

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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10000/100/60

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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ADMINISTRATION OF SARDINIA  
SEPT. 1943 - JAN. 1944

7/PP

1952  
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Classified papers  
to which access  
has been granted  
have been stamped



INCOMING MESSAGE

10302

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 232103 B 1949 Sep

TO : FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 8689

PREC: PRIORITY

-----

Instruct BADOLIO to appoint a high commissioner or other representative as the Supreme Civil Authority over the 3 Prefectures of Sardinia, with instructions that he, the prefects, and civil administration are to be guided by Allied Control Officers who will be sent to Sardinia to supervise and coordinate the civil administration, economic, political and financial matters. A token Allied Garrison is being sent into Sardinia to meet our naval and air operational requirements. A limited number of control officers are being sent as soon as possible in order that the administration there may get off to the right start. This team of officers will include specially organized groups of technicians to supervise the working of the coal mines and see that they produce without delay.

/s/ Eisenhower

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

10301

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 241953 B Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 92

PREG: IMMEDIATE

-----  
YOUR NUMBER EIGHT SIX EIGHT NINE.

HAVE SEEN BADOGLIO WHO PROMISES TO COMPLY AT ONCE. HE WILL  
PROBABLY APPOINT THE SENIOR PREFECT IN SARDINIA AS THE SUPREME  
CIVIL AUTHORITY.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARIANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission



INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

10300

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 251430 B Sep 1943

TO: FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 9310

PRED: PRIORITY

666- - - - -

Name of High Commissioner appointed by Badoglio required here as soon  
as known

EISENHOWER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

10299

FROM: FATDA

DATE: 251943Z Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV GP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 112

PREC: IMMEDIATE

-----

REOURAD NUMBER NINE TWO. BADOGLIO HAS APPOINTED THE PREFECT BRUNO  
AS HEAD OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF SARDINIA AND IS SENDING HIM AT ONCE  
A DIRECTIVE ON THE LINES YOU INSTRUCTED.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission



OUTGOING MESSAGE

10236

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 271714A Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 145

PREC: PRIORITY

REURAD NINE THREE ONE ZERO CITE FMHQ.

REQUESTED NAME OF HIGH COMMISSIONER APPOINTED BY BADOGLIO DASH BRUNO.

MILITARY GENERAL PASSO. BADOGLIO SENDING DIRECTIVE TODAY.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

M/C NO: H 1/02 <sup>10 37</sup>

REF NO: 1899

FILED : 011827A Oct

REC'D :

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Regional Allied Commissioner Sardinia reports currency proclamation not yet received and General Basso strongly prejudiced against AM Lire. ( TO FATIMA FOR MACFARLANE SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FMGS). Require Badoglio take necessary action. Inform this headquarters if communications satisfactory with Sardinia.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

10-35

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PRIOR : PRIORITY

FROM : EISENHOWER

TO : MACFARLANE

M/C NR: N 2/02

REF NO. 1903

FILED: 011830A Oct

REC'D:

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Appointment of PIETRO BRUNO by BADOLIO Government to be Commissioner of Sardinia strongly protested by General ROOSEVELT and Brigadier BOULNGIS, Regional Allied Commissioner. BRUNO's Fascist <sup>and</sup> and pro German record and his unpopularity with Sardinians justify protest. ROOSEVELT and BOULNGIS suggest General BASCO would make excellent Civil and Military Governor. Proposal concurred in. Necessary approach on above lines to Italian Government should be taken by you.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

10195

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM

M/C NO: 23/02

REF NO: 236

FILED: 021915A Oct

REC'D:

REFERENCE YOUR NINE FIVE AND ONE EIGHT NINE NINE PD TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED  
MACFARLANE PD MARSHAL BADOGLIO REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE CURRENCY  
PROCLAMATION BE TRANSMITTED TO GENERAL BASSO IN SARDINIA PD QUOTE  
(TEXT OF KINGS CURRENCY PROCLAMATION LESS HIS ALEANIAN AND ETHIOPIAN TITLES DATED  
TWO FOUR SEPTEMBER)

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV OP at AMILCAR

M/C NO: 24/02 91

REF NO: 237

FILED : 021916A Oct

REC'D :

-----  
REFERENCE YOUR ONE EIGHT NINE NINE PD TO FREEDOM RPT AFHQ ADVANCE COMMAND POST  
AT AMILCAR FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE FREEDOM PASS IN CIPHER HELD PD THE  
ITALIAN AUTHORITIES INFORM ME THAT MAJOR SOLIAZZO LEFT BRINDISI ONE OCTOBER  
CARRYING THE CURRENCY PROCLAMATION TO SARDINIA BY AIR PD HE HAD COPIES FOR THE  
PREFECTS OF CAGLIARI CMA SASSARI AND NUORO PD AM ARRANGING TO SUPPLEMENT THIS  
BY SENDING THE PROCLAMATION BY RADIO TO GENERAL BASSO

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM REPEAT AFHQ ADV GP  
AT AMILCAR

M/C NR: 2/10200

REF NR: 244

FILED: 030918A

REC'D:

-----  
REFERENCE YOUR ONE NINE ZERO THREE. WITH REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENTAL  
ORGANIZATION IN SARDINIA MARSHALL BADOLIO STATES THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE  
IN SARDINIA IS GENERAL BASSO. BRUNOS POSITION IS THAT OF A SUBORDINATE HEADING  
THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. THE MARSHALL STATES THAT THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES  
SHOULD COMMUNICATE WITH BASSO AND NOT WITH BRUNO.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUT GOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

M/C NR: 6/09

REF NO. 246

FILED: 031421A Oct

REC'D:

10292

REFERENCE MY TWO FOUR FOUR.

I SAW BADOGLIO AGAIN THIS MORNING. HE ASSURES ME THAT BRUNO HAS BEEN RELIEVED OF HIS OFFICE AND THAT A SUCCESSOR WILL BE APPOINTED IN DUE COURSE. IN THE MEAN TIME HE HOPES OUR AUTHORITIES WILL DEAL ON ALL SUBJECTS WITH GENERAL BASSO.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.M. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

10291

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 01/10

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR: 338

PREC: PRIORITY

FILED: 101124A Oct

FROM: FATIMA

REC'D:

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILO-R

-----

MARSHALL BADOLIO HAS INFORMED THE MISSION OFFICIALLY OF BRUNCE DISMISSAL  
IN SARDINIA PD AND STATES THAT ALL CIVIL AND MILITARY POWERS HAVE BEEN  
ASSUMED BY GENERAL BASSO.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: RESTRICTED

PREQ : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

M/C NR: 10/09

REF NR: 4968

FILED : 090905A Oct

REC'D :

-----

Reports from Sardinia clearly indicate that General Giangiacomo Castagna is pro Fascist and non cooperative. (For FATIMA signed EISENHOWER site FFMGS). We should insist that Marshall Badoglio remove him from his present command and from the island of Sardinia.

