

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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10000/100/701

83 pp.

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785015

10000/100/701

OPERATIONAL PLANS, POST HUSKY
JUNE - SEPT. 1943

83pp.

NO.	REF. NO.	DATE	FROM/TO	Subject
42	-	24 Aug	To: CSO	-
43	-	25 "	From: MGS	M.G. in future ops
44	6898	27 "	"	Freedom Directive
45	6896	27 "	"	"
46	AL11	28 "	"	Amcor Liaison including cable
46A-0	II	28 "	"	Amcor Liaison including cable
47-56	II	31 "	"	Amcor Liaison including cable
54	AM/cags	30 "	From: M.L. Gov Sec, AFHQ	
58	2407	9 Sep	"	AFHQ
59	105 HQ	26 "	To: Amcor Liaison	
60	99'65	25 "	From: CINC FHGCT	

54	ATM/cags	30	"	From: MIL CHD Sec, AFHQ.
58	2407	9	Sept.	" AFHQ.
59	105 HQ	26	"	To: Amper Liaison.
60	9965	25	"	From: CINC FHGT

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FOLIO	REF No.	DATE	FROM/TO
1-5	—	25 June	Ly. C.C.H.O. M.M.UTE
6-7	141F/14006(16)	20	Planning Security Instruction
8-10	—	25	From: C.C.H.O. M.M.UTE
11	—	25	Ly. C.C.H.O. M.M.UTE
12	—	27	A.F.H.Q. M.C.S. to Chief of Staff
13	—	28	from A.F.H.Q. M.C.S.
14	5633	28	from F.H.G.D.M.
15	141F/14006(16)	28	from H.Q. 141 Force
16	141F/1950/CA	29	to M.C.S., A.F.H.Q.
17-20	5633	28	from A.F.H.Q. to TROOPERS
21	—	11 July	minutes on Post Newby Admin.
22	—	12	from M.C.S., A.F.H.Q.
23	15AG/178/1	16	from C.C.S.
24	—	—	minutes
25	—	—	minutes
26	15AG/7836/CA	17 July	minutes by C.C.H.O.
27	2194	19	from Freedom
28	CA/525	20	to Freedom
29	—	22	from Freedom
30	15AG/1601/33/SDI	30	Butters from 15AG
31	TAC/MCA/30	30	to Freedom
32	15AG/1601/33/SDI	7 Aug	from C.C.S.
33	15AG/1601/33/SDI	3	to Freedom
34	15AG/1601/33/SDI	3	to Freedom
35	15AG/1601/33/SDI	3	to Freedom

16	5633	28	from AFHQ to TRPOPS
17-20		11 July	offsite on Post Nasty Admin
21		12	from To MGS, R.F.H.C.
22	15AG/178/1	16	from C.G.S.
23			minutes
24			minutes
25			list of office
26	15AG/7856/	17 July	minutes by C.C.A.O.
27	2194	19	from Freedom
28	CA/525	20	to to Freedom
29		22	from Freedom
30	15AG/1601/33/SDI	30	Butters from 15AG
31	TAC/MGA/30	30	to Freedom
32	15AG/203/66/3	7 Aug	from C.G.S.
33	AMCOT/44	3	to Freedom
32+33	AMCOT/44	3 Aug	to FREEDOM
34	15AG/203/66/3	7	from C.G.S.
35	SDI.2369	10	FROM MAIN 8TH ARMY
36	00432	13	Pharmaceutical Control
37	AMCOT/21	17	to AMCOT LIAISON
38	2620	14	to: KOOPERS
39+40	AMCOT/63	24	to G.O.C. INC.
41	SD.3128		from 15 AG
42	A919	23	from FREEDOM See Nasty file

26 SEP 1943



TO: 15TH AIR FORCE
FROM: 15TH AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: 15TH AIR FORCE

TO: 15TH AIR FORCE
FROM: 15TH AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: 15TH AIR FORCE

ON ARRIVAL IN EAST TAIL, FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS MADE.
FIRST. REPORTING PARTY 20TH SEPT AT 10.00 HRS.
SECOND. ARRIVAL 21ST SEPT. 15.00 HRS. AND ON STATE FORCE
TO GET DOWN AFTER DRUGS & GIVE ALL NECESSARY STOPS
IN FOUR AIRCRAFT.
THIRD. ARRIVAL 22ND SEPT FROM 10.00 HRS. TO 11.00 HRS.
FOURTH. 21.00 HRS. ON 22ND SEPT. 10.00 HRS. AND 11.00 HRS.
FIFTH. 22.00 HRS. ON 22ND SEPT. 10.00 HRS. AND 11.00 HRS.
SIXTH. 23.00 HRS. ON 22ND SEPT. 10.00 HRS. AND 11.00 HRS.

TO: 15TH AIR FORCE
FROM: 15TH AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: 15TH AIR FORCE

TO: 15TH AIR FORCE
FROM: 15TH AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: 15TH AIR FORCE

TO: 15TH AIR FORCE
FROM: 15TH AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: 15TH AIR FORCE

C 50

464

I don't think this has anything to
do with us

13 29/9

PHAR 29/9

2 2 7 4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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MOST SINCERE

Operational Planning.

AMCOT/105/HQ.

AMCOT HEADQUARTERS,
15 Army Group.

31/10/55
J. J. J.

26. Sept. 3.

Reference your AM/11/65 of 24. Sept. 43.

1. Copy of message sent in reply to Signal 8666 CITE PAGES of 23. Sep. is attached for necessary action reference visit with G(SD).
2. The following information reference regions not already known to you in the latest available :

Region 3	Compania
" 4	Abruzzi, Lazio
" 5	Umbria and the Marches.
" 6	Sardinia
" 7	National Headquarters.
" 8	Tuscany
" 9	Emilia

DB

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD.
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief Staff Officer.

463/105/27/9/43

MOST SECRET

CIPHER MESSAGE
IN

FOLIO NO 0808

9 SEPT 43

FROM: SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FILMGS
TO: FILPOT FOR AMG REPEATED 15TH ARMY
GROUP REAR FOR RENNELL
ORIG NO: 2407

TOO 1445B/9
TOR 2310B/9

CONFIRMATION TODAY CONVERSATION RENNELL - MAXWELL.

ALL REGION TWO OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED BY AMG. NO FURTHER ACTION BY
US BULNOIS AND HALE WILL NOT BE ATTACHED FIVE CORPS.

SMC DISTRIBUTION
GENERAL LORD RENNELL 1 ACTION

SMC 2300B/9
TT 2320B/9 JH

SMC NOTE:- HAS GONE TO FILPOT.

ACTION

Copy on 66/HG

seen by CCAO
DEF
135.

81A 462

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Bigot.

SECRET

ATE/cage

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section

SUBJECT: Organisation of AMG for mainland Operations

TO : Brigadier - General J.C. Holmes.

30th August 1943

1. General McSherry raised the above question yesterday at TIZI OUZOU and proposes to bring it up for your consideration to-day and subsequently discuss it with Lord Rennell on his return to SICILY. He has in mind that the present purely regional organisation of AMG (other than for H.C. AMG) involves some disadvantages in the sort of campaigns which must be expected to the west, and perhaps to the east of the Apennines.

2. It is therefore suggested that the existing AMG H.C., would remain the appropriate staff at the level of 15 Army Group. It is further suggested that new small permanent AMG headquarters should be established for each forward army i.e. V Army and 8th Army, who would accompany the respective regional Army Commanders irrespective of regional limits, so long as they remain in contact with the enemy.

3. It is suggested that V Army staff would consist of Colonel Hume and Colonel Ashley and a maximum of one responsible officer each from four or five principle divisions, together with two or three junior staff officers making a maximum of say ten officers in all.

4. This staff would be the channel for AMG Orders to be issued in the tactical phase to any junior AMG formations including, at the time of operation AVALANCHE, Region 3. This staff would also issue Warning Orders, Operation Orders etc., to the D.C.A.O. of Region 4 bringing this AMG team into action at the appropriate time and place.

5. Just as soon as the combat formations were clear of Region 3, provided tactical situation permitted, a direct channel would be set up from the D.C.A.O., Region 3 to AMG H.C.; similarly as and when Region 4 was clear of the enemy this region also would pass from under direct command of V Army to AMG H.C.

6. I am in favour of this proposal since it has the three advantages of retaining some continuity of AMG control at Army level (2) retaining a territorial basis for the AMG teams and (3) that it permits of the mobilisation of personnel, transport, equipment and records of each region as an AMG unit with appropriate officers in charge of the several sections of staff work.

7. If, following your discussion with General McSherry, this is agreed I suggest that MGs Plans be instructed to draw up a directive on these lines for AMG regional planning teams which could be issued as soon as we have Lord Rennell's concurrence.

DISTRIBUTION: Gen. Holmes.
Gen. McSherry
M.C.S. (Plans)

SECRET

Seen by P.C.C.A.O.

A. COLONEL,
Deputy Chief Military Government Section

BIGOT

P.A.B. 14/15

REGOT - BAYTOM.

MOST SECRET
OFFICER ONLY

8th ARMY AIRCOT.

OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION No. 2.

APPENDICES.

- A.. Organisation Reg 2 & Chain of Command
- B.. Districts and Towns.
- C.. Detachments for BAYTOM.
- D.. Transport allocations and Rendez-vous.

INFORMATION.

MAPS. ITALY 1/100000 sheets 254
" 1/250000 " 36, 37, 38, 44, 42, 43, 47, 48, 52 & 53.

1. Military Government will be provided by AIRCOT 8th Army, for the area contained in the three Southern Departments of ITALY.

2. These Depts, namely CALLABRIA, LUCANIA & PUGLIA are known as AIRCOT Reg 2.

3. The government will be provided in three Phases, dependent on military operations, as follows:-

- Phase 1. Capture of landings and landings with the object of seizing the towns of REGGIO & SAN GIOVANNI and the airfield SOUTH of REGGIO.
- Phase 2. The advance NORTH and East as far as BARRERA - DELL'ANTICO - SAN STEFANO.
- Phase 3. Occupation of the remainder of REGION 2.

4. The military operation covering phases 1 and 2 is known as BAYTOM.

5. OPERATION BAYTOM.

(a) OWN TROOPS. 15 Corpsunder command

1 Can Div.
5 Div.
1 Can Army Tr Bde.
234 Inf. Bde.
Supporting troops & Artillery.

(b) TASKS. Phase. 1. 1 Can Div will assault on a 1 Bde front
(i) Capture a beach between 446-490 and 447508
(ii) Capture high ground SOUTH of grid line 510.
(iii) Capture REGGIO & REGGIO AIRFIELD.

5 Div will assault on a 2 Bde front
(i) Capture beaches 447507-447520 and 447520-447533.
(ii) Capture

1. Military Government will be provided by AEGIS 8th Army, for the area contained in the three Southern Departments of ITALY.
2. These Divs, namely CALLABRIA, LUCANIA & PUGLIA are known as AEGIS Reg 2.
3. The Government will be provided in three Phases, dependent on military operations, as follows:
 - Phase 1. Capture of beaches and landings with the object of seizing the towns of REGGIO & SAN GIOVANNI and the airfield SOUTH of REGGIO.
 - Phase 2. The advance NORTH and East as far as BARIATA - ILLIANOVO - SAN GIULIANO.
 - Phase 3. Occupation of the remainder of REGION 2.
4. The military operation covering phases 1 and 2 is known as HAYDOWN.
5. OPERATION HAYDOWN.
 - (a) OWN TROOPS. 15 Corpsunder command 1 Can Div.
5 Div.
1 Can Army Tr Bde.
234 Inf. Bde.
Supporting troops & Artillery.
 - (b) TASKS. Phase. 1. 1 Can Div will assault on a 1 Bde front
 - (i) Capture a beach between 445-490 and 447508
 - (ii) Capture high ground SOUTH of grid line 510.
 - (iii) Capture REGGIO & REGGIO AIRFIELD.
 - 5 Div will assault on a 2 Bde front
 - (i) Capture beaches 447507-447520 and 447520-447523.
 - (ii) Capture high ground to the EAST of beaches.
 - (iii) Capture SAN GIOVANNI.
- Phase 2.
 - (i) 1 Can Div will be prepared to advance N.E. on AEGIS REGGIO - SAN STEFANO 653 -DHIANUOVO 6762.
 - (ii) 5 Div will be prepared to move N.E. on Axis San GIOVANNI - SCILLA - BARIATA.
6. REGION 2. The occupation of the remainder of the area known as Region 2 will proceed as the tactical situation permits.

...../2

Copy 11 filed Secret
Spec.

- (a) Territory occupied as a result of operation BYRON
(b) The remainder of CALABRIA AND the provinces of LUCANIA and FUGLIA.

ATTENTION.

6. On arrival at their destinations ALGOT Officers are to set up Local Military Government and Administration immediately, in accordance with the policy of the X ALGOT HQ.

- BAYTOWN.

12. Tasks. The following tasks are assigned to Dets.
- | | |
|--------------|--|
| (a) Phase 1. | A Det.....REGLIO Town and surrounding occupied areas |
| | E. Det....." " |
| |San GIOVANNI |
| (b) Phase 2 | C Det.....Follow up. |
| | D Det....." " |

14. Pending the arrival of MATN HQ Reg 2, orders will be issued to ALGOT Officers by L.O.s Corps and Div, who will be with their respective formations.

16. Liaison Officers.

- (a) 13 Corps Lt Col Micholls DSO, IC.
(b) 1 Can Div Capt Mills.

2-280"

 $\dots/\sqrt{3}$

11. Personnel. Detachments of AMGOT personnel to accompany the task forces in Phase 1 (the assault phase) and to follow up in Phase 2, are detailed in App B.
12. Tasks. The following tasks are assigned to Dets.
- (a) Phase 1. A Det.....PERRIO Town and surrounding occupied areas
B Det.....San GIOVANNI
- (b) Phase 2 C Det.....Follow up.
D Det....."
13. Command. AMGOT MAIN HQ 8th ARMY, will embark from Sicily to the Mainland on D plus 1 or D plus 2. On arrival it will be known as AMGOT MAIN HQ Reg 2, and will be established at or near PERRIO. The exact location will be made known as soon as possible, until such time communication will be effected, through LO 13 Corps.
14. Pending the arrival of MAIN HQ Reg 2, orders will be issued to AMGOT Officers by L.O.s Corps and Div, who will be with their respective formations.
15. The Chain of Command for Reg 2 is set out at App A. Detachments, however, are to be under the command of their Det Commanders until they report to Div L.O.s after landing.
16. Liaison Officers.
- (a) 13 CorpsLt Col Nicholls DSO, MC.
(b) 1 Can DivCapt Mills.
(c) 5 DivLt Malatesta.
17. Movement. Movement orders will be issued separately to O.C. Dets.
18. Embarkation. Dets will embark with the transport allocated to them. Details of allocations are at App D.
19. Rendez-vous on landing. Details of rendez-vous for Dets on landing are at App D. Dets are to proceed and report as quickly as possible. 439
20. Date and Times. D. day is the date of the operation and will be notified later. Zone Time B (GMT plus 2 hours) will be used.
21. Password.
- Challenge "Alec James"
Answer "The Arsenal".

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SECTION 2

22. Personnel. Personnel for Reg 2 in Phase 3, will be called forward as required by MAIN HQ Reg 2. Pending embarkation they will remain under command AEGOT REAR HQ 8th Army, in Sicily.
 23. AEGOT REAR HQ 8th Army will embark under instructions to be issued separately by MAIN HQ Reg 2. On arrival in ITALY they will become part of AEGOT HQ Reg 2.
 24. Movement and embarkation. Orders will be issued at a later date by AEGOT REAR HQ 8th Army.
 25. Transport. Transport will be shipped from Sicily as ordered by AEGOT REAR HQ 8th Army. The balance of transport not available in Sicily will be shipped direct to ITALY by A.F.H.Q.
 26. Reinforcements. 60 landing personnel for phase 3 will report to MAIN HQ Reg 2, unless otherwise ordered.
- GENERAL.
27. Communications. An improvised Don R. service will be established by MAIN HQ Reg 2, on arrival, pending the establishment of a system to cover ~~main~~ Reg 2.
 28. Briefing. All officers will know the Commanding Officers intention before landing in Italy. O.C. Dets are to brief their officers on the day of embarkation but not before.
 29. Security. No copies of this order will be taken ashore before D plus 2. Extracts from the main part and from the Appendices, may be taken, but anything that might lead to the identification of military units, will not be included.
 30. Flags, Proclamations. Notices and ~~Orders~~ Proclamations kit. Officers will be issued with a supply of flags, proclamations and notices which will be loaded on to their vehicles. Officers personal kit will also accompany them in the vehicles.
 31. Rations. Each vehicle will be loaded with 7 days rations for the personnel accompanying the vehicle. Subsequently the supply of rations for all AEGOT Units located in the province, will be the responsibility of the C.A.O.s of provinces.

AEGOT MAIN HQ 8th ARMY.
31 August 1943.

DISTRIBUTION.

O.C. A DET.	COPI	NO.	1
" B "	"	"	2

GENERAL.

27. Communications. An improvised Don R service will be established by MAIN HQ Reg 2, on arrival, pending the establishment of a system to cover main Reg 2.
28. Briefing. All officers will know the Commanding Officers intention before landing in Italy. O.C. Dets are to brief their officers on the day of embarkation but not before.
29. Security. No copies of this order will be taken ashore before D plus 2. Extracts from the main part and from the Appendices, may be taken, but anything that might lead to the identification of military units, will not be included.
30. Flags, Proclamations. Notices and Official Personnel Kit. Officers will be issued with a supply of flags, proclamations and notices which will be loaded on to their vehicles. Officers personal kit will also accompany them in the vehicles.
31. Rations. Each vehicle will be loaded with 7 days rations for the personnel accompanying the vehicle. Subsequently the supply of rations for all ALFOT Units located in the province, will be the responsibility of the C.A.O.s of provinces.

ALFOT MAIN HQ 8th ARMY.
31 August 1943.

