

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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MISCELLANEOUS INCIDENTS &
MILITARY CONDITIONS AT ARMISTICE
TIME
SEPT. - NOV. 1943

41pp

A more or less random
selection of papers, relating
to incidents unconnected with
each other, illustrating some of
the conditions prevailing in
Southern Italy at the date
of the Amistice.

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

16 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: AFHQ.

Roatta

1. At my meeting with Ambrosio and rolatto yesterday Ambrosio raised the question of the status of the Italian Army vis-a-vis the Allied Forces in the joint fight which is now commencing common enemy. I maintained that the present situation was far from clear and anomalous and that it required crystalizing on the lines that Italy was now fully in the war on the side of the Allies. I told him that this raised a bigger question on which we here were not empowered to give decisions. I asked for a clear expression of the Italian High Command's views on the subject and suggested that we discuss them later with Marshall Badoglio.

2. Later I saw Marshall Badoglio and Ambrosio with Mr Macmillan and Mr Murphy and the Marshall gave a clear explanation of the Italian case which Messrs. Macmillan and Murphy will be able to present and discuss on their arrival in Tunis.

3. At this meeting we also dealt satisfactorily with the question of AMGOT Lira and stressed again the importance of SOE and PWE work here which seems to be fully realized by the Italians.

4. Glad to hear that Brigadier Strong will be here shortly. He will find the Italian Intelligence Service here functioning very spasmodically.

Lieutenant General
Head of Mission

SECRET

2286

18 September 1943.

The following is a summary of yesterday's conversation between General Macfarlane and General Roatta:

- 1) - No news has been received of the condemning to death of the Greek Alex Iados; however, there are no means of communications with Greece.
- 2) - The visit of the wireless technician from Gibraltar will be very welcome.
- 3) - Marshall Badoglio has proposed a meeting with General Eisenhower at which they will represent their respective General Staffs.

General Eisenhower has agreed to the proposal: The meeting will take place at Tunis.

The exact date has not yet been fixed.

- 4) - Constitution of intelligence and communication centers to be distributed in Italian territory controlled by the Germans.
 - 10 wireless operators are ready; their brief training can be begun today, 18 September.
 -
 - The wireless sets should be sent to the Albergo Impero and be assigned for the use of this service; Lieut. Malaby is in the picture.
 - We are engaged in finding 10 officers to work with the 10 wireless operators - thus constituting 10 intelligence cells.
 - The 10 cells will, in their respective areas which will be indicated separately, constitute as many intelligence centers; these will be responsible for their specific service, and for any necessary communications with headquarters of Italian formations, for the organization of sabotage on the spot, acting on their own initiative following the instructions which will be given in accordance with the situation of Italian units on the spot who, as a general rule, will carry out the sabotage.
 - A submarine will be ready in three or four days at most for the despatch of the intelligence cells; their despatch can therefore take place on the 21st or 22nd of this month.

Buindis' Diary Vol I, Appendix 32.

To Eisenhower
From Macfarlane

20 September 1943.

1. Very glad to see the copy of your telegram to London and Washington shown to me by Kennel. I hope we can get a speedy answer on policy. It will help here a lot.
2. I am telling Badoglio that his visit to you probably won't take place now for about ten days.
3. Strong has arrived and is getting around. We had a long session with Ambrosio yesterday. The Italian intelligence organization is at the moment quite useless. All the personnel and documents were left behind in Rome. They are trying to build up an organization here but it won't be much good to us for some time.
4. Kennel and Holmes have arrived. We had a long talk yesterday and agreed our policy and are seeing Badoglio - I hope - this morning.
5. As already telegraphed, I saw Badoglio again yesterday. He was as charming as ever and himself wrote to the Italian Embassy, Madrid, at once in his own hand.
6. He was looking much more tired and harassed than the last time I saw him but he seems to have great powers of recuperation and went to Bari last night to do his broadcast reply to Mussolini's effort.
7. We can be one hundred percent certain of him and of Ambrosio. The latter is very easy to work with and a very good Chief of Staff - but I think that there is little else to him.
8. Reatta will be O. K. as long as things go well. He is very talkative and easy to work with. He has no guts and crumples up at once if I have to be tough with him which is at times inevitable.
9. On the Navy and the Air side cooperation appears to be going well. Within their limits, the Italian Air Forces are doing quite a lot in a small way - principally across the water from here.

10. On the Army side I am doing all I can to keep the little that is left going and to restore their self-respect.

They were delighted to send some Field Artillery to the Airborne Division and up at Bari are playing well with our Phantom detachments.

Frankly, however, from all I have seen they have nothing left alive fit to fight Germans, no tanks, antiquated and inadequate equipment, very little transport and no ammunition reserves.

They are themselves very keen to producing one corps of three divisions to join in the advance from here. They even suggested that this corps and our V Corps should operate under the Italian Army which is in these parts!!!

If in any way possible I think we should let them form their 51 Corps with at any rate the Iagnano and Piacenza Divisions. They will be best employed like all other Italian troops on labour, L of C or air-drome guards but there is a lot to be said from the morale point of view in favour of letting one corps go forward up the coast on our right when we advance. There is no argument in favour of this!!!

(Later) I have just got back from a long meeting with Badoglio with Rennel and Holmes. Badoglio had Count Aquaroni (temporary Minister of Finance and Food) with him. He is quite useless and very talkative.

Rennel will tell you all about the matter.

Our AMGOT proposals were accepted.

There was a long discussion about finances - the gist of which was,

- a. The urgent necessity for more AMGOT lira.
- b. A strong Italian request that sterling lira rate of exchange should be made slightly more favourable to the Italians.
- c. The fact that, now that Mussolini and his Fascist government were presumably getting whole-hearted support from the Germans, Badoglio's effort would much embarrassed if any undue restrictions were placed upon his government.
- d. Badoglio stressed the fact that he was terribly anxious to take part in the actual fighting of the Germans and spoke of not only producing a corps in this part of the world but of bringing over divisions from Sardinia and rearming the Italian Armies we have taken prisoner.

He mentioned also the reinforcements in men he was hoping to get from the Balkans and elsewhere. I am at the moment giving him no encouragement at all except a sympathetic hearing. I am gradually trying to convince him and his military advisors that any hope of restoring the Italian Army as a useful fighting machine in the way he suggests is entirely out of the question at the moment. I hope this will sink in in due course but as you can well understand I am refraining from pouring all the cold water these ideas deserve upon them.

I went to Bari yesterday and had a look at the wireless station which is now functioning once again satisfactorily. Bari is very full of people and there are a suitable number of rather useless Italian troops in and around the place. Of them there are some who are of a certain value. I saw our Airborne Platoon guarding the wireless and also a Phantom Detachment. Both in very good heart but both rightly anxious that we should show the flag rather more effectively in the Bari Area. There are a lot of doubtful down-hearted people in these parts.