RESTRICTED



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

FREQ : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NR: 04/00-33

REF NR: 341

FILED : 101155A Oct

REC'D :

-----  
REFERENCE YOUR FOUR NINE SIX EIGHT AND OUR THREE THREE EIGHT PD

I RECOMMEND THAT THE REMOVAL OF CASTAGNA BE EFFECTED BY THE ALLIED COMMISSIONER IN SARDINIA ACTING THROUGH GENERAL BASSO PD MARSHALL RADOGLIO WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO DISCHARGE THIS OFFICER ARBITRARILY WITHOUT SOME SORT OF HEARING PD BASSO SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ACTION OR AT LEAST TO RECOMMEND THE REMOVAL TO RADOGLIO WHO CAN THEN ACT WITHOUT HESITATION.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA  
Acting Chief of Mission



ALLIED MILITARY MESSAGE - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

M/C NR: 143-38

REF NR: 6255

FILED : 121259A Oct

REC'D : 121508A

-v- - - - -

Since CASTAGNA is second in command, we feel that BADOGLIO not BASCO is the one to take action. (To FATIMA for TAYLOR rpt AFHQ ADVANCED COMMAND POST signed EISENHOWER cite FHNG3 reference your #4698 of 9th October). It is not a question of discharging CASTAGNA but of relieving him of his present command and removing him from the island. Suggest that BADOGLIO recall him to his headquarters for consultation and that no new command be given until his attitude is ascertained with regard to the position which Italy is about to assume.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

10287

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NR: 08/14

REF NR: 405

FILED: 141841A Oct

REC'D:

-----  
REFERENCE YOUR SIX TWO FIVE FIVE PD

~~GENERAL AMBROSIO IS RECALLING CASTAGNA TO BRINDISI AT ONCE~~

GENERAL AMBROSIO IS RECALLING CASTAGNA TO BRINDISI AT ONCE

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General., USA  
Acting Chief of Mission



INCOMING

SECRET

ROUTINE

FREEDOM

FATIMA

14/25/85

1630

241605A

250230A

Surprise to learn 22nd from Fable that Dasso and Assored (?) move same date to mainland and that Nagli from Corsica replaces him. ADDRESSED FATIMA  
RPTD AFHQ ADV CP, FABLE, FAKIR FOR ACTION SIGNED CINC. CITE FHGCT. Regret reply not despatched your routine 436 of 16 October but this did not indicate intention immediate move. Owing complicated problems attached re-distribution Corsica and Sardinia garrisons and Civil administration. Instruct Italian High Command refrain from carrying out moves of this kind prior coordination and notify all concerned to insure continuity.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

10285

26 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, General Ambrosio, Chief of the  
Supreme General Staff.

It is requested that in the future the Comando Supremo refrain from moving key officials holding important military or administrative positions without first coordinating the matter with the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force Headquarters. The need for this understanding is suggested by the recent move of General Basso from Sardinia and General Magli from Corsica.

For the Chief of Mission

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FREEDOM

TO: EATMA

M/C NO: N 1/02

REF NO: 1899

FILED: 011827A Oct

REC'D:

Regional Allied Commissioner Sardinia reports currency proclamation not yet received and General Basso strongly prejudiced against AM Lire. ( TO EATMA FOR MACFARLANE SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FIM(S)). Require Badoglio take necessary action. Inform this headquarters if communications satisfactory with Sardinia.

THIS COPY ONLY IS TO BE SHOWN to duly  
accredited unofficial researchers Order  
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

412310

16284



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : EISENHOWER

TO : MACFARLANE

M/C NR: N 2/02

REF NO. 1903

FILED: 011830A Oct

REC'D:

-----

Appointment of PIETRO BRUNO by BADOGLIO Government to be Commissioner of Sardinia strongly protested by General ROOSEVELT and Brigadier BOULNOIS, Regional Allied Commissioner. <sup>and</sup> BRUNO's Fascist and Pro German record and his unpopularity with Sardinians justify protest. ROOSEVELT and BOULNOIS suggest General BASSO would make excellent Civil and Military Governor. Proposal concurred in. Necessary approach on above lines to Italian Government should be taken by you.

**SÉCRET**

Equals British MOST SECRET

MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION

Allied Force Headquarters

*Sign + return  
MSP*

File # \_\_\_\_\_.

30th September, 1943.  
(Date)

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Documents.

TO : Lieut. Gen Mason McFarlane.

1. Herewith are 1 copy(ies) of Instructions on Allied Control over Sardinia copy No. 11.

2. Receipt is to be acknowledged on the form below, which should be returned immediately to Military Government Section, Allied Force Headquarters, A. P. O. #512.

*CA 102*  
*Where?*  
*after lunch*  
*Archives*  
*12 Nov 44.*

*T. B. Jackman*  
*Major*  
T. B. JACKMAN,  
Major,  
Mil. Govt. Sec.

*10-80*

*CA 11-1 - Govt, Sardinia*



INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 232103 B 1943 Sep

TO : PATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 8689

PREC: PRIORITY

-----

Instruct BADGLIO to appoint a high commissioner or other representative as the Supreme Civil Authority over the 3 Prefectures of Sardinia, with instructions that he, the prefects, and civil administration are to be guided by Allied Control Officers who will be sent to Sardinia to supervise and coordinate the civil administration, economic, political and financial matters. A token Allied Garrison is being sent into Sardinia to meet our naval and air operational requirements. A limited number of control officers are being sent as soon as possible in order that the administration there may get off to the right start. This team of officers will include specially organized groups of technicians to supervise the working of the coal mines and see that they produce without delay.

/s/ Eisenhower

This copy may only be shown to duly  
accredited unofficial researchers Order  
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

413310

10281

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 241953 B Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 92

PREC: IMMEDIATE

YOUR NUMBER EIGHT SIX EIGHT NINE.

HAVE SEEN BADOGLIO WHO PROMISES TO COMPLY AT ONCE. HE WILL  
PROBABLY APPOINT THE SENIOR PREFECT IN SARDINIA AS THE SUPREME  
CIVIL AUTHORITY.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission

This copy only NOT BE SHOWN to duly  
accredited unofficial researchers Order  
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----  
413310



INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE : 251430 B Sep 1943

TO : FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 9310

PREC: PRIORITY

666 - - - - -

Name of High Commissioner appointed by Badoglio required here as soon  
as known

EISENHOWER

10279

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 251943B Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 112

PREC: IMMEDIATE

REOURAD NUMBER NINE TWO. BADOGLIO HAS APPOINTED THE PREFECT BRUNO  
AS HEAD OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF SARDINIA AND IS SENDING HIM AT ONCE  
A DIRECTIVE ON THE LINES YOU INSTRUCTED.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission

10-7



OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 271714A Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 145

PREC: PRIORITY

REURAD NINE THREE ONE ZERO CITE FHMGS.

REQUESTED NAME OF HIGH COMMISSIONER APPOINTED BY BADOGLIO DASH BRUNO.

MILITARY GENERAL BASSO. BADOGLIO SENDING DIRECTIVE TODAY.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission.

10-77

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C NO: 23/02

REF NO: 236

FILED : 021915A Oct

REC'D :

REFERENCE YOUR NINE FIVE AND ONE EIGHT NINE NINE PD TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED  
MACFARLANE PD MARSHAL BADOLIO REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE CURRENCY  
PROCLAMATION BE TRANSMITTED TO GENERAL BASSO IN GARDINIA PD QUOTE  
(TEXT OF KING'S CURRENCY PROCLAMATION LESS HIS ALBANIAN AND ETHIOPIAN TITLES DATED  
TWO FOUR SEPTEMBER)

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

10276



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NO: 24/02

REF NO: 237

FILED: 021916A Oct

REC'D:

REFERENCE YOUR ONE EIGHT NINE NINE PD TO FREEDOM RPT AFHQ ADVANCE COMMAND POST  
AT AMILCAR FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE FREEDOM PASS IN CIPHER HELD PD THE  
ITALIAN AUTHORITIES INFORM ME THAT MAJOR SOLIAZZO LEFT BRINDISI ONE OCTOBER  
CARRYING THE CURRENCY PROCLAMATION TO SARDINIA BY AIR PD HE HAD COPIES FOR THE  
PREFECTS OF CAGLIARI CMA SASSARI AND NUORO PD AM ARRANGING TO SUPPLEMENT THIS  
BY SENDING THE PROCLAMATION BY RADIO TO GENERAL BASSO

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

10275

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM REPEAT AFHQ ADV CP  
AT AMILCAR

M/C NR: 2/3

REF NR: 244

FILED : 030918A

REC'D :

-----

REFERENCE YOUR ONE NINE ZERO THREE. WITH REFERENCE TO THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION IN SARDINIA MARSHALL BADOGLIO STATES THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE IN SARDINIA IS GENERAL BASSO. BRUNOS POSITION IS THAT OF A SUBORDINATE HEADING THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. THE MARSHALL STATES THAT THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES SHOULD COMMUNICATE WITH BASSO AND NOT WITH BRUNO.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.

