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ARMISTICE TERMS & DECLARATION OF WAR  
BY ITALY ON GERMANY  
SEPT. - NOV. 1943

177 pp



ESTABLISHMENT  
of  
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION at BRINDISI

Phase II  
Chapter I.

At the time of ITALY's capitulation, there were two Armistice documents in existence,

- (i) The short terms
- (ii) The long terms, known also as the instrument of surrender.

3 Sep 43 The short terms were signed by the Italian Government.

8 Sep 43 Public announcement was made that an armistice had been signed.

The C in C, General EISENHOWER decided that a Military Mission should be despatched to the Italian Government, which had escaped from Rome and had established itself at Brindisi.

12 Sep 43 Lt General F.N. Mason MACFARLANE was appointed as Head of the Military Mission (authority:- letter from A.F.H.Q. dated 12 Sept 43; no reference, signed by Major General W.B. SMITH. Chief of Staff.)

This letter defined the task of the Mission as follows:-

1229

"The task of the Mission is to transmit the military instructions of the Commander in Chief to the Italian Government, collect and transmit intelligence, and arrange for such coordinated action as the Italian armed forces and people can be induced to take against the Germans".

The Mission comprised three Sections:- NAVAL, Ground Forces (ARMY), and AIR.

Brig Gen Maxwell D. TAYLOR was nominated by the C in C as head of the Army Section.

Air Commodore FOSTER was nominated by the Air C in C, Med as head of the Air Section, and

Admiral was nominated by the C in C Med as head of the Naval Section.



Political questions were to be dealt with as laid down in the following paragraph extracted from A.F.H.Q. letter of the 12 Sep '43 :-

The British Resident Minister in North Africa (Rt. Hon. H.M. MACMILLAN) and the U.S. Minister (Mr MURPHY) or their representatives, will be associated with your Mission, in order to make the necessary diplomatic contacts with the Italian Government. They will however report to you, and all instructions from the Allied Commander-in-Chief, on political as well as military questions, will be transmitted to them through you.

- 14 Sep 43. Air Commodore FOSTER reported.
- 16 Sep 43. Capt Ellery W. STONE reported, - Head of Communications.
- 21 Sep 43. Lt Col Nelson W. MONFORT was relieved from his assignment with AMG Region II, and assigned as Liaison Officer for Civil Affairs between the Military Mission and Italian Civil Authorities.
- 22 Sep 43. Col ROSSI reported for duty as liaison officer between the Mission and the Italian Government.

The following is an extract from a cable from MACMILLAN to MACFARLANE, (Fairfield Rear ref 548 of 22 Sep)

"Prime Minister has sent me agreed policy of War Cabinet which, in effect, approves our proposals. It agrees to co-belligerency, requires signature of long terms and offers return of liberated areas to Italian Government in return for broad-basis coalition government, and acceptance of authority of control commission. Prime Ministers (uncipherable)'s policy as one of ~~payment~~ "Payment by Results".

- 23 Sep 43. General EISENHOWER cabled MACFARLANE as follows (Freedom ref 550 of 23 Sep 43). 1228

"Do not hand copy of long term armistice to Badoglio. Entire subject of Long Term Armistice and status of Italian Government now under consideration by British and American Governments and we expect final instructions within a few days. These instructions will include some modification of Long Term Armistice."

- 24 Sep 43. A.F.H.Q. cabled MACFARLANE requesting him to arrange a conference between the C in C and Badoglio at Malta. The agenda was to be as follows. (Freedom ref 565 of 24 Sep 43).





- (a) Belligerency status for Italy soon as she declares War on Germany.
- (b) Present Government to carry on as Government of Italy. Authority of King and Badoglio to be built up in every practicable way, but with understanding that this is not prejudice untrammelled right of people of Italy to decide eventual form of Government later.
- (c) Final form to be decided after Germans are evicted from Italian territory.
- (d) King and Badoglio to build up broad based Anti-Fascist Coalition Government which will continue to work for Allies against Germans on basis of Armistice. Our principle to be payment by results.
- (e) Payment to take form of possible modification of Military Armistice terms and handing over of territory to Italian Government as quickly as it is free of enemy.
- (f) Long Term Armistice will not be discussed as we are re-instructed to hold it in abeyance pending further orders. Certain additional terms or instructions of Political, Financial and Economic nature will be communicated from time to time by the C in C to the Italian Government under provision of paragraph twelve of the Armistice of Sep 3rd.

25 Sep 43. MACFARLANE was informed by cable (Fairfield Rear ref 583 of 25 Sep 43.) that it was now possible that the long terms might be presented at the Malta Conference.

27 Sep 43. A meeting, preliminary to the Malta conference, was held at Brindisi; amongst those who attended were:-

Maj. Gen. W.B. SMITH.  
Mr. MURPHY.  
Mr. MACMILLAN.  
Lt Gen. MACFARLANE.  
Marshall BADOGLIO.

There is no record in the Brindisi diary, nor in other files available at the time of writing, of the discussions which took place at this meeting. It appears, however, that the long terms were presented to Badoglio; vide Fatima cable 155 of 29 Sep from MACFARLANE to EISENHOWER:-

"Badoglio has agreed to sign long terms".

30 Sep 43. No record of the Malta Conference is at present available, beyond the following Press Communique, (see Freedom's cable 1647 of 30 Sep, to Macfarlane). **1227**

September 29th, the Allied Commander in Chief met Marshall Badoglio to discuss Military questions of mutual interest. The Conference was held in Malta on board the Flagship of Admiral Willis, HMS Nelson. Marshall Badoglio was accompanied by members of his military, naval, and air Staffs while the Allied Commander in Chief was accompanied by Admiral of The Fleet Cunningham, General Alexander, Air Chief Marshall Tedder, The Allied Chief of Staff General Smith, Mr Macmillan and Mr Murphy.

the principle topic/





The principal topic of discussion was the method for making most effective the Italian Military effort against the common enemy, Germany. Some units of the Italian Military, Air, and Naval Forces have already been engaged actively against the Germans.

- 1 Oct 43. Capt ZEROLI U.S.N.R. reported for duty.
- 6 Oct 43. Messrs CACCIA and REBER ( Political Officers) reported for duty.
- 8 Oct 43. The following cable (Freedom 4636 of 8 Oct to Patima) indicates in broad terms the subject of negotiation between 30 Sept and 12 Oct.

"You may inform Badoglio that the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union approve the amendments to the long term document desired by Badoglio of which you are (?) cognisant. However this should be used if necessary to stimulate the declaration of war at once. A supplementary document in the form of a Protocol embodying these amendments will be forwarded to you promptly for the signature of Badoglio."

A more detailed account of the negotiations is given in the following cables:-

Freedom's 3372 to Patima dated 5 Oct 43.  
Freedom's 3439 to Patima dated 5 Oct 43.  
Freedom's 3770 to Patima dated 6 Oct 43.  
Letter from Gen Taylor to Badoglio dated 7 Oct 43.  
Freedom's 4534 to Patima dated 7 Oct 43.  
Freedom's 5277 to Patima dated 9 Oct 43.  
Freedom's 5649 to Patima dated 10 Oct 43.  
Letter from Gen Taylor to Badoglio dated 11 Oct 43.  
Patima's 365 to Freedom dated 11 Oct 43.  
Letter from Gen Taylor to Gen Whitley AFHQ. dated 11 Oct 43.  
Freedom's 6248 to Patima dated 12 Oct 43.  
Patima's 379 to Freedom dated 12 Oct 43.  
Patima's 386 to Freedom dated 12 Oct 43.--(Text of Badoglio's Proclamation re declaration of War)

- 13 Oct 43. Italy declared war on Germany.  
Freedom's 6636 to Patima gives the following information:-

Tripartite statement which will be issued in Washington immediately following Badoglio war declaration covers following points:

1. Governments of United States, Great Britain and Russia acknowledge Italian war declaration and accept Italian active armed cooperation as co-belligerents.
2. The 3 governments acknowledge Italian Government pledge to submit to electoral will of Italian people after Germans driven out and 3 governments emphasize nothing can detract from absolute right of Italians eventually to decide on kind of democratic government they will have.

3. Co-belligerency/





3. Co-belligerency status does not effect armistice terms which remain in force and can only be adjusted by agreement among Allied Governments depending on the assistance the Italian Government furnishes to United Nations' cause.
4. This refers your 373. This information most secret and for your personal use only.

There is no subsequent reference in the Brindisi diary to the actual terms of the Tripartite statement. The following however is an extract from AFHQ letter MGS 322 - 12 of 1 Nov 43, General Instructions to Major General Kenyon A. JOYCE. :-

"The relationship of co-belligerency between the Government of Italy and the United Nations' Governments cannot of itself affect the terms [of the Instrument of Surrender] recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford to the United Nations' cause." (Tripartite Statement of 13 October 1943.)

14 Oct 43. Freedom's cable 7368 to Fatima dated 14 Oct, gives the following information:-

"In view of the Italian declaration of war and uncertainty of date on which Italian Government may be able to function from Rome the following arrangements are being made:-

Para 1. Allied Commission being activated and will establish a skeleton headquarters in close contact with Italian Government at Brindisi."

The remainder of this message gives some details of the proposed organisation of the Allied Commission, it's absorption of the Allied Military Mission, and it's relation with A.M.G. and with the Italian Administration. Further details of the Allied Commission's work and proposed organisation appear in the following messages and basic documents:-

Freedom's W.2674/8321 to AGWAR dated 16 Oct 43.

Letter from Gen Taylor to Gen Richardson (15 Army Group dated 23 Oct 43.

Fatima's 547 to Freedom dated 23 Oct 43.

Freedom's 1831 to Fatima dated 24 Oct 43.

AFHQ ADMIN MEMO No 35

Dated 1 May 43.

AFHQ ADMIN MEMO No 69

Dated 18 Oct 43.

16 Oct 43. Fatima's 437 to Freedom dated 16 Oct, reads as follows:-

1225



"Badoglio has queried several times about the revised long terms which have been reported on the way here PD I have discovered that he has not communicated the armistice terms to his Ministers and I believe he is waiting for the revised document to do so PD Meanwhile his Ministers do not understand his reticence PD I strongly recommend getting the document here without delay."



It should be noted that up to this date there is nothing to indicate whether or not the long terms had been signed at Malta on 29 Sept. On the one hand there is MACFARLANE's 155 of 28 Sept signifying Badoglio's willingness to sign the long terms. On the other hand it is obvious that Badoglio desired certain amendments. Were these amendments to be made before signature, or did he sign "in good faith" ?

18 Oct 43. Freedom's 8760 of 18 Oct to Fatima stated that the wording of the amendments to the long terms were still under discussion in Washington.

28 Oct 43. MACFARLANE sent a long letter to EISENHOWER summarising the position to date. This letter included paragraphs on the Italian Political situation, the Italian administration, and the way in which AMGOT and the Allied Commission would fit into the general picture.

1 Nov 43. EISENHOWER's 5023 of 1 Nov to MACFARLANE sets out in some detail the standpoint of the Allies in relation to the political influence at work in the Italian Government. This message includes the following passages:-

"(1) Our immediate policy should be based upon a single principle. We will not recognise or cooperate with any Italian Government unless it is prepared to accept loyalty to the terms of the Armistice and all that these imply. This must be made known to any prospective Premier or ministers who will have to be told that the Long Terms were signed on September 29.

.....  
(4) I do not think you need worry too much in these circumstances about the amending protocol to the armistice terms. If Badoglio goes, the terms stand and the new Premier will have to swallow them as part of the sweets of office."


[ It now becomes clear that Badoglio did in fact sign the long terms at Malta on 29 Sept 43, and that the amendments were to be made subsequently. ]

1 Nov 43. A.F.H.Q.'s letter MGS - 322 - 12 of 1 Nov to Major Gen Kenyon A. JOYCE constitutes the DIRECTIVE to him in his capacity as Acting Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission. This letter contains detailed directions as to the functions of the Commission.

2 Nov 43. Freedom's 5603 of 2 Nov to Fatima (received 12 Nov) gave information regarding announcements made at the end of the Moscow Conference.

This message mentioned also the establishment of an Advisory Commission for Italy, and gave in addition a lengthy recapitulation of the relations between the Allied Nations and Italy.

6 Nov 43. General JOYCE arrived at Brindisi.



1224



7 Nov 43.

Freedom's 7824 of 7 Nov to Fatima gave the text of the revisions of the long terms.  
Following the revised text, there is a paragraph regarding the Naval agreement:-

"....The foregoing instrument is only acceptable on condition that the Cunningham agreement with respect to the employment of the Italian Navy is amended as follows....  
....If you do not have complete text of Cunningham agreement it is in hands of Admiral ~~McGREGOR~~ McGREGOR. You should have Admiral's McGregor and De Courten come to Brindisi, and the protocol and the amendments to the Cunningham agreement to be signed simultaneously...."

Mr CACCIA and Mr REBER were appointed Vice President - Deputy Vice President respectively of the political section to be effective on activation of the A.C.C. on 10 Nov (Freedom's 7708 of 7 Nov to Fatima).



1223

7 Nov 43. Further explanations of the future status of A.C.C. and A.M.G. were given in the following cables:-

Freedom's 8218 to Fatima dated 8 Nov 43.  
Freedom's 708 to Fatima dated 9 Nov 43.

9 Nov 43. Establishment of the Allied Control Commission was announced in Freedom's 8692 dated 9 Nov to Fatima; as follows:-

"Effective 10 November Allied Control Commission for Italy established. See Administrative Memorandum No 74. Functions will be to enforce terms of surrender, to insure conduct of Italian Government conforms to Allied requirements, and to be channel of communication with Italian Government. Commission will control Italian Government, including it's administration of four provinces of Apulia. Military Government continues for the present in balance of occupied Italy. You will be notified of any transfer of territory from Military Government to Italian administration under the Control Commission.

.....  
When Italian Government declared war it was accepted as co-belligerent. This simply means that in fact it is fighting same enemy as Allies and has given limited support for that immediate purpose. Italy still bound by terms of surrender. Italy is not an Ally of United Nations; it's Government remains under complete control and must take orders from A.C. Commission."

Allocation of principal appointments in the Commission was the subject of Freedom's 9102 of 10 Nov to Fatima.

The following passage is an extract from Fatima's 854 of 9 Nov to Freedom:-

"Having signed the amending protocol to the long terms Badoglio and the Minister of Marine declined to sign the amendments to the Cunningham agreement. Their chief reason was that in spite of having cooperated fully and loyally since the Cunningham agreement was concluded and in spite of having now become co-belligerents they were being asked to accept conditions considerably less favourable to them than those imposed six weeks ago. I therefore withdrew the signed copies of the protocol and informed Badoglio that he would get his copies back when the Naval document had been signed. Late tonight I saw Badoglio again and he eventually promised that the Naval amendment would be signed tomorrow....."

*This is the first reference in the Brindisi files to the Cunningham Agreement, and there is no information as to the terms of the agreement.*

10 Nov 43. Fatima's 879 of 10 Nov to Freedom gives further information regarding the hitch in obtaining the signature to the Naval amendments:-





"Marshall Badoglio....states his position....remains as follows -  
Quote - I asked General MACFARLANE to present to General EISENHOWER  
certain modifications of the amendments to the Naval agreement  
which I hope General EISENHOWER will authorize. In event he is  
unable to do so himself and feels that the amendments must be  
signed without delay, I am prepared to obtain the necessary signatures.  
In the latter case, however, I will sign only if General EISENHOWER  
will promise me to intervene with the Allied Governments to have my  
proposal accepted - Unquote".

10 Nov 43. A cable from Freedom bearing no date or reference was received at Brindisi on  
10 Nov. This message contained the text of the C in C's announcement of the  
formation of A.C.C., and a broad summary of it's functions..

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED - authority AFHQ Administrative  
Memo No 74 of 2 Nov 43.

13 Nov 43. Fatima's 922 of 13 Nov to Freedom gives the text in Italian of  
Badoglio's amendments to the Cunningham agreement.  
There is no English text in the Brindisi diary.

15 Nov 43. Freedom's 8/15 of 15 Nov to Fatima expresses the C in C's reactions  
to Badoglio's proposed amendments:-

"....The British and American Governments have agreed to the  
modification proposed by the Italians in the long term  
document, but....have demanded an additional statement  
in the Cunningham agreement asserting the right of the  
United Nations to make such disposition of any or all  
Italian ships as they may think fit....  
....If Badoglio cannot accept this quid pro quo, then  
the long term document as signed at Malta must stand as  
originally written without modification, thus affirming  
the unconditional surrender of the Italian ground, Air  
and Naval forces. The Cunningham agreement, which has  
not yet been signed, then becomes an adhoc working  
arrangement subject to variation as we desire...."

1221

16 Nov 43. Fatima's 966 of 16 Nov to Freedom stated that Badoglio would sign  
the amended Naval agreement on the following day; after signature  
General JOYCE would hand to him a signed copy of protocol amendment  
to the long terms.

17 Nov 43. The amended Cunningham agreement was signed at noon this day.  
(see Fatima's 985 of 17 Nov to Freedom).

Copies of the text in English and Italian are in the custody  
of the Secretary General of A.C.C.





THE STORY BEHIND ITALY'S SURRENDER

Clerk Lee

The complete factual story of Italy's sudden secret surrender to the Allied Nations can now be told from the accounts of the participants themselves. Hereto, important portions of the story have been kept secret because some of the principal actors involved were in German-controlled territory, or their families were in danger of Nazi reprisals. At the present time, all of them are safely behind our lines in Italy or elsewhere.

The story begins with a brief flashback to February, 1943, when General Ambrosio succeeded General Ugo Cavallero as Chief of Staff of the Italian armed forces.

Ambrosio had seen the handwriting on the wall of North Africa, where Italy's empire had been engulfed in a surge of Allied power. Across the Mediterranean, the Germans were enjoying a momentary advantage, but it would soon be overcome, and Italy itself would be invaded.

To go on with Germany could mean only further disaster for Italy. The entire Italian nation hated the Germans, who had treated the people not as allies but as slaves. The Italian Army, navy and air force were smarting under the constant insults and snubs of the German officers. Even if Germany should by some miracle win the war, Italy would still be the loser.

It was clear that there was only one way out of the dilemma; Italy must seek a separate peace and trust to the Allies for alleviating her postwar suffering. That meant deposing Mussolini, because the United Nations had already made it plain that to rid Italy of Fascism was one of their war aims. But the time was not yet ripe for Ambrosio to act.

The time finally came late in July, when American and British forces were pushing forward swiftly on all fronts in Sicily. Italian cities were reeling under the destructive weight of our air attacks; the bombing of Rome had increased the people's desire to get out of the war, which they plainly understood was being fought for the benefit of Germany alone.

Ambrosio called together the four or five men who controlled the Italian armed forces. They decided not only that Mussolini go, but that Fascism must be wiped out in one swift stroke, so suddenly and decisively that the Germans would not have time to intervene. They laid their plans carefully.

The ideal solution would be to have Mussolini deposed by the Fascist Party itself, thus completely repudiating the Black Shirt leader. Someone whispered in the ear of Dino Grandi, former Fascist Ambassador to London, that if he took the lead in urging the Fascist Grand Council to force Il Duce's resignation, Grandi might find himself at the head of the Italian government and thus in position to approach the United Nations for a peace settlement, which would assure Grandi of preferential treatment.

*data from an Ambrosio interview, 3/2/57  
1237  
early part of 1944*



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(It might be noted here that the Italian military leaders never had the slightest intention of allowing Grandi to seize power.)

At the time the coup was carried out, everyone in Italy was thinking and talking peace. Even Mussolini himself, as Marshal Badoglio declared later, had been seriously considering approaching the Allies. Il Duce had finally become convinced that Hitler had "betrayed" him. After the conference of the two dictators in the spring, Mussolini had seen the light that his countrymen had seen months before. Hitler, he held his closest collaborators, was working for Hitler alone, and would gladly sacrifice the lives of Italian lives to postpone the final day of reckoning for Germany. Mussolini told his Fascist coworkers that he intended to break with Germany by September Fifteenth.

But Il Duce waited too long. Grandi agreed with General Ambrosio that the Allies would never listen to Mussolini's peace proposals and that the founder of Fascism would have to go. Grandi played his part well at the climactic final session of the Fascist Grand Council, which met in the Palazzo Venezia on July twenty-fourth, and finally, at 3:30 on Sunday morning, voted 24 to 7, with one not voting, to depose of Il Duce.



That same night the Army moved swiftly. Mussolini was arrested as he left the Royal Palace. Marshal Badoglio, who had not been informed of the conspiracy until the day before, found himself head of the government. As a reward for his services, Grandi was given not control of Italy, but a tip that enabled him to escape to Lisbon while many of the other Fascist leaders were fleeing or being taken into custody. Those were the preliminaries that set the stage.

The military men behind Badoglio had determined to approach the Allies. Their problems were to establish contact in the face of redoubled Gestapo vigilance in Rome and in all the neutral capitals of the world. The Germans watched all departures from Rome, and it was not until more than two weeks after Mussolini had been overthrown that a way was found to send an envoy out of Italy.

The second week in August a Foreign Office delegation left Rome enroute to Lisbon to greet the Italian Ambassador to Chile on his return from South America. With the delegation went the two men whom the Italian government had selected for the difficult and dangerous mission of contacting the Allied nations and arranging to get Italy out of the war.

The chief negotiator was General Giuseppe Castellano, senior officer on General Ambrosio's staff. His interpreter and adviser was Franco Montanari, 36 year old Harvard graduate, whose mother is an American and who for three years was Italian consul in Honolulu.

As a Foreign Office official, Montanari was a legitimate member of the delegation. It was not difficult for him to obtain a false passport for Castellano, who traveled as a civilian accompanying the delegation. Castellano is a Sicilian, short and swarthy, and most of his experience has been as a staff officer.

At Madrid, Castellano and Montanari dropped off the diplomatic train on the pretense of visiting friends and immediately got in touch with the British Ambassador. General Castellano informed the Ambassador that he had been instructed by the Badoglio government to seek an armistice.

The London and Washington governments were promptly informed. Their first concern was to establish that Castellano and Montanari were accredited representatives of the Rome government. That was done by Marshal Badoglio depositing a signed statement with the British authorities setting forth that Castellano was his representative.

Castellano and Montanari were told to proceed to Lisbon, where they took rooms in a hotel and lived as members of the Italian diplomatic mission. The Gestapo agents in Lisbon focused their attention on other members of the diplomatic group and took only casual notice of Castellano and Montanari.

Meanwhile, General Eisenhower had been instructed to rush delegates to Lisbon to meet the Italians. He selected as his representatives Major Gen. Walter B. Smith, his chief of staff, and Brigadier K. W. D. Strong, assistant chief of staff.



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Smith's middle name is Bedell, and his associates call him Beedle. He is five feet ten inches tall, with brownish hair turning gray. He wears a pipe-nez on a black ribbon and usually looks preoccupied. He had had long experience in staff work, including duty on the general staff in Washington and as secretary to the combined British-American chief of staff.

Strong is a six footer who wears tortoise-shell glasses. He is reputed to be one of the brainiest officers in the British Army. Of him, Eisenhower says, "I have never known a more brilliant intelligence officer". His part in planning for the forthcoming Italian invasion had been large, and he was chosen to meet the Italians in the hope that he could get valuable military information from them.

The two Allied envoys left North Africa the afternoon of Wednesday, August 18th. Civilian passports were prepared for them. Smith took the identity of a businessman; Strong of a commercial traveler.



Next day they climbed aboard a small passenger plane, unarmed, in accordance with international conventions, and took off from one of Gibraltar's landing fields. An hour and a half later they sat down in Lisbon.

Their passports were examined and checked without question, and customs officers found nothing dutiable in their suitcases.

They were met unobtrusively by an American official, who recognized them by a prearranged signal, and were driven in an inconspicuous automobile to the home of Mr. George F. Kennan, the American charge d'affaires, where they waited for darkness.

Their first meeting with the Italians took place at 10:30 on the night of August 19th in the private residence of the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, where General Smith and Brigadier Strong were driven from Kennan's home.

Castellano and Montanari dined in their hotel, then took a taxi to a restaurant, where they had coffee. In approved detective-story fashion, they took another taxi to a distant part of the city, walked into a building by one entrance and out another, and found a third taxi to drive them to the Ambassador's home.

The Italians were ushered into the Ambassador's study where, behind closed shutters and drawn curtains, Sir Ronald introduced Castellano and Montanari to the Allied representatives and Mr. Kennan. There were no handshakes or other amenities as the men sat down at a small round table. Everything was very formal.

General Smith, acting as spokesman, said to Castellano, "I understand you have come to ask for armistice terms. Here are the terms."

He read out the articles one by one; Italy to surrender unconditionally and to avoid giving any assistance to our enemies; the Allies to have full use of Italian bases, the fleet and air force to surrender themselves; Italian divisions overseas to be called home; political and economic terms to be imposed later.

"There can be no discussion of these terms," General Smith concluded, "They must be accepted unconditionally."

"My purpose in coming was not actually to request an armistice," Castellano stated, "but to see how Italy could cooperate with the Allies."

It was obvious that the Italians had hoped to come in on the winning side without formally surrendering.

General Smith cut those hopes short. "We are not prepared to discuss anything but an armistice. You have just heard the terms. They will not be altered; you can accept or reject them."

Castellano signified that he understood, and Montanari put a copy of the terms in an inside pocket. That concluded the formal meeting, and the talk turned to military matters. Brigadier Strong took cover. Castellano urged that Allied parachute troops be brought at once to the aid of the British and Commonwealth forces.



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"There can be no discussion of these terms," General Smith concluded, "They must be accepted unconditionally."

"My purpose in coming was not actually to request an armistice," Castellano stated, "but to see how Italy could cooperate with the Allies."

It was obvious that the Italians had hoped to come in on the winning side without formally surrendering.

General Smith cut these hopes short. "We are not prepared to discuss anything but an armistice. You have just heard the terms. They will not be altered; you can accept or reject them."

Castellano signified that he understood and Montanari put a copy of the terms in an inside pocket. That concluded the formal meeting, and the talk turned to military matters. Brigadier Strong took cover, Castellano urged that Allied parachute troops be dropped at Rome simultaneously with the landings he assumed would be made in other parts of Italy. He said that the German forces around the Capital were not large and that the Italian divisions would assist our parachute troops.

From time to time Strong went into the next room where a number of technical and communications experts were assembled. A system of communication was agreed on, and Montanari was provided with a code and given a battered-looking suitcase, which contained a compactly built radio transmitter and receiver.

The talks continued throughout the night without a break. Just before daylight and just before the Nazi who always watches the Ambassador's residence had taken up his post across the street, Castellano and Montanari were sent back to their hotel by automobile, as they left, Smith and Strong shook hands with them.

The Allied representatives returned immediately to North Africa by plane passing through Gibraltar, and reported at headquarters to Gen. Eisenhower.



The two Italians, however, were delayed in their departure homeward by the late arrival of the boat bringing the Ambassador from Chile. On the 23rd of August, the Ambassador arrived and with the welcoming delegation went off for Italy by special train.

There the armistice terms were submitted to the Badoglio government and immediately accepted. Castellano and Montanari prepared to convey that information to Eisenhower's headquarters by radio on the 26th on the day agreed for the first signal.

Meantime, no sooner had Montanari and Castellano left Lisbon than a serious complication developed in the person of a strangely assorted pair of generals who turned up in the British Ambassador's office one morning.

The two officers were Major General Carton de Wiart of the British Army, and General Giacomo Zanussi, of the Staff of General Roatta, who was chief of staff of the Italian Army (in distinction to General Ambrosio who headed all the Italian military services.)

Zanussi explained that he had been sent from Rome when Castellano failed to return on schedule. He said he had been commissioned to negotiate an armistice by Marshal Badoglio in the event that Castellano had met with any mishap.

The American and British officials were immediately suspicious. General Roatta, Zanussi's superior, had been Italian military attache in Berlin and was reputed to be pro-Nazi. There was a possibility that the Germans had learned of the armistice negotiations and had sent Zanussi to get the details.

