

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

10000/100/299

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

10000/100/299

PUBLIC SAFETY & CIVIL DEFENSE
FEB. 1943; AUG. - OCT. 1943

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

WGS-384.51

25 October 1943

SUBJECT: Policy for Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense in Occupied Enemy Territory.

TO : HQ. AMG, CMF
HL. AMG, 15 ARMY GROUP

1. Attached copy of this HQ. Operation Memorandum No. 40 of 14 October 1943 is forwarded for your attention and action.

[Signature]
D. S. JACKLING
Lt. Col.

Copy to: AMG (F)
HL, AC ✓

Noted.
[Signature]
Colonel
P.S. A.C.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

COPY NO. 15

14 October 1943

OPERATION MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 40)

POLICY FOR PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE

IN OCCUPIED ENEMY TERRITORY

1. GENERAL

a. Policy for Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense in North Africa is contained in General Order No. 16 dated 11 February, 1943. This Memorandum defines the policy to be observed in occupied enemy territory.

b. Passive Air Defense in occupied territory, as elsewhere, is a normal military duty and will be carried out in accordance with military instructions on the subject.

Civil Defense in occupied territory is only of importance in so far as it affects military requirements. It is the duty of the Military Government Administration to provide such Civil Defense Measures as are required by the military.

c. In any area of military importance, Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense will be closely related. It is essential therefore, that in such an area, the two should be planned and executed together under the direction of the Military Commander.

2. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

a. Civil Defense will be a military necessity in those areas where the failure of the Civil Defense will hinder military operations.

b. Civil Defense may be of importance even in areas of no military value, if the failure of the Civil Defense organization is likely to result in such damage to essential services, stocks of food, and

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- b. Passive Air Defense in occupied territory, as elsewhere, is a normal military duty and will be carried out in accordance with military instructions on the subject.

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- c. In any area of military importance, Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense will be closely related. It is essential therefore, that in such an area, the two should be planned and executed together under the direction of the Military Commander.

2. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

- a. Civil Defense will be a military necessity in those areas where the failure of the Civil Defense will hinder military operations.
- b. Civil Defense may be of importance even in areas of no military value, if the failure of the Civil Defense organization is likely to result in such damage to essential services, stocks of food, and communications, that ultimately the military will be encumbered by serious problems, of unrest, refugees, starvation, or disease amongst the civil population.
- c. Where it is necessary to raise the standard of Civil Defense to meet military requirements, some assistance from the military will usually be necessary, either by giving directions or advice, or by making available essential equipment and supplies which cannot otherwise be obtained by the civilian authorities.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

- a. The relative importance of Civil Defense to military requirements will be defined by classifying areas of occupied territory as follows:-

CLASS "A"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as a military necessity, where the principle is accepted that every possible assistance is to be given to the organization of Civil Defense, including, if

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Operation Memorandum No. 40, dated 14 Oct 43 (cont'd) RESTRICTED

necessary, the lending without charge of essential equipment and the provision of essential materials.

CLASS "B"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as of military importance only in so far as there may be repercussions on the military in the event of failure of the Civil Defense organization. In these areas such equipment as is available may be sold or rented to the local authorities.

CLASS "C"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded of no military importance.

- b. The classification of areas as above, and their re-classification according to changing circumstances, will be the responsibility of Army Commanders in the Combat Zone, and of the District or Base Section Commanders in the Communications Zone (I of C).

4. RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE IN CLASSIFIED AREAS

- a. In Class "A" areas, pending the establishment of the Military Government Administration, the local military commander, assisted by Military Government officers, will be responsible for organizing minimum standards of Civil Defense.

When the Military Government Administration has been established, it will be the responsibility of this administration to organize and supervise Civil Defense services in accordance with the requirements of the military commander.

- b. In Class "B" areas organization and supervision of Civil Defense will be the responsibility of the Military Government Administration. If coordination with the military is required, such coordination will be the responsibility of the local military commander.

5. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT FOR CIVIL DEFENSE INCLASSIFIED AREAS

- a. In Class "A" areas it is a military responsibility to decide the requirements and to provide any necessary equipment or material.

Section Commanders in the Combat Zone, and of the District or Base Section Commanders in the Communications Zone (L of C).

4. RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE IN CLASSIFIED AREAS

- a. In Class "A" areas, pending the establishment of the Military Government Administration, the local military commander, assisted by Military Government officers, will be responsible for organizing minimum standards of Civil Defense.

When the Military Government Administration has been established, it will be the responsibility of this administration to organize and supervise Civil Defense services in accordance with the requirements of the military commander.

- b. In Class "B" areas organization and supervision of Civil Defense will be the responsibility of the Military Government Administration. If coordination with the military is required, such coordination will be the responsibility of the local military commander.

5. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT FOR CIVIL DEFENSE IN CLASSIFIED AREAS

- a. In Class "A" areas it is a military responsibility to decide the requirements and to provide any necessary equipment or material.
- b. In Class "B" areas it is a Military Government Administration responsibility to decide the requirements, and to provide equipment to be sold or rented, subject to such equipment being available and within the limits of transportation allotted by the military to the Military Government Administration.

- c. If equipment is available, the Military Government Administration may sell or rent it to suitable applicants from Class "C" areas.

6. ADVICE ON PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE

The P.A.D. and C.D. Advisor, AFHQ, will be responsible for giving advice as necessary on all matters of Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense, working through the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 and normal

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Operation Memorandum No. 40, dated 14 Oct 43 (cont'd)

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military channels with regard to military matters, and through the Military Government Section with regard to civil matters.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

L. D. SMITH,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Lowell W. Rocks
LOWELL W. ROCKS,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-3A

Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section

29 September, 43

SUBJECT: Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense.

TO 1 JACS

Ref ACC/1004/4 (P.S.) of 23 Sep please return forthwith
enclosures to my memo of 11 Sep.

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Updeman

T. B. JACKMAN
Major, Govt. Sect.

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TO: Military Government Section, AFHQ.

FROM: Planning Staff ACC.

SUBJECT: Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense.

REFERENCE: ACC/1004/4 (P.S)

DATE: 23 September 1943.

1. Reference your letter TBJ/JL dated 23 September 1943, I have considered this matter and am in agreement with the policy as suggested.

W.H. for

Colonel

R.E. RATHBONE.

Colonel

J.J. ALBRIGHT.

Joint Assistant Chiefs of Staff.
Armistice C.C.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section

TBJ/jl

324.5

22 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: JACS

SUBJECT: Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense.

It would be helpful if the comments asked for in Memo of 11 September could now be furnished.

2A, B, C, D

T. B. Jackman
Major

T. B. JACKMAN
Major
Military Govt. Section

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HOT SECRET.

Military Govt School.

13 Sep 43

Dear Sir,

I enclose two copies of the memo which I prepared for Col. Young on the subject of PAD and CD. It was not intended as a Directive although it was called such for want of a better name. Col Young is concerned with Public Safety generally and he wished me to define the PAD and CD position. The memo is prepared in draft form for simplicity of alteration or addition. Attached thereto, are the observations of Lt-Col Briggs to Col Young.

Col Young asked me to tell you that he will be delighted to see you when you come here. He said that if any civil defence problem arises which must be dealt with urgently, he will attend to it. Otherwise, he will leave things for your arrival.

Col Young showed me the likely establishment for the CD side. I repeat this below:-

Supt of Fire and CD Services

Col (Br)

Major (Br or A)
(preferably Br)

Captains - 2 (A)

If the need arises, one Lt-Col (A) and one Major may be added. If the first Major is British, the second will be American or vice versa.

Col Young expressed the opinion that it might be advantageous if the Col and Major covered both Fire and CD and the captains split into Fire and CD duties respectively.

Yours respectfully,

Major, BAOC

Lt-Col S.E.H. Durr.

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Col Young expressed the opinion that it might be advantageous if the Col and Major covered both Fire and CD and the captains split into Fire and CD duties respectively.

Yours respectfully,



Major, RAOC

Lt-Col S.E.H.Daw,
Civil Defence Adviser's Dept,
5, Rue M Petain,
Algiers.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION

11 Sept, 1943

SUBJECT : Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense.

TO : Acting Joint Chief Planners, M.G., School.

1. Attached is Informal Routing Slip from G-3/^{WITH}Draft
Operation Memorandum.

2. A copy of General Order No. 16 is also attached.

3. Please forward comments and treat for urgent reply.

T. B. Jackman
Major

T. B. JACKMAN,
Major,

Military Government Section

f- J. C. Holmes Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff & by his
delegation.

