

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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BIGOT, ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES
COMMITTEE (EUROPE)
JULY 1942 - MAR. 1943

10 pp

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RE-DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM ON A.T.(E) BANKING FACILITIES (at 7A.), incorporating amendments in letter from Mr. Lithby dated 7th Aug. 1942, (at 8A.) and Note on meeting held at the Treasury on 19th August (at 12A.)

1. So long as we are concerned only with the immediate scene of military operations, it is not necessary to consider the provision of banking facilities.

But, as soon as possible after a town is cleared of the enemy, it is desirable that a banking service should be available:

- (a) as a matter of convenience to enable the Army (and the civil population if they so desire) to pay by cheque;
- (b) to reduce the number of notes required by encouraging the use of cheques and by facilitating the clearance and reissue of notes.

General Policy.

2. As a matter of general policy, we should try and get the local Banks to re-open but, if this is not practicable or they will not co-operate, we should be ready to open a Bank of our own.

3. It is impossible to foresee what conditions will be during the earlier stages of our occupation or to what extent local Banks will be able to function owing to:

- (a) destruction of records, etc.,
- (b) absence, or unwillingness to collaborate, of legally indispensable personnel.

4. If the local branch of the Central Bank refuses to co-operate, it will be necessary to select another local Bank to act as the local central Bank. The choice of this Bank is probably better left to the local Banks function, the British Military Authority will at some stage have to establish their own Bank

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4. If the local branch of the Central Bank refuses to co-operate, it will be necessary to select another local Bank to act as the local central Bank. The choice of this Bank is probably better left to the local Banks function, the British Military Authority will at some stage have to establish their own Bank in each town, both for Army and civilian business, in which case it will be advisable to recruit personnel from local banking staff wherever possible. This organisation should have a name with a popular appeal and Service Bancaire des Armees Aliées is suggested.

Organization and Procedure.

5. The C.C.A.O. will have under him a banking expert and a few banking personnel who will, according to circumstances:

(a) guide the local Banks,
(b) act as Managers of the Service Bancaire des Armees Aliées.

6. It may be that on arrival we shall find the banks closed, in which case we shall/

-2-

we shall have to concentrate on getting things going again. If, however, the Banks are open, a limitation on the withdrawal of deposits from the French banks should be avoided if possible, but such a limitation would be preferable to the issue of B.M.A. notes. It may be found necessary to place a limit on withdrawals and to consider (after hearing the local bankers) whether a more general moratorium is, in spite of its obvious disadvantages, inevitable. In any case owing to their peculiar constitution it will be necessary to institute a moratorium for the Savings Banks. If any form of general moratorium is declared, the proclamation should include a reopening date for banks (to apply to selected local banks if they are willing to collaborate: alternatively to the opening of the B.M.A. bank.) The C.C.A.O. or his banking representative will call a conference of bankers and request their collaboration, etc. He will outline the measures to be taken and consult them as to details of application. These measures will include the complete severance of local Banks for their Head Offices in enemy territory and the blocking of all accounts of persons or institutions resident in enemy territory, etc. No Bank refusing to co-operate in these measures will be permitted to carry on business.

7. A limit on withdrawals may have to be maintained for a while, because among other reasons, the assets covering such balances will presumably remain for some time under enemy control. The maximum assets that will remain at the disposal of the local banks will be:

- (a) Cash in the till,
- (b) Cash reserves of the local branch of the Central Bank (which should immediately, as a precautionary measure, be placed under military custody), and there may be very little of them left owing to enemy action.

The Banks in each district should be required to pool their cash resources and to make an estimate of their liabilities so that, after the measures referred

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The Banks in each district should be required to pool their cash resources and to make an estimate of their liabilities so that, after the measures referred to in paragraph 6 have been taken, they can determine whether any limitation of withdrawal of deposits is necessary. In deciding this matter they should take into account the currency which will be deposited by the B.M.A. and the cash required by the Army for pay of the troops, civilian wages, payments for supplies etc. In fixing any such limits account must also be taken of wages bills of factories. The position will be reviewed from time to time with the object of revising these restrictions as soon as is practicable.

In order to avoid as far as possible, the disappearance through hoarding etc,

of any/

of any French (or other) currency notes brought by the Expeditionary Force and ensure for as long as possible a supply of currency for the Army, it would be advisable, in the first instance, for such notes to be held in store; only such portion as was deemed advisable being injected into the banking system through the opening of an account.

8. The advice of local banking firms (as opposed to branch managers of Paris Banks) is likely to be most useful in determining the degree and nature of restrictions to be applied; the most influential regional are (i) Credit du Nord, (ii) Banque Louis Dupont et Cie, of which the former seems the more suitable for our purposes.

9. B.M.A. will wherever practicable deposit their funds with local branches of the Central Bank or other "reserve" banks. The issue of B.M.A. notes should, if possible, be avoided but if it is found necessary to use B.M.A. notes then these Banks will be employed in issuing and clearing them. These reserve banks will also administer the exchange control under the supervision of the Controller of Banks, and all foreign exchange transactions will be canalised through them. If the local Banks do not co-operate, the Service Bancaire des Armees Aliees will carry out these functions.

10. Any sterling balances accumulated by the local Banks in the course of the business indicated in para.9. will be available for payments throughout the sterling area.

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A T (E) P (42) 4 ✓

Telephone etc.

A T (E) P (42) 7 ✓

(43) 3 ✓
(43) 14 ✓

Tr

A T (E) P (42) 8 ✓

(42) 25 ✓

Propaganda

A T (E) P (42) 10 ✓

Finance

A T (E) P (43) 12 ✓

US organization

A T (E) P (43) 10 ✓

Staff Course

A T (E) P (42) 11 ✓

(43) 8 ✓

Food
Vitamins

A T (E) P (42) 21 ✓

(42) 35 ✓

Law & Budget

A T (E) P (42) 23, ✓

29 ✓

37 ✓

Medical 1885

War Office File No.:

32/Postal/2060.



ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

SECRET.

Previous References:

A.T.(E)/M(42)1:
Conclusion (5)(c).
A.T.(E)/M(42)2:
Minute 10 (iii).

Paper No.:

A.T.(E)/P(42)4.
14th July, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

TELEPHONES, TELEGRAPHS AND POSTAL SERVICES.

(Memorandum by D.D.M.O. (H) for consideration by the Committee at their third meeting on 16th July, 1942.)

1. In accordance with Minute 5 of the first meeting of the Committee I attached at Appendix A a report by the Director of Signals on the maintenance of civil telephones and telegraphs in Europe.

The report recommends that the P.M.G. should be asked to nominate an official from the G.P.O. for the appointment of a Director of Posts and Telegraphs on the staff of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer and that the officer should undertake such preliminary planning as necessary.

For the information of the Committee, I have set out in greater detail below some of the problems which have to be solved.

2. The civil administration, whether under martial law or not, cannot begin to function if deprived of means of communication. Army facilities will be fully employed on Army business and will not be able to accept extra traffic. It will therefore be necessary to improvise a system for the use of the administration until the normal systems can be repaired and restored.

3. From the outset the civil administration will require communications for the following purposes:-

Law and order: intercommunication between police stations, prisons communication between police stations, prisons

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3. From the outset the civil administration will require communications for the following purposes:-

Law and order: intercommunication between police stations, communication between police stations, prisons and courts;
communication between police H.Q. and military H.Q.;

Food relief: intercommunication between central control and distributing agencies;

Transport: communication for traffic control by railways, roads and canals;

Public utilities: communication between central authority and water works, power and light stations, fire stations;

General administration: communication between central authority and outlying centres beyond urban limits as well as with important centres within urban limits - banks, markets, docks, hospitals, rescue centres.

- 2 -

4. The emergency measures to provide communication required for the purposes given above can be divided into two categories:-

- (i) measures to meet local demands of small radius;
- (ii) measures to meet 'trunk' demands for long distances.

(i) Small radius demands might be met by:-

- (a) temporary telephone lines (provided the minimum equipment is made available) utilising such short distance air or ground lines as may have escaped destruction and prove adaptable;
- (b) motor-cycle and bicycle despatch riders;
- (c) where essential, the provision of small "walkie-talkie" radio sets.

(ii) The requirements on longer distances would probably have to be met by motor cycle despatch riders pending some restoration of the telegraph and/or telephone systems; and even then it is to be assumed that the Army would require the use of most lines so restored.

It is to be assumed that the maximum use will be made of the local post and telegraph administration and that British control should be as unobtrusive as possible.

5. The economic life of the community will be largely suspended until some means of communication for general public use is opened: e.g. distributors will need to communicate with the Food Supply Control, with wholesalers and with one another. Within a small area this can be done by personal visit, but beyond these limits something more is necessary, especially as movement will be controlled or restricted.

On grounds of security, telephone facilities cannot be opened to general use for some time.

Telegraph or post facilities even if available can be opened to the public only if they can be censored.

If arrangements can be made for censorship, the rudimentary postal system over a limited area could be established by road-bus or trucks using the existing post offices and personnel. This, however, will require stocks of stamps and essential P.O. equipment such as post-marking machinery.

6. From the above it is clear that the Director of Posts and Telegraphs would need to co-ordinate his planning in the office of the

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6. From the above it is clear that the Director of Posts and Telegraphs would need to co-ordinate his planning in the office of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer with the plans regarding law and order, food relief, transportation, public utilities, salvage and restoration, and other departments of the general administration.

It would also have to be integrated with the plans of the Signal Officer - in-Chief.

7. The foregoing applies to any territory, but different aspects of the problem would have different emphasis in different terrains. In Norway, for example, the restoration of land lines would be of great importance; in France and Belgium the maximum use could be made of bicycles.

8. It is suggested, therefore, that the Committee should accept, in principle, the recommendation made by the Director of Signals, that a Director of Posts and Telegraphs for the staff of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer be nominated.

(Intd.) T. R.

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF SIGNALS ON THE MAINTENANCE OF

CIVIL TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPHS IN EUROPE.

1. The conditions visualised fall into two phases:-

First:

A period of martial law during which the commander in the field will directly control the civil administration.

Second:

When direct control is handed over to the indigenous Central Government, military interests being safeguarded by liaison officers in the different Government departments.

2. It is anticipated that a very thorough "scorched earth" policy will have been carried out, and that most of the telephone exchanges, switching centres, repeaters and trunk routes will have been destroyed or damaged. Local circuits are likely to be affected to a lesser degree.

3. Speedy repair is likely to be complicated by the fact that British telegraph equipment differs from that used in parts of Europe, notably France, and cannot therefore be used on the same circuits in all cases.

4. The first essential, from the civilian point of view, is likely to be the restoration of local communications; followed as soon as possible by trunk facilities. The latter are most likely to conflict with military needs.

5. The appointment of a Director of Posts and Telegraphs on the staff of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer would be of great assistance to the Signal Officer-in-Chief of the expeditionary force as he would relieve the latter of responsibility for civil communications.

6. During the first phase, while the military commander is in direct control, the Director of Posts and Telegraphs would have to act under the instructions of the Signal Officer-in-Chief as regards tele-communications, but such could be done during this phase by restoring civil communications with the aid of the existing resources in indigenous personnel and such material as can be made available.

7. When the second phase is reached, the Director of Posts and Telegraphs will require an adequate number of subordinates to take control of the various civil areas.

8. It is recommended that the Postmaster-General be asked to nominate an official of the G.P.O. for the appointment of Director of Posts and Telegraphs, so that he can undertake such preliminary planning as may be possible. I regard it as most important that the Director of Posts and Telegraphs should be British, though he may conveniently have a proportion

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8. It is recommended that the Postmaster-General be asked to nominate an official of the G.P.O. for the appointment of Director of Posts and Telegraphs, so that he can undertake such preliminary planning as may be possible. I regard it as most important that the Director of Posts and Telegraphs should be British, though he may conveniently have a proportion of foreign nationals in his staff.

War Office File No. :

120/Gen. 1/1704.



ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

SECRET.

Previous References:

A.T.(E)/1(42)1:
Conclusion (5)(b).
A.T.(E)/1(42)2:
Minute 10(11).

Paper No.:

A.T.(E)/F(42)7.

21st July, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

TRANSPORTATION.

(Memorandum by D. G. M. G. for consideration by the Committee at their fourth meeting on 23rd July, 1942.)

1. I attach herewith a memorandum by Brigadier Greig (Annex A), who was employed on the Transportation Staff at the Peace Conference at Versailles 1918/19, and afterwards with the Army of Occupation on the Rhine. In these capacities he had considerable personal experience of the measures necessary to control a very disorganised and broken-down system of European railways. In particular, while at the Peace Conference, he was in continual touch with the Communications Section under Brigadier-General Sir Osborne Manoe.

2. From a study of this memorandum it appears that, from a transportation point of view, the period to be considered is divisible into certain phases:-

Phase I. Liberated territories limited to areas of active military operations.

Phase II. Liberated territories extended to include areas apart from active operations, but excluding the main centre of communications of the country concerned, i.e. such cities as Paris or Brussels.

Phase III. Liberated territories extended to include the main centres of communications.

Phase IV. When active operations have ceased within the frontiers of the country concerned, but an armistice has not been concluded.

Phase V. After an armistice has been concluded.

3. During Phase I the whole area will be the scene of military operations, and the full efforts of the available military transportation

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Phase IV. When active operations have ceased within the frontiers of the country concerned, but an armistice has not been concluded.

Phase V. After an armistice has been concluded.

3. During Phase I the whole area will be the scene of military operations, and the full efforts of the available military transportation services will be directed to establishing such transportation communications as can be got going to meet requirements of the military forces. During this phase civil demands would have to be fitted in to the military programme, and the extent to which they would be met would rest with the military commander. It would be essential at this time for the Civil Commissioner attached to the C.-in-C. to have a Transportation Section working under him, and in the closest contact with the Director of Movements and Transportation on the military side.

4. Phase II would be a most difficult period, as it would be extremely difficult to get any decent system of transportation communications ~~going~~ ^{80%} until the city containing the control of the country had been occupied. During this period, the Transportation Section under the Civil Commissioner would have to take over such lesser nodal points as were available, and do their best to re-establish some form of transportation system. At this stage the original Transportation Section would certainly need reinforcement.

- 2 -

5. During Phase III a Transportation Commission would have to be set up at the headquarters of the railway administration concerned. It, as I imagine would be the case, military control would still be in force, this Commission should have a strong military flavour. It will, of course, be responsible to the C-in-C., via the Chief Civil Commissioner. I do not see this Commission being formed from the original Transportation Section attached to G.H.Q., though it would be desirable for it to have representatives from this Section on its staff. At the same time, military traffic would still have an over-riding priority and the Commission would, therefore, have to take its orders in so far as this is concerned from the C-in-C.
6. During Phase IV it is possible that the whole of the country may be taken over by a Civil Commission, but L. of C. requirements of the forces would still need priority.
7. During Phase V a situation analogous to that which arose after the armistice in the last war would again arise, and the delineation between military and civil would, presumably, be worked on similar lines.
8. From the above it appears that the head of the Civil Commission, who will be on the staff of the C-in-C., will require under him a transportation official of great experience, to plan and organise the necessary arrangements for the various phases envisaged. It is difficult to say when this appointment should be filled. At the moment, although there would be a considerable amount of investigation and devilling to do, it does not appear that there would be a full time job for an individual of this calibre. On the other hand, this work cannot, unfortunately, be added to that of the Director of Transportation. War Office, or his existing staff, who are already more than fully occupied with current problems. It would, however, be possible for Brigadier Greig (Inspector of Transportation) to help in this connection to a limited extent. In order to get the matter going, I suggest that the head transportation official should be nominated now, that he should be put in the picture, and that one permanent staff officer be added to D.Tr.'s staff, with the object of devoting himself to this problem. This officer would be earmarked as part of the staff of the senior transportation official, and would carry out his investigations on lines to be laid down by him, and assisted as necessary by Brigadier Greig, who could be earmarked as the senior military member of this official's staff.
9. In so far as the provision of additional rolling stock is concerned, current demands in North America and this country already more than absorb available capacity until the middle of 1944; in fact, it is doubtful whether it will be possible to meet even these requirements. It is for consideration, therefore, whether it would serve any useful purpose to add to this programme further rolling stock to meet post-war requirements. Such orders could only be met if other vital weapons of war, required for the prosecution of the war, were given a lower priority.

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(Incl.) R.F.F.N.

ATTACH A to
A.T.(E)/P(42)7.

NOTE BY THE INSPECTOR OF TRANSPORTATION ON TRANSPORTATION ASPECTS
OF PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF
LIBERATED TERRITORIES.

1. The transportation problems fall into several phases which are affected both by geographical considerations and by the incidence of successive administrative problems demanding transportation.

2. FIRST PHASE.

Liberated territories limited to areas of active military operations.

In this phase military traffic will not only have absolute priority, but it is likely to absorb a considerable proportion of the transportation capacity and resources available. Communications will have to be maintained principally by transportation troops, and such locomotives and rolling stock as are captured in a workable condition are likely to have to be supplemented by additional imported equipment. Assistance from local civilian staffs will probably be scanty, but arrangements should be organized beforehand to enable the maximum use to be made of them. Such arrangements might include getting in touch beforehand with any senior railway officials of the country concerned who may be available to accompany the field forces and assist in organizing the local personnel. In this phase there will be little scope for the running of relief traffic and relief measures would probably be limited to the issue of essential food under military arrangements.

3. SECOND PHASE.

Liberated territories extended to include areas apart from active operations but excluding Paris (or Brussels).

The importance of Paris (and similarly Brussels) as the centre of the civil railway administration cannot be over-emphasised. Until the Germans have evacuated Paris and the control which they exercise over the transport systems of the country has been replaced by an effective allied military control, it will be practically impossible to organize civil traffic in areas evacuated by the Germans. It is of vital importance, therefore, to establish effective military control in Paris at the earliest possible moment.

4. THIRD PHASE.

Liberated territories extended to include Paris (and similarly Brussels in the case of Belgium).

The first step is the establishment of a Transportation Commission at the headquarters of the French railway administrations with an adequate military organization to ensure that this control is effective, whether with the willing concurrence or otherwise of the French authorities. This

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3. SECOND PHASE.

Liberated territories extended to include areas apart from active operations but excluding Paris (or Brussels).

The importance of Paris (and similarly Brussels) as the centre of the civil railway administrations cannot be over-emphasised. Until the Germans have evacuated Paris and the control which they exercise over the transport systems of the country has been replaced by an effective allied military control, it will be practically impossible to organize civil traffic in areas evacuated by the Germans. It is of vital importance, therefore, to establish effective military control in Paris at the earliest possible moment.

4. THIRD PHASE.

Liberated territories extended to include Paris (and similarly Brussels in the case of Belgium).

The first step is the establishment of a Transportation Commission at the headquarters of the French railway administrations with an adequate military organization to ensure that this control is effective, whether with the willing concurrence or otherwise of the French authorities. This Commission will have for its main function the re-habilitation of the French railway systems and their working with their own staffs under their own civilian officials, with a view to ensuring requirements, not only of military traffic, but those of the civil population.

