

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

10000/100/625

108pp

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

10000/100/625

SECURITY
MAR. - JULY 1945

108pp.

0898

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

8pp

SECURITY
10000/100/625

03991

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COAT
OF
ARMS

BRITISH MILITARY
ADMINISTRATION,
RURITANIA.

PERSONAL IDENTITY CARD
Nº 1232.

08001

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2.

SURNAME.....

NAMES.....

DATE OF BIRTH.....SEX.....

PLACE OF BIRTH.....

FATHER'S NAME.....

MOTHER'S NAME.....

OCCUPATION.....

RELIGION.....

LANGUAGES.....

NATIONALITIES, AT BIRTH.....

AND SINCE.....

.....

HEIGHT.....COMPLEXION.....

COLOUR OF HAIR.....OF EYES.....

RACE (IF NOT EUROPEAN).....

REMARKS.....

.....

NAME & ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER.....

.....

.....

For changes see page 5

3

BEARER'S
PHOTOGRAPH

SIGNATURE.....

FINGER PRINTS OF THE RIGHT HAND

THUMB

INDEX

MIDDLE


THIRD

785015

[illegible]

09021

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09031

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8

9.

This page is reserved for remarks
by the Medical Authorities.

09081

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10.

RENEWALS

PLACE OF RENEWAL.....

DATE OF EXPIRY.....

STAMP OF RENEWING OFFICE

PLACE OF RENEWAL.....

DATE OF EXPIRY.....

STAMP OF RENEWING OFFICE

PLACE OF RENEWAL.....

DATE OF EXPIRY.....

PLACE OF RENEWAL.....

DATE OF EXPIRY.....

STAMP OF RENEWING OFFICE

11.

ADDRESS.....

1ST CHANGE.....

2ND CHANGE.....

3RD CHANGE.....

4TH CHANGE.....

09051

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12. NEXT OF KIN IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

.....
ADDRESS.....

.....
.....

TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS

SIGNATURE.....

0905

785015

2606

1A	None	17 Nov 43	Extracts from Memo of Brig. Mullen. Thompson.
2A	None	22 Sep 43	To: H. C. T. Z. Young.
3A	CA/022	22 Sep	To: Midland.
4A	11572/9/CA	26 Sep	From: Midland.
5A	7982/CA	28 Sep	Memo. ATM.
6A	7905/CA	29 Sep	To: M.C.
7A	75764 MO	2 May	From: Thompson.
8A	7982/CA	28 Sep	Memo. ATM.
9	7982/CA	5 May	Minute. ATM.
10A	None	9 May	Memo.
11A	None	9 May	To: H. C. T. Z. Young.
12A	11572/13/CA	6 May	From: M.C.F.
13A	0.389 504/7	10 May	From: J. Z. (CI Section)
14A	141F/1400/6(1C)	11 May	From: J. Z. (2d)
15A	None	12 May	Memo. ATM.
16A	—	11 MAY 43	Memo.
17A	80198 MO	15 "	From: Thompson.
18A	4917/4/50632	16 "	From: H. C. T. Z. Young.
19A	1918	17 "	From: C. Z. Friedman.
19A	141F/1400/4(1B)	19 "	" : C. Z. Friedman.
20A	CA/089	19 "	To: Thompson.
20A	CA/089	19 "	To: Thompson.
21A	82500/9011	20 "	From: Thompson.
22A	—	—	From: G. (1B)
23A	141F/1400/CA	21 "	To: H. C. T. Z. Young.
24A	141F/1400/CA	21 "	To: Thompson.
25A	CA/122	1 June	To: Thompson.
26A	—	—	From: M.C.

12A 11572/13/CA 6 May From: M.C.F.
 13A 0-389 504/7 10 May From: J-2 (CI Section)
 14A 141F/1400/6(10) 11 May From: J-2 (St)
 15A None 12 May Memo: ATM
 16A 11 MAY 43 Memo.
 17A 80198 M011 15 " From Troopers.
 18A 4917/1400/32 16 " From: J-2 (Signed: M.C.F.)
 19A 1918 17 " From: C-2 Friedman.
 19A 141F/1400/4(10) 19 " " : C(10) founding list notified
 20A CA 089 19 " To: Troopers.
 20A CA/089 19 " To: Troopers.
 21A 82500/9011 22 " From Troopers
 22A From G(10)
 23A 141F/1400/CA 29 " To G(10) (6)
 24A 141F/1400/CA 31 " To Deputy CCAO
 25A CA/22 1 June To Troopers
 26A 141F/1400/CA 2 " Ed. & M.C.G.
 27 82735 N-11 30 May Troopers.
 28. CA/25 3 June To: Troopers
 29 141F/1424/4(10) 2 " From: G(10)
 30 9/087 8 " " : G(10) F.
 31 Memo 10 " " : MAJOR MOKLEY FLETCHER
 32 ECA/09 10 " " : 12 ARMY.
 33 7982/CA 12 " To: D.P.S.S.
 34 " 12 " 141F
 35 " 12 " CCAO.
 36 28 MAY Memo To D.C.C.A.O.
 37 7982/CA 12 June To CAPT. ALEXANDER
 38 CA 159 13 " " : 12 ARMY
 39 141F/1400/4(10) 14 " From: C(10) 141F

0908

40	141F/1424/CA(1b)	15	From: C(1b), 141 Force.
41	7982/CA	16	To: Capt Alexander
42	"	16	"
43	EC A/18	15	From: 12 ARMY
44	—	16	From: CAPT ALEXANDER
45	—	16	Memo from "
46	7982/CA	17	To: Captain Alexander
47	CA/144	17	To: Force 343.
48	141F/7982/CA	17	To: 12 ARMY & 343 Force.
49	—	17	Memo from Capt: Alexander
50	—	17	"
51	7982/CA	17	To: Capt Alexander
52	AL/126	18	From: AMCOR WIAISON
53	—	18	To: Lt. Col. Yang.
54	—	19	From: AMCOR HIAISON
55	141F/1424/CA(1b)	19	" BASU 141F
56	7982	20	To: Capt Alexander
57	—	20	Memo from Major Haley Fletcher.
57	—	18/6	From Force 343
57	—	20	Memo from Major Haley Fletcher.
58	7982	21/6	To: Major Haley Fletcher
59	—	18/6	From Force 343

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47	CA 144	14	To: Force 343.
48	141F/7982/CA	14	To: 12 Army v 343 Force.
49	—	14	Memo from Capt. Alexander
50	—	14	"
51	7982/CA	14	To Capt Alexander
52	AL/126	18	From: AMOAT WIAISON
53	—	18	To: Lt. Col. Yang.
54	—	19	From: AMOAT Liaison
55	141F/1424/CA	19	" BASU 141F
56	7982	20	To: Capt Alexander
57	—	20	Memo from Major Haley Fletcher.
58	—	20	Memo from Major Haley Fletcher.
59	7982	21/6	To: Major Haley Fletcher
60	71400/1	18/6	From Force 343
61	—	—	From: B.G.S. (I)
62	7982	24/6	Memo from Col Baller
63	7982	24/6	Memo to 61
64	7983	24/6	To Col. Charles Poletto
65	7982	3/7	To CAP. CAPT BENSON.
66	6.589.23/2013	11/7	To: Force 343.
67	15RG/1402/CA	23	From: AFHQ.
68	15RG/1402/CA	24	Summary: BG 8 (1) 15 Army Group
69	15RG/1402/CA	23	To HQ 15 Army Group
70	15RG/1402/CA	23	Chief of Staff. 15 Army Group
71	15RG/1402/CA	24	To 8 F.R.
72	15RG/1402/CA	24	To: 15 Army
73	15RG/1402/CA	23	To: 15 Army

FOLIO	REF No.	DATE	FROM
74	A143	24/7	Janta
76	15AG/7982/CA	25/7	to. Capt. Benson
76	14F/7982/CA	28/43	1 to 1 Capt. Williamson
44	---	38/43	transferred to 10th JPS
4849	---	39/43	Col. Bollos.
	---		copied

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2605

230

0 7 1 2
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Subject: Intelligence Reports.

SECRET

15AG/7982/CA

Commanding General
Seventh Army Adv. H.Q.

Forwarded herewith are copies of four letters from G(1b),
15 Army Group, which, it is thought, will be of interest to
the Senior Civil Affairs Officer attached to 7 Army.

C.R.
J. COLONEL,
S.S.O.
ANGOT

ANGOT H.Q.
15 Army Group
Field
25 Jul 43

2604

Subject: Intelligence Reports

SECRET

15AG/7082/CA

G.C.A.O.
AMDOT, Adv. H.Q.
a/c 86 Area
Syracuse

Cp. Capt. Benson
H.Q. Main Eighth Army

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of four letters from G(1b) giving information which, it is thought, will be of interest to you.
2. Copies are being forwarded direct in case you have not received them through 8 Army channels. Copies have also been sent to 7 Army for Lt. Col. Poletti.

COLONEL
S.S.O.
AMDOT

AMDOT, H.Q.
15 Army Group
Field
23 Jul 43

2653

09131

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

(74)

25/7/43
7982

242308

PAWCOX

20

SEVENTH ARMY

EIGHTH ARMY

FORWARD

68.

A 143

FIRST X AMNOT REPORT THAT MOST OF CAPABILITIES ARE COOPERATIVE
AND PREPARED TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE X SECOND X THEY CONSIDER
EVACUATION OF ALL NON SUSPECT CAPABILITIES PW SHOULD BE SUSPENDED X
THIRD X THEY UNDERSTAND SOME CAPABILITIES PW ALREADY EVACUATED NA
AND REQUESTED THAT WHERE POSSIBLE THOSE SATISFYING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
BE RETURNED SOON TO REPORT TO SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS
OFFICER ARMY CONCERNED X FOURTH X FORTHCOMING AGREE THIS HEAD-
QUARTERS X FIFTH X REQUEST YOU CONSIDER AND IF AGREED ISSUE
NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS

Internal Distribution by 'A':

- G(Ops)
- GS(I)
- AC(US)
- Q(Maint)
- Q(Mov)
- AMNOT
- War Diary (2)
- Master File
- Float
- File 3091/A.1

This copy only to be used by X to duty
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ date
41141U

2612

SLU:

Lt Col FARLEY SMITH
PUBLIC SAFETY

[Signature]
3517

By Air Letter EXHIBIT
Services.
Sgt: W. J. FIDELITY,
Colonel.

09:51
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SUBJECT:- OVRA.

SECRET

1. AG/1102/8/C(11)

23 July 43.

A.C. of S, G-2,
Seventh Army.

The Special I(b) Officer with Eighth Army has made contact with the head OVRA agent at SYRACUSE and has obtained from him certain information about that organisation.

The name of the OVRA chief in SICILY, FORRESTA Pietro of PALERMO has already been transmitted to you by message.

The OVRA appears to have been concerned only with the security of the Fascist Regime, and not with counter-espionage in the wider sense. One of the special war-time tasks allotted to the OVRA has been to keep an eye on the activities of the Germans and particularly of the Gestapo. Information on the Gestapo, and possibly even on the Abwehr may therefore be found in OVRA files: these appear to be generally kept at prefecture offices.

At SYRACUSE the OVRA representatives appear to have confined themselves largely to reporting on the general attitude and moral of the civil population.

There is as yet no indication that members of the OVRA have been instructed to carry out espionage in the event of an Allied landing: they should however be considered as a potential danger in this direction, until there is evidence to the contrary.

It has been ascertained that the functions of the OVRA are duplicated by a less secret body of plain clothes police, known as the Squadra Politica to be found in every Questura. Members of this body, like those of the OVRA, should be regarded as security suspects.

H.Q. 13 Army Group,
B.M.A.F.

Copy To: A.M.S.O.T. H.Q.

Major-General
Chief of General Staff
13 Army Group.

09171

(72)

HEADQUARTER ANGOT
(11-2-1943)
15th Army Group
AGG-777

1575/7982/CA
24 July 1943

SUBJECT: Carabinieri.

TO : MAJOR G. C. FORD, Commander, Prisoner of War Camp,
Turin.

220

1. In confirmation of my verbal request of this morning, it is the desire of Brigadier General McNEELY, DODAG, Angot, that should any members of the Carabinieri reach from Sicily reach your prisoner of War camp, that both the G-2 IB Branch, 15th Army Group, (Fenton 186), and the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Angot, (Baggage 76) Room 10, be notified at once giving the name and grade of the Carabinieri to them with the point at which captured. The G-2 IB Branch is particularly interested in the interrogation of members of the Carabinieri before they are evacuated further.

2600

2. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Angot, is particularly concerned with the return to Sicily of any dependable members of the Carabinieri in order that they may be able to continue to perform their Civil Police functions under the direction of the Allied Military Government.

LEONARD BOLLES, Col, Inf,
Comm of Public Safety,
Angot.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-2 IB Branch, 15th Army Group
Attention: Lt Col Gibson 219

0918

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SUBJECT :- German Intelligence Service in SICILY.

DECLASSIFIED
DATE 24 Feb 43.
BY 7982
FORGE 141

SECRET.

15AG/1403/1/G(Ib).

23 Jul 43.

Ninth Army.

Reference this H.Q. 1402/11/G(Ib) dated 23 Jul 43.

Major DI MODICA, who gave the information on the PARTITO DI AZIONE, states that he was informed by MARTINO Augusto, who is referred to in para 3 of the above letter, that there is a lieutenant of the Carabinieri at TAORMINA who is a member of the Partito di Azione.

This lieutenant reported that a German officer had arrived at TAORMINA with the intention of placing agents with W/T in the district to remain in the event of an Axis evacuation.

According to DI MODICA the lieutenant will probably get in touch with our forces, but if he does not do so he can be identified through MARTINO Augusto.

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
B.N.A.F.

W.D. Gibson M.Col
Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

Copy to :- G-2 (C.I.), A.F.H.Q.
AMST H.Q.

To SEC
Public Safety
at Col Gandy bank

70

1 page
100/625
23 Jul 43

70

69

2591

09191
HEADQUARTER AMGOT
(U.S. Contingent)
15th Army Group
APO 777

(71)
15AG/7982/CA
24 July 1943

SUBJECT: Carabinieri.

221

TO : Major ATKINSON, Prisoner of War Camp, Biserte.

1. In confirmation of my verbal request as of yesterday, it is the desire of Brigadier General MOSHERRY, DCAO, Amgot, that should any members of the Carabinieri Reali from Sicily reach your prisoner of war camp, that both the G-2 IB Branch, 15th Army Group, (Fantex 186), and the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Amgot, (Bagpipe 76) Room 10, be notified at once giving the name and grade of the Carabinieri to them with the point at which captured. The G-2 IB Branch is particularly interested in the interrogation of members of the Carabinieri before they are evacuated further.

2. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Amgot, is particularly concerned with the return to Sicily of any dependable members of the Carabinieri in order that they may be able to continue to perform their Civil Police functions under the direction of the Allied Military Government.

LEONARD BOLLES, Col, Inf,
Comm of Public Safety,
Amgot.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-2 IB Branch, 15th Army Group
Attention: Lt.Col.Gibson. 47

1. Partito di Azione.

1. SECRET
24 7982
N 7982
FORGE 141

SECRET

15 AG/1102/11/G(16)

23 July 42.

C.G., H.Q. Seventh Army. (for attention of
G.S.I(b), H.Q. Eighth Army.

1. Interrogation of an Italian officer prisoner (Major Giovanni di Modica) who is believed sincere and reliable has elicited information concerning the members of an Italian political party, the members of which may be useful in furnishing information to security personnel. The political and propaganda aspects of the matter are in the hands of AMOT and Psychological Warfare, and are of no interest to security personnel except as background material for making contacts.

2. The party is known as Partito di Azione. It is of republican sentiments and feels that Italy should have a federal form of government modeled on Switzerland or the United States, all of this to be brought about by an election. Because of Fascist policy the party has been forced to remain under cover, but appears to be well organized throughout Sicily. The party has occupied itself with attempts to disaffect the army and the people from the Crown and the Fascist Party, and the prisoner claims that they were successful in weakening the resistance of the coastal divisions.

3. The head of the party is Count Storse, one time Foreign Minister of Italy and at present in the United States. Organizers in Sicily are:

Major DI MODICA, Giovanni	(Professor of Economics at the University of Turin) now a prisoner)
MARTINO, Augusto	for CATANIA and SYRACUSE, living at TACORINA
MARTINO, Giuseppe	for MESSINA, living at S. STEFANO, near MESSINA
lawyer, cousin of above	for TRAPANI, living at PAFANELLA, near TRAPANI
COSANTINO, Giuseppe	for PALERMO, living at CATTOLICONE, near PALERMO
lawyer	
MARILLI, Guido	

4. The party is stated to be well organized into regional groups, SICILY represents one region. Regional groups are divided into sections each of three members, only one of which knows who are the members of the adjoining sections.

5. The party publishes a periodical called "Stella Liberata" which is circulated among the members. Members meet to exchange views at small luncheon called Circoli.

W.D. Libson. Lt-Col
Major General.

0921

2. The party is known as Partito di Azione. It is of republican sentiments and feels that Italy should have a federal form of government modeled on Switzerland or the United States, all of this to be brought about by an election. Because of Fascist policy the party has been forced to remain under cover, but appears to be well organized throughout Sicily. The party has occupied itself with attempts to disaffect the army and the people from the Crown and the Fascist Party, and the prisoner claims that they were successful in weakening the resistance of the coastal divisions.

3. The head of the party is Count Sforza, one time Foreign Minister of Italy and at present in the United States. Organizers in Sicily are:

Major DI GIOIA, Giovanni	(Professor of Economics at the University of TURIN) now a prisoner)
MARTINO, Augusto	- for CATANIA and SYRACUSE, living at TAORMINA
MARTINO, Giuseppe	- for MUSSINA, living at S. STEPHANO, near REGGIO
lawyer, cousin of above	- for TRAPANI, living at PAFANELLA, near TRAPANI
COSENTINO, Giuseppe	- for PALERMO, living at CASTELLUZZO, near PALERMO
lawyer	
NAPOLI, Guido	

4. The party is stated to be well organized into regional groups. SICILY represents one region. Regional groups are divided into sections each of three members, only one of which knows who are the members of the adjoining sections.

5. The party publishes a periodical called "Italia Libera" which is circulated among the members. Members meet to exchange views at small fires called Circoli.

H.Q. 15 Army Group
H.N.A.F.

W.D. Libson. Lt. Col
for Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

COPI TO: G-2 (G.I.), A.F.H.Q.
AMGOT H.Q. ✓

1/1 part
100/625
23 July 43
(69)

To SER
Public Sec/27, (Hood/9021)
Lt Col Stanley, 1st Lt

6/27/43

09221

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Subject: Prisoners of War.

15AG/727

24. July. 43.

68

H.Q.,
15 ARMY GROUP.

1. Information has been received from Sicily that most of the Carabinieri are prepared to continue in office and to give the required undertakings to abstain from acts prejudicial to the Allied Military Government.
2. In the first few days of the operation, a number of Carabinieri were taken prisoner and have reached North Africa. In view of the co-operative spirit of the Carabinieri, it is desirable that evacuation to Africa of prisoners of war belonging to the Carabinieri should be suspended until I(B)-G.2 and/or the Public Safety Division of AMGOT have had an opportunity of questioning the men themselves. It is requested that a suggestion to this end be made to the 7th and 8th Armies.
3. Where Carabinieri have already reached North Africa, it is suggested that the men concerned should be interviewed by I(B)-G.2, whereafter they should be returned to Sicily and ordered to report to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer of the Army concerned. If conditions are such that it will not be possible for the men to be interrogated on this side, no further action would appear to be possible.

F. J. MONDREY,
Brigadier-General,
D. C. C. A. O.

2597

H.Q. AMGOT,
15 ARMY GROUP,
FIELD.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri

AMGOT H.S.

HEADQUARTERS

Date

N

FORCE 141

ED.

SECRET

15AG/1402/8 G (16)

23 July 43

1. The following information concerning the Italian espionage and counter espionage and the part played therein by the Carabinieri has been received from the Special (b) officer working with Eighth Army. It is considered that the information may be regarded as reliable.
2. Italian counter espionage is directed by the CENTRO CONTRO SPIONAGGIO (C.C.S.) a combined Services Organisation forming part of the S.I.M.
3. The C.C.S. works entirely through the Carabinieri, and the S.I.M. also appears to make considerable use of the Carabinieri for espionage work. Both the C.C.S. and the S.I.M. use local Carabinieri stations as cover addresses.
4. Carabinieri chosen for counter espionage work wear plain clothes and are termed a military police as distinct from the ordinary Carabinieri who are a judicial police. Before the Allied landing, the local teams of Carabinieri engaged in counter espionage worked distinctly apart from the normal Carabinieri, having, in keeping with their secret character, their own office, and never frequenting the Carabinieri barracks. They appear, however, to have been instructed to report, in the event of an Allied landing, to the local barracks for normal Carabinieri duties and to exchange their plain clothes for uniform.
5. An Italian officer prisoner, intelligent and apparently reliable, who was questioned yesterday by an officer of this branch, stated that all officers of the Carabinieri are concerned in counter espionage and that all members of the S.I.M. are recruited from the Carabinieri. An M.I.6. officer who was in TRIPOLI considers the first statement quite likely to be true.
6. Although there is as yet no direct evidence that the enemy has made plans for any members of the Carabinieri to carry out espionage work within the area of SICILY occupied by the Allies, it is clear that certain Carabinieri personnel, those who are working or have worked for the C.C.S. or S.I.M., present a serious potential threat to our security.
7. It is considered that this danger can only be met by C.A.P.O.'s and security personnel in conjunction making every effort to segregate those Carabinieri connected with the C.C.S. or S.I.M. from those concerned solely with normal police functions. If the former can be discovered and arrested without delay, this should remove the security threat, while enabling the latter to be used as the basic national police body required by AMGOT.
8. It is requested that C.A.P.O.'s be instructed to give their co-operation and urgent attention to this task.
9. We have the following information concerning Carabinieri personalities connected with C.C.S. and/or S.I.M., most of it received from the same source as above.