1027



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUT GOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

M/C NR: 6/03

REF NO. 246

FILED: 031421A Cat

REC'D:

REFERENCE MY TWO FOUR FOUR.

I SAW BADOGLIO AGAIN THIS MORNING. HE ASSURES ME THAT BRUNO HAS BEEN RELIEVED OF HIS OFFICE AND THAT A SUCCESSOR WILL BE APPOINTED IN DUE COURSE. IN THE MEAN TIME HE HOPES OUR AUTHORITIES WILL DEAL ON ALL SUBJECTS WITH GENERAL BASSO.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission

10-71


IL CAPO DELL'UFFICIO AFFARI CIVILI

P.M.I67,11 3 ottobre 1943

APPUNTO PER IL BRIGADIER GENERAL  
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

In relazione alla nostra conversazione di stamane mi permetto richiamare alla Sua attenzione quanto segnalato dal Comando Supremo, cioè che da parte degli esperti anglo-americani nell'isola non verrebbero mantenuti i necessari contatti con S.E. il Generale Basso per coordinare le locali attività di carattere civile, politico ed economico, mentre un accordo per coordinare tali attività è già intervenuto fra il Generale ROOSEVELT e il predetto Generale Italiano.

Le sarò grato se Ella vorrà cortesemente facilitare, nel comune interesse, l'opera di collaborazione fra gli esperti anglo-americani e i nostri Comandi Militari in Sardegna.



10272



FILE

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

4 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, Dr. Silvio Innocenti.

With regard to the contact to be established between Allied and Italian authorities on Sardinia, I wish to inform you that the attention of Algiers has been invited to the fact that General Basso is the spokesman for the Italian government. I feel sure that this will clarify the situation and improve cooperation.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission

10271

TRANSLATION

Note for Brig. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor

With reference to our conversation this morning, I wish to draw to your attention what has been reported by the High Command, namely that the necessary contacts are apparently not being maintained with General Basso by the Anglo-American experts on the island to coordinate local activities of a civilian political and economic character, whereas an agreement to coordinate such activities has already been reached between General Roosevelt and the above-mentioned Italian General.

I shall be obliged if you will be good enough to facilitate, in the common interest, the work of collaboration between the Anglo-American experts and our military headquarters in Sardinia.

10-70



FILE

*citel 33 out*

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

4 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, Marshal Badoglio.

The following letter from Mr. Piccardi has been transmitted to the Allied Mission from Algiers:

"Per se il Maresciallo Badoglio ho raggiunto Napoli alla vigilia dell'evacuazione delle forze germaniche. La popolazione stretta intorno al governo di vostra eccellenza si e levata in armi per cacciare le retronguardie tedesche. In vista della difficile situazione della citta dove le autorità locali sono considerate compromesse per il contegno tenuto durante l'occupazione tedesca ho assunto provvisoriamente poteri per ristabilimento situazione normale raggiungero appena possibile sede governo per mettermi a disposizione di vostra eccellenza. Ministro Piccardi.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission

10-10-43

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILO R

M/C NR: 01/10

REF NR: 338

FILED : 1011244 Oct

REC'D :

-----  
MARSHALL BADOGLIO HAS INFORMED THE MISSION OFFICIALLY OF BRUNO'S DISMISSAL  
IN SARDINIA PD AND STATES THAT ALL CIVIL AND MILITARY POWERS HAVE BEEN  
ASSUMED BY GENERAL BASSO.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission

10288



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: RESTRICTED

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

M/C NR: 10/09

REF NR: 4968

FILED : 090905A Oct

REC'D :

-----

Reports from Sardinia clearly indicate that General Giangiacomo Castagna is pro Fascist and non cooperative. (For FATIMA signed EISENHOWER cite FMGS). We should insist that Marshall Badoglio remove him from his present command and from the island of Sardinia.

RESTRICTED

10267

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NR: 04/10

REF NR: 341

FILED : 101155A Oct

REC'D :

REFERENCE YOUR FOUR NINE SIX EIGHT AND OUR THREE THREE EIGHT PD

I RECOMMEND THAT THE REMOVAL OF CASTAGNA BE EFFECTED BY THE ALLIED COMMISSIONER  
IN SARDINIA ACTING THROUGH GENERAL BASSO PD MARSHALL BADOGLIO WILL BE VERY  
RELUCTANT TO DISCHARGE THIS OFFICER ARBITRARILY WITHOUT SOME SORT OF HEARING PD  
BASSO SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ACTION OR AT LEAST TO RECOMMEND THE REMOVAL TO  
BADOGLIO WHO CAN THEN ACT WITHOUT HESITATION.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

10155



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

M/C NR: 8/13

REF NR: 6255

FILED : 121259A Oct

REC'D : 121508A

-V-

Since CASTAGNA is second in command, we feel that BADOGLIO not BASSO is the one to take action. (To FATIMA for TAYLOR rpt AFHQ ADVANCED COMMAND POST signed EISENHOWER cite FHNGS reference your #4698 of 9th October). It is not a question of discharging CASTAGNA but of relieving him of his present command and removing him from the island. Suggest that BADOGLIO recall him to his headquarters for consultation and that no new command be given until his attitude is ascertained with regard to the position which Italy is about to assume.

10185

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 08/14

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR: 405

PREC : PRIORITY

FILED : 141841A Oct

FRQ : FATIMA

REC'D :

TO : FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

-----  
REFERENCE YOUR SIX TWO FIVE FIVE PD

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

GENERAL AMEROSIO IS RECALLING CASTAGNA TO BRINDISI AT ONCE

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General., USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

10257



ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Military Government Section

18 October 1943

To: Region 6--Sardinia  
JACS  
Hq. AMG  
Patina ✓  
MOS

The administration of the Regional Allied Commission Region No. 6, (Sardinia) will until further notice be administered direct from AFHQ MOS.

At the earliest convenient date after the setting up of the Allied Commission and the transfers of the first AMGOT territory to the Italian government the administration of commission staff in Sardinia will similarly be transferred to Allied Commission. In the meantime copies of all correspondence will be sent to JACS for information.

*A. T. Maxwell*  
A. T. MAXWELL,  
Colonel,  
Deputy Chief, Mil. Government Sec.



*hm* 10283

INCOMING

SECRET RM

4/25

ROUTINE

1630

FREEDOM

241605A Oct

FATIMA

250230A

Surprise to learn 22nd from DABLE that Basso and Assored (7) move same date to Mainland and that Nagli from Corsica replaces him (ADDRESSED FATIMA RPTD AFHQ ADV CP, FABLE, FAKIR FOR ACTION, SIGNED CINC. CITE FHGCT). Regret reply not despatched your routine 436 of 16 October but this did not indicate intention immediate move. Owing complicated problems attached re-distribution Corsica and Sardinia Garrisons and Civil Administration. Instruct Italian High Command refrain from carrying out moves of this kind prior coordination and notify all concerned to insure continuity.

10262



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

26 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, General Ambrosio, Chief of the  
Supreme General Staff.