5. Organisation of Transportation Commission.

In view of its functions the Commission will require ^{to be} allied (i.e. Anglo-American) in character and under the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, if one is appointed. Apart from actual military traffic requirements, the problems with which it will have to deal in the early stages are essentially military in character and the Commission should therefore be a military one. An important function will be in connection with intelligence and planning, i.e. the collection of information as to the

transportation /

transportation resources in the territories concerned and also those at the disposal of the Axis powers. The development of transportation facilities in the liberated territories must proceed according to a long-term integrated plan. At the start it will be necessary to organize all such civil resources in personnel and equipment as are available and probably to supplement these with military technical personnel and equipment. The plan, however, should provide for the allocation and utilization of civil transportation personnel, who may be subsequently liberated, together with locos, rolling stock and other equipment either captured from the Axis powers or to be handed over under armistice terms.

As traffic in connection with measures of relief and reconstruction develops, members of the Commission should be nominated to form the nucleus of a future Communications Section of a Supreme Economic Council or other allied body charged with problems of assistance in administration and subsequent reconstruction of liberated territories. This would relieve the Transportation Military Commission proper of all detailed work on other than purely military requirements. General control would be exercised by the Commission by allocating to the Communications Section for relief, etc., traffic a suitable quota of the transport facilities available either in train timings or, more probably, in the early stages, by an allotment of locomotives and wagens.

6. FOURTH PHASE.

This phase comprises the situation when active operations have ceased within the frontiers of France, either by having passed beyond them or by the incidence of an armistice. At this stage military requirements will probably be met by the allocation of a suitable base area, coupled with the assurance of the necessary number of train timings over the selected railway L. of C. Technical railway operating should, except in the base area, be entirely back in the hands of the civil administration; relief and reconstruction traffic would assume increasing proportions; the Allied Military Railway Commission, as such, would be reduced in its functions and it would gradually be replaced by the Communications Section referred to above, preferably by the transfer of personnel from one to the other. It is necessary that this Communications Section should retain at least a quasi-military character or at any rate have military representation on it until the conclusion of the Peace Treaty to ensure that military requirements in connection with problems with which it will have to deal are adequately safeguarded. Such problems will include the arrangements for the reception and distribution of any locomotives and rolling stock captured from, or handed over by, the Axis powers as a result of armistice or other terms; arrangements for census and reconstruction of rolling stock throughout Western Europe generally; measures to safeguard military or general economic requirements against the demands of private or commercial interests.

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7. Based on experience after the last war a note of warning requires to be sounded on two points :-

(i) Transportation clauses in armistice terms.

Careful planning of these and of the organisation to implement them is necessary beforehand. The quantity of locomotives and rolling stock handed over in the last war was designed to immobilise the German military effort, but the resulting situation created an insoluble congestion problem. The quantities should therefore be limited to the maximum that can be handled and usefully used for relief and reconstruction traffic. Sub-commissions to deal with its reception and allocation to agreed areas will be necessary.

(ii) /

- 3 -

(ii) Representation of interested countries in
Transportation Commissions.

The inclusion of representatives of countries receiving transportation relief in any Transportation Commissions having to make decisions for executive action is undesirable, and in practice leads to complete failure to arrive at any decisions or to initiate action. Prior to liberation of territories the functions of such representatives should be purely advisory, and after liberation the most workable organization is for transportation missions to be sent to the countries concerned and for these missions to act as the channel of communication between the main executive Allied Commission and various national transportation authorities.

(Sgd.) J.P.S. Greig
Brigadier.

13th July, 1942.

Inspector of Transportation.

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War Office File No. :

120/General/1704.



ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

SECRET.

Previous References :

A.T.(E)/A(42)4:
Minute 27.

Paper No. :

A.T.(E)/E(43)3.

12th January, 1943.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS.

(Note by the Chairman for consideration by the Committee at their eighteenth meeting to be held on Thursday, 14th January, 1943.)

1. The following is an extract from a minute by the Director of Transportation, War Office, on the subject of the basis of our transportation requirements for 1943 - 1944:-

"A factor to be borne in mind in relating requirements to production is that the requirements generally are based on military operational needs only, and make no provision for the transportation demands which will arise under the O.C.A.O.'s. organization in connection with emergency rehabilitation and relief under military auspices in liberating territories in Europe. These demands are certain to be very heavy and taken in conjunction with operational requirements will outweigh any production capacity."

2. The above gives rise to the following questions:-

- (i) should the War Office provide for, and production take account of, the rehabilitation of continental railways, etc., for civil purposes, in the same way as we are providing to a limited extent for the food and medical requirements of the civil population?
- (ii) if so, within what limits should this be done, and at what target should we aim?
- (iii) alternatively, should we rely on local continental transportation services for civil relief and rehabilitation requirements?

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(ii) if so, within what limits should this be done, and at what target should we aim?

(iii) alternatively, should we rely on local continental transportation services for civil relief and rehabilitation requirements?

3. It is likely that similar considerations will arise over other aspects of the planning now being undertaken by D.C.C.A.O. But I suggest that if we can evolve certain principles in answer to the above questions, they may prove applicable, mutatis mutandis, to other classes of equipment or stores which may be concerned, and which might be dealt with on similar lines as they arise. The question of availability of supplies may well be the determining factor in particular cases.

(Intd.) F.C.E.

1880

E.

War Office File No.:

120/General/1704.

Previous References:

A.T.(E)/P(42)7.

A.T.(E)/P(43)3.

A.T.(E)/M(43)1.

Conclusion (7).

ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken
to ensure the secrecy of this document.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS.

(Note by the Joint Secretaries.)

1. On the instructions of the Chairman we circulate Appendices A and B for consideration by the Committee at their twenty-third meeting to be held on 25th March, 1943.
2. Appendix A has been prepared by the Inspector of Transportation in accordance with Conclusion (7) of the eighteenth meeting, and shows transportation requirements for essential civil purposes during the first six months.
3. Appendix B has been compiled by D.C.C.A.O. to show the road vehicles, drivers and petrol which would be required for the same purpose if other means of transportation were not available. It also shows, in columns (e) and (f), vehicle and petrol requirements for the medical units envisaged.

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Region - North Western Europe
Transportation Requirements for Essential
Civil Purposes during Period of Military Responsibility for Relief

Note by I. Th.

1. In accordance with Conclusion 7 of Paper A.T.(S)/M (43) I dated 14-Jan-43, an estimate of major items of transportation equipment required for essential civil purposes during the period of military responsibility for relief has been prepared and is given in the attached schedules.

2. Analysis of Requirements.

The items of transportation equipment and stores involved fall into 3 groups -

Group I Items for which special separate provision should be made.

Group II Items for which it is not considered that any special provision need be made on the grounds that they come under one or other of the 2 following categories -

Category A Items such as rails, sleepers and standard railway bridging for repair of damaged lines. It is considered that these will either be of sufficient operational importance to justify repair with military resources or that they can be overcome by the use of local resources or of alternative routes.

Category B Items such as equipment for the repair and operation of inland waterway systems. It is considered that these, although they may be of great importance, are probably not essential in the early stages, and are, in any case, a long term policy.

Group III This includes the large mass of items of minor equipment, spares and expendable stores for which it is suggested that the best method of provision would be by an all-round addition of, say 10% to the general military provision of such items for this theatre.

3. Basis of Calculation.

(i) General. The estimate in Schedule I shows the minimum transportation equipment (coming under Group I) for which separate provision should be made to assist the local transportation administrations in handling and distributing the relief stores for which C.G.A.O. is responsible.

(ii) Tonnes and Areas. The tonnes to be handled are made up of -

(a) Minimum and (b) Special as shown in Schedule II.

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- Group I Items for which special separate provision should be made.
- Group II Items for which it is not considered that any special provision need be made on the grounds that they come under one or other of the 2 following categories -

Category A Items such as rails, sleepers and standard railway bridging for repair or damaged lines. It is considered that these will either be of sufficient operational importance to justify repair with military resources or that they can be overcome by the use of local resources or of alternative routes.

Category B Items such as equipment for the repair and operation of inland railway systems. It is considered that these, although they may be of great importance, are probably not essential in the early stages, and are, in any case, a long term policy.

Group III This includes the replacement of items of minor equipment, spares and expendable stores for which it is suggested that the best method of provision would be by an all-round addition of, say 10%, to the general military provision of such items for this theatre.

3. Basis of Calculation.

(i) General. The estimate in Schedule I shows the minimum transportation equipment (excluding under Group I) for which separate provision should be made to assist the local transportation administrations in handling and distributing the relief stores for which C.O.A.C. is responsible.

(ii) Tonnes and Arms. The tonnage to be handled are made up of -

- (a) The essential food imports as shown in Schedule II.
- (b) An addition of 33% for other relief stores and equipment required by C.O.A.C.

For distribution purposes the lengths of hauls have been worked out on the basis of the regions shown in Column (b) of Schedule II.

(iii) Phasing. The estimate covers a total period of 6 months. It has been assumed that no imports of transportation equipment will be practicable during the first 6 weeks, and the phasing by regions assumed for the subsequent periods from D + 43 to D + 180 is shown in the attached schedules.

/(iv).

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- 2 -

(iv) Priority of Estimates of Individual Items of Equipment. The basis on which individual requirements of major items have been worked out is given in detail in the appropriate schedules.

(a) In the case of locomotives and rolling stock 100% of the locomotive and 50% of the rolling stock requirements have been included in the summarized estimate on the assumption that no locomotives and 50% of the rolling stock will be available from local resources.

(b) The workshop equipment (Schedule VIII) consists of 2 sets, one for France and one for Belgium/Holland, and is based on the maintenance requirements of the number of locomotives and wagons shown in Schedules V and VI.

4. Joint U.K./U.S.A. Requirement.

It should be noted that as the regions included in Schedules II and III cover the whole area likely to be involved, the estimates represent a joint U.K./U.S.A. requirement, but they have not yet been discussed or agreed with the U.S.A. authorities.

5. Provision.

If these requirements, and the general basis of calculation, are approved in principle, it is recommended, in order to avoid setting up a separate stores provision organization under C.C.A.C., that -

(i) Responsibility for provision should be placed on the Transportation Directorate in the War Office.

(ii) The items should be included (in a separate column) in the schedules of military transportation requirements, planned to cover six monthly period corresponding with the first six months of the operations with which they are connected.

6. Schedules are attached as follows -

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| Schedule I | - Summary of principal items of transportation equipment. |
| Schedule II | - Summary of food relief imports. |
| Schedule III | - Phases of the programme of relief import traffic. |
| Schedule IV | - Crane requirements. |
| Schedule V | - Locomotive requirements. |
| Schedule VI | - Rolling stock requirements. |
| Schedule VII | - Locomotive coal requirements. |
| Schedule VIII | - Workshop equipment requirements. |

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shown in Schedules V and VI.

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- Schedule V - Locomotive requirements.
- Schedule VI - Rolling stock requirements.
- Schedule VII - Locomotive coal requirements.
- Schedule VIII - Workshop equipment requirements.

[Signature]
Inspector of Transportation.

EXHIBIT I

Summary of Principal Items of Transportation Equipment & Stores for which Special Provision should be made.

ITEMS	ESTIMATE OF QUANTITIES		REMARKS
	Unit	Quantity	
Cranes, wharf	Number	64	Based on 32 berths. (Various capacities from 1 to 10 tons).
" mobile	-	40	
Locomotives S.G. main line (2-3-0)	-	52	
Locomotives S.G. steam churning (0-6-0)	-	24	
Wagons S.G. 20-ton covered.	-	3250	
Brake vans S.G. 20-ton	-	130	
Loco coal	Tons	35000	
Railway workshop equipment	Sets	2	For details see Schedule VIII.

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Cranes, wharf	Number	64	Based on 32 berths. (Various capacities from 1 to 10 tons).
" mobile	-	40	
Locos S.G. main line (2-3-0)	-	82	
Locos S.G. steam shunting (0-6-0)	-	24	
Wagon S.G. 20-ton covered.	-	3250	
Brake vans S.G. 20-ton	-	150	
Loco coal	Tons	35000	
Railway workshop equipment	Sets	2	For details see Schedule VIII.

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SUMMARY OF IMPORT TONNAGES OF FOOD FROM D + 43 to D + 120(Based on Requirements for Food Relief)

COUNTRY	REGIONS	MONTHLY TONNAGES (000 METRIC TONS)	PER MONTH (TONS AVAILABLE)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
FRANCE	F 1	3.8	12,500
	F 2	2.3	
	F 3	3.0	
	F 4	5.1	
	F 5	2.5	
	F 6	1.4	
	Paris	71.2	84,500
	Lille	13.0	
BELGIUM	B 1	40.2	43,000
	B 2	2.6	
HOLLAND	H 1	33.4	36,000
	H 2	0.6	

NOTE: Columns (d) and (e) have been rounded off to allow for slight addition for medical supplies.

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SCHEDULE II

SUMMARY OF IMPORT TONNAGES OF FOOD FROM D + 43 to D + 190

(Based on Requirements for Food Relief)

COUNTRIES	MONTHLY TONNAGES (000 METRIC TONS) (c)	TOTALS	
		PER MONTH (TONS AVOIRDUPOIS) (1)	PER DAY (TONS AVOIRDUPOIS) (e)
1	3.8	18,500	650
2	2.3		
3	3.0		
4	5.1		
5	2.8		
6	1.4		
1	71.2	84,500	2,850
2	13.0		
1	40.2	43,000	1,450
2	2.6		
1	33.4	34,000	1,150
2	0.6		
			6,100

and (e) have been rounded off to allow for slight addition
supplies.

SCHEDULE IIIPHASING OF PROGRAMME
OF RELIEF IMPORT TRAFFIC.

PERIOD	DAILY TONNAGE	REGIONS COVERED
D + 43 to D + 60	600	Any three in France.
D + 60 to D + 90	1500	F 1 to F 6 inclusive, plus reserve of 350 tons per day.
D + 90 to D + 120	4000	F 1 to F 6 inclusive; Paris and Lille; all for reserve in previous period.
D + 120 to D + 150	6500	F 1 to F 6 inclusive; Paris and Lille; B 1 B 2.
D + 150 to D + 160	8000	F 1 to F 6 inclusive; Paris and Lille; B 1 B 2; H 1 and H 2.

No estimates have been considered before D + 43.

SCHEDULE IIIPHASING OF PROGRAMME
OF RELIEF IMPORT TRAFFIC.

DAILY TONNAGE	REGIONS COVERED
600	Any three in France.
1500	F 1 to F 6 inclusive, plus reserve of 350 tons per day.
4000	F 1 to F 6 inclusive; Paris and Lille; allowing for reserve in previous period.
6500	F 1 to F 6 inclusive; Paris and Lille; B 1 and B 2.
8000	F 1 to F 6 inclusive; Paris and Lille; B 1 and B 2; H 1 and H 2.

No estimates have been considered before D + 43.

Estimate of Amount of Quayage and Crane Equipment Required.PORTS

DATE (a)	COUNTRIES (b)	DAILY TONNAGE (c)	DISCHARGE RATE PER FOOT RUN OF QUAY SPACE (d)	LENGTH OF QUAY REQ'D. (FEET) (e)	AVERAGE BERTHS R (1 BERTH = (f)
D + 43 to D + 60	France	600	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	1200	3
D + 60 to D + 90	France	1500	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	3000	6
D + 90 to D + 120	France	4000	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	8000	16
D + 120 to D + 150	France Belgium	4500 2000	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	9000 4000	18 8
D + 150 to D + 180	France Belgium Holland	4500 2000 1500	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton $\frac{1}{2}$ ton $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	9000 4000 3000	18 8 6

NOTES: Column (c).

An average of 2 cranes per berth has been calculated in consideration of possibility of discharge being made partly by ships' derricks and crane.

SCHEDULE IVEstimate of Amount of Quayage and Crane Equipment Required.PORTS

DAILY TONNAGE	DISCHARGE RATE PER FOOT RUN OF QUAY SPACE	LENGTH OF QUAY REQ'D. (FEET)	AVERAGE NO. OF BERTHS REQUIRED (1 BERTH = 500 FT.)	NO. OF CRANES REQUIRED (2 PER BERTH)
(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
600	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	1200	3	6
1500	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	3000	6	12
4000	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	8000	16	32
4500	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	9000	18	36
2000	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	4000	8	16
4500	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	9000	18	36
2000	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	4000	8	16
1500	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton	3000	6	12

(c). An average of 2 cranes per berth has been calculated in consideration of the possibility of discharge being made partly by ships' derricks and partly by crane.

ESTIMATE OF LOCOMOTIVES REQUIRED.

		DAILY TONNAGE FORWARDED		DISTANCE IN MILES		NO. OF TRAINS PER DAY EACH WAY		DAILY TONNAGE	
DATE	COUNTRIES	Ports to Depots	Main Line	Ports to Depots	Main Line	Ports to Depots	Main Line	Ports to Depots	Main Line
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)
D + 43 to D + 60	France	-	600	-	50	-	2x2=4	-	200
D + 60 to D + 90	France	1500	1000	15	100	2x4=8	2x3=6	120	600
D + 90 to D + 120	France	4000	3000	15	150	2x10=20	2x8=16	300	2400
D + 120 to D + 150	France	4500	3500	15	200	2x12=24	2x9=18	360	3600
D + 120 to D + 150	Belgium	2000	1500	15	150	2x5=10	2x4=8	150	1200
D + 150 to D + 180	France	4500	3500	15	200	2x12=24	2x9=18	360	3600
	Belgium	2000	1500	15	150	2x5=10	2x4=8	150	1200
	Holland	1500	800	15	100	2x4=8	2x2=4	120	400

- Assumptions: 1. Lines other than those for the military L. of C. will be used, otherwise maximum of 2.
2. No locos will be found in working order.

- Notes: 1. Column (f). Mileage is assumed having regard to 2 military L. of C. each 200 mil.
Column (g). } average load 400 tons.
Column (h). }
Column (i). } Engine working average 90 miles per day.

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ESTIMATE OF LOCOMOTIVES REQUIRED.

SCHEDULE V.

TONNAGE LOADED	DISTANCE IN MILES		NO. OF TRAINS PER DAY EACH WAY		DAILY LOCOMOTIVE MILEAGE			NO. OF LOCOMOTIVES REQUIRED IN- CLUDING 25% FOR REPAIRS ETC	
	Ports to Depots (a)	Main line (f)	Ports to Depots (g)	Main line (h)	Ports to Depots (j)	Main line (k)	TOTAL (l)	Main Line (m)	SHUTTLE (n)
600	-	50	-	2x2=4	-	200	200	4	-
1000	15	100	2x4=8	2x3=6	120	600	720	10	3
3000	15	150	2x10=20	2x8=16	300	2400	2700	37	6
3500	15	200	2x12=24	2x9=18	360	3600	3960	55	15
1500	15	150	2x5=10	2x7=14	150	1200	1350	19	6
3500	15	200	2x12=24	2x9=18	360	3600	3960	55	15
1500	15	150	2x5=10	2x7=14	150	1200	1350	19	6
800	15	100	2x4=8	2x3=6	120	600	720	10	3

than those for the military L. of C. will be used, otherwise maximum of 4 trains each way per day
be found in working order.