DISTRIBUTION.

O.C. A DET.	1	NO.	
" B "	2	"	
" C "	3	"	
" D "	4	"	
10 13 Corps	5-6	"	
" 1 Can Div	7	"	
" 5 Div	8	"	
" 15 Army Group	9	"	
ALFOT HQ. PALERMO	10-11	"	
O.C. ALFOT 8th Army	12	"	
ALFOT HQ 8th Army	13-15	"	
File	16	"	

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APPENDIX 'A' TO AMBOT OPERATIONAL ORDER NO. 2 TO ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF

ORGANIZATION CHART.2. CHAIN OF COMMAND.

AMBOT H.Q. REGION 2.

COMPARTIMENTO CALABRIA.

Officers ;

1 SCAO 3 Med. or San.
1 CAPO 1 Supply
2 Legal. 1 Custodian
2 Finance

COMPARTIMENTO PUGLIA.

Officers ;

1 SCAO 5 Med. or San.
1 CAPO 1 Supply
3 Legal 2 Custodians.
3 Finance

COMPARTIMENTO

OFFICIAL

1 SCAO
1 CAPO
1 Legal
1 Finance.

Prov. of
REGGIO
CALABRIA

Prov. of
CATANZARO

Prov. of
COSENZA

Prov. of
Lecce

Prov. of
BRINDISI

Prov. of
TARANTO

Prov. of
BARI

Prov. of
FOGGIA

DISTRICTS.

1. REGGIO
2. GIOIOSA
3. PALMI
4. TAURIANOVA

DISTRICTS.

1. CATANZARO
2. VIBO VALENTIA
3. BICASTRO
4. CATRORE

DISTRICTS.

1. COSENZA
2. PAOLA
3. CORIGLIANO

DISTRICTS.

1. LECCE
2. GALATINA

DISTRICTS.

1. BRINDISI
2. OSTUNI

DISTRICTS.

1. TARANTO
2. MARUHA

DISTRICTS.

1. BARI
2. SANOPOLI

3. GIOIA

4. ALTAMURA

5. BITONTO

6. MOLFETTO

7. RIVO DI PULITO

8. CORATO

9. BISCEGLIE

10. TIRANI

11. SANDETTA

12. ANDRIA

13. CANOSA

DISTRICTS.

1. FOGGIA
2. CERIGNOLA

3. LECERA

4. S. SEVERO

5. M. S. ANGELO

Each Province will have ; - 1 C.A.O. (Prov).
1 C.A.P.O. (Prov).
1 Supply Officer.

Each District will have ; - 1 C.A.O.
1 C.A.P.O.

Certain Provinces and Districts requiring more personnel have been allotted additional A/C.A.O.'s.
MATERA DISTRICT will be operated by MATERA Provincial Staff.

APPENDIX 'A' TO AMSCOT OPERATIONAL ORDER NO. 2 TO ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF REGION 2.

ORGANIZATION CHART.

2. CHAIN OF COMMAND.

AMSCOT H.Q. REGION 2.

COMPARTIMENTO CALABRIA.

Officers ;
3 Med. or San.
1 Supply
1 Custodian

COMPARTIMENTO PUGLIA.

Officers ;
1 SCAO 5 Med. or San.
1 CAPO 1 Supply
3 Legal 2 Custodians.
3 Finance

COMPARTIMENTO LUCANIA.

Officers ;
1 SCAO 1 Med. or San.
1 CAPO 1 Supply.
1 Legal 1 Custodian.
1 Finance.

	Prov. of COSTANZA	Prov. of LECCE	Prov. of BRINDISI	Prov. of TARANTO	Prov. of BARI	Prov. of NOVIGLIA	Prov. of POTENZA	Prov. of MATERA
DISTRICTS.	DISTRICTS.	DISTRICTS.	DISTRICTS.	DISTRICTS.	DISTRICTS.	DISTRICTS.	DISTRICTS.	DISTRICTS.
1. COTRONE	1. COTRONE	1. LECCE	1. BRINDISI	1. TARANTO	1. BARI	1. NOVIGLIA	1. POTENZA	1. MATERA
2. GALLIACCA	2. GALLIACCA	2. GALLIACCA	2. GALLIACCA	2. GALLIACCA	2. GALLIACCA	2. GALLIACCA	2. GALLIACCA	2. GALLIACCA
3. CORIGLIANO	3. CORIGLIANO	3. CORIGLIANO	3. CORIGLIANO	3. CORIGLIANO	3. CORIGLIANO	3. CORIGLIANO	3. CORIGLIANO	3. CORIGLIANO
ve ; - 1 C.A.C. (Prov).								
1 C.A.P.C. (Prov).								
1 Supply Officer.								
ve ; - 1 C.A.C.								
1 C.A.P.C.								
Districts requiring more								
allotted additional A/C.A.O's.								
be operated by MATERA								

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MOST SHORT
OFFICER ONLY

APPENDIX "B" TO NGCZ OPERATIONAL ORDER NO. 2.

ANNEX 2

C.A.O. DISTRICTS.

COMPARTIMENTO PROVINCE

DISTRICT

LARGE COMMUNITIES

POPULATION
(approx)

CALABRIA	REGGIO (2)	(1) Reggio	130,000
	CALABRIA		
(2)		Giosa Ionica	14,500
		Locri	10,000
(2)		Grotteria	8,000
		Mammola	10,500
(2)		Caulonia	12,000
		Siderno	15,000
(3)		Palmi	13,000
		Villa S/Giovanni	15,000
(2)		Scilla	7,000
		Bagnara	12,000
(2)		Squillace	7,000
(4)		Taurianova	18,500
		Cittanova	14,000
(2)		Palistena	15,000
		Rosaria	13,000
(2)		Gioia	10,300
		Cinquemani	6,500
(5)		Laureana	9,500
CATANZARO (2)		Catanzaro	50,000
		Philadelfia	9,000
(6)		Vibo Valentia	18,500
		Mileto	7,500
(2)		Nicotera	8,000
		Pizzo	8,500
(7)		Serra San Bruno	7,000
(2)		Mionastro	20,000
		Sarbiase	13,000
(8)		Serrastretta	6,500
(2)		Cotrone	24,500
		Cutro	6,700
(2)		Civo	10,000
		Policastro	9,500

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(2)	Villa S/Giovanni	15,000
	Scilla	7,000
	Bagnara	12,000
	Seminara	7,000
(4)	Taurianova	18,500
	Cittanova	14,000
(2)	Palistena	13,000
	Rosaria	13,000
	Cicilia	10,800
	Cinghiesi	6,500
	Laureana	9,500
CATANZARO (5)	Catanzaro	50,000
(2)	Philadelfia	9,000
(6)	Vibo Valentia	18,500
	Mileto	7,500
	Nicotera	8,000
	Pizzo	8,500
	Serra San Bruno	7,000
(7)	Nicotro	28,000
	Sambiasi	18,000
	Serrastretta	6,500
(8)	Cotrone	24,500
	Cutvo	6,700
(2)	Civo	10,000
	Policastro	9,500
COSINZA (9)	Cosinza	45,000
(2)	S. Giovanni	15,000
	Armentea	10,500
	Rende	9,500
	Piumefreddo Bruzio	8,700
(10)	Corigliano Collabra	16,000
	Rossano	15,500
(2)	Acri	16,000
	Disignano	7,000
	Longobucco	8,000
	Iszani	7,000
(11)	Paola	14,000
	Castrovillari	12,000
	Casano	11,500
(2)	Belvedere	7,500
	Cetraro	8,500
	Fuscaldo	9,000

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<u>COMPARTIMENTO</u>	<u>PROVINCIA</u>	<u>DISTRICT</u>	<u>LARGE COMMUNITIES</u>	<u>POPULATION (Airstox)</u>
CALABRIA (Contd.)	COSSENZA (Contd.)	(11)	Verbania	6,000
		(2)	San Marco	9,000
			Montalto Uffugo	9,500
LUCANIA	POTENZA	(1)	Potenza	25,000
		(2)	Lauria	10,000
			Moliterno	6,000
			Marone	7,000
		(2)	Avigliano	20,000
			Melfi	13,000
			Ricciardi in Vulture	12,000
		(2)	Lavullo	9,500
			Muro Lucano	8,000
	MATERA	(3)	Matera	19,000
			Tricarico	7,500
			Pisticci	10,500
		(2)	Irsina	7,000
			Ferrandina	7,000
			Montescaglioso	7,000
			Canzano	7,000
			Palazzo	7,000
			Stigliano	7,000
PUGLIA	LECCE	(1)	Lecce	40,000
		(2)	Galatina	17,500
			Marò	17,000
			Galatone	10,000
			Casano	9,000
			Copertino	10,000
			Maglie	12,000
			Scanzano	9,000
			Gallipoli	13,000
	BRINDISI	(3)	Brindisi	35,000
		(4)	Ostuni	25,000
			Ceglie Messapico	15,000
			San Vito	11,000
			Mesagne	16,000
			Francavilla Fontana	20,000
			Cisternino	9,000
			Oria	11,000

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MATERA	(3)	Lavello	9,500
		Muro Lucano	8,000
		Matera	19,000
		Tricarico	7,500
		Pisticci	10,500
		Irsina	7,000
		Ferrandina	7,000
		Montescaglioso	7,000
		Genzano	7,000
		Palazzo	7,000
LECCE	(1)	Stigliano	7,000
		Lecce	40,000
		Galatina	17,500
		Mardo	17,000
		Galatone	10,000
		Casarano	9,000
		Copertino	10,000
		Maglie	12,000
		Sginitano	9,000
		Gallipoli	13,000
BRINDISI	(3)	Brindisi	35,000
		Ostuni	25,000
		Ceglie Messapico	15,000
		San Vito	11,000
		Mesagne	16,000
		Princavilla Fontana	20,000
		Cisternino	9,000
		Oria	11,000
		Pasano	20,000
		Letiano	9,000
TARANTO	(5)	Taranto	105,000
		Martina Franca	35,000
		Manduria	15,000
		Grottaglie	12,500
		Massafra	11,000
		Grotto	12,000
		Sava	9,500
		Mottola	10,000
		Bari	170,000
		Triggiano	11,000
BARI	(7)	Monopoli	25,000
		Castellana	12,000
		Putignano	18,000
		Mocci	14,000

ALPHABETIC 'B' (Contd.)

(3)

COMPARISON PROVINCE

FUGLIA
(Contd.)

BARI

Large Communes.

- (9) Coja del Colle
Santeramo
Acqua Viva
Conversano
Rustigliano
Molcaltaro
Polignano
Moladibari

- (10) Altamura
Grevina Immaglia

- (11) Bitonto
Mondugno
Palo del Colle
Grana Appula

- (12) Ruvo in Puglia
Verluzzi

- (13) Molsetta
Giovannazzo

- (14) Biscoglie

- (15) Corato

- (16) Trani

- (17) Andria

- (18) Barletta

- (19) Canova
Minervino
Spisazzola

- (20) Foggia

- (21) Corigliola
Trinitapoli
Mangiarita

- (22) Lucca
Borlino
Roseto

Population (Approx.)

26,000
16,000
12,000
17,000
11,000
10,500
11,000
17,000

27,000
23,000

32,000
12,500
14,000
15,000

28,000
25,000
50,000
11,500

40,000
50,000
36,000
59,000
52,000
27,000
20,000
11,500
67,000

39,000
11,000
10,000

17,000
7,000
5,000

SECRET
OFFICIAL ONLY

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

(12) Ruvo in Puglia Perlizzi	28,000 25,000
(13) Molsetta Giovinnazzo	50,000 11,500
(14) Maccoglie	40,000
(15) Corato	50,000
(16) Trani	36,000
(17) Andria	59,000
(18) Barletta	52,000
(19) Canova Minervino Spinazzola	27,000 20,000 11,500
(20) Foggia	67,000
(21) Cerignola Trinitapoli Margherita	39,000 11,000 10,000
(22) Lucera Borlino Roseto Ascoli Accadia San Agata Orsara	17,000 7,000 5,000 10,000 5,000 6,500 7,500
(23) Sant'Angelo San Giovanni San Marco in Lamis Manfredonia Bisepi Vico del Gargano	24,000 11,500 19,000 15,000 9,000 9,000
(24) San Severo Torre Maggiore San Nicandro Apricena	35,000 13,000 13,000 9,000

Note. Only the larger Communes in the Districts for which C.A.C.'s are responsible have been listed. Most Districts, however, include a number of lesser Communes which will nevertheless be the responsibility of the C.A.C. to administer.

(b)

NOT SECRET
OFFICER ONLY

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Comments

Note 2. The first named/in each District will be the H.Q. of the District except KOTAKA (2) who are administered by Provincial H.Q.

Note 3. The Province of KATRA is one District and the functions of C.A.O. provincial and C.A.O. District are amalgamated into the C.A.O. Provincial H.Q.

Note 4. The population figures are in most cases those of 1929 and are therefore probably an underestimate.

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APPENDIX "D" TO AMOT OPERATIONAL ORDER No. 2.

DET	OFFICER	DET VZNS	VEHICLES	WANT SCHEDULE		OFFICER ONLY
				H/C	APPROX LANDING DATE	RESOURCES ON LANDING
1 Can Div L.O.	Cap. Mills	Pte Dutcher	1(15cwt) L. 4737097	1	D + 1	1 Can Div HQ
	Lt. Lennon					
5 Div L.O.	Lt. Melatesta			1	D + 1	5 Div HQ
	Lt. Shannon					
13 Corps L.O.	Lt. Col. Nichols	Fus Bates	1.A. 1(15cwt) 5184134	1	D + 2	13 Corps HQ
A.	Major Benton Jones	L/Cpl Kein	2.A. 1(15cwt) 2.4740867	3	D + 1	1 Can Div HQ
	Major Pollock					
	Capt. Grizzard					
	Lieut. Simpson					
	Major Johnwick					
B	Lieut Vitli	Fus. Walker	4.A. 1(15cwt) 2.5184092	3	D + 1	1 Can Div HQ
	Lt. Papalardo					
C	Major Holmstrom	Rfn. Levy	6.A. 1(15cwt) 2.4977439	3	D + 1	5 Div HQ
	Lt. Harris					
	Capt. O'Brien					
	Lt. Muehlbauer					
	Capt. Bailey					
AMOT REGION	Capt. Mavis	Fus. Davison	9.A. 1(15cwt) 2.4976713	-	D + 1/ D + 2	13 Corps or AMOT Region 2 HQ
	Lt. Col. Gerry					
2 HQ	Wing Comd Deer	Fus. Burdon	10.A. 1(15cwt) 2.4976787	-	D + 1/ D + 2	13 Corps or AMOT Region 2 HQ
	Major Millard					

MOST SECRET

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT - ITALY

REGION 2

MAIS

Ref. ITALY 1 : 250,000

ATTACHMENTS.

A. C.A.O.'s DIRECTIVES & I.O.'s.

B. ORGANIZATION

C. PERSONNEL

D. TRANSPORT

E. D.R. SERVICE

Introduction.

A large scale operation known as AVANGUARD, and one on a smaller scale, known as BAYONET have been planned for the invasion of the Italian Mainland.

2. AVANGUARD includes a landing in the vicinity of Naples to be undertaken by 5th Army.

3. BAYONET is a smaller operation by 15 Corps in the vicinity of REGGIO (map ref.).

4. Assuming that the AVANGUARD objectives are attained it is considered likely that, apart from the area of operation BAYONET, the occupation of the three Southern Compartimenti of Italy will take place peacefully and simultaneously.

5. The object of this appreciation and plan is to provide the requirements for an Allied Military Government of the Region concerned, based on the assumption in para. 4 and in accordance with the policy of AMBROT

R.Q.

.....

Introduction.

A large scale operation known as AVALANCHE, and one on a smaller scale, known as BATTION have been planned for the invasion of the

Italian Mainland.

2. AVALANCHE includes a landing in the vicinity of Naples

to be undertaken by 5th Army.

3. BATTION is a smaller operation by 13 Corps in the

vicinity of REGGIO (map ref. 7).

4. Assuming that the AVALANCHE objectives are attained it is considered likely that, apart from the area of operation BATTION, the occupation of the three Southern Compartimenti of Italy will take place peacefully and simultaneously.

5. The object of this appreciation and plan is to provide the requirements for an Allied Military Government of the Region concerned, based on the assumption in para. 4 and in accordance with the policy of ANZOC

H.Q.

APPENDIX.

6. INTENTION

To provide an Allied Military Government for the Compartimenti of CALABRIA, PUGLIA and LUCANIA.

7. ORGANIZATION OF THE REGION.

The area over which the Government is to be set up is

known as Region 2.

LETTERS
TO
THE
PRESIDENT

The subdivisions of Region 2 according to Italian

(a) Three Comparisons (1) California

(44) FUGIA.

(111) 170411A

(b) Ten Provinces

(i) CALABRITA

3. METODO CALABRIA

CONTENTS

CONCLUSION

(11) FULLA 5 BULT

(11) PUGLIA

5 BUT

T29D-MT

VIETNAM

STIMULI

CELLULOSE

(144) LUCANIA 2 TOTINZA

(144) LIGAMTA

APPENDIX

9. For the purpose of administration under ARSOT Officers the provinces have been further divided into DISTRICTS according to towns, population and area. These divisions however do not conform to any division of Italian Administration. Details of DISTRICTS are given at App. 'A'.

10. ALLIED GOVERNMENT PRINCIPLES.

In order to secure the best results it is desirable that the Allied Organization should be on parallel lines to the Italian Administration through whom it will work. The Regional Government organization should be capable of being switched over to an "ALL ITALY" Government when the conquest and occupation of the country has been sufficiently advanced, and the

COTRILLANA
COSIMELLA
(11) FURIA 5 BARI
INDICE
NOGLIA
BRINDISI
TARANTO
(11) LUCANIA 2 POTENZA
MATERA

9. For the purpose of administration under ARSOT Officers the provinces have been further divided into DISTRICTS according to towns, population and area. These divisions however do not conform to any division of Italian Administration. Details of DISTRICTS are given at App. 'A'.

