

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

ACC

10000/100/400

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

000/100/400

GENERAL ORGANIZATION
JULY - NOV. 1943

17 pp.

5 Oct. AC of S to Sec 1A.

6 Oct - Rec'd by phone from Lt Col Parlman, who was author of 6B, "practically all of 6B can be disregarded."

6B refers only to a means of setting up an administrative unit which will include all off-st men in MG and later AC.

advised
5012

CIRC See 7 to 7J (inc)
Req: 4 of RM 6 PM
" 5 of 6 PM
" 8 of 6 PM
" 9 of 6 PM

disturbance stopped by Col Parlman.
different arrangements being made.

785015

6B

5 October 1943

OBJECTIVES

1. Divide AMG into two parts, main AMG to continue until Allied Commission can be set up in Rome; small AMG to be made into a company with three parts, one to stay with 15th Army Group, and one each with Fifth and Eighth Armies.
2. Do not use term "Allied Commission" at this time.
3. Abolish all activated units except Hq. and Hq. Company, AMGOT Fifteenth Army Group (U. S. Contingent). Convert the latter into a Regiment.
4. Take the Regiment out from under control of Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Group, and put it under the Military Governor, eliminating the Headquarters Command from chain of command.
5. Take the areas of Sicily, Calabria, Lucania, and the province of Foggia from the jurisdiction of C.C. Fifteenth Army Group and place them under the Military Governor (later the Deputy President)

5011

785015

JW

5 October 1943

STEPS TO BE TAKEN

1. Revoke AG 322/164A-0, 30 September 1943
To Commanding General, 15th Army Group.

2. Revoke AG 322/164A-0, 30 September 1943
To C.G., Hq. Command, Allied Force.

5010

3. Letter order to C.G., 15th Army Group-
a. Redesignating Hq. and Hq. Co. AMGOT, 15th Army Group,
U. S. contingent as 2675th Regiment, AMGOT (U. S. cont-
ingent) with full allotment of grades and ratings.

b. Providing for sub-allotment as now.

c. Providing for redesignation by C.O. of regiment of
(1) 2672nd Hq. Co., S.M.G. (Prov.)
(2) School for Military Government, Allied Force (Prov.).

d. Authority to C.O. of Regiment to publish travel orders,
as approved by the Military Governor.
(Note: at a later date the deputy President of the
Commission)

e. Internal administration and operational control are
authorized as directed by the Commanding Officer 2675th
Regiment, subject to the approval of the Military Governor.

f. Transferring the Regiment from 15th Army Group command
to?

Separate
order re-
quired?

(Gen. Sawbridge to be consulted as to whether necessary
that the regiment hook on to any existing unit. Assign-
ment to Hq. Command is not desired. Direct communication
etc., is necessary.)

4. Letter order to C.O. Hq. Command, directing
(a. Dissolution of 2672nd Hq. Co. S.M.G. (Prov.)?
(b. Dissolution of 2675th Hq. Co. S.M.G. (Prov.)?

(c. Dissolution School for Military Govt., Allied Force.
(d. Transferring personnel and equipment to 2675th Regiment,
AMGOT (U. S. Contingent).

e. Providing for necessary reports, rosters, entries in
morning reports, etc.
By General Holmes (for AGO issuance)

5. Order removing Sicily, Calabria, Lucania and province of
Foggia from jurisdiction of 15th Army Group, and placing
these areas under the Military Government, i.e. Eisenhower,
(big AMGOT)

6. Designation of a Chief Civil Affairs Officer for big AMGOT.
(i.e., Gen. McSherry)

7. AFHQ order attaching Company X (little AMGOT) to 15th Army
Group. (Palermo to prepare T/O and names) (Designation of
Gen. Rennell as C.C.A.O. by Alexander?)

