

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

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10000/100/697

AMGOT, LESSONS FROM SICILIAN OPERATION
AUG. - OCT. 1943

1000

Folio	Date	Ref	From/To	Subject
1-3	15 Aug	ECA 7/22	From: Angel & Army	Major Lesson Start
4	16 "	ECA 9/19	" " "	" "
5	—	—	Memo.	
6-8	18 Aug	ECA 9/21	Angel & Army - From	Ref. - Lesson Angle.
9-10	—	58 HQ	70 GOC in C	Report
11	30 Aug	CP/pm	16 Army Group	Report
12-16	2nd Sept	58 HQ	S.C. HQ	Lessons from Sicilian Operns
17	18 Aug	266 HQ	From C.EAO	
18-19	27 Aug	C.A.O.C. 10/3	From G.S.C to S.C.A.O.	
20	9/9	—	From C.A.O. Caltagirone	
21	11/9	1094/PS.	" DCSO	" Lessons Learned"
22	10/9	5131/CS.	Comm. P.S.	" Lessons Learned"
23	12/9	3006/HQ.	77. D.C.S.R.	Assessment of Personnel
23	10/9	3012/PH.	77. D.P.H.	Medical Supplies
24-5	18/8	CAT/4	SCAO Catania	Reports of Field officers
26-7	9/9	—	AFHQ MGS.	Admin. Lessons from Ops. in Sicily
28	13/9	—	From DCSO	
29-30	13/9	CAT/4/4	From SCAO Catania	Reports of Field officers
31	17/9	58/HQ	To: " "	" " " "
32-34	16/9	Cat/4/4	From " "	" " " "
35-48	18/9	Calt. Prov/3	" " Caltanissetta	" " " "
49-50	22/9	58/HQ.	To: MGS, AFHQ	Administration Lessons.

1934

12-16	2nd Sept	58/HQ	From C.EAO	Lessons from Sicilian Operan
17	18 Aug	266 HQ	from G.S.C to	S.C.A.O.
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20	9/9	"	DCSO	
21	11/9	1094/PS	Comm. P.S.	"Lessons Learned"
22	10/9	5131/CS	H. D.C.S.R.	"Lessons Learned"
23	12/9	3006/HQ	H. D.P.H.	Movement of Personnel
23	10/9	3012/PH	H. D.P.H.	Medical Supplies
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35-48	18/9	Catt. Prov/3	" " Caltanissetta	" " " "
49-50	22/9	58/HQ	To: MGS, AFHQ	Administration Lessons.
51-9	15/9	MF 1/8	From: SCAO Caltanissetta	
52-2	23/9	PR/202	" " Ragusa	
63	28/9	MGS/300	" AFHQ MGS	252
4-85	1/10		" SCAO Trapani	
86	8 Oct		from SCAO	Field Officer
92			Siracusa	Reports

Subject. Reports of Field Officers. FOS/571.

Ref. Rep./2.

S.C.A.O.,
Syracuse.

From personal experience gained the following policy should be adopted.

1. Take all available typewriters and hide them.
2. Establish office in Town Hall or suitable and central building.
3. If Town Major knows his job, and is co-operative, he regards it as his duty to seal Banks and Post Offices, and should be encouraged.
4. Take over a reasonable house for quarters.
5. Find a Garage and fill it with as many civilian vehicles and M.T. spares as possible. Then place a guard on it.

In my opinion at least oneday spent in this organisation will save countless days of worry in the weeks to follow.

Contact with officials, Police, Clergy can all be relegated to second place until the above items are settled.

J. R. Zed

Major.
C.A.O.

2.9.43

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August 30th. 1943.

29.43

571

Major.
C.A.O.
A.M.G.O.T
AUGUSTA.

21

FLORIDA,

29 August 1943.

S.O.A.O., Syracuse.

The following observations are submitted in accordance with your POS/571 of 22 August :-

1. The first thing which became obvious when AMGOT started to operate was the importance of having its Officers close up behind the Assault Force. Most, almost all, the looting was done by civilians after troops had moved on and before AMGOT could restore civil order.
2. Only second in importance I would place the proper constitution of a CAO unit. Much valuable time was lost because CAOs did not have (1) transport, (2) the help of a clerk-driver-batman, and (3) the active cooperation of a CAO similarly equipped. It is essential that the CAO should travel with ~~KIA~~ stationery, proclamations, flags, food and personal kit, but be troubled by none of them in that hectic first impact; and the CAO is necessary to maintain liaison with near-by troops to assist with force if required.
3. Lack of communications has been found to have hampered AMGOT operations seriously. If D.Rs cannot be spared to accompany advanced CAOs, ~~an immediate~~ ^{RESERVE} service from the nearest AMGOT headquarters is essential as quickly as possible. More Military Police, with more Provost Officers, are needed. Quicker and more consistent PSP work would also be appreciated.

4. An outstanding feature of the island under Allied occupation was the helplessness of the population when their Fascist leaders were removed. This necessitated a far greater measure of interference by AMGOT in local affairs than H.Q. seems to have anticipated or should in fact be necessary, if we are not to exchange one foreign domination for another. There is much to be said for the theory that, removed from fear and left more to themselves, supplies would be marketed and prices adjust themselves without that outside control (so prominent a feature of Axis administration), which has made so complicated a Black Market almost an integral part of the economic

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2. Only second in importance I would place the proper constitution of a CAO unit. Much valuable time was lost because CAOs did not have (1) transport, (2) the help of a clerk-driver-batman, and (3) the active cooperation of a CAPO similarly equipped. It is essential that the CAO should travel with ~~XIX~~ stationery, proclamations, flags, food and personal kit, but be troubled by none of them in that hectic first impact; and the CAPO is necessary to maintain liaison with near-by troops to assist with force if required.

3. Lack of communications has been found to have hampered AMGOT operations seriously. If D.Rs cannot be spared to accompany advanced CAOs, an ~~immediate~~ ^{essential} service from the nearest AMGOT headquarters is essential as quickly as possible. More Military Police, with more Provost Officers, are needed. Quicker and more consistent FSP work would also be appreciated.

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29.43

571

J. H. Seaman
Captain.
C.A.O., Florida.

251

(A. M. G. O. T.)

District of Coto

(NOTO AVOLA, PACHINO, ROSOLINI & CANICATTINI)

OFFICE To:- S.C.A.O., AUGOT, SYRACUSE.

FILE N.

OUR REFERENCE GTI/23/IO

YOUR REFERENCE POS/57I dated 22 Aug 43.

NOTO. 26th September 1943

PALAZZO SANT'ALFANO

SUBJECT: Reports of Field Officers.

I. STAFF. The greatest difficulty a C.A.O. has to to compete with is the weight of ~~work~~ and business of all descriptions, and sorting the essential from the non-essential. This is increased by the constant call from H.Q. of detailed returns in specialist subjects which with present means of communication, take time and trouble to collect from Communes. There is a constant temptation to neglect the more important duties of administration in the field, in order to keep up to date in the office. A small, but skilled, office staff is therefore essential, and no C.A.O. should be without at least one trained Clerk, accustomed to military routine. If the Army is unable to produce them, experienced A.T.S. or S. African W.A.A.S. from Mid - East, would do perfectly well. An Italian speaking or French speaking clerk is even more useful.

2. POLITICS. Local Politics are another of the C.A.O's 'bugbears'. If it can be firmly established that, during the stewardship of the Allied Military Government, the only qualities on which its servants will be judged are their honesty and efficiency at their work, I am convinced that the machine will run more smoothly.

3. SUMMARY. I have concentrated on two points only, which I consider to be of great importance.

The only other A.M.G.O.T. Officer in this district is in hospital.

I regret that this report is late.

Def: l
Major,

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NOTO
DE

De F. L.
Major,
C.A.O.,
NOTO District



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Reports of Field Officers.

1. STAFF. The greatest difficulty a C.A.O. has to compete with is the weight of work and business of all descriptions and sorting out the essential from the non-essential. This is increased by the constant call from H.Q. of detailed returns in Specialist subjects which with present means of communication, take time and trouble to collect from the Communes. There is a constant temptation to neglect the more important duties of administration in the field in order to keep up to date in the office. A small but skilled office staff is therefore essential, and no C.A.O. should be without at least one trained Clerk accustomed to Army routine. If the Army is unable to produce them, then experienced A.T.S. or S.African W.A.A.S. from Mid East would do perfectly well. An Italian speaking or French speaking Clerk is even more useful.
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Signed ? Fricker.

C.A.O.,


Sept. 26th. 1943.

NOTO District.

Need of Reducing a CAO's
Office Work

(Letter of the CAO of
NOTO District to
SCAO AMGOT, 26
September 1943

9... The greatest



ACC Files 10000/100/692

CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICE

PROVINCE OF TRAPANI

13 Via Regina Margherita

TRAPANI (Sicily)

October 1, 1943.



SUBJECT: Reports by Field Officers on Experiences.

TO : Chief of Staff, Hq. AMGOT, Palermo.

1. Reference AMGOT/200/Hq., 18 Aug. '43.
2. Reports herewith submitted on experiences in the field by a number of officers in this Province.

Floyd E. Thomas

FLOYD E. THOMAS,
Lt. Col., Inf.,
S.C.A.O. - Trapani.

B.V. Noted
12/10

12/10

10/10

Noted
8/1

P/A
247

Reference:- 266/H.O.

84

Subject:- Reports of Field Officers.

Mo. H.O. (through S.C.A.O. Province of Wapani.)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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J. Taylor Jr.
CAG. Comune of Exile.

43 The following headings should cover all except minor personal experiences in most Occupied Territories.

1. Personal: The populations of the countries to be occupied are for the most part susceptible to the outward appearance of officers. Every officer should at all times appear well groomed. When dealing with local councils or individuals courtesy should be shown no matter how exasperating situations may become, they frequently do. When speaking through an interpreter do not make or allow long statements mistakes are more apt to arise with verbosity than with short and precise sentences. On reaching a decision either with councils or individuals do not allow further argument on that subject, terminate the interview politely but firmly. Occasionally when moving among the population of your particular community make enquiry as to conditions prevailing (from ordinary residents). This serves a dual purpose, as a necessary check on the actions of local authorities and as an introduction of oneself to the people, showing that you are taking a real interest in their welfare. As a contrast to the last sentences, care must be taken when complaints are made by residents against higher authorities, most complaints are founded on a desire to harm such authorities in the eyes of Allied Officers and are the outcome of personal grievances, having little bearing on communal welfare.

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2. Local Authority:- This is a question of manpower and in most cases the Allied Officer will find that he is in sole control of a large area. He must have assistance to keep order and enforce the proclamations issued by H.Q. Usually he will find a force of Police officers belonging to the Occupied Territory. Normally that force is pensionable personnel and their first desire is to secure their pensionable service. By tactful and firm handling the force can be used to maintain order under the Allied laws or such beneficial laws as are already instituted in the country in question. In many cases Allied Officers

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will have to show that the authority of the Police is directly upheld by the Allies, that situations usually arising in uneducated parts of the country where the population are apt to think that only actual military law applies. During this period a very strict observation must be kept on the Police to see that no favoritism is shown or authority abused. Other local bodies such as communal or town councils are frequently composed of persons who are by independent means, and very little interested in politics. A careful survey can be made by examination of records and where possible these persons should be allowed to carry on community work owing to their knowledge of local conditions. Again supervision is necessary as most councils will wish to make improvements which in normal times they could not afford. Perhaps this is natural when large quantities of Allied currency appears but the Allied Officer must always remember that the policy is to make the population pay (themselves) for all except essentials needed in the first period of occupation. Every assistance should be given to Medical bodies to function properly as they are very necessary when privation has reduced the stamina of the people and diseases or epidemics are liable to break out.

3. Use of Force.:- The average community at the time of occupation has had a surplus of force, either in the part of the invading army, their own forces or perhaps both. When and quiet administration usually puts the majority at ease and the minority exists

should be allowed to carry on community work owing to their knowledge of local conditions. Again supervision is necessary as most councils will wish to make improvements which in normal times they could not afford. Perhaps this is natural when large quantities of Allied currency appears but the Allied Officer must always remember that the policy is to make the population (pay themselves) for all except essentials needed in the first period of occupation. Every assistance should be given to Medical bodies to function properly as they are ~~a~~ very necessary when privation has reduced the stamina of the people and diseases or epidemics are liable to break out.

3. Use of Force:- The average community at the time of occupation has had a surplus of force, either on the part of the invading army, their own forces or perhaps both. Firm and quiet administration usually puts the majority at ease and in many ways that majority assists in suppressing any rebellious faction likely to bring trouble to the community as a whole. Force when necessary in extreme cases should be used swiftly and any subsequent proceedings dealt with as soon as possible in order to obviate any suggestion of personal grudge.

J. Taylor, I.F.

C.A.O. Commune of Hise.

Province of Yapani.

12
Subject: Report of Field Officers

To: FMGOT H.Q.

Officers operating in the field in the capacity of C.F.O. certain problems which could be solved more easily if the following were taken. (a) If the enlisted personnel of FMGOT was recruited from and if such EM's were given a screening test prior to being determined if they could meet the qualifications of interpreter general administrative worker, it would ease the heavy load placed on C.F.O.s who have to duplicate and fill out personnel files on them. This operation alone caused a delay or loss of work of one to two hours.

(b) Sufficient organic transportation should be included into requisition of vehicles unnecessary. Through field experience it is most of these are absolutely unreliable.

(c) Questionnaires and directives requiring reply should be left on the sheet to include a reply. This would make filing easier.

For the benefit of C.F.O.s going into the field it is advisable that immediately after setting up HQs they contact and find out the public's reaction to carabinieri authority. In many places due to misinterpreting of proclamations by the public.

20/9/43-
21/9

d Officers

in the field in the capacity of C.F.O., C.F.P.O., are faced with
could be solved more easily if the following steps were
listed personnel of AMGOT was recruited from Italian speaking stock
were given a screening test prior to being assigned to AMGOT
could meet the qualifications of interpreter, filing clerk, and
worker, it would ease the heavy paper work burden now
have to duplicate and fill out personally most forms directed to
alone caused a delay or loss of working time daily of from

anic transportation should be included into the T.B.A. to make
unnecessary. Through field experience it has been found that
absolutely unreliable.

and directives requiring reply should have sufficient space
include a reply. This would make filing and reference much easier
of C.F.O.'s going into the field in Sicily or Italy it is
likely after setting up HQs they contact the carabinieri and
reaction to carabinieri authority. In many places it has been
interpreting of proclamations by the public. This condition should

of affairs should be halted by the issuance of a personal proclamation stating that the authority of the carabinieri has not been abrogated and orders are still in effect.

Another point to remember when taking over newly occupied most European countries the State maintains breeding farms where blooded stock are kept on hand for public service. Care should be taken that animals are not sold at auction with other government or military property or will cause a breakdown in the livestock production.

Lr-d

80
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on hand for public service. Care should be taken that these
at auction with other government or military animals as it will
the livestock production.

Samuel J. Bates

Lt. C.F.O. Gallina, Salaparuta, Poggioreale
(Italy)

785015

A. M. G. O. T.

ALCAMO

①.

DATE 20th September 43.Subject. Reports of Field officersThrough S.C.A.O. TRAPANI.
TO. C.S.O. AMGOT H.G.

Reference AMGOT/266/HG. d/d 18 August 43.

①.

It is suggested that when directives are issued by AMGOT H.G. on such subjects as Taxes - Pensions, Insurance, Banks & Post offices, which generally deal with the complicated Italian method of administration much time would be saved for the C.A.O. if the ^{Italian} Provincial Directors of these services were instructed to inform the local subordinates in the towns of the Province, of the subject matter & procedure that H.G. requires.

Considerable time is spent by C.A.O.s trying to explain unfamiliar subject matter & frequently the results obtained are unsatisfactory.

It is considered that the Tax System is very complicated - (even Communal Taxes) - & that the directives forwarded are too involved.

Material assistance would be given to C.A.O.s.

- (a). If the senior official (Italian) was given his instructions direct & ordered to contact the Communal officials in the Province
and/or (b). If H.G. issued a translation into Italian of these directives for C.A.O.s to hand to their local officials. In many cases, translations carried out locally are ²⁴³ unsatisfactory
and/or (c). An AMGOT official from H.G. toured the

Better Method of Issuing
Return Cards)

(Letter of CAO Alcarne
Provence to SCAO AMST
20 August 1943)

It is recommended

ACC Files 10000/100/697

A. M. G. O. T.

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ALCAMO

(2)

DATE 20 August 1943

Province & contacted direct - the Italian official
at the more important towns.

- (2) As Returns & Requests for information are becoming more
& more numerous as time goes on - many letters
refer to previous reference numbers of letters which
have not been received - information asked for
has sometimes been duplicated or even triplicated
previously. ^{by C.A.O.} It would be appreciated if the
magnitude of a C.A.O.'s duties could be taken into
account, & this be taken as a suggestion & not as an adverse
criticism.

- (3) Rationing System & Black Market.

It is evident that the Italian method of issuing
rationing Cards is very corrupt & open to considerable
abuse by the Public. It is believed that many
persons have two rationing Cards in the same name,
& that persons, who are issued with ration
Cards are also obtaining "Bolletta di Macinazione"
Cards which entitles them to have their grain
ground once a month into flour. The smaller
mills principal output is from the grain
of small producers, who do not ^{always} declare their
own production - these millers charge a higher
price to grind the grain of those persons who
are not entitled to a "Bolletta di Macinazione" Card.

Very rigorous control is necessary at the
Mills & a better method of issuing ration
& "Bolletta di Macinazione" Cards. There is
tremendous scope for operators in the Black Market,
particularly for those who don't ~~dec~~ make an
honest declaration of their grain. By various ways

A. M. G. O. T.

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ALCAMO

(3)

DATE 20 September 43.

& means there is a very large leakage in the conversion of the grain supplies of this country - i.e. by duplication.

Below is given the state of distribution for various rations, & is taken from information given at the Rationing office of the Town Hall.
1943.

PASTA. None since end of May.

OLIVE OIL Last distribution 15 March

SUGAR None since 15 March

SOAP None since 31st Jan.

