

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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ITALIAN PERSONNEL & ORGANIZATION
OCT. 1943

24 pp

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J. J. J.

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16 Oct 43

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D. Hensley Smith
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To see 2B and 2C

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

DSJ/DW/JY

26 October 1943

MGS 342.16

SUBJECT: Enlistment of Italians for service against Germany.

TO : AMG (P) (3 copies)
HQ, AG (4 copies) *3 copies*

Attached copies of HQ AMG letter AGOCT/369/HQ of 23 October 1943 are forwarded for information.

[Signature]
D. S. JACKLING
Lt. Colonel

1 Incl
as above

Copy to:-

- G-1 (B)
- G-1 (A)
- The Office of the Resident American Minister
- The Office of the Resident British Minister

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27/10/43
4569

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AMGOT/369/HQ
 AMGOT HQ SICILY
 23 October 1943

SUBJECT: Italian Recruits

TO : All S.C.A.O.s

For your information a communication has been received from 15th Army Group stating that Italians wishing to enlist for service against Germany must join the Italian Army.

Charles M. Spofford
 CHARLES M. SPOFFORD, *Capt.*
 Colonel, G.S.C.,
 Chief Staff Officer.

DISTRIBUTION

Agrigento	6	BCAO Region 4	5		
Caltanissetta	6	AMGOT 15 Army Group	2		
Catania	6	AMGOT 8th Army Region	3	10	
Enna	4	File 266 and 369	2		Cont. of Property 1
Palermo	35	Float	1		Trans. Com. & Util. 1
Ragusa	6	MGS, AFHQ	12		Labor 1
Siracusa	10	Spheres	10		Econ. & Supply 1
Trapani	6	<u>Division</u>			Agriculture 1
Messina	8	Finance	5		Education 1
Pantelleria	3	Public Safety	4		Monuments & 1
AMGOT Liaison	1	Legal	1		Fine Arts
AMGOT 8th Army	6	Public Health	1		
BCAO Region 2	6	Public Relations	1		

*3rd Army Column
 in Sicily
 Italian file*

F/109 (Final)
(Corrected Copy)

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APPENDIX "B"

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G-3 SECTION

COPY NO. 11

3 October 1943

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES

OBJECT.

1. To decide the policy to be adopted for the future of the Italian ground and air forces.

GENERAL.

2. An agreement has already been reached on the employment and disposition of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine. At Appendix A an outline of this agreement is given.

GROUND FORCES AVAILABLE.

3. a. The following Italian ground forces exist in areas under our control:

20th Friuli Inf Div
44th Cremona Inf Div
225th C/D ?
226th C/D ?

— CORSICA

30th Sabauda Inf Div
31st Calabria Inf Div
47th Bari Inf Div
Nerbo Parachute Div (Four Bns)
204th C/D ?
205th C/D ?

— SARDINIA

58th Legname Inf Div
104th Mantova Inf Div
152nd Vicenza Inf Div
24th C/D
210th C/D
212th C/D
227th C/D
31st Coastal Brigade

— Mainland of ITALY (in our possession)

- b. It is considered that those forces which are now in enemy occupied ITALY and the BALKANS will be demobilized after surrendering their

of this agreement is given.

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Mambo Parachute Div (Four Bns)
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205th C/D ?

--- SARDINIA

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104th Mantova Inf Div
152nd Vicenza Inf Div
24th C/D
210th C/D
212th C/D
227th C/D
31st Coastal Brigade

--- Mainland of ITALY (in our possession)

- b. It is considered that these forces which are now in enemy occupied ITALY and the BALKANS will be demobilized after surrendering their equipment. Some Italians may be evacuated from the BALKANS but numbers are unlikely to be large.

- c. Small bodies of men may remain in hiding in the hills of ITALY, but it is thought that the German policy as they retire northwards will be to evacuate all men of military age. All Italian equipment that is not evacuated will almost certainly be destroyed.

AIR FORCES

4. Details of the Italian air forces in our control are given in appendix B. There are some 5 squadrons of fighters, 1 squadron of bombers, 1 squadron of torpedo bombers, 2 squadrons of seaplanes and 1 squadron of reconnaissance aircraft.

PRISONERS OF WAR.

5. In North AFRICA there are now 122,000 Italian prisoners of war of which 48,000 are already employed on labor duties. In SICILY there are now 32,000

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of whom 16,000 are employed on labor duties. Of the available prisoners of war some 56,000 have been requested by the U.K. for labor duties there. It is not however the policy at present to evacuate any further prisoners, except those who cannot be released or employed for security reasons.

ITALIAN EQUIPMENT.

6. a. The formations listed in para. 3 are fairly complete in personal equipment and weapons and have a proportion of Field and AA artillery. Reserves of equipment in Italian hands are however practically nil. Of the equipment captured in North AFRICA practically none remains, as it has been issued to SOE and French units.
- b. In SICILY approximately 165,000 Italian troops were captured. Previous experience indicates that the equipment surrendered will re-equip 20 to 25 percent of the forces in clothing and light weapons, i.e., some 30 to 40,000 men, and some 5 percent of the heavy equipments may be serviceable.
- c. In general it is estimated that sufficient ammunition is available to outlast the life of such weapons as are in the hands of the Italian forces, or can be salvaged.
7. a. It is therefore concluded that, provided no more equipment is issued to SOE or to the French, there should be sufficient to equip some 30-40,000 men. This might be held for maintenance of forces already in being, or might be used for reforming units from P. of W.
- b. It is emphasized that Italian equipment is a wasting asset, as all manufacturing facilities are in enemy hands.