I am seeing Charles Allfrey this afternoon and will mention this to him and also the fact that as soon as his build-up permits I think it would be well if he included Bari in his initial defensive dispositions. ~~Secondly, this will create an admiral impression upon the population.~~ Firstly, this will create an admiral impression upon the population. Secondly, I am certain that we ought to use Bari as a port as soon as possible. And, thirdly, it will give him much more elbow room in which to make his concentrations.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : AFHQ CP REPEAT TO FREEDOM

REF. NO. 043

Sep

DATE: 211310B

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: IMMEDIATE

Without reference to me four war correspondents arranged interview with Marshall Badoglio this morning. It is clearly unsound that pending decisions on policy Badoglio should air his views in Anglo American press. Furthermore I consider correspondents had no right to contact Badoglio without my permission. I have therefore forbidden the interview and shall allow none until after Badoglio has visited you. Hope you agree.

AUTHENTICATED

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

REF. NO. 7991

DATE : 22 September 1943

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

Relative interviews Badoglio your 043 September 22, Commander in Chief
in full agreement your decision.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

REF. NO. 046

DATE: 21 Sep 1956 lms

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : IMPORTANT

ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EARLIEST POSSIBLE
RECAPTURE OF THE ALTA MURA AND FOGGIA DISTRICTS AS THEY CONTAIN
THE BULK OF THE GRAIN RESERVES FOR SOUTHERN ITALY.
AM INFORMING COMMANDER FIVE CORPS.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

DATE: Sep 21 14 57

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 047

PREC: IMMEDIATE

I SAW AMBROSIO THIS MORNING. THE GERMANS HAVE CUT THE
APULIAN AQUEDUCT AT PONTE ATELIA ABOUT TWO FIVE KILOMETERS NORTH
NORTHWEST OF POTENZE. THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND IS GRAVELY
CONCERNED OVER THE RESULTING SITUATION AND STRICT WATER RATIONING
IS BEING INTRODUCED IN THE LARGE AREA FED BY THE AQUEDUCT.
WITH RATIONING THEY DO ANTICIPATE SERIOUS DIFFICULTY FOR
ANOTHER FORTNIGHT. THEY STATE THAT ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF
WATER SUPPLY ARE MOSTLY WELLS AND CONTAMINATED. THEY ESTIMATE
THAT THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE AQUEDUCT CAN BE REPAIRED IN FROM
THREE TO FOUR DAYS IF NO FURTHER DAMAGE IS DONE. AM INFORMING
COMMANDER FIVE CORPS.

AUTHENTICATED

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ CP

REF. NO. 049

DATE: *Sep 21 1810*

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: IMPORDANT

GERMAN DAMAGE TO AQUEDUCT SERVING SOUTHERN ITALY MAY CAUSE SERIOUS
WATER SHORTAGE HERE. REQUEST IMMEDIATE DESPATCH BY AIR OF FOUR
LISTER BAGS, CHLORINATING EQUIPMENT AND HALAZONE TABLETS FOR 50
MEN. ALSO NEEDED AT ONCE; ATEBRINE SMCIN TWO SETS SIGERCK.

AUTHENTICATED

FRANK M. RAHTER
1st Lieut, AGD
Adjutant General

INCOMING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM: FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

REF NO. 9235

DATE: 251126B 1943 Sep

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: ROUTINE

Shipment of water purification materials leaving here 26
September by courier plane. (Reference your 049 of 22 September)
Your request for "Two set SIGERCK (King)" repeat not understood.
Please repeat. What is extent of damage to aqueduct.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

FROM : FATIMA

DATE: 261500 Sep

TO : FREEDOM RPT TO AFHQ CP

CLASS: SECRET

REF. NO. 126

PREC : IMMEDIATE

FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT TO FORT BASE BY GENERAL ALEXANDER. BEGINS:
QUOTE HAVE JUST VISITED MACFARLANE AT BRINDISI, CONSIDER IMMEDIATE
REPAIR OF APULIA AQUEDUCT OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE. CONTACT MACFARLANE
IMMEDIATELY WHO WILL ASSURE FULL ITALIAN COOPERATION. USE ALL ITALIAN
AND YOUR OWN ENGINEER RESOURCES TO GET WATER SUPPLY REPAIRED EARLIEST.
DEMAND ON AFHQ FOR ANY NECESSARY STORES FOR SHIPMENT FIRST PRIORITY.
UNQUOTE.

AUTHENTICATED:

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NRL

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : IMPORTANT

FROM : MAIN 5 CORPS

TO : FATIMA

M/C NR:

REF. NO: 0262

FILED : 041600A Oct

REC'D :

Reference your 224 dated 2 October. Repairs to aqueduct at atella 02953 will be completed 6 October. Estimated date of completion of all repair on aqueduct serving Bari Brindisi Taranto area 12 October.

THE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

23 September 1943

Dear General,

I refer to what you said yesterday about General Montgomery's plans. According to the information given by the radio, the Germans are looting and burning Naples. No wonder as they are not only but plunderers.

The same thing will happen in Rome, perhaps with more fury even, when they will have to leave the town.

I do not mean to make any suggestion to General Montgomery who does not need any advice - nevertheless it seems to me that to have a division of parachutists ready, to throw it over Rome at the right moment, is a measure which might save the city.

I leave the decision to you, after submitting to you this idea of mine.

I remain,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Badoglio

Original in British Library. 1011. 7th 73.

Dear General,

I refer to what you said yesterday about General Montgomery's plans. According to the information given by the radio, the Germans are looting and burning Naples. No wonder as they are not only but plunderers.

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I remain,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Badoglio

Original in Bindi's Diary. Vol. II. Feb 73.

2275

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SMC/RELAY NR: Svc 1990/27

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : 15th ARMY GROUP for action, for info
AFHQ ADV CP, FATIMA

M/C NR:

REF NO. 237

FILED: 272020B Sep

REC'D

Instructions following will be disseminated at once to all ranks as guidance for their relations with Italians. Italy has been defeated and has surrendered unconditionally. However both the King and Badoglio have offered to help the Allies drive the Germans out of Italy. We have accepted this offer. This does not mean that Italy becomes one of (Trere fdy ? ? ? ?) to cooperate and to give us every assistance to meet our operational demands and have been accorded the status of Belligerents.

Our troops must do absolutely correct in their conduct. All our demands must be made through Italian Military or Civil Officials. Our dealings should be conducted on a firm basis but without rudeness as far as possible. Must obtain what we need for the operations through the friendly cooperation of the Italians.