POTATOES Only two distributions 1Kg and .250grs

MEAT Very limited

EGGS Total absence to public at official prices

COAL One distribution only.

KEROSENE DO.

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Yet all the above can be purchased in the B.M. except, perhaps, potatoes.

It is considered that an Island wide investigation is necessary into the ^{control of} Rationing administration & that the grain leakage accounts for the lack of sufficient flour to make pasta to be distributed on the rationing system to the Public. The present issue of ration cards expires on 31st Oct 43. which is a suitable period for re-adjustment of present control

V.D. Kelaart, Capt RA
V.D. KELAART

C.A.O.

76
 Subject:- Report on experience in the Field
 To:- S. C. A. O.
 From:- Capt. R. L. Kennedy, CMO & Warehouse Supply.

● Herewith are the above subject:-

(a) The following should be included in the Assamets force Command and/or Operations Order:-

1. Prohibiting of looting of business premises of shops & plant.
2. Prohibiting seizure of Carabini or local police weapons as personal weapons. These weapons should be put in the Carabini store under guard and its handling are to CMO or Amoral.

3. Allotment of M.P. personnel, for essential bank etc guard, to the CMO accompanying the Assamets force.

(b) CMO must check on arrival to see if any breach of order has been committed by troops so that it can be dealt with straight away instead of it coming up weeks after.

(c) All motor vehicles must be prohibited from being on the road by Proclamation.

Local police weapons as personnel do. These weapons should be put in the Central store under guard until handed over to CMO on arrival.

3. Allocation of M.P. personnel, for essential bank etc guard, to the CMO accompanying the Assam force.

(b) CMO. must check on arrival to see if any breach of order has ^{been} committed by troops so that it can be dealt with straight away instead of it coming up weeks after.

(c) All motor vehicles must be prohibited from being on the road, by Proclamation, until CMO has issued permit for essential use only.

CMO. must be provided with vehicle permit, or a passport, giving all essential particular of vehicle & purpose vehicle is to be used for. No permits to be issued unless driver's licence is current.

Vehicle permits must be standard ⁽⁴¹⁾ in all areas.



R. PREFETTURA DI TRAPANI

n.

Censimento dei Distributori di Benzina e di altri Carburanti

La ditta

ha impiantato e gestisce in Comune di

uno distributore automatico di

del tipo

di litri

e della capacità

Tale impianto è situato in

e precisamente

esso risulta autorizzato dalla Prefettura con decreto

N.

Data

XVII.

Il Funzionario Addetto

e di altri Carburanti

La ditta
ha impiantato e gestisce in Comune di
uno distributore automatico di
del tipo e della capacità
di litri

Tale impianto è situato in
e precisamente
esso risulta autorizzato dalla Prefettura con decreto
N.

Data XVII.

Il Funzionario Addetto

OSSERVAZIONI:

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(a) Lenses check to be kept on all vehicles
seen on the road & the vehicles
confiscated, if not authorized, and
handed over to Civil Affairs. They
should not be taken by troops & war.

(c) Stocked guards to be kept on petrol
fuel dumps under C.A.O. Can employ
Civilian Guards for this task.

Stocks of petrol dumps to be taken
so that a check can be kept on it. Petrol
etc should be treated the same as
currency.

(f) No prisoners to be released from
prisons by Assault force. I had
hundreds released.

(g) Troops to be ordered to avoid looting
inflation in early stage. Better
to be for burden & jumped in looting.
is discovered.

(h) C.A.O. to think ahead as to what
will probably be required in the way
of information by August HQ and

Stocks of patrol dumps to be taken so that a check can be kept on it. Patrol etc should be treated the same as currency.

- (1) No prisoners to be released from prisons by Assault force. I had hundreds released.
- (2) Troops to be ordered to avoid being in flatland in early stages. Better to be for boulder & jumped in leavies. & discovered.
- (3) CMOs to think ahead as to what will probably be required in the way of information by August HQ and as - taking stock of essential goods, getting the population, ascertain quantity of essential food needed per week. After weeks some CMOs don't know this. Get to know the local food habits.



R. PREFETTURA DI TRAPANI

n.

Censimento dei Distributori di Benzina e di altri Carburanti

La ditta

ha impiantato e gestisce in Comune di

uno distributore automatico di

del tipo

di litri

e della capacità

Tale impianto è situato in

e precisamente

esso risulta autorizzato dalla Prefettura con decreto

N.

Data

XVII.

e di altri Carburanti

La ditta.....

ha impiantato e gestisce in Comune di.....

uno distributore automatico di.....

del tipo.....

e della capacità

di litri.....

Tale impianto è situato in.....

e precisamente.....

esso risulta autorizzato dalla Prefettura con decreto

N.....

Data.....

XVII.

Il Funzionario Addetto

OSSERVAZIONI:

- 74
- (i) General Order No 5 should come with operation or first occupation.
- (j) Special attention to be paid to direct clearing, & refuse disposal. Publish by-laws making duties, habits an offence, punishable. The locals don't mind a flap & dust, but they are determined to use our troops. The Samtans Doctor can help in this matter & I have found them keen & willing to give support.
- (k) CPOs must be provided with good transport, as early as possible. The job cannot possibly be done on more than one horse with an old regiminaire on a mule at all. There are so many loan spots committed which he has to fulfill with local officials who have no vehicles.
- (l) CPOs to get postal, tax, legal etc

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own troops. The Samtans, Doctors can
help in this matter & I have found
them keen & willing to give support.

(k) C.A.s must be provided with good
transport, as early as possible. The
job cannot possibly be done on
more than one horse with an older
regimented can or more at all.
There are so many loan spots
committed which he has to fulfill with
local officials who have no vehicles.

(l) C.A.s to get postal, tax, legal etc
officials to work early, getting their
entire work done & providing all
necessary figures, stock etc ready
that will most likely be required
by Aug 5 or HQ at a later date.

(m) C.A.s will save themselves, other 23rd
necessary, a lot of money; jobs
in the later stages, if they wish to

things done by degree - instead of waiting until a situation is called for on each item

(u) All HP Specialists Officers should spend a day or two with a CPO to see the difficulties he has to contend with. They would probably be more patient if they have this experience.

(o) CPOs to deal with redun. called for as quickly as they can & not wait until they have been asked several times.

15 Sept 43.

W. J. Hammond
Capt
The Hammond School

785015

A M. G. O. T.

72

ALCAMO

Subject. Reports of Field officers

DATE 18 September 1943

TO. C.S.O.

A.M.G.O.T. H.Q.

PALERMO.

Through S.C.A.O. TRAPANI.

Reference A.M.G.O.T. /266/H.Q. dated 18 Aug 43.

Herewith report on experiences in the Field.

Though the Subjects may not be of general interest to those C.A.O.'s now at present in the Field in Sicily, they may be of

Service to other prospective C.A.O.'s, who will be allotted in future phases to different countries.

V.D. Kelant, Capt

V.D. KELAART

C.A.O.

237

REPORTS OF FIELD OFFICERSFrom Capt V.D. Kelant
C.A.OALCANDIssue of Permits for Cars & Trucks

It is considered that for the most of a C.A.O.'s working time can be expended in the work involved in the issue of ^{official} ~~Windsor~~ permits for Civilian Cars & Trucks. Though it is realised that the use of a Vehicle is necessary for business purposes & for those engaged on Agricultural work entailing haulage of produce & supervising farm labour, applications for permits should be closely investigated & all pleasure riding ruthlessly prohibited - as such applications discredited when issuing permits a registered should be kept giving the following details.

No. of Permit	To whom issued	Address	Period of Validity	District - Business or Professional of owner	Type of Vehicle	When licence was last paid	Regd No of Vch
---------------	----------------	---------	--------------------	--	-----------------	----------------------------	----------------

The above details, will, if kept in a Tabular form result in a complete check on all Vch for which permits have been issued. In addition it will enable a check on all those persons who have ~~not~~ not paid their licence for some time which is frequently the case.

No permits are considered, unless the owner of the vehicle produces his *hucanga Di Circolagione* per Autovettura, without which it is not possible to obtain the essential details.

Vehicle is necessary for business purposes & for those engaged on Agricultural work entailing haulage of produce & supervising farm labour, applications for permits should be closely investigated & all pleasure riding ruthlessly prohibited - & such applications discarded when issuing permits a register should be kept giving the following details.

No. of Permit	To whom issued	Address	Period of Validity	Business or Profession of owner	Type of vehicle	Regd No of vehicle	Whether paid

The above details, will, if kept in a tabular form result in a complete check on all vehs for which permits have been issued. In addition it will enable a check on all those persons who have ~~not~~ not paid their licence for some time which is frequently the case. No permits are considered, unless the owner of the vehicle produces his *hicanga Di Cincologione* } , without which it is impossible for the C.A.O. to obtain the essential details.

No 33.

PERMIT

FARACI
LABONIS
of
VICIOMIA
N26
ALCAMO

ISSUED BY A.M.G.O.T

DATE - 14 Sept 43

VEHICLE LICENCE No 3377 T.P.

Valid for Provinces
of Trapani & Palermo.
only.

A.N. OTHER
CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICE
For transport of Agric Prods. ALCAMO

The chief point concerning these Windshield permits is that insufficient information is shown on them. This particularly applies to those permits issued at PALERMO & the communes in that province. They do not show provinces for which the permit is valid or the names of the communes.

AUCTION SALE OFGOVERNMENTANDMILITARY HORSES

Previous to the occupation of a country by Allied armies all abandoned Army horses will have been ^{perforated} by the civilians, particularly the farmers.

As soon as possible, a local ordinance should be published by the C.A.O. ordering that all ^{such} horses be declared to the "Horse Commission". This Commission should be composed of responsible local Citizens, ~~and~~ ^{who} must include a Veterinary Surgeon.

The Commission will compile a register, which will include the name & address of the present owner of the horse & the Army Number which is stamped on the horses "fore" hoofs. The work is thus done by the Commission ^{& supervised by the C.A.O.} As soon as practical, an announcement must be published of the date, time & place of Sale.

Full arrangements must be made the day previous to the sale, to ensure that an "exhibition ring" is roped off to keep the public under control, & to prevent them from closing right in on top of the C.A.O. & officials conducting the sale. On the first

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roped off to keep the public under control, & to

prevent them from closing right in on top of the

C.A.O. & officials conducting the sale. On the first

occasion no "ring" was made & the Carbiniers could

not compete with the immense crowds.

Almost 100 horses were sold in ALCOMO for ~~it~~

nearly ~~for~~ one million one hundred thousand dollars,

thus averaging about 110 dollars apiece - which is an excellent

average considering the quality of the horses. The lowest fetching

20 dollars - & the highest 265 dollars.

64
C
TRANSPORT Every C.A.O. when taking over a district in the early stages of occupation will require a number of vehicles for hauling food supplies for the population under his administration. Large numbers of Military Vehicles will have been abandoned by the retreating army & many of them will have been taken & hidden by the Civilians.

It will be of great value for the incoming C.A.O. to sack out some local mechanics & employ them in the repair & maintenance of these Vehicles. Here, we were fortunate to obtain the services of Tunisian mechanics - one of whom ^{whom} had been employed by the British at BENGHAZI. These men have towed in many abandoned Vehicles & have repaired them & maintained a fleet of Vehicles, which have served innumerable uses. One point of great advantage is that ~~on~~ ⁱⁿ long trips to fetch grain supplies there has not been one case of delay due to mechanical breakdown, which would have caused ^{serious} ~~serious~~ hold up in the food situation. Continental Italian P.O.W. have proved very useful in loading up the grain on the trucks & travel with the Vehicles all the time.

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PUBLIC HEALTH.

It has been found in ALCAMO that there was very little cooperation between the "Ufficiali Sanitarii" & the local doctors. This was due primarily to jealousy - & also to the fact that the local doctors dislike having to admit that their patients have infectious diseases etc. Full cooperation must be obtained between the Doctors & the "Ufficiali Sanitarii" of the Municipality - & these Doctors must be ordered to give their support - this will take time. Another point is that the standard of Hygiene - Sanitation & cleanliness is at a very low ^{level} standard - & the civilians appear to prefer to treat their maladies & complaints in their own homes instead of calling in medical aid.

In order to improve the low standard that prevails in most towns it is a question mainly of education, cooperation - supplies & equipment ^{all of} which take time.

In the initial stages the C.A.O. has to take action on preliminary lines until such time as the P.H.D. is able to investigate.

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In the initial stages the C.A.O. has to take action
on preliminary lines until such time as the P.H.D.
is able to investigate.

Facilities for cleaning away refuse from streets
can be enforced upon the Municipality by the C.A.O.

19 Sept 67

SECRET/2566/NO
18 August 1943

Subject: Reports of Field Officers.

To : S.O.A.C.'s.

1. It is requested that all S.O.A.C.'s and Specialist Field Officers be instructed to submit reports, except S.O.A.C.'s to the Headquarters, expressing "disagreement" in practical field experience.

2. It is believed that such reports, when consolidated, edited and published will be of considerable value to all Field Officers in the future. It is with this object in view that they should be written and they should contain any suggestions which it is believed would be helpful.

3. All reports should be collected by the S.O.A.C.'s, the S.O.A.C. reports should be forwarded to S.O.C. and those of the Specialist Officers to the Head of the Division concerned.

WILLIAM H. H. H. H.
S.O.C. S.O.C. S.O.C.
Chief Staff Officer

1. It is requested that all C.A.O.'s and qualified field officers be instructed to submit reports, and all C.A.O.'s to this Headquarters, explaining "reasons learned" in practical field experience.

2. It is believed that such reports, when consolidated, edited and published will be of considerable value to all field officers in the future. It is with this object in view that they should be written and they should contain any suggestions which it is believed could be helpful.

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(2)

To S.C.A.O., Trapani,

Report attached as directed above.

B. W. H. Dyer
(B.W.H. Dyer)

Capt. C.A.O.

235

Readiness for Warranted
Dismissal of Local
Officials

(Letter of CDO, Commune of

Orpaleme, 78000

AMGOT, 17 September
1943)

9 Don't

9 When

ACC Files, 10000/100/697

66
COMMUNE OF SALEMI.

17th. sept. 1943.

SGOT/266/HQ.

REPORTS OF FIELD OFFICERS.

To S.C.A.O., Trapani,

Before being sent into the field, every C.A.O. should be supplied with an advance of pay in the local currency, sufficient for personal needs. In many cases men were sent abroad with no such money in their possession, and their inability to pay for such items as haircuts, laundry, food to supplement rations which in the early stages were often very irregular to say the least, causes a great deal of unnecessary embarrassment, as a considerable period of time elapses before a field cashier can be contacted.

every officer should be supplied with an electric torch, as in the early stages much work has to be done at night, often out of doors, and a meagre supply of matches is a poor substitute.

A more liberal supply of service interpreters would be a boon; local talent is often of very poor quality and of doubtful integrity. Any interpreter supplied by the prevailing Communal Officials should at first be treated with suspicion, as he is often the tool of men whose loyalty to the Allied Govt. is questionable. Try if possible to find one who can write English as well as speak it. When controlling three or four towns, take the same interpreter around with you rather than utilise the services of a different one in each place, as it saves a great deal of time explaining matters.

A reliable means of transport is essential to the officer in the field, local cars requisitioned are invariably of very poor quality and cause much delay.

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A reliable means of transport is essential to the officer in the field, local cars requisitioned are invariably of very poor quality and cause much delay.

Don't hesitate to remove officials in office on occupation if it is necessary on political or security grounds, or because of lack of co-operation or incompetency. It is advisable to start at the top and do so gradually, as to remove the whole lot at once might disrupt the local Government and cause chaos. Try to discriminate between genuine allegations of previous misrule and spiteful ones made because of some personal grievance. When appointing new officials endeavour to obtain those acceptable to the public generally, whose co-operation is essential.

(Continued)

(2)

essential to the success of the scheme. If a new mayor has to be appointed support him in every way possible. Otherwise people will ignore his decisions and come crying to you, the result being that you are inundated with petitioners.

When the old regime is obviously corrupt, and universally detested because of oppressive conduct and frauds inflicted on the public, they should be removed to a detention camp even if only for a comparatively short period until things are more or less normal, so as to convince the public that they are in fact having a 'New Deal'. When these people are seen to walk about freely even though removed from office, the public become suspicious and doubtful of co-operating wholeheartedly, fearing that they will return again to power after the Occupation and take their revenge. Consequently it is almost impossible to get reliable evidence against them.

In any corrupt Government the Police Service are invariably likewise, as it is they who enforce and support the system. Therefore it is a great pity that the C.A.O. just hasn't got the time to exercise more direct supervision over them. I would suggest, however, that on the recommendation of the C.A.O. any of the leading officials (provided not bad enough for detention) should be immediately transferred to another district and replaced by others, who at least would be free from local contacts which might influence them, and in addition would make for better discipline. The unreliability of the Police Force is a terrific handicap, but there is no alternative but to make use of their services. At the same time it is often necessary to impress on the public that they still retain their authority, in view of the fact that they are almost always detested (often with very good reason), and the people generally are apt to get the idea that they can be ignored.

When relief or food has to be distributed to large numbers of the population, do so from as many points as possible. This prevents the concentration of ^{disgruntled} crowds at the same place, and so lessens the likelihood

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When relief or food has to be distributed to large numbers of the population, do so from as many points as possible. This prevents the concentration of ^{disgruntled} crowds at the same place, and so lessens the likelihood of disturbances and even minor riots. Direct local officials to enquire into every application for relief, as many people would prefer to loaf on relief than work for a reasonable wage. When it becomes necessary to requisition grain, don't poach on the territory of neighbouring C.A.O.s. without first consulting them; it causes bad feeling and it might leave them in a worse position than you are.

(Continued)
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(3)

Returns required by Headquarters should be curtailed as far as possible: at present many of them overlap and repeat themselves. Furthermore they take up too much time of the C.A.O. with the result that supervision and other important work has to suffer. When a printed questionnaire is sent out for completion, sufficient copies for one for each Commune should be forwarded, otherwise the C.A.O. has to type out the extra necessary copies himself. It must be remembered that the majority of the C.A.Os. have to do all their own typing. When technical details are wanted, e.g. re banking, taxation, etc., I suggest that the H.W. officer concerned consults the civilian chiefs of the particular department who could prepare a memorandum in their own language, for subsequent ^{and collection} distribution throughout the district if necessary by C.A.Os. By this method the actual facts needed could be obtained at the first attempt, thus obviating the necessity of repeating the same enquiry two or three times. Technical terms unfamiliar to the C.A.O. are often used, and the difficulty of putting them over through an indifferent interpreter is enormous. Again, queries are often raised which the C.A.O. cannot answer through lack of knowledge, resulting in interminable discussions with the question still unanswered at the end.