Carabinieri chosen for counter espionage work wear plain clothes and are termed a military police as distinct from the ordinary Carabinieri who are a judicial police. Before the Allied landing, the local teams of Carabinieri engaged in counter espionage worked distinctly apart from the normal Carabinieri, having, in keeping with their secret character, their own office, and never frequenting the Carabinieri barracks. They appear, however, to have been instructed to report, in the event of an Allied landing, to the local barracks for normal Carabinieri duties and to exchange their plain clothes for uniform.

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It is requested that C.A.P.O.'s be instructed to give their co-operation and urgent attention to this task.

5. We have the following information concerning Carabinieri personalities connected with C.C.S. and/or S.I.M., most of it received from the same source as above.

(i) DE LEO, in charge of counter espionage in SICILY, is directly responsible to the CENTRO CONTRO SPIONAZZIO in ROME.

(ii) DE LEO's Counter-Espionage HQ in SICILY, which used to be at PALERMO, moved to VILLA ISABELLA near SAN CATALDO in April this year.

(iii) DE LEO has an assistant called Capt. RICAGNI.

(iv) Correspondence for DE LEO and RICAGNI used to be addressed c/o Gruppo Interno, Carabinieri Station, PALERMO. Since the move to SAN CATALDO, such correspondence has been addressed c/o Carabinieri Station, SAN CATALDO.

(v) Capt. PANNATO at CALTANISSETTA was responsible for counter-espionage work in S. and S.E. SICILY. Responsible to DE LEO.

(vi) A small team of plain clothes Carabinieri worked under PANNATO at COMISO.

To Sec Lt Col Fawcett

Public Safety Dept

-2-

(vii) A team of 8 Warrant Officer - Maresciallo MACCA - and four other ranks worked for Capt. NATO in the SYRACUSE district. MACCA left SYRACUSE for CATANIA on the eve of the Allied landing.

(viii) North of CATANIA it appears that the local warrant officer works directly under DE LEO.

6. Seventh and Eighth Armies have been informed of the contents of this letter.

H.Q. 15 Army Group
B.N.A.F.

W.D. Gibson. Lt. Col

for Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I),
15 Army Group.

2595

2 pages
100/6257
23 July 43
17

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

SECRET
(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

B 389.231/2 OI(3)

17 Jul 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR : GOC in C, 15 Army Gp.
Att: GS"I" (Lt. Gentry)

SUBJECT : Publications Requested.

Reference your request dated 27 June 1943 for regulations governing the "Carabinieri Reali" and the Italian Fire Fighting Services and Corps of Public Security Agents.

1. The attached book has been forwarded by I.S.(O)., in response to this office cable 5130 dated 27 Jun 1943.

2. I.S.(O)., inform us that this is the only document they have which deals with the Italian Services and that for all other information on CCRR and Italian Police and Security see "Revised Notes on Italian Army - Dec 1942" and P.I.D. Italian Handbook pp 80-81.

For the A.C. of S., G-2,

accredited unofficial research staff
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

411410

To: AMGOT.

ATT: *Public Safety*

H. Blackmore
H. BLACKMORE,
Captain,
G-2 Section OI(Lib)

2594

SECRET
(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

MOST SECRET.

IMPORTANT.
CIPHER MESSAGE
IN
RECEIVED FROM AFHQ

OLIO NO: 10721
27 JUNE/43
TOO NIL
THI 1356B
TOR NIL

FROM : G-2 FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FIGBI

TO : USFOR FOR JIC FOR IS (O)

ORIG. NO:- 5130

1. IF AVAILABLE REQUEST URGENTLY COPY OF REGULATIONS GOVERNING INTERNAL ORGANISATION AND DISCIPLINE OF THE "CARABINIERI REALI", THE "ITALIAN FIRE FIGHTING SERVICES, PAD", THE CORPS OF PUBLIC SECURITY AGENTS AND THE "POLIZIA MUNICIPALE".

2. OF ABOVE PARTICULARLY DESIRE DATA PERTAINING TO CARABINIERI REALI.

IF TRANSLATIONS NOT AVAILABLE ORIGINAL TEXTS ACCEPTABLE.
"R" NO. 51.

ORIGINATOR: G-2 01(3)

AFHQ DIST;

SGS
FORCE 141 (REAR)
AG RECORDS

NOTE BY S.M.C.:- AFHQ HAVE BEEN ASKED TO PASS

THIS SIGNAL TO CCAO - on request
per Gibson, GSI(B).
S.M.C. 2120B/29
T.T. 2135B/29 P.B.

This copy only MAY BE shown to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Rec/Army by TAG/

411410

JUN 1943

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET - HUSKY

SECRET

141P/ 7982 /CA
3 July, 43.

Subject: Aides-memoire for
Civil Affairs Police Officers.

Memo to: Commanding General
Force 343 (for Civil Affairs)
Rear Echelon

There are forwarded herewith three packages of aides-memoire for Civil Affairs Police Officers in relation to towns in HONORIFIED not immediately connected with the operation. Lt. Colonel Poletti requests that the documents be held by you for the time being. The intention is that one complete set be retained by the C.A.P.O. attached to your headquarters, one set for each province be issued to the senior C.A.P.O. in the province concerned and that the aide-memoire for a particular town be issued ultimately to the senior C.A.P.O. who has occasion to function in that town.

This copy only may be used to duly
accredited unofficial researchers. Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ _____ date _____

411410

AMGOT Rear AMHQ
US/AP0512.

(S) Lemuel Bolles
Colonel.
Commissioner of Public Safety
For Major General, Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

2592

664
AMGOT REAR HEADQUARTERS
A.F.H.Q., B.N.A.F.
A.P.O. 777

PERSONAL and
CONFIDENTIAL

141P/7983/CA

24 June 1943

Group Captain Benson
Regional S.C.A.O.
12th Army

Dear Captain Benson,

You have undoubtedly seen the directive dated the 14th of June 1943 issued by Headquarters 141 and addressed to the 12th Army and Force 543 on the subject of "Security Intelligence".

The policy to be followed in regard to the arrest and treatment of officials of the local governments is rather fully outlined in paras 5 and 6. Of course this is of particular interest to all of us as applied to units of the Carabinieri Reali, more especially referred to in para 6 b (iii). The thought occurs to me that if we are to have any Carabinieri left, assault troops must be able, first, to identify Carabinieri engaged in ordinary police activities and, second, that operations orders to assault troops must reflect the provisions of the directive "Security Intelligence" clearly and adequately.

You will have a deep personal interest, of course, in the application of the provisions of the directive to the other administrative officials whom you intend to use in the later phases of civil administration.

We have just completed the instruction of the first class of officers here, and a new class will begin at an early date. It would be exceedingly useful to us in instructing the public safety group if we could have available for our confidential information copies of such civil affairs annexes or plans as may have been prepared and issued in connection with the operations orders from the headquarters of the force to which you are attached, as well as similar data included in any of the operations orders of the sub task forces. If it is possible to let me have copies of such extracts to be used as a guide in preparing these instructions, it will be exceedingly helpful. Should the opportunity present itself and be strictly in accordance with the security regulations and the policy of your tactical commander, will you be good enough to send me anything available along these lines?

We all miss you around here and trust that you are getting along happily where you are. Col. Martin joins me in sending kindest regards and best wishes.

12th Army

Dear Captain Benson,

You have undoubtedly seen the directive dated the 14th of June 1943 issued by Headquarters 141 and addressed to the 12th Army and Force 343 on the subject of "Security Intelligence".

The policy to be followed in regard to the arrest and treatment of officials of the local governments is rather fully outlined in paras 5 and 6. Of course this is of particular interest to all of us as applied to units of the Carabinieri Reali, more especially referred to in para 6 b (iii). The thought occurs to me that if we are to have any Carabinieri left, assault troops must be able, first, to identify Carabinieri engaged in ordinary police activities and, second, that operations orders to assault troops must reflect the provisions of the directive "Security Intelligence" clearly and adequately.

You will have a deep personal interest, of course, in the application of the provisions of the directive to the other administrative officials whom you intend to use in the later phases of civil administration.

We have just completed the instruction of the first class of officers here, and a new class will begin at an early date. It would be exceedingly useful to us in instructing the public safety group if we could have available for our confidential information copies of such civil affairs annexes or plans as may have been prepared and issued in connection with the operations orders from the headquarters of the force to which you are attached, as well as similar data included in any of the operations orders of the sub task forces. If it is possible to let me have copies of such extracts to be used as a guide in preparing these instructions, it will be exceedingly helpful. Should the opportunity present itself and be strictly in accordance with the security regulations and the policy of your tactical commander, will you be good enough to send me anything available along these lines?

2591

We all miss you around here and trust that you are getting along happily where you are. Col. Martin joins me in sending kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Leonel Bolles,
Colonel, Inf.,
Public Safety Division.

LB/JM

GROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
Declassified unclassified research Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ date 411410

63
PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

AMCOT REAR HEADQUARTERS
A.P.H.Q., B.N.A.F.
A.P.O. 777

24 June 1943

141F/7982/CA

Lt. Col. Charles Poletti
Regional S.C.A.O.
Force 343

Dear Colonel,

You have undoubtedly seen the directive dated the 14th of June 1943 issued by Headquarters 141 and addressed to the 12th Army and Force 343 on the subject of "Security Intelligence".

The policy to be followed in regard to the arrest and treatment of officials of the local governments is rather fully outlined in paras 5 and 6. Of course this is of particular interest to all of us as applied to units of the Carabinieri Reali, more especially referred to in para 6 b (iii). The thought occurs to me that if we are to have any Carabinieri left, assault troops must be able, first, to identify Carabinieri engaged in ordinary police activities and, second, that operations orders to assault troops must reflect the provisions of the directive "Security Intelligence" clearly and adequately.

You will have a deep personal interest, of course, in the application of the provisions of the directive to the other administrative officials when you intend to use in the later phases of civil administration.

We have just completed the instruction of the first class of officers here, and a new class will begin at an early date. It would be exceedingly useful to us in instructing the public safety group if we could have available for our confidential information copies of such civil affairs annexes or plans as may have been prepared and issued in connection with the operations orders from the headquarters of the force to which you are attached, as well as similar data included in any of the operations orders of the sub task forces. If it is possible to let me have copies of such extracts to be used as a guide in preparing these instructions, it will be exceedingly helpful. Should the opportunity present itself and be strictly in accordance with the security regulations and the policy of your tactical commander, will you be good enough to send me anything available along these lines?

We all miss you around here and trust that you are getting along happily where you are. Col. Martin joins me in sending kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Dear Colonel,

You have undoubtedly seen the directive dated the 14th of June 1943 issued by Headquarters 141 and addressed to the 12th Army and Force 343 on the subject of "Security Intelligence".

The policy to be followed in regard to the arrest and treatment of officials of the local governments is rather fully outlined in paras 5 and 6. Of course this is of particular interest to all of us as applied to units of the Carabinieri Reali, more especially referred to in para 6 b (iii). The thought occurs to me that if we are to have any Carabinieri left, assault troops must be able, first, to identify Carabinieri engaged in ordinary police activities and, second, that operations orders to assault troops must reflect the provisions of the directive "Security Intelligence" clearly and adequately.

You will have a deep personal interest, of course, in the amplification of the provisions of the directive to the other administrative officials whom you intend to use in the later phases of civil administration.

We have just completed the instruction of the first class of officers here, and a new class will begin at an early date. It would be exceedingly useful to us in instructing the public safety group if we could have available for our confidential information copies of such civil affairs annexes or plans as may have been prepared and issued in connection with the operations orders from the headquarters of the force to which you are attached, as well as similar data included in any of the operations orders of the sub task forces. If it is possible to let me have copies of such extracts to be used as a guide in preparing these instructions, it will be exceedingly helpful. Should the opportunity present itself and be strictly in accordance with the security regulations and the policy of your tactical commander, will you be good enough to send me anything available along these lines?

We all miss you around here and trust that you are getting along happily where you are. Col. Martin joins me in sending kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Lamuel Bolles,
Colonel, Inf.,
Public Safety Division.

LB/JM

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Sec/Army by TAG/	date
411410	

785015

SECRETU1P/7982/CASECRETSUBJECT: Passes for Boats in Territorial Waters of MORRIFIELD.

TO: C.S.C.

The situation regarding the issue of permits for boats to operate in the waters around MORRIFIELD requires clarification. At present the only contemplated publication which covers this point is the notice entitled "Do Not Leave the Shore", vide page 12 of the Proclamations Section of the "C.A.O.'s Handbook".

It is understood that as is the practice in British waters, this is a naval responsibility, and it is presumed that the naval authorities will issue these permits. There is, however, no provision in the AMGOT plan for orders being issued by any other authority than the military governor or the C.A.O. on his behalf. Again the enforcement of any such order when issued has not been allocated to any authority. Presumably there would be naval patrols, but even if arrests were made by these patrols, no procedure is laid down for bringing the offender before any military court.

At a later stage the port police (Agenti di Marina), ^{of the port} of the Agenti di P. S., would be required to assist in the enforcement of any order covering this subject.

Perhaps AMGOT Liaison should take the matter up with the appropriate naval authority.

AMGOT Rear Headquarters
AFHQ, D.N.A.F.
In the Field.
24 June 1942.
RUSH/51

(Sd) Samuel Solles

Samuel Solles,
Colonel, Inf.,
Commissioner of Public Safety.

Copy to Legal Division

entitled "Do Not Leave the Shore", vide page 12 of the Proclamations Section of the "C.A.O.'s Handbook".

It is understood that as is the practice in British waters, this is a naval responsibility, and it is presumed that the naval authorities will issue these permits. There is, however, no provision in the AMGOT plan for orders being issued by any other authority than the military governor or the C.G.A.O. on his behalf. Again the enforcement of any such order when issued has not been allocated to any authority. Presumably there would be naval patrols, but even if arrests were made by these patrols, no procedure is laid down for bringing the offender before any military court.

At a later stage the port police (Agenti di Marina), ²³ of the Agenti di P. S., would be required to assist in the enforcement of any order covering this subject.

Perhaps AMGOT Liaison should take this matter up with the appropriate naval authority.

(Ed) Samuel Holmes,
Samuel Holmes,
Colonel, Inf.,
Commissioner of Public Safety.

AMGOT Rear Headquarters
AFHQ, D.H.A.F.
In the Field.
24 June 1943.
H.M./J.M.

Copy to Legal Division

P/P ²³ 1/2

This copy only MAY BE SHOWN to duly accredited official representatives Order Sec/Army by TAG/ Date 411410

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

To Major Farley-Smith

21 June 63

Request that distribution 61
include Senior CAO attached
to each Task Force and sub-
Task Forces. To be distributed
through appropriate caos.

Copies given to you

Copies made for 343

Copies to go to Gong.

Boles

CPS.
2583

0936

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SUBJECT: Security Intelligence

17 June 43
7982

SECRET
MOST SECRET

MIF/1400/1/4(Ib)

16 June 43

Herewith 50 copies of MIF/1400/1/4(Ib) dated 14 June
and amendment thereto, as requested by you.

H.Q. M.I. Forces
B.N.A.F.

Brigadier
B.G.S.(I).

2537

0237

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

20 June 43

Col. Martin

The attached
just came. Can you
let me know at your
earliest convenience,
by telephone if you
cannot send a note
by this evening's D.
R., how many go
to Col. Poletti?

Answered verbally
24/6

A.S. Alexander

Capt. M. T.
2585

Angot Liaison

SECRET-131507

22/6
1943

59

HEADQUARTERS, FORCE 343
Civil Affairs Section.

18 June 1943.

MEMORANDUM to : 141 Force (Angot)

Send security passes to me when CSO Angot
sends proclamations and other material. Expedite all of it.

Charles Polenti
CHARLES POLENTI,
Lt. Colonel, AUS,
Civil Affairs Section.

2583

THIS COPY ONLY MAY BE USED BY
ACCREDITED UNOFFICIAL RESEARCHERS
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----
411410

ACTION
TAKEN.

A/A
22/6

SECRET-131507

SECRET

141F/1962/CA

2581

SUBJECT: Passes for Dock Workers, etc.

Major Marley Fletcher,
AMCOT Liaison,
141 Force.

1. Your inquiry directed to Major Farley-Smith regarding passes and conditions for dock workers, etc. has been passed to me for answer.

2. Reference is made to Paragraph 49, AMCOT Plan, from which I quote as follows: "Date Stamp Passes: Issued by G(Int)(b) or G.2(C.I.) to officers in charge of port control, service installation for control of employees, etc."

3. It appears from the foregoing that passes for the persons mentioned in your inquiry will be issued by either one or the other agencies referred to.

4. This Division has arranged for a general pass for issue to, and use by, Medical, Civilian Defense and other approved Civilian officials and also for a special pass for approved civilians making occasional journeys. See Sub-Paragraphs A and B, Paragraph 49, AMCOT Plan. The remaining three (3) types of passes referred to C, D, and E have been charged to the specific agencies mentioned.

5. These arrangements have been completed in close consultation with Lt. Col. Gibson (I.E.), 141 Force Headquarters. Please advise if these arrangements are not adequate from your viewpoint to dispose of the situation.

L. BOLLES
Colonel,
C. P. S.

AMCOT
141 Force
In the Field

21 June 1945

0 9 4 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1. Your inquiry directed to Major Farley-Smith regarding passes and conditions for dock workers, etc. has been passed to me for answer.

2. Reference is made to Paragraph 49, AMSCOT Plan, from which I quote as follows: "Date Stamp Passes: Issued by G(Int)(b) or G.2(C.I.) to officers in charge of port control, service installation for control of employees, etc."

3. It appears from the foregoing that passes for the persons mentioned in your inquiry will be issued by either one or the other agencies referred to.

4. This Division has arranged for a general pass for issue to, and use by, Medical, Civilian Defense and other approved Civilian officials and also for a special pass for approved civilians making occasional journeys. See Sub-Paragraphs A and B, Paragraph 49, AMSCOT Plan. The remaining three (3) types of passes referred to C, D, and E have been charged to the specific agencies mentioned.

5. These arrangements have been completed in close consultation with Lt. Col. Gibson (I.E.), 144 Force Headquarters. Please advise if these arrangements are not adequate from your viewpoint to dispose of the situation.

L. BOLLES
Colonel,
C. P. S.

AMSCOT
144 Force
In the Field
21 June 1943
LB/DTH

Approved only by <u>144 Force</u> and <u>144 Force</u> only
Approved by official representatives of the
Sec/Army by TAG/ date <u>21 11 43</u>

785015

7982
Maj. Farley - Smith.

Do Jun 43
7982.

57

Grand Army R.N.

Naval Staff 141 is

anxious to know the policy regarding

pay & conditions for dock workers etc.

2583

in places likely to be interesting.

20 JUN.

Public Safety

(TB)

M. T.

MOST SECRET 56

SUBJECT: Security Printing.

141F/7982/CA

TO: Capt. A.S. Alexander, M.I.
AMGOT Liaison
141 Force H.Q.

20 June 43

1. Application Forms. With reference to your note of 19 June I return herewith the four copies of the reduced application form. On one of these I have indicated the additional alteration required, i.e., delete line "B" and lower line "A" in its place.

2. Someone telephoned from your H.Q. to Lt. Col. Thorne Thorne yesterday morning that you were coming here in the afternoon and would get into touch with me; hence the delay in answering your note. Regarding your AL/126 of 18 June I shall be in ALGIERS tomorrow and will call and see you during the day but will telephone from ALGIERS to fix a time.

Autorizzazione

52 3. Notice Cards. The words "Autorizzazione" should be used for specific authority instead of "permit".

4. Pass Applications. Lt. Col. Garry is in touch with you on this point and will take the 1200 copies for CHIMPANZEE himself. The remaining 1300 copies should be distributed as in Twelfth Army's EDA/18 of 15 June. The 2500 for Force 343 should be sent in bulk.

Please hold any supplies received over and above these figures until I have examined the matter with you in person. We may have to hold them ourselves.

43
2582
R.M.J. MARTIN,
Lt. Col.,
Public Safety Division.

AMGOT
141 Force
In The Field.
RJM/JM

This copy only MAY BE GIVEN to only
accredited unofficial researchers under
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

411410

0243

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SUBJECT:- Documents for HORRIFIED

BIGOT 55

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS

Date 19 June 43

N 2982

FORCE 141

1415/1421/G(Th)

19 June 43

Lt.Col. MARTIN,
Public Safety Division,
BIGOT

copy only
accompanied by official researchers Order
Sub/Army by TAL/ date

Reference your request to Lt.Col. GIBSON; herewith a
miscellaneous collection of specimen documents.

