

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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USE & DISPOSITION OF ITALIAN
ARMED FORCES, ARMY & GENERAL
SEPT. - NOV. 1943

80PP

BIGOT
SECRET

3 September 1943

Page One.

1.

This aide memoire enumerates the points which it has been agreed that the Italian Government will do everything possible to accomplish prior to the proclamation of an Armistice between the Italian Forces and those of the Allies, and other points on which action is to be taken subsequent to the proclamation.

2.

From the hour that the Armistice instrument comes into force until its proclamation:

(a) Take all possible measures to safeguard ALLIED prisoners of war. If GERMAN pressure to hand them over becomes too great they should if possible be released and succoured by the people.

(b) NO ITALIAN warships are to be allowed to fall into GERMAN hands. Arrangements must be made to insure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, immediately on declaration of Armistice. ITALIAN submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would be a revealing measure.

(c) No merchant shipping is to be allowed to fall into GERMAN hands. Merchant shipping in Northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports South of the Line VENICE - LAGHORN. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

(d) GERMAN Forces should not be allowed to take over ITALIAN coast defences.

(e) Arrangements are to be made to be put in force at the proper time for ITALIAN organizations in the BALKANS to march to the coast, with a view to their being taken off to ITALY by the UNITED NATIONS.

3. For the defence of ROME, in which one Allied Airborne Division (probably reinforced) is to participate, detailed plans will be completed and all preliminary preparations made, including the following:-

(a) Three key airfields in the vicinity of ROME to be effectively secured

(b) Preparatory moves will be taken to insure that all avenues to ROME can be seized and blocked with the least delay.

(c) Agreed navigational aids for the ALLIED troop-carrying aircraft will be established.

(d) Full measures will be taken to insure that anti-aircraft fire is not opened on the troop-carrying aircraft. As far as possible

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(e) No merchant shipping is to be allowed to fall into GERMAN hands. Merchant shipping in Northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports South of the Line VENICE - LEBRON. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

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(c) Agreed navigational aids for the ALLIED troop-carrying aircraft will be established.

(d) Full measures will be taken to insure that anti-aircraft fire is not opened on the troop-carrying aircraft. As far as possible neutralize GERMAN RUF stations.

(e) Arrangements will be made for contact between Commander and Staff, immediately the division lands.

(f) Arrangements will be made for provision of all supplies required by the airborne division, exclusive of ammunition (food, trucks, possibly some medical assistance).

(g) Fighter groups selected by the ITALIAN air force to be retained to assist in defence of ROME.

4. Anticipating the need for lengthy communications which cannot be handled by the present link, arrangements will be made for a rendez-vous as required at times and places to be designated by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, and with recognition signals. Written messages

22/.....BIGOT

SECRET

Page Two.

in code will be exchanged for onward transmission by hand of officer courier.

5. PROCLAMATION

At 1830 hours ROME time (1830 B hrs) X day (X day will be communicated later but only a few hours in advance) following immediately after the announcement of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Force of the conclusion of an Armistice, which announcement will begin at 1815 hours ROME time, Marshal BADOLLO will proclaim the Armistice by every available means of public dissemination, by radio broadcast, by announcement to the press and foreign diplomatic corps, and by telephone and telegraph to all agencies of the ITALIAN Government and the ITALIAN Armed Forces. Included in this proclamation will be orders to the ITALIAN Armed Forces and people to cease all forms of resistance to the Armed Forces of the UNITED NATIONS. At the same time instructions will be issued to resist and obstruct the operations of the GERMAN Forces in every possible way as long as they remain on ITALIAN soil.

6. POST-PROCLAMATION MEASURES:

From and after 1830 hours ROME time (1830 B hrs) X day the following measures are to be put in train, as rapidly as practicable:

(a) A ceasing of work by all personnel engaged in occupations which facilitate the maintenance, movement and/or operations of the GERMAN Armed Forces.

(b) So far as possible, the paralysis of all movement of GERMAN Forces throughout ITALY, especially in areas mentioned in sub-paragraph 'd' below, by the following means:

(1) By direct attacks on Headquarters and Command Posts of GERMAN military organizations.

(2) Cutting of GERMAN communications (telephone and telegraph, road and rail).

(3) Destruction by sabotage or other means of enemy motor transport.

(4) Ambushing Staff cars, dispatch riders and transport movement generally.

(c) The destruction of GERMAN aircraft, stores of petrol, oil, ammunition, etc, especially in areas mentioned in sub-paragraph 'd' and around ROCCIA.

(d) (1) ROME area

(a) The seizure of all communications running through the outskirts of the city to prevent the Germans occupying it or moving through it.

(b) Direct attack on GERMAN Headquarters at FRASCATI.

(c) Air defence of city.

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(2) SPEZZIA Area

Maximum cover for the departure of the fleet.

(3) Between ROME and NAPLES

Interfere as much as possible with movement of GERMAN divisions located between ROME and NAPLES.

(4) NAPLES

Prevent destruction of port and shipping and hold port area if possible.

(5) TARANTO

Seize and hold port for entrance of UNITED NATIONS Forces.

(6) BARI and BRINDISI/.....

1616

Page Three

(6) BARI and BRINDISI

Same as TARANTO, but with priority to TARANTO

(7) CALABRIA.

Out off GERMAN Forces in the TOE of ITALY by blocking road and rail communications.

AIDE-MEMOIRE for GENERAL MACFARLANE

No 2

It happened that Anglo-american troops take directly possess of our military and civilian motor-cars, oils and petrols, leaving receipt and promising to give them back.

This is more than, being asked and with great sacrifice on our side, we have already given to the new Basis of Taranto.

If we go on with this system Italian troops will loose every possibility of operating. It is therefore necessary that Anglo-american forces ask regularly what they temporary need.

September the 15 th 1943.-

Quindici diary. Vol 1. Folio 10.

15 September 1943.

RECONSTITUTION OF ITALIAN UNITS

(Translation)

1) Since it is impossible to produce Italian ammunition in Southern Italy, it is not possible to determine the number of units which can be reconstituted, unless we know how many and what munitions there are in Libya, Tunisia, Sicily and Calabria.

The first thing, therefore, to do is to authorize us to make an inventory, urgently, of such munitions, and to put them at our disposal.

2) We ask the same for German ammunition and arms which are in the same area, and in general for all the Ital - German material which still remains there

3) On the basis, approximately decided, of the above mentioned things available, and of the clothing and equipment available in Southern Italy and of that which the Anglo - Americans can supply us with, it will be possible to determine the number of units to be reconstituted as well as the program of reconstitution.

4) As for personnel, both officers and men, we consider it convenient to utilize especially the prisoners of war in Libya and Tunisia, belonging (as far as the men are concerned) to central and Northern Italy. As far as Officers are concerned, above all, we should like those of the General Staff, and those who are career officers, especially those of a lower rank.

Naturally, for moral reasons, a certain proportion of prisoners of other categories and from other regions should be returned.

5) In the same way prisoners from Central and Northern Italy, at present or ultimately in Sicily and Calabria, should be put at our disposal.

*(Presumably from
William Duvernois Command)*

Revised: 1943. Vol I. Folio 14.

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*(Presumably from
Medium Supreme Command)*

Binding: Vol. I. Folio 14.

Most Urgent NOTE No 5.

IN THE ISLAND OF CEFALONIA
(Translation)

15 or 16 Sep 43

A battle has started between Italians and Germans for the possession of the island and therefore of the bay of Argostoli.

The Germans are using numerous Stukas; it is a matter of great urgency to have the support of the Allied Air Force on behalf of the land troops or also that Allied troops should be sent to their assistance as quickly as possible on warships.

The possession of the bay of Argostoli is of the greatest importance for the British Navy.

(Presumably for Italian Supreme Command)

Lionides' Diary. Vol 1. F.R. 15.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

TO : AFHQ

Ref 003

DATE : 17 September 1943

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

I HAVE SEEN A FURTHER URGENT REQUEST FOR HELP TO BE GIVEN TO ITALIAN TROOPS IN
CEPALONIA. THEY ARE SAID TO BE UNDER HEAVY ATTACK FROM NUMEROUS STUKAS.
ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HOLDING THE ISLAND.

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NOTE N. 22

19 - 9 1943

(follows note n. 5)

Command garrison Cefalonia urgently requests help naval and aerial means to check movement of Germans who transport personnel to the island.

Should the Allied Command wish to keep the island, help must be sent immediately to the garrison; if not the necessary shipping must be organized to evacuate the troops from the island when resistance will no longer be possible.

/s/ (?)

Quindisi Diary, Vol I. Fol 46

- 011

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET

16 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ, Tunis.

1. Yesterday I had a long talk with General Roatta, Chief of Staff. Later on I saw General Ambrosio with General Roatta and finally Marshall Badoglio with Mr MacMillan and Mr Murphy.

2. I telegraphed you yesterday the situation regarding Italian troops in this area which is as follows:

Headquarters 7th Army (General Arisio) at Francavilla.
Headquarters 9th Corps (General Leri) at Bari.
Headquarters 51st Corps (General DeStefani) at Brindisi.
Headquarters 31st Corps (General Mercogli) at Calabria.

