

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

10000/100/78

USE & DISPOSITION OF ITALIAN
ARMED FORCES, ARMY
SEPT. - NOV. 1943

10501

BIGOT
SECRET

3 September 1943

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AIDE MEMOIRE

Page One.

1. This aide memoire enumerates the points which it has been agreed that the Italian Government will do everything possible to accomplish prior to the proclamation of an Armistice between the Italian Forces and those of the Allied, and other points on which action is to be taken subsequent to the proclamation.

2. From the hour that the Armistice instrument comes into force until its proclamation:

(a) Take all possible measures to safeguard ALLIED prisoners of war. If GERMAN pressure to hand them over becomes too great they should if possible be released and succored by the people.

(b) NO ITALIAN warships are to be allowed to fall into GERMAN hands. Arrangements must be made to insure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, immediately on declaration of Armistice. ITALIAN submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would be a revealing measure.

(c) No merchant shipping is to be allowed to fall into GERMAN hands. Merchant shipping in Northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports South of the Line VENICE - LECORNE. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

(d) GERMAN Forces should not be allowed to take over ITALIAN coast defenses.

(e) Arrangements are to be made to be put in force at the proper time for ITALIAN organizations in the BALKANS to march to the coast, with a view to their being taken off to ITALY by the UNITED NATIONS.

3. For the defense of ROME, in which one Allied Airborne Division (probably reinforced) is to participate, detailed plans will be completed and all preliminary preparations made, including the following:

(a) Three key airfields in the vicinity of ROME to be effectively secured

(b) Preparatory moves will be taken to insure that all avenues to ROME can be seized and blocked with the least delay.

(c) Agreed navigational aids for the ALLIED troop-carrying aircraft will be established.

(d) Full measures will be taken to insure that anti-aircraft fire is not opened on the troop-carrying aircraft. As far as possible

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- (c) Agreed navigational aids for the ALLIED troop-carrying aircraft will be established.
- (d) Full measures will be taken to insure that anti-aircraft fire is not opened on the troop-carrying aircraft. As far as possible neutralize GERMAN RIF stations.
- (e) Arrangements will be made for contact between Commander and Staff, immediately the division lands.
- (f) Arrangements will be made for provision of all supplies required by the airborne division, exclusive of ammunition (food, trucks, possibly some medical assistance).
- (g) Fighter groups selected by the ITALIAN air force to be retained to assist in defense of ROME.

4. Anticipating the need for lengthy communications which cannot be handled by the present link, arrangements will be made for a rendez-vous as required at times and places to be designated by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, and with recognition signals. Written messages

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Page Two.

in code will be exchanged for onward transmission by hand of officer courier.

5. PROCLAMATION

At 1830 hours ROME time (1830 B hrs) of X day (X day will be communicated later but only a few hours in advance) following immediately after the announcement of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Force of the conclusion of an Armistice, which announcement will begin at 1815 hours ROME time, Marshal BADOLLO will proclaim the Armistice by every available means of public dissemination, by radio broadcast, by announcement to the press and foreign diplomatic corps, and by telephone and teletype to all agencies of the ITALIAN Government and the ITALIAN Armed Forces. Included in this proclamation will be orders to the ITALIAN Armed Forces and people to cease all forms of resistance to the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS. At the same time instructions will be issued to resist and obstruct the operations of the GERMAN Forces in every possible way as long as they remain on ITALIAN soil.

6. POST-PROCLAMATION MEASURES:

From and after 1830 hours ROME time (1830 B hrs) X day the following measures are to be put in train, as rapidly as practicable:

- (a) A ceasing of work by all personnel engaged in occupations which facilitate the maintenance, movement and/or operations of the GERMAN Armed Forces.
- (b) So far as possible, the paralysis of all movement of GERMAN Forces throughout ITALY, especially in areas mentioned in sub-paragraph 'd' below, by the following means:
 - (1) By direct attacks on Headquarters and Command Posts of GERMAN military organizations.
 - (2) Cutting of GERMAN communications (telephone and telegraph, road and rail).
 - (3) Destruction by sabotage or other means of enemy motor transport.
 - (4) Ambushing Staff cars, dispatch riders and transport movement generally.
 - (c) The destruction of GERMAN aircraft, stores of petrol, oil, ammunition, etc, especially in areas mentioned in sub-paragraph 'd' and around FOGGIA.
 - (d) (1) ROME area
 - (a) The seizure of all communications running through the outskirts of the city to prevent the Germans occupying it or moving through it.
 - (b) Direct attack on GERMAN Headquarters at FRASCATI.
 - (c) Air defense of city.

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(c) Air defense of city.

(2) SPEZZIA Area

Maximum cover for the departure of the fleet.

(3) Between ROME and NAPLES

Interfere as much as possible with movement of GERMAN divisions located between ROME and NAPLES.

(4) NAPLES

Prevent destruction of port and shipping and hold port area if possible.

(5) TARANTO

Seize and hold port for entrance of UNITED NATIONS Forces.

(6) BARI and BRINDISI/.....

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Page Three

(6) BARI and BRINDISI

Same as TARANTO, but with priority to TARANTO

(7) CALABRIA.

Cut off GERMAN Forces in the TOE of ITALY by blocking road and rail communications.

1433

M.O.S.T. S.E.C.R.E.T. T.E.L.E.G.R.A.M.

TO:- C. in C. Med. (Personal)

FROM:- F.O."Z"

EMERGENCY.

1. MY 121946. Received with ceremony and marked courtesy. Declined BADOGGIO'S invitation to lunch.
2. Spent half hour with Minister of Marine making following points:
 - (a) Your satisfaction at manner in which Italian Navy carried out terms of armistice.
 - (b) German submarines at POIA.
 - (c) Italian ships in Spanish waters.
 - (d) Necessity for Italians to fight at once against Germans.
3. Para 2 (b). All communications out to POIA. Minister of Marine promised to make every effort to send by air orders for destruction of U-boats.

Para 2 (c). No communication with Italian ambassador Madrid. I promised to pass a message to Madrid which he is sending to me.

Para 2 (d). Minister of Marine in complete agreement and anxious to have Italian men-of-war to operate.
4. Minister of Marine asked:
 - (a) What instructions had been issued for disarming Italian men-of-war.
 - (b) Names of Italian men-of-war in Spanish waters.
 - (c) Our policy regarding requisitioning Italian merchant vessels. I told him I would obtain this information for him.
5. In company with Minister of Marine I saw Marshall BADOGGIO and repeated with emphasis the points made in para 2. Marshall BADOGGIO informed me.
 - (a) That Germans had set up a puppet Italian Government in the North and he could not say whether Italian ambassador Madrid recognised Northern or BADOGGIO Government but he assured me I should receive a message to transmit to Madrid.
 - (b) That ROOSEVELT CHURCHILL message would be broadcast today in Italian from EARI with Italian King's approval. He gave me a reply to ROOSEVELT CHURCHILL message to transmit to senders.
 - (c) As regards kicking Germans out of Italy the Marshall evinced every desire to do so, Italians fighting with Allies.
6. I believe both Marshall and Minister of Marine have every desire to lead Italian Forces against Germans in Italy but they have insufficient confidence in their following until there is greater evidence of Allied strength in Italy.

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6. I believe both Marshall and Minister of Marine have every desire to lead Italian Forces against Germans in Italy but they have insufficient confidence in their following until there is greater evidence of Allied strength in Italy.

* Have completed arrangements to visit Marshall BADOGLIO at Brindisi.

13th September 1943.

Original. Brindisi Diary, Vol 1, 7th 3.

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M.O.S.T. S.E.C.R.E.T. T.E.L.E.G.R.A.M.

TO- C. in C. Med.

FROM: F.O."Z"

EMERGENCY

Following received from Head of Italian Government begins:-

TO. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the U.S.A. and
WINSTON CHURCHILL, Prime Minister of Great Britain.

I thank you most warmly for the message which you, who direct the destinies of such great Nations, have been pleased to send me, in these hours so tragic for my country.

I place secure trust in your affirmation that the Anglo-American Armed Forces who have already disembarked at various points on the Italian Continent, will continue to pour in as numerous and as eager to help, as the situation so imperiously demands.

Our own armed forces, already tested and scattered in Italy and still more, outside Italy, cannot possibly unite and validly oppose, alone, the German forces. But everything that is possible is being and will be done with that same spirit and with that same tenacity which we displayed together on the battlefields of Italy and France during the last Great War.

I can assure you that the Italian people closely united around their King, and longing at the cost of any sacrifice whatsoever to achieve liberty and a peace with justice, will not fail manfully to carry out on this occasion their duty - their whole duty. We are not lacking in faith, and we will march with you, our American and British friends

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(signed) Marshall BADOLLO.

Benito's diary VI I 9th?

FPP

AIDE-MEMOIRE for GENERAL MACFARLANE

No 2

It happened that Anglo-american troops take directly possess of our military and civilian motor-cars, oils and petrols, leaving receipt and promising to give them back.

This is more than, being asked and with great sacrifice on our side, we have already given to the new Basis of Taranto.

If we go on with this system Italian troops will loose every possibility of operating. It is therefore necessary that Anglo-american forces ask regularly what they temporary need.

September the 15 th 1943.-

Bonidier Diary. Vol. 1. Folio 10

15 September 1943.

RECONSTITUTION OF ITALIAN UNITS

(Translation)

1) Since it is impossible to produce Italian ammunition in Southern Italy, it is not possible to determine the number of units which can be reconstituted, unless we know how many and what munitions there are in Libya, Tunisia, Sicily and Calabria.

The first thing, therefore, to do is to authorize us to make an inventory, urgently, of such munitions, and to put them at our disposal.

2) We ask the same for German ammunition and arms which are in the same area, and in general for all the Ital - German material which still remains there

3) On the basis, approximately decided, of the above mentioned things available, and of the clothing and equipment available in Southern Italy and of that which the Anglo - Americans can supply us with, it will be possible to determine the number of units to be reconstituted as well as the program of reconstitution.

4) As for personnel, both Officers and men, we consider it convenient to utilize especially the prisoners of war in Libya and Tunisia, belonging (as far as the men are concerned) to central and Northern Italy. As far as Officers are concerned, above all, we should like those of the General Staff, and those who are career officers, especially those of a lower rank.

Naturally, for moral reasons, a certain proportion of prisoners of other categories and from other regions should be returned.

5) In the same way prisoners from Central and Northern Italy, at present or ultimately in Sicily and Calabria, should be put at our disposal.

(Presumably from
Italian Supreme Command)

(British Diary. Vol. 1. Folio 14)

1430

Most urgent NOTE No 5.

IN THE ISLAND OF CEFALONIA
(Translation)

15/16 Sep 43

A battle has started between Italians and Germans for the possession of the island and therefore of the bay of Argostoli.

The Germans are using numerous Stukas; it is a matter of great urgency to have the support of the Allied Air Force on behalf of the land troops or also that Allied troops should be sent to their assistance as quickly as possible on warships.

The possession of the bay of Argostoli is of the greatest importance for the British Navy.

(Presumably from Italian Supreme Command)

Quindici. Diary. Vol 1. Feb. 15.

NOTE No 7.

TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MISSION
(Translation)

16 Sep 43

We ask you to authorise urgently the sending of a torpedo boat to Argostoli to help the garrison which is fighting against the Germans.

A torpedo boat and a hospital ship to Cattaro to embark numerous wounded.

A merchant ship with an escort to Corfu to bring to Italy 400 German prisoners, who would be consigned to the English, as well as the German Consul at Corfu and his wife.

We take this opportunity of representing to you the necessity of having a general authorisation for the urgent employment of light craft in Italian ports, for necessities of the kind referred to above, which occur from time to time.

(Presumably from Italian Supreme Command)

Brindisi Diary Vol 1. Folio 17.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

TO : AFHQ

Ref 003

DATE : 17 September 1943

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

I HAVE SEEN A FURTHER URGENT REQUEST FOR HELP TO BE GIVEN TO ITALIAN TROOPS IN
CEFALONIA. THEY ARE SAID TO BE UNDER HEAVY ATTACK FROM NUMEROUS STUKAS.
ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HOLDING THE ISLAND.

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NOTE N. 22

19 - 9 1943

(Follows note n. 5)

Command garrison Cefalonia urgently requests help naval and aerial means to check movement of Germans who transport personnel ~~in~~ the island.

Should the Allied Command wish to keep the island, help must be sent immediately to the garrison; if not the necessary shipping must be organized to evacuate the troops from the island when resistance will no longer be possible.

/s/ (?)

Brindisi Diary Vol 1. Fol. 46

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET

16 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ, Tunis.

1. Yesterday I had a long talk with General Roatta, Chief of Staff. Later on I saw General Ambrosio with General Roatta and finally Marshall Badoglio with Mr Macmillan and Mr Murphy.

2. I telegraphed you yesterday the situation regarding Italian troops in this area which is as follows;

Headquarters 7th Army (General Arisio) at Francavilla.
Headquarters 9th Corps (General Lerici) at Bari.
Headquarters 51st Corps (General DeStefani) at Brindisi.
Headquarters 31st Corps (General Mercelli) at Calabria.

3. 9 Corps is static and contains only coastal troops. (I have asked Airborne Division to send a platoon to Bari to guard the all important wireless station against sabotage or raid).

a. 51st Corps is supposed to be mobile. In point of fact, it is far removed from being so. It consists of the Legnano Division in the Brindisi Area. This division is now practically up to strength. Also the Piacenza Division in the Francavilla Area which with the approval of GOC Airborne Division is moving to an area about ten miles north of Francavilla as soon as possible.

b. 31st Corps comprises the Mantova Mobile Division which has had most of its transportation removed by the Germans. There are also some immobile coastal formations under command of this Corps.

c. There are also in Calabria three independent battalions of apparently fairly high Italian standard. These are one battalion (Mambo) paratroops and two battalions (815 and 816 AS).

4. The Italian High Command are most anxious to move these three battalions to the Taranto Area. They are also anxious to move the Mantova Division from Crotona by sea to Taranto to join up with 51st Corps.

5. They wish to produce a Corps (51st) on our right flank to operate on our right side up the eastern coastal sector.

6. I informed them that I would pass on their requests as also their request that we should stiffen up these defenses with either tanks or at least carriers.

Brindisi Day Unit Folio 11a

SECRET

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7. I have naturally stressed very strongly that no movements or operations can be undertaken by them except under the orders of the Allied Commander on the spot. This they fully realized.

8. The Command of all the troops in the heel of Italy Area is vested in the 7th Italian Army. I have arranged for the liaison officers to be exchanged between this Headquarters and Headquarters our 5th Corps and No. 6 Base Sub Area, Taranto.

9. At the request of Commander, Airborne Division I have asked the Italian High Command to attach three groups of Italian Field Artillery to the Airborne Division. They have promised to comply as far as mobility permits.