Zanussi was asked for his credentials. He pointed to General Carton de Wiart; "Here are my credentials. I have no others."

From the point of view of secrecy, Zanussi could not have made a more unfortunate choice. Carton de Wiart was a well-known man in Europe, and a most conspicuous figure because he had lost one arm and one eye in the course of many years of distinguished service in the British Army. Any one of a dozen Nazi agents in Lisbon might recognize him.

To forestall this possibility, he was put aboard a plane and hurried to England. Word was given out that the Italians had released him because of poor health.

Zanussi was flown to Gibraltar and then to Algiers, where Eisenhower, Smith, Strong and the few others who had been let in on the secret were waiting for the first word from Castellano in Rome. The suspense was nerve-racking.

We had placed our bets on Castellano and almost anything might have happened to him. There was a serious charge that the Nazis had spotted him in Lisbon and would capture him or assassinate him on the way back to Rome. And there was always the possibility that the whole episode was a frame-up engineered by the Germans.



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The transmission plan arranged in Lisbon called for Castellano to send the first message from Rome on the 27th of August. From noon on the 26th, radio operators in AFHQ began listening on the agreed wave length.

Then, promptly at noon the following day, the first faint signal came through. It was just a squeal in the ether, but it electrified headquarters. By 3 P M a complete message had been received.

The message said that Badoglio accepted the armistice terms. General Eisenhower dispatched a prompt reply, arranging for a further meeting in Sicily on August 31. That was as soon as Castellano dared to risk leaving Rome again.



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On the morning of that day Castellano and Monteneri drove out to a Rome airfield, which had not been taken over by the Germans. Castellano's trimotor Savoia-Marchetti was waiting for them. It took off in the direction of Sardinia and then swung south toward Sicily. The chief pilot had been taken into Castellano's confidence, but the co-pilot, navigator and radio operator were locked up during all landings in the next few days to prevent their talking.

American antiaircraft gunners at the Termini Imerese airport about 20 miles east of Palermo had been warned not to fire on the Italian plane which was coming in at nine a.m. The plane sat down without incident 5 minutes early. Brigadier Strong, escorted Castellano and Monteneri to a Douglas C-47 which flew them across Sicily to the Cassibile airdrome, outside Catania. Then the men drove to advance Allied Headquarters.

Headquarters was a tent camp in an olive grove. The Italians were given one tent for living quarters. A half-hour after Castellano arrived, General Smith and his party came in by plane from North Africa, and the men met in a big conference tent at eleven a.m.

Castellano brought a discouraging report. He said conditions in Italy had altered considerably since the first conversation in Lisbon. German troops were pouring into the country. Italy had become an occupied nation and its government was not free. If the government signed the armistice immediately, it would require some guarantees that its members would not be left at the mercy of the Nazis.

General Smith's reply was unequivocal: the Allies had plans which they would carry out under any circumstances. Castellano had left Lisbon to get the terms accepted in Rome. Now he was telling a different story. The Allies could not continue to negotiate. They would proceed with their plans regardless of whether the armistice were signed or not.

At the end of the discussions, Castellano agreed to return to Rome that night and inform his government of the Allies' position. He was given until midnight of Sept. 8 first-second to send a reply. It must be a firm acceptance or rejection of the armistice.

With him aboard the Savoia went General Zanussi, who meanwhile had satisfied Eisenhower of his good faith. Among other things, he had sent a radio message to Rome strongly urging that the armistice be accepted.

Again came a period of anxious waiting at the radio. Castellano's reply was finally whispered through the air at 7:30 P.M. on Wed. night, 19 hours behind the fixed time. It said: Italy accepted the terms and Castellano was returning by plane the next morning.

Castellano made the trip undetected by the same route he had followed on his first journey. He was met at Termini Imerese airfield by General Smith, who escorted him to Cassibile and to the conference tent at 11 a.m.



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Smith and Strong had expected that the armistice would be signed immediately. But Castellano said that, although his government accepted he was not empowered to sign the papers.

If Castellano had tossed a hand grenade onto the table, he could not have caused a stronger reaction. "D" day for our landings near Naples was only seven days off. That was the second of September and the invasion was set for the 9th. If Italian troops were going to offer even limited resistance, it would make a big difference in the disposition of our own strength.

Very strong messages were drafted to be sent back to Rome by radio. They stated that unless Castellano were empowered to sign the armistice immediately, the whole negotiation would break down. Badoglio was asked to deposit a written document accrediting Castellano to sign as his representative.



There was another long, worrying delay over communicating with Rome. Atmospheric conditions were unfavorable, and it was not until 8 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd that the message got through and was acknowledged by the secret station in Rome.

The generals spent the time at Cassibile working out details of the parachute landings to be made at Rome. General Alexander had approved the plan, which Castellano had urged partly as a measure of safety for the Italians involved in the Armistice negotiations. He said the Italians had sufficient armed strength around Rome to assist the American parachutists in holding the capital until our main body drove up from southern Italy.

The Germans had poured some 14 divisions into Italy since the fall of Mussolini, making a total of 19 but their forces around Rome were small.

The conference also discussed the problem of announcing the armistice-if it should be signed. It was decided that General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio would make simultaneous broadcasts at 6:30 on the evening of the eighth.

But still there was no word from Rome.

It finally came at 4:30 the afternoon of Sept 3rd. Badoglio had produced the required statement empowering Castellano to sign. No time was lost.

Castellano and Montanari were summoned to the conference tent, where General Smith and Brigadier Strong were waiting. Messages notified General Eisenhower, Commodore Dick, chief of staff to Admiral Cunningham, General Lowell W. Rooks, assistant chief of staff to Eisenhower (G-3), Robert Murphy, President Roosevelt's representative in North Africa, and Harold Macmillan, British resident minister in Algiers.

Castellano and General Smith took seats at an American barracks table covered by a white cloth. They affixed their signatures to the document which was to save many thousands of American, British and Italian lives, to alter the whole world balance of naval power and to destroy the Rome-Berlin Axis.

There was no champagne to celebrate, but General Rooks produced a bottle of whiskey, poured it into mugs, and everybody drank in silence.

Then General Smith and Castellano stepped outside the tent, picked branches from the olive tree overhead and exchanged them. Eisenhower shook hands with Castellano and hurried away.

Four days later, at 2 o'clock in the morning of Sept 7 1943 a big American sedan slid silently out onto the bomb-battered docks at Palermo.

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Two American officers left the car and quickly climbed aboard a waiting British PT boat. The youthful English skipper immediately headed out to sea from the harbor.

Brigadier Gen Maxwell Taylor and Col William T Gardiner of the American Army were starting on one of the most dangerous and fateful secret missions in history. They were headed for Rome, in the heart of German occupied Italy, and as a result of their activities in the next forty hours the whole course of current history was to be affected.

The mission to Rome had developed as a result of the secret Italy-Allied negotiations which had culminated in the signing of the armistice. Gen Eisenhower had been interested in Castellano's plan of landing an American air-borne division in Rome. It was the kind of daring move that appealed to the Allied Commander in chief as a short cut to victory. If it succeeded, it would draw important German forces up from the south and make our capture of Naples relatively easy. It might galvanize the Italian Army into active fighting against the Germans everywhere in Italy.



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An American division was chosen for the attack on Rome. The divisional commander, Gen Taylor, his chief of staff, were summoned on Sept 4th to work out details with Gen Castellano and determine whether the plan was feasible.

The two Americans met with Castellano in Sicily on Sept 5th. They had to work fast. The original plan for our invasion of Italy had called for the division to land in Volturno valley. In the Naples area, a few hours before our main invasion forces attacked at Salerno. Not many hours were left to get ready for the new mission. That meant studying an entirely new set of maps; intensive briefing of the officers and men and loading different equipment. It required a perfect understanding with the Italians on the disposition of Italian and German troops. The Italians would have to provide motor transport and fuel.

The American officers conferred with Castellano the entire day and night of the 5th. They worked out a tentative plan for the paratroops to capture one air-drome on the night of the 8th and hold it. Then two other airports near Rome would be seized and with the help of the Italians, a ring of troops would be thrown around the capital.

But as they got into details, the divisional commander and Gen Taylor became less and less satisfied that they could depend on the Italians for the assistance necessary to the success of such an ambitious and hazardous attack. After many hours of discussion they suddenly got the same idea.

"It's no good", they said. "We don't have enough information. Unless we can get it first hand, we'll have to call the operation off", said the divisional commander.

Taylor didn't hesitate. "I'll go to Rome," he offered.

There was another volunteer, Col Gardiner, who used to be governor of Maine, a handsome, athletic man with graying black hair.

Through a secret radio station that had been set up in Rome during the negotiations, a message was flashed to the Italian capital. The Italians were told that two American officers were coming, and to make arrangements.

Taylor and Gardiner wore uniform shirt and trousers of summer tan, with neckties and fatigue caps when they went aboard the PT boat at Palermo. They carried trench coats.

The PT chased northward over the smooth Tyrrhenian Sea all night and at dawn it was within sight of the Island of Ustica. At an agreed rendezvous point, an Italian corvette was waiting. It sent over a small boat and the two Americans went aboard.

Admiral Maugeri, head of the Italian Naval Intelligence, greeted them as guests of the Royal Navy. "We will put you ashore at the port of Gaeta, 25 miles south of Rome," the Admiral said. "To avoid suspicion, we will pretend you are



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Admiral Maugeri, head of the Italian Naval Intelligence, greeted them as guests of the Royal Navy. "We will put you ashore at the port of Gaeta, 25 miles south of Rome," the Admiral said. "To avoid suspicion, we will treat you as if you were captured aviators we picked up at sea after a plane crash."

At 6:30 in the evening the corvette eased up to the dock at Gaeta. As it was being made fast, the Admiral whispered to the Americans, "At exactly this time tomorrow night, if everything goes well, most of the Italian fleet will leave port and head out to sea. We will meet the British at prearranged points and surrender. The signal to sail will be the announcement of the armistice."

To complete the illusion that they had been picked up from sea, Taylor and Gardiner rumpled their clothes, mussed their hair and took off their neckties. They jammed their fatigue caps in their pockets and hid their pistols and cartridgeridge belts under their trench coats.



The Italians carried out their part realistically. The two Americans were shoved unceremoniously down the gangplank and into a waiting navy limousine.

An Italian officer, carrying two suitcases, got in after them. The suitcases contained radio sets equipped for both transmission and reception.

Italian sailors on the dock stared with interest as the car drove out of the navy yard. A few miles beyond the Gaeta it turned sharply into a lane and pulled up. A car was parked across the roadway, facing in the opposite direction. Its motor was running and its rear doors were open. The American jumped in and they turned out onto the ancient Appian Way and headed north toward Rome.

The side windows of the vehicle were frosted, but looking through the windshield, Taylor and Gardiner took note of frequent signs pointing down side roads to German military establishments. The principal approach to Rome from the south seemed to be almost undefended. There were only four road-blocks along its entire length.

Beside one of the road-blocks, four German soldiers were standing.

Taylor's finger tightened on the trigger of the pistol in his coat pocket. Gardiner clicked off the safety catch on his automatic. But the Germans paid no attention as the car brushed by.

The last light had just faded when they drove into Rome's blacked-out streets. The car swung into the court-yard of the Palazzo Capare, which houses a number of overflow military offices from the Ministry of War just across the street. Car backed up to a portico and Taylor and Gardiner stepped swiftly into a wing of the palace which had been blocked off for their use. Sentries patrolled the corridors.

An excellent dinner was waiting, but the Americans were in no mood to be wined and dined. All during the day the sense of urgency had been growing on them. Now the time of the parachute landings was less than 24 hours away. They had just sat down when the chief of staff of Gen. Carboni, commander of troops in the Rome area, came in to make a formal call.

"We must see General Carboni immediately," Taylor said.

The Italian officer, not knowing the date of the invasion, was amazed "But my dear sir, we have arranged only courtesy calls for this evening."

Taylor made it clear that he had no time for formalities. A few minutes later Gen. Carboni came in.

His first sentences shocked the Americans; he was not pessimistic about the military situation. The arrangements which had been discussed for assisting the parachute landings could not be carried out. German reinforcements had arrived in the Rome district in the past few days and the Italians were outnumbered. Further, the Germans



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That was bad enough. But then came the bombshell. Carboni said flatly, the armistice announcement must be postponed. It would be highly undesirable, in view of the changed conditions. It would bring about immediate German occupation of Rome and the establishment of a new Fascist government.

Taylor and Gardiner went into a quick huddle. If the situation was as bad as Carboni described it, the air-borne operation would have to be cancelled. On the other hand, perhaps Carboni was exaggerating. The Americans would have to confirm his statements. And they would have to do what they could to prevent postponement of the armistice.



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"It is imperative," Taylor said, "that we see Marshal Badoglio at once."

The Italians said that was impossible. The Marshal was an old man. It was after midnight and he had been asleep for hours. Taylor's insistence won. Carboni telephoned to Badoglio's aide and told him the Americans were coming.

With the driver and an aide in the front seat, Carboni, Taylor and Gardiner got into the General's black limousine shortly after midnight. They had gone only a few hundred yards through the dark streets when a command rang out.

"Halt"

The figure of a sentry, carrying a short carbine, loomed out of the blackness. He flashed his light over the faces of the men in the rear seat. Taylor and Gardiner had turned up the collars of their trench coats and again put their caps in their pockets.

Even the General's headquarters pass didn't satisfy the sentry. He walked up to the front of the car and examined the secret identification which the Italians, unknown to the Germans, used as a laissez-passer.

Eight more times they were challenged and halted. The Italians in the car were jumpy, knowing that detection by the Germans would mean death. Taylor and Gardiner were too preoccupied to worry about their own safety. Not only their own lives were at stake now but the fate of the entire air-borne division and even perhaps the armistice itself.

After a twenty-minute drive they were escorted into Badoglio's ornate villa. Most of the Marshal's aides were in pajamas and dressing gowns. They had been awake even before Carboni's call, because an air alarm was on.

The visitors were taken to an upper floor by elevator and Carboni went alone into Badoglio's study. Fifteen minutes later he took the Americans inside.

Badoglio understood some French and Taylor addressed him in that language. He expressed alarm at Carboni's view of the military situation and his belief that the armistice must be postponed. He asked if the Marshal agreed.

"Oui, absolument," Badoglio replied in halting French. "The armistice announcement will have to be postponed," he continued, "if I announce it tomorrow night, the Germans will cut my throat the following morning."

Taylor and Gardiner had come to Rome strictly on military business. Now they found themselves confronted with a far bigger issue than the air-borne operation. They were involved in questions of international policy, and on their actions might depend the whole outcome of the invasion. If the armistice plan collapsed, the Italian army might fight us instead of helping us; the fleet might not come out to surrender.



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Taylor spoke without hesitation. "Does the Marshal realize," he asked "how deeply Italy has committed itself by signing the armistice?" Is he prepared to face the consequences of failing to live up to his word? Does he realize Allied reaction will be very strong? Does he fear the Germans more than the Allies?

Tears came to the old man's eyes. "I do not believe," he said "that the Allies will wreak vengeance against their friends who are waiting only a propitious moment to join them in fighting against the Germans."

Slowly and courteously, Taylor explained that it was not a question of vengeance, but of many thousands of lives and of the immediate future of the war. There could be no waiting for a propitious moment. This was the moment. Plans already made must be carried out, and we were counting on the armistice announcement to assist us in an operation which was highly dangerous, in which many Allied lives would be lost and which would eventually bring about the liberation of Italy.



Badoglio sat in silence behind his desk.

"How do you propose to deal with the situation?" Taylor asked.

The Marshal suggested that he Taylor return at once to General Eisenhower, explain that the announcement of the armistice would bring immediate German retribution against Rome and against Badoglio personally, and tell him that it was impossible to go through with the agreement.

Taylor pointed out that he could not undertake any such mission. He urged Badoglio to prepare a message for radio transmission to Eisenhower, setting forth his position. After strong insistence Badoglio agreed.

The first message drawn up by Badoglio stated that owing to changes, in the situation, it was no longer possible to announce the armistice on schedule, as that would bring about immediate occupation of Rome by the Nazis and violent seizure of the government.

Into the text, Badoglio wrote, "as General Taylor agrees."

Gardiner spotted this sentence, and Taylor told the Marshal that he would not be put in the position of endorsing postponement of the armistice. Badoglio re-drafted the message but again he included the implication that Taylor agreed with him. The third draft was satisfactory.

Taylor quickly wrote a message of his own, having established to his own satisfaction that the air-borne attack could not succeed. He informed his General that the operation must be called off. To make doubly sure, he inserted a code word in Badoglio's message which meant: Do not attack by parachute. Cancel the operation."

With their eyes on their wrist watches, Taylor and Gardiner rose to leave. The interview had lasted only 15 minutes, but it was already 1:30 in the morning.

Badoglio got up and took Taylor's hand. Again tears filled his eyes. "I swear by my honor of 55 years as a soldier my loyalty to the Allied cause." Then he repeated the pledge in Italian.

Carboni himself took the messages to the secret radio station, after dropping the Americans at the Palazzo Caprara. When the Italian General returned, the Americans questioned him anxiously. "Have the messages gone?"

Carboni made a grimace as he answered, "Not yet. The coding will take a long time." The operator is trying to establish contact, but atmospheric conditions are bad. He hopes to raise Allied Force Hq soon."

The rest of the night and well into the morning, Taylor and Gardiner paced about their quarters. They ate some breakfast and slept fitfully. Mostly they eyed their watches, counting the minutes.



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Gardiner spotted this sentence, and Taylor told the Marshal that he would not be put in the position of endorsing postponement of the armistice. Badoglio redrafted the message but again he included the implication that Taylor agreed with him. The third draft was satisfactory.

Taylor quickly wrote a message of his own, having established to his own satisfaction that the air-borne attack could not succeed. He informed his General that the operation must be called off. To make doubly sure, he inserted a code word in Badoglio's message which meant: Do not attack by parachute. Cancel the operation."

With their eyes on their wrist watches, Taylor and Gardiner rose to leave. The interview had lasted only 15 minutes, but it was already 1:30 in the morning.

Badoglio got up and took Taylor's hand. Again tears filled his eyes. "I swear by my honor of 55 years as a soldier my loyalty to the Allied cause." Then he repeated the pledge in Italian.

Carboni himself took the messages to the secret radio station, after dropping the Americans at the Palazzo Caprara. When the Italian General returned, the Americans questioned him anxiously. "Have the messages gone?"

Carboni made a grimace as he answered, "Not yet. The coding will take a long time. The operator is trying to establish contact, but atmospheric conditions are bad. He hopes to raise Allied Force Hq soon."

The rest of the night and well into the morning, Taylor and Gardiner paced about their quarters. They ate some breakfast and slept fitfully. Mostly they eyed their watches, counting the minutes.

Once Taylor thought he heard the sound of planes. He thought of the men of his division getting ready to step into their big-bellied transport ships. He imagined the planes roaring off into the night and speeding toward Rome.

Then the noise of motors grew louder. It was planes but not parachute planes, because the time was only 10 A. M. The building shook for a long time to the crump of heavy bombs. A sentry came in "Your bombers are attacking German Hq at Frascati, outside the capital." The bombing stopped and the long waiting began again.



At 11:35 in the morning Gen Carboni came hurriedly into the room. "Your messages have just been cleared."

The Americans were tremendously relieved. They had done all they could for the present.

Both Taylor and Gardiner were asleep at 3:30 in the afternoon when an officer came in to hand them a radio message: "You will return to Allied headquarters. Passage by air has been arranged. Your plane will not be fired upon by Allied aircraft or antiaircraft guns."

1215  
Taylor took his last opportunity to re-emphasize what he had told Marshal Badoglio. He sent for General Carboni and repeated to him that the Allied reaction would most certainly be very strong if the Italians failed to announce the armistice as scheduled at 6:30 P.M. now only 3 hours away.

"Will you not explain our situation to General Eisenhower?" Carboni asked. Once more, Taylor pointed out that he could not do so. "Why don't you send an Italian general back with us?" he said.

The Italians approved. It was decided that Gen. Francesco Rossi, deputy chief of the Imperial general staff, would make a good envoy. He was sent for, and at 4:30 P.M. the three officers, together with an Italian interpreter, Sublt. Tagliavie, walked out into the courtyard and into a waiting car.

Gardiner described the trip through the city. "Like the other car, this one had shattered-glass windows, but we could see ahead. There weren't any signs of bomb damage except along the railroad tracks, which had been pounded hard. Several pieces we had to take long detours on our way to the Centocelle airrome. Traffic appeared fairly normal, with street cars and busses running."

"Quarter-mile from the airport, the Americans spotted a squad of German infantry. They were marching along the road in the same direction. They paid no attention as the car overtook and passed them. 'They were so close,' Taylor said, 'that I could have reached out my hand and touched them on the shoulder.'"

There were no Germans at the airport itself. The car drove out onto the runway where a Savoia-Marchetti bomber was waiting, its motors already warmed.

It was a beautiful afternoon, and as the Savoia climbed to 12,000 feet and headed out over the sea, Taylor and Gardiner looked back at the dome of St. Peter's and the massed buildings of Rome in the distance. The city looked calm and peaceful.

Back at Allied Headquarters things were far from peaceful.

The messages from Badoglio and Taylor had summed the situation.



"Will you not explain our situation to General Eisenhower?" Carboni asked.

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A quarter-mile from the airport, the Americans saw a squad of German infantry. They were marching along the road in the same direction. They paid no attention as the car overtook and passed them. "They were so close," Taylor said, "that I could have reached out my hand and touched them on the shoulder."

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Back at Allied Headquarters things were far from peaceful.

The messages from Badoglio and Taylor had spurred the staff to swift action. Word was flashed to the air-borne division that the attack was not to be made. The message did not reach the divisional general until 4:30 in the afternoon, fifteen hours after Taylor had written it in Rome. The paratroops were already on the field set for the take off.

Eisenhower didn't hesitate in taking action on Badoglio's request for postponement of the armistice announcement. A sizzling reply was rushed back to Rome. It informed Badoglio that Eisenhower would announce the armistice as planned at 6:30 in the evening.



That left Badoglio with no alternative. Once the armistice was announced, Badoglio knew he could be regarded by the Germans as their enemy regardless of whether he himself made the announcement or not. If he did make the announcement, the allies would have faith in him. If he did not he would be betraying us.

While their plane sped steadily southward Taylor and Gardiner saw their watches touch 6:30. They had not any way of knowing what had happened as a result of their messages; whether the armistice announcement had been postponed and the entire invasion plan changed, or whether it had gone off as scheduled.

They didn't have much time to worry about the armistice. As they approached the African Coast, an American A-20 spotted them and got into attacking position behind the Savoia. For the first time, Taylor and Gardiner were worried about themselves.

The A-20 came straight at them. Then, at the last minute it pulled up and swung away without firing.

Half an hour later, at seven o'clock, the Savoia set down on El Aouina airfield outside Tunis. An excited Air Corps sergeant ran over and opened the door. He spotted Taylor.

"Have you heard the news, Sir?" he shouted, "The Eyties have surrendered. General Eisenhower has just announced an armistice over the radio."

The Nazis never got an opportunity to cut Badoglio's throat or otherwise avenge themselves on him. At eight P. M. on the night of the 8th--an hour and a half after the scheduled time--he went on the air over Radio Rome and announced that the armistice had been signed. He instructed Italian troops not to oppose it. Then he disappeared.

Next morning before daylight, and before the Germans had recovered from their shock, a big limousine sped out of Rome. It carried not only Marshal Badoglio but King Victor Emmanuel.

The car drove straight east across Italy to the Adriatic port of Pescara. The King and the Marshal went aboard an Italian cruiser. Next morning they were safe in the port of Taranto, behind the British lines.

END



U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

12 September 1943.

SUBJECT: Instructions for Military Mission with the Italian Government.

TO : Lieutenant-General F.A. Mason Macfarlane.

1. The Italian Government, to whom an Armistice has been granted, is now established in the Brindisi area.

The Commander-in-Chief has decided that a Military Mission shall be dispatched to the Italian Government.

You are appointed Head of the Military Mission and will assume your duties forthwith.

2. Object

1214  
The task of the Mission is to transmit the military instructions of the Commander-in-Chief to the Italian Government, collect and transmit intelligence, and arrange for such coordinated action as the Italian armed forces and people can be induced to take against Germany.

In fulfilling this task you, and all members of your mission, will bear constantly in mind the extreme importance of inculcating in the Italian Government, armed forces and people, the will to resist and hamper in every way the German forces in Italy and the Italian possessions.

3. Composition

The Military Mission will consist of Naval, Ground Force and Air Sections. The heads of these sections will report to you on all matters of policy; on technical matters they may report direct to the appropriate service from which they are drawn.

The names of the heads of the sections will be notified to you in due course.

Attached is chart showing provisional organisation.

4. Political Questions

The British Resident Minister in North Africa (Rt. Hon. H.M. MacMillan) and the U.S. Minister (Mr Murphy) or their representatives, will be associated with your Mission, in order to make the necessary diplomatic contacts with the Italian Government. They will however report to you, and all instructions from the Allied Commander in Chief, are to be passed through them.



1217  
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5. Communications

You will report to the Allied Commander-in-Chief. On matters affecting only one service, you may communicate with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, G.O.C. 15 Army Group and Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, as appropriate, with copies to AFHQ.

*Original in Resident's Diary 1.1.21.1.*



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You will not communicate direct with any agencies in Washington or London (e.g. War Department, Admiralty).

Suitable facilities will be provided for you by Chief Signal Officer, AFHQ.

6. Armistice Terms

Copies of the Armistice Terms, together with the political, economic and financial conditions referred to in para 12 of the Armistice Terms, are attached herewith for your information and guidance. The latter have not yet been presented to the Italian Government and you will not inform the Italian Government of their contents.

By command of General EISENHOWER


(sgd) W.B. Smith.  
W. B. SMITH  
Major General, U.S. Army,  
Chief of Staff

Attached:  
Organisation Chart  
Armistice Terms

1213



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1212



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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ADVANCE COMMAND POST

12 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Taylor.

SUBJECT: Notes For Allied Military Mission.

1. ARMISTICE DOCUMENTS

A copy of the full length armistice terms (which have not yet been signed) has been furnished unofficially to General Castellano, and may have been sent to Italy by his staff officer who returned on 5th September.

The short armistice terms which were signed on 3 September were handed General 'C' officially and despatched as above.

An aide-memoire, unsigned, dated 3 September, records action which was unofficially agreed that the Italian Government and Forces would carry out prior to and after the proclamation on 8th September. A copy was furnished General 'C' and transmitted to Marshall Badoglio. A copy is attached, Enclosure A. Attention is directed to para.6.

2. COMMUNICATIONS

You will be able to use:-

- a. 1 Airborne Division link via 15th Army Group.
- b. Onarrival, V Corps link via 15th Army Group, but at a later ~~date~~ date possibly via Eighth Army.
- c. Such naval signals facilities as are available via Cinc Med at Bizerta, later Algiers.
- d. Clandestine S.O.E. link via S.O.E. Headquarters at Algiers. The code for your station is 'Monkey' and it is presently located at Brindisi, presumably with Marshall Badoglio.

Captain deHann, S.O.E., who is being instructed to report to you as interpreter, is in charge of this and several other clandestine radio parties. S.O.E. use special codes and frequencies, and the portable field sets communicate only to Algiers, and not to each other or to army stations. They are therefore unsuitable for establishing direct communications within the country; but it is suggested that you keep one set



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- e. Such special radio facilities as may be furnished for the sole use of the Mission. Details and time of arrival will follow as early as possible.

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

Original in Brindisi Diary Vol I Folio 2A.