411410

H.Q. D.I Force,
B.N.A.F.

TO SEE

Public SAFETY

H. Day - Ralph Innes
2581
Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

Rushy
19/6

REF ID: A66041	19/6	19 June 1943.
7982	54	
Col. Martin		

It became necessary for the printer to change the size of the paper used, due to quantity involved. As the attached is smaller, there is no space between lines marked "A", "B" and "C" and thus he cannot bring them closer together (or lower) as you had requested. Will you please indicate on a copy of the new proof what change, if any, you want in this spacing? The other corrections are being made and the job will be started when we receive your reply.

ACTION TAKEN	2580
57	Capt. M.I.
	Ampt. Liaison

MOST SECRET

BIGOT

53

Division G-2's, Confidential

Memo to Lt. Col. Young.

Matters which may be called to the attention of Divisional G-2's respecting the operation of CARO's (Civil Affairs Police Officers).

1. The Civil Affairs Police Officers will be attached to divisions as directed by tactical commanders. They work under a C.A.O. The tentative assignments are:

HQ 343 Force	Major S. A. Martin
45 Div.	Capt. P. C. Lewis
9 Div.	Capt. C. A. Rein
1 Div.	Major E. R. Kennedy
3 Div.	Major R. Ashworth

Capt. A. J. P. Maude
Lt. G. Mitchell
Lt. C. E. Smith
Lt. V. Kovanich

2. These C.A.P.O.'s will have the following duties generally:

To make a survey of the civil police force in order to determine how they can best be organized, what functions can be assigned to them, and the date on which they can be put into operation to relieve tactical forces from civil functions.

To survey the civil prisons and jails, fire fighting and civil defense organizations for the same purpose.

To survey the system of registration of vehicles, persons, etc.; the civil traffic and circulation systems, and to make formal or informal recommendations respecting these and others required when the civil agencies are put into operation.

3. The C.A.P.O. will be assigned as directed by the tactical commander, but since his work will be in close relation to that of the Provost Marshal and tactical commanders controlling the civil population, he should be in a position to secure the necessary data from the officers named and should have their cooperation. The C.A.P.O. should have a knowledge of

- a. Reliable officials
- b. Officials to be arrested
- c. Places which should be guarded (vital installations)
- d. Where essential records are located
- e. Attitude of the people.

Much of this information the C.A.P.O. will obtain from civil Sources, but there should be at all times the closest liaison between the C.I.C. and the C.A.P.O.'s. The activities of the C.I.C. are also of interest to C.A.P.O.'s, but because of information cannot but be of mutual benefit to both

HQ 343 Force Major S. A. Martin
 45 Div. Capt. P. C. Lewis Capt. A. J. P. Maude
 9 Div. Capt. C. A. Rein Lt. G. Mitchell
 1 Div. Major E. R. Kennedy Capt. E. W. Abel Lt. C. E. Smith
 5 Div. Major E. Ashworth Lt. R. Raab Lt. V. Kovanich.

2. These C.A.P.O.'s will have the following duties generally:

To make a survey of the civil police force in order to determine how they can best be organized, what functions can be assigned to them, and the date on which they can be put into operation to relieve tactical forces from civil functions.

To survey the civil prisons and jails, fire fighting and civil defense organizations for the same purpose.

To survey the system of registration of vehicles, persons, etc.; the civil traffic and circulation systems, and to make formal or informal recommendations respecting these and others required when the civil agencies are put into operation.

3. The C.A.P.O. will be assigned as directed by the tactical commander, but since his work will be in close relation to that of the Provost Marshal and tactical commanders controlling the civil population, he should be in a position to secure the necessary data from the officers named and should have their cooperation. The C.A.P.O. should have a knowledge of

- Reliable officials
- Officials to be arrested
- Places which should be guarded (vital installations)
- Where essential records are located
- Attitude of the people.

Much of this information the C.A.P.O. will obtain from civil Sources, but there should be at all times the closest liaison between the C.I.C. and the C.A.P.O.'s. The activities of the C.I.C. are also of interest to C.A.P.O.'s, and a general interchange of information cannot but be of mutual benefit to both branches of the service.

4. Copy of instructions issued to C.A.P.O.'s is inclosed for your information.

This copy only MAY BE SHOWN to duly
 accredited unofficial researchers under
 Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

411410

LEWIS B. BOLDEN
 BALTIMORE
 Commissioner of Public Safety.

2573

SUBJECT: - Security Passes: Notice Cards: Pass Applications. 52

Lt. Col. R.M.J. Martin,
AMGOT.

MOST SECRET.

AL/126.

18 June 43.

Referring to you letter 141F/7982/CA of 17 June.

1. Passes. The balance will be ready by 28 June or earlier, and we shall need packaging and delivery instructions for them.
2. Notice Cards. On receiving from you the translation to be used for "specific authority", I shall have 2,000 more cards printed. Will you advise us as to packaging and delivery?
3. Pass Applications. It is believed that these will be printed in a few days from the time when the proof is received back here, and we shall need packaging and delivery instructions for them also.

A.S. Alexander

ANGOT,
FORCE 141,
FIELD.
AA/ST.

A. S. Alexander,
Captain M.I.,
AMGOT Liaison.

2578

This copy only MAY BE SHOWN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers under
Sec/Army by TAG/ _____ date _____
4 1410

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Subject: Security Print

To: Capt. A. S. Alexander
AMGOT Liaison
141 Force Hq.

MOST SECRET

141F/7982/CA

51

49 + 50

1. Your two notes of 17 June. It will be quite satisfactory if the books of special passes are broken up as suggested. If, however, you get the whole order it may not be necessary to break them up.

2. Proof of the application form is returned herewith for slight alterations. ~~The brackets on either side of~~ The words "Generale" and "Speciale" should be bracketed together, as indicated on the proof.

5. In the last line but one of the Italian version the fourth word is dell', and in the last line there should be an apostrophe after the i in Addi. It would also be better if the three lines on the right hand side of the second section should be lowered and closed up as indicated.

[Signature]

2577

R.M.I. Martin
Lt. Col. for Commissioner
of Public Safety

0949

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

~~MOST SECRET~~

17
June,

Col. Martin ¹⁵⁰

If you find this
proof satisfactory and will
so telephone me on 18 June,
job can be done by 22 June.
If corrections needed, it will take
longer. Hastily.

A.S. Alvarez 2570 ft.

0950

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

17 June MOST Col. Martin:
SECRET

If passes are to be 49
divided up as 9 general to
1 special, books for special
passes will have to be broken
up. Will that be satisfactory?
Or will the numbering (now
blank) prevent?

A.S. Alexander, Capt. 2575

785015

SECRET

SECRET: The Counter Intelligence Corps.

SECRET

1417/1982/3A

17 Jun 43.

Amcor.
S.C.A.C. & Twelfth Army H.Q.
Amcor.
S.C.A.C. & 343 Force.

Three copies of instructions issued by AMF relative to the organization, tactical mission and tactical operations of Counter Intelligence Corps Sections are forwarded herewith. It is thought that this information will be of considerable value to C.A.P.Os., as it throws a good deal of light on the intermediate stage between the assault phase and the commencement of the regional organization.

Owing to pressure of work here, it is not possible to send mimeographed copies, but you may be able to have these made at your end.

Copy No. 34 of 1417/1424/G(Tb) of 2 Jun, 43 is also enclosed. Perhaps you would be good enough to pass this to the senior C.A.P.O. on the staff of your H.Q.

Ray Martin
Lt. Colonel,
For Commissioner of Public Safety.

AMCOR H.Q.
141 Force,
field.

to duly
unofficial recorders Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ date
411410

Rec'd by

Reilly
17/6

2574

0952

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

PORTUNE, ALGERES from AMGOT

JUNE 17/7308

47

FORCE 343

CA/177

BIGOT - HUSKY - MOST SECRET

For Poletti do you wish security passes sent to you for distribution x
If not signal suggested percentage and delivery points. x

7982
7998
Liaison Section

This copy only MAY be used to duly
accredited unofficial personnel Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ - 411410

*As no reply received and
advising Alexander to send
half available supply to
343. Reply
20/6*

Reply

2573

IMPORTANT
BIGOT - HUSKY - MOST SECRET

RIGOT

MOST SECRET

141F/7982/CA

17 June 1943

Subject: Security Passes: Notice Cards: Pass Applications.

Capt. A. S. Alexander, M.I., AMGOT Liaison

With reference to your two notes of 16 June:-

1. Passes. This is very satisfactory. We will divide the passes received into two lots for Twelfth Army and 343 Force. The former should be divided in the same proportions as suggested in Twelfth Army's signal ECA/18 of 15 June. We are asking 343 today to say how they want their supply. I will advise you when we hear from them.
2. Notice Cards. These should be sent to S.C.A.O.s for use in accordance with para 45 of the AMGOT Plan. The wording of the notices was suggested to Colonel Bolles on 1 June but there is no objection to an additional 2,000 cards being printed with the altered wording but the Italian version will have to be altered as well.
3. Pass Applications. I cannot ask for first priority for these but we can wait until the printer advises you of the probable delivery date.

De J. Martin
Lt. Colonel

For Commissioner of Public Safety

AMGOT
141 Force
In the Field

This copy only MAY BE SHOWN to any
accredited unofficial researchers under
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

411410

SECRET 16 June 43

Lt. Col. R. M. J. Martin: 45

• The corrections to the passes were delivered to the printer last night, and will cause no appreciable delay.

I am having separate packages of 1100, 1200 and 200 prepared — but should like word from you whether these are the general or the special. I assume the former, since they are the more numerous. These packages are per cable received today. We await your full instructions on completed job.

ACTION TAKEN

46 Capt. M I

A. S. Alexander

Agent
Liaison

785015

SUBJECT: - Security Passes; Notice Cards;
Pass Applications.

44
MOST SECRET

16 June 43.

Lt. Col. R.M.J. Martin,
A M G O T.

With reference to your letter of 16th June, order
141F/7982/CA.

1. Passes. The printer has promised to make delivery at his shop on the morning of Saturday, 19 June, of more than 10% but less than 50% of the total order of 50,000. The proportion will be 9 general to 1 special pass. We will stand ready to pick up the job that day in order to have it properly packed, and addressed and delivered in accordance with instructions as you may give us.

2. Notice Cards. The 500 are already printed and I plan to pick them up tomorrow. Lt. Col. Gibson instructed me to send 240 each to 343 Force and 12th Army, the balance to be retained by AMGOT for possible future needs. He wants us to attend to delivery, suggesting that it be made to the C.A.O. at each destination, with instructions that the notice cards are to be used for marking prohibited areas, when a request for such marking is made. Would you be good enough to give me your directions as to wording the instructions to be given with the notices, and when, to whom and by whose hand you would like them to go to each destination?

Lt. Col. Gibson also expressed the opinion that in the last line "specific authority" would have been preferable to "permit", as he felt that each entry should require written authorization for the specific time and place of entry, whereas the present form might seem to allow passage to holders of permits not intended to be valid for this purpose. He suggested that an additional 2,000 notice cards would be needed presently, with the altered wording. If you concur, please advise me so that I can order them.

To SER

me so that

PUBLIC SUPPLY 446

6176

The
wording
used
was
suggested
by
Lt. Col.
Gibson
on 15 June 43.
Rmt

me so that the printer can change the type and fit the work in when he can. He is very overburdened at the moment.

3. Pass Applications. I shall give the copy for these to the printer early tomorrow morning and advise you when he can finish them. If the finished job would take too long, I can try for another "priority", though I hesitate to do so too often, with the volume of work AMGOT is now requesting. One likes to save a little ammunition, just in case.....

I am not sure whether B/F is what appears in pencil in the upper left-hand of the copy. It would help in the future, if accents could be indicated by hand, as the apostrophe is confusing.

A.S. Alexander

AMGOT,
FORCE 141,
FIELD.
ASA/ST.

A.S. Alexander,
Captain M.I.
AMGOT Liaison.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

80571
BAGOT HUSKY.
MOST SECRET.

IMPORTANT. DECLASSIFIED
CIPHER MESSAGE 16 Jun 43
IN

43
FOLIO NO 4891.
15TH JUNE 43.

FROM : 12TH ARMY VIA MIDEAST.
TO : FORTUNE ALGIERS FOR AMGOT.
ORIG. NO: ECA/18.

7982
FORCE 141

TOC 1130.
THI NIL.
TOR NIL.

7853

(A) VEHICLES PROVIDED BY EIGHTH ARMY ARE COUNTED AGAINST WE AMGOT YOUR
CA/157 OF 12/6 REFERS (B) DPM NO OBJECTION BUT LETTERS LD NOT RPT NOT
UNDERSTOOD. YOUR CA/346 14 JUNE REFERS (C) PASSES 1100 LAURAGH 1200
CHIMPAZEE 200 12 ARMY AMGOT YOUR CA/159 13 JUNE REFERS.

CIVIL AFFAIRS
WAR ROOM

4 ACTION.

1
copy only
accredited unofficial reproduction
Sec/Army by TAG/7982

411410

SMC. 22158/15.
T.T. 22408/15.

ad 250

Seen On 7858

7804/7
Copy On '7853' me (A)

" " 7804/7 me (B)

09581

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SUBJECT: SECURITY PRINT

SECRET

141F793 CA
16 June 43

42

Capt. C.M. Alexander
A/GOT Liaison
141 Force Hq.

Enclosed is a copy for a form of which 60,000 copies are required early - Size 8" x 10" or nearest convenient size. Quality of paper relatively unimportant. No doubt the D.P.S.S. will lay out in the most suitable manner. It is hoped that the alterations on the copy are intelligible.

[Signature]

Lieut. Colonel
For Commissioner of Public Safety

A/GOT Hq.
In The Field

This copy only MAY BE SHOWN TO
accredited unofficial researchers under
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----
411410

2563

09591

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SUBJECT : SECURITY PASSES.

SECRET. 41

14177982 /GA.

16 June 43.

Capt. A.S. Alexander. H.I.
AMCOT Liaison, 141 Force, H.Q.

ATT

With further reference to your note of 14 June to Lt. Col. Spofford, it would be better if delivery of the first instalment of the order were to be made to you. We are getting into touch with the Twelfth Army and Force 343 as to distribution and you will be notified of the result as soon as we hear from them.

Meanwhile will you please confirm the number of passes of each kind which is to be delivered in advance and when delivery can be expected.

Please consult Lt. Col. Gibson. I(b) as to distribution of the notice cards. They should be delivered to you.

We have sent 100 copies of the General Pass to Twelfth Army by air to-day. This leaves us with 4 pads of 100 and approximately 300 loose General Passes and 50 of the Special Passes. These can be sent to you for distribution later in the week.

Many thanks for your prompt action on the proofs.

Smiley

AMCOT H.Q.
In the field.

Lieut. Colonel 5507
for Commissioner of Public Safety

This copy only to be used to duly
recorded official research order
recd/Army by 143/ date

411410

To:
Lt. Col. 41A
C. M. Spofford

Herewith proof of
each type of pass, as
requested.

Must be in hands of
printer by 8 A.M., 16
June; but if no changes
needed, telephone to me
will suffice.

Any changes will risk
(over)

delaying job so
that none would be
available Saturday June
18, due to other work in
printer's hands.

Hastily,

A.S. Alexander

Captain, M.I.

Angot Liaison

14 June 1943 2225 hrs.

P.S. May I have instructions

for delivery of completed

job? i.e. passes + notices.

09621

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Herewith proofs of passes as under:

41B

General Pass Form : 400 loose proofs 100 to 12th Army
4 sample bound books. 15/6/43.

Special Pass Form : 50 loose proofs.

2565

EPH

785015

3 page

100/625

15 June 43

SECRET

40

SUBJECT: Security Intelligence

RECEIVED

16 Jun 43

7982

FORCE 141

SECRET
MOST SECRET

100/124/G(1b)

15 Jun 43

Twelfth Army
Force 3.3

Reference this headquarters letter number 100/100/1/G(1b) dated 14 June 43.

The following amendment should be made to para C(3) (iii) of the above letter:

Delete detail under the heading "Militia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale", and substitute the following:

"The MVSN (Fascist Militia) can be broadly divided into the ordinary Militia, which are combatant troops, and the special Militia, which perform part-time auxiliary police duties with certain State services, such as Railways, Post, Road etc.,

The former will become prisoners of war. The latter will NOT be arrested or interned unless they endanger our security. The organization will be dissolved in due course.

Militia officers should be searched and documents seized for subsequent pursuit by security staffs and Civil Affairs Police Officers."

H.Q. 12th Force,
B.M.A.F.

W. J. Wilson Lt-Col
Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
12th Force.

2565

Copy to:

A.F.M. G-2, (C.I.)
Force 141 G (Ops)

A
G.S.G.

To SRE
PROS.

PUBLIC SAFETY

C.S.G.
LT COL FRANK SMITH

60 copies received and
distributed to Tave June

(R)

Handwritten signatures and initials, including "Rush" and "R".

785015

SUBJECT:-

Security IntelligenceHEADQUARTERS

Date

15.6.43

N

7882

FORCE 141

BIGOT

MOST SECRET

WAF/LACC/L/G(Ib)

14 June 43

Twelfth Army
Force 343

1. Forwarded herewith are three/two copies of I.S.(c) Handbook on Sicily, Copies Nos

This handbook contains most of the information of Security interest available concerning SICILY.

2. The following is a guide as to that Security action should be taken in respect of the persons and organisations referred to therein.
3. Personnel of the German Abwehr and Italian Intelligence Service
- Persons belonging to the German Abwehr and Italian Intelligence Service should be discovered and arrested as soon as possible. This task will be given the highest priority by military security personnel. When such persons are arrested the nearest S.I.(b) officer will be informed immediately, and special arrangements made for their custody.

Any headquarters or premises of the above should be discovered and searched at the earliest moment. Any documents belonging to such personnel will be seized and examined as soon as possible by security personnel or security staffs. The S.I.(b) officer should also be informed of all such cases. (Note: Care should be taken not to remove police, civil service etc., records, if the same premises are being used for various purposes).

4. German Party Groups

Personnel of these Groups should be arrested, if found, their premises searched, and documents seized and examined.

5. Prominent Residents likely to prove friendly

These may be contacted by security officers when considered appropriate. They should not be approached in the first instance by Security N.C.Os. or Enlisted Men.

6. Officials

(a) It is convenient to divide officials broadly into the following four categories :-

(i) Local government officials responsible for provincial

785015

interest available concerning SICILY.

2. The following is a guide as to that Security action should be taken in respect of the persons and organisations referred to therein.
3. Personnel of the German Abwehr and Italian Intelligence Service

Persons belonging to the German Abwehr and Italian Intelligence Service should be discovered and arrested as soon as possible. This task will be given the highest priority by military security personnel. When such persons are arrested the nearest S.I.(b) officer will be informed immediately, and special arrangements made for their custody.

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4. German Party Groups

Personnel of these Groups should be arrested, if found, their premises searched, and documents seized and examined.

5. Prominent Residents likely to prove friendly

These may be contacted by security officers when considered appropriate. They should not be approached in the first instance by Security N.C.Os. or Enlisted Men.

6. Officials

- (a) It is convenient to divide officials broadly into the following four categories :-

(i) Local government officials responsible for provincial and communal administration, e.g., prefects and mayors, and their various councils or committees and related services.

(ii) Officials of the public services, e.g., railways, customs, public utilities, especially Post, Telephone and Telegraph, Electric Power and Water Services.

(iii) Police.

(iv) Officials of the Fascist Party Organisation, viz, federal secretaries, local political secretaries and members of their respective Directorates; fiduciaries and their committees; Party Inspectors etc.,

TO SEC:
.....(b)..... PAO's only

PUBLIC SAFETY

641050 (LOCAL) FURTHER SWIFT

- 2 -
- (b) The following policy will be adopted with regard to the arrest and treatment of the above officials :-

(i) Local Government Officials

It is likely that the leading local government officials, such as prefects, will, in general, be strong Fascists. In fact, it is probable that all administration officials will be, at any rate outwardly, supporters of Fascism.

At the same time, it is important that the existing administrative machine should continue to function.

Officials in this category will NOT therefore be arrested simply because they hold such appointments, or because they are Fascists. They will only be arrested if it is found, after enquiries and investigation in HERRING, that their continued retention would constitute an active threat to our security, or if they are actively obstructive or disaffected. The appropriate AFO representative should be informed as soon as possible of any such cases of arrest, and should, wherever possible, be consulted first.

The offices of these officials may well contain documents of security interest. A rapid examination of such documents should therefore be carried out at an early stage, and they should be preserved from destruction. They are necessary for the administration to function and so should not be removed.

(ii) Officials of the public services

No action should be taken by security personnel in respect of such officials, unless enquiries and investigation reveal the likelihood of their endangering our security.

(iii) Police

Corpo degli Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza and Polizia Municipale

No special action is required by security personnel in respect of these police officials.

A rapid examination of the documents in their

At the same time, it is important that the existing administrative machine should continue to function.

