

TO : All Concerned.

1. Information has been received that the enemy has obtained valuable information regarding our Order of Battle from distribution lists placed on captured documents.

2. Originators of documents will avoid, as far as possible, showing a wide distribution by one of the following methods:

a. Showing only the designations of higher echelons, to which sufficient copies should be sent for further distribution to lower echelons. In this case the scale to be adopted should be shown; that is, one copy per battalion. This method is particularly suitable for distribution within a theater or force.

b. Adopting a standard distribution list which may be given an initial circulation and which subsequently should be referred to as "Distribution List A (plus or minus---)". This method is particularly suitable for the distribution of a series of documents to substantially the same addressees.

3. When it is essential to show a wide distribution, the classification of a document will be that warranted by its entire contents.

4. The above does not apply to distributions within a headquarters.

By command of General WILSON;

J. L. Tarr
J. L. TARR,
Colonel, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

af
DISTRIBUTION:
"D"

311.5-
X 461- P'actions

PAGES MISSING OR
PAGINATION INCORRECT -
FILMED AS FOUND

11 JAN 1944
1747
It is recommended that a CMP control be established at the Arsenal landing stage to cover departures and arrivals.


5. Remarks. It will be noticed that it has been recommended throughout that CMP should be present with CC.RR at all control points, and on certain patrols, as Italian CC.RR are not authorised to check British personnel's passes. This is intended as a safeguard against slackness on the part of the CC.RR. It should, combined with the similar pass systems advocated for British and Italians alike, at once tighten up the requirements for control of Italians and also ensure stricter enforcement.

It is considered that, in view of the great importance of TARANTO as a Naval Base and supply port, the above recommendations should receive consideration of the highest priority, with a view to the work being put in hand without delay.

TOS 16-45 A

R. Math.
Major-General, *J.*
Commanding No. 2 District.


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ADDITIONAL HIRING SPECIN ARE


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EXISTING PROTECTION SNAHN
HIRING REQUIRED SNAHN


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
1292

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



TOWN PLAN OF TARANTO

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



SUBJECT: Security Policy and Procedure

H.A. 15 Army Group,
C.M.P.

BR. SECRET 1400/2/G(Ib). SECRET.

1549/1400/2/G(Ib).

24 Oct. 43

TO: Allied Military Mission BRINDISI

1. Will you please advise this H.A. as to the procedure which should be adopted in the following aspects of security work.

2. (a) Cases have occurred and will no doubt continue, in which the activities of personnel of the Italian Army call for their arrest and trial, detention or internment on security grounds. This may occur both inside the "Kingdom" or in territory administered by A.G.

(b) The following two cases in particular have arisen:

NAPAL EOMI

(i) Col. VITTOCI, comd. CROCIOLIE Airfield was arrested by F.S.P. on the grounds that he concealed an Italian aircraft and, after our occupation, made a pro-German anti-ally speech to his men. He was handed over by the F.S.P. to the Carabinieri for custody, and the documents of the case were forwarded to Italian Seventh Army through the Allied Military Mission for disciplinary action.

It was later understood that VITTOCI was to be released and restored to his command on the orders of General RANZA. Eighth Army instructed the F.S.P. to re-arrest him if he were released and to retain him in Allied custody.

(ii) Colonel MAGLITTI, commanding the garrison of CAT ANZAR, is alleged to have declared, after the Allied occupation of the town, that he did not recognise the Armistice, and to have given orders to his troops on 11 Sept. that all arms in the barracks were to be held at the disposal of the Germans, if and when they should return.

He was arrested by the Allies and handed over to the Italian authorities, in whose custody he still is. The Italian authorities wish the British authorities to dispose of him.

(c) It is desired to ascertain:

(i) Whether Italian military personnel guilty of security offences should be tried by Allied or Italian Courts, and by what type of court.