10. The Italian High Command also wish their four mobile divisions to return from Sardinia to Southern Italy. I told them there was very little chance of this at the moment.

11. The ammunition situation of the Italian forces in Southern Italy may be rather better than they told me the day before yesterday. It appears that their used-to-be considerable stocks in the Area Brindisi-Bari which have been considerably depleted but there may be appreciable amounts left. I ought to have the fitters tomorrow.

? figures
12. As regards the suggestion that we should collect and forward to Italy stocks of ammunition captured by us in North Africa and Sicily. The Italian High Command request that they should be allowed to send some technical experts to help in sorting out what they most require. I told them that if we were able to comply with the request for ammunition we would certainly accept their suggestion regarding technical assistance. As regards reconstituting the Italian Army the High Command state that there would be little difficulty in producing men and that it was almost entirely a question of armament and munitions. They made two suggestions:

a. That we might be able to let them have captured German weapons and ammunition. I held out little hope on this point.

b. That we should let them have some of the prisoners we have taken and in the first instance certain officers (staff) of whom they were badly in need

13. I had to listen to a long dissertation on the strategical situation by Ambrosio. His principal point was that by a frontal advance from south to north through Italy we were in fact playing the enemy's game and that it was clearly indicated that we ought to make a landing in force on the eastern coast north of Rimini or at any rate far enough north to cut off the Germans in the centre and south of Italy. Ambrosio was anxious that we should use Bari as soon as possible as a port of disembarkation. Ambrosio described an advance to be rough line Foggia - Naples as a small maneuver with a very limited object.

SECRET

SECRET

14. I listened patiently to his dissertation and said that I thought that in the absence of knowledge of most of the factors involved it was a *good* academic effort.

15. Ambrosio stressed the point that Italy was now determined to fight to a finish and that the Italian forces would continue to fight even after Italy had been liberated. I said all the right things.

16. I spoke very straight to Ambrosio and Roatta on the following lines. I said that the apparently classy way in which they were writing off practically all of the Italian Army but not in liberated territory made no sense at all. It was in fact utterly contrary to the spirit in which I imagined them to be cooperated. I told them that they must by every possible means keep these formations fighting and as far as possible direct their action. Bari radio ought to be in full blast all the 24 hours with encouragement and directives to their isolated forces and the civil population. I said I would try to produce some wireless sets to send out to such formations as were still making a fight and with which they had at the moment no communication. ((propose if you agree to use some of the six SOG sets which I am expecting for this purpose)).

17. I also again stressed the extreme importance of organising sabotage and propaganda on the most intensive scale as early as possible. I said that I hoped to produce in the near future a strong SOE and PVE team and that I was counting upon the Italian authorities to cooperate with this team to the maximum extent.

18. Ambrosio appeared to realize very fully that I was insisting on him and his staff waking up and getting a real move on and he assured me that he would go flat out on all the points I had made.

Lieutenant General
Head of Mission.

SECRET

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

DATE : 16 September 1943

TO : CINC A.F.H.Q.

PREC : IMMEDIATE

REF. NO.

CLASS: SECRET.

MSG NO. 11

FOR CINC FROM MACFARLANE

ITALIAN NINTH CORPS COMMANDING ONLY STATIC COASTAL TROOPS HAS MOVED
FIVE
TO BARI PD/ONE CORPS NOW IN BRINDISI COMMANDS LEGNANO DIVISION
AROUND BRINDISI AND PICENO DIVISION IN FRANCAVILLA AREA PD WITH CONSENT
COMMANDER AIRBORNE DIVISION PICENO DIVISION IS MOVING A SHORT DISTANCE
TO THE NORTH PD ITALIANS WISH TO MOVE MANTOVA DIVISION FROM CROTONE
AREA TO TARANTO TO JOIN NINTH CORPS PD THEY WISH TO FORM A MOBILE CORPS
OF THREE DIVISIONS TO OPERATE UP THE COAST ON OUR RIGHT PD APPARENTLY
ITALIAN THIRTY ONE CORPS IN CALABRIA WILL BE LEFT WITH ONLY COASTAL TROOPS
PD ITALIANS HAVE PROMISED TO PROVIDE SOME ARTILLERY FOR AIRBORNE DIVISION
PD DON'T KNOW YET HOW MUCH PD ITALIAN AMMUNITION SITUATION MAY BE RATHER
BETTER THAN REPORTED YESTERDAY PD I WILL KNOW MORE ABOUT THIS TOMORROW

MACFARLANE

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

TO : A.F.H.Q.

REF NO. M 102

MGS NO. 17

DATE : 16 September 1943

PREC :

CLASS: SECRET

In response to request for 3,000 soldiers for work in the Taranto Docks and for 300 lorries, Italians are providing about 2,000 soldiers and 1,000 civilians but only 50 lorries. please inform MacMillan.

Macfarlane

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1943

TO : FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 013

PREC IMPORTANT

YOUR NUMBER TEN THROUGH MASSINGHAM.

HAVE BEEN CHASING ITALIANS ON QUESTION OF ASSISTANCE IN TARANTO PORT
FOR LAST THREE DAYS. SITUATION HAS IMPROVED AND IF ITALIANS FULFIL
THEIR PROMISES IT SHOULD BE VERY MUCH BETTER. SIGNED MACFARLANE,
I MADE ALL ARRANGEMENTS TO RECEIVE DUKE AOSTA THREE DAYS AGO.

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SUPREME COMMAND OPERATIONS SECTION
(Translation)

16 September 43.

MEMO No 6.

SUBJECT : - Operations in the Aegean.

The Germans troops in the RODI area have a total strength equivalent to 5 battalions partly motorised and partly armoured; a portion of these troops is certainly detailed for the surveillance of Italian troops; the coastal defense is most efficacious; the aerodrome of CATTAVIA can be reduced in a very short time.

Nevertheless it would be opportune to organise a landing in the central part of the island overcoming the troops of Cyprus and of the EAST. It is unlikely that the future will present such a favourable opportunity to reconquer the island, whose possession is of fundamental importance for eventual operations in the Aegean.

Principles diary, Vol 1, FSR 16.

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SUPREME COMMAND OPERATIONS SECTION
(Translation)

MEMO No. 8.

16 September 43.

In order to prevent the transfer from SARDINIA to
CORSICA of German troops it would be opportune (since it is
impossible to allot Italian Naval force to the straits of
BONIFACIO) to provide adequate Allied Air forces for distribu-
tion on the following aerodromes which are at present in
working order:-

AECHEIRO.
BORORE.
ORISTANO
ZEPPERA
DECIMO.

We can later indicate other aerodromes on which
repairs are at present in progress.

Buindisi Diary Vol 1. Entry 18.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

TO : A.F.H.Q.

REF NO. M 104

MSG NO 20

DATE: 16 September 1943

PREC: IMPORTANT

CLASS: SECRET

Italian S. 82 arrived here from Sardinia today. (.) Reports Island clear of Germans except extreme North in area of Olbia to Palau (.) German evacuation from that area continues (.) American liaison party arrived by parachute and then taken to Italian HQ where it is now functioning (.) Germans have destroyed all stocks and rendered unserviceable airfields occupied by them (.) Italians in anticipation of Allied landings are repairing airfields in South (.) ~~suggest this~~ Decimomannu fit for use (.) Italians have requested permission to run a courier service every two days from Brindisi to Decimomannu (.) Suggest that this might be sanctioned by route Taranto-Catania-Palermo-Sardinia (.) Landings on outward and inward journeys at Palermo for check and information purposes would be advisable (.) Request early instructions on this point (.) Italian General Staff report airdromes at Alghero and Borore and Oristano and Zeppera also fit for use and urge air action against German Troops moving from Sardinia to Corsica.

MACFARIANE

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HIGH COMMAND OPERATIONS SECTION
(Translation)

P.M. 167. 16 September 43.

NOTE No. 9.

In execution of the conditions of the Armistice, among other units, the steamer "COSTANTE C" has also sailed to Malta.

This ship had the following cargo:-

- 1000 Barrels of Petrol.
- 410 Tons of Food Supplies.
- 5 Tons of Sanitary (Medical) Material.
- 2 Tons of Transport Material.

As we are concerned with material which is badly needed at this moment, and on which we count a great deal at the moment, it would be desirable that the said steamer should return, with it's cargo, to an Italian port.

British Diary Vol I FSh 19

NOTE N. 19

COMANDO SUPREMO
OPERATION OFFICE

P.M. 21, September 19th 1943

Following note n. 9 we communicate that between the 10 and 12 of this month, besides the steamer "Costante C", the following others have been sent from Bari to Malta:

- Steamer	PELAGOSA	- with fodder and oats
- "	RINUCCI	- " 1067 tons of <u>food</u> and various material
- "	APUANIA	- with 70 tons of <u>frozen meat</u>
- "	MONTEBELLO	- " 354 tons of <u>food</u> and various materials
- "	LUANA	- with 700 tons of <u>ammunitions</u> and <u>food</u>

Considering the precarious logistical situation of the troops scattered in Puglia and Calabria, it would be most important to get back these steamers, or at least part of the material they were loaded with.

The question is of particular interest for food and ammunitions.

/s/ (?)

Benidini diary Vol 1. Folio 45

1415

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

TO : AFHQ

REF. NO.

MGS NO. 12

? Sept-
DATE: 16 August 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: IMMEDIATE

Italians inform me that Italian 31 Corps report that commander 13 Corps has forbidden use of telephone to Italian troops and has put two Italian Divisional Commander in a concentration camp. Please give me some explanation earliest possible. If the story is true no doubt they deserved it but it makes things a bit difficult here.

Glad to receive your No 101. Am writing (?) again by MacMillan who returns Tunis on 16th.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

TO : FREEDOM

REF. NO. 018

Sep
DATE: 190925B 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC

~~XXXXXXXX~~

ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND HAVE REGISTERED THEIR REGRET THAT COMMANDER
BRITISH ONE THREE CORPS HAS FORBIDDEN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THREE
ONE ITALIAN CORPS AND SEVEN ITALIAN ARMY. SIGNED MACFARLANE.
ALSO THAT ITALIAN THREE ONE CORPS HAS BEEN ORDERED TO CATANZARO
TO REORGANISE THE AREA. I REPLIED THAT THESE MEASURES WERE
DOUBTLESS OPERATIONALLY NECESSARY AND THAT IT THE MEANTIME THEY
MUST BE CARRIED OUT.

AUTHENTICATED.

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1413

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: G-2 FREEDOM

DATE: 17 September 1943

TO : FATMA

CLASS: MOST SECRET

REF. NO. 6011

PREC: PRIORITY

Following from Hitchens. You must ensure rapidest communication
all intelligence reach Italian High Command concerning German military
activities in ROME Northern Italy. Send latest picture German Battle
order in North. Are 18 rpt 18 panzer and 14 rpt 14 motorized divs
cinfirmmed query.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : G-2 FREEDOM

REF. NO. 028

Self
DATE: 191430B 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

YOUR 6011 DATED 17 SEPTEMBER.

ITALIANS HAVE NO INFORMATION GERMAN DISPOSITIONS LATER THAN ORDER
OF BATTLE PROVIDED BY CASTELLANO.

BRIGADIER STRONG, FOORD HAVE ARRIVED AND ARE MEETING COMMANDO SUPREMO
WITH VIEW TO ITALIANS ORGANISING SOME INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

AT PRESENT NONE EXISTS.

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AUTHENTICATED

1411

(Presumably ^{from} ~~the~~ Italian Supreme Command)

Nota 17

18 September 1943

In analogy with what has been arranged for the fleet, authority is requested for the flying of the National Flag on airports also, keeping unchanged the present instructions which regulate it's display.

The question is of capital importance in it's bearing upon morale and disciplinary cohesion of air forces, a cohesion which is entirely in the interests of their collaboration with the Allied Forces.

In view of the need to give our Air Force Headquarters instructions on this point as soon as possible an early reply would be very welcome.

(See *Principi*. Re constituted file No 34).

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : AFHQ CP REPEAT AFHQ

REF. NO. 38

Sep
DATE: 201015B 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: IMPORTANT

I HAVE GIVEN PERMISSION TO ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND TO FLY THE ITALIAN
FLAG ON THE AIRPORTS IN THE SAME WAY AS ITALIAN NAVY HAVE BEEN ALLOWED
TO FLY THEIR FLAGS. IF THIS IS NOT APPROVED LET ME KNOW.

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AUTHENTICATED

1409

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

DATE : 18 September 1943

TO : FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 008

PREC: IMMEDIATE

VISITED COMMANDER SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY WITH COMMANDER BRITISH FIFTH ~~ARMY~~ CORPS
LAST NIGHT. LIAISON WELL ESTABLISHED. SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY APPEAR TO
BE COOPERATING SATISFACTORILY UP TO DATE BUT WE HAVE BIG REQUIREMENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH TARANTO PORT AND IT IS TOO EARLY TO BE CERTAIN. SIGNED
MACFARLANE. POSITION OF COMMANDER FIFTH CORPS FULLY EXPLAINED TO COMMANDER
SEVENTH ARMY AND LATER TO GENERAL ROATTA. BOTH UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT NO
ITALIAN TROOPS CAN MOVE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF COMMANDER FIFTH CORPS
IN THIS AREA.

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AUTHENTICATED

1408

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

DATE: 18 September 1943

TO : FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF.NO. 10

PREC: IMMEDIATE

ITALIAN COMMANDER AT CORFU REPORTS GERMAN FORCES AT GOMENIZZA APPARENTLY
ASSEMBLED TO ATTACK CORFU. EMINENTLY. HE URGENTLY REQUESTS SUPPLIES OF
FOOD AND MEDICAL STORES. ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND AGAIN REQUEST URGENTLY
TO BE ALLOWED TO SEND TORPEDO BOATS SIRIO AND CLIO TO CORFU.

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AUTHENTICATED

1407

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION.

DATE: 18 September 1943

TO : EISENHOWER (PERSONAL)

CLASS: SECRET

REF.NO. 11

PREC: IMPORTANT

OUR POLICY REGARDING PERMITTING ITALIANS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR CORFU
AND OTHER ISLANDS IS APPARENTLY INCONSISTENT. WE ARE ENCOURAGING
ITALIAN AIR FORCE TO DO ALL THEY CAN AND THEY WILL OPERATE. ON THE OTHER
HAND ITALIAN NAVY HAVE BEEN REFUSED PERMISSION TO LEAVE PORT PENDING REPLY
FROM CINC MEDITERRANEAN TO FO TARANTO. PLEASE CLARIFY THIS SITUATION
FOR ME AS IT SEEMS ILLOGICAL.

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4 1 3 3 1 0

AUTHENTICATED.