8. AGO order transferring by name Sardinia, AMGOT, Tizi, Region IV contingents into regiment.

By General McSherry as C. O. Regiment → *see Par 6 and 3 d*

9. Order attaching Region III people to little AMGOT.
10. General McSherry to compile TO/WES for AMGOT Hq. and Hqrs. Company - Region I and Region II. *+ little AMGOT.*

For C. O. Regiment

5009

11. Form and then detach Co. X as "little AMC" assigning it to command of Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Group.
12. Organize a Headquarters Company.
13. Reconstitute School for Military Government.
14. Incorporate all personnel in the Regiment.

5A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

5 October 1943. /thh

5008

SUBJECT: Allied Commission.

TO : J.A.C.S.

FROM : J.A.C.S.

1. We are to draft out establishments and directives for:-

Military Section - Headquarters and sub-commissions for P/W, war material factories, war material disposal.

Political Section as a whole, leaving the exact number of political officers (civilians) blank, but working on about twelve such political officers.

2. We are going into their functions further, in conjunction with branches of A.F.H.Q. and will let you know in due course.

E. Gueterbock

E. GUETERBOCK,
Brigadier,
Mil. Gov. Sec.

AC
1120

gpa

785015

MGS ALG V MGS TI2
5 OCTOBER 1943
MESSAGE NO 5

CR

104025/939
5600

4A

TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MAXWELL AND JACKLING ETA YOURS ABOUT 1515 HOURS 5 OCTOBER.
GRATEFUL IF SHORT CONFERENCE CAN BE ARRANGED COMPLETE ANG ORGANISATION
ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANG PLANNING AND MOUNTING.

A T MAXWELL COLONEL

END KKKK
RECD

SECRET **EQUALS** **BRITISH** **MOST** **SECRET**
AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

3B
BIGOT

BIGOT

TO: FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP

TO: FILPOT

FOR AMG

PRIORITY

NO: 6896

SIGNED: EISENHOWER

CITE FMGS

5005

For your information paraphrase of our reference number 3144 is sent in connection with planned future operations our plans regarding Military Government are: We are organizing a unit from personnel now in SICILY to go with the BAYTOWN operation and as region two is captured take control. From personnel in the theater and that coming from WASHINGTON and LONDON we are organizing a second team to handle region three in connection with operation AVALANCHE. Since these operations will be under command of 15 ARMY GROUP, Allied Military Government for regions three and two respectively will be under control of present AMGOT organization.

As quickly as conditions permit, SICILY will be organized into region 1 and AMGOT Headquarters will move to mainland, probably near NAPLES. Therefore authority is requested from Combined Chiefs of Staff to extend jurisdiction of AMGOT to include any ITALIAN territory captured. Military Governor of all territory taken to be Commanding General, 15 ARMY GROUP. Authority now requested would not include supervision of National Government in ROME by present AMGOT organization, as it is presumed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will issue a directive in this respect at the appropriate time. Notification should be made of any change in existing general directive covering political, economic and financial matters. End paraphrase.

This information is background for message of 27 August informing you of extension of existing HUSKY general directive for time being.

MC OUT 11172)

MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION FILES
SUBJECT
FILE NO. 11172-371-4

BIGOT

SECRET **EQUALS** **BRITISH** **MOST** **SECRET**

COPY No. 2

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

785015

Ref. No. 6896 27 Aug. 43 Continued Page 2

ORIGINATOR: MIL GOV SEC

INFORMATION: SCS
**

AG RECORDS

MC OUT 11172

27 Aug. 43

2137D

Ref. No. 6896 vd

785015

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SEC

SECRETWAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTERBrig. Gen. H. J. VES.
Colonel MAXWELL
Major JACKMAN**OUTGOING MESSAGE**

PRIORITY

TO: (ACTION) AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
USFOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

REF NO: W-5194

REF NO: 2132

SIGNED: EISENHOWER, CITE FMGS NAF 295

The strategic concept contained in NAF 250 of 30th June having been accepted for planning purposes (reference your FAN 165 of 17th July), it is requested that the following appreciation and recommendations concerning military government be likewise accepted for planning purposes:

Para 1. The UNITED STATES and British Governments prescribed 2 objectives for operation HUSKY which would also apply to post HUSKY,

(A) The military objective of eliminating ITALY from the war, i.e., destroying and rendering ineffective the Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever they may be;

(B) The political objective of delivering the Italian people from the Fascist regime which led them into the war and of restoring ITALY as a free nation.

