

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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BIGOT, PROPAGANDA
MAR. - JULY 1943

7-1-92

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

FILMED AS FOUND
IN COLLECTION

Ref.	REF.	DATE	FROM
1A	None	14/3	Memo to Major Gen Lord Russell.
2A	None	16/4	Memorandum
3X	Fortune 93	13/4	From: Tyner
3A	CA/007	15/4	To: Tyner.
4A	Fortune III	16/4	From: Agnew
5A	- None	17/4	Memo to Col Maxwell & Stafford.
6A	7161	26/4	From: BisB.
7A	CC/221	26/4	From: Midland
8A	114C/001	28/4	To: Col KN Black.
9A	None	28/4	Minute to 3001
10A	—	11/5	From: J(P)
11A	AFHQ	11/5	From: Eisenhower
12A	—	11/5/43	Extract from Memo.
13A	Ref 16	17/5	From: B-C Med.
14A	—	4 MAY 43.	5th REVISION OF AMOYS. Sec 16. M.M. of C.A.
15A	—	" "	Memo.
16A.	—	15/5/43	15/5/43 - 15/5/43 - 15/5/43
16A	—	25	25 - 15/5/43 - 15/5/43
17	Fortune 209	24	From: AAWAR
18.	—	25	Memo.
19	—	—	Psychological Warfare Bureau. Ref. to 141 Zone.
20A	—	29 MAY.	Memo. CCAO to CAS.
21	—	29 MAY.	Memo. to CAS.
22	—	3 June	From: AFHQ, (P.W.B.)
23	7921	21	Memo by Lord Russell
		9	Memo. To Col. McKernan INC., AFHQ.

1A	26/4	cc/221	From: Melant
8A	28/4	inc/001	To: TEL NW Black
9A	28/4	None	Mind to 2001
10A	11/5	—	From: J (P)
11A	11/5	AFHQ	From: Eisenhower
12A	11/5/43	—	Extract from Memo.
13A	17/5	Med 16	From: G-C Med
14A	4 May 43	—	5th Revision of ANDRS. Sec 16. M.M. of C.A.
15A	" "	—	Memo.
16A	15/5	—	15/5/43
16B	25	—	25 - 1000000 from AFHQ
17	24	Fortune 209	From AQAR
18	25	—	Memo.
19	—	—	Psychological Warfare Bureau. Ref. to 141 Zone.
20A	29 May	—	Memo. CCAO to CAS.
21A	29/5	—	From: AFHQ (P.W.B.)
22	4	—	Memo by hand Remier
23	9	7951	Memo. To Col. Melant INC., AFHQ.
24	9	Fortune 335	From AQAR.
25	11	7951/CA	To: Col. Martin, INC, 141 F.
26	14	—	From: AFHQ.
27	14	—	Minutes of Meeting Sec. Plan. Staff - P.W.B.
28	18	—	AFHQ. Sec. Plan. Staff - From ANGOT NIAISON.
29	24	—	Report from AFHQ. Remier
30	29 June	None	Psychological Warfare Bureau Directive for Work by 29.
31A	13 APR	Fortune 93	From AQAR.
31	7 Jul.	—	Memo from Maj Moley - Sketches.
32	7	Fortune 431	From: AQAR
33	6	—	PWB Directive.
34	9	—	From: AFHQ (P.W.B.) To CCAO.
35A	26	77528 092	AFHQ (P.W.B.) To P.A.O.
35B	26	8429	From: AFHQ To FANTOX

Sl.	REF.	DATE	FROM OR TO
36	15AG/951/CA	15 July 73	memo to C.O.A.O.
37		13 " 43	From AFHQ
38		14 " 43	memo to Col Enner
39	DO.	10 " 43	From: 2nd Lt. H. G. W. Atkinson C.M.P.
40	W4618 9571.	11 July 43.	From: Cite FMGS and Caribou
41	7951	13 July 43.	To: 2nd Lt. G. W. Atkinson C.M.P.
42.	None	None	From: Cite FMGS Caribou.
43.	1912	18 Jul	From: AFHQ.
44	477/52	19 July	For Freedom.
45.	DO	19 July	DO letter.
43.	-	-	BBC News Service.
44	None	14 July	From: J. W. Atkinson

14 July 1943

TO: Lt. Col. Charles M. Spofford, G.S.C.

SUBJECT: Italian Language Newspaper.

Reference attached memorandum from Lt. Col.
T. Farley Smith on the above subject, I am sending
you herewith the plan as requested.

John W. Atkinson
John W. Atkinson
2nd Lt., CMP

AMGOT REAR
School of Instruction

Noted As B/F
For Sicily.

[Signature]
22/7

To S&K
CSO *[Signature]*
1742

785015

Subject: Italian Language Newspaper.

141F/7951/CA

To: 2nd Lt. John W. Atkinson, CMP,
School of Instruction.

13 July 1943

Reference your memorandum of 10 July on the above subject addressed to Lt. Col. Spofford, will you please send the plan to this office in an envelope addressed to Lt. Col. Spofford when it will be taken forward to the addressee at Advance HQ.

P. Perry Smith
Lt. Col.

AMGOT REAR
AFHQ
BNAF.

1741

8
NO NEWS RECEIVED IN SICILY.

0951
 043

		<u>Times B</u>	<u>Mq/g</u>	<u>Metros.</u>
PACIFIC SERVICE	News	0705 - 0710	11.82	25.38
			9.6	31.25
	News	0815 - 0830	11.82	25.38 +
	Radio Newscast	1000 - 1025	15.31	19.60
AMERICAN SERVICE	Radio Newscast	2100 - 2130	9.6	31.25
	News.	2245 - 2300	9.6	31.25
GENERAL OVERSEAS	News.	1300 - 1315	17.87	16.79 +
	News	1500 - 1510	17.87	16.79 +
	News	1700 - 1715	17.87	16.79 +
	News	2000 - 2010	15.14	19.82 +
			7.065	42.46
	News	2245 - 2300	9.51	31.55 +
			7.065	42.46
	News	2400 - 0006	7.065	42.46
NORTH AMERICAN SERVICE.	News	0445 - 0500	6.11	49.10
	Newscast	0500 - 0530	6.11	49.10
	News	0630 - 0645	6.11	49.10
EUROPEAN SERVICE.	News.	1000 - 1015	7.065	42.46
			9.60	31.25
	Newscast	1500 - 1530	9.69	30.95
			11.82	25.38
			9.60	31.25
	News.	2245 - 2300	9.825	30.53
			7.185	41.25
			7.23	41.40

+ Most reliable services.

AMGOT

To See
 Lt Col (R) J. Smith
 R. 2/7/40

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS
Date 18 Jul 43
7951
FORCE 141

(142)

TO: AGWAR

SIGNED: EISENHOWER, CITE: FHMGS

32.

3A

Your FORTUNE 431 of July 7th would refer you to CA/007 of April 15th to AGWAR FR FORTUNE. Coordination arrangements between INC and AMGOT completed and satisfactory.

ORIGINATOR: MIL GOVT SEC

AUTHENTICATION: BRIG. GEN. J. C. HOLMES

INFORMATION: SGS
BRITISH MINISTER
AMERICAN MINISTER
INC
AMGOT REAR
AG RECORDS

A TRUE COPY

T. B. JACKMAN, MAJOR
MILITARY GOVERNMENT SECTION

To SER. g.k.
0.80.
MAJOR CROFT R.H.

LT COL FARLEY-SMITH TS

R/A 2/7/43 1739

R. 11/7.

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AFHQ
OUTGOING MESSAGE

DATE: _____
NO: 7951
FORCE 141

PRIORITY

TO: AGWAR (FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF)
USFOR (FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF)

REF NO: W 4618
REF NO: 9571

SIGNED: EISENHOWER, (CITE FMGS)

Reference our NAF 252 of 2 July and TROOPERS 97528 OA 2 of July 8 NAF 281.

It was our intention to give the representatives of the press not the text but the substance of certain portions of the directive in order that they might know the policy of the two governments with respect to the ITALIAN people. However, this point will now be covered by the statement to the ITALIAN people to be made by the President and the Prime Minister. No portion of the directive will therefore be given to the press.

ORIGINATOR: MLL GOV SEC

AUTH: BRIG. GEN. J O HOLMES, GSC

INFORMATION: SGS
AMOOT REAR
CAO
MR MURPHY
MR MACMILLAN
**
AG RECORDS

THIS COPY MAY BE SHOWN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ _____ date _____

411410

MC OUT 3881

11 July 43

09280

Ref No. W 4618
9571

1p

1738

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

COPY No.

5

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

AMGOT

July 10, 1943

TO: Lt. Col. Charles M. Spoffard, G.S.C.

FROM: 2nd Lt. John W. Atkinson, C.M.P.

SUBJECT: Italian language newspaper to be published by AMGOT.

1. I suggest that AMGOT consider publishing and distributing in the occupied areas of Italy under its control an Italian language newspaper especially designed to foster an attitude of cooperation and goodwill on the part of the Italian people toward AMGOT'S occupational missions in that country.

2. A plan for such a newspaper which I have already prepared and which is based upon the general directives for military government as set forth in U.S. Army Field Manual 27-5 is according to the following outline:

SECTION I. GENERAL

Purpose

Policy

Military Necessity

Welfare of the Governed

Flexibility

Economy of Effort

Permanence

Advantages of Newspaper Propaganda

Italian Dialects

Four Publics

SECTION II. NEWS

News Events

Political

Economic and Social

Propaganda and Counter Propaganda

SECTION III. FEATURE NEWS

Editorials

Departments

"Dolce Far Niente"

"Lettre al Editore"

"Lo Che Dicono i Prigionieri Italiani"

"Dove Stanno i Perduti"

"Lo Che Fanno i Fanciulli Italiani"

3. If the project interests you the above plan is ready

1737

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Permanence

Advantages of Newspaper Propaganda
Italian Dialects
Four Publics

SECTION II. NEWS

News Events
Political
Economic and Social
Propaganda and Counter Propaganda

SECTION III. FEATURE NEWS

Editorials

Departments

"Dolce Far Niente"
"Lettere al Editore"
"Lo Che Dicono i Prigionieri Italiani"
"Dove Stanno i Perduti"
"Lo Che Fanno i Fanciulli Italiani"

1737

3. If the project interests you the above plan is ready to be forwarded at your convenience.

Respectfully,

John Atkinson, 2nd Lt., CMF

*To SAK
Lt Col. Fowler / Smith
11/7*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

W.C.C.A.

Referenced attached letter.

Do you wish to ask for
the plan so that it can
be considered after we
have gone forward?

C.A.S. (14).

W.C.C.A.
7/17/80

785015

Subject: Reply FORTUNE 431

Memo to: Col. Annis, G-1, MATOUSA

1. In accordance with your request to General Hosherry attached is draft cable in reply to FORTUNE 431. The subject matter is covered by the early exchange of cables which the writer of FORTUNE 431 apparently had not seen.

THIS COPY ONLY MAY BE SHOWN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----
Encl. 411410

CHARLES M. SPOTFORD
Lt. Col., C.S.C.

File 7951

1736

(Draft Cable)

14 July 1943

TO: AMWAR for H. HALL from KINERDORFER Site CAD Case AMOT

Manner in which propaganda, censorship and psychological warfare functions to be performed outlined our 6202 replying to PORTUNE 93.

For operation HUSKY staff of IHC to be responsible for press, public relations, censorship and psychological warfare activities. AMOT proposes to have small section of approximately 4 officers of whom two will be attached. Their function will be to work up matters for both forward and rear transmission and to coordinate propaganda with IHC. Two of 4 officers have already been attached to AMOT staff. Believe other two can be secured from theatre. If not will request qualified personnel.

1735

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(Equals British Confidential)

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Psychological Warfare Branch

DIRECTIVE FOR WEEK BEGINNING JULY 13, 1943.

MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY.

- a) Handle the Sicilian operations soberly and factually. Remember that the Axis has not yet thrown in its main reserves. The first real battle has yet to come. Do not therefore imply that the total reduction of Sicily will be rapid or easy. Maintain the tacit assumption that the campaign will last many weeks. Quote Axis communiques when they conceal true situation or disagree with each other.
- b) Exploit the expedition as a demonstration of British and American sea power. Stress the failure of Axis submarines and aircraft to prevent the landing.
- c) In features compare constantly the invasion season of 1940 with the invasion season of 1943.
- d) Do not call the Sicilian operations a Second Front.
- e) Do not refer to the inactivity of the Italian fleet.
- f) Look out for satellite comment on the experience of the first German ally to be turned into a German battlefield. (N.B. Do not use this line for France.)

THE BALKANS

Keep the Balkan war of nerves going. Stress that Italy has not withdrawn her 30 divisions in the Balkans, three times as many as she has on the mainland. Suggest in commentaries that this is causing discussion in the Italian High Command and between the Germans and Italians. Italian casualty lists of the Balkan campaign should give a useful peg this week.