10. ALLIED GOVERNMENT TRANSITION.

In order to secure the best results it is desirable that the Allied Organization should be on parallel lines to the Italian Administration through which it will work. The Regional Government organization should be capable of being switched over to an "ALL ITALY" Government when the conquest and occupation of the country has been sufficiently advanced, and the functions of the D.C.C.A.O. of Region 2 can be transferred to Rome at any appropriate time without any loss of efficiency. Details of the organization for Region 2 are at App. 'B'.

11. FACTORS AFFECTING AN ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN REGION 2

Since it is assumed that the occupation of the area will mainly be peacefully accomplished, the initiation of the Allied Military Government is likely to present fewer problems than Sicily. Problems of house-
...../3

MOST SECRET

ing, refugees, civilian casualties and epidemics are likely to be less difficult (except in the area covered by BAYONH) and the disorganization of local government resulting from military operations, will not have taken place.

12. At the same time the Region is not self-supporting in food and it will accordingly be necessary for M.F.H. to arrange for supplies to be available as required, immediately AVAILABLE takes place.

13. The Region is deficient in water supply. It is also reputed to be dangerous from the malarial aspect.

THE PLAN.

14. CHAIN OF ADMINISTRATION

Details of the organization for the Government of Region 2 are set out at App. 'B'.

15. In addition to controlling Region 2, the H.Q. will also act as the Operational H.Q. with 8th Army for BAYONH. An Advanced section of the Main H.Q. Region 2, will go to the Mainland during the Assault phase of BAYONH. Main H.Q. Region 2 will be established on the Mainland as soon as operations permit, probably in the vicinity of KONGIO.

16. Near H.Q. Region 2, will remain in Sidi to direct the transportation to the Mainland of Region 2 personnel, transport and supplies and will be in the vicinity of the port of embarkation.

17. Communications and Provincial H.Q. will form at Near H.Q. Region 2 and commence to function on instructions from Main H.Q. Region 2, after their arrival on the Mainland.

18. Details of personnel for Region 2 are given at App. 'C'.

13. The region is deficient in water supply. It is also reported to be dangerous from the malaria aspect.

THE PLAN.

14. CHAIN OF ADMINISTRATION

Details of the organization for the government of Region 2 are set out at App. 'B'.

15. In addition to controlling Region 2, the H.Q. will also act as the Operational H.Q. with 8th Army for BAYBOM. An Advanced section of the Main H.Q. Region 2, will go to the Mainland during the Assault phase of BAYBOM. Main H.Q. Region 2 will be established on the Mainland as soon as operations permit, probably in the vicinity of RAGGIO.

16. Near H.Q. Region 2, will remain in Sicily to direct the transportation to the Mainland of Region 2 personnel, transport and supplies and will be in the vicinity of the port of embarkation.

17. Compartmental and Provincial H.Q. will form at Rear H.Q. Region 2 and commence to function on instructions from Main H.Q. Region 2, after their arrival on the Mainland.

18. Details of personnel for Region 2 are given at App. 'C'.

19. INFORMATION OF PERSONNEL

As required by Main H.Q. Region 2, Rear H.Q. will arrange with Ferry Control for the transfer to the Mainland of Region 2 personnel.

20. The date and numbers required will depend upon the

tactical situation following AVANCE and BAYBOM.

21. The date of shipping will depend upon the shipping

2300

MOST SECRET

- 4 -

tonnage available.

460

22. All Region 2 personnel will report to Rear H.Q. Region 2. They will be assembled at the earliest possible date and pending their being required for the operation, will gain useful experience in Sicily by being dispersed through the province of Catania with existing C.A.O.'s. They will be reassembled by Rear H.Q. Region 2 as the tactical situation requires but all personnel will be ready to proceed from Sicily not later than D3 of BATTORNI or D3 of AVALANCHES, whichever is the earlier.

23. On arrival on the Mainland all officers will report to Main H.Q. Region 2 who will issue instructions to them.

24. As the tactical situation permits, and under the direction of Main H.Q. Region 2, S.C.A.O.'s will move to their Compartiments and instruct C.A.O.'s (provincial) and C.A.O.'s to take up their duties.

25. It may be necessary for C.A.O.'s to be embarked before the shipment of the C.A.O.'s (provincial) or their staff, in which case C.A.O.'s will report to and receive orders direct from Main H.Q. Region 2 until the Provincial H.Q. arrives.

26. TRANSPORT.

Details of the allocation of transport for Region 2 personnel are set out in App. 'D'.

27. Transport will be handed over to the unit concerned by Rear H.Q. Region 2 at the Assembly Point near to the point of embarkation.

28. Region 2 personnel will accompany the transport allocated to them during transshipment.

29. COMMUNICATIONS.

all personnel will be ready to proceed from Sicily not later than D3 of BATTION OR D3 of AVALLANCE, whichever is the earlier.

23. On arrival on the Mainland all officers will report to Main H.Q. Region 2 who will issue instructions to them.

24. As the tactical situation permits, and under the direction of Main H.Q. Region 2, S.C.A.O.'s will move to their Compartiments and instruct C.A.O.'s (provincial) and C.A.O.'s to take up their duties.

25. It may be necessary for C.A.O.'s to be embarked before the shipment of the C.A.O.'s (provincial) or their staff, in which case C.A.O.'s will report to and receive orders direct from Main H.Q. Region 2 until the Provincial H.Q. arrives.

26. TRANSPORT.

Details of the allocation of transport for Region 2 personnel are set out in App. 'D'.

27. Transport will be handed over to the unit concerned by Rear H.Q. Region 2 at the Assembly Point near to the point of embarkation.

28. Region 2 personnel will accompany the transport allocated to them during transhipment.

29. COMMUNICATIONS.

A separate D.R. system for Region 2 will be established to provide communications within the Region. Details are set out at App. 'E'.

30. BRIEFING.

Briefing of Region Officers will be the responsibility of Rear H.Q. Region 2 and will be carried out immediately prior to the embarkation.

31. KIT & EQUIPMENT.

All personal kit and equipment for a unit will be

...../5

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MOST SECRET

- 5 -

loaded on to unit transport.

32. RATIONS.

All personnel will carry haversack rations for 48 hours.

33. Campo rations for 7 days for each unit will be loaded on to unit transport.

34. W.e.f. arrival on the Mainland C.A.O's (provincial) will be responsible for the supply of rations to all units, (including Compartiments P.A.), in their province. They will arrange for units to draw rations themselves from a nearby Military unit if one exists or alternatively they will draw in bulk and arrange their distribution to the units in the province.

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W.A.F. arrival on the Mainland C.A.O.'s (provincial) will be responsible for the supply of rations to all units, (including Compartiments H.), in their province. They will arrange for units to draw rations themselves from a nearby Military unit if one exists or alternatively they will draw in bulk and arrange their distribution to the units in the province.

APPENDIX A to Allied Military Government of Southern Italy-

REGION 2
9.A.O. DISTRICTS
46 F

COMPARTAMENTO PROVINCE

DISTRICT

LARGE COMMUNES
POPULATION
(Approximate)

CALABRIA	REGGIO CALABRIA	(1) Reggio	130,000
		(2) Gioia Ionica	14,500
		Locri	10,000
		Grotteria	8,000
		Mammola	10,500
		Caulonia	12,000
		Siderno	15,000
		(3) Palmi	18,000
		Villa S/Giovanni	15,000
		Scilla	7,000
		Bagnara	12,000
		Seminara	7,000
		(4) Taurianova	18,500
		Cittanova	14,000
		Palistena	13,000
		Rosaria	13,000
		Gioia	10,800
		Cinquesfondi	66,500
		Laureana	9,500
	CATANZARO	(5) Catanzaro	50,000
		Philadelfia	9,000
		(6) Vibo Valentia	18,500
		Mileto	7,500
		Nicotera	8,000
		Pizzo	8,500
		Serva San Bruno	7,000
		(7) Nicastro	28,000
		Sambiasi	18,000
		Serrastretta	6,500
		(8) Cotrone	24,500
		Cutro	6,700
		Civo	10,000
		Policastro	9,500
	COSANZA	(9) Cosenza	15,000

(2)	Giosa Ionica	14,500
	Locri	10,000
	Grotteria	8,000
	Mammola	10,500
	Caulonia	12,000
	Siderno	15,000
(3)	Palmi	18,000
	Villa S/Giovanni	15,000
	Scilla	7,000
	Bagnara	12,000
	Seminara	7,000
(4)	Taurianova	18,500
	Cittanova	14,000
	Palistena	13,000
	Rosaria	13,000
	Gioia	10,800
	Cinquelfondi	26,500
	Leureana	9,500
CATANZARO (5)	Catanzaro	50,000
	Filadelfia	9,000
(6)	Vibo Valentia	18,500
	Mileto	7,500
	Nicotera	8,000
	Pizzo	8,500
	Serva San Bruno	7,000
(7)	Nicastro	28,000
	Sambiasi	18,000
	Serrastretta	6,500
(8)	Cotrone	24,500
	Cutro	6,700
	Civo	10,000
	Policastro	9,500
COSERZA (9)	Cosenza	45,000
	S.Giovanni	15,000
	Amantea	10,500
	Rende	9,500
	Fiumefreddo Bruzio	8,700
(10)	Corigliano Collabra	16,000
	Rossano	15,500
	Acri	16,000
	Bisignano	7,000
	Longobucco	8,000
	Luzzi	7,000

SECRET

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APPENDIX A (cont'd)

COMPARTIMENTO PROVINCE

- 2 -

DISTRICT

LARGE COMUNES

CALABRIA (Cont'd) Cosenza (Cont'd)

- (11) Paola
- Castrovillari
- Cassano
- Belvedere
- Cetraro
- Fuscaldo
- Verbicaro
- San Marco
- Montalto Uffugo

14,000
12,000
11,500
7,500
8,500
9,000
6,000
9,000
9,500

IGUARIA

POTENZA

- (1) Potenza
- Iauria
- Moliterno
- Maraio

25,000
10,000
6,000
7,000

(2)

- Avigliano
- Melfi
- Rionero in Vulture
- Lavello
- Muro Lucano

20,000
13,000
12,000
9,500
8,000

MATERA

- (3) Matera
- Tricarico
- Pisticci
- Irsina
- Ferrandina
- Montescaglione
- Genzano
- Palazzo
- Stigliano

19,000
7,500
10,500
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000
7,000

MA

FUGLIA

LECCE

- (1) Lecce
- (2) Galatina
- Nardo
- Galatone
- Casarano
- Copertino
- Maglie
- Squinzano
- Gallipoli

49,000
17,500
17,000
10,000
9,000
10,000
12,000
9,000
13,000

BRINDISI

- (3) Brindisi

35,000

(1) Ostuni

25,000

Montalto Uffugo 9,500

LUCANIA	POTENZA	(1)	Potenza	25,000
			Lauria	10,000
			Moliterno	6,000
			Meraico	7,000
		(2)	Avigliano	20,000
			Melfi	13,000
			Rionero in Vulture	12,000
			Lavello	9,500
			Muro Lucano	8,000
MA	MATERA	(3)	Matera	19,000
			Tricarico	7,500
			Pisticci	10,500
			Irsina	7,000
			Ferrandina	7,000
			Montescaglione	7,000
			Genzano	7,000
			Palazzo	7,000
			Stigliano	7,000

FUJIA	LECCE	(1)	Lecce	49,000
		(2)	Galatina	17,500
			Nardo	17,000
			Galatone	10,000
			Casarano	9,000
			Copertino	10,000
			Maglie	12,000
			Squinzano	9,000
			Gallipoli	13,000

BRINDISI	(3)	Brindisi	35,000
	(4)	Ostuni	25,000
		Geglie Messapico	15,000
		San Vito	11,000
		Mesagne	16,000
		Francoavilla Fontana	20,000
		Cisternino	9,000
		Oria	11,000
		Fasano	20,000
		Latiano	9,000
TARENTE	(5)	Taranto	105,000

	(6)	Martina Franca	33,000
		Manduria	15,000
		Grottaglie	12,500
		Massafra	11,000
		Ginosa	12,000
		Sava	9,500
		Mottola	10,000

APPENDIX A (Cont'd)

- 3 -

COMPARTIMENTO PROVINCEDISTRICTPOPULATION (Approx.)PUGLIA
(Cont'd)

BARI

(7) Bari
Triggiano170,000
11,000(8) Monopoli
Castellana
Putignano
Moci25,000
12,000
18,000
14,000(9) Gioja del Colle
Santeramo
Aqua Viva
Conversano
Rutigliano
Noicaltaro
Polignano
Moladibari26,000
16,000
12,000
17,000
11,000
10,500
11,000
17,000(10) Altamura
Gravina Impuglia
~~Triggiano~~27,000
28,000
~~28,000~~(11) Bitonto
Mondugno
Palo del Colle
Grumo Appula32,000
12,500
14,000
15,000(12) Ruvo in Puglia
Terlizzi28,000
25,000(13) Molsetta
Giovinazzo50,000
11,500

(14) Visceglie

40,000

(15) Gorato

50,000

(16) Trani

36,000

(17) Andria

59,000

(18) Barletta

52,000

(19) Canova
Minervino
Spisazzola27,000
20,000
11,500

FOGGIA

(20) Foggia

67,000

16,000
 12,000
 17,000
 11,000
 10,500
 11,000
 17,000
 27,000
 28,000
 32,000
 12,500
 14,000
 15,000
 28,000
 25,000
 50,000
 11,500
 40,000
 50,000
 36,000
 59,000
 52,000
 27,000
 20,000
 11,500
 67,000
 39,000
 11,000
 10,000
 17,000
 7,000
 5,000
 10,000
 5,000
 6,500
 7,500

(10) Altamura
 Gravina Impuglia
 Bitonto
 Mondugno
 Palo del Colle
 Grumo Appula
 (11) Bitonto
 Mondugno
 Palo del Colle
 Grumo Appula
 (12) Rovo in Puglia
 Terlizzi
 (13) Molsetta
 Giovinazzo
 (14) Bisceglie
 (15) Gorato
 (16) Trani
 (17) Andria
 (18) Barletta
 (19) Canova
 Minervino
 Spisazzola
 FOGGIA
 (20) Foggia
 (21) Cerignola
 Trinitapoli
 Margherita
 (22) Lucera
 Berlino
 Roseto
 Ascoli
 Accadia
 San Agata
 Orsara

COMPARTIMENTO PROVINCEDISTRICTLARGE COMMUNESPOPULATION (Approx)

FUGLIA

FOGGIA

(23)

Monte S. Angelo

24,000

San Giovanni

11,500

San Marco in Lamis

19,000

Marfredonia

15,000

Biespe

9,000

Vico del Gargano

9,000

(24)

San Severo

35,000

Torre Maggiore

13,000

San Nicandro

13,000

Apricena

9,000

Note 1.

Only the larger Communes in the Districts for which C.A.O.'s are responsible have been listed. Most Districts, however, include a number of lesser Communes which will nevertheless be the responsibility of the C.A.O. to administer.

Note 2.

The first named Commune in each District will be the H.Q. of the District, except POTENZA (2) who are administered by Provincial H.Q.

Note 3.

The Province of Matera is one district and the functions of C.A.O. provincial and CAO district are amalgamated into the C.A.O. provincial H.Q.

Note 4.

The population figures are in most cases those of 1929 and are therefore probably an underestimate.

Note 1. Only the larger Communes in the Districts for which C.A.O.'s are responsible have been listed. Most Districts, however, include a number of lesser Communes which will nevertheless be the responsibility of the C.A.O. to administer.

Note 2. The first named Commune in each District will be the H.Q. of the District, except POTENZA (2) who are administered by Provincial H.Q.

Note 3. The Province of Matera is one district and the functions of C.A.O. provincial and CAO district are amalgamated into the C.A.O. provincial H.Q.

Note 4. The population figures are in most cases those of 1929 and are therefore probably an underestimate.

Torre Maggiore 13,000
San Nicandro 13,000
Apricena 9,000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Appendix 'B' to Allied Military Government of Southern Italy-

ORGANIZATION CHART

MOST SECRET

D.C.C.A.O.

STAFF

COMANDO MILITARE CALABRIA

Officers:

- 1 SCAG 3 Med or Sen
- 1 CAPO 1 Supply
- 2 Legal 1 Custodian
- 2 Finance
- Other Ranks

COMANDO MILITARE PUGLIA

Officers:

- 1 SCAG 5 Med or Sen
- 1 CAPO 1 Supply
- 3 Legal 2 Custodians
- 3 Finance
- Other Ranks

Prov of
REGGIO
CALABRIA

Prov of
CATANZARO

Prov of
CROTONE

Prov of
LAMEZIA

Prov of
BRINDISI

Prov of
TARANTO

Prov of
BARI

Prov of
FOGGIA

DISTRICTS

- 1. REGGIO
- 2. GIOIOSA
- 3. PALMI
- 4. TAURIANOVA

DISTRICTS

- 1. CATANZARO
- 2. VIBO VALENTIA
- 3. NICASTRO
- 4. CROTONE

DISTRICTS

- 1. CROTONE
- 2. PAOLA
- 3. CORIGLIANO

DISTRICTS

- 1. LAMEZIA
- 2. CALABRITTO
- 3.

DISTRICTS

- 1. BRINDISI
- 2. OSTUNI

DISTRICTS

- 1. TARANTO
- 2. MARTINA

DISTRICTS

- 1. BARI
- 2. MINOROLI
- 3. GIOIA
- 4. ALTAMURA
- 5. BITONTO
- 6. NOGENTINO
- 7. SAN GIOVANNI
- 8. CORATO
- 9. MOTTOLA
- 10. TRANI
- 11. ANDRIA
- 12. CANOSA
- 13. GROTTOLE

Each PROVINCE will have:-
1 C.A.C.
1 C.A.P.O.
1 Supply Officer
Other Ranks

Each DISTRICT will have:-
1 C.A.O.
1 C.A.P.O.
Other Ranks

Certain Provinces and Districts requiring more personnel have been allotted additional A.C.A.O.'s.
MATERA District will be operated by MATERA Provincial Staff.

