

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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MISCELLANEOUS MILITARY & ADMINISTRATIVE
PAPERS & DOCUMENTS
SEPT. - NOV. 1943

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1. The following is a statement of policy regulating Allied and Italian propaganda conducted in Italian Territory.

2. Propaganda will be conducted in Italy on a cooperative basis between the Allied and Italian propaganda agencies. A united propaganda front will be formed comparable to that which exists in the field of military operations. As in the latter field the full direction will be given by the Allied Commander in Chief in the form of propaganda directives which he will issue from time to time. The Italian government will influence the formulation of these portions pertaining to propaganda for Italians by timely submission of recommendations to Allied Force Headquarters.

3. In the application of this general policy of cooperation the following pattern of collaboration is proposed: At each focal point of propaganda emission such as Radio Bari there should exist side by side two propaganda groups, one Allied and the other Italian. These two groups will use jointly the available propaganda facilities whether the latter be radio, press or cinema. The propaganda from both groups will be controlled by the Field Propaganda Director. Inasmuch as questions of application may arise, the Allied Commander in Chief will designate a representative who will adjust any conflicts in the requirements of the two propaganda groups.

4. It is of recognized importance to both the Allied and Italian governments to increase and improve the technical qualities of propaganda

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facilities. As has been done in North Africa, the Allied technicians are prepared to make every effort in terms of skill, equipment and personnel to increase the output of Italian propaganda facilities. Thus at Bari it is an obvious advantage for the joint propaganda requirements to improve the station, provide funds to increase the pay of certain employees and generally to increase the capacity of the station. This is of particular importance because of Radio Bari's unique position as the only present medium of propaganda transmission. Because of the investment in men and equipment it is reasonable to vest the technical management in an Allied manager. It is thoroughly understood that their prejudices in no wise the free and untrammelled use of the facilities for Italian propaganda, in fact, the increased output will place at the disposition of the Italian propaganda a much more effective vehicle of transmission.

5. It is not the intention of the Allies to undertake propaganda to Italians on their own account but to leave it to the Italians themselves for the free development of their own propaganda to their own country within the lines of the generally agreed directive.

TOP SECRET

COPY

Office of Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean Station,

TOP SECRET.

23rd September, 1943.

No. Med.00380/17D.

MEMORANDUM.

MEMORANDUM ON AGREEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND
DISPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND MERCANTILE MARINE.

The attached copy of an agreement concerning the employment and disposition of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine is forwarded for information with reference to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's message timed 232304, September to Admiralty only.

/s/ ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET.

Distribution -

The Secretary of the Admiralty (Submission No. 17B/Med.00380/17D.)
The Allied Commander-in-Chief
The Commander-in-Chief, Levant
The Commander, United States Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
The Flag Officer Commanding, Gibraltar
The Flag Officer Commanding, Force "H"
The Vice Admiral, Malta
Vice Admiral A.J. Power, C.B., D.S.O.
The Rear Admiral, Force 'H'
The Rear Admiral Commanding, Fifteenth Cruiser Squadron
The Flag Officer, Taranto Area
The Flag Officer, Italy
The Flag Officer, Tunisia
The Flag Officer, Sicily
The Commodore Commanding, Twelfth Cruiser Squadron
The Commodore, Algeria
The Naval Officers in Charge, Mediterranean Station
The Ministry of War Transport Representative

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/s/

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET.

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- The Commodore, Algeria
- The Naval Officers in Charge, Mediterranean Station
- The Ministry of War Transport Representative

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Office of Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean Station.

MOST SECRET.

23rd September 1943.

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON THE EMPLOYMENT AND
DISPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN FLEET AND MERCANTILE
MARINE BETWEEN THE ALLIED NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE
ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE ITALIAN MINISTER
OF MARINE.

The armistice having been signed between the Head of the Italian Government and the Allied Commander-in-Chief under which all Italian warships and the Italian Mercantile Marine were placed unconditionally at the disposal of the United Nations, and H.M. The King of Italy and the Italian Government having since expressed the wish that the Fleet and the Italian Mercantile Marine should be employed in the Allied effort to assist in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, the following principles are established on which the Italian Navy and Mercantile Marine will be disposed.

- (A) Such ships as can be employed to assist actively in the Allied effort will be kept in commission and will be used under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, as may be arranged between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.
- (B) Ships which cannot be so employed will be reduced to a care and maintenance basis and be placed in designated ports, measures of disarmament being undertaken as may be necessary.
- (C) The Government of Italy will declare the name and whereabouts of

- (1) Warships
- (11) Merchant Ships

now in their possession which previously belonged to any of the United Nations. These vessels are to be returned forthwith as may be directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

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now in their possession which previously belonged to any of the United Nations. These vessels are to be returned forthwith as may be directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. This will be without prejudice to negotiations between the Governments which may subsequently be made in connection with replacing losses of ships of the United Nations caused by Italian action.

(D) The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief will act as the agent of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in all matters concerning the employment of the Italian Fleet or Merchant Navy, their disposition and related matters.

235



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MOST SECRET.

Page 2

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FLEET AND MERCANTILE MARINE (CONTD).

- (E) It should be clearly understood that the extent to which the terms of the armistice are modified to allow of the arrangements outlined above and which follow, are dependent upon the extent and effectiveness of Italian co-operation.
2. Method of Operation. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean will place at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine, a high ranking Naval officer with the appropriate staff who will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for all matters in connection with the operation of the Italian Fleet, and be the medium through which dealings will be carried out in connection with the Italian Mercantile Marine. The Flag Officer acting for these duties (Flag Officer, Liaison) will keep the Italian Ministry of Marine informed of the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and will act in close co-operation as regards issue of all orders to the Italian Fleet.

3. Proposed disposition of the Italian Fleet.

- (a) All battleships will be placed on a care and maintenance basis in ports to be designated and will have such measures of disarmament applied as may be directed. These measures of disarmament will be such that the ships can be brought into operation again if it so seems desirable. Each ship will have on board a proportion of Italian Naval personnel to keep the ships in proper condition and the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will have the right of inspection at any time.
- (b) Cruisers. Such cruisers as can be of immediate assistance will be kept in commission. At present it is visualized that one squadron of four cruisers will suffice and the remainder will be kept in care and maintenance as for the battleships but at a rather greater degree of readiness to be brought into service if required.
- (c) Destroyers and Torpedo Boats. It is proposed to keep these in commission and to use them on escort and similar duties as may be requisite. It is proposed that they should be divided into escort groups working

operation of the Italian Fleet, and be the medium through which dealings will be carried out in connection with the Italian Mercantile Marine. The Flag Officer acting for these duties (Flag Officer, Liaison) will keep the Italian Ministry of Marine informed of the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and will act in close co-operation as regards issue of all orders to the Italian Fleet.

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(c) Destroyers and Torpedo Boats. It is proposed to keep these in commission and to use them on escort and similar duties as may be requisite. It is proposed that they should be divided into escort groups working as units and that they should be based on Italian ports.

(d) Small Craft. M.A.S., minesweepers, auxiliaries and similar small craft will be employed to the full, detailed arrangements being made with the Flag Officer (Liaison) by the Italian Ministry of Marine for their best employment.

(e) Submarines. In the first instance submarines will be immobilized in ports to be designated and at a later date these may be brought into service as may be required to assist the Allied effort.

4. Status.....



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MOST SECRET.Page 3.MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FLEET AND
MERCANTILE MARINE (CONTD).

4. Status of Italian Navy. Under this modification of the armistice terms, all the Italian ships will continue to fly their flag. A large proportion of the Italian Navy will thus remain in active commission operating their own ships and fighting alongside the forces of the United Nations against the Axis powers.

The requisite Liaison officers will be supplied to facilitate the working of the Italian ships in co-operations with Allied forces. A small Italian liaison mission will be attached to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to deal with matters affecting the Italian fleet.

5. Mercantile Marine. It is the intention that the Italian Mercantile Marine should operate under the same conditions as the merchant ships of the Allied Nations. That is to say, all mercantile shipping of the United Nations is formed into a pool which is employed as may be considered necessary for the benefit of all the United Nations. In this will naturally be included the requirements for the supply and maintenance of Italy. The system will be analogous to that used in North Africa, where the North Africa Shipping Board controls all United States, British and French shipping in detail in so far as Italian ships are concerned. While it may be expected that a proportion of Italian ships will be working within the Mediterranean and to and from Italian ports, it must be appreciated that this will not always necessarily be the case and ships flying the Italian flag may be expected to be used elsewhere as is done with the merchant ships of all the United Nations. Italian ships employed as outlined in this paragraph will fly the Italian flag and will be manned by crews provided by the Italian Ministry of Marine.

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AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NAVAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
MEDITERRANEAN, ALLIED FORCES AND THE ROYAL ITALIAN MINISTER OF MARINE
WITH RESPECT TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE ITALIAN NAVY

The aforementioned agreement is amended as follows:

The following phrase to be added to the Preamble:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of this agreement as to immediate employment and disposition of Italian warships and merchant ships do not affect the right of United Nations to make such other dispositions of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. Their decisions in this respect will be notified to the Italian Government from time to time."

Final sentence of last paragraph to be amended to read:

"will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag."

The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at BRINDISI.

For the Naval Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean, Allied Forces.

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Final sentence of last paragraph to be amended to read:

"will be manned so far as possible by crews provided by Italian Ministry of Marine and will fly the Italian flag."

The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

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For the Naval Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean, Allied Forces.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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FLAG OFFICER LIAISON, ITALY,
NAVY HOUSE,
TARANTO.

10th. November, 1943.

FOL/285/03.

BRIGADIER TAYLOR,
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION.

The attached is the text of the remarks of the Minister of Marine which General Mason MacFarlane has taken with him to Allied Force Headquarters.

2. The Minister of Marine is not prepared to sign the amendment in its present form. You will note that he has proposed an alternative wording, but I am not empowered to accept this without the approval of my Commander-in-Chief.
3. I warned Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, by signal last night as to the state of affairs, and informed him that General Mason MacFarlane would arrive at Algiers this afternoon with the Minister's remarks.

/s/

REAR-ADMIRAL.

10th. November, 1943.

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/s/

REAR-ADMIRAL.

TRANSLATIONMEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE

With respect to the amendment of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement, regarding the employment of the Italian Fleet, proposed by the United Nations as a condition of signature of the amendment to the additional armistice terms, the Italian government calls attention to what follows:

I The Cunningham-De Courten agreement was examined and accepted by mutual agreement between the minister of the Italian Navy and Admiral Cunningham on 23 September 1943, under the Armistice, with the aim of permitting the Italian Fleet to make its own contribution to Allied efforts in the prosecution of the war. In the agreement it was clearly affirmed that Italian warships would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet according to agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

II The Cunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet; hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.

III The Italian government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.

IV The Italian government therefore feels compelled to place in evidence the form of the additional clause in which are mentioned the unilateral decisions of the United Nations, which should be brought to the attention of the Italian Government from time to time.

V The Italian government, therefore, emphasizes that the additional clause could of course be accepted provided it were modified in the following form which, while respecting the substance of the desires of the United Nations, is rendered in a manner reconcilable with natural Italian requirements:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of the present agreement relative to the employment and disposition of the warships and merchant marine of Italy does not preclude the possibility that all or part of the Italian ships may be employed in other ways that the United Nations consider suitable to the ends of the war in general. Their proposals in this connection will be discussed from time to time with the Italian Government."

mutual agreement between the minister of the Italian Navy and Admiral Cunningham on 23 September 1943, under the Armistice, with the aim of permitting the Italian fleet to make its own contribution to Allied efforts in the prosecution of the war. In the agreement it was clearly affirmed that Italian warships would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet according to agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

II The Cunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet; hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.

III The Italian government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.

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/s/ The Chief of Government

Badoglio.