1406

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM from Eisenhower
cite FHGCT. repeat FREEDOM
and cite Cinc Med. Ref 010, 18/9.
TO: FATIMA for PERSONAL ATTENTION
of General Mason Macferlane

del
DATE: 201520B 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC :

REF NO. RELAY 381/20

Policy is to get Italian Naval Forces to secure points of Strategic
importance. Therefore Italian warships in Italy may be used to
proceed Corfu or elsewhere but insure that Flag Officer Taranto
is fully informed of these instructions and that any special orders
which he may issue are complied with.

NOTE: Delay due to 2 services on this Msg.

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4 1 3 3 1 0

1405

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : FATIMA

DATE: 241020B Sep

TO : AFHQ ADV CP rpt to FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO: 084

PREC :. MOST IMMEDIATE

ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND STATE THAT ITALIAN GARRISON ON CORFU CONSISTS OF ONE EIGHT INFANTRY REGIMENT OF AQUA DIVISION. ABOUT THREE ZERO DASH SEVEN FIVE MILLIMETER GUNS FIELD ARTILLERY AND SOME CARIBINIERI. TOTAL OF ABOVE ABOUT THREE THOUSAND. THESE HAVE BEEN JOINED BY ABOUT THREE THOUSAND ITALIAN TROOPS WHO HAVE ESCAPED FROM ALBANIA WITH ONLY THEIR WEAPONS. THE ONLY ANTI DASH AIRCRAFT IS ONE BATTERY OF EIGHT DASH TWO ZERO MILLIMETER GUNS. NO TANKS. NO ANTI DASH TANK GUNS. LAST NIGHT THE GERMANS LANDED ON THE SOUTHWEST COAST IN THE AREA SOUTH OF LAKE KORISSIO. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS STATE SIX LANDING CRAFT WERE USED AND THAT STUKAS ARE ACTIVE THIS MORNING.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission.

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4 1 3 3 1 0

1404

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 241420Z SEP

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 87

PREC: IMMEDIATE

ISLAND OF CORFU. GERMANS HAVE GOTTEN A FOOTING AND JUDGING BY PRECEDENTS THE CHANCES THAT THE ITALIANS CAN HOLD OUT FOR MORE THAN A SHORT TIME SEEM SMALL. THERE IS UNDOUBTED SCOPE FOR AIR SUPPORT AND ALSO SUPPORT BY NAVAL LIGHT CRAFT. WE ARE ENCOURAGING ITALIANS TO DO THEIR BEST WITH THEIR OWN RESOURCES. AS FAR AS GROUND TROOPS ARE CONCERNED THE TIME IS PROBABLY PASSED WHEN ANYTHING SHORT OF STRONG REINFORCEMENTS OF ALL ARMS WOULD DO ANY GOOD. I ASKED BADOGLIO THIS MORNING WHY HE HAD CHOSEN TO USE THREE VALUABLE MERCHANT SHIPS TO REMOVE DISARMED ITALIAN TROOPS FROM PORT EDDA INSTEAD OF PUTTING REINFORCEMENTS INTO CORFU. HIS REPLY WAS THAT THE ITALIAN COMMAND HAD NOT ANTICIPATED ATTACK ON CORFU FOR SOMETIME. PLEASE INFORM ME WHETHER YOU ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO RETAINING CORFU AND IF SO WHETHER I SHOULD URGE ITALIANS TO REINFORCE THEIR GROUND TROOPS IN THE ISLAND. I HAVE TOLD THEM THAT ALL WE OURSELVES MIGHT MAKE AVAILABLE AT SHORT NOTICE IS ONE BATTALION MARINES AND POSSIBLY SOME LIGHT ANTI DASH AIRCRAFT. PLEASE ^{inform} THE CINC MED REFERENCE MY TALK WITH HIM YESTERDAY. I HAVE HAD TO CANCEL MY INTENTION OF GOING TO CORFU AS THE PORT WHERE WE WERE TO LAND IS APPARENTLY IN GERMAN HANDS AND FIRES HAVE BEEN REPORTED ON THE AERODROME.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE ¹⁴⁰³
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

AP0 512

19 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ.

1. Attached is a memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army with reference to the Italian munitions in Sicily and Calabria.
2. The Allied Mission requests information as to the intention of AFHQ with regard to this subject. If it is expected to make the stocks available to the Italian forces in the near future it appears desirable to acquiesce in their suggestion to send technicians to supervise the assembling and sorting of the stocks in our hands.

For the Chief of Mission;

Maxwell D. Taylor
Brig. Gen. A.U.S.

1 Inclosure
Translation, memo Italian
C/S to Gen Macfarlane.

Brindisi diary Vol I Folio 38

TRANSLATION

18 September 1943

NOTE FOR GENERAL MACFARLANE

The munitions which the divisions of the 51st Corps have amount to three days of fire (1)

In the advance depots on the coast which are in the course of organization there are not many stocks. As the most important depots are in the interior in areas at present controlled by the Germans, we cannot count on finding these in good condition.

To emphasize the importance of getting the Italian munitions from Sicily and Calabria the most useful lots are the following:

Caliber 6.5 mm for automatic rifle
Caliber 8 mm for the Breda machine gun
Caliber 8 mm for the Fiat 35 machine gun
Hand Grenades
81 mm mortar shells and cartridges
20 mm AA shells
Anti-Tank Projectiles 47/32
Projectiles for the 75/18 cannon
Shells for the 100/22 Howitzer
Shells for the 149/19 Howitzer

The underlined items are the most important for the moment.

It will be possible to send qualified Italian officers to the spot (i.e. Sicily and Calabria) to select the munitions and to assure that they are complete.

(1) The Italian day of fire (Unfoc):

Automatic rifles	-	1200 rounds
Machine gun	-	2000 rounds
Light artillery, per gun	-	250 rounds
Medium artillery, per gun	-	150 rounds

Revised diary Vol I Folio 38

Chief of Staff

/s/ Roatta

1401

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA (for Gen Macfarlane)

CITE: FHCOS

JDJD 7074

DATE: 20 September 1943

DATE REC'D: 201000B

Proceed as soon as possible to carryout your recommendation for organisation of Italian Divisions in Calabria, Taranto Areas into an Italian Corps to operate under command of Eighth Army. Probable missions are as you suggest, static defense of L of C, Ports etc. Also will probably be required to perform some labour. Montgomery has been informed.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : FATIMA

TO : AFHQ CP rpt to FREEDOM

REF.NO. 044

Sep
DATE : 21131B

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : IMMEDIATE

EXCAPED JUGOSLAV OFFICER (NAVAL) JUST ARRIVED HERE FROM SPLIT REPORTS
TWO DIVISIONS JUGOSLAV PARTISANS HOLDING SPLIT BEING SERIOUSLY HARRASSED
BY STUKAS FROM MOSTAR, ZAGREB AND ZEMUNIK. FORTRESS AT ENTRANCE TO
KLIS HARBOUR IS ALSO GIVING MUCH TROUBLE. AIR SUPPORT ON ABOVE TARGETS
URGENTLY REQUIRED. HE ALSO REPORTS ONE THREE THOUSAND MEN ALL DISARMED
ITALIAN BERGAMO DIVISION AWAITING SHIPS TO RESCUE THEM. IS THERE ANY
OBJECTION TO PERMITTING ITALIANS TO TAKE AIR AND NAVAL ACTION AS FAR
AS CAN BE ARRANGED QUERY.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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4 1 3 3 1 0

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: Sep 21/48

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 048

PREC: IMPORTANT

GENERAL AMBROSIO AGAIN SUGGESTED THIS MORNING THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING A LANDING ON THE EAST COAST TO PUT THE FORCE OF ABOUT ONE ITALIAN REINFORCED REGIMENT INTO THE ABBUZI HILLS, WHERE THERE ARE MANY ITALIAN SOLDIERS IN HIDING TO SYNCHRONIZE WITH OUR ADVANCE NORTHWARDS WHEN IT TAKES PLACE. I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED THIS PROJECT TO COMMANDER FIVE CORPS.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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413310
413310

1398

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

REF. NO. 59

Sep
DATE: 221804 B

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: IMPORTANT

ITALIAN AUTHORITIES ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE HAVE ISSUED ORDERS
PROHIBITING THE USE OF TELEPHONES BY CIVILIANS IN THE BRINDISI
AND OCCUPIED AREAS EXCEPTING FOR PREFECTS, QUESTORS AND FIRE
BRIGADES. (THIS IS GOOD)

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 240939 B Sep

TO : FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 8744

PREC: ROUTINE

Pending firm operational decisions regarding Sardinia it appears that minimum military and naval forces will be sent to back up air commitments which are likely to be small. Signals policy will be to make every possible use of existing telephone facilities in order reduce outlay signals personnel and equipment to minimum.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: ELTIMA

TO : FREEDOM

REF. NO. 60

Sep
DATE: 222227 B

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

ATTENDED MONTGOMERY'S CONFERENCE AT FIVE HEADQUARTERS TODAY. LATER MET GENERAL ARISIO COMMANDING SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY AND MONTGOMERY EXPLAINED HIS WISHES. ARISIO AGREED IN EVERY RESPECT BUT STATED THAT DECISION RESTED WITH BADOGLIO. HAVE JUST FINISHED A VERY LONG DISCUSSION WITH BADOGLIO AND AMEROSIO. FINALLY SECURED THEIR COMPLETE AGREEMENT TO THE PROPOSALS MADE BY MONTGOMERY. THESE PROPOSALS WITH WHICH MONTGOMERY AND I WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS.

ALL ITALIAN TROOPS IN SOUTHERN ITALY ARE UNDER THE COMMAND OF GENERAL ARISIO WHO IN TURN IS UNDER COMMAND OF GENERAL MONTGOMERY.

ARISIO WILL HAVE UNDER HIM THE THREE ONE ITALIAN CORPS WHICH WILL COMMAND ALL ITALIAN TROOPS IN CALABRIA, ALSO ITALIAN FIVE ONE AND NINE CORPS IN APULIA AND HEEL OF ITALY. THE ITALIANS UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT IN THE MEANTIME THEIR TROOPS WILL BE USED FOR GUARDING LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AIRDROMES, VITAL POINTS, AND WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE LABOUR AND GENERALLY MAKE THEMSELVES USEFUL AS REQUIRED IN REAR AREAS TO BEST HELP THE COMING OPERATIONS.

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4 13310

1395

DETAILS WILL BE ARRANGED BETWEEN SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY AND BRITISH
EIGHT ARMY WHO WILL PROVIDE A SMALL MISSION AT SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY
HEADQUARTERS.

BADOGGIO MADE ONLY ONE COMPARATIVELY SMALL REQUEST ON WHICH I AM
TELEGRAPHING YOU SEPARATELY.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

139

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

REF, NO. 61

Sep
DATE: 222228 B

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

REFERENCE MY CABLE NUMBER 60.

BADOGGIO IS DESPERATELY ANXIOUS THAT ONE ITALIAN INFANTRY REGIMENT WITH A GROUP OF FIELD ARTILLERY AND ONE ANTI - TANK UNIT AND AN ENGINEER UNIT SHOULD BE AFFILIATED TO ONE OF OUR DIVISIONS TAKING PART IN THE FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS. HE SAYS QUITE RIGHTLY THAT THIS WILL HAVE A VERY GREAT EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY AS A WHOLE. HE ASSURES ME THAT THEY WILL BE PICKED TROOPS AND THAT HE WILL EQUIP THEM COMPLETELY WITH THE BEST EQUIPMENT HE POSSESSES AND WILL ENSURE AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE MANY GRAVE OBJECTIONS TO ATTACHING A BRIGADE GROUP OF THIS DESCRIPTION TO A FIELD ARMY FORMATION OF OURS. ON THE OTHER HAND BADOGGIO PLEADED ALMOST PATHETICALLY TO BE PERMITTED TO DO SO AND I AM MYSELF CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD HAVE AN ADMIRABLE EFFECT UPON ITALIAN ARMY COOPERATION. YOU SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT WE HAVE ALLOWED THE REMNANTS OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCES IN SOUTHERN ITALY TO OPERATE WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS ON THE COOPERATION THEY ARE GIVING. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT IF BADOGGIO'S SUGGESTION IS APPROVED THE ITALIAN BRIGADE GROUP SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO ONE OF THE DIVISIONS OF FIVE BRITISH CORPS

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413310

1393

IN SECOND LINE. AMBROSIO HAS GUARANTEED TO HAVE THE BRIGADE GROUP AS ABOVE CONCENTRATED WHEREVER REQUIRED IN ONE WEEK FROM TODAY. PLEASE INFORM ME AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IF YOU AGREE. YOUR AGREEMENT WOULD BE A GESTURE OF VERY GREAT VALUE INDEED AND WOULD DO MUCH TO MAKE UP FOR BADOGLIO'S DISAPPOINTMENT IN NOT BEING ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS WITH AN ITALIAN CORPS. FINALLY SUCCEEDED TONIGHT IN CONVINCING BADOGLIO THAT ANY SUCH SUGGESTION WAS RIDICULOUS AND THE GOOD GRACE WITH WHICH HE FINALLY APPROVED ALL ASKED OF HIM IS POSSIBLY DESERVING OF THIS CONCESSION ON OUR PART.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 23 September 1943

TO : 15th ARMY GROUP rpt
FATIMA, FAIRFIELD,
(EBS pass in clear)

CLASS: MOST SECRET

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

REF NO. 8638

Reference FATIMA number 60 dated 23 September. Decision with regard to employment ITALIAN Infantry Regt. as suggested is left to General ALEXANDER. In further telegram just received General MACFARLANE again stresses how strongly BADOGLIO feels on this subject and stresses the great effect upon the ITALIAN morale which would result from a favourable reply. Please notify AFHQ definite decision repeat to General MACFARLANE.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM REPEAT TO AFHQ CP
(FREEDOM Pass in Cypher Held)

REF. NO. 066

Sep
DATE: 230915 B

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

YOU WILL RECEIVING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM BADOGLIO ABOUT ALLOWING ITALIAN TROOPS TO BE EMPLOYED IN ACTUAL FIGHTING. THIS WAS SENT BEFORE MY TALK WITH BADOGLIO WHICH I REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 060 and 061 OF YESTERDAY. BADOGLIO'S MESSAGE INDICATES HOW DEEPLY HE FEELS ON THIS SUBJECT. IF IN YOUR REPLY TO HIM YOU COULD INDICATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE TO HIS REQUEST FOR AN ITALIAN REGIMENT TO BE ATTACHED TO ON OF OUR FIELD DIVISIONS YOU WOULD CHEER UP THE OLD GENTLEMAN AND THE ITALIAN ARMY AS A WHOLE. BADOGLIO ADDRESSED ABOUT FOUR HUNDRED OFFICERS HERE YESTERDAY AND IS TALKING TO A BIGGER OFFICER AUDIENCE TODAY. HE TELLS ME THAT HIS MEETING YESTERDAY WAS MOST ENTHUSIASTIC. HE IS CERTAINLY DOING THAT HIS BEST BUT/DOES NOT ALTER THE FACT THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF POSSIBLY A VERY FEW PICKED UNITS THE ITALIAN ARMY IS QUITE INCAPABLE OF FIGHTING GERMANS.