EAST FRONT - SOUTH FRONT.

We should not be surprised by bad news from Russia this week. Make our listeners see the German success in perspective. Only if Germany could have looked Russia out completely this year could she have avoided defeat. Not even the Germans believe this is possible. One reason why it is not possible is the South Front and the West Front, which contain more than 100 Axis divisions.

POLICY

Italy. Continue to exploit Fascist sensitivity to our distinction between the Party and the people. Assure Italy of peace and freedom once Fascism is destroyed. Give where possible inside Italy news items, building up cautiously the oppo-

785015

Maintain the tacit assumption that the campaign will last many weeks. Quote Axis communiques when they conceal true situation or disagree with each other.

- b) Exploit the expedition as a demonstration of British and American sea power. Stress the failure of Axis submarines and aircraft to prevent the landing.
- c) In features compare constantly the invasion season of 1940 with the invasion season of 1943.
- d) Do not call the Sicilian operations a Second Front.
- e) Do not refer to the inactivity of the Italian fleet.
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POLICY

Italy. Continue to exploit Fascist sensitivity to our distinction between the Party and the people. Assure Italy of peace and freedom once Fascism is destroyed.

Give where possible inside Italy news items, building up cautiously the opposition, but without suggesting that it is united or organised.

United Nations Unity. This can be well demonstrated by frequent mention of military cooperation. Refer in features to the Russians as Allies. Stress that the liberation of Europe is a joint enterprise from within as well as from without.

Satellite Difficulties. Give all the news available about this, as well as about Resistance.

GENERAL.

Do not give the impression that Sicily is our only amphibious enterprise.

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See/Army by TAG/ date 411410

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Cx 120
29 Nov 1943
16/7

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(Equals British Confidential)

-2-

Roosevelt said there would be others.

Continue to speak of Germany's three defeats in 1943 - Stalingrad, Tunis and the Ruhr.

Continue to contrast the infinitely longer Allied supply lines with those of the Axis, pointing out that while ours become increasingly secure, those of the Axis are increasingly disrupted. In broadcasts to France, this theme should be treated as a Transport Campaign.

The following themes should be maintained:

The 3-Front War.

No help for the Axis from Japan.
Axis manpower shortage.

While military news is so strong, we can afford to cut down features of war aims, e.g. post-war food, in all languages.

LA

1733

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785015

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MOST SECRET15AG/7951/CA15 July 1943

Subject: AMGOT Information Section

Memo to: C.C.A.O.

1. According to the arrangements with General McClure and other officers of INC, primary responsibility for psychological warfare, press and censorship matters for HUSKY is to be in INC. It was, however, decided that AMGOT should have attached to its staff qualified public relations officers, one British and the other American, and any such other staff as might be required to furnish information to INC. This material might be of a nature for transmission either to the civil population (e.g. newspaper stories to accompany proclamations and orders) or to the U.S. and U.K. (e.g. material in explanation of action taken or policies adopted by AMGOT).

2. Lt. James (B) has reported from INC and has been serving as PRO for the past 3 or 4 weeks. Major Sommers (A) spend about 10 days at Chrea but was recalled to INC HQ. I understand that an American officer will replace Major Sommers as PRO in the near future.

3. In addition to the above two press officers I believe we should add two other officers to the staff, who with the press officers will form a small Information Section. Of the two, one should be an officer well versed in the situation in Sicily and Italy and with a knowledge of the Italian people and Italian organs of communication. The other officer would ~~be~~ as a permanent liaison officer at INC HQ in Sicily.

4. If this plan is approved we will canvass our available officer personnel for candidates for these posts. There are several officers who have had press and public relation experience who might qualify. If none are found to be suitable for the assignments proposed I should like authority to obtain qualified officers from or through AFHQ.

This copy only <u>11</u> <u>11</u> <u>11</u> SHOWN to duly accredited unofficial researchers Order Sec/Army by TAG/ date <u>411410</u>
--

AMGOT 15 Army Group.

Frank J. McSherry
 FRANK J. McSHERRY
 Brigadier General, U. S. Army
 Commanding (U. S. Contingent and
 D.C.C.A.O.)

Spec. to

Do C.C.A.O.

Public Section

4. If this plan is approved we will canvass our available officer personnel for candidates for these posts. There are several officers who have had press and public relation experience who might qualify. If none are found to be suitable for the assignments proposed I should like authority to obtain qualified officers from or through AFHQ.

Frank J. McSherry
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Commanding (U. S. Contingent and
D.C.C.C.A.O.

ANGOT 15 Army Group.

[illegible]

4491

File - Propaganda

SECRET
(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Psychological Warfare Branch

HEADQUARTERS
Date <i>14 July 43</i>
<i>7951</i> <i>795</i>
FORCE 141 <i>35</i>

26 June 1943

Lt. Col. C. M. Spofford,
Allied Force Headquarters.

BIG OT

Dear Colonel Spofford:

In inclose herewith the paper on Psychological Warfare operations, of which C. D. Jackson spoke to you before he left for America. I am inclosing two copies because I hope that you will give Colonel Holmes a copy and persuade him during the next two or three days to find time for a thorough discussion of its weaknesses. We know that it is a rough and ready document, but Mr. Jackson felt that the matter was so urgent that even a rough and ready document was better than nothing.

If you can spare the time, I would like to have Mr. R.H.S. Crossman, who is taking Mr. Jackson's place, discuss this with you. Will you give me a ring if this is convenient?

Yours sincerely,

C. B. Hazeltine
C. B. HAZELTINE,
Colonel, U.S. Army,
Chief of PWB.

2 Incl.

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Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----
411410

See:
P.A.O.

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MOST SECRETIMPORTANT
CIPHER MESSAGE
IN7951 63/2217
FOLIO NO: 12478
7 JULY 43

9 JUL 1943

FROM: FREEDOM
TO: FANTOX
ORIG NO: 8429

SIGNED CINC CITE PHSGS

TOO
THI
TOR 0806

FOR BGS MARTIN AND PWB HAZLETINE FROM MCCLURE.
EISENHOWERS ANNOUNCEMENT FOR D REPEAT D - DAY MUST HAVE PRIORITY
OVER ALL OTHER LEAFLET PRINTING.
PARA TWO. YOUR PROPOSED SURRENDER LEAFLET CAUSES GRAVE CONCERN.
HAS IT GENERAL ALEXANDERS PERSONAL APPROVAL QUERY DOES IT
REFLECT HIS DESIRE QUERY WAS IT CLEARED BY CINC AFHQ QUERY.
PARA THREE. IT IS OF SUCH TIMELINESS AS TO VERGE ON THE SIDE OF
BLUFF. IT DEVIATES FROM CCS APPROVED POLICY IN THAT IT IS TOO
SOFT. IT IGNORES US NAVY. IT IS NOT LOCAL IN ITS CONTENT BUT
ANNUNCIATES BROAD POLICY.
PARA FOUR. POLICY PROPAGANDA MUST HAVE AFHQ APPROVAL. THE EFFECTS
ARE FAR REACHING. WE MUST CAREFULLY CONFORM TO C REPEAT CHARLIE S
DIRECTIVES.
PARA FIVE. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF POLICY DIRECTIVES BUT
MUST SUBMIT YOUR OWN IDEAS FOR PROPAGANDA LINES TO AFHQ FOR
APPROVAL IF THEY ARE OF MORE THAN LOCAL COMBAT SIGNIFICANCE AND
INDICATE GENERAL ALEXANDERS APPROVAL.
PARA SIX. UNABLE TO COMPLETE TELEPHONE CALL SINCE THIS MESSAGE.
PLEASE REPLY SOONEST.
PARA SEVEN. THIS SENTENCE PERSONAL FOR HAZLETINE. CONSIDER
REPLACING MARTELLI WITH SALSWORTHY BOLSTERED BY A CIVILIAN ON
POLICY LEVEL. GENERAL ALEXANDER NEEDS AN ADVISOR WHO KNOWS
POLICY AND NOT INCLINED TO RUN WITH THE BALL SINCE IRREPARABLE
DAMAGE BY FREE WHEELING IN PROPAGANDA.

SMC DISTRIBUTION:

BRIG MARTIN	1 (PERSONAL)
INC.	2 ACTION
OPS	1
AMGOT	2

IMPORTANT
MOST SECRET

2 Page

100/606

9 July 43

26 June 43

9/7

Handwritten notes and signatures:

- Spokane in action*
- C.C.A.O. in doing this*
- C.4.0945B/8*
- T.T.1000B/8*
- Major P. L. ...*
- to get ...*
- at ...*
- of ...*
- has ...*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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MOST SECRET.

7951?

C.C.A.O.

Attached paper returned
herewith as requested.

Seen by B.G.S. (I) and
myself.

Thank-you.

W.D. Gibson. Lt. Col.

I(6)

785015

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Psychological Warfare Branch

26 June 1943

6 34H
7 JUL 1943
RUC

Major General Lord Rennell

Dear General:

Mr. C. D. Jackson, who has left for a short visit to the States, asked me to forward to you the enclosed paper on the function of the Psychological Warfare Branch. You will find that we have lifted from you a great many ideas, and no doubt emasculated them in the process.

We shall be extremely grateful, if you could spare the time, however brief, to read this very rough outline. If you desire further conference on this subject, I would be glad to have Mr. R. H. S. Crossman, who is taking Mr. Jackson's place, talk with you on functions of the Branch.

Yours most sincerely,

C. B. Hazeltine

C. B. HAZELTINE,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
Chief of PWB.

1 Incl.

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Psychological Warfare Branch

24 June 1943

SECRET (BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SUBJECT: GENERAL OUTLINE OF FWB OPERATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF EXPANSION OF "HUSKY" to include accredited unofficial researchers Order Sec/Army by IAG/ date 411410

1. BACKGROUND:

The policy followed by FWB in the TORCH operation and since has been conditioned by the nature of the territory and peoples occupied and by the propaganda requirements of the moment. The landing was made in a country where it was anticipated that the people, after the first shock, would be in the main friendly. Since there was no question of combat propaganda at the landing points, what was needed was as many people as possible to furnish news, give entertainment and education through films, distribute booklets, pamphlets, posters, and staff a generally pacific country. This meant that the original FWB landing group very quickly split up into smaller groups to staff these outposts.

Then followed the conquest of Tunis which was almost entirely a combat operation conducted through the use of leaflets, eventually winding up after the conquest with several more outposts in Tunisia repeating the earlier operations in the rest of North Africa.

In other words as FWB moved across North Africa, it set up miniature FWDs wherever it found a centre of sufficient importance to leave personnel, to open propaganda shops, take care of the local cinema situation, establish contacts with the press and the local dignitaries, etc. This was a great strain on personnel, but, nevertheless, by skillful manipulation of the small number of

the policy followed by FWB in the TORCH operation and since has been conditioned by the nature of the territory and peoples occupied and by the propaganda requirements of the moment. The landing was made in a country where it was anticipated that the people, after the first shock, would be in the main friendly. Since there was no question of combat propaganda at the landing points, what was needed was as many people as possible to furnish news, give entertainment and education through films, distribute booklets, pamphlets, posters, and staff a generally pacific country. This meant that the original FWB landing group very quickly split up into smaller groups to staff these outposts.

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In other words as FWB moved across North Africa, it set up miniature FWBs wherever it found a centre of sufficient importance to leave personnel, to open propaganda shops, take care of the local cinema situation, establish contacts with the press and the local dignitaries, etc. This was a great strain on personnel, but, nevertheless, by skillful manipulation of the small number of people available, it was possible to have a main base at Algiers, with outposts in Casablanca, Rabat, Oran, Constantine, Tunis, Ferryville, etc. But no matter how many people we were accumulating from England and America, we never really had enough. The only way we kept going was by kiting bodies instead of cheques.

The fact that we had to conduct combat propaganda in the Tunisian Campaign set us new problems of organization and personnel and strained our slender resources still further.

On top of this came the need for staffing our own radio stations, which were

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under construction demanding quite another type of iter and technician.

And while all this was going on, we knew that we were faced, some time during the summer, with the prospect of another far larger military operation and had to plan, within the limit of our means and G-1 and G-4's permission, for combat personnel and also for post-occupation personnel, this time for enemy territory.

The net of all this is that we have accumulated a little of everything and not enough of anything; that we are, in some respects, long on body, and in many respects, short on talent. But we have made a fair showing within the framework of the limited objective, and so long as the objective was limited.

But now the objective is suddenly expanded, not only as to the size of the territory but as to the propaganda problems. For the first time, both in the combat and in the occupation stage, we are faced with a problem of psychological warfare against an enemy whose own country is about to be invaded, whose own army will be the soldiers fighting us, and whose own political regime knows that defeat probably means, not overthrow, but death. In other words, this is bigger, more complicated, more serious and more important than anything PWB has tackled to date.