Mileage is assumed having regard to 2 military L. of C. each 200 miles in length by D. 100
Average load 400 tons.

Engine working average 90 miles per day.

ESTIMATE OF 20-TON COVERED WAGONS AND HEAVY VANS REQUIRED

DATE	COUNTRIES	DAILY TONNAGE FORWARDED		NO. OF 20-TON COVERED WAGONS FORWARDED DAILY		THROUGHPUT IN DAYS		NO. REQUIRED FOR REPAIRS
		Ports to Depots	Main Line	Ports to Depots	Main Line	Ports to Depots	Main Line	Ports to Depots
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
D + 43 to D + 60	France	-	600	-	40	-	4	-
D + 60 to D + 90	France	1500	1000	120	30	4	6	528
D + 90 to D + 120	France	4000	3000	320	240	4	8	1458
D + 120 to D + 150	France	4500	3500	360	280	4	8	1584
D + 120 to D + 150	Belgium	2000	1500	160	120	4	6	704
D + 150 to D + 180	France	4500	3500	360	280	4	8	1580
	Belgium	2000	1500	160	120	4	6	704
	Holland	1500	800	120	64	4	6	528

Assumptions: 50% of wagons required will be found locally (Column (1))

Notes:

Column (c) { Average wagon load 12½ tons
 Column (f) {
 Column (m) Two brake vans per main line engine.

ESTIMATE OF 20-TON COVERED WAGONS AND BRACE VANS REQUIRED

SCHEDULE VI

S	DAILY TONNAGE FORWARDED		NO. OF 20-TON COVERED WAGONS FORWARDED DAILY		THROUGH IN DAYS		NO. REQUIRED + 10% FOR REPAIRS ETC.		TOTAL AFTER DEDUCTING 50%	NO. OF 20- TON BRACE VAN REQUIRED
	Ports to Depots	Main Line	Ports to Depots	Main Line	Ports to Depots	Main Line	Ports to Depots	Main Line		
	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)
	-	600	-	48	-	4	-	211	106	6
	1500	1000	120	80	4	6	528	528	528	16
	4000	3000	320	240	4	8	1428	2112	1760	60
	4500	3500	360	280	4	8	1564	2464	2024	88
	2000	1500	160	120	4	6	704	792	718	30
	4500	3500	360	280	4	8	1580	2464	2024	88
	2000	1500	160	120	4	6	704	792	718	30
	1500	800	120	64	4	6	528	422	475	12

of wagons required will be found locally (Column (l))

Item (c) { Average wagon load 12½ tons
 Item (f) {
 Item (m) Two brake vans per main line engine.

ESTIMATES OF COAL REQUIRED

DATE (a)	COUNTRIES (b)	TOTAL DAILY LOCO MILEAGE (c)	DAILY TONNAGE OF COAL REQUIRED (d)	MONTHLY COAL CONSUMPTION (TONS) (e)	EXTRA COAL TO BUILD UP APPROX 30 DAYS RESERVE AT D + 180 (f)	COAL FOR RAILWAY WORKSHOPS AND TRACINGS ERECTATIONS (TONS) (g)
D+43 to D+60	FRANCE	200	12	$\frac{0+12 \times 30}{2} = 180$		200
D+60 to D+90	FRANCE	1020	46	$\frac{12+46 \times 30}{2} = 870$	500	200
D+90 to D+120	FRANCE	3300	147	$\frac{46+147 \times 30}{2} = 2695$	1000	290
D+120 to D+150	FRANCE	4960	214	$\frac{147+214 \times 30}{2} = 5865$	2000	290
	BELGIUM	1950	87	$\frac{0+87 \times 30}{2} = 1305$	1000	180
D+150 to D+180	FRANCE	4960	214	$\frac{214+214 \times 30}{2} = 7320$	3000	290
	BELGIUM	1950	87	$\frac{87+87 \times 30}{2} = 2655$	1500	200
	HOLLAND	920	41	$\frac{0+41 \times 30}{2} = 615$	500	200

Assumption:- No coal will be found locally.

Note:- Average Consumption for locomotive is taken as 100 lbs per mile

Schedule VII

ESTIMATES OF COAL REQUIRED

DAILY MILEAGE	DAILY TONNAGE OF COAL REQUIRED	MONTHLY COAL CONSUMPTION (TONS)	EXTRA COAL TO BUILD UP APPROX 30 DAYS RESERVE AT D + 180	COAL FOR RAILWAY WORKSHOPS AND WAGONS FRICTIONS (TONS)	EXTRA COAL TO BUILD UP 30 DAYS RESERVE AT D + 180	TOTAL COAL REQUIRED (TONS)
(a)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)
200	12	$\frac{0+12 \times 30}{2} = 180$		200		380
1020	16	$\frac{12+16 \times 30}{2} = 870$	500	200	70	1640
5300	147	$\frac{16+147 \times 30}{2} = 2095$	1000	290	70	4255
960	214	$\frac{147+214 \times 30}{2} = 5065$	2000	290	70	8225
950	87	$\frac{0+87 \times 30}{2} = 1305$	1000	180	25	1510
960	214	$\frac{214+214 \times 30}{2} = 7320$	3000	290	80	10690
950	87	$\frac{87+87 \times 30}{2} = 2655$	1500	200	200	4555
920	41	$\frac{0+41 \times 30}{2} = 615$	500	200	200	1515
Locally. Locomotive is taken as 100 lbs per mile						32,770

Schedule VIII.ESTIMATE OF RAILWAY WORKSHOP EQUIPMENT REQUIRED

The under-mentioned items are based on requirements for 55 Main Line and 15 Shunting Engines for France, and 27 Main Line and 9 Shunting Engines for Belgium and Holland. The two latter countries have been combined for these items in view of the comparatively small number of locomotives required for each country separately.

The items are tabulated on similar lines to those in the military programme with slight adjustments in order that the machinery may be used for continental locomotives.

DETAILSFranceBelgium/Holland

(a) 5-ton steam travelling cranes
1 by D + 60
1 by D + 90
1 by D + 120

(b) Generators 50-kwts. diesel driven
5 by D + 150
4 by D + 180

(c) MachineryTN. STORES.FranceBelgium/HollandItem.Group No.

1.	(M) 6" centres, sliding, surfacing & screw-cutting lathes with change wheels, faceplate & chuck	1	1
	(M) 8" centres, ditto - chuck with hollow spindle for bars up to 2 1/2" dia.	2	2
	(M) 12" centres, ditto	1	1
	(M) Turret lathes to take up to 3" dia. bar	1	1
	(M) 36" single vertical boring turning mill, complete with fittings to clamp loco axle-boxes etc. on table	1	1

2.	(M) Portable cylinder boring machine for cylinders up to 22" dia. (alternative hand and rope drive)	1	1
	(M) Portable piston valve boring machine up to 12" dia. (alternative hand and rope drive)	1	1
	(M) Portable cylinder valve seat facing machine for inside cylinders (alternative hand and rope drive)	1	1
	(M) Portable crank pin turning machine to turn up to 6 1/2" long by 12" long (alternative hand or		

YOUNG & RUBICAM/BBDO

1 b7 D + 120

$$5.3yD + 150$$

France

1

7

T

(A) 6" hand electric grinder
Tool brazing furnace for topping tools,
petroleum fired for temperatures up to 1520°C.
(1 furnace with means of obtaining air blast
cooling)

TABLE VIII (Contd.)

Group No.	Description	Brance		Belgium/Holland
3	(14) Slotting machine 12" stroke	1		1
	(15) Screwing machine for bolts up to 2" dia. and tubes up to 3" dia. complete with suitable die-heads tangential chasers for screw threads of standard Whitworth form	1		1
	(16) Sensitive drilling machine for holes up to 1" dia. with automatic electric reverse for tapping	1		1
	(17) 26" vertical drilling machine for holes up to 2" dia.	1		1
	(18) Radial drilling machine 5' rad. for holes up to 2" dia.	2		1
	(19) Electric welding set double operator complete with D.C. generator 15/150 amps	1		1
	(20) Electric welding set single operator portable complete with D.C. generator 15/150 amps.	1		1
	(21) Power hacksaw 6"	2		1
	(22) Carriage wagon & tender wheel lathe for wheels up to 4' dia. capable of turning both wheel tyres and outside journals	1		1
	(23) 36" circular saw bench for timber	1		1
	(24) 42" band saw for timber	1		1
	(25) 9" planing machine for timber	1		1
4	(26) 8" wood turning machine	1		1
	(27) Sharpening machine for 36" circular saw	1		1
	Hand set for 36" circular saw	1		1
	(28) Files & setter for 42" band saw	1		1
	Electric saw tracing machine for 42" hand saw	1		1
	Band saw setting machine (hand operated)	1		1
	(29) Pneumatic power hammer 10 cwt.	1		1
	(30) Plate bending rolls for steel plates up to 2"	1		1
	(31) Boiler tube reeling machine for tubes 1 1/2" to 5 1/2" outside diameters	1		1
	(32) Double ended fettling grinder, 1 head for brass, 1 for cast iron	1		1
	Two heating rings, maximum tyre dia.			
5	(33) Carriage wagon & tender wheel lathe for wheels up to 4' dia. capable of turning both wheel tyres and outside journals	1		1
	(34) 36" circular saw bench for timber	1		1
	(35) 42" band saw for timber	1		1
	(36) 9" planing machine for timber	1		1
	(37) 8" wood turning machine	1		1
	(38) Sharpening machine for 36" circular saw	1		1
	Hand set for 36" circular saw	1		1
	(39) Files & setter for 42" band saw	1		1
	Electric saw tracing machine for 42" hand saw	1		1
	Band saw setting machine (hand operated)	1		1
	(40) Pneumatic power hammer 10 cwt.	1		1
	(41) Plate bending rolls for steel plates up to 2"	1		1
	(42) Boiler tube reeling machine for tubes 1 1/2" to 5 1/2" outside diameters	1		1
	(43) Double ended fettling grinder, 1 head for brass, 1 for cast iron	1		1
	Two heating rings, maximum tyre dia.			

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holes up to 2" dia.
 (L) Radial drilling machine 5' rad. for
 holes up to 2" dia.
 (M) Electric welding set double operator
 complete with D.C. generator 15/150 amps
 (N) Electric welding set single operator
 portable complete with D.C. generator
 15/150 amps.
 (K) Power hacksaw 6"

4 (H) Carriage wagon & tender wheel lathes for
 wheels up to 4' dia. capable of turning
 both wheel tyres and outside journals
 (I) 36" circular saw bench for timber
 (J) 42" band saw for timber
 (K) 9" planing machine for timber
 (L) 8" wood turning machine
 (M) Sharpening machine for 36" circular
 saw
 Hand set for 36" circular saw
 (N) Files & setter for 42" band saw
 Electric saw brazing machine for 42"
 band saw
 Band saw setting machine (hand
 operated)

5 (P) Pneumatic power hammer 16 cwt.
 (Q) Plate bending rolls for steel plates
 up to 1"
 (R) Boiler tube reeling machine for
 tubes 1 1/2" to 5 1/2" outside diameters
 (S) Double ended fettling grinder, 1
 head for brass, 1 for cast iron
 Tyro heating ring, maximum tyre dia.
 7' - petrol clean fired

6 Portable riveters hearths
 Pneumatic rivetting hammer - Boyer
 No. 60 or equivalent with range of snaps
 Pneumatic chipping hammer for rivets
 up to 1/2" dia.
 Pneumatic caulking hammer
 Pneumatic drilling machine up to
 1 1/2" dia.
 Pneumatic close-quarter drills
 Pneumatic horn check grinders
 Pneumatic nut runners
 Diesel driven air compressor, 240 cub.
 ft. 3 dm. with receivers separators and
 distribution piping with drains and cocks

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Group No.		France		Belgium/Holland	
7	Tirman's hearth for 2 soldering irons, petroleum fired	1		1	
	Tirman's bending rollers 36" hand operated	1		1	
	Surviving machine or tirman's jenny medium size hand operated	1		1	
	Tirman's folder 30" hand operated	1		1	
	Copperanaths' brazing hearth	1		1	
	Blacksmiths' hearth with blower	2		2	
	Pipe bending machine for pipes up to 2" dia. hand operated	1		1	
	Pipe screwing machine for pipes up to 2" dia. hand operated	1		1	
8	Hydraulic press, 30 tons for bashing & axle box braces, hand operated	1		1	
	Marking out table, 4' x 3'	2		1	
	Portable locomotive weighing machine for weights up to 20 tons, per axle, 4'8 1/2" gauge	12		12	
	Hydraulic lifting jacks (or beam jacks) 50-tons	4		4	
	De-greasing plant suitable for locomotive parts up to 2' 6" x 2', self-contained with either petroleum burner or boiler for steam supply	1		1	
	Locomotive stands (cast iron foot with spindles screwing) into brakes and heads shaped to take loco frames	12		3	
9	(H) Case iron cupola 24" dia. with Pootes blazr Cero oven, self-contained, 4' x 4' x 5', high with 12" deep shelves	1		1	
	Tongs for lifting 100 lb. crucibles (in sets)	2		1	
	Ladles, single hand, shank carrier, 28lbs. (in sets)	2		1	
	Ladles, double hand shank carrier, 112lbs (in sets)	2		1	
	White metallizing plant for locomotives driving axle-boxes (8" dia. journals) & wagon frames (4" to 5" dia. journals) complete with furnace and crucibles	1		1	
	Portable oil burning apparatus with tank & blower for workshop built furnace	1		1	

Blacksmiths' hearth with blower	2	2
Pipe bending machine for pipes up to 2" dia. hand operated	1	1
Pipe sawing machine for pipes up to 2" dia. hand operated	1	1
Hydraulic press, 30 tons for bushing & axle box brasses, hand operated	1	1
Marking cut table, 4' x 3'	2	1
Portable locomotive weighing machine for weights up to 20 tons, for axle, 4' 8 1/2" gauge	12	12
Hydraulic lifting jacks (or beam jacks) 50-tons	4	4
De-greasing plant suitable for locomotive parts up to 2' 6" x 2', self-contained with either petroleum burner or boiler for steam supply	1	1
Locomotive stands (cast iron feet with spindles screwing) into brakes and heels shaped to take loco frames	12	3
(11) Cast iron cupola 24" dia. with footers blower	1	1
Core oven, self-contained, 4' x 4' x 5', high with 12" deep shelves	1	1
Tongs for lifting 100 lb. crucibles (in sets)	2	1
Ladles, single hand, shank carrier, 28lbs. (in sets)	2	1
Ladles, double hand shank carrier, 112lbs (in sets)	2	1
White metalting plant for locomotives driving axle-boxes (8" dia. journals) & wagon brasses (4" to 6" dia. journals) complete with furnace and crucibles	1	1
Portable oil burning apparatus with tank & blower for workshop built furnace	1	1

NOTES: (11) = Machines so marked to be fitted with individual electric motors.

All machines to be supplied with full complements and accessories ready to work.

SCHEDULE OF ROAD VEHICLES, DRIVERS AND PETROL REQUIRED.GENERAL.

As it is not possible to prepare accurate calculations at this stage certain assumptions have been

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. 3-ton vehicles are used, loaded to capacity.
2. Each vehicle does 1 trip per day.
3. Each vehicle averages 50 miles per day.
4. Petrol consumption averages 10 miles to the gallon, i.e. 5 gallons per vehicle per day.
5. Other means of transportation, e.g., train and inland water transport, are not considered.

SCHEDULE.

DATE.	COUNTRIES.	DAILY TONNAGE FORWARDED.	VEHICLES AND DRIVERS.			
			NO. OF 3-TON LORRIES AND DRIVERS REQUIRED AT 1 DRIVER PER LORRY.	TOTAL AFTER ADDING 10% FOR REPAIRS (LOTTIES) AND SICKNESS (DRIVERS).	ADDTL. VEH. FOR 2 MED. UNITS. 1 British 1 American.	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
D + 43 to D + 60	France	600	200	220	204	424
D + 60 to D + 90	France	1500	500	550	204	754
D + 90 to D + 120	France	4000	1333	1466	204	1670
D + 120 to D + 150	France	4500	1500	1650)	204	2587
	Belgium	2000	667	733)		
D + 150 to D + 180	France	4500	1500	1650)	204	3137
	Belgium	2000	667	733)		
	Holland	1500	500	550)		

NOTES:

Columns (a), (b) and (c). Details are the same as those given in Schedule 1. Tonnages represent items shown in paragraph 3(ii) of the covering note in Appendix 1, sufficient to cover services such as works, public services, civil defence, etc.

Column (h). This figure is obtained from columns (d) and (f) x 5 for the daily total. This schedule shows that the total number of vehicles and drivers required for the period being supplied amounts to 3137 with a total daily petrol consumption of 1570 (D + 150 to D + 180, columns (g) and (j)).

1872

APPENDIX B to
A.P. (P)/P(45)14.SCHEDULE OF ROAD VEHICLES, DRIVERS AND PETROL REQUIRED.

prepare accurate calculations at this stage certain assumptions have been taken into consideration.

3-ton vehicles are used, loaded to capacity.

Each vehicle does 1 trip per day.

Each vehicle averages 50 miles per day.

Petrol consumption averages 10 miles to the gallon, i.e. 5 gallons per vehicle per day.

Other means of transportation, e.g., train and inland water transport, are not available.

BY PAGE REF.	VEHICLES AND DRIVERS.				PETROL.	
	NO. OF 3-TON LORRIES AND DRIVERS REQUIRED AT 1 DRIVER PER LORRY.	TOTAL AFTER ADDING 10% FOR REPAIRS (LORRIES) AND SICK- NESS (DRIVERS).	ADDTL. VEH. FOR 2 MED. UNITS. 1 British 1 American.	TOTAL NO. VEHICLES.	DAILY PET. CONSUMPTION (GALLONS).	TOTAL PETROL CON- SUMPTION AFTER ADDING 10% FOR OTHER USERS.
	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)
	200	220	204	424	2020	2222
	500	550	204	754	3520	3872
	1533	1666	204	1670	7685	8453
	1500 667	1650 733	204	2587	11855	13040
	1500 667 500	1650 733 550	204	3137	14355	15790

columns (a), (b) and (c). Details are the same as those given in Schedule III of Appendix A. The figures represent items shown in paragraph 3(ii) of the covering note in Appendix A but may not be sufficient to cover services such as works, public services, civil defence, agriculture, etc.

column (h). This figure is obtained from columns (d) and (f) x 5 for the daily consumption. The schedule shows that the total number of vehicles and drivers required when all 10 regions are supplied amounts to 3137 with a total daily petrol consumption of 15790 gallons.
150 to D + 100, columns (g) and (j).