AUTHENTICATED

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4121 B 413310

1390

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 23 September 1943

TO: FATDA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 560 (R 11/24)

PRES: URGENT

In me/ name you are authorized to accept as a principle the offer of Badoglio for a reinforced Italian Regiment to serve with one of our Divisions. Read your 061 and 066. General Alexander will inform you direct of unit to which this force is to be attached.

NEW SUBJECT: For your personal information President and Prime Minister have agreed in general on status co-belligerent contingent on declaration of war against Germany by Badoglio Government and certain other requirements. We have sufficient information to proceed with conference with Badoglio and arrival here tomorrow of Cinq Med. will give you more details as to time and place.

NEW SUBJECT: Inform Badoglio that American General Roosevelt just returned from Sardinia reports favourable situation and some units, particularly NEMBO Parachute Division, with considerable combat value and anxious to fight. Itend at earliest opportunity to transfer Italian Forces in Corsica to Sardinia which subsequent movement of selected Italian units from Sardinia to Italian mainland as transport becomes available.

NOT to be
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ _____ date _____

413310

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 241422B Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 89

PREC: IMPORTANT

I COMMUNICATED TO BADOGLIO THIS MORNING THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN THE
FIRST AND LAST PARAGRAPHS OF YOUR NUMBER FIVE SIX ZERO.

BADOGLIO WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE AND GRATEFUL. I WILL TELEGRAPH SHORTLY
EXACT POSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE REINFORCED ITALIAN REGIMENT WHICH
WILL ^{be} COMPLETE IN EVERY RESPECT AND READY TO MOVE ON THREE ZERO INSTANT.

AUTHENTICATED.

F.N. MASON MACPARKLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 4/29

CLASS : SECRET

REF NO. 170

PREC : PRIORITY

FILED: 291117A Sep

FROM : FATIMA

REC'D : 291117A

TO : FREEDOM rpt to 15th ARMY GROUP

*Ref
Fatima 89*

COMPOSITION OF REINFORCED ITALIAN REGIMENT TO BE PLACED AT THE DISPOSITION OF EIGHTH ARMY FOLLOWS; ONE MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT OF THREE BATTALIONS STRENGTH TWO FIVE ZERO ZERO -; ONE ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF TWO GROUPS OF SEVEN FIVE MILLIMETER HOWITZERS, ONE GROUP OF ONE ZERO FIVE MILLIMETER HOWITZERS AND ONE BATTERY OF TWO ZERO CENTIMETER GUNS. ARTILLERY STRENGTH ONE SEVEN ZEROZERO; ATTACHED SERVICE TROOPS, SEVEN HUNDRED, TOTAL STRENGTH TWO TWO NINE OFFICERS AND FOUR NINE SEVEN EIGHT MEN. THIS FORCE IS ASSEMBLED IN THE BRINDISI DASH BARI AREA, READY FOR ATTACHMENT TO BRITISH FORCES SEPTEMBER THREE ZERO. ITALIANS CAN PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.

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413310

1387

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : FATIMA

DATE: 262250B Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 137

PREC: IMPORTANT

ITALIAN AUTHORITIES ARE MOST ANXIOUS THAT FOUR HUNDRED GERMAN PRISONERS
JUST ARRIVED FROM BALKANS SHOULD BE SENT TO NORTH AFRICA. ITALIANS
QUITE PREPARED TO MAKE SHIPPING AVAILABLE. PLEASE INSTRUCT ME.

NEW SUBJECT. BADOGLIO IS SENDING AN OFFICER TO SARDINIA TO REPORT
TO HIM ON THE STATE OF THE NEMBO PARACHUTE DIVISION. IF IT IS IN GOOD
SHAPE HE IS MOST ANXIOUS THAT IT SHOULD BE USED IF POSSIBLE WHEN WE
GET NEAR ROME TO HELP TO PREVENT THE GERMANS FROM COMMITTING RAVAGES
SIMILAR TO THEIR ACTION AT NAPLES.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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VOID 413310

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NR: 21/4

REF NR: 273

FILED : 042210A Oct

REC'D :

THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND INDICATES THAT IF WE HAVE ANY INTENTION OF USING THE NEMBO PARACHUTE DIVISION IN SARDINIA IT WILL HAVE TO BE FURNISHED WITH PARACHUTES FROM ALLIED SOURCES. THE ITALIANS HOPE THAT IF THERE IS AN AIRBORNE OPERATION AGAINST ROME THE NEMBO PARACHUTISTS WILL HAVE AT LEAST TOKEN PARTICIPATION.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

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4 13310

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 241504 B Sep

TO : FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 8857

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Following messages from General BECUFFI commanding BERGANA DIVISION at
SPALATO for MARSHALL BADOGLIO should be passed Italian Government for action,

Para 2. First message states in execution armistice terms there are fifteen
thousand (15,000) troops in SPALATO with five (5) days reduced rations. Dis-
patch of escorted ships in accordance promise repatriation urged and in event
delay rations requested.

Para 3. Second message and no reply received and requests convoy transport
fourteen thousand (14,000) to Italy. Hospital ship for six hundred (600)
wounded requested. Only four days food remaining.

Para 4. Dates of messages, which were relayed from CAIRO, unknown. First
message probably 20th September.

signed C in C

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138.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: ROUTINE

FROM: FREEDOM (AFHQ)

TO: FATIMA

M/C NR: 31/14

REF NR: 2668

FILED: 031440A Oct

REC'D: 141837A

Please obtain and report early approximate overall personnel strengths separately for Italian Naval, Ground and Air Forces in mainland, treating following regions separately. CALABRIA, APULIA and occupied east coast belt, remaining occupied west coast. FABLE please report total strengths by services for Sardinia and Corsica combined. For your information these figures required for estimate food supply commitment. FATIMA REPEAT FABLE FAKIR FOR G-2 FROM G-2 FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FHGBI. Also ~~required~~ required detailed order of battle to include all specialist units such as Dock Operating Companies, GT Companies etc.. Will FAKIR and FABLE produce similar information concerning islands.

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S E C R E T

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NO: 12

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 252

PRED: PRIORITY

FILED: 0922314 Oct

FROM: PATIA

REC'D:

TO: FREEDOM

FROM ITALIAN COMANDO SUPREMO TO GENERAL CASTELLANO PD BAREN TO FREEDOM FOR GENERAL
CASTELLANO REPEAT AFTER ADV OF AMERICAN FROM PATIA SIGNED MACFARLANE BAREN PD NUMBER
ONE SIX SIX SIX SLANT O REPEAT ODOX P REPEAT PATIA PD REFERRING TO ONE SIX ONE PD
EXCELLENCE BALOGGIO THINKS NOT CONVENIENT FOR THE MOMENT TO CALL BACK IN ITALY THE
INDICATED GENERALS BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO THE SAME FOR OTHER GENERALS ALSO
WORTHY OF EVERY RESPECT PD GENERAL AMEROSIO

AUTHENTICATED:

FRANK A. MEYER
1st Lieut, AGC
Adjutant General.

.....
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: CinC, AF :
: Initials :
: 4 October 1943 :
.....

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

4 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Power.

The Italian Army has again requested the authority to transport from Crotona by sea two motorized artillery groups earmarked for the reinforced regiment to be attached to the 8th Army. If the 8th Army approves this movement, is it feasible from the naval point of view? The Italians will wish the artillery disembarked at Brindisi or Taranto.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

5 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier Martin, Headquarters, 15th Army Group.

1. Marshall Badoglio and party will arrive at Headquarters, 15th Army Group at 1300, 6 October. The party will consist of the Marshall, General Ambrosio, Chief of the Supreme General Staff, Colonel Valenzano, Aide-de-Camp to Marshall Badoglio and myself.

2. The Marshall will probably wish to discuss the following topics with General Alexander:

- a. The disposition to be made of the Italian reinforced regiment which has been prepared for attachment to the 8th Army.
- b. The attachment of Italian liaison officers from the High Command to the 15th Army Group, 8th and 5th Armies.
- c. The possibility of employment of large tactical units of the Italian Army.
- d. The extent of the contemplated use of Italian troops on lines of communication.

3. As no one in the party has ever been to your headquarters, I suggest the desirability of having us met by a guide somewhere on the road. This and any additional information which you wish to transmit can be sent back by our dispatch rider.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

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4 1 3 3 1 0

SECRET

1380

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/NR: M/C NR: 10
CLASS: SECRET REF NR: 296
PREC: PRIORITY FILED: 062222A Oct
FROM: FATIMA REC'D:
TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

I ACCOMPANIED MARSHALL BADOGLIO AND GENERAL AMERCSIO TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF ONE FIVE ARMY GROUP WHERE THEY WERE RECEIVED BY GENERAL ALEXANDER PD IN THE COURSE OF A THREE HOUR CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED;

(A) THE USE OF THE REINFORCED ITALIAN REGIMENT TO BE ATTACHED TO THE EIGHTH ARMY.

(B) THE PLACING OF ITALIAN LIAISON OFFICERS AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF ONE FIVE ARMY GROUP.

(C) STRATEGY OF THE ENSUING CAMPAIGN TO RECOVER ROME AND NORTHERN ITALY.

THE ITALIANS RETURNED QUITE HAPPY OVER THEIR RECEPTION.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

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1379

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM FOR CASTELLANO

M/C NR: 4

REF NR: 278

FILED: 051011A Oct

REC'D:

FOLLOWING FROM COMMANDO SUPREMO PD TO FREEDOM FOR CASTELLANO FROM FATIMA
SIGNED TAYLOR PD QUOTE ONE SIX EIGHT EIGHT SLANT OP PD FOLLOWING INTERVIEWS
WITH OFFICERS OF THE SEVEN ONE SUB AREA IN BRINDISI WE SEEM TO UNDERSTAND
THAT GRADUALLY ALL STORES AND SUPPLIES THAT WE HAVE FOR THE ITALIAN TROOPS
ARE GOING TO BE REQUISITIONED PD WE BEG TO POINT URGENTLY OUT THE MATTER TO
ALLIED HEADQUARTERS EMPHASIZING THAT THE LOSS OF SUCH MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES
AS EXISTING IN OUR BASES AT BRINDISI AND BARI WOULD MEAN THE IMPOSSIBILITY TO
PROVIDE FURTHER FEEDING FOR MEN AND ANIMALS SIGNED AMBROSIO UNQUOTE

AUTHENTICATED:

FRANK A. RAHTER
1ST Lieut AGD
Adjutant General

MEETING BETWEEN MARSHALL BADOLIO AND GENERAL ALEXANDER

AT THE COMMAND POST, 15TH ARMY GROUP, OCTOBER 6, 1943.

PRESENT

General Alexander
Marshall Badoglio
General Ambrosio
Air Marshall Coningham
General Lord Rennell
Major General Richardson
Brigadier General Taylor

Following luncheon at General Alexander's Headquarters, the officers mentioned above assembled to discuss matters of common interest. Marshal Badoglio first asked about the disposition of the reinforced regiment to be placed at the disposition of the Eighth Army. General Alexander stated that this was to be attached to the 1st British Airborne Division and that orders would be issued shortly.

General Ambrosio presented an estimate of the situation from the Italian point of view to General Richardson. A copy of this document had been previously submitted to this Mission.

General Alexander explained to the Italians his general plan of campaign and that his estimated time of arrival in Rome was about November 1. He indicated his intentions to push on beyond Rome and eventually occupy the Po Valley. He indicated his desire to receive an Italian liaison group for his headquarters, this group to include both military and air personnel. It was agreed that about four officers would be designated at once for attachment to his headquarters.

General Ambrosio proposed that the Italian troops in Sardinia either be used to land on the West coast of Italy in conjunction with the Fifth Army or to be used later in a landing operation North of Apennines. General Alexander replied that these divisions could hardly be used in the immediate future because of the lack of time to mount the operation, and also because of the shortage of shipping. He asked whether the Italians could provide their own craft. Ambrosio replied that they could, in part only, and observed that these divisions were without amphibious training. It was a general consensus that Italian Military participation to the conclusion of the operation against Rome would have to be limited to the reinforced regiment previously mentioned.

There followed a general discussion of the best method of occupying Northern Italy. The Italians recommended an operation based on Rimini, accompanied by an amphibious force landed near the mouth of the Piave. It was stated that the coast on either of the mouth of the Po was unsuitable for such operations.

Ambrosio raised the question of the movement of two battalions of artillery from Grotone to the Heel of Italy for the purpose of reinforcing the detachment being prepared for the Eighth Army. General Alexander said that this would be studied and a reply made subsequently.

Ambrosio also advanced the desirability of movement of the Pisceno and Legnano Divisions northward to the general vicinity of Altemura. He pointed out that such a movement northward would have a salutary effect upon the morale of the Italians. General Alexander replied that it would be necessary to wait a little longer before such a movement could be considered.

The meeting broke up with mutual expressions of confidence and good will.

(At the outset of the meeting General Alexander passed to General Taylor a note on the subject of the visits of the King of Italy outside the provinces under Italian jurisdiction. This note expressed his disapproval of any such movement into areas under military government)

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 16/09

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR: 332

PREC : PRIORITY

FILED : 091801A Oct

FROM : FATIMA

REC'D :

TO : FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

AT HIS CONFERENCE WITH GENERAL ALEXANDER ON OCTOBER SIX MARSHALL BADGLIO ASKED TO HAVE TWO BATTALIONS OF FIELD ARTILLERY TRANSPORTED FROM CROTONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF JOINING THE ITALIAN REINFORCED REGIMENT ATTACHED TO THE EIGHTH ARMY PD GENERAL ALEXANDER PROMISED TO TAKE THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION PD I HAVE SINCE BEEN INFORMED BY ADMIRAL POWER THAT THERE IS NO SHIPPING AVAILABLE IN THIS AREA AND THAT IF THE MOVE IS APPROVED ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS WILL HAVE TO MAKE SOME SPECIAL PROVISION PD IF THIS FACT ELIMINATES THE MOVEMENT FROM CONSIDERATION I REQUEST TO BE INFORMED

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General. U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

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1376

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 13/11

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR: 5818

PREC : PRIORITY

FILED : 111139A Oct

FROM : FREEDOM

REC'D : 111426a

TO : FATIMA

Movements within combat area are controlled by 15th Army Group. Reference your 332 dated 9 October NOT to 15th Army Group. (Signed CinC, Cite FHGCT. Action FATIMA for Taylor information 15th Army Group, AFHQ ADVANCED COMMAND POST). Suggest movement of vehicles of two battalions Italian artillery from Crotone to join Italian reinforced regiment take place over land.