It is requested that in the future the Comando Supremo refrain from moving key officials holding important military or administrative positions without first coordinating the matter with the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force Headquarters. The need for this understanding is suggested by the recent move of General Basso from Sardinia and General Magli from Corsica.

For the Chief of Mission

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA

10061

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Military Government Section

ATM/GF/caga

MGS 014.14-8

19 November 1943.

SUBJECT: Allied Control in Sardinia

TO : Regional Allied Commission (Sardinia).

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Sec/Army by TAG 4-1-33-140

1. Administrative Memorandum No. 80, 14 November 1943, on command and Administration of Sardinia, as well as a more general A.G. letter of 12 November 1943 on Relations between Military Commanders and Officers of Allied Military Government, have ~~now~~ been issued by this headquarters. These express a policy which has now been adopted by this Headquarters. They are in part based on developments not known when the representatives of the Military Government Section, G-3 and G-4 conferred with you some days ago. Accordingly you will understand that present instructions supersede in so far as inconsistent any provisional understandings you may have reached with members of that party.

2. It is essential in the present situation in Italy that close attention be paid to the allocation of authority and responsibilities. There are the officers commanding various Allied formations and installations; performing functions relating to civil affairs within the same areas will be representatives of the Allied Military Government - and in Sardinia the Regional Allied Commissioner - and hereafter of the Allied Control Commission. There are also the civil authorities of the Italian Government and the commanders of the Italian armed forces. When all of these are operating in the same territory confusion will inevitably result if all concerned are not clearly advised of the scope of their respective duties. This is particularly true of the situation in Sardinia. The purpose of the present memorandum is to define and explain in the light of current developments your position as Allied Regional Commissioner.

3. The Italian Government is being permitted to function, subject to Allied supervision. As it proves itself capable of carrying responsibilities, the Allied Governments will place more reliance upon it. For example, they will look to the Italian Government to administer the territory handed over to it, to provide goods and services, to direct economic production and the like - all subject to the instructions and guidance of the Allied Control Commission. The Commission is the agency the Allied Nations have created to enforce their policy upon the Italian Government.

4. As Allied Regional Commissioner in Sardinia you will be brought under command of the Allied Control Commission (as soon as is practicable) in the meantime, as was pointed out in your directive of 28 September, you will conduct your mission in such a way that you will be able at the proper time to come naturally into its system of control. Your function in Sardinia is chiefly analogous to that of the Economic and Administrative Section of the Commission - supervising the administration and economic production of the island. With respect to the mining of coal, lead and zinc on the island, the mining

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division of the industry and Commerce Subcommission, now in process of organization under Lt. Colonel Roenig as Chief Mining Officer, will have the responsibility of seeing that it is done in conformity with the integrated plan being worked out at this Headquarters for the fullest development of Italy's mineral resources in the interest of the war effort. Accordingly, the technical coal and mining personnel on your regional strength will for purposes of operation and on all technical matters be under the direction of the Chief Mining Officer; on all matters of common interest in the administration of Sardinia, they will be under your direction. This does not affect your general responsibility to see that the normal life of the island is maintained on an incident of which the repair of demolitions must be pressed to the utmost. In executing your mission you will work upon and through the high commissioner in Sardinia of the Italian Government.

5. An Allied garrison is being stationed in the island. The Garrison Commander has responsibility for the command of Allied forces and for the local ground defense, of Allied airfields and installations, and those ports which are being worked in the Allied interest. You and he will have different functions within the same territory and in general neither should assert control over the other. Of course in case of a military emergency such as an invasion of the island, the Garrison Commander would give such orders as the situation instantly required and all personnel would for the time being necessarily come under his control.

6. Various units of the Italian armed forces are stationed in the island. With the exception of certain organizations actually placed at the disposal of the Garrison Commander, these troops will continue to be under Italian command. Like the Italian armed forces generally, these units are subject to the ultimate control of the Allied Control Commission, working upon the Italian Government which in turn exercises command through the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army.

7. in order that the Allied Control Commission may be advised as to the condition of these Italian troops in Sardinia, certain members of the Military Section of the Commission will be stationed in the island. It has been found convenient that they be attached to the staff of the Garrison Commander. But they are the representative of the Commission for purposes related to the control of the Italian armed forces, just as you will presently be representative of the Commission for purposes related to the civil administration and economy of the island. You will not exercise command over them, and of course they will not have any control over you. They will be under command of the Allied Control Commission, as will also be the Regional Allied Commissioner as soon as AFHQ issues an order to that effect.

8. When any problem arises in the course of your mission it will be important first to make an analysis to determine by what method it is properly to be handled. For example, suppose it is desired that some amendment of the Italian law be made. Since this calls for action on the national level, it is the Italian Government at Brindisi to which the matter pertains. Your channel therefore is to request ARHA to take steps, which would act through the Allied Control Commission, to cause the Italian Government to take the appropriate measures. Again, suppose you determine that debris should be cleared from devastated portions of Cagliari, and that to bring this about quickly units of the Italian Army should be ordered to get on with the work. This is a matter of local administration for which you should look to the Italian authorities.

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in the island. You would therefore address your instructions to the Italian high commissioner, calling upon him to do the work assigned and in particular to procure the necessary units from the Italian commander in Sardinia. Again, suppose local disorders should break out requiring the presence of troops. Since the preservation of order is in principle a matter for the local civil authority, you would direct the Italian high commissioner to do what was necessary, including a directive by him to a appropriate military commander to take such military action as the situation required. (It is for the moment true that the high commissioner and the Italian military commander for Sardinia are one and the same person. This is an unsatisfactory situation, and one which it is expected will be corrected.) Of course in all extremities where the assistance of Allied forces was needed, you would ask the Allied Garrison Commander for the necessary assistance. Finally, there will be the problem of distributing food. That is sent to the island for civilian consumption will, under your direction be made available through the normal channels of distribution.

9. It is impossible to provide you with instructions which will cover every specific case, or to give any simple formula governing your conduct or your relations with other authorities, Allied and Italian, in the island. The success of your mission must be dependent upon the practical good sense with which you meet the varied problems which confront you.

A. T. MAXWELL,  
Colonel,  
Acting Chief of Section

Incls:

A. G. Letter 014.1-1 GOF-AGM  
Admin Memo No. 80.

Distribution:

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Ken. Joyce ✓  
C/O  
G-3  
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F  
MDT/hjp

30 November 1943

His Excellency, Marshal Badoglio

Dear Marshal Badoglio:

As a matter of interest to Your Excellency I am  
appending to this letter an outline of the plan for the Allied Command  
and Administration of Sardinia, following the return of the island to  
the jurisdiction of the Italian Crown. Colonel F. L. Simmons has already  
been dispatched to Sardinia to act as my liaison officer in representing  
the Allied Control Commission at the Headquarters of the Italian Ground  
Forces in Sardinia.

Most sincerely,

1 Incl:  
Command and Administration  
in Sardinia

CA BZ

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Sec/Army by TAG/ date 413310

10-37

091.1 - Report - Sardinia

COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION IN SARDINIA

1. ALLIED COMMAND

a. Brigadier General Robert M. Webster has been announced as Allied Garrison Commander for Sardinia. He is authorized to apply to the Italian Military Commander for such military assistance in men and materials which he may require.

b. The Naval Officer in Charge, Maddalena Naval Base, will command all Allied naval forces in Sardinia.

2. DEFENSE

a. The Allied Garrison Commander will be responsible for the local ground defense of Allied airfields and installations, and those ports which are being worked in the Allied interest.

b. The Italian Military Commander will be responsible for the general ground defense and security of Sardinia.

c. An Allied Air Force Officer has been designated Air Defense Commander for Sardinia. Italian antiaircraft units which are assigned an active defense role will be under the local operational control of this Air Defense Commander. They will be subject to operational supervision of Major General, Antiaircraft and Coast Defense, AFHQ.

3. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

a. The Allied Regional Commissioner, upon transfer of Sardinia to Italian jurisdiction, will come under the command of the Allied Control Commission. He will be responsible for the supervision of Italian Civil Government and for that purpose will deal with the Italian Civil Commissioner.

b. A detachment of the Military Subcommittee of the Allied Control Commission will be attached to the staff of the Allied Garrison Command to deal with the Italian Military Authorities on behalf of the Allied Control Commission. This detachment, among other duties, will act as the liaison channel between the Allied Commander and Italian Military Authorities on the island.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY

a. The Italian Military Commander will be responsible for the

10250



administration and supply of all Italian army and air force units, subject to supervision by the Garrison Commander in the case of those Italian units which are placed under the command of the Allied Garrison Commander.

b. The Garrison Commander will be responsible for the delivery in bulk at the port of food and other supplies (whether destined for Italian military or civilian consumption) imported into the island under Allied arrangements.

5. MOVEMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION

a. All movements by sea to and from Sardinia will be ordered by AFHQ.

b. The Garrison Commander will be responsible for the operation of ports and Allied transportation agencies in Sardinia, and for the supervision of Italian transportation agencies, insofar as they affect AFHQ interests.

6. COMMUNICATIONS - The Allied Garrison Commander will control and coordinate the installation, operation and maintenance of all communications systems, civil and military, in Sardinia, for the purpose of insuring that they render the maximum assistance to the military effort. Otherwise, civil communication will be under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission.

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ROUTINE

FREEDOM

FATIMA

12/05

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Dec 040942A

Dec 050308A

Radio should by now have found suitable official for Civil High Commissioner Sardinia (TO FATIMA FOR JONES SIGNED EIGHTHOUR CITY PHOTOS). Urge prompt action to meet need for division military and civil responsibilities there.

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- 1 - M/C
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091.1-  
Gmt, Sardinia

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FATIMA

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Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----  
413310

REFERENCE YOUR NINE TWO EIGHT TWO FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE ALLIED CONTROL  
COMMISSION SPLITTING OF MILITARY AND CIVIL RESPONSIBILITIES IN SARDINIA DOES NOT  
SEEM THE BEST ORGANIZATION FOR EFFECTIVE CONTROL PD PARER TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA  
SIGNED JOYCE PAREN BADOGLIO AND I BOTH CONSIDER THAT IT IS PREFERABLE FOR SOME  
TIME TO COME TO HAVE A SENIOR ITALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER AND A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT WHO WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND  
COMMISSION FOR BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY FUNCTIONS PD THE DIVISION OF THE LATTER  
WOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE NEXT LEVEL BELOW THESE TOP REPRESENTATIVES PD THE ALLIED  
CONTROL COMMISSION WOULD THUS MAINTAIN IN SARDINIA A SMALL GROUP OF OFFICERS CMA  
THE SENIOR REPRESENTING THE DEPUTY PRESIDENT WITH JUNIOR REPRESENTATION FOR AT  
LEAST THE MILITARY CMA ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE SECTIONS PD MY VIEWSON THE  
ORGANIZATION FOR SARDINIA APPLY EQUALLY TO SICILY WHERE BADOGLIO EXPECTS TO  
APPOINT A HIGH COMMISSIONER PD BEFORE TAKING UP THE MATTER WITH BADOGLIO I REQUEST  
RECONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION AND THE RESULTING DECISION

AUTHENTICATED:

10253

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA

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0914-Port (Sardinia)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Military Government Section

HP/frt

To: *Malacca*  
*Mr Grady* 43  
17 December 1943. *MDZ*

MCS 014.148

SUBJECT: Report on Sardinia.

TO : Major General Joyce.

1. Copy of report on conditions in Sardinia, prepared by Major Rowell of this Section, is herewith transmitted for your information.

For the Chief of Section:

1 Submit that the recommendations in *Henry Parkman, Jr.*  
paras 16, 17, 18 *shd be followed up - At*  
*least on the political side action proposed*  
Incls - as above  
*is desirable* *HA* *20/12*

HENRY PARKMAN, JR.  
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

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*(Routing)*



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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section

RTR/lp

10 December 1943.

SUBJECT: Visit to Sardinia.

TO : Brigadier General Holmes.

1. Pursuant to my travel orders (AG 201-ACF#Howell, Henry T. (Off.) of 30 November, 1943) and your verbal directive, I travelled to Corsica as described in my report, thence proceeded to Sardinia leaving Bastia by air at 0925 hours, 5 December, and arriving at Alghero at 1145 the same day.

2. Arriving at Sassari by car at about 1600 hours, I was assigned a room in the officers' villa of the Allied Commission. I wish here to record my thanks to Brigadier Boulnois and his staff for their friendliness and courtesy.

3. Brigadier Boulnois received me the next morning, 6 December. After discussing the aspect of my mission to Corsica which pertained to his Command (See my report on Corsica, paragraph 16), he described some difficulties of his present situation. I believe his representations can be justly summarized in the statement that he feels himself to be in an awkward and anomalous position because his powers are restricted to civil affairs while circumstances compel him to deal with military authorities in the course of his official duties. The solution of the problem which the Brigadier proposed was for himself to be appointed the representative of the Allied Commander in Chief in Sardinia, with supreme power to deal with the Italians in regard to civil and military matters. In his opinion he needed powers similar to those of General Stronge in Corsica to whom he specifically referred. The Brigadier made it clear that he did not feel it necessary also to assume the powers of a garrison commander. Additional authority to deal with the Italians on military matters seemed to him sufficient for the effective execution of his duties.

4. It must be realized before the Brigadier's opinion is analyzed that his dealings with the Italians on the highest level are with Italian military authorities. In such a vital matter as the distribution of flour, the Brigadier must rely upon the Italian army for trucks and handling. The Italians have a Civil Affairs Section under Colonel Sanna and from what I gathered, it is cooperating loyally with Brigadier Boulnois and his staff. Nevertheless, the Brigadier feels emphatically that he could achieve more satisfactory results if he could deal with the Italian military authorities on a military as well as a civil plane.

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5. So far as civil affairs are concerned, and apart from the additional prestige and authority which Brigadier Boulnois would enjoy if his powers were increased as he desires, I cannot see that his proposed solution strikes at the root of the matter. The difficulty of the present situation is not that Brigadier Boulnois lacks authority, but rather that the Italian military are in control of Italian civil affairs. It is axiomatic in such a situation as has been demonstrated time and again by historical example that the military is apt to profit at the expense of the civil. To the Army, the soldiers come first and the Army is seeing to it that its soldiers, though ill fed, do not starve. But the fact remains that the Allied Commission has sufficient powers to impose an equitable division of food and other necessities between the civil and the military. Its task is undoubtedly rendered more difficult by the fact that it must deal with officials who being soldiers are naturally prejudiced in favor of the military. But the problem remains difficult, not unsolvable, and giving the Brigadier additional powers would not, in my opinion, make it much easier.

6. On the other hand, it is clear to me that the appointment of an Italian civil official as the highest civil authority on the island would improve the situation greatly. Such an official would have the interests of the civilian population at heart and presumably would be given the necessary authority to deal with General Magli and his staff on a basis of equality in regard to matters such as food which concern both the military and the civil. The Allied Commission could then sit in arbitration and cast the deciding vote. It is said that a civilian, properly qualified for the office, is not available. This I doubt.