War Office File No.:

32/Army/370.

Previous References:

A.T. (E)/M(42)1:
Conclusion (5)(d).



ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

SECRET.

A.T. (E)/P(42)8.

21st July, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

PROPAGANDA, PRESS AND CENSORSHIP.

(Note by D.D.M.O. (H) for consideration by the
Committee at their fourth meeting on 23rd
July, 1942.)

In accordance with Conclusion (5)(d) of the first
meeting of the Committee, I circulate herewith a report by
D.M.I. on the problems of propaganda, press and censorship.

(Intd.) T. R.

1871

E.

REPORT BY D.M.L. ON PROPAGANDA

PRESS AND CENSORSHIP.

1. Propaganda.

It may be assumed that local propaganda will be the responsibility of G.H.Q. 'I' (c), supplemented by transmissions from the United Kingdom by the European Service of the B.B.C., under the political direction of the Political Warfare Executive.

2. Press.

(a) Correspondents. These will presumably be limited to correspondents accredited to, and controlled by, Force H.Q.

(b) Newspapers. It will be necessary to decide whether local newspapers in occupied territory will be permitted to continue publication. If so it will be necessary to arrange for:-

- (i) censorship (see paragraph 4 (b) below); and
- (ii) supplies of news print.

It may also be necessary, if considered desirable, to provide, at least in part, an editorial staff. If so, control should be exercised by P.W.E. on behalf of the Force Commander.

3. Broadcasting.

If any broadcasting stations are occupied intact it will probably be desirable for control to be exercised by P.W.E. (on behalf of the Force Commander) and for such stations to be staffed by personnel drawn from the B.B.C.

4. Censorship.

(a) Postal, telegraph and telephone.

The object of these censorships is:-

- (i) to permit such inter-communication between members of the civil population of a friendly country as is consistent with operational security; and
- (ii) to obtain information.

In the initial stages of operations the postal, telegraph and

correspondents accredited to, and controlled by, Force H.Q.

(b) Newspapers. It will be necessary to decide whether local newspapers in occupied territory will be permitted to continue publication. If so it will be necessary to arrange for:-

- (i) censorship (see paragraph 4 (b) below); and
- (ii) supplies of news print.

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If any broadcasting stations are occupied intact it will probably be desirable for control to be exercised by P.W.E. (on behalf of the Force Commander) and for such stations to be staffed by personnel drawn from the B.E.C.

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(a) Postal, telegraph and telephone.

The object of these censorships is:-

- (i) to permit such inter-communication between members of the civil population of a friendly country as is consistent with operational security; and
- (ii) to obtain information.

In the initial stages of operations the postal, telegraph and telephone systems should be entirely suspended until such time as a proper control can be imposed. Such control will involve the routing of all communications through focal points where they can be most effectively handled by censorship sections.

Mail to external addresses should, as soon as possible, be given a preliminary scrutiny in the theatre of operations, leaving the final censorship to be carried out in the United Kingdom. For this purpose lists of suspect persons should be made available both in the theatre of operations and in the United Kingdom, and arrangements made for the rapid exchange of information between the theatre of operations and the United Kingdom, and vice versa.

At a later stage it may be advisable for selected mails to be censored in the theatre of operations. Postal and

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Telegraph /

- 2 -
Telegraph Censorship should be given the earliest possible notice of any such requirement.

(b) Press.

In the initial stages any local press will have to be suspended until arrangements can be made for its proper control. It is desirable, however, that it should be allowed to appear as soon as possible since its local propaganda value will be considerable. Steps to provide efficient censorship should therefore be taken as early as possible. The early provision of news print is also important in that connection.

(c) Control.

Initially all censorship will be under the direct control of Force H.Q. It will probably be found advisable to supplement the military personnel available by the employment of approved persons from the civil population.

When the Chief Civil Affairs Officer assumes control, under the G.O.C. of the back areas, he will include censorship in his responsibilities. A liaison officer from Force H.Q. should be attached to his staff.

(Sgd.) F. H. N. DAVIDSON.

Director of Military Intelligence.

20th July, 1942.



War Office File No.:

32/Publicity/370.

ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

SECRET

Previous Reference:

A. T. (E)/M(42)7:
Minute 56(ii).

Paper No.:

A. T. (E)/P(42)25.

7th September, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

PROPAGANDA, PRESS AND CENSORSHIP.

(Memorandum by D.D.M.O. (H) for consideration by the Committee at their ninth meeting to be held on 17th September, 1942.)

1. Subsequent to the report I made to the Committee at the fifth meeting (A. T. (E)/M(42)5: Minute 38), further discussion with P. W. E. (Brigadier Brooks) and D. D. I. P. has now made it clear that the diffusion of news and propaganda in occupied territory and the censorship and control of distributing agencies can be considered under the following heads and responsibility can be allocated accordingly:-

- (i) the provision of propaganda material;
- (ii) the provision of straight news, information and instructions;
- (iii) the re-establishment of improvisation and control of the necessary distributing agencies (newspapers, radio and cinema);
- (iv) the censorship of material put out by distributing agencies;
- (v) the provision of personnel to carry out the work entailed.

2. It is first necessary to emphasize that the Chief Civil Affairs Officer will be concerned with the items listed in paragraph 1, only in that part of the occupied territory which is under his administrative control. He will have no responsibility regarding them in the fighting areas nor in respect of propaganda aimed beyond the fighting front.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

PROPAGANDA, PRESS AND CENSORSHIP.

(Memorandum by D.D.M.O. (H) for consideration by the Committee at their ninth meeting to be held on 17th September, 1942.)

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- (iv) the censorship of material put out by distributing agencies;
- (v) the provision of personnel to carry out the work entailed.

2. It is first necessary to emphasize that the Chief Civil Affairs Officer will be concerned with the items listed in paragraph 1, only in that part of the occupied territory which is under his administrative control. He will have no responsibility regarding them in the fighting areas nor in respect of propaganda aimed beyond the fighting front.

As radio cannot be limited to any particular area, it will not be a responsibility of the C.C.A.O. It will be a P.W.E. responsibility, subject to the general direction of the Force Commander, more especially in respect of such security provisions as G.H.Q.I(b) and (c) may require.

3. Certain responsibilities can be made clear at once:-

- (a) In the zones in which fighting is taking place, or which are so close to the fighting line that the civil administration under the control of the C.C.A.O. cannot function there, the provision and distribution of propaganda, directed either to enemy troops or to civilians

In enemy occupied territory, is the responsibility of the I(c) Section G.H.Q., who will receive P.W.E. directives through the War Office. In this zone the C.C.A.O. has no responsibility.

- (b) In the occupied area under the administrative control of the C.C.A.O., the responsibilities will be divided as set out in paragraphs 4 to 8 below.

4. The provision of propaganda material (other than radio).

Propaganda material to be included in newspapers, news-sheets, bulletins, etc., will be provided by P.W.E. who will pass it to the C.C.A.O. for utilisation and distribution. A P.W.E. mission should be attached to the C.C.A.O. for this purpose.

5. The provision of straight news, information and instruction.

This will be a responsibility of the C.C.A.O., who should have on his staff a Press Information Officer and necessary assistants whose duty it will be to obtain, for dissemination to the local press, information, news and other material which, without his assistance, would not be available to the editors. Where necessary, in the absence of local newspapers, the C.C.A.O. will issue his own bulletins of information and arrange for them to be exhibited at "public information points", or otherwise distributed and published.

The help of the Ministry of Information would be sought in the provision and selection of the Press Information Officer and his assistants.

6. The re-establishment or improvisation, and the control of distributing agencies.

- (a) If all newspaper installations, printing presses, etc., have been destroyed, it will be the responsibility of the C.C.A.O. to improvise such machinery as he can to make and distribute news-sheets and bulletins, until the local newspapers can be re-started.

- (b) As soon as possible a selection of the local newspapers to which the civilian inhabitants are accustomed, must be re-started and published in their normal format and appearance. This responsibility will rest upon the C.C.A.O.

It is anticipated that an average of about five local newspapers per department will be necessary to cover local requirements. In his planning, therefore, the C.C.A.O. will consider what preparatory steps he can make towards the re-establishment at a very early stage of these local newspapers. These preparatory steps will include the earmarking of personnel, a selection of personnel and other

attached to the C.C.A.O. for this purpose.

5. The provision of straight news, information and instruction.

This will be a responsibility of the C.C.A.O., who should have on his staff a Press Information Officer and necessary assistants whose duty it will be to obtain, for dissemination to the local press, information, news and other material which, without his assistance, would not be available to the editors. Where necessary, in the absence of local newspapers, the C.C.A.O. will issue his own bulletins of information and arrange for them to be exhibited at "public information points", or otherwise distributed and published.

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(a) If all newspaper installations, printing presses, etc., have been destroyed, it will be the responsibility of the C.C.A.O. to improvise such machinery as he can to make and distribute ~~news~~ bulletins and bulletins, until the local newspapers can be re-started.

(b) As soon as possible a selection of the local newspapers to which the civilian inhabitants are accustomed, must be re-started and published in their normal format and appearance. This responsibility will rest upon the C.C.A.O.

It is anticipated that an average of about five local newspapers per department will be necessary to cover local requirements. In his planning, therefore, the C.C.A.O. will consider what preparatory steps he can make towards the re-establishment at a very early stage of these local newspapers. These preparatory steps will include the ear-marking of newsprint, a selection of personnel and other technical details. As an indication of the scale upon which his planning should be based it may be roughly estimated that the area under British jurisdiction in the first place will be about 650 square miles, with a population of rather more than 300,000. This is as much as can be foreseen at this stage. As the area expands, ad hoc arrangements will have to be made. It must be assumed that most of the personnel employed will be French, namely, the existing staffs of the local newspapers, with such ad hoc replacements as may be necessary, plus the minimum of British officials in supervisory positions at the top.

(c) As stated in the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2, the C.C.A.O. will have no responsibility with regard to radio stations.

/ (d)

- (d) The C.C.A.O., as soon as circumstances permit, will encourage and assist cinemas to reopen at convenient centres. Films and material will be supplied through War Office agency at least in the first stages.

7. The censorship of newspapers.

Censorship will not be a responsibility of the C.C.A.O. Censorship falls within the sphere of I(c) Section of G.H.Q., censor personnel, additional to that normally attached to G.H.Q., would be necessary for this purpose.

8. The provision of personnel.

Where the density of the population remaining is such as to justify the publication of newspapers, it must be assumed that at least the elements of the journalistic and editorial staffs required will be available from amongst that population, and a selection of them suitably vetted by G.H.Q.I(b), in consultation with M.I.5., will be available for journalistic and editorial work. These might be supplemented, where necessary, by the appointment of other suitable and reliable persons as well as from Fighting French sources. It is not anticipated that British personnel will take any large part in actually producing newspapers. Their role will be limited to supervision and control, and even that must be made as unobtrusive as possible. It is suggested, therefore, that the C.C.A.O. will require on his staff:-

- (i) a Press and Publicity Controller, in General charge of the C.C.A.O.'s responsibilities as described in this Paper;
- (ii) subordinate to the Controller, a staff of editorial supervisors whose duties would be to supervise the issue of newspapers in their respective districts, and to ensure that their editorial policy did not conflict with the interests of the Allied cause;
- (iii) subordinate to the Controller, a Press Information Officer and assistants (paragraph 5 above);
- (iv) a P.W.E. mission (paragraph 4 above).

It is important to note that it takes time to select and collect the officers who will be required for this, as well as for other departments under the C.C.A.O. at the present stage of the war, suitable officers (and the number is strictly

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- (i) a Press and Publicity Controller, in general charge of the C.C.A.C.'s responsibilities as described in this Paper;
- (ii) subordinate to the Controller, a staff of editorial supervisors whose duties would be to supervise the issue of newspapers in their respective districts, and to ensure that their editorial policy did not conflict with the interests of the allied cause;
- (iii) subordinate to the Controller, a Press Information Officer and assistants (paragraph 5 above);
- (iv) a P.W.E. mission (paragraph 4 above).

It is important to note that it takes time to select and collect the officers who will be required for this, as well as for other departments under the C.C.A.C. At the present stage of the war, suitable officers (and the number is strictly limited) are being dispersed at a considerable rate. It is of considerable importance, therefore, that those who will be required should be earmarked as soon as possible, given a common general training followed by individual specialised training according to needs, and kept within easy recall.

9. It is recommended that the considerations set out above should be placed before the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer as soon as he is appointed and that he should be invited to pursue his planning on the lines indicated.

(Intl.) W.P.O. 1859

War Office File No. :

15/General/9617.



ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

MOST SECRET.

Previous References :

A. T. (S)/H(L2)2:
Minute 10 (1).

Paper No. :

A. T. (S)/E(42)10.

22nd July, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

FINANCIAL QUESTIONS.

(Memorandum by P.U.S. (F) for consideration by the Committee at their fourth meeting to be held on Thursday, 23rd July, 1942.)

I circulate for the consideration of the Committee (as an extra item on the agenda) a copy of a letter which I have sent to the Treasury.

(Intd.) E. B. B. S.

MOST SECRET.

My dear Gilbert,

Civil Administration of Occupied Territories in Europe.

You were good enough a day or two ago to discuss with Cash and me in a preliminary way one or two financial points arising out of the preparatory work which is going on here in the War Office in connection with the civil administration of European territories liberated as a result of, or in the course of, Round-Up.

I am not sure whether I told you that we had set about this problem by setting up a Committee under the Chairmanship of Dovenschen,

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

PINNOCLE QUESTIONS.

(Memorandum by E.U.S. (7) for consideration by the Committee at their fourth meeting to be held on Thursday, 23rd July, 1942.)

I circulate for the consideration of the Committee (as an extra item on the agenda) a copy of a letter which I have sent to the Treasury.

(Intd.) E. B. B. S.

MOST SECRET.

24th July, 1942.

My dear Gilbert,

Civil Administration of Occupied Territories in Europe.

You were good enough a day or two ago to discuss with Cash and me in a preliminary way one or two financial points arising out of the preparatory work which is going on here in the War Office in connection with the civil administration of European territories liberated as a result of, or in the course of, Round-Up.

I am not sure whether I told you that we had set about this problem by setting up a Committee under the Chairmanship of Bovenschen, which has decided that the first task to be completed is the preparation of a Survey of the problems which will confront the Commander-in-Chief in the field other than those of a purely military nature.

We contemplate that there must be appointed under the Commander-in-Chief a civil authority (possibly designated Military Governor) to direct civil administration of the territories until such time as a native Government is reinstated or introduced, and that the arrangements to be made by this authority are capable of codification before the event to a very large extent.

The Committee have therefore entrusted the preparation of a Survey on individual points to various officers of this department

B.M. Gilbert, Esq., C.B.

G.H.Q. /

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G.M.G., Home Forces, and I myself have been asked to do the preparatory work in connection with a number of financial points on which I gave you some details.

The object of this letter is to tell you that we propose to do on some of them and to ask the Treasury to undertake the work of survey in the case of others.

1. The particular point on which we shall require Treasury guidance is that of the incidence of the cost of the civil administration.

Under arrangements of which you are already aware we hope to secure American (and subsequently Allied) agreement with the idea of all forces concerned using the British Military Authority note, and, if this is agreed, it will be necessary for Force Commanders, other than the British Force Commanders, to draw upon us for supplies of currency and to make use of them not merely for the payment of their troops but for the purchase of supplies and services locally, since it is present policy to avoid any system of regulation if it can be avoided. Thus an American Force (like the British Force) would pay its way, and we suggest would bear the cost of doing so finally, it being the business of the American authorities to repay to us in sterling (or in such other manner as may be specified by you) the face value of the B.M.A. notes drawn. I imagine that there would not be likely to be any dispute on this point.

But the cost of the civil administration itself presents greater difficulties. The headquarters of the civil administration may be British or American, and the chief local officers under that headquarters are likely to be a mixed bag. It is impossible that there will be any clear line of demarcation between American and British areas, at any rate after the first phase, and it is likely that the various lines of communication from ports will serve both forces indiscriminately. There will thus of necessity be only one account of the cost of administration and some rough and ready arrangement for dividing the costs (I refer later to the possibility of charging the "Native" Government when reinstated). These costs may include such items as public relief, the temporary payment of wages and salaries to existing State and local authority employees, the payment of State pensions, subsides of various kinds, and so on, and there will be certain items in respect of taxes and dues levied on the civil population.

The administration will be under the Supreme Commander, but this question of the incidence of cost raises the whole problem of who in London or Washington will be the responsible authority. To whom, for instance, will the administration apply for guidance as to policy and for sanction of expenditure. There are three possible solutions. Either a British or American Department can be put in charge or a joint body can be set up. A joint body would probably not be very satisfactory as it would not fit into any existing machinery of government. If the Americans will agree, there would, I think, be considerable advantages, but this would not

recourse American (and subsequently Allied) agreement with the idea of all forces concerned using the British Military Authority note, and, if this is agreed, it will be necessary for Force Commanders, other than the British Force Commanders, to draw upon us for supplies of currency and to make use of them not merely for the payment of their troops but for the purchase of supplies and services locally, since it is present policy to avoid any system of requisition if it can be avoided. Thus an American Force (like the British Force) would pay its way, and we suggest would bear the cost of doing so finally, it being the business of the American authorities to repay to us in sterling (or in such other manner as may be specified by you) the face value of the B.M.A. notes drawn. I imagine that there would not be likely to be any dispute on this point.

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There is the parallel point that when the local Government is reinstated it may be considered feasible to require it to pay some part of the cost of the civil administration up to the time of reinstatement, but if we raise this matter with the Allied Governments or French National Committee now, even on a hypothetical basis, they will want to be brought into the administration at a much earlier stage than we may consider desirable on operational and other grounds. I should therefore like you to agree that we can leave this question over until the Allies are consulted about the operations.

2. There are three minor but difficult subjects which we should like to ask you to take in hand. They are:-

- 3 -

- (a) Enemy Property - I understand that technically all persons at present on the Continent are enemies. This status will have to be altered immediately a force lands, but there may be German property remaining in the liberated territories which will have to be placed in the hands of a custodian. The custodian's instruction will have to be defined.
- (b) Goods taken in Prize - Under present arrangements I understand that ships and their cargoes captured in ports and goods in warehouses which have been landed from enemy ships will be dealt with as Prize. No doubt the Procurator-General's department will consider this question.
- (c) Trading with the Enemy - Proclamations covering the prevention of trading with the enemy will have to be published at an early stage. They should be drafted beforehand.