(ii) Whether they are subject to internment by the Allied authorities, if their continued liberty would constitute a threat to our security, though not chargeable with a specific security offence. If not, no such cases should be

201 - Col. Vitucci
X 371.2 - Security

201- Col Vitucci
X 371.2 - Security

detention or internment on security grounds. This may occur both inside the "Kingdom" or in territory administered by A.G.

(b) The following two cases in particular have arisen:

NAPOLITANO

(i) Col. VITUCCI, commander of the 1st Airborne Division, was arrested by F.S.P. on the grounds that he concealed an Italian aircraft and, after our occupation, made a pro-German anti-ally speech to his men. He was handed over by the F.S.P. to the Carabinieri for custody, and the documents of the case were forwarded to Italian Seventh Army through the Allied Military Mission for disciplinary action.

It was later understood that VITUCCI was to be released and restored to his command on the orders of General RANNA. Eighth Army instructed the F.S.P. to re-arrest him if he were released and to retain him in Allied custody.

(ii) Colonel MAGGIORI, commanding the garrison of Calvi, is alleged to have declared, after the Allied occupation of the town, that he did not recognise the Armistice, and to have given orders to his troops on 14 Sept. that all arms in the barracks were to be held at the disposal of the Germans, if and when they should return.

He was arrested by the Allies and handed over to the Italian authorities, in whose custody he still is. The Italian authorities wish the British authorities to dispose of him.

(c) It is desired to ascertain:

(i) Whether Italian military personnel guilty of security offences should be tried by Allied or Italian Courts, and by what type of court.

(ii) Whether they are subject to internment by the Allied authorities, if their continued liberty would constitute a threat to our security, though not chargeable with a specific security offence. If not, for such cases should be disposed of.

(iii) Any distinction between the procedure to be adopted in the "Kingdom" and that in A.G. territory.

(4) With regard to security action against civilians in the "Kingdom", the policy has been laid down that any such action should be necessary by Allied Security agencies should normally and where possible be taken through the Italian authorities, i.e. security arrests should be made by the Italian police and security offences tried by Italian courts.

In general this procedure appears to be satisfactory, as most security cases, e.g. pro-Fascist elements, suspected pro-German activities etc, may be regarded as a joint threat to the Allies and to the Badoglio Government.

(b) Cases are liable to arise, however, of civilians in the "Kingdom" committing very serious security offences against specifically Allied interests... 371.2/2

- 2 -

(c) For example, a civilian in the ALFA-UMA area is alleged to have offered money to another civilian to blow up a building in which Allied Military personnel are accommodated. 1 Airborne Div is anxious that this case should be dealt with directly by the appropriate Allied Military authorities rather than by the Italian civil authorities.

(d) It is felt that an Italian civil court is not a wholly suitable agency to try such cases, unless an Allied representative were included in the court. An Allied Military Court Martial might be a possible alternative.

4. It could be appreciated if we could be advised at an early date of the proper procedure to be followed in the above cases, both particular and general.

W. D. Gibson, Lt Col
W.D. GIBSON, Lt.Col.,

Brigadier,
R.C.S.(I).

WDC/ALB.

COPY TO: C-2 A.F.H.
G.S.I. Eighth Army
No. 2 District
AGG Hq. 15 Army Group.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

/sk
59 Mail
FILE

SVG/RELAY NR:

M/C NR : 10/17

CLASS :

REF. NR: I(b) 589

FREQ : PRIORITY

FILED : 161450A

FROM : 15th Army Group

REC'D : 171210A

TO : FATIMA info No. 2 Dist. (FORTBASE)

Understand Colonel Napoleoni to be released today 16th October and put in command Grottaglie airfield by order of General Ranza. Was arrested by 8th Army because of anti-Ally sentiments and action and detained Carabinieri barracks Taranto. All documents sent through Military Mission to 7th Italian Army for disciplinary action. Release of officer considered most unwise particularly to assume position of responsibility.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG Files
1 - Diary
1 - M/C

201 - Colonel Napoleoni

U. S. RESTRICTED
Equals British RESTRICTED

/ek

INCOMING

R-177/91

16/91

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

FREEDOM from MIDEAST

FATIMA

310221A

Get 310805A

Reference your 2626 FHGAB dated 26th October. TO FREEDOM RPTD FATIMA FROM MIDEAST.
Paraphrase of Sino 2903A by FREEDOM.