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1373

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

9 October 1943

Major General Robertson
Fortbase, Taranto.

I attach herewith copies of cables exchanged between the Italian authorities and General Castellano, their representative in Algiers; also, a copy of a radio on the same subject I have sent forward to Allied Force Headquarters. Have you any knowledge of an order preventing the requisitioning of Italian stores?

3 Incls,

Copy to:

Colonel Westrop

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief of Mission.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NR: 15/09

REF NR: 331

FILED: 091800A Oct

REC'D:

REFERENCE MESSAGE TO ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND FROM CASTELLANO YOUR NUMBER FOUR EIGHT NINE ZERO PD THIS MISSION HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY ORDER PREVENTING THE REQUISITIONING OF STORES AND SUPPLIES BELONGING TO THE ITALIAN FIGHTING SERVICES PD WHILE SUCH REQUISITIONING MUST OBVIOUSLY BE DONE WITH JUDGEMENT SO AS TO PREVENT CRIPPLING THESE SERVICES THERE ARE NOT MANY OCCASIONS WHEN IT HAS BEEN ESSENTIAL TO TAKE OVER CERTAIN SUPPLIES NEEDED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITALIAN PORTS AND ELSEWHERE PD I AM WITHHOLDING THE CITED CASTELLANO MESSAGE PENDING A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE EXEMPTION OF REQUISITION YOU WISH ACCORDED THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

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137

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : A TMA

M/C NR: 6/09

REF NR: 4890

FILED : 081917A Oct

REC'D : 090215A

Report is not correct. (Reference your #1633 for ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND from CASTELLANO signed EISENHOWER cite FELIA). In any case, message has been sent from here with strict order make no requisition on our stores and supplies.

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SECRET

1371

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 912

10 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Richardson, Chief of Staff,
15th Army Group, Santo Spirito.

Subject: Return of Italian Military Equipment which
has been requisitioned or captured.

The Mission has received many reports from the Italian High Command that the development of their Armed Forces is being seriously handicapped by the amount of requisitioned material, particularly motor vehicles, now in the hands of Allied troops. While the immediate and essential military requirements of the Allied forces are certainly paramount there is some point beyond which we should not go reducing the limited means available to the Italian High Command. It appears to me that the only place where this matter can be decided in its higher aspects is at your headquarters. With your concurrence, I should like to propose to the Italians that matters of this sort involving Italian equipment with tactical units be taken up with your staff by the Italian liaison group. It would seem appropriate to carry all requisition matters in the Base Areas to General Robertson where the Italians already have a liaison contact.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief of Mission

Copy to:

General Robertson

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1379

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
AF0 512

10 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Richardson, Chief of Staff,
15th Army Group, Santo Spirito.

Subject: Anticipated requirements for Italian troops.

General Roatta has requested an opportunity to discuss the matter of the anticipated requirements of the 15th Army Group for Italian troops for use in guarding lines of communications, anti-aircraft defense and similar duties. I informed him that you were preparing an estimate as to your probable needs and that it was unlikely that you would be ready yet to discuss the matter. I do agree with him, however, that if you intend to use Italian troops on a large scale that it is very important to present the case clearly to Algiers at an early date as it involves the question of repatriation of prisoners and the return of captured Italian material. Will you inform me whether you are willing to talk to Roatta on the subject or whether you prefer me to hold him off?

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief of Mission

1359

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FREEDOM

TO: FATIMA

M/C NO: N 2/12

REF NO: 5957

FILED: 111011 1358 Oct

REC'D: 120823A

Chief of Staff has authorized the attachment to this Headquarters of
The Italian Military Mission consisting of the following officers: General
Castellano, Col Meyerzani, Lt.Col. Dunadio, Major Tessitore, Major Cicarelli,
Capt. Guarrasi, 2nd Lt. Ianza, (For MacFarlane signed Eisenhower cite FHLIA)
and temporary visits here of only 7 others. Therefore accommodations are normally
available for them only. Accordingly other Italian officers or civilians, such
as General Aurelio, should be permitted to come here only after approval has been
secured from The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 AFHQ.

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PRES: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM

M/C NR: 02/14

REF NR: 398
1367

FILED: 141110A Oct

REC'D:

REFERENCE YOUR FIVE NINE FIVE SEVEN PD TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED TAYLOR PD
I SUBMITTED TO AMBROSIO YOUR COMMUNICATION RELATIVE TO THE PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY
MEMBERS OF THE CASTELLANO MISSION PD I RECEIVED A COUNTER PROPOSITION FROM HIM TODAY
ASKING THAT THE PERMANENT GROUP BE INCREASED BY ONE AND A COMPENSATING REDUCTION
OF ONE IN THE NUMBERS OF AUTHORIZED VISITORS PD THE PERMANENT PERSONNEL WHICH HE PROPOSES
IS CIN GENERAL CASTELLANO, CHIEF OF MISSION; COLONEL PEDERZANI, CHIEF OF STAFF; CAPTAIN
GIURIATI AND COMMANDER CALLETTI, NAVY LIAISON; LIEUTENANT COLONEL AA TIOLE, AIR LIAISON;
MAJOR TESSITORE, ARMY LIAISON; CAPTAIN GUARRASI, AIDE TO THE CHIEF OF MISSION; LIEUTENANT
LANZA, INTERPRETER PD IS THIS PROPOSAL SATISFACTORY TO YOU QUERY

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., USA
Acting Chief of Mission

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: ROUTINE

FROM: FATDMA

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NR: 1386

REF NR: 434

FILED: 160942A Oct

REC'D:

GENERAL AMBROSIO REQUESTS THE TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE ALLIED
COMMANDER IN CAIRO PD NUMBER ONE NINE SIX FIVE SLANT CP
QUOTE THE ITALIAN DIVISIONS VENEZIA AND Taurinense ARE FIGHTING IN MONTENEGRO WITH
THE JUGOSLAVIAN LIBERATING ARMY, AGAINST GERMANS WHO OCCUPY PODGORICA, CMTIGNE,
NIKSBIE, PEC AND BOCHE DI CATTARO PD PARA ITALIAN UNITS ARE NOW IN SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES
FOR FOOD AND THEY ASK ALSO TO HAVE SENT TO THEM MACHINE GUNS, AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT
MACHINE GUNS WITH PROPER AMMUNITION SUPPLIES PD PARA THEY ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE
AIRFIELD OF BERANE ONE ONE ZERO ZERO METERS LONG AND ONE SIX ZERO METERS WIDE, WITH
ALL THE ^{equipment} ~~MATERIAL~~ FOR NIGHT LANDINGS PD PARA CONSIDERING THE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO KEEP
THOSE TROOPS IN FIGHTING CONDITIONS, I BEG YOU TO DO YOUR BEST TO SUPPLY THEM WITH
NECESSARY FOOD AND ARMS BY AIR PD PARA IT IS ALSO NECESSARY THAT THE AIRFIELDS OF
MOSTAR, PODGORICA, SCUTARI AND TIBANA, FROM WHICH THE GERMANS AIR RAIDS START, SHOULD
BE NEUTRALIZED BY ALLIED AIR CRAFT PD PARA SUCH NECESSITY HAS ALREADY BEEN BROUGHT TO
THE ATTENTION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR FORCES IN FUGLIE PD PARA ON ACCOUNT OF THE
APPROACHING WINTER, IT WOULD BE URGENT TO KNOW WHICH KIND OF ASSISTANCE YOU THINK
POSSIBLE FOR THESE DIVISIONS PD PARA IF NO ASSISTANCE IS POSSIBLE WILL PLEASE ADVISE
US WHERE THEY COULD RETREAT SO AS TO AVOID TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF ABOVE MENTIONED
PD SIGNED AMBROSIO UNQUOTE

AUTHENTICATED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig Gen USA
Acting Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NO: 13/22

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 539

PRES: PRIORITY

FILED: 221430A Oct

FROM: FATIMA

REC'D:

TO: FREEDOM repeated 15th ARMY
GROUP AND FORTRESS

1357

I HAVE COMMUNICATED TO THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR DOCUMENT QUOTE
EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN TROOPS UNQUOTE DATED THREE OCTOBER ONE NINE FOUR THREE PD TO
FREEDOM REPEAT 15TH ARMY GROUP AND FORTRESS FROM FATIMA SIGNED TAYLOR PD IN A PREPARED
REPLY THE HIGH COMMAND MAKES THE FOLLOWING POINTS PD (1) THE ITALIANS ARE DISAPPOINTED
OVER THE LIMITED COMBAT PARTICIPATION WHICH IS CONTEMPLATED FOR THEIR TROOPS PD AS IT
HAS BEEN STATED THAT THE CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE WILL BE ATTENUATED IN PROPORTION
TO THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO WAR ON GERMANY IT IS FELT THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED
WIDER PARTICIPATION IN DIRECT MILITARY ACTION PD WITH REGARD TO THE SARDINIAN DIVISIONS
THE ITALIANS WISH THEM TO BE CONSIDERED AS TRAINED MOUNTAIN TROOPS WHICH COULD FIND
EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT IN THE OPERATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO DEVELOP IN NORTHERN ITALY PD
IT IS SUGGESTED THAT ONE OF THESE DIVISIONS BE LANDED ON THE BEACHES NEAR ROME AFTER
THE OCCUPATION OF THAT CITY BY OUR FORCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSURING ORDER IN THE
CAPITAL PD (2) THE HIGH COMMAND CONSIDERS THAT THE TEN DIVISIONS TO BE USED ON LINES OF
COMMUNICATIONS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR THE PURPOSE INTENDED PD THE POSSIBILITY OF
ADDING TO THE UNITS WILL BE STUDIED BY THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF WHICH WILL LATER SUBMIT
PROPOSALS PD (3) THE ITALIAN COAST DEFENSE UNITS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE
THE COAST PARTICULARLY AFTER OUR TROOPS HAVE ADVANCED WELL TO THE NORTH PD

(4) AS FOR...

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4 13310

(4) AS FOR DEMOBOLIZATION OF TROOPS THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE IN THE CASE OF OVERAGE SOLDIERS IN THE PROVINCES OF APULIA PD THERE HAS BEEN NO DEMOBOLIZATION OF THE FORCES OUTSIDE OF APULIA AS THE ATTITUDE OF THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES ON THAT SUBJECT IS NOT KNOWN PD MEANWHILE A CONTINUOUS STUDY IS GOING ON OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF MAXIMUM AGRICULTURE AND MINING WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING WHAT FURTHER DEMOBOLIZATION IS DESIRABLE

1364
AUTHENTICATED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

U.S. SECRET - Equals British MOST SECRET
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

October 1943

SUBJECT : Formation of Military Section of the Allied Commission.

TO : Major General Kenyon A. Joyce.

1. It is requested that you submit your comments on the attached (Appendix A) proposed initial organization of the Military Section of the Allied Commission. It is appreciated that the proposed organization can be only tentative, subject to such amendments as experience may dictate. Nor will the total strength shown be reached immediately, but may be reached as conditions require and as officers of suitable qualifications become available.

2. This Section will be divided into the following six sub-commissions,

- a. Naval Forces
- b. Land Forces
- c. Air Forces
- d. Prisoners of War
- e. War Material Factories
- f. Materiel Disposal

In addition it is intended that the Head of the Section should have a personal staff.

3. It is contemplated that the Deputy Head of the Section and each sub-commission will be a representative of the Government that does not provide the Head of the Section or sub-commission.

4. The main duties of the Naval sub-commission will be concerned with the carrying out of the agreement on the employment and disposal of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine. A copy of this agreement is attached to Appendix B.

5. The main duties of the Land Forces, the Air Forces and the Prisoners of War sub-commissions will be concerned with approved policies affecting these Italian forces and prisoners of war. The current broad policies are indicated in AFHQ paper P/109 (Final) (Appendix B).

6. It is essential that the Italian forces be used to the maximum. For this purpose a detailed troop list of the available forces, indicating their suitability for various types of employment, must be submitted to AFHQ as a

- a. Naval Forces
- b. Land Forces
- c. Air Forces
- d. Prisoners of War
- e. War Materiel Factories
- f. Materiel Disposal

In addition it is intended that the Head of the Section should have a personal staff.

3. It is contemplated that the Deputy Head of the Section and each sub-commission will be a representative of the Government that does not provide the Head of the Section or sub-commission.

4. The main duties of the Naval sub-commission will be concerned with the carrying out of the agreement on the employment and disposal of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine. A copy of this agreement is attached to Appendix B.

5. The main duties of the Land Forces, the Air Forces and the Prisoners of War sub-commissions will be concerned with approved policies affecting these Italian forces and prisoners of war. The current broad policies are indicated in AFHQ paper P/109 (Final) (Appendix B).

6. It is essential that the Italian forces be used to the maximum. For this purpose a detailed troop list of the available forces, indicating their suitability for various types of employment, must be submitted to AFHQ as a matter of urgency. Separate instructions have been despatched to you in this regard. The allocation of these forces between the various requirements will then be the responsibility of AFHQ, whose decisions you will convey from time to time to the Italian officials concerned upon notice.

7. No establishment for Liaison officers between Allied Commanders and Italian units has been included, as it is considered that these officers should be furnished by the Allied Headquarters which command Italian units. Such Headquarters will be empowered to deal direct with the Military Section through the normal chain of command.

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8. a. It will be appreciated that the disposal of war materiel and the organization of war materiel factories will be very closely linked with each other, with Naval, Land and Air Forces sub-sections, and with the policy on the employment of the Italian forces. These activities must also be closely coordinated with the Industrial and Economic sub-commissions.

b. The priorities of disposal of Italian war materiel between the Italian forces and such other forces as the Allies might wish to equip with it, must depend on the stocks that are in fact available. This is not known at present. You should therefore, as a matter of urgency, direct the appropriate officials to institute a detailed examination into this question and report the quantities of Italian materiel available.