Trans/Sgt. Shenfield/ajp

PROMEMORIA PER IL GENERALE MASON MACFARLANE

In relazione all'e mandamento al Cunningham - De Courten agreement, nei riguardi dell'impiego della flotta italiana, posto dalle nazioni Unite come condizioni di firma dell'amendamento alle condizioni aggiuntive di armistizio, il Governo Italiano rileva quanto segue:

1.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è stato esaminato ed accettato di mutuo accordo fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana e l'Ammiraglio Cunningham il 23 Settembre U.S., in regime di armistizio, con lo scopo di permettere alla flotta italiana di fornire il proprio contributo agli sforzi alleati nella prosecuzione della guerra. In esso era chiaramente affermato che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.

2.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è in corso di larga e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo: anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.

3.) - Il Governo Italiano, ed un mese e mezzo di distanza dalla conclusione del Cunningham - De Courten agreement, non vedrebbe in conseguenza l'opportunità di introdurre in esso una clausola aggiuntiva la quale parrebbe forse in contrasto con lo spirito di collaborazione sempre dimostrato dalla Marina Italiana. E ciò tanto più in quanto essa viene suggerita quando l'Italia si trova da quasi un mese in stato di co-belligeranza con le Nazioni Unite.

4.) - Il Governo Italiano ritiene quindi di dover porre in evidenza la forma della clausola aggiuntiva nella quale si parla di decisioni unilaterali delle Nazioni Unite, le quali dovrebbero essere notificate al Governo Italiano volta per volta.

5.) - Il Governo Italiano mette quindi in rilievo che la clausola aggiuntiva potrebbe senz'altro essere accettata qualora fosse modificata nella forma seguente, la quale pur rispettando la sostanza del desiderio delle Nazioni Unite, è redatta in modo conciliabile con le naturali esigenze italiane:

“““““ Inteso e concordato che le disposizioni del presente accordo relative all'impiego e disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutto o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra generale. Le loro proposte a questo riguardo saranno discusse di volta in volta col Governo Italiano”““““.

che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.

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IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

F. to RADOGLIO

235

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TRANSLATION

By order of His Excellency, Marshal Badoglio, Chief of the Government, I have signed the clauses added to the Preamble and to the last paragraph of the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, which were requested by the Allied Governments as conditions of the signature of the amendments to the Armistice.

In signing, I request that note be taken of the following statement:

"I believe it my duty to make clear that the request for insertion of these clauses, put forth less than two months after the meeting with Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet, alters the spirit of the agreement concluded between Admiral Cunningham and me. The clauses of this Agreement had been put forward in accordance with the Armistice, by Admiral Cunningham himself, who invited me to examine them and make known to them my observations and comments. In as much as there was complete agreement in regard to the text presented by the Allies, and as the Agreement has up to now been carried out in the widest and most complete manner without opposition either in letter or spirit, I did not and do not have any reason to believe it should be modified and completed by a subsequent safeguarding clause. This clause seems to be at odds with the active collaboration given up to now by the Italian Navy and with the visible demonstration of the loyalty with which the Italian Fleet is contributing to the utmost to the conduct of the war against the common enemy in the spirit of existing co-belligerency".

BRINDISI, 17 November 1943

/s/ Admiral De Courten

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BRINDISI, 17 November 1943

/s/ Admiral De Courten

Minister of the Navy

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In obbedienza agli ordini di S.E. il Maresciallo Badoglio, Capo del Governo, ho firmato le clausole aggiuntive al preambolo ed all'ultimo paragrafo del Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, richiesta dai Governi alleati come condizioni di firma degli emendamenti all'atto di armistizio.

Nel procedere a tale firma, chiedo che sia preso atto della seguente dichiarazione:

"Ritengo mio dovere mettere in chiaro rilievo che la richiesta di inserzione di queste clausole, avanzata a poco meno di due mesi all'incontro con Sir Andrew Cunningham, allora comandante in capo della Flotta Alleata del Mediterraneo, altera lo spirito dell'accordo concluso fra l'Amm. Cunningham e me. Le clausole di tale Agreement erano state proposte, in regime di armistizio, dallo stesso Amm. Cunningham, il quale mi aveva invitato ad esaminarle ed a comunicargli le mie osservazioni e considerazioni: poiche era stato raggiunto il completo accordo sul testo presentato da parte Alleata e poiche l'Agreement ha avuto finora la piu larga e completa applicazione senza nessun contrasto ne nella lettera, ne nello spirito, non avevo e non ho nessuna ragione di pensare che esso dovesse essere modificato e completato con una ulteriore clausola di carattere cautelativo. Tale clausola appare in antitesi con la collaborazione attiva data finora dalla Marina Italiana e con la palese dimostrazione della leale disposizione della Flotta Italiana ad intensificare fino al massimo limite il suo contributo alla condotta della guerra contro il comune nemico, nello spirito della co-belligeranza in atto."

Brindisi, 17 novembre 1943

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Brindisi, 17 novembre 1943

Ministro della Marina

225

NOTE FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

28 September 1943

Following what H.M. the King verbally expressed to you, I hasten to ask you to be so kind as pointing out without delay to the Superior Authorities the urgent need that the Ambassador GRANDI, who is now near OPORTO and can be reached through our Legation in Lisbona, should be brought here.

GRANDI, ex Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador in London and President of the Parliament, has directed and brought to a favourable conclusion the fall of fascism and of Mussolini.

Today more than ever, he represents an anti-fascist and anti-mussolinian flag.

His being with the Badoglio Government as Minister of Foreign Affairs would bring about a strong and certain disunion in the fascist republican party and would give a severe blow to Mussolini's movement.

GRANDI would also be in a position to make an active propaganda in favour of the Allies.

Agreement with this wish would be of vital importance to the common cause.

His Excellency Marshal Badoglio has been informed of this matter at the time of his departure.

THE MINISTER OF THE ROYAL HOUSEHOLD

- ACQUARONE -

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION - OUTGOING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NR:

M/C NR: 12/28

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO. 161

PREG: MOST IMMEDIATE

FILED:

FROM: FATMA

REC'D: 282023B Sep

TO : CINC MALTA

THE KING OF ITALY HAS REQUESTED ME TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE CINC FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE MALTA CONFERENCE. "IT IS A MATTER OF URGENT NECESSITY TO BRING AMBASSADOR GRANDI, NOW IN THE VICINITY OF OPORTO, TO BRINDISI FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSUMING THE PORTFOLIO OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. GRANDI, WHO ACHIEVED THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI AND FASCISM, IS NOW A SYMBOL OF THE ANTI DASH FASCIST MOVEMENT; HIS PRESENCE IN THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT AS MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD CREATE A SCHISM IN THE RANKS OF THE FASCIST REPUBLICANS AND WOULD BE A SETBACK TO THE MUSSOLINI PARTY; FURTHERMORE, GRANDI WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DEVELOP ACTIVE PROPAGANDA ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIES. ACQUIESCENCE TO THIS REQUEST IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO OUR COMMON CAUSE. GRANDI CAN BE REACHED THROUGH THE ITALIAN LEGATION LISBON. MARSHALL WAS GIVEN BRIEF NOTICE OF THIS MATTER AT THE MOMENT OF HIS DEPARTURE".

AUTHENTICATED:

2349
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brig Gen. U.S.A.

NOTE FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

28 September 1943

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THE MINISTER OF THE ROYAL HOUSEHOLD

- ACQUARONE -

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

7 October 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, Marshall Badoglio.

I have the honour to submit to his Excellency, Marshall Badoglio, a resume of the views of General Eisenhower and of the British and American Governments on the subject of the composition of the Badoglio Government.

The inclusion of Grandi in the Italian Government.

The reasons advanced for desiring Grandi in the Badoglio Cabinet have been given careful consideration and the possible advantages accruing therefrom have been closely evaluated. Outweighing the latter, is the inescapable fact that Grandi has been so intimately associated with Fascism that his inclusion now in the government would lead to serious misinterpretation. Even though he played an important part in the deposition of Mussolini, to the world outside Italy he symbolizes Fascism at its high tide. For this reason his presence in the Italian Government at this time is unacceptable to the United Nations.

Additions to the Badoglio Cabinet

It is of the greatest importance that the first additions to the Badoglio Cabinet be men of unequivocal liberal and democratic principles. The United Nations are viewing the formation of the new Anti-Fascist Government with the utmost attention. These nations will feel justified in supporting the Italian Government only insofar as the responsible positions are in the hands of ministers clearly anti-Fascist and clearly anti-German.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Chief of Mission

HEADQUARTERS 5th ARMY
Psychological Warfare Br. (TNC) AFHQ
APO 464 USA

19 October 1943

MEMORANDUM: OO PWB 15th Army Group.

1- The three draft telegrams attached were brought to PWB by the Neapolitan Committee of Liberation with a request that they be forwarded to the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Badoglio.

2- This committee, composed of delegates of the Liberal Party, the Partito d'Azione, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Communists and certain Veterans of past wars, represents the former opposition elements now supporting the King and Marshal Badoglio in the war against Germany. The committee has shown itself so far to be representative and responsible.

3- The recommendation by PWB, 5th Army, that these three messages be sent in telegraphic form by 15th Army Group to Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt, Marshal Badoglio has been approved by Chief of Staff, 5th Army.

JOHN T. WHITTAKER,
Lt. Col. AUS
Commanding Officer,
5th Army.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Il Comitato napoletano di Liberazione presenta il suo
deferente omaggio al Presidente della nobile Nazione
Americana Le cui Forze Armate offrono al popolo nostro,
già oppresso dalla brutale tracotanza germanica il conforto
della loro cordialità e gentilezza Stop Fa voti per la vittoria
delle Nazioni Unite arra di Libertà al popolo del mondo
intero Stop

Presidente ARANCIO -RUIZ

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Neapolitan Committee of Liberation sends its
deferential homage to the President of the noble
American nation whose Armed Forces offer to our people,
already oppressed by the brutal Germanic arrogance, the
comfort of their cordiality and kindness Stop It wishes
for the Victory of the United Nations pledge of Liberty
to the people of the entire World Stop

President ARANGIO -RUIZ

WINSTON CHURCHILL

Il Comitato napoletano di Liberazione presenta il suo
deferente omaggio a Vostre Onere ed al popolo britannico
auspicando la vittoria delle Forze della Libertà Step
La gentilezza delle Forze Armate anglo-americane è di
grande conforto al popolo napoletano nelle tragiche
sofferenze determinate dalla brutale occupazione
germanica

Presidente ARANGIO-RUIZ

2343

WINSTON CHURCHILL

The Neapolitan Committee of Liberation sends
its deferential homage to your honor and to the British
people with wishes for the victory of the forces of liberty and
the kindness of the Anglo-American forces is of
great comfort to the Neapolitan people in their tragic
sufferings caused by the brutal German occupation.

President ARANGIO - RUSSO

234

MARSHAL BADOGLIO

In the name of the Neapolitan people who have proudly borne the atrocious wounds inflicted upon their city by the overbearing German soldiery, the Neapolitan Committee of Liberation greets Your Excellency who interpreting the national sentiment has broken the iniquitous alliance and returned Italy to the ancient traditional friendships.

President ARANGIO - RUIZ

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2341

COPY

U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET 23 Oct 43

Joint note by Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden

POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN ITALY

This opportunity for a discussion of the policies which have been followed in connection with Allied military government of occupied enemy territory in Italy is very welcome as there have been many misunderstandings and some misrepresentations in connection with the policy and methods followed in dealing with the political and administrative problems resulting from military operations in Italy.

The military operations against Sicily were in the planning stage, it was obvious that a military organization linked to the invading armies would be required to control and administer, under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, the civil population and to restore their economic life, in view of the widespread destruction of public services which would be found in the ejection of the enemy. The military government would also be required to administer the conquered territory in such a way as to promote the military purposes and objectives of the Allied forces in their continued operations against the enemy. It was at the same time the intention to abolish the fascist regime and some interim administrative machinery had to be prepared before an indigenous democratic regime could emerge.

General

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U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

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General Eisenhower was instructed that the military government was to be based upon the following principles;

I. The Allied Military Government was to be essentially military and non-political. It was to serve primarily in the role of assistant to the combat troops in the military operations and therefore it could only be staffed by military personnel and be non-political in character.

II. At the time the military occupation was to deliver the people from the Fascist regime and to restore their freedom from Axis oppression.