Para 2. My 5973 NAF 250 establishes a post HUSKY plan towards carrying out the military objective by occupying the Italian peninsula up to and including ROME. In the course of this operation we shall be faced by 2 main possibilities. Either we shall have to fight all the way to ROME or at some point there may be an Italian surrender or collapse. No one can tell which of these will take place, but we consider that the first possibility must be plainly envisaged.

Para 3. Our reason for this is that in our appreciation the Fascist party backed by the Germans will do its utmost to keep ITALY in the war. So far as we know the control of the party, supported by the presence of German forces and the Gestapo, has not yet been materially weakened. Therefore, if we achieve our plan for occupation

MC-OUT-6923 19 July 43 1356B Ref No. W-5194/2132 JS

-1-

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

of all ITALY from ROME South, we should be prepared to find that there are still substantial Italian forces supported by Germans to the North, and that the government has moved to a Northern city. In these circumstances the Italian administrative machinery from ROME South will have largely disintegrated.

I, therefore, recommend that as soon as possible plans should be completed here for the preparation of an Allied Military Government for occupied territory up to ROME inclusive and for SARDINIA, and that these plans be developed so as to:

(A) Be capable of expansion from SICILY Northward on a regional basis as our advance proceeds towards ROME;

(B) Allow for supervision over what may remain of the central Italian administrative machine at ROME;

(C) Create a reserve of personnel against the need of advancing beyond ROME.

Para 4. While these provisions should be made for the foregoing contingency, we should nevertheless be prepared for the other possibility, i.e., that at some point the Italian will to resist snaps. In such an event, there are 2 possibilities;

Para A. There will be no Italian military or civilian group willing or able to assume the responsibility for administration under Allied control. Should this occur, we shall have to follow the same plan of establishing AMGOT as would have been the case if an Italian government had continued resistance North of ROME;

Para B. Central administrative authority or government will emerge or can be established which can, if properly handled, bring the important military advantage of reducing to the minimum the number of troops necessary for garrison purposes, thereby releasing the maximum number of fighting units for further combat purposes. The number of trained personnel necessary for military government could likewise be reduced.

I, therefore, recommend that I should be free in the light of developments in the situation to judge whether important military advantages could be gained by dealing with military or civilian groups or with members of the Royal Family, it being understood that no authority which maintains the character of the Fascist Party or any

785015

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SEC
SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

succession thereto, or which includes outstanding Fascist leaders would be made use of. To meet this contingency, plans for the staffing of a commission of control over an Italian Government must also be worked out here so as to be available in case of need.

Para 5. While in our view military considerations should remain predominant, nevertheless it may prove possible to advance the attainment of the second basic objective of restoring ITALY as a free nation should the course outlined in 4B become practicable. In addition, so long as a military government continues our responsibility for the well being of the Italian population under our control is immediate and direct. From the political point of view I assume that whereas only GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES are involved as long as we employ military government, should it be decided that relations could be established with some form of Italian central authority, the attitude and desires of other United Nations, notably the Soviet Union, may have to be considered.

Para 6. Whatever course of action is determined, our experience in the North African campaign has demonstrated the prime necessity of giving immediate guidance to the press and public in order to prevent unfounded or ignorant criticism which can diminish or even sabotage the achievement of the 2 basic objectives stated in paragraph 1. For this reason, I recommend that these 2 purposes and their possible consequences be explained as soon as possible and kept constantly before the public and that Allied propaganda should be organized to this end at once.

Para 7. Because of the time factor, a separate telegram is being sent requesting personnel to implement these plans in anticipation of your approval.

MC-OUT-6923 19 July 43 1356B Ref No. W-5194/2132 JS

-3-

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

COPY No. 1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

785015

Para 8. Summary.