9. The Allied Commission will contain sub-commissions dealing with legal and financial matters, etc., as well as public relations. The service of exports, members of these sub-commissions, will be available to the Military Section. Close coordination among all sections and sub-commissions will be essential and will be effected under directives of the Commander-in-Chief's Deputy.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

J.F.M. WHITELEY
Major General, G.S.
Acting Chief of Staff

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By command of General EISENHOWER:

J.F.M. WHITELEY
Major General, G.S.
Acting Chief of Staff

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MILITARY SECTION

Major General -- Chief (a)
 Brig or Brig Gen - D/C (a)
 6 other officers (c)
 6 stenographers (c)

U.S. SEC

Naval Forces	Land Forces	Air Forces	Prisoners of War	War Mater
Commodore -- Chief Captain -- D/C 6 other officers (c) 5 writers etc (c)	Brig or Brig Gen -- Chief Colonel -- D/C 6 other officers (c) 5 stenographers etc (c)	Air Commodore) Chief or Brig Gen) Colonel or Sp/Capt D/C 6 other officers (c) 5 stenographers etc (c)	Colonel -- Chief Lt. Col -- D/C 1 other officer (c) 3 stenographers etc (c)	Brig or Colonel 16 other 6 stenog

- (a) Or officer of comparable grade from Naval or Air Forces
 (b) Representatives of all supply services of Land, Air
 (c) Grades of "other officers" and stenographers to be

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MILITARY SECTIONAPPENDIX "A"

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

Major General -- Chief (a)
 Brig or Brig Gen - D/C (a)
 6 other officers (c)
 6 stenographers (c)

Air Forces

Prisoners of War

War Material Factories

Material Disposal

Air Commodore) Chief
 or Brig Gen)
 Colonel or Sp/Capt D/C
 6 other officers (c)
 5 stenographers etc (c)

Colonel -- Chief
 Lt. Col -- D/C
 1 other officer (c)
 2 stenographers etc (c)

Brig or Brig Gen
 -- Chief (a)
 Colonel D/C (a)
 16 other officers (b)(c)
 6 stenographers etc (c)

Brig or Brig Gen
 -- Chief (a)
 Colonel -- D/C (a)
 16 other officers (b) (c)
 6 stenographers etc (c)

- (a) Or officer of comparable grade from Naval or Air Forces
 (b) Representatives of all supply services of Land, Air and Naval Forces
 (c) Grades of "other officers" and stenographers to be determined later

APD 396

In reply refer to:
322

5 December 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral McGregor

The attached document on the organization of the Military Section has been received from Allied Force Headquarters. You will note that it calls for a statement of qualifications and ranks of officers set up in Appendix "A". Will you please furnish the desired information for the Military Section and the Naval Sub-commission? If you are agreeable, I shall undertake to assemble the data for the other Sub-commissions.

For the Deputy President Allied Control Commission

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

1 Incl,

Organization of
Military Section

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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G.3 SECTION

COPY NO. _____

3 October 1943

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES

*Copied from Army sub-
Com. file G.C.*

OBJECT

1. To decide the policy to be adopted for the future of the Italian ground and air forces.

GENERAL

2. An agreement has already been reached on the employment and disposition of the Italian Fleet and Merchantile Marine. At Appendix A an outline of this agreement is given.

GROUND FORCES AVAILABLE

- 3.a The following Italian ground forces exist in areas under our control:

20th Friuli Inf Div
44th Cremona Inf Div
225th C/D ?
226th C/D ?

= CORSICA

30th Sabaude Inf Div
31st Calabria Inf Div
47th Bari Inf Div
Mambo Parachute Div (Four Bns)
204th C/D ?
209th C/D ?

= SARDINIA

58th Legnano Inf Div
104th Mantova Inf Div
152nd Piacenza Inf Div
24th C/D
210th C/D
212th C/D
227th C/D
31st Coastal Brigade

= Mainland of
ITALY (in our
possession)

- b It is considered that those forces which are now in enemy occupied ITALY and the BALKANS will be demobilized after surrendering their equipment. Some Italians may be evacuated from the BALKANS but numbers are unlikely to be large.

- c Small bodies of men may remain in hiding in the hills of ITALY, but it is thought that the





GROUND FORCES AVAILABLE

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= CORSICA

30th Sabauda Inf Div
31st Calabria Inf Div
47th Bari Inf Div
Rembo Parachute Div (Four Bns)
204th C/D ?
209th C/D ?

= SARDINIA

98th Legnano Inf Div
104th Mantova Inf Div
152nd Piacenza Inf Div
24th C/D
219th C/D
212th C/D
227th C/D
51st Coastal Brigade

= Mainland of
ITALY (in our
possession)

b It is considered that those forces which are now in enemy occupied ITALY and the BALCANES will be demobilized after surrendering their equipment. Some Italians may be evacuated from the BALCANES but numbers are unlikely to be large.

c Small bodies of men may remain in hiding in the hills of ITALY, but it is thought that the German policy will be to evacuate all men of military age. All Italian equipment that is not evacuated will almost certainly be destroyed.

AIR FORCES

4. Details of the Italian air forces in our control are given in Appendix B. There are some 9 squadrons of fighters, 1 squadron of bombers, 1 squadron of torpedo bombers, 2 squadrons of seaplanes and 1/2 squadron of reconnaissance aircraft.

PRISONERS OF WAR

5. In North AFRICA there are now 122,000 Italian prisoners of war of 18,000 are already employed in labour duty. In SICILY there are

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32,000 of whom 16,000 are employed on labor duties. Of the available prisoners of war some 56,000 have been requested by the U.K. for labor duties there. It is not however the policy at present to evacuate any further prisoners, except those who cannot be released or employed for security reasons.

ITALIAN EQUIPMENT

6. a The formations listed in para 3 are fairly complete in personal equipment and weapons and have a proportion of field and AA artillery. Reserves of equipment in Italian hands are however practically nil. Of the equipment captured in NORTH AFRICA practically none remains, as it has been issued to EOL and French Units.

b In SICILY approximately 100,000 Italian troops were captured. Previous experience indicates that the equipment surrendered will re-equip 20 to 25 per cent of the forces in clothing and light weapons, ie. some 50 to 40,000 men, and some 5 per cent of the heavy equipments may be serviceable.

c In general it is estimated that sufficient ammunition is available to outlast the life of such weapons as are in the hands of the Italian Forces, or can be salvaged.

7. a It is therefore concluded that, provided no more equipment is issued to EOL or to the French, there should be sufficient to equip some 50,000 men. This might be held for maintenance of forces already in being, or might be used for reforming units from POW.

b It is emphasized that Italian equipment is a wasting asset, as all manufacturing facilities are in enemy hands.

POSSIBLE USES OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

8. Broadly speaking there are three possibilities:

That the forces:

a Are used as fighting formations.

b Are used for L of C security, AA defence, and service troops.

c Are demobilized and used as civilian labour.

The forces required in each of these roles are considered below, and the relative priorities are assessed in paras. 26-28.

USE AS FIGHTING FORMATIONS

9. Now that the Italians have been granted the right of co-belligerents, there will be strong pressure to permit the use of their forces in an active role.

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c In general it is estimated that sufficient ammunition is available to outlast the life of such weapons as are in the hands of the Italian forces, or can be salvaged.

7. a It is therefore concluded that, provided no more equipment is issued to SOL or to the French, there should be sufficient to equip some 30,000 men. This might be held for maintenance of forces already in being, or might be used for reforming Units from P of W.

b It is emphasized that Italian equipment is a wasting asset, as all manufacturing facilities are in enemy hands.

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USE AS FIGHTING FORMATIONS

9. Now that the Italians have been granted the right of co-belligerents, there will be strong pressure to permit the use of their forces in an active role.

Owing to the difficulties of command, maintenance and replacements, and to their doubtful fighting value, it is considered that such employment of Italian forces should be kept to a minimum. Furthermore the limited capacity of the L of C would preclude the use of large Italian forces except at the expense of a reduction of Allied forces. If strong political reasons necessitate their use, it is considered that a token force of one division at the most should be accepted.

10. a There is a need for Alpine troops capable of operating in high altitudes and in snow. Although no Italian Alpine units are available in Southern Italy, CORSIKA or SARDINIA, efforts should be made to form such units from any available personnel that save the German evacuation

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In addition, the possibility of utilizing certain carefully selected personnel for infiltration into enemy occupied areas as guerrilla forces merits consideration.

USE FOR L OF C SECURITY, FOR AA AND COAST DEFENSE AND AS SERVICE TROOPS

L OF C TROOPS:

11. There will be increasing requirements of troops in SICILY and ITALY for guard and duties, anti-sabotage protection and internal security duties as we advance Northwards. In addition certain defense precautions will be necessary in SARDINIA.
12. It is considered that these duties might be carried out by:
 - a IN SARDINIA - one Italian Field Division and two Sardinian Coastal Divisions.
 - b IN SICILY - one Italian Field Division and about three Allied Bns.
 - c IN ITALY south of NAPLES - FOGGIA - three divisions might be necessary, and a further three might be required for the area between this line and the FISA - RIMINI line. These six divisions could be either Field or Coastal divisions, preferably the former.

Thus a total of ten divisions might be necessary for this commitment.

AA and Coast defence.

13. Owing to our own shortage of AA units and to the ample supplies of AA and CD ammunition that are in our hands, particularly in PATERLINIA, it is important that Italian AA and CD units should be employed under our instructions.
 14. It might be possible to hand over the AA defense of certain areas solely to the Italians, for example at important hydro-electric stations or industrial targets. In other cases the mobile and non-mobile AA and CD equipments could be used to tighten up Allied defense of ports.
- Service units.
15. As the enemy retires it is envisaged that he will destroy ports, roads, railways and signal communication to the maximum possible extent. This will impose a great strain on our engineer and signal units, and it will therefore be essential that the maximum use be made of skilled and unskilled Italian labor. In addition there is a constant need for vehicle repairs and mechanical repairs of all sorts.

16. It is therefore considered that all specialist units of the Italian armed

- a. In Sardinia - one Italian Field Division and about three Allied Bns. Divisions.
- b. In Sicily - one Italian Field Division and about three Allied Bns.
- c. In Italy south of Naples - FUGOIA - three divisions might be necessary, and a further three might be required for the area between this line and the Pisa - Rimini line. These six divisions could be either Field or Coastal divisions, preferably the former.

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- 16. It is therefore considered that all specialist units of the Italian armed forces should be retained for these purposes, to work under the arms and services of the allies concerned.

USE OF AIR FORCES.

- 17. a. It is considered that the I.A.F. should be used to the maximum operationally, as far as possible they should be used in support of Italian armed forces and possibly HALKIN patriot forces, but should the situation demand they could be used for offensive action in areas where Allied forces are operating.
- b. Non-operational aircraft and crews, including transport and Air Sea Rescue aircraft, should be employed on normal duties in support of operational I.A.F. units, any surplus being used for similar formations in support of Allied air operations. For security reasons the I.A.F. is not considered suitable for SOE work.

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Italian personnel (technical) should as far as possible be employed on repair and maintenance of I.A.F. aircraft, but might be used for similar duties in Allied non-operational air units as a means of releasing Allied tradesmen.

18. More use can be made of the transportation aircraft, flying boats and seaplanes, which could work for SOE, on air sea rescue and Air Courier Service. All technical I/A/F personnel will be required for repair and maintenance of Italian and Allied aircraft and installations.

COMMAND.

19. a It is essential that Italian units and formations should be under operational command of the local Allied Hq., and under Italian military authority for administration only. Owing to the probable dispersion of Italian forces in Allied areas, it is considered that only by this system of command can the necessary flexibility be obtained. On occasion exception may have to be made however where, as for example in Sardinia, no suitable Allied Hq. exists.

- b Italian aircraft and crews should operate within the framework of the I.A.F., but under complete Allied control.

DEMOBILIZATION.

20. Consideration should be given to the early mobilization of non-specialist personnel who would be of use in agriculture or mines. The major agricultural areas likely to be in our hands this winter are APULIA, CAMPANIA, CALABRIA and also possibly LUCANIA, ABRUZZI and UMBRIA, and there are important coal and ore mines in SARDINIA. A phased estimate is required early of what labour should be released from the armed forces for the full development of these areas, in order that military and civil requirements can be balanced.

21. Further demobilization should not take place unless it is established that the civilian labor situation is such that employment can be found for demobilized troops, and that all military labor requirements can be met.

USE OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

22. It appears very doubtful whether Italian equipment would be available for equipping prisoners of war for combatant duties. Even for non-combatant duties it may be necessary for the Allies to supply the majority of clothing and equipment.
23. Prisoners of war should be sorted, and engineer, transportation and signals specialists, aircraft technicians and agricultural and mining types should be formed into units to assist in carrying out the tasks outlined above, in this Theater. This process is already begun.

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It is considered that Italian officers could be found for such units, and in addition certain outstanding officers and COOs might be released to stiffen the field forces.

TRANSFER OF ITALIAN FORCES FROM SARDINIA.

24. On the assumption that all Italian forces now in CORMICA will eventually be evacuated to SARDINIA there will ultimately be 188,000 men there. Of these only one Field Division, two Coastal Divisions plus certain AA and labor units are likely to be required, totalling some 40-50,000 men.

25. It is therefore desirable that, when shipping allows, some 140,000 personnel together with a minimum amount of heavy equipment should be transferred to the mainland. It should be possible to carry out this move with Italian warships. Until then it will be necessary to increase the import of food

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into SARDINIA to cover the requirements of this very considerable force.

PRIORITY EMPLOYMENT.

26. a It is considered that of the possible uses considered above the most important is that of specialist units.

b Depending on the labor situation that exists at the time it will be necessary to determine the relative importance of fighting units, L of C troops and labor units,

27. The estimated requirements for L of C troops total ten out of the available twelve to sixteen divisions. In addition one Field Division may be used in an active role, leaving a balance for reinforcements, for specialists and labor and for agricultural or mining work of from one to five divisions and 80,000 of #.

This balance will have to meet all labor requirements for NORTH AFRICA, CA, SICILY and ITALY, and will be reduced by 56,000 if the original demands of the U.K. are met.

28. In view of the possible shortage of labor in areas at present occupied by the enemy, and allowing for the difficulties that will be experienced in reallocating territorial units, such as coastal divisions to the areas where they are needed, it is concluded that the personnel available may not be sufficient to meet the requirements.

CONCLUSIONS.

29. a Specialists. First priority should be given to the utilisation of Italian specialist units for engineer, transportation and signal work. In addition specialist P of W in these categories should be drafted into units, or used as dilution personnel - a process that has already been started.
- b Combatant force. At most one Field Division should be reserved for use in active operations, together with any Alpine troops that later become available.
- c L of C troops. Ten divisions might be required for L of C security duties - three for SARDINIA, one for Sicily and six for ITALY south of PISA - RIMINI. Labor shortage may however make it essential to reduce this number.
- d AA & CD. AA and CD units should be retained. Possibly the defenses of certain targets may be made an Italian responsibility.
- e I.A.F. The I.A.F. should be used for the support of Italian forces or of Patriot forces in the BALKANS, for courier services, and for air sea rescue. I.A.F. specialists will be required for serving Italian and Allied aircraft.