Among all the uncertainties, there is at least one certainty, and that is that from a manpower standpoint, the new problem cannot be tackled by PWB as North Africa was tackled. PWB cannot be dropping off by the wayside full-size occupation teams, from its original invasion or combat group, as it moves along; and there are not enough trained people in America and England to do the job, even if we could obtain transportation for them and the equipment they have to have.

Furthermore, there is a new element introduced into the picture with which we have never had to cope until now, and that is the AMGOT organization which

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Furthermore, there is a new element introduced into the picture with which we have never had to cope until now, and that is the AUGOT organization which has a recognized highly important place in these future operations, as the body responsible for post-occupation administration.

The problem which confronts us this summer and autumn divides itself into three parts:

- (a) Combat propaganda in the strict sense of propaganda conducted in cooperation with the fighting troops.
- (b) Supporting propaganda (radio and leaflets) conducted from North Africa.
- (c) Propaganda in occupied territory.

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(A) The combat group conceived for the HORRIFIED operation can serve as a good prototype of what will be needed for the expanded plan, but it will have to be improved and enlarged, because in the new scheme this combat group must remain the combat unit for the entire operation. It will not shed its personnel or equipment on the way, and it must be able without calling on the army, except in occasional emergencies, to cope with:

1. The establishment of a real and intimate contact with Headquarters of Force Commander. This liaison must service back to the base radio, forward to the combat units, the directives of the Force Commander. And it must service forward to the combat unit the directives of Washington and London and guide forward leaflet production.
2. The establishment of communications within the combat unit and back to base.
3. The establishment of forward leaflet production, and forward loudspeaker units.
4. The establishment of prisoner interrogation and other forms of propaganda intelligence.

But the combat unit not only attacks the morale of the enemy, it also tries, by propaganda, to pacify the occupied areas behind the lines. For this purpose it must:

1. Obtain an intelligence estimate of the local situation.
2. Assume control of and put into action the local press and, if possible, wireless.
3. Be ready to put up and provide the output of its own wireless station, as well as loudspeakers.
4. Maintain its own monitoring unit.
5. Have its own mobile motion picture equipment.

(B) There is no real propaganda separation, but only a physical separation, between combat propaganda and propaganda from the base. Each feeds the other and complements the other. For this reason, overemphasis on the combat group would be just as bad as the reverse. The most important weapon, that base will have, will be its high-powered radio, which must at all costs be maintained and

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This means that for the base, we need an expanded editorial and announcing staff in Algiers, plus the necessary radio technicians to man Hippo, Swindle, and Tunis on a 24-hour basis.

Besides radio, the base will continue to produce leaflets by good coordination between Algiers, Tunis and Cairo (Cairo for production only). We will

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be able to produce large quantities of the long-range undated leaflets which pave the way for the combat leaflets, most of which will also be prepared in North Africa, either at Algiers or at Tunis. We also need such undated leaflets from London and New York in large quantities.

2. THE ITALIAN PROBLEM: GUIDING LINES FOR ITS SOLUTION.

In the preceding section, an attempt has been made to outline the organizational problem which faces us, and to sketch the lines along which we must solve it. Now we must turn to the psychological warfare problem itself.

In order to make even provisional plans for post-HORRIFIED operations, we have got to guess what will happen in Italy when HORRIFIED fails. Let us admit straight away that this is guess work. But unless we are prepared to guess and to act on our guess, no forward planning is possible.

The defeat and occupation of Italy can take place in 3 ways:

(a) Our armies may advance up "the boot" of Italy, fighting all the way, and assisted possibly by landings. This will mean that our combat unit, reorganized and enlarged, must advance with the troops. Such a campaign would give it its biggest opportunity to date. And behind the combat unit, in close cooperation with ANGOT, must move our psychological warfare occupation squads to consolidate the work of the combat unit.

(b) After a certain amount of fighting, there may be a quick surrender by a government which we are prepared to leave in power. In this case, we must assume that London and Washington would supply the key men to form the United Nations shadow cabinet in Italy. All that FWB--and for that matter ANGOT--would be asked to do would be to supply personnel for maintaining essential services.

(c) But suppose that this Italian "surrender" government collapsed and was unable to maintain central control. Suppose Italy fell apart into regional anarchy. Or suppose that there were no "surrender" government, but just a disintegration of

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(c) But suppose that this Italian "surrender" government collapsed and was unable to maintain central control. Suppose Italy fell apart into regional anarchy. Or suppose that there were no "surrender" government, but just a disintegration of the Fascist regime. In our view, one of these two contingencies is the most likely of all the contingencies here enumerated, and not only the most likely, but the most difficult to cope with.

We propose, therefore, to base our future planning on the following two assumptions:

1. There will be fighting in Italy itself of a character particularly suited to combat propaganda.
2. There will be a period when, in at least some districts, the power of the central government fails and emergency squads from the Fighting Services, from

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AMGOT and from PWB will be needed to restore order.

From these two assumptions the conclusions follow:

- (a) That the combat unit should be reorganized and enlarged for the next stage of the campaign. Meanwhile, the base radio staff should be strengthened to ensure the "creeping radio barrage" which is the chief radio contribution to combat work. The base leaflet team must also be strengthened for this purpose.
- (b) That personnel be chosen and trained for the consolidation of the occupation work in HOLLAND and in the areas left behind by the combat unit.
- (c) That plans be prepared in London and Washington for the printing and shipping of printed propaganda suitable for the occupied areas. This must be on a scale commensurate with the enlarged scope of HUSKY.

(d) That at once America and Britain be combed for the type of personnel suited to work with AMGOT in the event of a sudden collapse. For this contingency nothing but an elite of really high-powered men will do. They have got to assume immense individual responsibilities, take decisions quickly, and be men of action as well as experts. As far as possible, they should have some training both in the PWB base and with AMGOT. As well as these topnotchers, we must have in North Africa a pool of capable men of second rank, competent in Italian, both to accompany the topnotch men, if the collapse occurs, and to work in occupied areas. A pool of 12 topnotchers and 50 men of second rank should be aimed at. All should be trained in PWB, Algiers.

It will probably be said that it is impossible to find these 72 "bodies." To this, there is only one answer. Unless they are found, and found quickly, both CMI and PWE will fall down on their first great opportunity to prove that psychological warfare is not a gadget but an essential part of warfare and of pacification. The phase of the war is passed when we could be content to build great static organizations in the home countries for radio and leaflet production.

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It will probably be said that it is impossible to find these 72 "bodies." To this, there is only one answer. Unless they are found, and found quickly, both OWI and PWE will fall down on their first great opportunity to prove that psychological warfare is not a gadget but an essential part of warfare and of pacification. The phase of the war is passed when we could be content to build great static organizations in the home countries for radio and leaflet production. The phase of the war has now come when, cutting our home base staffs to a minimum essential to maintain the service, we must send out into the field the best men we have got. And if we have not got them, we must find them. For this work has to be done.

3. PWB COMMAND AND THE NORTH AFRICAN BASE

In order to function efficiently the high command of PWB must remain with AFHQ, and it is conceivable that AFHQ will move from Algiers into Italy.

Such a move by AFHQ will undoubtedly be accompanied by a gradual turning back

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to the French of the control of North Africa, which will greatly decrease the scope of activities so far as domestic North African propaganda is concerned-- leaving as the primary work in North Africa the radio operations, which are tied in directly with the front, and the leaflet production operation which is likewise linked with the front, plus the news and picture services to America and the East.

The PAFB Command, therefore, need only be concerned with the administration of the North African base, so as to insure a good radio and leaflet service.

As we look towards the future, it appears that:

1. The outpost operations in North Africa, such as Casablanca, Oran, Constantine, etc., will gradually be abandoned and the personnel concentrated on the main base in Algiers and possibly the sub-base in Tunis.
2. An executive will be put in charge of the administration of this territory who will have the dual responsibility of ensuring that the European requirements are fulfilled as well as the requirements of his immediate North African territory.
3. The PAFB Command will be able to devote its entire energies to the tasks of combat and occupation propaganda in HUSKY and of planning in advance for future operations beyond Italy.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTRE

INCOMING MESSAGE

JAJA

filed 082055

HEADQUARTERS
Date
N 7951
FORCE 141

AFSC W339/09
090622B
ref

IMMEDIATE

FROM: TROOPERS

TO : MILITARY RPTD FREEDOM (FOR RESIDENT MINISTER ALGIERS)
FOR J S M CIVAFFAIRS

NO : 97328 CA2, July 08, 1943

NO TRACE.

Your 1036 5 July, 1039 6 July, 1041 7 July and NAF 252.

1. Please inform us C in C8 reasons for believing it useful to publish Directive as no apparent advantage from Political Warfare angle.

2. Meanwhile we have following comments: (A) Assume not intended include modifications and additions proposed in CC8 258/1. (B) No date for publication mentioned. Should not in any case be until after any declaration by President and/or Prime Minister. Suitable date should be proposed by C in C in light of prevailing circumstances. (C) In any event consider it inadvisable publish Directive in extenso and in particular no reference should be made to changes in currency arrangements and use of local bank set out in sections 2 and 3.

3. Foreign Office and FWE agree.

4. Pending reply to 1 presume publication will not take place.

MC IN 3916

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C.S.O

10/6/43

TO SER

LT COL FRANKLY-SMITH

Ref No. 97528 CA2 July 8, 1943 Page 2

NAF 252 1s MC OUT 642 2/7/43 (Mil Govt Sec) Bigot

ACTION: MIL GOVT SEC

INFO: SGS
BR RES MINISTER
CIV AFFAIRS
AMGOT REAR
CAO
AG RECORD
**

MC IN 3916

9 July 43

1035B

Ref No. 97528 CA 2

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HEADQUARTERS

Date 8 July 43

7951

FORCE 141

August 1943
and then Hail

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Directive for the week beginning Tuesday July 6th, 1943

GENERAL

Mediterranean

- a) Don't play down the strength of the Axis forces, German and Italian, in Italy, either on land or in the air.
- b) Continue to emphasize the German decision to treat Italy as an outpost of the Reich, and the fact that this decision can only turn Italy into a German battlefield.

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General

- a) Continue to discuss the threat to Germany from the West as well as from the East and the South. Play up air-raids from England and convoys arriving in the British Isles.
- b) Refer to the three major Axis defeats so far in 1943: Stalingrad, Tunisia and the Ruhr.
- c) Play up the effect of the allied air offensive on transportation within Europe.
- d) Keep news from the far East brief and factual. Discuss the action in the S-W Pacific in such a way as to give the listener an idea of what the front and the objectives are in that part of the world. Continue to speak of Japan's own problems and of her inability to help the Axis in Europe.
- e) Dramatize the sea-war and the failure of the U-boat spring campaign.

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POLICY

ITALY

Continue to stress the assurance of survival as well as the impending doom. Use quotations from speeches by leading statesmen of the United Nations and keep on referring to Roosevelt's line at his press conference last month. The two things which stand between Italy and peace are the Fascist party and support of the Germans.

GENERAL

Continue to play up :

- 1) Germany's manpower shortage
- 2) Armed and passive resistance to occupation in all countries
- 3) Evidence of predatory action by Germany
- 4) Inability of Germany to organize the territory she has occupied.

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Special points for Deaks

ITALY

a) Point out that Italy is compelled to keep in the Balkans three times as many divisions as she has stationed on the mainland of Italy (not including the islands). To contribute in the holding down of Yugoslavia alone, she has to employ as many divisions as she has available to defend the Italian mainland.

Play up resistance to the Axis in the Balkans, but do not report successes by the Yugoslav patriots in such detail as to give the impression that resistance is undiminished.

For guidance only: The Axis has scored considerable successes, and armed resistance in Yugoslavia will be much weaker during the next few months, even though the Axis will be unable to withdraw any significant number of troops.

b) Use all available material showing that the Fascists are trying to incriminate the Italian people, and associate them in their war-guilt.

GERMANY

a) Increase the dispondency caused by the allied air offensive by repeating that Hitler can only hold out the prospect of a long war, with Germany trying to hang grimly onto her gains. The allies, on the other hand, are anxious to shorten the war and to start reconstructing a new and better world.

b) In recent home broadcasts, German commentators have frankly been pointing to the U.S. as the chief enemy of the German people. Remind the German listener, without directly alluding to this trend in German broadcasts, of the part played by the U.S. in the last war. Use the figures given by Elmer Davis on the number of American soldiers overseas, and the comparison with the last war.

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c) Play up whatever material is available on the anglo-american auxiliary aircraft-carriers, and, in general, the part played by the allied airforce in overcoming the submarine menace.

d) Remind the Germans that the Luftwaffe has not only proved itself incapable of preventing the allied airforce from raiding Germany at will, but has been unable to give effective assistance to the U-boats. The Luftwaffe's opposition to allied planes' operations has been decreasingly effective.

e) Follow a tough line on bombardments on Germany. Emphasize the damage caused but continue to emphasize that we aim at military objectives.