### 3. MAPS U.S. SECRET ~~Equals British~~ MOST SECRET

The following are supplied herewith:-

|                 |             |                                       |
|-----------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| Italy & Balkans | 1/1,000,000 | 2 Sets (please one map to Mr. Murphy) |
| Italy & Balkans | 1/500,000   | 1 Set                                 |
| Heel of Italy   | 1/100,000   | 1 Set                                 |
| Situation Map   | -           | 1                                     |

### 4. PROGRAM FOR MOVE OF REMAINDER OF MISSION

- a. Air Commodore Foster; has been requested to make the journey by air independently so as to arrive by night 13th September if possible.
- b. Seven officers, 1 civilian and 28 enlisted men with about 4½ tons of baggage are due at AFHQ Liaison Detachment camp, Cassibile, Sicily (telegraphic address Fairfield Advance) noon 13th September. They will be moved on to Taranto by sea by first opportunity arriving possibly on the 14th but certainly not later than 15th. You will be advised of ETA as soon as definite.

This party will probably be accompanied by three Italian Staff Officers who are being returned by General Castellano as not required with his mission. Their names are:

Lieut. Col. Dueros Paulo  
 Lieut. Col. Chiaperelli Emilio  
 Comdt. Bristore Umberto

1210

Arrangements will made to ship in 4 cars (and possibly radio vehicles and a truck) as soon as practicable.

It is noted that the head of the mission desires a permanent guard attachment to be made available when this can be arranged.

### 5. INFORMATION FROM AFHQ

A special Situation Report will be dispatched to you daily giving the current situation in broad terms and our future intentions. The following telegraphic code names may be useful:\*

AFHQ Command Post, (Amilcar) - No code name. Fairfield Rear is telephone address some times mis-used



Seven officers, 1 civilian and 20 enlisted men with about 4½ tons of baggage are due at AFHQ Liaison Detachment camp, Cassibile, Sicily (telegraphic address Fairfield Advance) noon 13th September. They will be moved on to Taranto by sea by first opportunity arriving possibly on the 14th but certainly not later than 15th. You will be advised of ETA as soon as definite.

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- AFHQ - Freedom (Algiers)
- Tac HQ 15th Army Group - Finbat (Bizerte)
- Main HQ 15th Army Group - Filpot (Cassibile, Sicily)
- Cinc Med, Bizerte ) - No code name.
- Cinc Med, Algiers )
- Air Command Post - No code name. (La Mersa)

NOTE: It is requested that for the present messages for AFHQ be addressed:

To AFHQ Command Post  
rptd Freedom



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6. COMPOSITION OF ITALIAN MILITARY MISSION AT AFHQ

See Enclosure B.

7. ALLIED PLANS AND BUILD UP

See 'Outline Situation Map' and estimate of avalanche build up, Enclosure C. The build up indicated for Avalanche is a forecast dated 8th September. For the present progress will be made more rapid from Bizerte, Sicily and Tripoli, owing to comparatively light losses of IST's. However build up the U.S. VI Corps from Oran depends on the use of MT ships using the port of Naples from about D - 12 and will be retarded if we fail to get the port in good time and in fair condition. The table in therefore only a very rough guide.

8. BROADCAST

Major Greenless, British Services, a technical expert on PWB Staff to General McClure has been sent to Turanto to inspect the powerful radio transmission station at Bari, and to assist if required in getting it servicable as soon as we control the city. Great importance is attached to this station being available at the earliest date for use by the Badoglio government. Until it is available the PWB plan is for an Italian spokesman to broadcast from Palermo, the transmission being picked up and relayed by the powerful station in Algiers.

/s/ B.M. Archibald

B. M. ARCHIBALD  
Colonel,  
G-3 Operations.

Encl:

- Encl A - Aide-Memoire, dated 3 Sept
- " B - Composition of Italian Military Mission at AFHQ.
- " C1 - Outline Situation Map &
- " C2 - Estimate of Avalanche Build UP
- " D1-2- List of Code Names
- " E - List of Commanders and Staff.

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A list of code names in current use for operations, and for principle places in Italy, is attached Enclosure D.

10. COMMANDERS AND STAFF



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List of the names of some Commanders and Staff who will be in the heel is attached Enclosure E.

- 3 -

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
AIDE MEMOIRE

MOST SECRET

3 September, 1943.

Page One.

1.

This aide memoire enumerates the points which it has been agreed that the Italian Government will do everything possible to accomplish prior to the proclamation of an Armistice between the Italian Forces and those of the Allies, and other points on which action is to be taken subsequent to the proclamation.

2.

From the hour that the Armistice instrument comes into force until its proclamation:

(a) Take all possible measures to safeguard ALLIED prisoners of war. If GERMAN pressure to hand them over becomes too great they should if possible be released and succoured by the people.

(b) NO ITALIAN warships are to be allowed to fall into GERMAN hands. Arrangements must be made to insure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, immediately on declaration of Armistice. ITALIAN submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would be a revealing measure. 1208

(c) No merchant shipping is to be allowed to fall into GERMAN hands. Merchant shipping in Northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports South of the line VENICE - LETHORN. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

(d) GERMAN forces should not be allowed to take over Italian coast defenses.

(e) Arrangements are to be made to be put in force at the proper time for ITALIAN organizations in the BALKANS to march to the coast, with a view to their being taken off to ITALY by the United NATIONS.

3.

For the defense of ROME, in which one Allied Airborne Division (probably reinforced) is to participate, detailed plans will be completed and all preliminary preparations made, including the following:-

(a) Three key airfields in the vicinity of ROME to be effectively secured.

(b) Preparatory moves will be taken to insure that all avenues to ROME can be seized and blocked with the least delay.

(c) Agreed navigational aids for the Allied troop-carrying aircraft will be established.

(d) Full measures will be taken to insure that anti-aircraft fire is not opened on the troop-carrying aircraft. As far as possible



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1208

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- (c) Agreed navigational aids for the Allied troop-carrying aircraft will be established.
- (d) Full measures will be taken to insure that anti-aircraft fire is not opened on the troop-carrying aircraft. As far as possible neutralise GERMAN RDF stations
- (e) Arrangements will be made for contact between Commander and Staff, immediately the division lands.
- (ff) Arrangements will be made for provision of all supplies required by the airborne division, exclusive of ammunition (food, trucks, possibly some medical assistance).
- (g) Fighter groups selected by the ITALIAN Air Force to be retained to assist in defense of ROME.

Anticipating the need for lengthy communications which cannot be handled by the present link, arrangements will be made for a rendez-vous as required at times and places to be designated by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, and with recognition signals. Written messages

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in/.....



U.S. SECRET

in code will be exchanged for onward transmission by hand of officer courier.

#### 5. PROCLAMATION

At 1830 hours ROME time (1830 B hrs) of X day (X day will be communicated later but only a few hours in advance) following immediately after the announcement of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Force of the conclusion of an Armistice, which announcement will begin at 1815 hours ROME time, Marshall Badoglio will proclaim the Armistice by every available means of public dissemination, by radio broadcast, by announcement to the press and foreign diplomatic corps, and by telephone and telegraph to all agencies of the ITALIAN Government and the ITALIAN Armed Forces. Included in this proclamation will be orders to the ITALIAN Armed Forces and people to cease all forms of resistance to the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS. At the same time instructions will be issued to resist and obstruct the operations of the GERMAN Forces in every possible way as long as they remain on ITALIAN soil.

#### 6. POST-PROCLAMATION MEASURES:

From and after 1830 hours ROME time (1830 B hrs) X day the following measures are to be put in train, as rapidly as practicable:

(a) A ceasing of work by all personnel engaged in occupations which facilitate the maintenance, movement and/or operations of the GERMAN Armed Forces.

(b) So far as possible, the paralysis of all movement of GERMAN Forces throughout ITALY, especially in areas mentioned in sub-paragraph 'd' below, by the following means:

(1) By direct attacks on Headquarters and Command Posts of GERMAN military organisations.

(2) Cutting of GERMAN communications (telephone and telegraph, road and rail).

(3) Destruction by sabotage or other means of enemy motor transport.

(4) Ambushing Staff cars, dispatch riders and transport movement generally.

(c) The destruction of GERMAN aircraft, stores of petrol, ammunition, etc, especially in areas mentioned in sub-paragraph 'd' and around Foggia.

(d) (1) ROME area.

(a) The seizure of all communications running throughout the outskirts of the city to prevent the GERMAN occupying it or moving through it.

(b) Direct attack on GERMAN Headquarters at FRASCATI.

(c) Air defense of city.

(2) SPINAZIA Area



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(c) Air defense of city.

(2) SPEZZIA Area

Maximum cover for the departure of the fleet.

(3) Between ROME and NAPLES

Interfere as much as possible with the movement of GERMAN divisions located between ROME and NAPLES.

(4) NAPLES

Prevent destruction of port and shipping and hold port area if possible.

(5) TARANTO

Seize and hold port for entrance of UNITED NATIONS Forces.

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET PARI and BRINDISI/.....



(6) BARI and BRINDISI U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

Same as TARANTO, but with priority to TARANTO.

(7) CALABRIA

Cut off GERMAN Forces in the TOE of ITALY by blocking road and rail communications.

1206

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U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

SICILY

September 3rd, 1943

The following conditions of an Armistice are presented by

General DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces,

acting by authority of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain and in the interest of the United Nations, and are accepted by

Marshall PIETRO BADOGLIO

Head of the Italian Government.

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian armed forces.
2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny, to the Germans, facilities that might be used against the United Nations.
3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and none of these may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany.
4. Immediate transfer of the Italian Fleet and Italian aircraft to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.
5. Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander-in-Chief to meet the needs of his military - naval programs.
6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory, both islands and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.
7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian armed forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.
8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may now be engaged.



Head of the Italian Government.

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8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may now be engaged.
9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.
10. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces for the Prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander-in-Chief may require, and in particular the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian Territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11. The/.....

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*See British Diary Vol I. July 2.*



U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

11. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.

12 Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature with which Italy will be bound to comply will be transmitted at a later date.

The conditions of the present Armistice will not be made public without prior approval of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The English will be considered the official text.

Marshall PIETRO BADOGLIO  
Head of Italian Government.

BY: /3/ Guiseppe Castellano

GUISEPPE CASTELLANO  
Brigadier General, attached to  
The Italian High Command.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
General U.S. Army  
Commander in Chief  
Allied Forces.

BY: /s/ Walter B. Smith

WALTER B. SMITH  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Chief of Staff.

Present:

Rt. Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN  
British Resident Minister A.T.H.Q.

ROBERT MURPHY  
Personal Representative of the  
President of the United States

ROYER DICK  
Commodore, R.N.  
Chief of Staff to the C. IN C. Med.

LOWELL W. ROCKS  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 AFHQ.

FRANCO MONTANARI  
Official Italian Interpreter

NOTE:- The foregoing is a copy of the text in the Brindisi diary. Comparison with annexe A of AFHQ's Directive MCS 322 - 12 of 1 Nov 43 to Major General Joyce reveals certain differences. The closing paragraphs of MCS 322-12 read as follows:-

13. The conditions of the present Armistice will not be made public without prior approval of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The present instrument shall be confirmed by the Italian Government. It will enter into force hours after the instrument of confirmation



BY: /3/ Giuseppe Castellano

GIUSEPPE CASTELLANO  
Brigadier General, attached to  
The Italian High Command.

Commander in Chief  
Allied Forces.  
BY: /s/ Walter B. Smith  
WALTER B. SMITH  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Chief of Staff.

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The closing paragraphs of MCS 322-12  
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13. The conditions of the present Armistice  
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approval of the Allied Commander-in-  
Chief.

The present instrument shall be  
confirmed by the Italian Government.  
It will enter into force        hours  
after the instrument of confirmation  
has been received at Allied Force  
Headquarters.

This Armistice will continue until the  
coming into force of a treaty of peace.  
It may be denounced by the Allies with  
immediate effect if the Italian  
Government does not fulfil its  
obligations.

Signed at  
at (hour)

(place)

on the

day of

(Signatures)

Present:

Rt. Hon. HAROLD MACMILLAN  
British Resident Minister A.F.H.Q.

ROBERT MURPHY  
Personal Representative of the  
President of the United States

ROYER DICK  
Commodore, R.N.  
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Major General, U.S. Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 AFHQ.

FRANCO MONTANARI  
Official Italian Interpreter  
Brigadier KENNETH STRONG  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ.



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INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER OF ITALY

Whereas the Italian Government, and the Italian Supreme Command acknowledge that the Italian forces have been totally defeated and that Italy can no longer carry on the war against the United Nations and have accordingly unconditionally requested a suspension of hostilities.

And whereas the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting on behalf of the United Nations are willing to lay down the terms on which they are prepared to suspend all hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her Allies are not obstructed, and that Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with requirements of these Governments.

The following terms have been presented by.....duly authorized to that effect, and have been accepted by.....representing the Supreme Command of the Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces, and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government.

1.

(A) The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally.

(B) Italian participation in the war in all Theatres will cease immediately. There will be no oppositions to landings, movements or other operations of the Land, Sea and Air Forces of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Italian Supreme Command will order the immediate cessation of hostilities of any kind against the Forces of the United Nations and will direct the Italian Navy, Military and Air Force authorities in all Theatres to issue forthwith the appropriate instructions to those under their Command.

(C) The Italian Supreme Command will further order all Italian Naval, Military and Air Forces or authorities and personnel to refrain immediately from destruction of or damage to any real or personal property, whether public or private.

2. The Italian Supreme Command will give full information concerning the disposition and condition of all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces, wherever they are situated and of all such forces of Italy's Allies as are situated in Italian or Italian occupied territory.

3. The Italian Supreme Command will take the necessary measures to secure airfields, port facilities, and all other installations against seizure or attack.



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1.

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(B) Italian participation in the war in all theatres will cease immediately. There will be no oppositions to landings, movements or other operations of the Land, Sea and Air Forces of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Italian Supreme Command will order the immediate cessation of hostilities of any kind against the Forces of the United Nations and will direct the Italian Navy, Military and Air Force authorities in all theatres to issue forthwith the appropriate instructions to those under their Command.

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2. The Italian Supreme Command will give full information concerning the disposition and condition of all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces, wherever they are situated and of all such forces of Italy's Allies as are situated in Italian or Italian occupied territory.

3. The Italian Supreme Command will take the necessary measures to secure airfields, port facilities, and all other installations against seizure or attack by any of Italy's Allies. The Italian Supreme Command will take the necessary measures to insure law and order, and to use its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of the present instrument. Subject to such use of Italian troops for the above purposes, as may be sanctioned by the Allied Commander in Chief all other Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will proceed to and remain in their barracks, camps or ships pending directions from the United Nations as to their future status and disposal. Exceptionally such Naval personnel shall proceed to shore establishments as the United Nations may direct.

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*See Sanctions Diary. Vol 1. Feb 2.*



4. Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will within the periods to be laid down by the United Nations withdraw from all areas outside Italian territory notified to the Italian Government by the United Nations and proceed to areas to be specified by the United Nations. Such movement of Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will be carried in conditions to be laid down by the United Nations and in accordance with the orders to be issued by them. All Italian officials will similarly leave the areas notified except any who may be permitted to remain by the United Nations. Those permitted to remain will comply with the instructions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

5. No requisitioning, seizures or other coercive measures shall be effected by Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces or officials in regard to persons or property in the areas notified in Article 4.

6. The demobilization of Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces in excess of such establishments as shall be notified will take place as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

7. Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries and transports will be assembled as directed in ports to be specified by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will be dealt with as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. (Note. If at the date of the Armistice the whole of the Italian Fleet has been assembled in Allied ports, this article would run - "Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries, and transports will remain until further notice in the ports where they are at present assembled, and will be dealt with as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.")

8. Italian aircraft of all kinds will not leave the ground or water or ships, except as directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

9. Without prejudice to the provisions 14, 15 and 28 (A) and (D) below, all merchant ships, fishing or other craft of whatever flag, all aircraft and inland transport of whatever nationality in Italian or Italian-occupied territory or waters will, pending verification of their identity and status, be prevented from leaving.

10. The Italian Supreme Command will make available all information about naval, military and air devices, installations, and defences, about all transport and inter-communication systems established by Italy or her allies on Italian territory or in the approaches thereto, about minefields or other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and such other particulars as the United Nations may require in connection with the use of Italian bases, or with the operations, security, or welfare of the United Nations Land, Sea or Air Forces. Italian forces and equipment will be made available as required by the United Nations for the removal of the above mentioned obstacles.

11. The Italian Government will furnish forthwith lists of quantities of all war material showing the location of the same. Subject to such use as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may make of it, the war material will be placed

12



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11. The Italian Government will furnish forthwith lists of quantities of all war material showing the location of the same. Subject to such use as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may make of it, the war material will be placed in store under such control as he may direct. The ultimate disposal of war material will be prescribed by the United Nations.

12. There will be no destruction of nor damage to nor except as authorized or directed by the United Nations any removal of war material, wireless, radio location or meteorological stations, railroad, port or other installations or in general, public or private utilities or property of any kind, wherever situated, and the necessary maintenance and repair will be the responsibility of the Italian authorities.

13. The manufacture, production and construction of war material and its import, export and transit is prohibited, except as directed by the United Nations. The Italian Government will comply with any directions given by the United Nations for the manufacture, production or construction and the import, export or transit of war material.

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14.

(A) All Italian merchant shipping and fishing and other craft, wherever they may be, and any constructed or completed during the period of the present instrument will be made available in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the competent Italian authorities at such places and for such purposes and periods as the United Nations may prescribe. Transfer to enemy or neutral flags is prohibited. Crews will remain on board pending further instructions regarding their continued employment or dispersal. Any existing options to repurchase or re-acquire or to resume control of Italian or former Italian vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered during the war will forthwith be exercised and the above provisions will apply to all such vessels and their crews.

(B) All Italian inland transport and all port equipment will be held at the disposal of the United Nations for such purposes as they may direct.

15. United Nations merchant ships, fishing and other craft in Italian hands wherever they may be (including for this purpose those of any country which has broken off diplomatic relations with Italy) whether or not the title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise, will be surrendered to the United Nations and will be assembled in ports to be specified by the United Nations for disposal as directed by them. The Italian Government will take all such steps as may be required to secure any necessary transfers of title. Any neutral merchant ship fishing or other craft under Italian operation or control will be assembled in the same manner pending arrangements for their ultimate disposal. Any necessary repairs to any of the above mentioned vessels will be effected by the Italian Government, if required, at their expense. The Italian Government will take the necessary measures to insure that the vessels and their cargo are not damaged.

16. No radio or telecommunication installations or other forms of intercommunication, shore or afloat, under Italian control whether belonging to Italy or any nation other than the United Nations will transmit until directions for the control of these installations have been prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Italian authorities will conform to such measures for control and censorship of press and of other publications, of theatrical and cinematograph performances, of broadcasting, and also of all forms of intercommunication as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may direct. The Allied Commander-in-Chief may, at his discretion, take over radio, cable and other communication stations.

17. The warships, auxiliaries, transports and merchant and other vessels and aircraft in the service of the United Nations will have the right freely to use the territorial waters around and the air over Italian territory.



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18. The forces of the United Nations will require to occupy certain parts of Italian territory. The territories or areas concerned will from time to time be notified by the United Nations and all Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will thereupon withdraw from such territories or areas in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to those of article 4 above. The Italian Supreme Command will guarantee immediate use and access to the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italy under their control.



19. In the territories or areas referred to in article 18 all Naval, Military and Air installations, power stations, oil refineries, public utility services, all ports and harbours, all transport and all inter-communication installations, facilities and equipment and such other installations or facilities and all such stock as may be required by the United Nations will be made available in good condition by the competent Italian authorities with the personnel required for working them. The Italian Government will make available such other local resources or services as the United Nations may require.

20. Without prejudice to the provisions of the present instrument the United (Nations) will exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout the territories or areas referred to in article 18, the administration of which will be provided for by the issue or (9of) proclamations, orders or regulations. Personnel of the Italian administrative, judicial and public services will carry out their functions under the control of the Allied Commander-in-Chief unless otherwise directed.

21. In addition to the rights in respect of occupied Italian territories described in articles 18 to 20,

(A) Members of the Land, Sea or Air Forces and officials of the United Nations will have the right of passage in or over non-occupied Italian territory and will be afforded all the necessary facilities and assistance in performing their functions.

(B) The Italian authorities will make available on non-occupied Italian territory all transport facilities required by the United Nations including free transit for their war material and supplies, and will comply with instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief regarding the use and control of airfields, ports, shipping, inland transport systems and vehicles, intercommunication systems, power-stations and public utility services, oil refineries, stocks and such other fuel and power supplies and means of producing same, as United Nations may specify, together with connected repair and construction facilities.

22. The Italian Government and people will abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and will carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations.

23. The Italian Government will make available such Italian currency as the United Nations may require. The Italian Government will withdraw and redeem Italian currency within such time-limits and on such terms as the United Nations may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations. The Italian Government will take such measures as may be required by the United Nations for the control of banks and business in Italian territory, for the control of foreign exchange and business in financial and financial transactions and for the regulation of trade and production and will comply with any instructions issued by the United Nations.



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24. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with or dealings with or for the benefit of countries at war with any of the United Nations or territories occupied by such countries or any other foreign country except under authorization of the Allied Commander-in-Chief or designated officials.

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(A) Relations with countries at war with any of the United Nations, or occupied by any such country, will be broken off. Italian diplomatic, consular and other officials and members of the Italian land, sea and Air Forces accredited to or serving on missions with any such country or in any other territory specified by the United Nations will be recalled. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries will be dealt with as the United Nations may prescribe.

(B) The United Nations reserve the right to require the withdrawal of neutral diplomatic and consular officers from occupied Italian territory and to prescribe and lay down regulations governing the procedure for the methods of communication between the Italian Government and its representatives in neutral countries and regarding communications emanating from or destined for the representatives of neutral countries in Italian territory.

26. Italian subjects will pending further instructions be prevented from leaving Italian territory except as authorized by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will not in any event take service with any of the countries or in any of the territories referred to in article 25 (A) nor will they proceed to any place for the purpose of undertaking work for any such country. Those at present so serving or working will be recalled as directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

27. The Military, Naval and Air personnel and material and the merchant shipping, fishing and other craft and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities or which is occupied by any such country, remain liable to attack or seizure wherever found in or over Italian territory or waters.

28.

(A) The warships, auxiliaries and transports of any such country or occupied country referred to in article 27 in Italian or Italian occupied ports and waters and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of such countries in or over Italian or Italian occupied territory will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving.

(B) The Military, Naval and Air personnel and the civilian nationals of any such country or occupied country in Italian or Italian occupied territory will be prevented from leaving and will be interned pending further instructions.

(C) All property in Italian territory belonging to any such country or occupied country or its nationals will be impounded and kept in custody pending further instructions.

(D) The Italian Government will comply with any instructions



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(B) The Military, Naval and Air personnel and the civilian nationals of any such country or occupied country in Italian or Italian occupied territory will be prevented from leaving and will be interned pending further instructions.

(C) All property in Italian territory belonging to any such country or occupied country or its nationals will be impounded and kept in custody pending further instructions.

(D) The Italian Government will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Commander-in-Chief concerning the internment, custody or subsequent disposal, utilization or employment of any of the above mentioned persons, vessels, aircraft, material or property.

29. BENITO MUSSOLINI, his Chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with.

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30. All Fascist organizations, including all branches of the Fascist Militia (MVSN), the Secret Police, (OVRA), all Fascist youth organizations will insofar as this is not already accomplished be disbanded in accordance with the directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as the United Nations may give for abolition of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and internment of Fascist personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist ideology and teaching.

31. All Italian laws involving discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinions will insofar as this is not already accomplished be rescinded, and persons detained on such grounds will, as directed by the United Nations, be released and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. The Italian Government will comply with all such further instructions as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may give for repeal of Fascist legislation and removal of any disabilities or prohibitions resulting therefrom.

32.

32.

(A) Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of or specified by the United Nations and any nationals of the United Nations, including Abyssinian subjects, confined, interned, or otherwise under restraint in Italian or Italian-occupied territory will not be removed and will forthwith be handed over to representatives of the United Nations or otherwise dealt with as the United Nations may direct. Any removal during the period between the presentation and the signature of the present instrument will be regarded as a breach of its terms.

(B) Persons of whatever nationality who have been placed under restriction, detention or sentence (including sentences in absentia) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the United Nations will be released under the direction of the United Nations and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected.

(C) The Italian Government will take such steps as the United Nations may direct to safeguard the persons of foreign nationals and property of foreign nationals and property of foreign states and nationals.

33.

(A) The Italian Government will comply with such directions as the United Nations may prescribe regarding restitution, deliveries, services or payments by way of reparation and payment of the costs of occupation during the period of the present instrument.

(B) The Italian Government will give to the Allied Commander-in-Chief such information as may be prescribed regarding the assets, whether inside or outside Italian territory, of the Italian state, the Bank of Italy, any Italian state or semi-state institutions or Fascist organizations or residents in Italian territory and will not dispose or allow the disposal, outside Italian territory of any such assets except with the per-



(A) Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of or specified by the United Nations and any nationals of the United Nations, including Abyssinian subjects, confined, interned, or otherwise under restraint in Italian or Italian-occupied territory will not be removed and will forthwith be handed over to representatives of the United Nations or otherwise dealt with as the United Nations may direct. Any removal during the period between the presentation and the signature of the present instrument will be regarded as a breach of its terms.

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34. The Italian Government will carry out during the period of the present instrument such measures of disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization as may be prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

35. The Italian Government will supply all information and provide all documents required by the United Nations. There shall be no destruction or concealment of archives, records, plans or any other documents or information.



36. The Italian Government will take and enforce such legislative and other measures as may be necessary for the execution of the present instrument. Italian military and civil authorities will comply with any instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief for the same purpose.

37. There will be appointed a control commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

38.

(A) The term "United Nations" in the present instrument includes the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the control commission and any other authority which the United Nations may designate.

(B) The term "Allied Commander-in-Chief" in the present instrument includes the control commission and such other officers and representatives as the Commander-in-Chief may designate.

39. Reference to Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces in the present instrument shall be deemed to include Fascist Militia and all such other military or para-military units, formations or bodies as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

40. The term "War Material" in the present instrument denotes all material specified in such lists or definitions as may from time to time be issued by the control commission.

41. The term "Italian Territory" includes all Italian colonies and dependencies and shall for the purposes of the present instrument (but without prejudice to the question of sovereignty) be deemed to include Albania. Provided however that except in such cases and to such extent as the United Nations may direct the provisions of the present instrument shall not apply in or effect the administration of any Italian colony or dependency already occupied by the United Nations or the rights or powers therein possessed or exercised by them.

42. The Italian Government will send a delegation to the Headquarters of the control commission to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the control commission to the competent Italian authorities.

43. The present instrument shall enter into force.....hours after its signature. It will remain in operation until superseded by any other arrangements or until the voting into force of the peace treaty with Italy.

44. The present instrument may be denounced by the United Nations with immediate effect if Italian obligations thereunder are not fulfilled or, as an alternative, the United Nations may penalize contravention of it by measures appropriate to the circumstances such as the extension of the



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The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation, the decision of the control commission will prevail.

Signed on the \_\_\_\_\_ day \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ (Place)  
(Hour) (Time)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Signature)

U.S. SECRET OF DEFENSE BULKY EDITION SECRET



U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

The following note is made as the result of the examination of documents in ARCHIVES Section.

In the course of writing a brief history of the early days of A.C.C., it was necessary to refer to the INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER OF ITALY. The text to which reference was made was that in the Brindisi Diary i.e. the text which accompanied A.F.H.Q. letter of 12 September 1943 to Lt. General Mason MacFarlane, appointing him as head of the Military Mission.

A revision of the terms of the INSTRUMENT was approved by the United Nations, and the text of the revised terms was given in Freedom's cable 7824 of 7th November 1943 to Fatima.

Comparison of this revised text with the text in the Brindisi Diary revealed that the latter was not the text under revision. The revised text indicates that the text under revision contained a preamble of six paragraphs, whereas the text in the Brindisi Diary contained a preamble of three paragraphs only. Brigadier Upjohn was consulted, and he produced in his files the text of an INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER OF ITALY containing a preamble of six paragraphs.