3. Finally, there is the question of the general economic policy to be followed in the liberated territories. This policy would cover such questions as the collection of taxes and local dues, price control, wages and salaries, public relief, the promotion of industry and agriculture. We propose to set on foot a survey of the problems thrown up under this heading. For this purpose the Treasury have been good enough to agree to the creation of a separate branch to deal with the financial and economic aspects of all O.T.A. questions as well as questions of banking, currency, etc. and to the employment in this branch (which is under Roy as Assistant Secretary) of a special officer who joined for duty on the 15th July. He is a man with considerable business and economic experience and I have no doubt that he is qualified to help us to get the problem stated. As soon as he has familiarized himself with the background of the question the branch will wish to make contacts with the many Government departments concerned, and I should like to think that there was an officer at the Treasury whom they could freely consult. Perhaps you could nominate one. They are, of course, already in contact with Rowe-Dutton on the questions which are within his province, but I am not quite sure who it would be on questions of general finance.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) E. B. E. SPEED.

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Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) E. B. E. SPEED.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

1850

War Office File No.:

616/2395.



ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

MOST SECRET.

COPY NO. 74

Previous References:

Paper No.:

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken
to ensure the secrecy of this document.

A.T.(E)/E(43)12.

17th March, 1943.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

UNITED STATES CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANISATION.

(Note by the Joint Secretaries.)

By direction of the Chairman, and with the agreement of Colonel Wade, the appended copy of a cable from the American War Department to H.Q., E.I.C.U.S.A., which the latter have repeated to the War Office, is circulated for the information of members.

U.S.217.

INCOMING MESSAGE ETGUSA.

ROUTINE.

FROM: AGWAR

TO: ALCIERS ACTION
ETGUSA ACTION

Ref No. 6559.

Interior Addresses:

FROM: MARSHALL.

1. Now established in the War Department, Civil Affairs Division reporting directly to the Secretary of War. This division will be War Department Agency for all matters other than those of strictly military nature in enemy territory or enemy controlled territory occupied as a result of military operations all action on such matters will be co-ordinated by this division to provide centralised control of all such activities now handled by

UNITED STATES CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION.

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U.S. 217.

INCOMING MESSAGE ENCLOSURE.

ROUTINE.

FROM: LOWAR

TO: ALGIERS ACTION
ETCUSA ACTION

Ref No. 6559.

12th March, 1945.

EDITED LITERAL TEXT.

Interior Addresses:

FROM: MCKAYALL.

1. Now established in the War Department, Civil Affairs Division reporting directly to the Secretary of War. This division will be War Department Agency for all matters other than those of strictly military nature in enemy territory or enemy controlled territory occupied as a result of military operations all action on such matters will be co-ordinated by this division to provide centralized control of all such activities now handled by various Governmental and War Department Agencies. All communications from or to Theater Commanders on such matters will be processed by Civil Affairs Division through Operations Division. It is considered essential that you establish at the appropriate time an agency on your staff headed by suitably qualified individual and staffed with specialists competent to handle such matters. This applies to all Theater Commanders likely to participate in capture and occupation of enemy territory or enemy controlled territory. War Department stands ready to assist in procuring necessary specialists on request. Civil Affairs includes following major activities: (1) economic matters including fiscal affairs, exchange rates, taxation, currency, in 1865 commerce, development of local resources, etc. (2) civilian relief including food medical utilities. (3) public administration including military government where applicable. Letter follows describing above in detail. Planning of future operations should include organization of Civil Affairs Staff Agency when applicable and should to extent possible provide for maximum use under your control of local agencies existing in territory under policies established by you or communicated to you.

- 2 -

2. In areas where 2 or more of the United Nations are involved in occupation joint representation on Civil Affairs Staff may be necessary but even in such cases our representatives should form an integrated unit.

3. Unless already submitted, information is requested concerning your existing Civil Affairs organization.

War Office File No. :

53/Overseas/196.



ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

MOST SECRET.

Previous References :

A. T. (E)/H(42)1:
Conclusion (5)(f).

Paper No. :

A. T. (E)/P(42)11.

5th August, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

FOOD.

(Memorandum by D. Q. M. G. for consideration by the Committee at their sixth meeting on 6th August, 1942.)

1. As the result of discussions which have been carried out between Colonel Vickers of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Mr. Dudley Ward of the Inter-Allied Post-War Relief Committee, Mr. Maude of the Ministry of Food, D. S. T. and myself, certain facts have emerged which call for clarification as to the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War and the Inter-Allied Post-War Relief Committee in regard to planning the victualling, during the war, of territories re-occupied by the Allies.

2. As matters now stand, there are two statements bearing on this problem:-

(a) that contained in paragraph 8(b) of the Conclusions of the 83rd (42) meeting of the War Cabinet of the 29th June, 1942:-

"In reply to the Secretary of State for War, it was agreed that the problem of handling post-war relief, to be dealt with at the Washington Conference, did not include the problem of victualling, during the war, territories which might be re-occupied by the Allies as a result of military operations";

(b) and that contained in the text of a draft Inter-Governmental Agreement, setting up the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Article 5 of which reads as follows:-

"The Director-General immediately upon taking office shall, in conjunction with military and other appropriate authorities of the United Nations, prepare plans for emergency relief of civilian population upon occupation of any area by armed forces

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(b) and that contained in the text of a draft Inter-Governmental Agreement, setting up the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Article 5 of which reads as follows:-

"The Director-General immediately upon taking office shall, in conjunction with military and other appropriate authorities of the United Nations, prepare plans for emergency relief of civilian population upon occupation of any area by armed forces of any of the United Nations, arrange procurement and assembly of the necessary supplies, and create emergency organisation required for this purpose."

3. In order to enable the Committee to consider the above statements in relation to the problem, I submit the following review.

At present a large proportion of Europe is occupied by the Axis powers. The object of allied planning is, as a result of military operations, to compel the enemy to evacuate these territories. In order to achieve this end, certain operations are envisaged, the direct result of which will entail the landing of military forces on various parts of the Continent. Any one of these operations, if put into effect, may entail /the

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the freeing of certain definite tracts of country over which bitter fighting may have to occur. As a result of these operations enemy resistance may "crack" over a much wider territory, and large tracts of country, not necessarily contiguous to those in which the operations are taking place, may be liberated, the cumulative effect of which may be the complete evacuation by the enemy of whole countries, and, finally, the termination of hostilities.

4. The present wording of the statement at 2(a) above may, in its widest interpretation, be taken to imply that the Secretary of State for War will be responsible for the problem of victualling such territories right up to the armistice. In other words, his responsibility would extend to planning the victualling of the whole of allied territories now under enemy occupation, from the time they are liberated up to the end of the war.

5. This, I submit, is obviously not the intention, but it is necessary to decide more precisely what these responsibilities will be. I suggest that the problem be approached as follows.

The period during which the liberated population of allied countries will need their victualling supplemented can be divided into three phases:-

- (a) Phase I. The phase during which active operations in any of the territories concerned are in progress by "invasion" forces. This phase will cover the actual landing operations, and the subsequent period entailing an advance against enemy opposition, the driving back of the enemy, and progressive liberation of the civil population.
- (b) Phase II. Fighting has passed on, and the "back areas" gradually return to normal, or to a state of normality comparable to that obtaining in rear areas in France during the war 1914/18.
- (c) Phase III. As a result of Phase I, or a number of similar phases, Axis control weakens and cracks in wide stretches of country, not necessarily even contiguous to the fighting zones. The collapse develops, and whole countries are freed, though without necessarily any actual arrival of allied "invasion" forces.

6. Each of these phases is considered in turn below:-

- (a) Phase I. During the period of landing operations and, subsequently, within the area where actual fighting is taking place it will not be possible to carry out any detailed arrangements for feeding the civilian population affected. As soon as possible, however, it will be necessary to import food in the right pack for distribution. During this phase the only means of landing such supplies would be through the beaches, i.e. through the military "pipe".

The question of when it will be possible to land food for the civilian population, and of how it should be distributed to them, will necessarily form part of the military plan, and all arrangements during this phase, both for selection of pack, ordering of the necessary quantities, and devising some form of distribution, must fall to the military commander.

- (b) Phase II. During this phase it should be possible to import

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- (b) Phase II. During this phase it should be possible to import suitable commodities in bulk, i.e., sacks of grain, flour, sugar, etc. In fact, the pack during this phase will be similar to that required for Phase III. It will still, however, be necessary for the military commander to control closely, or, at any rate, so far as he desires, the method of import and distribution adopted.

- (c) Phase III. During this phase, the military will be still interested to the same extent in the areas in which they are operating, but, in so far as the rest of the allied territories which have been freed are concerned, they will only be interested in ensuring that such arrangements as are made do not interfere with military plans.

7. It is clear, therefore, that during Phase I the whole problem of victualling the civil population must be planned and executed under the direction of the military commander. As regards Phase II and Phase III, for which similar types of foodstuffs are required, I suggest that the planning and arrangements for procurement and assembly of the necessary supplies should not, and need not, fall on the military, but should be assigned to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

8. Phase II will merge into Phase I, and it will be impossible to plan exactly when the stage will be reached when the type of ration provided for Phase II can be substituted for that in Phase I. This decision can only be made by the Commander-in-Chief on the spot, as a result of the course of operations, but he should be able to call upon the stocks provided for Phases II and III, should he consider that supplies of this nature are necessary.

He will also continue to control the distribution of foodstuffs during Phase II for so long as he considers it necessary.

9. The above review is obviously capable of elaboration, but I do not wish to say more at this stage. If, as a result of the discussion for which this paper will form the basis, it is decided that the conclusions I reached above are sound, I submit that the following recommendations be made:-

(i) that the Secretary of State for War's responsibilities for victualling the civil population of liberated allied territories be confined to the following:-

(a) the planning for the victualling of civilians liberated as a direct result of British military operations;

(b) the formulation of estimates of the quantities of special back supplies needed to implement (a) above;

(c) the execution of the plan;

(ii) that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration be responsible for the following:-

(a) the planning and implementation of the victualling of the civil population of all allied territories liberated other than by direct military operations;

(b) the formulation of estimates of the quantities of bulk supplies needed, their procurement, storage, transport and distribution; with the exception that the transport and distribution of this type of supply should be controlled by the military Commander-in-Chief in any area which he considers necessary.

(Intd.) R.F.B.N.

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ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

Previous References :

A.T.(E)/M(22)15:
Conclusion (11G)(c).

Paper No. :

A.T.(E)/P(43)8.

8th February, 1943.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

FOOD REQUIREMENTS IN LIBERATED TERRITORIES:

PROVISION OF VITAMINS.

(Memorandum by Brigadier Q. (Ops.) for consideration by the Committee at their twentieth meeting to be held on Thursday, 11th February, 1943.)

1. At their fifteenth meeting held on 26th November, 1942, the Committee considered the question of the provision of vitamins for the civil population in liberated territories, in order to prevent the spread of deficiency diseases, and invited D.G.M.C. to investigate the problem in the light of the fact that a supply of tablets containing the necessary vitamins, in combined form, would not be available in January, 1943 (Conclusion (11G)(c)).

2. The question has been referred to D. of H. for examination, in consultation with the Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Food, and the following conclusions have been reached:-

- (a) that the necessary vitamins and minerals could best be provided in the form of a fortified chocolate;
- (b) that issues should be made to expectant and nursing mothers and to children under 14 (representing about 30 per cent of the population);
- (c) that a reasonable scale of issue would be one ounce per head per day, which would necessitate provision of some 500 tons of chocolate over a period of two months;
- (d) that, as the range of supplements to be added to the chocolate is wider than in the case of the Army specification, further tests will have to be carried out to ensure that chocolate so fortified will keep

FOOD REQUIREMENTS IN LIBERATED TERRITORIES:

PROVISION OF VITAMINS.

(Memorandum by Brigadier G. (Ops.) for consideration by the Committee at their twentieth meeting to be held on Thursday, 11th February, 1943.)

1. At their fifteenth meeting held on 26th November, 1942, the Committee considered the question of the provision of vitamins for the civil population in liberated territories, in order to prevent the spread of deficiency diseases, and invited D.O.M.G. to investigate the problem in the light of the fact that a supply of tablets containing the necessary vitamins, in combined form, would not be available in January, 1943 (Conclusion (110)(c)).

2. The question has been referred to D. of H. for examination, in consultation with the Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Food, and the following conclusions have been reached:-

(a) that the necessary vitamins and minerals could best be provided in the form of a fortified chocolate;

(b) that issues should be made to expectant and nursing mothers and to children under 14 (representing about 30 per cent of the population);

(c) that a reasonable scale of issue would be one ounce per head per day, which would necessitate provision of some 500 tons of chocolate over a period of two months;

(d) that, as the range of supplements to be added to the chocolate is wider than in the case of the Army specification, further tests will have to be carried out to ensure that chocolate so fortified will keep without harmful effect on the vitamins.

3. The Committee are now asked to approve in principle that this type of fortified chocolate should be accepted in order to provide supplementary vitamins for specified classes of civilians in liberated territories.

If this is agreed, procurement action can be initiated as soon as the further tests as in sub-paragraph 2 (d) above, have been carried out.

(Intd.) H.L.L.

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War Office File No.:

110/General/6519.



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Previous References:

A.T.(E)/L(42)5:
Conclusion (35)(b).

Paper No.:

A.T.(E)/P(42)21.
29th August, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER.

(Memorandum by D.D.L.O.(H) for consideration by
the Committee at their eighth meeting to be held
on 3rd September, 1942.)

1. This Paper is submitted in compliance with Conclusion (35)(b) of the fifth meeting of the Committee, which "invited D.D.L.O.(H), in conjunction with D.D.P.S., to proceed with the planning of our requirements as regards the maintenance of law and order so that when completed the statement of our requirements could be discussed with H.Q., E.F.O.U.S.A., with a view to obtaining their agreement". It is the result of consultations with D.D.P.S., Brigadier Shapcott of J.A.G.'s Department and Brigadier Reeve, A(P) Branch, G.H.Q., Home Forces, and of a discussion held at the Foreign Office on 28th August, at which were present Sir William Malkin and Mr. J.G. Ward of the Foreign Office, Brigadier Shapcott, Lt.-Colonel McLeod, representing D.D.P.S., and Lt.-Colonel French, H.O.11, from the War Office.

2. Statement of requirements re law and order: three phases.

Military requirements will be of three degrees corresponding to three phases of the operations:-

Phase 1, during which the area is within the combat zone or close to it. In this phase the operational requirements will be absolutely paramount over all other considerations. It will be terminated as soon as military exigencies permit and of this the commander must be the sole judge.

MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER.

(Memorandum by D.D.A.C.(H) for consideration by the Committee at their eighth meeting to be held on 3rd September, 1942.)

1. This Paper is submitted in compliance with Conclusion (35)(b) of the fifth meeting of the Committee, which "invited D.D.A.C.(H), in conjunction with D.D.P.S., to proceed with the planning of our requirements as regards the maintenance of law and order so that when completed the statement of our requirements could be discussed with H.Q., D.D.O.U.S.A., with a view to obtaining their agreement". It is the result of consultations with D.D.P.S., Brigadier Shapcott of J.A.G.'s Department and Brigadier Reeve, A(P) Branch, G.H.Q., Home Forces, and of a discussion held at the Foreign Office on 25th August, at which were present Sir William Malkin and Mr. J.G. Ward of the Foreign Office, Brigadier Shapcott, Lt.-Colonel McLeod, representing D.D.P.S., and Lt.-Colonel French, M.O.II, from the War Office.

2. Statement of requirements re law and order: three phases.

Military requirements will be of three degrees corresponding to three phases of the operations:-

Phase 1, during which the area is within the combat zone or close to it. In this phase the operational requirements will be absolutely paramount over all other considerations. It will be terminated as soon as military exigencies permit and of this the commander must be the sole judge.

Phase 2, begins when the combat zone has moved sufficiently far forward as to close the first phase. The area then becomes an essential part of the line of communications and a base area.

Phase 3, covers conditions which would obtain when an area is so removed from the fighting front, or has been cleared of Axis control even without the actual arrival of invasion forces, that the military interest is limited to ensuring that nothing occurs in the area which may interfere with military plans. In some circumstances it is conceivable that the conditions of Phase 2 would obtain from the outset.

The maintenance of law and order is a crucial military necessity in the first two of these phases, and there is a military interest in its maintenance in the third phase.

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Phase 1 is the most important and the steps taken to ensure the fulfillment of military requirements in Phase 1 can be progressively modified to suit the conditions of Phases 2 and 3. The following paragraphs 3 to 8 refer therefore to Phase 1.

3. Military requirements in Phase 1.

During Phase 1 military requirements in an occupied enclave will be as follows:-

- (i) exclusive military control of all means of transportation, and of all local resources, will be essential;
- (ii) on grounds of security, control of the police (which may contain unreliable elements), power to promulgate and enforce decrees, and supervision of the local courts;
- (iii) as the inhabitants will most probably be cut off from their normal sources of supply of food and necessities, they will therefore be dependent on the invading forces for these. This fact would necessitate military control of wholesale and retail distribution and the rationing system. Distributing transport must be correlated with the paramount operational demands on docks and transportation. Public health and the control of disease is intimately related to the problem of food supply and transportation;
- (iv) military expenditure will be the governing monetary factor and, besides purely army issues, will include expenditure in connection with the preceding items in both American and English terms. Therefore, in order that the general financial machine should function, and function efficiently, it is necessary that administrative control of currency, exchange rates and banking should be in the hands of the Supreme Command;
- (v) public utilities, power stations, factories, repair installations, mines, etc., normally under civilian control must be restored and made ready to serve military needs with the least possible delay.

4. Method of ensuring fulfilment of these requirements.

The controls enumerated in the preceding paragraph can be assured by nothing short of martial law. The duration of martial law is an operational matter and must be at the sole discretion of the commander; of course, he will be fully informed and

(ii) on grounds of security, control of the police (which may contain unreliable elements), power to promulgate and enforce decrees, and supervision of the local courts;

(iii) as the inhabitants will most probably be cut off from their normal sources of supply of food and necessities, they may therefore be dependent on the invading forces for these. This fact would necessitate military control of wholesale and retail distribution and the rationing system. Distributing transport must be correlated with the paramount operational demands on docks and transportation. Public health and the control of disease is intimately related to the problem of food supply and transportation;

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4. Method of ensuring fulfilment of these requirements.

The controls enumerated in the preceding paragraph can be assured by nothing short of martial law. The duration of martial law is an operational matter and must be at the sole discretion of the commander; the Allied Governments concerned would, of course, be fully informed and would be consulted as to the stage at which martial law could be withdrawn.

Martial law safeguards the success of military operations in three ways:-

- (i) it makes the will of the commander supreme;
- (ii) it ensures civil tranquillity by subordinating every branch of the civil administration to the commander's discretion;
- (iii) it introduces by proclamation a special code of "war crimes" triable by special military courts, covering such offences as sabotage, and all offences against military security.

It must be stated that, at the appropriate stage, the Allied Governments and the Fighting French National Committee will agree to the declaration of martial law in their respective territories and will collaborate in enforcing it for as long as may be necessary. On that assumption (and there is really no alternative), the machinery for maintaining law and order under a martial law regime may be discussed under four heads:-

- (a) the assumption of authority;
- (b) promulgation of regulations;
- (c) the system of courts and their supervision;
- (d) police.

