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"I" REPORTS, DCCAO
AUG. 1942 - FEB. 1943; JUNE 1943

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MOST SECRET.

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14 June 43.

7886.

To: C.G.S.

I have written a note which D.C. in C may care to see about possible political developments on the mainland, following on an unexpectedly sudden collapse of resistance in HORRIFIED.

ANGOT,
FORCE 141,
FIELD.
LR/ST.


Major General,
C.C.A.O.
A M G O T.

To SEE 611

D.C.C.A.O. *[Signature]*

*2/17
3/17
[Signature]*

[Signature]

BRIEF.MOOT REPORT.

The possibility of a collapse in Italy following rapidly on the occupation of North Africa must be considered; a sequence of events which I will attempt to describe could produce such a collapse. Information available suggests that it was not the fall of Tunis so much as the reality of the capitulation which created dismay in Rome. Propaganda by Axis stations on the heroic resistance of the Axis troops in the face of overwhelming opposition announced decisions and to fight to the last, on the last inch of ground even in the case of peninsulas aggravated the dismay felt at the sudden collapse of resistance which even Rome apparently thought could be continued for several weeks.

2. Pantelleria was ordered to continue resistance and then suddenly collapsed when the landing took place. Psychologically this was another mistake on the part of the Italian propaganda policy.

3. If after a landing in North Africa the resistance in the whole area were to collapse more quickly than expected by the Italian general public or even government and general staff in Rome, the effect might quite likely prove serious especially if propaganda, not only does not prepare the public for a sudden collapse but, continues to blare on the same lines as hitherto about the heroic resistance of troops with inadequate equipment in the defence of the mother land, etc. etc.

4. But with the occupation of any part of North Africa another element enters into the picture. In proclamation No. 1 we announced the dissolution of the Fascist party. Public declaration by the Allied Governments leaves no doubt that this will be done; the Fascist leaders like Mussolini have reacted to these statements and the recent purge in the government and party looks very much as if there already had been evidence of a growing tepidity towards Fascism among certain prominent Fascists. Secret sources confirm this.

5. If any lawless reaction of Italian public opinion once sets the idea that Italy has been defeated and that the Fascist party will be broken up and the attribution for the leaders of the party will follow, I should expect to see a number of Fascist leaders go into hiding or try to escape to Switzerland and Germany. I should also expect many other Fascists who cannot get away to become more and more lukewarm and to begin to try to prove that they were not really serious Fascists at all.

6. Now if this development were to take place the consequences would be very important. The "Home Front" in Italy has never been maintained by public opinion generally but by the active local Fascists in each locality. The party machine and the OVRA are what make the home front. There is no other local leadership other than from the

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5. If any large section of Italian public opinion once gets the idea that Italy is being defeated and that the Fascist party will be broken up and that retribution for the leaders of the party will follow, I should expect to see a number of Fascist leaders go into hiding or try to escape to Switzerland and Germany. I should also expect many other Fascists who cannot get away to become more and more lukewarm and to begin to try to prove that they weren't really senior Fascists at all.

6. Now if this development were to take place the consequences would be very important. The "Home Front" in Italy has never been maintained by public opinion generally but by the active local Fascists in each locality. The party machine and the OVMA are what make the Home Front. There is no other local leadership other than the Civil Service or from a middle or upper class; trades union leadership as such does not, of course, exist at all.

7. Why the Italian Army disintegrated after Caporetto was that men just went home and there was no "Home Front" machinery or public opinion for some weeks to apprehend them as deserters or send them back to their units as "stragglers". The police and civil service machinery were impotent and pretty incompetent. These have not improved under the Fascist regime except in so far as they also have been kept in order and run by the party or reported on by the OVMA.

8. If therefore the Fascist party machine disintegrates there is nothing in Italy in my opinion, which will stop the rank and file of the army going home after a major and unexpected sudden collapse. The corps of officers will probably remain loyal to the Crown and some units with good leadership will of course remain coherent. But if once the fear of reprisals on the families of deserters is removed

and if local...

and if local Fascist organizations begin to close their eyes to men in the army returning home or overstealing leave from their units, there is a distinct possibility of delinquency. I have dealt with the circumstances in which fascists might find it convenient not to be too zealous.

8. To this must be added the strong survival in Southern Italy generally of the population being mentally "Agin the government." The Mafia, and the *Camorra* to a lesser extent, were more attitudes of mind than true secret societies in recent years. That attitude of mind is and was that whatever a man does, he must never be given away to the police or to constituted authority. The existence of this frame of mind has been the principal obstacle to the acceptance of Fascism in Italy south of Naples. Remove the fear of the Fascist machine and OVRA and a deserter in southern Italy stands a very good chance of not being discovered.