Officials in this category will NOT therefore be arrested simply because they hold such appointments, or because they are Fascists. They will only be arrested if it is found, after enquiries and investigation in HERRIT, that their continued retention would constitute an active threat to our security, or if they are actively obstructive or disaffected. The appropriate AMOT representative should be informed as soon as possible of any such acts of arrest, and should, wherever possible, be consulted first.

The offices of these officials may well contain documents of security interest. A rapid examination of such documents should therefore be carried out at an early stage, and they should be preserved from destruction. They are necessary for the administration to function and so should not be removed.

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No action should be taken by security personnel in respect of such officials, unless enquiry and investigation reveal the likelihood of their endangering our security.

(iii) Police

Corpo degli Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza and Polizia Municipale

No special action is required by security personnel in respect of these police officials.

A rapid examination of the documents in their offices should be made if possible, and their records should be preserved.

Note: Members of these bodies may also be members of the OVRA (see below).

Carabinieri Reali

This is a Force which is used for both Military Police and for Civil Police duties. Any members of the Force engaged as combatant units or in their military capacity, will be taken prisoner. Those engaged on civil police work will not be taken prisoner or arrested, unless they appear to threaten our security.

...../AMOT.....

AMGOT will contact the civil police detachments of Carabinieri and will arrange where possible for them to continue to function and to co-operate.

Note: It is the intention to use local police forces for civil police work, and the best disciplined and trained of the local police are the Carabinieri. They must not therefore be removed or interned, except in the circumstances mentioned above.

The documents in their headquarters and offices should be examined and preserved.

Members of the Squadra Investigativa will, if found, be treated in the same way as members of the Italian Intelligence Service.

2563

Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (MVSN)

This is one of several bodies of Fascist Militia (others are the Railway, Forest etc., Fascist Militia). The MVSN is a militarised force, it is purely Fascist, and it has no functions not already covered by other police forces. Its members should therefore be taken prisoner, and the organisation will be dissolved.

Its headquarters should be searched and documents seized for subsequent perusal by security staffs and Civil Affairs Police Officers.

O.V.R.A.

Every effort should be made to obtain information regarding the identity of OVRA Agents. When there are any reasonable grounds for thinking that any person is employed by OVRA, he should be arrested (unless a key man in some important service), interrogated by security personnel, and subsequently interned.

The domiciles of such persons should be searched and all documents seized for examination by security staffs.

Officials of Fascist Party Organisation
These should be arrested and interned forthwith.

SEE
39

785015

interned, except in the circumstances mentioned above.

The documents in their headquarters and offices should be examined and preserved.

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Its headquarters should be searched and documents seized for subsequent perusal by security staffs and Civil Affairs Police Officers.

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The domiciles of such persons should be searched and all documents seized for examination by security staffs.

(iv)

Officials of Fascist Party Organisation

These should be arrested and interned forthwith.

Their offices should be seized and documents preserved for examination by AMGOT and Security Officers.

7. Newspaper Editors

The Policy regarding these editors will be determined by representatives of the Information and Censorship Section and of AMGOT.

H.Q. 141 Force, B.N.A.F. Copy to:

AMGOT, C-2 (CI) Copies
Force 141 G(Ops) of I.S.(O)
A Handbook on
C.C.A.O.

Chief of Major General Staff.
141 Force.

(SICILY not enclosed.)

2503

SEE
39

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

38.

FORTUNE FROM ANGOT

1308308

TWELFTH ARMY FOR DEFENSE CIVIL AFFAIRS

2562

GA/159

46/7973

DIGOT HUSKY - MOST SECRET X confirmed that it is intended that all medical supplies for civilian population be found from here X see my GA/146 June 10 reference proclamations X instructions will accompany proclamations X reference last sentence your BGA/09 June 10 hope able despatch 2500 passes on 19 June X signal delivery points and numbers required each point.

32

copy only if shown to duly
accredited unofficial researchers
Sec/Army by TAG/ date
411410

10 SEE ABOVE V 32.

PUBLIC SAFETY

DIGOT HUSKY - MOST SECRET

IMPORTANT

Lieut. Colonel

09711
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

MOST SECRET - BIGOT

141F/79/CA
BIGOT H.
12 June 43.

37

Dear Alexander,

Lt. Col. Martin of our Public Safety Division discussed yesterday with the D.P.S.D. (Major Pacey) the layout etc., of 50,000 passes the ~~due~~ date for which was given by AFHQ as 28th June. He has today written to ~~141 Force asking that~~ Major Pacey ~~should~~ endeavour to let us have some 200 copies (loose) with the proofs.

It is necessary that this order as well as that for 500 notice cards referred to in the ~~same~~ minute should be given a high priority as we must have, say, 10% of the 50,000 passes and all the notice cards by next Saturday the 19th.

Will you please do the needful and let me know that you have arranged accordingly?

Yours,

Capt A.S. Alexander
Liaison Officer
H.Q. 141 Force.

(Sdo) C.M. S. Poffalo.

2561

File

copy only MAY BE USED to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

411410

36
28 May 43

Memo to D.C.C.A.O.

Re Passes -

The following recommendations concerning passes issued by AMGO are submitted;

1. "General Pass" - On white paper of durable quality - For issue to (a) Doctors, Midwives, nurses, etc, (b) To enrolled members of the P.A.D. organization, (c) To other authorized groups.

2. "Pass for Daily Journey" - On light blue or green paper (or other color depending upon available stock) of good quality. For issue to workmen, merchants, etc., who require permission to travel daily to a legitimate errand.

3. "Special Pass" - For issue for special individual needs - on any quality or color stock paper. Color must be distinct from No. 2.

Suggested copy for above passes attached which it is recommended be approved and ordered for early delivery.

It is requested that the 50,000 passes authorized be provided in the following quantities.

No. 1 - General Pass (White)	10,000
No. 2 - Pass for Daily Journey (Color)	35,000
No. 3 - Special Pass (White or Color)	5,000

The following should be overprinted in red on all three types of pass; or rubber-stamped

AMGO

Alteration or wrongful use of this pass subjects the offender to severe punishment.

All subject matter to be in both English and Italian.

LEWIS H. HARRIS, Colonel,
Public Safety Div.

785015

The following recommendations concerning passes issued by AMGT are submitted;

1. "General Pass" - On white paper of durable quality - For issue to (a) Doctors, midwives, nurses, etc., (b) To enrolled members of the P.A.D. organization. (c) To other authorized groups.

2. "Pass for Daily Journey" - On light blue or green paper (or other color depending upon available stock) of good quality. For issue to workmen, merchants, etc., who require permission to travel daily, subject to a legitimate demand.

3. "Special Pass" - For issue for special individual needs - on any quality or color stock paper. Color must be distinct from No. 2.

Suggested copy for above passes attached which it is recommended be approved and ordered for early delivery.

It is requested that the 50,000 passes authorized be provided in the following quantities.

No. 1 - General Pass (White)	10,000
No. 2 - Pass for Daily Journey (Color)	35,000
No. 3 - Special Pass (White or Color)	5,000

The following should be overprinted in red on all three types of pass; or rubber-stamped

AMGT

Alteration or wrongful use
of this pass subjects the offender
to severe punishment.

All subject matter to be in both English and Italian.

LEONARD W. BAKER, Colonel,
Public Safety Div.

This copy only to be used to copy	
recredited unofficial representations Order	
Sec/Army by TAG/	date
411410	

0974

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Pass No 2 Date 27/4/53 Time 1575
Place :- Bhopal 36A
Issued to :- Julius Klein
Signature :- Julius Klein
Purpose :- business trip to Ahmedabad
in connection with fruit marketing
Expires :- 1200 30/5/53 2533
Issued by :- J. D. Martin
Mg. C.M.P.

09751

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Passes 36B
a. Medical - red

b. 4 approved civilians } White.
making occasional
journeys

c. General Security - blue
passes


d. Special Security - brown
pass

Colored square to be
pasted on corner of the
civilian identification
card with stamped
monogram of the following
number to be kept
in ink - Record of
numbers to be kept
against the name.

B-4

09751

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



09771

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

36c

Laschiapassare ristretto

LASCHIAPASSARE
RISTRETTO

TEMPORARY
PASS

2557

29781

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

36 D
• This pass ~~is~~ valid unless accompanied
by identity card

Issued AT. —

By. — — — — — NAME & SIGNATURE

— — — — — OFFICIAL TITLE

FIMGOT

2556

Include - "address" as 2nd Line

1 2 3 4 5 6

THE ALTERATION OR WRONGFULL USE
SUBJECT THE

0979

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

NAME & OFFICIAL TITLE

FMGOT

2556

Include "address" as 2nd line

THE ALTERATION OR WRONGFULL USE

OF THIS PASS WILL SUBJECT THE

OFFENDER TO SEVERE PUNISHMENT

Months 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 YEAR 44 43 1944

Day 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

39801

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(Work Notes
Passed)

28 May '43

36 E

Memo to N.E.C.A.O.

Re - Passes -

recommending
~~The use of~~ The following ~~passes~~ ^{recommending} to be
issued by Amgo ~~are submitted~~ ^{are submitted} ~~to Section~~ ^{to Section} ~~mounted~~.

1. "General Pass" - on white paper of
durable quality - For issue to ^(a) Roosters
Midwives, Nurses etc - (b) To enrolled members
of the P.H. organization; (c) To other authorized
groups.

2. "Pass for Daily Journey" - on light blue
or green ^(or other color depending upon available stock) paper of good quality - For
issue to workmen, merchants etc ^{to} who
require permission to travel daily upon
a legitimate errand.

3. "Special Pass" - For issue for special
individual needs - on any quality ^{or color}
stock paper. Color must be distinct
from #2.

Suggested copy for above passes
Attached which it is recommended

Midwives, Nurses etc - (a) To enrolled members of the P.H. organization; (c) To other authorized groups.

2. "Pass for Daily Journey" - on light blue or green paper ^(or other color depending upon availability of stock) of good quality. For issue to workmen, merchants etc. ^{25,000} require permission to travel daily upon a legitimate errand.

3. "Special Pass" - For issue for special individual needs - on any quality ^{or color} stock paper. Color must be distinct from #2 -

Suggested copy for above passes attached which it is recommended be approved and ordered for early delivery -

It is requested that the 50,000 passes authorized be provided in the following quantities.

- #1 - General Pass (WHITE) 20,000
- #2 - Pass for Daily Journey (Color) 35,000
- #3 - Special Pass (White, Color) 5,000

over 50,000

1000
The following should be called
printed in all three types of paper
in Red -

F M G O T

Activation is wrongful use of their
 Pass subjects the offender to
 Severe punishment -

444 Subject matter to be in both English
and Italian

Original - 1 Copy

141F/7982/CA

12 no 43

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

Memo: to C.C.A.O.

Subject: Military Police

Most Secret

In event of emergency in HORRIFIED where-by the local police are unavailable for preserving law and order. The following distribution of Military Police units is recommended.

Station	CO.	BN.	POP.
Palermo	-	1	574,853
Trapani	2	-	214,904
Agriento	2	-	222,429
Caltanissetta	1	-	135,731
Ragusa	1	-	176,906
Enna	1	-	98,706
Siracusa	2	-	181,002
Catania	2	-	295,820
Messina	1	-	170,681
Total	12 +	1 equals	4 Bns

Population figures are not guaranteed - M.P. units are based upon the U.S.A.,T.O.

It is suggested that the C.C.A.O. bring this subject to the attention of the Tactical Commander for his information with the request that 4 Bns of M.P. be available upon call *at* the C.C.A.O.

C.P.S.

Col.

0985

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Subject: Security Printing Notices.

SECRET

141F/7032/CA

12 June 1943.

141 Force.

Reference paragraph 6 of extract from Staff Memorandum No. 39 AFM, dated 18 May 43. It is requested that 500 notices be printed on cardboard or some suitable material worded as per attached. They are required as soon as possible.

In the course of an interview with the DPCS the latter expressed his ability to carry out the order. It the printing can be executed with a separate colour for either language so much the better.

Rank

2554

L

Colonel,
Commissioner of Public Safety.

AMCOT
141 FORCE
IN THE FIELD

THIS COPY ONLY MAY BE ACCREDITED UNOFFICIAL REPLY UNDER Sec/Army by TAG/ _____ date _____ 411410

0986

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

PROHIBITED AREA

NO ENTRY WITHOUT PERMIT

ITALIAN

~~ZONA~~

AREA PROIBITA

È VIETATA L'ENTRA
TA SENZA PERMESSO

2553

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

MOST SECRET.

LALF/7982/CA

D.P.S.S.,

49, Boulevard Thiers, PARIS.

Dear Pacey,

Referring to my call yesterday, we have been asked to get delivery of the passes at the earliest possible moment, preferably with the proclamations. Will you please do what you can? Also, would it be possible for you to let me have 200 loose copies at the same time as the proof, as we want to send some out in advance as specimens only?

AMCOT H.Q.

Yours

In the Field.

This copy only may be used by

credited unofficial researchers only

12 Jan 43

See/Army by 220/

411410

2552

0988

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS
Date 11
7982
FORCE 141

32

URGENT
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]

BIGOT HUSKY

TO: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

TO: [illegible]
FROM: [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]

TO: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

- A. [illegible]
- B. [illegible]
- C. [illegible]

ACTION TAKEN
38

CIVIL AFFAIRS
WAR ROOM
ACTION
1

PLEASE SUBMIT DRAFT REPLIES
TO A B-C TO EXECUTIVE OFFICE
FOR CO-ORDINATION BY HIM

TO: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

URGENT
BIGOT HUSKY
NEXT SUBJECT

To SEE
PUBLIC SECURITY

CFO
 1. Be minute on p 31
 2. The date given should be advanced please let me know. Papers will be distributed 7965 ~ 7973
 3. Army - force has been sent to receive. Support are sent to receive. Detailed instructions to be sent to [illegible] 7/12/6

THIS COPY ONLY MAY BE SHOWN TO
 accredited unofficial researchers under
 Sec/Army by TAG/ date
411410

2551

785015

7982 31

URGENT.

AM GOT.

YOUR F7982/CA of

2 JUN applies -

a representative in
required tomorrow afternoon) as

soon as possible after 1400

has to check Paris 2550

being designed by Maj' Pacey

49 Bde THIBRS. ALGERS.
There have to go to U.K. for printing.

10 JUN.

2. P.O.

Saw DPLS + arranged
layout. Size 8x5 folded
to give 4x5 per page. Numbering
impossible. If in blocks must
be prefaced requiring extra 2x
hours. Decided this very desirable.
DPLS instructed by A(hunt) that
job must be completed by 28 Jan. Proof
will be sent to DPLS (Lt. Col. Hartman)
personally as soon as possible. To be
returned in 6 hours. Delivery may
be possible slightly before final date
given -

Shirley
14/6/63

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

ARMY FORM C.

MESSAGE FORM

Register No.

Call.

Srl. No.

Priority

Transmission Instructions

DATE 8 JUN 1943

N: 7982

Above this line for Signals use only.

30.

From
(A)

ORIGINATOR

Date-Time of Origin.

June 08 1530H

Office Date Stamp.

For Action.

AMCOT

To

(W) For Information (INFO).

Message Instructions

GR

DPSS (49 BOUTWARD THERES)

26

ORIGINATOR's No.

10087

REF YOUR LMF/F7982/GA DATED 2 JUN (.) PLEASE ARRANGE FOR REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT MAJOR JACKY BENS AT 49 BOULEVARD THERES ARRIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS LATEST AND SIZE OF FORCES TO BE FURNISHED

2549

THIS COPY ONLY MAY BE SHOWN to any accredited unofficial researchers Order Sec/Army by TAG/ date 411410

DISTRIBUTION:-

1412/1277/0

AMCOT

DPSS (4913)

WILL (2)

WIGAT (1)

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means except

WIRELESS

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

Originators Instructions. Degree of Priority.

THL or THOR

Signed.

10087

Signed.

10087

TIME CLEARED

SUBJECT:- Security MORRFIELD

BIGOT

DIPOR

LOS 1100 11

141F/1124/64 (1b)

2 June 43

HEADQUARTERS

Rev

M

7982

FORCE 141

TO: Twelfth Army (Copies 1-14)
Force 343 (Copies 11-10)1. Object

Our security object in MORRFIELD will be to prevent the conduct of our operations being prejudiced by leakage of information through espionage or other causes, by damage to our material and communications, etc., through sabotage, or by subversive influences directed against the personnel of our forces.

This directive is designed to lay down the general principles which will be followed in the achievement of this object, with special reference to the functions of military security personnel (Field Security and Counter-Intelligence Corps) working under the direction of the Security (In and Counter-Intelligence) staffs.

2. Responsibility

Security Staffs and military security personnel are responsible for ensuring that all possible measures, in the spheres of both military and civil security, are taken to achieve the above object at all stages of the operation.

In security matters affecting civilians, however, the main work in the very closest co-operation with the representatives of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory, in particular with the C.I.C.'s (Civil Affairs Police Officers) who are responsible for supervising the civilian police forces.

In addition, all ranks are responsible for taking all normal military security precautions, which will be of more vital importance than ever in a hostile country, and for taking appropriate action in all cases involving a threat to our security on the part of civilians.

3. Security Organisation

Field Security Sections of Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachments are allotted on the scale of one for each Division and higher headquarters.

Four Fort Security Sections are available, two British and two U.S. These have been allotted to Twelfth Army and Force 343 respectively.

Special Intelligence (b) unit, consisting of three officers, is attached to Force 141, and will work under the direction of this Headquarters. It is proposed however, to attach one officer to each of the Force, with whose security staff he will co-operate. It will be the function of this unit to carry out special counter-espionage tasks, to organise a system of informers

785015

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In security matters affecting civilians, however, they must work in the very closest co-operation with the representatives of A.S.O. (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory), in particular with the C.I.C.O's (Civil Affairs Police Officers) who are responsible for supervising the civilian police forces.

In addition, all ranks are responsible for taking all normal military security precautions, which will be of more vital importance than ever in a hostile country, and for taking appropriate action in all cases involving a threat to our security on the part of civilians.

3. Security Organisation

Field Security Sections or Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachments are allotted on the scale of one for each Division and higher Headquarters.

Four Port Security Sections are available, two British and two U.S. These have been allotted to 12th Army and Force 343 respectively.

Special Intelligence (b) unit, consisting of three officers, is attached to Force 141, and will work under the direction of this Headquarters. It is proposed however, to attach one officer to each Task Force, with those security staff he will co-operate. It will be the function of this unit to carry out special counter-espionage tasks, to organise a system of informers and counter-intelligence agents, and to collaborate with personnel of F.S. and C.I.C. Sections.

It is hoped that two units of mobile vans for the detection of illicit wireless transmitters will be available. These will work under the direction of this Headquarters, to which all reports of suspected illicit wireless transmission should be forwarded.

4. Military Security Personnel - General

(a) It should be ensured that commanders and staffs of formations and units

2/18 2/16

TO SEE PUBLIC SECRETARY

Disputations
2/16

and units appreciate the functions of Field Security and Counter-Intelligence personnel.

(b) It has happened in the past that these personnel have been employed in a manner prejudicial to the efficiency of their proper work. It should be generally realised that they have very definite and numerous Counter-Intelligence functions to perform throughout the areas occupied by our forces - functions which must, especially in a hostile country, play an important part in the successful conduct of our operations; accordingly, they should only be diverted from their proper role in exceptional cases of urgent operational necessity. For instance, they should NOT be employed as interpreters, guards, dispatch-riders, prisoner of war escorts etc., or for the investigation of thefts and crimes other than security offences.

(c) It should also be appreciated that security personnel cannot, on their own, carry out all measures which may need to be taken for security purposes. For instance, they are not sufficiently numerous to act as anti-sabotage guards on installations, etc.; their task is rather to advise on anti-sabotage precautions and investigate cases of attempted or suspected sabotage. Similarly, they will probably require the assistance of combat troops to seize suspect premises etc., scheduled for search and to deal with other special targets.

(d) All ranks should be ready to give such assistance as they can when requested by security personnel in the performance of their duties.

(e) Military Security personnel may be identified as follows:

(i) Counter-Intelligence Corps (U.S.). Each agent and special agent carries a leather-bound folder containing his photograph and particulars of identification; he also carries a War Department Military Intelligence Division Gold Badge, the number of which is recorded in the folder.

(ii) Field Security Personnel (British). All Field Security Personnel will carry an Officer's identity card (M.F. B.2635 or Mable East) with photograph and particulars, and an endorsement to the effect that they are engaged on Field Security duties.

(f) All suspicious incidents and persons and other such matters of security interest should be referred immediately by units to the nearest security personnel.

5. Information

(a) Little security intelligence concerning HOPFIELD is available. What there is will be forwarded shortly and additional items will be forwarded from time to time. Such of the following details as are known will be included:

(i) Italian Secret Service Organisation, methods and

(c) It should also be appreciated that security personnel cannot, on their own, carry out all measures which may need to be taken for security purposes. For instance, they are not sufficiently numerous to act as anti-sabotage guards on installations, etc.; their task is rather to advise on anti-sabotage precautions and investigate cases of attempted or suspected sabotage. Similarly, they will probably require the assistance of combat troops to seize suspect premises etc., scheduled for search and to deal with other special targets.