POSSIBLE USES OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

8. Broadly speaking there are three possibilities:
That the forces:
 - a. are used as fighting formations.
 - b. are used for I of C security, AA defense, and service troops.
 - c. are demobilized and used as civilian labor.

The forces required in each of these roles are considered below, and the relative priorities are assessed in paras. 26-28.

USE AS FIGHTING FORMATIONS.

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POSSIBLE USES OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

8. Broadly speaking there are three possibilities:

That the forces:

- a. are used as fighting formations.
- b. are used for L of C security, AA defense, and service troops.
- c. are demobilized and used as civilian labor.

The forces required in each of these roles are considered below, and the relative priorities are assessed in paras. 26-28.

USE AS FIGHTING FORMATIONS.

9. Now that the Italians have been granted the right of co-belligerents, there will be strong pressure to permit the use of their forces in an active role. Owing to the difficulties of command, maintenance and replacements, and to their doubtful fighting value, it is considered that such employment of Italian forces should be kept to a minimum. Furthermore the limited capacity of the L of C would preclude the use of large Italian forces except at the expense of a reduction of Allied forces. If strong political reasons necessitate their use, it is considered that a token force of one division at most should be accepted.
10. a. There is a need for Alpine troops capable of operating in high altitudes and in snow. Although no Italian Alpine units are available in Southern ITALY, CORSICA or SARDINIA, efforts should be made to form such units from any available personnel that later escape the German evacuation.

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- In addition, the possibility of utilizing ~~SECRET~~ carefully selected personnel for infiltration into enemy occupied areas as guerrilla forces merits consideration.

USE FOR L OF C SECURITY, FOR AA AND COAST DEFENSE AND AS SERVICE TROOPS.

L of C Troops:

11. There will be increasing requirements of troops in SICILY and ITALY for guard duties; anti-sabotage protection and internal security duties as we advance Northwards. In addition certain defense precautions will be necessary in SARDINIA.
12. It is considered that these duties might be carried out by:
 - a. In SARDINIA — one Italian Field Division and the two Sardinian Coastal Divisions
 - b. In SICILY — one Italian Field Division and about three Allied Bns.
 - c. In ITALY south of NAPLES — FOGGIA — three divisions might be necessary, and a further three might be required for the area between this line and the PISA — RIMINI line. These six divisions could be either Field or Coastal Divisions, preferably the former.

Thus a total of ten divisions might be necessary for this commitment.

AA and Coast Defense:

13. Owing to our own shortage of AA units and to the ample supplies of AA and CD ammunition that are in our hands, particularly in FANTALERIA, it is important that Italian AA and CD units should be employed under our instructions.
14. It might be possible to hand over the AA defense of certain areas solely to the Italians, for example at important hydro-electric stations or industrial targets. In other cases the mobile and non-mobile AA and CD equipments could be used to thicken up Allied defense of ports.

Service Units.

15. As the enemy retires it is envisaged that he will destroy ports, roads, railways and signal communication to the maximum possible extent. This will impose a great strain on our engineer and signal units, and it will therefore be essential that the maximum use be made of skilled and unskilled Italian labor. In addition there is a constant need for vehicle repairs and mechanical repairs of all sorts.

... of the Italian armed

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16. It is therefore considered that all specialist units of the Italian armed forces should be retained for these purposes, to work under the Arms and Services of the Allies concerned.

USE OF AIR FORCES.

17. a. It is considered that the I.A.F. should be employed to the maximum operationally. As far as possible they should be used in support of Italian armed forces and possibly BALKAN patriot forces, but should the situation demand they could be used for offensive action in areas where Allied forces are operating.
- b. Non-operational aircraft and crews, including transport and Air Sea Rescue aircraft, should be employed on normal duties in support of the operational I.A.F. units, any surplus being used for similar formations in support of Allied air operations. For security reasons the I.A.F. is not considered suitable for SOE work.

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- c. Italian technical personnel should as far as possible be employed on repair and maintenance of I.A.F. aircraft, but might be used for similar duties in Allied non-operational air units as a means of releasing Allied tradesmen.

18. More use can be made of the transportation aircraft, flying boats, and seaplanes, which could work for SOE, on Air sea rescue and Air courier service. All technical I.A.F. personnel will be required for repair and maintenance of Italian and Allied aircraft and installations.

COMMAND.

19. a. It is essential that Italian units or formations should be under operational command of the local Allied HQ, and under Italian military authority for administration only. Owing to the probable dispersion of Italian forces in Allied areas, it is considered that only by this system of command can the necessary flexibility be obtained. On occasion exception may have to be made however where, as for example in SARDINIA, no suitable Allied HQ, exists.