The present system of passes (general and special) is too complicated, and occupies too much time of the C.A.O. Although the security aspect is appreciated, I suggest that the C.A.O. be authorised to approve of them, and a copy forwarded to H.W. for record. The pass itself should be simplified, e.g. the foreign translation printed immediately under the English.

The C.A.O. should make early contact with the prominent citizens in the town, but not at the expense of the poorer classes who might otherwise become suspicious. Also, contact with all layers of society gives a more complete picture of what is going on, and problems to be solved

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Railways are usually out of service for some considerable time, and as soon as restrictions regarding civilians are eased, I suggest that a bus service linking various towns in the province be instituted. This would reduce the number of cars on the road, with the resultant saving of petrol.

B.W.H. Dyer Captain. C.A.O.
(B.W.H. Dyer)

30 SEP 1943

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

/ecn

28 September 1943


MGS - 300

SUBJECT: Administrative Lessons from Operations in Sicily.

TO : Chief Administrative Officer, A.F.H.Q.

1. Reference request contained in your letter of 8 September under above heading attached is one (1) copy of the report dated 22 September received from HQ. AMG.

2. Your attention is drawn to Para 2 (1) and Para 8 (ii) and (iii). This section is now in touch with Assistant Director of Hirings and Claims with regard to requisitioning, and with the office of the DME with regard to coordination between medical services and A.M.G. Officers responsible for public health. Approach is also being made to HQ. CIC and the Provost Marshall Section.



J. G. HOLMES,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief, Military Government Section.

Incls:
1 as above

Copy To HQ AMG

231

*C.S.O. If you have a spare copy
of Lesson learnt I should like to
see it
30/9 B.L.
J.S.*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Subject:- S.C.A.O.'s Reports.
To:- ANGOT H. . Sicily.
From:- ANGOT Province of Ragusa

62
202.

23 Sep 43

Herewith report on experiences immediately
after occupation.-

Ragusa



It-Col
S.C.A.O. ANGOT
Province of Ragusa

239

REPORT ON EXPERIENCES IMMEDIATELY AFTER OCCUPATION

Roughly the plan of operation for AMGOT with Eighth Army was that an Advance party of 4 officers was to land at Cassibile with 76 Base Sub-Area to take over towns of Syracuse and Avola, and possibly Augusta, that there should be a Liaison Officer with 30 Corps and that parties should land with 51 Div., 1 Cdn Div., and 231 Dde to take over Noto, Pachino, Rosolini, Ragusa ecc.. There were to be 3 Provincial Administrators in the first instance, Catania, Siracusa and Augusta of which I was that of Siracusa. On 5 Jul 43 I embarked at Malta on a L.C.T. with my party, Catania party (less C.O.) and an Advanced H.Q. AMGOT Eighth Army under the Second in Command also 2-15 cwt. trucks and 2 M/Cs. We sailed in evening of 10 July, arriving off Cassibile on morning of 11 Jul but could not disembark owing to congested landing place until morning 12 Jul.

A happy liaison was made on the boat with 151 Base Sub-Area for Augusta. Capt. Gray prospective C.A.C. for Augusta was forthwith attached to them. This was the only liaison I had with an Army formation except 30 Corps whom I never saw after M. Africa.

I arrived at Siracusa about 1330 hrs. 12 Jul. where I found C.O. advanced party and another officer at the Casa del Fascio. The town had suffered somewhat from bombing but the gravest damage was caused by looting of food-stuffs by local population and food was very short.

On 13 Jul the Catania party started off for Augusta and I took over Siracusa. I saw the Prefetto Quastore and Iodesta who signed a declaration of co-operation. The only liaison with the Army was with 66 Sub-Area from whom little information of the situation could ever be gained. AMGOT Eighth Army H.Q. remained at Siracusa in touch only with the Base Area. I sent an officer to Floridia to take over and another towards Lertini to find out situation and if possible to take it over. He did well and entered with leading troops. I made contact with R.D.I.C. Siracusa.

On 14 Jul Catania party returned from Augusta as nothing was to be gained by staying there since there was only about one house at 224 g.

Undoubtedly AMGOT action suffered though lack of contact with Army formations.

I feel that in an advance of this nature a preferable method

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On 13 Jul the Catania party started off for Augusta and I took over Siracusa. I saw the Prefetto Questore and Podesta who signed a declaration of co-operation. The only liaison with the Army was with 66 Sub-area from whom little information of the situation could ever be gained. ANGOT Eighth Army H.Q. remained at Siracusa in touch only with the Base Area. I sent an officer to Floridia to take over and another towards Lentini to find out situation and if possible to take it over. He did well and entered with leading troops. I made contact with N.O.I.C. Siracusa.

On 14 Jul Catania party returned from Augusta as nothing was to be gained by staying there since there was only about one house at 224.

Undoubtedly ANGOT action suffered though lack of contact with Army formations.

I feel that in an advance of this nature a preferable method would have been as follows:-

Siracusa party with Corps H.Q. The C.C. would detail officers to Divisions in whose line of advance there were towns to be occupied. As the advance approached the boundary of Siracusa Province, the Catania party would step up to Corps H.Q. and so on. If the Corps Commander was unwilling to change his ANGOT advisor who would usually be the S.C.A.C. of the province being passed through, a special ANGOT liaison officer should be detailed to remain permanently with him. - Liaison officers must however through work through S.C.A.Cs in the normal way.

The particular Liaison Officer with 30 Corps told me that he was tremendously handicapped by having no previous knowledge of the workings of a Corps or any other British Formation. H.Q.

On 14th I received orders to move to Ragusa to take over there next day. I found following towns taken over:- Pachino, Rosolini, Modica and Ragusa. One officer was still on the beach waiting for his Jeep which had travelled on another craft. A peculiar thing happened this night owing to ANGOT being out of touch with the Army. The Liaison Officer was ordered by 30 Corps Commander to arrest a certain number of

the inhabitants of Raguse as hostages, as reports were prevalent of sniping in this locality (actually all the firing was done by British troops). The arrests were made on the advice of the 2nd. in command of Carabinieri, a prominent Fascist now interned.

The Liaison Officer was unable to find the S.C.A.C. in the middle of the night and the latter only heard of the arrests by chance the next day. As far as I could make out the hostages did not know ^{why} they were arrested nor did any of the townspeople. Personally I have never heard of hostages being taken by the British Army before, and if this is done I should have thought it necessary to broadcast the affair, otherwise the point is lost.

I released the men in a couple of days.

The only troops in neighbourhood were 1 Coy. of Canadian Infantry whose behaviour was bad.

It was very difficult to obtain any transport. The 1 Can. Div. who had passed through had lost a good deal of their transport at sea and taken everything in the town they could lay their hands on.

The Prefect was arrested and his vice appointed to act.

Two men offered themselves as interpreters, one a Slav from Syria, the other an American subject. Later both were interned on investigations made by F.S.S. I knew of their previous histories and personally thought they were not dangerous in any way.

The number of A.G.O.T. officers in the Province was very small but on the 17th various officers arrived accompanied by two sets of ~~varying~~ varying orders from A.G.O.T. Light Army and from 30 Corps Comd. respectively. However this was eventually sorted out.

to L. W. K. A

59
Subject : Reports in the Field L. C.A.O.s MF//8.
S.C.A.O. ~~CALTANISSETTA~~.

Reference H.Q. A.M.G.O.T. letter calling for reports
from C.A.O.'S. on experiences in the field.

Herewith copy of above report for you, with request you
will forward attached copy to H.Q. A.M.G.O.T.

MUSSOMELI.
18 SEP 43.



D. Morley Fletcher
D. Morley-Fletcher,
Major,
Civil Affairs Officer,
No 3 District CALTANISSETTA.

Copy for H.Q. A.M.G.O.T. SICILY. —

II. HQRS. AMGOT

FORWARDED. Calt Prov/3 dated 18 Sept. 43
refers.

Caltanissetta
27 Sept. 1943

W. R. Inglis
Lt. Col.,
S.C.A.O., Caltanissetta Province.

C.S.O.

16 see 58

I will B.O. this file for C.A.O. 228
MB 30/9.

Need for more detailed
drawing
(Letter of CAO District
No. 3, Callanissetta
Province, to SCAD 44603
18 September 1943*)
H. Thompson (81)

ACC File. 10000/100/697

Memorandum : to H.Q. A.M.G.O.T. SICILY
FROM : S.C.A.O. CALTANISSETTA.

58
Appendix "A" to
MF/8 of 18 SEP 45.

Subject : Lessons observed in the field by S.A.O.
District No 5, Caltanissetta Province.

1. Value in the field of training at Military Govt School North Africa,
and in general Mabledon and Charlottesville.

This point was discussed with other S.A.O.s and administrative officers. It was generally agreed that the background to the particular national problem involved was invaluable, but these officers who had not previously done an amount of home politics or local administration felt they had specialised to too great a degree. There is a tendency at schools to explain the final perfect working of A.M.G.O.T. when the main H.Q. is fully functioning and all the divisions can give immediate answers on full information. This will not occur for the first two months.

Thinking in general is done in terms of the finished product, and from the top down, not from the field back to the H.Q. It is admitted that warnings are frequently given reminding officers that common sense is what is necessary.

A remedy is to provide more practical tuition, including on the staff selected officers who have experienced work in the field. In addition, practical schemes should be run as in the normal military staff college, in which a team takes over a fictitious province, and is faced with the general type of problem every SCAG and S.A.O. faces every day. Care in

of local administration felt they had specialized to too great a degree. There is a tendency at schools to explain the final perfect working of A.M.G.O.T. when the main H.Q. is fully functioning and all the divisions can give immediate answers on full information. This will not occur for the first two months.

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A remedy is to provide more practical tuition, including on the staff selected officers who have experienced work in the field. In addition, practical schemes should be run as in the normal military staff college, in which a team taken over a fictitious province, and is faced with the general type of problem every SCAG and C.A.O. faces every day. Care in specialist training is necessary, as in the first two months many specialists and particularly C.A.F.O.s will be doing General Administrative work.

2. The A.M.G.O.T. "BIBLE"
This is very detailed for use of C.A.O.s, and a shorter type of "edition 'agent's pamphlet'" is advocated. This will include the legal and financial powers of the C.A.O., the original proclamations, the organization of AMOT HQs with short description of duties of departments, and an appendix including basic wage rates, others showing form of C.A.O.s weekly report, and an act of Uniformity on AMOT procedure - office, correspondence, modes

2.

of address, fly of flag, rules for rations, pay and mail.

3. Composition of A.M.G.O.T. personnel in first flight.

This requires the most careful consideration. There is

a tendency to push the senior officers too far forward, rather than maintaining them with their particular task force H.Q.

Though natural, it should be resisted. The first A.M.G.O.T. representative required in town is a junior officer who will get about rapidly whether provided with transport or no.

The O.A.C. and an other rank clerk or interpreter can enter at the Brigade H.Q. level. The B.C.A.C. accompanied by an adjutant officer is required last, and when some form of group ing change of the battle is evident

4. Cooperation with Military.

Perfect cooperation will come as A.M.G.O.T. work is better known, and the A.M.G.O.T. personnel have the maximum period possible before a task in getting to know and work with their particular task force formation. It is important that these early flight personnel, and officers at H.Q.s or doing liaison should have considerable knowledge of the working of their military colleagues, and before the invasion can prove their worth as helpful staff officers.

Teaching of A.M.G.O.T. policy and organisation might now be included in pre-invasion training of all troops, and a pamphlet issued on the subject by AFCA. In addition, the C in G

night

should be asked through his staff to issue a directive

adjutant officer is required last, and when some form of group
ing change of the battle is evident

4. Cooperation with Military.

Perfect cooperation will come as A.M.G.O.F. work is better known, and the A.M.G.O.F. personnel have the maximum period possible before a task in getting to know and work with their particular task force formation. It is important that these early flight personnel, and officers at H.Q.s or doing liason should have considerable knowledge of the working of their military colleagues, and before the invasion can prove their worth as helpful staff officers.

Teaching of A.M.G.O.F. policy and organisation might now be included in pre-invasion training of all troops, and a pamphlet issued on the subject by A.M.G.O.F. In addition, the C in G might be asked through his "A" branch to issue a directive to all formations stating how they can help the administration, and vice-versa, and requesting formations NOT to seize town halls and government or municipal administrative buildings for their H.Q.s. Where a town hall is taken, the administration of that town virtually ceases, and all necessary documents and staff are scattered preventing early return to normal conditions.

3.

7. C.A.O.s Initial Questionnaire.

On the arrival of a C.A.O. in a new country there are always the same initial questions to be answered before a full administrative picture is obtained. After a few visits, most C.A.O.s draft a questionnaire form to ensure that important points are not left out. It is recommended that a number of questionnaire forms be issued to each administrative officer before landing, and a draft of this questionnaire can be included in the C.A.O.'s

handbook referred to in para 2 above. *A possible form is attached to this Appendix.*

8. Reports.

Daily or weekly reports of progress in the first few days ~~are~~ badly required by C.A.O.s and from them by Adv A.M.G.O.T. H.Q.s. C.A.O.s are doing a 14 to 18 hour day, and find these reports very trying. It is recommended that a short standard form of daily report, weekly report, and a C.A.O.s report form be included in A.M.G.O.T. standing orders and the C.A.O.s handbook. Practical ~~xxx~~ training at the Military Govt School could well include tuition in the writing and forwarding of these "sit reps".

9. Work of C.A.P.O.s.

It is for consideration whether the number of C.A.P.O.s on T.O./M.S. is not in excess of requirements. In occupied territories it will be normal to find the local police warned and prepared to maintain their traditions in safe-

8. Reports.

Daily or weekly reports of progress in the first few days ~~are~~ badly required by C.A.O.s and from them by Adv A.A.G.O.T. R.Q.s. C.A.O.s are doing a 14 to 18 hour day, and find these reports very trying. It is recommended that a short standard form of daily report, weekly report, and S.C.A.O.s report form be included in A.M.G.O.T. standing orders and the C.A.O.s handbook. Practical ~~and~~ training at the Military Govt School could well include tuition in the writing and forwarding of these "nit rops".

9. Work of C.A.P.O.s.

It is for consideration whether the number of C.A.P.O.s on T.O./A.E. is not in excess of requirements. In occupied territories it will be normal to find the local police warned and prepared to maintain their traditions in safeguarding the peace of civilians. Much of the police work in countries must come under the notice of the C.A.O. Police officers and one or two travelling assistant officers at R.Q.s of Provinces are essential, but in many cases A.P.O.s and ~~the~~ C.A.P.O.s have been used for general administration. The point of the need for general administrative teaching at the military govt schools is here evidenced. All tend to be general administrators in the early stages, and general assistants to C.A.O.s are of greater use than A.P.O.s. It is recommended that the T.O./A.E. is therefore reconsidered with a view to less police officers, and more administrative.

10. Public Relations.

The daily work of the C.A.C. automatically is a big part of the allied public relations policy. In the base ports, and after three or four months, there will be Public Relations Officers, perhaps, and possibly representatives of Psychological Warfare. These will help in press control and in the dissemination of policy. But in the field the C.A.C. and S.C.A.C. will have to act for himself. It is recommended that some training in this be given in the Military Govt School. Once an occupation has been effected the local population expect, unreasonably, immediate return to peace conditions, the overthrow of all previous Fascist customs, taxes, and even ration cards, and a new arm. The C.A.C. cannot answer all these questions individually, and press, news sheets, or local letters or ^{leaf} pamphlets might avert an outbreak of anxiety. Could this point be considered in conjunction with IRO, and guidance given at the Training schools, and a paragraph on this subject included in the "Bible" or handbook.

11. Press.

Also connected with Public Relations is rumour and news. It is very annoying for an isolated C.A.C. to be greeted by his syndico, informed that an armistice has been signed and that we are now allies! As electricity may be cut, local wireless may not be available to the officer to confirm or deny this,

unreasonably, in ediate return to peace conditions, the over-throw of all previous Fascist customs, taxes, and even ration cards, and a new arm. The C.A.O. cannot answer all these questions individually, and press, news sheets, or local letters or ~~papers~~ ^{leaf} might avert an extent of anxiety. Could this point be considered in conjunction with LHO, and guidance given at the Training schools, and a paragraph on this subject included in the "Bible" or Handbook.

11. Notes.

Also connected with Public Relations is rumour and news. It is very annoying for an isolated C.A.O. to be greeted by his Syndaco, informed that an armistice has been signed and that we are now allies! As electricity may be cut, local wirelone may not be available to the officer to confirm or deny this, and local rumours are very prevalent. It is requested that H.Q. A.M.G.O.I. consider the publication of a news sheet of important items down to C.A.O.s not less than twice a week, and that the P.H.C. at A.M.G.O.I. H.Q. send occasional directives on the handling of such news as armistices, abdications and defects ! (if any).

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12. LOOTING. and ARMS collection.

Instruction to all armies on what is looting would help the work of C.A.O.s in clearing up complaints. It appears that quite senior officers consider that looting on a grand scale, ^{is not looting -} o.g., taking food, wine or cooking pots for a company or a formation R.Q.s, or taking the municipal silver for a formation mess ^{which are} as much looting as the taking of a watch or pearl necklace by an individual man.

In connection with arms collection. It might be held that it was looting for officers to retain excellent automatics and shot guns after an arms collection. This is a frequent occurrence. It is recommended that in future the system of arms collection be arranged with local task forces by A.A.O.O.T before an invasion occurs.

13. ADMINISTRATION.

For addition to G 1098. for each C.A.O. and S.O.A.O.

Flags - one union jack and one stars and stripes.

Maps - distribution effected of small scale maps of district.

Medical box - including iodine, atabrine, aspirin, bandages, sulphur etc for first aid.