In the absence of any additional information, it is assumed that the text revised by Freedom's 7824 is the text produced by Brig. Upjohn. This text has been checked against that in the Brindisi Diary, and it was found that discrepancies were confined to the preamble. The preamble of Brig. Upjohn's text is as follows:-

Whereas in consequence of an armistice dated September 3rd 1943, between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments on the one hand and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended



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Whereas in consequence of an armistice dated September 3rd 1943, between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments on the one hand and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United Nations on certain terms of a military nature;

And whereas in addition to those terms ~~it was also provided in the~~ said Armistice that the Italian Government bound themselves to comply with other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature to be transmitted later;

And whereas it is convenient that the terms of a military nature and the said other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature should without prejudice to the continued validity of the terms of the said Armistice of September 3rd, 1943, be comprised in a further instrument;



U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

The following together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3rd, 1943, are the terms on which the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting on behalf of the United Nations are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these Powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these Governments.

These terms have been presented by ..... duly authorized to that effect;

And have been accepted by ..... representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces, and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government.

(End of preamble - no further discrepancies)

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*afshari.*

*Archives.*

*24 Sep 44.*



SECRET

Taranto,  
14 September 1943

Dear General,

Got marooned on the landing ground and arrived yesterday but eventually reached Taranto and contacted Admiral Power.

Spent the day today at Brindisi.

First saw Ambrosio, then Badoglio and then the King.

Ambrosio. Intelligent, friendly but seemed depressed and lacking in enthusiasm.

Badoglio. Old, Honest, friendly and said about the right thing.

The King. Very old and gaga.

Apart from having got the Fleet, I should describe the situation as unpromising. I don't find any evidence of inspired leadership or genuine enthusiasm. As I spoke to all, inclined to ascribe the present state of affairs to the short notice they were given at Avalanche.

Communications.

These are lamentable. Brindisi is in touch with two Divisions in the toe and the heel, with Gardinia, with Cephalonia, uncertainly with Venice- and with nowhere else.

As against this, Bari is functioning and gives good reception all over Italy.

Army.

The following Divisions are in being.

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Original in Brindisi Diary, MS. Folio 7



SECRET

Mantova Division near Crotona  
Piceno Division near Brindisi  
Legaano Division (part of)  
In the South---- North of Brindisi  
Form coastal formations.

In Sardinia---- Four Divisions recuperating.

In Cephalonia-- One Division

In Dodecanese-- One Division

Ambrosio says that all the rest of the Italian Army is "surrounded by the Germans and finished". In fact, they can be written off.

Of the Divisions still in being in the South.

- A. They have hardly any motor transport left.
- B. They have practically no petrol.
- C. Their armament is mostly 1918.
- D. They only have their unit eschelons of armament.
- E. They are very short of boots.

To sum up, they are practically immobile and have ammunition for about two days fighting.

The only reserves of ammunition appear to be the stocks we have captured in North Africa and Sicily. Ambrosio suggests that we should collect these and send them over. He would also like as many boots as we can send at once.

Even if we could do the shipping, Ambrosio says that it would be no good trying to fetch Divisions from the Balkans as they are finished.

In the South, the Italians have no tanks at all.

He wants organised laborers very badly at Taranto and I am asking Ambrosio for 3,000 men tomorrow.

As regards employing the Italian formations in the zones we occupy:-

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I suggest that they should come under the orders of our Commanders on the spot. They amount in the South to 2 plus Divisions- immobile and very short of armament. They could be used for defense of airdromes, lines of communication and as laborers.

To keep the flag flying, they might be formed into a corps, (HQ CORPS is at Brindisi) but it would be a corps of extremely low value.

Think it would be best to form this corps and put it under Monty for static use at ports and on lines of communication. I put all this tentatively to Ambrosio who was quite in agreement.

It does not look as if we shall get much Italian help in the air. Foster has just arrived and I am taking him out to Brindisi tomorrow and he will report results.

The two things we can do here to get maximum help out of the Italians are:-

1. SOE
2. ~~THE~~ P.W.E.

There is tremendous scope and a fruitful field for both. I have made the point that good sabotage of enemy communications and dumps etc will damage Italians' towns far less than the alternative bombing.

He must go flat out on SOE and P.W.E.

Apart from the Fleet, the genuine military help we are likely to get is going to be practically nil.

The Crown Prince is in Brindisi. I have'nt seen him yet. The Duke of Aosta arrives here tomorrow to join the King.

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Mussolini who had been taken to the Abbruzzi Country under a picked guard of 50 was rescued by a German raid of 500 paratroops of the 3rd German Paratroop Division. The guard failed to shoot him as ordered

The Transport situation here is very bad. Practically no petrol and very few vehicles.

I am doing all I can to put some pep into the Italians but they are unlikely to cheer up when Avalanche goes well. They all say we should have attacked North instead of South of Naples. On this point, I tell them they know nothing about it and to shut up.

I hope to get the Mission installed in Brindisi tomorrow. I shall spend the day there in any case.

The Airborne Division made a very good impression. Hopkinson's death has been a tragedy.

Forgive this illegible scrawl but I've no facilities here yet.

Yours very Sincerely

Mason Macfarlane

P.S. Ambrosio says that there is little likelihood that the Italians' formations or units in German occupied Italy will fight against us except for Blackshirt ones which probably will.

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N. 1

15 September 1943

Note for GENERAL MAC FARLANE

The clauses of the armistice, made known by the anglo-american radio, have shown that Italy accepted surrender on very hard and onerous terms, especially in what concerned the fleet.

On its side, the new fascist government - to break the spirit of the population and troops - declared that it too wanted peace, but on honourable conditions.

It is therefore absolutely necessary and urgent that the Anglo-Americans should publicly make clear that the enforcement of the above mentioned conditions was subordinated to the attitude of the Italians - (absolutely loyal to the conditions - behaviour of the authorities and population) etc)

Anyway, as the Germans in spite of the correct attitude of the Italians towards them after the armistice, started unequivocal war actions on a grand scale, against the F.F.A. and the Italian population, and as these courageously reacted, the world ought to know that the Allies now consider Italy as a State which collaborates spontaneously on the military plan.

Therefore it would be necessary for the Allies to express, with an active propaganda, the new tendencies and designs of the Allies as far as we are concerned.

*See Brindley's Diary. Vol I. July 9.*



U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET  
NAVAL MESSAGE

C-in-C Med (R) C-in-C Med (A) From F.O.T.A.  
MOST SECRET IMMEDIATE  
CYPHER

Your 141916. I have reported to General Macfarlane at Brindisi today Thursday and interviewed the Minister of Marine.

2. Minister of Marine represented that a memorandum by Commodore Dick exempted warships smaller than destroyers except submarines in ports south of latitude 42° from proceeding to Allied ports.
3. Minister of Marine strongly urges that these vessels should continue to be used for fighting Germans and moving personnel to such localities as Corfu and the Dalmatian coast and also for support of troops at Bari and to northward.
4. He also asks for all minor war vessels at Augusta to be sent to Taranto or Brindisi in order to operate in Adriatic.
5. He asked permission to use minor war vessels at Palermo to operate from Madalena and interrupt German communications between Corsica, Elba and Piombino which is very important in view of western half of Corsica being in Italian hands.
6. I informed Minister that I would represent his requests but that it appeared to me impracticable that conduct of sea warfare in Mediterranean could be exercised by any authority other than you. He replied that as no Allied ships were on the scenes referred to he sought permission to use his own ships.
7. Minister informed me that General Eisenhower had given permission for cruiser *SCIPIO AFRICANUS* and four destroyers to be placed at disposal of King of Italy. Cruiser, two corvettes and two torpedo boats are at Brindisi for this purpose. Request information whether they are to remain exempt from other orders.
8. Whole matter resolves ~~in~~ as to whether minor Italian war vessels are to be surrendered or used for war purposes under Italian command. As matter has been under discussion between British mission and Italian Government and military policy is similarly affected I await further instructions before implementing your 152127.

T.O.O. 161707B Sep  
T.O.D. In Transit.

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*Brindisi Dray 152127*

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET



ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

SECRET

16 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ.

*Roatta*

1. At my meeting with Ambrosio and *rolatto* yesterday Ambrosio raised the question of the status of the Italian Army vis-a-vis the Allied Forces in the joint fight which is now commencing common enemy. I maintained that the present situation was far from clear and anomalous and that it required crystalizing on the lines that Italy was now fully in the war on the side of the Allies. I told him that this raised a bigger question on which we here were not empowered to give decisions. I asked for a clear expression of the Italian High Command's views on the subject and suggested that we discuss them later with Marshall Badoglio.

2. Later I saw Marshall Badoglio and Ambrosio with Mr MacMillan and Mr Murphy and the Marshall gave a clear explanation of the Italian case which Messrs. MacMillan and Murphy will be able to present and discuss on their arrival in Tunis.

3. At this meeting we also dealt satisfactorily with the question of AMGOT Lira and stressed again the importance of SOE and FWE work here which seems to be fully realized by the Italians.

4. Glad to hear that Brigadier Strong will be here shortly. He will find the Italian Intelligence Service here functioning very spasmodically.

Lieutenant General  
Head of Mission

*Bonidin's Diary, Vol 1, Folio 11.*

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

SECRET

16 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ, Tunis.

1. Yesterday I had a long talk with General Roatta, Chief of Staff. Later on I saw General Ambrosio with General Roatta and finally Marshall Badoglio with Mr MacMillan and Mr Murphy.

2. I telegraphed you yesterday the situation regarding Italian troops in this area which is as follows:

Headquarters 7th Army (General Arisio) at Francavilla.  
Headquarters 9th Corps (General Lerici) at Bari.  
Headquarters 51st Corps (General DeStefani) at Brindisi.  
Headquarters 31st Corps (General Mercolli) at Calabria.

3. 9 Corps is static and contains only coastal troops. (I have asked Airborne Division to send a platoon to Bari to guard the all important wireless station against sabotage or raid).

a. 51st Corps is supposed to be mobile. In point of fact, it is far removed from being so. It consists of the Legnano Division in the Brindisi Area. This division is now practically up to strength. Also the Piceno Division in the Francavilla Area which with the approval of GOC Airborne Division is moving to an area about ten miles north of Francavilla as soon as possible.

b. 31st Corps comprises the Mantova Mobile Division which has had most of its transportation removed by the Germans. There are also some immobile coastal formations under command of this Corps.

c. There are also in Calabria three independent battalions of apparently fairly high Italian standard. These are one battalion (Membo) paratroops and two battalions (815 and 816 AS).

4. The Italian High Command are most anxious to move these three battalions to the Taranto Area. They are also anxious to move the Mantova Division from Crotone by sea to Taranto to join up with 51st Corps.

5. They wish to produce a Corps (51st) on our right flank to operate on our right side up the eastern coastal sector.

6. I informed them that I would pass on their requests as also their request that we should stiffen up these defenses with either tanks or at least carriers.

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7. I have naturally stressed very strongly that no movements or operations can be undertaken by them except under the orders of the Allied Commander on the spot. This they fully realized.

8. The Command of all the troops in the Heel of Italy Area is vested in the 7th Italian Army. I have arranged for the liaison officers to be exchanged between this Headquarters and Headquarters our 5th Corps and No. 6 Base Sub Area, Taranto.

9. At the request of Commander, Airborne Division I have asked the Italian High Command to attach three groups of Italian Field Artillery to the Airborne Division. They have promised to comply as far as mobility permits.

10. The Italian High Command also wish their four mobile divisions to return from Sardinia to Southern Italy. I told them there was very little chance of this at the moment.

11. The ammunition situation of the Italian forces in Southern Italy may be rather better than they told me the day before yesterday. It appears that their used-to-be considerable stocks in the Area Brindisi-Bari which have been considerably depleted but there may be appreciable amounts left. I ought to have the fitters tomorrow.

12. As regards the suggestion that we should collect and forward to Italy stocks of ammunition captured by us in North Africa and Sicily. The Italian High Command request that they should be allowed to send some technical experts to help in sorting out what they most require. I told them that if we were able to comply with the request for ammunition we would certainly accept their suggestion regarding technical assistance. As regards reconstituting the Italian Army the High Command state that there would be little difficulty in producing men and that it was almost entirely a question of armament and munitions. They made two suggestions:

a. That we might be able to let them have captured German weapons and ammunition. I held out little hope on this point.

b. That we should let them have some of the prisoners we have taken and in the first instance certain officers (staff) of whom they were badly in need

13. I had to listen to a long dissertation on the strategical situation by Ambrosio. His principal point was that by a frontal advance from south to north through Italy we were in fact playing the enemy's game and that it was clearly indicated that we ought to make a landing in force on the eastern coast north of Rimini or at any rate far enough north to cut off the Germans in the centre and south of Italy. Ambrosio was anxious that we should use Bari as soon as possible as a port of disembarkation. Ambrosio described an advance to be rough line Foggia - Naples as a small maneuver with a very limited object.

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14. I listened patiently to his dissertation and said that I thought that in the absence of knowledge of most of the factors involved it was a *good* academic effort.

15. Ambrosio stressed the point that Italy was now determined to fight to a finish and that the Italian forces would continue to fight even after Italy had been liberated. I said all the right things.

16. I spoke very straight to Ambrosio and Roatta on the following lines. I said that the apparently classy way in which they were writing off practically all of the Italian Army but not in liberated territory made no sense at all. It was in fact utterly contrary to the spirit in which I imagined them to be cooperated. I told them that they must by every possible means keep these formations fighting and as far as possible direct their action. Bari radio ought to be in full blast all the 24 hours with encouragement and directives to their isolated forces and the civil population. I said I would try to produce some wireless sets to send out to such formations as were still making a fight and with which they had at the moment no communication. (( propose if you agree to use some of the six SOE sets which I am expecting for this purpose)).

17. I also again stressed the extreme importance of organising sabotage and propaganda on the most intensive scale as early as possible. I said that I hoped to produce in the near future a strong SOE and PWE team and that I was counting upon the Italian authorities to cooperate with this team to the maximum extent.

18. Ambrosio appeared to realize very fully that I was insisting on him and his staff waking up and getting a real move on and he assured me that he would go flat out on all the points I had made.

Lieutenant General  
Head of Mission.

SECRET



ADVANCED ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

September 17, 1943.

Dear General:

We have a message from the American Ambassador in Madrid to the effect that the Italian Ambassador in Spain advised him that since the Italian armistice he has received no instructions. He urgently wishes to receive instructions signed by Marshall Badoglio ordering him to collaborate with the American and British Embassies, as well as for his Military and Naval Attaches to cooperate with their American and British colleagues.

According to this advice the Italian Ambassador does not know officially the terms of the armistice. He only knows that an armistice has been signed, that Victor Emmanuel remains King and that Badoglio is Prime Minister. He requests that the armistice terms be communicated to him urgently, as well as instructions regarding Italian shipping now in Spanish ports.

The Italian Ambassador is also doubtful regarding any message which he might receive in Italian code because he believes that the Italian codes are known to the Germans.

You may wish to communicate the foregoing to Marshall Badoglio if this information has not already come to you through any other source. We believe that it would be helpful indeed if written instructions to the Italian Ambassador signed by Marshall Badoglio, or some member of his staff, could be sent to the Italian Ambassador immediately by plane, and relayed to Gibraltar for delivery to him at that place.

With cordial good wishes I am,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ Robert D. Murphy

Lieutenant General Mason Macfarlane  
Allied Military Mission  
Brindisi Italy

P. S.....

*Original in Political Sec. File.*

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P. S. --- Things seem to be going very well indeed and I know you must be greatly encouraged. News of the German evacuation of Sardinia and their planned evacuation of Corsica should be a source of great stimulation for the Italians.

I talked with Pedell about communications and the undesirability of transmitting messages through the Italians via MONKEY, and all of that, I understand, is being straightened out.

He also told me that he had sent you some motor cars.

I also emphasized to him the necessity you feel to return to Gibraltar for the period from October 1-14.

The atmosphere here today is very cheerful. This apparently was not the case yesterday or the day before.

All the best to you.



TRANSLATION

SECRET

GOVERNMENT OF H. M. THE KING OF ITALY

23 September 1943

TO GENERAL MASON MAC FARLANE

Lieutenant General Chief of Mission

\* \* \* \* \*

In answer to General Eisenhower's memorandum which your Excellency communicated to me today, I should be most grateful if you would kindly transmit to our Royal Ambassador in Madrid, Marchese PAOLUCCI, and to the R. Minister in Lisbon, Signor PRUMAS, the following direct message of H. M. the King:

"The lack of sufficient and proper radio connections has made it difficult to send my direct word from this free part of peninsular Italy to the Italians who are in the country, and to those who abroad represent in my Name the Royal Government and the Country.

Meanwhile, hoping that direct communications will be established, Your Excellency will kindly transmit my words of unshaken faith to all compatriots. I trust that I shall soon come back to Rome with my Government. The cordial and powerful help of the valorous Anglo-American troops, the numerous proofs of fidelity and attachment which the population has given me with unanimous enthusiasm, the perfect behaviour of all the Armed Forces which remained true to their oath, are a great comfort to me in this grave moment.

*Original in Political Sec. Files*

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every obstacle, every adversity will be overcome; The Italians trust my Government and me as I keep intact and unshaken a complete certitude in the sacred duty of the Fatherland.

Your Excellency will kindly give the widest diffusion to these words of mine in Spain and Portugal and in any place where it will be possible to, so that the feelings and the words of the King may reach every compatriot. VITTORIO EMANUELE

/s/

/s/ BADOGLIO  
CAPO DEL GOVERNO DI  
S.M. IL RE D'ITALIA

SECRET



11 October 1943

To Marshall Badoglio.

As your Excellency is aware the Germans are almost certainly in possession of all Italian Diplomatic and Consular ciphers.

Will your Excellency kindly issue a strict injunction against any further use of these ciphers until such time as new ones are arranged.

This instruction will be passed to Italian Diplomatic and Consular officials through Allied signal channels.

Allied Military Mission.

*Lt. M. J. T.*

SECRET

*Original in Political Sec. Files.*



(To Eisenhower)  
(From Macfarlane)

20 September 1943.

1. Very glad to see the copy of your telegram to London and Washington shown to me by Rennel. I hope we can get a speedy answer on policy. It will help here a lot.
2. I am telling Badoglio that his visit to you probably won't take place now for about ten days.
3. Strong has arrived and is getting around. We had a long session with Ambrosio yesterday. The Italian intelligence organization is at the moment quite useless. All the personnel and documents were left behind in Rome. They are trying to build up an organization here but it won't be much good to us for some time.
4. Rennel and Holmes have arrived. We had a long talk yesterday and agreed our policy and are seeing Badoglio - I hope - this morning.
5. As already telegraphed, I saw Badoglio again yesterday. He was as charming as ever and himself wrote to the Italian Embassy, Madrid, at once in his own hand.
6. He was looking much more tired and harrassed than the last time I saw him but he seems to have great powers of recuperation and went to Bari last night to do his broadcast reply to Mussolini's effort.
7. We can be one hundred percent certain of him and of Ambrosio. The latter is very easy to work with and a very good Chief of Staff - but I think that there is little else to him.
8. Roatta will be O. K. as long as things go well. He is very talkative and easy to work with. He has no guts and crumples up at once if I have to be tough with him which is at times inevitable.
9. On the Navy and the Air side cooperation appears to be going well. Within their limits, the Italian Air Forces are doing quite a lot in a small way - principally across the water from here.

Quindici Days. Vol I 20th 47

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10. On the Army side I am doing all I can to keep the little that is left going and to restore their self-respect.

They were delighted to send some Field Artillery to the Airborne Division and up at Bari are playing well with our Phantom detachments.

Frankly, however, from all I have seen they have nothing left alive fit to fight Germans, no tanks, antiquated and inadequate equipment, very little transport and no ammunition reserves.

They are themselves very keen to producing one corps of three divisions to join in the advance from here. They even suggested that this corps and our V Corps should operate under the Italian Army which is in these parts!!!

If in any way possible I think we should let them form their 51 Corps with at any rate the Legnano and Piceno Divisions. They will be best employed like all other Italian troops on labour, L of C or air-drome guards but there is a lot to be said from the morale point of view in favour of letting one corps go forward up the coast on our right when we advance. There is no argument in favour of this!!!

(Later) I have just got back from a long meeting with Badoglio with Rennel and Holmes. Badoglio had Count Aqueroni (temporary Minister of Finance and Food) with him. He is quite useless and very talkative.

Rennel will tell you all about the matter.

Our AMGOT proposals were accepted.

There was a long discussion about finances - the gist of which was;

- a. The urgent necessity for more AMGOT lira.
- b. A strong Italian request that Sterling lira rate of exchange should be made slightly more favourable to the Italians.
- c. The fact that, now that Mussolini and his Fascist government were presumably getting whole-hearted support from the Germans, Badoglio's effort would much embarrassed if any undue restrictions were placed upon his government.
- d. Badoglio stressed the fact that he was terribly anxious to take part in the actual fighting of the Germans and spoke of not only producing a corps in this part of the world but of bringing over divisions from Sardinia and rearming the Italian Armies we have taken prisoner.



He mentioned also the reinforcements in men he was hoping to get from the Balkans and elsewhere. I am at the moment giving him no encouragement at all except a sympathetic hearing. I am gradually trying to convince him and his military advisors that any hope of restoring the Italian Army as a useful fighting machine in the way he suggests is entirely out of the question at the moment. I hope this will sink in in due course but as you can well understand I am refraining from pouring all the cold water these ideas deserve upon them.

I went to Bari yesterday and had a look at the wireless station which is now functioning once again satisfactorily. Bari is very full of people and there are a suitable number of rather useless Italian troops in and around the place. Of them there are some who are of a certain value. I saw our Airborne Platoon guarding the wireless and also a Phantom Detachment. Both in very good heart but both rightly anxious that we should show the flag rather more effectively in the Bari Area. There are a lot of doubtful down-hearted people in these parts.

I am seeing Charles Allfrey this afternoon and will mention this to him and also the fact that as soon as his build-up permits I think it would be well if he included Bari in his initial defensive dispositions. ~~Firstly, I am certain that this will create an admirable impression upon the population.~~ Firstly, this will create an admirable impression upon the population. Secondly, I am certain that we ought to use Bari as a port as soon as possible. And, thirdly, it will give him much more elbow room in which to make his concentrations.



OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

REF. NO. 039

*Sep*  
DATE : 202000B 1943

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : URGENT

-----  
Italians urgently require copy of Long Armistice Terms.

Castellano wishes remain here until they arrive.

Can you fly copy early 21 September. Hope leave here

0700 hours 22 September if Terms arrive.

AUTHENTICATED

1170

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
FAIRFIELD REAR  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

21 September, 1943.

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Mason MacFarlane

SUBJECT Copy of Long Terms of the Armistice  
for General Castellano.

My dear General,

1. We had a telegram from Strong this morning asking for a copy of the Long Terms of the Armistice for delivery to Castellano by the 21st.
2. Attached is a copy, and also a copy of a telegram sent by General Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will see from this telegram that General Eisenhower hopes to avoid the signature of the long terms.
3. I thought you should be aware of the exact situation because you may wish to give some indication of it to Castellano when handing over the copy. On the other hand, there is no guarantee the Combined Chiefs of Staff will approve General Eisenhower's recommendation.

Yours ever,

(Sgd) J.F.M. WHITELEY,

Major General  
Deputy Chief of Staff

2 Incl.

- 1 - Copy of Long Terms
- 2 - Copy of Message 502

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET



AFHQ MESSAGE FORM.

FROM FAIRFIELD REAR

TO FREEDOM

Ref No 502

19 Sept 43

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET ~~SECRET~~

Pass the following to Combined Chiefs of Staff:

My views are summarized as follows. In our future relations with Italy there are only two courses:

(1) To accept and strengthen the legal Government of Italy under the King and Badoglio; to regard this government and the Italian people as co-belligerents but with their military activity subject to my direction under terms of armistice, and I, of course, making such military, political and administrative conditions as I may find necessary from time to time. Included in these would be the imposition by directive of such clauses of the long terms as may be necessary from the supply, shipping, economic and other points of view under the authority of article 12 of the short terms.

(2) To sweep this government aside, set up an Allied Military Government of occupied Italy, and accept the very heavy commitments involved.

Of these two courses, on military grounds, I strongly recommend the first. Since as a co-belligerent it would necessarily declare war on Germany and on the Fascist Republican Government of Italy, it will be the natural rallying point for all elements desiring to fight against Fascism in Italy.

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM (Frm Gen Smith)

TO : FATIMA (Personal for Gen Macfarlane)

REF. NO. 17

*Sep.*  
DATE: 221507 B 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC. URGENT

*? edition*  
A revised addition of the long terms is now in preparation.

You should therefore not hand to the Italians any copy of the  
present ~~and~~ edition of the long terms. Your conversation  
with Brigadier *Strong* refers.



OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

*Sep*  
DATE: 221802

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 57

PREC: IMMEDIATE

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I HAVE RECEIVED COPY OF THE LONG TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE FOR DELIVERY TO CASTELLANO WHO HAS RETURNED TO TUNIS. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HOPE TO AVOID THE SIGNATURE OF THE LONG TERMS. PLEASE LET ME KNOW DEFINITELY WHETHER I SHOULD HAND A COPY OF THE LONG TERMS TO BADOGLIO TO ENABLE HIM TO CONSIDER THEM OR NOT. IF I DO SO HE IS SURE TO WANT TO DISCUSS THEM WITH ME. I AM QUITE PREPARED TO DO THIS AND CAN FORWARD ANY COMMENTS HE MAY WISH TO MAKE WITHOUT IN ANY WAY COMMITTING US TO ANYTHING. GRATEFUL FOR IMMEDIATE REPLY.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission.

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FAIRFIELD REAR (Macmillan)

DATE: 221804B 1943 *Sep*

TO : FATMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 548

PREC : URGENT

R 672/22

- 
1. Murphy and I for your personal information made report to the C-in-C on our return which led to General EISENHOWER'S telegram to Combined Chiefs Staff shown to you by General HOLMES.
  2. I also made personal report to Prime Minister on similar lines.
  3. Prime Minister has sent me agreed policy of War Cabinet which, in effect, approves our proposals. It agrees to co-belligerency, requires signature of long terms and offers return of liberated areas to Italian Government in return for broad-basis coalition government, and acceptance of authority of control commission. Prime Minister (uncipherable)'s *Churchill's* policy as one of "payment by Results".
  4. This telegram was very welcome to General EISENHOWER and Chief of Staff, and we are hoping for Washington's prompt concurrence. When this is received we will give you full guidance as to policy and plan of action.
  5. Meanwhile instructions of NR 543 from C-in-C to you *in force* regarded as urgent sent and important preliminaries. They are based upon Prime Ministers own suggestions.
  6. All this, of course, is for your personal and private information, not at (this stage) to be communicated to Italians.

1171



INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 231406 B Sep

TO : FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 550  
R 472/23

PREC: URGENT

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Do not hand copy of long term armistice to Badoglio. Ref your R158 of 22 September. Entire subject of Long Term Armistice and status of Italian Government now under consideration by British and American Governments and we expect final instructions within a few days. These instructions will include some modification of Long Term Armistice and particularly preamble (\*\*\*\*\*) receipt it. Preferable not to discuss with Badoglio. You will be informed soon as policy of our Government is known.

\* This is possibly a Signal's reference. It seems likely that the sender reference (not quoted above) was Fatima ST of 22 Sep.

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 23 September 1943

TO: FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 560 (R 11/24)

PREC: URGENT

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In my name you are authorized to accept as a principle the offer of Badoglio for a reinforced Italian Regiment to serve with one of our Divisions. Read your 061 and 066. General Alexander will inform you direct of unit to which this force is to be attached.

NEW SUBJECT: For your personal information President and Prime Minister have agreed in general on status co-belligerent contingent on declaration of war against Germany by Badoglio Government and certain other requirements. We have sufficient information to proceed with conference with Badoglio and arrival here tomorrow of Cinc Med. will give you more details as to time and place.