It is recommended:

(A) That plans should be completed for the preparation of AMGOT up to ROME inclusive, and for SARDINIA as paragraph 3 above;

(B) That the Allied Commander in Chief should be granted latitude within the limits proposed in paragraph 4 to deal with military or civilian groups in ITALY, and that plans for the staffing of a commission of control should be worked out as there indicated;

(C) That adequate propaganda provisions be made as outlined in paragraph 6.

ORIGINATOR: MIL GOVT SEC

AUTHENTICATION: J C HOLMES, BRIG GEN

INFORMATION: SGS

MR. MURPHY

MR. McMILLAN

G-3

**

AG RECORDS

MC-OUT-6923

19 July 43

13560

Ref No. W-5194/2132

js

785015

AFHQ MESSAGE FORM

1A

CALL	CIRCUIT No.	PRIORITY	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
	NR		
SPACES WITHIN HEAVY LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY			
FROM (A)	ORIGINATOR	DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN	
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS FOR ACTION		JULY 190855B	
TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)		MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS GR	
ADWAR - USFOR			
REF No.)	(CLASSIFICATION)	SECRET	
5232/2312			

ONE X REFERENCE PARAGRAPHS ONE FOUR AND ONE SIX DASH TWO OF OUR FIVE NINE SEVEN THREE
 NAF TWO FIVE ZERO AND ONE NAF TWO NINE FIVE INDICATING NEED FOR SOME NINE THREE 250
 ADDITIONAL OFFICER PERSONNEL AFTER ALLOWING FOR THOSE WHICH WILL BE MOVED FORWARD FROM
 ANCOIT SICILY AFTER OPERATION HUSKY CMA ALSO GIVING APPRECIATION AND MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS
 MILITARY GOVERNMENT X PAREN TO ADWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO USFOR FOR BRITISH
 CHIEFS OF STAFF ~~AND TO ADWAR FOR BRITISH GOVERNMENT REINFORCE~~ SIGNED BIRMINGHAM CITE NAGAP
 AND FINCS NAF 296 PAREN X IF PROPOSAL IS APPROVED FOLLOWING ARE PROVISIONAL DETAILS
 OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENT AND ARE LIABLE TO MODIFICATION X PARAGRAPH TWO X CROSS TOTAL IS
 DIVIDED INTO FOLLOWING SUBDIVISIONS AS IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL BE
 ORGANIZED FOR REGIONS IN ORDER THAT THE TERRITORY MAY BE COPE WITH AS ADVANCE IS MADE UP
 THE BOX X THERE WOULD BE EXTENSIONS OF ANCOIT SICILY EIGHTY NUMBER SIX AND NUMBER SEVEN
 WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A NEW OVERALL ORGANIZATION X REGION ONE DASH SICILY TWO ONE ZERO X
 REGION TWO DASH CALABRIA CMA LUCANIA CMA PUGLIE ONE NINE FIVE X REGION THREE DASH
 CAMPANIA ONE THREE EIGHT X REGION FOUR DASH ABRUZZI CMA LADIO TWO ZERO ZERO X REGION FIVE
 COORDINATED WITH G-1

DISTRIBUTION	PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
AG RECORDS	ORIGINATING SECTION: MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION
MIL GOVT SEC (4)	CONTENT AND CLASSIFICATION AUTHENTICATED
MR. MURPHY	NAME TYPED: BRIG. GEN. J. C. HOLMES
G-1 (A) (Gen. Sawbridge)	TEL No. FREEDOM 136
G-1 (B) (Brig. Westrop)	
Mr. MacMillan	

THI OR TOR

Opp.