Isolation allowance - officers in the field often have no cook and have to employ local labour.

This is not considered a fair charge on

A.A.O.O.T., but is surely not a fair charge.

on the individual officer. In addition,

and shot guns after an arms collection. This is a frequent occurrence. It is recommended that in future the system of arms collection be arranged with local task forces by A.M.G.O.F before an invasion occurs.

15. ADMINISTRATION.

For addition to G 1028. for each C.A.O. and S.O.A.O.

Flags - one union jack and one stars and stripes.

Maps - distribution effected of small scale maps of district.

Medical box - including iodine, atebromo, aspirin, bandages, sulphur etc for first aid.

Isolation allowance - officers in the field often have

no cook and have to employ local labour.

This is not considered a fair charge on A.M.G.O.F., but is surely not a fair charge.

on the individual officer. In addition,

in order to supplement sea rations local

foodstuffs are necessary which fall heavily

on isolated officers. It is requested

that application be made for a special

isolation allowance of $\frac{2}{6}$ or $\frac{1}{2}$ a dollar

a day for officers of A.M.G.O.F. in the

field, in view of the inevitable additional

expenses, and lack of provision of army cooks.

Portable typewriter - The provision of one for each C.A.O.

would increase efficiency and returns and

correspondence.

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6.

14. Indirect Rule.

The tendency in occupied countries will be to find cooperation in local administration. An inexperienced C.A.O. or assistant can easily become submerged in individual details. It is considered that varying degrees of indirect government can be carried out through the mayor from the very first day of arrival. To effect this the C.A.O. must have a very clear idea of what subjects are reserved to him and what he can easily leave with the mayor. Individual visits, and a system for vetting all inquiries is one problem that from the first can be performed with the assistance of the municipio. It is recommended that this point be given attention in the training at the Military Govt

School.

D. Morley Fletcher.

MUSKOGEEI.
18 SEP 43.

D. Morley-Fletcher,
Major.
Civil Affairs Officer,
District No 3 CALLEDANIA.

Addendum :

15. Training of future A.S.G.O.T personnel and cooperation with Army.

In order to add an impetus to the practical side of training, and to put A.S.G.O.T. objectives before Army staffs and formations, it is suggested that a British C.A.O. or S.C.A.O. be detailed in conjunction with M.G.S. to do a rapid lecturing tour of the following -
Military Govt School.

A.F.H.Q.

Br formations training in N.Africa

(Senior & intermediate)
C.H.Q. Battle School.

U.K. Command H.Q.S &

War Office (Civil Affairs)

London District.

inquirers is one problem that from the first can be performed with the assistance of the municipio. It is recommended that this point be given attention in the training at the Military Govt School.

S. M. Hatcher

MUSCHALLI.
18 SEP 43.

D. Morley-Fletcher,
Major.
Civil Affairs Officer,
District No 3 CALABAR DISTRICT.

Addendum :

15. Training of Future A.M.G.O.T personnel and cooperation with Army.

In order to add an impetus to the practical side of training, and to put A.M.G.O.T. objectives before Army staffs and formations, it is suggested that a British C.A.O. or C.E.A.O. be detailed in conjunction with M.G.S. to do a rapid lecturing tour of the following -

Military Govt School.	Staff College
A.F.M.C.	(Senior & Intermediate)
Pr formations training in N. Africa	G.H.Q. Battle School.
War Office (Civil Affairs)	G.F. Command H.Q.S &
Wimbledon School	London District.
Senior Officer's School	
1st Combined Ops Training Centre	House of Commons committee.

Subjects : The objects and working of A.M.G.O.T.
How A.M.G.O.T helps Army formations.
A.M.G.O.T. in the field and the Army Staff
A.M.G.O.T. organization in practice.

The U.S. contingent might consider it advisable to send a similar mission to U.S. formations, N.S.S. and Washington and Charlottesville.

Issued with
Appendix "H" to
MF/8 of 18 SEP.

52

C.A.O.'s QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EACH TOWN OR COMMUNE.

A. Personalities.

1. Syndaco.
2. Secretary.
3. Former Podesta.
4. Amassi Collector.
5. Priests.
6. Village priest.
7. Local doctor.
8. Other local notables.

9. Any allied nationals ?

10. Any interpreters ?

B. Labour & Employment.

11. Population.
12. Local industries
13. Unemployment
14. Relief.
How many able-bodied ?
15. Refugees ?
16. Old Age numbers.

C. Supply & Resources.

17. Water.
18. Bread ration ?
Wheat

Amassi
Harvest
Flour
Mills

Bakeries
Facts

19. Oil
20. Wine
21. Milk
22. Meat ration ?
23. Fish
24. Cheese

25. Principle shortages.

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- 11 Population.
- 12 Local industries
- 13 Unemployment
- 14 Relief.
How many able-bodied ?
- 15 Refugees ?
- 16 Old Age numbers.
- C. Supply & Resources.
- 17 Water.
- 18 Bread ration ?
Wheat
Amasai
Harvest
Flour
Mills
- Bakeries
Pasta
- 19 Oil
- 20 Wine
- 21 Milk
- 22 Meat ration ?
- 23 Fish
- 24 Cheese
- 25 Principle shortages.
- 26 Clothes.
- 27 Leather
Shoes
- 28 Fuel - wood
coal
electricity
oil
charcoal
- 29 Transport - lorries.
private cars.
petrol
oil
- 30 Enemy army stocks in locality ?
- D. Health.
- 31 Communicable diseases -
Typhoid
Malaria
T.B.

32 Clinic
33 Hospital
34 Maternity & Infancy -

Is it working?
Cost?

35 Midwife

E. Education.

36 Are schools still intact?
37 Are children having normal or enforced holiday?
38 When might they open if approved?
39 Are teachers still available?

F. Housing.

39 Is there much bomb damage?
40 Are there local materials for repair?
41 Is this practical work to take unemployed off relief?

G. Relief work.

42. What local schemes, e.g.,
bridge repairs
bomb damage
water improvement
town hygiene
road repair

are suitable to take men off relief onto municipal work at lowest basic wage?

H. Public Order.

43 Looting

44 Arrests

45 Has now in jail

Is there a jail?

46 Proclamations - how many received?

where posted?

47 Is curfew working and practical?

48 Whomand who are previous administrative staff.

49 Carabinieri -

What numbers?

What numbers before the war?

Are they still?

Loyalty?

Arms collection?

Do they realise responsibility under proclamations?

50 Public relations?

51 Any more

are suitable to take men off relief onto municipal work at lowest basic wage ?

N. Public Order.

43 Looting

44 Arrests

45 How now in jail

Is there a jail ?

46 Proclamations - how many received ?

where posted ?

47 Is curfew working and practical ?

48 Where and who are previous administrative staff.

49 Carabinieri -

What members ?

What members before the war ?

Maraschini ?

Loyalty ?

Arms collection ?

Do they realize responsibility under proclamations ?

50 Public relations ?

51 Any press

1. Communications.

52 Any telephone system ?

53 O.R. with Carabinieri,

telegraph

courier ?

2. Bank.

54 No money ?

What accounts ?

55 In which bank is Municipal account ?

56 State of Post Office ?

57 Pensions ?

58 Investigation of City pay rolls.

AMGOT/58/HQ.

Administrative Lessons from Operations in Sicily.

M.C.S.,
A.F.H.Q.

22. Sept. 5.

1. With reference to request contained in your memorandum of 9. Sept. 43, the following is a consolidation and summary of points raised in memorandum submitted by AMGOT field officers on this subject.

2. AMGOT and its relations with other units.

(i) AMGOT started in the Sicilian operation with one big handicap. It was, to almost all concerned in the operation, a new branch, whose functions and raison d'être were neither appreciated nor understood by the fighting services. The first task was therefore to "sell" AMGOT. This was achieved with some measure of success at the top, but efforts to penetrate the lower formations were not successful. It is, therefore, of great importance that during the planning stage opportunities should be given for putting all concerned in the picture as regards the role which AMGOT is to play in the operation.

(ii) Furthermore, AMGOT officers attached to assault forces should join their units well in advance of "D" day, not only to carry out what has been mentioned in the above paragraph, but also to coordinate their activities with those of the various army units with which they are most likely to be in contact, e.g. C.I.C., F.S.P. etc.

3. AMGOT in early stages of an Operation.

(i) The invasion of Sicily has clearly demonstrated that Civil Affairs Officers should be present in invaded cities at the time of their capture.

Civil Affairs liaison officers should be attached to combat units to help the commander to deal with civilian problems arising immediately after the assault.

Adequate numbers of Civil Affairs administrative officers should be sent forward with the troops to be left in supervision of the cities and towns from the time of their capture.

(ii) In cases where the assault force is advancing rapidly, high priority is essential for additional AMGOT personnel and transport. Lack of such priority has resulted in officers being spread too thinly over the ground to be able to do their jobs properly.

4. AMGOT Transport.

(i) It is essential that all AMGOT personnel with assault forces go in with

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(ii) In cases where the assault force is advancing rapidly, high priority is essential for additional AMGOT personnel and transport. Lack of such priority has resulted in officers being spread too thinly over the ground to be able to do their jobs properly.

4. AMGOT Transport.

(i) It is essential that all AMGOT personnel with assault forces go in with their own transport. Dependence on the units to which officers are attached does not work. Locally requisitioned transport cannot be relied on, as experience has shown that tactical units requisition all available vehicles. Furthermore the average local vehicle is not sufficiently reliable for the strenuous work on bad roads that it must perform.

(ii) If they do not land with their own vehicles officers cannot get into cities at the time of their capture, nor can they properly supervise the large areas for which they usually find themselves responsible.

5. AMGOT Personnel.

(i) In the early stages all specialist officers must be prepared to do the work of C.A.Os.

(ii) Under the present organization AMGOT officers are not provided with sufficient OR/EM as clerks, interpreters, guards and for other basic duties. There have been numerous cases of looting both by the civil population and the troops, which might have been alleviated by the presence of a body of troops under the control of AMGOT. There is no such body provided, in the AMGOT organisation, and the strength of C.M.Ps. and F.S.S. in relation to the number

✓ MS 30/9

of villages in a metropolitan country, such as Sicily, has been shown to be lamentably small. Shortage of OR/EM personnel heavily handicapped AMGOT officers in their attempts to prevent looting and the enforcement of the Proclamations, in particular curfew for the civilians and the "Out of Bounds" notices for troops. In cases where the advance was particularly rapid it often occurred that a town was left completely devoid of troops, particularly if the axis of advance had altered. This aggravated the problem for the AMGOT officer who found himself the sole person in uniform in a village or town, thus more strongly emphasizing the necessity for some form of accompanying OR/EM.

(iii) Other personnel points raised included the following :

- (a) That some of the men, selected for their knowledge of the Sicilian dialect, were of little value in translating Italian into English, or vice-versa on paper.
- (b) That they should receive more training concerning their attitude and behavior towards the inhabitants.
- (c) That a Z 1 Military Police Battalion, of detachments thereof, be placed at the disposal of the Senior Civil Affairs Officers.

6. SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS.

(i) Owing to shortage of transport, AMGOT personnel could not carry sufficient rations to be self supporting for more than a few days, and difficulty was often experienced in persuading the Quartermaster to provide them with rations. This could have been partly obviated if the function of AMGOT had been directly acknowledged by unit commanders as a part of the force.

(ii) Medical supplies were not provided for AMGOT personnel other than the General Issue first aid packet. In a unit which is obliged frequently to conduct its operations in comparatively isolated areas at considerable distances from Army hospital units it is felt that special provision should be made for equipping all AMGOT personnel with medical kits and equipment adequate to meet the situation.

7. Communications.

These were found to be of the utmost difficulty and here again the primary cause was lack of transport. The next most important reason was that priority on army signals had, quite naturally, to go to operational messages.

8. Miscellaneous.

(i) It is considered essential that such identification marks as police arm bands, special police identity cards, vehicle permit cards and special passes for after curfew hours be printed in advance.

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8. Miscellaneous.

(i) It is considered essential that such identification marks as police arm bands, special police identity cards, vehicle permit cards and special passes for after curfew hours be printed in advance.

(ii) C.I.C. should coordinate its activities more extensively with AMGOT and should submit copies of their reports in order to insure a uniformity of treatment of civilians.

(iii) A lack of sufficient instruction with respect to procedure of requisitioning property caused considerable confusion. This subject will be covered by more definite instructions from Headquarters AMGOT in the future.

Charles M. Stanford

CHARLES M. STANFORD.

Colonel, G.S.C.

Chief Staff Officer 22

REPORTS OF OFFICERS IN THE FIELD

HQrs. AMGOT



48
Calt Prov/3

Herewith reports by the following officers:-

Lt. Col. W.R. IRISH

Major E.J. MERCER

Major A.S. GILES

Capt. E.W. ABEL

Lt. G.W.E. COULT

Lt. Col. C.T. FRANCIS

S.C.A.O.

Senior Legal Officer

C.A.O.

C.A.O.

C.A.O.

P.C.A.P.O.

Caltanissetta

18 Sept. 1943

W. R. Irish
Lt. Col.

S.C.A.O., Caltanissetta Province.

47
Memo: Lessons Learned in the Field.

The following lessons were learned in the Field in the recent operations in Sicily:

Transport: Each CAO needs Army Transportation to do his job effectively.

Enlisted Men: Enlisted men for use as drivers, clerks, interpreters, guards, messengers, etc., are badly needed. These men should be organized into a military unit.

Communication: 8 Signal Company should be attached to AMGOT to give much-needed communications with SCAOs.

Supply: AMGOT Officers should be put in the chain of supply like any other branch of the Army. This was not done in the recent operations.

M.P.'s: The 2 I Military Police Battalion are highly desirable for this work in the early stages. They have been trained for just this. They should be placed at the disposal of the SCAOs.

Caltanissetta
18 Sept 43

W. P. Smith
Lt Col
S.C.A.O. Caltanissetta Province.

46

O A. M. G. O. T.

Senior Legal
Office of ~~Chief Civil Affairs~~ Police Officer

PROVINCE OF CALTANISSETTA

13 Aug 1943

Subject: "Lessons learned" by Legal Section
To: C. H. O.
Through: D. C. A. O. Caltanissetta.

1. Charge sheets fail to lay the offense under a specific provision of proclamation, order Article of Italian Penal Code or law of war.

2. Records of Summary Courts fail to give sufficient summary of evidence taken to make out prima facie case. Military witnesses move and case falls before Superior Court for lack of essential proof.

3. It is suggested that instructions, along the line of attached, be issued to Summary Court Officers.

4. Transportation presents the most serious difficulty in getting accused, witnesses and court together at the same time. It is suggested that every effort be made to furnish at least one vehicle in each Province for use of Superior Court (if vehicle can not be requisitioned locally), and that the Court make a weekly circuit, holding court on a day certain and a place certain each week.

5. Superior Court officers should be competent to review most sentences of Summary Courts within their territorial jurisdiction. It is

45

A. M. G. O. T.

~~Office of Chief Civil Affairs Police Officer~~
PROVINCE OF CALTANISSETTA

- 2 -

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suggested that the Senior Legal Officer of a Province, or Provinces, be given authority to review finally & to confirm sentences of such courts, excepting, that where facts & circumstances are such in a particular case that he has reason to believe that to secure uniformity, or for any other reason, the case should be reviewed by higher authority, he shall then forward the case, with his recommendations, if any. When Senior Legal Officer has more than one Province he might be allowed to delegate this authority to associate Superior Court Officers in one or more of such Provinces.

Edwin J. Mercer

Edwin J. Mercer

Maj. Gen., Senior Legal
Officer

A. M. G. O. T.

44

Office of Chief Civil Affairs Police Officer
PROVINCE OF CALTANISSETTA

Annex

194

Instructions to Summary Court Officers

1. Charge sheets presented to you must
(a) identify the proclamation (article & section),
order, Article of Italian Penal Code, or
law or usage of war alleged to have been
violated, (b) state time, place & acts of
accused which constitute the violation.
2. In each case referred to a higher court
a concise summary of sufficient testimony
will be recorded so that if witnesses become
unavailable there will be enough evidence
before the higher court to make out a *prima
facie* case. Affidavits are not satisfactory
for this purpose, such evidence must be
given in the presence of accused in person
& he have the opportunity to cross examine.

26

Observations of C.A.Os in the Field

CONFIDENTIAL 43

To: S.C.A.O. CALTANISSETTA PROVINCE

With reference to the instruction calling for the observations of Field Officers (AMGOT/266/HQ dated 18 Aug 43) the following are submitted for consideration.

1. TRAINING (i) Officers with specialist training or experience in Public Administration in other European countries should have been given more instruction in,

(a) the language

(b) the present organisation and less of the history of the country in which they were to be employed.

(ii) Enlisted men should have been trained in the importance of security in an enemy country.

2. EQUIPMENT (a) Officers should not be advised to get the minimum kit before leaving England because plenty would be available at destination and then be prevented from obtaining further kit before taking up their assignments.

(b) Officers were not provided with any medical equipment, other than a first field dressing, with which to combat the effects of bad water, unusual food, insect-pests, cuts and abrasions.

of themselves and the ORs of which they are eventually in charge
 (c) Some form of strong box or field desk with locks should have been provided. After the investigations of Intelligence Staffs, buildings such as Casa del Fascio may not have a sound lock in them.

(d) Transport, if only a motorcycle, which is should have been trained to ride, should be landed with the officer. The extraction of transport from a busily employed combat unit to take CPOs inland from the beach does not always conduce to mutual good will. Since the Army invariably takes over all mobile vehicles belonging to the inhabitants, the absence of any form of transport delays the restarting of normal life e.g. the provision of grain and fuel for mills. Without any other means of communication it is difficult to render reports.

(e) Enlisted Men assigned to AMGOT should be armed and trained in their weapons, preferably revolvers or automatic pistols.

3. PERSONNEL (a) Civil Affairs teams including Enlisted Men should work together as long as possible before assignment. This point is particularly important where an officer of one army may find himself in charge of personnel of another.

(b) Enlisted Men appear to have been selected for their knowledge of dialect. They have not proved, in most cases, of value in translating written Italian into English and vice versa. They should also have had training in the finer points of behaviour towards

officials and of their relationships with the inhabitants.