When cases of non-cooperation occur they must be reported through higher headquarters to the Allied Military Mission. Active resistance or hostile acts will be dealt as though committed by the enemy. We must rely on the common sense of all ranks within the Allied Forces. (Paraphrase FREEDOM Msg 237).

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SECRET - BIGOT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Spawc Wpy.
Original in B.I. July 22.

30 SEPTEMBER, 1943

SUBJECT: OSS/SOE Activities in ITALY.

TO : 15th Army Group.
Allied Military Mission to Italian Government.

1. The following activities by OSS/SOE in ITALY are approved by this headquarters:

- a. Instigation of the Italian population to carry out acts of resistance to German forces.
- b. Direct attack on communications and transport in that area of ITALY now held by the enemy. OSS raiding parties will make the attacks and remain to instruct and incite the local population to further and similar efforts.
- c. Destruction of enemy aircraft on the ground.
- d. Destruction of enemy supply dumps.
- e. The establishment by Special Force (SOE) of sea and air bases in the vicinity of LECCE.
- f. The establishment by OSS of a forward base in the vicinity of BASTIA (CORSICA).

From the foregoing bases (e. and f.) may be dispatched men, supplies and equipment in support of operations outside 15th Army Group area.

2. Such activities will be coordinated and controlled by:

- a. Attaching to the Allied Military Mission two representatives each from OSS and SOE to insure that the activities of their respective organizations do not conflict with the policies which have been established by the Allied Military Mission with the Italian Government.

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c. Destruction of enemy aircraft on the ground.

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f. The establishment by OSS of a forward base in the vicinity of BASTIA (CORSICA).

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2273

2. Such activities will be coordinated and controlled by:

a. Attaching to the Allied Military Mission two representatives each from OSS and SOE to insure that the activities of their respective organizations do not conflict with the policies which have been established by the Allied Military Mission with the Italian Government.

b. Coordination of proposed para-military and subversive activities within the combat zone by OSS/SOE with 15th Army Group. For the present, special operations North of the line all inclusive FIUMICINO - ROME - AVEZZANO - PESCARA will be initiated by AFHQ. South of this line, special operations will be directly controlled by 15th Army Group. A revision of this directive, shifting the dividing line Northward, will be issued by AFHQ after consultation with 15th Army Group, as the overland advance progresses.

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2. Signal communication plans proposed by OSS/SOE for the 15th Army Group area will be approved by CSO, AFHQ after coordination by him with 15th Army Group.
3. Subject to the coordination and control outlined in paragraph 2 above, OSS/SOE will proceed at once to infiltrate the necessary agents, supplies and communication equipment.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

LOWELL W. ROCKS,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Copies to:

OSS (Col. Eddy)
ISSU 6 (Lt. Col. Dodds-Parker)

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OFFICIAL:

LOWELL W. ROCKS,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Copies to:

OSS (Col. Eddy)
ISSU 6 (Lt. Col. Dodds-Parker)

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SECRET - BIGOT

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BIGOT

U. S. SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 03/01

CLASS : SECRET

REF NO: 193

PREC : IMPORTANT

FILED: 011547 A Oct

FROM: FATIMA

REC'D

TO : FREEDOM rpt to AFHQ ADV CP at Amilcar

BADOGGIO TELLS ME TODAY HE HAD HAD ANOTHER EIGHT ZERO FASCISTS ARRESTED IN BARI YESTERDAY. HE HAS REMOVED THE QUESTOR AND THE EDITOR OF THE GAZZETTA DEL MEZZOGIORNO UP TO DATE IN APULIA BETWEEN FIVE AND SIX HUNDRED FASCISTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND HAVE BEEN SENT TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS IN THE TREMETI ISLANDS.

AUTHENTICATED:

F.N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Mission.

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS : SECRET

PREC : PRIORITY

FROM : FATMA

TO : FREEDOM

M/C NR: 20/1

REF. NO. 210

227"

FILED:

REC'D: 012120A Oct

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY PRESS INTERVIEW BADOGLIO SOMEWHERE SOUTH ITALY TODAY. BADOGLIO BEGAN EXPRESS PLEASURE HIS FIRST INTERVIEW PRESS COINCIDED ANGIO DASH AMERICAN VICTORY NAPLES. SAID DELIGHTED ITALY WHO WAS TRADITIONALLY FRIEND BRITAIN AMERICAN ONCE AGAIN ON THE RIGHT ROAD. RECALLED BRITISH AMERICANS FIGHTING ALONGSIDE ITALIANS AGAINST GERMANS LAST WAR AND EXPRESSED CONVICTION THEIR COOPERATION NOW WOULD PRODUCE SAME RESULT. REPLYING QUESTION HOW DID MUSSOLINI FALL BADOGLIO CONFIRMED THIS WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY ACTION FASCIST GRAND COUNCIL AT MEETING JULY TWO FOUR. VOTE INVITING MUSSOLINI RESIGN WAS SPONSORED BY GRANDI GIANO BOTTAI AND CARRIED BY NINETEEN VOTES TO FIVE AFTER VIOLENT DEBATE. MUSSOLINI REPORTED RESULT NEXT DAY TO KING WHO ORDERED BADOGLIO TO TAKE OVER GOVERNMENT. MUSSOLINI WAS TAKEN INTO PROTECTIVE CUSTODY FOR HIS OWN SAFETY AND WROTE LETTER THANKING BADOGLIO. BADOGLIO LIKENED FALL FASCISM TO THAT OF OVER DASH RIPE PEAR. SAID DURING LAST SEVERAL MONTHS ANTI DASH FASCIST TALK BECAME OPEN AND NOTHING DONE PREVENT IT. NOBODY PUT UP FIGHT TO SAVE FASCISM AND NOT ONE FASCIST BADGE SEEN DAY AFTER MUSSOLINI'S FALL. GREATEST REJOICING STREETS ROME AND ALL ITALIAN CITIES. ABOUT SAME TIME RUMOUR CIRCULATED ROME HITLER ASSASSINATED WHEREUPON GERMAN SOLDIERS WENT MAD WITH JOY EMBRACING POPULATION AND TEARING DOWN HITLER'S PICTURES. GERMAN REACTION FALL MUSSOLINI WAS SEND MANY DIVISIONS ITALY AND REQUISITION PETROL COAL.....