It is assured that all security precautions will be taken and that the CDO Istanbul will receive all names.

Arrangements may be made to examine repatriates in transit through Egypt.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG Files ✓
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - M/C
- 1 - Gen. Taylor - Information

311.5 - Security

U. S. RESTRICTED
Equals British RESTRICTED

9710

ag

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

COPY
SECRET

SUBJECT: Control of Movement

H.Q. 15 Army Group
C.M.F.

RR SECRET - U.S. SECRET

15AG/1101/10/GI(B)

19 Nov 43

Fifth Army
Eighth Army

1. The security problem and danger presented by the movement of refugees etc. South-Eastwards through our forward positions has led to the preparation and issue of a comprehensive scheme for the proper security control of such persons. (Ref AFHQ Intelligence Instruction No. 33 dated 13 Nov 43.)

2. It is considered desirable that movement North-Westwards into the forward Army areas should also be subject to security control, with the object of preventing (a) the infiltration of unauthorized persons from Allied into German-occupied ITALY, and (b) the circulation of such persons into the forward areas, where vital military moves and dispositions may be observed either wilfully or casually, with consequent danger of leakage of information.

3. It is realised that certain controls of this nature are already enforced at various points in Army or Corps Areas, but it is thought that these should be co-ordinated and a continuous line of control established across the ITALIAN Peninsula, so that the possibility of unauthorized movement North-Westward may be reduced to the minimum.

4. In selecting the most suitable line, the following considerations must be taken into account:

(a) The restricted zone should include as few large towns and important civil centres as possible, as otherwise great difficulties would arise in the strict limitation of access thereto.

(b) A natural obstacle, preferably a river, should be followed where possible, thus facilitating the establishment of check points.

5. It is therefore suggested that:

(a) The following line would prove most suitable for the purpose: River FORTORE from its mouth to river junction H 8113 near BASILICE (H 8110), thence road BASILICE - SAN MARCO (H 7301) - FRAGNETO (N 6394) - PONTE (N 5790), thence River CALORE and River VOLTURNO to latter's mouth.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-1-80 BY 1045

311.5- Security
X 383.7- Refugees

(a) The restricted zone should include as few large towns and important civil centres as possible, as otherwise great difficulties would arise in the strict limitation of access thereto.

(b) A natural obstacle, preferably a river, should be followed where possible, thus facilitating the establishment of check points.

(a) The following line would prove most suitable for the purpose: River FORTONE from its mouth to river junction H 8113 near BASILICE (H 8110), thence road BASILICE - SAN MARCO (H 7301) - FRACINETO (N 6394) - PONTE (N 5790), thence River CALORE and River VOITURNO to latter's mouth.

(c) These check points should be manned by one N.C.O. of the CO.RR. (Territoriale or G.S.) and one N.C.O. of the Military Police and/or one N.C.O. of the FSP/CIC, according to the importance of the post and the availability of personnel.

(d) Apart from Allied military personnel, only those persons holding passes issued in accordance with the principles laid down in this HQ letter 15AG.1412/L/GI(b) dated 17 Nov 43 should be allowed to cross this control line from the South-East.

U. S. SECRET

9/...

-----date-----
Sec/Army by TAG/

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6. Will you please forward to this HQ your comments on the above proposals, and give particulars of any existing measures which may be in force in your Area for the Control of Civilian movement North-Westward.