- b. Italian aircraft and crews should operate within the framework of the I.A.F., but under complete Allied control.

DEMOBILIZATION.

20. Consideration should be given to the early demobilization of non-specialist personnel who would be of use in agriculture or mines. The major agricultural areas likely to be in our hands this winter are APULIA, CAMPANIA, CALABRIA and also possibly LUCANIA, ABRUZZI and UMBRIA, and there are important coal and ore mines in SARDINIA. A phased estimate is required early of what labor should be released from the armed forces for the full development of these areas, in order that military and civil requirements can be balanced.

21. Further demobilization should not take place unless it is established that the civil labor situation is such that employment can be found for demobilized troops, and that all military labor requirements and reinforcements can be met.

USE OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

22. It appears very doubtful whether Italian equipment would be available for equipping Prisoners of War for combatant duties. Even for non-combatant duties it may be necessary for the Allies to supply the majority of clothing and equipment.
23. Prisoners of War should be sorted, and engineer, transportation, and signals specialists, aircraft technicians and agricultural and mining

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23. Prisoners of War should be sorted, and engineer, transportation, and signals specialists, aircraft technicians and agricultural and mining types should be formed into units to assist in carrying out the tasks outlined above, in this Theater. This process is already begun.

It is considered that Italian officers could be found for such units, and in addition certain outstanding officers and NCOs might be released to stiffen the field forces.

TRANSFERENCE OF ITALIAN FORCES FROM SARDINIA.

24. On the assumption that all Italian forces now in CORSICA will eventually be evacuated to SARDINIA there will ultimately be 188,000 men there. Of these only one Field Division, two Coastal Divisions plus certain AA and labor units are likely to be required, totaling some 40-50,000 men.

25. It is therefore desirable that, when shipping allows, some 140,000 personnel together with a minimum amount of heavy equipment should be transferred to the mainland. It should be possible to carry out this move

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with Italian warships. Until then it will be necessary to increase the imports of food into SARDINIA to cover the requirements of this very considerable force.

PRIORITY OF EMPLOYMENT.

26. a. It is considered that of the possible uses considered above the most important is that of specialist units.
- b. Depending on the labor situation that exists at the time it will be necessary to determine the relative importance of fighting units, L of C troops and labor units.
27. The estimated requirements for L of C troops total ten out of the available twelve to sixteen divisions. In addition one Field Division may be used in an active role, leaving a balance for reinforcements, for specialists and labor and for agricultural or mining work of from one to five divisions and 80,000 P. of W.
- This balance will have to meet all labor requirements for North AFRICA, SICILY and ITALY, and will be reduced by 56,000 if the original demands of the U.K. are met.
28. In view of the possible shortage of labor in areas at present occupied by the enemy, and allowing for the difficulties that will be experienced in reallocating territorial units, such as coastal divisions, to the areas where they are needed, it is concluded that the personnel available may not be sufficient to meet the requirements.

CONCLUSIONS.

29. a. Specialists. First priority should be given to the utilization of Italian specialist units for engineer, transportation and signal work. In addition specialist P of W in these categories should be drafted into units, or used as dilution personnel - a process that has already been started.
- b. Combatant Force. At most one Field Division should be reserved for use in active operations, together with any Alpine troops that later become available.
- c. L of C Troops. Ten divisions might be required for L of C security duties - three for SARDINIA, one for SICILY and six for ITALY south of PISA - RIMINI. Labor shortage may, however, make it essential to reduce this number.
- d. AA & CD. AA and CD units should be retained. Possibly the defenses of SARDINIA should be made an Italian responsibility.

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- c. L of C Troops. Ten divisions might be required for L of C security duties - three for SARDINIA, one for SICILY and six for ITALY south of PISA --- RIMINI. Labor shortage may, however, make it essential to reduce this number.
- d. AA & CD. AA and CD units should be retained. Possibly the defenses of certain targets may be made an Italian responsibility.
- e. I.A.F. The I.A.F. should be used for the support of Italian forces, or of patriot forces in the BALKANS, for courier services, and for air-sea rescue. I.A.F. specialists will be required for servicing Italian and Allied aircraft.
- f. Command. Italian units should be under command of the local Allied HQ and under Italian control for administration only. On occasion exceptions may have to be made, however, where no suitable Allied HQ exists.
- g. Labor. Units and P of W not required for the above duties should be used for labor duties. An important aspect of this is to insure that the necessary labor for agriculture and mining is made available. Some demobilization for this purpose may be necessary, but further

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denobilization is undesirable at present and should only ultimately be carried out when the military labor requirements have been met.

h. Equipment. No further Italian equipment should be issued to SOE. The stocks that now exist should cover the requirements of existing units for some time, but if large numbers of P of W are reformed into units their clothing and equipment will have to be found from Allied sources.

i. Movement from SARDINIA. There will be some 140,000 personnel with light equipment to be moved out of SARDINIA when shipping is available.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

30. It is recommended that:

- a. This paper be approved.
- b. The policy as determined in this paper be communicated to the Italian Government and to 15th Army Group.
- c. Sections of AFHQ should initiate the appropriate action.