Incl-3

G.O. # 16
Info Rtg Slip
Copy of Draft Memo

ACA/1004/4
PS

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Informal Routing Slip

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

FILE :

DATE: 5 Sept 43

SUBJECT: Policy for P.A.D. and Civil Defense in Occupied Enemy Territory.

Fill in each column, initial action, and draw a line across the sheet just below initials. Number each memo consecutively in first column. Use entire column for long memoranda.

NUMBER	FROM	TO	DATE	
1.	G-3	Chief Military Government	5 Sept	1. It is considered necessary to define the policy for Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense in occupied enemy territory. 2. Present policy on the subject is contained in General Order No. 16 which refers to North Africa only. 3. A draft Operation Memorandum is forwarded for your approval and comments before submission to the Chief of Staff. 702. <i>LT Col Perry F. Bennett</i> <i>LOWELL W. MARKS</i> Major General, G.S.C. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

COPY NO. _____

OPERATION MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER)

POLICY FOR PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE

IN OCCUPIED ENEMY TERRITORY

1. GENERAL.

- a. Policy for Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense in North Africa is contained in General Order No. 16. This Memorandum defines the policy to be observed in occupied enemy territory.
- b. Passive Air Defense in occupied territory, as elsewhere, is a normal military duty and will be carried out in accordance with military instructions on the subject.

Civil Defense in occupied territory is only of importance in so far as it affects military requirements. It is the duty of the Military Government Administration to provide such Civil Defense measures as are required by the military.
- c. In any area of military importance Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense will be closely related. It is essential therefore that, in such an area, the two should be planned and executed together under the direction of the Military Commander.

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b. Passive Air Defense in occupied territory, as elsewhere, is a normal military duty and will be carried out in accordance with military instructions on the subject.

Civil Defense in occupied territory is only of importance in so far as it affects military requirements. It is the duty of the Military Government Administration to provide such Civil Defense measures as are required by the military.

c. In any area of military importance Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense will be closely related. It is essential therefore that, in such an area, the two should be planned and executed together under the direction of the Military Commander.

2. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

a. Civil Defense will be a military necessity in those areas where ^{1.19}

failure of the Civil Defense will hinder military operations.

b. Civil Defense may be of importance even in areas of no military value, if the failure of the Civil Defense organization is likely to result in such damage to essential services, stocks of food, and communications, that ultimately the military will be encumbered by serious problems of unrest, refugees, starvation, or disease amongst the civil population.

c. Where it is necessary to raise the standard of Civil Defense to meet military requirements, some assistance from the military will usually

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Operation Memorandum Number , dated 1943. (Cont'd)

be necessary, either by giving directions or advice, or by making available essential equipment and supplies which cannot otherwise be obtained by the civilian authorities.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE.

- a. The relative importance of Civil Defense to military requirements will be defined by classifying areas of occupied territory as

follows:-

CLASS "A"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as a military necessity, where the principle is accepted that every possible assistance is to be given to the organization of Civil Defense, including, if necessary, the lending without charge of essential equipment and the provision of essential materials.

CLASS "B"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as of military importance only in so far as there may be repercussions on the military in the event of failure of the Civil Defense organization. In these areas such equipment as is available may be sold or hired to the local authorities.

CLASS "C"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded of no military importance.

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Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as a military necessity, where the principle is accepted that every possible assistance is to be given to the organization of Civil Defense, including, if necessary, the lending without charge of essential equipment and the provision of essential materials.

CLASS "B"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as of military importance only in so far as there may be repercussions on the military in the event of failure of the Civil Defense organization. In these areas such equipment as is available may be sold or hired to the local authorities.

CLASS "C"

Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded of no military importance.

- b. The classification of areas as above, and their re-classification according to changing circumstances, will be the responsibility of the military commander.

4. RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE IN CLASSIFIED AREAS.

- a. In Class "A" areas, pending the establishment of the complete Military Government Administration, the local military commander will be responsible for organizing minimum standards of Civil Defense as well as Passive Air Defense. A Military Government officer will be appointed to assist him as required with Civil Defense.
- b. In Class "B" areas, or in areas which were Class "A" and have become Class "B", organization and supervision of Civil Defense will be the

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Operation Memorandum Number , dated 1943. (Cont'd)

responsibility of the Military Government Administration. If coordination with the military is required, such coordination will be the responsibility of the military commander through his P.A.D. Officer.

5. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVISION OF EQUIPMENT IN CLASSIFIED AREAS.

- a. In Class "A" areas it is a military responsibility to decide the requirements and to provide any necessary equipment or material.
- b. In Class "B" areas it is a Military Government Administration responsibility to decide the requirements and to provide equipment to be sold or hired, subject only to the military being in a position to allot the necessary transportation.
- c. If equipment is available, the Military Government Administration may sell or hire it to suitable applicants from Class "C" areas.

6. ADVICE ON PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE.

The P.A.D. and C.D. Advisor, AFHQ, will be responsible for giving advice as necessary on all matters of Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense, working through AC of S G-3 and normal military channels with regard to military matters, and through the Military Government Section with regard to civil matters.

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sibility to decide the requirements and to provide equipment to be sold or hired, subject only to the military being in a position to allot the necessary transportation.

2. If equipment is available, the Military Government Administration may sell or hire it to suitable applicants from Class "C" areas.

6. ADVICE ON PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE.

The P.A.D. and C.D. Advisor, AFHQ, will be responsible for giving advice as necessary on all matters of Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense, working through AC of S G-3 and normal military channels with regard to military matters, and through the Military Government Section with regard to civil matters.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

11 February 1943

GENERAL ORDERS)

NUMBER 18)

1491

Responsibility for Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense, Allied Force.. I
Boundaries..... II

I -- RESPONSIBILITY FOR PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AND CIVIL DEFENSE, ALLIED
FORCE

Section II, General Orders Number 26, this headquarters, 18
December 1942, is amended to read as follows:

"1. Announcement is made of the appointment of Captain Ivan B.
Franks, O.B.E., R.N., (Retired) Ministry of Home Security, as Chief
Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, on all matters per-
taining to Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense. His duties will
include the coordination of all matters relating to Passive Air and
Civil Defense under the control of Allied Force Headquarters.

"2. Passive Air Defense.

a The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is responsible for all
matters relating to Passive Air Defense, Allied Force North Africa.

"3. Civil Defense.

a Civil Defense in North Africa is a matter for the French
Administration. If, however, the French Administration breaks
down, Allied Military Operations will be encumbered.

b It is therefore, in certain areas, a military necessity
to insure that the Civil Defense Organization is adequate to
maintain public control by the French Administration under condi-
tions of air attack.

c In those areas, assistance in advice, material, and
finance may be necessary to the French Authorities from Allied
resources.

d The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, is responsible for
indicating the areas of 'Military Necessity.'

e Liaison Section is responsible for assessing the assist-
ance necessary to the French Administration.

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f Chief Administrative Officer is responsible for the allotment of any available Allied resources for Civil Defense.

"4. Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense Policy.

a The Chief Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief is the appropriate Officer to advise on Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense Policy; he will therefore be kept informed of such plans or developments as may affect Passive Air Defense or Civil Defense Policy."

II -- BOUNDARIES

Paragraphs 3 and 4, General Order Number 38, this headquarters, 30 December 1942, is amended to read as follows:

"3. The Mediterranean Base Section will serve all units of this command East of a general line AKMOUL-TAZA-OUTATELHADJ-TALEINT, all inclusive, except units of British First Army and such other units as may from time to time be designated by this headquarters to be served by British I of C. The facilities of the Port of Algiers are not available to Mediterranean Base Section without prior approval of this headquarters in each instance. The Mediterranean Base Section is responsible for the provision of supplies and equipment of United States units in the area of the British First Army unless otherwise specifically directed.

"4. The Atlantic Base Section will serve all units of this command West of general line AKMOUL-TAZA-OUTATELHADJ-TALEINT, exclusive, except such units as may from time to time be designated by this headquarters."

By command of Lieutenant General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

T. J. DAVIS,
Brigadier General, AGO,
Adjutant General.

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MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION

Allied Force Headquarters

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File # _____

28 August 1943
(Date)

SUBJECT: P.A.D. and Civil Defense in Sicily.

TO : Acting Joint Chief Planners Mil. Govt. School

is

1. Herewith ~~xxx~~ 1 copy(~~xxx~~) of Report of Visit to Sicily by Colonel H. L.

White and Lt. Col. S. E. H. Daw and Coordinating Route Slip to Mil. Gov. Sec. from
Civil Def. Advisor's Section 28 August 1943

2. Receipt is to be acknowledged on the form below, which should be
returned immediately to Military Government Section, Allied Force Headquarters,
A. P. O. #512.