STOCKS. THEIR INTENTION SAID BADOGLIO WAS CLEARLY TO THROTTLE ITALY. REGARDING LAST MEETING HITLER MUSSOLINI BADOGLIO SAID MESSOLINIS INTENTION TELL HITLER ITALY COULD NOT CONTINUE WAR BUT HITLER TALKED TWO HOURS WITHOUT STOP AND MESSOLINI LACKED COURAGE INTERRUPT. MESSOLINI NOW IN GERMANY WROTE ^{RECENTLY} 2283 TO SISTER SAYING HE WAS TAKING TO RELIGION. REPLYING QUESTION HOW HE AND ROYAL FAMILY LEFT ROME BADOGLIO SAID PARTY LEFT MORNING SEPTEMBER NINE SEVERAL MOTOR CARS WITHOUT ATTEMPT CONCEALMENT PASSING GERMAN ARMED DIVISION ON ROAD. ITALIAN GERMAN TROOPS THEN FIGHTING OUTSKIRTS ROME. PARTY EMBARKED ON ITALIAN CRUISER AT ITALIAN PORT AND WERE TAKEN TO SOUTHERN ITALY. IN CONCLUSION BADOGLIO STATED THAT AS SOON AS GOVERNMENT RETURNED ROME HE INTENDED GIVE IT WIDEST POLITICAL BASES. BADOGLIO ADDED HE INTENDED TO RETAIN THREE SERVICE MINISTERS AT PRESENT WITH HIM NAMELY GENERAL AMBROSIO ADMIRAL DE COURTEN AND GENERAL SANDALLI. BADOGLIO DRESSED LOOSE FITTING KHAKI COLONIAL UNIFORM WITH FOUR STARS FOUR BROWN RIBBONS RECEIVED JOURNALISTS TERRACE VILLA. HIS SIMPLICITY FRIENDLINESS AND WILLINGNESS ANSWER QUESTIONS MADE EXCELLENT IMPRESSION

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

CLASS: SECRET

PREC : ROUTINE

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : MACFARLANE

M/C NR: 30/03

REF NO: 2674

FILED :)#1%)\$

031504 ~~SEP~~ OCT

REC'D :

-2287-

King of Italy sent letter to GEORGE REX. (FOR MACFARLANE FROM CINC CITE

FHSGS REURAD 222 October 2nd)a Reply from GEORGE REX expected October 4th.

Agree both replies be presented together.

Brigadier General Taylor mmz file

You might be interested
in this report by our intelligence
officer summarizing a large
amount of information collected
from a variety of people at Box 2266.

Although the conclusion
is perhaps over-weighted, I think
the report fairly reflects an
important section of public opinion.

S. A. Matelli

Oct 8.

Bonadisi

af

of the population look upon us with surprise and disappointment and upon the Badoglio Government with distrust.

Energetic measures on the part of the Italian Government are necessary if it desires to gain the confidence of the people and maintain its own existence. Badoglio claims to have arrested 500 Fascists but these arrests have been made with little criterion; many of the arrested are harmless individuals. Far more dangerous characters are still at large and doing harm. The people are clamouring not so much for arrests but for the removal from office of notorious individuals.

The Marshal in his terror of "Communism" and desire to pre-serve the Monarchy, is only making his task more difficult.

Parties

These are springing up like mushrooms.

The more respectable elements have amalgamated various tendencies into a National Anti-Fascist front known as the Comitato d'Azione.

As always happens, extremists and disgruntled men who could normally not expect any position in a settled Government, are now fishing in troubled waters, forming their own little parties and energetically trying to obtain official recognition on the part of the Allies.

Chief of these bodies is the Gruppo d'Azione "Garibaldini" who are extremely active and have considerable ramifications. They have been of some use to us in pointing out Fascists and saboteurs but they certainly do not represent the mass of the people and their leaders appear to be rather shady characters.

Another extreme body which is very active is the Legione Monarchica, headed by a very excitable and irresponsible youth,

criterion; many of the arrested are harmless individuals. Far more dangerous characters are still at large and doing harm. The people are clamouring not so much for arrests but for the removal from office of notorious individuals.

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Another extreme body which is very active is the Legione Monarchica, headed by a very excitable and irresponsible youth, who claims to have enrolled over 1500 boys in his legion.

Unless, some really energetic, intelligent, political leader presents himself, capable of welding together all these conflicting elements and curbing the extremists, the whole country will fall into a chaos of weltering parties and in despair, will again turn to Fascism or something similar, as the only guarantee of order.

F. J. Robertson Cpt.

for Commander Martelli

for *Amid Italian Resistance* D Section
P.W.B. BARI

TO/COMMANDER MARTELLI R.N.

5 October, 42

Italian Army

The Italian army appears to have reached the last stages of demoralisation. The men are without weapons, food, or decent uniforms. They appear however willing to fight if they could be properly equipped and fed by the Allies but will only fight under Allied officers or under very carefully selected Italian junior officers under Allied control or Command as they have absolutely no trust or confidence in, or respect for their Generals and senior officers, who certainly have not displayed any energy or decision so far.

Numbers of junior officers, students and soldiers are pouring in through the German lines from the North, and the only Army office appointed to deal with them, has nothing to offer them in the way of clothing, uniforms, arms or pay. In desperation they come to us imploring to be formed into Legions to serve with and under Allied Armies.

It is a great pity that this excellent material cannot be organised and put to proper use more rapidly.

Unless Marshal Badoglio really takes more energetic steps and places the business in the hands of younger and more active men, he runs the risk of seeing the whole Army dissolve and of losing all the respect and loyalty towards his Government and the Monarchy, still remaining in the country.

Political situation

The situation is highly reminiscent of North Africa under the

uniforms. They appear however willing to fight if they could be properly equipped and fed by the Allies but will only fight under Allied officers or under very carefully selected Italian junior officers under Allied control or Command as they have absolutely no trust or confidence in, or respect for their Generals and senior officers, who certainly have not displayed any energy or decision so far.

Numbers of junior officers, students and soldiers are pouring in through the German lines from the North, and the only Army office appointed to deal with them, has nothing to offer them in the way of clothing, uniforms, arms or pay. In desperation they come to us imploring to be formed into Legions to serve with and under Allied Armies.

It is a great pity that this excellent material cannot be organized and put to proper use more rapidly.

Unless Marshal Badoglio really takes more energetic steps and places the business in the hands of younger and more active men, he runs the risk of seeing the whole Army dissolve and of losing all the respect and loyalty towards his Government and the Monarchy, still remaining in the country.

Political situation

The situation is highly reminiscent of North Africa under the Darlan regime. The bulk of the functionaries still in control of local life are Fascists, many of whom carry on a subtle propaganda against the Allies, who are accused of cleaning the country of food and of acting in a domineering and intolerable manner. The customary incidents between drunken Allied soldiers and Italian police and civilians are exaggerated and used against us while the terrible tales of German atrocities that are pouring in are pooh-poohed as Allied propaganda.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the majority

REPLY BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE LETTER FROM THE KING

I am very pleased to receive your letter of September 23, transmitted to me by cable by General Eisenhower and to have your expression of opinion in that in the common interest of our two countries. It is necessary and urgent that all or the greatest possible part of Italian territory be freed from the Germans with which opinion I am in complete agreement, and toward the accomplishment of which we should jointly direct our full effort using all available military resources of Italy and the Allied Governments.