3. 9 Corps is static and contains only coastal troops. (I have asked Airborne Division to send a platoon to Bari to guard the all important wireless station against sabotage or raid).

a. 51st Corps is supposed to be mobile. In point of fact, it is far removed from being so. It consists of the Legnano Division in the Brindisi Area. This division is now practically up to strength. Also the Piceno Division in the Francavilla Area which with the approval of 900 Airborne Division is moving to an area about ten miles north of Francavilla as soon as possible.

b. 31st Corps comprises the Mantova Mobile Division which has had most of its transportation removed by the Germans. There are also some immobile coastal formations under command of this Corps.

c. There are also in Calabria three independent battalions of apparently fairly high Italian standard. These are one battalion (Membo) paratroops and two battalions (815 and 816 AS).

4. The Italian High Command are most anxious to move these three battalions to the Taranto Area. They are also anxious to move the Mantova Division from Crotona by sea to Taranto to join up with 51st Corps.

5. They wish to produce a Corps (51st) on our right flank to operate on our right side up the eastern coastal sector.

6. I informed them that I would pass on their requests as also their request that we should stiffen up these defenses with either tanks or at least carriers.

SECRET

SECRET

7. I have naturally stressed very strongly that no movements or operations can be undertaken by them except under the orders of the Allied Commander on the spot. This they fully realized.

8. The Command of all the troops in theheel of Italy Area is vested in the 7th Italian Army. I have arranged for the liaison officers to be exchanged between this Headquarters and Headquarters our 5th Corps and No. 6 Base Sub Area, Taranto.

9. At the request of Commander, Airborne Division I have asked the Italian High Command to attach three groups of Italian Field Artillery to the Airborne Division. They have promised to comply as far as mobility permits.

10. The Italian High Command also wish their four mobile divisions to return from Sardinia to Southern Italy. I told them there was very little chance of this at the moment.

11. The ammunition situation of the Italian forces in Southern Italy may be rather better than they told me the day before yesterday. It appears that their used-to-be considerable stocks in the Area Brindisi-Bari which have been considerably depleted but there may be appreciable amounts left. I ought to have the fitters tomorrow.

? figures

12. As regards the suggestion that we should collect and forward to Italy stocks of ammunition captured by us in North Africa and Sicily. The Italian High Command request that they should be allowed to send some technical experts to help in sorting out what they most require. I told them that if we were able to comply with the request for ammunition we would certainly accept their suggestion regarding technical assistance. As regards reconstituting the Italian Army the High Command state that there would be little difficulty in producing men and that it was almost entirely a question of armament and munitions. They made two suggestions:

a. That we might be able to let them have captured German weapons and ammunition. I held out little hope on this point.

b. That we should let them have some of the prisoners we have taken and in the first instance certain officers (staff) of whom they were badly in need

13. I had to listen to a long dissertation on the strategical situation by Ambrosio. His principal point was that by a frontal advance from south to north through Italy we were in fact playing the enemy's game and that it was clearly indicated that we ought to make a landing in force on the eastern coast north of Rimini or at any rate far enough north to cut off the Germans in the centre and south of Italy. Ambrosio was anxious that we should use Bari as soon as possible as a port of disembarkation. Ambrosio described an advance to be rough line Foggia - Naples as a small maneuver with a very limited object.

SECRET

SECRET

14. I listened patiently to his dissertation and said that I thought that in the absence of knowledge of most of the factors involved it was a *fair* academic effort.

15. Ambrosio stressed the point that Italy was now determined to fight to a finish and that the Italian forces would continue to fight even after Italy had been liberated. I said all the right things.

16. I spoke very straight to Ambrosio and Hoatta on the following lines. I said that the apparently classy way in which they were writing off practically all of the Italian Army but not in liberated territory made no sense at all. It was in fact utterly contrary to the spirit in which I imagined them to be cooperated. I told them that they must by every possible means keep these formations fighting and as far as possible direct their action. Bari radio ought to be in full blast all the 24 hours with encouragement and directives to their isolated forces and the civil population. I said I would try to produce some wireless sets to send out to such formations as were still making a fight and with which they had at the moment no communication. ((propose if you agree to use some of the six SOE sets which I am expecting for this purpose)).

17. I also again stressed the extreme importance of organising sabotage and propaganda on the most intensive scale as early as possible. I said that I hoped to produce in the near future a strong SOE and PWE team and that I was counting upon the Italian authorities to cooperate with this team to the maximum extent.

18. Ambrosio appeared to realize very fully that I was insisting on him and his staff waking up and getting a real move on and he assured me that he would go flat out on all the points I had made.

Lieutenant General
Head of Mission.

SECRET

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

DATE : 16 September 1943

TO : CINC A.F.H.Q.

PREC : IMMEDIATE

REF. NO.

CLASS: SECRET.

MSG NO. 11

FOR CINC FROM MACFARLANE

ITALIAN NINTH CORPS COMMANDING ONLY STATIC COASTAL TROOPS HAS MOVED
FIVE
TO BARI PD/ONE CORPS NOW IN BRINDISI COMMANDS LEGNANO DIVISION
AROUND BRINDISI AND PICENO DIVISION IN FRANCAVILLA AREA PD WITH CONSENT
COMMANDER AIRBORNE DIVISION PICENO DIVISION IS MOVING A SHORT DISTANCE
TO THE NORTH PD ITALIANS WISH TO MOVE MANTOVA DIVISION FROM CROTONE
AREA TO TARANTO TO JOIN NINTH CORPS PD THEY WISH TO FORM A MOBILE CORPS
OF THREE DIVISIONS TO OPERATE UP THE COAST ON OUR RIGHT PD APPARENTLY
ITALIAN THIRTY ONE CORPS IN CALABRIA WILL BE LEFT WITH ONLY COASTAL TROOPS
PD ITALIANS HAVE PROMISED TO PROVIDE SOME ARTILLERY FOR AIRBORNE DIVISION
PD DON'T KNOW YET HOW MUCH PD ITALIAN AMMUNITION SITUATION MAY BE RATHER
BETTER THAN REPORTED YESTERDAY PD I WILL KNOW MORE ABOUT THIS TOMORROW

MACFARLANE

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

TO : A.F.H.Q.

REF NO. M 102

MGS NO. 17

DATE : 16 September 1943

PREG :

CLASS: SECRET

In response to request for 3,000 soldiers for work in the Taranto Docks
and for 300 lorries, Italians are providing about 2,000 soldiers and
1,000 civilians but only 50 lorries. please inform Macmillan.

Macfarlane

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1636

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1943

TO : FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 013

PREC IMPORTANT

YOUR NUMBER TEN THROUGH MASSINGHAM.

I'VE BEEN CHASING ITALIANS ON QUESTION OF ASSISTANCE IN TANTO PORT
FOR LAST THREE DAYS. SITUATION HAS IMPROVED AND IF ITALIANS FULFIL
THEIR PROMISES IT SHOULD BE VERY MUCH BETTER. SIGNED MACFARLANE,
I MADE ALL ARRANGEMENTS TO RECEIVE DUKE ACETA THREE DAYS AGO.

AUTHENTICATED.

SUPREME COMMAND OPERATIONS SECTION
(Translation)

MEMO No 6.

16 September 43.

SUBJECT : - Operations in the Aegean.

The German troops in the RODI area have a total strength equivalent to 5 battalions partly motorised and partly armoured; a portion of these troops is certainly detailed for the surveillance of Italian troops; the coastal defense is most efficacious; the aerodrome of CATTAVIA can be reduced in a very short time.

Nevertheless it would be opportune to organise a landing in the central part of the island overcoming the troops of Cyprus and of the EAST. It is unlikely that the future will present such a favourable opportunity to reconquer the island, whose possession is of fundamental importance for eventual operations in the Aegean.

Brindin Diary. Vol I. Fol. 16.

HIGH COMMAND OPERATIONS SECTION
(Translation)

P.M. 167. 16 September 49.

NOTE No. 9.

In execution of the conditions of the Armistice, among other units, the steamer "COSTANTE C" has also sailed to Malta.

This ship had the following cargo:-

1000 Barrels of Petrol.
410 Tons of Food Supplies.
5 Tons of Sanitary (Medical) Material.
2 Tons of Transport Material.

As we are concerned with material which is badly needed at this moment, and on which we count a great deal at the moment, it would be desirable that the said steamer should return, with it's cargo, to an Italian port.

Bonidin Diary Vol I Folio 19.

NOTE N. 19

COMANDO SUPREMO
OPERATION OFFICE

P.M. 21, September 19th 1943

Following note n. 9 we communicate that between the 10 and 12 of this month, besides the steamer "Costante C", the following others have been sent from Bari to Malta:

- Steamer	FELACOSA	- with fodder and oats
- "	RINUCCI	- " 1067 tons of <u>food</u> and various material
- "	APUANIA	- with 70 tons of <u>frozen meat</u>
- "	MONTEBELLO	- " 354 tons of <u>food</u> and various material
- "	LUANA	- with 700 tons of <u>ammunitions</u> and <u>food</u>

Considering the precarious logistical situation of the troops scattered in Puglia and Calabria, it would be most important to get back these steamers, or at least part of the material they were loaded with.

The question is of particular interest for food and ammunitions.

/s/ (?)

Bonidin Diary Vol 1. For us.

1632

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

TO : AFHQ

REF. NO.