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Appendix 'B' to Allied Military Government of Southern Italy-

ORGANIZATION CHART

A.M.C.A.O.

STAFF

TO CALABRIA
 Officers:
 3 Med or San
 1 Supply
 1 Custodian
 Other Ranks

COMPARTIMENTO PUGLIA
 Officers:
 1 SCAG 5 Med or San
 1 CAPO 1 Supply
 3 Legal 2 Custodians
 3 Finance
 Other Ranks

COMPARTIMENTO MOLISE
 Officers:
 1 SCAG 1 Med or San
 1 CAPO 1 Supply
 1 Legal 1 Custodian
 1 Finance
 Other Ranks

Prov of TARANTO	Prov of COTRIZIA	Prov of LECCE	Prov of BRINDISI	Prov of TARANTO	Prov of BARI	Prov of FOGGIA	Prov of POTENZA	Prov of MATERA
DISTRICTS	DISTRICTS	DISTRICTS	DISTRICTS	DISTRICTS	DISTRICTS	DISTRICTS	DISTRICTS	DISTRICTS
TARANTO BO VALINTEA DASTRO THONE	1. COTRIZIA 2. PAOLA 3. CONIGLIANO	1. LECCE 2. Galatina 3.	1. BRINDISI 2. OSTUNI	1. TARANTO 2. MARTINA	1. BARI 2. MURROLO 3. GIGIA 4. ARAVIA 5. ETTORIO 6. MURROLO 7. RUVO IN PUGLIA 8. CORATO 9. BENEVENTO 10. TRANI 11. BANCHEA 12. AURIA 13. CUNOA	1. FOGGIA 2. CERIGNOLA 3. LARERA 4. S. SEVERO 5. M. S. ANGELO	1. POTENZA 2. AVIGLIANO	1. MATERA
1 have:- 1 C.A.C. 1 C.A.P.O. 1 Supply Officer Other Ranks								
1 have:- 1 C.A.O. 1 C.A.P.O. Other Ranks								

and Districts requiring more
 in allotted additional A.C.A.O.'s.
 will be operated by MATERA

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 5

APPENDIX 'C' TO Allied Military Government of Southern Italy -

REGION 2

PERSONNEL.

OFFICERS

	Comp. of CALABRIA	Comp. of LUCANIA	Comp. of FUGLIA	TOTALS
S.C.A.O. (Compart)	1	1	1	3
C.A.O. (Prov)	3	2	5	10
A.C.A.O. (Prov)	-	1	1	2
C.A.O. (District)	11	2	24	37
A.C.A.O. (District)	2	-	4	6
C.A.P.O. (Compart)	1	1	1	3
C.A.P.O. (Prov)	3	2	5	10
A.C.A.P.O. (Prov)	-	-	1	1
C.A.P.O. (District)	11	1	24	36
Supply (Compart)	1	1	1	3
Supply (Prov)	3	2	5	10
Legal (Compart)	2	1	3	6
Finance "	2	1	3	6
Medical "	3	1	5	9
Gustodians(")	1	1	2	4
TOTALS	44	17	85	145

Note: Total of 118 Officers is required from Pool, including all Provincial and District Officers and Compartimenti Supply Officers.

OTHER RANKS

COMPARTIMENTI.	Comp. of CALABRIA	Comp. of LUCANIA	Comp. of FUGLIA	TOTALS
Clerks: S/Sgt.	1	1	1	3
Cpt. (Mess & Supply)	1	1	1	3
Others	6	4	8	18
Drivers:				
Cpl.	1	1	1	3
Others	7	5	7	19
Batmen	2	2	2	6
PROVINCE:				

C.A.O. (District)	11	-	4	6
A.C.A.O. (District)	2	-	4	3
C.A.P.O. (Compart)	1	1	1	10
C.A.P.O. (Prov)	3	2	5	1
A.C.A.P.O. (Prov)	-	-	1	36
C.A.P.O. (District)	11	1	24	3
Supply (Compart)	1	1	1	10
Supply (Prov)	3	2	5	6
Legal (Compart)	2	1	3	6
Finance	2	1	3	9
Medical	3	1	5	4
Gustodians	1	1	2	
TOTALS	44	17	85	145

Note: Total of 118 Officers is required from Pool, including all Provincial and District Officers and Compartimenti Supply Officers.

OTHER RANKS	Comp. of CALABRIA	Comp. of LUCANIA	Comp. of PUGLIA	TOTALS
CLERKS:				
S/Sgt.	1	1	1	3
Cpl. (Mess & Supply)	1	1	1	3
Others	6	4	8	18
Drivers:				
Cpl.	1	1	1	3
Others	7	5	7	19
Batmen	2	2	2	6
PROVINCE:				
CLERKS:				
N.C.O. (Office)	3	1	4	8
N.C.O. (Rations & Supply)	3	1	5	9
Others	6	4	8	18
Drivers:				
Cpls.	3	2	5	10
Others	12	8	19	39
Batmen	3	2	5	10
DISTRICTS:				
Drivers	22	2	40	64
TOTALS	70	34	106	210

440

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REGION 2

COMPARTMENT H.Q.

Jeeps & P/U's.	15 cwt trucks	3 ton trucks	M/Cs
1	1	1	1

**CALABRIA
PUGLIA
LUCANIA**

— — —

— — —

REGGIO	1	2	1	3 (2 D.R.I.S.)
CATANZARO	1	4	1	

1	2	1	3	
1	1	1	1	
1	1	1	1	
1	1	1	1	

**LECCE
BRINDISI
TARANTO
BARI
FOGGIA**

1 1 1 1 2 3 (2 D.R.I.S.)

MATERIA
POTENZA

2 1 2 1 3 (2 D.R.I.S.)

REGGIO PROV.

REGGIO PROV.	4	-	4
GATANZARO	4	-	4
COSENZA	3	-	3

**POTENZA
LAURIA**

— — — — —

1. LECCE
2. LECCE Towns

— — — — —

2. BRINDISI
2. OSTINI

— — — — —

1. TARANTO
2. TARANTO TOWNS

— — — — —

1. BARI

2. MONOPOPI

100

3. GIOIA del COLLE

100

4. ALFAMURA

1

PROVINCIAL H.Q.

REGGIO	1	3	2	1	1	3 (2 D.R.I.S.)
CATANZARO	1	1	1	1	1	1
COSENZA	1	1	1	1	1	1
LECCE	1	1	1	1	1	1
BRINDISI	1	1	2	1	1	1
TARANTO	1	1	1	1	1	1
BARI	1	1	2	1	1	2
FOGGIA	1	1	1	1	1	3 (2 D.R.I.S.)
MATERA	2	1	2	-	-	1
POTENZA	1	1	1	-	-	3 (2 D.R.I.S.)

DISTRICTSREGGIO PROV.

CATANZARO	4	4	4	1	1	4
COSENZA	4	4	4	1	1	4
POTENZA	3	3	3	1	1	3
LAURIA	1	1	1	1	1	1

1. LECCE
2. LECCE Towns

1. LECCE	1	1	1	1	1	1
2. LECCE Towns	1	1	1	1	1	1

2. BRINDISI
2. OSTINI

2. BRINDISI	1	1	1	1	1	1
2. OSTINI	1	1	1	1	1	1

1. TARANTO
2. TARANTO Towns

1. TARANTO	1	1	1	1	1	1
2. TARANTO Towns	1	1	1	1	1	1

1. BARI
2. MONOPOPI
3. GIOIA del COLLE
4. ALTAMURA
5. BITUNTO
6. MOLFETTA
7. RUVO in FUGLIO
8. CORATO
9. BISCEGLIE
10. PARANI
11. BARONISSA
12. ANDRIA
13. CANOSA

1. BARI	1	1	1	1	1	1
2. MONOPOPI	1	1	1	1	1	1
3. GIOIA del COLLE	1	1	1	1	1	1
4. ALTAMURA	1	1	1	1	1	1
5. BITUNTO	1	1	1	1	1	1
6. MOLFETTA	1	1	1	1	1	1
7. RUVO in FUGLIO	1	1	1	1	1	1
8. CORATO	1	1	1	1	1	1
9. BISCEGLIE	1	1	1	1	1	1
10. PARANI	1	1	1	1	1	1
11. BARONISSA	1	1	1	1	1	1
12. ANDRIA	1	1	1	1	1	1
13. CANOSA	1	1	1	1	1	1

1. FOGGIA
2. CERIGNOLA
3. BOVINO
4. S. SEVERO
5. MONTE SAN ANGELO

1. FOGGIA	1	1	1	1	1	1
2. CERIGNOLA	1	1	1	1	1	1
3. BOVINO	1	1	1	1	1	1
4. S. SEVERO	1	1	1	1	1	1
5. MONTE SAN ANGELO	1	1	1	1	1	1

TOTALS

TOTALS	61	16	10	1	1	49
--------	----	----	----	---	---	----

MOST SECRET

Appendix 'E' to Allied Military Government of Southern Italy -

REGION 2.
=====

D.R. SERVICE.
=====

General.

The Service will cover the whole of ALBET Region 2. This Region is divided into three Compartimenti. Each Compartimento will have its own D.R. Service which will connect up with similar services in the other Compartimenti. There are a total of 38 Civil Affairs Centres within the Region. 28 of these centres are included on D.R. routes. It will be necessary for officers in outlying Districts to pass their traffic through to some convenient centre on the D.R. route. A small additional 'Link' Service will operate between POTENZA and LARI.

2. HEADQUARTERS.

The Headquarters of the D.R. Services are situated at REGGIO, POTENZA and FOGGIA.

3. ESTABLISHMENT.

REGGIO	D.Rs.	M/Cs.
POTENZA	2	2
FOGGIA	3	3
	2	2

4. TIMETABLE.

Service.	Day.	Depart.	Arrive.
Service 'A' FOGGIA - LECCE	Monday	FOGGIA A.M.	LECCE P.M.
	Wednesday		
	Friday		
	Tuesday	LECCE A.M.	FOGGIA P.M.
	Thursday		
	Saturday		
Service 'E' POTENZA - COSENZA	Monday	POTENZA A.M.	COSENZA P.M.
	Wednesday		
	Friday		
	Tuesday	COSENZA A.M.	POTENZA P.M.
	Thursday		
	Saturday		

Service which will connect up with similar services in the other Compartimenti. There are a total of 38 Civil Affairs Centres within the Region. 28 of these centres are included on D.R. routes. It will be necessary for officers in outlying Districts to pass their traffic through to some convenient centre on the D.R. route. A small additional 'Link' Service will operate between POTENZA and BARI.

2. HEADQUARTERS.

The Headquarters of the D.R. Services are situated at REGGIO, POTENZA and FOGGIA.

3. ESTABLISHMENT.

REGGIO	D.Rs.	M/Cs.
POTENZA	2	2
FOGGIA	3	3
	2	2

4. TIMETABLE.

Service.	Day.	Depart.	Arrive.
Service 'A' FOGGIA - LECCE	Monday	FOGGIA A.M.	LECCE P.M.
	Wednesday		
	Friday		
	Tuesday Thursday Saturday	LECCE A.M.	FOGGIA P.M.
Service 'B' POTENZA - COSENZA	Monday	POTENZA A.M.	COSENZA P.M.
	Wednesday		
	Friday		
	Tuesday Thursday Saturday	COSENZA A.M.	POTENZA P.M.
Service 'C' REGGIO COSENZA	Monday	REGGIO A.M.	COSENZA P.M.
	Wednesday		
	Friday		
	Tuesday Thursday Saturday	COSENZA A.M.	REGGIO P.M.
Service 'D' POTENZA-BARI	Monday	POTENZA A.M.	BARI A.M.
	Wednesday		
	Friday		
	Tuesday Thursday Saturday	BARI P.M.	POTENZA P.M.

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...../2

MOST SECRET

(1) Service 'A' F 1A - LECCE.

Outgoing.	Distance - Miles.	Return.	Distance - Miles.
FOGGIA	00	LECCE	00
CERIGNOLA	25	BRINDISI	30
BARLETTA	25	OSTIA	25
BARI	40	MONOPOLI	25
GIOLA	25	BARI	30
TARANTO	30	BITONTO	15
LECCE	60	RUVO	15
Total Miles.	205	CORATO	5
		ANDRIA	5
		CANOSA	15
		CERIGNOLA	15
		FOGGIA	25
		Total Miles	205

(2) Service 'B' POTENZA - COSENZA.

Outgoing.	Distance - Miles	Return	Distance - Miles
POTENZA		COSENZA	
COSENZA	160	POTENZA	160

(3) Service 'C' REGGIO - COSENZA

Outgoing	Distance - Miles	Return	Distance - Miles
REGGIO	00	COSENZA	00
PALE	30	NICASTRO	35
VIBO	30	CATANZARO	25
CATANZARO	45	VIBO	45
COSENZA	40	PALE	30
Total Miles	145	REGGIO	30
		Total Miles	165

(4) Service 'D' POTENZA - BARI.

Outgoing.	Distance - Miles	Return	Distance - Miles
POTENZA	00	BARI	00
MATERA	70	ALTAMURA	30
ALTAMURA	15	POTENZA	50

Total Miles. 205

CORATO 5
 ANDRIA 5
 CANOSA 15
 CERIGNOLA 15
 FOGGIA 25
 Total Miles 205

(2) Service 'B' POTENZA - COSENZA.

Outgoing.	Distance - Miles	Return	Distance-Miles
POTENZA		COSENZA	
COSENZA	160	POTENZA	160

(3) Service 'C' PEGGIO - COSENZA

Outgoing	Distance - Miles	Return	Distance-Miles
PEGGIO	00	COSENZA	00
PAIMI	30	RICACCI	35
VIBO	30	CALANZANO	25
CALANZANO	45	VIBO	45
COSENZA	40	PAIMI	30
Total Miles	<u>145</u>	PEGGIO	<u>30</u>
		Total Miles	<u>165</u>

(4) Service 'D' POTENZA - BARI.

Outgoing.	Distance-Miles	Return	Distance-Miles
POTENZA	00	BARI	00
MATERA	70	ALTAMURA	30
ALTAMURA	15	POTENZA	50
BARI	<u>30</u>		<u>80</u>
	<u>80</u>		


437

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
TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "E"
I R SERVICE

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015Subject; AMGOT during future operations.MOST SECRET.

46

AL/11/
28 August 43.C.C.A.O.

I am sending this copy of cable to you personally as
it is of urgent importance and you will wish to see it at once.

A copy is being sent up through normal channels to your
office.


Colonel,
S. S. O.

AMGOT Liaison,
15 Army Group Main,
FIELD.
RJPT/JG.

D.C.C.A.O.

435

There is much in this file
which you may not have seen.

 2/9 P.A.
2/9

785015

~~BIGOT~~
~~MOST SECRET~~BIGOT
MOST SECRETIMPORTANT
CIPHER MESSAGE
INFOLIO NO 7800
27 AUG 43FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FMGS
TO : 15 ARMY GP
RPTD: FILPOT FOR AMG
ORIG NO: 6896TOO NIL
THI NIL
TOR 0348B/28

FOR YOUR INFORMATION PARAPHRASE OF OUR REFERENCE NUMBER 3144 IS SENT IN CONNECTION WITH PLANNED FUTURE OPERATIONS OUR PLANS REGARDING MILITARY GOVERNMENT ARE: WE ARE ORGANISING A UNIT FROM PERSONNEL NOW IN SICILY TO GO WITH THE BAYTOWN OPERATION AND AS REGION TWO IS CAPTURED TAKE CONTROL. FROM PERSONNEL IN THE THEATRE AND THAT COMING FROM WASHINGTON AND LONDON WE ARE ORGANISING A SECOND TEAM TO HANDLE REGION THREE IN CONNECTION WITH OPERATION AVALANCHE. SINCE THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE UNDER COMMAND OF 15 ARMY GP, ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR REGION 3 THREE AND TWO RESPECTIVELY WILL BE UNDER CONTROL OF PRESENT AMGOT ORGANISATION. AS QUICKLY AS CONDITIONS PERMIT SICILY WILL BE ORGANISED INTO REGION ONE AND AMGOT HEADQUARTERS WILL MOVE TO MAINLAND, PROBABLY NEAR NAPLES. THEREFORE AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO EXTEND JURISDICTION OF AMGOT TO INCLUDE ANY ITALIAN TERRITORY CAPTURED. MILITARY GOVERNOR OF ALL TERRITORY TAKEN TO BE COMMANDING GENERAL, FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP. AUTHORITY NOW REQUESTED WOULD NOT INCLUDE SUPERVISION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN ROME BY PRESENT AMGOT ORGANISATION, AS IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL ISSUE A DIRECTIVE IN THIS RESPECT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE MADE OF ANY CHANGE IN EXISTING GENERAL DIRECTIVE COVERING: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS END PARAPHRASE. THIS INFORMATION IS BACKGROUND FOR MESSAGE OF 27 AUGUST INFORMING YOU OF EXTENSION OF EXISTING HUSKY GENERAL DIRECTIVE FOR TIME BEING.