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5. Information

(a) Little security intelligence concerning HOPRIFFED is available. What there is will be forwarded shortly and additional items will be forwarded from time to time. Such of the following details as are known will be included:

- (i) Italian Secret Service Organization, methods and Headquarters.
- (ii) Enemy agents and suspects likely to be encountered in HOPRIFFED
- (iii) Enemy's espionage and sabotage plans to meet Allied invasion
- (iv) Any German organizations such as Abwehr or Gestapo operating in HOPRIFFED
- (v) Native civil police organizations and personalities
- (vi) Pro-Fascist political elements
- (vii) Persons likely to be friendly and co-operate with the Allies
- (viii) Anti-Fascist movements and underground organizations

/(b) The above information

(b) The above information, when received, must be most carefully safeguarded, as much of it will have been obtained from MOST SECRET sources. The names of pro-allied elements must, in particular, be treated with the highest degree of discretion and secrecy. Such information will not be passed to or through individuals whose duties do not strictly require knowledge thereof.

(c) Although little information or evidence is as yet available, it can be taken for granted that the enemy will have made plans for the organization and functioning of espionage and sabotage agents in preparation for our possible invasion of HONOLULU.

(d) The earliest opportunity must be taken after arrival to supply our scanty volume of security intelligence, by the questioning of civilians, the examination of records and other documents, and by the interrogation of prisoners.

6. Security Measures and Tasks

(a) General

The necessary security measures and tasks and the methods by which they will be carried out will vary to a certain extent in the forward battle areas and in the early stages from those in rear areas and in the later stages.

In the former case efforts will be concentrated mainly on certain urgent operational security tasks, which will be carried out mostly by military security personnel in conjunction with the combat troops. In the latter case, security measures will tend to become more of a long term and preventive nature, and will be carried out mainly by military security personnel in conjunction with the appropriate AMGOT representatives.

As a general principle, counter-intelligence measures should be imposed as swiftly as possible in order to give the impression that we have good and correct information. Such an impression will make much easier the task of security staffs and personnel in their dealings with the civil population at all stages.

(b) Proclamations

Proclamations and orders to the civil population have been prepared and their display in towns and villages as soon as these are captured will be arranged by AMGOT.

These proclamations and orders which are designed to control the conduct of civilians, cover the main security requirements. They provide for the immediate surrender of arms and V/T transmitters, and deal with such security matters as the imposition of curfew, the use of cameras and binoculars, carrier pigeons, prohibited areas, subversive propaganda etc., The published list of war crimes includes all security offences.

Security staffs should take an early opportunity of studying a

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Security staffs should take an early opportunity of studying a copy of the proclamations.

(c) Immediate Tasks of Security Personnel in Forward Combat Areas

The immediate tasks of security personnel in the forward areas will include the following:

(i) To search for and detain when found all known enemy agents and listed suspects except when expressly instructed to the contrary; to discover and detain for enquiry all other persons deemed likely to work actively against the security of our forces or operations; to investigate suspicious incidents and persons reported by units.

/(ii) To discover and prevent

-4-

(ii) To discover and prevent all possible means of communication with the enemy by persons within the area overrun by the forces, particularly any clandestine transmitters which have not been surrendered.

(iii) To discover and collect any hidden arms, ammunition or explosives which have not been handed in in accordance with the proclamations.

(iv) To give early assistance in the application of security precautions for the protection of vital installations, dock facilities, communications etc., against sabotage.

Lists of such installations etc., requiring early capture, guarding and anti-sabotage precautions should be prepared beforehand and detailed plans made for the implementation of the necessary measures.

(v) To collect all possible security intelligence by contacting any persons known to be friendly disposed, and by the questioning of civilians while they are still unmurdered by the battle.

(vi) To obtain all possible information of security interest by the discovery and examination of relevant documents.

Any premises likely to contain documents of security value will be scheduled for search. Such premises should include, in particular, any buildings occupied by the enemy intelligence personnel or suspects; Fascist, O.V.R.A. or Abwehr Headquarters; hostile Consular offices, etc., and, in general, post offices, police and other administrative offices. Detailed plans must be made for the early capture and guarding of such buildings to prevent the destruction of the documents they contain, and to allow of their early examination by the competent personnel, who will collect, copy, or arrange for the proper safeguarding of those of special interest. Such tasks must be definitely allotted and carefully co-ordinated so that the needs of all those interested are catered for.

In this connection it should be borne in mind that the general policy regarding documents in public administrative offices etc., such as police stations, is that they should be preserved intact and in situ, and not seized and carried away in bulk. This does not however, apply to post offices, from which all mail in transit should be seized as soon as possible for immediate examination by or delivery to the censorship authorities.

(vii) To assist in the interrogation of selected prisoners of war in order to elicit security intelligence.

(viii) To ensure as far as possible the proper observance by the civil population of all security provisions of the proclamations and orders posted by AMGOT representatives.

Note: Great care must be taken to ensure that the diplomatic immunity of neutral offices and officials is not violated.

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(viii) To ensure as far as possible the proper observance by the civil population of all security provisions of the proclamations and orders posted by ANGOI representatives.

Note: Great care must be taken to ensure that the diplomatic immunity of neutral offices and officials is not violated.

(d) Disposal of Civil suspects and Security detainees

(i) When a civilian is detained for security reasons by combat troops, the nearest military security personnel will be informed immediately so that the case can be investigated and the person interrogated.

(ii) In forward areas and in the early stages, civil suspects and security detainees should normally be disposed of through the civil section of Division and Corps prisoner of war cages. At each level the formation Security Officer must decide whether they can be cleared of suspicion and freed at once or whether they should be detained further.

Civil suspects cannot remain at Division or Corps cages pending long-term investigation, as it is the policy for these cages to be evacuated as quickly as possible.

Task Force Headquarters must, therefore, make arrangements for the removal of those whose continued detention is necessary from Corps cages to special premises where they can be temporarily accommodated and guarded pending trial or further investigation.

When the situation permits, they will be removed to proper prisons or detention establishments by arrangement with AMGOT.

(iii) When a person who has been detained appears, after interrogation and investigation by security personnel, to be an enemy agent, this Headquarters will be informed immediately, and the agent held under the strictest supervision of security personnel.

(iv) When a civil suspect or detainee is passed back to be held for further investigation, a complete case record must accompany him or be forwarded as rapidly as possible for the guidance of higher headquarters.

(c) Subsequent Security Measures and Methods

In the rear areas and after the initial phase, security work should tend to develop from a series of hastily improvised local measures to a more co-ordinated system based on preventive security controls and close collaboration with AMGOT, backed by ever increasing security intelligence.

Guidance on certain aspects of such security work is given below:

(i) Control of Movement

Restrictions on the local circulation of civilians will be determined by local AMGOT officers after consultation with the security staff and at the direction of the tactical commanders.

The general policy will be to restrict circulation after certain hours except for such special personnel as members of the medical profession and civil defense, and those doing essential work for the Allied Forces.

Civilian access to certain areas may be restricted or prohibited according to military needs. The perimeter of such areas should be marked by the posting of sentries or the placing of notice boards. A number of the latter are being prepared by AMGOT so that they will be available for immediate use.

Circulation between towns and villages will in general be prohibited except with permission of Civil Affairs Police Officers and/or the Security staffs.

It is the responsibility of security personnel to supervise the proper enforcement of the security regulations concerning civilian movement.

(ii) Presses, etc.

pending trial or further investigation.

When the situation permits, they will be removed to proper prisons or detention establishments by arrangement with AMGOT.

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It is the responsibility of security personnel to supervise the proper enforcement of the security regulations concerning civilian movement.

(ii) Passes, etc.

Civilians are already in possession of identity cards, and it is not proposed to issue fresh ones or to carry out a special registration of the population.

The following pass system will be adopted:

Two kinds of passes will be issued by AMGOT officers to civilians, namely:

Firstly, a pass or permit for special personnel of essential services to circulate locally as required or to take certain action prohibited to the population as a whole. This will bear the number of the owner's identity card.

Secondly, a pass for approved civilians to journey beyond the normal limits of the town or village. This will be attached to the identity card and will be stamped for the journey or journeys.

The security staff will keep AMGOT supplied with a list of persons to whom no passes should be issued without reference to the former. In addition, before issuing passes or permits for long distance journeys or important privileges, AMGOT will submit the name of applicants to the security staff for vetting. Local passes and permits conferring minor privileges will be issued by AMGOT without a prior vet by the security staff, but the latter will be kept informed of such passes issued.

The following kinds of pass will be issued by the security staff, or their representatives:

No. 1 White security pass for issue to U.S. and British civilian organizations such as Y.M.C.A., Red Cross, etc.

No. 2 Red security pass or permit for emergency issue to special individuals for counter-intelligence purposes. The use of these should be strictly limited, and details of all holders forwarded to this Headquarters.

The above passes have been ordered by this Headquarters, and an adequate quantity will be forwarded to Task Forces shortly for distribution down to divisions.

Special embossed stamps for stamping the above security passes have been ordered and will be issued on the scale of one per division and higher headquarters.

In addition, special date stamps are being prepared to enable local pass systems to be established for civil employees working in docks, service installations, etc. These will be forwarded when available.

(iii) Control of Communications and Publications

All arrangements for the censorship of civil mail, telephones and publications are handled by the Information and Censorship Section representatives of which are to be attached to Task Forces.

Security staffs will maintain close liaison with these representatives so that the latter may be kept informed of security requirements and priorities as regards censorship.

It is intended that all private civil telephone communications should be suspended at the earliest possible moment under arrangements made for this purpose and that only certain official lines required for admin-

The security staff will keep AMCOF supplied with a list of persons to whom no passes should be issued without reference to the former. In addition, before issuing passes or permits for long distance journeys or important privileges, AMCOF will submit the name of applicants to the security staff for vetting. Local passes and permits conferring minor privileges will be issued by AMCOF without a prior vet by the security staff, but the latter will be kept informed of such passes issued.

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All arrangements for the censorship of civil mail, telephones and publications are handled by the Information and Censorship Section representatives of which are to be attached to Task Forces.

Security staffs will maintain close liaison with these representatives so that the latter may be kept informed of security requirements and priorities as regards censorship.

It is intended that all private civil telephone communications should be suspended at the earliest possible moment under arrangements made by Security, and that only certain official lines required for administrative, civil defence and other such essential purposes, will be available for use by selected civilians, as requested by AMCOF: at a later stage limited local use of the telephone may be permitted to approved subscribers.

The discontinuation of the civil postal service resulting from our operations will presumably prevent all civil mail communication in the occupied areas in the early stages; thereafter, such communication is

/to be limited

to be limited for as long as necessary to post-cards only, which can be easily censored.

All necessary arrangements for the control of the press and other publications will be made by the Information and Censorship Section.

When Security staffs require the application of special censorship measures in special cases or localities, they should request the Information and Censorship Section to make the necessary arrangements. Detailed censorship instructions and arrangements for HUSKY are to be issued shortly by the Information and Censorship Section.

(iv) Co-operation with AMGOT

It is essential that security staffs should maintain the closest liaison throughout with the AMGOT organisation, especially C.A.P.O's. The latter are to be allotted first on a formation basis, then on a territorial basis: one is to be located at each main police headquarters, and it is their task to supervise the organisation and efficient working of a co-operative police force.

Although military security personnel may, in forward areas or where speed is essential, take any necessary security measures against civilians without reference to AMGOT, (e.g. search of premises, detention and search of suspect persons, snap road checks etc.), they should normally keep AMGOT advised of all contemplated security measures against civilians, and take such measures in conjunction with AMGOT where appropriate. For instance, any general regulations for the security control of the civil population, such as the declaration of prohibited areas or the registration of radio receiving sets, etc., will normally be arranged by AMGOT at the request of the security staff.

AMGOT is responsible for the removal and replacement of unreliable officials. No action will be taken by military security personnel in respect of officials without reference to AMGOT, unless the delay thus caused would result in the most serious prejudice to security.

There must be a free exchange of information of interest to the other between security staffs and AMGOT officers at all levels down to Divisional Headquarters.

(v) Co-operation with Civil Police

There are several native police organisations and forces in HORNED. It is anticipated that AMGOT will arrange for the dissolution or reorganisation of some, and persuade others to continue their functions in co-operation with the allies. Guidance on the probable attitude and comparative reliability of the various police organisations will be issued in due course.

Contact between military security personnel and the native police should normally be made in the early stages through the C.A.P.O's. Later, when conditions become more settled and C.A.P.O's have been able to appreciate the attitude and reliability of the police officials under their control, it will be possible for direct contact to be made on minor routine security matters.

Co-operation with the native police and other civil authorities should be welcomed and encouraged, but it must be borne in mind by security personnel that such authorities are fundamentally hostile and the possibility of treachery must be guarded against. A correct but firm attitude must be adopted by security personnel. In their dealings with the native police etc.,

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/It should be

It should be possible to make the native police to a certain extent responsible for the good behaviour, as regards security, of the civilians, G.S. they could help in anti-sectarian patrols, in checking entry to prohibited areas etc., Although it will not be possible to regard them as reliable guardians of our security interests, it should be possible to make them supplement the efforts of military security personnel in routine measures. MAJOT has agreed to try to arrange this.

(vi) Collection of Information

Owing to the scanty nature of advance information about personalities etc., in MAJOT, security staffs will have to depend to a large extent on information acquired locally after arrival. Military security personnel will therefore take the earliest opportunity of building up an informer service, but they must bear in mind that the inhabitants will be predominantly hostile, and all information received from them will require checking and confirmation before it can be considered reliable.

(vii) Territorial Security Responsibility

All territory occupied by our forces should be "covered" from the security point of view by Field Security or Counter Intelligence Personnel, and security staffs will arrange accordingly the allotment of areas or boundaries to P.S. Sections and C.I.C. detachments.

Such areas will normally correspond in general to the area occupied by the Formation to which the security personnel are attached. Experience has shown, however, that at times more advantageous use can be made of security personnel by splitting sections in order to reinforce where most needed. Formations should therefore realise that it may be necessary for higher Commanders to withdraw part of their sections for certain special requirements elsewhere.

As our forces advance and security personnel move on, these must arrange to hand over all relevant information to the security sections which are to take over the area which they are leaving. In this, reliance should not be placed on verbal information: complete files of relevant papers should be transferred.

(viii) Subversive Influences and Organisations

Military Security Personnel will take steps to detect and investigate all cases of subversive influences, propaganda and rumours etc., emanating from the population and likely to have an adverse effect on our forces.

Similarly it is their duty to detect and investigate any clandestine organisations or underground movements which might threaten any aspect of the security of our forces.

They should make themselves familiar with the morale, attitude, reactions and sentiments of the civil population, and in this they should keep in close touch with local Civil Affairs Officers who are also closely interested in such matters.

(ix) Civil Contractors and Employees

When it is necessary to employ civilians in the service of our forces, the following security principles will be adopted :-

In the case of civilians who are to be employed in a capacity in which they may have access to confidential military information, their names and particulars should be first submitted to the security staff for vetting, so

information acquired locally after arrival. Military security personnel will therefore take the earliest opportunity of building up an informer service, but they must bear in mind that the inhabitants will be predominately hostile, and all information received from them will require checking and confirmation before it can be considered reliable.

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When it is necessary to employ civilians in the service of our forces, the following security principles will be adopted:-

In the case of civilians who are to be employed in a capacity in which they may have access to confidential military information, their names and particulars should be first submitted to the security staff for vetting, so that advice may be given as to suitability.

In the case of contractors through whom civil labour is to be obtained, they should similarly be submitted for a security check before they are given a contract.

In the case of labourers etc., who will not have access to confidential military information, they need not be vetted before engagement; if, however, they are to be employed in any capacity in which they might endanger any

/aspect of our security

any aspect of our security, their names should be forwarded to the security staff on their engagement in order that a running check can be made in due course. Otherwise, such employees need not be vetted.

(x) Military Security Precautions

It is essential that the very highest standard of military security discipline should be maintained by all ranks in HONGKONG. Routine security precautions in such matters as the handling of documents, conversation in public places, use of telephones, guarding of stores and headquarters, etc. will be of even greater importance than in the U. S. or other countries, since virtually the entire native population of HONGKONG are potentially hostile, and it can be taken for granted that its inhabitants would gladly strike a blow at our security, if they could do so undetected. Special care must be taken to ensure that no documents are left behind in vacated premises on the move of headquarters.

Sound military security precautions must be held in hand with civil security measures if our security objective is to be effectively achieved, and security personnel will pay due attention to this aspect of their work, i.e. to the supervision of military security discipline.

7. Security of Ports

(a) It is of vital importance to ensure the institution of proper security measures at ports with the minimum delay after their capture. In the early stages the main object of such security precautions will be the prevention of sabotage: the next object will be to prevent leakage of information concerning our shipping and the disembarkation of troops and supplies through the access of unauthorized persons to the dock areas. The question of the security control of civilian travellers will not arise for some time, as there will be no such travellers in the early stages.

(b) Until the arrival of Port Security Sections, which should be landed as soon as operational commitments permit, their functions should be undertaken as far as possible by the diversion to this task of a limited number of security personnel from formation sections.

(c) It will be the responsibility of each Task Force to allot the Port Security Personnel available, so that all ports used by our forces are covered by such personnel as soon as possible after their capture, and to control and supervise their work.

(4) Two Naval Port Security Officers will be available to co-operate with the Military Port Security Sections. The latter must in any case work in the closest liaison with the Naval authorities at the ports.

(a) Port Security work is essentially an inter-Service matter, in which both the Naval and Military authorities share considerable interest and responsibility. The best means of co-operating will no doubt evolve with experience, but the following General division of responsibility should be taken as a guide :-

(1) Naval Responsibility

Sound military security precautions must go hand in hand with civil security measures if our security objective is to be effectively achieved, and security personnel will pay due attention to this aspect of their work to the commendation of military security discipline.

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(c) It will be the responsibility of each Task Force to allot the Port Security Personnel available, so that all ports used by our forces are covered by such personnel as soon as possible after their capture, and to control and supervise their work.

(e) Port Security work is essentially an inter-Service matter, in which both the Naval and Military authorities share considerable interest and responsibility. The best means of co-operating will no doubt evolve with experience, but the following general division of responsibility should be taken as a guide :-

Regulations for, and control of shipping (including small craft) and of seamen and crews.

Regulations for the control of entry and exit of individuals to and from port areas (jointly with Army, but with special emphasis on SAC approach).

Counter sabotage precautions as haris ships.

Regulations for and security of those parts of port areas used exclusively by the Navy.

(ii) Military Responsibility

Regulations for and control of entry and exit to and from port areas (jointly with Navy, but with special emphasis on land approach)

Provision of personnel for guards in port areas.

Provision and Supervision of Port Security Sections.

Provision, issue and control of passes and permits.

Counter sabotage precautions and counter espionage activities in the port area as a whole.

Examination and control of transients (at a possible later stage).

8. Security and Air Forces

Military security personnel of the ground forces will not be responsible for supervising the security of airfields or air force installations. They will, however, maintain close liaison with the security personnel of the air forces.

9. Counter Intelligence Funds

It is proposed to make available shortly to each Task Force Headquarters the sum of one thousand pounds (or its equivalent) to cover expenditure for counter-intelligence purposes. Instructions on the expenditure of and accounting for these funds will be forwarded separately to Twelfth Army and Force 543.

10. Reports

(a) Special or individual reports on security matters of immediate interest or requiring action on the part of this Headquarters will be rendered as necessary.

(b) In addition, periodic general security reports will be rendered at not more than fortnightly intervals, evaluating the security situation as a whole and containing any recommendations. Such reports will be in the following form:-

PART I - General Appreciation of Civil and Military Security situation during the period under review.

PART II - Particular cases and incidents including information that may be of value for future reference or that illustrates points of security importance, under the following headings:-

1. Military Security

Counter sabotage procedures and counter espionage activities in the part area as a whole.

Examination and control of transients (at a possible later stage).

8. Security and Air Forces

Military security personnel of the ground forces will not be responsible for supervising the security of airfields or air force installations. They will, however, maintain close liaison with the security personnel of the air forces.

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PART I - General Appreciation of Civil and Military Security situation during the period under review.

PART II - Particular cases and incidents including information that may be of value for future reference or that illustrates points of security importance, under the following headings:-

1. Military Security

- (a) Security of information
- (b) Security of material and installations
- (c) Security of access to Military establishments
- (d) Security of personnel

2. Civil Security

- (a) Individual suspects, etc.
- (b) Subversive movements and organisations

3. Relations between troops and civilians

- (a) Civilian morale and reactions
- (b) Rumours

4. Any other matters of general security interest

-11-

5. Locations statement of military security detachments

NOTE: A. Para. (3) should be coordinated with JAGC representatives

B. Para. (3) (c) should include rumors that are defamatory, over-
optimistic or that show a possible breach of security.

C. The action taken and/or contemplated should be recorded: sources
of information should be given and evaluated.

H.Q. 141 Force
B.N.M.F.