III. The Fascist party organization and all its auxiliaries, including the militia and youth movements, were to be immediately dissolved, the Fascist hierarchy removed from posts of authority, and the Fascist control over the machinery of administration completely eliminated. Fascist doctrine and propaganda were, of course, completely prohibited. Officials who were active members of the Fascist party were to be removed and interned.

IV. Freedom of speech and of press in so far as military interests were not prejudiced on the ground of security, and freedom of religious worship, were to be permitted.

V. All discriminatory laws based on the grounds of color, race or creed were to be annulled.

VI. Political prisoners were to be promptly released and the Fascist

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"Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State" were to be abolished.

VII. The administration was to be entirely military and impartial and no organized political groups were to be associated with it.

VIII. War criminals charged by the United Nations were to be imprisoned and held subject to further action.

The Commander-in-Chief was also given guidance as to the introduction of emergency military currency, a moratorium on debts, and the impounding of enemy government and Fascist funds. In particular the Commander-in-Chief was instructed to give careful attention to the matter of sound, fair and voluntary labor relations and to fix, if necessary, the hours and wages of labour.

The instructions on the above lines were issued to General Eisenhower at the end of June and the Allied Military Government began to operate immediately upon the first occupation of Sicilian territory in July.

The Allied forces in Sicily found local and provincial government at a complete standstill. The Civil Affairs officers staffing the military government quickly set up the local administrative authorities, operated the municipal administrations and essential local services, enforced the proclamations and orders of the military governor, issued local regulations to insure security and local order, coordinated with combat commanders requisitioning procurement and billeting and implemented generally the policy of the military administration described above. 2338

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U.S. SECRET Equals British MOST SECRET

In all this activity the utmost possible use was made of local Italians commanding the confidence of the people, who were well disposed to the Allied cause and not tainted with Fascist ideas. In particular it was found possible to control and use to a large extent the non-Fascist Italian police (Carabinieri), but of course the political police (OVRA), and the Squadristi, were abolished and their members incarcerated.

The policy of rooting out the Fascist regime was carried thoroughly into effect. Fascist officials were removed and jailed. All Fascist organizations were disbanded. Discriminatory laws were annulled, but otherwise local customs and laws were continued in force. The urgent problem of feeding the town populations was tackled with considerable success despite the almost complete absence of transportation. For military reasons, where necessary relief supplies were distributed from stocks imported by the Allied forces.

All reports show that Allied Military Government in Sicily has fulfilled its primary objectives; (1) to facilitate military operations; (2) to root out Fascism. It has performed an essential function in reestablishing the necessary public services, thereby enabling the combat forces to perform their task with the maximum support and cooperation of the civilian population. It has also helped to make available for the common war effort the economic resources of the island.

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This form of military government was extended to the Italian mainland when the Allied forces began the invasion in September.

At this juncture the general situation was transformed by the surrender of Italy and the declared intention of the Badoglio Government to assist the Allies against Germany. This was not permitted to alter the policy of the Allied Governments to enforce the terms of surrender and the Badoglio Government accepted this situation. This leaves the Allied Commander-in-Chief in absolute authority to take whatever measures may be necessary to carry out the terms imposed upon and accepted by the Badoglio Government.

The most recent developments have been the Italian declaration of war against Germany, and the acceptance by the Allies of Italy as co-belligerent with, among other conditions, the understanding that the Italian Government should be reorganized upon a broader and more liberal basis by the inclusion of representatives of anti-Fascist political groups.

As a result of these developments it is now contemplated that Military Government will be restricted in the future to the combat zone and that elsewhere supervision and control of the Italian administration will be carried out through the agency of a Control Commission under, so long as the military situation requires, the presidency of the Commander-in-Chief.

The arrangements for giving effect to this change and for associating other interested Allied Governments with the work of control are described in a separate paper entitled: "Allied Control Machinery in Italy", dated October 21st, which was circulated by Mr. Eden at the meeting of the Conference on October 22nd.

It will be seen from the foregoing that although the administration of

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conquered Italian territory has hitherto necessarily been controlled by military considerations, the intention and result have already been such as to give effect in a large measure to the principles announced by Mr. Molotov at the meeting of the Conference on the 22nd of October.

In accordance with the proposed new arrangements for the administration of Italian territory described in the paper circulated by Mr. Eden and referred to above, it would further fall to the Council of Allied High Commissioners to formulate administrative policies for Italy.

Moscow, October 23, 1943

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2335

7 November 1943

To: General Joyce.

As a possible interest I am sending herewith copy of a joint note presented to the Soviet delegation at the Moscow Conference by Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden with regard to military government in Italy.

J. C. HOLMES
Brigadier General, G.S.C.

Spores
November 6, 1945

Lieutenant General F. N. Mason MacFarlane,
Allied Military Mission,
Brindisi.

Dear Mason:

Copies of the documents made public after the
Moscow conference are enclosed for your information.

Sincerely,

Robert D. Murphy
Chief Civil Administrator

Enclosures:
Copies of documents.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE

AT MOSCOW

The conference of foreign secretaries of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull; of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden; and of the Soviet Union, Mr. V. M. Molotov; took place at Moscow from the 19th to 30th of October, 1943. There were twelve meetings. In addition to the foreign secretaries, the following took part in the conference: for the United States of America, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador of the United States; Major-General John R. Deane, United States Army; Mr. H. Hackworth, Mr. James C. Dunn, and experts. For the United Kingdom: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador; Mr. William Strang, Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, and experts. For the Soviet Union; Marshal K. E. Voroshilov; Marshal of the Soviet Union; Mr. A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. M. M. Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs; Mr. V. A. Sergeev, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade; Major General A. A. Gryzlov, of the General Staff; Mr. G. F. Saksin, Senior Official for People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and experts.

The agenda included all questions submitted for discussion by the three governments. Some of the questions called for final decisions, and these were taken. On other questions, after discussion, decisions of principle were taken; these questions were referred for detailed consideration to commissions specially set up for the purpose, or reserved for treatment through diplomatic channels. Other questions again were disposed of by an exchange of views. The governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been in close cooperation in all matters concerning the common war effort, but this is the first time that the foreign secretaries of the three governments have been able to meet together in conference.

In the first place there were frank and exhaustive discussions of the measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers representing the respective Chiefs of Staff in order to discuss definite military operations with regard to which decisions had been taken and which are already being prepared in order to create a basis for the closest military cooperation in the future between the three countries.

Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the recognition by the three governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interest of all peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and cooperation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted.

This conviction is expressed in a declaration in which the Chinese

United Kingdom; Mr. H. Hackworth, Mr. James C. Dunn, and experts. For the United Kingdom: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Ambassador; Mr. William Strang; Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, and experts. For the Soviet Union; Marshal K. E. Voroshilov; Marshal of the Soviet Union; Mr. A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. M. M. Litvinov, Deputy People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs; Mr. V. A. Sergeev, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade; Major General A. A. Gryzlov, of the General Staff; Mr. G. F. Saksin, Senior Official for People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and experts.

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This conviction is expressed in a declaration in which the Chinese Government joined during the conference and which was signed by the three foreign secretaries and the Chinese Ambassador at Moscow on behalf of their governments. This declaration published today provides for even closer collaboration in the prosecution of the war and in all matters pertaining to the surrender and disarmament of the enemies with which the four countries are respectively at war. It set forth the principles upon which the four governments agree that a broad system of international cooperation and security should be based. Provision is made for the inclusion of all other peace-loving nations, great and small, in this system.

The conference agreed to set up machinery for ensuring the closest cooperation between the three governments in the examination of European questions arising as the war develops. For this purpose the conference decided to establish in London a European Advisory Commission to study these questions and to make joint recommendations to the three governments.

Provision was made for continuing when necessary the tripartite consultations of representatives of the three governments in the respective capitals through the existing diplomatic channels.

The conference also agreed to establish an advisory council for matters relating to Italy to be composed in the first instance of representatives of their three governments and of the French Committee of National Liberation. Provision is made for addition to this council of representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia in view of their special interests arising out of aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war. This council will deal with day to day questions other than military preparations and will make recommendations designed to coordinate Allied policy with regard to Italy.

The three foreign secretaries considered it appropriate to reaffirm by a declaration published today, the attitude of the Allied governments in favor of the restoration of democracy in Italy.

The three foreign secretaries declared it to be the purpose of their governments to restore the independence of Austria. At the same time they reminded Austria that in the final settlement, account will be taken of efforts that Austria may make toward its own liberation. The declaration on Austria is published today.

The foreign secretaries issued at the conference a declaration by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin containing a solemn warning that at the time of granting any armistice to any German government, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have had any connection with atrocities and executions in countries overrun by German forces, will be taken back to the countries in which the abominable crimes were committed to be charged and punished according to the laws of those countries.

In an atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding which characterized all the work of the conference, consideration was also given to other important questions. These included not only questions of a current nature but also questions concerning treatment of Hitlerite Germany and its satellites, economic cooperation and assurance of general peace.

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MOSCOW

RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION AT 1:00 P.M., E.W.T., MONDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1943

JOINT FOUR-NATION DECLARATION

The Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China:

United in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, the subsequent declarations, continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

Conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

Recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

Jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.
2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.
3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.
4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.
5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

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4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.
5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.
6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.
7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union have established that the three governments are in complete agreement, that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influence and configuration shall be completely destroyed, and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States and United Kingdom declare that the action of their governments, from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In furtherance of this policy in the future, the Foreign Secretaries of the three governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.
2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.
3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.
4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character.
5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full amnesty.
6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.
7. Fascist chiefs and Army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States and United Kingdom declare that the action of their governments, from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In furtherance of this policy in the future, the Foreign Secretaries of the three governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.
2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.
3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.
4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organizations of a public character.
5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded full amnesty.
6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.
7. Fascist chiefs and Army generals known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

2329

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles stated above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the combined Chiefs of Staff.

The three governments, parties to this declaration, will, at the request of any one of them, consult on this matter. It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people, ultimately, to choose their own form of government.

DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed on Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938 as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

STATEMENT SIGNED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT,
PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL AND PREMIER STALIN
REGARDING ATROCITIES.

The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Nazi domination are no new thing and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that in their desperation, the recolling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three allied powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:

At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece; including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy.

Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Polish officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union, shall be held responsible.

what is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

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2327

Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Polish officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the governments of the allies.

SECRET

Authority - See Freedom of Information Act 7824 of 7 Nov 43.

It is agreed that the title of the document signed at Malta on September 29, 1943 by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, should be changed to "Additional conditions of Armistice with Italy." The following further amendments to this document are also agreed:

In the first paragraph of the Preamble the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" are inserted between the words "governments" and "on the one hand". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943 between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and United Nations on certain terms of a military nature."

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian Land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."



2328



In the first paragraph of the Preamble the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" are inserted between the words "governments" and "on the one hand". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943 between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and United Nations on certain terms of a military nature."

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."

In Article 1 a the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations to this purpose will be complied with."

~~TOP SECRET~~

The present Protocol is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at BAHADUR.

For the Allied Commander-in-Chief



2325

Authority for 12.1 - See Freedom
Call 763 + 97 Nov 83
PROTECTED

COPY



In the first paragraph of the Preamble the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" are inserted between the words "governments" and "on the one hand." The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943 between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and United Nations on certain terms of a military nature."

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."

In Article 1 in the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surren-

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names appear on the following list:

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

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In Article 1 a the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations to this purpose will be complied with."

The present Protocol is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at HAMMISI.

For the Allied Commander-in-Chief



COPY

Authenticity in Italy - See Freedman
Cable 7/20/47

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It is agreed that the title of the document signed at Malta on September 29, 1943 by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, should be changed to "Additional conditions of Armistice with Italy." The following further amendments to this document are also agreed:

In the first paragraph of the Preamble the words "acting in the interests of all the United Nations" are inserted between the words "governments" and "on the one hand." The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943 between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and United Nations on certain terms of a military nature."

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."

In Article 1 a the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses."

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

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In Article 1 the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

2323
"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations to this purpose will be complied with."