SMC DISTRIBUTION

AMGOT 3 ACTION

SMC 0630B/28
TF 0651B/28 IUBIGOT
MOST SECRET
IMPORTANT

31/8
Gen. A.O.
A copy of this telegram has been sent to the last command has been sent to the last command has been sent to the last command
28/8

2326

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

BIGOT
MOST SECRET

IMPORTANT
CIPHER MESSAGE
IN

FOLIO NO 07805
27 AUG 43

FROM : FREEDOM SIGNED EISENHOWER
TO : 15 ARMY GROUP
RPTD: FILPOT (FOR AMG)
ORIG. NO : 6393 CITE FHMGS

TOO NIL
THI NIL
TOR 20400

INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TWO SIX AUGUST THAT THE JURISDICTION OF PROVISIONS IN THE EXISTING GENERAL DIRECTIVE FOR HUSKY HAS BEEN EXTENDED FOR THE TIME BEING TO INCLUDE THAT PART OF THE MAINLAND OF ITALY WHICH IN THE NEAR FUTURE MAY BE CAPTURED. GENERAL EISENHOWER IS AUTHORIZED TO DESIGNATE FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP COMMANDER AS MILITARY GOVERNOR OF SUCH TERRITORY AND MODIFICATION OF EXISTING GENERAL DIRECTIVE COVERING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS WILL BE FURNISHED IN NEAR FUTURE. THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE TO TRANSMIT THEIR DIRECTIVE WHEREIN WILL BE ESTABLISHED YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. FOR INFORMATION OF AMG DIRECTIVE HAS BEEN GIVEN THAT FIFTH ARMY UNDER COMMAND FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP FOR PLANNING UP TO MOUNTING DATE IN RESPECT OF AVALANCHE AND WILL THEN COME UNDER FULL OPERATIONAL COMMAND. A DATE TO BE ANNOUNCED LATER. FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP WILL ASSUME MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITY.

AMGOT 3 ACTION

SMC 0545B/23.
T.T.0555B/23. JJC.

HEADQUARTERS
63/HQ
29 AUG 1943
AMGOT

ACTION

3/8



SECRET - BIGOT

TBJ/cags

X43

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section

BIGOT

SUBJECT: Military Government in connection
with future operations.

TO : C.C.A.O. H.Q., AMG

25th August, 1943

1. For your information a MAT message was sent to London and Washington on 19 August setting out Military Government plans in connection with future operations. This indicated that personnel from Sicily were being organised into a unit to go with the BAYTOWN operation and to take control of Region 2 as captured. As well a second team is being organised to deal with Region 3 in connection with AVALANCHE this being organised from personnel in the theatre and those arriving from Washington and London. These operations will be under command of 15 Army Group, and the AMG for 2 and 3 respectively will be under present AMG. As soon as conditions permit one region will be organised for Sicily and AMG H.Q., will move probably to NAPLES.

In the light of the above authority was accordingly requested to extend the jurisdiction of AMG to include any Italian territory which may be captured, G.O.C. 15 Army Group becoming the Military Government of all territory taken.

It was further stated that it was not intended that the authority should include supervision by the present AMG of the National Government in ROME.

It was ^{presumed} ~~prescribed~~ that a directive would be issued by the combined Chiefs of Staff and it was stated that any modification of existing directive would be notified.

2. A reply is awaited to the above.

dg

BIGOT

Ch. J. C. Holmes
for signature of

A. J. C. HOLMES,
Brigadier - General,
Chief, Military Government Section.

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

432

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SECRET - BIGOT

TBJ/cags

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section

BIGOT

SUBJECT: Military Government in connection
with future operations.

TO : G.C.A.O. H.Q., AMG

25th August, 1943

1. For your information a MAT message was sent to London and Washington on 19 August setting out Military Government plans in connection with future operations. This indicated that personnel from Sicily were being organised into a unit to go with the BAYTOWN operation and to take control of Region 2 as captured. As well a second team is being organised to deal with Region 3 in connection with AVALANCHE this being organised from personnel in the theatre and those arriving from Washington and London. These operations will be under command of 15 Army Group, and the AMG for 2 and 3 respectively will be under present AMG. As soon as conditions permit one region will be organised for Sicily and AMG H.Q. will move probably to NAPLES.

In the light of the above authority was accordingly requested to extend the jurisdiction of AMG to include any Italian territory which may be captured, G.C.O. 15 Army Group becoming the Military Government of all territory taken.

It was further stated that it was not intended that the authority should include supervision by the present AMG of the National Government in ROME.

It was ~~proposed~~ ^{proposed} that a directive would be issued by the combined Chiefs of Staff and it was stated that any modification of existing directive would be notified.

2. A reply is awaited to the above.

BIGOT

J. C. HOLMES,
Brigadier - General,
Chief, Military Government Section.

SECRET

(Equals British MOST SECRET)

431

BNR/cags

SECRET BIGOT

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section



BIGOT

310.1

SUBJECT: L of C Organization in Italy.

TO : Headquarters, AMG
Attention: CCAO

24th August, 1943

1. Enclosed is copy no. 38 of AG 370, 43-399 GCT-AGM of 16 August 1943 requested by you in your MGA 71 dated 23 August, 1943.

2. Request acknowledge of receipt on form attached.

BIGOT

J. C. HOLMES,
Brigadier-General, Chief,
Military Government Section.

B. N. Richardson
by B. N. RICHARDSON,
Capt. AGD.

Encl: Copy # 38

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Equals British MOST SECRET

38

BIGOT

AG 370.43-399 GCT-ACM

SECRET

(Equals British Most Secret)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

: : : : : : : : : :
 : **SECRET** :
 : Auth: C in C AF :
 : Initials :
 : 16 August 1943 :
 : : : : : : : : : :

 16 August 1943
BIGOT

SUBJECT: L of C Organization in ITALY.

TO : All concerned.

Transmitted herewith for your information is a copy of the approved policy of this headquarters relative to the L of C Organization in Italy.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

 1 Incl.
 As listed.
DISTRIBUTION:Copy No.

- 1 - War Office (SD 5)
- 2 - GHQ MIDEAST
- 3 - Chief Administrative Officer
- 4 - V Corps FORTUNE
- 5 - X Corps FORTUNE
- 6 - G-1 (Br)
- 7 - G-1 (A)
- 8 - G-2
- 9 - G-3 (Plans)
- 10 - G-3 (Ops)
- 11-12- G-4 (Mov & Tn)
- 13-14-15 - G-4 (A)
- 16 - G-4 (Br)
- 17-18 - Q(Maint)
- 19 - Tn (A)
- 20 - Tn (Br)
- 21 - S & T (Br)
- 22 - AA & CD
- 23 - SIGNALS, AFHQ
- 24 - Log Plans
- 25 - CG, Fifth Army
- 26 - Engr.
- 27 - War Dept (OPD)
- 28 - CG, SOS NATOUSA
- 29 - DTC, NATOUSA
- 30 - ORD
- 31 - CWS
- 32 - Medical
- 33 - S & T
- 34 - Labour
- 35 - REME
- 36-60 G-3 (Org)
- 61 - AG Records, AFHQ

T.J. DAVIS,
 Brigadier General, USA,
 Adjutant General.

SECRET
 (Equals British Most Secret)
BIGOT SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

SECRET

(Equals British Most Secret)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

BIGOT

38

FILE NO: HSD/420

14 August 1943
B I G O T

SUBJECT: L of C Organization in ITALY.

MEMO TO: HQ 15 Army Group.

1. The following policy will be followed in planning L of C organization in ITALY.

2. L of C (CZ):

The L of C (Communications Zone) will be organized as provided by FSR (British and United States). NAPLES will become the main base port for both British and American (with attached French) forces, and as such will be laid out to provide two contiguous and distinct areas, one American Base Section and one British Base Area. From NAPLES northwards, the L of C (CZ) will be divided along its length so that U.S. and British each have separate geographical areas. (If operations from NAPLES extend southwards initially, the same principles apply). It will be desirable but not essential to have separate rail and road communications within the respective L of C (CZ). Berthing and unloading of ships will proceed in accordance with the needs of the two nations, and it will be necessary for movement staffs (port headquarters) to assist in operating the port.

3. Organization of Districts:

To provide for administrative control, including military government, over areas of ITALY as occupation by field forces is established, there will be three districts which embrace one or more political areas of ITALY.

No. 1 District - SICILY.

No. 2 District - ITALY up to the northern boundary of CAMPANIA and APULIA.

No. 3 District - ITALY from the northern boundary of No. 2 District northwards until it is necessary to introduce another district.

The headquarters of Nos. 1 and 2 Districts will be found by the British. The nationality of the headquarters, No. 3 District will be decided later in the light of events but will probably be American. Further details of the proposed organization within districts are given in Appendix A.

4. The C-in-C Mediterranean will be responsible for the Naval arrangements at the port of NAPLES.

- 1 -

SECRET

(Equals British Most Secret)

B I G O T

BIGOT

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

SECRET
(Equals British Most Secret)

S I G O T

FILE NO: HSD/420, cont'd.

5. The District organization outlined above will take effect as soon as the Area or a sufficient portion of the Area or District ceases to be within the zone of active operations. Initially, a district headquarters may be placed under command of 15th Army Group if the situation requires.

6. Chain of Command:

a. The chain of command within the area allotted to 15th Army Group (combat zone plus portions of the L of C (CZ)) will be from Allied Force Headquarters to 15th Army Group.

b. In rear of the area allotted to 15th Army Group, district headquarters will be directly under Allied Force Headquarters.

7. Separate instructions will be issued governing command, working and manning of naval ports.

8. Attached at Appendix B is a sketch map showing the proposed layout.

2 Incls.
Appendix A - Organization of Districts
Appendix B - Sketch Map

(Sgd) W.B. SMITH
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff.

SECRET
(Equals British Most Secret)

S I G O T

SECRET

Equals British MOST SECRET

APPENDIX A

~~MOST SECRET~~ ~~BIGOT~~ (15)

<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>H.Q.</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1.	No. 1 District	SICILY	British	
2.	Base Area	CATANIA	British	
3.	Base Area	SYRACUSE	British	
4.	Base Section	PALERMO	U.S.	
5.	No. 2 District	ITALY inclusive CALPANIA and APULIA to the South.	British	
6.	Base Section	NAPLES	U.S.	
7.	Base Area	NAPLES	British	
8.	Base Area	REGGIO	British	
9.	Base Area	CROTONI	British	
10.	Base Section/Base Area	TARANTO	U.S. or British	
11.	No. 3 District	ITALY inclusive LAZIO and ABRUSSI to the North.	U.S. or British	
12.	Base Area	CIVITAVECCHIA	British	
13.	Base Area/Base Section	ROME	U.S. or British	

MOST SECRET - BIGOT~~MOST SECRET~~ ~~BIGOT~~

785015

B

APPENDIX "A"

~~(EQUALS EIGHTH MOST SECRET)~~



428

(EQUALS BRITISH : MOST SECRET)

← - N°1 DISTRICT - - - →

BIGOT

24 August

Jr. H. V.

Chuck

you mentioned that
you needed an extra copy
of our operational plan
and I am sending this to
you by Mac Jordan who
is leaving for Palermo in a
few minutes.

We are getting our crowd
together here and I believe
that everything will go off
well.

As far as the food situation
is concerned it seems quite
apparent that we shall
not be in a position to meet
essential requirements from
within the country, and I
am hopeful that a special
grain shipment can be

43
63/140

few minutes.

We are getting over crowd together here and I believe it has everything will go off well.

As far as the food situation is concerned it seems quite apparent that we shall not be in a position to meet essential requirements from within the country and I am hopeful that a special grain shipment can be laid on from this island, ^{in Africa}.

Hope you will do all you can to have over 20 men available early next month, and the additional 61 (making 118 field officers as agreed) as soon as possible. We should also ⁴²⁵ ~~425~~

about the specialists and
other members. If the
operation involves as we
expect there will be an
urgent need for personnel
to handle the 3 compartments
(see previous)

Samuel

Harvey

785015

MESSAGE FORM 10-10
HEADQUARTERS
14/5

77 AUG 1943

FORTBASE TAF

AMGOT

RPTD AFHQ MAC NAF

SD 3128

SECRET (.) No more British units or complete Air Corps units are likely to arrive from NORTH AFRICA or TRIPOLI in time for the opening phase of the forthcoming operations (.) SEVENTH ARMY will therefore assign a number of units and transfer certain equipment to EIGHTH ARMY FORTBASE and TAF (.)

SECOND (.) EIGHTH ARMY and TAF will NOT rpt NOT employ these units in first above outside SICILY without reference to 15 Army Gp and will release them to SEVENTH ARMY as soon as equivalent British or Air Corps units arrive to replace them (.)

THIRD (.) The units required from SEVENTH ARMY will include:

One FA Bde total 48, 155mm Guns and HOWS
Four tns HAM total 48 guns
QM Truck coys or provisional truck coys, total 1000 trucks
One engineer coy, with power tools for quarrying
One engineer coy G.S.
Two QM tns Services
Certain vehicles, mechanical equipment, engineer and Signal equipment (.)

FOURTH (.) SEVENTH ARMY will NOT rpt NOT nominate for ~~THIRD~~ ~~above~~ units already nominated for FIFTH ARMY except in the case of FA Bns (.)

FIFTH (.) Orders for assignment of units and transfers of equipment will be issued by HQ 15 Army Gp G(SD) and in the case of engineer and signal equipment by Chief Engineer and Chief Signal Officer 15 Army Gp (.)

SIXTH (.) Moves of units and transfers of equipment ordered under fifth above will be completed by 27 Aug (.) SEVENTH ARMY will arrange direct with EIGHTH ARMY and FORTBASE for the moves and subsequent administration including ammunition supply

as soon as equivalent British or Air Corps units arrive to replace them (.)

THIRD (.) The units required from SEVENTH ARMY will include:

- One FA Bde total 48, 155mm Guns and HOWS
- Four bns HAA total 48 guns
- QM Truck coys or provisional truck coys, total 1000 trucks
- One engineer coy, with power tools for quarrying
- One engineer coy G.S.
- Two QM bns Service
- Certain vehicles, mechanical equipment, engineer and Signal equipment (.)

FOURTH (.) SEVENTH ARMY will NOT rpt NOT nominate for ~~THESE~~ ~~above~~ units already nominated for FIFTH ARMY except in the case of FA Bns (.)

FIFTH (.) Orders for assignment of units and transfers of equipment will be issued by HQ 15 Army Gp G(SD) and in the case of engineer and signal equipment by Chief Engineer and Chief Signal Officer 15 Army Gp (.)

SIXTH (.) Moves of units and transfers of equipment ordered under fifth above will be completed by 27 Aug (.) SEVENTH ARMY will arrange direct with EIGHTH ARMY and FORTRASE for the moves and subsequent administration including ammunition supply of the US units (.)

SEVENTH (EIGHTH ARMIES FORTRASE ask

To be sent in CIPHER
or by SECRET means.

Col. G.S.

PRIORITY

TOO 2215 B

Manager of 6/100
Good document

191.8 to 2000-100

Distribution
List "B"

R.R.

File No. 1910

421

SECRET

2 3 4 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

40

1000/63/100

1000/63/100

1000/63/100

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
The Army, India.

Present conditions and future operations have involved or will involve certain modifications in the original organization of staff which was analyzed to deal only with Italy.

Certain developments not contemplated at the time when the General Instructions to my officers were drawn up have also taken place or are taking place.

Experience has shown that the only real economy which can be effected in staff personnel is to hand over to, or leave with, the local native government as much as possible. As you are aware the original proposed directive from the Combined Chief of Staff involved what amounted to a direct form of administration in Italy with the attendant necessity of providing a small number of officers than was provided for in the present for establishment staff. It was only after considerable correspondence that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were induced to modify their directive as to provide at any rate for some measure of indirect rule. The clause in question in the directive reads as follows:

"The replacement of any Prefects and Mayors of important communities who may be removed will rest with the Military Commander. He will decide whether the function of the Military Government is better served by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Italian officials."

After considerable discussion with you and other authorities I have pursued the policy in Italy of seeking to encourage the use of Allied Civil Affairs Officers by using Italian personnel. It has in consequence been possible for me already to effect such economy on the original 100,000 of approximately 140 officers (with approximately 100 percent) as to enable me to release or have for future operations at any rate 100 officers.

I feel reasonably confident that it will be possible to administer Sicily in the immediate future with 250/270 officers, allowing for a proportion of officers. But this is on the assumption that men and more work will be taken over by Italians, and less and less done directly by U.S.A. direct intervention in local affairs is, however, essential in the early stages owing to the rapidly rising and increasing of local personnel. In the nearer future assuming that this policy is pursued I shall hope to cut down the Italian establishment yet further, but I do not envisage this as being possible in the present circumstances with large numbers of Allied troops in the island, for another three months. It is always in the early days especially in conditions where transport and signal communication are impossible, that the main amount of

administration in Italy with the automatic necessity of providing a much larger number of officers than was provided for in the present War Relocation Authority. It was only after considerable correspondence that the War Relocation Authority were induced to accept their directive as to provide at any rate for some measure of indirect rule. The clause in question in the directive reads as follows:

"The replacement of any projects and layers of important organizations this may be removed will rest with the Military Government. It will decide whether the function of the Military Government is better served by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Italian officials."

After considerable discussion with you and other authorities I have named the policy in Italy of seeking to coordinate the use of Allied Civil Affairs officers by using Italian personnel; it has in consequence been possible for us already to effect such security on the individual U.S. of approximately 150 officers (with approximately 400 present) as to enable us to release or have for future operations at any rate 100 officers.

I feel reasonably confident that it will be possible to administer Italy in the immediate future with 250/300 officers, allowing for a proportion of advisors. But this is on the assumption that new and more work will be taken over by Italians, and less done directly by U.S.A. These direct intervention in local affairs is, however, essential in the early stages owing to the apathy, inertia and incompetence of local personnel. In the longer future assuming that this policy is pursued I shall hope to cut down the civilian establishment yet further, but I do not envisage this as being possible in the present circumstances, with large numbers of Allied troops in the island, for several months. It is always in the early days especially in circumstances where transport and signal communication are impossible, that the nearest consent of personnel is required to get things going.

I have introduced a feature in AMST organization at H. A. which is not provided for in the set up, namely, the creation of an Executive Council with C.O.A.S. and U.S.O.A.S. regarding and with the heads of the six divisions (Finance, Legal, Public Health, Public Safety, Civil Supply and Property Custodian); the Chief Staff Officer as members and in addition a Secretary drawn from the Secretariat at AMST Headquarters. The membership of the Executive Council is confined to persons named and does not include the subsidiaries of the heads of divisions in their absence. In other words membership of the Executive Council is personal to named officers except by special appointment. The Executive Council meets 4-5 times a week and no other subject may be discussed unless placed on an agenda submitted prior to the meeting for the approval of the U.S.O.A.S. The decisions of the Executive Council are recorded, communicated to the divisions concerned and appropriate minutes appear in the files dealing with the subjects which they cover. The Executive Council normally meets every Friday and its deliberations are confined to matters of principle which cannot be dealt with by the normal circulation of files.