MGS NO. 12

? Sept-
DATE: 16 August 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: IMMEDIATE

Italians inform me that Italian 31 Corps report that commander 13 Corps has forbidden use of telephone to Italian troops and has put two Italian Divisional Commander in a concentration camp. Please give me some explanation earliest possible. If the story is true no doubt they deserved it but it makes things a bit difficult here.

Glad to receive your No 101. Am writing (?) again by Macmillan who returns Tunis on 16th.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: BRINDISI MISSION

TO : FREEDOM

REF. NO. 018

5-6

DATE: 190925B 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC

MISSION

ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND HAVE REGISTERED THEIR REGRET THAT COMMANDER
BRITISH ONE THREE CORPS HAS FORBIDDEN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THREE
ONE ITALIAN CORPS AND SEVEN ITALIAN ARMY. SIGNED MACFARLANE.
ALSO THAT ITALIAN THREE ONE CORPS HAS BEEN ORDERED TO CATANZARO
TO REORGANISE THE AREA. I REPLIED THAT THESE MEASURES WERE
DOUBTLESS OPERATIONALLY NECESSARY AND THAT AT THE MEANTIME THEY
MUST BE CARRIED OUT.

AUTHENTICATED.

1600

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: G-2 FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

REF. NO. 6011

DATE: 17 September 1943

CLASS: MOST SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

Following from Hitchens. You must ensure rapidest communication
all intelligence reach Italian High Command concerning German military
activities in ROME Northern Italy. Send latest picture German Battle
order in North. Are 18 rpt 13 panzer and 14 rpt 14 motorized divs
confirmed query.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : G-2 FREEDOM

REF. NO. 028

Sep
DATE: 191430Z 1943

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

YOUR 6011 DATED 17 SEPTEMBER.

ITALIANS HAVE NO INFORMATION GERMAN DISPOSITIONS LATER THAN ORDER
OF BATTLE PROVIDED BY CASTELIANO.

BRIGADIER STRONG, FOORD HAVE ARRIVED AND ARE MEETING COMMANDO SUPREMO
WITH VIEW TO ITALIANS ORGANISING SOME INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.
AT PRESENT NONE EXISTS.

AUTHENTICATED

(Presumably ^{from} ~~for~~ Italian Supreme Command)

Nota 17

18 September 1943

In analogy with what has been arranged for the fleet, authority is requested for the flying of the national flag on airports also, keeping unchanged the present instructions which regulate it's display.

The question is of capital importance in it's bearing upon morale and disciplinary cohesion of air forces, a cohesion which is entirely in the interests of their collaboration with the Allied Forces.

In view of the need to give our Air Force Headquarters instructions on this point as soon as possible an early reply would be very welcome.

See Brindisi reconstituted file 34.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 201015B 1943

TO : AFHQ CP REPEAT AFHQ

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 38

PREG: IMPORTANT

I HAVE GIVEN PERMISSION TO ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND TO FLY THE ITALIAN
FLAG ON THE AIRPORTS IN THE SAME WAY AS ITALIAN NAVY HAVE BEEN ALLOWED
TO FLY THEIR FLAGS. IF THIS IS NOT APPROVED LET ME KNOW.

AUTHENTICATED

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : BRINDISI MISSION

DATE : 18 September 1943

TO : FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 008

PREC: IMMEDIATE

.....

VISITED COMMANDER SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY WITH COMMANDER BRITISH FIFTH ~~ARMY~~ CORPS
LAST NIGHT. LIAISON WELL ESTABLISHED. SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY APPEAR TO
BE COOPERATING SATISFACTORILY UP TO DATE BUT WE HAVE BIG REQUIREMENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH TARANTO PORT AND IT IS TOO EARLY TO BE CERTAIN. SIGNED
MACFARLANE. POSITION OF COMMANDER FIFTH CORPS FULLY EXPLAINED TO COMMANDER
SEVENTH ARMY AND LATER TO GENERAL ROATH. BOTH UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT NO
ITALIAN TROOPS CAN MOVE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF COMMANDER FIFTH CORPS
IN THIS AREA.

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AUTHENTICATED

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : FATIMA

DATE: 241020E Sep

TO : AFHQ ADV CP rpt to FREEDOM

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO: 084

PRIOR : MOST IMMEDIATE

ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND STATE THAT ITALIAN GARRISON ON CORFU CONSISTS OF ONE EIGHT INFANTRY REGIMENT OF AQUI DIVISION. ABOUT THREE ZERO DASH SEVEN FIVE MILLIMETER GUNS FIELD ARTILLERY AND SOME CARBINIERI. TOTAL OF ABOVE ABOUT THREE THOUSAND. THESE HAVE BEEN JOINED BY ABOUT THREE THOUSAND ITALIAN TROOPS WHO HAVE ESCAPED FROM ALBANIA WITH ONLY THEIR WEAPONS. THE ONLY ANTI DASH AIRCRAFT IS ONE BATTERY OF EIGHT DASH TWO ZERO MILLIMETER GUNS. NO TANKS. NO ANTI DASH TANK GUNS. LAST NIGHT THE GERMANS LANDED ON THE SOUTHWEST COAST IN THE AREA SOUTH OF LAKE KORISSIO. UNCONFIRMED REPORTS STATE SIX LANDING CRAFT WERE USED AND THAT STUKAS ARE ACTIVE THIS MORNING.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission.

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OUTGOING MESSAGEALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 241420B SEP

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV OP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 87

PREC: IMMEDIATE

ISLAND OF CORFU. GERMANS HAVE GOTTEN A FOOTING AND JUDGING BY PRECEDENTS THE CHANCES THAT THE ITALIANS CAN HOLD OUT FOR MORE THAN A SHORT TIME SEEM SMALL. THERE IS UNDOUBTED SCOPE FOR AIR SUPPORT AND ALSO SUPPORT BY NAVAL LIGHT CRAFT. WE ARE ENCOURAGING ITALIANS TO DO THEIR BEST WITH THEIR OWN RESOURCES. AS FAR AS GROUND TROOPS ARE CONCERNED THE TIME IS PROBABLY PASSED WHEN ANYTHING SHORT OF STRONG REINFORCEMENTS OF ALL ARMS WOULD DO ANY GOOD. I ASKED BADOGLIO THIS MORNING WHY HE HAD CHOSEN TO USE THREE VALUABLE MERCHANT SHIPS TO REMOVE DISARMED ITALIAN TROOPS FROM PORT EDDA INSTEAD OF PUTTING REINFORCEMENTS INTO CORFU. HIS REPLY WAS THAT THE ITALIAN COMMAND HAD NOT ANTICIPATED ATTACK ON CORFU FOR SOMETIME. PLEASE INFORM ME WHETHER YOU ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO RETAINING CORFU AND IF SO WHETHER I SHOULD URGE ITALIANS TO REINFORCE THEIR GROUND TROOPS IN THE ISLAND. I HAVE TOLD THEM THAT ALL WE OURSELVES MIGHT MAKE AVAILABLE AT SHORT NOTICE IS ONE BATTALION MARINES AND POSSIBLY SOME LIGHT ANTI DASH AIRCRAFT. PLEASE ^{inform} THE CINC MED REFERENCE MY TALK WITH HIM YESTERDAY. I HAVE HAD TO CANCEL MY INTENTION OF GOING TO CORFU AS THE PORT WHERE WE WERE TO LAND IS APPARENTLY IN GERMAN HANDS AND FIRES HAVE BEEN REPORTED ON THE AERODROME.

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413310

159?
F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

AFQ 512

19 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ.

1. Attached is a memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army with reference to the Italian munitions in Sicily and Calabria.

2. The Allied Mission requests information as to the intention of AFHQ with regard to this subject. If it is expected to make the stocks available to the Italian forces in the near future it appears desirable to acquiesce in their suggestion to send technicians to supervise the assembling and sorting of the stocks in our hands.

For the Chief of Mission;

Maxwell D. Taylor
Brig. Gen. A.U.S.

1 Inclosure
Translation, memo Italian
C/S to Gen Macfarlane.

Brindley, VNI F. 38.

TRANSLATION

18 September 1943

NOTE FOR GENERAL MACFARLANE

The munitions which the divisions of the 51st Corps have amount to three days of fire (1)

In the advance depots on the coast which are in the course of organization there are not many stocks. As the most important depots are in the interior in areas at present controlled by the Germans, we cannot count on finding these in good condition.

To emphasize the importance of getting the Italian munitions from Sicily and Calabria the most useful lots are the following:

Caliber 6.5 mm for automatic rifle
Caliber 8 mm for the Breda machine gun
Caliber 8 mm for the Fiat 35 machine gun
Hand Grenades
81 mm mortar shells and cartridges
20 mm AA shells
Anti-Tank Projectiles 47/32
Projectiles for the 75/18 cannon
Shells for the 100/22 Howitzer
Shells for the 149/19 Howitzer

The underlined items are the most important for the moment.

It will be possible to send qualified Italian officers to the spot (i.e. Sicily and Calabria) to select the munitions and to assure that they are complete.