W.D. Gibson Jr. Col.
Major General
Chief of General Staff
141 Force

2543

Copy to: A.P.M.Q. G-2 (C.I.)
Force K
45 Inf. Div. (U.S.)
Force 141 Naval Staff
G (Ops)
Col. J. H. W. Martin (INC)
A
D.P.M.
JAGC
Air Staff
P.S.C.
Spare

Copy Nos 21 - 22
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10131

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Major General
Chief of General Staff
141 Force

2543

Copy Nos 21 - 22
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Copy to: A.E.H.Q. R-2 (C.I.)
Force X
45 Inf. Div. (U.S.)
Force 141 Naval Staff
G (Ops)
Col. J. M. W. Martin (INC)
A
D.P.M.
R.R.O.T.
Air Staff
H.S.C.
Spars

H.Q. 141 Force
B.N.M.E.

6 pages
100/625
2 June 43

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

FORTUNE ALGIERS

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 03....
0800B

28

TROOPERS

This copy on
accredited unofficial
Sec/Army by TAG/ date

411410

CA/125

SECRET

From RENNELL

Your 84935 MO 11 30 May. See FREEDOM to AGWAR 1750
of 1 June repeated USFOR. Go ahead with manufacture as
ordered. No repeat no security passes ⁴rd at any rate for
present. See my CA/122 of 1 Jun.

2542

25

File

Ruffy

IMPORTANT

785015

MOST SECRETIMPORTANT.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

IN

DATE: 31 MAY

NO: 1982

FORCE 141

POLIC NO. 1612
30 MAY 43.FROM: TROOPERS
TO: FORTUNE
ORIG NO: 84935 MD 11TOO: 1140B
THI: 1556B/30
TOR: 1751B/30

REF NO: YOUR CA/089/2810 19 MAY.

ONE DIES AND STAMPS NOW BEING MADE WITH INSCRIPTION " ALLIED MILITARY
GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY".
IN VIEW PARA TWO OF R 8895 (FAN 129) FROM AGWAR TO ETOUSA OF 27 MAY IS
ALTERATION NOW NECESSARY. REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS EARLIEST.

TWO. REF SECURITY PASSES. HAS ANY DECISION BEEN REACHED.

SAC DISTRIBUTION:

CIVIL AFFAIRS 4 ACTION

IMPORTANT.
MOST SECRET**ACTION TAKEN**S.H.C. 2010B/30
T.T. 2100B/30 JJ

2541

accredited unofficial, research
Sec/Army by TAG/ date
411410

To SEC
LT. COL MARTIN.

ACTION
Trooper Remmell
Reply "Your 84935 to 85750 See
Freedom to AGWAR 1700 6/6
repeated USFOR @ go ahead
with manufacturing as ordered
No repeated security passes
required at any rate
for the same
in my 84102
1/6

785015

26
BIGOT - MOST SECRET.

Sub. t: Printing of Passes for ANGOT.

144F/7982/OA.

2 Jun 43.

A.Q.M.G.,
144 Force.

It is requested that the security printing of 50,000 passes in accordance with the enclosed particulars be put in hand. The passes should be of 4 pages, the English version being on page 2 and the Italian opposite on page 3. Page 4 (outside) would be blank and page 1 (outside) would indicate the type of pass, general or special; the endorsement should be overprinted on page 1.

The passes should be in blocks of 100, and an additional 200 of each kind should be supplied in advance of the main order.

Proofs should be furnished to this formation please.

for *Philip H. Col.*

for LEONEL BOLLES,
Colonel, C.P.S.,

ANGOT, 144 Force,
Field.

2 June 43

This copy only MAY BE SHOWN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ date
411410

Alterazione o uso non autorizzato di questo
lasciapassare soggetta l'offensore a pena severa.

To be overprinted in red or some
distinctive color on both types
of pass.

Passes to be numbered as follows:-

White	General	00001	to 45,000
<u>Colour</u>	Special	45001	to 50,000

10181

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

No.....

GENERAL PASS

Name.....
Address.....
Identity Card No.....

~~The above named~~ has permission to travel
within an area of..... *Elmwood* from
his) address for the purpose of.....
her).....

This pass is valid for a period of
.....from the date of issue, and
must be returned to office of issue upon ex-
planation. The holder may/may not be out of doors
during the hours of curfew.

Issued at.....on.....
day of.....194.., by
.....(Name and rank
in block letters)

Stamp	Signature
	(Official Title)
	(Rank)

2539

Note: The above in Italian on opposite page
or on reverse side.

785015

No. _____

Lasciapassare Generale

Nome _____

Indirizzo _____

Tessera d'identità _____

Il sunnominato e autorizzato di viaggiare

nei limiti di _____ chilometri

dalla sua dimora allo scopo di _____

Questo lasciapassare è valido per un

periodo di _____

dalla data d'emissione, e deve essere ritornato

all'ufficio emittente alla scadenza.

Il possessore può / non può essere fuori

di casa durante le ore di ritiro.

Emesso a _____ il _____

giorno di _____ 194_ da _____

Firma del possessore: _____

2583

Firma del possessore:

Il sunnominato e autorizzato di viaggiare

nei limiti di _____ chilometri

dalla sua dimora allo scopo di _____

2533

Questo lasciapassare è valido per un

periodo di _____

dalla data d'emissione, e deve essere ritornato

all'ufficio emittente alla scadenza.

Il possessore può / non può essere fuori
di casa durante le ore di ritiro.

Emesso a _____ il _____

giorno di _____ 194_ da _____

Nome _____ Grado _____

Firma _____

Titolo Ufficiale _____

Timbro _____

Grado _____

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

No.

PASS FOR DAY JOURNEY

Name.....

Address.....

Identity Card No.....

has permission to travel daily between
his above address and.....
her) for the purpose of his occupation of.....

This pass is valid for a period of
..... from the date of issue
and must be returned to office of issue upon
expiration.
(The holder may be out of doors.....
hours) before curfew ends and.....
hours) after curfew begins.

Issued at..... on.....
day of....., 194..., by
..... (Name and rank in
block letters)

Signature.....

Stamp..... (Official Title)
..... (Rank)

Note: The above in Italian on opposite page
or on reverse side.

1922

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

No.....

SPECIAL PASS

Name.....

Address.....

Identity Card No.....

has permission to travel from.....
to.....and return.

Purpose of journey.....

This pass is valid until.....and
must be returned to the office of issue on
completion of the journey.

The holder may/may not be out of doors during
hours of curfew for the purpose of the above
journey.

Issued at.....on.....
day of.....194., by

.....(Name and rank
in block letters)

.....Signature

.....(Official title)

.....(Rank)

Signature of holder

Stamp

2537

Note: The above in Italian on opposite page
or on reverse side.

168

MO

lasciapassare Speciale

Nome: _____

Indirizzo _____

Tessera d'identità No: _____

e autorizzato a viaggiare da _____

a _____

e ritornare.

Scopo del viaggio _____

Questo lasciapassare è valido fino a _____

_____ e deve essere ritornato all'ufficio

emittente alla fine del viaggio.

Il possessore può / non può essere fuori di

casa durante le ore di ritiro per lo scopo del

suddetto viaggio.

Emesso a _____

giorno di _____

194

da

Firma del possessore: _____

2530

1024

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

è autorizzato a viaggiare da _____
a _____

e ritornare.

Scopo del viaggio _____

Questo lasciapassare è valido fino a _____

_____ e deve essere ritornato all'ufficio

emittente alla fine del viaggio.

Il possessore può / non può essere fuori di

casa durante le ore di ritiro per lo scopo del

suddetto viaggio.

Emesso a _____ il _____

giorno di _____ 194 _____ da _____

Nome _____ Grado _____

Firma _____

Titolo ufficiale _____

Grado _____

Timbro

Firma del possessore:

2536

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

AMOT

R.J.P. THORPE THORPE, Lt. Col.

DEMOST HURRY MOST HURRY

TROOPERS

1. This copy may be shown to duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ _____ date _____

411410

FORTUNE ALGERS

GA/122

June 010800A

ROUTINE

2531

MOST SECRET.

20

Ref our GA/089 May 191800A.

Have now arranged for local printing of the 50,000 passes mentioned.
Presume provision die stamps and rubber stamps in hand. Also required
25 rubber stamps AMOT in open capitals each letter three quarters of
inch in height.

File 7982

Most Secret

BIGOT 24


Lt. Col. ~~Spafford~~ To Deputy CCAO
Kaswell41/F/7982/CA
31 May 43Subject. Security in Hornified : Panes

Refce fol. 17A herein. it is understood that no definite request has been made to War Office for actual ordering of the 12 die stamps and 100 rubber stamps mentioned.

Whilst the printing of the panes can no doubt be satisfactorily carried out in this country, I consider the provision of the die stamps and rubber stamps an urgent necessity and would ask that the War Office be asked to put the order for these in hand at once. At least 3 of the die-stamps will be required by this Division.

Leunef ~~W. C. Rolles~~
Colonel

revised
returned with
agreed by DecAO.
Ruthy
31 May 43.



2533

785015

BIGOT

SUBJECT: Coordination of Security
in HORRIFIED

To: Lt.Col. W.D.Gibson,
G (I) (b),
H.Q. 141 Force

23A
MOST SECRET HEADQUARTERS
141F/7552/CA 21/1
27 May 43 N 7981
FORCE 141

- 22P
1. Your memorandum of the discussion on 24 May has been read and is generally agreed with.
 2. The following detailed amendments are suggested.
 - (a) Para 4. Omit words "Foreign Office"
 - (b) Para 10, line 4. After "arrangements" insert "or removed from HORRIFIED".

AMGOT
141 Force
Field

A.T.MAXWELL,
Lt.Col.,
AMGOT

Cd. Bellis

This copy only : to be used only
accredited unofficial researchers Order
Sec/Army by TAG/ date 1410

to see from 22.

28/5.

1028

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

BIGOT

MOST SECRET

TO: Lt. Col. Maxwell } AMQOT
Lt. Col. Spofford }

BIGOT

Attached is a memorandum covering our discussion of 24 May.

Would you please let me know if there are any items with which you do not agree?

See 3A

*I have seen
Gibson's memo
and agree with this
and will answer.*

26/5/43

MOST SECRET

This copy may be used by
accredited unofficial researchers only
Sec/Army by TAG/ date
411410

W.D. Gibson. Lt. Col.

W.D. GIBSON
Lt. Col.
G (Tb)

HEADQUARTERS	
Date	28/5/43
M	7952
2532	
FORCE 141	

MOST SECRET

28
BIGOT

BIGOT

Memorandum on Discussion between AMGOT and G.S. I(b) on 24 May 43 on Matters Affecting Security and the Civil Population in HOLLAND

THIS COPY ONLY MAY BE SHOWN TO
accredited unofficial researchers or
Army by TAG/ A 410

The following points were discussed and agreed:

1. The I(b) (Counter-intelligence) staff and military security personnel are responsible for all matters affecting the security of our forces against espionage, sabotage and subversive influences.
2. It is expected that the political directive which is awaited will allow AMGOT to depose such native officials, including police, whom they consider unreliable and unco-operative. AMGOT will normally depose such officials if requested by us for security reasons.
3. It is AMGOT's responsibility to ensure the organisation and efficient working of a co-operative police force. Where necessary, friendly police officials will be inserted by AMGOT in place of those deposed.
4. Up to D. Day AMGOT relies for its information mainly on the Foreign Office, M.I. 6 and P.W. interrogation reports. I(b) will get most of its information from M.I. 6. AMGOT and I(b) will make available to each other any information likely to be of value to the other.
5. AMGOT will issue a directive to the Task Forces on the general treatment of officials and civilians by our forces, and on the powers of our forces in respect of civilians.
6. Contact between military security personnel and the native police force should be made in the early stages through the C.A.P.O.'s. Later, when conditions become more settled and C.A.P.O.'s have been able to appreciate the attitude of the native police officials under their control, contact can be made direct on minor routine matters in which military security personnel require information from the native police.
7. Military Security personnel can take such security measures against civilians as house searches, snap road checks, detention and search of individuals, etc. without reference to C.A.O.'s when speed is essential and in the forward battle areas. Normally, however, military security personnel will keep C.A.O.'s advised of all contemplated security measures affecting civilians.
8. Any general regulations for the security control of the civil population, e.g. declaration of prohibited areas, will normally be arranged by AMGOT at the request of I (b).
9. Civilian passes issued by AMGOT. I(b) to keep AMGOT advised with a list of persons to whom passes should not be issued without reference to

consider unreliable and unco-operative. AMGOT will normally depose such officials if requested by us for security reasons.

3. It is AMGOT's responsibility to ensure the organisation and efficient working of a co-operative police force. Where necessary, friendly police officials will be inserted by AMGOT in place of those deposed.

4. Up to D. Day AMGOT relies for its information mainly on the Foreign Office, M.I. 6 and P/W interrogation reports. I(b) will get most of its information from M.I. 6. AMGOT and I(b) will make available to each other any information likely to be of value to the other.

5. AMGOT will issue a directive to the Task Forces on the general treatment of officials and civilians by our forces, and on the powers of our forces in respect of civilians.

6. Contact between military security personnel and the native police force should be made in the early stages through the C.A.P.O.'s. Later, when conditions become more settled and C.A.P.O.'s have been able to appreciate the attitude of the native police officials under their control, contact can be made direct on minor routine matters in which military security personnel require information from the native police.

7. Military Security personnel can take such security measures against civilians as house searches, snap road checks, detention and search of individuals, etc. without reference to C.A.O.'s when speed is essential and in the forward battle areas. Normally, however, military security personnel will keep C.A.O.'s advised of all contemplated security measures affecting civilians.

8. Any general regulations for the security control of the civil population, e.g. declaration of prohibited areas, will normally be arranged by AMGOT at the request of I(b).

9. Civilian passes issued by AMGOT. I(b) to keep AMGOT advised with a list of persons to whom passes should not be issued without reference to I(b). Before issuing passes for long distance moves and important privileges, AMGOT will ask I(b) to vet applicants. Local passes and those conferring minor privileges will be issued by AMGOT without an I(b) vet, but I(b) to be kept informed of such passes issued, in order that a check-up can be made later if required.

10. Disposal of civil security suspects and detainees. Civil suspects who are arrested or detained in the forward areas will be disposed of through normal P/W channels and held in special civil compartments of P/W cages, until they can be moved to certain approved prisons under AMGOT arrangements: i.e., security suspects to be treated in same way as persons detained by AMGOT as civil P/W. I(b) to request 'A' branch to direct that civil suspects be accepted by Provost and such personnel. The question of searching women suspects must be left to local discretion in the early stages, but this must not be

** removed for security*

stated in written instructions. Later it may be possible to employ Allied nurses and native police matrons.

11. AMGOT will arrange for the preparation of standard signs to mark prohibited areas, so that these will be ready in the hands of combat troops when required.

12. Exchange of information between AMGOT and I(b) to be carried out at all levels down to Div. H.Q. which is the lowest level at which there is a military security officer.

13. Every effort should be made to preserve in situ rather than to seize documents in police and other administrative offices, banks, etc. The ideal would be for the combat troops to guard all such buildings and offices to prevent destruction or removal of documents, until they have been taken over or examined by the appropriate Allied authority, which will usually be an AMGOT officer in the case of public offices and documents. AMGOT will take up with G (Ops) and arrange for suitable instructions to be issued to Task Forces.

14. It should be possible to make the civil police to a certain extent responsible for the good behavior, as regards security, of the civilians: e.g., they could help in anti-sabotage patrols. Although it will not be possible to regard them as reliable guardians of our security interests, it should be possible to make them supplement the efforts of military security personnel in routine security matters. AMGOT will try to arrange this.

15. It is intended that there should be 122 C.A.P.O.'s; of these several would accompany each division. In the first stages they will be allotted on a formation basis, then on a territorial basis.

16. AMGOT will arrange for an I(b) officer to give a talk to the C.A.P.O.'s at their school to explain to them the duties and methods of military security personnel. Similarly the should explain his duties and methods to the I (b) staff here.

CCA.O.

1032

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

To Deputy CCAO 26 May 43
14:40

Noted -

May I discuss this
with you at your
convenience -

Bolles
Col -

2529

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SECRET.

CIPHER MESSAGE
IN

FOLIO NO 1034.
22ND MAY 43

TO : FORTUNE (FREEDOM PASS)
FROM : TROOPERS.
NO : B2500 MO 11.

TOO NIL.
THI 1230B/23
TOR 0300B/24

14A/7968

ONE. YOUR CA 093 MAY 21.
AS ALL PRINTING BEING DONE YOURS WITH EXCEPTION OF SECURITY
PASSES ARRANGE FOR PRINTED COPIES OF PROCLAMATIONS WITH
TRANSLATIONS DCS AND DONTB AND PAMPHLETS TO BE HERE
BEGINNING JUNE. STATE NUMBERS OF EACH DOCUMENT AND TOTAL
WEIGHT BEING SENT.

TWO. YOUR CA/089/2610 MAY19. CONFIRM PRINTING OF PASSES
TO BE HELD UP UNTIL YOU ADVISE DETAILS TO BE INCLUDED FOR
MEDICAL AND CIVIL DEFENCE SERVICES.

CIVIL AFFAIRS
G(OPS)
(FOR WRBB)

20A

3ACTION.
1

SNC. 0420B/24.
T.T. 0435B/24. JGD.

This copy only to be used for
unclassified unofficial research order
JOC/Army by 100/

411410

Action Copy
ON 7968

2528

Public Security

To see above and other papers in his file.

Action copies of the above signal has gone to
Col. Maxwell & Spang who have been dealing with
matter. It is in file 7968 - Printing.

G.P. 25/6

1034

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

20A

ASST, 1st Force

SECRET - MOST SECRET

A.T. MAXWELL, Lt. Col

TROOPERS

ROUTINE

CA/009

Ref 191800A

ROUTINE

accredited non-accredited researchers order
Sec/Army by Tag/ date 4 1 14 10

SECRET

NA

Ref your 80198 MO 11 15 May.

2527

MOB model received. Present intention to retain native identity papers. Extent of information to be included on ASST pass for medical services, Civil Defence etc still under discussion estimate number of passes required 50,000. Provision die stamps and rubber stamps agreed

7982

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS
Date 19 MAY 43
7892/Y905
FORCE 141

BIGOT MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO: FORCE 545

REF NO: 1918

FROM: G-2 FREEDOM

SIGNED: CINC, CITE: WHQBI

DISTRIBUTION BY G(Ib): AMGOT
14.1F/1400/G(Ib) Dated 18-5-43

SECRET BIGOT HUSKY

AMGOT Civil Police Organization responsible for Civil Police functions in territory. (REFERENCE your GP 1 I 50632 dated 16th May) Military Security Personnel responsible for security of Troops counter espionage and counter sabotage measures. Restrictions on local circulations of civilians will be determined by local Civil Affairs Officers after consultation with GSIB and at direction of tactical Commanders. General Policy will be to restrict circulation after certain hours except for special personnel such as Medical and Civil Defense. Within each district areas may be restricted or prohibited. Circulation between homes and centers will be prohibited except with permission of Civil Affairs Police Officer and GSIB. For foregoing passes being printed. For issue by AMGOT Representative: (A) pass for Medical and Civil Defense (B) pass for approved civilians. For issue by GSIB: (A) Security pass No. 1 for AMERICAN and BRITISH civilian employees Red Cross workers etc (B) Security pass No. 2 for emergency issue and special use by intelligence personnel. (C) Date Stamp Passes for Civil employees in ports and service installations.

ORIGINATOR: G-2

AUTHENTICATION: K. W. D. STRONG, BRIG.

INFORMATION:

S/GS
DTC
G-3 PLANS

FORCE 141
CINC MED
MAC

CAO
USN
AG Records

MC-OUT-2379

17 MAY 43

1100A
Sec/Army

REF NO: 1918

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

COPY No. 6

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

10361
EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET
SECRET

07789
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

18A
BIGOT

LYXV

filed 161025

HEADCLASSED
19 MAY 43
4982.
FORCE 141

AFSC N784/16
161818A
hes

OP PRIORITY

BIGOT HUSKY

FROM: FORCE 545 SIGNED MOSSEWM
TO: FREEDOM ALGIERS FOR HILL DILLON
NO: GP(1)/I/50632 May 16, 1943

BIGOT HUSKY

Grateful you inform us earliest what arrangements being made
for defence security organization to take over HORRIFIED and for
PASS organization for registering population. Is (?) HORRIFIED
same(?) responsible?

ACTION: G-2

INFORMATION: SGS
DTC
USN
CAO
MAC
C IN C MED
FORCE 141
G-3
AG RECORDS

SEE 19A

THIS COPY ONLY IS TO BE SHOWN TO duly
accredited unofficial researchers Order
date
Sec/Army by TAG/ 411416

MC-IN-2955 16 May 43

2005 A Ref No GP(1)/I/50632 tea

DISTRIBUTION BY G (Ib) : AMGOT ✓
141F/1400/G(Ib) Dated 18-5-43

No copy retained
141:18

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET
SECRET

2525
BIGOT
COPY No. 12

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

10371
EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

07849
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
AFHQ
INCOMING MESSAGE

BIGOT 17A

UKW
/16
Filed 160030B

14 MAY 43
2982/4968
FORCE 141

AFSC N280/16
160635A
VMC

ROUTINE

BIGOT HUSKY

FROM: TROOPERS SIGNED RENNELL

TO : FREEDOM, ALGIERS FOR FORTUNE FOR CIVAFFAIRS

NO : 80198 MO 11, 15 MAY 1805B.