Ref. to [unclear]
[unclear]

T. B. JACKMAN,
Major,
Mil. Govt. Sec.

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for file "Civil Defense"

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COORDINATING ROUTE SLIP
(Staff Minute Sheet)
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Classification

File No. _____

Date 28 August 1945
Originated:SUBJECT P.A.D. and Civil Defense in Sicily.

Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, initial action, draw 1 line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.

No.	Section of Origin	Pass To	Date	Has attached paper been coordinated with all concerned?
1	Civil Def Advisor's Section	Brig. Gen. J.C. Holmes, Mil Gov Section	28/8/45	Submitted herewith is inclosure referred to in C.D.A. letter reference No. 633. 1 Incl: PAD & CD in Sicily.

Wallace F. Nowikowski
 WALLACE F. NOWIKOWSKI
 2nd Lieutenant, Inf.,
 Military Secretary.

No. Incls 1

No. App _____

AFHQ Form No. 3 (Revised)

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Classification

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ALLIED NINE HEADQUARTERS
Civil Defense Adviser's Section
A.P.C. 512

1550/002

SUBJECT: P.A.D. and Civil Defense in Sicily.

TO : Civil Defense Adviser, A.P.H.O.

Report of Visit to Sicily by Colonel H. L. White
and Lt. Col. S. R. H. Day.

From August 15 to August 27, 1943.

1. Purpose of Visit.
2. Itinerary Covered.
3. Situation of P.A.D. and Civil Defense.
4. Conclusions.
5. Recommendations.

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3. Situation of P.A.D. and Gibraltar Defense.
4. Conclusions.
5. Recommendations.

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Report of Visit to Sicily by Colonel H. L. White and Lt. Col.
S. E. H. Daw.

1. Purpose of Visit.

The purpose of the visit was to ascertain the existing situation of Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense in the Sicilian ports, with a view to applying experience gained there to future planning; it being considered desirable for the benefit of this future planning that any lessons from Sicily should be added to the considerable experience already gained at Algeria and Tunisia.

2. Itinerary Covered.

PALERMO
SIRACUSE
AUGUSTA (Naval Base Only)
CATANIA

3. Situation as regards P.A.D. and Civil Defense.

- A. Base Areas and Ports.
- B. Base Sections.
- C. Naval Areas.
- D. Civil Defense (AMCOT).

A. Base Areas and Ports.

At PALERMO, after a general tour of the town and docks, at the suggestion of the Chief of Staff at Seventh Army rear Hq., visits were made to the various heads of military services in the area. On explaining to these the purpose of the visit the invariable comment was "why are there no such arrangements in operation here". It was found that much time in the docks was lost owing to there being no agreed warning system. Several uncoordinated warning signals exist but the sound of a gun firing out to sea, or a single anti-aircraft shot on land or from a ship, usually led to the words "Air Raid Warning" being passed by word of mouth. A wholesale exodus of dock workers then ensued. The loss of time of some 700 workers was estimated, on an average, at three hours per night.

Dock lighting presented many problems, no arrangements existed for an official warning to extinguish lights on shore and thus there was no guide to merchant ships alongside to put out their lights.

Where casualties had occurred as a result of air raids, normal

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- A. Base Areas and Ports.
- B. Base Sections.
- C. Naval Areas.
- D. Civil Defense (AMGOT).

A. Base Areas and Ports.

At PALERMO, after a general tour of the town and docks, at the suggestion of the Chief of Staff at Seventh Army rear Hq., visits were made to the various heads of military services in the area. On explaining to these the purpose of the visit, the invariable comment was "why are there no such arrangements in operation here". It was found that much time in the docks was lost owing to there being no agreed warning system. Several uncoordinated warning signals exist but the sound of a gun firing out to sea, or a single anti-aircraft shot on land or from a ship, usually led to the words "Air Raid Warning" being passed by word of mouth. A wholesale exodus of dock workers then ensued. The loss of time of some 700 workers was estimated, on an average, at three hours per night.

Dock lighting presented many problems, no arrangements existed for an official warning to extinguish lights on shore and thus there was no guide to merchant ships alongside to put out their lights.