W. D. GIBSON, Lt. Col.,
for Major-General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

WDG/GWD

Copy to: A.F.H.Q. (G-2)
No. 2 District
P.B.S.
A.M.G. H.Q. 15 Army Group
Lt. Col. ROBB c/o G.S.I. No. 2 District
Allied Control Commission

U.S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

COPY

Subject: Control of Movement.

H.Q. 15 Army Group
C.M.F.

SECRET

15-G/1401/10/G(Ib)

Fifth Army
Eighth Army

27 Nov 43.

Ref this H.Q. letter of even number dated 19 Nov 43.

1. The Control line described in para 5(a) of the above letter will be established forthwith.

2. The method of control will be as set out in paras 5(b) and (c) of the above letter.

3. Armies will be responsible for organising the check points and patrols.

When Eighth Army rear boundary moves forward to the FORTONE River, the question of the provision of personnel for check points on this River should if necessary be co-ordinated by Eighth Army with No. 2 District.

4. Apart from Allied military personnel, and Italian military personnel on duty, only those persons holding passes issued in accordance with the principles laid down in this H.Q. letter 15 A.G.1412/4/GI(b) dated 17 Nov 43 will be allowed to cross this control line from the South-East.

5. As regards the issue of passes to civilians by A.M.G. officers, A.M.G. is arranging for the following procedure to be adopted for such passes.

Any civilian wishing to cross the Control Line from S.E. to N.W. must apply to the nearest Civil Affairs Officer or Allied Control Commission representative: if the latter approves the application, he will forward it to the C.A.O. of the town or Province to which the civilian wishes to proceed: the latter C.A.O. will then issue the pass, if approved.

In this way Armies (through their S.C.A.O.) can control the number of persons permitted to enter this forward restricted zone and the degree of strictness to be applied in the granting of passes.

A.M.G. is arranging for due publicity to be given to the Civil population as to the existence of this restricted zone, and to the above pass procedure.

6. Access to FOGGIA Province is also to be restricted.

The same principles and procedure, as described above, are to be applied with regard to the issue of passes to enter this Province from the

311.5- Security
X 383.7- Refugees

311.5- Security
X 383.7- Refugees

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4. Apart from Allied military personnel, and Italian military personnel on duty, only those persons holding passes issued in accordance with the principles laid down in this H.Q. letter 15 A.G. 1112/14/GI(b) dated 17 Nov 43 will be allowed to cross this control line from the South-East.

5. As regards the issue of passes to civilians by A.M.G. officers, A.M.G. is arranging for the following procedure to be adopted for such passes.

Any civilian wishing to cross the Control Line from S.E. to N.W. must apply to the nearest Civil Affairs Officer or Allied Control Commission representative; if the latter approves the application, he will forward it to the C.A.O. of the town or Province to which the civilian wishes to proceed: the latter C.A.O. will then issue the pass, if approved.

In this way Armies (through their S.C.A.O.) can control the number of persons permitted to enter this forward restricted zone and the degree of strictness to be applied in the granting of passes.

A.M.G. is arranging for due publicity to be given to the Civil population as to the existence of this restricted zone, and to the above pass procedure.

6. Access to FOGGIA Province is also to be restricted.

The same principles and procedure, as described above, are to be applied with regard to the issue of passes to enter this Province from the South or West.

The control is to be enforced by C.C.R.R.: F.S.P. should supervise their efficient enforcement thereof on a spot-check basis.

A.M.G. is arranging for the necessary publicity to be given to this restriction.

7. Persons wishing to move from FOGGIA Province to the Forward Restricted Zone will be subject to the same restrictions and regulations as persons from any other Province.

This copy only NOT BE SHOWN to duly accredited unofficial researchers Order Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----
413310
A.C.C.

W.D. GIBSON, Lt. Col.,
for Major-General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 ARMY GROUP

Copy to: A.F.H.Q. (G-2 C.I.)

No. 2 District.

P.B.S.