226

It is the intention of the Allied Governments to obtain control of Rome at the earliest practicable date. It is my desire that civil government in the recovered areas of Italy shall be administered by the Italian Government insofar as it is permitted by military considerations and under the supervision of the Allied Supreme Commander. Consideration is now being given in consultation with our Allies to the exchange rate of the Lira.

With an expression of best wishes for the early success of our common effort to dislodge and destroy the Nazi invaders of your country, I am

Most Sincerely

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

President's Library Vol II John 211

Reply from His Majesty King George VI to the letter
from His Majesty the King of Italy

Your Majesty,

I thank your Majesty for your personal letter conveyed to me through General Eisenhower.

I and my Government agree that it is most important in our common interests that the greatest possible area of Italian territory should be freed from the Germans, and in particular that Allied troops should reach Rome at the earliest moment with the best assistance that the Italian Armed Forces can afford them.

My Government are prepared to agree on a provisional basis to your Majesty's suggestion that your Government's jurisdiction should be extended to Sicily and subsequently to other areas on the mainland of Italy as they are cleared of the Germans, the authority of the Italian Government being exercised under the supervision of the Allied Governments. At the same time I must make it clear that while my Government are prepared to deal with your Majesty's Government on a DE FACTO basis in regard to questions arising out the execution of the Armistice and the expulsion of the German invader from Italian soil, there is no question of recognising your Majesty's Government as our ally. Nor will this provisional arrangement be allowed by my Government to restrict in any way the free choice of the Italian people after the war of the form of democratic Government which they prefer.

I and my Government welcome your Majesty's reference to the political reconstruction of Italy, and the prospect of or a return to a parliamentary regime. My Government earnestly hope that all Anti-Fascist elements throughout Italy will range themselves around your Majesty and your Government and that a coalition Government including all patriotic groups will be formed with the object of carrying on the struggle against the German invader with the maximum force of the Italian people.

Finally, my Government are prepared to consider the possibility of altering the rate of exchange between pounds and lira, though I must warn your Majesty that there may be serious difficulties in the way of any such change.

KING GEORGE VI

Brindley Diary 1945, Feb 212

TO: GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

ALLIED MISSION -Brindisi-

(Original in Political Sec. File)

Following directions of H.E. Marshal Badoglio I'm sending you copy of a letter which the Prefect of Foggia addressed him.

The Chief of Government's Secretary

/s/ Lt. Col. G. Valenzano

.....
COPY of a letter dated Oct. 19, 1943 addressed from the Prefect of Foggia to Marshal Badoglio. 2261

On 12th inst. I already reported to Y.E. on the general situation of this province.

However the situation is daily worsening for two principal causes:

a) Overbearing attitude of the numerous allied troops who, as I already said, take over houses, farmhouses, and country-houses ousting tenants and peasants, forbidding them to enter their property even to get their implements.

For this reason many areas will not be farmed. The very few vehicles saved from German destruction are "requisitioned", that is robbed, because nobody indemnifies for them; they are taking over the AGIP oil tanks and also re-quintioning the empty barrels, thus rendering impossible an emergency depot.

b) Intrusion in every branch of civil life by numerous officers of civil affairs who, assigned in almost all villages, are taking complete charge, ousting or changing the village Mayor, arresting persons, and letting prisoners free, issuing orders not to pay taxes, taking without consideration provisions out of civil food stores ("ammassi"), publishing price and labour tariffs different, of course, for each town, even appointing themselves (as at Serracapriola) Town Governor, shutting up City Houses (as at Castelluccio dei Sauri), quartering troops in them and forbidding the Mayor and employees to enter, thus arresting the civil life of the town, issuing orders for works at enormous prices, hiring workmen whose wages they order to be paid by the Town Administration or by Civil Engineer Department without taking notice of their financial possibilities; are now setting their eyes on the arms deposited by the citizens and they may seize them if our Military Authority does not quickly take the arms over.

They are mostly youngsters (some of them are 23-24 years old) who have no single direction of action, not coordinated, who act at random without knowing all our difficult corporative system which, cannot be abruptly abolished.

This "civil service" which wants to do everything is raising so great a hitch in the life of the region which is more tied up now than during the period of German pillage raids.

We had thought the effort would be to help us: they didn't give us anything. We want nothing tough; we only wish to be let free to pursue our errands; we'll go on, as we can, in our misery.

To pursue the hope of enabling the Province of Foggia, whose food condition is worsening daily, to go on living it is absolutely necessary:

a) The Province should not be considered as conquered land but armistice zone and troops should be severely instructed to respect ownership and the freedom of labour.

b) These civil affairs officers should immediately be recalled from the towns they rule, leaving only two or three of them at the Prefecture, as control, but when an agreement on what to do is established we ought to be sure not to have it changed.

c) The administration of justice should proceed according Italian laws and through Courts and Italian offices of judicial police, leaving to English Court power to proceed only for felony and misdemeanor against operating troops.

It will thus be ended that "walk in and get out" from prisons, which fact gravely diminish the prestige of our Government.

d) The Province Administration should receive about twenty trucks for more urgent transports, mostly for food supplies.

Allied Control of the Town
Provisional under Badoglio
(Report of Major H. J.
Powell, MGS AFHQ, 30
October 1943*) - 57

1125.27, 28 (to "at the
time")

930-35



*ACC Order 10000

100/92. ~~133-14~~

~~Sept 43 to Oct 43~~

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512*original with
Political Section
Brindisi file 38*

30 October 1943

SUBJECT: Visit to the Allied Military Mission at Brindisi.

TO : Brigadier General Holmes.

2259

1. The information contained in this report was collected during my visit to Brindisi, 19 - 29 October 1943 while I was a guest of the Allied Military Mission. My principal informants were Captain Stone, USMC, Lt Col. Bonfort, Lt. Col. Wyne Bates, Lt. Col. Wayne, and Mr. Caccia. I also had the opportunity to talk at some length with other members of the Mission. I wish to record my appreciation of General Macvariano's hospitality and the pains taken by all members of his staff to make my mission successful.

THE PRESENT SADOGLIO GOVERNMENT

2. There should be no misapprehensions about the civil side of the Sadooglio Government as it is constituted today. It is a skeleton government exercising jurisdiction over four Apulian provinces in civil matters and has little or no national aspects. The very fact that it has an office of Civil Affairs (Ufficio degli Affari Civili) instead of a Ministry of the Interior indicates its local character. It must not be thought of as a national government in miniature.