NEW SUBJECT: Inform Badoglio that American General Roosevelt just returned from Sardinia reports favourable situation and some units, particularly NEMBO Parachute Division, with considerable combat value and anxious to fight. Itend at earliest opportunity to transfer Italian Forces in Corsica to Sardinia which subsequent movement of selected Italian units from Sardinia to Italian mainland as transport becomes available.



Office of Commander-in-Chief,  
Mediterranean Station.

23rd September, 1943.

SECRET

No. Med.00380/17D.

MEMORANDUM.

MEMORANDUM ON AGREEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND  
DISPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND MERCANTILE MARINE.

The attached copy of an agreement concerning the employment and disposition of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine is forwarded for information with reference to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's message timed 232304 September to Admiralty only.

/s/ ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET.

Distribution -

The Secretary of the Admiralty (Submission No. 17D/Med.00380/17D.)  
The Allied Commander-in-Chief  
The Commander-in-Chief, Levant  
The Commander, United States Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters  
The Flag Officer Commanding, Gibraltar  
The Flag Officer Commanding, Force 'H'  
The Vice Admiral, Malta  
Vice Admiral A.J. Power, C.B., D.S.O.  
The Rear Admiral, Force 'H'  
The Rear Admiral Commanding, Fifteenth Cruiser Squadron  
The Flag Officer, Taranto Area  
The Flag Officer, Italy  
The Flag Officer, Tunisia  
The Flag Officer, Sicily  
The Commodore Commanding, Twelfth Cruiser Squadron  
The Commodore, Algeria  
The Naval Officers in Charge, Mediterranean Station  
The Ministry of War Transport Representative

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Office of Commander-in-Chief,  
Mediterranean Station.

POST SECRET.

23rd September 1943.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON THE EMPLOYMENT AND  
DISPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN FLEET AND MERCANTILE  
MARINE BETWEEN THE ALLIED NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-  
CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE  
ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE ITALIAN MINISTER  
OF MARINE.

The armistice having been signed between the Head of the Italian Government and the Allied Commander-in-Chief under which all Italian warships and the Italian Mercantile Marine were placed unconditionally at the disposal of the United Nations, and H.M. The King of Italy and the Italian Government having since expressed the wish that the Fleet and the Italian Mercantile Marine should be employed in the Allied effort to assist in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, the following principles are established on which the Italian Navy and Mercantile Marine will be disposed.

- (A) Such ships as can be employed to assist actively in the Allied effort will be kept in commission and will be used under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, as may be arranged between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.
- (B) Ships which cannot be so employed will be reduced to a care and maintenance basis and be placed in designated ports, measures of disarmament being undertaken as may be necessary.
- (C) The Government of Italy will declare the names and whereabouts of

- (i) Warships
- (ii) Merchant Ships

now in their possession which previously belonged to any of the United Nations. These vessels are to be returned forthwith as may be directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

1167



The armistice having been signed between the Head of the Italian Government and the Allied Commander-in-Chief under which all Italian warships and the Italian Merchant Marine were placed unconditionally at the disposal of the United Nations, and H.M. The King of Italy and the Italian Government having since expressed the wish that the Fleet and the Italian Merchant Marine should be employed in the Allied effort to assist in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, the following principles are established on which the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine will be disposed.

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(1) Warships  
(11) Merchant Ships

now in their possession which previously belonged to any of the United Nations. These vessels are to be returned forthwith as may be directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. This will be without prejudice to negotiations between the Governments which may subsequently be made in connection with replacing losses of ships of the United Nations caused by Italian action.

(D) The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief will act as the agent of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in all matters concerning the employment of the Italian Fleet or Merchant Navy, their disposition and related matters.

(E) .....

1167

TOP SECRET.Page 2MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FLEET AND MERCHANTILE MARINE (CONTD).

- (E) It should be clearly understood that the extent to which the terms of the armistice are modified to allow of the arrangements outlined above and which follow, are dependent upon the extent and effectiveness of Italian co-operation.

2. Method of Operation. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean will place at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine, a high ranking Naval officer with the appropriate staff who will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for all matters in connection with the operation of the Italian Fleet, and be the medium through which dealings will be carried out in connection with the Italian Mercantile Marine. The Flag Officer acting for these duties (Flag Officer, Liaison) will keep the Italian Ministry of Marine informed of the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and will act in close co-operation as regards issue of all orders to the Italian Fleet.

3. Proposed disposition of the Italian Fleet.

- (a) All battleships will be placed on a care and maintenance basis in ports to be designated and will have such measures of disarmament applied as may be directed. These measures of disarmament will be such that the ships can be brought into operation again if it so seems desirable. Each ship will have on board a proportion of Italian Naval personnel to keep the ships in proper condition and the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will have the right of inspection at any time.

- (b) Cruisers. Such cruisers as can be of immediate assistance will be kept in commission. At present it is visualized that one squadron of four cruisers will suffice and the remainder will be kept in care and maintenance as for the battleships but at a rather greater degree of readiness to be brought into service if required.

- (c) Destroyers and Torpedo Boats. It is proposed to keep these in commission and to use them on escort and similar duties as may be requisite. It is proposed

1166



1185

Ranking Naval officer with the appropriate staff who will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for all matters in connection with the operation of the Italian Fleet, and be the medium through which dealings will be carried out in connection with the Italian Mercantile Marine. The Flag Officer acting for these duties (Flag Officer, Liaison) will keep the Italian Ministry of Marine informed of the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and will act in close co-operation as regards issue of all orders to the Italian Fleet.

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(c) Destroyers and Torpedo Boats. It is proposed to keep these in commission and to use them on escort and similar duties as may be requisite. It is proposed that they should be divided into escort groups working as units and that they should be based on Italian ports.

(d) Small Craft. M.A.S., minesweepers, auxiliaries and similar small craft will be employed to the full, detailed arrangements being made with the Flag Officer (Liaison) by the Italian Ministry of Marine for their best employment.

(e) Submarines. In the first instance submarines will be immobilized in ports to be designated and at a later date these may be brought into service as may be required to assist the Allied effort.

4. Status.....

NOT SECRET.

Page 3.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FLEET AND  
MERCANTILE MARINE (CONTD).

4. Status of Italian Navy. Under this modification of the armistice terms, all the Italian ships will continue to fly their flag. A large proportion of the Italian Navy will thus remain in active commission operating their own ships and fighting alongside the forces of the United Nations against the Axis powers.

The requisite Liaison officers will be supplied to facilitate the working of the Italian ships in co-operations with Allied forces. A small Italian liaison mission will be attached to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to deal with matters affecting the Italian Fleet.

5. Mercantile Marine. It is the intention that the Italian Mercantile Marine should operate under the same conditions as the merchant ships of the Allied Nations. That is to say, all mercantile shipping of the United Nations is formed into a pool which is employed as may be considered necessary for the benefit of all the United Nations. In this will naturally be included the requirements for the supply and maintenance of Italy. The system will be analogous to that used in North Africa, where the North Africa Shipping Board controls all United States, British and French shipping under certain agreements which will have to be arranged in detail in so far as Italian ships are concerned. While it may be expected that a proportion of Italian ships will be working within the Mediterranean and to and from Italian ports, it must be appreciated that this will not always necessarily be the case and ships flying the Italian flag may be expected to be used elsewhere as is done with the merchant ships of all the United Nations. Italian ships employed as outlined in this paragraph will fly the Italian flag and will be manned by crews provided by the Italian Ministry of Marine.

115



INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FREEDGH

TO : FATIMA

REF NO. 565

*Sep.*  
DATE : 241111B 1943

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : URGENT

-----  
Ascertain please date most convenient to Badoglio for conference with C-in-C. Sunday September 26th or any following day is satisfactory to us. Suggested the arrangements are the meeting will be on a Battleship in Malta Harbour. American cruiser can be made available to bring Badoglio and party or Italian Warship if he prefers. If he wishes to fly to MALTA he should come in an Amphibian as it is not desirable for him to land at MALTA for reasons which you will understand. C-in-C prefers to hold conference rather early in morning, say ten O'clock, as this will enable all to return home on same day.

Items of agenda will be: a) Belligerency status for Italy soon as she declares war on Germany. b) Present Government to carry on as Government of Italy. Authority of King and Badoglio to be built up in every practicable way, but with understanding that this is not prejudice untrammelled right of people of Italy to decide eventual form of Government later. c) Final form to be decided after Germans evicted from Italian territory. d) King and Badoglio to build up broad based Anti-Fascist Coalition Government which will continue to work for Allies against Germans on basis of Armistice. Our principle to be payment by results. e) Payment to take form of possible modification of Military Armistice terms and handing over of territory to Italian Government as quickly as it is free of enemy. f) Long Term Armistice will not be

Cont. message No 565.

discussed as we are re-instructed to hold it in abeyance pending further orders. Certain additional terms or instructions of Political, Financial and Economic nature will be communicated from time to time by the C-in-C to the Italian Government under provision of paragraph twelve of the Armistice of September here.

Request reply to first paragraph this message as ~~matter~~ of URGENCY.



INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FAIRFIELD REAR

DATE: 25 September 1943

TO : FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 583

PREC: URGENT

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Modifying my message 565. Have just received information that Prime Minister has approached President again on subject of Long Term Armistice which he believes should be signed. Accordingly it now seems that earliest date for Badoglio conference would be wednesday 29th as we hope by this time to have definite instructions as to whether we shall or shall not present Long Term Armistice. Other information given in our previous message and particularly to be covered in conference remain firm. Ask you make tentative preliminary arrangements based on date of 29th September. If we are instructed to obtain signature to Long Term document it will probably be necessary for Murphy, Macmillan and myself to come to Brindisi before conference for preliminary discussion with you and Badoglio in order that there may be no hitch or delay in actual signing and subsequent discussion.

Further details later.

1162

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE : ~~26143~~ 261435B 1943 Sep

TO : FATIMA

CLASS : SECRET

REF NO. 9780

PREC : URGENT

-----  
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Macmillan and I with three others will arrive Brindisi by plane at approximately 1430<sup>00</sup>A time September 27. Wish to have conference your headquarters with you and Marshall Badoglio which will be preliminary to the conference. Hope to arrange for Wednesday 29 September. Acknowledge.

\* - Major Gen W.B. Smith

1161



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FREEDOM

TO: FATIMA

M/C NR: N-6/28

REF NO. 277

FILED: 271950B 1943 Sep

REC'D:

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In compliance with your instructions we communicated the long terms of the Armistice to Massigli this afternoon with suitable explanations. He took was inclined to protest that he had not seen them before and that the signature would take place without a "French Witness" but we said 1) that they were only being communicated to Badoglio today. 2) that we thought all the French points were covered and, 3) if they were'nt there would be an opportunity of raising points through the Mediterranean Commission.

X HEAJJECVWD (?) to the signature of such a document by the Badoglio Government since he thought this evidenced willingness to deal with such a Government. He however seemed reassured when we pointed out that our relations with the Badoglio Government are based on the clear understanding that no final form of the Government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian Territory. He considered this point of capital importance and seemed greatly relieved.

k: ? "He objected"

1160

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 251751Z Sep

TO : AFHQ CP REPEAT TO FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 110

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

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YOUR NUMBER FIVE SIX FIVE. WE WILL ARRIVE AT VALETTA AT ZERO  
EIGHT ZERO ZERO B HOURS ON TWO SEVEN SEPTEMBER IN ITALIAN CRUISER  
SCIPIO AFRICANO. MEETING CAN THEREFORE TAKE PLACE AT ONE ZERO ZERO  
ZERO HOURS AS SUGGESTED. PARTY WILL BE BADOGLIO, AMBROSIO, ROATTA,  
DE COURTEN, SANDALLI. I WILL ACCOMPANY. I HAVE GIVEN THE ITEMS OF  
AGENDA TO BADOGLIO WHO IS QUITE HAPPY ABOUT THEM. AM IN COMMUNICATION  
WITH ADMIRAL PETERS REGARDING SAILING DIRECTIONS FOR SCIPIO AFRICANO.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE

Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission



ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 260908B Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to FAIRFIELD REAR

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 118

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

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URAD NUMBER FIVE EIGHT THREE RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD. I AM  
PROVISIONALLY POSTPONING SAILING FROM HERE TILL PM TWO EIGHT TO  
ARRIVE VALETTA ZERO EIGHT ZERO ZERO, TWO NINE. I NOTE POSSIBILITY  
OF VISIT FROM MURPHY MACMILLAN AND YOURSELF BUT WILL NOT MENTION THIS  
OR ANYTHING IN CONNECTION WITH LONG TERMS WITH BADOGLIO UNTIL I  
HEAR FURTHER FROM YOU.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission

1158

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APC 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 261246B Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 120

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

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IN DISCUSSING MALTA MEETING WITH BADOGLIO TODAY HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WISHES TO PRESS STRONGLY FOR THE USE OF THE TERM ALLY IN PLACE OF CO DASH BELLIGERENT. HE DOES NOT CLAIM ANY MODIFICATION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND HIS GOVERNMENT. HE STATES IT IS PURELY A QUESTION OF THE VALUE TO HIM IN RALLYING THE ITALIAN PEOPLE BY THE USE OF THE WORD ALLY AS OPPOSED TO CO-BELLIGERENT. HE MAKES THE POINT THAT MUSCOLINI AND HIS QUISLING GOVERNMENT ARE ACCEPTED AS ALLIES BY HITLER AND IF WE ONLY CALL HIS GOVERNMENT CO - BELLIGERENT IT PLACES HIM AT A GRAVE DISADVANTAGE. AS FAR AS I KNOW THIS IS THE ONLY MAJOR POINT BADOGLIO IS LIKELY TO RAISE AT MALTA BUT SEE MY IMMEDIATE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NUMBER ONE TWO ONE.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission

1157



ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE : 261247 B Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS : SECRET

REF NO. 121

PREC : MOST IMMEDIATE

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THE KING ASKED ME TO SEE HIM THIS MORNING. HE SAW ME ALONE AND THE MEETING LASTED THREE QUARTERS OF AN HOUR. HE SPOKE VERY FRANKLY HE HAD ALREADY STUDIED THE POINT FOR DISCUSSION AT MALTA. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS; HE SAID THAT HE ALONE COULD DECLARE WAR ON GERMANY AND THEN ONLY IF APPROVED BY A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT. HE DID NOT THINK THAT HE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DECLARE WAR UNTIL A GOVERNMENT ON A BROAD BASIS HAD BEEN FORMED AFTER HE REACHED ROME. FOR HIM TO DECLARE WAR NOW WOULD NOT BE CONSTITUTIONAL AND WOULD BE ALMOST TANTAMOUNT TO DECLARING CIVIL WAR. THE KING ALSO WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER WE INSISTED BADOGLIO REMAINING THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE DURATION OF THE WAR, HE SAID THAT IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT IT HE MIGHT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO FORM A REPRESENTATIVE ANTI DASH FASCIST GOVERNMENT IF WE STIPULATED THAT BADOGLIO MUST REMAIN PRIME MINISTER. HE ADDED THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE FASCIST PARTY ALTHOUGH LATENT IN SOME AREAS WAS STILL GREAT AND WAS MUCH UNDERESTIMATED BY BADOGLIO. THE VERY LARGE RED PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION WERE EQUALLY A MENACE AND ALTHOUGH AT THE MOMENT THE CATHOLIC PARTY WAS DEFINITELY PRO DASH MONARCHY THEIR REACTIONS COULD REALLY

BE FORETOLD WITH ACCURACY. HE HOPED VERY MUCH THAT WHEN WE REACHED ROME ITALIAN TROOPS MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO BE AMONG THE FIRST TO ENTER THE CITY . HE SAID FINALLY THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DANGEROUS TO LEAVE THE CHOICE OF POST WAR GOVERNMENT UNRESERVEDLY IN THE HANDS OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE. I COMMENTED SUITABLY ON ALL THE KING'S POINTS AND EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT IF HE WISHED TO PURSUE THEM FURTHER HE SHOULD INSTRUCT MARSHALL BADOGLIO TO BRING THEM UP IF HE THOUGHT FIT AT THE MALTA CONFERENCE.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE

Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission



ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 262239Z Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 136

PREC: IMPORTANT

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BADOGLIO TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD NOT YET DISCUSSED THE AGENDA FOR THE MALTA MEETING WITH KING BUT HE WAS GOING TO DO SO TONIGHT. HE MADE EXACTLY THE SAME POINTS AS THE KING MADE THIS MORNING NAMELY THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE PREFERABLE TO AWAIT FORMATION OF A PROPER CABINET BEFORE DECLARING WAR ON GERMANY.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

FROM: FATMA

DATE: 281037A Sep

TO : FREEDOM  
(Personal for Eisenhower)

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 151

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

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KING OF ITALY AFRAID OF HAVING ALL HIS MALTA PARTY IN ONE SHIP OWING TO RISK OF LOSING THE LOT. HAVE THEREFORE MADE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS. MARSHALL BADOGLIO AND MYSELF ARRIVING VALETTA IN CRUISER SCIPIO AFRICANUS. EIGHT ZERO ZERO TWENTY NINTH. REMAINDER OF PARTY AS ALREADY ADVISED TRAVEL IN TWO AIRCRAFT ARRIVING MALTA AM. TWENTY NINTH IN TIME TO REACH NELSON BY ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO. PARTY TRAVELLING IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. AIR ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE DIRECT BY AIR COMMODORE FOSTER. ALL ABOVE DEPENDENT ON SATISFACTORY OUTCOME OF MEETING THIS MORNING WITH BADOGLIO OVER LONG TERMS. WILL WIRE RESULT OF THIS MOST IMMEDIATE AS SOON AS I CAN.

AUTHENTICATED

1153



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 6/28

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 155

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

FILED:

FROM: FATIMA

REF'D: 281340A Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

BADOGLIO HAS AGREED TO SIGN LONG TERMS. WE WILL ALL BE ARRIVING  
THEREFORE AS STATED IN MY NUMBER ONE FIVE ONE EARLY TOMORROW MORNING.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 12/28

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 161

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

FILED:

FROM: FATIMA

REC'D: 282023B Sep

TO : CINC MALTA

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THE KING OF ITALY HAS REQUESTED ME TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE CINC FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE MALTA CONFERENCE. "IT IS A MATTER OF URGENT NECESSITY TO BRING AMBASSADOR GRANDI, NOW IN THE VICINITY OF OPORTO, TO BRINDISI FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSUMING THE PORTFOLIO OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. GRANDI, WHO ACHIEVED THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI AND FASCISM, IS NOW A SYMBOL OF THE ANTI DASH FASCIST MOVEMENT; HIS PRESENCE IN THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT AS MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD CREATE A SCHISM IN THE RANKS OF THE FASCIST REPUBLICANS AND WOULD BE A SETBACK TO THE MUSSOLINI PARTY; FURTHERMORE, GRANDI WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DEVELOP ACTIVE PROPAGANDA ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIES. ACQUIESCENCE TO THIS REQUEST IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO OUR COMMON CAUSE. GRANDI CAN BE REACHED THROUGH THE ITALIAN LEGATION LISBON. MARSHALL WAS GIVEN BRIEF NOTICE OF THIS MATTER AT THE MOMENT OF HIS DEPARTURE".

1151

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig Gen. U.S.A.



1. The full instrument of surrender, even though somewhat superseded, should now be signed. His Majesty's Government, the United States Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. recognize that the terms cannot at present be carried out in respect of territory under actual German control. These terms, however, represent the requirements with which the Italian Government will be expected to comply when they are in a position to do so. Only when the Italian Government has accepted these terms will it be possible to avoid subsequent disputes and misunderstandings which might arise in the absence of a definite agreement.

2. Should the execution of any of the military clauses of the armistice impede the Italian capacity to wage war against Germany such provisions will again be reviewed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

3. On condition that it declares war on Germany the present Government of Italy shall, subject to paragraph 7 below, be regarded as the Government of Italy. As such, it will be treated as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. Such relationship will be based on the clear understanding:-

(a) that it will not in any way prejudice the untrammelled right of the people of Italy to choose the form of democratic Government which they prefer;

(b) that no final form of the Government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory.

(c) that the present Italian Government construct the broadest

See Freedoms  
56's of 24 Sept.

Copy for record  
25/9  
Stat. 2001

H. Dook

See Freedson's  
56's of 24 Sept.

and understandings which might arise in the absence of a defined agreement.

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1196

(b) that no final form of the Government of Italy will be decided upon until the Germans are evicted from Italian territory.

*H. Gork*

(c) that the present Italian Government construct the broadest based anti-Fascist coalition Government possible.

4. Allied Military Government and the functions contemplated for the Armistice Control Commission in the full terms of surrender will be merged as promptly as practicable into an Allied Commission under the Allied Commander-in-Chief. This Allied Commission shall be empowered to furnish guidance and instructions from time to time to the Italian Government on military, political and administrative matters.

5. Useful services against the enemy will be recognized by the

Allied



the Allied Governments in the adjustment and working of the Armistice terms. Italy must "work her passage". The guiding principle will be payment by results.

100-200000  
100-200000

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: N 5/30

CLASS : SECRET

REF. NO: 1091

PRED : PRIORITY

FILED: 291909A 1943 Sep

FROM : FREEDOM

REC'D:

\* TO : FATIMA

Prohibitive conditions have prevented me from reaching Malta to  
be present at meeting. Will send with General Di Raimondo documents  
which you are expecting.

From Castellano at Freedom to Italian High Command  
% Fatima.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: N 12/1

CLASS: RESTRICTED

REF NO: 1647

PREC: M PRIORITY

FILED: 300033A Sep

FROM: FREEDOM

REC'D

TO : FATIMA

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SPECIAL COMMUNIQUE BEGINS.

September 29, the Allied Commander

in Chief met Marshall Badoglio to discuss Military questions of mutual interest. The Conference was held in MALTA on board the Flagship of Admiral Willis, HMS Nelson. Marshall was accompanied by members of his military, naval, and air Staffs while the Allied Commander in Chief was accompanied by Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, General Alexander, Air Chief Marshall Tedder, The Allied Chief of Staff General Smith, Mr Macmillan and Mr Murphy. The principle topic of discussion was the method for making most effective the Italian Military effort against the common enemy, Germany. Some units of the Italian Military, Air, and Naval Forces have already been engaged actively against the Germans.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512  
ALLIED FORCE MILITARY MISSION

30 September 1943

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Chief of Staff, AFHQ

1. The Mission has received the enclosed documents from the Italian Government with the request that one (1) copy be given to you and one to General Castellano.

2. This document was prepared for presentation at the Malta Conference, but the opportunity for presenting it did not arise.

For the Chief of Mission,

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen, U.S.A.

Incl;  
2 copies Document prepared at Malta Conference.

*Note - There is no trace or record, in Archives,  
of the enclosures to this memo.*

*(Original - Political Sec. Files - Amintore Tanassi)*



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR :

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : ~~FATIMA~~ for GEN TAYLOR

M/C NR : 13/05

REF NO : 3439

FILED : 051418A Oct

REC'D :

-----  
For your information the following is repeated from cable 9273 from AGMAR.

"The Soviet Government has agreed to your proposal to keep secret the long terms of surrender after they have been signed by the Italian Government"

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: N 25/03 *Set*

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 2580

PREC: URGENT

FILED: ~~DATA~~

FROM: AGWAR (Gen Marshall)

REC'D:

TO : FATIMA

Personal message from GENERAL MARSHALL at AGWAR just received is repeated (thru FREEDOM) for your necessary action.

1. Inform Badoglio that it is the view of this government that GRANDI'S presence in BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT at this time would not be acceptable. Even though GRANDI was perhaps Chief Figure in deposition of MUSSOLINI, he has been so closely associated with FASCISM that to place him now in BRINDISI GOVERNMENT would cause much adverse comment and misinterpretation.

2. First accretions to BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT should be men of unequivocal liberal and democratic principle. It is only through the use of such men in responsible positions that this government can feel justified in supporting the present Italian Government.

3. The KING'S position on the question of declaration of war as stated (?) # 428 is unimpressive. Germany has already taken active belligerent steps against Italy and the chief strength of BADOGLIO'S GOVERNMENT is it's announced determination to rid Italy by force of the German invader.

4. An immediate declaration of war by the Italian Government on Germany is necessary if Italy is to be given the status of co-belligerent.

*Is #28 a signal relay no? Fatima's 121 of 26 Sep. seems relevant. may be the proper reference.*

*1145*



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : ROUTINE

FROM : MACFARLANE

TO : E.T.M. for TAYLOR

M/C NR: 16/05

REF NO: 3370

FILED : 051123A Oct

REC'D :

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Have consulted General Eisenhower. You can now communicate first two paragraphs of General Marshall's telegram to Badoglio as coming from General Eisenhower. As regards the question of Declaration of War, General Eisenhower has telegraphed you instructions separately. New Subject. Tell Italian authorities and Admiral Poller that the German Prisoners of War can be sent at first opportunity to Algiers.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

7 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, Marshall Badoglio.

I have the honour to submit to his Excellency, Marshall Badoglio, a resume of the views of General Eisenhower and of the British and American Governments on the subject of the composition of the Badoglio Government.

The Inclusion of Grandi in the Italian Government.

The reasons advanced for desiring Grandi in the Badoglio Cabinet have been given careful consideration and the possible advantages accruing therefrom have been closely evaluated. Outweighing the latter, is the inescapable fact that Grandi has been so intimately associated with Fascism that his inclusion now in the government would lead to serious misinterpretation. Even though he played an important part in the deposition of Mussolini, to the world outside Italy he symbolizes Fascism at its high tide. For this reason his presence in the Italian Government at this time is unacceptable to the United Nations.

Additions to the Badoglio Cabinet

It is of the greatest importance that the first additions to the Badoglio Cabinet be men of unequivocal liberal and democratic principles. The United Nations are viewing the formation of the new Anti-Fascist Government with the utmost attention. These nations will feel justified in supporting the Italian Government only insofar as the responsible positions are in the hands of ministers clearly anti-Fascist and clearly anti-German.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

*Original in British Diary JMW. Folio 237.*



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : EATLA

M/C NR : N. 11/05

REF NO : 3372

FILED : 051127A Oct

REC'D :

I have just talked with General Mason Macfarlane and we both agree that you should now present to Marshall Badoglio and, if possible, to the King in the strongest way my views on the subject of Italian Declaration of War. The failure of the Italian Government to declare war is, in my opinion, leaving Italian garrisons in the Mediterranean area in a confused state and with a complete lack of understanding of what is expected of them in their action against the common enemy. For example, in the recent German attack on the island of Cos a strong Italian Garrison declined to fight and I believe their unwillingness to resist the Germans is the result of the indecisive situation as suggested above. Messages from our Governments indicate grave uncertainty on their part caused by what they describe as the un-impressive attitude of the Italian Government in this matter. We intend to advance rapidly on Rome and all recovered territory will come under the control of the Italian Government provided it now takes a firm position. The Marshall has shown every willingness to cooperate effectively but failure to declare war is militating against the position of the Italian Government and the recognition we can accord it. I am well aware that his Majesty and his family, the Marshall and other members of the Government are personally

exerting them selves to the utmost to inspire Italian resistance to the Germans, but in the matter of formal declaration of war they must act decisively and without further delay. The world will understand decisive action but further temporizing will be interpreted as a desire on the part of the Italian Government to evade definite responsibility. I repeat that you should present this matter to the proper authorities in the most emphatic way as I consider it of vital importance at this stage of relations between Italy and the United Nations.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR :

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA for TAYLOR

M/C NR : N 8/06

REF NO : 3770

FILED : 0609454 Oct

REC'D :

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As a continuation of our 3372 October 5th the following message has just been received from General Marshall.

"The President and the Prime Minister that the King of Italy declare war on Germany as soon as possible.

There appears to be no necessity for waiting until Rome is occupied by the Allies.

You will, therefore, put pressure upon the Italian Government for an early Declaration of War against Germany without waiting for further successes by the Allied Forces.