This balance will have to meet all labor requirements for NORTH AFRICA, SICILY and ITALY, and will be reduced by 50,000 if the original demands of the U.K. are met.

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- c L of C troops. Ten divisions might be required for L of C security duties - three for SARDINIA, one for Sicily and six for ITALY south of PISA - RIMINI. Labor shortage may however make it essential to reduce this number.
- d AA & CD. AA and CD units should be retained. Possibly the defenses of certain targets may be made an Italian responsibility.
- e I.A.F. The I.A.F. should be used for the support of Italian Forces or of patriot forces in the BAIXANS, for courier services, and for air sea rescue. I.A.F. specialists will be required for serving Italian and Allied aircraft.
- f Command. Italian Units should be under command of the local Allied Hq. and under Italian control for administration only. On occasions exceptions may have to be made, however, where no suitable Allied Hq exists.
- g Labor. Units and P of W not required for the above duties should be used for labor duties. An important aspect of this is to ensure that the necessary labor for agriculture and mining is made available. Some demobilization for this purpose may be necessary, but further demobilization is undesirable at present and should only ultimately be carried out when

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the military labor requirements have been met.

- b Equipment. No further Italian equipment should be issued to SOE. The stocks that now exist should cover the requirements of existing units for some time, but if large numbers of P of W are reformed into units their clothing and equipment will have to be found from Allied sources.
- i Movement from SARDINIA. There will be some 140,000 personnel with light equipment to be moved out of Sardinia when shipping is available.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

30/ It is recommended that:

- a This paper be approved.
- b The policy as determined in this paper be communicated to the Italian Government to the 15th Army Group.
- c Sections of AFHQ should initiate appropriate action.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

30/ It is recommended that:

- a This paper be approved.
- b The policy as determined in this paper be communicated to the Italian Government to the 10th Army Group.
- c Sections of AFHQ should initiate appropriate action.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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29 October 1943

TO : The Chief of Staff, AFHQ

In reply to your communication, subject "Formation of Military Section of the Allied Commission," the following is submitted:

1. The data called for in para. 6 and 8 a will be obtained at the earliest date practicable.

2. As to Appendix A the following comments are submitted:

STRENGTHS AND ESTABLISHMENT

1. While it is agreed that the total strength shown need not be reached immediately experienced may show that the suggested strength may have to be exceeded.

2. It is presumed that the personnel of the Military Section of the grades and qualifications designated, will be found by G-1, AFHQ, and NOT have to be provided from the ceiling allotted for Military Government.

3. It is understood that the proposed establishment for the Naval, Land and Air Forces Subcommissions represents only the staffs at Government Headquarters. These staffs will be insufficient to ensure that these orders are carried out. It will presumably be for the Allied formation commander under whose orders Italian formations or units are placed, or for the Allied District Commander in whose district the Italian formations or units are located, to inspect those units and ensure that the orders of the Allied Commission are carried out. If this is accepted it should be for AFHQ to lay down policy, and for the Allied Commission to interpret this policy in orders and directives to the Italian Government, sending copies to Allied formations and districts concerned for the necessary inspections.

USE OF ITALIAN FORCES

4. With regard to the maximum use being made of Italian forces, it is considered that the following Italian land forces units should be formed at placed at the disposal of the Allied Commission.

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- (a) A number of truck companies for the transportation of essential supplies for the Italian people. The problem of distribution cannot otherwise be solved without calling on transport from the Allied fighting forces. Nearly all useful Italian civilian motor vehicles have been commandeered by the Allied Armies. It is thought that a number of car and truck companies could be provided by reorganizing Italian combatant units as well as their transport units. The number of trucks required has not yet been calculated, but it is likely to exceed 2,500.
- (b) Companies or platoons of cooks, messengers, orderlies and drivers for the administration of the Allied Commission. This proposal will save a considerable amount of Allied man-power and should be accepted in all cases where security considerations permit.

PRISONERS OF WAR SUBCOMMISSION

5. The role of the Prisoners of War Subcommittee requires clarification. There are four categories of prisoners of war for which arrangements will have to be made in Italy, viz.

- (a) German troops captured.
- (b) Pre-armistice Italian prisoners of war, i.e., men captured before the armistice and still held as prisoners of war.
- (c) American and British Empire troops or civilians recaptured.
- (d) German soldiers captured, who are not really Germans but are Italian or United Nations subjects, forced into the German armed forces.

These categories require different treatment and it is not clear with which categories the Prisoners of War Subcommittee is to deal. In making a decision the following factors must be considered.

6. German troops captured

These will presumably be dealt with in the normal way by the Allied Forces, including any Italian units acting under command of the Allied Forces.

7. Pre-armistice Italian prisoners of war

This is the categories referred to in para. 2, 22 and 23 of AFHQ paper P/109 (Final), in which it is stated that prisoners of war units

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should be formed. It is understood that these men and units are being controlled and administered by AFHQ through their normal prisoners of war channels.

The first question to decide is whether these pre-armistice prisoners of war are to continue to be controlled and administered, through normal channels by AFHQ or by the Allied Control Commission. Except as regards their liberty of action, these men are no different from Italian armed forces which surrendered after the armistice. It would therefore be logical that, if they are to continue to be controlled and administered through normal channels by AFHQ, any communications with the Italian Government regarding them should be handled by the Naval, Land or Air Forces Subcommittee.

On the other hand if their control and administration is to be handed over to the Allied Control Commission, a separate Prisoners of War Subcommittee would be required, though it is probable that the strength proposed in the chart at Appendix A to the Acting Chief of Staff's letter might have to be increased.

8. American and British Empire troops and civilians recaptured

To deal with this category, an organization known as the Prisoners of War Subcommittee is already in existence and operating under G-1 AFHQ. This organization was set up some time ago by the British and American Governments to deal with these personnel. At the time of the inception of this organization, it was anticipated that Italy would surrender as a whole and that Allied Forces would be able to occupy it quickly without much opposition. Under those circumstances there would have been thousands of American and British Empire nationals to be cared for, a problem which would have necessitated negotiations with the Italian government and would rightly have been dealt with by the Allied Control Commission.

The present situation is, however, entirely different. The majority of American and British nationals have probably been removed by the Germans. Only small numbers are coming through into our hands and they are brought back into our armed forces through normal military channels. Very little if any contact is required with the Italian Government.

Thus this organization could well be retained under direct military control and not be absorbed in the Allied Control Commission. In this event, it would be desirable to change its name from Prisoners of War Subcommittee in order to avoid confusion.

U. S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET

U.S. SECRET Eq. O. British MOST SECRET

9. German soldiers captured, who are not really Germans but are Italian or United Nation subjects, forced into the German armed forces.

This category does not include American or British Empire subjects, who have been considered in par. 8, above.

It is to be noted that there is in the Allied Control Commission a subcommission for Internees and Displaced persons, which deals with displaced Italians or United Nations personnel other than American or Empire nationals. This subcommission is organized not only to administer but also to screen such personnel with the assistance of G-2 officers and, it is hoped, accredited representatives of the United Nations concerned. It is therefore considered that this category of Prisoners of War should be handed over by the Allied Forces to the Allied Control Commission for screening, accommodation, etc., and eventual disposal in accordance with the policy laid down by AFHQ.

10. In this connection, an important point arises. As the Allied Commission has no troops at its disposal for guarding such personnel until they are found to be bona-fide, it appears ~~extremely~~ necessary for the local Allied Forces commander to be responsible for guards and escorts until they can be released to the unguarded camps controlled by the Displaced Persons Subcommission.

11. INTELLIGENCE (Para 6 and AFHQ Paper P/109 Final, Par. 19)

Amended
The collection and collation of intelligence from Italian military sources will be an important matter, particularly as information regarding German forces or resources may well be obtainable. There will be an intelligence organization in the Allied Control Commission, coordinated by an Intelligence Committee in the Commission, which committee will report to the Joint Intelligence Committee at AFHQ. It is therefore recommended that copies of all intelligence reports by Allied commanders controlling Italian forces or military installations should be sent to the Military Section of the Allied Control Commission for collation and onward transmission. It should similarly be permissible for the Allied Control Commission to indicate to such Allied commanders any intelligence matters on which information is required.

KENYON A. JOYCE
Major General, U.S. Army

U. S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET

1350

ENCLOSURE

Not Given

0-842

IMMEDIATE

27 Oct 43a

2nd District

271250a

INFORMATION FATMA

With effect from 0800 hours 30th October military command of Calabria passes from
FM Sub Area to 31st Italian Corps Headquarters Catanzaro. Detailed instructions
will be issued shortly. BMM to 7th Italian Army ACK. All informed.

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FILE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

091.1 - Govt of Foreign Countries

SECRET

H.Q., No. 2 District,
(FORTBASE),

C.M.F.

10650.

18 Oct. '43.

Copy No. 60

H.Q., No. 2 District (FORTBASE)

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 9.

Subject:- HAND OVER OF ADMINISTRATION OF CALABRIA TO
THE ITALIAN ARMY.

INTENTION.

1. The administration of CALABRIA will be handed over to the 31 Italian Corps on 30 Oct. '43.

METHOD.

2. LIAISON WITH 31 ITALIAN CORPS.

(a) A R.E. liaison officer of British Military Mission is already attached to the Italian Corps.

(b) A liaison officer, provided under arrangements British Military Mission attached 7th Italian Army, will be attached H.Q. 31 Italian Corps.

3. CLEARANCE OF SURPLUS BRITISH PERSONNEL FROM CALABRIA.

(a) By 30 Oct. it is proposed that all British units and depots, other than a movements staff and road staging post at REGGIO, will be removed from CALABRIA.

(b) The movement of these units and depots, is, however, dependent upon the clearance of stocks now on the ground and movement

091.1 - Govt of Foreign Countries

1348

INTENTION.

1. The administration of CALABRIA will be handed over to the 31 Italian Corps on 30 Oct. '43.

METHOD.

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LIAISON WITH 31 ITALIAN CORPS.

- (a) A R.E. liaison officer of British Military Mission is already attached to the Italian Corps.
- (b) A liaison officer, provided under arrangements British Military Mission attached 7th Italian Army, will be attached H.Q. 31 Italian Corps.

CLEARANCE OF CURRENTS BRITISH PERSONNEL FROM CALABRIA.

- (a) By 30 Oct. it is proposed that all British units and depots, other than a movements staff and road staging post at REGGIO, will be removed from CALABRIA.
- (b) The movement of these units and depots, is, however, dependent upon the clearance of attacks now on the ground and movement facilities available. It is probable that certain units and depots, will still be located in CALABRIA after 30 Oct.
- (c) Comd. d.s. Sub. area will be responsible for reporting to the H.Q. and British I.O. with Italian Corps, the designations, strengths and locations of British units and depots still in CALABRIA at 30 Oct.

Cont/...Sheet 2...

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Sheet 2.

- (d) British L.O. will be responsible for the movement of all units mentioned in sub para (c) above as soon as practicable. Unless specific destinations are given, all such units and dets. will be ordered to proceed to TARANTO, with instructions to send a rep. ahead to report to G(SD) H.Q., No. 2 District.

4.

CLEARANCE OF SURPLUS STORES FROM CALABRIA.

- (a) There are at present very large surplus stocks of amm., POL., Sups. and miscellaneous stores at CROTONE, REGGIO and FRANGAVILLA. Stocks from CROTONE are being cleared by rail to TARANTO. Stocks from FRANGAVILLA are being cleared to REGGIO. REGGIO stocks will be cleared by rail to TARANTO as soon as CROTONE is clear.

Present indications are that clearance of CROTONE will be complete by 30 Oct., but that there will still be at REGGIO some five thousand tons of stores, mainly amm.

- (b) Mov., East ITALY, will take immediate action to ensure that the maximum amount of stores are moved by the 30 Oct.

- (c) Comd., H.M. Sub Area will report to H.Q., No. 2 District, British L.O. at 31 Italian Corps and Movements Staff, REGGIO, the stocks of all commodities on the ground at CROTONE, REGGIO and FRANGAVILLA, as at 30 Oct.

- (d) British L.O. with Italian Corps will arrange the despatch by rail of any stocks remaining at CROTONE. Movements Staff, which will be established at REGGIO, will be responsible for the despatch by rail of all surplus stores from REGGIO and FRANGAVILLA.

- (e) All stores will be consigned to TARANTO. Mov., East ITALY, in consultation with Services, will determine required destinations.

5.

BRITISH UNITS AND PERSONNEL REMAINING IN CALABRIA.

to TARANTO. Stocks from FRANGAVILLA are being cleared to REGGIO. REGGIO stocks will be cleared by rail to TARANTO as soon as CROTONE is clear.

Present indications are that clearance of CROTONE will be complete by 30 Oct., but that there will still be at REGGIO some five thousand tons of stores, mainly amm.

- (b) Mov., East Italy, will take immediate action to ensure that the maximum amount of stores are moved by the 30 Oct.
- (c) Comd., R.A. Sub Area will report to H.Q. No. 2 District, British L.O. at 31 Italian Corps and Movements Staff, REGGIO, the stocks of all commodities on the ground at CROTONE, REGGIO and FRANGAVILLA, as at 30 Oct.
- (d) British L.O. with Italian Corps will arrange the despatch by rail of any stocks remaining at CROTONE. Movements Staff, which will be established at REGGIO, will be responsible for the despatch by rail of all surplus stocks from REGGIO and FRANGAVILLA.
- (e) All stores will be consigned to TARANTO. Mov., East Italy, in consultation with Services, will arrange to required destinations.

BRITISH UNITS AND PERSONNEL REMAINING IN CALABRIA.

It is intended that, as soon as practicable after 30 Oct., a force of 1,300 men, the only British personnel remaining in CALABRIA, will be :-

- (a) Movements Staff at REGGIO, to be known as Mov. REGGIO.
- (b) Road staging post at REGGIO, to be known as R.S.P. REGGIO.

Both the above units will be provided under arrangements H.Q. No. 2 District, and will be in position before 30 Oct.

Cont./.....Sheet 3....

Sheet 3.

6. RESPONSIBILITY OF 31 ITALIAN CORPS.

G.O.C., 31 Italian Corps has agreed to accept the following responsibilities :-

- (a) The undertaking of all routine military duties which would normally require the employment of allied troops.
- (b) The control and maintenance of such parts of the Is. of C. REGGIO - NAPLES and REGGIO - TARANTO as lie within the Province of CALABRIA.

ORGANIZATION OF THE IS. OF C.

7. Some 30,000 vehicles and an unknown number of personnel, probably in the neighbourhood of 60,000, require to be moved ex SICILY between 1 Nov. '43 and 31 Mar. '44.

8. No. 1 District has been requested to ensure that all vehicles and personnel embarking on MESSINA - REGGIO Ferry are in possession of 400 miles petrol and seven days rations.