The present Protocol is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at BAIRDS.

For the Allied Commander-in-Chief



COPY

Authority for text

See Friedman's copy 783 + 7 Nov 43.

EEETEEEL

It is agreed that the title of the document signed at Malta on September 29, 1943 by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, should be changed to "Additional conditions of Armistice with Italy." The following further amendments to this document are also agreed:

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"Whereas in consequence of an Armistice dated September 3, 1943 between the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting in the interests of all the United Nations on the one hand, and the Italian Government on the other hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and United Nations on certain terms of a military nature."

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 3, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian Land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."

In Article 1 the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names appear

In the fourth paragraph of the Preamble the words "and Soviet" are inserted between the words "United Kingdom" and "Governments", and the word "and" between the words "United States" and "United Kingdom" is deleted. The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"The following, together with the terms of the Armistice of September 5, 1943, are the terms on which the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Governments, acting on behalf of the United Nations, are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and the Allies are not obstructed and Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with the requirements of these governments."

In paragraph six of the Preamble the word "unconditionally" is inserted between the word "accepted" and "by". The paragraph in question therefore reads as follows:

"and have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government."

In Article 1 the word "unconditionally" is deleted. The Article in question therefore reads as follows:

"The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender."

Article 29 is amended to read as follows:

"Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations and who now or in the future are on territory controlled by the Allied Military Command or by the Italian Government, will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations to this purpose will be complied with."

The present Protocol is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the 9th November 1943 at BAUDISI.

For the Allied Commander-in-Chief



TRANSLATIONMEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE

With respect to the amendment of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement, regarding the employment of the Italian Fleet, proposed by the United Nations as a condition of signature of the amendment to the additional armistice terms, the Italian government calls attention to what follows:

I The Cunningham-De Courten agreement was examined and accepted by mutual agreement between the minister of the Italian Navy and Admiral Cunningham on 23 September 1943, under the Armistice, with the aim of permitting the Italian fleet to make its own contribution to Allied efforts in the prosecution of the war. In the agreement it was clearly affirmed that Italian warships would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet according to agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

II The Cunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet; hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.

III The Italian government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.

IV The Italian government therefore feels compelled to place in evidence the form of the additional clause in which are mentioned the unilateral decisions of the United Nations, which should be brought to the attention of the Italian government from time to time.

V The Italian government, therefore, emphasizes that the additional clause could of course be accepted provided it were modified in the following form which, while respecting the substance of the desires of the United Nations, is rendered in a manner reconcilable with natural Italian requirements:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of the present agreement relative to the employment and disposition of the warships and merchant marine of Italy does not preclude the possibility that all or part of the Italian ships may be employed in other ways that the United Nations consider suitable to the ends of the war in general. Their proposals in this connection will be discussed from time to time with the Italian government".

/s/ The Chief of Government

Badoglio.

Trans/Sgt. Shenfield/ajp.

2321

TRANSLATION

Presumably 10 Nov 43.

See future 85-922.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE

With respect to the amendment of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement, regarding the employment of the Italian Fleet, proposed by the United Nations as a condition of signature of the amendment to the additional armistice terms, the Italian government calls attention to what follows:

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/s/ The Chief of Government

Badoglio.

Trans/Sgt. Shenfield/ajp.

2320

MEMORIA PER IL GENERALE MASON MACFARLANE

In relazione all'emendamento al Cunningham-De Courten agreement, nei riguardi dell'impiego della flotta italiana, posto dalle Nazioni Unite come condizione di firma dell'emendamento alle condizioni aggiuntive di armistizio, il Governo Italiano rileva quanto segue:

- I - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è stato esaminato ed accettato di mutuo accordo fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana e l'Ammiraglio Cunningham il 23 settembre u.s., in regime di armistizio, con lo scopo di permettere alla flotta italiana di fornire il proprio contributo agli sforzi alleati nella prosecuzione della guerra. In esso era chiaramente affermato che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.
- II - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è in corso di larga e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo; anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.
- III - Il Governo Italiano, ad un mese e mezzo di distanza dalla conclusione del Cunningham-De Courten agreement, non vedrebbe in conseguenza l'opportunità di introdurre in esso una clausola aggiuntiva la quale parrebbe forse in contrasto con lo spirito di collaborazione sempre dimostrato dalla Marina Italiana. E ciò tanto più in quanto essa viene suggerita quando l'Italia si trova da quasi un mese in stato di co-belligeranza con le Nazioni Unite.
- IV - Il Governo Italiano ritiene quindi di dover porre in evidenza la forma della clausola aggiuntiva nella quale si parla di decisioni unilaterali delle Nazioni Unite, le quali dovrebbero essere notificate al Governo Italiano volta per volta.
- V - Il Governo Italiano mette quindi in rilievo che la clausola aggiuntiva potrebbe senz'altro essere accettata qualora fosse modificata nella forma seguente, la quale pur rispettando la sostanza del desiderio delle Nazioni Unite, è redatta in modo conciliabile con le naturali esigenze italiane:

"E' inteso e concordato che le disposizioni del presente accordo relative all'impiego e disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutte

o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che
le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra
generale. Le loro proposte a questo riguardo saranno discusse
di volta in volta col Governo Italiano".

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

BADOGGIO

2318

PROMEMORIA PER IL GENERALE MASON MACFARLANE

In relazione all'emendamento al Cunningham-De Courten agreement, nei riguardi dell'impiego della flotta italiana, posto dalle Nazioni Unite come condizione di firma dell'emendamento alle condizioni aggiuntive di armistizio, il Governo Italiano rileva quanto segue:

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"E' inteso e concordato che le disposizioni del presente accordo²³¹⁷ relative all'impiego e disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutte

o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che
le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra
generale. Le loro proposte a questo riguardo saranno discusse
di volta in volta col Governo Italiano".

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

BADOGLIO

COPY

MOST SECRET

FLAG OFFICER LIAISON, ITALY,
NAVY HOUSE,
TARANTO.

10th. November, 1943.

FOL/285/03.

BRIGADIER TAYLOR,
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION.

The attached is the text of the remarks of the Minister of Marine which General Mason MacFarlane has taken with him to Allied Force Headquarters.

2. The Minister of Marine is not prepared to sign the amendment in its present form. You will note that he has proposed an alternative wording, but I am not empowered to accept this without the approval of my Commander-in-Chief.
3. I warned Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, by signal last night as to the state of affairs, and informed him that General Mason MacFarlane would arrive at Algiers this afternoon with the Minister's remarks.

/s/

REAR-ADMIRAL.

TRANSLATION

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HASON MACFARLANE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

With respect to the amendment of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement, regarding the employment of the Italian Fleet, proposed by the United Nations as a condition of signature of the amendment to the additional armistice terms, the Italian government calls attention to what follows:

I The Cunningham-De Courten agreement was examined and accepted by mutual agreement between the minister of the Italian Navy and Admiral Cunningham on 23 September 1943, under the Armistice, with the aim of permitting the Italian Fleet to make its own contribution to Allied efforts in the prosecution of the war. In the agreement it was clearly affirmed that Italian warships would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet according to agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

II The Cunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet; hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.

III The Italian government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.

IV The Italian government therefore feels compelled to place in evidence the form of the additional clause in which are mentioned the unilateral decisions of the United Nations, which should be brought to the attention of the Italian government from time to time.

V The Italian government, therefore, emphasizes that the additional clause could of course be accepted provided it were modified in the following form which, while respecting the substance of the desires of the United Nations, is rendered in a manner reconcilable with natural Italian requirements:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of the present agreement relative to the employment and disposition of the warships and merchant marine of Italy does not preclude the possibility that all or part of the Italian ships may be employed in other ways that the United Nations consider suitable to the ends of the war in general. Their proposals in this connection will be discussed from time to time with the Italian government."

Cunningham on 23 September 1943, under the Armistice, with the aim of permitting the Italian fleet to make its own contribution to Allied efforts in the prosecution of the war. In the agreement it was clearly affirmed that Italian warships would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet according to agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

II The Cunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.

III The Italian government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.

IV The Italian government therefore feels compelled to place in evidence the form of the additional clause in which are mentioned the unilateral declarations of the United Nations, which should be brought to the attention of the Italian government from time to time.

V The Italian government, therefore, emphasizes that the additional clause could of course be accepted provided it were modified in the following form which, while respecting the substance of the desires of the United Nations, is rendered in a manner reconcilable with natural Italian requirements:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of the present agreement relative to the employment and disposition of the warships and merchant marine of Italy does not preclude the possibility that all or part of the Italian ships may be employed in other ways that the United Nations consider suitable to the ends of the war in general. Their proposals in this connection will be discussed from time to time with the Italian government".

/s/ The Chief of Government

Badoglio.

Trans/Sgt. Shanfield/ajp

2314

PROPOSIZIONE PER IL GENERALE MASON MACFARLANE

In relazione all'e mandamento al Cunningham - De Courten agreement, nei riguardi dell'impiego della flotta italiana, posto dalle nazioni Unite come condizioni di firma dell'arrendamento alle condizioni aggiuntive di armistizio, il Governo Italiano rileva quanto segue:

1.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è stato esaminato ed accettato di mutuo accordo fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana e l'Ammiraglio Cunningham il 23 Settembre U.S., in regime di armistizio, con lo scopo di permettere alla flotta italiana di fornire il proprio contributo agli sforzi alleati nella prosecuzione delle guerre. In esso era chiaramente affermato che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.

2.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è in corso di larga e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo: anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.

3.) - Il Governo Italiano, ed un mese e mezzo di distanza dalla conclusione del Cunningham - De Courten agreement, non vedrebbe in conseguenza l'opportunità di introdurre in esso una clausola aggiuntiva la quale parrebbe forse in contrasto con lo spirito di collaborazione sempre dimostrato dalla Marina Italiana. E ciò tanto più in quanto essa viene suggerita quando l'Italia si trova da quasi un mese in stato di co-belligeranza con le Nazioni Unite.

4.) - Il Governo Italiano ritiene quindi di dover porre in evidenza la forma della clausola aggiuntiva nella quale si parla di decisioni unilaterali delle Nazioni Unite, le quali dovrebbero essere notificate al Governo Italiano volta per volta.

5.) - Il Governo Italiano mette quindi in rilievo che la clausola aggiuntiva potrebbe senz'altro essere accettata qualora fosse modificata nella forma seguente, la quale pur rispettando la sostanza del desiderio delle Nazioni Unite, è redatta in modo conciliabile con le naturali esigenze italiane:

"Nessun inteso e concordata che le disposizioni del presente accordo relative all'impiego o disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutte o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra generale. Le loro proposte a questo riguardo saranno discusse di volta in volta col Governo Italiano".

permettere alla flotta italiana di fornire il proprio contributo agli sforzi alleati nella prosecuzione della guerra. In esso era chiaramente affermato che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.

2.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è in corso di larga e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo: anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.

3.) - Il Governo Italiano, ed un mese e mezzo di distanza dalla conclusione del Cunningham - De Courten agreement, non vedrebbe in conseguenza l'opportunità di introdurre in esso una clausola aggiuntiva la quale porrebbe forse in contrasto con lo spirito di collaborazione sempre dimostrato dalla Marina Italiana. E ciò tanto più in quanto essa viene suggerita quando l'Italia si trova da quasi un mese in stato di co-belligeranza con le Nazioni Unite.

4.) - Il Governo Italiano ritiene quindi di dover porre in evidenza la forma della clausola aggiuntiva nella quale si parla di decisioni unilaterali delle Nazioni Unite, le quali dovrebbero essere notificate al Governo Italiano volta per volta.

5.) - Il Governo Italiano mette quindi in rilievo che la clausola aggiuntiva potrebbe senz'altro essere accettata qualora fosse modificata nella forma seguente, la quale pur rispettando la sostanza del desiderio delle Nazioni Unite, è redatta in modo conciliabile con le naturali esigenze italiane:

"Nella intesa e concordata che le disposizioni del presente accordo relative all'impiego e disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutte o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra generale. Le loro proposte e questo riguardo saranno discusse di volta in volta col Governo Italiano".