FRANCE

a) Continue to show a constant and friendly interest in the work of the Committee. Treat the Giraud visit to the U.S. factually, with moderation, following official statements. The visit is a military affair. Use press comment to illustrate opinion in England and in the U.S.

b) quote items illustrating Germany's exploitation of France.

c) Refer constantly and naturally to Anglo-American cooperation in the political and military spheres.

d) Do not try to refute Axis arguments against Russia. Continue to play up and explain the military role of Russia. Give every piece of evidence of Anglo-American-Russian solidarity.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

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Filed 070303Z

HEADQUARTERS
Date 7 Jul 43
N 7950
FORCE 141

AFSC N 403/07
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hgt

PRIORITY BIGOT HUSKY

FROM AGWAR FROM MARSHALL
TO EISENHOWER
NO FORTUNE 431 July 7, 1943

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Civil Affairs Officers qualified to supervise operations
of newspapers, broadcasts, and other public means of communication
not included in T/O HUSKY. (CITE CIVIL AFFAIRS).

HUSKY, BIGOT, NAGAP. These functions should be responsibility
officer in charge Civil Affairs in occupied territory under military
government.

Request you inform us your requirements this category BK
personnel.

ACTION: G-1

INFORMATION: SGS
AMBOT (REAR)
G-3
DTC
CAO
MIL GOVT SEC
AG RECORDS

To SEC DOCS
C.S.O.
LTCOL CARLEY
Capt G.H. HARRIS

MO-IN-2879 7 JULY 43

1200B

NO FORTUNE 431

He are doing his work a no doubt.

G.I. with answer

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W. Col Farley. Smith 31

Reference telephone call.

Herewith copy of

Cable to which ~~is~~

General Holmes is

very anxious to receive

answer.

Copies encls
3A & 8A sent
AMDOT Liaison 8 July 43
CHS/SP

Quarley. Hatching
may 3

27 JUL 43.

P/A [Signature]

COPY

AFHQ INCOMING MESSAGE.

FROM: AGWAR DATE: APR 13353 Z

ref ; fortune 93

RCD: APR 130924 A PREC: ROUTINE

CLASS: SECRET.

"EDITED LITERAL TEXT"

BIGOT

FROM: MARSHALL TO EISENHOWER.

Plan chart Military Government brought by HOLMES does not provide a staff Division or personnel and facilities to handle propaganda and policies as to local press radio broadcasts civilian censorship. We understand that plans for such services are being made in AFHQ. We should like to have a report on how it is intended these matters will be handled in connection with operations.

ACTION: 5 Force 141

Information:	1 Secy G/S	2 C in C Med	1 DTC
	1 G-1	2 A C in C Med	1 CG SOS NATOUSA
	3 G-3	,1 Q (Maint)	3 US Navy
	3 G-4		1 AG Cables.

Also ENCL 3.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

18 Col Seitz
7951
1 July 1943
RHE

STAFF MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 56)

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES -- PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The following is published to clarify the activities of Psychological Warfare and to coordinate them with all concerned:

1. MISSION: The mission of the Psychological Warfare Branch (under the Information and Censorship Section) is the collection, preparation, supply, distribution, and control of all propaganda originating within the theater of operations of this headquarters.

2. OBJECTIVE: The primary objective of this Branch is to undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize his forces, and sustain the morale of our supporters:

- a. In the combat area.
- b. In enemy and enemy-occupied countries.
- c. In areas occupied by our forces.

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3. OPERATIONS: To this end, the Psychological Warfare Branch will:

- a. Collect and evaluate information and intelligence along Psychological Warfare lines.
- b. Plan, prepare, produce and disseminate all necessary propaganda.
- c. Require facilities from other arms of the services for the dissemination of its propaganda material.
- d. Work in close cooperation with field commanders in matters of combat propaganda.
- e. Continue its activities before, during, and after an operation.

4. ORGANIZATION: Under the Information and Censorship Section, the Psychological Warfare Branch amalgamates the activities performed by Office War Information, Psychological Warfare Executive, Ministry of Information, and part of Office Strategic Services. Psychological Warfare Branch is organized along the following lines:

- a. Executive: Executive is responsible for the administration, direction and control.

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b. Planning: Planning coordinates and prepares propaganda plans and directives in accordance with the announced policies.

c. Information: Information collects and evaluates Psychological Warfare intelligence in collaboration with other information gathering agencies.

d. Propaganda: Propaganda prepares, produces, and distributes all propaganda in accordance with the aforementioned plans and directives.


5. COORDINATION: The Psychological Warfare Branch will coordinate the Office War Information - Psychological Warfare Executive joint propaganda directives with the plans of the theater as directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Force. On the tactical level all Psychological Warfare Branch detachments in the field or on special missions will be attached to the headquarters of the unit in whose area they are serving and will be for the support of the area commander. The general propaganda policy, however, and the attachment or relief of these detachments will be controlled by AFHQ.

6. Whenever propaganda is desired by any agency or force under this headquarters, the Psychological Warfare Branch will be contacted and a request for, or suggestions will be made as to the type, or line of propaganda, desired. The Psychological Warfare Branch will, in conformity with its directives, prepare and arrange for distribution of all approved propaganda.

7. The headquarters of Psychological Warfare Branch is located in the Maison d'Agriculture, 12 Boulevard Baudin.

Office Phone (Day) 336.60 Ext. 45
Office Phone (Night) 372.02)
372.03) Hotel Cornouailles

By command of General EISENHOWER:


T. J. DAVIS
Brigadier General, USA
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"A"

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Psychological Warfare Branch (INC)

Directive for Week Beginning Tuesday 23 June 1943

STRATEGY

1. Mediterranean.

- a. Don't play down the strength of the Axis forces, German and Italian in Italy, either on land or in the air.
- b. Wherever possible convey the impression that the Germans are going hastily everything to strengthen Italy materially and psychologically.
- c. Discuss the importance of Italy to Germany in the defense of Germany itself.
- d. Discuss the impasse in which Germany finds herself: faced with three vital fronts, Southern, Eastern and Western, and the consequent dispersal of her forces.
- e. The only chance of avoiding defeat for Germany would be to launch an offensive against Russia at this time and knock her out. That she still remains inactive in East is proof of the growing strain imposed by the Southern and Western Fronts.
- f. Continue to use the current news so as to increase the sense of Italy's isolation and openness to attack, by the means recommended in last week's directive.
- g. Stress the advantages accruing to the allies from their control of the Sicilian channel.
- h. The ban on strategical speculation on future allied military operations continues in force.

2. Western Europe.

- a. Play up the Western air offensive. State categorically the damage which is being done to German industry.
- b. Point out that the Ruhr, which produces two-thirds of Germany's coal and three-quarters of Germany's steel, is being systematically devastated.
- c. State repeatedly that the Ruhr is an anchored target which cannot be removed and remains within easy reach of the allied air forces.
- d. Play up the effect of the allied air offensive on transportation within Europe, showing how damage at any point has repercussions in the rest of Europe, including areas of military operations.

3. Far East.

Keep news from the Far East brief and factual. Avoid names of cities which convey nothing to an European audience. Write commentaries of round-ups to convey Japan's problems and her inability to come to the assistance of the Axis in Europe.

POLICY

HEADQUARTERS
Date 3 July 43
N 2951
FORCE 141

- Fronts.
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P O L I C Y

1. Italy.

Continue to stress not only the impending doom but the assurance of survival after the destruction of the Fascist regime. Do this for the most part by quotations from speeches and references, without direct quotations, to Roosevelt's line at his press conference of a few weeks ago.

2. General.

Use all available material to develop the following points:

- a. Germany's manpower problem, including conscription of foreign labor, resistance to conscription, and the Trojan horse.
- b. Armed resistance to occupation in all countries.
- c. Transport disruption both from outside and inside.
- d. Administration sabotage, inability of Germany to organize the territory she has occupied.

SECRET

BIGOT.

MOST SECRET.

18 June 43.

G. S. O. I.
ANGOT.

Meeting: A. F. H. Q. Joint Planning Staff and Psychological Warfare Branch.

1. Preamble: (a) This meeting was held 1700 hrs 17 Jun.
(b) No agenda was sent to ANGOT.
(c) Brig Martin received a copy of agenda and asked ANGOT LIAISON officer to hold a watching brief.
(d) Present: Brig Sugden, Brig Martin, Major Morley-Fletcher, P. W. B. - Col. Hazeltine, Mr R. Crossman, Mr. D Stevens, Lt. Col Mac Farlane, Comdr Martelli also about 12 others.
2. Object: Para III of Agenda was brought up since P. W. B. felt uncertain of direct contact with ANGOT which they felt might be necessary.
3. Husky: It was provisionally agreed -

- (a) P. W. B. were a weapon in hands of General Staff and their use during initial stages of attack was not a question for ANGOT.
- (b) During "post combat period" or "settling operations" their propaganda being used to reduce enemy opposition or feeling would be of interest to ANGOT. P. W. B. thought ANGOT might object to their methods, or they might object to ANGOT C. A. O's methods. Pointed out that any differences could be settled through normal staff channels on appropriate level.

Action envisaged: that C. A. O's should be advised of possibility of P. W. B. operating, or being able to operate at ANGOT request, in this area during settling period.

Post-Husky: P. W. B. would welcome ANGOT considerations in planning stage.

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Sec/Army by TMO/
date 411410

(c) Brig Martin received a copy of agenda and asked ANGOT LIAISON officer to hold a watching brief.

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Pointed out that any differences could be settled through normal staff channels on appropriate level.

Action envisaged: that C.A.O.'s should be advised of possibility of P.W.B. operating, or being able to operate at ANGOT request, in this area during settling period.

Post-Husky: P.W.B. would welcome ANGOT considerations in planning stage.

Action envisaged: that P.W.B. relations with ANGOT be included in para of ANGOT plan. 1713

5. Comment: The whole of their conference (over one hour) was unnecessary. Normal staff approach could have settled the problems "out of court".

6. Post Conference: Some of P.W.B. staff are off to U.K. others to Husky early next week. They therefore ask for very early conference with Lord Rennell or an ANGOT plenipotentiary to see if they can tie some of their ideas up before they discuss progress in U.K. 1530 hrs Sunday 30 Jun has been suggested at ANGOT Liaison Office.

Action /...

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Action required: Presence of a plenipotentiary or instructions to AMGOT LIAISON.

AMGOT, 141,
FORCE 141,
FIELD.
ME/ST.

2d
Major,
AMGOT Liaison.

P.W.

will be here

Continues Sunday

1000 hours.

M.T.

19 JUN.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

B I G O T

MOST SECRET

24 June 1943

MINUTES

Reference: documents 27 and 28 - after the meeting to which this refers I had a further meeting which was attended by the representative of Col. Hazeltime, Mr. Crossman, Mr. Jackson, and Commander Martelli.

There did not appear to be any difficulty arising out of the relations between I.N.C. and AMGOT so far as HORRIFIED was concerned nor was any change contemplated in the arrangements which had been made whereby I.N.C. 141 should be responsible for the present propaganda and public relations in HORRIFIED.

What is to happen thereafter was discussed to considerable length, but it does not arise at this stage. It seemed to be clear to me and to those others who were present at the meeting that in the event of certain future developments it would be necessary for an extended AMGOT to have its own plan and propaganda division.

AMGOT Rear Headquarters
AFHQ, B.N.A.F.
In The Field.

FJLR/AME

Penwell

Major General,
C.C.A.O.

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*Justo - [unclear]
Orio - [unclear]
850 - [unclear]*

W.H. [unclear] 28/6/43

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

would be necessary for an extended AMCOT to have its own plan and propaganda division.

AMCOT Rear Headquarters
AFHQ, B.N.A.F.
In The Field.

FJLR/AME

Handwritten:
J. C. R. - J. C. R.
J. C. R. - J. C. R.
J. C. R. - J. C. R.

Handwritten:
Quarrell.

Major General,
C.C.A.O.

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Handwritten:
P.H. 28/4/45.

171.

SECRET

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SECRET - BIGOT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

COPY NO.

12

17 June 1943.

MINUTES OF A MEETING BETWEEN JOINT PLANNING STAFF
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

Ref: Agenda dated 16 June, 1943.