(2)

39

I have also had to oversee regular meetings of the heads of the provinces. These meetings however, are not formal in nature but the heads of provinces, they are intended to be meetings at which the on current situations in order to exchange ideas. The first of such meetings was held on 20 and 21 Aug. 63.

In view of forthcoming operations I have found it necessary to oversee the creation of regional groups of provinces. As you are aware during the active operational phase of 1963 in July, the command was organized in two regional groups, each under a senior officer with 7th Army and 8th Army. Responsibility for these Civil Affairs groups rested with the two Army Commanders directly, the two senior officers in position were only to be under the C.A.A.C. for purposes of general guidance and policy and subject to the views of the Army Commanders. Owing to the reality of occupation of part of each of the provinces an agreement was brought to an end by your order to the two Army Commanders with effect from 31st July 1963, in all the provinces except Saigon and part of Cambodia and Laos. An exception was made in respect of areas where active fighting was still in progress. In forthcoming operations it is being apparent that the two regional organizations will be necessary and this has been set up in the plan. In view of the likelihood that some headquarters or at any time a forward headquarters may have to move to another place, I propose to consider solely in Region I. The other two regions contemplated will come directly under 1963 Headquarters when conditions permit. Until such time the Civil Affairs officers concerned will depend upon the Army Commanders as before. Region I will, however, of course continue to depend on ARVN II, directly. In view, however, of the difficulties of communication and command instruction in which the organization of Government has hitherto been established, it is anticipated that the regional headquarters will have to continue for some time, even when in the other two regions the administration of Civil Affairs rests directly to ARVN II.

While this will mean the provision of three regional headquarters under 1963 Headquarters, the personnel can be found in large part by the reduction of 1963 Headquarters staff which will thus have only 3 organizations dependent upon it instead of all the provinces combined, currently.

The Regions have been provisionally named, Region 1 - Saigon, Region 2 - 8th Army operational area, Region 3 - 5th Army operational area.

Parrell

Major General,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer, 422

785015

BIGOT BUTTRESS
MOST SECRETIMMEDIATE
CIPHER MESSAGE
INFOLIO NO. 03034.
17 AUG 43FROM : AFHQ
TO : TROOPERS FILPOT FORTBASE
INFO: MIDEAST
ORIG. NO : 2620 (CITE FHGDQ)HEADQUARTERS
21

19 AUG 1943

TOC NIL
THI NIL
FOR 0557/18

AMGOT

BIGOT BUTTRESS - AVALANCHE. REF OUR 2206 OF 15 AUG 43. BULK TONNAGE ALLOCATIONS BUTTRESS
ONE. AVALANCHE PORTION D PLUS 96 CONVOY FOLLOW. READ FOUR COLUMNS
(A) COMMODITY (B) TROOPERS PROVIS ON UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED
(C) FREEDOM PROVISION (D) TOTAL.
TWO.

	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)
ENGINEER STORES		1000		1000
TN STORES		200		200
SVY STORES			50	50
SUPPLIES		3850		3850
EFI		300		300
GRD STORES			1360	1360
MEDICAL STORES		15		15
ARMY AMN		13750		13750
RAF EXPLOSIVES & STORES		970		970
TOTAL		20085	1410	21495

UNDER HAAF ARRANGEMENTS
WITH AIR MINISTRYTHREE. DETAILED BREAKDOWNS FOLLOW DEPARTMENTALLY 18 AUG 43.
FOUR. ALL POL REQUIREMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED EX USA OR NORTH AFRICA
UNDER OUR ARRANGEMENTS.
FIVE. ANY NORTH AFRICAN PROVISION ENGINEER STORES AND ARMY AMN
PRECLUDED BY LIMITATIONS NA PORT FACILITIES.

PA TO MGA	1
Q MAINT	2 ACTION
SD	2
Q LOGS	2
A	1
FORTBASE	1
SVY	1
AMGOT	3
TAF	1
RE	2

SAC 07358/18.
T.T. 07558/18. JJC.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015


37

BIGOT - BUTTRESSFOR TRANSMISSION BY FAST AIRAMGOT/21/HQ17 August 1943

To: AMGOT Liaison, Syracuse

35.

Reference SD/2369 of 10/8: From CCAO I presume this refers to BUTTRESS as distinct from BAYTOWN. Reply to 8 Army that AMGOT arrangements for AVALANCHE and BAYTOWN are in hand and that inasmuch as 10 Corps is now in AVALANCHE operation the AMGOT arrangements for 10 Corps are in hand.



Lt. Col

 JAW
 MAJOR GENERAL
 Chief Civil Affairs Officer

(Gen's duty)

 AMGOT HQ
 15 Army Group

420

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CHANGE OF ACTION

PLEASE NOTE THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENT

MESSAGE NO. SD 2367 10 Aug 43 FOLIO 00432
ACTION CHANGED FROM SD TO AMGOT
AT REQUEST OF Cpt Bida (SD) DATE 12 Aug 43

DISTN:

AMGOT ✓
SD

DUTY OFFICER,
STATE MESSAGE CONTROL

419

785015



35

MOST SECRET
BIGOT BUTTRESS
OFFICER ONLY

CIPHER MESSAGE

IN

FOLIO NO 00432

10 AUG 43

TOO 2340
TOR. 1115

FROM: MAIN EIGHTH ARMY
TO: MAIN FIFTEENTH ARMY GP
RPTD TEN CORPS FORTUNE
MAIN TEN CORPS.
ORIG NO. SD 2369

TOO

REQUEST YOU MAKE ALL AMGOT ARRANGEMENTS FOR BUTTRESS.

SMC DISTRIBUTION

SD 3
AMGOT 3 ACTION

SMC 1441B/ 11
TT 1707B/ 11
JEF

BIGOT BUTTRESS
MOST SECRET
OFFICER ONLY.

ACTION.
AT-37.

*Ass. Forwarded. I understand all
any Army Airway Mats are a number 8
as far as has in parallel. See my letter to
General Holmes by Capt. Benson, Legation, Bangkok.
14/8/43. R. E.*

785015

DIGOT MOST SECRET.

15AG/203/G(Ops)

To : PA to CCS
PA to MGA
DCGS
BGS (2)
GSI (2)
G(3D) (2)
G(Air)
G(Special Ops)
RA

RE
X Sigs
Svy (Br)
A Liaison Officer
Q (Maint) Liaison Officer
Q (Mov & Tr) (2)
AMGOT (2)
RWLO
Tac Hq 'A' Force

17 AUG 1943

1730h

Subject:- Future Operations.

1. It is probable that Operation AVALLANCE and connected subsidiary operations will be carried out by Fifth United States Army, under Command of 15 Army Group.
2. Fifth United States Army will require Operation and other Instructions on the lines of those issued to HUSKY formations, so that the same procedure now common to Seventh and Eighth Armies may be continued.
3. Will Branches addressed please prepare without delay copies of such Instructions as they wish Fifth Army to have. It is desired that these copies be transmitted to G(Ops) not later than August 10, 1943, if practicable.
4. It is contemplated that a small Liaison Party from Main 15 Army Group will visit A.F.E.G. and the Fifth Army Plans Staff at FORTUNE in the near future to effect the required coordination and to deliver these instructions.
5. At this time also Branches should consider the other implications involved by the probable prospective inclusion of Fifth Army in 15 Army Group.

Major General,
C.G.S.

3

RA
TAC HQ 'A' Force

1. It is probable that Operation AVANCE and connected subsidiary operations will be carried out by Fifth United States Army, under Command of 15 Army Group.

2. Fifth United States Army will require Operation and other Instructions on the lines of those issued to HUSKY formations, so that the same procedure now common to Seventh and Eighth Armies may be continued.

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5. At this time also Branches should consider the other implications involved by the probable prospective inclusion of Fifth Army in 15 Army Group.

T.A.F. for information.
Portbase for information.
War Diary (4)

C.S.O. AMBOP H.Q.

X

One copy retained. Any action will be taken by you? Or you will issue me directions?

Major General,
C.G.S.

To 842 22-38
C.S.O.
417

Colonel,
S.S.O.
7th AUG. 43.

33

MESSAGE FORM.

ARMY FORM C-2128 (Large)
(Replaces AF 100-10)

CALL IN
AND
INSTRUCTIONS. QCT

21/HG

Part I of this signal is at 5 in
H266.

Serial No.
No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(REMOVE THIS LINE IN FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

MOST SECRET

PERSON

66/6

FROM

PILPOT

Originator's Number,

Date,

In reply to Number.

66/3

GENS	FROM	COMD	LT	PLAT
1/	YOUR	TEL	5634	OF
2/1	ONE	BRISON	and	OSCHY
will	charge	BRISON	TED	as
presently	and	BRISON	under	BRISON
ARMY	is	charge	not	possible
TWO	of	occupation	to	LAZIO
can	follow	AVAILABILITY	and	AVAILABILITY
can	follow	same	material	operation
I	operations	when	affected	will
be	GENERAL	ALBANY	X	Therefore
is	NO	separate	or	additional
could	or	desirable	X	THREE
following	made	X	BRISON	continues
as	SIXTY	with	BRISON 416	as
additional	BRISON	TED	at	any
rate	occupation	this	area	complete
I	BRISON	who	has	personal
experience	AVAILABILITY	and	LAZIO	will
company	or	QUE	AVAILABILITY	with

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

will	be	change	remain	under	STATION	TIME
previously	arranged	and	change	use	possible	
ARMY	X	as	occupation	to	LATITUDE	
TWO	extension	of	AVAILABILITY	and	AVAILABILITY	
can	only	follow	same	initial	operation	
can	only	follow	when	effected	will	
I	both	operations	GENERAL	X	Therefore	
be	under	NO	separate	or	additional	
is	repeat	or	desirable	X	THREE	
0000	possible	made	X	NECESSARY	conditions	
following	proposals	LOCALLY	with	REASON	as	
as	DOING	REASON	TWO	at	any	
additional	DOING	occupation	this	area	complete	
into	till	REASON	who	has	personal	
X	FOUR	AVAILABILITY	and	LATITUDE	will	
experience	REASON	or	QUICK	AVAILABILITY	with	
company	AVAILABILITY	ARMY	officer	either	SOME	
are	senior	according	to	availabilities	X	
or	STAFFARD	will	fly	yours	as	
These	two	wanted	and	take	over	
soon	as	to	part	one	this	
group	referred	FIVE	when	REASON	has	
signal.	X	this	part	of	and	
set	up	local	BOATS	can	be	
selection	of	light	of	then	situation	
considered	in	or	unification	all	regions	
X	Method	of	and	has	0000	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN
IF IT IS TO BE INTERPRETED OR FALL
IN LINE WITH THE MESSAGE MUST
BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
LEADER OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

T. H. L.

T. O. R.

785015

ARMY FORM C-2128 (Large)
(100s of 100.)

CALL IN
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS. OUT

No. of Groups.	OFFICE DATE STAMP.
GR.	

ONLY: MOST SECRET

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALB USE ONLY.)

TO

In reply to Number.

Date _____

Originator's Number,

FROM

can	also	then	be	considered	I
Direction	of	AVAILABLE	and	LACTO	regions
will	assume	greater	importance	public	opinion
than	SECURITY	and	RESEARCH	TWO	and
consider	RESEARCH	should	therefore	be	responsible
X	SID	GENERAL	ALERTNESS	has	seen
above	and	agrees	X	SEVEN	please
number	paragraphs	your	testimony.		

45

785015

Dutt Printing Works, Cal. 79 (310-A-G544) D 23,741--100000 P2d.

~~30~~ 31

BUTTRESS
MOST SECRET

IMMEDIATE
CIPHER MESSAGE
IN

DLIO NO. 18,339.
30 JULY 43.

FROM : FILPOT
TO : FREEDOM
RPT: FANTOM MIDEAST
ORIG. NO : TAC/MGA/30

HEADQUARTERS
31 JUL 1943
AMGOT

TOO 0920B/30
THI NIL
TOR 2230B/30

FOR CAO FROM MILLER. No trace
REF TROOPERS 53076 VQMG OF 26 JULY TO GALE FROM NAYLOR.
FORTBASE IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING ALL SHIPPING
TO SICILY EASTERN PORTS AND WILL COORDINATE MAINLAND PORTS
FOR BUTTRESS AS EXECUTIVE 15 ARMY GROUP. DOUBTFUL WHETHER
TROOPERS REALISE IMPORTANCE OF FORTBASE ROLE BOTH NOW AND
FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL EMERSON BE
RETAINED AS DD NOV AND TN FORTBASE.

DQMG 1
MOVAIN 2 ACTION
SL 2
Q MAINT 2
A 1
OS 1
ST 3

REME 1
WKS 1
MED 2
AMGOT 3

SAC 0050B/31.
T.T.0115B/31. JJC.

414

7947
COPIES ON 7901 "CIVIL SUPPLY"
7873 "MARK TO SICILY"

10 SEE

MASOR CROFT

[Signature]

SECRET

15AG/1601/33/SD1

Jul 43

HEADQUARTERS
7947

31 JUL 1943

AMGOT

Subject: BUTRESS Order of Battle

AFHQ G-3 ORG (Br)

1. Now that 10 Corps have been placed under command EIGHTH Army there has ceased to be a need for a separate order of battle for BUTRESS and in fact it might be a possible source of confusion or even lead to redundant units being included.

2. It is therefore recommended that all units in the BUTRESS Order of Battle be included in the HUSKY order of battle which should then become known as the 15 Army Group BUTRESS order of battle. The question of provision of HUSKY units for BUTRESS will be simplified. It is not recommended that units at present in the BUTRESS order of battle should be given new serial numbers at this stage but that the prefix B should be added where necessary to distinguish them from units with the same serial number in the HUSKY order of battle.

3. If the above be agreed will you please issue the necessary orders.

4. Similar action in regard to the COLLET order of battle will be necessary in due course but it is not recommended at present.

HQ 15 Army Gp
Field.General,
General Officer Commanding in Chief,
15 Army Gp.

Copy: EIGHTH Army - copy of BUTRESS OD with amendments 1 and 2 is attached.

List 'B'

1. Now that 10 Corps have been placed under command EIGHTH Army there has ceased to be a need for a separate order of battle for LUTRESS and in fact it might be a possible source of confusion or even lead to redundant units being included.

2. It is therefore recommended that all units in the LUTRESS Order of Battle be included in the HUSKY order of battle which should then become known as the 15 Army Group BRITISH order of battle. The question of provision of HUSKY units for LUTRESS will be simplified. It is not recommended that units at present in the LUTRESS order of battle should be given new serial numbers at this stage but that the prefix D should be added where necessary to distinguish them from units with the same serial number in the HUSKY order of battle.

3. If the above be agreed will you please issue the necessary orders.

4. Similar action in regard to the GOLIET order of battle will be necessary in due course but it is not recommended at present.

HQ 15 Army Gp
Field.

General,
General Officer Commanding in Chief,
15 Army Gp.

Copy: EIGHTH Army - copy of LUTRESS OB with amendments 1 and 2 is attached.

List 'D'

10 SEE
COLONEL THOMAS THORNE
MAJOR CROFT
413

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

29.

MOST SECRETIMPORTANT
CIPHER MESSAGE
INFOLIO NO 15931
22 JUL 43

FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FHMGS 100 15498/22
 TO : 15 ARMY GROUP FOR AMGOT 2947 THI ---
 ORIG NO: --- TOR 18388/22

REF NO: YOUR 879 OF 20 JULY.

HESITATE TO RECOMMEND CHOICE OF MONSORT FOR LIAISON WITH
 10 CORPS. REPORTS FROM PANTELLERIA INDICATE THAT WHEN
 LEFT IN CHARGE HE IS MUCH LESS EFFECTIVE THAN WHEN WORKING
 UNDER SOMEONE ELSE. IN LIGHT OF CHANGES IN STRATEGIC
 PLANNING SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER SENDING THIRD OFFICERS TO
 DEAL WITH FIVE ARMY CONCERNING OPERATION MUSKET.

SMC DISTRIBUTION
 CIVIL AFFAIRS 3 ACTION

SMC 19008/22
 TT 19158/22 10

*Bring for more Schuyler
 check with H2. - 1/2 of the + 2nd no
 action by 24/7. To SER.
 LTCOL EARRY-SMITH*

ACTION

DCUAO 79mcs.*In division.*

PA

3

23/7

AMGOT PATTNOX

201500 B

PATTNOX

CA/585

MOOT SECRET (.). Cite PUNCH (.). Your 2194 of 19 Jul (.). HIGGINS will NOT repeat NOT be available till 31 Jul earliest which on time table is soon enough (.). NO repeat NO special planning is necessary beyond what BUSH is doing with 8 Army now (.). HIGGINS will be used as soon as available with 10 Corps as arranged (.). He can go forward as divisional CAO when time comes (.). Report AMGOT when HIGGINS arrives yours (.).

2. GARTER noted (.)
3. NO repeat NO other A or B personnel will be available till concentration AMGOT personnel in TUNIS and SICILY is complete (.)
4. Consider DE GARTER should also be withdrawn PATRILLARIA for which WORMALD and one other quite sufficient

IMPORTANT

Major-General

CA/525

MOST SECRET (.) Cite WINGS (.) Your 3194 of 19 Jul (.) HICOLLS
will not repeat not be available till 31 Jul earliest which on time
table is soon enough (.) NO repeat NO special planning is necessary
beyond what BUNSEN is doing with 3 Army now (.) MONTFORT will be used
as soon as available with 10 Corps as arranged (.) He can go forward
as divisional CAG when time comes (.) Report AMOT when MONTFORT arrives
yours (.)

2. CARTER noted (.)

3. NO repeat NO other A or B personnel will be available till
concentration AMOT personnel in TUNIS and SICILY is complete (.)