Passes for civilians in HORRIFIED. Presume you have now received RODD model. Propose printing supply with counterfoils here if you agree from model now available ours. Consult Hill Dillon. Telegraph urgently quantity initially required. Propose also ordering 12 die stamps, 100 rubber stamps containing designation "Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory." Above by WS 31.

ACTION: FORCE 141

INFORMATION: SEC GS
G-3
RECORDS

ACTION
20A

MC IN 2988

16MAY43

2120A REF NO: 80198

Captain Graham

See 17A for early reply please.

17/5

EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

2524
411410
BIGOT
COPY No. 1

16A
HIGH SECRET

Memorandum: Arrangements regarding Information and Censorship

As a result of conferences between Major General Lord Rennell and Brigadier General McClure and others and more recent conferences of the junior planning group, the following arrangements have been laid down governing the handling of information, Propaganda and Censorship matters.

1. Propaganda functions.

These will be handled by INC, which will have a staff attached to the various forces as well as a coordinating and policy staff at A.F.H.Q.

Major lines of propaganda will be laid down by directives from the governments with subdirectives from A.F.H.Q. Local propaganda activities (leaflets, broadcasting, posters, press) will be handled in the territory by the operating staff of INC.

These matters will be coordinated with AMCOF by periodic meetings between representatives of AMCOF and INC. In large centers it may be desirable to have liaison officers between the two staffs.

2. Press.

The press will be supervised by INC, both in respect of the operation and censorship. The plan under consideration by INC is to continue publication as soon as practicable of the principal daily paper existing in FUSTIAN and MALACIOUS. Consideration is also being given to a single page newspaper printed in both English and Italian.

There will be assigned to AMCOF from INC a Public Relations Officer who will be responsible for the following:

- (a) Putting into local newspaper channels items of interest and importance, such as proclamations, general orders, ordinances and notices. These items will amount to newspaper notices and not to official publication.
- (b) Establishing the news contact with the outside world on activities of the military government and on events in MORRIFIELD. In this connection, the PRC should be brought into the AMCOF organization a considerable period before the operation so that he may be familiar with the background, planning and general purposes of the military government. This will make for better understanding of the problems involved.

3. Censorship.

Censorship of mail, telephone and telegraph communication, radio broadcasting, newspapers, motion pictures, plays, will be the responsibility of INC.

785015

1 page
100/625
16A

Major lines of propaganda will be laid down by directives from the government with subdirectives from A.P.H.Q. Local propaganda activities (leaflets, broadcasting, posters, press) will be handled in the territory by the operating staff of IHO.

These matters will be coordinated with AMGOT by periodic meetings between representatives of AMGOT and IHO. In large centers it may be desirable to have liaison officers between the two staffs.

2. Press.

The press will be supervised by IHO, both in respect of the operation and censorship. The plan under consideration by IHO is to continue publication as soon as practicable of the principal daily paper existing in FUSTILAN and MALICIOUS. Consideration is also being given to a single page newspaper printed in both English and Italian.

There will be assigned to AMGOT from IHO a Public Relations Officer who will be responsible for the following:

- (a) Putting into local newspaper channels items of interest and importance, such as proclamations, general orders, ordinances and notices. These items will amount to newspaper notices and not to official publication.
- (b) Establishing the news contact with the outside world on activities of the military government and on events in HONORIFIED. In this connection, the IHO should be brought into the AMGOT organization a considerable period before the operation so that he may be familiar with the background, planning and general purposes of the military government. This will make for better understanding of the problems involved.

3. Censorship.

Censorship of mail, telephone and telegraph communication, radio broadcasting, newspapers, motion pictures, plays, will be the responsibility of IHO.

4. Books and Periodicals.

A question is raised as to black-listing books and periodicals. No publication will be permitted without censorship not will any books be imported except through Allied sources. The policy towards existing publications will have to be laid down by AMGOT and IHO.

5. Directives.

From D day AMGOT will furnish to IHO directives on matters designed to assist the military administration of HONORIFIED - e.g. avoidance of destruction of records, stamps and currency.

PA

12

H.Q. 141 Force

Field

11 May 43

C. A. SNOWFORD,
Lt. Col. G.S.C.,
Acting D.C. AMGOT

16A
NOT SECRET

Memorandum: Arrangements regarding Information and Censorship

As a result of conferences between Major General Lori Rennell and Brigadier General McBure and others and more recent conferences of the junior planning group, the following arrangements have been laid down governing the handling of information, Propaganda and Censorship matters.

1. Propaganda functions.

These will be handled by DE, which will have a staff attached to the various forces as well as a coordinating and policy staff at A.F.H..

Major lines of propaganda will be laid down by directives from the governments with subdirectives from A.F.H.Q. Local propaganda activities (leaflets, broadcasting, posters, press) will be handled in the territory by the operating staff of INC.

These matters will be coordinated with AEGOF by periodic meetings between representatives of AEGOF and INC. In large centers it may be desirable to have liaison officers between the two staffs.

2. Press.

The press will be supervised by INC, both in respect of the operation and censorship. The plan under consideration by INC is to continue publication as soon as practicable of the principal daily paper existing in PUSTIAN and MALABION. Consideration is also being given to a single page newspaper printed in both English and Italian.

There will be assigned to AEGOF from INC a Public Relations Officer who will be responsible for the following:

(a) Putting into local newspaper channels items of interest and importance, such as proclamations, general orders, ordinances and notices. These items will amount to newspaper notice and not to official publication.

(b) Establishing the news contact with the outside world on activities of the military government and on events in HORALIED. In this connection, the DEO should be brought into the AEGOF organization a considerable period before the operation so that he may be familiar with the background, planning and general purposes of the military government. This will make for better understanding of the problems involved.

3. Censorship.

Censorship of mail, telephone and telegraph communication, radio broadcasting, newspapers, motion pictures, plays, will be the responsibility of INC.

785015

1 page
100/625
16A

Major lines of propaganda will be laid down by directives from the governments with subdirectives from A.F.H.O. Local propaganda activities (leaflets, broadcasting, posters, press) will be handled in the territory by the operating staff of INC.

These matters will be coordinated with AMCOI by periodic meetings between representatives of AMCOI and INC. In large centers it may be desirable to have liaison officers between the two staffs.

2. Press.

The press will be supervised by INC, both in respect of the operation and censorship. The plan under consideration by INC is to continue publication as soon as practicable of the principal daily paper existing in FUSTIAN and MALIOLIOUS. Consideration is also being given to a single page newspaper printed in both English and Italian.

There will be assigned to AMCOI from INC a Public Relations Officer who will be responsible for the following:

- (a) Putting into local newspaper channels items of interest and importance, such as proclamations, general orders, ordinances and notices. These items will amount to newspaper notice and not to official publication.
- (b) Establishing the news contact with the outside world on activities of the military government and on events in HONKIFIED. In this connection, the INC should be brought into the AMCOI organization a considerable period before the operation so that he may be familiar with the background, planning and general purposes of the military government. This will make for better understanding of the problems involved.

3. Censorship.

Censorship of mail, telephone and telegraph communication, radio broadcasting, newspapers, motion pictures, plays, will be the responsibility of INC.

4. Books and Periodicals.

A question is raised as to black-listing books and periodicals. No publication will be permitted without censorship not will any books be imported except through Allied sources. The policy towards existing publications will have to be laid down by AMCOI and INC.

5. Directives.

From D day AMCOI will furnish to INC directives on matters designed to assist the military administration of HONKIFIED - e.g. avoidance of destruction of records, stamps and currency.

C. A. STAFFORD,
Lt. Col. G.S.C.,
Acting D.O. AMCOI

15/5/43
P.A.
H.Q. 141 Force
Field
11 May 43

1042

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

12 May 43.

SUBJECT: AMGOT Security Passes

15A

1. I think we can accept the estimate of 25,000 passes on the following basis: Para 71(a) of Plan (5 May draft).

3,089	Doctors
1,289	Pharmacists *
1,243	Midwives
685	Diploma nurses
1,000	Dentists *
240	Vet. surgeons
1,325	Agents
4,090	Carabinieri
7,500	Civil servants - including postal officials, railways etc.
4,539	Spare

25,000	Total

Arrangements will be made for the printing of a further 25,000 if and when required.

2. Will Col. Chanler advise when drafting the necessary papers whether any printing will be required in connection with the Appendix to the local identification papers for occasional journeys under paragraph 71(b) of the Plan.

* not necessarily
all travelling

H.Q. 141 Force
B.N.A.F.

A.T. MAXWELL,
Lt.Col.,
AMGOT

Copies to: Lt.Col. Chanler
7982 (Security) file
7968 (Printing) file

Unnumbered
behind
2402

Col Maxwell agreed to increase list to 50,000 to cover Civil Defence
material. *[Signature]* agreed by Col Chanler.

785015

RIGOT
LEAD

HEADQUARTERS

DATE 12 MAY 1943

N.: 298v

FORCE 141

141F/11400/C(16)
11 1943

77

1943

7982

13A

THOMAS G. YOUNG, JR.
Lt. Col.
G (INT)

Captain Graham

We spoke this morning and you are making out a list to send to London.

HK. $\frac{12}{5}$

See Ltr at 10.2

13/5

SECRET

(EQUALLY BRITISH MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

HEADQUARTERS

12 MAY 1943

DATE:

N: 7982

FORCE 141

B-389.504/7.

10 May 1943.

TO: GSI(b), Force 141.

1. Reference draft memorandum of 9th Inst Security - Horrified.
- a. Passes required by GSI(b) have been ordered from London.
- b. It is agreed that the closest liaison must exist between security personnel and the AMEOT police. At this period it is not considered desirable to lay down the mechanical means of providing for such liaison.

2. The following amendments are suggested to paragraphs (69), (70), and (71):

(69) Close co-ordination between Allied Military Counter Intelligence and Civil Affairs Police will be maintained. A Joint Security Committee composed of representatives of Allied Military Counter Intelligence, Naval Security Staff, and AMEOT will be established at the seat of government and locally as required with the object of coordinating security policy.

(70) Restrictions on local circulation of civilians will be determined by the local CAGs after consultation with the G.S.I(b) (G-2 CI/US) and at the direction of the tactical commanders. In general the policy will be to restrict circulation after certain hours, except for special personnel such as medical and civil defence. Within each district certain areas may also be restricted or prohibited. Circulation between towns and centers will be prohibited except with permission of the C.A.P.C. and/or G.S.I(b).


(71) For the foregoing purposes the following passes will be required:

- a. For Medical, Civil Defence, Special AMEOT passes bearing number of National Identity Card.
- b. For approved civilians - National Identity Cards with attachment making occasional journeys where necessary stamped for journey.

Security Pass No. 1 (white) - Issued by G.S.I(b)

SECRET

(EQUALLY BRITISH MOST SECRET)



1, 0, 4, 5

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

HEADQUARTERS

DATE: 12 MAY 1943

No: 7982

FORCE 141

BIGOT

10 May 43

B-389.504/7.

(G-2 (CI) US) for issue to American and British civilian employees, Red Cross Workers, etc.

d. Security Pass No. 2 (Red) - Issued by G.S.I(b) (G-2 (CI) US) for emergency issue and special use by intelligence personnel, etc.

e. Date Stamp Passes - Issued by G.S.I(b) (G-2 (CI) US) to officers w/c port control, service installations for control of employees, etc.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

S. S. Hill-Dillon

S. S. HILL-DILLON,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
G-2 (CI) Section.

*To 3rd office.
Spec sheet to pencil addition in 71(a)
BeCa under is better 71(a) & (b)
Dy*

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

BY FAST AIR

No. 11572/13/CA.

Civil Affairs Branch,
G.H.Q., M.E.F.

6th May, 1943.

G.S.O.I.,
Civil Affairs,
H.Q.,
141 Force,
British North Africa Force.

LEADQ...	S
DATE:	10 MAY 1943
N:	7982
FORC	

Further to this Branch No. 11572/9/CA of 26th April, 1943 I am directed to forward specimen booklet and counterfoil of a hypothetical registration No. 1232.

2. Similar specimens and a copy of the "Notes on Registration" by Major Rodd have been sent to the War Office.

Captain Graham

to see.

J. M. H. (arm)
11. 11. 43.

/cv.

43.

Major
For G.S.O.I.,
CIVIL AFFAIRS BRANCH.

2522

Counter foil remaining in Register

NUMBER.....1232.....
DATE OF ISSUE.....
DATE OF EXPIRY.....
RENEWAL.....TILL.....
BY.....
RENEWAL.....TILL.....
BY.....
RENEWAL.....TILL.....
BY.....
RENEWAL.....TILL.....
BY.....

SURNAME.....
NAMES.....
DATE OF BIRTH.....SEX.....
PLACE OF BIRTH.....
FATHER'S NAME.....
MOTHER'S NAME.....
OCCUPATION.....
RELIGION.....
LANGUAGES.....
NATIONALITIES AT BIRTH.....
AND SINCE.....
HEIGHT.....COMPLEXION.....
COLOUR OF HAIR.....EYES.....
RACE (IF NOT EUROPEAN).....
REMARKS.....

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER
.....
for changes see overleaf
NAME & MAIDEN NAME OF WIFE
HUSBAND
.....
NUMBER (IF REGISTERED).....
REGISTRATION NUMBERS OF CHILDREN

THUMB INDEX MIDDLE RING
FINGER PRINTS OF RIGHT HAND

.....SIGNATURE.....



ADDRESS.....
.....
1ST CHANGE.....
.....
2ND CHANGE.....
.....
3RD CHANGE.....
.....
4TH CHANGE.....
.....
.....2527.....

SUBJECT: Security - HORRIFIEDSECRETMOST SECRET

9 May 43

To: Lt.Col. S.S. Hill-Dillan, AMHQ
 Lt.Col. T.G. Young, 141 Force

1. A memorandum on the progress of AMCOF security discussions is attached. It seems to us that most of the outstanding points have been dealt with and that only outstanding items are:

- (a) The question of drafting and printing of passes. As far as the AMCOF pass is concerned, this is being drafted in this office, and will be submitted for your comments. We have just heard from London that security printing should be executed there and we propose to include this item with other requirements.
- (b) We attach great importance to the closest liaison between security police and AMCOF police, and we should like to establish in principle that in the main cities they may be established in the same building if practicable. May we hear that you are agreeable to this proposal.

2. Will you now confirm that you are in agreement with paragraphs 69 - 71 as quoted, or whether you have any amendments or additions to suggest.

H.Q. 141 Force
 B.H.A.F.
 AM/MT

A.T. MAXWELL,
 Lt.Col.,
 AMCOF

COPIES TO: Lt.Col. T.G. Young, C-2, 141 Force
 'A' Branch.
 Lt.Col. William C. Chandler.
 7982 (Security) file
 7903 (Police) file
 7832 (Police Planning) file.
 Flout

(a) The question of drafting and printing. As far as the AUCOT pass is concerned, this is being drafted in this office, and will be submitted for your comments. We have just heard from London that security printing should be executed there and we propose to include this item with other requirements.

(b) We attach great importance to the closest liaison between security police and AUCOT police, and we should like to establish in principle that in the main cities they may be established in the same building if practicable. May we hear that you are agreeable to this proposal.

2. Will you now confirm that you are in agreement with paragraphs 69 - 71 as quoted, or whether you have any amendments or additions to suggest.

R.O. 141 Force
S.N.A.F.
ATH/TH

A.T. MAXWELL,
Lt. Col.,
AUCOT

COPIES TO: Lt. Col. T. C. Young, C. 2, 141 Force
141 Branch.
Lt. Col. William C. Chandler.
7982 (Security) file
7905 (Police) file
7832 (Police Planning) file.
Float

2 are (copy) a copy to 12: Army / 14 1000.

THIS COPY ONLY
accredited official personnel
Sec/Army by TAG/ date
411410

PA 10/13

SECRET

SECRET

9 May 43

MEMORANDUM

Present position regarding discussion with
Military Intelligence and Security Authorities
on Security in HOLLAND

1. The following extract from AMGOT Plan (draft dated 5 May 43) gives the up to date position.

"Intelligence and Security

(59) C.A.Os and C.A.P.Os will, by the nature of their work, obtain information which will be of importance to Allied Military Intelligence and Security services. Close coordination, including exchanges of information, will be established with these services. A Joint Security Committee will be established at the seat of Government and locally as required, with the object of coordinating security policy and taking decisions upon difficult cases. The committee will include representatives of Military Intelligence, Security and AMGOT.

Circulation of Civilians

(70) Restrictions on local circulation of civilians will be determined by the local C.A.Os under direction of the tactical commanders. In general the policy will be to restrict circulation after certain hours, except for special personnel such as medical and civil defence. Within each district certain areas may also be restricted or prohibited. Circulation between towns and centers will be prohibited except with permission of the C.A.P.O.

(71) For the foregoing purposes the following passes will be required:

- | | |
|--|---|
| (a) For Medical, Civil Defense | Special AMGOT passes bearing number of Italian Identity Card. |
| (b) For approved civilians making occasional journeys. | Italian Identity Cards with attachment where necessary stamped for journey. |
| (c) General Security Passes | Issued by Security Police to Security personnel. |
| (d) Special Security Passes | Issued by Security Police for restricted areas. |

2. This follows the lines of discussion with Lt. Col. Hill-Dillon and Lt. Col. Young. Force 343 have seen the plan and are satisfied with the security proposals.

3. An AMGOT representative leaving for CHMO on 11 May will discuss the subject with Force 545.

2519

"Intelligence and Security"

(69) C.A.P.s and C.A.P.O.s will, by the nature of their work, obtain information which will be of importance to Allied Military Intelligence and Security services. Close coordination, including exchange of information, will be established with these services. A Joint Security Committee will be established at the seat of Government and locally as required, with the object of coordinating security policy and taking decisions upon difficult cases. The committee will include representatives of Military Intelligence, Security and A.S.G.I.

Circulation of Civilians

(72) Restrictions on local circulation of civilians will be determined by the local C.A.P.s under direction of the tactical commanders. In general the policy will be to restrict circulation after certain hours, except for special personnel such as medical and civil defence. Within each district certain areas may also be restricted or prohibited. Circulation between towns and centers will be prohibited except with permission of the C.A.P.O.

(71) For the foregoing purposes the following passes will be required:

- | | |
|--|---|
| (a) For Medical, Civil Defense | Special A.S.G.I. passes bearing number of Italian Identity Card. |
| (b) For approved civilians making occasional journeys. | Italian Identity Cards with attachment where necessary stamped for journey. |
| (c) General Security Passes | Issued by Security Police to Security personnel. |
| (d) Special Security Passes | Issued by Security Police for restricted areas. |

2. This follows the lines of discussion with Lt. Col. Hill-Billson and Lt. Col. Young. Force 343 have seen the plan and are satisfied with the security proposals.

3. An A.S.G.I. representative leaving for CAIRO on 11 May will discuss the subject with Force 545.

4. Offences against military law in HORRIFIED. A.S.G.I. has submitted draft schedule of offences to military security authorities for comment.

5. Civilian Prisoners of War. A request has been made to 'A' Bruch, 141 Force to be transferred to 141 on the custody of civilian prisoners of war. The proposal is that they should be evacuated to North Africa and that they should be kept in separate cages from military prisoners of war.

Preliminary interrogation will be carried out in HORRIFIED. Further interrogation will be carried out after evacuation to North Africa and subsequently if conditions permit also in HORRIFIED.

This copy only to be used to supply
Accredited unofficial researchers. Order
See/Army by TAC/ ----- 411410

10531

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

96

7982/CA

Gso 1.

By we have the file up again
a Saturday ^{8 MAY} we have had some further
discussion with Security; & the matter
is progressing.

5/5

Don JG

2513 ✓
Noted to BF
Saturday
JS

Thank you.

He: 6


Col. Masanell.

Has this been up to you since 5/6
YES ARP. s/pt.

HA:

1054

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



785015

BIGOT - HUSKY

MOST SECRET

141F/7982/CA

28 April 1943

Subject: Security in HORIZONTAL and Relations with Military Security Authorities
 Present: Lt. Col. Hill Dillan, Lt. Col. Young, Lt. Col. Spofford, Lt. Col. Maxwell

The memorandum of 22 April (10) was used as the basis of discussion.

1. Para. 1. There should not be more than three categories of Pass.

Category	Type of Pass
(a) Doctors, midwives and Italians who are approved by C.A. and need to travel regularly.	Special C.A. passes as agreed Para. 2
(b) Occasional approved journeys by respectable citizens.	Italian identity cards stamped for journey.
(c) Security passes issued by 1 (b)	Red emergency pass issued by security - few in number.

2. Arrest. It was agreed that since responsibility of Col. Hill Dillan's department was to safeguard security of troops while that of C.A. was to safeguard civil government, that arrest of Italians therefore by security would only take place in "flagrant delicto" regarding actual crime and/or subversive action or threatened action which made delay dangerous. They would rarely if ever be interested in civil or ordinary criminal offenses.

3. Schedule of Offences. C.A. to send draft schedule to security for comment before final setting up.

4. Para 4. It was agreed that complete exchange of information was essential as and when necessary, and that a joint security committee should be set up at the seat of government and locally where necessary. Object of this was to coordinate security policy and discuss and decide upon difficult cases. Each section should keep its own cards, but when necessary could be shown to departments concerned.