12 Air Force.

A.M.G. H.Q. 15 Army Group

Lt. Col. Robb., c/o G.S.I. No 2 District

U.S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

U. S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET

- INCOMING

/hft

MOST SECRET

33/01

ROUTINE

8043

DEC 011404A

AFHQ G-2 FREEDOM

DEC 020635A

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION RPTD BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHE
MADRID NUMBER 2 DISTRICT

Cite FROBI signed G in G. Necessary that lists of names and pertinent security information needed concerning Italian Military Mission in Spain be despatched here prior to repatriation so that number 2 District can screen members arriving at Toronto. Also advisable that Italian Government instruct their Embassy that returning members will only be permitted to proceed to territories under the control of Royal Italian Government.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - M/C
- 1 - Gen. Taylor (action)

This copy only NOT BE SHOWN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ _____ date _____

4 13310

8043

9737

U. S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET

Subject :- Security - Italian Military Personnel. DEC 8 - 1943

51B-17586
HQ 2 DISTRICT CMF
2022/41 G.

A.C.C.

7 Dec 43.

Reference Freedom signal 8043 dated 1 Dec 43.

ATCHD
AG ACC

Kindly forward to this H.Q. lists of names and security information referred to in above signal, together with any recommendations you may have in the matter.

TOS. 12-40 A.

A.B. Malt. ^W
Lt-Col. ⁱⁿ
GS. 9708

RJC/mip

13 December 1943

In reply
refer to: 311.5

Subject: Security. Italian Military Personnel.

To: Commanding Officer, HQ, No. 2 District, C.M.F.

Reference your letter 2022/41G of 7 December 1943, which in turn referred to Freedom signal 8043 dated 1 December 1943, the information you request is not available at this time.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

EJC
ROGER H. DEXBY
1st Lt. AGD
Adjutant General

311.5 - Security

af

9733

26 DEC 1943

RWB3/S

Report on MACCHIA, manager of Hotel Internazionale

Macchia Pantaleo born at Martignano, Lecce, 15 Apr. 1907.

Became a member of the Fascist Party when studying law in Rome 1924 and continued so during his career. Joined the Fascist Militia as an Officer in 1930 (according to him to help in getting a job), and held the rank of Capt. until dismissed ~~the body was~~. He claims to have been not an active officer. In 1940 he served in camp for two months with the army, but was released for the "reserved occupation of clerk in the Provincial Administration". In 1942 was released called to colours but again released owing to "renal trouble".

He has for some time held the post of secretary to the Provincial Administration in Brindisi and still acts in that capacity. He was asked by the Limited Liability Coy. which owns this hotel, to superintend it after it had been requisitioned for the Allied Military Commission, as the manager is on active service". As there are two full time paid secretaries (one of whom is his cousin) his post seems quite superfluous.

He claims to have been a member of the Fascist party simply for what he could get out of it, and that he never had real Fascist sympathies: except at the beginning, he thought Fascism the only alternative to Communism or Socialism; which he thought would have ruined Italy. I am prepared to believe he was not an ardent Fascist but merely a time-server.

Since managing this hotel, and he does so solely in the evening from 1900 hours (and on the evening of the 20 Dec. when there was an alert for three minutes he saw fit to absent himself for the whole evening) - he has had food taken to his home every day at 1100 hrs by "arrangement with Capt. Bocchino". He has knowingly allowed the servants to take from the hotel "left-over food" against orders forbidding it. He has known that relatives of certain employees of the hotel regularly enter the hotel without having any business here.

I have ordered him 1) to inform the whole hotel staff that no food at all will be taken from this building.
2) to inform all hotel staff that they will have no visitors at all.

Further, I think he might stay on here for a little longer, at least, so that I may have further opportunities of talking with him.

Brindisi 21 Dec 43.

Capt. G2 ACC.

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Brindisi 21 Dec 43.

Capt. G2 ACC.

000.1 - Fascists...

R. B. B.

26 Dec.

Checked with

Bocchino

not

necessary!

not desired.

(976)

OK file

1309