4. Consider DE CARTON should also be withdrawn PATTELLARIA for which
MONTFORT and one other quite sufficient

IMPORTANT

Major-General

411

2359

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

264

MOST SECRET

CIPHER MESSAGE
IN

FOLIO NO: 15114
19 JUL 43

20 Jul 43

FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FHMGS
TO: 15 ARMY GP FOR AMGOT 7806
ORIG NO: 2194

T00 1553B/19
THI
TOR 2320B/19

NICHOLS REQUIRED HERE SPSNEST. CARTER NOT AVAILABLE.
CONSIDER MONFORT COULD BEST BE USED IN FIELD. CAN YOU
SUPPLY ALTERNATIVE AMERICAN LIAISON OFFICER, TEN CORPS.
PARA MONFORT EXPECTED SHORTLY STILL PROPOSE HE REJOIN
YOU.

AMGOT 3 ACTION

SMC 2345B/19
T.T. 2355B/19 JT

ACTION

25

3

MOS: C. 1. 1. 1.

1500/1954/100

17. 1. 1. 1. 1.

10000 11. 1. 1. 1. 1.

As a result of a conversation with Group Captain Bennett and Colonel Russell, 10 Corps and others, I have decided to continue a Civil Affairs group at 8 Army, subject to any comments which the U.S. 8 Army may have to make, consisting of Group Captain Bennett, Major Footbridge, Major Hillard, one Marine officer, one legal officer and one other officer (A or B), who will be responsible in 8 Army for such future operations as come under the direction of C.O. 8 Army after the completion of HILLIAR operation. The officers mentioned above will not take any part in the territorial administration of HILLIAR after the setting up of HILLIAR. In HILLIAR under C.O. 8 Army, and D.O. 8 Army, which will occur in the course of the next fortnight. These officers will be free for future operations.

Group Captain Bennett will be born on HILLIAR establishment as C.O. 8 Army, but the work of C.O. 8 Army, will be undertaken by Major Hillard, Lord Gerald Hillard who will, for the purpose, be posted as C.O. 8 Army, with provision. The other officers will be carried either on the H. 8 Army or the field establishment of HILLIAR but will be detached to Group Captain Bennett for the purposes stated.

C.O. 8 Army, 10 Corps has asked for two Civil Affairs officers with each of his two divisions undertaking operation HILLIAR. The British and one American officer will be detailed with each of these two divisions from among the officers now in HILLIAR who took part in the early stages of operation HILLIAR. The names of the officers selected will be notified in due course.

One part of the planning of operation HILLIAR at H. 8 Army 10 Corps will be undertaken in HILLIAR, it will be desirable for two officers to be attached to H. 8 Army 10 Corps to act as liaison between H. 8 Army, Military Government section H. 8 Army, HILLIAR, 15 Army Group and the Civil Affairs detachment at H. 8 Army. The following officers have been provisionally detailed for this purpose:-

Major, Colonel H. 8 Army, HILLIAR (B)
Major, Colonel HILLIAR (A) (as soon as he is released from duty in HILLIAR).

These two officers will take up their positions with H. 8 Army 10 Corps but will be travelling between 10 Corps and the other formation referred to for the purpose of planning the Civil Affairs administration in the territory controlled as a result of operation HILLIAR.

Group Captain Benson will be home on leave establishment in C.O.C., CANTON, but the work of C.O.C. CANTON, will be undertaken by Lieut. Colonel Lord Gerald Halloway who will, for the purpose, be posted as C.O.C., CANTON. The other officers will be carried out on the H.C., or the field establishment of CANTON but will be stationed to Group Captain Benson for the purpose stated.

C.O.C., 10 Corps has asked for two Civil Affairs officers with each of his two divisions undertaking operation BURNING. The British and one American officer will be detailed with each of these two divisions from among the officers now in CANTON who took part in the early stages of operation BURNING. The names of the officers selected will be notified in due course.

Also part of the planning of operation BURNING at H.C., 10 Corps will be undertaken in CANTON, it will be desirable for two officers to be attached to H.C., 10 Corps to act as liaison between H.C., 10 Corps, Military Government Section A.T.M.C., AMST, 15 Army Group and the Civil Affairs detachment at H.C., 8 Army. The following officers have been provisionally detailed for this purpose:-

Lieut. Colonel H.C., 10 Corps (B)
Lieut. Colonel Mansford (A) (an area as he is released from duty in Antwerp).

These two officers will take up their residence with H.C., 10 Corps but will be travelling between 10 Corps and the other formations referred to for the purpose of planning the Civil Affairs administration in the territory occupied as a result of operation BURNING.

H.C., AMST,
15 Army Group,
CANTON.

Copies to: Group Capt. Benson at H.C., 8 Army

16. Col. Mansford at AMST.

Military Government Section, A.T.M.C.

C.O.C., 15 Army Group (ref 1500/173/1 dated 16.10.43 and previous telegram 9th Army dated 15.10.43).

Drafted by Maj. Gen. Lord Rennell.

Interim Post. Hasty file.

#25

8th Army C.A. Group.

Gy. Capt Benson.

Major Boelinger.

Major Pollard.

1. F.O.

1 L.O.

1. AM. OTHER. (A u B)

10th Corp Group.

Dir. A.

Dir. Y.

1. B.

1. B.

1. A.

1. A.

AD 10th Corp.

1. B.

LO W. Nichols.

1. A.

409

23

9th Corps group

<u>Div x</u>	<u>Div y</u>
1 B -	1 B -
1 A -	1 A -

③

At 10th Corps

1 B Lt Col Nichols
1 A ? Carter.

408

24

8th Army CA group

{
Sr. Capt. Benson
Major Boeltjes
Major Millard
1 FO (3)
1 LO
anon (A or B)

407

MOST SECRET.OFFICER ONLY.

1516/170/1.

16 July 43.

17 JUL 43

1 ch to Col Marshall
J.R.

Memorandum

M1 to G in C 15 Army Group.

PA to C.G.S.

PA to M.C.A.

PA to D.C.G.S.

C.S.C.

Gen. HARRIS.

B.G.S.

D.C.S. (A).

Col. FOSTER, G(SB) and Tr.

C.S.C. 1. (Airborne).

C.S.O. 1. (Special Ops).

D.R.A.

C.E.

D.A.G.

Col. TALBOT.

D.Q.M.G. (Maint).

D.Q.M.G. (Mov. & Tr).

Maj- Gen. Lott, HARRIS.

SUBJECT: - Future Operations.

1. The following cable has been received from A.E.H.Q., outlining the planning policy for future operations.

Word No: 695 CITE FROST.

It must be clearly understood that FROST is responsible for conduct of operation in WINDSOCK including exploitation beyond FROST and GORLEN. Following is policy for planning these operations.

PAPA TWO.

THIRD and FIFTH CORPS will continue planning FROST and GORLEN within limits of directive already issued to them by FROST.

PAPA THREE.

FROST will prepare appreciation for further exploitation after CROTON has been secured, include: (a) possible courses, (b) outline maintenance plan, (c) forces that can be made available which are NOT repeat NOT already under command FROST. (d) Summary of port capacities, communications etc. of WINDSOCK.

PAPA FOUR.

FROST will take all possible preparatory measures to enable exploitation to be undertaken and will issue any further directives necessary to FIFTH and SIXTH CORPS.

(3)

785015

Maj- Gen. Lutz, RANMIL.

SUBJECT: Future Operations.

1. The following cable has been received from A.P.H.O., outlining the planning policy for future operations.

"Cris No: 025 CITE WITOX."

It must be clearly understood that FANTOX is responsible for conduct of operation in WITSOCK including exploitation beyond DUTNESS and COMBAT. Following is policy for planning these operations.

PARA TWO.

FANTOX and FIFTH CORPS will continue planning DUTNESS and COMBAT within limits of directive already issued to them by WITOX.

PARA THREE.

FANTOX will prepare appreciation for further exploitation after GROGONE has been secured, include: (a) possible courses, (b) outline maintenance plan, (c) forces that can be made available which are NOT report NOT already under command WITOX. (d) Summary of port capacities, communications etc. of WITSOCK.

PARA FOUR.

FANTOX will take all possible preparatory measures to enable exploitation to be undertaken and will issue any further directives necessary to FIFTH and FIFTH CORPS and FIFTH U.S. ARMY.

PARA FIVE.

FANTOX will keep FANTOX fully informed in all stages of planning and preparation, any modification desired by FANTOX must be within framework of plan drawn up by FANTOX and must NOT report NOT lead to cancellation of any measures already ordered."

ACTION TAKEN

TO SEE:

SECRET

C.S.O.

SUR

Pub on Post War file ✓
B. U when C.C.A.O. arrives

DF

MOST SECRET

BIGOT.

12th. July 1943.

Military Government Section
A.F.H.Q.

In the course of conversation with the Chief of Staff yesterday, he asked me for my views on military administration the the post-Husky phase. I gave him my views, which I have set out in the attached memorandum with certain elaborations of method. I shall be glad if you will transmit to him a copy, enclosed for the purpose, of this memorandum.

I would like to take this opportunity of putting on record that I was not in agreement with the memorandum which was prepared a few weeks since by Colonels Spofford and Maxwell on the post-Husky phase of administration, either in regard to the numbers of personnel required, or in regard to the programme which as I have attempted to point out must be divided sharply into two parts, namely up to Lat. 41 and beyond Lat. 41. Furthermore I am of the opinion that the present form of AMEOT is not suitable in organisation or personnel for conducting a central government in the capital of a large metropolitan country in Europe.

Copy for

General Sir H. Alexander
One spare for Chief of Staff.

Major General,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer,
15th. Army Group.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

I would like to take this opportunity of putting on record that I was not in agreement with the memorandum which was prepared a few weeks since by Colonels Spofford and Maxwell on the post-Husky phase of administration, either in regard to the numbers of personnel required, or in regard to the programme which as I have attempted to point out must be divided sharply into two parts, namely up to Lat. 41 and beyond Lat. 41. Furthermore I am of the opinion that the present form of AMROF is not suitable in organisation or personnel for conducting a central government in the capital of a large metropolitan country in Europe.

Major General,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer,
15th Army Group.

Copy for
General Sir H. Alexander
One spare for Chief of Staff.

405

BIGOT

NOTE: SECRET

POST-HURRY ADMINISTRATION.

1. Although ANGO was designed for the administration of Sicily, the provision of personnel has been on a sufficiently ample scale to enable it, with the addition of say 200/300 officers to extend the administration on the lines planned, and without further planning, to the mainland, up to the line NAPLES-REGENA-POZZI inclusive. This line can conveniently be referred to as the line of Lat. 41 North.
2. The administration of Southern Italy is neither different in kind nor separate in quality from that of Sicily. The only serious problem which presents itself is that of the densely populated Naples area, including satellite towns and surrounding country where a supply problem affecting 2,000,000 inhabitants arises inasmuch as there are not wholly self supporting. This area will also require rather denser administrative machinery than the rest of southern Italy which is sparsely populated. The only other centres in southern Italy are Bari, Taranto and Reggio di Calabria, all of which are smaller than Catania, and the largest of which is about half the size of Palermo.
3. Assessing military operations which progress up the mainland, the organisation of the military administration would follow immediately behind the operational formations and assume direction of the countryside on precisely the lines planned for Sicily. The personnel required will be found from the officers who have had the experience of setting up the administration in Sicily; local Sicilian requirements will be made up out of the re-inforcement pool from USA and UK, and from the surplus which I anticipate will be available on the Sicilian establishment as soon as the operational phase is over. Steps have already been taken to secure about 100 additional officers from UK for the pool and some officers available from Middle East with administrative and Italian experience are already on their way. There is a pool of administrative officers in Middle East concerned for the Balkans which could be made available in an emergency such as that of a "walk over". A preliminary study of the probable supply situation, particularly as it affects the Naples area is in hand. A special group of officers to deal with the Naples area and to proceed there by sea can be collected from present resources at short notice. Five to six experienced British officers with special knowledge of Naples have been earmarked by me for such duty.
4. The premises on which the foregoing summary is based is that the occupation of the mainland as an extension of the Sicilian operation is an exposed operation.

-ents itself is that of the densely populated Naples area, where a supply problem affecting satellite towns and surrounding country where a supply problem affecting 2,000,000 inhabitants arises inasmuch as these are not wholly self supporting. This area will also require rather denser administrative machinery than the rest of southern Italy which is sparsely populated. The only other cities in southern Italy are Bari, Taranto and Reggio di Calabria, all of which are smaller than Catania, and the largest of which is about half the size of Palermo.

5. Assuming military operations which progress up the mainland, the organization of the military administration would follow immediately behind the operational formations and assume direction of the countryside on precisely the lines planned for Sicily. The personnel required will be found from the officers who have had the experience of setting up the administration in Sicily; local Sicilian requirements will be made up out of the re-inforcement pool from USA and UK, and from the surplus which is anticipated will be available on the Sicilian establishment as soon as the operational phase is over. Steps have already been taken to secure about 100 additional officers from UK for the pool and some officers available from Middle East with administrative and Italian experience are already on their way. There is a pool of administrative officers in Middle East organized for the Balkans which could be made available in an emergency such as that of a "walk over". A preliminary study of the probable supply situation, particularly as it affects the Naples area is in hand. A special group of officers to deal with the Naples area and to proceed there by sea can be collected from present resources at short notice. Five to six experienced British officers with special knowledge of Naples have been earmarked by me for such duty.

4. The premises on which the foregoing summary is based is that the occupation of the mainland as an extension of the Sicilian operation is an opposed operation involving hostilities and that up to the occupation of the Lat. 41 line the Italian Government has neither collapsed nor capitulated. The subjects of collapse or capitulation are dealt with below; my remarks thereon are equally applicable whether capitulation takes place before or after the military occupation of the Lat. 41 line.

5. In the event of either collapse or capitulation, or in the event of a military occupation having been successfully extended up to Lat. 41, a new element enters into the problem as soon as UNMS comes into question. Indeed, as soon as there is any question of administration north of Lat. 41 the subject is immediately affected by the general policy of the United Nations towards Italy as a whole. Consideration must in fact be given to what we want to do about Italy in the immediate future.

6. The only indication we have up to the present is that the United Nations want to see Italy eliminated from the war by the destruction of the armed forces of Italy, and the delivery of Italy from Fascism and the restoration of Italy as a free nation. I have no knowledge of what, if any, parts of Italy are wanted for military purposes in order to carry on the war against

- 2 -

Germany. The objectives stated can be achieved by a capitulation of the Italian armed forces and the conclusion of an armistice pending the conclusion of a peace treaty with a non-Fascist state. The second of the two objectives cannot be achieved by a disintegration of Italy into separate regions, nor by a collapse of central authority, nor by the institution of a colonial type of government over the whole country. Moreover a collapse of central authority leading to internal disorder would certainly involve extensive garrisoning of all those parts of Italy which are needed for future operations against Germany, even if the United Nations were prepared to sit back and watch chaos develop with attendant distress in the remaining areas which are not militarily interesting to us. Disintegration and disorder even if we were to disinterest ourselves in all or any parts of Italy with which we are not militarily concerned are not compatible with the second of the two objectives mentioned. I therefore proceed on the assumption that we do not want to see disintegration and that we do want a central authority in Italy which will effectively govern the country.

7. A central authority in Italy can take two forms. It can either be a central Italian authority under the control of the United Nations. Or the United Nations can themselves exercise that central authority through AMGOT with a directing AMGOT H.Q. in Rome. But I cannot conceive of an AMGOT type of government in a country or even in a large tract of country which is not adequately garrisoned. But in an extreme form, I cannot imagine even Italy being governed by a foreign military government with no foreign troops in Italy. I do not believe the threat of reprisals or punitive measures which would be very inconvenient militarily proving to be sufficient authority for an AMGOT system of government without the present sanction of force exerted by armed troops of garrison actually in the country and spread over the country. If therefore an Allied Military Government over the whole or even a substantial part of the country is contemplated, garrisons for the parts over which this sort of government is to be exercised must also be envisaged, even if no part of Italy is needed for military operations against Germany. But I cannot conceive of the United Nations wishing to provide garrisons merely for the sake of having an AMGOT type of government if an equally satisfactory result can be achieved by instituting central Italian authority to do the government under proper control.

8. The maintenance of garrisons in Italy cannot in my view be justified after the capitulation of the Italian armed forces except for the purposes of

- (a) protecting such places and areas as are wanted for military operation elsewhere, and
- (b) providing such present sanctions as will ensure the central Italian government which we have placed in power exercising its authority in the country on the lines we desire.

7. A central authority in Italy can take two forms. It can either be a central Italian authority under the control of the United Nations. Or the United Nations can themselves exercise that central authority through AMGOT with a directing AMGOT Hqs. in Rome. But I cannot conceive of an AMGOT type of government in a country or even in a large tract of country which is not adequately garrisoned. But in an extreme form, I cannot imagine even Italy being governed by a foreign military government with no foreign troops in Italy. I do not believe the threat of reprisals or punitive measures which would be very inconvenient militarily proving to be sufficient authority for an AMGOT system of government without the present sanction of force exerted by armed troops of garrison actually in the country and spread over the country. If therefore an Allied Military Government over the whole or even a substantial part of the country is contemplated, garrisons for the parts over which this sort of government is to be exercised must also be envisaged, even if no part of Italy is needed for military operations against Germany. But I cannot conceive of the United Nations wishing to provide garrisons merely for the sake of having an AMGOT type of government if an equally satisfactory result can be achieved by instituting central Italian authority to do the government under proper control.

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- (a) protecting such places and areas as are wanted for military operation elsewhere, and
- (b) providing such present sanctions as will ensure the central Italian government which we have placed in power exercising its authority in the country on the lines we desire.

If there are no places under (a) which we need then the garrisons required for (b) can clearly be of a very limited type and size, in the capital and at certain strategic points, which in most cases will probably be the same as those needed under (a), namely the principal ports, and the historical entries into Italy from the other side of the Alpine Barrier, i.e. such places as Turin, Milan and Verona. But the garrisons required under (b) or under (a) and (b) will obviously be much smaller than those which would be required under a direct administration by AMGOT of the whole country.