Where casualties had occurred as a result of air raids, normal medical services had worked satisfactorily. There was, however, no control and report center for dealing with air raid incidents. The measures for dealing with trapped casualties were limited to a call on an Engineer unit to provide personnel, there were no rescue parties warned to stand by on an air attack developing. The military fire service seemed effective and did good work after it had arrived; at PALERMO, fortunately, no heavy incendiary attacks took place. Fire prevention measures, except on a limited unit scale, were lacking. No P.A.D. officer had been appointed to this base. It is understood, however, that an application is being made for a P.A.D. officer from L.F.H.Q.

The anti-aircraft Commanding General said he had found no P.A.D. at PALERMO and no prepared plans for reporting damage, fire prevention and bomb disposal. He commented on the lack of a warning system and observed that there was no P.A.D. control to be in contact with his C.O.P. He considered that such pre-planning was necessary and added that in any future planning on which he might be engaged, he would insist on P.A.D. measures being included. He felt too that it was important to get local

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Civil Defense on to its feet as it was vital, he said, "to get the community back to normal".

Civil Defense matters are dealt with under sub-paragraph D under.

In SERICUS the situation was better, in that an experienced P.A.D. officer had been appointed to the Base Air Area. He, however, did not arrive with the Base advance party and there had been no pre-planning with the various heads of services. He had got a reasonable P.A.D. scheme in operation and coordinated as much of the Civil Defense organization as was available. He was much handicapped by lack of extra stores such as stirrup pumps, etc. The military fire service was very efficient but hardly adequate. This service arrived very late on the scene and were not supplied with sufficient foam. For example, the destruction of a petrol pipe line by the enemy had led to the filling up of all cavities in and below a guy with petrol, and during the unloading of ammunition an accidental fire occurred. This was extinguished and the actual ammunition on the dock saved. Owing, however, to the accumulation of petrol, the guy was constantly erupting and bursting into flames. The supply of foam compound ran out and more had to be sent by air. The Fire Adviser from Tunisian District was also sent for. Effective and skillful measures were taken, but the guy (the only one suitable for unloading ammunition) was out of action for several days. A "G" Staff officer said that in his opinion, "had the flow of ammunition not been thus interrupted, CATANIA would probably have been captured in the first rush". The shortage of foam compound was much deplored.

There was a considerable fire hazard at petrol dumps and ammunition depots, owing to the parched stubble and other vegetation. It was stated that had this been burned off before the petrol or ammunition was stacked, there would have been less fire risk and the shadows thrown by stocks much reduced.

The anti-aircraft Commander at SERICUS was quite unaware that there was any P.A.D. organization in the area, no contact having been established between the P.A.D. control and the G.O.A.

The situation at the Naval base at AUGURIA is covered in sub section C under.

At CATANIA the Base Air Area had just taken over and there was much work in progress in getting the docks operative. No shipping had yet arrived. The Commander of this Air Area was much concerned on the question of P.A.D. as he expected air raids with the arrival of shipping in the docks. He had no P.A.D. officer and no plans at all for P.A.D. He left a copy of the headings of a typical P.A.D. scheme

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The anti-aircraft Commander at SERRAVALLE was quite unaware that there was any P.A.D. organisation in the area, no contact having been established between the P.A.D. control and the G.O.R.

The situation at the Naval base at AUGUSTA is covered in subsection C under.

At CATANIA the Base Sub Area had just taken over and there was much work in progress in getting the docks operative. No shipping had yet arrived. The Commander of this Sub-Area was much concerned on the question of P.A.D. as he expected air raids with the arrival of shipping in the docks. He had no P.A.D. officer and no plans at all for P.A.D. We left a copy of the headings of a typical P.A.D. scheme with him and he is applying to the AUGUSTA Base Sub Area Commander for the loan of his P.A.D. officer. He was informed by us that if a request was received at A.F.H.C. from 15th Army Group, an experienced P.A.D. officer would be sent over for temporary duty.

B. Base Sections.

There is an American Base Section with its Headquarters at PALERMO which, as soon as it becomes operative, will control the western half of the island. The eastern half is under the control of "Fort Area". This appears to be the equivalent of an L of C and which controls the various British Base Sub Areas.