5. The assumption of authority.

The paramount authority, which is the essence of military jurisdiction, is assumed by direct proclamation by the Force Commander. In the particular circumstances of friendly territories in Europe, it is necessary that the military and foreign nature of the paramount authority should be as unobtrusive as possible; proclamations and decrees issued over the signature of the Force Commander should be reduced to the absolute minimum.

It is therefore for consideration what form of declaration taking authority under martial law will be most helpful to the Commander. In territory which is unequivocally enemy, the Commander would issue over his own name a proclamation declaring military jurisdiction under his sole control. In the circumstances of an invasion of friendly territory he would require these same powers and the same unfettered authority, but his jurisdiction would probably be more readily and willingly accepted by the people if it derived from their own constitution and had the authority of their own monarch.

Thus in Western Europe, in Norway, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, it may be constitutionally possible for the Government concerned to declare martial law placing all power in the hands of a nominated military authority which in this case would be the Force Commander. This is a matter which the Foreign Office could be invited to examine. If it were found possible to use this method, it would obviate a subsequent lot of Infantry legalising acts done by the Commander without the authority of the constitution.

If, however, the method of declaration by the Allied Governments is adopted, it should contain nothing which would in any way fetter any action which the Force Commander in the exercise of his discretion may deem to be necessary or desirable.

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If, however, the method of declaration by the Allied Governments is adopted, it should contain nothing which would in any way fetter any action which the Force Commander in the exercise of his discretion may deem to be necessary or desirable.

Whether the first proclamation announcing military jurisdiction be made by the recognised Allied Government, or whether it be made by the Commander himself over his own name, it is highly desirable that it should be accompanied by a manifesto enjoining obedience to the military authorities issued at the same time by the Monarch or recognised Government.

In Enemy Occupied France, the first proclamation declaring military jurisdiction must be issued by the Force Commander, any public pronouncements by the Fighting French National Committee being in the form of manifestoes rallying the people and urging their assistance to the liberators. Until a Government emerges, capable of administering the country and ensuring civil tranquillity (and that may be delayed longer in France than elsewhere), the authority of the Allied Commander must be supreme, due regard being paid, of course, to the importance of General de Gaulle as the leader of the Fighting French and a rallying point both within and beyond the occupied zone. The importance of the Americans and ourselves keeping ¹⁸step in planning the methods to be used in exercising military control, as well as deciding relations with the Fighting French National Committee and General de Gaulle, is obvious.

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In Vichy France, special circumstances might arise which would place it in the category of Allied territory. If such circumstances did not arise, it would be treated in the same way as Enemy Occupied France.

6. Practization of regulations.

Authority having been assumed, it will express itself in decrees and orders for the population to obey. These will fall into three categories:-

(a) The main body of laws, civil and criminal. These are not ordinarily subject to suspension, modification or replacement under martial law. In any case in the first proclamation or immediately following upon it, the civil and penal codes and the existing system of courts will be confirmed, subject to any limitations which it may be necessary to impose. The pre-war codes have been materially altered by suspensions, additions, modifications and replacements under Nazi pressure. Not all of these alterations are objectionable and some are undoubtedly valuable; but it will be necessary to abrogate undesirable legislation enacted by local authorities or by the German military governor. This is an aspect on which Allied Governments would wish, and have a right, to be consulted.

(b) "War crimes". A special proclamation will be required defining these, prescribing penalties and placing them within the special jurisdiction of military courts established for the purpose.

(c) Security regulations; miscellaneous orders; and notices.

It is important to consider whether these proclamations and regulations should appear over the signature of the Commander, or of another.

Observing the principle that the military and foreign nature of the control is to be as unobtrusive as possible, the civil populations should, wherever possible, receive their orders from authorities of their own race.

In France, proclamations of categories (a) and (b) above must be signed by the Force Commander; those in category (c) could perhaps appear over the signature of the competent local authority in which case it may be necessary for the Commander to publish an enabling proclamation, in order that infringements might be triable before the ordinary courts.

7. Courts and their supervision.

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7. Courts and their supervision.

It has been noted (6 (a) above) that the existing system of courts will be confirmed, subject to any limitations it may be necessary to impose, and will continue to function, supplemented by special military courts which will deal only with contraventions of the "war crimes" proclamation.

To ensure impartiality, speedy congestion of cases, and to supervise the work of the courts generally, some control must be exercised from the top. For this purpose a jurist of sterling reputation should be selected and attached to the C.C.F.O.'s staff in each territory to maintain control for as long as necessary. In the cases of Norway, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, a jurist belonging to each of these countries would certainly be available and it should not be impossible to find a suitable French jurist for France.

The special military courts for handling war crimes will not be administered by the C.C.F.O. but by the J.M.C.

8. Police.

The maintenance of order, enforcing observance of the law, prevention of civil tumult, and civil security are of the highest importance to the Force Commander and can be assured only by a competent and reliable police force. The first duty of the C.C.A.O. will therefore be to restore or where necessary to improvise from the local population, a civil police system.

In all probability it will be found that in each territory the civil police, or sufficient of it to start with, will be found ready to continue duty. It must however be under the undisputed authority of the Commander for as long as he deems necessary. This authority will be exercised by the C.C.A.O. working through the normal local police hierarchy.

The C.C.A.O. will therefore require a Controller of Police who will pass instructions on police matters to the Prefect (or other local police head). He must be sufficiently well acquainted with the local police system to enable him to judge for himself whether the police are working satisfactorily.

In the case of Holland, Norway, Belgium and Luxembourg, the Controller would doubtless be provided by those recognised Governments.

In the case of Enemy Occupied France, it should not be impossible to find a British subject with the requisite knowledge and tact, or more than one if the area occupied embraces more than one department, if it is found undesirable to use fighting French officers to supervise local police.

9. Military requirements in Phase 2.

Phase 2 is a development from Phase 1 and cannot be sharply differentiated from it at any particular stage. The characteristic circumstances of Phase 2 are those which would enable the Commander to withdraw, or at least considerably modify, martial law. This he would not be prepared to do until he felt assured that the indigenous authority which would assume control in his place was in fact in a position to administer the country without recourse to armed force and was competent and capable of fulfilling all his requirements under (a) to (e) below.

It is obvious that the recognised Allied Government will wish to assume full authority as soon as possible and that the Commander will be equally anxious to be relieved of it. Thus the time for withdrawing martial law, or for modifying it, will be a matter for discussion in which the Allied Governments' wishes would receive full weight though the operational situation, as viewed by the Commander, would necessarily be the decisive factor.

In Phase 2 military demands are not directly operational but they are still essential to the successful conduct of operations. They will be as follows:-

The C.O.A.O. will therefore require a Controller of Police to pass instructions on police matters to the Prefect (or other local police head). He must be sufficiently well acquainted with the local police system to enable him to judge for himself whether the police are working satisfactorily.

In the case of Holland, Norway, Belgium and Luxembourg, the Controller would doubtless be provided by these recognised Governments.

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In Phase 2 military demands are not directly operational but they are still essential to the successful conduct of operations. They will be as follows:-

- (a) priority of military requirements on all forms of transportation;
- (b) priority on all economic resources, supplies, repair and maintenance installations, products of factories, mines and all forms of industry;
- (c) speedy re-establishment of all forms of production, conducive to the Allied war effort, and diversion of their products to military purposes;
- (d) maintenance of civil law and order; efficient police and courts; satisfactory security measures;
- (e) assurance that decrees and regulations desired by the Commander will be promulgated and enforced;

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(f) stable finance conditions;

(g) avoidance of civil turmoil from whatever cause - labour, economic or political.

To ensure the fulfilment of these requirements, the Commander will require liaison, in all administrative departments concerned, with the items listed above, with whatever indigenous central authority becomes responsible for the civil population when martial law is withdrawn.

He will also require means of redress if his legitimate demands are not met. His method would be to appeal on military grounds to the Allied Supreme Command who would then arrange for diplomatic representations to be made if that became necessary.

10. Military requirements in Phase 3.

a competent liaison will meet the Commanders' requirements in this phase.

11. General requirements.

A diplomatic agreement on the competency of British courts-martial in regard to members of H.M. Forces stationed or operating in the country invaded appears to be necessary. This agreement should provide that British courts-martial should have exclusive competency in dealing with individuals forming part of the military force serving in the country in which they are operating, whatever the nationality of the accused, for offences punishable under British law.

It is likely that the Allied Governments will wish to notify these exclusive arrangements if British troops continue to be stationed in their territories in Phase 3. In this connection Paper A.T.(E)/P(42)20 of 17th August is relevant.

12. Recommendations.

It is recommended that:-

- (a) the views of H.Q., E.T.O.E.A., be sought on the principles and methods described in this Paper;
- (b) the Foreign Office be invited to consider the steps to be taken in regard to the constitutional declaration of martial law referred to in paragraph 5 as well as in regard to the agreements described in paragraph 11 of this Paper;
- (c) the concurrence and support of the Allied Governments be obtained to the principle that by a declaration of martial

Allied Supreme Command who would then arrange for military representations to be made if that became necessary.

10. Military requirements in Phase 2.

A competent liaison will meet the Commanders' requirements in this phase.

11. General requirements.

A diplomatic agreement on the competency of British courts-martial in regard to members of R.H. Forces stationed or operating in the country involved appears to be necessary. This agreement should provide that British courts-martial should have exclusive competency in dealing with individuals forming part of the military force serving in the country in which they are operating, whatever the nationality of the accused, for offences punishable under British law.

It is likely that the Allied Governments will wish to modify these exclusive arrangements if British troops continue to be stationed in their territories in Phase 3. In this connection Paper A.I.(E)/P(42)20 of 17th August is relevant.

12. Recommendations.

It is recommended that:-

- (a) the views of H.Q., E.L.O. U.S.A., be sought on the principles and methods described in this Paper;
- (b) the Foreign Office be invited to consider the steps to be taken in regard to the constitutional declaration of martial law referred to in paragraph 3 as well as in regard to the agreements described in paragraph 11 of this Paper;
- (c) the concurrence and support of the Allied Governments be obtained to the principle that by a declaration of martial law, the Commander shall assume or be given supreme authority when our forces enter European territory.

(Incl.) W.P.O.

War Office File No.:

110/Gen. 1/6519.

Previous Reference:

A.T.(E)/M(42)11:
Conclusion (87)(b).



SECRET. H M

A.T.(E)/P(42)35.

9th November, 1942.

ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

LAW AND ORDER: DECLARATION OF MILITARY CONTROL.

(Note by the Joint Secretaries.)

On the instructions of the Chairman, we circulate as Appendix A a memorandum by Sir William Malkin, **Legal Adviser** to the Foreign Office, and Colonel E.C. Dotts, Theater Judge Advocate, E.T.O.U.S.A., for consideration by the Committee at their next meeting to be held on Thursday, 12th November, 1942.

This memorandum has been prepared in accordance with Conclusion (87)(b) of the eleventh meeting, and discusses the action necessary under paragraphs 5 and 11 of A.T.(E)/P(42)21.

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APPENDIX A
to A.T.(E)/P(42)35.

JOINT MEMORANDUM BY SIR WILLIAM MURKIN, LEGAL ADVISER TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE,
AND COLONEL MD. C. BETTS, J.A.G.D., THEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE, E.T.O., U.S.A.

1. We have been instructed to consider the questions arising on paragraphs 5 and 11 of the memorandum on "Maintenance of Law and Order": A.T.(E)/P(42)21. We have had several discussions on the subject, and find ourselves in agreement on the following observations.

PARAGRAPH 5 OF A.T.(E)/P(42)21.

2. No consideration is here given, nor is any necessary to be given, to the legal authority for Allied military forces to govern Axis (enemy) territory captured from Axis forces and occupied. Such capture and occupation of Axis territory would ipso facto suspend the enemy's civil government there; and it would become obligatory on the occupying Allied forces to exercise the function of government in maintaining public order through military government, until a capable substitute government is provided by the Power responsible for preservation of public order. Under such circumstances, as is recited in Article 43 of Annex to Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907:-

"The authority of the legitimate Power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." (Paragraph 282, WDM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare). (All occupied countries of Europe and Axis and Allied Powers are signatories).

The exercise of such powers of military government is a command responsibility, and full legislative, executive, and judicial authority is vested in the commanding general of the theatre of operations. By virtue of his position, he is the military governor of the occupied territory and his supreme authority is limited only by the laws and customs of war (Rules of Land Warfare), and by such instructions as he may receive from higher authority. (Paragraph 5, WDM, 27-5, Military Government).

3. Respecting the territories of Europe to be recovered by Allied forces from invading and occupying Axis forces - for the purpose of determining the authority Allied force commanders may exercise over such territory and the inhabitants thereof - it is believed that such European territory may be divided into three categories, i.e.:-

Category One: territory of a European Power from which territory, by act of government (as distinguished from terms of surrender given by a military commander without sanction of his government), such Power

no consideration is here given, nor is any necessary to be given, to the legal authority for Allied military forces to govern Axis (enemy) territory captured from Axis forces and occupied. Such capture and occupation of Axis territory would inso facto suspend the enemy's civil government there; and it would become obligatory on the occupying Allied forces to exercise the function of government in maintaining public order through military government, until a capable substitute government is provided by the Power responsible for preservation of public order. Under such circumstances, as is recited in Article 43 of Annex to Hague Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907:-

"The authority of the legitimate Power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." (Paragraph 262, WDM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare). (All occupied countries of Europe and Axis and Allied Powers are signatories).

The exercise of such powers of military government is a command responsibility, and full legislative, executive, and judicial authority is vested in the commanding general of the theatre of operations. By virtue of his position, he is the military governor of the occupied territory and his supreme authority is limited only by the laws and customs of war (Rules of Land Warfare), and by such instructions as he may receive from higher authority. (Paragraph 5, WDM, 27-5, Military Government).

3. Respecting the territories of Europe to be recovered by Allied forces from invading and occupying Axis forces - for the purpose of determining the authority Allied force commanders may exercise over such territory and the inhabitants thereof - it is believed that such European territory may be divided into three categories, i.e.:-

Category One: territory of a European Power from which territory, by act of Government (as distinguished from terms of surrender given by a military commander without sanction of his government), such Power has withdrawn its governing authority and sanctioned the substitution of Axis Power military authority - such as in "occupied" France.

Category Two: territory of a European Power over which the governing authority of such Power has been allowed to function under surveillance or by sufferance of Axis Power's military authority - such as in Denmark or "unoccupied" France.

Category Three: territory of a European Power from which territory its governing authority has been ousted and Axis Power's military authority substituted without sanction by act of Government of such European Power - such as in Holland, etc.

4. Category One territory, for purposes of these considerations, may properly be treated as if enemy territory captured from the enemy and occupied by force of arms - subject to the authority of the military commander, to be exercised by him through military government. Supporting the foregoing in Hall's International Law, Eighth Edition (1924), at page 607, it is stated that:-

/s/.....when

".....when a place is militarily occupied by an enemy the fact that it is under his control, and that he consequently can use it for the purposes of his war, outweighs all considerations founded on the bare legal ownership of the soil."

Applying this principle, the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council in the *Guthrie* (1916) 2 B. & C. P. C. 36, held that having regard to the relations between Great Britain and Egypt, to the anomalous position of Turkey, and to the military occupation of Egypt by Great Britain, Port Said was a port enemy to Germany.

5. An historical pattern for such treatment is to be found in Japan's treatment of the Port Arthur territory captured on January 2, 1905, from Russia, occupied and administered by the Japanese Army through a military government (until the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of September 1905). At the time of such capture, by act of Government, Sino-Manchukuo governing authority had been withdrawn from this Manchurian territory of Port Arthur, and Russian authority thereover had been substituted; and no state of war existed between Japan and China or Manchuria (Chapter X, International Law, applied to Russo-Japanese War, Takahashi, 1908). Similarly, at the time of capture from Axis Powers and occupation of Category One territory (e.g. France), by act of government, (French) governing authority had been withdrawn therefrom and Axis Power military authority thereover substituted; and (it is assumed) no state of war exists between (France) and the Allied Powers. It does not appear that there is any legal justification for distinction between the propriety of administering the territory of Port Arthur by Japan through military government and the propriety of administering Category One territory (e.g. occupied France) by Allied Powers through military government.

6. As a consequence, it is proper that commanders of Allied forces invading, capturing from Axis Powers and occupying Category One territory assume the command responsibility of establishing and exercising military government over such territory and the inhabitants thereof. (The exercise of such responsibility may be through the aid of native officials and institutions of government, to the extent found to be trustworthy agencies). In respect of this responsibility to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, Allied force commanders have no option.

7. Nevertheless, the extent to which Allied force commanders may find it desirable in practice to establish and exercise military government is partly a question of policy and may depend upon the circumstances of the case. We shall revert to this point hereafter.

8. Category Two territory in principle may be treated as Category One territory. Respecting this, Hall, immediately following the statement of principle quoted above, adds:-

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".... In like manner, but with a stronger reason, where sovereignty is double or ambiguous a belligerent must be permitted to fix his attention upon the crude fact of the exercise of power."

9. In respect of Category Two territory, however, Allied force commanders may find it possible to meet their responsibilities for restoring and ensuring public order and safety through agencies of the local government freed from the dominance of Axis Powers control. In such event, it may be unnecessary for Allied force commanders to do anything more than to preserve unimpeded the legal fact of their authority to be exercised in such degree as circumstances may require. Similarly, in varying degrees, it may be expected that the local governments of the areas freed from Axis Powers domination will respect the authority of Allied force commanders and assist their administration of the territory through military governments - exercising such functions of government as the proximity of the fighting front and the attitude of the public require.

10. In practice, it seems probable that Category Two territory may approximate either to Category One or Category Three according to the circumstances and conditions prevailing at the time any such territory comes under control of Allied force commanders. Both in the case of "unoccupied" France and Denmark those circumstances and conditions might be such as to approximate to the case either to that of "occupied" France on the one hand, or of Holland on the other.

11. Category Three territory presents somewhat different problems. It is not believed that, initially, Allied force commanders will be obligated to assume responsibilities for administering civil Government in such territory. It may properly be expected that, upon the Axis military being ousted from Category Three territory, the local native government in such territory will assume its civil functions, in keeping with its responsibility to exercise its civil powers of Government to restore and ensure public order and safety. To the extent that such civil administration is capable of and does restore and ensure public order and safety there will be no need for Allied force commanders to undertake such responsibility - initially, not properly theirs. However, to the extent that such native governments fail so to assume and exercise such civil powers will it become obligatory on Allied force commanders to exercise their command responsibilities through military Government - in substitution for impotent native civil Government.

12. Let it here be specially noted that under the law of military necessity Allied force commanders, under all circumstances, without regard to time or place, may take all measures, recognised as proper by international law, requisite to the security of their forces and ensuring the performance of their mission - by way of self-defence. These powers are in addition to those which may be exercised through military Government when administering civil Government over territory in which they are responsible for restoring and ensuring public order and safety.