4 Organisation (a) Teams, on assembly, should know their individual appointments. CAO's have performed the duties of CAP.O's and vice versa in the same team.

(b) An officer should be appointed as Adjutant or Staff Officer to the S.C.A.O. Had this been the case much material could have been collected from CAO's reports for his staff. Much information would have been ready for presentation to HQs AMCOT on its establishment on the island.

(c) The army in the lower organisations were ^{frequently} unaware of the existence, and when they were aware, were ignorant of the functions of CAO's. Many opportunities for cooperation were thereby missed.

(d) The absence of L of C troops added to the burdens of CAO's. (i) Salvage units could have collected much material before it was damaged or stolen by the inhabitants. The derailing of the population while large quantities of small arms and ammunition were lying about for all to take was difficult to explain to the people who were afraid of marauders especially Germans.

(ii) Military Police to enforce "Off Limits" rules and to check the use of ex enemy vehicles by troops visiting "off limits" towns. A task for which the carabinieri are of course useless.

(iii) C.I.C. when available, proved invaluable in checking the antecedents of many individuals who had not been in the towns when they were first occupied and who did not return until the Army had passed on.

(IV) Communications of any sort did not exist. All attempts to get Signal units who were repairing civil and ex enemy lines for military use, to repair an additional one for the CAO failed.

5. Supply (a) Not infrequently CAOs obtained no rations or existed on what they found left in billets of departing troops. In some instances CAOs had no E.M. with them who could either relieve the CAO. So that he could buy local food or go for him to do so. One or two meals of bread or pasta, made of 94% milled flour containing barley, olive oil and tomatoes add emphasis to the plea made in para 2(b). Officers ordered to report should be ordered to bring rations with them.

(b) Wear and tear of clothing and equipment, due to much walking, call for some arrangement for repair and replacement, especially of clothing and boots where the patterns of the two armies differ so much.

6. Civilians (a) Sindacos and their staffs have usually been cooperative and, when mutual confidence has been established, they have shown considerable courage and have, at times, carried out uncongenial tasks.

(b) To one who has had considerable official contact with British Civil and Military Police it was, at first, a surprise that the Carabinieri, in the condition in which they then were, could keep any order at all. They have improved considerably since the occupation but need constant keeping up to the mark.

(c) The Clergy are extraordinarily ineffective. The thieves and lying propensities of all classes of the people are not a good testimonial

39 5

(d) The peasant classes are hard working but inherently dishonest. Perhaps because of a long period of fascism they have acquired a past model in misinterpreting or disregarding proclamations and ordinances. They make serious penalties but they continue with considerable success where the powers of enforcement are limited.

The well to do classes are not hard working, are also dishonest and in addition are selfish.

Both classes have an unrequited desire for revenge against quite harmless neighbours who may, at some time, have gained some minor advantage. What their ultimate fate will be is, at the moment, a further speculation. It will be interesting to see how things develop.

(e) Fascism or the fact that some of the organisations set up under the regime have not been abolished by us is sometimes used as an excuse to attempt to make orders.

7 Conclusion Stress has been laid on the difficulties in the hope that some may be avoided in future operations. It is a matter of speculation how single handed C.A.O.s would have fared in a country where the population was patriotic and had the guts to be non co-operative.

It has been a most interesting experience. Though the work has always been exacting and some times exasperating it has often been amusing.

CALTANISSETTA

29 Aug 1943

AS. C. Iles ^{magri}
212
C.A.O.

7
7.0. Report.38
5 Sept. 43Suggestion.

That the officer to be C.A.O. in any given area act as O.C. town right from the start regardless of the presence of fighting troops.

This would obviate the necessity for the colossal amount of clean-up work on
1. shotguns. 2. Enemy material. 3. transport and many others.

The officer should be loaned troops by the fighting forces for this phase, to work under his control so that when the force moves on, he is able to assume the responsibility from personal knowledge, not a bungled job such as was left heretofore.

EWABH Capt.

C. A. O.

List 2. Caltanissetta

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A.M.A.O.C.To: D.S.O.A.C.From: C.A.O. No. 4 District.Subject: Report. Field ExperienceInitial stage.

The initial stage in this work was much as described at the school of instruction except that I being trained for the Public Safety Division, started work as a C.A.C.

I entered the field by being posted to the 1st. Div. and commenced duty by following the assault troops.

On entering a town I found that the best procedure was to find and question the local chief of Carabinieri as to the qualities of the Syndeco and Secretary. Then to the local Priest and to cross examine him, then to the Syndeco and Secretary and to do likewise.

This method gave me a cross check on the state of the local government. The Carabinieri I found to be usually very keen and helpful and would usually give an accurate account of local activities. Priest leaders were usually dealt with by the C.I.C. and need not cause any great worry at this stage.

If the Syndeco had fled or was otherwise absent the local priest was appointed for a temporary period until the town settled and one could get on sure ground.

FOOD AND WATER

This was a major consideration but could usually be solved by collecting all the small stocks of the poorer people and the big stocks that could be found in the houses of the fascists and the rich, and then with the co-operation of the Syndeco a ration system could be started, also grain could usually be found ~~and~~ at the mill or in the magazine, this carried us over until things settled down. Water could usually be found in local wells and although it meant that it had to be carried, the people could manage.

Medical

would help.

Finance

Supplies were found to be short, but at a pinch the army

A good supply of ready money is essential as everything such as banks are frozen and labour is easy to obtain when the money is at hand to pay for work done.

Secondary stage

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Secondary Stage.

When taking over a town after the din and bustle of war has passed the chief difficulty of the C.A.C. is to live down the premises of those that have gone before.

Extravagant claims have been made in the past by transient C.A.C.'s, these men were not trained but divisional men appointed by the local Commanders; who led the inhabitants to believe that all the good things in life were following behind, consequently the resident C.A.C. has the unthankful job of telling the population the truth and so giving thought to the fact that we are liars.

Offices

It is not recommended that C.A.C.'s reside in the same building as the office is situated, should he do so then he asks for trouble as he is unable to leave the job for a minute.

Staff should be employed to see callers, for although the C.A.C. should be available to the poorest individual who calls it is necessary that the wheat be sorted from the chaff. A great deal of time is wasted by seeing people who have an axe to grind, or who want money for relief. Should he make a practise of seeing these

Continued.

people then he will never see the people who matter.
Interpreters

Good interpreters are necessary especially for the C.A.I.C. in having to deal with many legal matters, these being difficult to interpret cause great loss of time.

Transport

This is matter of dire necessity, the quality of cars requisitioned is poor and spare parts are practically unobtainable.

Four or five punctures a day are common and where towns are far apart this results in a great loss of time.

Morale

Morale of the population has been found to be good and in general the people have welcomed the invasion of the allies.

Political

Political tendencies seem to favour us but there are a great many complaints that fascists are retained in positions of trust in the local government. This I think is an effort to wipe off old scores but it has been proved that these men although once fascists are now satisfied to hold their jobs on good behaviour, and it is found that they in most cases know their jobs and I have found that it is bad policy to throw all of them out because of their past record as we cannot obtain the same efficiency with new blood as the job has to be learned.

In the early stages we cannot afford to have learners in the jobs that matter. Therefore pre-fascist workers properly supervised by the C.A.I.C. give the best results.

Carabinieri

The Carabinieri are the bulwark of the C.A.I.C. and as such should be recognised. They should be assisted in the way of increased wages, new boots and clothing as soon as possible. Also many good leaders are holding lower ranks owing to the severance of the Rome control. Production should be accelerated where possible. Owing to the lack of allied troops on the island in the near future the Carabinieri will be the people we, the C.A.I.C.'s in the field rely on.

Prices

This is an important question. Prices are hard to ascertain as quoted by the proclamation i.e.; as on 9th July, 1943, as very few people have any idea of the prices legally set on that date.

In consequence many articles especially clothing fetches high prices. The answer is an official price list. To be provided

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Fire & A.R.P.

In large towns this department of ANBOT could no 208 find some work to do, but in my experience outside of the provincial cities fire and A.R.P. services are practically non-existent and by the state of some towns, which I have seen are totally unnecessary. Most of the smaller towns I have seen have been built on solid rock and the cellars of the houses make good air raid shelters. In the case of fire water is a great difficulty and it is hard to find for drinking purposes for the greater part of the year.

C.A.I.C.'s

These officers are doing admirable work and have to work in very close co-operation with the C.A.C. and both have to know as much of each others job as possible. I think that the term C.A.I.C. should be abolished and that this officer should be described as

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as Asst. C.A.C. and to him should be delegated all the powers of the C.A.C. working out the Carabinieri and local Police Forces as his special province.

C.A.F.O.'S are now in the field as C.A.C.'S and working with them as others who are of equal rank who were retained as C.A.F.O.'S, the designation of Asst. would I am sure create a very happy atmosphere.

Rank

It seems a ridiculous position that officers performing similar duties in adjacent districts, both of which have the same number of towns under their control, should be of such different rank.

In example is where six towns are controlled by each individual and the ranks are respectively, Major and Lieutenant. I suggest that the Position of C.A.C. is one that justifies a rank commensurate with the appointment. Further, it is practically impossible to maintain the standard set by the Allied Government on the pay of the lower rank.

Paper Work - Returns

It is found, that without clerical assistance the C.A.C. has to work far into the night in an endeavour to satisfy the demands made by H.Q. usually by the aid of candles, therefore one has to sacrifice either the returns or the more important work in the field.

G. Coult
Gilbert Coult, Lieutenant.

C.A.C. No. 4 District.

Calcutta Province.

SUBJECT:- Reports of Field Officers.

Our Ref:- CAT/4/4.

Ar Ref:- AMGOT/266/HQ.

D:- 18 AUG 43.

34

To:- AMGOT H.Q.
PALERMO.

From:- Lt. Col. Wellesley,
S.C.A.O.
Province of Catania.



The report received from C.A.O. CALTAGIRONE is enclosed herewith. This report was sent to this office as a result of a reminder and no trace can be found of its being previously received.

J. Wellesley

Catani.
16 Sep 43.
Encl:

Lt. Col.
S.C.A.O.

33

8B

COPY

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
CALTAGIRONE

SECRET

REF/C.A.O./C./10/3

DATE 27 th August 1943

Subject: REPORT " LESSONS LEARNED "

TO H.Q. A.M.G.O.T

Reference AMGOT H.Q. letter Angot/266/H.Q. dated 18 Aug.
43 the following report is submitted for the Southern half of Catania Province.

A. GENERAL.

1. Considerable difficulty has been experienced with transport for C.A.O.S. Although it has been comparatively simple to find and requisition civilian cars these have proved unsatisfactory as they have mostly been off the road for some time; tyres and spare parts are extremely scarce. At any rate for the first few weeks skeleton WD transport should be made available.

2. The majority of Italian civilian and military lorries run on Diesel oil, in most cases they were immobilised by removing the "injectors". If every C.A.O. carried two spare stocks of injectors (Bosche type) he could have lorries available for food transport almost immediately on entry into a district.

3. PUBLIC RELIEF. It is considered that the maximum of L.25 for the head of family and L.5 for each dependent is far too high; it would pay the average Sicilian working man to give up work at L 40/50 per day. L.10+2 has been found adequate in this district.

I have made it a rule that no able bodied man (other than pensioners) shall receive assistance unless he is prepared to work say 4 hrs a day on clearing roads, buildings etc. As well as providing ready labour this has had the effect of weeding out "bogus" claimants among refugees from other places whose circumstances are necessarily unknown to the investigating committee; for instance in one commune 400 able bodied men claimed assistance but of these 398 preferred to do without it rather than work from 8 - 12 daily.

4. While personal interviews with civilians who have claims, requests and the like are considered necessary they would occupy all the C.A.O.'s time if uncontrolled. It has been found that the best results are obtained by allowing ~~sleep~~ interviews only between 14.30 and 16.30 hrs; since the ordinary Sicilian sleeps all afternoon only those with genuine grievances demand an interview, the "time wasters" prefer to sleep.

5. A very high proportion of the country population is illiterate and cannot be expected either to read or understand the proclamations.

It was found that the best way of surmounting this difficulty is to get every priest to explain the proclamations simply from the pulpit the first Sunday after occupation.

In this connection it was found that excellent results were obtained by the C.A.C. (whatever his creed) making, by arrangement with the archbishop or senior priest, a formal attendance at the cathedral or parish church the first Sunday after occupation. The clergy have been very cooperative and the importance of utilising their influence cannot be too highly stressed.

6. In almost every commune there exists the elements of a so called Democratic party who regard our entry into a town as the arrival of a terrestrial paradise in which they are the only possible leaders. In most cases they make wild accusations against every member of the present administration (about 10 are pure nonsense) whilst insisting that since they have always been anti-fascist they should ~~take~~ take over the administration; this have are quite incapable of doing since obviously they have held no administrative posts for many years. If they are not to be a nuisance these people want treating firmly.

B. SUPPLY.=

7. The word "AMMASI" has unpleasant connections for the farmers. Where practicable better results are obtained by using some wording which indicate that the System is controlled by AMGOT.

8. Since most AMMASI stores are found to be completely empty on entering towns where fighting has taken place immediate transport is required for getting grain into towns. It is suggested that 3 ton lorries for AMGOT use be kept well forward for use in emergency. Mule trains can be useful in emergency but are very slow and difficult to organize.

9. It has been found useful to issue weekly from this HQ a list of maximum prices for eggs, vegetables etc to operate in all the communes? Prices vary from week to week according to season, availability of transport etc and standard prices throughout the area ensure reasonable distribution.

C. POLICE

10. The civilian police have worked very well and only general supervision need be exercised? It is hopeless to expect to impose allied civil police organisation on Sicilian police forces; it has not always been easy for a professional allied policeman realize that what appears to be the beginning of a major riot is merely two Sicilian friends passing the time of day.

11. Police difficulties have occurred all the time with our own troops whose discipline has not always been of the highest standard; it is realised that the G.M.P. personnel in any occupation are necessarily limited but it would be a great advantage if at least a detachment could be stationed in each major town one the L. of C or in rest areas.=

D. PUBLIC HEALTH.

12. A much speedier method of distributing imported or captured medical supplies is required. For example this area which is almost totally devoid of supplies submitted as yet.

The immediate needs in any area over which fighting has taken place are for wounded rather than sick people. The hospitals which are not accustomed to dealing with large numbers of civilian wounded don't carry large enough

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8C

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
CALTAGIRONE

REF/

- 2 -

DATE _____

stocks of bandages, dressing etc.

E. LEGAL.

13. It would be an advantage if C.A.O. 's could enter a captured area already armed with permission to open Summary military courtes and also to try minor cases under the Italian penale code? For example the first person breaking the curfew~~s~~ should be punished and the punishment published on the day the offence occurred not a week later.

F. REPORTS

14. The other two C.A.O. 's in this area have read this report and have nothing to add to it.

P.C.

Major RA
CAO CALTAGIRONE

206

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

FROM: Reports of Major Ralph

ASST/33/11

ASST L.D. STELL

17th September 1943.

TO:-

S.C.A.C.
CANBERRA.

Reference your GAF/1, dated 18th August 1943, enclosing report from Major Ralph. I am directed by the S.C.A.C. to inform you that he entirely agrees with your remarks and directs that you should inform Major Ralph accordingly.

"While personal interviews with civilians who have claims, requests and the like are considered necessary they would occupy all the S.C.A.C.'s time if uncontrolled. It has been found that the best results are obtained by allowing interviews only between 1430 and 1630 hrs; since the ordinary civilian sleeps all afternoon only those with genuine grievances demand an interview; the "cheek-makers" prefer to sleep."

The above extract comes from Captain Baxter-Jones, and it is suggested that Major Ralph try out this method.

W.P.
Major,
Military Assistant to
Chief Civil Affairs Officer

205

SUBJECT:- Reports of Field Officers.

30

O. Ref:- CAT/4/4.
Your Ref:- AMGOT/266/HQ.
D:- 18 Aug 43.

Inmate to
SCMS

To:- AMGOT H.Q.
PALERMO.



From:- Lt. Col. Wellesley,
S.C.A.O.
Province of Catania.

I enclose a copy of a report received from C.A.O.
Bronte.

J. Wellesley

Catania.
13 Sep 43.
Encl:

Lt. Col.
S.C.A.O.

To:- Lt. Col. Wellesley,
S.C.A.O.
Province of Catania.

AMGOT.

BRONAR.

9th September, 1943.

Ref. No. AMGOT/266/HQ.

REPORTS OF FIELD OFFICERS - LESSONS LEARNED.

ACTION DURING FIRST STAGES.

Upon entry into an occupied town contact should be made with local officials - many of whom are absent - a point which often enables one to assess their value. From those present information can be obtained as to the general situation of the town and populace, and the problems to be faced. AMGOT H.Q. should be immediately established in the most suitable building, and Proclamations and Notices explained to the officials and posted.

A general survey of the town is then necessary to ascertain the position as regards dead, food and water supplies, electric power, hospitals, banks, post offices, population and refugees. Full use should be made of local units at an early stage. It is the writer's experience that full co-operation will be received from the following units for the purposes shown :- Corps of Military Police - traffic control, posting of signs and control of military and civilians, Hygiene Section, R.A.M.C. - for supervising burial of dead and cleansing of infected premises, (2) Royal Engineers - removal of debris from streets and repairs to water systems (including pumping stations), R.A.M.C. - supervision of hospitals, R.E.M.E. - repairs to, and installation of engines for mills, Supply Depots - emergency supplies of fuel. Without the assistance of such units the work of a C.A.O. would be rendered futile. In connection with this matter one point should be guarded against. Operations may make it necessary for these units to move on at any time leaving their work incomplete. It is therefore necessary to prepare for such contingency by permitting local engineers and workmen to work in conjunction with the military authorities in order that they will be able to carry on with the work alone. This has proved ~~xxx~~ quite successful in practice.

REQUISITIONING.

Quite a considerable amount of requisitioning has to be done during

785015

NOTES

Notices explained to the officials and posted.

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REQUISITIONING.