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APPENDIX "A"

SUMMARY OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE EMPLOYMENT AND
DISPOSITION OF THE ITALIAN FLEET AND MERCHANTILE MARINE

1. The armistice having been signed between the head of the Italian Government and the Allied Commander-in-Chief under which all Italian warships and the Italian merchantile marine were placed unconditionally at the disposal of the United Nations, and his Majesty the King of ITALY and the Italian Government having since expressed the wish that the fleet and the Italian merchantile marine should be employed in the Allied effort to assist in the prosecution of the war against the Axis powers, the following principles are established on which the Italian Navy and merchantile marine will be disposed.

a. Such ships as can be employed to assist actively in the Allied effort will be kept in commission and will be used under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, as may be arranged between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

b. Ships which cannot be so employed will be reduced to a care and maintenance bases and be placed in designated ports, measures of disarmament being undertaken as may be necessary.

c. The Government of ITALY will declare the names and whereabouts of warships, merchant ships, now in their possession which previously belonged to any of the United Nations, these vessels are to be returned forthwith as may be directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. This will be without prejudice to negotiations between the Governments which may subsequently be made in connection with replacing losses of ships of the United Nations caused by Italian action.

d. The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief will act as the agent of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in all matters concerning the employment of the Italian Fleet or merchant navy, their disposition and related matters.

e. It should be clearly understood that the extent to which the terms of the armistice are modified to allow of the arrangements outlined above and which follow, are dependent upon the extent and effectiveness of Italian cooperation.

2. Method of Operation.

The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will place at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine a high ranking Naval officer with the appropriate staff who will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for all matters in connection with the operation of the Italian fleet, and be

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- b. Ships which cannot be so employed will be reduced to a care and maintenance bases and be placed in designated ports, measures of disarmament being undertaken as may be necessary.
- c. The Government of ITALY will declare the names and whereabouts of warships, merchant ships, now in their possession which previously belonged to any of the United Nations, these vessels are to be returned forthwith as may be directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. This will be without prejudice to negotiations between the Governments which may subsequently be made in connection with replacing losses of ships of the United Nations caused by Italian action.
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2. Method of Operation.

The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will place at the disposal of the Italian Ministry of Marine a high ranking Naval officer with the appropriate staff who will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for all matters in connection with the operation of the Italian fleet, and be the medium through which dealings will be carried out in connection with the Italian mercantile marine. The Flag Officer acting for these duties (Flag Officer, liaison) will keep the Italian Ministry of Marine informed of all requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and will act in close cooperation as regard issue of all orders to the Italian fleet.

3. Proposed disposition of the Italian Fleet.

- a. Battleships will be placed on a care and maintenance basis in ports to be designated and will have such measures of disarmament applied as may be directed. These measures of disarmament will be such that the ships can be brought into operation again if it so seems desirable. Each ship will have on board a proportion of Italian Naval personnel to keep the ships in proper condition and the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will have the right of inspection at any time.

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APPENDIX "A" (Cont'd)

b. Cruisers. Such cruisers as can be of immediate assistance will be kept in commission. At present it is visualized that 1 Squadron of 4 cruisers will suffice and the remainder will be kept in care and maintenance as for the battleships but at a rather greater degree of readiness to be brought into service if required.

c. Destroyers and Torpedo Boats. It is proposed to keep these in commission and to use them on escort and similar duties as may be required. It is proposed that they should be divided into escort groups working as units and that they should be based on Italian ports.

d. Small craft. MAS, minesweepers, auxiliaries and similar small craft will be employed to the full, detailed arrangements being made by the Flag Officer (Liaison) by the Italian Ministry of Marine for their best employment.

e. Submarines. In the first instance submarines will be immobilized in ports to be designated and at a later date these may be brought into service as may be required to assist the Allied effort.

4. Status of Italian Navy.

Under the modification of the armistice terms, all the Italian ships will continue to fly their flag. A large proportion of the Italian Navy will thus remain in active commission, operating their own ships and fighting alongside the forces of the United Nations against the axis powers.

5. The requisite Liaison Officers will be supplied to facilitate the working of the Italian ships in cooperation with Allied Forces. A small Italian Liaison Mission will be attached to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to deal with matters affecting the Italian fleet.

6. Mercantile Marine.

It is the intention that the Italian mercantile marine should operate under the same conditions as the merchant ships of the Allied Nations. That is to say, all mercantile shipping of the United Nations is forged into a pool which is employed as may be considered necessary for the benefit of all the United Nations. In this will naturally be included the requirements for the supply and maintenance of ITALY. The system will be analogous to that used in North AFRICA, where the North AFRICA shipping board controls all United States, British and French shipping under certain agreements which will have to be arranged in detail, insofar as Italian ships are concerned. While it may be expected that a proportion of Italian ships will be working within

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APPENDIX "B"

I.I.F. ORDER OF BATTLE

S U P P L E M E N T

4th SQUADRON, AREA

Status of serviceability aircraft

FIGHTERS

4th STORMO

21st GRUPO

371 Squadron

FIGHTER BOMBERS

5th STORMO

BOMBERS

98 GRUPO

SEMPLES

141 Squadron

9 Squadron

(Air Sec. Rescue)