9. (a) All arrangements at REGGIO for the reception and despatch of these personnel and vehicles will be made by Mov. REGGIO and R.S.F. REGGIO.

(b) Mov. REGGIO will be responsible for :-

(i) The efficient and prompt disembarkation and move to assembly area of all personnel and vehicles landing at REGGIO, and for the control of the REGGIO end of the Ferry.

They will also be responsible for the despatch of personnel and stores by rail to TARANTO where this is required.

(ii) The dissemination of all information possible to convey comds. re route, condition of roads and bridges, diversions, etc.

of the Is. of C. REGGIO - NAPLES and REGGIO - TARANTO as 140 within the Province of CALABRIA.

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They will also be responsible for the despatch of personnel and stores by rail to TARANTO where this is required.

(ii) The dissemination of all information possible to convey coms. re route, condition of roads and bridges, diversions, staging areas, etc.

(iii) The routing and timing of all convoys.

(c) R.S.F. REGGIO will be responsible for :- 1347

(i) The control and assembly of all personnel and vehicles in the assembly area at REGGIO.

(ii) Supervision of assembly area.

(iii) Ensuring that all vehicles and personnel are self-contained in food and petrol for the journey from REGGIO.

Cont/.....Sheet 4....

Sheet 4.

- (v) all other duties required to assist in the prompt and efficient assembly and despatch of convoys.
- (vi) C.C., Staging Post will also act in the capacity of Town Major, REGGIO.
10. (a) 51 Italian Corps will be responsible for the upkeep of the road and bridges on the Is. of C., traffic control and the maintenance of traffic signs, and the selection, preparation, staffing and control of staging areas at approx 200 kms. intervals.
- (b) A.I.E. officer of the Italian Military Mission has been attached to H.Q., 51 Italian Corps to assist in the work, and to interpret needs in respect of H.Q. work to the Italians.
- (c) 51 Italian Corps will be responsible for providing a small staff, including medical staff, at each staging area.
11. D.F.A., No. 2 District, in conjunction with Movements, No. 2 District, will undertake signposting of the Is. of C.
12. REPAIR & RECOVERY.
- (a) Vehicles which break down must be towed by another vehicle of the convoy.
- (b) If it is not possible to tow the vehicle, it will be left under guard, which will be furnished by 51 Italian Corps. All valuable stores will be removed. On arrival at dawn, the location of the vehicle will be given to H.Q. Sub Area concerned, who will arrange to recover.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE.

No. 1 District is requested to undertake the

traffic control and the maintenance of traffic signs, and the selection, preparation, staffing and control of staging areas at approx 200 AMS.

- (b) A R.E. officer of the British Military Mission has been attached to H.Q., 31 Italian Corps to assist in the work, and to interpret needs in respect of R.E. work to the Italians.

- (c) 31 Italian Corps will be responsible for providing a small staff, including Medical staff, at each staging area.

11. D.F.M., No. 2 District, in conjunction with Movements, No. 2 District, will undertake signposting of the Ls. of C.

12. REPAIR & RECOVERY.

- (a) Vehicles which break down must be towed by another vehicle of the convoy.

- (b) If it is not possible to tow the vehicle, it will be left under guard, which will be furnished by 31 Italian Corps. All valuable stores will be removed. On arrival at destination, the location of the vehicle will be given to H.Q. Sub Area concerned, who will arrange to recover.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE.

No. 1 District is requested to undertake the maintenance of the personnel and vehicles of Mov. REGGIO and R.S.P. REGGIO W.S.P. 30 Oct. 43.

14. (a) The following may communicate direct with British Liaison Officers at H.Q., 31 Italian Corps :-

H.Q., No. 1 District.
H.Q., No. 2 District.
Mov. REGGIO.
H.Q.P. REGGIO.

- (b) All other H.Q. will communicate with No. 2 District or admin. matters in SALERNO.

Cont/.....Sheet 5....

15. On completion of hand over of CALABRIA to 31 Italian Corps, H.Q., R.M. Sub Area will move to TARANTO where it will take over from H.Q., 6 Base Sub Area. H.Q., 6 Base Sub Area, on release, will be prepared to move to another port, probably ANCONA. Details will be issued in due course.

16. ACK.

R. Goldie Brig

Major-General,
G.O.C.,

R.M.G./emb.

G.O.C. No. 2 District, (FORTBASE).

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1346

INCOMING

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT GIVEN

FREEDOM

A-TDA

18/02

5183

012014A Nov

020312

Department telegraphs that correspondent of Reuters with 5th Army. RATIA FROM MURPHY SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE MOCIV. Reports that with the approval and cooperation of Allied Forces a corps of Italian volunteers has been organized which will be under the direct Allied command and completely independent from the Italian Army. The corps is reported to have as its "spiritual leader" Benedette Croce and Guiseppe Pavone "well known Anti-Fascists" as the principle organizer. Italian volunteers and officers who have recently succeeded in escaping from northern Italy are the principle components of the corps. Interest in such an organization has recently been expressed by Colonel Randolph Picciardi and we would appreciate confirmation from you that this or other similar "Italian Legions" will be organized in Allied-occupied territory with the approval of Commander-in-Chief.

OUTGOING

SECRET

21

ROUTINE

731

FATIMA

022216A Nov

FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR for
MURPHY cite FHCIV

YOUR NUMBER FIVE ONE EIGHT THREE PD TO FREEDOM RPT AFHQ ADVANCE CORRESPONDENT POST
AT AMILCAR FOR MURPHY CITE FHCIV FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE PD I HEARD IN
NAPLES THAT UNITS OF THE TYPE YOU DESCRIBE ARE BEING ORGANIZED UNDER THE
AEGIS OF OSS REPEAT OBOE SUGAR SUGAR PD BOTH GENERAL ALEXANDER TO WHOM I
MENTIONED THE MATTER AND MYSELF ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF
ITALIAN TROOPS OTHER THAN THOSE INCORPORATED IN THE ITALIAN ARMY PD SUCH
VOLUNTEERS MIGHT WELL BE TRAINED FOR SABOTAGE AND OTHER SIMILAR NON OASH
MILITARY DUTIES BUT THE PRODUCTION OF ITALIAN UNITS PARALLEL TO BUT NOT
IN THE ITALIAN ARMY IS IN OUR OPINION TO BE DEPRECATED PD GLAD IF YOU WOULD
NOTIFY GENERAL BISTONOVER

AUTHENTICATED:

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

OUTGOING

SECRET

IMPORTANT

PATNA

FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at MILCAR for
GEN. BEDELL SMITH or GEN. WHITELEY

07/03

742

031357A Nov

CHIEF OF SOE RPT SUGAR OBOE RBY ASKED ME YESTERDAY TO ASK THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS WITH CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION AVAILABLE FOR FOR DESPATCH FROM PARI TO THE BALKANS PD TO FREEDOM RPT AFHQ ADVANCE COMMAND POST FOR GENERAL BEDELL SMITH OR GENERAL WHITELEY FROM PATNA EIGHT MACPARLANE PD MACHINE GUNS DASH FOUR ZERO ZERO CMA LIGHT ANTI DASH AIRCRAFT DASH FIVE ZERO CMA ANTI DASH TANK GUNS DASH TWO ZERO CMA MORTARS DASH FIVE ZERO CMA PD I RPT ITEM THINK IT PROBABLE THAT ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND WILL BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE UP THE EQUIPMENT PD FURTHERMORE THE TRANSACTION APPEARS TO VIOLATE PARA TWO NINE H RPT NOV CMA QUOTE EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES UNQUOTE DATED OCTOBER THREE CMA ONE NINE FOUR THREE PD IF YOU APPROVE THE DEMAND PLEASE INSTRUCT ME ACCORDINGLY SO THAT I RPT ITEM CAN TELL ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND THAT IT IS AN ORDER FROM GENERAL EISENHOWER PD AT THE SAME TIME I RPT ITEM OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO TELL THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY ARMS AND HOW MUCH AMMUNITION WE ARE LIKELY TO DEMAND FROM THEM IN THE FUTURE AS THEY WILL OBVIOUSLY SAY THAT THEY CANNOT RPT NOT PRODUCE THE FORMATIONS WHICH WE ARE ASKING THEM TO PRODUCE IF WE TAKE AWAY TOO MUCH OF THEIR EQUIPMENT

AUTHENTICATED:

F.M. MASON MACPARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

INCOMING

SECRET

9/09

PRIORITY

8260

FREEDOM

081922A Nov

PATIMA

090400A

Ensuing in reference your 742 dated 3 November equipment and ammunition will not come from Italian units or stock. Add. PATIMA INFORMATION FLAMBO SIGNED CINC CITE FRUCT. Source of equipment will be from captured stocks in Sicily, Lampedusa or Pantelleria.

INCOMING

CONTROL COMMISSION

SECRET

32/12

ROUTINE

5856

AFHQ

031945A Nov

FATIMA

121715A by
Air Courier

Order of battle Italian Army received by G-3 AFHQ, consists almost entirely of combatant units. Most urgently request you despatch immediately by fast air complete list of Italian Army administrative units. FATIMA SIGNED
EISENHOWER CITE FHIA including Engineer and signals units stating, where possible, present locations and when available for employment.

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4 13310

INCOMING

SECRET

21/11

NOT GIVEN

9309

FREEDOM

110950 Nov

FATIMA

111327

Direct Italian High Command to disseminate following instructions to all Italian forces: toxic gas will not be employed except on orders of the Commander in Chief AFHQ. FROM FREEDOM TO FATIMA SIGNED CINC CITE FMCT.

OUTGOING

SECRET

10/15

PRIORITY

954

FATIMA

152233A Nov

FREEDOM

NUMBER

THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR/NINE THREE ZERO NINE CITE FHGCT HAS BEEN CONVEYED
PAREN TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PAREN TO THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND PD
THE LATTER HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED STATING THAT THERE IS NO REPEAT NO POISON GAS
EQUIPMENT WITH THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

O INCOMING

SECRET

8/13

PRIORITY

165

FREEDOM

130059A Nov

FATIMA

130430A

To be attached temporarily to the War Material Disposal Sub Committee of Military section of the Allied Control Commission proposes to send Cemec forward representative Lt. Col. Shutte (British) to Brindisi for the purpose of:

1. With reference to operational commitments, ascertaining the status of equipment Italian Army. (ADDED FATIMA (ATT GEN JOYCE), INFORMATION 15 ARMY GROUP, FLAMEC, PBS, DIST 2, SIGNED CINC CITE FHGCT.)
2. To make recommendations as to what further equipment from Italian sources, if any, is required to meet these operational requirements.
3. In excess of requirements, to report what materials held.

As soon as the military section of the Control Commission is functioning, request concurrence that this officer will be to this Headquarters returned.

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4 - 3310

OUTGOING

SECRET

17/13

URGENT

921

FATIMA

132032A Nov

FREEDOM

THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION PAREN TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PAREN HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED FROM MARSHAL BADOLIO QUOTE ON THE ORDERS OF HIS MAJESTY THE KING I AM CONSIDERING EFFECTING THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE HIGH COMMANDS ODN PARA MARSHALL GIOVANI MESSE TO BE APPOINTED CHIEF OF THE SUPREME GENERAL STAFF IN PLACE OF THE GENERAL ARMY COMMANDER VITTORIO AMBROSIO WHO WILL BE PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE KING PD PARA GENERAL CORPS COMMANDER TADDEO ORLANDO TO BE APPOINTED UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR PD PARA GENERAL CORPS COMMANDER PAOLO BERARDI TO BE APPOINTED CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY PD PARA. BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THESE APPOINTMENTS I WISH TO HAVE THE VIEWS OF THE ALLIED HIGH COMMAND IN THE PROPOSAL PD UNQUOTE

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING

SECRET

21/16

PRIORITY

1618

FREEDOM

161453A Nov

FATIMA

162025A

Concur in changes (TO FATIMA FOR JOYCE SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FMGS
REFERENCE YOUR 921 OF 13 NOVEMBER) proposed for Italian High Command.

CONTROL COMMISSION

OUTGOING

SECRET

3/21

PRIORITY

1053

FATIMA

Nov 211135A

FREEDOM

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM MARSHAL BADOGLIO CLN QUOTE I
INFORM YOU THAT H PD M PD THE KING CMA AT MY SUGGESTION CMA HAS APPOINTED CLN
MARSHAL OF ITALY GIOVANNI MESSE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF SEMCLN ARMY CORPS GENERAL
PAOLO BERARDI CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ROYAL ARMY PD PARA PD TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA
SIGNED JOYCE PD ARMY GENERAL VITTORIO AMBROSIO CMA HAVING REACHED THE AGE LIMIT
AND FOLLOWING HIS OWN REQUEST CMA VACATES THE POST OF CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF AND
WILL TAKE ON THE WORK OF INSPECTION OVER THE TROOPS OF THE ROYAL ARMY PD PARA THE
FOREGOING CHANGES WILL TAKE PLACE ON TWO TWO NOVEMBER ONE NINE FOUR THREE PD
BADOGLIO UNQUOTE

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING

SECRET

24/22

NOT GIVEN

3933

FREEDOM

NOV 211835A

FATIMA

NOV 221850A

1. Boulnois has suggested kindest and best thing would be to explain to vast Italian army in Sardinia how limited are possibilities for it to fight on mainland. (ACTION FATIMA INFO FABLE SIGNED CINC CITE FHGCT).

2. Ref your 539 of 22 Oct. You will suggest to Italian High Command that they furnish such information concerning employment of Italian forces to Italian Commander Sardinia as they consider desirable in order to alleviate situation reported by Boulnois.

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CONTROL COMMISSION
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OUTGOING

SECRET

14/22

PRIORITY

1082

FATIMA

Nov 221850A

FREEDOM REPEAT FILPOT

THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE NEED FOR AN AGREED SCHEDULE OF PRIORITIES AND PROCEDURE FOR ALLOCATION OF ITALIAN TROOPS UNDER THE POLICY CONTAINED IN G THREE LETTER QUOTE EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES UNQUOTE THREE OCTOBER ONE NINE FOUR THREE DASH P REPEAT PETER SLANT ONE ZERO NINE PD TO FREEDOM REPEAT FILPOT FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PD I RECOMMEND THAT A QUALIFIED OFFICER FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS BE SENT HERE AT ONCE TO SETTLE THESE QUESTIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMISSION AND THE FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP PD MEANWHILE CMA IMMEDIATE REQUESTS FOR TROOPS ORIGINATING FROM THE ALLIED ARMIES ARE BEING TRANSMITTED BY THE COMMISSION TO THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND FOR COMPLIANCE

AUTHENTICATED:MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

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1634