(1) The Italian day of fire (Unfoc):
Automatic rifles - 1200 rounds
Machine gun - 2000 rounds
Light artillery, per gun - 250 rounds
Medium artillery, per gun - 150 rounds

Chief of Staff

/s/ Roatta

150

Bonidin diary Vol I Folio 38

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA (for Gen Macfarlane)

CITE: FHCOS

JDJD 7074

DATE: 20 September 1943

DATE REC'D: 201000B

Proceed as soon as possible to carryout your recommendation for
organisation of Italian Divisions in Calabria, Taranto Areas into an Italian
Corps to operate under command of Eighth Army. Probable missions are as you
suggest, static defense of L of C, Ports etc. Also will probably be
required to perform some labour. Montgomery has been informed.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : FATIMA

TO : AFHQ CP rpt to FREEDOM

REF.NO. 044

Sep
DATE : 211918

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : IMMEDIATE

EXCAPED JUGOSLAV OFFICER (NAVAL) JUST ARRIVED HERE FROM SPLIT REPORTS
TWO DIVISIONS JUGOSLAV PARTISANS HOLDING SPLIT BEING SERIOUSLY HARRASSED
BY STUGAS FROM MOSTAR, ZAGREB AND ZEMUNIK. FORTRESS AT ENTRANCE TO
KLIS HARBOUR IS ALSO GIVING MUCH TROUBLE. AIR SUPPORT ON ABOVE TARGETS
URGENTLY REQUIRED. HE ALSO REPORTS ONE THREE THOUSAND MEN ALL DISARMED
ITALIAN BERGAMO DIVISION AWAITING SHIPS TO RESCUE THEM. IS THERE ANY
OBJECTION TO PERMITTING ITALIANS TO TAKE AIR AND NAVAL ACTION AS FAR
AS CAN BE ARRANGED QUERY.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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1589

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATMA

DATE: *Sep 21/458*

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 048

PREC: IMPORTANT

GENERAL AMBROSIO AGAIN SUGGESTED THIS MORNING THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER MAKING A LANDING ON THE EAST COAST TO PUT THE FORCE OF ABOUT ONE ITALIAN REINFORCED REGIMENT INTO THE ABBUZI HILLS, WHERE THERE ARE MANY ITALIAN SOLDIERS IN HIDING TO SYNCHRONIZE WITH OUR ADVANCE NORTHWARDS WHEN IT TAKES PLACE. I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED THIS PROJECT TO COMMANDER FIVE CORPS.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

REF. NO. 59

Sep
DATE: 221304 B

CLASS: SECRET

PPEC: IMPORTANT

ITALIAN AUTHORITIES ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE HAVE ISSUED ORDERS
PROHIBITING THE USE OF TELEPHONES BY CIVILIANS IN THE BRINDISI
AND OCCUPIED AREAS EXCEPTING FOR PREFECTS, QUESTORS AND FIRE
BRIGADES. (THIS IS GOOD)

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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418810

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 240939 B Sep

TO : FATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 8744

PREQ: ROUTINE

Pending firm operational decisions regarding Gardinia it appears that minimum military and naval forces will be sent to back up air commitments which are likely to be small. Signals policy will be to make every possible use of existing telephone facilities in order reduce outlay signals personnel and equipment to minimum.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

REF. NO. 60

Sep
DATE: 122222Z B

CLASS: SECRET

PRIORITY: MOST IMMEDIATE

ATTENDED MONTGOMERY'S CONFERENCE AT FIVE HEADQUARTERS TODAY. LATER
MET GENERAL ARISIO COMMANDING SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY AND MONTGOMERY EXPLAINED
HIS WISHES. ARISIO AGREED IN EVERY RESPECT BUT STATED THAT DECISION
RESTED WITH BADOGLIO. HAVE JUST FINISHED A VERY LONG DISCUSSION WITH
BADOGLIO AND ARISIO. FINALLY SECURED THEIR COMPLETE AGREEMENT TO THE
PROPOSALS MADE BY MONTGOMERY. THESE PROPOSALS WITH WHICH MONTGOMERY
AND I WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS.
ALL ITALIAN TROOPS IN SOUTHERN ITALY ARE UNDER THE COMMAND OF GENERAL
ARISIO WHO IN TURN IS UNDER COMMAND OF GENERAL MONTGOMERY.
ARISIO WILL HAVE UNDER HIM THE THREE ONE ITALIAN CORPS WHICH WILL COMMAND
ALL ITALIAN TROOPS IN CALABRIA, ALSO ITALIAN FIVE ONE AND NINE CORPS IN
APULIA AND HEEL OF ITALY. THE ITALIANS UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT IN THE
MEANTIME THEIR TROOPS WILL BE USED FOR GUARDING LINES OF COMMUNICATION,
AIRDROMES, VITAL POINTS, AND WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE LABOUR AND
GENERALLY MAKE THEMSELVES USEFUL AS REQUIRED IN REAR AREAS TO BEST HELP
THE COMING OPERATIONS.

DETAILS WILL BE ARRANGED BETWEEN SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY AND BRITISH
EIGHT ARMY WHO WILL PROVIDE A SMALL MISSION AT SEVENTH ITALIAN ARMY
HEADQUARTERS.

BADOLIO MADE ONLY ONE COMPARATIVELY SMALL REQUEST ON WHICH I AM
TELEGRAPHING YOU SEPARATELY.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

1587

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM

REF. NO. 61

Sep
DATE: 222228 B

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

REFERENCE MY CABLE NUMBER 60.

BADOGGIO IS DESPERATELY ANXIOUS THAT ONE ITALIAN INFANTRY REGIMENT WITH A GROUP OF FIELD ARTILLERY AND ONE ANTI - TANK UNIT AND AN ENGINEER UNIT SHOULD BE AFFILIATED TO ONE OF OUR DIVISIONS TAKING PART IN THE FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS. HE SAYS QUITE RIGHTLY THAT THIS WILL HAVE A VERY GREAT EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY AS A WHOLE. HE ASSURES ME THAT THEY WILL BE PICKED TROOPS AND THAT HE WILL EQUIP THEM COMPLETELY WITH THE BEST EQUIPMENT HE POSSESSES AND WILL ENSURE AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE MANY GRAVE OBJECTIONS TO ATTACHING A BRIGADE GROUP OF THIS DESCRIPTION TO A FIELD ARMY FORMATION OF OURS. ON THE OTHER HAND BADOGGIO PLEADED ALMOST PATHETICALLY TO BE PERMITTED TO DO SO AND I AM MYSELF CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD HAVE AN ADMIRABLE EFFECT UPON ITALIAN ARMY COOPERATION. YOU SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT WE HAVEN ALLOWED THE REMNANTS OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCES IN SOUTHERN ITALY TO OPERATE WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS ON THE COOPERATION THEY ARE GIVING. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT IF BADOGGIO'S SUGGESTION IS APPROVED THE ITALIAN BRIGADE GROUP SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO ONE OF THE DIVISIONS OF FIVE BRITISH CORPS

IN SECOND LINE. AMBROSIO HAS GUARANTEED TO HAVE THE BRIGADE GROUP AS ABOVE CONCENTRATED WHENEVER REQUIRED IN ONE WEEK FROM TODAY. PLEASE INFORM ME AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE IF YOU AGREE. YOUR AGREEMENT WOULD BE A GESTURE OF VERY GREAT VALUE INDEED AND WOULD DO MUCH TO MAKE UP FOR BADOGLIO'S DISAPPOINTMENT IN NOT BEING ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS WITH AN ITALIAN CORPS. FINALLY SUCCEEDED TONIGHT IN CONVINCING BADOGLIO THAT ANY SUCH SUGGESTION WAS RIDICULOUS AND THE GOOD GRACE WITH WHICH HE FINALLY APPROVED ALL ASKED OF HIM IS POSSIBLY DESERVING OF THIS CONCESSION ON OUR PART.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 23 September 1943

TO : 15th ARMY GROUP FPD
FATIMA, FAIRFIELD,
(EBS pass in clear)

CLASS: MOST SECRET

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

REF NO. 8698

Reference FATIMA number 60 dated 23 September. Decision with regard to employment ITALIAN Infantry Regt. as suggested is left to General ALEXANDER. In further telegram just received General MACFARLANE again stresses how strongly BADOLLO feels on this subject and stresses the great effect upon the ITALIAN morale which would result from a favourable reply. Please notify AFHQ definite decision repeat to General MACFARLANE.

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM REPEAT TO AFHQ CP
(FREEDOM Pass in Cypher Held)

REF. NO. 066

Sep
DATE: 230915 B

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: MOST IMMEDIATE

YOU WILL RECEIVING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM BADOGLIO ABOUT ALLOWING ITALIAN TROOPS TO BE EMPLOYED IN ACTUAL FIGHTING. THIS WAS SENT BEFORE MY TALK WITH BADOGLIO WHICH I REPORTED IN MY TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 060 and 061 OF YESTERDAY. BADOGLIO'S MESSAGE INDICATES HOW DEEPLY HE FEELS ON THIS SUBJECT. IF IN YOUR REPLY TO HIM YOU COULD INDICATE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE TO HIS REQUEST FOR AN ITALIAN REGIMENT TO BE ATTACHED TO ONE OF OUR FIELD DIVISIONS YOU WOULD CHEER UP THE OLD GENTLEMAN AND THE ITALIAN ARMY AS A WHOLE. BADOGLIO ADDRESSED ABOUT FOUR HUNDRED OFFICERS HERE YESTERDAY AND IS TALKING TO A BIGGER OFFICER AUDIENCE TODAY. HE TELLS ME THAT HIS MEETING YESTERDAY WAS MOST ENTHUSIASTIC. HE IS CERTAINLY DOING HIS BEST BUT/DOES NOT ALTER THE FACT THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF POSSIBLY A VERY FEW PICKED UNITS THE ITALIAN ARMY IS QUITE INCAPABLE OF FIGHTING GERMANS.