139 Squadron

149 Squadron

183 Squadron

288 Squadron

Reconnaissance

103 Squadron

Brindisi

Lecce

Leverano

Total

Manduria

Total

Manduria

Total

Brindisi

Brindisi

Taranto

Taranto

Taranto

Taranto

Total

Manduria

Total

Mc. 205 16

Mc. 202 2

Mc. 202 4

Re. 2001 2

Mc. 200 1

25

Re. 2002 8

8

C.Z. 1007 1

1

C.Z. 501 6

C.Z. 506 1

C.Z. 506 2

C.Z. 501 3

C.Z. 506 1

C.Z. 501 3

C.Z. 506 2

C.Z. 501 2

C.Z. 506 2

C.Z. 501 2

24

Ca. 314 5

5

4583

FIGHTER BOMBERS

5th STORMO

BOMBERS

98 GRUPO

SEAPLANES141 Squadron
9 Squadron
(Air Sea Rescue)

139 Squadron

149 Squadron

183 Squadron

288 Squadron

Reconnaissance

103 Squadron

Various AircraftMECCA, MANDURIA, BRINDISI, S. RANCRAZIO
LIVORNO, GIOTTAGLIASECRET

- 1 -

SECRET
(Control British MOST SECRET)Manduria
Total

Re. 2002

Manduria
Total

C.Z. 1007

Brindisi
BrindisiC.Z. 501
C.Z. 506

Taranto

C.Z. 506
C.Z. 501
C.Z. 506

Taranto

C.Z. 501
C.Z. 506

Taranto

C.Z. 501
C.Z. 506

Taranto

C.Z. 501
C.Z. 506

Total

C.Z. 501

Manduria
Total

Ca. 314

1 Ca. 133. 1 Ca. 310
1 Ca. 314. 1 Ca. 313
2 S. 73 2 S. 79
1 S. 81 11 S. 82
1 G. 12 1 G. 18
22

4582

25

SECRET

English MOST SECRET

SECRET

Private Transport Aircraft

LECCE	S. 75	2
	S. 79	4
	S. 81	1
	S. 83	1
Total		<u>8</u>

Light Aircraft

Brindisi	Saiman 202	4
	Cicogna	1
	F.N. 305	1
Total		<u>6</u>

AERONAUTICA DELLA SARDEGNA

Status of serviceability aircraft

FIGHTERS

155 Gruppo

Total	Mc. 205	7
	Mc. 202	4
		<u>11</u>

Torpedo Bombers

(Decimomannu - Milis)

Long Range Bombers

Decimomannu

Seaplanes

84 Gruppo (Elmas)

S. 79	6
-------	---

C.Z. 1007	14
-----------	----

C.S. 506	2
Rs.	14
Total	<u>8</u>

NOTE

- (1) The 13 Gruppo (Fighters) have no serviceable aircraft because all were destroyed at Venafiorita to stop them falling into the hands of the Germans.
- (2) Aircraft of the 121 Fighter Bomber Gruppo were rendered unserviceable in order to stop them falling into the German hands.

S U P P L E M E N T

Status of serviceability aircraft

FIGHTERS

155 Gruppo

Mc. 205	7
Mc. 202	4
Total	<u>11</u>

Torpedo Bombers

(Decimomannu - Milis)

S. 79 6Long Range Bombers

Decimomannu

C.Z. 1007 14Seaplanes

84 Gruppo (Elmas)

C.S. 506	2
Es. 14	6
Total	<u>8</u>

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SUMMARYSICILIA

Status of serviceability aircraft

Torpedo Bombers

Castelvetroano

S. 79 13Fighters

Sclacca & Trapani

M.C. 200 22Various

Castelvetroano

S. 82	5
S. 81	2
Ca. 133	1

S E C R E TSECRET
British AOSF SECRET

/jjf

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

2A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

23 October 1943

165 3/3.3

TO: J.A.C.S.
(For Attention Captain Gillett)

Herewith are extracts from memoranda issued by G-3, A.F.H.Q. which you may find of some interest.

W. de Knoop, capt.

W. DE KNOOP
Captain
Military Government Section

Incls.

CR

24/001/2341 4562

2B

E X T R A C T

L of C Troops:

11. There will be increasing requirements of troops in SICILY and ITALY for guard duties, anti-sabotage protection and internal security duties as we advance Northwards. In addition certain precautions will be necessary in SARDINIA.
12. It is considered that these duties might be carried out by:
 - a. In SARDINIA -- one Italian Field Division and the two Sardinian Coastal Divisions
 - b. In SICILY -- one Italian Field Division and about three Allied Bns.
 - c. In ITALY south of NAPLES - FOGGIA -- three divisions might be necessary, and a further three might be required for the area between this line and the PISA - RIMINI line. These six divisions could be either Field or Coastal Divisions, preferably the former.

Thus a total of ten divisions might be necessary for this commitment.

Service Units.

15. As the enemy retires it is envisaged that he will destroy ports, roads, railways and signal communication to the maximum possible extent. This will impose a great strain on our engineer and signal units, and it will therefore be essential that the maximum use be made of skilled and unskilled Italian labor. In addition there is a constant need for vehicle repairs and mechanical repairs of all sorts.