9. If what I have described proves to be the sequence of events, there will be little value in discussing whether or not the Army will back the Crown or can be relied on as an element to back a government or a group of people, with which or *whom* we should be prepared to sign an armistice. With a decaying army and no competent civil service, with a Crown which will not have much more than a corps of officers and no other leaders or class on which it can count for support, and above all with no apparent future in the world, Italy without the Fascist party after twenty years of Mussolini's rule stands a fair chance of falling into chaos in which central government and power can easily break down.

10. I attach a brief picture of the sort of thing that has come in Germany after the manner of 1918. In Italy a foretaste of what may happen can be obtained from the period after Caporetto and in 1930 - 31 when the Central Government was rapidly becoming impotent.

11. There is in Italy even today a strong regional feeling, historically, the inheritance of the many states of which Italy consisted up to 1870. That regionalism in the absence of a sufficiently strong central government can easily lead to producing areas to *refuse* to send food to towns. There is some evidence of this already. Certain towns still wall supplied with or manufacturing a commodity may refuse to release such goods to the nation as a whole. I have seen in 1930 and 1933 towns with more meat than the population could eat refusing to let any go to *Trujin* on account of uncertainty of future supplies.

12. With no efficient brake on regionalism by a Central Government, local politics are likely also to come to the fore. The latent *communist* of the industrial north, the clericalism of Romagna and the *Marches*, the factionalism of Naples are in such circumstances, quite likely to break out in acute form. How far this will disintegrate the central government still further and repeat the picture of Germany in 1918 - 19, it is of course impossible to say. But we have seen how far the regionalism of Spain took that country.

There will be a great value in discussing and discussing the value of the Crown or can be relied on as an element to back a government or a group of people, with which or whom we should be prepared to sign an armistice. With a decaying army and no competent civil service, with a Crown which will not have much more than a corps of officers and no other leaders or class on which it can count for support, and above all with no apparent future in the world, Italy without the Fascist party after twenty years of Mussolini's rule stands a fair chance of falling into chaos in which central government and power can easily break down.

10. I attach a brief picture of the sort of thing that may ensue in Germany after the summer of 1918. In Italy a forecast of what may happen can be obtained from the period after Caporetto and in 1930 - 21 when the Central Government was rapidly becoming impotent.

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13. This is not intended to be a forecast of what will happen, so much as a warning of what may happen. The outbreak of regionalism in acute form may have to be dealt with quickly and empirically if a break up in Italy is to be avoided. A break up which would lead to garrison commitments of Allied troops in order to use Italy or Italian resources and facilities for the prosecution of the war, is an unpleasant prospect. Time and especially rapid decisions at the outset can save, and in Germany could have saved, years of trouble.

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to conduct some sort of orderly retreat and did in fact succeed in getting large numbers disembarked at Aachen and elsewhere, coming then with civilian clothes, a discharger sheet, a railway warrant and some small amount of cash.

In Munich a women's and soldiers' committee was established and organized the distribution of stocks in a somewhat reckless and haphazard way but settled down to a fairly orderly government. Meanwhile they were isolated by a kind of guerrilla siege by bands of officers amongst whom the two Ardenas were the chief leaders. It was, I think, Arden Della Valle who organized the final putsch and personally jumped off the shoulders of the government.

These officer guerrillas later murdered, one half being monarchists (Wittenbach), the other half pro Weimar.

In Berlin there were two Soviets, one in the East End, Rosa Luxemburg's, which attempted a certain amount of administration, the other the Spartacist in the West End under Karl Liebknecht was more of a militant faction. The police, reinforced by some Landwehr and 1 of 2 troops kept some order in the neutral zones but, though carried on by ordinary bureaucratic inertia, the momentum of administration was slowing down and public utilities were collapsing. This of course also applied to other towns in Germany.

In Weimar the constituent was struggling with the obstruction of a lot of well meaning people who could not possibly have had a clear idea of what was going on and most of them would have found it difficult to adjust themselves to the new perspective if they had had.

In the occupied Rhineland, resistance was beginning to take shape organized by people mainly young ex-soldiers inspired by a kind of 'Anarchist' 'exaltation'. This was the movement which was given a colossal impetus by the gallant but unfortunate expeditions, later on.

What was left of the Prussian soldiers belted to their estates and washed their hands of political responsibility, the responsibility which they had held since Frederick the Great. The only other class of people who were fit to take on any administrative responsibility or who had the necessary education and perspective, was the civil service which, I might almost say, reluctantly took over the leadership of the nation and became the backbone of Weimar.