AUTHENTICATED

785015

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 23 September 1943

TO: RAIDA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 560 (R 11/24)

PREC: URGENT

In my name you are authorized to accept as a principle the offer of Badoglio for a reinforced Italian Regiment to serve with one of our Divisions. Read your 061 and 066. General Alexander will inform you direct of unit to which this force is to be attached.

NEW SUBJECT: For your personal information President and Prime Minister have agreed in general on status co-belligerent contingent on declaration of war against Germany by Badoglio Government and certain other requirements. We have sufficient information to proceed with conference with Badoglio and arrival here tomorrow of Cinc Med. will give you more details as to time and place.

NEW SUBJECT: Inform Badoglio that American General Roosevelt just returned from Sardinia reports favourable situation and some units, particularly FEMBO Parachute Division, with considerable combat value and anxious to fight. Attend at earliest opportunity to transfer Italian forces in Corsica to Sardinia which subsequent movement of selected Italian units from Sardinia to Italian mainland as transport becomes available.

1573

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: 241422Z Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV OP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 89

PREC: IMPORTANT

I COMMUNICATED TO BADOGLIO THIS MORNING THE INFORMATION GIVEN IN THE
FIRST AND LAST PARAGRAPHS OF YOUR NUMBER FIVE SIX ZERO.

BADOGLIO WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE AND GRATEFUL. I WILL TELEGRAPH SHORTLY
EXACT POSITION AND STRENGTH OF THE REINFORCED ITALIAN REGIMENT WHICH
WILL ^{be} COMPLETE IN EVERY RESPECT AND READY TO MOVE ON THREE ZERO INSTANT.

AUTHENTICATED.

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt to 15th ARMY GROUP

M/C NR: 4/29

REF NO. 170

FILED: 291117A Sep

REC'D : 291117A

*Ref
Fatima
89*

COMPOSITION OF REINFORCED ITALIAN REGIMENT TO BE PLACED AT THE DISPOSITION OF EIGHTH ARMY FOLLOWS; ONE MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT OF THREE BATTALIONS STRENGTH TWO FIVE ZERO ZERO -; ONE ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF TWO GROUPS OF SEVEN FIVE MILLIMETER HOWITZERS, ONE GROUP OF ONE ZERO FIVE MILLIMETER HOWITZERS AND ONE BATTERY OF TWO ZERO CENTIMETER GUNS, ARTILLERY STRENGTH ONE SEVEN ZEROZERO; ATTACHED SERVICE TROOPS, SEVEN HUNDRED, TOTAL STRENGTH TWO TWO NINE OFFICERS AND FOUR NINE SEVEN EIGHT MEN. THIS FORCE IS ASSEMBLED IN THE BRINDISI DASH BARI AREA, READY FOR ATTACHMENT TO BRITISH FORCES SEPTEMBER THREE ZERO. ITALIANS CAN PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.

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448310

1577

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : FATIMA

DATE: 262250Z Sep

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 137

PREG: IMPORTANT

ITALIAN AUTHORITIES ARE MOST ANXIOUS THAT FOUR HUNDRED GERMAN PRISONERS
JUST ARRIVED FROM BALKANS SHOULD BE SENT TO NORTH AFRICA. ITALIANS
QUITE PREPARED TO MAKE SHIPPING AVAILABLE. PLEASE INSTRUCT ME.

NEW SUBJECT. BADOGLIO IS SENDING AN OFFICER TO SARDINIA TO REPORT
TO HIM ON THE STATE OF THE NEMBO PARACHUTE DIVISION. IF IT IS IN GOOD
SHAPE HE IS MOST ANXIOUS THAT IT SHOULD BE USED IF POSSIBLE WHEN WE
GET NEAR ROME TO HELP TO PREVENT THE GERMANS FROM COMMITTING RAVAGES
SIMILAR TO THEIR ACTION AT NAPLES.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVO/NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PRED: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NR: 21/4

REF NR: 273

FILED: 042210A Oct

REC'D:

THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND INDICATES THAT IF WE HAVE ANY INTENTION OF USING THE NEMBO PARACHUTE DIVISION IN SARDINIA IT WILL HAVE TO BE FURNISHED WITH PARACHUTES FROM ALLIED SOURCES. THE ITALIANS HOPE THAT IF THERE IS AN AIRBORNE OPERATION AGAINST ROME THE NEMBO PARACHUTISTS WILL HAVE AT LEAST TOKEN PARTICIPATION.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

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INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

DATE: 241504 B Sep

TO : NATIMA

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 8857

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Following messages from General BECUFFI commanding BERGANA DIVISION at SPALATO for MARSHALL BADOLIO should be passed Italian Government for action.

Para 2. First message states in execution armistice terms there are fifteen thousand (15,000) troops in SPALATO with five (5) days reduced rations. Dispatch of escorted ships in accordance promise repatriation urged and in event delay rations requested.

Para 3. Second message and no reply received and requests convoy transport fourteen thousand (14,000) to Italy. Hospital ship for six hundred (600) wounded requested. Only four days food remaining.

Para 4. Dates of messages, which were relayed from CAIRO, unknown. First message probably 20th September.

signed C in C

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: ROUTINE

FROM: FREEDOM (AFHQ)

TO: FATIMA

M/C NR: 31/14

REF NR: 2668

FILED: 031440A Oct

REC'D: 141837A

Please obtain and report early approximate overall personnel strengths separately for Italian Naval, Ground and Air Forces in mainland, treating following regions separately. CALABRIA, APULIA and occupied east coast belt, remaining occupied west coast. FABLE please report total strengths by services for Sardinia and Corsica combined. For your information these figures required for estimate food supply commitment. FATIMA REPEAT FABLE FAKIR FOR G-2 FROM G-2 FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FHGBI. Also ~~submitted~~ required detailed order of battle to include all specialist units such as Dock Operating Companies, GT Companies etc.. Will FAKIR and FABLE produce similar information concerning islands.

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM

M/C NO: 12

REF NO: 252

FILED: 032231A Oct

REC'D:

FROM ITALIAN COMANDO SUPREMO TO GENERAL CASTELLANO PD BAREN TO FREEDOM FOR GENERAL
CASTELLANO REPEAT AFHQ ADV CP AMILCAR FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE BAREN PD NUMBER
ONE SIX SIX SIX SLANT O REPEAT OBOE P REPEAT PETER PD REFERRING TO ONE SIX ONE PD
EXCELLENCE BADOGLIO THINKS NOT CONVENIENT FOR THE MOMENT TO CALL BACK IN ITALY THE
INDICATED GENERALS BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO THE SAME FOR OTHER GENERALS ALSO
WORTHY OF EVERY RESPECT PD GENERAL AMEROSIO

AUTHENTICATED:

FRANK A. HARTER
1st Lieut. AGD
Adjutant General.

785015

SECRET
Auth: CinC, AF
Initials
4 October 1943


ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

4 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Power.

The Italian Army has again requested the authority to transport from Crotona by sea two motorized artillery groups earmarked for the reinforced regiment to be attached to the 8th Army. If the 8th Army approves this movement, is it feasible from the naval point of view? The Italians will wish the artillery disembarked at Brindisi or Taranto.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission



SECRET

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

5 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier Martin, Headquarters, 15th Army Group.

1. Marshall Badoglio and party will arrive at Headquarters, 15th Army Group at 1300, 6 October. The party will consist of the Marshall, General Ambrosio, Chief of the Supreme General Staff, Colonel Valenzano, Aide-de-Camp to Marshall Badoglio and myself.
2. The Marshall will probably wish to discuss the following topics with General Alexander:
 - a. The disposition to be made of the Italian reinforced regiment which has been prepared for attachment to the 8th Army.
 - b. The attachment of Italian liaison officers from the High Command to the 15th Army Group, 8th and 5th Armies.
 - c. The possibility of employment of large tactical units of the Italian Army.
 - d. The extent of the contemplated use of Italian troops on lines of communication.
3. As no one in the party has ever been to your headquarters, I suggest the desirability of having us met by a guide somewhere on the road. This and any additional information which you wish to transmit can be sent back by our dispatch rider.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

SECRET

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/NR:

M/C NR: 10

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR: 296

PREC: PRIORITY

FILED: 062222A Oct

FROM: FATIMA

REC'D:

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV OP at AMILCAR

I ACCOMPANIED MARSHALL BADOGLIO AND GENERAL AMBROSIO TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF ONE FIVE ARMY GROUP WHERE THEY WERE RECEIVED BY GENERAL ALEXANDER P. IN THE COURSE OF A THREE HOUR CONFERENCE THE FOLLOWING MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED;

(A) THE USE OF THE REINFORCED ITALIAN REGIMENT TO BE ATTACHED TO THE EIGHTH ARMY.