3. The office of Civil Affairs has been placed under Piccardi who was Minister of Labor in the original Sadooglio Government. As you will recall, he made an excellent impression on General Maccherry who met him in Naples and this impression is confirmed by members of the Military Mission. Although his sphere of activity is legally limited at present to the four provinces under Italian Sovereignty, he has expressed himself as anxious to examine the future economic problems of Italy as a whole with the Chief of the Economic Section of the Control Commission. Piccardi himself intends to handle the economic matters of his office.

4. Under Piccardi is Innocenti who is responsible for the civil administration of the four provinces. Innocenti was appointed prefect of Taranto by Sadooglio and was later summoned to Brindisi to take over the supervision of the four provinces. He held the office of Chief of the Civil Affairs office until the appointment of Piccardi to that post. From what I gather, his duties remain about the same, but he is responsible to Piccardi as the new Chief of Civil Affairs instead of being directly responsible to the Marshal. Innocenti is reported to be a capable, professional civil servant on the prefectorial level. He is not qualified by experience, at least, for a high position on the national level such as that of Minister of the Interior.

5. Piccardi's financial adviser is Guido Jung, former Minister of Finance. Jung was brought from Palermo by Lord Rennell to serve as financial adviser to the Badoglio Government. He now wears the uniform of Colonel of the Italian Army. He is not Minister of Finance and has stated that he does not intend to become so because of his age. Jung's reputation as an able man in the financial field is well known. His reputation and past experience in Italian finance should qualify him as a useful adviser on national financial problems.

6. General Aliberti, Quartermaster General of the Italian Army, ²²⁵⁸ handles military and civilian supplies. His military jurisdiction in this field is national; his civil jurisdiction is limited to the four provinces. As a member of the army he is, of course, not under Piccardi, but the civilian side of his activities are closely coordinated with the Italian Civil Affairs Office.

7. The Duke of Aquarone is Minister of the Royal Household. As such he was not a member of the Council of Ministers when it existed or a political figure on the Italian scene. The traditional duties of his office pertain to the administration of the Royal Household and are generally those of a King's Chamberlain. At Brindisi, he took charge for a while of financial and supply matters until others more qualified could be found. More recently he has assisted Innocenti unofficially. It is said that his advice bears weight with the King.

8. On 20 October, the Allied Military Mission was advised that a Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been established by Badoglio with himself as Minister. This was made possible by the escape from Rome of some of the younger officials of that Ministry. Badoglio's request for France was made in order to bring an elder and more experienced official into the group.

9. The men who have been briefly described above constitute the civil side of the present Badoglio Government. Piccardi, Jung and the Marshal himself are the only officials who have had experience in administration along national lines. Badoglio and Piccardi are the only two officials who are legitimate Ministers in that they were formally appointed Ministers by the King. But Piccardi, although he has not been dismissed by the King and consequently still holds his portfolio, does not wish to be considered a Minister under present circumstances. His authority is limited to the four provinces - hence, is not ministerial in scope - and his staff is practically non-existent. In this connection, it must be emphasized that these officials from the Marshal down are doing the work largely themselves. There are very few if any assistants above the clerical level and officer personnel and equipment is at a bare minimum.

10. The great majority of Badoglio's original Ministers are still in Rome unless they have been removed by the Germans. As is known to you, Badoglio was given the choice of constituting a new Government with the personnel which might be found in territory not under German control

or of waiting until he could return to Rome and obtain a wider choice of abler men. He was led to believe that the return would take place sooner than the military situation has now proved possible. Badoglio decided to wait.

11. The factors motivating his decision seem to have been the following:

a) Badoglio felt that any new government which he constituted should be as strong as possible in the sense of including men of ability and reputation. He is reported to have pointed out that Mussolini's new fascist Party was a ridiculous collection of nonentities and that he wished to avoid forming a government which would be comparably obscure in its personnel. 2257

b) The ministers of his original cabinet were still legitimate ministers, not having been dismissed by the King. Badoglio is reported to have been reluctant to have them dismissed out of courtesy for former colleagues and, I surmise, because he hoped their ministerial status might gain them better treatment at German hands.

c) The following is conjecture, but it is reasonable to believe that Badoglio felt it inappropriate to establish a government on national lines, the jurisdiction of which would be limited to four Apulian Provinces.

d) Brindisi lacks the physical accommodations for government of any size. This is particularly true since the Allied services have taken over the few suitable buildings for their offices and quarters. This is a factor which must have influenced Badoglio's decision.

12. It should be recalled here that the military terms of the Armistice precluded the civil terms and that the first mission to be sent to the Badoglio Government was of a predominantly military nature. It was therefore a natural consequence of the paramount importance attributed to military affairs by the Commander-in-Chief that the Badoglio Government should concentrate its attention and energies on executing the military terms to the satisfaction of the Allied Military Mission. I gather from members of the Mission that the Badoglio Government has not only complied to the letter with the formal terms of the Armistice but has shown a sincere desire to cooperate with the Mission in every way in order to make Italy's military and naval assistance of the greatest possible value to the Allies.

POSSIBLE REMOVAL OF THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT TO ANOTHER CITY

13. With regard to the possible removal of the Badoglio Government from Brindisi to a city other than Rome, the situation seems to be this. In my opinion, there are only three cities so far in territory not under seat of government. They are Palermo, Bari and Naples.

a) Palermo. Although Palermo is probably the best equipped physically at this moment to house a government of some magnitude and conditions in the island of Sicily have settled down to a level of organization and order where General Alexander might consider it safe to transfer his jurisdiction over the island to the Italian Government, serious psychological disadvantages stand in the way of removing the Badoglio Government to Palermo. In the first place, it would be a step backwards both physically and mentally. Those hostile to the Government would interpret it as a flight from the mainland and an admission that the Allied hold on the mainland was still precarious. The psychological value of having the King and his Government on the mainland where the fighting is going on to rally the Army and the people from behind the lines is not to be underestimated. The Badoglio Government has spoken to the Italians and the world with confident expectancy of returning to Rome within the immediate future. A removal to Palermo would seem to indicate a loss of confidence in the immediacy of the return. In the second place the Badoglio Government is in a better position at Brindisi to organize the military assistance which it has promised the Allies. As a "War Government", it is more in the war at Brindisi than it would be in Palermo. 2256

b) Bari. Bari is a thriving, commercial city which has enjoyed remarkable development during the last twenty years. It has very few of the historical traditions or associations of such cities as Palermo or Naples. Apart from the old city huddled around the cathedral, the impression is one of modernity. It has modern hotels, docks and government buildings in the Fascist style. It has no royal palace, so far as I know. The Air Force and other Allied services have made heavy demands upon suitable buildings. Although Bari is situated in one of the four provinces under Italian jurisdiction, its military importance to Allied operations inclines me to the opinion that the Allied Military Commanders would oppose the presence of the Badoglio Government in a place where they will soon be short of space if they are not short already.

c) Naples. The physical conditions of Naples at the moment is known to me only at second hand. I would doubt very much, however, if General Alexander would be willing to relinquish the direct control which he exercises through AMG for Italian jurisdiction regardless of the degree of indirect control which he would retain. Naples and its port seem to me to be too important as military assets and too close to the front to permit of anything but military government. But if these conditions did not prevail, I would see a distinct advantage in the removal of King and Government to the third largest city of the realm, which is also the traditional residence of the Crown Prince. It would bring the Government closer to the front and place the Royal Family in closer contact with Italians who have suffered seriously from the war. It would add strength and prestige to that Government with which the Allied Government have decided to deal until conditions allow a new government to take its place.