Meanwhile any radically minded way as the Weimar constitution took shape. The Prussian and Bavarian soldiers went back, the first to training and the latter to retraining, while the great middle class of officers who had taken the place of the caste officers as constabulary had wiped most of the latter out, thought that they would give Weimar a twist.

When, its income almost concluded, the constituent assembly moved to Berlin, both Rosa Luxemburg and Liebknecht were still going strong, and the first session in the Reichstag was under siege from the Spartacists in the pierce.

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It was actually Schleicher who organized the execution of ex-soldiers which raised the siege and it was not much later that Lammung and Liebharts, who were losing ground, were kidnapped by some ex-officers and drowned in the Landwehr canal on a dark night.

The subsequent history of all these factions is not really very relevant to this note, which is only to draw attention to the kind of thing that might follow a collapse of a centralized military regime anywhere else.

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FOOD AND COMMODITY
(a) FOOD AND COMMODITY

(1) General

From reports of 1941, food conditions and prices in Sicily vary considerably from section to section. This variation naturally depends to some extent on local crop conditions and the nature of the crop grown in the particular area. Food rationing is general but the amounts obtainable vary from adequate quantities to amounts insufficient to support the usual living standard. The "black market" is widespread and flourishes particularly in agricultural areas. Purchases on the "black market" is universal, and in many communities is necessary to maintain a proper standard of living.

(11) Rations

(Dates range from August 1942 to February 1943)

Bread (normal laborers)	500 gr. daily
" (other men)	400 gr. daily
" (women and children)	300 gr. daily
Olive oil (normal laborers)	400 gr. bi-weekly
" (women and children)	300 gr. "
Macaroni (normal laborers)	4 kg. monthly
" (women and children)	3 kg. "
Meat (bought once weekly)	125 gr. daily
	(200 gr. daily, Catania /us, 1942)

(141) Comparative Prices (1942-43)

	Controlled Price	Black Market
Spaghetti	kg 1.70 Lire	12 Lire
Rice	" 2.10-3.00 "	4-50 "
Olive oil litre	" 6.50-11.00 "	12-22 "
Condensed milk	" 2.00 "	" "
Cheese	" 20-24 "	" "
Whole wh. flour	" 2.50 "	" "
Red wine litre	" 2.50 "	" "
Macaroni (semola)	kg 2.10-2.50 "	" "
" (2. qual)	" 1.80-2.00 "	" "
Soap	" 4-5 "	" "
Meat (poor quality)	" 80-150 "	" "
Meat (once weekly)	" 10 "	" "
Oranges	" 1.20-3.00 "	" "
Apples	" 1.20 "	" "
Pears	" 1.60 "	" "
Pinto	" 2.50 "	" "
Peas	" 1.80 "	" "
Tomatoes	" 1.00 "	" "
Strawberries 100g.	" 5.00 "	" "
Lemons 100g.	" 1.00 "	" "
Tangerines	kg 2.00-5.00 "	" "

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500 gr. daily
400 gr. daily
300 gr. daily
400 gr. bi-weekly
300 gr. "
4 kg. monthly
3 kg. "
125 gr. daily
(200 gr. daily, Catania
Aug, 1942)

Bread (usual laborers)
" (other men)
" (women and children)
Olive oil (usual laborers)
" (women and children)
Macaroni (usual laborers)
" (women and children)
Wheat (bought once weekly)

(411) Comparative Prices (1942-43)

	Controlled Price	Black Market
Spaghetti	kg 1.70	12 lire
Rice	" 2.10-3.00	4-20 "
Olive oil litre	" 6.50-11.-	12-22 "
Cond Milk "	2.00	"
Cheese	kg 20-25	"
Whole Wh. Flour	" 2.50	"
Red Wine litre	2.50	"
Macaroni (seeds)	kg 2.10-2.50	"
" (2. gal)	" 1.80-2.-	"
Soap	" 4-5	"
Shoes (poor quality)	60-150	800 "
Meat (once weekly)	10	"
Oranges	1.20-3.-	"
Apples	1.20	"
Pears	1.60	"
Nuts	2.50	"
Peaches	1.80	"
Tomatoes	1.00	"
Strawberries lbs.	5.00	"
Lemons lb.	.10	"
Tangerines	2.-	"
Pears	2.00-5	"
Grapes	1.60	"

(b) Notes

Good workers used to receive 4-4.50 lire an hour, but can now earn as much as 70 lire a day if they are good bargainers.

(c) Notes

In most sections, private cars have been requisitioned by the Government. Shortages have been evident everywhere. Naptha gas and Diesel fuel, are used extensively. Agricultural tractors are operating on horses, but are greatly reduced in number.