16. It is therefore considered that all specialist units of the Italian armed forces should be retained for these purposes, to work under the Arms and Services of the Allies concerned.

DEMOBILIZATION.

20. Consideration should be given to the early demobilization of non-specialist personnel who would be of use in agriculture or mines. The major agricultural areas likely to be in our hands this winter are APULIA, CAMPANIA, CALABRIA and also possibly LUCANIA, ABRUZZI and UMBRIA, and there are important coal and ore mines in SARDINIA.

Allied Bns.

- c. In ITALY south of NAPLES - FOGGIA -- three divisions might be necessary, and a further three might be required for the area between this line and the PISA - RIMINI line. These six divisions could be either Field or Coastal Divisions, preferably the former.

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21. Further demobilization should not take place unless it is established that the civil labor situation is such that employment can be found for demobilized troops, and that all military labor requirements and reinforcements can be met.

USE OF PRISONERS OF WAR

23. Prisoners of War should be sorted, and engineer, transportation, and signals specialists, aircraft technicians and agricultural and mining types should be formed into units to assist in carrying out the tasks outlined above, in this Theater. This process is already begun.

SECRET

-1-

*8 copies
in special file
after*

SECRET

It is considered that Italian officers could be found for such units, and in addition certain outstanding officers and NCOs might be released to stiffen the field forces.

TRANSFERENCE OF ITALIAN FORCES FROM SARDINIA

24. On the assumption that all Italian forces now in CORSICA will eventually be evacuated to SARDINIA there will ultimately be 188,000 men there. Of these only one Field Division, two Coastal Divisions plus certain AA and labor units are likely to be required, totaling some 40-50,000 men.
25. It is therefore desirable that, when shipping allows, some 140,000 personnel together with a minimum amount of heavy equipment should be transferred to the mainland. It should be possible to carry out this move with Italian warships. Until then it will be necessary to increase the imports of food into SARDINIA to cover the requirements of this very considerable force.

CONCLUSIONS.

29. a. Specialists. First priority should be given to the utilization of Italian specialist units for engineer, transportation and signal work. In addition specialist P of W in these categories should be drafted into units, or used as dilution personnel - a process that has already been started.
- b. Combatant Force. At most one Field Division should be reserved for use in active operations, together with any Alpine troops that later become available.
- c. L of C Troops. Ten divisions might be required for L of C security duties - three for SARDINIA, one for SICILY and six for ITALY south of PISA --RIMINI. Labor shortage may, however, make it essential to reduce this number.
- d. AA & CD. AA and CD units should be retained. Possibly the defenses of certain targets may be made an Italian responsibility.
- e. I.A.F. The I.A.F. should be used for the support of Italian forces, or of patriot forces in the BALKANS, for courier services, and for air-sea rescue. I.A.F. specialists will be required for servicing Italian and Allied aircraft.
- f. Command. Italian units should be under command of the local Allied HQ and under Italian control for administration only. On occasion exceptions may have to be made, however, where

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- f. Command. Italian units should be under command of the local Allied HQ and under Italian control for administration only. On occasion exceptions may have to be made, however, where no suitable Allied HQ exists.
- g. Labor. Units and P of W not required for the above duties should be used for labor duties. An important aspect of this is to insure that the necessary labor for agriculture and mining is made available. Some demobilization for this purpose may be necessary, but further demobilization is undesirable at present and should only ultimately be carried out when the military labor requirements have been met.
- h. Equipment. No further Italian equipment should be issued to SOE. The stocks that now exist should cover the requirements of existing units for some time, but if large numbers of P of W are reformed into units their clothing and equipment will have to be found from Allied sources.

S E C R E T

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1. Movement from SARDINIA. There will be some 140,000 personnel with light equipment to be moved out of SARDINIA when shipping is available.

45.0

EXTRACT

/33f

2c

28 September 1943.

I. Situation of the Italian Forces as of 25 SeptemberA. Forces Under the Control of the National Government

- In Corsica: 2 mobile divisions - 2 coastal divisions
(Cremona, Friuli)
- In Sardinia: 4 mobile divisions - 3½ coastal divisions (Sabaunda,
Calabria, Bari and Nembo)
- Italian Peninsular: 3 mobile divisions - 5½ coastal divisions.
(Legnano, Picene, Mantova)
- In Aegean: 1 mobile division (Cuneo)

Total 10 Mobile Divisions - 11 Coastal Divisions

The mobile divisions have the known deficiencies in arms and in means of transportation and all have been tried (?) in recent battles. Furthermore, parts of 4 divisions coming from the Balkans are in process of being reorganized in the Puglie (on the Italian mainland).

B. Forces in German-held Territory Which Would Be at Present Against the Germans:

In Piedmont-incomplete sections of troops of 4th Army.
In Venezia Giulia and Trentino - incomplete sections of troops of the 8th and 2nd Armies.

In Dalmazia, Montenegro and Albania - in process of being recuperated 13,000 men from the Spalato Zone (Dalmazia) and 12,000 men from the Santo Quaranta Zone (Albania). The recovery is very laborious and entails losses because of the lack of aerial protection: embarkation at Santi Quaranta with the fall of Corfu is no longer possible: it will be tried at Palermo Port (North of Santi Quaranta).