14. The analysis given above is largely conditioned by the assumption that consistent with the policy established here, the King and his Government would be given jurisdiction over the territory in which their seat

of government was situated. In this connection, it is worth recalling that Badoglio himself has stated frankly that he does not consider his Government at the present time in a position to handle effectively the problems of administration which would arise from the transfer of any considerable territory from AMG back to Italian jurisdiction. This is obviously a statement based on a realistic evaluation of the evidence as it appears to Badoglio and singularly unmotivated by political and psychological considerations. It has not escaped Badoglio, as evinced by his suggested compromise, that confidence, prestige and authority would accrue to his Government if he could add to the territory under its jurisdiction. It may be argued that these gains would have outweighed the inability to administer the territory effectively. Badoglio did not think so.

CONCLUSIONS

15. The conclusions which are expressed in the following paragraphs were reached independently and must be considered the official views of the Allied Military Mission.

16. The problem presented by the Badoglio Government has two main aspects, military and political. The military aspect can be stated in a few words; namely, that the Badoglio Government should execute the military terms of the Armistice loyally and promptly and should give the Allied Forces the additional military assistance which is implied in Italy's declaration of war against Germany and her admission to the status of co-belligerent, it is necessary that the Italian Government which the Allied Governments have charged with executing the co-belligerency should have the strongest possible popular support. This brings us to the political field.

17. The intention of the Allied Governments has been plainly stated that the Italian people shall be allowed to choose their own form of Democratic Government as soon as military conditions permit. In the meantime, Badoglio has stated his intention of enlarging his Government to include representative of the various parties and currents of political thought which are found in Italy today. But it is not his intention to constitute such a Government until he reaches Rome. Members of the Military Mission with whom I have discussed Badoglio's intentions in this regard are convinced of his sincerity. His reasons for failing to realize his intentions more fully while at Brindisi have been given above (see paragraph 11). They need not to be repeated here.

18. The point has been reached, however, where the time factor is becoming paramount. So long as it was expected that Rome would be taken by the Allied Forces at a not too distant date, reasons for deferring the constitution of a new government of a national and representative character were just and cogent. If, however, the allied advance should be delayed indefinitely or even for four or five months, it should be considered whether more would not be lost than gained by waiting. The same obstacles, inavailability of a suitable seat and lack of first class personnel will continue to prevail. But the serious disadvantages which would arise from pro-

~~These~~ delay impose consideration of actions which have hitherto seemed inadvisable. For example, would the establishment of a national and representative government at Palermo not outweigh the disadvantages connected with the location of the city? Would a government formed of the best men available rather than those most desirable not be better than the kind of government which is functioning at present?

19. I am of the opinion that every effort should be made to constitute a national and representative government from what personnel is available if it is likely that the Allies will not have reached Rome within the next six weeks. In the first place, it is reasonable to believe that such a government could not fail to enjoy more confidence and support than the present government if it continued to be constituted as it is today. People are sceptical of political promises and apt to ignore the justifiable reasons for a delay which their impatience will cause them to interpret as an attempt at frustration. I am speaking here of British and Americans at home as well as of Italians in occupied and unoccupied Italy. Realization is some part of the promised government on a wider basis had better be undertaken now in a gradual and intelligent manner than adopted abruptly later on, as the result of popular resentment.

20. In the second place, it is essential for the cause of the Democracies and the strength of the Badoglio government that Italian territory be turned back to the latter as soon as military considerations permit. We cannot afford to forget that millions of our potential Allies now under German oppression are watching us very closely in this regard. In their minds, the question is reduced to its simplest form: have we come as the liberators whom we profess to be or with the intention of hanging on to what we have conquered. The way in which we shall be received by them, the hope which underlies their courage to resist until we come, the assistance they will give us not only during the combat phases but the difficult period thereafter will be influenced by our actions rather than our words. It is understood that we will exercise military government anywhere so long as military government will contribute to the successful prosecution of the war. But when the military commander decides that military government in any given part of Italian territory is no longer necessary to achieve this purpose. I am convinced that we stand to lose more than we shall gain by not handing that territory back to the Italian Government. There is one condition, however, and that is that the Italian Government which is the Badoglio Government will be able to administer it effectively under our supervision. I do not think for the sake of the strength that the Badoglio Government needs to acquire in order to be of the maximum assistance to us, of the impression that we need to make upon our friends, and of our own principles and convictions that we can afford not to press for the development of a national and representative Italian Government capable of administering whatever Italian territory is handed back to it before Rome is taken.

THE CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT

21. At the present time, it would be useless and wasteful for the Control Commission as a whole to attempt to deal with the present Badoglio

Government on national problems. As has been pointed out in the first part of this report, there is little in the Badoglio Government as now constituted which corresponds to the various sub-commissions of the Economic and Administrative Section of the Control Commission which were set up to correspond to the divisions of the normal Italian government. A financial officer and an Economic Officer have counterparts in Jung and Piccardi on the national level. Allied representatives of Public Health, Public Safety, Law, Education, etc., would have to descend to the provincial level on the Italian side to find opposite numbers. Until this situation is remedied on the Italian side, there is little to be done. In fact, it is my opinion that sending a number of specialists who might attempt to accomplish something in their field without the proper Italian counterparts to accomplish it would lead to unhappy results. The proper procedure would rather seem to be to get the Badoglio Government enlarged and to send Control Commission members as their counterparts are produced.

PERSONNEL FOR A LARGER GOVERNMENT

22. As has been said before, Badoglio feels unable to obtain the proper men for a wider government until he reaches Rome. That very few experienced top level men are available under present conditions is admitted. But surely there are men available who could fill certain key positions on a temporary basis with adequacy if not with distinction. In Italy, there has been a long tradition in government of calling on university professors to fill technical posts. Are the Universities of Naples, Bari, Catania, and Palermo so devoid of first class faculty members that they would be unable to furnish jurists, economists, doctors, agricultural experts and other qualified to serve the state? Would the President of the Court of Appeals of Naples or his Vice-President be incapable of organizing a Ministry of Justice? Experience shows that in Sicily, at least, the Italian civil courts have been coordinated into a system embracing the Island under a committee of Italian professional jurists. And would it be impossible to find a questore with long experience in a large city to head the public safety organization? These observations are put in the form of questions because I do not possess the evidence at the moment to make them as affirmative statements. Circumstances, however, incline me to believe that such men could be found.