DISSEMINATION: Civilian Supply
Public Health

RESOURCES IN SICILY

(1) Natural

Water is very scarce in the North West of SICILY, with the exception of PALERMO. P.M. states that in MONTAGNA there is no water, and it has to be brought in by water trucks.

A STEEL QUARRY exists at ALICIANO. Forests of pine, oak and cork trees are located near MESSINA, and there are salt marshes along the coast between TRAPANI and MARSALA.

(12) Artificial

A BRIDGE SYSTEM does not exist, except in the larger cities, such as PALERMO, MESSINA, SIRACUSA and CATANIA.

In PALERMO there is a machine shop which is a branch of the FIAT of TURIN. It is used for repairs and assembling purposes.

There is a powder plant at ALTAFRATE, another in GALEMI (FRANCESCO CARPAGNINI) and a third important and large powder plant in GALEMI, about 1 km south of the city.

DISSEMINATION: Civilian Supply
Public Health

605

MESSINA AND POLITICAL

Views of Two Officers

A young Italian officer, who is himself a staunch royalist, believes that nearly all Italians are entirely devoted to the House of Savoy.

While admitting that an Allied invasion of Italy would benefit the country by routing the Fascists and the Germans, P.M. is certain that any such operations would be resisted by the Italians unless the cooperation of the King of Italy (whom the Allies could reach through the Vatican) had previously been enlisted.

P.M. has heard of the anti-Fascist "LIBERA ITALIA" Movement, and has little faith in it. The leader of the Movement, Count SPINELLI, is too old and old-fashioned, and has no following among the Italians of today.

Secondly, states P.M., the Anti-Fascists living out of Italy who have formed this Movement are considered "sold" to the British, i.e. paid by us to serve British purposes and interests. Furthermore, these political exiles have been living abroad "with their hatred of Fascism and in a spirit of

It is used for repairs and assembling purposes.

There is a power plant at ALMADITE, another in SALATI (Frasco GARRISONI) and a third important and large power plant in CASTRALINGUA, about 1 km south of the city.

DESTRUCTION: Civilian supply
Public Health

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ARMED AND POLITICAL

Views of Two Officers

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P.M. himself would prefer to remain in a prison camp rather than be free as a member of the "Free Italians", but if the British were to enter Italy by agreement with the Italian King, he would join us with enthusiasm - along with all other Italian P.M.

Another Italian officer, a major, regrets that our two peoples, who could never hate each other, should be at war, but is certain that the Italians will continue to fight it out by Germany's side.

The Major thinks that if we invade Italy, we shall not do so in any spirit of "liberating the Italians from Fascism", but rather we shall impose hard terms on all the Italian people.

This officer blames Mussolini's errors of the past few years on the death of his brother, Arnaldo Mussolini, who used to exert a moderating and steadying

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influence on the Dues

REMARKS: Public Safety

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MOBILIZATION AND POLITICS

(a) Attitude toward Fascism

P/Ss attitude towards ranges from intense hatred of Mussolini to a generally favourable attitude. Personal loyalty to the King, on the other hand, seems to survive generally.

(b) Discussion Group

One P/S from Catania spoke of a World War veteran friend, ROSARIO PISTINO, who belongs to an unorganised group of middle-aged men who meet informally and talk against the Fascist Government. This group has no connection with organised anti-Fascist organisations.

Anti-war sentiment is said to be strong in CATANIA among soldiers with long service.

(c) Inter-racial Relations

Relations with the Germans are said to be bad, mainly because of the Germans' attitude toward Sicilian women. Frequent brutal rapes; 50 Nazis were reported killed by irate fathers and brothers of CATANIAN girls who had been attacked.

In the summer of 1941, 12 Nazis were killed in a fight at a Sicilian railroad station.

(d) Personalities

Cavaliere NAVARRA, Mayor of GELA "a man of good deeds" 600
Donloccosi, owner of wheatlands in RAMONA (CATANIA)
Duca di CARACI (75 years old), non-fascist philanthropist in CATANIA
GRAVINO, wealthy landowner in CATACINE
Ingoglio CALABRO, Mayor of MESSINA
BOTTARO & MARINO Fascist Club "Giacca Angelo" SYRACUSE
Comandante CHIGLIARO, Mayor of Syracuse
PEZZANO, Vice Prefect of SYRACUSE
BACCHIELLO, Proprietor of Olive Oil Plant in SYRACUSE

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(c) Inter-Axis Relations

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BOTTARO & MANIERO Fascist Club "Himmler Angelo" SYRACUSE
Commandator CUNIGLIARO, Mayor of Syracuse
PEZANO, Vice Federale of SYRACUSE
DA RUDELLA, Proprietor of Olive Oil Plant in SYRACUSE

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To see item 1

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