PRESENT:

Brigadier Sugden
Brigadier Martin
Colonel Sloane
Colonel Wyman
Colonel MacCloskey
Colonel Hazeltime
Lt. Colonel Goldtranson
Lt. Colonel Martelli
Lt. Colonel Reynolds
Commander Fryer
Commander Smith, USN
Major Schreck
Major Hear
Major D. M. Fletcher
R. H. Crossman
G. H. P. Garratt
D. Stephens
C. W. Jackson

Deputy AC of S, G-3
Special Services, Force 141
G-2
G-3 Plans
Med Air Command
FWB
"A" Force
PWB
G-3 Plans
RN
G-3 Plans
Med Air Command
Special Ops, Force 141
ALACOT
FWB
FWB
FWB
FWB

1. Representatives of FWB stressed the necessity for their representation on the staff of Force 141 and any other forces in charge of operation, to insure better control, coordination and receipt of early information, on which they might base leaflet propaganda. This is required to integrate combat propaganda with military operations, and applies not only to front line propaganda but also to radio and leaflet work originating in North Africa. They further pointed out that leaflet propaganda under present directives must be approved by a considerable chain of authorities, representing a long period of time to accomplish. Brigadier Sugden stated that at AFHQ he was responsible for preparations of operational and strategic plans and their implementation, and that his responsibility to coordinate all arms of the services included coordination with FWB at the proper stage when planning for operations. He further stated that Colonel Wyman would be the officer concerned with insuring that FWB would be informed of all items that might affect them.

Colonel Hazeltime suggested that it would simplify the problem if FWB could prepare leaflets from an approved weekly leaflet directive without further approval of Force 141 or AFHQ, provided they did not depart from the policy

785015

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Colonel Hazeltime suggested that it would simplify the problem if FWB could prepare leaflets from an approved weekly leaflet directive without further approval of Force 141 or AFHQ, provided they did not depart from the policy line laid down by the CCS - in such cases leaflets would have to go to AFHQ or Force 141 for a decision. Brigadier Sugden said he would take this matter up with the Chief of Staff for a decision.

2. Colonel Hazeltime stated that in view of the enlarged scope of HUSKY and the possibility of sudden changes which might be required in the line taken by FWB, it will be necessary for FWB to be integrated more closely in all future military plans and operations. He suggested that inasmuch as the sudden requirements of Force Commanders might not come to him directly that G-3 undertake the responsibility of informing him. Brigadier Sugden agreed that closer integration was necessary. However, he did not agree that G-3 should be responsible for informing FWB of the requirements of service commanders. He believed that a Staff Memorandum outlining the procedure of making requests for propaganda to FWB should be circulated to the services who might call upon FWB.

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- 1 -

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SECRET
SECRET - BICOT

Minutes of Meeting with PWB, 17 June (Cont'd.)

3. PWB representatives stated that, as now organized, AMGOT has no official relation with PWB and they requested a formalization of the chain of command, in order that there might be no conflict between the lines taken by the PWB and AMGOT after military operations were completed. Brigadier Sugden stated that in his opinion PWB and AMGOT are both sections of a large staff and that it was the duties of the section heads to mutually agree to the lines of procedure adopted. In the event of conflict of policy, such conflict should be taken to the next appropriate level.

4. Colonel Hazeltime stated that in any plan for post-HUSKY occupation, the relations between PWB and AMGOT will have to be more precisely defined than in the plan for HORRIFIED.

The meeting was informed by Brigadier Sugden that Colonel Holmes was now working on a post-HUSKY AMGOT organization, and it was suggested that PWB should get into touch with him, in order to insure that they were represented in this new layout.

[Signature]
H. P. SMITH,
Commander, U. S. N.,
G-3 Plans.

HPS/lhg
DISTRIBUTION:

Brigadier Sugden
Brigadier Martin
Colonel Sloane
Colonel Wyman
Colonel MacCloskey
Colonel Hazeltime
Lt. Colonel Martelli
Commander Smith, USN
Major D. M. Fletcher
G-3 Plans

1
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6-9
10
11 (File)
12
13-15 (Spare)

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HPS/lhg

DISTRIBUTION:

Brigadier Sugden
Brigadier Martin
Colonel Sloane
Colonel Wyman
Colonel MacCloskey
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H. P. Smith
H. P. SMITH,
Commander, U. S. N.,
G-3 Plans.

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SECRET - EICOT

- 2 -

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PSYCHO. JICAL WARFARE BRANCH

SECRET

14 June 1943

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

Memorandum to: AMGOT HQ.
LAI Force In the Field.

We are in perfect agreement with the
comment on Operational Instructions No. 1,
as indicated in your letter of June 11th.

For Colonel Hazeltine,

HEADQUARTERS
Date 16 June 43
N 7951
FORCE 141

Donald F. Hall,
Lieut. Colonel, FA
Executive

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To SEE

APOS

C.S.O.
(LT COL. PHILIP J. SMITH)

1711

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

PA

16/6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

INC, AMHQ.

B I C O, T

NO SECRET

141P/8021/ST

12 June 43

26A

The attached Memorandum on Operation Instruction No. 1 for P.V.B. Combat Teams is returned to you herewith together with comments of AIGOT. Please reply to AIGOT direct.

There are no other comments.

HQ 141 Force.
Field.

JH

Accredited unofficial researchers Under
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

Lt.-col., G.S.
Special Forces.

1710

441410

785015

AMGOT

MOST SECRET

141F/7951/CA

11 June 1943

SUBJECT: Operation Instruction No. 1 for
P.W.B. Combat Terms

To: Col. Martin,
Representative INC,
141 Force

1. We should like to make the following comments on the
above:

- (a) Para 2(c). Proclamations and public notices to the inhabitants of HORRIFIED will be required at a very early stage and to save time printing should be local. Can we assume that priority for these will be given.

Is it proposed to take in any paper, or will the operation of presses be entirely dependent on local supplies if any. It is assumed that INC will discuss the question of the publication of existing newspapers or the launching of any fresh ones before issue takes place.

- (b) Para 3. It is assumed that INC will discuss with AMGOT in advance the scope and direction of any radio propaganda which affects the inhabitants of HORRIFIED. INC will from time to time be asked to accept notices, announcements and advice to local population from AMGOT facilitating the Military Government of the area.

2. We should be glad to hear whether you are in agreement with these comments. ✓

A. T. Maxwell
A. T. MAXWELL
Lt. Colonel
Principal Administrative Officer
AMGOT

HQ AMGOT
141 Force
In the Field

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Psychological Warfare Branch

Memorandum

5 June 1943

SUBJECT: Operation Instruction No. 1 for P.W.B. Combat Teams.

I. TASKS.

The following tasks will be performed by the P.W.B. Combat Teams:

1. Tactical propaganda against enemy troops.
2. Local propaganda amongst the civilian population.
3. Radio propaganda.
4. Collection of propaganda intelligence.

II. METHOD.

The above tasks will be accomplished by the following methods:

1. Tactical propaganda against enemy troops:
 - (a) Leaflets. If the local military situation permits, previously prepared leaflets of general application, but addressed to enemy troops may be distributed by means of:
 - (i) Patrols.
 - (ii) Converted 25-Pdr. base ejection smoke shells. Combat Teams will take with them 100 "mushrooms," i.e. modification of smoke shell, together with 50,000 special leaflets.

If necessary, tactical leaflets can be produced locally at a later stage for distribution to enemy troops by either of these means.

- (b) Loudspeakers. If available, portable loudspeakers of the Naval Portovox type will be taken and used for front-line enemy propaganda if circumstances require and permit.

2. Local Propaganda amongst the civilian population:
 - (a) Posters. A supply of suitable posters will be taken by the Combat Teams for displaying in occupied localities.

- (b) Leaflets and Circulars. A supply of leaflets and circulars will be taken by the Combat Teams for hand distribution amongst the civilians in occupied areas.

- (c) Printing Press. Any printing press available will be taken over and used for the local production of leaflets, posters, etc., as required.

- (d) Newspapers. If it is decided to continue publication of an existing newspaper, or even to launch a fresh one, the Teams will undertake this task.

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- (d) Newspapers. If it is decided to continue publication of an existing newspaper, or even to launch a fresh one, the Teams will undertake this task.

NOTE: Above will be done in close liaison with AICOF.

3. Radio Propaganda.

In the event of a local radio station being discovered intact, it will be taken over and worked in cooperation with the C.S.O. Radio will be used for:

- (a) Broadcasting announcements by C-in-C, Force Commander or Military Governor.
- (b) Propaganda to civilians in HONORIFIED and the mainland.

At a later stage, as practicable, mobile radio transmission units will be landed and operated as required.

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4. Intelligence.

Information will be collected regarding the morale of enemy troops and civilians for the purpose of immediate tactical and local propaganda from base. Good communications from Force HQs. to base via Force 141 will be essential.

The principle heading for the types of information required are as follows;

- (a) Attitude of military and civilians to Allied landings.
- (b) Information on the political situation, both local and on the mainland.
- (c) Reactions of military and civilians to our propaganda as guide to future psychological warfare.

C. B. HAZELTINE
Colonel, U.S.A.
Commanding PAB

Distribution

Force 141 (2 copies)
Lt. Comdr. G. A. Martelli
Lt. Col. D. Macfarlane

785015

1 page
100/606
9 June 43

~~SECRET~~
~~HIGH HUSKY~~

HEADQUARTERS

Date 10.6.43

N 79.11

FORCE 141

IMPORTANT
MILITARY MESSAGE
IN

RECEIVED FROM AFHQ

FOUO NO. 3441
9 JUNE 43.

FROM: ACTAR FROM JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO: EISENHOWER PORTUNE AIRLERS
ORIG NO: PORTUNE 335

FOUO: 0330Z/09
REF: 0740Z/09
FOR: 0815H

RECOMMENDATIONS OF YOURS ARE DESIRED AS TO WHEN FORTY FIVE OF THE POLICE FOR
HUSKY PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT. AN EARLY
REPLY REQUESTED.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS RECOMMENDED THAT IT BE MADE EFFECTIVE AT ONCE, BUT WE
ARE CONCERNED THAT IT MIGHT POINT TOO DEFINITELY TO CHARACTER OF COMING OPERATIONS
IF IT IS ADOPTED PRIOR TO ASSAULT.

A.F.H.Q. DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: INC
INFO: SCS CIVIL MED
INC CAD
C-3 USN
FORCE 141 AG RECORDS
MAC

SND DISTRIBUTION:

SPECIAL FORCES INC 1 ACTION
NA TO D O IN C 1
CIVIL AFFAIRS 1

SEC. 1600Z/09
T.T. 1600Z/09 JJ

~~SECRET~~
~~HIGH HUSKY~~
~~DISPATCH~~

To SEC.

P. AOS

LEGAL

19/0

1706

RECEIVED

141, 7951/CA

9 June 1943

23
PA 01

Memorandum to Col. McCormick,
INC, AFHQ

We heard from Major Summers a day or so ago that he will be unable to visit Chrea until about 14 June.

We have been thinking how best to utilize the visit of the two officers you have kindly agreed to earmark and we should, therefore, like Capt. Laister to come up here as soon as possible, as there is no reason why he should wait until Major Summers is available.

If he will give a ring to FORTUNE 82, the AMGOT Liaison Section at Force 141, they can arrange to get him out to Chrea.

du
A. T. MAXWELL
Lt. Colonel
Principal Administrative Officer
AMGOT

HQ AMGOT
141 Force
In the Field
ATM:rl

1705

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Col Maxwell

C.C.A.O. may
like to see this.

J. W. Martin.

To SEE

Col. Maxwell

C.S.O.

By

4/6

CSO. & PRO.

22

Ref. § 2 (c) first call a printing
unit be for proclamations &
publications.

Ref. § 2 (d) I want to know about
✓ newspapers before they are re-started.
By "Y" I mean my C.O.O.s.

Ref. 3 (a) Such Radio propaganda
to come to me or my SC.O.O.s.
with Task Forces, in my absence

Ref. 3 (b) so far as Harbinger is
concerned any threat against.

make this clear
KINC.



1705

7/6

Let me see draft off.

SECRET

SECRET
29 May 1945.

Will you ask Colonel Spafford or myself to get on this matter if the officers have not shown up by 6 June 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: C.S.C. 1

SUBJECT: IIC FOR PROBABLY

1. I discussed with General McCollum, Colonel Phillips, and Colonel McCormick the question of the provision of PRO's for AFGOT.
2. General McCollum has now decided to allocate two officers for these two posts, an American officer Captain James on the Staff of the Saturday Evening Post and Captain Leister, Jr. Major
3. These officers will be told to contact AFGOT in China shortly and should spend sometime at the school and in discussion with heads of divisions.
4. At a later stage a selected journalist will also be invited to China for a short stay and give some advanced information as to the formation of AFGOT. This latter should be organized after consulting with the PRO's.
5. It is intended that the PRO's should accompany AFGOT and should assist the senior officer in AFGOT in putting in the hands of press representatives material which would subsequently form the basis for their reports to the States and Great Britain.
6. The IIC senior officers emphasized that the PRO's were not intended to act as a substitute for interviews by the press with principal officials. Their main task would be:

- (a) To assist officials of AFGOT in their dealings with the press.
- (b) To advise them on the form of interviews and handouts.
- (c) To assist correspondents in obtaining access and prior information.

HQ Force 121
Field

Handwritten signature
A. T. MAXWELL,
Lt. Col.,
Principal Administrative Officer,
AFGOT

3. These officers will be told to contact AFOT in China shortly and should spend sometime at the school and in discussion with heads of divisions.