222X

2312

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

F. TO RADOGLIO

COPY

TRANSLATION

By order of His Excellency, Marshal Badoglio, Chief of the Government, I have signed the clauses added to the Preamble and to the last paragraph of the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, which were requested by the Allied Governments as conditions of the signature of the amendments to the Armistice.

In signing, I request that note be taken of the following statement:

"I believe it my duty to make clear that the request for insertion of those clauses, put forth less than two months after the meeting with Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet, alters the spirit of the agreement concluded between Admiral Cunningham and me. The clauses of this Agreement had been put forward in accordance with the Armistice, by Admiral Cunningham himself, who invited me to examine them and make known to them my observations and comments. In as much as there was complete agreement in regard to the text presented by the Allies, and as the Agreement has up to now been carried out in the widest and most complete manner without opposition either in letter or spirit, I did not and do not have any reason to believe it should be modified and completed by a subsequent safeguarding clause. This clause seems to be at odds with the active collaboration given up to now by the Italian Navy and with the visible demonstration of the loyalty with which the Italian Fleet is contributing to the utmost to the conduct of the war against the common enemy in the spirit of existing co-belligerency".

BRINDISI, 17 November 1943

/s/ Admiral De Courten

In signing, I request that note be taken of the following statement:

"I believe it my duty to make clear that the request for insertion of these clauses, put forth less than two months after the meeting with Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet, alters the spirit of the agreement concluded between Admiral Cunningham and me. The clauses of this Agreement had been put forward in accordance with the Armistice, by Admiral Cunningham himself, who invited me to examine them and make known to them my observations and comments. In as much as there was complete agreement in regard to the text presented by the Allies, and as the Agreement has up to now been carried out in the widest and most complete manner without opposition either in letter or spirit, I did not and do not have any reason to believe it should be modified and completed by a subsequent safeguarding clause. This clause seems to be at odds with the active collaboration given up to now by the Italian Navy and with the visible demonstration of the loyalty with which the Italian Fleet is contributing to the utmost to the conduct of the war against the common enemy in the spirit of existing co-belligerency".

BRINDISI, 17 November 1943

/s/ Admiral De Courten

Minister of the Navy

COPY

231

202X

In obbedienza agli ordini di S.E. il Maresciallo Badoglio, Capo del Governo, ho firmato le clausole aggiuntive al preambolo ed all'ultimo paragrafo del Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, richiesta dai Governi alleati come condizioni di firma degli emendamenti all'atto di armistizio.

Nel procedere a tale firma, chiedo che sia preso atto della seguente dichiarazione:

"Ritengo mio dovere mettere in chiaro rilievo che la richiesta di insersione di queste clausole, avanzata a poco meno di due mesi all'incontro con Sir Andrew Cunningham, allora comandante in capo della flotta Alleata del Mediterraneo, altera lo spirito dell'accordo concluso fra l'Am. Cunningham e me. Le clausole di tale Agreement erano state proposte, in regime di armistizio, dallo stesso Am. Cunningham, il quale mi aveva invitato ad esaminarle ed a comunicargli le mie osservazioni e considerazioni: poiche era stato raggiunto il completo accordo sul testo presentato da parte Alleata e poiche l'Agreement ha avuto finora la piu larga e completa applicazione senza nessun contrasto ne nella lettera, ne nello spirito, non avevo e non ho nessuna ragione di pensare che esso dovesse essere modificato e completato con una ulteriore clausola di carattere cautelativo. Tale clausola appare in antitesi con la collaborazione attiva data finora dalla Marina Italiana e con la palese dimostrazione della leale disposizione della flotta italiana ad intensificare fino al massimo limite il suo contributo alla condotta della guerra contro il comune nemico, nello spirito della co-belligeranza in atto."

Brindisi, 17 novembre 1943

2311

Governo, ho firmato le clausole aggiuntive al preambolo ed all'ultimo paragrafo del Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, richiesta dai Governi alleati come condizioni di firma degli emendamenti all'atto di armistizio.

Nel procedere a tale firme, chiedo che sia preso atto della seguente dichiarazione:

"Ritengo mio dovere mettere in chiaro rilievo che la richiesta di inserzione di queste clausole, avanzata a poco meno di due mesi all'incontro con Sir Andrew Cunningham, allora comandante in capo della flotta Alleata del Mediterraneo, altera lo spirito dell'accordo concluso fra l'Am. Cunningham e me. Le clausole di tale Agreement erano state proposte, in regime di armistizio, dallo stesso Am. Cunningham, il quale mi aveva invitato ad esaminarle ed a comunicargli le mie osservazioni e considerazioni: poiche era stato raggiunto il completo accordo sul testo presentato da parte Alleata e poiche l'Agreement ha avuto finora la piu larga e completa applicazione senza nessun contrasto ne nella lettera, ne nello spirito, non avevo e non ho nessuna ragione di pensare che esso dovesse essere modificato e completato con una ulteriore clausola di carattere cautelativo. Tale clausola appare in antitesi con la collaborazione attiva data finora dalla Marina Italiana e con la palese dimostrazione della leale disposizione della flotta italiana ad intensificare fino al massimo limite il suo contributo alla condotta della guerra contro il comune nemico, nello spirito della co-belligeranza in atto."

Brindisi, 17 novembre 1943

Ministro della Marina

2311

COPY

MOST SECRET

FLAG OFFICER LIAISON, ITALY,
NAVY HOUSE,
TARANTO.

10th. November, 1943.

FOL/285/03.

BRIGADIER TAYLOR,
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION.

The attached is the text of the remarks of the Minister of Marine which General Mason MacFarlane has taken with him to Allied Force Headquarters.

2. The Minister of Marine is not prepared to sign the amendment in its present form. You will note that he has proposed an alternative wording, but I am not empowered to accept this without the approval of my Commander-in-Chief.

3. I warned Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, by signal last night as to the state of affairs, and informed him that General Mason MacFarlane would arrive at Algiers this afternoon with the Minister's remarks.

/s/

REAR-ADMIRAL.

TRANSLATIONMEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE

With respect to the amendment of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement, regarding the employment of the Italian Fleet, proposed by the United Nations as a condition of signature of the amendment to the additional armistice terms, the Italian government calls attention to what follows:

I The Cunningham-De Courten agreement was examined and accepted by mutual agreement between the minister of the Italian Navy and Admiral Cunningham on 23 September 1943, under the Armistice, with the aim of permitting the Italian Fleet to make its own contribution to Allied efforts in the prosecution of the war. In the agreement it was clearly affirmed that Italian warships would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet according to agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

II The Cunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet; hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.

III The Italian government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.

IV The Italian government therefore feels compelled to place in evidence the form of the additional clauses in which are mentioned the unilateral decisions of the United Nations, which should be brought to the attention of the Italian government from time to time.

V The Italian government, therefore, emphasizes that the additional clause could of course be accepted provided it were modified in the following form which, while respecting the substance of the desires of the United Nations, is rendered in a manner reconcilable with natural Italian requirements:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of the present agreement relative to the employment and disposition of the warships and merchant marine of Italy does not preclude the possibility that all or part of the Italian ships may be employed in other ways that the United Nations consider suitable to the ends of the war in general. Their proposals in this connection will be discussed from time to time with the Italian government."

Armistice terms, the Italian government calls attention to what follows:

- I The Cunningham-De Courten agreement was examined and accepted by mutual agreement between the minister of the Italian Navy and Admiral Cunningham on 23 September 1943, under the Armistice, with the aim of permitting the Italian Fleet to make its own contribution to Allied efforts in the prosecution of the war. In the agreement it was clearly affirmed that Italian warships would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet according to agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.
- II The Cunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet; hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.
- III The Italian government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.
- IV The Italian government therefore feels compelled to place in evidence the form of the additional clause in which are mentioned the unilateral decisions of the United Nations, which should be brought to the attention of the Italian government from time to time.
- V The Italian government, therefore, emphasizes that the additional clause could of course be accepted provided it were modified in the following form which, while respecting the substance of the desires of the United Nations, is rendered in a manner reconcilable with natural Italian requirements:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of the present agreement relative to the employment and disposition of the warships and merchant marine of Italy does not preclude the possibility that all or part of the Italian ships may be employed in other ways that the United Nations consider suitable to the ends of the war in general. Their proposals in this connection will be discussed from time to time with the Italian government".

/s/ The Chief of Government

Badoglio.

Trans/Sgt. Shenfield/ajp

PROMEMORIA PER IL GENERALE MASON MACPARIANE

In relazione all'e mandamento al Cunningham - De Courten agreement, nei riguardi dell'impiego della flotta italiana, posto dalle nazioni Unite come condizioni di firma dell'amendamento alle condizioni aggiuntive di armistizio, il Governo Italiano rileva quanto segue:

1.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è stato esaminato ed accettato di mutuo accordo fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana e l'Ammiraglio Cunningham il 23 Settembre U.S., in regime di armistizio, con lo scopo di permettere alla flotta italiana di fornire il proprio contributo agli sforzi alleati nella prosecuzione della guerra. In esso era chiaramente affermato che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.

2.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è in corso di larga e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo: anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.

3.) - Il Governo Italiano, ed un mese e mezzo di distanza dalla conclusione del Cunningham - De Courten agreement, non vedrebbe in conseguenza l'opportunità di introdurre in esso una clausola aggiuntiva la quale porrebbe forse in contrasto con lo spirito di collaborazione sempre dimostrato dalla Marina Italiana. E ciò tanto più in quanto essa viene suggerita quando l'Italia si trova da quasi un mese in stato di co-belligeranza con le Nazioni Unite.

4.) - Il Governo Italiano ritiene quindi di dover porre in evidenza la forma della clausola aggiuntiva nella quale si parla di decisioni unilaterali delle Nazioni Unite, le quali dovrebbero essere notificate al Governo Italiano volta per volta.

5.) - Il Governo Italiano mette quindi in rilievo che la clausola aggiuntiva potrebbe senz'altro essere accettata qualora fosse modificata nella forma seguente, la quale pur rispettando la sostanza del desiderio delle Nazioni Unite, è redatta in modo conciliabile con le naturali esigenze italiane:

"L'Inteso e concordato che le disposizioni del presente accordo relative all'impiego e disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutte o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra generale. Le loro proposte a questo riguardo saranno discusse di volta in volta col Governo Italiano".

1.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è stato esaminato ed accettato di mutuo accordo fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana e l'Ammiraglio Cunningham il 23 Settembre U.S., in regime di armistizio, con lo scopo di permettere alla flotta italiana di fornire il proprio contributo agli sforzi alleati nella prosecuzione della guerra. In esso era chiaramente affermato che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.

2.) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è in corso di larga e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo; anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.

3.) - Il Governo Italiano, ed un mese e mezzo di distanza dalla conclusione del Cunningham - De Courten agreement, non vedrebbe in conseguenza l'opportunità di introdurre in esso una clausola aggiuntiva la quale parrebbe forse in contrasto con lo spirito di collaborazione sempre dimostrato dalla Marina Italiana. E ciò tanto più in quanto essa viene suggerita quando l'Italia si trova da quasi un mese in stato di co-belligeranza con le Nazioni Unite.

4.) - Il Governo Italiano ritiene quindi di dover porre in evidenza la forma della clausola aggiuntiva nella quale si parla di decisioni unilaterali delle Nazioni Unite, le quali dovrebbero essere notificate al Governo Italiano volta per volta.

5.) - Il Governo Italiano mette quindi in rilievo che la clausola aggiuntiva potrebbe senz'altro essere accettata qualora fosse modificata nella forma seguente, la quale pur rispettando la sostanza del desiderio delle Nazioni Unite, è redatta in modo conciliabile con le naturali esigenze italiane:

“Nessun inteso o concordato che le disposizioni del presente accordo relative all'impiego e disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutte o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra generale. Le loro proposte a questo riguardo saranno discusse di volta in volta col Governo Italiano”.

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

F. to BADOGLIO

COPY

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TRANSLATION

By order of His Excellency, Marshal Badoglio, Chief of the Government, I have signed the clauses added to the Preamble and to the last paragraph of the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, which were requested by the Allied Governments as conditions of the signature of the amendments to the Armistice.