TIME CLEARED

- 2 -

DASH UATRIA CMA MARCHES ONE THREE FIVE X REGION SIX DASH BARDINIA ONE ZERO ZERO X REGION SEVEN DASH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOUR ONE SEVEN X TOTAL ONE THREE NINE FIVE X FIGURE FOUR ONE SEVEN CMA REGION SEVEN SHOULD ULTIMATELY BE REDUCED BY FOUR TWO OFFICERS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH THREE BELOW X PARAGRAPH THREE X ONE NINE FIVE OFFICER PERSONNEL FROM AMGOT SICILY HAVE BEEN PROVISIONALLY ALLOCATED TO REGION TWO AND FOUR TWO TO AMGOT REGION ONE AND TWO HEADQUARTERS WHO IT IS PROPOSED WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING FOR REGION TWO INCLUDING OPERATIONS BUTTRESS AND COMBAT X NET TOTAL NUMBER OF FRESH PERSONNEL TO BE PROVIDED WILL THEREFORE AMOUNT TO CIN REGION ONE AND TWO NIL X REGION THREE ONE THREE EIGHT X REGION FOUR TWO ZERO ZERO X REGION FIVE ONE THREE FIVE X REGION SIX ONE ZERO ZERO X REGION SEVEN FOUR ONE SEVEN X PARAGRAPH FOUR X FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF NINE EIGHT NINE PERSONNEL INTO RESPECTIVE PLANNING STAFFS AND MAIN BODIES X REGION ONE AND TWO NIL X REGION THREE PLANNING STAFF TWO SIX DASH MAIN BODY ONE ONE TWO X REGION FOUR PLANNING STAFF TWO SIX DASH MAIN BODY ONE SEVEN FOUR X REGION FIVE PLANNING STAFF TWO FOUR DASH MAIN BODY ONE ONE ONE X REGION SIX PLANNING STAFF TWO ZERO DASH MAIN BODY EIGHT ZERO X REGION SEVEN PLANNING STAFF NINE EIGHT DASH MAIN BODY THREE TWO SEVEN X PARAGRAPH FIVE X BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL INTO SENIOR AND JUNIOR RANKS IS CIN REGION ONE AND TWO NIL X REGION THREE SEVEN COLONELS CMA TWO FIVE LIEUTENANT COLONELS CMA ONE ZERO SIX JUNIOR OFFICERS X REGION FOUR EIGHT COLONELS CMA THREE EIGHT LIEUTENANT COLONELS CMA ONE FIVE FOUR JUNIOR OFFICERS X REGION FIVE FIVE COLONELS CMA ONE NINE LIEUTENANT COLONELS CMA ONE ONE ONE JUNIOR OFFICERS X REGION SIX TWO COLONELS CMA ONE ZERO LIEUTENANT COLONELS CMA EIGHT EIGHT JUNIOR OFFICERS X REGION SEVEN FOUR SIX COLONELS CMA SEVEN FIVE LIEUTENANT COLONELS CMA TWO NINE SIX JUNIOR OFFICERS X REGIONAL HEADS WITH SEVERAL MILLION PERSONS UNDER THEIR CONTROL AND PRINCIPAL DIVISIONAL HEADS IN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION SHOULD HAVE RANK OF BRIGADIER GENERAL WHICH SHOULD FACILITATE CHOICE OF FIRST CLASS MEN AND ENSURE ADEQUATE STATUS X FURTHER CCAO AND DCCAO SHOULD HAVE THE RANK MAJOR GENERAL X ALSO PERCENTAGE OF COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS IS