4. At a later stage a selected ^{list of} journalist will also be invited to China for a short stay and give some advanced information as to the formation of AFOT. This latter should be organized after consulting with the PEO's.

5. It is intended that the PEO's should accompany AFOT and should assist the senior officer in AFOT in putting in the hands of press representatives material which would subsequently form the basis for their reports to the States and Great Britain.

6. The ID senior officers emphasized that the PEO's were not intended to act as a substitute for interviews by the press with principal officials. Their main tasks would be:

- (a) To assist officials of AFOT in their dealings with the press.
- (b) To advise them on the form of interviews and handouts.
- (c) To assist correspondents in obtaining access and prior information.

Alch
A. F. MAXWELL,
Lt. Col.,
Principal Administrative Officer,
AFOT

HQ Force III
Field

1703

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SECRET

SECRET

29 May 45

G.C.S.

Reference attached diagram:-

I am only concerned in Civil Affairs with:

(1) ensuring that certain publicity is given to matters which require publicity in Horrificed, e.g. announcements to the population, warnings etc.

(11) and ensuring that publicity and propaganda is not perpetrated in such a manner as to have harmful repercussions in Horrificed, e.g. matters which might cause unrest, panic, etc.

Point (i) is covered under notes (a) and (b) in the left hand margin and I will ensure that Col. Martin and Lt. Comdr Martelli are given the necessary material.

But Point (11) is insufficiently covered. As D.C. in C. in the course of our conversation on the subject pointed out the general line of propaganda followed very much affects the civil government of the territory. The direct contact presumably for the provision of material and directions between Col. Hagelstine and Lt. Comdr Martelli does not provide for consultation with myself or my staff at any point. When I can effectively exercise a veto, if certain of the material is in my opinion dangerous or undesirable, or on which D.C. in C. stated he wished to be advised by me.

Wither the contact with A.P.M.C. should be at a higher level in 141 e.g. with Colonel Martin or I shall have to have an officer in parallel with Lt. Comdr Martelli and attached to this section. I prefer the former. If this is agreed I will arrange for one of my headquarters officers to maintain contact with Col. Martin and keep me informed of anything which affects the civil government of Horrificed.

General directives at a high level, for example proposals to Washington and London for modification of existing directives, supplementing them, etc. etc., should come from Brigadier General Melure directly to me for submission to D.C. in C. with comments through yourself. I have pencilled in, in red the changes which these proposals involve.

SECRET
accredited unofficial researchers Order

(44)

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COPIES ONLY OF THIS REPORT TO BE
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Sec/Army by TAG/ date -----

Mr. 141 Force,
R.H.A.F.
IR/ST.

411410

Major General,
C.G.A.O.
A.M.G.O.T.

Replied by LCHC

~~any further action~~


[Handwritten signature]

FIGOT

SECRET

20A

Psychological Warfare Board - Representation at Hq. Force 141.




Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

1702

785015


1702



SECRET

SECRET

Psychological Warfare Board - Representation at HQ Force 141.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

785015

(a) Information
(b) Deputy
C in C's
demands
other than local. policy
and
material.

AFHQ

Deputy
C in C's
demands

(a) Local Information
(b) All requests
for action by
branches of the
Staff and by
formations
(including AFHQ)

Lt. Col. MARSHALL R.H.

A.F.H.Q.
policy
implementation

Deputy
C in C's
local
demands

Operational Team

1701

Mr Maxwale

Civ Affair.

26/5/43

26/5/43

26/5/43

PA 18/5

25 May 43

Note for file 7951 (Propaganda)

1. Col. Martin has been informed by the C.G.S. that he should consult the C.C.A.O. AMGOT on the drafting of leaflets etc, which he undertook to do.
2. He also undertook to take special care to avoid rash promises such as giving of food etc., and again such subjects would be submitted to AMGOT.
3. Col. Martin undertook to see that AMGOT received copies of all INC telegrams in future.

*File 7951
p 2675*

A.T. Maxwell
A.T. MAXWELL,
Lt. Col.,
AMGOT

1700

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS

Date

N

FORCE 141

WAR

filed 240326Z

AFSC W243/24
240645B
ces

PRIORITY

BIGOT-HUSKY

FROM: AGWAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO: FREEDOM FOR EISENHOWER, FORTUNE ALGIERS.
NO: FORTUNE 269
FAN 127

COPY ON
2211 'ARMISTICE
TERMS'

The President has expressed the following views on
Psychological Warfare for HUSKY. The Prime Minister concurs:
reference your telegram of 17 May on the subject.

"Most certainly we cannot tell the Italians that if they
cease hostilities they will have a peace with honor. We cannot
get away from unconditional surrender. All we can tell them is
that they will be treated by us and the British with humanity
and with the intention that the Italian people be reconstituted
into a nation in accordance with the principles of self-determination.
This latter should, of course, not include any form of fascism
or Dictatorship."

Accordingly, the existing approved statement of policy,
transmitted in our FORTUNE 111 of April 16, will be adhered to
in your planning for Psychological Warfare.

FOOTNOTE: Fan 127

ATTN: GEN MCCLURE

INFORMATION: SCS

G-3

FORCE 141

MR MURPHY

MR MACMILLAN

LOG

MC-IN-5777

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Ref No FORTUNE 269 tca
COPY No.

1 page
Pink Cable
100/606
24 May 43

BIGOT

1 page
yellow cable
21 May 43
100/606

20 EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS

45
N 7951

FORCE 141

NATOUSSA

ROUTINE BIGOT HUSKY

TO: TROOPERS NO. 3095
FOR GENERAL BROOKS PWE FROM MCCLURE

SIGNED: EISENHOWER

To avoid further confusion such as arose about our recent French broadcast, we send you herewith the main line along which, as approved by Allied Commander in Chief, Psychological Warfare is being conducted in this area.

1. The propaganda themes for Psychological Warfare against Italy are in full accord with the plan for Political Warfare brought by Grossman.

2. Algiers radio will keep precisely in line with the leaflet series, which are being composed in accordance with the phase plan below. Indeed, these Italian leaflets will form the basic directive for the campaign. To assure better coordination we will cable you summaries of the leaflets with the dates on which the drops commence.

3. Propaganda emanating from Algiers believed by the enemy to be directly inspired by AFHQ. For this reason slight divergencies between the Algiers radio line and that of London and New York may prove an extremely useful form of strategic conception. The divergence over French which you recently pointed out, may have been noticed by the enemy also.

4. However, we realize in this instance the interests of strategy and politics conflicted and will seek in future to avoid the danger you point out.

5. Our phase plan combines, both in timing and content, psychological warfare with strategic deception. This combination, for reasons given above, is only possible to propaganda from North Africa.

6. The plan envisages three phases. Phase 1-in this phase, concluded, propaganda concentrated on the first theme of the Italian plan. In accordance with the strategic conception plan the attempt was made to create the impression that the propaganda had reached its climax only to ebb away.

SECRET

COPY No. 7

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Phases 2- the propaganda ebbs from a high intensity in phase one. The peace theme is expanded in the form of reasoned argument. b This phase is a propaganda lull. Phase 3- propaganda tempo gradually increases to the intensity of phase one. Fear themes, as in phase one, but coupled with all the peace with honor material which official declarations allow. During this phase, in accordance with PVE Italian Plan, the propaganda target will be the Italian Army, the people with the weapons in their hands.

7. During this phase the deception plan will be as in phase one..

8. Would you let us have your comments on this plan and also your own phase plan as soon as possible

ORIGINATOR: INC

INFORMATION: SEC GS
DTC
G-3
FORCE 141
MAC
CAO
CINC MED
USN
SUMMARY
LOG
RECORDS

MC OUT 3489

21MAY43

1047A

REF NO: 3095 36

SECRET

Propaganda File

15A

11th May, 1945

JOINT P.W.E.-M.O.I.-B.E.C. RE-OCCUPATION COMMITTEE

The attached draft (designed as the basis of a new section for inclusion in the Military Manual of Civil Affairs) defines the Political Warfare and Propaganda Functions to be performed in liberated regions and gives some indication of the staff and organisation through which these functions will be carried out.

The following sub-committees have been appointed to work on special problems:

- (i) Personnel Sub-Committee
- (ii) Radio Sub-Committee
- (iii) Printed Matter Sub-Committee
- (iv) Films Sub-Committee
- (v) Books Sub-Committee
- (vi) News Services Sub-Committee
- (vii) Finance Sub-Committee

This copy only SHOULD BE SHOWN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ _____ date _____

411410

Of the above, the Personnel, Radio and Films Sub-Committee have submitted interim reports and an interim report of the Printed Matter Sub-Committee is in course of preparation.

This set up is of course applicable only to a
100% British 'set up' & has no relation to
conditions in North Africa or Hong Kong

1697

PA
GPB 22/5/45

14A
MOST SECRET

4th May 1945.
R.C. Payer No. 7
(Rev. v)

JOINT P.M.E.-A.O.I.-B.B.C. REOCCUPATION COMMITTEE

5TH REVISION OF AMENDMENTS FOR INCORPORATION IN
SECTION 16, MILITARY MANUAL OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

FUNCTIONS

The political warfare and propaganda functions to be performed in each region which has been liberated by a task force will include:

- 1) Supply of information services to nationals of the region.
- 2) Provision of facilities for the supply of news about events in the liberated region to the home and overseas public.
- 3) Political and security censorship of the local press, radio etc. and of outgoing news.
- 4) Supply of news and information to our own troops in the region.
- 5) Political warfare to allied nationals within territories still unliberated.
- 6) Political Warfare against the enemy.

Of the above, Nos. 1 and 2 only will fall fully within the responsibility of C.C.A.O.; though he will be interested in No. 3 to the extent mentioned below and will also have an advisory interest in respect of Nos. 4 and 5, No. 6 will not concern him.

For the discharge of the functions with which he is primarily concerned, the C.C.A.O. will have attached to him an officer with the title of Chief Information Services Officer (C.I.S.O.).

This officer will work in close consultation with the Political Warfare Authorities responsible for functions 5 and 6 above (i.e. propaganda to allied nationals in unliberated territory, and Political Warfare against the enemy).

The C.I.S.O. will also be responsible, in consultation with the appropriate authorities, for advising the C.C.A.O. on the propaganda and Political Warfare implications of his administrative arrangements.

Function 1 (supply of information services to nationals in liberated territory) will be taken to include all information, publicity and public relations services vis-à-vis the nationals of the liberated region, including those required by all departments and civilian relief organisations operating under C.C.A.O. It may be further subdivided for each region into:

- i) collection of intelligence and information for official use.
- ii) control, management and servicing of radio stations.
- iii) organisation and supply of news and photographic services into the region.
- iv) production of bulletins, broadsheets and official newspapers.
- v) control and servicing of newspapers produced by local nationals.
- vi) supply and distribution of films and books.
- vii) citizens' advice service.
- viii) liaison with a) "I" staffs, Naval, Military and Air
stations as now exist or be established in

785015

the liberated region to the home and overseas public.

3) Political and security censorship of the local press, radio etc. and of outgoing news.

4) Supply of news and information to our own troops in the region.

5) Political warfare to allied nationals within territories still unliberated.

6) Political Warfare against the enemy.

Security by TAG/ date 11/14/10

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- iii) organisation and supply of news and photographic services into the region.
- iv) production of bulletins, broadsheets and official newspapers.
- v) control and servicing of newspapers produced by local nationals.
- vi) supply and distribution of films and books.
- vii) citizens' advice service.
- viii) liaison with a) "I" staffs, Naval, Military and Air
b) such other organisations as may exist or be established in the region with the permission of C.C.A.O.

Function 2 (provision of facilities for news about events in the region to the home and overseas public) will require the appointment to the C.I.S.O.'s staff of a special officer with the title of "Information Officer."

Function 3 (political and security censorship) will be carried out by units of personnel specially selected for the purpose by H.O.I. C.C.A.O. will be administratively responsible for these units, which will have attached to them Service advisers, whose decisions on operational security will be final; and also Civil Affairs advisers, whose decisions on matters of publication within the area, will be final, and who will also advise on outgoing news referring to the area. In the event of a dispute on policy regarding the last named, the matter will be referred to London for final decision.

- 2 -

It should be noted

that certain of the services comprised in function 1, and notably 1), ii), iii), iv), and parts of viii) will also be required for the discharge of functions 5 and 6 above (i.e. propaganda to nationals in unliberated territory and political warfare against the enemy) which are not the responsibility of C.O.A.O. In such cases, it will be necessary for the appropriate P.W. authority to consult with the C.I.A.O. as to the allocation of scarce resources, e.g. radio time, paper stocks etc. and other matters of common interest. Administration of the radio stations will be the direct responsibility of C.O.A.O. and not of regional D.C.C.A.O.s.