The U.S. Base Section was preparing to take over the administration of the American half of the island from the 7th Army. The Commander of this Base Section was not aware that such a thing as a P.A.D. organisation even existed. He expressed much concern at the lack of measures to deal with the effects of air attack and asked that one of his Engineer officers be sent to A.F.H.C. for training by the G.D.A. Section in order that adequate arrangements could be made. This was agreed, provided that application was made via 7th Army. The Commander

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stated that plans were in preparation for a large transit camp and that the question of P.A.D. had been left out entirely. He showed us the sketch plans and asked for suggestions. It was found possible to make recommendations for shelters, reporting of air raid damage and protection of vehicles from extensive damage by fire, without any modification of the general layout.

The "Port Area" was in the process of moving its Headquarters from MURCHIE to GLENMILL. There is no P.A.D. officer on the staff of this formation; P.A.D. measures are left to Base Sub Areas.

C. Naval Areas.

Naval Areas at RALPH and ABERDEEN were visited. The Area at RALPH would, had there been a P.A.D. scheme in existence, have been incorporated as a sector of this scheme. It was, however, entirely independent except for liaison between the Naval Fire Marshall and the Army Engineer Fire Service. This separation led to difficulty on the question of warnings and dock lighting. A Fire Marshall and a Naval Bomb Disposal Officer were allotted to the Naval Staff. The Fire Marshall said that they were imperfectly equipped for fire fighting as they had only two trailer pumps, no extinguishers and very few stirrup pumps. He stressed the great need for a fire float, only recently had he been able to get an Italian fire float into commission. He recommended the inclusion of a fire float with the Port Assault Force in future operations. He said, too, that pre-planning was necessary in order that all fire resources, Naval, Army, and Civilian could be pooled. The Naval Bomb Disposal officer considered that his service should arrive with the Port Assault Force. He also recommended the earlier arrival of the Army B.D.O.

The Naval Commander raised the question of gas cleansing equipment and it was suggested that he discuss this matter with the Chemical Warfare Section of 7th Army HQ.

At ABERDEEN the British Naval Base was entirely separated from any Military Base and it constituted a separate P.A.D. problem. A naval officer had been appointed to deal with P.A.D. in addition to his other duties. The arrangements made were satisfactory but equipment was inadequate. Trailer pumps which were expected did not arrive, neither was their planning known to him. The trailer pumps, one Italian and one Military were subsequently obtained; also some Italian fire equipment. There were a number of extinguishers found in the base but there was only one stirrup pump. This improvised fire service was efficient but sadly inadequate to deal with air attack. Here again the lack of fire floats with sufficient foam equipment was deplored. The Naval Commander stated that there appeared to have been no study directed to the fire fighting on ships in port.

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D. Civil Defence.

The responsibility for Civil Defence in Sicily rested entirely with AMOT and there appeared to be little or no coordination between this service and the military P.A.D.

The Fire and Civil Defence services of AMOT is part of the Public Safety Division and only in PALERMO did there appear to be a full time officer to deal with Civil Defence. In other places, it was dealt with as a part time duty by a Police officer.

The Civil Defence officer at PALERMO is well trained and experienced. He stated that the Civil Fire Bde. was efficient and fairly well equipped but that the Civil Defence organization was practically non-existent. There was thus, no rescue service, no fire guards, no reporting and control center. The Civil Defence controller had been dismissed and the Chief of the Fire Brigade appointed to take over the Civil Defence organization. Wardens have now been appointed under police control.

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The Fire and Civil Defense officer said that lack of pre-planning had caused difficulty in that policy and control of the Fire Service varied in the different AMOT areas on the Island. He found, also, that extra trailer pumps were necessary as there was a shortage of spare parts for the existing appliances. There was also a great need for stirrup pumps. Stretchers were in very short supply.

The post raid problems were now being dealt with by the Medical and Welfare branch of AMOT. He said that much more pre-planning was necessary than had taken place and instanced cases of tactical military units interfering with the Civil Fire Service, vehicles and premises were requisitioned and, in some cases, the service rendered inoperative. He also felt handicapped in that his service was subordinate to the Public Safety Division and he had no direct access to the local AMOT Chief. There was no coordination with P.A.D. control as this control was non-existent.

At SIRACUSE, where there was no full time Civil Defense officer, the police officer had re-organized Wardens Services from Carabinieri. They reported air raid damage to the military P.A.D. control but were not very reliable, owing to a tendency to seek shelter during air raids.