(B) THE PLACING OF ITALIAN LIAISON OFFICERS AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF ONE FIVE ARMY GROUP.

(C) STRATEGY OF THE ENSUING CAMPAIGN TO RECOVER ROME AND NORTHERN ITALY.

THE ITALIANS RETURNED QUITE HAPPY OVER THEIR RECEPTION.

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen. U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

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1569

MEETING BETWEEN MARSHALL BADOLIO AND GENERAL ALEXANDER
AT THE COMMAND POST, 15TH ARMY GROUP, OCTOBER 6, 1943.

PRESENT

General Alexander
Marshal Badoglio
General Ambrosio
Air Marshal Coningham
General Lord Rennell
Major General Richardson
Brigadier General Taylor

Following luncheon at General Alexander's Headquarters, the officers mentioned above assembled to discuss matters of common interest. Marshal Badoglio first asked about the disposition of the reinforced regiment to be placed at the disposition of the Eighth Army. General Alexander stated that this was to be attached to the 1st British Airborne Division and that orders would be issued shortly.

General Ambrosio presented an estimate of the situation from the Italian point of view to General Richardson. A copy of this document had been previously submitted to this Mission.

General Alexander explained to the Italians his general plan of campaign and that his estimated time of arrival in Rome was about November 1. He indicated his intentions to push on beyond Rome and eventually occupy the Po Valley. He indicated his desire to receive an Italian liaison group for his headquarters, this group to include both military and air personnel. It was agreed that about four officers would be designated at once for attachment to his headquarters.

General Ambrosio proposed that the Italian troops in Sardinia either be used to land on the West coast of Italy in conjunction with the Fifth Army or to be used later in a landing operation North of Apennines. General Alexander replied that these divisions could hardly be used in the immediate future because of the lack of time to mount the operation, and also because of the shortage of shipping. He asked whether the Italians could provide their own craft. Ambrosio replied that they could, in part only, and observed that these divisions were without amphibious training. It was a general consensus that Italian Military participation to the conclusion of the operation against Rome would have to be limited to the reinforced regiment previously mentioned.

There followed a general discussion of the best method of occupying Northern Italy. The Italians recommended an operation based on Rimini, accompanied by an amphibious force landed near the mouth of the Piave. It was stated that the coast on either of the mouth of the Po was unsuitable for such operations.

Ambrosio raised the question of the movement of two battalions of artillery from Crotone to the Heel of Italy for the purpose of reinforcing the detachment being prepared for the Eighth Army. General Alexander said that this would be studied and a reply made subsequently.

Ambrosio also advanced the desirability of movement of the Pisceno and Legnano Divisions northward to the general vicinity of Altemura. He pointed out that such a movement northward would have a salutary effect upon the morale of the Italians. General Alexander replied that it would be necessary to wait a little longer before such a movement could be considered.

The meeting broke up with mutual expressions of confidence and good will.

(At the outset of the meeting General Alexander passed to General Taylor a note on the subject of the visits of the King of Italy outside the provinces under Italian jurisdiction. This note expressed his disapproval of any such movement into areas under military government)

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/O NR: 16/09

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR: 332

PREC: PRIORITY

FILED: 091801A Oct

FROM: FATIMA

REC'D:

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

AT HIS CONFERENCE WITH GENERAL ALEXANDER ON OCTOBER SIX MARSHALL BADOGLIO ASKED TO HAVE TWO BATTALIONS OF FIELD ARTILLERY TRANSPORTED FROM CROTONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF JOINING THE ITALIAN REINFORCED REGIMENT ATTACHED TO THE EIGHTH ARMY PD GENERAL ALEXANDER PROMISED TO TAKE THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION PD I HAVE SINCE BEEN INFORMED BY ADMIRAL POWER THAT THERE IS NO SHIPPING AVAILABLE IN THIS AREA AND THAT IF THE MOVE IS APPROVED ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS WILL HAVE TO MAKE SOME SPECIAL PROVISION PD IF THIS FACT ELIMINATES THE MOVEMENT FROM CONSIDERATION I REQUEST TO BE INFORMED

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General. U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 19/11

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR: 5818

PREC: PRIORITY

FILED: 111139A Oct

FROM: FREEDOM

RMC'D: 1111426A

TO: EATLA

Movements within combat area are controlled by 15th Army Group. Reference your 332 dated 9 October NOT to 15th Army Group. (Signed CinC. Cite ENGOT. Action EATLA for Taylor information 15th Army Group, AFHQ ADVANCED COMMAND POST). Suggest movement of vehicles of two battalions Italian artillery from Crotone to join Italian reinforced regiment take place STAR land.

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

9 October 1943

Major General Robertson
Fortbase, Taranto.

I attach herewith copies of cables exchanged between the Italian authorities and General Castellano, their representative in Algiers; also, a copy of a radio on the same subject I have sent forward to Allied Force Headquarters. Have you any knowledge of an order preventing the requisitioning of Italian stores?

3 Incls,

Copy to:

Colonel Westrop

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief of Mission.

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 18/09

CLASS: SECRET

REF NR: 334

PREC: URGENT

FILED: 091805A Oct

FROM: FATIMA

REC'D:

TO: FREEDOM

FOLLOWING FROM COMMANDO SUPREMO FOR GENERAL CASTELLANO PD TO FREEDOM FOR CASTELLANO
FROM FATIMA SIGNED TAYLOR PD QUOTE NINE OCTOBER ONE NINE FOUR THREE PD NUMBER
ONE EIGHT ONE THREE SLANT OP PD ALLIED MISSION IN CORSICA HAS INSTRUCTED THAT
ITALIAN TROOPS ARE TO MOVE TO SARDINIA TAKING WITH THEM ONLY WHAT IS ESSENTIAL
MERELY FOR THEIR LIVING AND LEAVING BEHIND IN CORSICA FOR THE FRENCH TROOPS
CMA ALL CARS CMA MOST HORSES AND PACK ANIMALS CMA LARGE AMOUNTS OF STORES AND
MATERIALS ~~AND~~ AMMUNITION AND PETROL PD IF THIS IS DONE OUR UNITS WOULD BECOME
INEFFECTIVE AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE PART IN OPERATIONS AS AGREED AT MALTA
MEETINGS PD PLEASE REQUEST ALLIED COMMAND TO REVOKE INSTRUCTIONS PD DECISION IS
URGENT AS MOVEMENT IS TO START TODAY OR TOMORROW SIGNED AMERICISIO UNQUOTE

AUTHENTICATED:

ROBERT E. DOE
Major. A.G.D.
Secretary to the Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM Fpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NR: 15/09

REF NR: 331

FILED: 091800Z Oct

REC'D:

REFERENCE MESSAGE TO ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND FROM CASTELLANO YOUR NUMBER FOUR EIGHT
NINE ZERO PD THIS MISSION HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY ORDER PREVENTING THE REQUISITIONING
OF STORES AND SUPPLIES BELONGING TO THE ITALIAN FIGHTING SERVICES PD WHILE SUCH
REQUISITIONING MUST OBVIOUSLY BE DONE WITH JUDGMENT SO AS TO PREVENT CRIPPLING
THESE SERVICES THERE ARE NOT MANY OCCASIONS WHEN IT HAS BEEN ESSENTIAL TO TAKE OVER
CERTAIN SUPPLIES NEEDED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITALIAN PORTS AND ELSEWHERE PD
I AM WITHHOLDING THE CITED CASTELLANO MESSAGE PENDING A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE
EXEMPTION OF REQUISITION YOU WISH ACCORDED THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : MATIA

M/C NR: 6/09

REF NR: 4890

FILED : 081917A Oct

REC'D : 090215A

Report is not correct. (Reference your #1688 for ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND from CASTELLANO signed EISENHOWER cite FILIA). In any case, message has been sent from here with strict order make no requisition on our stores and supplies.

SECRET

1561

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

10 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Richardson, Chief of Staff,
15th Army Group, Santo Spirito.

Subject: Return of Italian Military Equipment which
has been requisitioned or captured.

The Mission has received many reports from the Italian High Command that the development of their Armed Forces is being seriously handicapped by the amount of requisitioned material, particularly motor vehicles, now in the hands of Allied troops. While the immediate and essential military requirements of the Allied forces are certainly paramount there is some point beyond which we should not go reducing the limited means available to the Italian High Command. It appears to me that the only place where this matter can be decided in its higher aspects is at your headquarters. With your concurrence, I should like to propose to the Italians that matters of this sort involving Italian equipment with tactical units be taken up with your staff by the Italian liaison group. It would seem appropriate to carry all requisition matters in the Base Areas to General Robertson where the Italians already have a liaison contact.

Copy to:

General Robertson

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief of Mission

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1560

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

10 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Richardson, Chief of Staff,
15th Army Group, Santo Spirito.

Subject: Anticipated requirements for Italian troops.

General Roatta has requested an opportunity to discuss the matter of the anticipated requirements of the 15th Army Group for Italian troops for use in guarding lines of communications, anti-aircraft defense and similar duties. I informed him that you were preparing an estimate as to your probable needs and that it was unlikely that you would be ready yet to discuss the matter. I do agree with him, however, that if you intend to use Italian troops on a large scale that it is very important to present the case clearly to Algiers at an early date as it involves the question of repatriation of prisoners and the return of captured Italian material. Will you inform me whether you are willing to talk to Roatta on the subject of whether you prefer me to hold him off?

MARWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief of Mission

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREQ : PRIORITY

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

M/C NO: N 2/12

REF NO: 5957

FILED : 111624A Oct

REC'D : 120823A

Chief of Staff has authorized the attachment to this Headquarters of
The Italian Military Mission consisting of the following officers: General
Castellano, Col ^Feyerzani, Lt.Col. Dunadio, Major Tessitore, Major Ciccareli,
Capt. Guarnasi, 2nd Lt. Ianza, (For Masfarlane signed Eisenhower cite FHLIA)
and temporary visits here of only 7 others. Therefore accommodations are normally
available for them only. Accordingly other Italian officers or civilians, such
as General Aurelio, should be permitted to come here only after approval has been
secured from The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 AFHQ

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PRES: PRIORITY

FROM: FATMA

TO: FREEDOM

M/C NR: 02/14

REF NR: 399

FILED: 141100A Cst

REC'D:

REFERENCE YOUR FIVE NINE FIVE SEVEN PD TO FREEDOM FROM FATMA SIGMET TAYLOR PD
I SUBMITTED TO AMBROSIO YOUR COMMUNICATION RELATIVE TO THE PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY
MEMBERS OF THE CASTELLANO MISSION PD I RECEIVED A COUNTER PROPOSITION FROM HIM TODAY
ASKING THAT THE PERMANENT GROUP BE INCREASED BY ONE AND A COMPENSATING REDUCTION
OF ONE IN THE NUMBERS OF AUTHORIZED VISITORS BY THE PERMANENT PERSONNEL WHICH HE PROPOSE
IS ONE GENERAL CASTELLANO, CHIEF OF MISSION; COLONEL PEDERZANI, CHIEF OF STAFF; CAPTAIN
GIURILATI AND COMMANDER GILLETI, NAVY LIAISON; LIEUTENANT COLONEL AA TIOLI, AIR LIAISON;
MAJOR TESTATORE, ARMY LIAISON; CAPTAIN GUARISI, AID TO THE CHIEF OF MISSION; LIEUTENANT
LANZA, INTERPRETER PD IS THIS PROPOSAL SATISFACTORY TO YOU QUINCY

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., USA
Acting Chief of Mission

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: ROUTINE

FROM: FATIMA

TO: FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR

M/C NR: 2/16

REF NR: 434

FILED: 160943A Oct

REC'D:

GENERAL AMBROSIO REQUESTS THE TRANSMISSION OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE ALLIED COMMANDER IN CAIRO PD NUMBER ONE NINE SIX FIVE SIANT OF QUOTE THE ITALIAN DIVISIONS VENEZIA AND TAURINENSE ARE FIGHTING IN MONTENEGRO WITH THE JUGOSLAVIAN LIBERATING ARMY, AGAINST GERMANS WHO OCCUPY PODGORICA, CETTIGNE, NIKSIE, PEO AND BOOCHE DI CATTARO PD PARA ITALIAN UNITS ARE NOW IN SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR FOOD AND THEY ASK ALSO TO HAVE SENT TO THEM MACHINE GUNS, AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT MACHINE GUNS WITH PROPER AMMUNITION SUPPLIES PD PARA THEY ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE AIRFIELD OF DEBANE ONE ONE ZERO ZERO METERS LONG AND ONE SIX ZERO METERS WIDE, WITH ALL THE ^{equipment} ~~equipment~~ FOR NIGHT LANDINGS PD PARA CONSIDERING THE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO KEEP THOSE TROOPS IN FIGHTING CONDITIONS, I BEG YOU TO DO YOUR BEST TO SUPPLY THEM WITH NECESSARY FOOD AND ARMS BY AIR PD PARA IT IS ALSO NECESSARY THAT THE AIRFIELDS OF MOSTAR, PODGORICA, SCUTARI AND TIFANA, FROM WHICH THE GERMANS AIR RAIDS START, SHOULD BE NEUTRALIZED BY ALLIED AIR CRAFT PD PARA SUCH NECESSITY HAS ALREADY BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR FORCES IN PUGLIE PD PARA ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROACHING WINTER, IT WOULD BE URGENT TO KNOW WHICH KIND OF ASSISTANCE YOU THINK POSSIBLE FOR THESE DIVISIONS PD PARA IF NO ASSISTANCE IS POSSIBLE WILL PLEASE ADVISE US WHERE THEY COULD RETREAT SO AS TO AVOID TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF ABOVE MENTIONED PD SIGNED AMBROSIO UNQUOTE

AUTHENTICATED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig Gen USA
Acting Chief of Mission

1356

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NO: 13/22

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 599

PREC : PRIORITY

FILED : 221430A Oct

FROM : FATIMA

REC'D :

TO : FREEDOM repeated 15th ARMY
GROUP AND FORTHEASE

I HAVE COMMUNICATED TO THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR DOCUMENT QUOTE EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN TROOPS UNQUOTE DATED THREE OCTOBER ONE NINE FOUR THREE PD TO FREEDOM REPEAT 15TH ARMY GROUP AND FORTHEASE FROM FATIMA SIGNED TAYLOR PD IN A PREPARED REPLY THE HIGH COMMAND MAKES THE FOLLOWING POINTS PD (1) THE ITALIANS ARE DISAPPOINTED OVER THE LIMITED COMBAT PARTICIPATION WHICH IS CONTEMPLATED FOR THEIR TROOPS PD AS IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT THE CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE WILL BE ATTENUATED IN PROPORTION TO THE ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO WAR ON GERMANY IT IS FELT THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED WIDER PARTICIPATION IN DIRECT MILITARY ACTION PD WITH REGARD TO THE SARDINIAN DIVISIONS THE ITALIANS WISH THEM TO BE CONSIDERED AS TRAINED MOUNTAIN TROOPS WHICH COULD FIND EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT IN THE OPERATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO DEVELOP IN NORTHERN ITALY PD IT IS SUGGESTED THAT ONE OF THESE DIVISIONS BE LANDED ON THE BEACHES NEAR ROME AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF THAT CITY BY OUR FORCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSURING ORDER IN THE CAPITAL PD (2) THE HIGH COMMAND CONSIDERS THAT THE TEN DIVISIONS TO BE USED ON LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR THE PURPOSE INTENDED PD THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDING TO THE UNITS WILL BE STUDIED BY THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF WHICH WILL LATER SUBMIT PROPOSALS PD (3) THE ITALIAN COAST DEFENSE UNITS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE THE COAST PARTICULARLY AFTER OUR TROOPS HAVE ADVANCED WELL TO THE NORTH PD

(4) AS FOR...

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1555

(4) AS FOR DEMOBOLIZATION OF TROOPS THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE IN THE CASE OF OVERAGE SOLDIERS IN THE PROVINCES OF APULIA PD THERE HAS BEEN NO DEMOBOLIZATION OF THE FORCES OUTSIDE OF APULIA AS THE ATTITUDE OF THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES ON THAT SUBJECT IS NOT KNOWN PD MEANWHILE A CONTINUOUS STUDY IS GOING ON OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF ~~ARMED~~ AGRICULTURE AND MINING WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING WHAT FURTHER DEMOBOLIZATION IS DESIRABLE

AUTHENTICATED

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.
Acting Chief of Mission

INCOMING

Not Given

6-842

IMMEDIATE

27 Oct 43A

2nd District

271250A

INFORMATION FATIMA

With effect from 0800 hours 30th October military command of Calabria passes from RM Sub Area to 31st Italian Corps Headquarters Catanzaro. Detailed instructions will be issued shortly. RRM to 7th Italian Army ACK. All informed.

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418310

INCOMING

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT GIVEN

FREEDOM

IA TMA

18/02

5183

012014A Nov

020819A

Department telegraphs that correspondent of Reuters with 5th Army. FATIMA FROM
MURPHY SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FHCIV. Reports that with the approval and cooperation
of Allied Forces a corps of Italian volunteers has been organized which will be
under the direct Allied command and completely independent from the Italian Army.
The corps is reported to have as its "spiritual leader" Benedette Croce and Guiseppe
Iavone "well known Anti-Fascists" as the principle organizer. Italian volunteers and
officers who have recently succeeded in escaping from northern Italy are the principal
components of the corps. Interest in such an organization has recently been expressed
by Colonel Randolph Picciardi and we would appreciate confirmation from you that this
or other similar "Italian Legions" will be organized in Allied-occupied territory
with the approval of Commander-in-Chief.