In signing, I request that note be taken of the following statement: "I believe it my duty to make clear that the request for insertion of these clauses, put forth less than two months after the meeting with Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet, alters the spirit of the agreement concluded between Admiral Cunningham and me. The clauses of this Agreement had been put forward in accordance with the Armistice, by Admiral Cunningham himself, who invited me to examine them and make known to them my observations and comments. In as much as there was complete agreement in regard to the text presented by the Allies, and as the Agreement has up to now been carried out in the widest and most complete manner without opposition either in letter or spirit, I did not and do not have any reason to believe it should be modified and completed by a subsequent safeguarding clause. This clause seems to be at odds with the active collaboration given up to now by the Italian Navy and with the visible demonstration of the loyalty with which the Italian Fleet is contributing to the utmost to the conduct of the war against the common enemy in the spirit of existing co-belligerency".

BRINDISI, 17 November 1943

/s/ Admiral De Courten

ments as conditions of the signature of the amendments to the Armistice.

In signing, I request that note be taken of the following statement:

"I believe it my duty to make clear that the request for insertion of these clauses, put forth less than two months after the meeting with Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet, alters the spirit of the agreement concluded between Admiral Cunningham and me. The clauses of this Agreement had been put forward in accordance with the Armistice, by Admiral Cunningham himself, who invited me to examine them and make known to them my observations and comments. In as much as there was complete agreement in regard to the text presented by the Allies, and as the Agreement has up to now been carried out in the widest and most complete manner without opposition either in letter or spirit, I did not and do not have any reason to believe it should be modified and completed by a subsequent safeguarding clause. This clause seems to be at odds with the active collaboration given up to now by the Italian Navy and with the visible demonstration of the loyalty with which the Italian Fleet is contributing to the utmost to the conduct of the war against the common enemy in the spirit of existing co-belligerency".

BRINDISI, 17 November 1943

/s/ Admiral De Courten

Minister of the Navy

COPY

202X

In obbedienza agli ordini di S.E. il Maresciallo Badoglio, Capo del Governo, ho firmato le clausole aggiuntive al preambolo ed all'ultimo paragrafo del Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, richiesta dai Governi alleati come condizioni di firma degli emendamenti all'atto di armistizio.

Nel procedere a tale firma, chiedo che sia preso atto della seguente dichiarazione:

"Ritengo mio dovere mettere in chiaro rilievo che la richiesta di inserzione di queste clausole, avanzata a poco meno di due mesi all'incontro con Sir Andrew Cunningham, allora comandante in capo della flotta Alleata del Mediterraneo, altera lo spirito dell'accordo concluso fra l'Am. Cunningham e me. Le clausole di tale Agreement erano state proposte, in regime di armistizio, dallo stesso Am. Cunningham, il quale mi aveva invitato ad esaminarle ed a comunicargli le mie osservazioni e considerazioni: poiche era stato raggiunto il completo accordo sul testo presentato da parte Alleata e poiche l'Agreement ha avuto finora la piu larga e completa applicazione senza nessun contrasto ne nella lettera, ne nello spirito, non avevo e non ho nessuna ragione di pensare che esso dovesse essere modificato e completato con una ulteriore clausola di carattere cautelativo. Tale clausola appare in antitesi con la collaborazione attiva data finora dalla Marina Italiana e con la palese dimostrazione della leale disposizione della flotta italiana ad intensificare fino al massimo limite il suo contributo alla condotta della guerra contro il comune nemico, nello spirito della co-belligeranza in atto."

Brindisi, 17 novembre 1943

Ministro della Marina

23/5

MOST SECRET

FLAG OFFICER LIAISON, ITALY.
NAVY HOUSE,
TARANTO.

10th. November, 1943.

FOL/285/03.

BRIGADIER TAYLOR,
ALLIED MILITARY MISSION.

The attached is the text of the remarks of the Minister of Marine which General Mason MacFarlane has taken with him to Allied Force Headquarters.

2. The Minister of Marine is not prepared to sign the amendment in its present form. You will note that he has proposed an alternative wording, but I am not empowered to accept this without the approval of my Commander-in-Chief.

3. I warned Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, by signal last night as to the state of affairs, and informed him that General Mason MacFarlane would arrive at Algiers this afternoon with the Minister's remarks.

/s/

REAR-ADMIRAL.

TRANSLATION

Presumably 10 Nov 43.

See Faticia's cable 850 }
" 922 }

ajp/shen

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE

With respect to the amendment of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement, regarding the employment of the Italian Fleet, proposed by the United Nations as a condition of signature of the amendment to the additional armistice terms, the Italian government calls attention to what follows:

I The Cunningham-De Courten agreement was examined and accepted by mutual agreement between the minister of the Italian Navy and Admiral Cunningham on 23 September 1943, under the Armistice, with the aim of permitting the Italian fleet to make its own contribution to Allied efforts in the prosecution of the war. In the agreement it was clearly affirmed that Italian warships would be employed under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet according to agreements between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

II The Cunningham-De Courten agreement has been in the course of broad and complete application for more than a month and the activation of the relative provisions has occasioned no dissension between the Minister of the Italian Navy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet; hence the cooperation of the Italian Fleet, by mutual accord, has been even more broad than was initially foreseen.

III The Italian government, at a distance of a month and a half from the conclusion of the Cunningham-De Courten agreement does consequently not see any occasion for introducing into it an additional clause which would perhaps seem at odds with the spirit of collaboration always demonstrated by the Italian Navy, and all the more so, inasmuch as it is suggested when Italy has been for almost a month in a state of co-belligerency with the United Nations.

IV The Italian government therefore feels compelled to place in evidence the form of the additional clause in which are mentioned the unilateral decisions of the United Nations, which should be brought to the attention of the Italian government from time to time.

V The Italian government, therefore, emphasizes that the additional clause could of course be accepted provided it were modified in the following form which, while respecting the substance of the desires of the United Nations, is rendered in a manner reconcilable with natural Italian requirements:

"It is understood and agreed that the provisions of the present agreement relative to the employment and disposition of the warships and merchant marine of Italy does not preclude the possibility that all or part of the Italian ships may be employed in other ways that the United Nations consider suitable to the ends of the war in general. Their proposals in this connection will be discussed from time to time with the Italian government".

/s/ The Chief of Government

Badoglio.

Trans/Sgt. Shenfield/ajp.

MEMORIA PER IL GENERALE MASON MACFARLANE

In relazione all'è mandamento al Cunningham - De Courten agreement, nei riguardi dell'impiego della flotta italiana, posto dalle nazioni Unite come condizioni di firma dell'emendamento alle condizioni aggiuntive di armistizio, il Governo Italiano rileva quanto segue:

1°) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è stato esaminato ed accettato di mutuo accordo fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana e l'Ammiraglio Cunningham il 23 Settembre U.S., in regime di armistizio, con lo scopo di permettere alla flotta italiana di fornire il proprio contributo agli sforzi alleati nella prosecuzione della guerra. In esso era chiaramente affermato che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.

2°) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è in corso di large e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo; anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.

3°) - Il Governo Italiano, ed un mese e mezzo di distanza dalla conclusione del Cunningham - De Courten agreement, non vedrebbe in conseguenza l'opportunità di introdurre in esso una clausola aggiuntiva la quale porrebbe forse in contrasto con lo spirito di collaborazione

2303

di permettere alla flotta italiana di fornire il proprio contributo agli sforzi alleati nella prosecuzione della guerra. In esso era chiaramente affermato che le navi da guerra italiane sarebbero state impiegate sotto gli ordini del Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo secondo accordi fra il Comandante in Capo Alleato ed il Governo Italiano.

2°) - Il Cunningham - De Courten agreement è in corso di larga e completa applicazione da più di un mese e la attuazione dei provvedimenti relativi non ha dato luogo a nessun contrasto fra il Ministro della Marina Italiana ed il Comandante in Capo della Flotta del Mediterraneo; anzi la cooperazione della flotta italiana, per mutui accordi, è stata anche più ampia di quanto fosse inizialmente previsto.

3°) - Il Governo Italiano, ed un mese e mezzo di distanza dalla conclusione del Cunningham - De Courten agreement, non vedrebbe in conseguenza l'opportunità di introdurre in esso una clausola aggiuntiva la quale porrebbe forse in contrasto con lo spirito di collaborazione sempre dimostrato dalla Marina Italiana. E ciò tanto più in quanto essa viene suggerita quando l'Italia si trova da quasi un mese in stato di co-belligeranza con le Nazioni Unite.

4°) - Il Governo Italiano ritiene quindi di dover porre in evidenza la forma della clausola aggiuntiva nella quale si parla di decisioni unilaterali delle Nazioni Unite, le quali dovrebbero essere notificate al Governo Italiano volte per volta.

5°) - Il Governo Italiano mette quindi in rilievo che la clausola aggiuntiva potrebbe senz'altro essere accettata qualora fosse modificata nella forma seguente, la quale pur rispettando la sostanza del desiderio delle Nazioni Unite, è redatta in modo conciliabile con le naturali esigenze italiane:

*** 2° inteso e concordato che le disposizioni del presente accordo relative all'impiego e disposizione delle navi da guerra e mercantili italiane non pregiudicano la possibilità che tutte o parte delle navi italiane siano impiegate in altri modi che le Nazioni Unite riterranno convenienti ai fini della guerra generale. Le loro proposte a questo riguardo saranno discusse di volta in volta col Governo Italiano***.

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

F. TO BADOGLIO

2302

TRANSLATION

By order of His Excellency, Marshal Badoglio, Chief of the Government, I have signed the clauses added to the Preamble and to the last paragraph of the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, which were requested by the Allied Governments as conditions of the signature of the amendments to the Armistice.

In signing, I request that note be taken of the following statement:
"I believe it my duty to make clear that the request for insertion of these clauses, put forth less than two months after the meeting with Sir Andrew Cunningham, then Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Mediterranean Fleet, alters the spirit of the agreement concluded between Admiral Cunningham and me. The clauses of this Agreement had been put forward in accordance with the Armistice, by Admiral Cunningham himself, who invited me to examine them and make known to them my observations and comments. In as much as there was complete agreement in regard to the text presented by the Allies, and as the Agreement has up to now been carried out in the widest and most complete manner without opposition either in letter or spirit, I did not and do not have any reason to believe it should be modified and completed by a subsequent safeguarding clause. This clause seems to be at odds with the active collaboration given up to now by the Italian Navy and with the visible demonstration of the loyalty with which the Italian Fleet is contributing to the utmost to the conduct of the war against the common enemy in the spirit of existing co-belligerency".

2301

BRINDISI, 17 November 1943

/s/ Admiral De Courten

Minister of the Navy

In obbedienza agli ordini di S.E. il Maresciallo Badoglio, Capo del Governo, ho firmato le clausole aggiuntive al preambolo ed all'ultimo paragrafo del Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, richieste dai Governi alleati come condizioni di firma degli emendamenti all'atto di armistizio.