7. There are between 250,000 and 225,000 Italian soldiers in Sardinia at present. Relatively speaking no more than a hundred have anything to do. The Sardinians among them have been given a 60-day leave, renewable at request, to return to their homes. The rest, apart from perfunctory military duties, idle away the time in the village square. They are ragged, ill fed and low in morale. In general, they have but one desire; to go home, and in that desire, they and the Sardinians see eye to eye. I am of the opinion that it would be a good thing for all concerned if those soldiers who were bona fide farmers and had homes in the territory occupied by the Allies were sent home, if the units to which they belong are not to be used in this war. This step would relieve the situation to some degree.

8. With regard to Brigadier Boulnois' staff, its members measure up well in my opinion with any other ~~AND~~ group in ability and energy. The British and American officers work well and live well together and differences in opinion do not run on national lines except in one matter; that of authority at Headquarters. With the exception of Colonel Hale, the top positions are all held by British officers; specifically, the Executive Officer or Chief Staff Officer and the



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Heads of Finance, Public Safety and Supply are all British. On the other hand, the Provinces of Nuoro and Cagliari have Americans at the top and the Liaison Officer at General Magli's Headquarters is also American. In my opinion, this does not balance the British surplus of authority at Headquarters to which all important matters must be referred. This is also the opinion of three American officers at Headquarters. The question, however, is debatable.

9. Relations with General Magli's Headquarters are conducted through Lt. Col. Berl (USA) who is stationed at these Headquarters at Bortigali. I lunched with Colonel Berl and the Italian Chief of Staff on my way to Cagliari. Colonel Berl is clearly well liked by the Italians and seemed to me to be doing an excellent job. He reported that the Italians had been cooperating in every way and he expressed his confidence in the officers with whom he had to deal. It was Colonel Berl's opinion that General Magli and his staff did not deserve the suspicion with which they are viewed by the Public Safety Division at Sassari in regard to Fascism. As confirmation of his opinion, Colonel Berl cited the action taken by General Magli with regard to the conspiracy described in Annex A to this report.

10. Colonel Simmons, whom I also saw at Bortigali, shared Colonel Berl's opinion of the reliability of the Italian Military Authorities.

11. It is pertinent at this point to report the wish of Brigadier Boulnois that the Civil Affairs Section of the Italian Army under Colonel Sanna should remove from Italian Headquarters at Bortigali to Sassari. It would doubtless be a great convenience for the Allied Commission to have its Italian counterpart located in the same city. But it can be argued that the city is not the right city for the work to be performed.

12. It is a fact that Cagliari has been badly damaged by bombing. But this fact made it all the more necessary for Allied Authority to press for its rehabilitation and to be in a position where it could supervise the work. There is a provincial team at Cagliari at present under Major Neslin and from what I could see it has made an excellent start. The fact remains, however, that Cagliari because of its size, prestige and unfortunate condition, deserved immediate attention. I believe that the Allied Commission would have acquired instant favor among the Sardinians if it had set up its Headquarters at Cagliari at the start and devoted itself, at least partly, to the pressing problems of the city. It may be argued that Cagliari is some 60 kilometers farther removed than Sassari from Italian Headquarters at Bortigali. But this is a minor consideration. In my opinion, both the Allied Commission and the Italian Civil Affairs Section should be at Sassari and should have been there from the start.

13. The political situation in Sardinia follows a familiar pattern. There is a Separatist Movement, the members



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of which belong to the well-to-do and professional classes. On final analysis, their program does not envisage true independence but the "protection" of the United States or Great Britain. This "protection" is conceived as chiefly economic, that is, as an opportunity to participate in American or British wealth. There is no doubt that Sardinia has been exploited by the Mainland and kept from developing its own resources. This has caused justifiable bitterness against the Mainland among the Sardinians who would have benefitted by local enterprise. In the second place, I believe that the Separatist Movement in Sardinia and Sicily is partly motivated by dread of the future. Certain radical reforms in the prevailing social and economic systems of Italy are being advocated by all the liberal parties in varying degree and the concentration of wealth and privilege in a relatively few hands has been one of the principal targets of liberal criticism. No one can foresee how far to the left Italy may travel when she becomes mistress of her fate again. British or American "protection" may well seem to those who have the most to lose a secure shelter against the impending storm.

14. In each of the three provinces, there is a provincial "Committee of Anti-Fascist Concentration". Each Party is entitled to be represented on it by two delegates. The three strongest Parties are the Socialist Party, The Christian Communist Party and the Christian Social Party. The last two, as indicated by their names, have socialist and communist programs without the traditional anti-religious elements. The Sardinians are devout, practicing Catholics. The provincial Committees advise the Prefects of their respective provinces. When meeting together, they form the Regional Committee which has been recognized as an advisory body on affairs concerning the Island as a whole by the military authorities. 10-2

15. Although these Committees have been most active in recommending the elimination of Fascists from office, it is my impression that Sardinia has undergone less purging than the parts of Italy under Allied Military Government or the Allied Control Commission. My views may be colored, however, by the obnoxious activities of certain members of the Fascist Militia, the units of which were incorporated into the Italian regular army on 25 June after the fall of Mussolini, but continue to exist as units (see Annex A). The slow progress of Allied arms on the mainland, the small number of Allied ground forces in Sardinia, the fact that the island was not taken by force, the proximity of the Germans on the Mainland, all these facts are a source of encouragement to the professional Fascist. As our garrison increases in Sardinia and our troops advance in Italy proper, this same Fascist will undergo the usual metamorphosis. But at present he is still uncertain enough of the final outcome to dangle his legs on the Fascist side of the fence with an occasional sally into the field proper.



Since he is now a member of the Italian army, it is the duty of General Magli to take the proper measures of constraint and discipline. Such measures were promptly taken in the serious matter of the recent conspiracy (see Annex A). In matters of less importance, I am inclined to think that the Italian Command is content to view the individual incidents as a blowing off of steam which is best allowed to blow.

16. In the financial field the condition of provincial and communal finances is being investigated by Captain Giroux of the Finance Division at Headquarters. His investigations show a thorough exploitation of the municipalities for the benefit of private or parastatal companies on the Mainland. To cite an example, consumer and some miscellaneous taxes are collected for the Comune of Sassari by the Societa Trezza of Verona at a rate of 22% on the taxes collected. The rate first suggested by Trezza in 1931 was 55%. When the Podesta refused to accept the contract, he was removed from office. 22% was later accepted as a fair compromise. The profits of Trezza went of course into the pockets of individuals inhabiting the Mainland and were spent there. Ciano is said to have been involved.

17. Such an incident of Fascist graft is not new to anyone familiar with Fascist devices for enriching the Party leaders. What concerns the present situation is that the officials of the Comune of Sassari are prepared to continue the contract for 1944 at the same rate. They seem incapable of the initiative which is needed for undertaking to collect the taxes themselves or for compelling the local branch of Trezza to accept a fair rate. It is a sort of paralysis which has been encountered everywhere in the field of local government. Two decades of Fascism have reduced local government to a state of utter and abject dependency on national direction. Ready loans from parastatal and private banks have long since made it superfluous to balance or budget and officials feel it to be the natural and easy way to maintain the attitude and system to which they are accustomed.

18. This state of affairs raises a fundamental question. To what extent is it the duty of the Allied Commission, which is responsible for control and is not the governing agency, to interfere with such internal affairs as the wasting of the taxpayer's money by his own officials? Analysis shows that the necessary reforms should be undertaken on a national scale and that a change of attitude towards governmental responsibility must accompany laws and decrees. A liberal government can be expected to deal with the problem. In the meantime, I believe that the Badoglio Government could take a few important measures to eradicate the worst evils of the prevailing system of local taxes and finances. With the proper decrees to support them, Allied Control Officers could do some effective work on a large scale in beginning to clear up the mess. Without legal backing on the national level, they must

perforce tackle commune by commune, an endless and unsatisfactory task. Here too we see the need for the appointment of an Italian civilian to handle the civil affairs of Sardinia.