PERSONNEL

The nucleus staff required to carry out functions 1, 2 and 3 (i.e. information services to local nationals and provision of facilities for outgoing news and censorship) will include:

a) Staff at Force Headquarters - C.I.S.O.

Assistant C.I.S.O.	Radio Officer
Information Officer (to provide facilities for outgoing news under function 2)	Press Officer
Censorship Unit	Film Officer
Intelligence Unit	News supply and distribution officer
Publications Unit	Citizens' Advice Officer
Docks Officer	Liaison Officers

together with the necessary technical and subordinate staff.

b) Staff of Regional Headquarters.

Field Director (with the title of D.C.I.A.O.)
Assistant ditto.

With functional staff on the lines of a) above and the necessary technical and subordinate staff.

CONTROL FROM LONDON

During the period of military control, the D.C.I.S.O. and his staff in each region will be locally responsible to the regional D.C.C.A.O. He will also have a responsibility through the C.I.S.O. to P.W.A. in London, which will provide guidance directives, and materials in cooperation with the appropriate departments of H.Q.I.

TRANSITION TO CIVIL CONTROL

At the point when replacement of military control of a given country or region by that of a civil authority reaches the stage at which British diplomatic or consular representation is appointed, control at the London end will pass from P.W.A. to H.Q.I.; and a proportion of the field staff or staffs in that country or region will be released by agreement with the C.O.A.O. to form a Public Relations Department attached to the British Diplomatic or Consular Representative, and responsible to H.Q.I. in London.

resources, e.g., radio time, paper, etc. matters of common interest. Administration of the radio stations will be the direct responsibility of C.C.A.O. and not of regional D.C.C.A.O.s.

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- | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| Assistant C.I.I.S.O. | Radio Officer |
| Information Officer (to provide facilities for outgoing news under Function 2) | Press Officer |
| Censorship Unit | Press Officer |
| Intelligence Unit | News supply and distribution officer |
| Publications Unit | Citizens' Advice Officer |
| Docks Officer | Liaison Officers |

together with the necessary technical and subordinate staff.

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Field Director (with the title of D.C.I.C.O.)
Assistant ditto.

With functional staff on the lines of a) above and the necessary technical and subordinate staff.

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TRANSITION TO CIVIL CONTROL

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NAVAL MESSAGE

TO: V.A.M.

FROM: C IN C AND 16

HUSH ABOUT SECRETBIGOT Following for Mayhurst France from Martelli.

1. Transport of leaflets was arranged by NPH. They are asking Tripoli to expedite.
2. Leaflets should be dropped as soon as possible without time limit. Please report when this is completed.
3. Owing to uncertainty air transport should be grateful if you could undertake printing in future.
4. Make of leaflets Nos. 1,2,4,5, sent you May 11 should be kept. Reprints of them may be required at a later stage.
5. Am sending you immediately make of leaflets Nos. 6,7,8,9, and suggest you print 25000 of each. No. 7 is now version of No. 3. Will advise you soon as possible when these should be dropped.

141905 A

Distribution by G(O):

G 3(I)
ALLOTG(O)
17 May 43

FORCE 141
DATE: 17/5/43
HEADQUARTERS

1695

P-A JWM

17/5

This copy only MAY BE SHOWN to only	
unclassified individuals without their	
Sec/Army by TAG/	date
411419	

MOST SECRET

12A

EXTRACT

Memorandum: Arrangements regarding Information and Censorship

As a result of conferences between Major General Lord Rennell and Brigadier General McClure and others and more recent conferences of the junior planning group, the following arrangements have been laid down governing the handling of information, Propaganda and Censorship matters.

1. Propaganda Functions.

These will be handled by INC, which will have a staff attached to the various forces as well as a coordinating and policy staff at A.P.H.Q.


Major lines of propaganda will be laid down by directives from the governments with subdirectives from A.P.H.Q. Local propaganda activities (leaflets, broadcasting, posters, press) will be handled in the territory by the operating staff of INC.

These matters will be coordinated with AMCOT by periodic meetings between representatives of AMCOT and INC. In large centers it may be desirable to have liaison officers between the two staffs.

X X

Captain Wormald

Please See 12A.



169

H.Q. 141 Force
Field
11 May 43

May 11 Cal.
18.8.43.

C. M. SPOTFORD,
Lt. Col. G.S.C.,
Acting M. C. AMCOT

Ah. 16 June

EQUALS BRITISH SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS

12 MAY 1943

DATE:

7/12

FORCE 141

C.H. author

TO: URIFORM WASHINGTON 399

ROUTINE

SIGNED: EISENHOWER

Did any AMERICAN transmitter broadcast on or about Feb 20th Italian program calling Italian Antifascists make war North Africa form Legion Fight Axis? (HAZELTINE TO SHEERWOOD FROM HOLLANDER) (CITE PHPWO) Italian claiming he heard such broadcast and trying get North Africa held Barcelona. Civil Affairs here asks confirmation broadcast also whether any cases similar Barcelona reported. If so what disposition made?

ORIGINATOR: PWB

AUTHENTICATION:

INFORMATION:

SSS

DTC

INC

AG Records

1 page
yellow cable
100/606
11 May 43

P. See 4 A.
JH: 12/4

R.P.R. P.A. 14/5 JH:

MC OUT 888

11 May 43

1004A

Jh

EQUALS BRITISH SECRET

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1693

7

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785015

(COPY)

NAVAL MESSAGE.

10A

TO: C IN C MED

FROM: V.A. MALTA

IMPORTANT RUSH MOST SECRET B I G O T

Following for Lieutenant-Commander MARTELLI Psychological Warfare Section from Fayhurst France.

Leaflets did not arrive May 8th.

2. Please confirm that your R.A.F. received them in good time.
3. R.A.F. here ask for delivery earlier than one day before dropping.
4. Your paragraph 4. Yes, will telegraph quantities tomorrow.

091605B

Distribution by G(P)
MTCOT

G(P)
11 May 43.

P.A.

12/5/43

HEADQUARTERS
12 MAY 1943
DATE :
N: 781/1692
F 141

6807

①

Ref. ⑤. This tel. is alt for CH. action
but Maxwell and Spofford should keep
in touch with WRC about the propaganda
line, and get me a copy of the directive
reference to.

2. I agree with ④ which was the outcome
of a meeting between Mr. Maclean (WRC)
and myself. If there is a record of the
meeting, I would like to have it. Ask
Col. Clark.

J. 28/4

Col. Spofford ②
Col. Maxwell.

If you wish to deal with "pans" in the
action to me I will obtain the second of the
meeting referred to in para 2. I have spoken to

QA

2. I agree with (2) what was the outcome
of a meeting between Mr. Maclean (1950)
and myself. If there is a record of the
meeting, I would like to have it. Ask
Col. Clark.

J. 28/4

Col. Spafford (2)
Col. Maclean.

If you wish check with James (a Mac-
lean) to see I will obtain the record of the
meeting referred to in para 2. I have spoken to
Col. Clark; stopp about it.

1691

28/4
J. Maclean
Gr.

8.12.2

Q-28+10-

INFORMATION CENSORSHIP SECTION

SECRET - BICOT - HUSKY

LT. COL. K. W. C. K.

Ref. INC/001

ROUT

INC IS INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION AFHQ WHICH CONSISTS THREE BRANCHES X

PUBLIC RELATIONS X PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE X CENSORSHIP X PLANS SUBMITTED BY INC

AFHQ TO FORCE 141 RECOMMEND X FURTHER REFERENCE FORTUNE 93 AND NUMBER 6202 X

TO MARSHALL SIGNED EISENHOWER FROM MCCLURE X ESTABLISHMENT INC SECTION 141

CONSISTING THREE OFFICERS ONE ASSIGNED FROM EACH THREE BRANCHES INC AFHQ WITH ONE

THESE OFFICERS DESIGNATED CHIEF SECTION X THIS BASIS POLICY RECOMMENDED X INC

SECTION 141 WILL MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON WITH INC SECTION AFHQ TO INSURE THAT AFHQ

POLICIES AS MODIFIED BY LOCAL CONDITIONS ARE EXECUTED WITHIN MEANS MADE AVAILABLE X

OPERATING PROCEDURE RECOMMENDED X INC 141 SHALL BE OPERATING AGENCY FOR 141

INSOFAR AS AREAS ACTIVE COMBAT CONCERNED X INC AFHQ WILL RELIEVE 141 OF THIS

RESPONSIBILITY AS RAPIDLY AS TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS THEREBY FREEDING TACTICAL

COMMANDER OF ANY STATIC OPERATIONS WITHIN FIELD OF INC X SUCH PERSONNEL AND

EQUIPMENT AS ARE AVAILABLE WILL BE PROVIDED BY INC AFHQ BALANCE PROVIDED BY 141 X

ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE ASSIGN SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT ASSAULT PHASE FOLLOWUPS

HANDLE PRESS MAIL TELEPHONE TELEGRAPH CENSORSHIP X CONDUCT PROPAGANDA RELATED

ACTIVITIES BEHALF ALLIED CAUSE X UTILIZED LOCAL MEDIA INCLUDING RADIO STATIONS

CARRY OUT DIRECTIVES POLICIES BOTH GOVERNMENTS THROUGH C IN C AND IN CLOSEST

COOPERATION MILITARY ADMINISTRATION X FOLLOWING AMONG MEDIA BE USED X BROADCASTS

NEWSPAPERS PERIODICALS LOUDSPEAKERS PAMPHLETS BOOKS LEAFLETS PHOTOGRAPHS MOTION

PICTURES POSTERS LECTURES ADDRESSES MEETINGS DISPLAYS WORD OF MOUTH CAMPAIGN X

LOUDSPEAKER SET AND PORTABLE BROADCASTING SET BE SENT EACH EAST AND WEST SOON AS

POSSIBLE AFTER LANDINGS X CONTEMPLATED PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE EXERCISE SUPERVISORY

CONTROLLOCAL BROADCASTING STATIONS NEWSPAPERS PUBLICATIONS X PLANNED PUBLISH

TWO PAGE NEWSPAPERS IN ENGLISH ITALIAN EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME AFTER ASSAULT AND

CONTINUE PUBLICATION UNTIL PROPER ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY INC PERMIT LOCAL NEWSPAPERS

785015

OPERATING PROCEDURE RECOMMENDED X INC 141 SHALL BE OPERATING AGENCY FOR 141
 INSOFAR AS AREAS ACTIVE COMBAT CONCERNED X INC AFHQ WILL RELIEVE 141 OF THIS
 RESPONSIBILITY AS RAPIDLY AS TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS THEREBY FREEDING TACTICAL
 COMMANDER OF ANY STATIC OPERATIONS WITHIN FIELD OF INC X SUCH PERSONNEL AND
 EQUIPMENT AS ARE AVAILABLE WILL BE PROVIDED BY INC AFHQ BALANCE PROVIDED BY 141 X
 ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE ASSIGN SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT ASSAULT PHASE FOLLOWUPS
 HANDLE PRESS MAIL TELEPHONE TELEGRAPH CENSORSHIP X CONDUCT PROPAGANDA RELATED
 ACTIVITIES BEHALF ALLIED CAUSE X UTILIZED LOCAL MEDIA INCLUDING RADIO STATIONS
 CARRY OUT DIRECTIVES POLICIES BOTH GOVERNMENTS THROUGH C IN C AND IN CLOSEST
 COOPERATION MILITARY ADMINISTRATION X FOLLOWING AMONG MEDIA BE USED X BROADCASTS
 NEWSPAPERS PERIODICALS LOUDSPEAKERS PAMPHLETS BOOKS LEAFLETS PHOTOGRAPHS MOTION
 PICTURES POSTERS LECTURES ADDRESSES MEETINGS DISPLAYS WORD OF MOUTH CAMPAIGN X
 LOUDSPEAKER SET AND PORTABLE BROADCASTING SET BE SENT EACH EAST AND WEST SOON AS
 POSSIBLE AFTER LANDINGS X CONTEMPLATED PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE EXERCISE SUPERVISORY
 CONTROL LOCAL BROADCASTING STATIONS NEWSPAPERS PUBLICATIONS X PLANNED PUBLISH
 TWO PAGE NEWSPAPERS IN ENGLISH ITALIAN EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME AFTER ASSAULT AND
 CONTINUE PUBLICATION UNTIL PROPER ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY INC PERMIT LOCAL NEWSPAPERS
 RESUME PUBLICATION X LEAFLETS WILL BE DROPPED DURING AFTER ASSAULTS X PRESENT
 BROADCASTING ACTIVITIES INC AFHQ BE CONTINUED FROM NORTH AFRICA TO OCCUPIED
 TERRITORY EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

Distribution: "A" Branch
 Civil Affairs
 D.C.G.S.