Nel procedere a tale firma, chiedo che sia preso atto della seguente dichiarazione:

"Ritengo mio dovere mettere in chiaro rilievo che la richiesta di inserzione di queste clausole, avanzata a poco meno di due mesi all'incontro con Sir Andrew Cunningham, allora comandante in capo della Flotta Alleata del Mediterraneo, altera lo spirito dell'accordo concluso fra l'Amm. Cunningham e me. Le clausole di tale Agreement erano state proposte, in regime di armistizio, dallo stesso Amm. Cunningham, il quale mi aveva invitato ad esaminarle ed a comunicargli le mie osservazioni e considerazioni; poiche era stato raggiunto il completo accordo sul testo presentato da parte Alleata e poiche l'Agreement ha avuto finora la piu larga e completa applicazione senza nessun controtto ne nella lettera, ne nello spirito, non avevo e non ho nessuna ragione di pensare che esso dovesse essere modificato e completato con una ulteriore clausola di carattere cautelativo. Tale clausola appare in antitesi con la collaborazione attiva data finora dalla Marina Italiana e

2300

della seguente dichiarazione:

"Ritengo mio dovere mettere in chiaro rilievo che la richiesta di inserzione di queste clausole, avanzata a poco meno di due mesi all'incontro con Sir Andrew Cunningham, allora comandante in capo della flotta Alleata del Mediterraneo, altera lo spirito dell'accordo concluso fra l'Am. Cunningham e me. Le clausole di tale Agreement erano state proposte, in regime di armistizio, dallo stesso Am. Cunningham, il quale mi aveva invitato ad esaminarle ed a comunicargli le mie osservazioni e considerazioni; poiche era stato raggiunto il completo accordo sul testo presentato da parte Alleata e poiche l'Agreement ha avuto finora la piu larga e completa applicazione senza nessun contresto ne nella lettera, ne nello spirito, non avevo e non ho nessuna ragione di pensare che esso dovesse essere modificato e completato con una ulteriore clausola di carattere cautelativo. Tale clausola appare in antitesi con la collaborazione attiva data finora dalla Marina Italiana e con la palese dimostrazione della leale disposizione della flotta italiana ad intensificare fino al massimo limite il suo contributo alla condotta della guerra contro il comune nemico, nello spirito della co-belligeranza in atto."

Brindisi, 17 novembre 1943

Ministro della Marina

2300

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Deputy President

16 November 1943

Dear Ike,

I have put down formally in the attached memorandum what took place with Badoglio today.

Between you and me, the old Marshal was deeply stirred although he controlled himself as a soldier would. In my presentation to him I was as direct and cold as the situation required, but I naturally felt sorry for him. However, as we know, there was but one answer to the whole thing.

Incidentally, I was perfectly delighted to get your fine, straight message which presented your stand so clearly, and I was further delighted that the thing was handled here without reference to the Allied Governments.

I believe I have squared away to a fair start. It was actually at my suggestion that Badoglio held his press conference at which he announced what the intention of their government was relative to bringing together such ministers as they could in the freed part of Italy to carry on until Rome was reached. I believe he is absolutely sincere in saying he will withdraw just as soon as he can turn over direction to political figures. He has told me personally that, being a soldier, the political phases of his burden are most distasteful to him and that he looks forward to the time when he can pass on his burden.

He sent his ministers and the newly designated under-secretaries to my headquarters where I received them and discussed matters at some length. From what I have been able to learn so far, none has a "Nazi" taint.

Badoglio is most anxious to get away from here as there are absolutely no accommodations for his government in Brindisi. About a week ago we discussed the possibilities of moving to the General Naples area. Badoglio suggesting Salerno or Sorrento. This move is desired by me, of course, just as much as it is by Badoglio because I have never seen a more unsuitable, restricted layout for any sizeable activity than this shabby, old, dock-front hotel.

As a result of my talk with Badoglio, and in accordance with a message from your headquarters suggesting the area of Sorrento, I sent a reconnaissance party headed by McSherry on our side and representation on the Italian side to look over Salerno. There are some

2299

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As a result of my talk with Badoglio, and in accordance with a message from your headquarters suggesting the area of Sorrento, I sent a reconnaissance party headed by McSherry on our side and representation on the Italian side to look over Salerno. There are material handicaps there due to battle damage, yet I believe it would be possible to make the move in about three

or four weeks. It will be necessary, however, to get certain clearances and priorities at Salerno if this is done. Because I was not satisfied with the information I received relative to the availability of space at Salerno, I am sending Taylor and two others tomorrow to make a final check-up on both Salerno and Sorrento. For this, I am having McSherry come over from Palermo and I hope that the results this time will enable me to make some specific recommendations and requests. When these go forward, I hope you will give directions which will cause them to be put into effect in order that we may go as soon as possible. I might add that the matter of turning territory back to the Italians must be predicated on their ability to function with a central government, which ability they certainly do not have here. Also, the Commission has to be adequately provided for to do its part. If we can accomplish this move, I believe we shall then be able to negotiate the turning over of Sardinia, Sicily and Region 2 in Southern Italy without delay, should this be in accordance with your wishes.

Thanks a lot for sending that anniversary message to Helen. We always have a bottle of champagne on November 15th, but this year I did not even have access to a cable office, let alone a florist.

As a personal matter, I wish you would send me a horse - but, on second thought, I don't know when I'd be able to ride it as I have been keeping some swell hours -- 8:00 A. M. to 12:00 midnight. C'est la Guerre!

Yours ever,

COMPOSIZIONE DEL GOVERNO

MARESCIALLO BADOGLIO - PRIMO MINISTRO E CAPO DEL GOVERNO

MINISTRI

MARESCIALLO BADOGLIO PIETRO	INTERIM	ESTERI
AMIRAGLIO DE COURTEN RAFFAELE		MARINA
GENERALE A.A. SANDALLI RENATO		AERONAUTICA

SOITOSEGRETARI

ON. REALI VITTO	INTERIM	
S.E. DE SANTIS GIUSEPPE	GRAZIA E GIUSTIZIA	
ON. CUOIO GIOVANNI -	EDUCAZIONE NAZIONALE	
ON. DE CARO RAFFAELE -	LAVORI PUBBLICI	
S.E. JUNG GUIDO	FINANZE	
PROF. CORBINO EPICARMO	INDUSTRIA E COMMERCIO	
PROF. SICILIANI TOMMASO	AGRICOLTURA E FORESTE	
GEN. DI RAIMONDO GIOVANNI	FERROVIE - AUTOTRASPORTI IN CONCESSIONE	2398
ING. DOTT. FANO MARIO	POSTE E COMUNICAZIONI TELEFONICHE	RADIO

MARESCIALLO BADOGLIO - PRIMO MINISTRO E CAPO DEL GOVERNO

M I N I S T R I

MARESCIALLO BADOGLIO PIETRO

INTERIM ESTERI

AMMIRAGLIO DE COURTEN RAFFAELE

MARINA

GENERALE A.A. SANDALLI RENATO

AERONAUTICA

SOTTOSEGRETARI

ON. REALI VITTO

INTERNI

S.E. DE SANTIS GIUSEPPE

GRAZIA E GIUSTIZIA

ON. GUGLIO GIOVANNI -

EDUCAZIONE NAZIONALE

ON. DE CARO RAFFAELE -

LAVORI PUBBLICI

S.E. JUNG GUIDO

FINANZE

PROF. CORBINO EPICARMO

INDUSTRIA E COMMERCIO

PROF. SICILIANI TOMMASO

AGRICOLTURA E FORESTE

GEN. DI RAIMONDO GIOVANNI

FERROVIE - AUTORIZZAZIONE

CIVILE E TRASPORTI IN COM-

CESSIONE

ING. BOTT. FANO MARIO

POSTE E COMUNICAZIONI RADIO-

TELEFONICHE

S.E. GEN. ORLANDO TADDEO

GUERRA

AMMIRAGLIO BARONE PIETRO

MARINA MERCANTILE

TRANSLATION

16 November 1943.

Special Secretary's Office of the
Chief of Government.

No. 879 of prot.

TO THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

MAIN OFFICE

We send you the composition of the new Government with some
biographical data concerning the new Under-Secretaries.

SPECIAL SECRETARY OF THE
CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT
(Lt. Col. G. Valenzano)

2297

Pol

UNDER SECRETARIES

Hon. Prof. REALI, Vito

DEFENSE

Born in Vigevano.
 Member of Parliament from November 1919
 to May 1924.
 Present Prefectural Commissioner at POTENZA

Hon. Prof. CUCINO, Giovanni

NATIONAL EDUCATION

Born in Salerno.
 Member of Parliament from November 1919
 to May 1924.
 Present Prefectural Commissioner at SALERNO.

His Excellency DE SANTIS, Giuseppe

JUSTICE

Born in Naples.
 Began his judiciary career in May 1901.
 In December 1931 he was appointed Prosecuting Attorney
 for the Tribunal at Florence.
 Has taught for many years LEGAL LAW in the Superior
 School of the Royal Carabinieri at Florence.
 In December 1942 he was appointed Attorney General
 of the Court of Appeals at Bari.

Hon. Attorney DE CARO, Raffaele

PUBLIC WORKS

Born in Benevento.
 Lt. Col. of the Royal Army in the War 1-15-1915.
 Ex-President of War Veterans in the Province of Benevento.
 Member of Parliament from November 1919 to
 May 1924.

Prof. COMINO, Epicerio.

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

Born in Rome.
 Professor of Mechanics at the Royal University

2294

His Excellency DE SANIS, Giuseppe

JUSTICE

Born in Naples.

Began his judiciary career in May 1901.

In December 1931 he was appointed Prosecuting Attorney for the Tribunal at Florence.

Was taught for many years LEGAL L. in the Superior School of the Royal Carabinieri at Florence.

In December 1942 he was appointed Attorney General of the Court of Appeals at Bari.

Gen. Attorney DE CARO, Raffaele

PUBLIC WORKS

Born in Benevento.

Lt. Col. of the Royal Army in the War 1915-1918.

Ex-President of War Veterans in the Province of Benevento.

Member of Parliament from November 1919 to May 1924.

Prof. CORRAO, Epiceramo.

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

Born in Rome.

Professor of Economics at the Royal University of Naples.

At present Vice-President of the Provincial Group of Economy at Naples.

Attorney Professor SICILIANI, Tommaso

AGRICULTURE AND FORESTS

Born in Grotto (Taranto).

Professor at the Royal University of CASERTA in 1905.

and at the University of PAVIA in 1908. He taught Law in the Royal Superior School of Bari.

Fought and was decorated in the War of 1915-1918.

Was lately appointed Secretary of the Professional and Artist Union of Bari, by the Badoglio Government.

Brigadier Gen. DI RAIMONDO, Giovanni

RAILROADS - CIVILIAN
MOTORIZED AND FRANCHISED
TRANSPORTATION

Born in Modica.

Comes from the Corps of Engineers and has attended
The War College.

Took part in the War of 1915-1918.

Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty from 1930 to 1934.

From May 1940 to date occupies the post of Superior
Director of Transportation of the Headquarters Command
of the Royal Army.

Engineer Doctor RAMO, Mario

POSTAL-RADIO AND TELEPHONE
COMMUNICATIONS

Born in Turin.

Artillery Officer in the War of 1915-1918. Decorated
with 3 medals for bravery.

Since 1925, General Director of Telephone and Radio
Societies throughout Italy.

Admiral BARONE, Pietro

MERCHANT MARINE

Born in Modica.

Took part in the War of 1915-1918 and in the Ethiopian
Campaign. In this last he directed all landing operations of the
expedition.

For 5 years, from 1930 to 1943, he was Naval Military
Commander of Sicily.

Up to the present time he was the General
Director of the Merchant Marine.

His Excellency General ORLANDO, Taddeo

WAR

Born in Gasta.

Comes from the Artillery Corps.

Took part in the Libyan campaign (1911).

In the War of 1915-1918, and in this war, in
command of the Grenadier Division on the Western
and Eastern fronts, and of the XX Army Corps in
Tunisia.

Decorated with the C. M. S.

2295

Born in Turin.
Artillery Officer in the War of 1915-1918. Decorated with 3 medals for bravery.
Since 1925, General Director of Telephone and Radio Societies throughout Italy.

Admiral BAUGH, Pietro

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Decorated with the C. M. S.

His Excellency JACO, Guido

TREASURY

Born in Palermo.
Fought, and was decorated with 3 silver medals.
A promotion for war merit - a British military cross.
Financial delegate to the Peace Conference.
Financial counselor to the Embassy in Washington.
Minister of the Treasury.

TRANSLATION

16 November 1949.

Special Secretary's Office of the
Chief of Government.

No. 879 of prot.

TO THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

MAIN OFFICE

We send you the composition of the new Government with some
biographical data concerning the new Under-Secretaries.