- 3 -

SOMEWHAT HIGHER THAN IN SICILY BY REASON OF THE HIGHER RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION X FOR RANKS OF LIEUTENANT COLONELS AND UPWARDS PROPOSE THAT OVERALL DIVISION SHOULD BE EQUAL X IN ORDER TO MEET DIFFICULTIES OF FINDING SUITABLE MAN POWER IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS WE PROPOSE THAT FOR LOWER RANKS CMA IE CMA MAJORS DOWNWARD CMA DIVISION SHOULD BE ON BASIS SIXTY SIX PERCENT AMERICAN CMA THIRTY FOUR PERCENT BRITISH AS UNDER CLN SENIOR OFFICERS AMERICAN ONE ONE EIGHT CMA BRITISH ONE ONE SEVEN X JUNIOR OFFICERS AMERICAN FOUR EIGHT SEVEN CMA BRITISH TWO SIX EIGHT X GRAND TOTAL AMERICAN SIX TWO ZERO CMA BRITISH THREE SEVEN ZERO X PARAGRAPH SIX X IT IS APPARENT TO ALL CONCERNED HERE THAT HIGHER CALIBRE STAFF THAN HITHERTO AVAILABLE WILL BE REQUIRED AT HEAD OF BOTH TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FIRMS IF A SUCCESSFUL MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SO LARGE AN AREA IS TO BE ORGANIZED X IT IS SUGGESTED THAT GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS MUST BE PREPARED TO SUPPLY SENIOR PERSONNEL AND KEY MEN SHOULD BE ENLISTED FROM INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL POSTS X IT IS FELT THAT THE EXPERIENCE SUCH PERSONNEL WOULD GAIN WOULD BE OF HIGH VALUE EITHER IN THE EVENT OF THEIR TRANSFER FROM AMGOT TO OTHER THEATRES CMA OR OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMISSION OF CONTROL OVER AN ITALIAN AUTHORITY X PARAGRAPH SEVEN X FIRST PRIORITY BREAKDOWN X PAREN CHART FOLLOWS WITH NINE COLUMNS ACROSS NUMBERED ONE TO NINE AND ONE SEVEN LINES FROM TOP TO BOTTOM LETTERED A TO Z PAREN X LINE A COLUMN ONE SERIAL CMA COLUMN TWO DIVISION CMA COLUMN THREE ~~REGIMENTAL COLONELS~~ ¹¹ COLONELS CMA COLUMN FOUR ~~REGIMENTAL MAJORS~~ ¹² COLONELS CMA COLUMN FIVE LIEUTENANT COLONELS CMA COLUMN SIX LIEUTENANT COLONELS CMA COLUMN SEVEN MAJORS AND JUNIOR OFFICERS CMA COLUMN EIGHT MAJORS AND JUNIOR OFFICERS CMA COLUMN NINE ALL OVER TOTAL X LINE B COLUMN ONE B CMA COLUMN TWO BLANK CMA COLUMN THREE US CMA COLUMN FOUR UK CMA COLUMN FIVE US CMA COLUMN SIX UK CMA COLUMN SEVEN US CMA COLUMN EIGHT UK CMA COLUMN NINE BLANK X LINE C COLUMN ONE C CMA COLUMN TWO HEADQUARTERS CMA COLUMN THREE FOUR CMA COLUMN FOUR THREE CMA COLUMN FIVE NIL CMA COLUMN SIX ONE CMA COLUMN SEVEN SEVEN CMA COLUMN EIGHT SIX CMA COLUMN NINE TWO ONE X LINE D COLUMN ONE D CMA COLUMN TWO LEGAL CMA COLUMN THREE ONE CMA COLUMN FOUR TWO CMA COLUMN FIVE TWO CMA COLUMN SIX ONE CMA COLUMN SEVEN TWO CMA COLUMN EIGHT ONE CMA COLUMN NINE NINE X LINE E COLUMN ONE E CMA COLUMN TWO FINANCIAL CMA COLUMN THREE THREE CMA COLUMN FOUR TWO CMA COLUMN FIVE ONE CMA COLUMN SIX TWO CMA