Quite a considerable amount of requisitioning has to be done during the first few days. For example, transport is required for AVGOT personnel, engines are required to operate mills or pumping stations, timber, cement and other materials for repair work may be needed. No instructions are contained in the AVGOT Plan on this subject, and in consequence it is feared that haphazard methods may have been employed which will probably lead to a deal of confusion ~~xx~~ at a later stage. Furthermore, it has been found that military personnel are very lax in this matter, on many occasions no requisition form or in fact any form of receipt at all has been given for the article taken, with consequent enquiry of the AVGOT officer, who in the absence of proof, can rarely record the complaint. In this connection it has also been found that there exist peculiar ideas as to what articles may be requisitioned, the order that only those needed for operational purposes being so obtained, is more or less ignored.

TRANSPORT.

It is considered essential that adequate transport be provided for AVGOT officers in future, as it seems hardly consistent with the dignity of the P.T.O.

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Notices explained to the officials and posted.

A general survey of the town is then necessary to ascertain the position as regards dead, food and water supplies, electric power, hospitals, banks, post offices, population and refugees. Full use should be made of local units at an early stage. It is the writer's experience that full co-operation will be received from the following units for the purposes shown:— Corps of Military Police — traffic control, posting of signs and control of military and civilians, Hygiene Section, R.A.M.C. — for supervising burial of dead and cleansing of infected premises, (2) Royal Engineers — removal of debris from streets and repairs to water systems (including pumping stations), R.A.M.C. — supervision of hospitals, R.E.M.E. — repairs to, and installation of engines for mills, Supply Depots — emergency supplies of fuel. Without the assistance of such units the work of a C.A.O. would be rendered futile. In connection with this matter one point should be guarded against. Operations may make it necessary for these units to move on at any time leaving their work incomplete. It is therefore necessary to prepare for such contingency by permitting local engineers and workmen to work in conjunction with the military authorities in order that they will be able to carry on with the work alone. This has proved ~~xxx~~ quite successful in practice.

REQUISITIONING.

Quite a considerable amount of requisitioning has to be done during the first few days. For example, transport is required for AMGOT personnel, engines are required to operate mills or pumping stations, timber, cement and other materials for repair work may be needed. No instructions are contained in the AMGOT Plan on this subject, and in consequence it is feared that haphazard methods may have been employed which will probably lead to a deal of confusion ~~xx~~ at a later stage. Furthermore, it has been found that military personnel are very lax in this matter, on many occasions no requisition form or in fact any form of receipt at all has been given for the article taken, with consequent enquiry of the AMGOT officer, who in the absence of proof, can merely record the complaint. In this connection it has also been found that there exist peculiar ideas as to what articles may be requisitioned, the order that only those needed for operational purposes being so obtained, is more or less ignored.

TRANSPORT.

It is considered essential that adequate transport be provided for AMGOT officers in future, as it seems hardly consistent with the dignity P.T.O.

of an officer taking over control of a town to arrive say, on the pillow of a motor cycle, or on some military vehicle upon which he has literally "scrounged" a lift.

In addition, often a town is left without any means of transport and the provision of a truck would be of inestimable value for the conveyance of foodstuffs, materials for repair work and personnel. Lack of suitable transport has frequently been the cause of much delay and in many cases has prevented the carrying out of essential matters.

INTERVIEWS WITH PUBLIC.

The majority of interviews should be with local officials and those connected with public utilities, as such valuable time is wasted listening to the petty personal problems of individuals. It must have been every ANGOT officer's experience to witness the inevitable queue outside the ANGOT Office as well as listen to innumerable matters which could well be dealt with elsewhere. I would therefore suggest that such interviews be kept to an absolute minimum, suitable cases being diverted to either the Municipal Authorities or the Police. At the same time it is realised that such useful information may be obtained respecting personalities or matters affecting the populace by granting some interviews. The latter are also likely to form a favourable impression of the occupying forces if they are given a sympathetic hearing and some sound advice thus creating confidence in the new administration.

ANGOT PERSONNEL.

An urgent necessity is that of supplying the C.A.O. with some personnel E.G. Other Ranks. For an officer to enter and be left in a town with no help whatever places him under a great handicap. There are many occasions when his forced to attend to small matters which could well be dealt with by a capable N.C.O. Although in the early stages there is the minimum of paper work, this increases as time goes on and not only does the officer find himself in the position of administrator but also that of clerk, with a consequent decrease in efficiency.

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion I would say the two most pressing needs for the future are transport and personnel as officers working ⁱⁿ Sicily have been handicapped by the lack of both. Travelling between towns on bad roads ~~and~~ such loss of time which is increased by the type of

785015

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CONCLUSION.

In conclusion I would say the two most pressing needs for the future are transport and personnel as ~~the~~ officers working Sicily have been handicapped by the lack of both. Travelling between towns on bad roads causes much loss of time which is increased by the type of transport which has been available.

SGD....T. RUSSELL.
Capt.
Civil Affairs Officer.

C.C.A.O.

28

→ To see from flagged page.

2. In reply to 27 we may send copies of 16 (with attachments)?

In addition we will send Divisional Reports which we will call for again (see 17) and a packet of pp. 18 on.

①
13/9.

M.A.:
See minutes on 25.
Please draft - neither
in reply to 27 +
submit
14/9

785015


SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section

jw



9 Sept 43

SUBJECT: Administrative Lessons from Operations in SICILY.

TO : Hq., AMG

Reference attached please submit report here in duplicate by 22 September.



1 - Incl - as above

T. B. Jackman
Major

T. B. JACKMAN
Major
Military Government Section

201

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

COPY

26

8 September 1943.

SUBJECT: Administrative Lessons from Operations in SICILY.

TO :

1. It is desired to incorporate into an Administrative Report for the benefit of the W.D. (U.S.) and W.O. (Br.) and other theaters of war, the appropriate lessons from the Administrative and logistical planning and operations point of view, learnt during the SICILIAN campaign, whilst those lessons are fresh in the minds of Staff officers and observers who participated in the operations.

2. Concise and constructive reports or informal memoranda are desired from the various staffs concerned, covering in substance the following applicable subject matter, or any additional subjects considered appropriate. The major lessons deducted from these reports will, it is hoped, illustrate the soundness or weakness of methods adopted in any phase of the operation from the point of view of organization, administration, movement and training.

a. Planning from the date that Hq. Force 141 (later Hq. 15 Army Group) started to plan the operation.

b. Movements of personnel, vehicles and stores into the areas whence they were to be embarked and loaded for the operation.

c. Loading of ships and craft.

d. Arrangements for embarking personnel, vehicles and stores for the assault and subsequent calling forward of the balance of the force.

e. Administration on the beaches and in the Beach Maintenance Areas.

f. The establishment and working of Base Sub Areas.

3. It is also desired to cover the functions and cooperation given by the Navy and Air Force and any major lessons and experiences encountered on subjects pertaining to the Technical Services, enumerated below.*

4. Reports and allied papers will be submitted at the earliest practicable date to reach this Headquarters not later than 25 September 1943.

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

H.M. GALE
Lieutenant General
Chief Administrative Officer

British - Engineers, Movement and Transportation, Medical, Provost, Supply and Transport, Ordnance, and H.E.M.E.

U.S. - CWS, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation.

SUBJECT:- Reports of Field Officers.

25
Our Ref:- CAT/4.
Our Ref:- AMGOT/266/HQ.
D:- 18 Aug 43.

To:- AMGOT H.Q.
PALERMO.

From:- Lt. Col. Wellesley,
S.C.A.O.
Province of Catania.



I enclose copy of a report received from C.A.O.
ACIREALE.

I cannot agree with Major Rolph that AMGOT officers should be ~~exactly~~ inaccessible to the public and a short period of each day must be dedicated to this unpleasant and often useless task. When AMGOT has been functioning for a longer period it may be possible to publish a notice saying that no interviews will be granted except by appointment.

Catania.
7 Sept 43.
Encl:

*I entirely agree with Lt. Col. Lordcroft
Wellesley. Tell him
so and tell him
to tell Major Rolph
So too: suggest to
Capt. Brinkman
Kennedy.*

Lt. Col.
S.C.A.O.

194

m/g

COPY.

To:-- Senior Civil Affairs Officer,
Province of Calabria.

Subject:-- Reports of Field Officers.



Reference AMGOT/266/HQ of 18th August 1943 I have the following report to submit.

1. It became apparent from the start that it was necessary to arrive in towns as soon as they were taken, thus ensuring that
 - (a) essential buildings, such as 'municipi, were not occupied by troops or looted by civilians,
 - (b) carabinieri were not disarmed in an irregular manner,
 - (c) the minimum of opportunity was given to civilians to loot and
 - (d) some civilian transport was left for the use of AMGOT.
2. Early contact with the F.S.S. was essential. This enabled representatives of both to formulate a working agreement and avoided the premature interment of essential Public Officials when a few days respite could easily be allowed. The C.A.O. was then able to obtain all the information that he required from such Officials and to find a suitable successors.
3. I found it most essential to give the Senior Ranks of the Carabinieri a talking to as quickly as possible. This restored their confidence which always seemed to be rather shaken, and encouraged them to set about their work under their new masters with enthusiasm. In every instance they appeared only too pleased to co-operate.
4. When only one or possibly two officers were given responsibility for the Civil Affairs of large Districts of, say, a population of 100,000 people it was fatal to receive the public. If this were done the officer would be assailed and his office would be crowded with a filthy, unruly mob who had no idea of good order. Not one in a hundred would have an important point to raise or make a request which could not be answered by the Podesta or other local official. Even if the officer could see them the answers given in almost every case would disappoint and not please. I found that in order to make real progress with my job it was necessary to enter a town fully aware of what I wanted to find out, of the people I wanted to see and the actions which I was going to take in the circumstances as I found them. To do this and hint that the public would be received produced an impossible combination which had to be avoided if the C.A.O. wished to carry out his real job of conducting Civil Affairs as instructed

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5. C.A.O.s making early entry into towns should not only make sure that they are adequately provided with copies of the proclamations but that they also have a variety of other notices such as 'For use of A.M.G.O.T. only', 'These premises will not be entered by British Troops without the authority of the undersigned', 'A.M.G.O.T.' etc. The early posting of the notices in places where required gives notice of the arrival of the C.A.O. and provides a ready means of his using his authority.

6. I found most of the instructions in the A.M.G.O.T. 'Bible' workable but practising would have been so much easier if the various proformas referred to had been supplied.

7. I find that an O.R. clerk is a great asset. Besides carrying out all P.T.O.

minor but necessary work in the C.A.Os office he can be used for drawing supplies and carrying out other duties which at the present time no native of the country has the confidence or authority to do.

Although the above is not an actual report of the exact occurrences which came my way, every point which I have mentioned was emphasized by experiences which I have had, not one, but on lots of occasions over the last two months.

Acireale.
4th September 1943.

SIGNED...R. ROLPH.
Major R.E.
Civil Affairs Officer,
Acireale District.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015SUBJECT: Medical Supplies.

AMCOT/RO12/PH.

AMCOT R.O. SICILY.

10 Jan 43.

TO: Chief Staff Officer.

19

58/HB
61.216
23

Reference C.A.C.O. 10/5 dated 27 Aug 42 is agreed that
tremendous difficulties necessitating some delay exist in maintaining
the position as regards the distribution of Medical Stores to the civil
population during an occupation of enemy country.

The position is that the Army has full control of all imported
and captured Medical Supplies. If the Army's own material suffers in
consequence of enemy action large amounts are of necessity made into the
captured material and the quantity made available to AMCOT for civil
distribution reduced in consequence. Again, military and civilian transport
captured by the Army is retained by it, often of necessity for considerable
periods and only released to AMCOT in small quantities.

The problems mentioned are being made the subject of a special
discussion with the Army authorities.

[Signature]

D. GORDON GILLIES.

Colonel.

Director of Public Health.

197

785015

Subject: "Lessons Learned" Reports

To: Chief Staff Officer.

AMCOT/5131/CS
AMCOT HQ SICILY
10 September 43.

1. Reference Report on above from Caltagirone dated 27 August, which reached this Division on 10 Sept.
2. Para. 7: The amasso system is being revised now, the problem is to find and set up a working substitute.
3. Para. 8: Strongly recommended.
4. Para. 9: This is done on our instructions in every Province.
5. Para. 2: This depends on the type of transport used in the country to be occupied; knowledge of this is obtained from Intelligence sources. In Sicily these sources were found to be quite unreliable. It is suggested that batteries, plugs, and standard size tyres should be taken.

CJH/EDG.



J. F. R. SETTE
Lt. Col., G. S. C.
D. C. S. R.

785015

1000
SUBJECT:- REPORT "LESSONS LEARNED."

58/HQ 21
AMGOT/1004/PS

AMGOT H.Q., SICILY.

11th September 1943.

TO:- C.S.O.

19
With reference to the report of the C.A.O.,
CALTAGIRONE, dated 27th August 1943, the following
comment is offered.

Paragraph 4. The C.A.O.'s method of
dealing with interviews and requests seems to me an
excellent one, and might well be offered as a suggestion
to S.C.A.O.s.

Paragraph 9. The plan followed in announcing
maximum prices in each comune is excellent. In this
connection, however, public posting of these prices in every
place where such products are on sale is essential.
Without this feature control of violations is almost impossible.

Paragraph 10. The last sentence cannot be
allowed to pass unchallenged. If any Officer is capable
of appreciating what constitutes a riot it is the professional
Allied policeman. Our experience has been that it is the
inexperienced C.A.O. who fails to appreciate the significance
of an incipient riot.

Stuart Martin
For **LEMMUEL S. HOLMES.**
Colonel,
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY.
195

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

C.S.O.

18-19 seems to me to be filled with most excellent advice.

C.C.A.O. has forwarded at 16 notes by Cp. Capt. Benson & Col. Polatti & I do not think we should fwd. this letter separately - rather wait until others have been received

2. I would like to know more about the "injection". Civil Supply may know whether some difficulty has been found elsewhere

3. I will have copies made for Division

TB 8/9.

Done & sent to

P.S., C.S., B.H. and Legal

9/9

B.U.

T.B.

17/9/4

785015

Ref. v.g. and 23

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

CALTEGARTONE
HEADQUARTERS
H.Q.

SECRET

REF/C.A.O.C./10/3

Subject: REPORT " LESSONS LEARNED "

DATE 27 th August 1943

7 SEP 1943
58/49
AMGOT

TO H.Q. A.M.G.O.T.

Reference AMGOT H.Q. letter AMGOT/266/H.Q. dated 18 Aug. 43 the following report is submitted for the Southern half of Catania Province.

A. GENERAL.

1. Considerable difficulty has been experienced with transport for C.A.O.S. Although it has been comparatively simple to find and requisition civilian cars these have proved unsatisfactory as they have mostly been off the road for some time; tyres and spare parts are extremely scarce. At any rate for the first few weeks skeleton WD transport should be made available.

2. The ~~majority~~ majority of Italian civilian and military lorries run on Diesel oil; in most cases they were immobilised by removing the "injectors". If every C.A.O. carried two spare sets of injectors (Bosche type) he could have lorries available for food transport almost immediately on entry into a district.

3. PUBLIC RELIEF.

(It is considered that the maximum of L.25 for the head of family and L 5 for each dependent is far too high; it would pay the average Sicilian working man to give up work at L 40/50 per day. L.10+2 has been found adequate in this district.)

I have made it a rule that no able bodied man (other than pensioners) shall receive assistance unless he is prepared to work say 4 hrs a day on clearing roads, buildings etc. As well as providing ready labour this has had the effect of weeding out "bogus" claimants among refugees from other places whose circumstances are necessarily unknown to the investigating committee; for instance in one commune 400 able bodied men claimed assistance but of these 398 preferred to do without it rather than work from 8 -12 daily.

193

Subject: REPORT " LESSONS LEARNED "

AMGOT

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4. While personal interviews with civilians who have claims, requests and the like are considered necessary they would occupy all the C.A.O.'s time if uncontrolled. It has been found that the best results are obtained by allowing interviews only between 14.30 and 16.30 hrs; since the ordinary Sicilian sleeps all afternoon only those with genuine grievances demand an interview; the "time wasters" prefer to sleep.

5. A very high proportion of the country population is illiterate and cannot be expected either to read or understand the proclamations. It was found that the best way of surmounting this difficulty is to get

every priest to explain the proclamations simply from the pulpit the first Sunday after occupation.

In this connection it was found that excellent results were obtained by the C.A.O. (whatever his creed) making, by arrangement with the archbishop or senior priest, a formal attendance at the cathedral or parish church the first Sunday after occupation. The clergy have been very cooperative and the importance of utilising their influence cannot be too highly stressed.

6. In almost every commune there exists the elements of a so called Democratic party who regard our entry into a town as the arrival of a terrestrial paradise in which they are the only possible leaders. In most cases they make wild accusation against every member of the present administration (9 out of 10 are pure nonsense) whilst insisting that since they have always been anti-fascist they should take over the administration; this they are quite incapable of doing since obviously they have held no administrative posts for many years. If they are not to be a nuisance these people want treating firmly.

B. SUPPLY. =

7. The word "AMMASSI" has unpleasant connections for the farmers. Were practicable better results are obtained by using some wording which indicates that the System is controlled by AMGOT.

8. Since most AMMASSISTES are found to be completely empty on entering towns where fighting has taken place immediate transport is required for getting grain into towns. It is suggested that 3 ton lorries for AMGOT use be kept well forward for use in emergency. Mule trains can be useful in emergency but are very slow and difficult to organize.

9. It has been found useful to issue weekly from this HQ a list of maximum prices for eggs, vegetables etc to operate in all the communes. Prices vary from week to week according to season, availability of transport etc and standard prices throughout the area ensure reasonable distribution.

C. POLICE

10. The civilian police have worked very well and only general supervision need be exercised. It is hopeless to expect to impose allied civil police organisation on Sicilian police forces; it has not always been easy for a professional allied policeman to realize that what appears to be the beginning of a major riot is merely two Sicilian friends passing the time of day.

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11. = Police difficulties have occurred all the time with our own troops, whose discipline has not always been of the highest standard; it is realised that the G.M.P. personnel in any occupation are necessarily limited but it would be a great advantage if at least a detachment could be stationed in each major town on the L of C or in rest areas.