19. The food situation is tight but the recent importation of flour has kept it from becoming critical. The large number of Italian troops on the island aggravate the situation. Certain products such as cheese have been blocked by the Italian Command for fear that the soldiers may run short. The distribution of available flour between the civil and the military is established on a large scale. It is then the responsibility of the Provincial Officer of Alimentation to supervise the distribution of the civilian portion to the several communes. There have been demonstrations for bread at Nuoro but the consensus of opinion among the Civil Supply officers at Headquarters in Sassari is that there is little or no starvation. I myself witnessed no such scenes of hunger at Sassari as I had witnessed in Palermo. The country people, as usual, were adequately fed.

20. I finished my trip at Carbonia as the guest of Major Matthews of the Mining Division. Major Matthews' brief summary of the work accomplished to date by the Division speaks for itself. It is appended to this report as Annex B. Here I would only add that I was not only impressed most favorably by the way the Division was performing its primary task of getting out the coal, but also by the way it was handling such attendant problems as those of labor and the political attack upon the Director General of the Mines. Signor Piga.

21. With regard to the labor problem, the Division suggested to the miners that they should elect a committee from among themselves to represent their interests. Such a committee was constituted and it now meets every week with the representatives of management and the officers of the Division. Grievances are fully cured and the officers of the Division act as arbitrators between the miners and the managers. There have been no labor troubles since the committee was constituted.

22. With regard to Signor Piga, the facts as I gathered them are these. Lt. Col. Koenig informed Brigadier Boulnois before my arrival that he considered Piga indispensable to the proper execution of his work at Carbonia. Later, while Col. Koenig was away, the Podesta of Iglesias called on Major Matthews who was acting Chief of the Division and informed him that the Prefect of Cagliari had removed Piga from the Director Generalship of the coal mines. The reason given was Piga's Fascist record. Major Matthews called together the Prefect, his new appointee, Piga and some other officials and demanded that the case against Piga should be fully stated in his presence. It was ascertained that Piga had been a member of the Fascist Party in good standing (otherwise he could not have held his position in the mines), but it was also ascertained that the Prefect, his new appointee and the other anti-Piga officials had also been Fascist appointments. To Matthews,



the incident was clearly a manoeuvre on the part of a group to obtain a desirable job for one of their members while squaring a personal and political grudge with an enemy. Matthews told the meeting that he was retaining Figa and that the matter was closed.

23. This was the state of affairs when I left Carbonia on the morning of 10 December. On my return here on the afternoon of the same day, I found a message from Brigadier Boulnois (no. 12645 of 11 December) advising that the future of Figa would be discussed at a meeting in Cagliari on 13 December because of serious political developments. The Brigadier wished Col. Koenig to be informed. The message and our reply are appended for your information.

24. The serious political developments mentioned in Brigadier Boulnois' message are unknown to me. I would surmise, however, in the light of the background given above that Figa's enemies are making another attempt on what seems to them to be a higher level to get the job and have their enemy ousted. One fact is clear. Figa has cooperated loyally with the Mining Division, he has the confidence of Col. Koenig and Major Matthews and the coal is coming out of the ground ahead of schedule.

25. A final incident concerning the Mining Division must be reported here. Major Matthews requested Brigadier Boulnois to send him a junior Civil Affairs Officer to assist him with certain problems such as food. The situation at Carbonia is unusual in that the town is controlled by the Coal Company and housing, food distribution, and other essential elements and activities of daily life are administered by the Company. Brigadier Boulnois sent a Major Alexander in compliance with Major Matthews' request. Major Alexander brought with him a directive from the Brigadier including the following paragraphs:

5. On all questions except technical mining questions you are in command of the officers and EM/OR assigned to this Region and now stationed at Carbonia. You will be responsible for their welfare and discipline and general administration.

7. You will be solely responsible for the Regional local Imprest Account and from it will meet such "house-keeping" and other expenditure as is properly payable by the Commission.

Major Matthews refused to accept Major Alexander's command on the grounds that he as Col. Koenig's deputy together with the other members of the Division, were under Col. Koenig's command and responsible to Col. Koenig alone. The directives governing authority, so far as I can perceive, leave the members of the Mining Division under the authority of Brigadier Boulnois except insofar as technical mining questions are concerned. But inasmuch as coal is extracted by miners whose food, shelter and salaries directly affect

their productivity, the line of division between mining questions and normal civil affairs problems must necessarily be blurred if not entirely effaced.

26. The solution of the problem which I recommend is to appoint Lt. Koenig Senior Civil Affairs Officer for the district of Carbonia as well as Head of the Mining Division. He would thus have the necessary powers in all aspects of his work to continue to achieve his excellent results.

27. When I left Carbonia on 10 December, Major Alexander was returning to Headquarters at Sassari to report the result of his discussions with Major Matthews to Brigadier Boulnois. Major Matthews made it clear to me that he was glad to have Major Alexander's assistance but could not accept his command. Since then, Major Matthews has sent a message to this Headquarters requesting a clarification of his position. Our reply drafted by Col. Dalrymple together with Major Matthews' message are appended for your information.

HENRY T. ROWELL  
Major, C.M.P.  
A.F.S.C. - M.G.S.

Incls - as above



-2-

8. On the other hand, the Public Safety Division at Headquarters gave me the impression that they took a graver view of the matter. Inasmuch as it is the business of this Division to deal with subversive activities in the civilian population and to estimate the extent of dissidence and discontent, I believe its opinion deserves careful consideration. There is undoubtedly a number of Sardinians who are true Fascists and would be glad to see Sardinia restored to the new Fascist Party. These individuals have not been forced to take cover as completely in Sardinia as elsewhere and do not know as thoroughly that they have been defeated. They undoubtedly would like to make trouble, but are helpless without military support. General Magli's action is a strong indication that he will act loyally in regard to the Allies. The trial of the officers concerned and its outcome should be carefully watched as an occasion for him to furnish further proof.

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10243

ANNEX A

Fascist Conspiracy

1. For some time previous to the events described in this report, the Public Safety Division of the Allied Commission in Sardinia had been receiving reports that the Fascist Militia was acting in an objectionable manner. The most serious incident occurred in a town where a group of the militia would not permit the citizens to listen to a speaker who was making a liberal speech. Elsewhere there had been some demonstrations of strength with Fascist songs and slogans, and talk against the present Italian Government and the Allies. In some of the barracks Radio Rome was tuned in regularly.
2. Sometime before 2 November, General Martini, a general of the Fascist Militia, made contact with the Captain of an Italian PT boat which made regular weekly runs between the port of Maddalena and adjacent islands. He requested the Captain to take him over to a part of the mainland held by the Germans. The Captain agreed.
3. The Captain, however, reported the conversation to Admiral Brevanesi, Senior Italian Naval Officer at Maddalena. Admiral Brevanesi communicated with General Magli immediately and the following plan was devised. The PT boat was to leave with General Martini as agreed between the General and the Captain of the boat. But it was to be manned with a loyal crew who would seize General Martini when the boat was safely out at sea.
4. The boat did not set sail on 2 November, its regular day for making its trip to the islands, because of a heavy sea. The next day, however, departure was possible and the Captain set forth with General Martini on board.
5. The arrest of the General by the Admiral's men took place when the boat was well out to sea. On his person, documents were discovered of the following nature:
  - a. Reports of meetings held since 18 September with the purpose of planning Sardinia's restoration to the Italian Fascist Government.
  - b. Lists of individuals believed to be sympathetic to the Fascist cause or known to be hostile to it.
  - c. Cyphers and codes.
  - d. A document signed by 15 to 20 persons, mostly Fascist Militia officers, authenticating General Martini's position as their delegate.
6. The documents were sent immediately to General Magli at Bortigali and the news was communicated to General Webster at Elmas. At the time of my visit to Bortigali, I was informed by Colonel Simmons that the military members of the conspiracy were under arrest and that the evidence had been turned over to the Judge Advocate in preparation for trying the accused by Court Martial.
7. In the opinion of Colonel Simmons and Lieutenant Colonel Berl, the conspiracy was an isolated incident indicating no more than the discontent, unrest and enmity of a small group of Fascist officers. They believe that General Magli handled the matter with energy and skill.