Immediately following such declaration a joint announcement of Italy's co-belligerence will be made by the U.S., U.K., and the Soviet\*.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

7 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, Marshall Badoglio.

The following is a resumé of the views of the British and American Governments relative to the need for an immediate declaration of war on Germany by the Italian Government:

An immediate declaration of war is essential at this stage of relations between Italy and the United Nations. It is the considered opinion of General Eisenhower and the governments which he represents that now is the time to take this decisive step. The failure to do so up to now has placed Italy in a false position with respect to the nations fighting against Germany and has led to uncertain action on the part of the Italian fighting forces. The Italian garrisons in the Mediterranean are in doubt as to what is expected of them and their indecisive action against the Germans up to now is a reflection of this confused understanding. The moment has now arrived to rally every element in and out of Italy in support of the powerful offensive about to be launched to regain Rome and to eject the German invader. The Anglo-American advance will be rapid and the recovered territory will pass to the control of the Italian Government provided it now takes a determined stand. General Eisenhower is deeply appreciative of the cooperative spirit which his Excellency, Marshall Badoglio has shown, but the failure to declare war is militating against the Italian position vis-a-vis the United Nations. The latter are aware of the magnificent effort of his Majesty and of the Royal Family to inspire Italian resistance against the Germans. The effect of their action, however, is attenuated by the failure to make a formal declaration of war. The world can only understand decisive action and further delay will be interpreted as the desire on the part of the Italian Government to avoid a definite commitment. An immediate declaration of war by the Italian Government on Germany is necessary if Italy is to receive the status of a co-belligerent.

The Allied leaders respect the reluctance of his Majesty, the King to declare war for constitutional reasons. The present situation, however is in no wise comparable to that when Mussolini led an unwilling nation into war. Now it is the nation which has declared war and looks to the government for formal sanction. The thousands of gallant Italians engaged in acts

*Original in British Diary Vol III Folio 238. 1139*



of war at this moment are entitled to the rights and protection of belligerency in their relations both to the Allies and to Germany. If a constitutional validation is necessary, it can follow the formation of a broad national government in Rome, but, in the meantime, the United Nations await a declaration of war as the inevitable response of Italy to the German acts of aggression.

The foregoing statement emanating from the Allied Commander-in-Chief is also an expression of the views of President Roosevelt and of Prime Minister Churchill.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA  
Acting Chief of Mission.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : MOST IMMEDIATE

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C NR: 3/07

REF NO: 301

FILED: 071218A OCT

REC'D: 071218A

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ACCOMPANIED BY REBER AND CACCIA I PRESENTED TO BADOGLIO THIS MORNING THE MATTERS CONTAINED IN YOUR NUMBERS TWO FIVE EIGHT ZERO AND THREE THREE SEVEN TWO. THE RECEPTION WAS MOST FAVOURABLE, HE READILY AGREED THAT GRANDI WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND STATED THAT HE WAS PREPARING A MINISTERIAL STATE OF KNOWN ANTI DASH FASCISTS WHICH HE WOULD PRESENT TO THE MISSION IN DUE COURSE. AFTER A DISCUSSION OF THE ADVANTAGES OF AN IMMEDIATE DECLARATION OF WAR THE MARSHALL DECLARED HIMSELF WHOLELY IN AGREEMENT AND PROMISED TO DO HIS UTMOST AT ONCE TO PERSUADE THE KING:THUS, ACQUIESCENCE OF THE LATTER MAY COME IN THE NEXT FEW HOURS IN WHICH CASE THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT ASSUMES GREAT IMPORTANCE. GENERAL ALEXANDER EXPRESSED THE VIEW YESTERDAY THAT IT SHOULD CLOSELY PRECEDE HIS OFFENSIVE TO BEGIN IN ABOUT A FORTNIGHT. REBER AND CACCIA CONSIDER THAT IT SHOULD COME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE BEFORE THE MEETING OF THE MEDITERRANEAN COMMITTEE ABOUT OCTOBER ONE TWO. MY PERSONAL THOUGHT IS THAT, ONCE AGREED UPON, THE DECLARATION SHOULD BE PUSHED THRU WITHOUT A PAUSE TO ALLOW THE ITALIANS TO RECONSIDER. I LOOK TO YOU FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT AND EXPECT AFHQ TO ORGANIZE THE PROPAGANDA AND PUBLICITY INCIDENT TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT. WILL ANYTHING SPECIAL BE REQUIRED FROM BADOGLIO OR THE KING QUERY.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig Gen USA

1137



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 12/07

CLASS : SECRET

REF NO: 4534

PREC : ROUTINE

FILED : 072017A Oct

FROM : FREEDOM

REC'D :

TO : FATIMA

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Policy is to waste no time in announcing declaration of war.

Reference your 301 dated 7 October.

For publicity and propaganda purposes 1100A hours or 1600 A hours are the best times.

This requires you to fix time and date of announcement giving us 12 hours notice.

King or Badoglio should make some statement giving reasons for declaration of war in order to inspire Italian people. Cable text of this statement.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : MOST IMMEDIATE

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C NR: 5

REF NO: 316

FILED : 08110 A OCT

REC'D :

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BADOLIO INFORMED ME CONFIDENTIALLY THIS MORNING THAT HE EXPECTS TO BE READY TO  
DECLARE WAR NEXT MONDAY OR TUESDAY. ACQUERONE HAS GONE TO NAPLES TO BRING BACK  
TWO EX DASH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT TO PLACE IN CABINET POSTS. EXPECTS TO RETURN  
TOMORROW. THE MARSHALL THINKS KING WILL MAKE A BROADCAST TO THE NATION IF DESIRED.

AUTHENTICATED:

ROBERT E. DOE  
Major, A.G.D.  
Secy to the Mission



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

M/C NR: 17/8

REF. NO: 4636/8

FILED : 081104A OCT

REC'D : 081311A

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

You may inform BADGLIO the the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union approve the amendments to the long term document desired by BADGLIO of which you are cognisant. However this should be used if necessary to stimulate the declaration of war at once. A supplementary document in the form of a Protocol embodying these amendments will be forwarded to you promptly for the signature of BADGLIO.

signed. EISENHOWER.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C NR: 12/8

REF NO: 322

FILED : 081823

REC'D

REFERENCE YOUR NUMBER FOUR SIX THREE SIANT EIGHT.

I HAVE INFORMED BADOGLIO OF THE APPROVAL OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE LONG TERM  
DOCUMENT, HE RECEIVED THE NEWS WITH EXPRESSION OF JOY AND PROFOUND GRATITUDE.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. USA  
Acting Chief of Mission



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : AFHQ ADV CP

M/C NR:

REF NO: 5277

FILED : 092224A Oct

REC'D : 09

British and American governments not yet agreed as to whether a statement by Badoglio or King (for TAYLOR for info MARTELLI PWB from JACKSON signed ELSENHOWER cite FRINC) in amplification of the declaration of war by Italy on Germany at the time Italy becomes a co-belligerent should be part of Italian war declaration or should follow a Washington London Moscow tripartite acknowledgement of Italian co-belligerency status. Expect this disagreement to be settled soonest and will advise. Para. However, both governments agree the following suggestions should be included in statement when issued: "Following declaration of war on Germany grievances by Italy and appeals for resistance and fighting the German invader to all Italians everywhere. To be considered as enemies of Italy are all Italians collaborating with the German invader in whatsoever manner. When the Germans have been driven out these collaborators will be dealt with according to their just deserts. The fact that Italy is no longer warring with any of the United Nations or Russia is source of great gratification. Constitutional authority called into being the present government, which is a military government, in order that the wishes of the Italian to free Italy from German domination should be accomplished. Obviously this can only be done by joining military action with the Allies. Marshall Badoglio will gladly turn over the government with its heavy burdens to a successor in accordance with the will of the Italian people, when the German have been driven out and if the military situation permits. Until that time he intends that

Representatives

113?

representatives of patriotic and democratic elements, who desire that their native land be cleared of the German invaders, should be included in the present government. When peace is restored this present arrangement will in no way impair the completely free right of the Italian people to choose their own form of democratic government".

Para. In order achieve maximum impact, the war declaration and any other statements should be broadcast not only over radio Bari but simultaneously over other available stations in Algiers, Tunis and monitored for relay by BEC and OWI in order accomplish this following will be necessary: (a) Recordings of all speeches should be made immediately in triplicate by you without waiting for decision in Paragraph 1. (b) One copy to be retained by you for Bari Broadcast, other two sent by personal courier to PWB Tunis and PWB Algiers. (c) An agreed upon release date and hour which will allow sufficient time for recordings to reach here. Suggest forty eight hours as minimum required. (d) In view uncertainty outlined in paragraph 1, it is most important you separate on recordings the declaration of war from any other statements in order to allow for last minute changes and interrelations. It will not be possible do any dubbing which will be accepted by radio audience as genuine. (e) Send with recordings English and Italian texts of all recorded material.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

M/C NR: 31/10

REF NO: 5649/10

FILED : 101913A Oct

REC'D : 102047A

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Combined Chiefs of Staff advises that disagreement outlined first paragraph our 5277, 9th October settled in favour of Roosevelt - Churchill's - Stalin Tripartite statement to follow immediately after Italian Declaration of War on Germany. Because of urgency cannot afford delay which making and shipping recordings in accordance our 5277, 9th October would entail. Therefore following our superceding instructions: (1) Wire soonest Italian Declaration of War on Germany and inspiring background statement by King or Badoglio in accordance with suggestions quoted our cable but omitting all specific to co-belligerency status which will be announced as such in Tripartite statement. (2) Advise us of date and hour release of Declaration of War allowing twenty four hours notice (this supercedes twelve hours notice requested our 4534, 7th October.)

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NRL

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

M/C NR: 17/11

REF NO: W2230/5938

FILED : 111541A Oct

REC'D : 111800A

In reconciliation of recent cables connection Italian War Declaration  
(To AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff and USFOR for British Chiefs of Staff  
signed Eisenhower cite FHINC) TAM 39 October 9; 9763 October 10 personal from  
Marshall to Eisenhower; TAM 42 October 10; and our MAT<sup>48</sup>/October 10. (This is MAT 49)  
following is understood sequence of events;

1. Announcement Declaration of War by Italy together with statement by King  
or Badoglio as outlined TAM 39 but specific reference to co-belligerency status.  
General Taylor instructed to furnish us advance text of declaration war and statement  
giving twenty-four hours warning on date and hour of release. We will cable you text  
and release time to enable simultaneous press and radio release by London, Washington,  
and all outlets here.

1. Following<sup>this</sup>/release will await tripartite declaration by London, Washington  
and Moscow as outlined cable 9763 cited above which will include specific reference  
co-belligerency status. We will release here immediately following your  
announcement.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

11 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency Marshall Badoglio.

It has now been five days since I had the honour to submit to Your Excellency the expression of the views of the Allied Governments on the urgency of an Italian Declaration of War. Throughout this period the eyes of the United Nations have remained fixed upon your Government, awaiting an expression of your intentions. Meanwhile I understand that the Mediterranean Commission is assembling tomorrow to consider far-reaching matters of policy affecting the entire Mediterranean area with the status of Italy still in doubt. Unless the Italian Government takes decisive action at once, the Commission will convene in an atmosphere inimical to Italian interests.

While the Allied leaders recognise that a declaration of war requires careful preparation, they do not understand the delay in announcing to them the fundamental decision that Italy is prepared to declare war at once. It appears, therefore, most desirable that you permit me to communicate such a statement to General Eisenhower at once in order to clarify your position. With this decisive step taken, the next is to draft the text of the declaration and of his Majesty's statement to the nation. These should be presented to Algiers in advance of publication for coordination with the parallel announcement being prepared on Italian co-belligerency. As all of these preparations are time-consuming, it is important that they proceed concurrently with the reorganization of the Cabinet which Your Excellency is undertaking.

In conclusion, I feel obliged to emphasize to Your Excellency that the Allied Governments are working in complete darkness as to your intentions and each day of further delay in declaring war is militating against the Italian position at a most critical time.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. USA  
Acting Chief of Mission.

*Original in British diary, Vol III, Folio 279.*

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : XXX A URGENT

FROM : FATMA

TO : FREEDOM personal for EISENHOWER

M/N NR: 12/11

REF NO: 359

FILED : 112025A OCT

REC'D :

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ITALY WILL DECLARE WAR ON GERMANY AT ONE SIX ZERO ZERO A HOURS ONE THREE  
OCTOBER. THREE DOCUMENTS FOLLOW BY RADIO;

(1) INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR IN MADRID TO PASS THE DECLARATION  
OF WAR TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN SPAIN;

(2) A NOTE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER COMMUNICATING THE DECLARATION OF WAR AND  
REQUESTING THAT THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ITALIAN EMBASSIES AND LEGATIONS  
BE INFORMED;

(3) THE PROPOSED TEXT OF THE KING'S PROCLAMATION TO THE NATION.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. USA  
Acting Chief of Mission



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MISSION

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM FOR GENERAL WHITELEY

M/C NR: 19/11

REF. NO: 366

FILED : 112237A Oct

REC'D :

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THE AIRPLANE WHICH WILL BRING BACK GENERAL MACFARLANE ARRIVES AT MAISON BLANCHE  
AT ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO A ONE TWO OCTOBER. LIEUTENANT RAHTER OF THIS MISSION WILL  
BE ON BOARD WITH MESSAGES FOR YOU RELATING TO THE ITALIAN DECLARATION OF WAR.  
PLEASE HAVE HIM MET.

AUTHENTICATED:

ROBERT E. DOE.  
Major A.G.D.  
Secretary of the Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FATMA

TO : FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR WHITELEY

M/C NR: 2/12

REF NO: 368

FILED L 120806A Oct

REC'D :

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REFERENCE OUR THREE SIX SIX LIEUTENANT RAHTER HAS THE LETTER SIGNED BY BADOGLIO TO THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN MADRID THE TEXT OF WHICH IS FOUND IN OUR RADIO NUMBER THREE SIX ZERO. THE MARSHALL DESIRES THIS LETTER SENT BY PLANE TO MADRID TO CONFIRM HIS RADIO INSTRUCTIONS. THE PLANE SHOULD BE LAID ON TO ARRIVE AT MADRID WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE HOUR OF THE DECLARATION.

CORRECTED TIME OF ARRIVAL OF RAHTER'S PLANE ALGIERS IS ONE SEVEN SEVEN ZERO A.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. USA  
Acting Chief of Mission



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : XXA URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER

M/C NR: 13/11

REF NO: 360

FILED : ~~XXXXXX~~  
112029A Oct

REC'D :

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MARSHALL BADOGLIO REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE TRANSMITTED TO THE ITALIAN  
AMBASSADOR IN MADRID PD TO FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR EISENHOWER FROM FATIMA SIGNED TAYLOR PD  
QUOTE ONE ONE OTTOBRE NINE FOUR THREE PD ASE IL MARCHESE PADLUCCI DE CALBOLI  
AMBASCIATORE D APOSTROPHE ITALIA A MADRID PD VOSTRA ECCELLENZA E INCARICATO DA SM  
IL RE DI COMUNICARE ALL APOSTROPHE AMBASCIATORE DI GERMANIA A MADRID CMA AFFINCHE  
LO PARTECIPAI AL SUO GOVERNO CMA CHE DI FRONTE AI CONTINUI ED INTENSIFICATA ATTI DI  
GUERRA COMPIUTI CONTRO GLI ITALIANI DALLE FORZE ARMATE TEDESCHES CMA L APOSTROPHE  
ITALIA SI CONSIDERA DALLE ORE ONE FIVE HEREIN ORA DI GREENWICH HEREIN DEL GIORNO ONE  
THREE OTTOBRE IN STATO DI GUERRA CON LA GERMANIA SIGNED BADOGLIO UNQUOTE.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig Gen USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

SECRET

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
AFM 512

11 October 1943.

Major General Whiteley,  
Deputy Chief of Staff, AFHQ

My Dear General;

The bearer of this letter, Lieutenant Fahter, will transmit to you a personal letter from Marshall Badoglio to General Eisenhower; also the signed original of the communication to the Italian Ambassador in Madrid. He also has a copy of the four radios sent off from this Mission on the night of October 11, bearing upon the Italian Declaration of War.

Marshall Badoglio recommends that the letter to the Italian Ambassador in Madrid be sent to him by Airplane for double assurance that the message is accurately transmitted and that the Ambassador accepts its authenticity. It is not clear to me that this precaution is necessary and I transmit the Marshall's suggestion without comment.

In summary, the scenario of events as planned is as follows;

At 1600A--

The Italian Ambassador in Madrid transmits the Declaration of War to the German Ambassador to Spain.

At Bari, the radio broadcasts the Declaration of War and plays the record reproducing the Marshall's proclamation to Italy. Elsewhere, at Algiers, London, Washington, etc, the text of the Declaration of War, and of the Marshall's appeal will be broadcast as arranged by AFHQ.

Marshall Badoglio will hold a press conference in which he will announce the Declaration of War and will elaborate those points contained in your number 5277 which are not treated in his appeal to the Nation. The press will be permitted to take photographs and may be allowed to submit questions, depending upon the Marshall's desires.

Since the resistance of the King has been broken, everything seems to be going extremely well, and I hope all our Allies, including the Cossacks on the Don, are entirely happy.

Sincerely yours,

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR,  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

112

*Original in Binder diary JST 201 301.*

SECRET



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : XXX A URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM personal for GEN EISENHOWER

M/C NR: 18/11

REF NO: 365

FILED : 112215A OCT

REC'D :

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FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PROCLAMATION TO BE MADE BY MARSHALL BADOGLIO TO THE ITALIAN PEOPLE. IT WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED THAT THIS WOULD BE MADE BY THE KING BUT AT THE LAST MOMENT THE LATTER EXPRESSED A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR HAVING BADOGLIO MAKE THE PRONOUNCEMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REASONS. I CONCURRED IN THIS. THERE ARE SEVERAL POINTS IN YOUR FIVE TWO SEVEN SEVEN WHICH ARE NOT COVERED IN THE PROCLAMATION. AT BADOGLIO'S REQUEST THE PROCLAMATION WAS KEPT AS SIMPLE AS POSSIBLE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE MISSING POINTS WOULD BE EMPHASIZED IN A PRESS CONFERENCE TO BE HELD BY THE MARSHALL AT ONE SIX ZERO ZERO A OCTOBER ONE THREE. AS THE MARSHALL WILL MAKE A RECORD OF THIS PROCLAMATION DURING THE AFTERNOON ONE TWO OCTOBER I REQUEST THAT CONCURRENCE OF ITS CONTENTS BE EXPEDITED. THE TEXT FOLLOWS.

*not typed by Archais - See Brundis  
master file of military cables*

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FRELDGM

TO : EATIMA

M/C NR: 7/12

REF NO: 6248

FILED : 121252A Oct

REC'D : 121520A

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Contents BADOGLIO proclamation your #365, October 12th and your plan to cover missing points our #5277 in press conference concurred in with following exception: Extreme importance fullest force being given point that "the present arrangement will in no way impair untrammelled right of the people of ITALY to choose their own form of democratic government when peace is restored". Make it essential this be included in original proclamation. We are inserting this statement in the proclamation immediately after the words "DI GOVERNO DEMOCRATICO DAL PARSE" and will release in this form. We look to you to secure concurrence. Cable immediately Italian version of this statement as used by BADOGLIO, para. Agreeable to cover remaining omitted points in press conference but it is necessary that text of previously prepared press handout be signaled here in advance to insure release at 1600A hours, 13th October. Amplification of statement and correspondents stories to be forwarded soonest.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : XXX A URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM personal for EISENHOWER

M/C NR: 13/12

REF NO: 379

FILED :

REC'D : 121933A Oct

REFERENCE YOUR SIX TWO FOUR EIGHT.

THE MODIFIED PORTION OF THE RADOGLIO PROCLAMATION FOLLOWS PD

(See Brindisi Master File of Outgoing cables for Italian text.)

THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE ENTIRE PROCLAMATION, AND THE ITALIAN AND ENGLISH TEXTS OF THE MARSHALLS PREPARED PRESS RELEASE FOLLOW IN SEPARATE RADIGS. 1

RECOMMEND THAT FOR UNIFORMITY YOU USE THE SAME ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS. THE MARSHALL HAS MADE HIS PHONOGRAPH RECORDING WHICH WILL BE HEARD OVER RADIO BARI TOMORROW at 1600A.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

**SECRET**  
**ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE**

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: XXX A URGENT

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM personal for EISENHOWER

M/C NR:

REF. NO.

FILED:

REC'D:

*2. Ym 1/ta*

*13/12*  
*379*

*But*

*121933A*

REFERENCE YOUR SIX TWO FOUR EIGHT PD TO FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR EISENHOWER FROM FATIMA  
SIGNED TAYLOR PD THE MODIFIED PORTION OF THE BADOGLIO PROCLAMATION FOLLOWS PD QUOTE  
IL GOVERNO DA ME PRESEDUTO SARA TRA BREVE COMPLETATO CMA CHIAMANDOVIT A FAR PARTE  
RAPPRESENTANTI DI OGNI PARTITO POLITICO CMA COSI DA COSTITUIRE UNA VERA ESPRESSIONE  
DI GOVERNO DEMOCRATICO DEL PAESE CMA FERMO RESTANDO IL PRINCIPIO CMA GIA ENUNCIATO  
CMA CHE CMA FINITA LA GUERRA CMA IL POPOLO ITALIANO SARA LIBERO DI SCEGLIERE CMA  
CON LE ELEZIONI CMA IL GOVERNO CHE PIU GLI AGGRADERA UNQUOTE PD THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION  
~~TO BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS HERE~~ OF THE ENTIRE PROCLAMATION CMA AND THE ITALIAN AND ENGLISH  
<sup>MARSHAL'S</sup>  
TEXTS OF THE PREPARED PRESS RELEASE FOLLOW IN SEPARATE RADIOS PD I RECOMMEND THAT FOR  
UNIFORMITY YOU USE THE SAME ENGLISH TRANSLATION PD THE MARSHAL HAS MADE HIS PHOTOGRAPH  
RECORDING WHICH WILL BE HEARD OVER RADIO BARI TOMORROW AT 1600 R

**DISTRIBUTION:**

- 1 - AG Files
- 1 - Diary

**AUTHENTICATED:**

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

*Pol*

**SECRET**

*1120*



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : XXX A URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C NR: 21/12

REF.NO: 386

FILED : 122327h Oct

REC'D :

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF BADOGLIO'S PROCLAMATION TO THE ITALIAN NATION. QUOTE: ITALIANS: IN A STATEMENT OF EIGHT SEPTEMBER, THE GOVERNMENT OF WHICH I AM THE HEAD ANNOUNCED THAT THE ALLIED COMMANDER IN CHIEF HAD GRANTED THE ARMISTICE WHICH WE HAD ASKED AND THAT ITALIANS TROOPS WERE ORDERED TO REMAIN AT THEIR POSTS ARMED AND READY TO REPEL ANY ATTACK FROM WHATEVER QUARTER IT MIGHT COME. WITH A SIMULTANEITY OF ACTION WHICH SHOWED CLEARLY THAT ORDERS HAD BEEN ISSUED IN ADVANCE, GERMAN TROOPS EITHER DISARMED OUR UNITS OR MORE OFTEN ACTUALLY ATTACKED THEM. BUT GERMAN ARROGANCE AND SAVAGERY DID NOT END HERE. WE ALREADY KNEW THEIR HABITUAL CONDUCT BY THE OUTRAGES, THEFTS AND VIOLENCE OF EVERY KIND COMMITTED IN CATANIA WHILE THEY WERE OUR ALLIES. ATTACKS OF EVEN GREATER BARBARITY WERE LATER PERPETRATED AGAINST HELPLESS CIVILIANS POPULATIONS IN CALABRIA, IN APULIA AND IN THE SALERNO REGION. BUT WHERE THE FEROCITY OF THE ENEMY SURPASSED ALL BOUNDS OF HUMAN IMAGINATION WAS IN NAPLES. THE HEROIC POPULATION OF THAT CITY AFTER ENDURING WEEKS OF SUFFERING COOPERATED COURAGEOUSLY WITH BRITISH AND AMERICAN TROOPS IN ROUTING THE HATED GERMAN. ITALIANS; THERE WILL BE NO PEACE IN ITALY AS LONG AS A SINGLE GERMAN TREADS OUR SOIL, WE MUST MARCH FORWARD TOGETHER WITH OUR FRIENDS OF AMERICA, BRITAIN AND RUSSIA AND OF THE OTHER UNITED NATIONS. IN THE BALKANS, IN JUGOSLAVIA, IN ALBANIA, IN GREECE AND ELSEWHERE, THE ITALIAN TROOPS WHO HAVE BEEN WITNESSES OF GERMAN ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND OF CRUELTY MUST FIGHT.....

TO THE END AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY. THE GOVERNMENT WHICH I LEAD WILL SOON BE COMPLETED BY BRINGING IN REPRESENTATIVES OF EVERY POLITICAL PARTY, THUS A TRULY DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORMED AND I REAFFIRM THE PROMISE THAT ONCE THE WAR IS OVER THE ITALIAN PEOPLE WILL BE FREE TO HOLD ELECTIONS AND CHOOSE THE GOVERNMENT WHICH THEY DESIRE. ITALIANS; I INFORM YOU THAT HIS MAJESTY THE KING HAS CHARGED ME THIS DAY THE ONE THREE OF OCTOBER TO ANNOUNCE THE DECLARATION OF WAR ON GERMANY.

AUTHENTICATED:

ROBERT E. DOE.  
Major A.G.D.  
Secretary to the Mission

1118



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : XXXA URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C NR: 17/12

REF NO: 382

FILED : 122200A Oct

REC'D :

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ITALIAN TEXT OF MARSHALL EADOGHIO'S PROPOSED FORMAL STATEMENT TO  
THE PRESS TOMORROW..\* THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION WILL BE INCLUDED IN A SUBSEQUENT RADIO.

\* Omitted when this was typed - Archive.  
See Brindisi Alaska file.

1117

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : XXXA URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C NR: 20/12

REF. NO. 385

FILED : 122247A Oct

REC'D :

■ THE FOLLOWING IS THE ENGLISH TEXT OF BADOGLIO'S PREPARED STATEMENT TO THE PRESS WHICH WILL BE RELEASED HERE. QUOTE: THE GOVERNMENT OF WHICH I AM THE HEAD WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY NOMINATED BY HIS MAJESTY THE KING. MY GOVERNMENT HAS A SINGLE OBJECTIVE, TO FREE THE COUNTRY FROM GERMAN OPPRESSION. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS CAN ONLY BE DONE BY A UNITED MILITARY EFFORT IN WHICH WE SHALL WORK IN THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE MANNER WITH THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES. FOR THE FULL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE, ALL THOSE WHO LOVE ITALY ABOVE ALL ELSE MUST JOIN TOGETHER ACCORDING TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY IN THIS WORK OF REDEMPTION. MY GOVERNMENT WHICH NEEDS THIS HELP UNDERTAKES TO COMPLETE ITS RANKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BY CALLING UPON THE OUTSTANDING POLITICAL PERSONALITIES OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES SO THAT IT SHALL HAVE A THOROUGHLY DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER. AS SOON AS THE WAR IS ENDED AND VICTORY WON AS IT MOST SURELY WILL BE, THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WILL CONSIDER ITS MISSION ACCOMPLISHED AND WILL BE THOROUGHLY CONTENT WITH HAVING FREED THE COUNTRY FROM GERMAN OCCUPATION. ACCORDINGLY, THE GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKES HERE AND NOW TO GIVE FORMAL ASSURANCE THAT AT THE END OF THE WAR THE ITALIAN PEOPLE WILL BE PERFECTLY FREE TO CHOOSE THE GOVERNMENT WHICH IT DESIRES FOR THE NOT LESS IMPORTANT TASKS OF PEACE AND RECONSTRUCTION. THIS UNDERTAKING HAS ALREADY BEEN GIVEN IN THE DECREE DISSOLVING THE CHAMBER OF THE FASCI AND CORPORATIONS IN WHICH IT WAS STATED THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD FOUR MONTHS AFTER THE END OF HOSTILITIES. WHAT WAS SAID THEN IS REAFFIRMED NOW. THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAS THE CLEARLY DEFINED TASK OF LEADING THE COUNTRY UNTIL PEACE HAS BEEN WON. WITH THAT, ITS MANDATE WILL CEASE.