Owing to shortage of time, no information could be obtained as regards Civil Defense in CATANIA.

4. Conclusions.

In all ports, whether under American or British control, there appeared to have been an entire lack of pre-planning. In two cases only (SIRACUSE and AUGUSTA) was there a P.A.D. officer or a P.A.D. scheme in operation. These schemes were much below the North African standard.

At PALERMO and CATANIA there were no P.A.D. officers and no coordinated arrangements whatever for dealing with the effect of air raids. Military fire units were available but no central control for passing fire calls was observed. Fire prevention was in existence only on a unit basis and on an inadequate scale to deal with air attacks.

In all places visited, the lack of pre-planning was evident, in that there were no arrangements made in advance for a warning system, for reporting air raid damage or for dealing with casualties. These arrangements, where they were found in existence at all, had been made some time after the occupation of the ports and were, with the exception of SIRACUSE, entirely uncoordinated and, to a large extent, haphazard. Many casualties occurred at SIRACUSE from our own anti-aircraft splinters. These might have been much reduced if a P.A.D. scheme had been in operation earlier, with organized rescue services, so that all ranks not on duty during an air raid could take over.

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The almost entire absence of fire watching and fire prevention led to many calls on the military and civil fire services and, had there been serious incendiary attacks, these services would have been quickly overwhelmed.

In our opinion, fire appliances arrived much too late and, but for light and infrequent air attacks, the absence of fire equipment in the initial stages would have led to disaster. In one case, as has already been mentioned, the effects of an accidental fire, due only indirectly to enemy action, were most serious.

Had the lessons learned in Algeria and Tunisia been applied in the planning of the Sicilian campaign, many, if not all, of the difficulties referred to in this report would have been avoided; moreover, the arrangements made by the P.A.D. officer at SIRACUSE would have been much more effective had the experiences gained in North Africa been made available to him.

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6. To avoid the same lessons having to be learned a third time, the next heading contains recommendations for future planning.

5. Recommendations.

A. In future operations, it is recommended that there be a P.A.D. Staff officer at Army Hq. to coordinate the P.A.D. Planning of the operations. This officer should work in cooperation with: 100

1. Military Government Civil Defense and Fire officer for the whole territory involved.
2. Army Hq. Military Fire officer.
3. P.A.D. Staff officer of all ports and Base Sub Areas.
4. Military Government C.D. and Fire officers of towns.

If there are also Base Sections and Areas, a P.A.D. Staff Officer should be temporarily attached to these headquarters.

Plans prepared should cover the following phases:-

1. Tactical operations stage: P.A.D. measures for beach groups and port assault parties. These preliminary measures should include the organization of a P.A.D. report center and such Casualty, and Fire Prevention Services amongst tactical and other units as may be practicable and necessary.
2. Port occupation and operation stage: P.A.D. and Civil Defense measures for Base Sub Areas, Naval Bases, Ports. These measures include an interim P.A.D. scheme, followed by a complete scheme as soon as a degree of stability has been reached in the area of the Base. Also, with the assistance of the Military Government Civil Defense officer, Civil Defense is operating for additional fire prevention, fire fighting, and reporting of bombs. Previous discussions between Naval and Military authorities to agree on a warning system are, in our opinion, essential if loss of time at docks is to be avoided. A policy as regards control of dock lighting should also be agreed in advance.
3. L of C stage: General P.A.D. and C.D. measures for the whole territory covered.
- B. More attention should, in the future, be devoted to fire fighting. Fire appliances, their crews, and adequate equipment should be landed before stores. If they must be carried in the store ships, they should be so loaded as to be landed first.

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Beach group and port assault party stores should include a small supply of stirrup pumps.
 - A fire float should be sent with the Port assault party.
 - C. The Military Government Civil Defense and Fire officer in all large ports should be a full time officer and be directly responsible to the Senior Military Government officer in the area. It is vital that Civil Defense cooperation be available at the earliest possible moment and executive measures may be necessary.
 - D. The Port Assault Party should, in our opinion, include personnel whose duty it is to attend to the protection of vital parts of electricity, pumping, and other dock operating installations. These measures include improvised protection against splinters and incendiary bombs, as well as prevention of sabotage.

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A.P.H.C.
August 23, 1943

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