13. Category One territory conditions provide the Allied force commanders responsible for establishing and exercising military Government with full legislative, executive and judicial authority as heretofore pointed out. Conformable thereto, such commanders and the forces under their command exercise all the authorities and have all the immunities recognised in international law as inhering in military Government - among which are the power of requisition, freedom from taxation, and extra-territoriality from the jurisdiction of courts civil and criminal of the territory (which, if allowed to function, do so with the authority of the military Government and, of necessity, are subject to orders of the military commander administering the Government). Therefore, it is not necessary to enumerate or specify all the powers and authority of such a Government in any draft of understanding between Allied force commanders and any representatives or nationals of the country concerned (e.g. France) and available. However, it would be desirable, if political

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14. The observations in paragraph 11 above about Category Three territory may well also be applicable to Category Two. In both cases, therefore, it may be desirable to provide (by agreement between Allied force commanders and the appropriate governmental authorities) for recognition of the right of requisition, freedom from taxation, and enjoyment of extra-territorial privileges and exemption from the jurisdiction of, and immunity to, processes of the courts, civil and criminal, of the territory.

15. However, in case such expectations may not be acted upon, or, even though initially acted upon, they do not materialize, and such native government fails to assure and exercise such civil powers ensuring public order and safety - Allied force commanders may exercise their command responsibility through military governments, as if in Category One territory. Under these circumstances there will be no necessity for an agreement enumerating the powers and authority of Allied force commanders. They will enjoy, inso facto, all such as will inhere in them in Category One territory, above mentioned.

16. It results from the above that, certainly in Category Three, and possibly in Category Two or even Category One cases, we have to reckon with the likelihood that an Allied or friendly government, or part of it, will return to the occupied territory, or be established in it, as soon as the military situation permits. It will naturally desire to re-establish and exercise its authority over the territory, and to direct the operations of the local officials, so far as this may be compatible with military requirements. It appears moreover that, subject always to these requirements, the Allied force commander would wish this to be done; for he would presumably be glad to be relieved to the greatest practicable extent of the responsibility for the administration of the occupied territory; and not only that administration, in so far as he remains responsible for it, but the actual conduct of his military operations, will be greatly facilitated if he enjoys the willing co-operation of the Allied government concerned and the local authorities and population, and if the administrative measures which he finds it necessary to take are operated, so far as possible, through the machinery with which the local inhabitants are familiar. The more the necessary powers of the commander are exercised through the medium of the local law, government and officials, the better.

17. The question then is as to the technical method by which this result can be attained. We can see two possible procedures.

(a) It might be possible for the Allied or friendly government to declare a state of siege (or whatever corresponds thereto under their municipal law) in the occupied territory and to subordinate the local officials and inhabitants to the authority of the Allied force commander. Whether such action would cover all the requirements of the commander it is impossible to say except after an expert examination of the law of each Allied or friendly country concerned. If it did, this procedure would possess the following advantages:-

(i) The actions taken by the Allied force commander and those acting under his direction would be sanctioned from the outset by the municipal law of the country; their validity would not be subject to question in the local courts, and there would be no need for their subsequent validation by some such process as an act of indemnity. This point, though not

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(ii) The fact of the commander's directions being carried out through the medium of the local law and its agencies, with which both the local officials and the inhabitants would be familiar, should considerably facilitate their operation without difficulty or friction.

19. This course may, however, encounter the following objections:-

(i) The municipal law of the country concerned might not permit of the powers in question being conferred upon a foreign commander.

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(ii) Even if it did, the Allied or friendly government might be unwilling for political reasons to take this step.

(iii) From the legal point of view (of the Allied force commander) objection might be felt to his powers apparently being conferred upon him by the government of the country instead of being derived from his position as the commander of a force in occupation. In case such objection obtains, the alternative course (B) (paragraph 20) would be preferable.

20. (B) The alternative course would be for the commander to act under his own authority and to issue any necessary proclamations, ordinances, etc., in virtue of that authority, but for his action to be publicly supported, and obedience to it enjoined on the local population, by the Allied or friendly government concerned. For instance, the sovereign or government of the country might issue something in the nature of a manifesto announcing that while the actions of the commander were taken under his own authority, they were taken with the full knowledge and approval of the government, that all officials were to co-operate in carrying them out so far as they might be required to do so, and that all the inhabitants were to comply strictly therewith and would be liable to penalties for failure to do so. In cases where the commander or an officer under his direction found it necessary to take action in a particular locality, this could be supported by the issue of a corresponding announcement by the appropriate local authority, such as the prefect or mayor.

21. Whether such action by the Allied or friendly government concerned should be reinforced by their immediately enacting legislation validating the action of the commander and persons acting under his authority, would be a matter for consideration in each case. But at some stage, such legislation would probably be necessary to protect local officials or inhabitants who had carried out the directions of the commander, and it should be definitely agreed with the Allied or friendly government that any necessary steps to this end should be taken by it.

22. Whether course (A) or course (B) is adopted, the question will arise whether offences against the enactments of the commander should be tried by military tribunals of the occupying forces or by the local courts. It would probably be desirable to make use of the latter to the greatest extent compatible with the security of the occupying forces. This, however, is obviously a matter to be considered in consultation with the Allied or friendly governments concerned.

23. It is obvious that both the principle and details of the arrangements to be made will require to be studied, so far as circumstances permit, in consultation with the Allied or friendly governments concerned, if the advantage of the hearty collaboration of the local inhabitants is to be secured. It would be very desirable, provided that military considerations permit, if the proclamations and/or enactments to be issued

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24. In order to assist in this task, there is attached herewith the draft of a proclamation (Annex I) which might suitably be issued by an American commander upon invading territory of any category. The publication of such proclamations would be more likely to serve their purpose of securing the friendly co-operation of the local inhabitants, if promulgated to them through a medium in which they have confidence and are traditionally accustomed to respect as a source of authority. If no such medium is available, then promulgation should be through such agency as will tend to make co-operation by the local population respectable as a patriotic effort for the restoration of the authority of their government and the freedom of their country from the invaders, giving a sort of guarantee of the good faith of the Allied force commander's proclamation. Herewith as Annex III, to be modified as indicated in Note 3 thereof, is a suggested form for such promulgation. This is only given as an indication of what such a document should contain, since the Allied or friendly government would presumably wish to prepare their own draft.

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25. If, upon invading territory of any category, it becomes necessary for Allied force commanders to assure and exercise, through military government, the powers of civil government incident to their criminal responsibility, because of an inept native civil government, Allied force commanders should issue proclamations which, if issued by an American commander, may be substantially in the form of Proclamation No. 2 hereto attached (Annex II). The publication of such proclamations would be much more palatable to the native population, and the military government established, as therein provided for, would be less resented and more favored by the local population, if such proclamations were promulgated through the same reassuring friendly medium as Proclamation No. 1 may have been promulgated. In case such medium is the lawful government of either Category Two or Category Three territory, then it would be well to adhere in such proclamations same such recitals as are set out in Note 2 of Annex III herewith - provided merely as a suggestion.

Among the objects to be served by such recitals (sub-paragraph a) through the governing authority, it is hoped, would be the validation and legal sanction of acts of the native population co-operating with the Allied force commanders and their military governments - insuring them against liability therefor, which may be exacted through court actions after Allied forces are withdrawn.

26. Either contemporaneous with, or immediately following, the publication of Proclamation No. 2, ordinances for the government of such territory should be published, upon authority of the Allied force commanders governing in that territory. A comprehensive form for such ordinance is to be found in Appendix V, U.S. War Department, FM 27-5, Basic Field Manual, Military Government.

27. One particular point which will require consideration in consultation with each Allied or friendly government concerned, will be that of the legislation enacted in the occupied territory by the Germans. In our view, such legislation should cease to have effect on the termination of the German occupation; but (i) it is possible that it may be desirable to maintain certain particular enactments in force, (ii) it would in any case be desirable that the position of the German legislation should be made plain to the local population. The question whether the necessary steps to this end should be taken by the Allied or friendly government concerned (if available), or by the commander of the occupying forces, should be considered, in advance if possible, in consultation with the Allied or friendly governments concerned.

PARAGRAPH 11 OF I.T.(E)/F(42)21.

28. The principle that a force in occupation of territory possesses exclusive jurisdiction in internal matters over its members, and that those are exempt from at any rate the original jurisdiction of the local courts, is well established in international law. It appears, however, that agreements with the Allied or friendly governments concerned, laying down the precise scope of these privileges and limitations, would be very desirable, and these governments are likely to expect this to be done, particularly as most of them have had the experience of negotiating agreements of this nature in regard to their forces in the United Kingdom. The Norwegian Government have in fact

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29. Such agreements should recognise the exclusive jurisdiction of the occupying military authorities over their forces in matters of internal discipline and administration. As regards the jurisdiction of the local courts, it would be desirable, as regards Phase 1 and Phase 2, to secure that these courts should exercise no jurisdiction over the occupying forces or their members, either in criminal or civil matters. In the case of territory occupied by Allied forces after the eviction of the enemy, such exemption would be fully in accordance with international law. It is thought unlikely that in these two phases civil claims would arise, except where the responsibility really lay with the government of the occupying force, and we assume that such cases would be dealt with by claims commissions which these governments would set up in the occupied territories.

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30. In Phase 3, the position would probably be the same as regards criminal jurisdiction. But it would be necessary to make provision for civil claims against individual members of the forces, by which we mean claims where the government could not be held responsible and which could not therefore be dealt with by claims commissions. Such claims could not be dealt with by the military tribunals of the occupying forces, and, in the interest of good relations between those forces and the local authorities and inhabitants, some means of dealing with them will have to be found. If military considerations permit, it would be a satisfactory solution if the jurisdiction of the local courts over individual members of the occupying forces were admitted in such cases, subject to arrangements which would ensure that members of the forces were not arrested or imprisoned on account of failure to meet a civil debt. Arrangements on these lines are now being worked out in regard to the American forces in the United Kingdom. If, in any case, the occupying military authorities felt unable to accept such an arrangement, it would be necessary to consider what other solution could be found, since it seems clear that provision for dealing with such civil claims must be made in some way or other.

31. If agreements on the above lines are made with the Allied or friendly governments concerned, it might be that they should contain provisions as regards the fiscal, etc., immunities and privileges of the forces in occupation - see paragraphs 13 and 14 above and sub-paragraphs a, b, c and d of Note 2 to Annex III.

(Signed) WILLIAM MALKIN.

Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office.

(Signed) ED. C. BETTS, Col.

J.A.G.D., Theater Judge Advocate, E.T.C.U.S.A.

27th October, 1942.

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ANNEX I.PROCLAMATION NO. 1.UNITED STATES ARMYEUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS.

Headquarters, Theater of
Operations

..... (Place)

..... 1942.

TO THE PEOPLE OF

In keeping with the friendship of the United States
for your country and you, proclaimed by
The President of the United States
shared by her Allies

The forces of the United States supported by Allied forces have
landed in . We come among you as friends, not as enemies
or conquerors. You are asked to receive us as friends. Our purpose is
not conquest but to free your country from its oppressors, restore your
authority and protect your country and its people in the enjoyment of an
orderly government of its choice. When conditions permit and the
necessity for our presence shall have ceased our troops will be withdrawn.

(e.g. French) Laws and regulations will remain in force except
in so far as they are inconsistent with a state of war and military
necessities, or with the safety of the forces of the United States and
supporting Allied forces. The officers and employees of your Government
and its administrative districts are urged to continue their duties as
usual and to co-operate with the forces of the United States and supporting
Allied forces in expelling the enemy from your country, in restoring its
authority and in the maintenance of internal order. You are urged to
continue your several occupations, to keep open your churches and schools,
and to follow as far as possible the usual habits and customs of your
lives and the business of your community. It is to your interest as well
as your patriotic duty to co-operate with these forces. You will be
required to observe such orders and regulations as your governing author-
ities or I, as Commanding General of these forces, and my subordinates,
may issue in order to assure the safety and tranquillity of your country

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may issue in order to assure the safety and tranquility of your country
and yourselves.

Your assistance to these forces in the accomplishments of their
mission will reflect credit upon you and benefit your great country.

.....
Signature.

General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

.....

(Reference paragraph 24 of covering memorandum Appendix A 4853
A.T.(3)/2(42)35).

ANNEX II.PROCLAMATION NO. 2.UNITED STATES ARMY
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS.

Military Control of
 Headquarters, Theater of Operations

TO THE PEOPLE OF
 and such other parts of
 hereafter be controlled by the Army of the United States and its
 supporting forces.
 as are now or may

The Army of the United States, supported by Allied forces, is in control of the (state(s)) (province(s)) above named and is advancing farther into territory. The purpose of its control is

It is the policy of the Army of the United States, and supporting Allied forces, not to make war upon you, the civilians inhabiting the controlled territory; but, on the contrary, to maintain tranquility and order in that territory. As Commanding General of the Theater of Operations, I have therefore established military control in the ((states) (provinces)) above mentioned and will extend the same to other such territory. The establishment and operation of military control, by preserving order, will benefit you. It is therefore to your interest, as well as your duty, to cooperate and obey.

You must obey promptly and fully, in letter and in spirit, such orders and ordinances as I, my successors as Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations, and subordinate military authorities may issue from time to time. In particular you must obey the directions of military policemen, who wear a blue arm band bearing the letters "MP" and personnel on civil affairs duty, who wear a purple arm band bearing the letters "Ca". You must refrain from any act or word of hostility or disrespect to the occupying forces.

(French) laws and regulations now in force will remain in force except insofar as they are inconsistent with a state of war or with the rights and safety of the controlling forces or as they may be changed by me or my successors. The executive and judicial officers of your government and of its ((states) (provinces)), counties and cities will continue the performance of their duties as usual, subject to supervision and direction by personnel under command of the Army of the United States on civil affairs duty. The meetings and functions of your (Congress) (Parliament) and of the legislatures of your (states) (provinces) are suspended. The officers and employees of the railroads, steamboat lines, canals, bus and truck lines,

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It is the policy of the Army of the United States, and supporting Allied forces, not to make war upon you, the civilians inhabiting the controlled territory; but, on the contrary, to maintain tranquillity and order in that territory. As Commanding General of the Theater of Operations, I have therefore established military control in the ((states) (provinces)) above mentioned and will extend the same to other such territory. The establishment and operation of military control, by preserving order, will benefit you. It is therefore to your interest, as well as your duty, to co-operate and obey.

You must obey promptly and fully, in letter and in spirit, such orders and ordinances as I, my successors as Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations, and subordinate military authorities may issue from time to time. In particular you must obey the directions of military policemen, who wear a blue arm band bearing the letters "MP" and personnel on civil affairs duty, who wear a purple arm band bearing the letters "CA". You must refrain from any act or word of hostility or disrespect to the occupying forces.

(French) laws and regulations now in force will remain in force except insofar as they are inconsistent with a state of war or with the rights and safety of the controlling forces or as they may be changed by me or my successors. The executive and judicial officers of your government and of its ((states) (provinces)), counties and cities will continue the performance of their duties as usual, subject to supervision and direction by personnel under command of the Army of the United States on civil affairs duty. The meetings and functions of your (Congress) (Parliament) and of the legislatures of your (states) (provinces) are suspended. The officers and employees of the railroads, steamboat lines, canals, bus and truck lines, street railways, electric light and power plants and transmission lines, telephones, telegraphs, cables, radio stations, meterworks, gas works, and other public utilities within the occupied territory must continue in the performance of their duties.

You who obey the directions given in this Proclamation and in other orders and ordinances have nothing to fear from the Army of the United States and its supporting Allied forces and will be protected by them in your persons, property, family rights, religion, and in the exercise of your occupations. You who fail to render such obedience or who commit crimes or offenses will be severely punished.

It is your duty as well as to your interest to continue your usual occupations, to open your churches and schools, and to resume as far as possible the ways of peace.

/This

- 2 -

This Proclamation will be (accompanied). (followed) by ordinances setting out in detail what is required of you and what it is forbidden for you to do.

.....
Signature.

.....
General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.

.....

(Reference paragraph 25 of covering memorandum - Appendix A to M.T.(E)/P(42)35.)

P R O M U L G A T I O NVIVE LA FRANCE!VIVE LA FRANCE!VIVE LA FRANCE!

TO OUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN OF OCCUPIED FRANCE:

1. Your fellow countrymen among the United Nations sorrowfully conscious of the impossibility of France alone freeing herself from the domination of Axis Powers and expelling the occupying armies from among you, have urged the Governments of the United States and Great Britain to accept as a primary aim of their war against the Axis Powers the freeing of France and the re-establishment of its government to full authority, not allowing that aim to await the defeat of Axis Powers. In keeping with the desire of the millions of friends of France in both these countries and the traditional respect of the Governments of these countries for France they have ordered their military forces to free France from Axis military occupation and domination of the Axis Powers. Accordingly, Allied military forces have landed on the shores of France. Vive la France! Vive la Republique!

2. You are urged to receive these Allied military forces as deliverers and friends. Their mission will be more readily and speedily accomplished with your co-operation - in the patriotic duty resting upon all sons and daughters of France to aid in the restoration of the power, the might and the glory of France. With your aid and friendly co-operation these forces will be the better able to succor your needs for food, clothing and medical supplies, care and attention and to administer through military government their responsibilities for the restoration of public order and safety.

3. These ends will be served through the exercise by Allied force commanders of legislative, executive and judicial authority - pending the restoration of the authority of France - ensuring fair, sympathetic and understanding government, in contrast with the inconsiderate, harsh, ruthless government administered by the Axis Powers.

4. The exercise of such authority will be in accordance with the command responsibility resting upon the Allied force commanders to take all measures in their power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.

.....
 of Allied military forces in your midst, has issued the following Proclamation

(here should be inserted Proclamation No. 2).

5. All loyal sons and daughters of France are rallied to the aid of

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domination of Axis Powers and expelling the occupying armies from among you, have urged the Governments of the United States and Great Britain to accept as a primary aim of their war against the Axis Powers the freeing of France and the re-establishment of its government to full authority, not allowing that aim to await the defeat of Axis Powers. In keeping with the desire of the millions of friends of France in both these countries and the traditional respect of the Governments of these countries for France they have ordered their military forces to free France from Axis military occupation and domination of the Axis Powers. Accordingly, Allied military forces have landed on the shores of France. Vive la France! Vive la République!

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.....
 of Allied military forces in your midst, has issued the
 following Proclamation

(here should be inserted Proclamation No. 2).

5. All loyal sons and daughters of France are rallied to the aid of the Allied military force under the command of.....in support of their purpose to liberate France and restore her to her former power, might and glory among the other great nations of the world. Vive la France! Vive la République! Vive la France!

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NOTES.

The phrase "United States and Great Britain" is used in this paper (and U.S. Army and like phrases) on the understanding that it is preferable as "French fait" to give such precedence to the United States.

NOTE 1/

NOTE 1: In case of such promulgation of Proclamation No. 2 in other than Category One territory (France), there may be a possibility of securing such promulgation as an act of government (e.g. Holland) or of refugee claimants of governmental authority. In any such case, appropriate editorial modifications will have to be made in this promulgation (Annex III), which is prepared as if intended alone for France.