23. They must be sought out, however, as part of an established policy. To wait for one or another to turn up and offer his services is haphazard. If a wider government is to be established, a plan of its organization should be drawn up and priorities given to certain positions or sections. When men know that steps are actually being taken to form a national government, it will be possible to persuade them to participate in it as a patriotic duty. It is not likely that the ablest men would care to be associated with the present quasi provincial organization.

24. A final word must be said about awaiting a return to Rome before constituting a national government. It is known that the archives of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs were destroyed before the Germans could seize them. It is a reasonable assumption that the same thing was done in some, at least of the other Ministries. The Germans, certainly, will remove any documents of value which are left. What they will do the buildings is still a matter of conjecture, but the possibility must be considered that they too will be destroyed.

25. As to personnel, it is not likely that the Germans will fail to remove anyone important on whom they can lay their hands. A certain number will probably escape. But in view of German skill and thoroughness in these matters, it is reasonable to assume that Badoglio will not come into a Rome equipped with an administrative machine which needs only to be put in motion in order to function. Thus, there is all the more reason for constructing a substitute machine which can carry the load in Rome at first and later furnish the nucleus or parts of what will be rebuilt.

AMGLO

26. Allied control of the four Apulian provinces under the jurisdiction of the Badoglio Government is exercised by Liaison Officers drawn from AMG and attached to the Allied Military Mission. The organization contains 13 officers and 6 AM/OR's. The Chief Liaison Officer is Lt. Col. Nelson Monfort whose Headquarters are situated at Brindisi.

27. During my visit to the Allied Military Mission Col. Monfort made it possible for me to see his organization at work. In his company, I visited Taranto, Lecce and Bari, and talked with the AMGLO officers there. In Brindisi, I saw a great deal of Col. Mayne, Col. Monfort's Deputy and Head of the Brindisi team. The information presented below is combined from what these officers told me and what I saw for myself.

28. AMGLO officers and men are distributed in groups among the four provincial capitals and the Headquarters. The strength of each group corresponds to the importance of the capital and the amount of work to be done there. At the time of my visit, officers and men were distributed as follows:

Headquarters, Brindisi: Col. Monfort, 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Sgt. interpreter, 1 clerk, 1 driver, Lt. Col. Mayne gives part of his time.
Bari: 1 Major, 3 Lieutenants.
Brindisi: 1 Lt. Col. Part of Lt. Col. Mayne's time, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Sgt. interpreter.
Lecce: 1 Major.
Taranto: 1 Lt. Colonel, 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 interpreter, 1 clerk.

In Brindisi, as indicated above, Lt. Col. Mayne, Chief of the Provincial Team, also serves as Col. Monfort's Deputy at Headquarters. There

are two offices. The paper work of Headquarters is handled in one office; the provincial in the other.

29. The offices of the AMGLD officers are situated in the Palazzo del Governo in three cities and in the Casa del Mucchio in the fourth (Trento). Two Italians are hired to furnish clerical assistance; 1 translator in Taranto, 1 interpreter in Bari. Both vetted by field security.

2232

30. The principal matters handled by AMGLD Headquarters are high level liaison and trade and supplies. Messages and requests from AMGLD to the Italian Army and Government pass through Col. Monfort's office and are taken up with the proper officials. Requests of the 15th Army Groups and the various area commands follow the same channel. The Allied Military Mission also uses Col. Monfort's office to handle the civil side of its business on the provincial level.

31. With regard to supplies, the four provinces are treated as a territorial unit. It has been estimated that the four provinces as a whole will require 6,000 tons of grain monthly from November through January and 9,000 tons monthly from February to July when the next harvest comes in. Requests for other supplies have also been made. The Italian authorities come to Col. Monfort for these supplies. It is his task to verify the documents which have been submitted and to take appropriate action.

32. In handling matters which extend to the four provinces, Col. Monfort deals with the Italian officials at the highest level: General Aliberti, Piccardi or Innocenti. If the business involves orders to the provincial prefects or other provincial authorities, they are issued by Innocenti and the AMGLD provincial officers on the spot report anything unsatisfactory in their local execution.

33. The AMGLD provincial officer deals with the local affairs of his province. He serves as liaison officer between the civilian population and the armed forces. For example, complaints against members of the armed forces who are alleged to have committed offenses against civilians are taken to the local AMGLD officer who refers them in turn to the proper military authority. He is in direct touch with the provincial officials of his province and keeps an eye on their behaviour. He maintains close relations with the area or sub-area commander and constitutes the normal channel through which these commanders deal with the local officials.

34. AMGLD does not post proclamations or ordinances. This is done either by the appropriate Italian officials or the area commanders. The latter occurs when the matter in question affects both Allied military forces and civilians; for example, hours when wine and spirits may be sold in restaurants and bars. In such an ordinance, printed in Italian and English, it is stated that the ordinance is issued in coordination with the Prefect. AMGLD is the coordinating agency

35. AMGIO exercises political functions in accordance with the general Allied policy that active fascists shall be removed from positions of authority or influence. Col. Monfort has had at least two prefects removed from office and suitable officials put in their place. His procedure has been to collect all pertinent information from Field Security and his own officers and to present it with his recommendation to Innocenti. There has not been an instance in which his recommendation has not been carried out promptly and without objection. AMGIO officers in the provinces keep an eye on the *podesta* and other communal officials as well as on those of the provincial level. 2251

36. AMGIO officers concur in stating that Italian officials everywhere have been thoroughly cooperative. Col. Monfort feels that his staff is large enough to handle the work efficiently and it is my opinion that he is right. This does not mean that other provinces of the same approximate area and population but with a more complicated economic structure (highly industrialized area, etc.) could be supervised effectively by the same small number of officers. It does mean, however, that the relatively large numbers of officers attributed to provinces under the present proposed scheme of commission control would bear reviewing. It is a fundamental and sound principle of Military Government not to waste manpower.

HENRY T. ROWELL
Major, C. M. F.
MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION

HTR/atr

INCOMING

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FREEDOM

FATMA

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Recommend you propose to Italian Government broadcasts over Radio Bari immediately and until end sowing season instructing Italians liberated territory sow maximum grain and Pulse Acreage, also suitable instructions concerning Maize and other crops. PARLETINE JACKSON TO ALLIED MILITARY MISSION SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE VHWNO. Also recommend such instructions be made locally by all means at disposal of Government. Above has been discussed with and approved by HQS here. For your information neither OWI nor SAC to participate this campaign.

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