II. Possibilities of Italian Cooperation:

According to the actual situation, possibilities for cooperation are as follows:

(A) Population:

Sentiment is almost unanimously anti-German; could create obstacles, as it has done and is doing, by its hostile attitude and acts of sabotage against the German occupation; all this would culminate in open hostilities as the liberating forces approach the various Italian regions. However, it is necessary to hasten matters, as much as possible.

4558

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(A) Population:

Sentiment is almost unanimously anti-German; could create obstacles, as it has done and is doing, by its hostile attitude and acts of sabotage against the German occupation; all this would culminate in open hostilities as the liberating forces approach the various Italian regions. However, it is necessary to hasten matters, as much as possible, because the return of Mussolini and his entourage to the Political scene could paralyze to some extent, even those of the population who are well intentioned regarding our side as the leaders of the late political party become organized.

(B) Army:

There is in the process of organization in the Puglie a motorized detachment composed of:-

- 1 Regiment Infantry
- 3 Artillery groups
- Engineers
- Services

This detachment will depend on an English division and will take part in the future operations of the 8th Army. The remaining units existent in Puglia and Calabria, shall be for the present engaged as guards for the rear lines of communications. However, the Italian command desires as soon as possible a greater participation in the active operations with the 3 divisions already in the Puglie

80000 men
Some other units

and in Calabria and with 4 other divisions (3 Infantry plus 1 Paratroops) obtainable in Sardinia - Corsica. Moreover, with a modest Anglo-American contribution of automotive equipment,, it should not be difficult to set up in short order 3 additional divisions; we could thus have ready an army of roughly 10 divisions.

It should be pointed out at this time that our units in Sardinia and Corsica have operated and will operate in cooperation with the Anglo-Americans assuring consequently possession of those islands. The same can be said of the "Cuneo" division in EGEO which, on orders of the British Commander, maintains in its possession important islands in the archipelago.

XII. DIVERS REPLENISHMENTS: For the needs of the Italian "F.F.A.A." and the populace who are cut off from their previous sources of supply from the North, it is necessary that the Allies supply Italy with coal, oil, gasoline, wheat, sugarcane meat, soap, salt, etc. A list of the necessary requirements for October has already been handed to the Anglo-American Mission.

/JJF

IA

6A

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

13 October 1943.

MCS 383.6

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian
Prisoners of War for Labour

TO : AMG HQ., C.M.F., A.M.C. (P)
H.Q., A.C.

Attached copy of this H.Q. letter MCS 383.6 (Italian P/W)-C,
dated 10 Oct. 1943, is forwarded for information.

A. T. HAYTELL
Colonel
Deputy Chief
Military Government Section

1 Incl.
as above

CR/

14/oct/
B 2126

U. S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET 556

SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

LRC:sl

1B

HEADQUARTERS
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 534

.....P.....
: **SECRET** :
:Auth: CG, NATOUSA :
:Initials: *CCSA* :
: 10 October 1943 :
:.....:

AG 383.6 (Italian P/W) -0

10 October 1943

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Prisoners of War for Labor

TO : Commanding Generals:
SOS NATOUSA, APO 750
Twelfth Air Force, APO 528
Mediterranean Base Section, APO 600
Atlantic Base Section, APO 759
Eastern Base Section, APO 763
Island Base Section, APO 550

1. Italian prisoners of war who have been screened in accordance with letter this headquarters, AG 383.6 (Italian P/W) E-0, subject: "Security Screening of Italian POW Preparatory to Organization into Labor Units", dated 23 September 1943, and who have been determined to be secure, will be given an opportunity to be released from close confinement and granted limited freedom of movement in accordance with the conditions set forth below and in the attached form.

2. These prisoners of war will be organized into labor and service units patterned along the lines of applicable United States Army T/O and E, in accordance with needs for such units. All of these units will be staffed by Italian officers and non-commissioned officer prisoner personnel, who will be responsible for maintenance of internal organization, administration, and discipline.

3. The Commanding General, SOS NATOUSA, will evaluate the needs of the Twelfth Air Force and the various base sections for such labor, and will recommend the organization and assignment of units within the theater as needed.

4. Supervisory personnel will be utilized as required and will be selected from American commissioned officers and enlisted men presently on duty with prisoner of war camps or other installations under base section control.

5. Guard personnel will be reduced at the earliest practicable moment to the minimum consistent with security.

4555

6. Food, shelter, and pay will be the same as that now accorded other prisoners of war. Amounts to be paid and mode of payment will be as provided in War Department Circular Number 10, cs. Canteen facilities will be made available to personnel engaged upon this labor.

7. Appropriate clothing and equipment for the type of duty contemplated

1558

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

Ltr Hq Natouss, 10 Oct 43, AG 383.6 (Italian P/W) -0

will be supplied in accordance with instructions to be issued by the Commanding General, SOS NATOUSS.

8. General requirements of the Geneva Convention with reference to hours and conditions of labor will be observed. However, should the particular situation require it, staggering of shifts to permit night employment and employment on Sundays will be permitted. The criterion should be the schedule of duty of similar units of the United States Army employed on this or similar projects.