- 4 -

COLUMN SEVEN THREE CMA COLUMN EIGHT FOUR CMA COLUMN NINE ONE FIVE X LINE P FIRST COLUMN
 F CMA SECOND COLUMN HEALTH CMA THIRD COLUMN NIL CMA FOURTH COLUMN TWO CMA FIFTH COLUMN
 TWO CMA SIXTH COLUMN ONE CMA SEVENTH COLUMN FOUR CMA EIGHTH COLUMN ONE CMA NINTH COLUMN
 ONE ZERO X LINE G COLUMN ONE G CMA SECOND COLUMN PUBLIC SAFETY CMA THIRD COLUMN TWO CMA
 FOURTH COLUMN NIL CMA FIFTH COLUMN TWO CMA SIXTH COLUMN ONE CMA SEVENTH COLUMN TWO CMA
 EIGHTH COLUMN TWO CMA NINTH COLUMN NINE X LINE H FIRST COLUMN H CMA SECOND COLUMN AGRICULTU
 CMA THIRD COLUMN ONE CMA FOURTH COLUMN NIL CMA FIFTH COLUMN ONE CMA SIXTH COLUMN ONE CMA
 SEVENTH COLUMN TWO CMA EIGHTH COLUMN ONE CMA NINTH COLUMN SIX X LINE I FIRST COLUMN I CMA
 SECOND COLUMN TRANSPORTATION CMA THIRD COLUMN NIL CMA FOURTH COLUMN TWO CMA FIFTH COLUMN
 ONE CMA SIXTH COLUMN ONE CMA SEVENTH COLUMN TWO CMA EIGHTH COLUMN TWO CMA NINTH COLUMN
 EIGHT X LINE J FIRST COLUMN J CMA SECOND COLUMN ECONOMICS CMA THIRD COLUMN ONE CMA FOURTH
 COLUMN ONE CMA FIFTH COLUMN TWO CMA SIXTH COLUMN ONE CMA SEVENTH COLUMN FOUR CMA EIGHTH
 COLUMN FOUR CMA NINTH COLUMN ONE THREE X LINE K FIRST COLUMN K CMA SECOND COLUMN LABOR CMA
 THIRD COLUMN BLANK CMA FOURTH COLUMN BLANK CMA FIFTH COLUMN ONE CMA SIXTH COLUMN ONE CMA
 SEVENTH COLUMN THREE CMA EIGHTH COLUMN ONE CMA NINTH COLUMN SIX X LINE L FIRST COLUMN L CMA
 SECOND COLUMN EDUCATION CMA THIRD COLUMN ONE CMA FOURTH COLUMN NIL CMA FIFTH COLUMN ONE
 CMA SIXTH COLUMN NIL CMA SEVENTH COLUMN ONE CMA EIGHTH COLUMN NIL CMA NINTH COLUMN THREE
 LINE M FIRST COLUMN M CMA SECOND COLUMN PROPERTY CONTROL CMA THIRD COLUMN BLANK CMA FOURTH
 COLUMN BLANK CMA FIFTH COLUMN ONE CMA SIXTH COLUMN TWO CMA SEVENTH COLUMN TWO CMA EIGHTH
 COLUMN ONE CMA NINTH COLUMN SIX X LINE N FIRST COLUMN N CMA SECOND COLUMN INFORMATION CMA
 THIRD COLUMN ONE CMA FOURTH COLUMN NIL CMA FIFTH COLUMN ONE CMA SIXTH COLUMN NIL CMA
 SEVENTH COLUMN TWO CMA EIGHTH COLUMN THREE CMA NINTH COLUMN SEVEN X LINE O FIRST COLUMN O
 CMA SECOND COLUMN MILITARY ADMINISTRATORS CMA THIRD COLUMN ONE CMA FOURTH COLUMN TWO CMA
 FIFTH COLUMN SIX CMA SIXTH COLUMN SEVEN CMA SEVENTH COLUMN ONE FIVE CMA EIGHTH COLUMN
 SEVEN CMA NINTH COLUMN THREE EIGHT X LINE P FIRST COLUMN P CMA SECOND COLUMN CAPO CMA
 THIRD COLUMN BLANK CMA FOURTH COLUMN BLANK CMA FIFTH COLUMN TWO CMA SIXTH COLUMN ONE CMA
 SEVENTH COLUMN ONE FIVE CMA EIGHTH COLUMN ONE ZERO CMA NINTH COLUMN TWO EIGHT X LINE Q
 FIRST COLUMN Q CMA SECOND COLUMN TOTALS CMA THIRD COLUMN ONE FIVE CMA FOURTH COLUMN ONE