ALL COPIES MUST BE SHOWN TO duly
 accredited unofficial researchers Order
 Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

411410

SECRET
(E) BIGOT

SECRET

British MOST SECRET

AFHQ
INCOMING MESSAGE

CLASS: MOST SECRET BIGOT
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

REF. NO. CC/221

BIGOT

FROM: MIDEAST

TO AIR MINISTRY SPECIAL SIGNAL OFFICE RPTD FREEDOM
FOLLOWING FROM COMMANDERS IN CHIEF TO CHIEFS OF STAFF
DATE: April 262045C

1. Although not directly concerned with HUSKY from the operational or planning point of view, we are forwarding you our views on the Propaganda Warfare angle of the operation since we have had the advantage, over a long period, of obtaining first hand information regarding the feeling and morale of the Italian Armed Forces. This information has been obtained from Prisoners of War and other sources exclusive to the Middle East.
2. We consider, contrary to popular belief, that the Italians will fight with much more determination in Defence of Italy itself than they have in Africa, or would in defence of occupied or outlying territories. An intense love of country, as distinct from comparative indifference to empire, will be primary inducement of Italians to fight and means must be found to neutralise, counterbalance or even exploit to our advantage this feeling.
3. In our opinion, therefore, a carefully prepared and intensive propaganda campaign must be an essential part of operation HUSKY. Doubtless you have already this in mind but we have no knowledge of special instructions having been issued to PWE for HUSKY. We therefore record below for your information our views on the line to be followed.
4. Existing propaganda which appears to be designed
 - (A) To impress on Italians magnitude of coming disaster
 - (B) To split Axis. Is excellent from long term point of view but seems unlikely to us to achieve important results before HUSKY. We consider more positive line of approach is required.
5. Any clarification of our intentions towards Italy would have far reaching results. The Italians are led by their own propaganda machine to believe that defeat will mean the end of Italy and permanent impoverishment of the country by Bolshevisation. We must neutralise this if necessary by playing on previous and traditional good relationship of Anglo Saxons and Italians. We should point contrast between almost inevitable permanent occupation by Germany if Axis should win, and prospect of fair treatment and access to world markets promised by Atlantic Charter.
6. Further to exploit Italians love of country, we should emphasise our overwhelming superiority in arms. Particularly in the air, which makes defeat inevitable no matter how the people may fight. As a complement to this we should point out that the destruction of Italian towns, factories, monuments and civilian life which is an inescapable accompaniment of war in Italy is due to the use of Italian soil. Italian lives, Italian labour and war equipment by Germany for German interests. The longer Italian resistance, the greater will be the destruction.

1689

A

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SECRET

British MOST SECRET

Ref. No. CC/221 BIGOT

SECRET

BIGOT

REF. NO. CC/221 2620450

BIGOT

7. We should not sneer at Italian prowess to date since this may act as incentive to reverse form when playing on home ground. We should convince them that their cause is a hopeless one and is anyway not their own. We should, however, exploit widespread lack of confidence among Italians in their high command and in the competency or honesty of senior officers.

8. We should not set also unreservedly Fascist regime which has many tangible and material achievements to its account but should make it clear our quarrel is with those men and the part of the system responsible for war.

9. During HUSKY itself, the spreading of false rumours, etc., by agents in Freedom stations, etc., may have important results and we suggest, if not already arranged, a comprehensive and carefully aimed plan should be prepared now as an essential part of the operation.

10. Finally, any increase in radio or leaflets to Italy will be valuable. We intend to intensify our propaganda in the Dodecanese and Greece to the limit of our resources.

ACTION: 5 Force 141

INFORMATION: 1 G-3
1 Sec GS

HFX ton

REC'D April 270828A

Ref. No. CC/221

SECRET

SECRET

BIGOT

HEADQUARTERS
DATE: 27 APR 1943
Nr: 7951
FORCE 141

1 page
100/606
April 24 2045C

File
No action at present let keep in touch with INC
28/4

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

A F H Q
OUTGOING MESSAGE**BIGOT**

CLASS : SECRET BIGOT-HUSKY

REF: 7161

PREC : PRIORITY

TO : TROOPERS FOR KENNEDY DMO

SIGNED : C IN C

Joint OWI-PWE Directive had as objective withdrawal Italian Troops from Balkans to defenses Italy. Objection to this line taken here. See USFOR cable 2633 dated April 24th 2113Z for their justification. Unknown here whether they are in future operation picture. Some high official of PWE should be posted. While we approve increasing unrest among Italians we do not wish Italian defenses increased. However, if this propaganda line is desired as part of the cover plan and will not adversely affect HUSKY, we have no objection to it being followed.

ORIGINATED BY : INC

AUTHENTICATION: DAN GILMER
COLONEL, G.S.C.

INFORMATION : 1 G-3 Plans
1 Sec G/S
1 Force 141
2 DTC
1 C in C Med

1 MAC
1 AG Records
1 CAO
1 INC
1 AG Cables

BIGOT

1683

Equals British MOST SECRET

Apr 26 1754A LRC/rad

FILED: April 26 1754A

7161

4. Col. Spofford
4. Col. Maxwell.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. Let us keep propaganda - policy and organization separate in our minds. This deals with organization.
2. During the planning phase one member of the planning staff shared with in a joint staff committee (WFO & PWT) to ensure that the propaganda which is directed at Horvick is consistent with our political directive and does not contain either promises or threats which cannot be implemented by the Civil Administration.
3. In the administrative stage, propaganda should in my view be dealt with by the Chief Secretary and his Assistant and not by an ad hoc division. The reason is that propaganda in Horvick is a direct concern of and directly affects the policy under which Civil Administration is conducted. That policy is the function of the Chief Secretary and the CEAO.

Planning Staff should sit in a joint staff committee (JWC or JWE) to ensure that the propaganda which is directed at Hornified is consistent with our political directives and does not contain either promises or threats which cannot be implemented by the Civil Administration.

3. In the administrative stage, propaganda should in my view be dealt with by the Chief Secretary and his Assistant and not by an ad hoc division. The reason is that propaganda in Hornified is a direct concern of and directly affects the policy under which Civil Administration is conducted. That policy is the function of the Chief Secretary and the CEAO.

4. I am opposed in the early stage, at any rate, to the Civil Administration dealing and carrying out the propaganda itself. It should be and direct and may contribute to the various propaganda organization which already exist, e.g. PSE, JWC, Min. of. , War of. , etc. For CA to set up another

propaganda machine with copy center
copy machine and duplicate and
complete with existing machine.

5. You agree please draft up
to working by Tel. accordingly.

Perwell.

14/6/63

14/6/63

1 page

14/6/63

to Washington Tel. according

Peru

14/4/43

authorities in Peru are in a state of confusion and are unable to give any definite information. The situation is very serious and it is expected that the government will soon be forced to take drastic measures. The situation is very serious and it is expected that the government will soon be forced to take drastic measures.

1 page
14/6/43
No. 5
100/606

785015

COPY

A.F.H.Q.

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: AGHAR DATE: APRIL 162253Z REF. NO: FORTUNE 111

RSD: 170204A PRC: PRIORITY CLASS: SECRET

HUSKY
 "EDITED LITERAL TEXT"
 THIS IN REPLY TO REF 163 FAN 117, FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
 FOR KISENHOWER, FORTUNE ALIERS, AND USFOR LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, with the concurrence of the State Dept., and British Foreign Office, have approved the following statement of policy upon which plans for Psychological Warfare including propaganda should be developed with regard to operation. Begin: Statement of policy.

"It is important to distinguish between the policy to be pursued up to the moment of the invasion of Italy and the policy to be pursued after that period. In the first period, a firm line should be followed, without any promises, and should emphasize the following 4 points as the basis of joint British - American propaganda:

Point 1: We should lose no opportunity to point out the hopelessness of Italy's present position in the war to the Italian people.

Point 2: The war against Italy should be pursued by attacking by land and sea and air upon all possible occasions and with all possible force.

Point 3: By all possible means, passive resistance and sabotage of the Italian war effort should be encouraged.

Point 4: Appeals to premature revolt or ridicule of the Italian Armed Forces or the Italian people should be avoided.

Immediately before invasion takes place, and for the period succeeding the assault, this line should be modified to the extent of holding out some ray of hope to the Italian's about their future, the Allies being presented in the guise not of conquerors but of liberators.

The following point should then be added:

Point 5: We should hold out assurances that Italy will survive as a nation after the defeat of the Fascist Government, without making any specific territorial commitment."

DISTRIBUTION BY C (PLANS):

Inc.
 Civil Affairs.

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DISTRIBUTION BY C (PLANS):

Inc.
Civil Affairs.

G (Plans),
17 Apr 43.

To CCAO:

1688
E.

*You will like to see the nature
It seems to be sufficient at this stage for
INC Plans to be sent. M- G.A.*

E

785015

14A

ARRQ
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: AGWAR
TO: NO: FORTUNE III
DATE: APRIL 162253Z
CLASS: SECRET

REC'D: 170204A
PRIORITY

HUSKY

"EDITED LITERAL TEXT"

THIS IN REPLY TO NAF 163 PAN 117, FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR EISENHOWER, FORTUNE, ALGERS, AND US FOR LONDON FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, with the concurrence of the State Dept. and British Foreign Office, have approved the following statement of policy upon which plans for Psychological Warfare including propaganda should be developed with regard to operation. Begin; Statement of policy.

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ACTION: 5 G-3

INFORMATION: 1 Sec GS 2 G in C med 1 DMC
1 G-1 2 Air C in C Med 1 CG SO S NATOUSA
3 G-4 1 Q(Maint) 5 FORCE 141
3 U.S. Navy 1 AG Cables

REF: NO: FORTUNE III

DATE: APRIL 162253Z

REF VMO

of a cable received by G-(P), of which 1 copy was sent to

Point 1: We should lose no opportunity to point out the hopelessness of Italy's present position in the war to the Italian people.

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INFORMATION: 1 Sec GS 2 C in C med 1 DTC
1 G-1 2 Air C in C Med 1 CG SO S NATOUSA
3 G-4 1 Q(Maint) 5 FORCE 141
3 U.S. Navy 1 AF Cables

REF VMC

DATE: APRIL 162253Z

REF. NO: FORTUNE 111

Note: This is a copy of a cable received by G-(P), of which 1 copy was sent to us.

The original copy was given to Col. Clark, INC.

1685

1 page
100/606
Apr 16 2253Z

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

CIVIL AFFAIRS, FORN 141

SECRET - RUCAT - HUSKY

Lt. Col. C. E. Spofford

AGFAR

FORN, ALCING

CA/007

APR 151445A

ROUTINE

3X
PLACING ON PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES TO HANDLE PROPAGANDA AND POLICIES IN CONNECTION
WITH MATTERS REFERRED TO FORN 93 IN CHARGE INC X PLAN SUBMITTED BY INC TO
FORN 141 PROVIDE FOR INC STAFF TO BE ATTACHED FORN 141 DURING BOTH PLANNING AND
OPERATIONAL PHASES X SIGNED MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHALL X INFORMATION ON THIS WILL
BE COMMUNICATED SEPARATELY BY INC X METHOD OF COORDINATION BETWEEN INC STAFF AND
AGFAR NOW UNDER DISCUSSION AS TO WHICH WILL ADVISE YOU FURTHER

Distribution:

INC
D.C.C.S.
"A" Branch
Float
Master message

This copy only NOT BE SHOWN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

1684

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

BIGOT

A F H Q
INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: AGHAR

DATE: APR 13553Z

REF: FORTUNE 93

INFO: APR 130924A

PREC: ROUTINE

CLASS: SECRET

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

BIGOT

FROM MARSHALL TO EISENHOWER

Plan chart Military Government brought by HOLMES does not provide a Staff Division or personnel and facilities to handle propaganda and policies as to local press radio broadcasts civilian censorship. We understand that plans for such services are being made in AFHQ. We should like to have a report on how it is intended these matters will be handled in connection with operations.

ACTION: 5 Force 1/1

INFORMATION: 1 Socy G/S
(LCS/osc)1 G-1
3 G-3
3 G-42 C in C, Med
2 C in C, Hod
1 Q(Maint)
5 Force 1/1

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

1 CG SOS MATOUSA
3 US Navy
1 AG Cables

1683

E

APR 13553Z

FORTUNE 93

see file 7801.

TOP SECRET

Extracts from Memorandum
of Brigadier Moulton-Perryman
17 March 1943 on Subject of
Intelligence Lessons from
North Africa

Reference 7951 (2A)
Propaganda
Policy

1 page
100/606
17 Mar 43

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

listed as
17 Apr

DCGS.

This is done as soon as
possible in all occupied
territories - in this case it
will be done by IVC and
CA jointly. Expect 1682

785015

lasted a bit.
17 Apr.

O.C.G.S.

This is done as soon as
possible in all occupied
territories. In this case it
will be done by INC and
CA jointly, expect 1682

14/4/43
General.
High.

(5) The organization of a newspaper for the troops is suggested based on
news received by radio.

(Form 141 - Copied 13 April, 1943)

SECRET

3X

- (1e INC)

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| 8 2 5 |