SPECIAL SECRETARY OF THE
CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT
(Lt. Col. G. Valensano)

2294

Italy - 231.3 - Secretaries, employees

Pol

UNDER SECRETARIES

Hon. Prof. REALI, Vitto

INTERIOR

Born in Vigevano.
Member of Parliament from November 1919
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At present Prefectural Commissioner at POTENZA

Hon. Prof. CUOMO, Giovanni

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In December 1942 he was appointed Attorney General
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Hon. Attorney DE CARO, Raffaele

PUBLIC WORKS 2293

Born in Benevento.
Lt. Col. of the Royal Army in the War 1915-1918.
Ex-President of War Veterans in the Province of Benevento.
Member of Parliament from November 1919 to
May 1924.

Prof. CONNING, Epicerano.

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

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Professor of Economics at the Royal University
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His Excellency DE CARO, Raffaele PUBLIC WORKS 2293

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Member of Parliament from November 1919 to May 1924.

Prof. CORBANO, Epiceramo. INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

Born in Roma.
Professor of Economics at the Royal University of Naples.
At present Vice-President of the Provincial Group of Economy at Naples.

Attorney Professor SICILIANI, Tommaso AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

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Professor at the Royal University of CAMBRINO in 1905.
and at the University of PERUGIA in 1908. He taught Law in the Royal Superior School of Bari.
Fought and was decorated in the War of 1915-1918.
was lately appointed Secretary of the Professional and Artist Union of Bari, by the Badoglio Government.

- 2 -

Brigadier Gen. DI PALMADO, Giovanni

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MOTORIZED AND FRANCHISED
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Born in Modica.

Comes from the Corps of Engineers and has attended
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Societies throughout Italy.

Admiral MARONE, Pietro

MERCHANT MARINE

Born in Modica.

Took part in the War of 1915-1918 and in the Ethiopian
Campaign. In this last he directed all landing operations of the
expedition.For 5 years, from 1928 to 1943, he was Naval Military
Commander of Sicily.Up to the present time he was the General
Director of the Merchant Marine.

His Excellency General ORLANDO, Taddeo

Born in Gasta.

Comes from the Artillery Corps.

Took part in the Libyan campaign (1911).

in the War of 1915-1918, and in this war, in
command of the Grenadier Division on the western
and Eastern fronts, and of the XX Army Corps in
Tunisia.

Decorated with the O. M. S.

229

COMMUNICATIONS

Born in Turin.
 Artillery Officer in the war of 1915-1918. Decorated
 with 3 medals for bravery.
 Since 1925, General Director of Telephones and Radio
 Societies throughout Italy.

Admiral MARINI, Pietro

MERCHANT MARINE

Born in Modica.
 Took part in the war of 1915-1918 and in the Ethiopian
 Campaign. In this last he directed all landing operations of the
 expedition.
 For 5 years, from 1938 to 1943, he was Naval Military
 Commander of Sicily.
 Up to the present time he was the General
 Director of the Merchant Marine.

His Excellency General ORLANDO, Rinaldo SAR

Born in Gaeta.
 Comes from the Artillery Corps.
 Took part in the Libyan campaign (1911).
 in the war of 1915-1918, and in this war, in
 command of the Grenadier Division on the western
 and Eastern fronts, and of the XX Army Corps in
 Tunisia.
 Decorated with the O. M. S.

His Excellency JUNG, Guido

TREASURY

Born in Palermo.
 Fought, and was decorated with 3 silver medals.
 A promotion for war merit - a British military cross.
 Financial delegate to the Peace Conference.
 Financial counselor to the Embassy in Washington.
 Minister of the Treasury.

2292

UNDER - SECRETARIES

Hon. Prof. REALI, Vitto

INTERIOR

Born in Vigevano.
Member of Parliament from November 1919
to May 1924.
At present Prefectural Commissioner at POTENZA.

Hon. Prof. CUOMO, Giovanni

NATIONAL EDUCATION

Born in Salerno.
Member of Parliament from November 1919
to May 1924.
At present Prefectural Commissioner at SALERNO.

His Excellency DE SANTIS, Giuseppe

JUSTICE

Born in Naples.
Began his judiciary career in May 1901
In December 1931 he was appointed Prosecuting Attorney
for the Tribunal at Florence.
Has taught for many years PENAL LAW in the Superior
School of the Royal Carabinieri at Florence.
In December 1942 he was appointed Attorney General
of the Court of Appeals at Bari.

Hon. Attorney DE CARO, Raffaele

PUBLIC WORKS

Born in Benevento.
Lt. Col. of the Royal Army in the war 1915-1918.
Ex-President of War Veterans in the Province of Benevento.
Member of Parliament from November 1919 to
May 1924.

Prof. CORBINO, Epicarino.

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

Born in Rome.
Professor of Economics at the Royal University
of Naples.

to May 1924.

At present Prefectural Commissioner at SALERNO.

His Excellency DE SANTIS, Giuseppe

JUSTICE

Born in Naples.

Began his judiciary career in May 1901

In December 1931 he was appointed Prosecuting Attorney for the Tribunal at Florence.

Has taught for many years PENAL LAW in the Superior

School of the Royal Carabinieri at Florence.

In December 1942 he was appointed Attorney General of the Court of Appeals at Bari.

Hon. Attorney DE CARO, Raffaele

PUBLIC WORKS

Born in Benevento.

Lt. Col. of the Royal Army in the war 1915-1918.

Ex-President of War Veterans in the Province of Benevento.

Member of Parliament from November 1919 to

May 1924.

Prof. CORBINO, Epicarno.

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

Born in Rome.

Professor of Economics at the Royal University of Naples.

At present Vice-President of the Provincial Group of Economy at Naples.

Attorney Professor SICILIANI, Tommaso

AGRICULTURE AND FORESTS

Born in Ginosa (Taranto).

Professor at the Royal University of CAMERINO in 1905, and at the University of PERUGIA in 1908. He taught Law in the Royal Superior School of Bari.

Fought and was decorated in the war of 1915-1918.

Was lately appointed Secretary of the Professional and Artist Union of Bari, by the Badoglio Government.

Brigadier Gen. DI RAIMONDO, Giovanni
RAILROADS - CIVILIAN
MOTORIZED AND FRANCHISED
TRANSPORTATION

Born in Modica.
Comes from the Corps of Engineers and has attended
The War College.
Took part in the War of 1915-1918.
Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty from 1930 to 1934.
From May 1940 to date occupies the post of "Superior
Director of Transportation of the Headquarters Command
of the Royal Army."

Engineer Doctor FANO, Mario
POSTAL-RADIO AND TELEPHONE
COMMUNICATIONS

Born in Turin.
Artillery Officer in the War of 1915-1918. Decorated
with 3 medals for bravery.
Since 1925, General Director of Telephone and Radio
Societies throughout Italy.

Admiral BAHONE, Pietro
MERCHANT MARINE

Born in Modica.
Took part in the War of 1915-1918 and in the Ethiopian
Campaign. In this last he directed all landing operations
of the expedition.
For 5 years, from 1938 to 1943, he was Naval Military
Commander of Sicily.
Up to the present time he was the General
Director of the Merchant Marine.

His Excellency General ORLANDO, Taddeo
WAR

Born in Gaeta.
Comes from the Artillery Corps.
Took part in the Lybian campaign (1911).
in the War of 1915-1918, and in this war, in
command of the Grenadier Division on the Western
and Eastern fronts, and of the XX Army Corps in
Tunisia.
Decorated with the O.M.S.

2290

Born in Turin.

Artillery Officer in the War of 1915-1918. Decorated with 3 medals for bravery. Since 1925, General Director of Telephone and Radio Societies throughout Italy.

Admiral BARONE, Pietro

MERCHANT MARINE

Born in Modica.

Took part in the War of 1915-1918 and in the Ethiopian Campaign. In this last he directed all landing operations of the expedition.

For 5 years, from 1938 to 1943, he was Naval Military Commander of Sicily.

Up to the present time he was the General Director of the Merchant Marine.

His Excellency General ORLANDO, Taddeo

WAR

Born in Gaeta.

Comes from the Artillery Corps.

Took part in the Libyan campaign (1911), in the War of 1915-1918, and in this war, in command of the Grenadier Division on the Western and Eastern fronts, and of the XX Army Corps in Tunisia.

Decorated with the O.M.S.

His Excellency JUNG, Guido

TREASURY

Born in Palermo.

Fought, and was decorated with 3 Silver Medals.

A promotion for war merit - a British military cross. Financial delegate to the Peace Conference.

Financial counselor to the Embassy in Washington.

Minister of the Treasury.

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27 Nov 43

Tour Notes BrindisiBy Brig. CusterbookSetting up A. C. C.

1. Contact was made with the Italian government. From discussions it was apparent that the earliest date for handing over territory is 20 December 1943. The principal limiting factors are accommodation, provision of communications and setting up Italian governmental machinery. General Joyce was not prepared to start functioning from Brindisi.

3. It was agreed that HQ AMG and A. C. C. should move forward simultaneously if possible. A. C. C. would examine the transport situation and see if they can move with the transport which they have plus what is coming from Palermo.


4. General Joyce decided that A. C. C. would be established with a limited advance H., the balance being at Naples. Advance H. would initially be organized at Sorrento or Salerno as at Appn A. rear HQ at Naples as at appn B. Head men would in all cases be at Adv HQ, except for the following:-

- (a) Executive officer and internal ACC administration
- (b) Security
- (c) War material Factories Subcommittee
- (d) Property Control Subcommittee
- (e) Fine Arts and Monuments Subcommittee and temporarily
- (f) Internal Transportation Subcommittee
- (g) Shipping Subcommittee

2. It was apparent that the present organization of the Economic and Administrative Section does not correspond with the Italian governmental organization. Pending any decision by the Vice President concerned, the following changes will be effected at a date to be notified later:

- (a) Economic Director will parallel the Minister for Commerce, Industry and Labour and control Sub-commissions for Industry, Commerce and Labour only.
- (b) Administrative Director will parallel the Minister for the Interior and control the Interior, Public Safety and Public Health Subcommissions only.
- (c) Mines will be under Public Works and Utilities.

2230



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5. Three officers provided by AFHQ, G-4, have arrived at Brindisi to be attached to War Material Disposal Subcommittee. Col. Zellars is to visit Brindisi to contact them.

Transportation coordination

6. A conference was held with Q(M) FLAMBO. It was decided that there would be a conference at Naples on 30 November at 1500 hours to discuss the procedure for moving civilian freight and passengers. The following are to attend:-

INCL LINA BERNH

→ Col. Fitch
Major Hickingbotham
Col. Evans
Lt. Col. Legg
Supply representative, Region 2
Col. Murphy

Salem

7. In order to facilitate movements of imports and exports over internal transportation routes, it was decided that at every main port AMG (A.C.C.) would have a supply officer who would be in close touch with the local movements office and be able to represent AMG (A.C.C.) requirements. As far as AMG is concerned the ports are Palermo, Catania, Syracuse, Messina, Reggio and Crotone. The AMG (A.C.C.) supply officer must report his location both to the local movements office and to the local HQ Base area, subarea, section, etc.

8. For the present Col. Fitch's HQ is c/o movements and Transportation, Adv. Admin. Esh. AFHQ (FLAMBO for movements for Fitch).

Local Resources and Transportation

9. AFHQ (or FLAMBO) will require accurate data regarding local resources. It will be for AMG (A.C.C.) to produce these data. Then, when it comes to bidding for supplies or transportation, AMG (A.C.C.) has to bid for civilian requirements. It is therefore clear that A.C.C. will have to be certain regarding the accuracy of data produced by the Italians and will have to be able to prove their points in bidding on behalf of the Italians. This aspect requires emphasis in certain Subcommittee, etc., directives.

Information Subcommittee

10. It seems probable that this will be abolished, the whole task being taken over by P. W. B. Mr. Hamilton Smith of P. W. B. will visit HQ AMG (Major Desmond) about 3 December to discuss the disposal of the present information officers.

Wages increase

11. General Joyce approved Jung's proposed increase to basic pay

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only of Italian armed forces, and his proposal to increase civil servants' wages, less indemnities "Presenza" and "Operosita", in the four provinces. It was agreed that it would be desirable for Region 2 wages to keep in line with this increase and Region 1 wages to be brought in-line when sufficient food rations could be made available.

E. Gueterbock

E. GUETERBOCK
Brigadier

228

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