ANNEX E  
HEADQUARTERS  
SARDINIA BRANCH  
MINING DIVISION  
A.M.G.

8 December 1943

When Lt Col Koenig and Maj Matthews arrived in Sardinia production of coal was practically at a standstill. Coal to the amount of approximately 7000 tons per month was being produced for local essential requirements such as power generation, railways, and the Italian Navy. The pier at the Port of Sant'Antioco had not been used after it had been bombed in May. Seventy thousand tons of coal on the pier were on fire from spontaneous combustion and no effort had been made to repair the pier and the heavy loading machinery knocked out by bombing. A large Italian Steamship had also gone down alongside the pier.

To date production of coal has been stepped up to the rate of 30,000 tons per month and the rate of production is gradually increasing. All available preparation plants are now in operation on a part time basis and as labor, supplies, transportation are made available the capacity of the plants and the mines will increase toward the goal set by the Mining Division of 100,000 tons per month by July 1st, 1944. Repairs to the Pier at Sant'Antioco are about 80% complete. Most of the burned coal has been removed, the Steamship "Sfinge" is now afloat, and a sufficient portion of the loading machinery has been repaired to permit loading 3000 tons of coal per day. About 10,000 tons of 1 1/4" x 0 screenings (newly mined coal) is on the pier awaiting cargo boats which are to be furnished by the C.M. (Coal Section) AFHQ. Three thousand tons of coal have been delivered to Palermo and 3000 additional tons will leave within a few days to same destination.

The Mining Division is in urgent need of 60,000 lin meters of pit props from Corsica. Unless this timber is delivered on or before Jan 1st, coal production will begin to drop and will thereafter gradually cease.

The labor situation appears to be keeping pace with the increased rate of production. About 2000 additional miners are needed but it is believed that this required labor will become available if the Italian Army will continue to discharge miners for work in the mines.

Every effort should be made to expedite delivery of supplies now on requisition from abroad.

The food situation in this district is fairly satisfactory when the imported wheat and flour is taken into consideration. However, the Commune of Carbonia, was approximately 30 tons short on the last delivery of flour and this represents about five (5) days supply. Present stocks of flour will be exhausted by 5 Jan 1944.

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21 DEC 1943

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PRIORITY

FREEDOM SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE PHMGS

FATIMA FOR JOYCE

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DEC 201759 A

DEC 210850 A

We have reconsidered problem of Italian administration of Sardinia following your 1290 of 5 December, in the light of a further report from representative of this section who has just returned from island.

Our conclusion still remains after two examinations on the ground that more satisfactory results are to be expected if responsibility for Italian military and civil matters is divided at the top level. Reasons: (a) there is a conflict of interest on the question of food, with a natural inclination by the commander of troops to favor the Army. (b) the prefects at present are functioning with, but scarcely under a civil affairs officers on Maglis Staff; thus Italian Civil Affairs authority cannot and the military power do not control these officials. (c) the large military force on the island is due to unusual circumstances, and cannot be considered as a permanent feature of the island. (d) it is not considered desirable, in view of the present policy of the governments that Italian Military Governors should be appointed. (e) on Allied side there is sharp distinction between Garrison Commander and Regional Commissioner dealing with civil affairs.

We therefore conclude that Italian Civil Commissioner should be appointed as soon as possible to coincide with the change in Regional Allied Commissioner which is now taking place.

Grateful therefore if you will take matter up strongly with Marshal on above lines.

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Int. Affairs



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1 DEC 1943 375

Incoming message ref. 16825 of 20 Dec. 1943 (cont'd)

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10240

23 December 1943

To His Excellency Marshal Badoglio -

Dear Marshal Badoglio:-

It is the view of Allied Force Headquarters that the administration of Sardinia can be improved by making a division between military and civil functions of government. To accomplish this, I am directed to request Your Excellency to appoint a civil official in charge of civil affairs who will be coequal with the senior military authority. Would Your Excellency kindly inform me of the action taken in this regard and the incumbent whom you propose to nominate for this post?

Most sincerely,

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N.1466 DI PROT.

26 DEC 1943



IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

25 DICEMBRE 1943

CARO GENERALE,

IN RISPOSTA ALLA LETTERA DEL 23  
DICEMBRE C.A. RIGUARDANTE IL MIGLIO-  
RAMENTO DELL'AMMINISTRAZIONE DELLA  
SARDEGNA, LA INFORMO CHE QUANTO PRI-  
MA DESIGNERÒ UN ALTO GENERALE CON UN  
PREFETTO, DEI QUALI, A SUO TEMPO, LE  
COMUNICHERÒ I NOMINATIVI.

MOLTO CORDIALMENTE.

AL SIG. GENERALE  
KENYON A. JOYCE  
CAPO COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO

10230

S E D E  
\*\*\*\*\*

26 DEC 1943 422

TRANSLATION

*MOZ*

CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT  
No. 1466 of Prot.

25 December 1943

Dear General:

In answer to your letter of 23 December regarding improvement in the administration of Sardinia I am writing to inform you that as soon as possible I shall designate a high ranking general and a prefect and will communicate their names to you at that time.

Very cordially,

BADOGLIO

*0911-Genl (Sardinia)*

To General Kenyon A. Joyce  
Chief Allied Control Commission  
Headquarters

*CA Br*

*10-37*



2 JAN 1944

GDM/mip/mas 740

In reply  
refer to: 400.354

2 January 1944

S.E. Il Commissario Generale  
Commissariato dell' Alimentazione  
Stato Maggiore R. Esercito

Your Excellency:

The receipt of your letter, dated 30 December 1943, regarding rationing civilians in Sardinia, is acknowledged.

In order that proper co-ordination may be assured, it is requested that matters of this nature be submitted to the Allied Control Commission by the appropriate Italian Ministry or by the Supreme Command. It is also requested that detailed information concerning the cases presented be likewise furnished this Commission; thereby enabling the Commission to effect appropriate action in the most expeditious manner.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

ROBERT E. DOE  
Major, A.G.D.  
Secretary of the Commission

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FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITY HELLS

FARGO, FATIMA REAR, FABLE, RELAY FAIRBANKS

Memorandum administrative. AFTER. will be issued on 31 January making HQ ACC  
 directly responsible for Civil Affairs in Sardinia and accordingly pending  
 Allied Regional Commissioner (Sardinia) under command of HQ, ACC.

This is paraphrase by CRYPTO FREEDOM of our 44668 citing JJOS SVC 907.

In your message FEB 424 of 26 January cite FARGO 590 with your request we are  
 in compliance.

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44468

SIGNED CINC CITE FRMG

JAN 301040

FARGO - FATIMA REAR - FABLE - RELAY FAIRBANKS

FEB 021926A

Memorandum administrative, AFHQ, will be issued on 31 January making HQ ACC directly responsible for civil affairs in Sardinia and accordingly placing Allied Regional Commissioner (Sardinia) under command of HQ, ACC. In your message FEB 424 of 26 January cite FARGO 530 with your request we are in compliance.

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1 - CJS

This is a paraphrase by crypto Freedom of our 44668.

CAB

U. C. SECRET  
Equala Br...

10231

0911- Jant.



2003