AUTHENTICATED

1116  
ROBERT. E. DOE MTR.  
SECRETARY TO THE MISSION.



SECRET

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

12 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Richardson, Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group.

Subject: Assembly of Journalists at Allied Military Mission.

Marshall Badoglio is holding a press conference at 1600A on 13 October for the purpose of announcing the Italian Declaration of War to the press. I am quite anxious to have a maximum turn-out in order to produce the proper fanfare. Would you kindly get off an urgent signal to the Fifth and Eighth Armies requesting their attached journalists to report to the Mission at 1400A tomorrow. As the time factor may not permit the correspondents in the Naples area to arrive here in time I would suggest that General Clark might be asked to make a plane available to bring the correspondents directly to Brindisi.

As we desire to maintain complete secrecy the purpose of assembling the correspondents here would of course not be announced to them.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission.

*Original with Political Sec*

SECRET

1115

SECRET

*Italian Govt.*

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

12 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Richardson, Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group.

Subject: Italian Declaration of War.

In accordance with present plan the Italian Government will declare war on Germany tomorrow, 13 October, at 1600A.

This declaration will be followed shortly thereafter by a tripartite announcement of Italian co-belligerency by the United Nations and Russia.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission

*File*

SECRET

1114



SECRET

Ital. Govt.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

12 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Power.

1. According to present plans the Italian Government will declare war on Germany at 1600A hours, 13 October. This is, of course, to be kept secret until that hour.
2. The press is being assembled at the Mission at 1400A hours tomorrow preparatory to moving on the Castle in force. If you have any press representatives in Taranto, I would request that they be notified.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

P.L.

SECRET

1113

SECRET

*atlas sent*

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

12 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Lord Rennell.

The Italian Declaration of War is laid on for 1600A, 13 October.  
Release will be made simultaneously from Bari, Algiers, London,  
Washington, etc.

I have not forgotten about the champagne.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission

*Phil*

SECRET

1112



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION / OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR EISENHOWER

M/C NR: 7

REF NO: 373

FILED : 1214201 OCT

REC'D :

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IN HANDLING ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND ALLIED PRESS HERE IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF YOU COULD LET ME HAVE SOME ADVANCE INDICATION OF MAIN POINTS COVERED IN PROPOSED ANGLO DASH AMERICAN DASH RUSSIAN DECLARATION OF CO DASH BELLIGERENCY. IF IT DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO THE UNDERTAKING GIVEN THAT ITALIAN TERRITORY NOW RUN BY AMGOT BE TURNED OVER TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE: I TRUST THIS WILL BE MADE CLEAR IN OFFICIAL COMMENT.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

1111

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR EISENHOWER

M/C NR: M/C1/12

REF NO: 367

FILED :

REC'D : 120805 04.

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ITALIAN ACTION WITH REGARD TO JAPAN HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED IN WORKING OUT THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY. IT IS DEFINITELY PREFERABLE TO GET THE GERMAN DECLARATION OUT OF THE WAY BEFORE RAISING THE JAPANESE QUESTION WITH THE ITALIANS. I SHOULD LIKE TO HAVE EARLY INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE COURSE YOU DESIRE TAKEN WITH REGARD TO JAPAN.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen U S A  
Acting Chief of Mission.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR: SVC 4291

CLASS: SECRET

M/C NR: N. 20/19

PREC : OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

REF.NO:

FROM : FREEDOM

FILED : 191235A OCT

TO : FATIMA. For EISENHOWER FREEDOM ALGIERS PAN  
251 from the combined COS

REC'D : 191835

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Your SVC 240 refers (?) to in response to your NAF 465. The question ask Badoglio is to declare war with nation other than Germany who are allied Germany in this war was carefully considered by the USA and the UK before the allied decision was reached, requesting Badoglio to declare war on Germany alone. Gen Smith informs us that in his conversation with Badoglio on this subject, it was agreed at some later time Italy would sever Diplomatic relations with Japan ordering this action if taken by Badoglio would appear to be to offer a satisfactory solution. It is not believed however that this is a vital consideration at this time. For the present therefore no attempt should be made to require the Badoglio government to do more than declare war on Germany.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FREEDOM

TO: FATIMA

M/C NR: 25/21

REF NO: 202

FILED: 211106A Oct

REC'D: 211516

Forwarded id FAN 251 from the combined Chiefs of Staff in response to our NAF 465 and is quoted for your information: FOR TAYLOR SIGNED CINC CITE FHSGS.

"United States and United Kingdom carefully considered the question of asking Badoglio to Declare war with nations other than Germany who are Allied with Germany in this war before Allied decision was reached requesting Badoglio to Declare War on Germany alone. We have been informed by General Smith that in his conversation with Badoglio on this subject, it was agreed that at some later time Diplomatic Relations with Japan would be severed by Italy. A satisfactory solution would appear to be offered if this action is taken by Badoglio. It is not believed however that this is a vital consideration at this time. No attempt should be made to require the Badoglio Government to do more than Declare War on Germany, for the present."



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

M/C NR: 5/13

REF NO: 6636

FILED : 131053A Oct

REC'D : 131315A

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Tripartite statement which will be issued in Washington immediately following  
Badoglio war declaration covers following points;

1. Governments of United States, Great Britain and Russia acknowledge Italian war declaration and accept Italian active armed cooperation as "co-belligerent"
2. The 3 Governments acknowledge Italian Government pledge to submit to electoral will of Italian people after Germans driven out and 3 Governments emphasize nothing can detract from absolute right of Italians eventually to decide on kind of democratic government they will have.
3. Co-belligerency status does not affect armistice terms which remain in force and can only be adjusted by agreement among Allied Governments depending on the assistance the Italian Government furnishes to United Nations' cause.
4. This refers your 373. This information most secret and for your personal use only.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 9/13

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 6718

PREC : URGENT

FILED : 131427A Oct

FROM : FREEDOM

REC'D : 131540A

TO : FATIMA

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Due necessity furnishing London, Washington advance information on Badoglio's Proclamation we have already transmitted close translation of Italian text which must stand. Only minor differences exist between that and translation your 386. To prevent possible confusion correspondents at Badoglio's press conference should be told that a close translation based on original Italian text has been forwarded London, Washington and will be released here.

1108



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 06/13

CLASS: SECRET

REF.NO: 391

PREC : URGENT

FILED : 131700A Oct

FROM : FATIMA

REC'D :

TO : FREEDOM

-----  
EVERYTHING WENT OFF HERE ON TIME AND AS PLANNED. BADOGLIOS PRESS CONFERENCE WAS QUITE SUCCESSFUL. THE CORRESPONDENTS QUESTIONS BROUGHT OUT NOTHING MORE THAN A SLIGHT ELABORATION OF SOME OF THE POINTS CONTAINED IN THE PROCLAMATION AND PREPARED RELEASE. YOUR SIX SEVEN ONE EIGHT ARRIVED TOO LATE. HOWEVER CORRESPONDENTS WERE TOLD THAT THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION FURNISHED THEM WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL ONE.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen. USA  
Acting Chief of Mission.

1105

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : ROUTINE

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C MR: 11/13

REF NO: 396

FILED :

REC'D : 132239A Oct

THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGE FROM THE DISCUSSION FOLLOWING QUESTIONS OF JOURNALISTS AT TODAY'S NEWS SESSIONS. THE ORIGINAL INTENTION OF THE KING AND MARSHALL HAD BEEN TO MAKE THE DECLARATION OF WAR WHEN THEY HAD RETURNED TO ROME WHERE THEY COULD FORM A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING ALL PARTIES IN THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER FIGHTING SOON BROKE OUT BETWEEN ITALIANS AND GERMANS AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO WAIT FOR THE RETURN TO ROME. IT WAS THEREFORE DECIDED TO MAKE THE FINAL DECLARATION OF WAR FORTHWITH. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THIS PROCLAMATION IS THAT THE ITALIAN FORCES ON LAND, ON THE SEA AND IN THE AIR WILL BE ENTIRELY AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE ALLIED WAR EFFORT; IN FACT, IN CORSICA THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN FIGHTING AGAINST THE GERMANS AND THEY ARE STILL FIGHTING IN THE BALKANS AND IN NORTHERN ITALY. THE NUMBER OF ITALIAN TROOPS ALREADY AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIED EFFORT IS QUITE SUBSTANTIAL WHEN A COUNT IS TAKEN OF THE DIVISIONS IN SARDINIA. THE CABINET WILL BE COMPLETED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT UNTIL ARRANGEMENTS ARE COMPLETED IT IS OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS PERSONALITIES; MEANTIME, ACTIONS ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN WORDS AND THE ITALIAN PEOPLE ARE SHOWING BY ACTIONS THAT THEY APPROVE WHOLE HEARTEDLY OF THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT. ALL ITALIAN AMBASSADORS AND MINISTERS HAVE PLACED THEMSELVES UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT EXCEPT ONE WHO HAS SINCE BEEN APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO BERLIN BY THE FASCIST REPUBLICAN REGIME. THE MARSHALL HAS SEEN A REPORT OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S SPEECH AT AJACCIO AND HE STATED THAT ITALY WISHES TO LIVE IN PEACE AND ON GOOD TERMS WITH FRANCE. THE MARSHALL SAID THERE IS NO INDICATION AS YET OF THE REACTION OF GERMANY ON JAPAN. AS FAR AS THE GERMANS ARE CONCERNED THEY CANNOT DO WORSE THAN THEY HAVE ALREADY DONE.

AUTHENTICATED:

ROBERT E. DOE, Secretary.



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NRL

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : EATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/CNR: 11/14

REF NR: 408

FILED : 141900A Oct

REC'D :

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PLEASE FURNISH MISSION WITH SUMMARY OF WORLD REACTION TO ITALIAN DECLARATION OF WAR, ALSO SUCH INFORMATION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN COMMISSION AS YOU CONSIDER USEFUL TO THE MISSION PD TO FREEDOM FOR ATTENTION OF MACMILLAN AND MURPHY PD ~~XXXX~~

MANY THANKS FOR CACCIA PD HE HAS BEEN INDISPENSABLE DURING THESE LAST BUSY DAYS

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General., USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

1107

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM *from Eisenhower*

TO : FATIMA *for Badoglio*

M/C NR: 7/15

REF NO: 7366/14

FILED : 142937A Oct

REC'D : 150745A

Observe with great satisfaction that the Italian Government has declared war on Germany. By maintaining a vigorous resistance to the German forces the Italian Nation, through its armed forces and its civilian population, may hasten the redemption of Italy. I take this occasion to inform you that the Allied Commission is being constituted and that an advance group of officers will shortly arrive at Brindisi prepared to discuss the most pressing problems with the Italian Government. It is important that we start examining forthwith problems connected with the gradual transfer of territory now under Allied Military Government to the administration of the Italian Government subject to guidance and instruction from the Mission. It is apparent that any measures of this sort require detailed consideration, and that it is a prerequisite that the Italian Government put itself in a position satisfactorily to discharge the responsibilities involved. The purpose disclosed in your proclamation and in your statement to the press yesterday point the way to the accomplishment of this objective.

*(Transmitted to Badoglio in Gen. Taylor's letter of 15 Oct. See files of Political Section)*



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 5/16

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR: 437

PREC: PRIORITY

FILED: 161023A Oct

FROM: FATIMA

REC'D:

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR (g80er)

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REFERENCE YOUR FOUR SIX THREE SIX/EIGHT AND OUR THREE TWO TWO PD TO FREEDOM FOR  
MURPHY AND MACMILLAN PD BADOGLIO HAS QUERIED SEVERAL TIMES ABOUT THE REVISED  
LONG TERMS WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED ON THE WAY HERE PD I HAVE DISCOVERED THAT  
HE HAS NOT COMMUNICATED THE ARMISTICE TERMS TO HIS MINISTERS AND I BELIEVE HE  
IS WAITING FOR THE REVISED DOCUMENT TO DO SO PD MEANWHILE HIS MINISTERS DO NOT  
UNDERSTAND HIS RETICENCE PD I STRONGLY RECOMMEND GETTING THE DOCUMENT HERE WITHOUT  
DELAY

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General., USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : AFHQ

TO : FATIMA info HQ 2nd District FORTASE

M/C NR: 5/17

REF NO: 8192

FILED : 161738A Oct

REC'D : 170123A

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Sir Brian Robertson, Major-General Deputy CAO representative of AFHQ now in Taranto, requests copy Armistice Terms. Take necessary action to get a copy of Armistice Terms to Robertson together with our instructions about SECRECY in this connection. Acknowledge.

1700



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR : 16/16

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR : 445

PREC : PRIORITY

FILED : 162008A Cct

FROM : FATIMA

REC'D :

TO : FREEDOM

REFERENCE YOUR SIX SIX THREE SIX PD TO FREEDOM FOR ATTENTION OF MURPHY AND MACMILLAN  
FROM FATIMA SIGNED TAYLOR PD HAS THE TRIPARTITE STATEMENT ACCEPTING THE ITALIAN CO -  
BELLIGERENCY BEEN ISSUED QUERY IF SO PLEASE FORWARD TEXT HERE PD IF NOT NOW SHALL I  
EXPLAIN OUR FAILURE TO RESPOND QUERY

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General., USA  
Acting Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATMA

M/C NR: 14/17

REF NO: 8327

FILED : 162205A Oct

REC'D : 170937A

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Summary world reaction Declaration of War under preparation. Refer 408 October 14th. To be transmitted shortly. Owing to absence of Soviet Representative and continued discussions regarding terms of invitation to French Committee of National Liberation meetings of Mediterranean (politico military) Commission have been postponed. It now seems unlikely Commission will meet until after Moscow conference has reached preliminary agreement regarding relations Mediterranean Commission with Allied Commission. Consequently seems likely meeting will not take place for several weeks.



U. S. SECRET  
Equals British MOST SECRET

*J. Short*

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

SECRET  
Auth: CinC. AF  
Initials: *JS*  
17 October 1943

17 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Robertson.

In compliance with telegraphic instructions from Allied Force Headquarters I attach hereto the Short and Long Armistice Terms. There have been some slight amendments agreed upon for the Long Terms which have not been received by the Mission.

Your attention is invited to the fact that the Long Terms are MOST SECRET and that the fact of their existence is being carefully concealed.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission

2 Inclosures

Short Terms  
Long Terms

U. S. SECRET  
Equals British MOST SECRET

1097

*Pol*

*atlas. mil.*

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
APO 512

17 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency Marshal Badoglio.

In confirmation of the statement which I have already made to Your Excellency orally I have the honor to inform you that the American, British and Soviet Governments have approved the amendments to the document containing the Long Armistice Terms which you desired. A supplementary document in the form of a Protocol embodying these amendments is being forwarded to me by General Eisenhower and immediately on its receipt I will communicate it to Your Excellency for signature.

*387.4 - Armistice*

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of the Mission

*Pil*

1096



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NO: 7

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 459

PREC : PRIORITY

FILED : 171400A Oct

FROM : FATIMA

REC'D :

TO : FREEDOM rpt FORTBASE for INFO

-----  
YOUR EIGHT ONE NINE TWO ACKNOWLEDGED PD TO FREEDOM REPEAT FORTBASE FOR INFO FROM  
FORWARD  
FATIMA SIGNED TAYLOR PD I SHALL/GENERAL ROBERTSON AT ONCE A COPY OF THE SHORT AND  
AND LONG ARMISTICE TERMS PD YOUR ATTENTION IS INVITED TO THE FACT THAT THE LATTER  
WILL BE LESS AMENDMENTS AS THE LATTER HAVE NEVER BEEN RECEIVED AT THIS MISSION

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C NO: 9

REF NO: 461

FILED : 171450A Oct

REC'D :

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REFERENCE MY FOUR FIVE NINE PD TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED TAYLOR PD MARSHALL  
BADOGLIO HAS ONCE MORE ASKED ABOUT THE AMENDED LONG TERMS WHICH HAVE NOT YET BEEN  
RECEIVED PD IN ORDER TO ALLY HIS UNEASINESS I AM TRANSMITTING TO HIM A NOTE VERBALE  
CONVEYING IN WRITING THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN YOUR FOUR SIX THREE SIX SIANT EIGHT

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: ~~RESTRICTED~~

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATLA

M/C NR: 52/17

REF NO: 8433

FILED : 171123A Oct

REC'D : 171727A

Following tripartite statement was issued simultaneously from Washington, London and Moscow immediately following the Declaration of War on Germany by Italy on October 13. "The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledge the position of the Royal Italian Government as stated by Marshall Badoglio and accept the active cooperation of the Italian Nation and Armed Forces as a co-belligerent in the War against Germany. The Military events since September 8th and the brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population, culminating in the Italian Declaration of War against Germany have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent and the American, British and Soviet governments will continue to work with the Italian Government on that basis. The three governments acknowledge the Italian Government pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the Democratic form of Government they will eventually have.

The relationship of co-belligerency between the governments of Italy and the United Nations' Governments cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford the United Nations' cause."

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION  
AFM 512

18 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency Marshal Badoglio.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the following tripartite statement was issued simultaneously from Washington, London and Moscow immediately following the Declaration of War on Germany by Italy on October 13. "The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union acknowledge the position of the Royal Italian Government as stated by Marshal Badoglio and accept the active cooperation of the Italian Nation and Armed Forces as a co-belligerent in the War against Germany. The Military events since September 8th and the brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population, culminating in the Italian Declaration of War against Germany have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent and the American, British and Soviet governments will continue to work with the Italian Government on that basis. The three governments acknowledge the Italian Government pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the Democratic form of Government they will eventually have.

The relationship of co-belligerency between the governments of Italy and the United Nations' Governments cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford to the United Nations' cause."

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.  
Acting Chief of Mission

1092

382- Dec 7 War

Paul



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : XXX A URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : E.TDA

M/C NO: 10/18

REF NO: 8760

FILED : 180918A Oct

REC'D : 180947A

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Wording of amendments to long terms still under discussion in Washington. Personal  
for Taylor from Whiteley signed Eisenhower. Reference your 461. Therefore make no  
commitment in writing pending further instructions.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NO: 2/18

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 465

PREC : URGENT

FILED : 181311A Oct

FROM : FATIMA

REC'D :

TO : FREEDOM

YOUR EIGHT SEVEN SIX ZERO ARRIVED AFTER I HAD GIVEN MARSHALL BADOGLIO THE FOLLOWING WRITTEN MEMORANDUM PD TO FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR MAJOR GENERAL WHITELEY FROM FATIMA SIGNED TAYLOR PD PAREN CONFIRMING A PREVIOUS ORAL MESSAGE AS AUTHORIZED BY YOUR FOUR SIX THREE SIX SLANT EIGHT OF EIGHT OCTOBER PD QUOTE IN CONFIRMATION OF THE STATEMENT WHICH I HAVE ALREADY MADE TO YOUR EXCELLENCY ORALLY I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT THE AMERICAN CMA BRITISH AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS HAVE APPROVED THE AMENDMENTS TO THE DOCUMENT CONTAINING THE LONG ARMISTICE TERMS WHICH YOU DESIRED PD A SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENT IN THE FORM OF A PROTOCOL EMBODYING THESE AMENDMENTS IS BEING FORWARDED TO ME BY GENERAL EISENHOWER AND IMMEDIATELY ON ITS RECEIPT I WILL COMMUNICATE IT TO YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR SIGNATURE UNQUOTE PD PARA I SINCERELY HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE NO HITCH AND THAT THE DOCUMENT IN QUESTION WILL REACH ALGIERS IN TIME FOR MACMILLAN AND MURPHY TO BRING THEM ON FRIDAY PD AS MENTIONED IN MY NUMBER FOUR SIX ONE WE ARE INFORMED BY ACQUARONE THAT BADOGLIO HAS NOT SHOWN THE ARMISTICE TERMS TO ANYONE CMA NOT EVEN TO HIS SERVICE MINISTERS PD THIS HAS GIVEN RISE TO THE CHARGE THAT BADOGLIO'S WAYS ARE AS DICTORIAL AS THOSE OF MUSSOLINI PD THERE IS THUS NEED FOR SPEED ON OUR PART IF WE DO NOT WISH TO EXPOSE BADOGLIO TO THIS FORM OF CRITICISM

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General USA  
Acting Chief of Mission 189



ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: RESTRICTED

PREC: ROUTINE

FROM: FREEDOM

TO: FATIMA

M/C NO: 20/21

REF NO: 152

FILED: 210864A Oct

REC'D: 211427A

Summary world press reception of Italian declaration of war prepared as follows

FATIMA signed EISENHOWER cite FNCIV from MURPHY. World press hailed Italian declaration as finally putting Italian people in camp wherein they always belonged by tradition, sentiment and interest - with democracies against historic enemy who violated pledges treated Italy as conquered territory. Declaration considered another proof of tides turning anti-Hitler. Newspapers emphasize moral value of declaration but generally express wait and see attitude concerning effect in bringing substantial military assistance to Allies. Tripartite statement on co-belligerency status widely applauded because indicates Italy still considered defeated power who can mitigate but not escape consequences of having fought anti-Allies but whose people are guaranteed free democratic choice ~~after~~ government after peace. Tripartite statement also taken as evidence full Soviet collaboration with Allies. Paragraph following are typical quotations

American British neutral press Washington Post, "War declaration marks complete swing pendulum. Shows that Mussolini in his megalomania refused concede - that Germany always been Italy's enemy. Para. New York Times "Dramatic swing overshadowed significant fact it gave occasion for first joint statement by Roosevelt Churchill Stalin and associates, Soviet with Anglo-American governments is guaranteeing people of France and all liberated nations right to choose own government. Para London Times "There's no doubt whatever of wholehearted desire of Italian people for United Nations victory. Question which cannot be answered except by test of experience

is whether war declaration will enable substantial number Italians take up arms or sabotage or other means in struggle to expel intruder. Its plain that now situation does'nt effect armistice terms which retain full force. Para. El Mercurio of Santiago, Chile "Germany violated all treaties with former Ally. German Alliance never popular with Italians. Para. La Noche of Lima, Peru "War declaration ends twenty years of errors. Para. Elciario of Montevideo, Uruguay "Italy has found place her tradition demanded. Italian People always wanted war anti-Germany. Para. National Zeitung of Basle, Switzerland "Overwhelming majority Italian people behind war declaration. Para. Diewelt (?) of Zurich, Switzerland "Forces which Germany successfully hurled against world today recoil against her. Para. Seenska Dagbladet of Stockholm "Great satisfaction in Northern Italy over war declaration. Unites occupied Italy against Germans. Para. Radio Ankara of Turkey "War declaration moral effect and impact on Germany's prestige cannot be minimized. It's proof how much fortunes of war turned against Germany. Axis as such is definitely broken. Soviet participation proves collaboration between Allies.



INCOMING

SECRET

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

FATIMA

4/02

5058

011712 Nov

020101A

Ensuing in Reference your progress report of 28th October. PERSONAL FOR MASON  
MACFARLANE FROM CINC CITE FHCOS. Appreciate this clear informative letter. Letter  
instructions have been issued and sent you actuating the Commission effective 10th  
November. Joyce will arrive about 6th or 7th. This will allow minimum of 3 to 4  
days and such other time as you think necessary to indoctrinate him and place him  
in touch with the situation. I want you to know how thoroughly I appreciate what  
you are doing in a most difficult and delicate situation. Other messages today  
reply to your report on changes in political alignment. New subject. For your  
personal information, we are informed talks are proceeding at Moscow as to the  
disposition of many important units of the Italian fleet. We have as yet no  
specific information but fear that when instructions come they will be a shock  
to the Italian Government. I have also heard today that a Reuters report from  
Washington has revealed the signature of the long term Armistice.

INCOMING MESSAGE

SECRET

16/31

URGENT

5023

FREEDOM

011623A nov

FATIMA

012015A

Your message arrived (Personal for Mason Macfarlane from Eisenhower c ite  
THCOS reference your 695) just as I was about to send you the following:

"(1) Our immediate policy should be based upon a single principle. We will not recognize or cooperate with any Italian Government unless it is prepared to accept loyalty to the terms of the Armistice and all that these imply. This must be made known to any prospective premier or ministers who will have to be told that the Long Terms were signed on September 29.

(2) Italians will of course appreciate that the attitude of the British and American publics to Italy both now and in the future will be influenced by the character of any Italian Government. The more broadly based it is and the more genuinely Anti-Fascist is its performance, the better will be the effect upon the public opinion of the democratic world.

(3) Apart from making these facts known, you should be careful not to intervene. If Badoglio is unable to obtain ministers he will presumably resign. The King will then send for Sforza. Sforza may take the bait in spite of all his professions and form a coalition government. If so, well and good. If he refuses and all others refuse equally to serve under the King presumably the King will send for Badoglio again and ask him to carry on. Badoglio will either decide to



continue or refuse and tel, the King frankly what the facts are, but these events should follow their natural sequence, neither stimulated or retarded by you. Meanwhile, while all preparations should continue, it should be made clear that the actual change-over to Italian jurisdiction under Allied control should be held up until stability is reached in the governmental structure.

(4) I do not think you need worry too much in these circumstances about the amending protocol to the armistice terms. If Badoglio goes, the terms stand and the new Premier will have to swallow them as part of the sweets of office."

It seems that you have done everything possible in the present situation and nothing remains except to await developments. As soon as you can, send me your personal estimate of the situation and forecast of events.

OUTGOING

MOST SECRET

8

IMMEDIATE

718

FATIMA

0222104 Nov

FREEDOM for EISENHOWER, MURPHY and MACMILLAN  
rptd AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR*showed by 5023*

YOUR FIVE ZERO FIVE THREE PD YOUR PARA PAREN ONE PAREN PD OBVIOUSLY LONG TERMS MUST BE MADE KNOWN TO ANY PROSPECTIVE PREMIER PD TO FREEDOM FOR EISENHOWER MURPHY AND MACMILLAN RPTD AFHQ ADVANCE COMMAND POST FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE PD I CONSIDER HOWEVER THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE SHOWN TO ANY POLITICAL LEADERS BEFORE THE PROSPECTIVE PREMIER HAS NOTIFIED HIS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT OFFICE AND THEN IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ONLY TO HIM WITH A PLAIN STATEMENT THAT HE WILL BE ALLOWED TO TAKE OFFICE ONLY IF HE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEM PD PARA PD YOUR PARA PAREN TWO PAREN PD IN ALL OUR TALKS WITH THE KING CMA BADOGLIO AND OTHERS CMA WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF SECURING A GENUINE ANTI DASH FASCIST GOVERNMENT ON A BROAD BASIS PD THE MARSHAL HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO SUCH A POLICY BOTH WITH REGARD TO THE ALLIES AND TO HIS OWN PEOPLE PD PARA PD YOUR PARA PAREN THREE PAREN PD PLEASE SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NUMBER SEVEN ONE NINE WHICH INCLUDES ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AND FORECAST OF THE EVENTS PD PARA PD YOUR PARA PAREN FOUR PAREN PD I AGREE THAT THE QUESTION OF AMENDING THE LONG TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE IS NOW LESS PRESSING BUT I STILL FEEL THAT WE SHOULD GET ON WITH IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

AUTHENTICATED:

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission

1081



INCOMING

|            |             |
|------------|-------------|
| RESTRICTED | 28/12       |
| ROUTINE    | 5603        |
| FREEDOM    | 021700A Nov |
| FATIMA     | 121517A     |

For your information the following announcements have been made at the end of the Moscow Conference. (TO FATIMA FOR MACEDONIAN SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FMCS.)