NOTE 2: The foregoing form of promulgation, discussed in paragraph 25 of the covering memorandum (Appendix A), is only suitable for the promulgation of Proclamation No. 2 upon invading Category One territory (France). If conditions obtaining upon the invasion of Category Two or Category Three territory are such as to make it necessary for the Allied force commanders to assume their command responsibility of administering the occupied territory through military government it would be well, as pointed out in paragraph 25 of the covering memorandum (Appendix A), to add thereto some such recital as the following:-

- a. All subjects of the lawful government of..... are called upon and urged to obey and respect the authority of such military government which has been established upon the invitation and with the sanction of this government. Obedience to the authority of such military government, execution of its orders and co-operation in its administration by the people of..... is expected and directed - with full assurance of this government that all such acts are lawful and proper.
- b. No tax, direct or indirect, will be collected upon property of the Allied forces or their governments, their representatives, civilian employees, governmental agencies or authorized welfare organizations; nor will any tax be collected upon any purchase from, sale to, or any transaction of any kind with the Allied forces, the Allied Governments, their representatives, civilian employees, agencies or organizations.
- c. The Commanding General, Allied forces, the forces under his command, and supporting forces, and their governments, the representatives of their governments and civilian employees of those governments, shall enjoy extraterritorial privileges and be exempt from the jurisdiction and immune to the processes of the courts, civil and criminal, of
- d. Requisitioning of billets, supplies, lands, buildings, transportation and services for the military needs of the forces under command of the Commanding General, Allied forces, is authorized, if not procurable by agreement promptly, in sufficient quantities and at fair prices. Requisitions will be made only by authority of the commanding officer of the troops in the locality and upon the Mayor or other appropriate civil authorities, but may be upon individuals in cases of necessity. Payment will be made at once in cash or in voucher payable in cash by the disbursing officer of the Army to which the officer belongs upon whose authority the requisition is issued. Prices will be the fair market value to be fixed by agreement if possible, otherwise by the appropriate military authorities.

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2. All subjects of the lawful government of.....
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NOTE 3: The recitals of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 5 above would be suitable for promulgation of Proclamation No. 1, through some native medium, as suggested in paragraph 24 of covering memorandum (Appendix A). Consideration should be given to adding the substance of the recitals in sub-paragraphs 2, 4, 5 and 6 of NOTE 2 above.



War Office File No.:

24/General/2290.

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ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

Previous References:

A. T. (E)/H(42)6:
Conclusion (45).
A. T. (E)/H(42)7:
Minute 49(i).

Paper No.:

A. T. (E)/P(42)23.
1st September, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

PUBLIC HEALTH: MEDICAL STORES.

(Memorandum by the Chairman for consideration by the Committee at their eighth meeting to be held on 3rd September, 1942.)

1. I have now received from A.M.D.3. the schedule of essential items of medical equipment called for in Conclusion (45) of the sixth meeting.
2. The schedule, which is too long and detailed to warrant circulation, is divided into various sections covering medicines, chemicals and medical materials; sera and vaccines; compressed tablets; surgical dressings; rubber and waterproof goods; surgical appliances and sundries; splints; dental appliances and materials; and X-ray films. It is drawn up on the basis of a population figure supplied by G.H.Q., Home Forces, and covers estimated requirements for one month.
3. It will be remembered that at the second meeting on 9th July, the Committee were informed that the Ministry of Supply had written to D.A.R. suggesting that orders for an overall percentage addition to military medical stores should be placed, so that the additional stores might be available for the civil population.
4. It is now for the Committee to decide:-

- (i) whether the Ministry of Supply should be requested to place orders for medical stores, which would in due course be available for the civil population in territories occupied in future operations on the continent; and, if so,
- (ii) whether such stores should be ordered on the basis of

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

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(i) whether the Ministry of Supply should be requested to place orders for medical stores, which would in due course be available for the civil population in territories occupied in future operations on the continent; and, if so,

(ii) whether such stores should be ordered on the basis of requirements for a month, or for a longer period.

(Incl.) F.C.B.

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War Office File No.:

24/General/2290.



SECRET

ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

Previous References:

A.T.(E)/F(42)14.
A.T.(E)/F(42)15.
Conclusion (45).

Paper No.:

A.T.(E)/F(42)29.

20th October, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

PUBLIC HEALTH: CARE OF CIVIL POPULATION. MAINTENANCE OF HEALTH, AND PREVENTION OF DISEASE IN EUROPEAN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY OUR FORCES.

(Memorandum by D.C.C.I.C. for consideration by
the Committee at their twelfth meeting to be
held on Thursday, 22nd October, 1942.)

1. The public health problems in occupied territory form an essential part of the greater administrative problem which the occupation will create. The latter is twofold, namely to relieve the military commander of all responsibility other than engaging and defeating the enemy, and to assist the civil administration to resume its proper functions.
2. The Army medical services are staffed and equipped to attend to the medical, surgical and hygienic needs of the forces, but they have neither the personnel, the equipment, nor the time to deal with the health problems of the civil inhabitants of the territory in which the Army is operating or providing garrisons. Army medical care provided by the A.M.S. to the civilian population must take second place, and will be limited to such measures which are essential to the well-being of the troops, or to the success of military operations.
3. It follows that the medical and hygiene section of the C.C.I.C.'s staff must arrive at the theatre of operations at the earliest possible moment, in order to organize a medical relief service based on the use of such national public health services as still exist in the liberated territory.
4. The public health problems in occupied territory, so far as hygiene

PUBLIC HEALTH: CARE OF CIVIL POPULATION, MAINTENANCE OF
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3. It follows that the medical and hygiene section of the C.C.A.O.'s staff must arrive at the theatre of operations at the earliest possible moment, in order to organize a medical relief service based on the use of such national public health services as still exist in the liberated territory.

4. The public health problems in occupied territory, so far as hygiene and sanitation are concerned, can be grouped under six headings:-

- 1874
- (a) housing;
 - (b) conservancy;
 - (c) water;
 - (d) food;
 - (e) clothing;
 - (f) infectious diseases.

5. The following conditions which will affect the above problems are likely to be met with:-

(a) The "scorched earth" policy will have been ruthlessly and meticulously carried out.

(b) Parts will be destroyed or blocked. This will affect the quantities of heavy stores that can be landed.

E
(c)

(c) Towns and villages will be levelled to the ground, or burnt, thus rendering thousands of inhabitants homeless.

(d) Water supplies will be destroyed, polluted or intentionally poisoned. This will necessitate extermination and treatment.

(e) Sewage systems will be disorganized with risk of water supplies being contaminated and bowel infection spreading.

(f) The herding together of refugees, which appears to be inevitable, will increase the risk of spread of infectious diseases, and their treatment will be correspondingly difficult.

(g) The shortage of coal and coke will restrict the cooking of food, and the heating of buildings unless wood is available from damaged buildings.

(h) The destruction of roads will hamper the work of relief parties: means of transport will be removed, destroyed or immobilised.

(i) Increases in the number of invasion areas and their isolation owing to the presence of an intervening enemy will mean a separate organisation for each area.

(j) Many civilians will be without clothing and bedding.

(k) Our own means of transport on land and sea will be required primarily for military purposes.

6. Owing to the present inadequate ration in occupied territories, a large proportion of the population there must be existing on the verge of deficiency disease. If to this is added the privation which is bound to be their lot during the period between the enemy retreat and the time when they come under the care of the occupying forces, many cases of frank deficiency disease may be expected. Provision must therefore, be made for prophylaxis and treatment of these deficiency diseases at all centres from which rations are to be issued to refugee populations.

7. When considering the organization of a medical relief service (which must necessarily be based on the utilisation of the existing national public health services), it should be remembered that the efficiency of the latter may have been considerably reduced by such conditions as:-

(a) destruction of civil hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, etc.;

(b) the shortage of civil doctors, nurses and hospital staffs.

These conditions involve the provision of supplementary personnel raised from Allied welfare organizations or otherwise.

8. The conditions affecting the public health services will not be static. At the outset the chaotic state of the newly liberated territory

- (h) The destruction of roads will hamper the work of relief parties; means of transport will be removed, destroyed or immobilised.
- (i) Increases in the number of invasion areas and their isolation owing to the presence of an intervening enemy will mean a separate organisation for each area.
- (j) Many civilians will be without clothing and bedding.
- (k) Our own means of transport on land and sea will be required primarily for military purposes.

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- (a) destruction of civil hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, etc.;
- (b) the shortage of civil doctors, nurses and hospital staffs.

These conditions involve the provision of supplementary personnel raised from Allied welfare organisations or otherwise.

8. The conditions affecting the public health services will not be static. At the outset the chaotic state of the newly liberated territory will make the work of medical relief on an adequate scale a practical impossibility. Conditions will improve in the rear areas as soon as the public services are reorganised, but those in the forward areas will present a recurring problem of varying proportions, as, and when, active operations penetrate deeper into enemy territory.

9. From the above survey, the following points of principle emerge for the consideration of the Committee:-

- (a) approval of the principle that the military authorities can only accept responsibility for the administration of civilian public health and medical services in so far as such administration is essential to the well-being of the troops, or to the success of military operations;

/ (b)

- 3 -

- (b) approval of the provision of a medical and hygiene section of the C.C.F.O's. staff at the minimum strength necessary to supervise and assist the proper functioning of the local medical and hygiene services;
- (c) approval of the provision of medical supplies so as to prevent the spread of deficiency disease, in so far as such supplies are not included in the schedule of medical stores now being drawn up;
- (d) the desirability of discussing civil health and hygiene problems with the Allied Governments in this country and with the Free French, with the objects of :-
 - (i) enabling these subjects to be handed over to Allied Governments as early as possible, and
 - (ii) obtaining assistance from the Allied Governments in the form of local knowledge and experience, and the provision of liaison staff, for the benefit of the military administration during their period of responsibility;
- (e) the desirability of approaching voluntary welfare organisations in this country, such as the Anglo-American Ambulance Corps etc., with a view to obtaining their help, if necessary, in the problem of medical assistance in invaded areas.

(Intd.) S.S.L.

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War Office File No. :

24/General/2290.



ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

SECRET.

Previous References :

A.T. (E) 13(44)29.
A.T. (E) 11(42)12:
Minute 93.

Paper No. :

A.T. (E) 12(42)37.

24th November, 1942.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

PUBLIC HEALTH

(Memorandum by D.C.C.A.O. for consideration by the Committee at their fifteenth meeting to be held on Thursday, 26th November, 1942.)

1. Introduction.

I have now been able to go fully into the medical and hygiene problems with which the C.C.A.O. is likely to be confronted in reoccupied territories and to prepare an outline plan to meet these problems. This plan presupposes that the Relief Department of the Board of Trade will be in a position to give practical assistance in a number of ways.

I have already been in touch with Mr. Dudley Ward on the subject, and I feel that the A.T. (E) Committee will wish to consider and discuss the nature of the assistance which I suggest will be necessary.

2. Situations with which the C.C.A.O. may be faced.

I have assumed that the enemy will endeavour to complicate our armies' problems by removing key personnel such as doctors; also that many hospitals will have been damaged or destroyed. Communications will have been interrupted and means of transport removed. Water will be, or will become, contaminated.

3. Problems.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

PUBLIC HEALTH.

(Memorandum by D.C.C.A.O. for consideration by the Committee at their fifteenth meeting to be held on Thursday, 26th November, 1942.)

1. Introduction.

I have now been able to go fully into the medical and hygiene problems with which the C.C.A.O. is likely to be confronted in reoccupied territories and to prepare an outline plan to meet these problems. This plan presupposes that the Relief Department of the Board of Trade will be in a position to give practical assistance in a number of ways.

I have already been in touch with Mr. Dudley Ward on the subject, and I feel that the A.T.(B) Committee will wish to consider and discuss the nature of the assistance which I suggest will be necessary.

2. Situations with which the C.C.A.O. may be faced.

I have assumed that the enemy will endeavour to complicate our armies' problems by removing key personnel such as doctors; also that many hospitals will have been damaged or destroyed. Communications will have been interrupted and means of transport removed. Water will be, or will become, contaminated.

3. Problems.

Arising out of such situations it seems that:-

(a) doctors will have to be brought into the reoccupied countries, and nationals who have got away from the countries concerned are the most obvious source of supply. As this source of supply will not be sufficient to meet requirements, clinicians will have to be considered as well;

(b) treatment centres will have to be set up in towns, but in country districts travelling dispensaries and operating theatres will have to be resorted to;

(c) hygiene sections will be required. It is thought that it will not be possible to form efficient sections from local inhabitants;

- 2 -

- (d) water will have to be treated either by the use of water purifiers, by boiling, or by chlorination;
- (e) relief stores and equipment such as clothing, blankets and stretchers, as well as equipment for treatment centres, will be required, and the Army will not be able to supply these;
- (f) there may be a shortage of personnel qualified to instruct in P.M.D.;
- (g) it may be desirable to evacuate certain sick or wounded civilians. Ports and ships required by the Army will not be available for this purpose. On the other hand a restricted amount of shipping and some harbours not used for the Army might be made available to meet the requirements.

The necessary accommodation might be provided in hatted camps which already exist in England.

4. Recommendations.

It is therefore recommended:-

- (a) that the Relief Department of the Board of Trade be asked:-
 - (i) to prepare lists of doctors and chemists in this country who could be made available to go overseas when required;
 - (ii) to go into the question of providing travelling dispensaries and operating theatres with the necessary staffs;
 - (iii) to form and train, from nationals in this country, hygiene sections which would be available to proceed overseas when required;
 - (iv) to go into the question of providing medical relief stores and equipment;
 - (v) to undertake the training of nationals and British subjects in P.M.D. duties so that they can be sent overseas when the opportunity offers;
- (b) that D.M.G., Home Forces, in conjunction with the Relief Department of the Board of Trade, be asked to go into the

(g) it may be desirable to evacuate certain sick or wounded civilians. Ports and ships required by the Army will not be available for this purpose. In the other hand a restricted amount of shipping and some harbours not used for the Army might be made available to meet the requirements.

The necessary accommodation might be provided in hutted camps which already exist in England.

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(ii) to go into the question of providing travelling dispensaries and operating theatres with the necessary staffs;

(iii) to form and train, from nationals in this country, hygiene sections which would be available to proceed overseas when required;

(iv) to go into the question of providing medical relief stores and equipment;

(v) to undertake the training of nationals and British subjects in P.D. duties so that they can be sent overseas when the opportunity offers;

(a) that D.M.G., Home Forces, in conjunction with the Relief Department of the Board of Trade, be asked to go into the possibility of evacuating and accommodating some of the sick and wounded civilians in this country;

(c) that the Bureau of the Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Committee be asked to prepare lists of doctors and chemists in U.S.A. and Canada, who could be made available to go overseas when required.

(Initd.) S. S. L.

War Office File No. :

0181/164.



SECRET.

ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT.

Previous References:

A.T.(E)/1(42)17:
Conclusion (128).
A.T.(E)/1(43)1:
Minute 8.

Paper No.:

A.T.(E)/1(43)20.

23rd February, 1943.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORIES (EUROPE) COMMITTEE.

CIVIL DEFENCE AND FIRE-FIGHTING.

(Memorandum by Major-General Bramjohn for consideration by the Committee at their twenty-first meeting to be held on Thursday, 25th February, 1943.)

1. Experience in North Africa has shown that operationally it is important to develop a civil defence and fire-fighting organization in reoccupied cities and ports as rapidly as possible and that it is essential to make detailed plans in advance for this purpose.

2. A meeting was held on 18th February, 1943, at Norfolk House, under my chairmanship, to discuss this problem as it affects Continental operations to be mounted from the United Kingdom.

Representatives of the Home Office (Mr. S.J. Baker, Assistant Under-Secretary and Commander A. Firebrace, Chief of Fire Staff), War Office (D.C.C.A.O. and Inspector, Fire Services, 23), Home Forces Planning Staff, E.T.O.U.S.A. and S.O.S. were present.

3. At this meeting, the following principles were agreed:-

- (a) the Army would be responsible for providing the fire-fighting services required for the protection of military installations;
- (b) N.F.S. units would not be required for overseas; the object must be to develop the indigenous civil defence and fire-fighting organisation;
- (c) this development would be carried out by civil defence officers and fire-fighting experts on the G.O.A.O.'s staff, whom the Home Office would be asked to provide;
- (d) natives of the countries likely to be reoccupied should be trained in advance at Ministry of Home Security schools to serve as organizers and instructors in both civil defence and

CIVIL DEFENCE AND FIRE-FIGHTING.

(Memorandum by Major-General Brandt for consideration by the Committee at their twenty-first meeting to be held on Thursday, 25th February, 1943.)

1. Experience in North Africa has shown that operationally it is most important to develop a civil defence and fire-fighting organization in reoccupied cities and ports as rapidly as possible and that it is essential to make detailed plans in advance for this purpose.

2. A meeting was held on 16th February, 1943, at Norfolk House, under my chairmanship, to discuss this problem as it affects Continental operations to be mounted from the United Kingdom.

Representatives of the Home Office (Mr. S.J. Baker, Assistant Under-Secretary and Commander A. Firebrace, Chief of Fire Staff), War Office (D.C.C.A.O. and Inspector, Fire Services, Q.3), Home Forces Planning Staff, E.T.O. U.S.A. and S.O.S. were present.

3. At this meeting, the following principles were agreed:-

(a) the Army would be responsible for providing the fire-fighting services required for the protection of military installations;

(b) M.F.S. units would not be required for overseas; the object must be to develop the indigenous civil defence and fire-fighting organisation;

(c) this development would be carried out by civil defence officers and fire-fighting experts on the C.C.A.O.'s staff, whom the Home Office would be asked to provide;

(d) natives of the countries likely to be reoccupied should be trained in advance at Ministry of Home Security schools to serve as organizers and instructors in both civil defence and fire-fighting overseas, under the direction of the Civil Affairs Officers;

(e) all equipment for civil fire-fighting services overseas would almost certainly have to be provided from the United Kingdom.

4. At the conclusion of the meeting, D.C.C.A.O. and the Inspector of Fire Services were asked, in collaboration with Mr. Baker and a U.S. representative, to co-ordinate, and prepare estimates of, the requirements for civil fire-fighting services overseas.

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5. I accordingly invite the Committee:-

- (i) to approve the principles agreed at the meeting;
- (ii) to confirm the instructions given to D.C.C.A.C. to prepare preliminary estimates of the requirements, both in personnel and equipment for civil defence and fire-fighting services overseas; and to take the necessary action to obtain these requirements through the War Office branches concerned;
- (iii) to authorise D.C.C.A.C., now that permission has been given for discussions with the Allied Governments and French National Committee, to arrange for such numbers of Allied nationals as may be considered necessary to be trained at Ministry of Home Security schools in civil defence and fire-fighting.

(Intl.) M.C.D.E.

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