OUTGOING

SECRET

21

ROUTINE

731

FATIMA

022216Z Nov

FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR for
MURPHY cite FHCIV

YOUR NUMBER FIVE ONE EIGHT THREE PD TO FREEDOM RPT AFHQ ADVANCE COMMAND POST
AT AMILCAR FOR MURPHY CITE FHCIV FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE PD I HEARD IN
NAPLES THAT UNITS OF THE TYPES YOU DESCRIBE ARE BEING ORGANIZED UNDER THE
AEGIS OF OSS REPRAT OBOE SUGAR SUGAR PD BOTH GENERAL ALEXANDER TO WHOM I
MENTIONED THE MATTER AND MYSELF ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE FORMATION OF
ITALIAN TROOPS OTHER THAN THOSE INCORPORATED IN THE ITALIAN ARMY PD SUCH
VOLUNTEERS MIGHT WELL BE TRAINED FOR SABOTAGE AND OTHER SIMILAR NON DASH
MILITARY DUTIES BUT THE PRODUCTION OF ITALIAN UNITS PARALLEL TO BUT NOT
IN THE ITALIAN ARMY IS IN OUR OPINION TO BE DEPECATED PD GLAD IF YOU WOULD
NOTIFY GENERAL EISENHOWER

AUTHENTICATED:

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

OUTGOING

SECRET

IMPORTANT

FATIMA

07/03

742

031357A Nov

FREEDOM rpt AFHQ ADV CP at AMILCAR for
GEN. BEDELL SMITH or GEN. WHITELEY

CHIEF OF SOE RPT SUGAR OBOE EASY ASKED ME YESTERDAY TO ASK THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS WITH CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION AVAILABLE FOR FOR DESPATCH FROM BARI TO THE BALKANS PD TO FREEDOM RPT AFHQ ADVANCE COMMAND POST FOR GENERAL BEDELL SMITH OR GENERAL WHITELEY FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARIANE PD MACHINE GUNS DASH FOUR ZERO ZERO CMA LIGHT ANTI DASH AIRCRAFT DASH FIVE ZERO CMA ANTI DASH TANK GUNS DASH TWO ZERO CMA MORTARS DASH FIVE ZERO CMA PD I RPT ITEM THINK IT PROBABLE THAT ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND WILL BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE UP THE EQUIPMENT PD FURTHERMORE THE TRANSACTION APPEARS TO VIOLATE PARA TWO NINE H RPT HOW CMA QUOTE EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES UNQUOTE DATED OCTOBER THREE CMA ONE NINE FOUR THREE PD IF YOU APPROVE THE DEMAND PLEASE INSTRUCT ME ACCORDINGLY SO THAT I RPT ITEM CAN TELL ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND THAT IT IS AN ORDER FROM GENERAL EISENHOWER PD AT THE SAME TIME I RPT ITEM OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO TELL THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY ARMS AND HOW MUCH AMMUNITION WE ARE LIKELY TO DEMAND FROM THEM IN THE FUTURE AS THEY WILL OBVIOUSLY SAY THAT THEY CANNOT RPT NOT PRODUCE THE FORMATIONS WHICH WE ARE ASKING THEM TO PRODUCE IF WE TAKE AWAY TOO MUCH OF THEIR EQUIPMENT

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARIANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

INCOMING

SECRET

9/09

PRIORITY

8260

FREEDOM

081922A Nov

FATMA

090400A

Ensuing in reference your 742 dated 9 November equipment and ammunition will not come from Italian units or stock. Add. FATMA INFORMATION VIAMBO SIGNED CINC CITE FHGCT. Source of equipment will be from captured stocks in Sicily, Lampedusa or Pantalleria.

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INCOMING

CONTROL COMMISSION

SECRET

ROUTINE

AFHQ

FATIMA

32/12

5856

031345A Nov

121715A by
Air Courier

Order of battle Italian Army received by G-3 AFHQ, consists almost entirely of combatant units. Most urgently request you despatch immediately by fast air complete list of Italian Army administrative units. FATIMA SIGNED
EISENHOWER CITE FILIA including Engineer and signals units stating, where possible, present locations and when available for employment.

to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
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413310

1548

FILMED AS FOUND
IN COLLECTION

INCOMING

SECRET

8/13

PRIORITY

165

FREEDOM

130059A Nov

FATIMA

130430A

To be attached temporarily to the War Material Disposal Sub Committee of Military section of the Allied Control Commission proposed to send Cemed

forward representative Lt. Col. Shutte (British) to Brindisi for the purpose of:

1. With reference to operational commitments, ascertaining the status of equipment Italian Army. (ADDED FATIMA (ATT GEN JOYCE), INFORMATION 15 ARMY GROUP, FIAMBO, PDS, DIST 2, SIGNED CINC CITE PHOTO.)

2. To make recommendations as to what further equipment from Italian sources, if any, is required to meet these operational requirements.

3. In excess of requirements, to report what materials held.

As soon as the military section of the Control Commission is functioning, request concurrence that this officer will be to this Headquarters returned.

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418310

INCOMING

SECRET

21/11

NOT GIVEN

9309

FREEDOM

110950A Nov

PATIMA

111927A

Direct Italian High Command to disseminate following instructions to all Italian forces; toxic gas will not be employed except on orders of the Commander in Chief AFHQ. FROM FREEDOM TO PATIMA SIGNED CINC CITE EHCCT.

OUTGOING

SECRET

10/15

PRIORITY

954

FATIMA

1522334 Nov

FREEDOM

NUMBER

THE SUSTANCE OF YOUR/NINE THREE ZERO NINE CITE PHGCT HAS BEEN CONVEYED
JAREN TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE JAREN TO THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND PD
THE LATTER HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED STETING THAT THERE IS NO REPEAT NO POISON GAS
EQUIPMENT WITH THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

OUTGOING

SECRET

17/13

URGENT

921

FATIMA

132032A Nov

FREEDOM

THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION PAREN TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PAREN
HAS JUST BEEN RECEIVED FROM MARSHAL BADOLIO QUOTE ON THE ORDERS OF HIS
MAJESTY THE KING I AM CONSIDERING EFFECTING THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE HIGH
COMMANDS ~~OWN~~ PARA MARSHALL GIOVANI MESSE TO BE APPOINTED CHIEF OF THE SUPREME
GENERAL STAFF IN PLACE OF THE GENERAL ARMY COMMANDER VITTORIO AMBROSIO WHO WILL BE
PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE KING PD PARA GENERAL CORPS COMMANDER TADDEO
ORLANDO TO BE APPOINTED UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR PD PARA GENERAL CORPS
COMMANDER PAOLO BERARDI TO BE APPOINTED CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY PD PARA
BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THESE APPOINTMENTS I WISH TO HAVE THE VIEWS OF THE
ALLIED HIGH COMMAND IN THE PROPOSAL PD UNQUOTE

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig. Gen., U.S.A.

CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING

SECRET

21/16

PRIORITY

1618

FREEDOM

161453A Nov

FATIMA

162025A

Concur in changes (TO FATIMA FOR JOYCE SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FIMGS
REFERENCE YOUR 921 OF 13 NOVEMBER) proposed for Italian High Command.

CONTROL COMMISSION

OUTGOING

SECRET

3/21

PRIORITY

1053

FATIMA

Nov 211135A

FREEDOM

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM MARSHAL BADOGLIO CLN QUOTE I
INFORM YOU THAT H PD M PD THE KING CMA AT MY SUGGESTION CMA HAS APPOINTED CLN
MARSHAL OF ITALY GIOVANNI MESSE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF SEMCLN ARMY CORPS GENERAL
PAOLO BERARDI CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ROYAL ARMY PD PARA PD TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA
SIGNED JOYCE PD ARMY GENERAL VITTORIO AMBROSIO CMA HAVING REACHED THE AGE LIMIT
AND FOLLOWING HIS OWN REQUEST CMA VACATES THE POST OF CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF AND
WILL TAKE ON THE WORK OF INSPECTION OVER THE TROOPS OF THE ROYAL ARMY PD PARA THE
FOREGOING CHANGES WILL TAKE PLACE ON TWO TWO NOVEMBER ONE NINE FOUR THREE PD
BADOGLIO UNQUOTE

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING

SECRET

24/22

NOT GIVEN

3933

FREEDOM

NOV 211835A

FATIMA

NOV 221850A

1. Boulnois has suggested kindest and best thing would be to explain to vast Italian army in Sardinia how limited are possibilities for it to fight on mainland. (ACTION FATIMA INFO FABLE SIGNED CINC CITE FHGCT).

2. Ref your 539 of 22 Oct. You will suggest to Italian High Command that they furnish such information concerning employment of Italian forces to Italian Commander Sardinia as they consider desirable in order to alleviate situation reported by Boulnois.

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CONTROL COMMISSION
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OUTGOING

SECRET

14/22

PRIORITY

1082

FATIMA

Nov 221850A

FREEDOM REPEAT FILPOT

THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE NEED FOR AN AGREED SCHEDULE OF PRIORITIES AND PROCEDURE FOR ALLOCATION OF ITALIAN TROOPS UNDER THE POLICY CONTAINED IN G THREE LETTER QUOTE EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES UNQUOTE THREE OCTOBER ONE NINE FOUR THREE DASH P REPEAT PETER SIANT ONE ZERO NINE PD TO FREEDOM REPEAT FILPOT FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PD I RECOMMEND THAT A QUALIFIED OFFICER FROM YOUR HEADQUARTERS BE SENT HERE AT ONCE TO SETTLE THESE QUESTIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMISSION AND THE FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP PD MEANWHILE CMA IMMEDIATE REQUESTS FOR TROOPS ORIGINATING FROM THE ALLIED ARMIES ARE BEING TRANSMITTED BY THE COMMISSION TO THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND FOR COMPLIANCE

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, U.S.A.

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1540

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

*Classified papers to
which action is granted
have been stamped*

1833