D. PUBLIC HEALTH.

12. A much speedier method of distributing imported or captured medical

18

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
CALTAGIRONE

REF/

- 2 -

DATE 28.th Aug. 1943

supplies is required. For example this area which is almost totally devoid of supplies submitted full lists of requirements on 1.st August but has recieved nothing as yet.

The immediate needs in any area over wich fighting has taken place are for wounded rather than sick people. The hospitals which are not accustomed to dealing with large numbers of civilian wounded dont carry large enough stocks of bandages, dressings etc.

E.LEGAL.

13. It would be an advantage if C.A.O.'s could enter a captured area already armed with permission to open Summary military courts and also to try minor cases under the Italian penal code. For example the first person breaking the curfew should be punished and the punishment published on the day the offence occurred not a week later.

F.REPORTS.

14. The other two C.A.O.'s in this area have read this report and have nothing to add to it.

P.C. Renta Tan

Major RA
CAO CALTAGIRONE

File 58.

OT/266/HQ.

18 August 1943.

Subject:- Reports of Field Officers.

To :- S.C.A.Os.

1. It is requested that all C.A.Os and specialist field officers be instructed to submit reports, through S.C.A.Os. to this Headquarters, emphasizing "lessons learned" in practical field experience.
2. It is believed that such reports, when consolidated, edited and published will be of considerable value to all field officers in the future. It is with this object in view that they should be written and they should contain any suggestions which it is believed would be helpful.
3. All reports should be collected by the S.C.A.Os. The C.A.O. reports should be forwarded to C.S.O. and those of the specialist officers to the Head of the Division concerned.

CHARLES M. SPOTFORD.
Lt.Col. G.S.C.
Chief Staff Officer.

AMGOT H.Q.,
15 Army Group.

Distribution:

Agrigento.
Caltanissetta.
Catania.
Enna.
Palermo.
Siracuse.
Ragusa.
Trapani.

— action
92.

SUBJECT:-- Lessons from Sicilian Operation.

SECRET

AMGOT/58/EQ

AMGOT H.Q. SICILY.

2nd September 1945.

TO: General Officer Commanding in Chief,
15 Army Group.

I enclose copies of notes on "lessons learnt" prepared by Group Capt C.E. Benson D.S.O., and Lieut-Colonel Poletti (A.U.S.) who were respectively in charge of the groups of Civil Affairs Officers in the early stages of the landing in Sicily with the 8th and 7th Armies.

I have already brought up with yourself, C.G.S. and M.G.A. most of the points made by Group Captain Benson, who also encloses a series of notes by the A.P.M. 8th Army, both of which documents have also been submitted to H.Q. 8th Army.

In the course of recent conversations with yourself and M.G.A. on the subject of guard troops, I wish to draw your attention to Group Captain Benson's recommendations that all C.A.Os should be accompanied by O.Rs. especially in places which may be removed from an L. of C., and where they are frequently the only representatives of the Allied Armies in a particular locality.

In the course of my recent conversations, M.G.A. pointed out that the duty of providing guards for C.A.Os rested with the Army and Area Commander, to whom application for escorts etc. should be made. In the absence of sufficient numbers of O.Rs of the C.M.P. this will involve calling on combat formations for detachments of troops for the purposes stated. If this policy is to be followed I submit that directions accordingly should be issued to Army Commanders in future operations and at the present time to Area Commanders where they are concerned. I fully realise the difficulty of providing detachments of combat troops for the purpose, but as suggested to you already the only alternative is providing guard companies. I understand, however, that there are considerable difficulties involved by this proposal.

As you are aware, AMGOT is not now and is not contemplated to be organised in such a manner as to provide for C.A.Os, individually undertaking police duties. It is true that Civil Affairs personnel includes Civil Affairs Police Officers, but these officers are intended to supervise and control local police organisations, which in the early stages of an occupation are not capable of maintaining and cannot be relied upon to maintain, law and order among the local population, still less, can they be used for restraining ill discipline among troops.

The problem as I see it falls in two parts, in the first place there is the provision of personnel able to undertake escort, guard, and police duties in the opening stages of an occupation with the guidance and supervision of C.A.Os. The proposed solution to this of using combat troops does not in the phase in question seem to me to be practicable. The second aspect of the problem is the provision of guard and escort troops for C.A.Os in remote localities in the occupational period, where these officers are far removed from your troops, or troops normally disposed for garrison duties. Here use of the latter appears to be practicable but involves as in

frequently the only representatives of the Allied Armies in a particular locality.

In the course of my recent conversations, M.G.A. pointed out that the duty of providing guards for C.A.Os rested with the Army and Area Commander; to whom application for escorts etc. should be made. In the absence of sufficient numbers of O.Rs of the C.M.P. this will involve calling on combat formations for detachments of troops for the purposes stated. If this policy is to be followed I submit that directions accordingly should be issued to Army Commanders in future operations and at the present time to Area Commanders where they are concerned. I fully realise the difficulty of providing detachments of combat troops for the purpose, but as suggested to you already the only alternative is providing guard companies. I understand, however, that there are considerable difficulties involved by this proposal.

As you are aware, AMGOT is not now and is not contemplated to be organised in such a manner as to provide for C.A.Os, individually undertaking police duties. It is true that Civil Affairs personnel includes Civil Affairs Police Officers, but these officers are intended to supervise and control local police organisations, which in the early stages of an occupation are not capable of maintaining and cannot be relied upon to maintain, law and order among the local population, still less, can they be used for restraining ill discipline among troops.

The problem as I see it falls in two parts, in the first place there is the provision of personnel able to undertake escort, guard, and police duties in the opening stages of an occupation with the guidance and supervision of C.A.Os. The proposed solution to this of using combat troops does not in the phase in question seem to me to be practicable. The second aspect of the problem is the provision of guard and escort troops for C.A.Os in remote localities in the occupational period, where these officers are far removed from your troops, or troops normally disposed for garrison duties. Here use of the latter appears to be practicable but involves as in the first case the issue of appropriate instructions to the Formation Commanders concerned.

Of the other difficulties to which Group Captain Benson alludes, I draw your particular attention to the necessity of making adequate provision of M.F. for C.A.Os in the assault and follow up waves. This is I believe now realised but it requires in my opinion the issue of a General Directive. This could with advantage include reference to the necessity of explaining to all formations the functions and duties of AMGOT, as well as the issue of elementary instructions to all ranks, such as were contained in the leaflet entitled "Do's and Don't's" which I sought to have distributed among all ranks taking part in the Sicilian operation. With greater knowledge of the duties and functions of AMGOT, the difficulties encountered by my officers obtaining supplies and the use of local transport would doubtless have been mitigated.

The present assumption in the organisation of AMGOT personnel has been that AMGOT is not self-contained as regards 'Q' and Signals, it has always been a fact that AMGOT depended on General Army 'Q' and Signals facilities. Assuming

-2-

that this premise holds good I do not agree with Group Captain Benson's recommendations on the subject. If, however, AMGOT is to be self-contained, considerable modification of the general set up will be required in W.Es and equipment. I do nevertheless agree with Group Captain Benson that the present arrangements whereby there has been virtually no signals intercommunication between the Civil Affairs posts and between these and combat formations, including the H.Qs of higher formations, it is unsatisfactory. It is on the one hand not reasonable to expect provision of signal facilities in the remote localities which may be of considerable administrative importance but which have no military importance. It is on the other hand impossible to maintain an efficient administration or to report thereon without such facilities.

Reynolds

Major General,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

Q Q R Y.

3047/22

ARMY 8 ARMY.

ARMY,
15 Army Group. (2 copies).

15th August, 1943.

MEMORANDUM ON MAJOR ISSUES TO BE LEARNED FROM
THE SYRIAN OPERATION.

The invasion of Syria has clearly demonstrated that Civil Affairs Officers must be present in invaded cities at the time of their capture. Civil Affairs Liaison Officers must be attached to combat units to help the commander to deal with civilian problems arising immediately after the assault. Adequate numbers of Civil Affairs administrative officers must be sent forward with the troops to be left in supervision of the cities and towns from the time of their capture.

2. This being a *revue*, which I believe will be endorsed by Eighth Army and the formations under its command, there are certain facts which the invasion of this island have brought clearly to light and which are worthy of note and ready in any future activities, particularly where such activities are ambitious.

3. (a) It is essential that Civil Affairs officers be provided with the necessary transport to enable them to have that mobility which is vital if they are to arrive in a city the moment it is captured. Reserves with their transport must also be brought up in good time.

(b) Civil Affairs officers, under the present organization are not provided with any O.R.s and to this extent they are invaluable, by their mere numbers, of helping to maintain law and order, both as regards our own troops and civilians. There have been numerous cases of looting both by the civil population and the troops, which might have been alleviated by the presence of a body of troops under the control of AMOR. There is no such body provided in the AMOR organization and the strength of C.M.P.'s and F.S.S. in relation to the number of villages in a metropolitan country, such as Syria, has been shown to be lamentably few.

(c) The formations of the army and in particular the lower formations, below divisions, are still somewhat vague about the functions of AMOR officers and therefore the liaison between army and AMOR in the lower formations is not close enough.

(1) The lack of "Q" arrangements and communications.

The points in para. 3 are taken in detail:-

(a) MOBILITY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS.

2. This being a premise, which I believe will be endorsed by Eighth Army and the formations under its command, there are certain facts which the invasion of this island have brought clearly to light and which are worthy of note and remedy in any future activities, particularly where such activities are amphibious.

3. (a) It is essential that Civil Affairs officers be provided with the necessary transport to enable them to have that mobility which is vital if they are to arrive in a city the moment it is captured. Reserves with their transport must also be brought up in good time.

(b) Civil Affairs officers, under the present organisation are not provided with any O.L.s and to this extent they are incapable, by their mere numbers, of helping to maintain law and order, both as regards our own troops and civilians. There have been numerous cases of looting both by the civil population and the troops, which might have been alleviated by the presence of a body of troops under the control of AFHQ. There is no such body provided in the AFHQ organisation and the strength of G.M.P.'s and F.S.S. in relation to the number of villages in a metropolitan country, such as Sicily, has been shown to be lamentably few.

(c) The formations of the army and in particular the lower formations, below divisions, are still somewhat vague about the functions of AFHQ officers and therefore the liaison between army and AFHQ in the lower formations is not close enough.

(d) The lack of "Q" arrangements and communications.

4. The points in para. 3 are taken in detail:-

(a) MOBILITY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS.

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(1) Civil Affairs Officers were expected to be in a town as soon as it was captured. The transport provided was negligible and in many ways unsuitable. Officers were expected to obtain transport from captured local resources. This was found to be quite impracticable as every single vehicle available in a town was seized by the assaulting troops and reserved for operations, legitimate or otherwise. Even municipal vehicles on which the cleanliness and economic life of a city depended were impounded. Consequently the Civil Affairs Officers were bound to find themselves with no means of getting to their destinations except by walking or obtaining a lift from the military. Local cars at best are never suitable owing to their low clearance.

(2) Civil Affairs Officers were expected to go, and should go, even though for a short period, to every town captured, however small, which in a metropolitan country, such as is Sicily, must mean a very considerable amount of movement, again involving transport.

(3) The number of AFHQ officers provided was in the main sufficient but reserves were not on the island in time, partly due to the phenomenal speed of advance, particularly in the Corps area.

(4) Attention is drawn to report written by the A.P.M., Corps dated 28th July 1943, which expresses much the same views as those given above. Copy is attached.

-2-

(b) SUMMARY OF O.R. PERSONNEL

(1) Shortage of O.R. personnel in nearly every case rendered the AMOT officers useless for the purpose of preventing looting and in enforcing the laws issued under the proclamations, in particular curfew for the civilians and the "out of bounds" notices for troops.

(2) The above point is well brought out in the A.P.L. Corps report referred to in subpara. (4) above.

(3) The absence of means to stop looting led to two factors, one militating against AMOT and the other against the economic life of the country. In the first place it was practically impossible to catch anyone "in the act" which was the instant cry of the army who asked for "definite proof" and in the second place, fear was engendered in the civilian population seriously impeding the collection of grain, so necessary in Sicily to provide food for the towns which were and are in definite short supply.

(4) In cases where the advance was particularly rapid it oftened that a town was left completely devoid of troops, particularly if the axis of advance had altered, thereby leaving the town off the L. of C. This aggravated the problem of the AMOT officer who would find himself the sole person in uniform in the city. The necessity for some form of O.R.'s was very much borne out under such circumstances.

(c) IGNORANCE OF FUNCTIONS OF AMOT.

Lower formations were definitely found to be ignorant of the functions of AMOT, and even of its existence. This is very natural considering the late appearance of AMOT in the planning stage and the secrecy which had of necessity to shroud the operation HUSKY. No doubt the Sicilian invasion has resulted this to a certain extent, but the efficient and smooth running of AMOT must depend very largely on mutual cooperation and understanding.

(d) INTERNAL ORGANIZATION.

(1) AMOT personnel, particularly in the towns which had been left by the troops, often found themselves in a very difficult position as regards rations, and this was aggravated by lack of transport. It was easy to say: "Attach yourself for rations etc., to the nearest army unit", but often there was none or it was occasionally changing. The AMOT personnel therefore found extreme difficulty in obtaining rations, particularly if D.I.D. was far distant.

(2) Communications were found to be of the utmost difficulty. Army signals were often, then not did not run through places where AMOT officers were established. AMOT officers therefore had no means of getting back reports to their respective provincial heads until a D.I.D.S. was started. This again necessitated motorcycles, but in future it should be considered beforehand.

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(2) Communications were found to be of the utmost difficulty. Army signals more often than not did not run through places where AMOT officers were established. AMOT officers therefore had no means of getting back reports to their respective provincial heads until a D.R.L.S. was started. This again necessitated motorcycles, but in future it should be considered beforehand.

5. REMARKS.

(a) MOBILITY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS.

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It is admitted that AMOT personnel and transport to minimum requirements, must be incurred in the order of battle and in the assault. An immediate follow-up is essential, varying according to the country which is being invaded. It is appreciated that operational needs will "scream priority". In this case the policy of having AMOT officers in with the troops must be abandoned. A definite policy is required on this point.

(b) STRUCTURE OF PERSONNEL.

A body of men should be under the orders of AMOT who should be brought in with the follow-up and who would act as guards, etc. This personnel should consist of a formation of non-first line troops under their own officers. Their provision under AMOT would materially help the P.M. branch. A similar plan is suggested in the A.P.M. report already referred to in this letter in para. 5. of that report.

(c) IMPROVEMENT OF FUNCTIONS OF AMGOT.

The only way of countering this is to have junior officers instructed by short lectures as to the functions of AMGOT. Written pamphlets seldom if ever do any good and are usually not read.

(4) INTERNAL ORGANIZATION.

Once an operation is launched AMGOT should be treated and run in exactly the same way as any normal army unit taking part in the operation. It is suggested that AMGOT is as much an army unit as is any other unit, and should be organized accordingly.

(SGD) ????

C. E. BERNARD,
Group Captain,
AMGOT 8th Army.

Copies to:- 8th Army {2}
JC Corps {2}

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Copies to: 8th Army (2)
30 Corps (1)

C. A. B. L. C. A.
Group Captain,
ANGON 8th Army.

785015

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
Palermo Province



CF/pm

30 August 1943

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

TO : Chief Civil Affairs Officer - AMGOT HEADQUARTERS

1. The sooner C.A.O. gets into a captured town, the better.
2. Police arm bands and special police identity cards should be printed in advance.
3. Permit cards for certain vehicles should be printed in advance.
4. Special passes for after curfew hours should be printed in advance.
5. C.I.C. personnel should coordinate with C.A. The C.A.O. frequently arranges a conference, gives a person a task, and then by chance learns some days after the fact that the person was arrested by C.I.C. Moreover, C.I.C. ought to submit to C.A. copy of report of its actions.
6. Need more C.A.O's and fewer so called specialists. For instance all C.A.P.O's have been doing job of C.A.O's.

Charles Poletti

CHARLES POLETTI
Lt. Colonel
Senior Civil Affairs Officer

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

B. G. on
receipt of Col. Paletti's
report.

~~DS~~
268.

P/A
26/8
65

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

BA or
my return
21/8

D 4 4 E 4

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
15 Army Group.

10

I enclose copies of notes on "Lessons learned" prepared by Group Capt G.E. Benson D.S.O., and Colonel Poletti (A.L.S.) who were respectively in charge of the groups of Civil Affairs Officers in the early stages of the landing in Sicily with the 6th and 7th Armies.

I have already brought up with yourself, G.E.S. and M.G.A. most of the points made by Group Captain Benson, who also encloses a series of notes by the A.P.F. 6th Army, both of which documents have also been submitted to E.Q. 6th Army.

In the course of recent conversations with yourself and M.G.A. on the subject of guard troops, I wish to draw your attention to Group Captain Benson's recommendations that all G.A.O.s should be accompanied by O.B.s. especially in places which may be removed *from an L of R*, and where there are frequently the only ~~one~~ representative of the Allied Armies in *a particular* locality.

In the course of my recent conversations, M.G.A. pointed out that the duty of ~~providing~~ *providing* guards for G.A.O.s rested with the Army or Area Commander, etc. *to* where application for escorts should be made. In the absence of sufficient numbers of G.O.s of the G.H.F., this involves *will* ~~calling on~~ *en-but* ~~information for detachments~~ of troops for the purposes stated. If this policy is to be followed, I submit that directions accordingly *should* ~~be issued~~ *in future operation* to Army Commanders at the present time to Area Commanders where they are concerned. I fully realize the difficulty of providing detachments of combat troops for the purpose, *but* as suggested to you already the only alternative is

2.

The problem, as I see it, falls in two parts, in the first place there is the provision of personnel able to undertake escort, guard, and police duties in the opening stages of an occupation with the guidance and supervision of C.A.Cs. The proposed solution to this of using combat troops does not in the phrase in question seem to me to be practicable. The second aspect of the problem is the provision of guard and escort troops for C.A.Cs in remote localities in the occupational period, where these officers are far removed from your troops, or troops normally disposed for garrison duties. There use of the latter appears to be practicable but involves as in the first case the issue of appropriate instructions to the Formation Commanders concerned.