- 5 -

FOUR CMA FIFTH COLUMN TWO THREE CMA SIXTH COLUMN TWO ZERO CMA SEVENTH COLUMN SIX FOUR CMA
 EIGHTH COLUMN FOUR THREE CMA NINTH COLUMN ONE SEVEN NINE X PAREN END OF CHART PAREN X NOTES
 ON QUALIFICATIONS OF ABOVE IN PREPARATION AND WILL BE CABLED SOONEST X PARAGRAPH EIGHT X
 BREAKDOWN OF PLANNING STAFFS AND MAIN BODIES BY PRIORITY RETURNED FROM US AND UK
 IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY NEW OFFICERS TO BE OBTAINED FROM THEATRE X REGIONS ONE AND TWO
 PLANNING STAFF NIL MAIN BODY NIL X REGION THREE PLANNING STAFF TWO SIX FIRST PRIORITY CMA
 MAIN BODY SEVEN FIVE FIRST THREE SEVEN SECOND X REGION FOUR PLANNING STAFF TWO SIX FIRST
 PRIORITY CMA MAIN BODY FIVE NINE SECOND FIVE EIGHT THIRD FIVE SEVEN FOURTH X REGION FIVE
 PLANNING STAFF TWO FOUR SECOND PRIORITY CMA MAIN BODY THREE SEVEN SECOND PRIORITY THREE
 SEVEN THIRD ~~THREE~~ THREE SEVEN FOURTH ~~THREE~~ X REGION SIX PLANNING STAFF TWO ~~TWO~~⁹⁹
 FIRST PRIORITY CMA MAIN BODY FIVE EIGHT SECOND ~~TWO~~ TWO TWO THIRD ~~THREE~~ X REGION
 SEVEN PLANNING STAFF THREE TWO FIRST PRIORITY SIX SIX SECOND CMA MAIN BODY ONE ZERO ONE
 SECOND ~~ONE~~ ONE ZERO EIGHT THIRD ~~ONE~~ ONE ONE ZERO FOURTH ~~ONE~~ X SUMMARY OF
 PRIORITIES CMA FIRST PRIORITY ONE SEVEN NINE X SECOND PRIORITY THREE EIGHT TWO X THIRD
 PRIORITY TWO TWO FIVE X FOURTH PRIORITY TWO ZERO FOUR X DATES PRIORITIES SHOULD ARRIVE IN
 NORTH AFRICA CMA FIRST PRIORITY AUGUST FIFTEENTH X SECOND PRIORITY AUGUST THIRTIETH X
 THIRD PRIORITY SEPTEMBER FIFTEENTH X FOURTH PRIORITY SEPTEMBER THIRTIETH X PARAGRAPH X OF
 FIRST PRIORITY TWENTY MERCENY SHOULD ARRIVE EARLIEST BY AIR OR OTHER AVAILABLE MEANS X
 PARAGRAPH NINE X PLANNING EXPERIENCE FOR AMCOG SICILY EMPHASIZED NEED FOR CLERICAL
 ASSISTANCE FOR PLANNING STAFFS X THERE IS AN ACUTE SHORTAGE OF CLERKS IN THIS THEATER X
 PROPOSE CMA THEREFORE CMA THAT CLERKS BE SENT WITH FIRST PRIORITY ON SCALE OF ONE HUNDRED
 PERCENT OF NUMBER OF OFFICERS CMA IE CMA ONE ZERO TWO AMERICAN AND SEVEN SEVEN BRITISH X
 DRAFTS SHOULD CONTAIN GENEROUS ALLOWANCES OF WARRANT OFFICERS CMA NCOs AND STENOGRAPHERS X
 PROPOSE FURTHER THAT OVERALL DIVISION OF RELISTED MEN SHOULD BE ON PERCENTAGE CMA SIXTY
 SIX PERCENT US AND THIRTY FOUR PERCENT UK X PARAGRAPH X THE OVERALL ALLOTMENT OF RANKS
 AND GRADES GRANTED MATCADA IS INADEQUATE TO PROVIDE FOR THIS PERSONNEL AND ADDITIONAL
 ALLOTMENTS WILL BE NECESSARY FOR ALL THIS PERSONNEL.