5. It was decided that C.A. should be asked to provide intermittent or prison accommodation-in the special cages to be asked or requested for A- for security prisoners.

THIS COPY ONLY MAY BE SHOWN TO duly
 accredited official researchers. Great
 Sec/Army by CAG/----- date -----

411410

A. T. MAXWELL, Lt. Col.
 For: MAJOR GENERAL
 CIVIL AFFAIRS

2517

(a) Doctors, midwives and Italians who are approved by C.A. and need to travel regularly.

(b) Occasional approved journeys by respectable citizens.

(c) Security passes issued by 1 (b)

Italian identity cards stamped for journey.

Red emergency pass issued by security - few in number.

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411410

A. T. HANWELL, Lt. Col.
FOR: MAJOR GENERAL
CIVIL AFFAIRS

2517

Force 141
Field

1. F.S.P. have nothing to do with civil or criminal offenses ever: nothing is an F.S.P. saw murder or rape being committed I should expect him to take an interest (police) in interest in the event. This however the arrest of suspects which leads to trouble, with the perpetrators of flagrant delicto. Here the local F.S.P. must consult the local C.A. There question need normally will be referred up to

10571

higher levels: Herion's time.

2. Provided there is a central bureau intelligence committee. I'll agree to the reservation. But Hill-Diken must agree on his side to have his birds and my CID staff officers in the same place.
3. Please proceed with Hill-Diken on the lines.

28/4/63

01011

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

A F H Q
INCOMING MESSAGE

CLASS: MOST SECRET
PREC: ROUTINE

SECRET

Only British MOST SECRET

REF NO: 75764 M011
TOO:0209483

BIGOT

FROM: TROOPERS
TO: FORTUNE ALGIERS (FOR CIV AFFAIRS) (FREEDOM PASS)
DATE: MAY 021505A
BIGOT HUSKY

No information yet stage preparation PURPLE PRIMER.

ACTION: 5 Force 141

INFORMATION: 1 Sec/GS
2 DTC
1 G-3

1 AG Records
1 AG Cables

LCS/rjk

RECD: MAY 021711A

REF NO: 75764 M011

File on Security File
and BV JH 3/3

SECRET

Only British MOST SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
DATE: 8 MAY 1943
N: 772
FORCE 141

2516
E

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SUBJECT:- Field Security Police.

File 7982

(6A)

HQ. 141 FORCE.

141F/7905/CA.

29 Apr 43.

Civil Affairs Branch,
G.H.Q. M.E.

I should be grateful if you could obtain and despatch here one copy of the Field Security Police Regulations issued to F.S.P. in M.E.

R. J. P. THORNE, Lt. Col.
Lt. Col.
G.S.O. 1.
Civil Affairs.

2515

BY MAIL AIR.

No. 12372/9/CA

Civil Affairs Branch,
CHC., KCP.

26th April, 1943

141 Kono.

For Maj. Gen. The Lord Russell of Bedford.

3A

Reference your signal No. 34/C22 of 23 April '43. I am directed to say that the specimen booklet prepared by Major Dodd has been forwarded to the D.C.C.A.C., B.M.A., Tripoli, but two specimens of a page of the forms from which the booklet is made are enclosed together with two copies of Major Dodd's "Notes on Registration" in connection therewith.

It will be observed that the registration form is double foolscap size - the left hand half remaining in the Register as the permanent record, and the right hand half (p. 3 of which is in position for the register to affix finger prints and signature) being detached and folded to form pp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, and 12 of the booklet. Pages 5, 6, 7 & 8 are blank leaves. With a durable stiff cover, bearing a suitable title or inscription this Registration form or booklet is similar to a Passport, in size and functions.

Having finger prints, signature and photograph, a die stamp to use over a part of the photograph is the fourth requisite to guard against forgery.

I am to add that although circumstances have made it impracticable for this form of registration to be used in any Occupied Territory controlled by this Branch, it is considered to be one which might be adopted as the basis for a universal system.

See 12A.

[Signature]

Major,
FOR CHIEF SECRETARY.

HEADQUARTERS

785015

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See 12A.

[Signature]

Major,
FOR CHIEF SECRETARY.

AG

File on Publications

JMH: 30/14

HEADQUARTERS
DATE: 30 APR 1943
N: 7982
FORCE 141

2512

E

C O P Y

E.A. 11/30

NOTES ON REGISTRATION

The necessity of an adequate registration system is almost too obvious to need stressing but at the risk of seeming pedantic I would point out that there are four main reasons why all individuals should be registered:

- (a) In order to prove the identity of the individual.
- (b) In order to ascertain the extent of his rights.
- (c) In order to ascertain the extent of his obligations.
- (d) In order to estimate statistically the administrative commitment under (b) & (c) above.

2. It is not mechanically possible to prove absolute identity, if such a conception can be said to exist philosophically, biologically, psychologically, or even administratively. I am only concerned with the last. It is possible to establish a working identity for administrative purposes. That the identity should differ from that previously held by an individual before some human or natural cataclysm revolutionised his circumstances is not very relevant. It does not really matter if Bill James was once also George Smith or Freddy Robertson, as long as when he gets to Dartmoor, he goes on being Convict 4099, and that the same man is not Convict 4099 and Convict 4100, or two men are both 4099.

3. The ordinary administration has to deal with an individual through the Police Department to ensure he behaves himself, through the revenue department to ensure that he pays his dues to the state, through the supplies department to ensure that he is fed, through the legal department to establish his claim to title and through a number of other departments to ensure the statutory distribution of rights and obligations.

4. It has become rather too common a practice in newly formed administrations especially those formed after a conquest involving partial or total destruction of antecedent records, for the different departments having dealings with limited aspects of the individual's social and economic environment, to institute sets of records of their own, and issue recognition documents in respect of their relations with the individuals concerned. This not only allows one individual to assume several identities for his various environmental responsibilities, but also several individuals to assume the same identity for different administrative relationships. Correlation of the records kept is almost an impossibility since all records other than a central registry are partial. The Medical Department may have to keep a record of persons requiring insulin but this will only overlap to a limited extent with the Education Office's record of school attendances or the Trade Department's record of licences issued to Park Hatters.

2. It is not mechanically possible to prove absolute identity, if such a conception can be said to exist philosophically, biologically, psychologically, or even administratively. I am only concerned with the last. It is possible to establish a working identity for administrative purposes. That the identity should differ from that previously held by an individual before some human or natural cataclysm revolutionised his circumstance, is not very relevant. It does not really matter if Bill Jones was once also George Smith or Freddy Robertson, as long as when he gets to Dartmoor, he goes on being Convict 4099, and that the same man is not Convict 4099 and Convict 4100, or two men are both 4099.

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5. There are only two ways of ensuring universality and uniformity: One is that every registering or recording department should record all the data required by all the others, and that the other is that one central registry should be the only authority establishing identity and issuing recognition documents recording all data required by the various departments and furnishing them with the information required. The first is unsatisfactory because

- (a) it still leaves a loophole for identity
- (b) it means the continual corruption of different records on information circulated by one department, all the others in respect of each or any modification.

2513

.....2/.

(c) The keeping of registration is a technical, and from a staff point of view, expensive business and should not be duplicated unless it is absolutely essential.

6. It is therefore proposed that a central registry be instituted which will first assign or confirm an identity on all the individuals to be administered, and secondly, issue the only document of identity recognised by all departments for all distributor of all information relevant to his status, economic circumstance, domicile, sanitary condition etc. to the departments concerned.

7. The departments who for obvious reasons require constant reference to records at short notice, such as the Police, would be provided with a duplicate set of the Central Registry's records which could be classified according to their own requirements, possibly domiciliary, possibly alphabetical. The department of Labour would similarly probably wish to keep a duplicate set of the Central Registry's records classified by Trades. But an essential element of the system is that these would in fact be duplicate records of the central records and that if, for instance, a box office clerk were re-classified as an Evacuation officer by the Labour office the Central Registry should at once be informed, in order that it might make the entry in its own record and circulate the other duplicate holding departments. Similarly when the Police enter "hanged" on their records the Central Registry should be informed in order that the Nation department may be circualarized to remove the victim from the Nation strength and the Labour Office cease their efforts to find him a job in his registered trade of hairdressers sundriesman.

8. The duplication of Central Registration Records is an easy matter up to a certain point. The latter mechanical difficulties are encountered. The number of duplicate recording departments should therefore be severely limited. All other departments would naturally have access to the Central Registry, though they would not have one on the premises.

9. A pattern for a single recognition document for all purposes is submitted. It is subject to modification where certain additional data may be required by departments with whose workings I am not familiar, and certain data may not be considered necessary at this stage though they may come in useful later on. The mechanical devices, the turnover, counter, and binding provisions I think would be essential to speedy registration. The essential thing is that no document other than this document should be recognized as evidence of identity which can easily be made the vehicle of any special administrative provisions by way of restriction or licence by additions or entries in the allotted pages, and recorded on the counterfoil.

10. The counterfoil would form the basis of the records issued in card index or loss leaf form to all the departments requiring them including those used in the Central Registry. All or any entries made by departments on the identity

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10. The counterfoil would form the basis of the records issued in card index or loss leaf form to all the departments requiring them including those used in the Central Registry. All or any entries made by departments on the identity documents would be reported to the Registry for entry on the counterfoil and then circulated to all record holders.

11. The only additional administrative documents an individual might require are a Ration Card and a Relief Ticket. But these would not constitute documents of identity since they would be issued in the same name and number as the identity document and be annexed thereto, invalid without the production of the letter.

12. The registration authorities would insist on the surrender of all other documents British or Italian previously held, including even such things as driving licences and travel passes. Entrilements of this kind can always be entered on the proposed identity card. But it is essential that they be not twice used to support identity at registration. A note of the documents surrendered will be made on the counterfoils.

(Sgd) P. ROSE

Major,
Senior Detachment Officer.

10871

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Counterfoil remaining in Register

NUMBER.....
DATE OF ISSUE.....
DATE OF EXPIRY.....
RENEWAL.....TILL.....
BY.....
RENEWAL.....TILL.....
BY.....
RENEWAL.....TILL.....
BY.....
RENEWAL.....TILL.....
BY.....

SURNAME.....
NAMES.....
DATE OF BIRTH.....SEX.....
PLACE OF BIRTH.....
FATHER'S NAME.....
MOTHER'S NAME.....
OCCUPATION.....
RELIGION.....
LANGUAGES.....
NATIONALITIES AT BIRTH.....
AND SINCE.....
HEIGHT.....COMPLEXION.....
COLOUR OF HAIR.....EYES.....

THUMB	MIDDLE	INDEX	THUMB
FINGER PRINTS OF RIGHT HAND			

.....SIGNATURE.



ADDRESS

.....

1ST CHANGE

.....

THUMB	MIDDLE
FINGER PRINTS OF LEFT HAND	

1. SURNAME.....

2. SURNAME.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Detachable Leaf for Identity Booklet.

INDEX THUMB
OF RIGHT HAND

THUMB INDEX MIDDLE THIRD

FINGER PRINTS OF THE RIGHT HAND

...SIGNATURE.

SIGNATURE

BEARER'S
PHOTOGRAPH

3

2

SURNAME

ADDRESS

STAMP OF RENEWING OFFICE

DATE OF EXPIRY

PLACE OF RENEWAL

DATE OF EXPIRY

PLACE OF RENEWAL

STAMP OF RENEWING OFFICE

DATE OF EXPIRY

PLACE OF RENEWAL

STAMP OF RENEWING OFFICE

DATE OF EXPIRY

PLACE OF RENEWAL

RENEWALS

10.

11.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

NATIONALITIES AT BIRTH.....
AND SINCE.....
HEIGHT.....COMPLEXION.....
COLOUR OF HAIR.....EYES.....
RACE (IF NOT EUROPEAN).....
REMARKS.....
NAME AND
ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER
.....
.....
for changes see overleaf
NAME & MAIDEN NAME OF WIFE
HUSBAND
.....
NUMBER (IF REGISTERED).....
REGISTRATION NUMBERS OF CHILDREN
.....
.....
.....
REGISTRATION OFFICE.....

.....
1ST CHANGE
.....
.....
.....
2ND CHANGE
.....
.....
3RD CHANGE
.....
.....
4TH CHANGE
.....
.....
NEXT OF KIN IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
.....
.....
ADDRESS
.....

REGISTRATION OFFICER

.....
2.
SURNAME.....
NAMES.....
DATE OF BIRTH.....
PLACE OF BIRTH.....
FATHER'S NAME.....
MOTHER'S NAME.....
OCCUPATION.....
RELIGION.....
LANGUAGES.....
NATIONALITIES,
AND SINCE.....
.....
HEIGHT.....
COLOUR OF HAIR.....
RACE (IF NOT EU.....
REMARKS.....
.....
NAME & ADDRESS
.....
.....
For chang

7 0 7 0 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

.....	2.		
.....	SURNAME.....	ADDRESS.....	11.
.....	NAMES.....		
.....	DATE OF BIRTH.....SEX.....		
.....	PLACE OF BIRTH.....	1ST CHANGE.....	
.....	FATHER'S NAME.....		
.....	MOTHER'S NAME.....		
.....	OCCUPATION.....		
.....	RELIGION.....	2ND CHANGE.....	
.....	LANGUAGES.....		
.....	NATIONALITIES, AT BIRTH.....		
.....	AND SINCE.....		
.....		3RD CHANGE.....	
.....	HEIGHT.....COMPLEXION.....		
.....	COLOUR OF HAIR.....OF EYES.....		
.....	RACE (IF NOT EUROPEAN).....		
.....	REMARKS.....	4TH CHANGE.....	
.....			
.....	NAME & ADDRESS OF PRESENT EMPLOYER.....		
.....			
.....			

TRY OF ORIGIN

RATION OFFICER

For changes see page 5

785015

by the Medical Authorities.
This page is reserved for remarks

6

12. NEXT OF KIN IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

ADDRESS.....

TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS

PERSONAL IDENTITY CARD

No.

PLACE OF ISSUE.....

DATE OF ISSUE.....

VALID TILL.....
unless renewed. For renewals see
page 6.

The Issuing Authority will not be responsible for the accuracy of the particulars contained in this card, which were furnished by the holder. Copies of these particulars are available for inspection at the Record Office in.....

SIGNATURE.....

9.

TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS

Page 6.

CHILDREN

AT BIRTH.

f. HUSBAND'S)
WIFE'S)

No.

generals see

The Issuing Authority will not be responsible for the accuracy of the particulars contained in this card, which were furnished by the holder. Copies of these particulars are

1 0 7 31

3A

OUTGOING MESSAGE
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ORIGINATED BY : CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE 144
AUTHENTICATION : Lt. Col. A.T. Maxwell.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION :
CONFIDENTIAL

THIS SPACE
FOR SIGNAL
USE ONLY

ACTION : WARRANT FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS
TO : ADDRESSES
(INFORMATION
(ADDRESSES

FROM : FORUM ALGERIA

REF. NO : 01/022 DATE : APR 22 1630H PRECEDENCE : ROUTINE
TIME

FROM HODD X UNDERSTAND HODD HAS PREPARED COMPREHENSIVE PASS FOR LOCAL CIVILIANS
BRITISH X GRATEFUL YOU SEND SPECIFIC EARLIER AIR WINTER IN ISSUE ON 1942

THIS COPY ONLY TO BE SENT TO 1st
authorised unofficial researchers order
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----
1410

2510

1 E

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SECRET - HARRY

(2A)

SUBJECT:- Issue of passes to Civilians and Security in Horified.

SECRET

Lt-Col. T.G. Young.
G (Int).

Lord Rennell asked me to let you have the enclosed copy covering his talk with you this morning, may I have your comments as soon as you are ready.

22 Apr 43.

Lt-Col.
Civil Affairs,
HQ 141 Foros.

This copy only MAY BE SHOWN to duly
accredited unofficial researchers under
Sec/Army by TAG/ ----- date -----

411410

2509

E

BIGOT HUSKI

SUBJECT:- Issue of passes to Civilians and Security in Horrificed.

MOST SECRET

Note arising out of conversations with Cols. Hill Dillon and Young.

1. It will be the function of the Civil Administration police department to issue general purposes passes to local civilians moving about the country. ^{leading} It is not contemplated in the initial phases to issue C.A. passes to everyone but all locals will be required to carry their own personal identification papers.

2. The form of C.A. pass will be agreed with the Security organisation and will contain a reference by number etc., to the local identification papers of the person carrying such a pass. He will therefore until further notice have to carry both his own papers and his C.A. pass. The latter may be endorsed as requisite in regard to his movements, curfew exemption etc.

3. The C.A. Police will maintain contact in each locality with Security Police only regarding undesirables. It is understood that Security police have had or will have orders not to arrest civilians except in "Flagrant delicto" with out orders from their higher authority. It would be a good thing if when Security police wish to make an arrest they were instructed to report in every case that they had consulted the local C.A. officers (C.A. Police) and report his agreement or disagreement.

4. Intelligence on personnel, sabotage, subversive organisation etc - must be pooled between all parties interested. This will be effected by a regional joint intelligence committee including representation of the Civil Affairs police, Security police, I.B. etc. These regional committees will depend from a central joint intelligence committee at the seat of the Headquarters of the Military Government on which will be represented the C.A. Police in the person of the Chief Commissioner or a senior delegate (e.g. head of the Criminal investigation department) a member of the Secretariat of the Military Government, and such G.S.I. and Security organisations as these require. This central committee will deal with intelligence collected and pooled in a central bureau, and with the application, in so far as police administration is concerned, of such general policy as is laid down by the head of the Military Government from direction received from higher levels.

5. The issue of special passes e.g. to Allied Civilian nationals, to local labour in docks etc., to intelligence agents will be undertaken by the Security organisation.

6. While ultimately the C.A. police should deal with immigration and emigration of all civilians and in fact administer the passport control machinery, the organisation of this section can be left until the second phase is reached. The section will be administered by the police but under the

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and will contain a reference by number etc., to the local identification papers of the person carrying such a pass. He will therefore until further notice have to carry both his own papers and his C.A. pass. The latter may be endorsed as requisite in regard to his movements, curfew exemption etc.

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5. The issue of special passes e.g. to Allied Civilian nationals, to local labour in docks etc., to intelligence agents will be undertaken by the Security organisation.

6. While ultimately the C.A. police should deal with immigration and emigration of all civilians and in fact administer the passport control machinery, the organisation of this section can be left until the second phase is reached. The section will be administered by the police but under the supervision of the Joint Intelligence Bureau.

7. The central joint intelligence bureau at the seat of the Military Government should house in one building the special branch of the C.A. police (criminal and political subsections) and the Military security headquarters, so that one set only of card indexes is maintained though each body remains under its own departmental control with its own files. The C.A. police special branch will be responsible for making available such local police records as have been saved, and for maintaining and supervising the local police criminal investigation machinery, including finger print, Bestillon etc., records.

22 Apr 43
141 Force.

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see file 7801

SECRET

Extracts from Memorandum
of Brigadier Mockler-Perryman
17 March 1943 on Subject of
Intelligence Lessons from
North Africa

Security (IA)
798 (MA)

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Sec/Army by TAO/ date 411410

(3) In discussing the problem of organized security in the rear areas memorandum states that control of merchant seamen ashore, movement of civil population, non-cooperation of civil officials, and civil arrest all require organization. The memorandum goes on to suggest that:

"Such matters are as much a question for Civil Affairs as security. In consequence, the liaison between Civil Affairs and the General Staff I(b) cannot be too close. It is recommended that a fairly senior officer should form part of the I(b) staff at GHQ to carry out liaison duties with the civil side. It is also recommended that in an Allied Force the civil section attached to GHQ should have equal representation of the various nations involved." (Paragraph 29)

Dr G3

by experience in all the other territories
have administrative is that the organization is

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DPGS

*My experience is also the other provision of
have administration is that the organization is
a joint intelligence bureau in the center of
government and command. The bureau should
pool all relevant information: the personnel
of the intelligence sections should be chosen to
be based in the same building. The bureau
should include a joint intelligence committee
consisting of I(b), any other I organization
which deal with personnel and political
intelligence, Civil Affairs Police Branch,*

(Force 141 - Copied 13 April, 1943)

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a representation of the Civil Administration Secretariat (which deals with the policy governing administration) etc.

The main objection in the first instance is to coordinate policy in the aspect of interment of undisciplined war, prisoners, to ensure that keepers in the railways are well-ventilated with and considering the consequences of and in deciding on the movement and circulation of the civil population.

Perwell.

16/6/63

Reg. J.

171

M. G. C. A.

I think this will be all right. We shall have to settle the location of the military and civil government at a later stage, otherwise the administration of the

printers, to ensure that keepers on the
railways are well acquainted with the
characteristics of the correspondence = and in
deciding on the movement and circulation
of the civil population.

Perwell.

16/6/63

16/4/43

171

M. G. C. A.

I think this will be all right.

We shall have to settle the location of the military and civil governments at a later stage, otherwise the ~~last~~ amalgamation of the two communities will be difficult.

Reichens -

18 Apr 43

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[Faint, illegible handwritten text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

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