Of the other difficulties to which Group Captain Benson alludes, I draw your particular attention to the necessity of issuing adequate provision for C.A.Cs ~~in the assault and follow up waves.~~ ^{in the assault} This in I believe now realised but it requires in my opinion the issue of a general directive. This could with advantage include reference to the necessity of explaining to all formations the functions and duties of ATRCT, as well as the issue of elementary instructions to all units, ^{such} as were contained in the leaflet entitled "Do's and Don't's" which I sought to have distributed among all units taking part in the Sicilian operation. With greater knowledge of the duties and functions of ATRCT, the difficulties encountered by my officers in obtaining supplies and the use of local transport would doubtless have been mitigated.

The present assumption in the organization of ATRCT personnel has been that ATRCT is not self-contained as regards 'J' and Signals, it has always been a pre-die that ATRCT depended on General 'J' and Signals facilities. ^{among the} ^{with} ^{the} I do not agree Group Captain Benson's recommendations on the

issue of appropriate instructions to the Formation Commanders concerned.

Of two other distinctions to which Army Captain Benson alludes, I

draw your particular attention to the necessity of making adequate provision *of his* for C.A.Cs. *in the assault and follow up waves.* This

is I believe now realized and it requires in my opinion the issue of a general *directive.* This could with advantage include reference to the necessity of

explaining to all formations the functions and duties of AFPO, as well as the *such* issue of elementary instructions to all ranks, as were contained in the leaflet *entitled "Do's and Don't's"* which I sought to have distributed among all ranks *taking part in the Sicilian operation.* With greater knowledge of the duties and functions of AFPO, the difficulties encountered by my officers in obtaining supplies and the use of local transport would doubtless have been mitigated.

The present assumption in the organization of AFPO personnel has been

that AFPO is not self-contained as regards 'Q' and Signals. It has always been

a *premise* that AFPO depended on General 'Q' and Signals facilities. *Army HQ*

this *premise* holds good I do not agree Group Captain Benson's recommendations on the subject. It, however, AFPO is to be self-contained, considerable modification

of the general set up will be required in "B" and equipment. I do nevertheless

agree with Group Captain Benson that the present arrangements whereby there has

been *virtually no signal* these and combat formations, including the U.Cs of higher formations, it is *183*

unsatisfactory. It is on the one hand not reasonable to expect provision of

signal facilities in the remote localities which may be of considerable

administrative importance but which have no military importance. It is on the

other hand impossible to maintain an efficient administration or to report thereon

without such facilities. *There is no doubt that the*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Subject :- Port

ECA9/21

8.

AMGOT,
15 Army Group

AMGOT 8 Army

18th August 1943.

Please receive copy of "Notes on Sicilian Campaign - from Provost Angle" which is referred to in my Memorandum forwarded you under cover of my ECA9/20 of 17th August, 1943.

Col 5 T.
Group Captain,
AMGOT 8 Army.

7

NOTES ON ITALIAN CAMPAIGN TO D.F. - FROM PROVOST ANGEL

1. ARRIVAL OF PROVOST. The early stages of this Campaign have shown the importance of Provost being in the earliest flights of their formations, and that they should land with their light transport (Jeeps and Motorcycles) and a small proportion of 15 cats. I future operations the following sequence of arrival is suggested:-

- (a) C.M. Detachment with Bde. with support flights of assaulting Infantry.
- (b) Mobile det. of Div. Coy with A.P.M. with or before the Corps.
- (c) Mobile det. of Corps reconst with A.P.M.
- (d) Remainder of Div. Coy.
- (e) Mobile det. of Traffic Coy. (If attached).
- (f) Remainder of Corps Coy.
- (g) Rear parties consisting of heavy section of Corps and Traffic Coy. Coy H.Q. to follow as soon as sea transport permits.

Note. "Mobile det." means all Jeeps and Motorcycles available with a small proportion of 15 cats. for signing material etc.

"Beach Brick" Pro det. land with Bricks in their first flights with a proportion of transport (Jeeps if possible as being more suitable for sand than motorcycles). It was proved on the beaches that Brick det. were severely handicapped by lack of transport.

2. PROVISION OF INTERPRETERS FOR BDE. During the advance, Provost had to take over all provisionally organized teams, pending the arrival of A.M.C.O.I. Linguistic difficulties rendered these operations much more complicated and lengthy than necessary. The A.M.C.O.I. of a formation at least should have an interpreter of some kind permanently attached.

3. A.M.C.O.I. (Crise of one kind or another requiring investigation occurs early (vide pilfering beaches - crimes by and against civilians). Pro Branch C.M.C. are too occupied on other important duties to give much time to this side nor have the majority of the personnel the necessary training. A.M.C.O.I. det. shall therefore land with Corps in early flight and remain under command Corps.

In the present instance a small detachment of 4 Officer and 5 Other Ranks was landed with Corps on about D + 3 and immediately taken over by Army. The remainder of the A.M.C.O.I. det. with Corps including A.M.C.O.I. A.M.C.O.I. still in H.A. on D + 8.

4. P.O.I. This admittedly difficult problem needs more consideration. It has been amply proved that the countryside is covered with disarmed Italian troops in plain clothes. As at present, this is perhaps not important, but in the unfortunate necessity of even a temporary withdrawal it is submitted that the case would be very different. Fighting troops have not the time to organize this properly; Provost is too weak and too busy to do so. It would therefore appear that the only solution is special units for this purpose in greater strength and further forward.

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found brick two lots land with bricks in their first flights with a proportion of transport (Jeeps if possible as being more suitable for sand than motorcycles). It was proved on the beaches that Brick lots were severely handicapped by lack of transport.

2. REVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS FOR 1940. During the advance, prevent had to take over and provisionally organized to me, pending the arrival of A.M.C.C. Inaugural difficulties rendered these operations much more complicated and lengthy than necessary. The A.M.C. of a formation at least should have an interpreter of some kind permanently attached.

3. U.I.B. (rise of one kind or another requiring investigation occurs early (vide pilfering beaches - crimes by and against civilians). No branch U.I.B. are too occupied on other important duties to give much time to this side nor have the majority of the personnel the necessary training. U.I.B. etc. should the afore said with Corps in early flight and remain until our own Corps.

In the present instance a small detachment of 1 Officer and 5 Other Ranks was landed with Corps on about D + 3 and immediately taken over by us. The remainder of the U.I.B. etc. with Corps including A.M.C., U.I.B., etc. still in K.A. on D + 13.

4. A.M.C.'s this admittedly difficult problem no more consideration. It has been amply proved that the countryside is covered with stranded Italian troops in plain clothes. As at present, this is perhaps not important, but in the unfortunate necessity of even a temporary withdrawal it is submitted that the cause would be very different. Fighting troops have not the time to organize this properly; prevent is too weak and too busy to do so. It would therefore appear that the only solution is special units for this purpose in greater strength and further forward.

5. GUARD REPAIRS. As an advance progress as many instances occur where guards are required i.e. Decks of food - men. - Valuable stores of the kind or another - certain buildings required for social purposes - enemy military hospitals etc. Both our own troops and the civilian population indulge in looting and wanton destruction - fighting troops in prevent are not in a position to undertake these duties effectively. A lot of valuable stores have been lost or spoilt already. It is suggested that a special unit for this purpose should be attached to Corps. It could consist of low category or semi-trained personnel such as Pioneers, Palestine Regt. etc. strength a minimum of 2 Corps per Corps. It could be under the command of A.M.C. Corps as being the individual the most likely to get information as to where this unit could be used to the greatest advantage. A part would be allotted to subordinate formations by the A.M.C. as circumstances demanded. This matter has been discussed with Heads of Services who occur if anything of this kind existed the P.O. problems would also be eased especially with regard to escorts on the move.

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6. CIVILIAN CONTROL - With the boot will in the world, B. C. O. T. are not sufficiently strong nor do they get forward quickly enough to be able to impose reason to a state of the civilians moving about. The civilian population is therefore uncontrolled. There is absolutely nothing to prevent it.

- (a) $\frac{1}{2} \log 2$
(b) $\frac{1}{2} \log 3$
(c) $\frac{1}{2} \log 4$

The first of these is the fact that the
 Government has been unable to secure
 the necessary funds to carry out its
 policy of non-interference. This is
 due to the fact that the Government
 has been unable to secure the necessary
 funds to carry out its policy of non-
 interference. This is due to the fact
 that the Government has been unable
 to secure the necessary funds to carry
 out its policy of non-interference.

[illegible]

3. Public relations. He went down by those means in victory important especially in the first ten days of my leaving. The demand of all need should the effort of the highest quality. When to look at India, however this has not always been the case.

the war and civilian losses are too high to be met by the war savings stamps, which would have been due by 1947 had the C. & O.'s been sufficiently generous and willing to ease for and receive. C. & O. have refused above proposal and in case carried for some 14 days or fully 14 days to the war savings stamps, but of civil savings, etc., prior to the arrival of C. & O.'s.

6. Individuals. The two are by these who is vitally important especially in the first few days of my teaching. The personal of all train should therefore be of the highest quality. Only to back of teacher concerned this has not always been the case.

227. 11. 23

(=2) *Perdix perdix* L. Colap.
1910

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C. C. A. O.

1 - 4 submitted.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

AMGOT., H.Q.,
1st Army Group.



Ref. ECA/9/19

AMGOT., 8 Army.
16 August 1943.

Attached is a memorandum on a few major points which emerge from the Invasion of Sicily in respect of lessons which should be learned and studied.

This memorandum has been seen by 8 Army to whom copies are being sent. A letter has been received by me from M.G.G.S. 8 Army agreeing in principle ^{with} the points raised.

Edmund 178

Group Captain,
AMGOT 8 Army.

*These memoranda are to be
have been raised? by*

Need of Adequate Transport
and Personnel

(Memorandum of Group
Captain, AMG Eighth Army,
AMG
for 1st Ch Army Group,
15 August 1943)

¶ 4 (a) & (b)



ACC Files 10000/109697

ALMOT,
15 Army Group. (2 Copies).

ACA7/22

ALMOT 8 ARMY.

15th August 1943.

.....

MEMORANDUM ON MAJOR LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE
SICILIAN OPERATION.

The invasion of Sicily has clearly demonstrated that Civil Affairs Officers must be present in invaded cities at the time of their capture. Civil Affairs liaison officers must be attached to combat units to help the commander to deal with civilian problems arising immediately after the assault. Adequate numbers of Civil Affairs administrative officers must be sent forward with the troops to be left in supervision of the cities and towns from the time of their capture.

2. This being a premise, which I believe will be endorsed by Eighth Army and the formations under its command, there are certain facts which the invasion of this island have brought clearly to light and which are worthy of note and remedy in any future activities, particularly where such activities are amphibious.

3. (a) It is essential that Civil Affairs officers be provided with the necessary transport to enable them to have that mobility which is vital if they are to arrive in ~~the~~ city the moment it is captured. Reserves with their transport must also be brought up in good time.

(b) Civil Affairs officers, under the present organization are not provided with any C.P.'s and to this extent they are incapable, by their mere numbers, of helping to maintain law and order, both as regards our own troops and civilians. There have been numerous cases of looting both by the civil population and the troops, which might have been alleviated by the presence of a body of troops under the control of ALMOT. There is no such body provided in the ALMOT organization and the strength of C.M.P.'s and I.S.S. in relation to the number of villages in a metropolitan country, such as Sicily, has been shown to be lamentably few.

(c) The formations of the army and in particular the lower formations, below divisions, are still somewhat vague about the functions of ALMOT officers and therefore the liaison between army and ALMOT in the formations is not close enough.

The invasion of Sicily has clearly demonstrated that Civil Affairs Officers must be present in invaded cities at the time of their capture. Civil Affairs liaison officers must be attached to combat units to help the commander to deal with civilian problems arising immediately after the assault. Adequate numbers of Civil Affairs administrative officers must be sent forward with the troops to be left in supervision of the cities and towns from the time of their capture.

2. This being a premise, which I believe will be endorsed by Eighth Army and the formations under its command, there are certain facts which the invasion of this island have brought clearly to light and which are worthy of note and remedy in any future activities, particularly where such activities are amphibious.

3. (a) It is essential that Civil Affairs officers be provided with the necessary transport to enable them to have that mobility which is vital if they are to arrive in ~~the~~ city the moment it is captured. Reserves with their transport must also be brought up in good time.

(b) Civil Affairs officers, under the present organization are not provided with any U.R.'s and to this extent they are incapable, by their mere numbers, of helping to maintain law and order, both as regards our own troops and civilians. There have been numerous cases of looting both by the civil population and the troops, which might have been alleviated by the presence of a body of troops under the control of AFHQ. There is no such body provided in the AFHQ organization and the strength of U.K.P.'s and P.S.S. in relation to the number of villages in a metropolitan country, such as Sicily, has been shown to be lamentably few.

(c) The formations of the army and in particular the lower AFHQ divisions, are still somewhat vague about the functions of AFHQ officers and therefore the liaison between army and AFHQ in the ~~177~~ formations is not close enough.

(d) The lack of "Q" arrangements and communications.

The points in para. 3 are taken in detail :-

(a) MOBILITY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS.

(1) Civil Affairs Officers were expected to be in a town as soon as it was captured. The transport provided was negligible and in many ways unsuitable. Officers were expected to obtain transport from captured local resources. This we found to be quite impracticable as every single vehicle available in a town was seized by the assaulting troops and removed for operations, legitimate or otherwise. Even municipal vehicles on which the cleanliness and economic life of a city depended were impressed. Consequently the Civil Affairs Officers were bound to find themselves with no means of getting to their destinations except by walking or obtaining a lift from the military. Local cars at best are never suitable owing to their low clearance.

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(2) Civil Affairs Officers are expected to go, and should go, even though for a short period, to every town captured, however small, which in a metropolitan country, such as is Sicily, must mean a very considerable amount of movement, again involving transport.

(3) The number of AMOT officers provided was in the main sufficient but reserves were not on the island in time, partly due to the phenomenal speed of advance, particularly in the Corps area.

(4) Attention is drawn to report written by the A.F.M., Corps dated 28 July 1943, which expresses much the same views as those given above. Copy is attached.

(b) SHORTAGE OF C.R. PERSONNEL.

(1) Shortage of C.R. personnel in nearly every case rendered the AMOT officers useless for the purpose of preventing looting and in enforcing the laws issued under the proclamations, in particular curfew for the civilians and the "out of bounds" notice for troops.

(2) The above point is well brought out in the A.F.M. Corps report referred to in subpara (4) above.

(3) The absence of means to stop looting led to two factors, one militating against AMOT and the other against the economic life of the country. In the first place it was practically impossible to catch anyone "in the act" which was the insistent cry of the army who asked for "definite proof" and in the second place, fear was engendered in the civilian population seriously impeding the collection of grain, so necessary in Sicily to provide food for the towns which were and are in definite short supply.

(4) In cases where the advance was particularly rapid it oftened that a town was left completely void of troops, particularly if the axis of advance had altered, thereby leaving the town off the L. of C. This aggravated the problem of the AMOT officer who would find himself the sole person in uniform in the city. The necessity for some form of C.R.'s was very much borne out under such circumstances.

(c) IGNORANCE OF FUNCTIONS OF AMOT.

Lower formations were definitely found to be ignorant of the functions of AMOT, and even of its existence. This is very natural considering the late appearance of AMOT in the planning stage and the secrecy which had of necessity to surround the operation NISSEY. No doubt the Sicilian invasion has remedied this to a certain extent, but the efficiency and smooth running of AMOT must depend very largely on mutual cooperation and understanding.

(d) INTERNAL ORGANIZATION.

(1) AMOT personnel, particularly in the towns which had been left by the troops, often found themselves in a very isolated position.

(1) Shortage of O.R. personnel in nearly every case rendered the AMOT officers useless for the purpose of preventing looting and in enforcing the laws issued under the proclamations, in particular curfew for the civilians and the "out of bounds" notice for troops.

(2) The above point is well brought out in the A.R.M. Corps report referred to in subpara (4) above.

(3) The absence of means to stop looting led to two factors, one militating against AMOT and the other against the economic life of the country. In the first place it was practically impossible to catch anyone "in the act" which was the insistent cry of the army who asked for "definite proof" and in the second place, fear was engendered in the civilian population seriously impeding the collection of grain, so necessary in Sicily to provide food for the towns which were and are in definite short supply.

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(d) INTERNAL ORGANIZATION.

(1) AMOT personnel, particularly in the towns which had been left by the troops, often found themselves in a very difficult position as regards rations, and this was aggravated by lack of transport. It was easy to say: "Attach yourself for rations etc.; to the nearest army unit", but often there was none or it was continually changing. The AMOT personnel therefore found extreme difficulty in obtaining rations, particularly if D.I.D. was far distant.

(2) Communications were found to be of the utmost difficulty. Army signals more often than not did not run through places where AMOT officers were established. AMOT officers therefore had no means of getting back reports to their respective provincial heads until a D.R.M.S. was started. This again necessitated motorcycles, but in future it should be considered beforehand.

5. REMARKS.

(a) MOBILITY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS.

It is submitted that AMOT personnel and transport, to
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minimum requirements, must be included in the Order of Battle and in the assault in immediate follow-up is essential, varying according to the country which is being invaded. It is appreciated that operational needs will "scream priority". In this case the policy of having AMGT officers in with the troops must be abandoned. A definite policy is required on this point.

(b) SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL.

A body of men should be under the orders of AMGT who should be brought in with the follow-up and who would act as guards, etc.. This personnel should consist of a formation of non-first line troops under their own officers. Their provision under AMGT would materially help the P.M. branch. A similar plan is suggested in the A.P.M. report already referred to in this letter in para. 5 of that report.

(c) IGNORANCE OF FUNCTIONS OF AMGT.

The only way of countering this is to have junior officers instructed by short lectures as to the functions of AMGT. Written pamphlets seldom if ever do any good and are usually not read.

(d) INTERNAL ORGANIZATION.

Once an operation is launched AMGT should be treated and run in exactly the same way as any normal army unit taking part in the operation. It is suggested that AMGT is as much an army unit as is any other unit, and should be organized accordingly.

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Copies to :- 8 Army (2)
30 Corps (4)

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