"The Conference also agreed to establish an Advisory Council for matters relating to Italy to be composed in the first instance of representatives of their three Governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation. Provision is made for addition to this council of representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in view of their special interests arising out of aggression of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war. This Council will deal with day to day questions other than military preparations and will make recommendations designed to coordinate Allied policy with regard to Italy.

The three Foreign Secretaries considered it appropriate to reaffirm by a declaration published today, the attitude of the Allied Governments in favor of the restoration of Democracy in Italy. Number 2. Text of declaration regarding Italy. The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that the three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy toward Italy must be based upon fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental

and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In furtherance of this policy in the future, the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect: 1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism. 2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups. 3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed. 4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character. 5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full amnesty. 6. Democratic organs of local Government shall be created. 7. Fascist chiefs and Army Generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles stated above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1082

The three Governments, parties to this declaration, will, at the request of any one of them, consult on this matter. It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government."



COPY

Continuity for Text - See Freedom of Information Act 7624-7704

RECEIVED

It is agreed that the title of the document signed at Malta on September 29, 1943 by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, should be changed to "Additional conditions of Armistice with Italy." The following further amendments to this document are also agreed:

In the first paragraph of the Preamble the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" are inserted between the words "governments" and "on the one hand." The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943 between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and United Nations on certain terms of a military nature."

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."

In Article 1 the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."

In Article 1 the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations to this purpose will be complied with."

The present Protocol is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at BANDISI.

For the Allied Commander-in-Chief





TOP SECRET

COPY

AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,  
MEDITERRANEAN, ALLIED FORCES AND THE ROYAL ITALIAN MINISTER OF MARINE  
WITH RESPECT TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

The aforementioned agreement is amended as follows:

The following phrase to be added to the Preamble:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time."

Final sentence of last paragraph to be amended to read:

"will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag."

The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at BRINDISI.

For the Naval Commander-in-Chief,  
Mediterranean, Allied Forces.

their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time."

Final sentence of last paragraph to be amended to read:

"will be amended so far as possible by crews provided by Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag."

The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at BRINDISI.

For the Naval Commander-in-Chief,  
Mediterranean, Allied Forces.

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**U. S. SECRET**  
**Equals British SECRET**

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NO.

M/C NO: 14/8

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 7824

PREC: PRIORITY

FILED: 071902A

FROM: FREEDOM

REC'D: 080645

TO: FATIMA

A protocol in revision of the "Terms of Surrender" as approved by Great Britain, United States and Soviets has been received. (To Fatima for MacFarlane signed Eisenhower cite FMCG3) Its text follows:

"Protocol. It is agreed that the title of the document signed at Malta on September 29, 1943 by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, should be changed to <sup>"</sup>quote additional conditions of Armistice with Italy." The following further amendments to this document are also agreed:

"In the first paragraph of the Preamble the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" are inserted between the words "governments" and "on the <sup>one</sup> other hand". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:  
"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3rd, 1943, between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and United Nations on certain terms of <sup>military ? nature</sup> a Kiligany Patbre."

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted

*Pol*  
**U. S. SECRET**  
**Equals British SECRET**

*107*

**U. S. SECRET**  
**Equals British SECRET**

between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows: "The following, together with /? their terms of the Armistice of September 3rd, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows: "and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."

In Article 1a the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows: "The Italian land, sea and air forces where-ever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows: "Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascists associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by

**U. S. SECRET**  
**Equals British SECRET**



**U. S. SECRET**  
**Equals British SECRET**

the United Nations to this purpose will be complied with." Signatures and date to follow. The foregoing instrument is only acceptable on condition that the Cunningham agreement with respect to the employment of the Italian Navy is amended as follows: 1. The following phrase to be added to the Preamble: "It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time." 2. Final sentence of last paragraph to be amended to read "will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag." If you do not have complete text of Cunningham agreement it is in hands of Admiral McGregor. You should have Admirals McGrigor and De Courten come to Brindisi and the protocol and the amendments to the Cunningham agreement to be signed simultaneously. Authority is hereby given you to sign the protocol for the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces and for Admiral McGrigor to sign the amendments to the Cunningham agreement. C-in-C Mediterranean concurs.

It is considered essential that these documents be signed with the least possible delay especially in the light of the political situation and the possibility that Badoglio may not long remain as Prime Minister. It should be pointed out to him that the early signature of these instruments will enhance his personal situation as his signature is already affixed to a document which in his opinion is less favorable. In the event that Badoglio asks for any alternative he should be told that these amendments are final.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG  
1 - Diary  
1 - M/C

**U. S. SECRET**  
**Equals British SECRET**

COPY

SECRET

FLAG OFFICER LIAISON, ITALY,  
NAVY HOUSE,  
TANANTO.

10th. November, 1943.

FOL/285/03.

BRIGADIER TAYLOR,  
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION.

The attached is the text of the remarks of the Minister of Marine which General Mason MacFarlane has taken with him to Allied Force Headquarters.

2. The Minister of Marine is not prepared to sign the amendment in its present form. You will note that he has proposed an alternative wording, but I am not empowered to accept this without the approval of my Commander-in-Chief.

3. I warned Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, by signal last night as to the state of affairs, and informed him that General Mason MacFarlane would arrive at Algiers this afternoon with the Minister's remarks.

/s/

REAR-ADMIRAL.



10th. November, 1943.

FOL/285/03.

BRIGADIER TAYLOR,  
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION.

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/s/

REAR-ADMIRAL.

TRANSLATIONMEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE

With respect to the amendment of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement, regarding the employment of the Italian Fleet, proposed by the United Nations as a condition of signature of the amendment to the additional armistice terms, the Italian government calls attention to what follows:

I The Cunningham-De Courten agreement was examined and accepted by mutual agreement between the minister of the Italian Navy and Admiral Cunningham on 23 September 1943, under the Armistice, with the aim of permitting the Italian Fleet to make its own contribution to Allied efforts in the prosecution of the war. In the agreement it was clearly affirmed that Italian warships would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet according to agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

II The Cunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet; hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.

III The Italian government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.

IV The Italian government therefore feels compelled to place in evidence the form of the additional clause in which are mentioned the unilateral decisions of the United Nations, which should be brought to the attention of the Italian government from time to time.

V The Italian government, therefore, emphasizes that the additional clause could of course be accepted provided it were modified in the following form which, while respecting the substance of the desires of the United Nations, is rendered in a manner reconcilable with natural Italian requirements:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of the present agreement relative to the employment and disposition of the warships and merchant marine of Italy does not preclude the possibility that all or part of the Italian ships may be employed in other ways that the United Nations consider suitable to the ends of the war in general. Their proposals in this connection will be discussed from time to time with the Italian government."



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II The Gunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet; hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.

III The Italian Government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Gunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.

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/s/ The Chief of Government

Badoglio.

Trans/Sgt. Shenfield/ajp

107

PROMEMORIA PER IL GENERALE MASON MACFARLANE

In relazione all'e mandamento al Cunningham - De Courten agreement, nei riguardi dell'impiego della flotta italiana, posto dalle nazioni Unite come condizioni di firma dell'avvenimento alle condizioni aggiuntive di armistizio, il Governo Italiano rileva quanto segue:

- 1.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è stato esaminato ed accettato di mutuo accordo fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana e l'Ammiraglio Cunningham il 23 Settembre U.S., in regime di armistizio, con lo scopo di permettere alla flotta italiana di fornire il proprio contributo agli sforzi alleati nella prosecuzione delle guerre. In esso era chiaramente affermato che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.
- 2.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è in corso di larga e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo: anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.
- 3.) - Il Governo Italiano, ed un mese e mezzo di distanza dalla conclusione del Cunningham - De Courten agreement, non vedrebbe in conseguenza l'opportunità di introdurre in esso una clausola aggiuntiva la quale porrebbe forse in contrasto con lo spirito di collaborazione sempre dimostrato dalla Marina Italiana. E ciò tanto più in quanto essa viene suggerita quando l'Italia si trova da quasi un mese in stato di co-belligeranza con le Nazioni Unite.
- 4.) - Il Governo Italiano ritiene quindi di dover porre in evidenza la forma della clausola aggiuntiva nella quale si parla di decisioni unilaterali delle Nazioni Unite, le quali dovrebbero essere notificate al Governo Italiano volta per volta.
- 5.) - Il Governo Italiano mette quindi in rilievo che la clausola aggiuntiva potrebbe senz'altro essere accettata qualora fosse modificata nella forma seguente, la quale pur rispettando la sostanza del desiderio delle Nazioni Unite, è redatta in modo conciliabile con le naturali esigenze italiane:  

"nulla inteso e concordato che le disposizioni del presente accordo relative all'impiego e disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutte o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra generale. Le loro proposte a questo riguardo saranno discusse di volta in volta col Governo Italiano".



alleati nella prosecuzione della guerra. In caso era chiaramente ammesso che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.

2.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement e in corso di larga e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo: anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.

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4.) - Il Governo Italiano ritiene quindi di dover porre in evidenza la forma della clausola aggiuntiva nella quale si parla di decisioni unilaterali delle Nazioni Unite, le quali dovrebbero essere notificate al Governo Italiano volta per volta.

5.) - Il Governo Italiano mette quindi in rilievo che la clausola aggiuntiva potrebbe senz'altro essere accettata qualora fosse modificata nella forma seguente, la quale pur rispettando la sostanza del desiderio delle Nazioni Unite, è redatta in modo conciliabile con le naturali esigenze italiane:

«...inteso e concordato che le disposizioni del presente accordo relative all'impiego e disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutte o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra generale. Le loro proposte a questo riguardo saranno discusse di volta in volta col Governo Italiano».

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

F. to BAIOGLIO

202X

1072

COPY

TRANSLATION

By order of His Excellency, Marshal Badoglio, Chief of the Government, I have signed the clauses added to the Preamble and to the last paragraph of the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, which were requested by the Allied Governments as conditions of the signature of the amendments to the Armistice.

In signing, I request that note be taken of the following statement:

"I believe it my duty to make clear that the request for insertion of these clauses, put forth less than two months after the meeting with Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet, alters the spirit of the agreement concluded between Admiral Cunningham and me. The clauses of this Agreement had been put forward in accordance with the Armistice, by Admiral Cunningham himself, who invited me to examine them and make known to them my observations and comments. In as much as there was complete agreement in regard to the text presented by the Allies, and as the Agreement has up to now been carried out in the widest and most complete manner without opposition either in letter or spirit, I did not and do not have any reason to believe it should be modified and completed by a subsequent safeguarding clause. This clause seems to be at odds with the active collaboration given up to now by the Italian Navy and with the visible demonstration of the loyalty with which the Italian Fleet is contributing to the utmost to the conduct of the war against the common enemy in the spirit of existing co-belligerency".

BRINDISI, 17 November 1943

/s/ Admiral De Courten



In signing, I request that note be taken of the following statement:

"I believe it my duty to make clear that the request for insertion of these clauses, put forth less than two months after the meeting with Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet, alters the spirit of the agreement concluded between Admiral Cunningham and me. The clauses of this Agreement had been put forward in accordance with the Armistice, by Admiral Cunningham himself, who invited me to examine them and make known to them my observations and comments. In as much as there was complete agreement in regard to the text presented by the Allies, and as the Agreement has up to now been carried out in the widest and most complete manner without opposition either in letter or spirit, I did not and do not have any reason to believe it should be modified and completed by a subsequent safeguarding clause. This clause seems to be at odds with the active collaboration given up to now by the Italian Navy and with the visible demonstration of the loyalty with which the Italian Fleet is contributing to the utmost to the conduct of the war against the common enemy in the spirit of existing co-belligerency".

BRINDISI, 17 November 1943

/s/ Admiral De Courten

Minister of the Navy

END

1073

222

In obbedienza agli ordini di S.E. il Maresciallo Badoglio, Capo del Governo, ho firmato le clausole aggiuntive al preambolo ed all'ultimo paragrafo del Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, richiesta dai Governi alleati come condizioni di firma degli emendamenti all'atto di armistizio.

Nel procedere a tale firma, chiedo che sia preso atto della seguente dichiarazione:

"Ritengo mio dovere mettere in chiaro rilievo che la richiesta di inserzione di queste clausole, avanzata a poco meno di due mesi all'incontro con Sir Andrew Cunningham, allora comandante in capo della Flotta Alleata del Mediterraneo, altera lo spirito dell'accordo concluso fra l'Amm. Cunningham e me. Le clausole di tale Agreement erano state proposte, in regime di armistizio, dallo stesso Amm. Cunningham, il quale mi aveva invitato ad esaminarle ed a comunicargli le mie osservazioni e considerazioni: poiche era stato raggiunto il completo accordo sul testo presentato da parte Alleata e poiche l'Agreement ha avuto finora la piu larga e completa applicazione senza nessun contrasto ne nella lettera, ne nello spirito, non avevo e non ho nessuna ragione di pensare che esso dovesse essere modificato e completato con una ulteriore clausola di carattere cautelativo. Tale clausola appare in antitesi con la collaborazione attiva data finora dalla Marina Italiana e con la palese dimostrazione della leale disposizione della Flotta italiana ad intensificare fino al massimo limite il suo contributo alla condotta della guerra contro il comune nemico, nello spirito della co-belligeranza in atto."

Brindisi, 17 novembre 1943



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Brindisi, 17 novembre 1943

Ministro della Marina

1072

OUTGOING

MOST SECRET

19/9

IMMEDIATE

854

PATIMA

092318Z Nov

FREEDOM rptd AFHQ ADV C P at AMILCAR for  
EISENHOWER, MURPHY and MACMILLAN

HAVING SIGNED THE AMENDED PROTOCOL TO THE LONG TERMS BADOGLIO AND THE MINISTER OF MARINE DECLINED TO SIGN THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CUNNINGHAM AGREEMENT PD THEIR CHIEF REASON WAS THAT IN SPITE OF HAVING COOPERATED FULLY AND LOYALLY SINCE THE CUNNINGHAM AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED AND IN SPITE OF HAVING NOW BECOME CO DASH BELLIGERENTS THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO ACCEPT CONDITIONS CONSIDERABLY LESS FAVORABLE TO THEM THAN THOSE IMPOSED SIX WEEKS AGO PD TO FREEDOM RPTD AFHQ ADVANCE COMMAND POST AT AMILCAR FOR EISENHOWER CMA MURPHY AND MACMILLAN FROM PATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE PD I THEREFORE WITHDREW THE SIGNED COPIES OF THE PROTOCOL AND INFORMED BADOGLIO THAT HE WOULD GET HIS COPIES BACK WHEN THE NAVAL DOCUMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED PD LATE TONIGHT I SAW BADOGLIO AGAIN AND HE EVENTUALLY PROMISED THAT THE NAVAL AMENDMENTS WOULD BE SIGNED TOMORROW BUT ASKED ME TO TAKE WITH ME A DOCUMENT CONTAINING HIS OBSERVATIONS AND A SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO THE DOCUMENT AS SIGNED PD I WILL BRING THE DOCUMENT CONTAINING BADOGLIO'S SUGGESTED AMENDMENT WITH ME TOMORROW PD BADOGLIO ASKED ME TO REQUEST YOU TO DO YOUR BEST TO GET HIS PROPOSED AMENDMENT AGREED TO IN THE SAME WAY AS YOU HAVE SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE LONG TERMS AMENDED PD I MADE NO PROMISE WHATEVER EXCEPT THAT I WOULD GIVE YOU HIS MESSAGE.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Mission

1071



OUTGOING

SECRET

22/10

URGENT

879

FATIMA

101920A Nov

FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER

MARSHAL BADOLIO HAS INFORMED ME THAT THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING HIS PROMISE GIVEN LATE LAST NIGHT TO HAVE THE NAVAL AMENDMENTS SIGNED TODAY PD TO FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PD PD HE STATES HIS POSITION WAS AND REMAINS AS FOLLOWS CLN QUOTE I ASKED GENERAL MACFARLANE TO PRESENT TO GENERAL EISENHOWER CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE NAVAL AGREEMENT WHICH I HOPE GENERAL EISENHOWER WILL AUTHORIZE PD IN EVENT HE IS UNABLE TO DO SO HIMSELF AND FEELS THAT THE AMENDMENTS MUST BE SIGNED WITHOUT DELAY CMA I AM PREPARED TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY SIGNATURES PD IN THE LATTER CASE CMA HOWEVER CMA I WILL SIGN ONLY IF GENERAL EISENHOWER WILL PROMISE ME TO INTERVENE WITH THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE MY PROPOSAL ACCEPTED PD UNQUOTE PARA FOLLOWING THIS STATEMENT MARSHAL BADOLIO MADE A MOST EARNEST PRESENTATION OF THE COMPLETE COOPERATION HE HAD PUT FORTH AND OF THE COOPERATIVE EFFORT THE ITALIAN NAVY HAD RENDERED PD HE ENDED WITH EXPRESSIONS OF IMPLIED REGRET THAT THE TERMS OF THE NAVAL AMENDMENTS WERE AS SUBMITTED FOR SIGNATURE

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR  
Brigadier General, USA

1070

INCOMING

CONTROL COMMISSION

SECRET

28/11

URGENT

9545

FREEDOM

111455A Nov

FATIMA

111847A

Can you cable text of Badoglio's amendment as referred to in paragraph 3 ? (TO  
FATIMA SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FMGB REFERENCE YOUR 254 OF 9 NOVEMBER) These  
have not been received.

1068



OUTGOING

SECRET

18/13

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

922

FATIMA

132106A Nov

FREEDOM

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT REFERRED TO IN YOUR NUMBER NINE NINE FIVE FOUR FIVE DATED  
ELEVEN NOVEMBER PD TO FREEDOM CITE PHNGS FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PD

NOTE: Italian text is reproduced elsewhere in this file -  
see papers attached to letter to General Taylor of  
10 November from Flag Officer Liaison, Italy. (Taranto).

CONTROL COMMISSION

## OUTGOING

SECRET

NOT GIVEN

PRIORITY

8/15

FATIMA

151129A Nov

FREEDOM

151450A

Mason Macfarlane's number 854 referenced reporting the objection of Badoglio and the Minister of Marine to the amendments to the Cunningham agreement, the position of the Italians is understood here and the situation is as follows. (PERSONAL FOR GENERAL JOYCE FROM CINC).

I cannot in honesty recommend to my Governments the acceptance of Badoglio's proposed revision of the disputed paragraph in the Cunningham agreement as I am certain that Badoglio's wording would not be acceptable. At Malta I was willing and ready to recommend changes in the long term Armistice because I felt reasonably sure that my recommendations would be accepted by my two governments.

The British and American Governments have agreed to the modification proposed by the Italian in the long term document, but to clarify and define their position and rights with respect to the Italian Navy, and Merchant Marine, have demanded an additional statement in the Cunningham agreement asserting the right of the United Nations to make such disposition of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. The Cunningham agreement should be looked upon as an instrument that sets forth in some detail an important way in which the Italian Government can effectively contribute to the winning of the war under the acknowledged right



of the United Nations to specify the ways in which Italian collaboration can be most efficiently rendered. If Badoglio cannot accept this Quid Pro Quo, then the long term document as signed at Malta must stand as originally written without modification, thus affirming the unconditional surrender of the Italian ground, Air and Naval forces. The Cunningham agreement, which has not yet been signed, then becomes an Ad Hoc working arrangement subject to variation as we desire.

I fully appreciate Badoglio's difficulties but I will not hold out to him promises and hopes which I feel I could not possibly fulfill. He undoubtedly has a hard choice to make but only through trusting implicitly in the good faith of the United Nations can he help Italy earn her way to a respected position in the family of nations.

OUTGOING

SECRET

5

URGENT

966

FATIMA

161312A Nov

FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR  
personal for EISENHOWER

I PRESENTED YOUR REQUIREMENTS RE AMENDED NAVAL AGREEMENT TO PADOGGIO THIS  
MORNING HAREN TO FREEDOM RPTD AFHQ ADVANCE COMMAND POST AT AMILCAR PERSONAL  
FOR EISENHOWER FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE HAREN AND HE AGREED TO SIGNATURE  
AT ONE ONE THREE ZERO TOMORROW MORNING TO I SHALL COMPLETE ARRANGEMENTS AND  
HAND HIM SIGNED COPY OF PROTOCOL AMENDMENT TO LONG TERMS WHEN NAVAL AGREEMENT  
SIGNED

AUTHENTICATED:

KENYON A. JOYCE  
Major General, U.S.A.  
Deputy President

1065



HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 519

16 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Eisenhower.

I called on Marshal Badoglio this morning, and, based on your message to me, made a presentation of the situation relating to signing of the amended naval agreement. I caused an accurate interpretation to be made to the Marshal passage by passage so that he would have an exact statement.

When I finished the Marshal, who was plainly moved, asked if he might speak. He then stated in effect that he had already put in writing how he thought the allied naval demands should be changed, but that he was now aware this could not be acceded to and that as Italy was a conquered country all he could do was sign. He went on to say that he was forced to state that his sense of justice was "sorely hurt" at the proceeding; that the naval agreement had been negotiated by Admiral Cunningham and Admiral De Courten and that he had believed the agreement reached was final. He stated that it had been his understanding that the agreements arrived at (original surrender terms and naval agreement) would be applied strictly or modified in favor of Italy in accordance with the help Italy gave to the war effort. That he had declared war on Germany and had cooperated fully and loyally in the use of their armed forces and that now in the status of a co-belligerent he found the Allies imposing more stringent terms. That in reality this imposition of harsh terms had now occurred in two instances. He ended by repeating the statement that as leader of a conquered country he, of course, had no alternative except to sign, but that he hoped when history was written it would accurately record his position and his actions.

Badoglio then said that he had great regard for you as a soldier and a realist and that he hoped that you would try to see that the modifications which he had asked for would be applied in practice. He said that he was not asking for any promise from you or for any answer. He merely hoped that you would do what you could to see that in recompense for the loyal efforts of Italy you would lead subsequent events toward amelioration rather than toward other terms that were hard for him to meet.

After the interchange relative to the naval terms Badoglio turned the conversation to a discussion of the new ministers and under-secretaries.



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After the interchange relative to the naval terms Badoglio turned the conversation to a discussion of the new ministers and under-secretaries he was designating, and on my suggestion at the end of our conversation, we agreed on 11:30 tomorrow, November 17, as the time for the signing of the Cunningham Agreement as amended.

KENYON A. JOYCE  
Major General, U.S.A.  
Deputy President

1067



HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Office of the Deputy President

16 November 1943

Dear Ike,

I have put down formally in the attached memorandum what took place with Badoglio today.

Between you and me, the old Marshal was deeply stirred although he controlled himself as a soldier would. In my presentation to him I was as direct and cold as the situation required, but I naturally felt sorry for him. However, as we know, there was but one answer to the whole thing.

Incidentally, I was perfectly delighted to get your fine, straight message which presented your stand so clearly, and I was further delighted that the thing was handled here without reference to the Allied Governments.

I believe I have squared away to a fair start. It was actually at my suggestion that Badoglio held his press conference at which he announced what the intention of their government was relative to bringing together such ministers as they could in the freed part of Italy to carry on until Rome was reached. I believe he is absolutely sincere in saying he will withdraw just as soon as he can turn over direction to political figures. He has told me personally that, being a soldier, the political phases of his burden are most distasteful to him and that he looks forward to the time when he can pass on his burden.

He sent his ministers and the newly designated under-secretaries to my headquarters where I received them and discussed matters at some length. From what I have been able to learn so far, none has a "Nazi" taint.

Badoglio is most anxious to get away from here as there are absolutely no accommodations for his government in Brindisi. About a week ago we discussed the possibilities of moving to the general Naples area, Badoglio suggesting Salerno or Sorrento. This move is desired by me, of course, just as much as it is by Badoglio because I have never seen a more unsuitable, restricted layout for any sizeable activity than this shabby, old, dock-front hotel.

As a result of my talk with Badoglio, and in accordance with a message from your headquarters suggesting the area of Sorrento, I sent a reconnaissance party headed by McSherry on our side and representation on the Italian side to look over Salerno. There are material handicaps there due to battle

I have put down formally in the attached memorandum what took place with Badoglio today.

Between you and me, the old Marshal was deeply stirred although he controlled himself as a soldier would. In my presentation to him I was as direct and cold as the situation required, but I naturally felt sorry for him. However, as we know, there was but one answer to the whole thing.

Incidentally, I was perfectly delighted to get your fine, straight message which presented your stand so clearly, and I was further delighted that the thing was handled here without reference to the Allied Governments.

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or four weeks. It will be necessary, however, to get certain clearances and priorities at Salerno if this is done. Because I was not satisfied with the information I received relative to the availability of space at Salerno, I am sending Taylor and two others tomorrow to make a final check-up on both Salerno and Sorrento. For this, I am having McSherry come over from Palermo and I hope that the results this time will enable me to make some specific recommendations and requests. When these go forward, I hope you will give directions which will cause them to be put into effect in order that we may go as soon as possible. I might add that the matter of turning territory back to the Italians must be predicated on their ability to function with a central government, which ability they certainly do not have here. Also, the Commission has to be adequately provided for to do its part. If we can accomplish this move, I believe we shall then be able to negotiate the turning over of Sardinia, Sicily and Region 2 in Southern Italy without delay, should this be in accordance with your wishes.

Thanks a lot for sending that anniversary message to Helen. We always have a bottle of champagne on November 15th, but this year I did not even have access to a cable office, let alone a florist.

As a personal matter, I wish you would send me a horse - but, on second thought, I don't know when I'd be able to ride it as I have been keeping some swell hours -- 8:00 A. M. to 12:00 midnight. C'est la Guerre!

Yours ever,

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Yours ever,

1062



ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 512

17 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, Marshal Badoglio.

I have been informed by General Eisenhower that he cannot recommend to the Allied Governments the acceptance of your proposed revision to the amended Naval Agreement because he is convinced that such revision would not be acceptable to them.

It is stated that the Allied Governments have agreed to the modification proposed by the Italian Government in the Long Terms of Surrender, but to clarify and define their position and rights with respect to the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine they have demanded an additional statement in the Naval Agreement asserting the right of the United Nations to make such disposition of any or all Italian ships as they see fit. The amended Naval Agreement must be looked upon as an instrument which sets forth in some detail an important way in which the Italian Government can effectively contribute to the winning of the war in acknowledging the right of the United Nations to specify the ways in which Italian collaboration can be most effectively rendered.

It is further stated that if the Italian Government cannot accept the amended Naval Terms as submitted, the Instrument of Surrender as signed at Malta must stand as originally written without modification, thus affirming the unconditional surrender of the Italian Ground, Air and Naval Forces. The Naval Terms which have not yet been signed then automatically become a working arrangement subject to such variations as the United Nations desire.

KENNETH A. JOYCE  
Major General, U.S.A.  
Deputy President

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KENYON A. JOYCE  
Major General, U.S.A.  
Deputy President



OUTGOING

SECRET

7/17

XXX URGENT

985

PATIMA

1714454 Nov

FREEDOM rptd AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR  
PERSONAL FOR EISENHOWER

THE AMENDED CUNNINGHAM AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED AT NOON TODAY ONE SEVEN NOVEMBER WITHOUT INCIDENT PD TO FREEDOM RPTD AFHQ ADVANCE COMMAND POST AT AMILCAR PERSONAL FOR EISENHOWER FROM PATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PD THERE HAD BEEN SPECULATION ON WHETHER ADMIRAL DE COURTEN WOULD OR WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT RESIGN PD HE DID NOT REPEAT NOT DO SO BUT HE SUBMITTED A STATEMENT REITERATING THE ITALIAN POSITION WITH THE REQUEST THAT IT BE FORWARDED PD AS TO BADOGLIO'S REACTION TO THE REQUIRED SIGNING PLEASE REFER TO MY LETTER WHICH I DESPATCHED TO YOU BY DIRECT PLANE THIS MORNING PD I AM SENDING SIGNED DOCUMENT AND DE COURTEN STATEMENT BY OFFICER COURIER

AUTHENTICATED:

KENYON A. JOYCE  
Major General, U.S.A.  
Deputy President



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