9. Limited daily pass privileges to nearby communities will be permitted, in the discretion of the base section or other commander directly concerned, after consultation with local French authorities. The general practice of base sections concerned will be observed in the exercise of this privilege. Not more than 10% of the strength of the particular unit will be granted this privilege at any one time.

10. Members of these units will be subject to military law and will have the punitive Articles of War read to them in the Italian language.

11. A declaration (Appendix "A") will be executed by each Italian prisoner to be employed. An identification card (Appendix "B") will be made for each member of these units, setting forth his name, grade, date of birth, color of eyes and hair, height and weight. Fingerprints of one hand will be included. Supplies of these forms will be prepared and distributed by the Provost Marshal General. The identification card will be required to be upon the person of the member at all times. Local French authorities will be informed of the means of identification put into effect and of all local rules and regulations governing the extent of the freedom of movement granted such individuals.

12. Administrative instructions now applicable to prisoners of war will remain in force with reference to Italian prisoners of war in these units. Censorship of mail and all articles intended for prisoners, received from outside sources, will continue. Additional rules and regulations relative to the administration of such companies will be issued by this headquarters when necessary.

13. No publicity of any kind will be given this program.

2 Incls:

By command of General EISENHOWER:

Appendix "A"
Appendix "B"

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - TAG, WD
- 1 - DTC
- 2 - G-1 (B)
- 1 - G-1 (A)
- 1 - PMG
- 6 - CG SOS Natouss
- 4 - CG Twelfth AF
- 12 - ea. base section


H. W. ROBERTS
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

- 2 -

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SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

785015

SECRET
Equale British MOST SECRET

PW No. _____ Rank _____ Name _____

Christian Names 4554

DECLARATION OF ITALIAN PRISONER OF WAR

APPENDIX "A"
NOT TO APPEAR ON
REPRODUCED FORM

ENGLISH

As a result of the Armistice concluded between the Allied Forces and the Kingdom of ITALY, and the public pronouncements of the Italian Government to cooperate in every way with the Allied Forces to drive the Germans out of ITALY, I DECLARE that I am willing to work as directed on behalf of the Allied Forces in North Africa and to assist them to the best of my ability in the war against GERMANY.

I UNDERTAKE not to abuse any liberty or privileges which may be granted to me as a result of making this Declaration.

I UNDERTAKE to obey any orders or regulations issued by the Allied Military Authorities, and I understand that if I do not do so my liberty and privileges may be taken away.

ITALIAN

Come risultato dell' Armistizio concluso fra le Forze Alleate e il Regno D'ITALIA, e le proclamazioni pubbliche del Governo Italiano de cooperare in ogni maniera con le Forze Alleate per spingere fuori dall' ITALIA i tedeschi, DICHIARO che desidero lavorare come mi si può dirigere per conto delle Forze Alleate nell' Africa settentrionale, e aiutarlo al mio meglio nella guerra contro la GERMANIA.

M'impegno di non abusare qualsiasi libertà o privilegio che mi verrà dato per ragione di aver fatto questa dichiarazione.

M'impegno di osservare tutti gli ordini o regolamenti emessi dalle Autorità Militari Alleate, e capisco che nel caso mi non osservarli, si potrà ritirarmi la mia libertà o i miei privilegi.

FRENCH

Comme suite à l'Armistice conclu entre les Forces Alliées et le Royaume d'ITALIE, et la déclaration du Gouvernement Italien qu'ils aideront les Forces Alliées à chasser les Allemands d'Italy, JE DECLARE que je consens à travailler selon les directives qui me seront données par les Forces Alliées en Afrique du Nord et de les aider au mieux de mes possibilités dans la guerre contre L'ALLEMAGNE.

Je m'engage à ne pas abuser d'aucune des libertés ou privilèges qui peuvent m'être accordés comme conséquence de ma présente déclaration.

Je m'engage à obéir à tous ordres ou règlements publiés par les Autorités Militaires Alliées, et je suis conscient qu'au cas où je n'agisais pas ainsi, mes libertés et privilèges pourraient m'être retirés.

Signature of PW _____

Date _____

ACCEPTED:

Signature of Commandant _____

PW Camp No. _____

NOTE: To be completed and retained on file in camp of the Prisoner of War.

SECRET

Equale British MOST SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

NOT TO APPEAR ON
REPRODUCED FORM

DESCRIPTION OF ITALIAN PRISONER OF WAR

NAME OF PRISONER (surname first)
(BLOCK LETTERS)

ISN

AGE

HEIGHT

WEIGHT

COLOUR OF EYES

COLOUR OF HAIR

DISTINGUISHING MARKS

KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH

KNOWLEDGE OF FRENCH

ISSUING OFFICER

DATE

COMMANDANT

PW CAMP No.

IMPRINT OF RIGHT THUMB
overstamped by issuing
office

NOTE: To be on card form similar to WD AGO Form No. 65-4, Officer Identification Card,
with measurements the same.

SECRET
Eguals British MOST SECRET

SECRET

Eguals British MOST SECRET