9. In addition to the provision of garrisons the provision of personnel under an AMGOT government or an Italian Government needs consideration. It has been held, and properly in my view, that we could not contemplate providing enough personnel to replace senior Italian administrative personnel even in the provinces of Sicily. For a fortiori can we contemplate providing personnel to replace senior officials in the central government in Rome. Leaving for the moment the provision of personnel for the central government in Rome out of account, I reckon that on the very modest basis of say 700 officers for the administration of Sicily and Southern Italy up to Lat. 41, not less than 2500 more would be wanted for the remaining Italian provinces, excluding provision for the Central Government

and specialized officers for industrial management and control in the north. These figures moreover presuppose that under the AMGOT system the existing police forces in the country with their own cadres and personnel will continue to function under a very limited number of supervising Allied police officers. This seemed a reasonable supposition in Sicily where a large number of readily available Allied troops provide the sanction of force and the means of restoring order if the supposition is found to be wrong. I am however not prepared to make the same assumptions in regard to the rest of Italy with garrisons limited to a few points of strategic importance. If therefore to the figures I have quoted are added a provision for the additional AMGOT police cadres which I would have to recommend as necessary, and the provision of personnel to exercise directing control of the central government departments without their own local Italian ministerial heads and heads of services, we reach a fantastic total which I see not prospect of providing either in the time or in the quality required from USA and UK.

10. I am therefore driven into the alternative of finding a workable solution in the institution or maintenance of an effective Italian Central Government which will have among other primary duties those of being responsible for the maintenance of public law and order in the country and of conducting the internal economic life of the people. This alternative is consistent with the second of the two objectives referred to in para. 5, provided that suitable Italian personnel can be found to conduct such a government. But there is in my view no hope of finding and using any such Italian personnel except to conduct an Italian Government. I very much doubt whether they would be available to conduct affairs under and with an AMGOT system. A compulsory abdication of sovereignty imposed by the United Nations as a result of military capitulation would effectively in my view eliminate any chance of finding the very limited personnel available willing to help. And without that personnel we come back to the difficulties which were brought out in the correspondence on the COS directive covering AMGOT. Sicily of securing enough trained foreign administrative personnel who are capable of conducting a bureaucratic machine in an unfamiliar language and land.

11. Having stated these difficulties, I arrive at the conclusion that a central Italian Government must be maintained. I continue with my proposals to implement this policy on the premises assumed earlier in this memorandum. Though if invited to do so I could suggest the names of certain Italian personalities who could probably be secured to conduct such a government, I do not propose to discuss this subject further since the names will be equally well known in London and Washington.

12. Up to Lat. 41 I recommend that we proceed by the extension of AMGOT to take over militarily occupied country. For any operation involving the occupation of more

ministerial heads and heads of services, we reach a fantastic total which I see not prospect of providing either in the time or in the quality required from USA and UK.

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11. Having stated these difficulties, I arrive at the conclusion that a central Italian Government must be maintained. I continue with my proposals to implement this policy on the premises assumed earlier in this memorandum. Though if invited to do so I could suggest the names of certain Italian personalities who could probably be secured to conduct such a government, I do not propose to discuss this subject further since the names will be equally well known in London and Washington.

12. Up to Let.41 I recommend that we proceed by the extension of AMGOT to take over militarily occupied country. For any operation involving the occupation of Rome, whether by force of arms or as a result of capitulation, or by the conclusion of an armistice prior to capitulation, two specially bodies of men should be selected in advance, and for choice earmarked now. These two groups should be

- (i) the Allied Commission of Control, and
- (ii) the Allied advisors and controllers of the Italian central government.

The persons required for (i) need little description. They will consist of Allied military naval and air representatives with such additional specialists from other departments as are needed. Group (ii) should consist of persons, some of whom may be drawn from AMGOT, from USA and UK etc. to act as controllers in the Italian ministries to ensure that the orders given to the Italian Government by the Commission of Control are carried out by the Italian services. Generally speaking AMGOT personnel is not sufficiently qualified to carry out these functions which will be largely technical and not administrative.

13. With the occupation of Rome, the Commission and advisors and controllers will take up their duties. In the meanwhile AMGOT will be in existence and administering the country up to lat. 41. When the Italian Government under the control of the men in Groups (i) and (ii) is functioning, the Italian Government will resume control and administration from Rome of all the provinces hitherto administered by AMGOT. The Government in Rome also will control and administer all other Italian metropolitan territory which is not in enemy hands or in which fighting is still in progress. The transition from AMGOT to the Italian Government will be gradual and sufficient AMGOT personnel will be left behind in each province to ensure that central government orders issued at the instance of the Commission of Control are carried out. But this personnel will then cease to be answerable to AMGOT Hqs.. Exception can be made in handing over to the Italian Government in certain areas of military interest where the AMGOT direct control could continue; but even in such cases where the Italian Central Government did not exercise control or full control, responsibility would pass from AMGOT Hqs. to the Commission of Control in Rome.

14. In these circumstances AMGOT while continuing to exist as the organ of Government of the Commander of the Troops in the Field would always be available to him for the administration of additional areas in the operational or post operational phases; but the responsibility for the main administration of the country would eventually pass away from the Commander to a static and territorial organization more adapted to the work, and using the local government machinery both at the centre and in the provinces. The economy of personnel involved is obvious. The use of trained AMGOT personnel to take over new areas is equally advantageous. Since the personnel in Groups (i) and (ii) can and almost certainly must include civilian personnel e.g. from State Departments etc. so can the advisory and controlling personnel in the ministries be either military or civilian. Indeed the proposal provides for and envisages the direct intervention of the Foreign Offices etc. at the appropriate moment, leaving both the C. in C. and the Commanding General in the Field free with their own administrative organization to do their normal work instead being concerned with long range political and administrative questions. Finally the proposal is consistent with the second of the two objectives quoted in para 5 which an AMGOT government as the government of a conquering and dominating army is not.

11th. July 1943.

14. In these circumstances AMKOT while continuing to exist as the organ of Government of the Commander of the Troops in the Field would always be available to him for the administration of additional areas in the operational or ex post operational phases; but the responsibility for the main administration of the country would eventually pass away from the Commander to a static and territorial organisation more adapted to the work, and using the local government machinery both at the centre and in the provinces. The economy of personnel involved is obvious. The use of trained AMKOT personnel to take over new areas is equally advantageous. Since the personnel in Groups (i) and (ii) can and almost certainly must include civilian personnel e.g. from State Departments etc. so can the advisory and controlling personnel in the ministries be either military or civilian. Indeed the proposal provides for and envisages the direct intervention of the Foreign Offices etc. at the appropriate moment, leaving both the C. in C. and the Commanding General in the Field free with their own administrative organisation to do their normal work instead being concerned with long range political and administrative questions. Finally the proposal is consistent with the second of the two objectives quoted in para 5 which an AMKOT government as the government of a conquering and dominating army is not.

11th. July 1943.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015*West Secret*141F/7950/CA29 June 1943

15

To: M.C.S., AFHQ

1. Your letter of 28th June, enclosing Chief of Staff's minute of 27th on the "Responsibilities and Functions of the M.C.S. of AFHQ" are received and noted.

2. A clarification of the last para of C of S's minute is desired. The C of S is perhaps not aware of the circumstances which obtain in AMGOT Headquarters and training centre at Chreca.

3. All the officers at AMGOT Headquarters and Training Centre at Chreca are borne on AMGOT TO/RE for duty in occupied territories under G.C.C. 141 Force as Military Governor and all these officers are posted/assigned to specific functions in AMGOT. There is therefore no "school" personnel to transfer from Force 141 to AFHQ; all the personnel in the school and running the school is military government administrative personnel which will be required overseas. Not only is there no surplus personnel but the personnel available, which is under strength at the time of writing, is not of such quality that any can be spared for reposting to an AFHQ school or training centre. Exceptions are a few officers who are not considered suitable for administrative functions overseas, and a limited amount of British C.A. camp service personnel posted to AMGOT for duty at Chreca for convalescence and light work.

4. In view of the possible extension of AMGOT commitments (General Alexander's letter to G-in-C of 25th June, para 2, refers) G.C.C. 141 Force who has been consulted would be unwilling to agree to the release of any AMGOT personnel now borne on AMGOT TO/RE for duty outside the sphere of the activities of AMGOT.

AMGOT Rear Headquarters
AFHQ
BHQ

MAJOR GENERAL
G.C.C.A.O.
AMGOT

P.C. 1410
you have seen?
H. 2-1
R. 4. 150
36/6.

Per. H. 1410
399

785015

1 Incl 43.
7806

~~MOST SECRET~~

141P/1400/1/G (Ib)

28 Jun 43

1 ~~2~~

Copy to: List 'B'

Major General
Chief of General Staff
I/I Force.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

BIGOT HUSKY
MOST SECRETIMPORTANT
CIPHER MESSAGE
INFOLIO NO: 10961
28 June 1943

"RECEIVED FROM AFHQ"

BIGOT HUSKY

FROM: CITE HIGHAM ORIG M & TN
TO: TROOPERS
INFO: MIDEAST
ORIG NO: 5633*Original in
file 8.*

PERSONAL for D Mov From LAWRENCE 4.

ARRIVED 27 JUNE HIGHAM 28 JUNE.

2. SUGGEST YOU SEND ANY QUERY ON D PLUS 46 CONVOYS DES-
PATCHED MOST IMMEDIATE WHILST BELLAMY AND I HERE. NO
REPLY YET TO MY 3RD OF 70799 DATED 24 JUNE LAWRENCE 2.3. POST HUSKY PLANS DUE SUBMISSION CCS 1 JULY. STAFFS
V AND X CORPS PLANNING UNDER 141 HERE FOR GOBLET AND
BUTTRESS RESPECTIVELY. BOTH OPERATIONS LIKELY TO REQUIRE
MT/STORES SHIPS FROM POOL ALLOCATED FOR POST HUSKY MOUNTED
ASSAULT PORTIONS FROM NORTH AFRICA AND TRIPOLI AND SOME
ADMIN TPS FROM EGYPT.4. HAVE EXPLAINED YOUR 92050 OF 22 JUNE at AFHQ AND ME
AND EMPHASISED EARLY DEMANDS REQUIRED FOR US PRESENTERS
BACKED BY OPERATIONAL REASONS AS NOW KNOWN.5. INTEND REMAINING HERE TO CONTACT MCDAVID. HIGHAM
PROCEEDS MIDEAST WITH FORCE X AND Y DOCUMENTS AND SHOULD
PROCEED HOME PRIORITY AIR DIRECT FROM THERE.AFHQ DISTRIBUTION:INFO: SGS DTC
CAO NAVY
MAC AMGOT (REAR)
AG RECORDSSMC DISTRIBUTION:Q(MOV) 2 ACTION
NAVAL STAFF 1
PA to MGA 1
CIVIL AFFAIRS 2
WAR ROOM 1C.4.144SB/30
T.T.1510B/30 JTIMPORTANT
BIGOT HUSKY
MOST SECRET

348

2 3 X 17
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COPI

SECRET

12
7

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

28 June 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO: General Rennell
General McSherry

The Chief of Staff has instructed me to send you the
attached paper.

3

/s/ J. C. HOLMES
J. C. HOLMES
Colonel, CSC
Chief, Mil. Govt. Sec.

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COPI

SECRET

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section

27 June 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT : Responsibilities and Functions of the Military Government Section of A.F.H.Q.

The purpose of this memorandum is to confirm the oral instructions you have given me in amplifying those set forth in Staff Memorandum No. 50 of June 15th, which establishes the responsibilities and functions of the Military Government Section.

The Section will be responsible for the formulation of future plans with respect to military Government of enemy occupied territory in the same manner that G-5 and other sections of the staff of AFHQ are responsible for future plans. An officer of the Section is a member of the Executive Planning Section.

In general administrative matters will be handled directly by AFHQ - HONORIFIED or other similar units set up for the future, whereas policy matters will be handled by this Section as being those requiring action in the name of the Commander-in-Chief.

The Section should require from military Governments in the field such financial reports as are necessary to maintain an accurate record of the cost of administering enemy territory. This information should be forwarded at the appropriate time to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the two Governments for use in assessing the cost of occupation for possible payment at the end of the war. We shall require from military Governments in the field such basic economic reports as may be currently useful to the two Governments or helpful in post-war planning.

Staff Memorandum No. 50 states that the Section will be the channel of communication in matters of military Government for Force 141 and other task forces which may become concerned in military Government of enemy territory. The Section will correspond directly on matters where policy has been previously determined. Any communications involving a change of policy or having a major policy implication will be prepared for your signature.

In order that properly trained personnel may be supplied for military Government of territory to be occupied, there will be established, under AFHQ, an Allied Military Government Section.

The Section will be responsible for the formulation of future plans with respect to military government of enemy occupied territory in the same manner that G-3 and other sections of the staff of AFHQ are responsible for future plans. An officer of the Section is a member of the Executive Planning Section.

In general administrative matters will be handled directly by AFMOT - HONORIFIED or other similar units set up for the future, whereas policy matters will be handled by this Section as being those requiring action in the name of the Commander-in-Chief.

The Section should require from military governments in the field such financial reports as are necessary to maintain an accurate record of the cost of administering enemy territory. This information should be forwarded at the appropriate time to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the two governments for use in assessing the cost of occupation for possible payment at the end of the war. We shall require from military governments in the field such basic economic reports as may be currently useful to the two governments or helpful in post-war planning.

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In order that properly trained personnel may be supplied for military government of territory to be occupied, there will be established, under AFHQ, an Allied Military Government Centre which will serve as a training school and replacement depot for personnel, both officers and enlisted men, for future operations. This will be accomplished by transferring the school now established at Chreva from Force 141 to AFHQ at a time considered to be most convenient for both HUSNT and Post-HUSNT operations.

J. C. HOLMES
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Mil. Govt. Sec.

28 June 1943

APPROVED - Copies to
Rennell McQuerry

/s/ W. B. S.

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NOTE ON POST-HUSKY OPERATIONS.

1. The present position is that General Alexander is in command of Husky and post-Husky operations. He has certain formations which are engaged in making plans for post-Husky operations. The result of the first phase of these post-Husky operations will be the occupation of certain territory beyond Horrified.
2. General Alexander has a C.C.A.O. who is concerned with the enemy territories occupied by General Alexander's forces. Since the territories occupied by these forces beyond Horrified will be General Alexander's responsibility, the administration of these additional territories will, unless General Alexander decides otherwise, be dealt with by his C.C.A.O. (3)
3. But while the formations engaged in post-Husky operations have to prepare an operational plan for General Alexander's approval and will do so in Algiers in contact with A.F.H.C. as 141 troops, no further plan is necessary for the military government of the additional territories which they will occupy. The administration of these additional territories is only an extension of the civil administration of Horrified with some staff drawn

2. General Alexander has a C.C.A.O. who is concerned with the enemy territories occupied by General Alexander's forces. Since the territories occupied by these forces beyond Horrified will be General Alexander's responsibility, the administration of these additional territories will, unless General Alexander decides otherwise, be dealt with by his C.C.A.O.

3. But while the formations engaged in post-Huaky operations have to prepare an operational plan for General Alexander's approval and will do so in Algiers in contact with A.F.H.Q. as 141 troops, no further plan is necessary for the military government of the additional territories which they will occupy. The administration of these additional territories is only an extension of the civil administration of Horrified with some staff drawn from that area plus a certain amount of additional staff from U.K. and America which C.C.A.O. has already asked for. When the military plan for the first phase of these operations is ready C.C.A.O. will post officers to accompany the formations and detail them to the areas and places concerned.

4. So far there is no difficulty and A.F.H.Q. (Military Government Section) need not and should not be concerned with this subject which is solely General Alexander's responsibility and that of his staff.

2.

5. These considerations apply to the whole additional territory concerned in the first post-Husky phase up to and including all territory and towns as far as Lat. 41°N.

6. If, however, occupation, as a result of military operations or other developments, expands north of Lat. 41°N., new factors enter in to the problem and a plan is necessary to take care of the capital and all the territory occupied prior to the actual occupation of the capital. With the occupation of the capital the centre of gravity of the civil administration changes, and the type of the civil administration must necessarily undergo modification according to whether:-

(a) there is or is not a central government;

(b) that government shall or shall not, under proper control, exercise authority in the occupied area;

(c) it is intended to extend the occupation, if possible, or to avoid any extension, to the whole country;

(d) if the whole country is not occupied, the central government shall or shall not exert authority from an occupied capital over an unoccupied area.

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- (b) that government shall or shall not, under proper control, exercise authority in the occupied area;
- (c) it is intended to extend the occupation, if possible, or to avoid any extension, to the whole country;
- (d) if the whole country is not occupied, the central government shall or shall not exert authority from an occupied capital over an unoccupied area.

7. Before a plan can be drawn for the extension of the civil administration of the Allied armies north of Lat. 41°N. a directive clarifying points (b), (c), and (d) is necessary.

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8. This clarification will have to come to General Alexander from C.-in-C. who, before deciding, will wish to consult his staff (the Military Government Section) and the British and U.S. Ministers and may wish to refer to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

9.

3.

9. In order to assist in clarifying the points, General Alexander may wish to submit to C.-in-C. his recommendations, for approval or otherwise, on points (b), (c), and (d).

10. The submission to C.-in-C. by General Alexander should however be on lines which H.M.G. at any rate are likely to approve when consulted by Washington. It is therefore suggested that H.M.G.'s views should be ascertained at once.

11. General Alexander may therefore consider it proper to embody in a letter to C.-in-C. now:-

(i) The conclusions of paragraphs 1-5 that up to Lat. 41°N. the civil administration is the concern of his C.C.A.O. who will provide whatever staff and orders are necessary to take over this territory as an extension of Angot Horrified, and that no separate plans or organisation are necessary.

(ii) The submission that any extension of occupation beyond Lat. 41°N. will require a directive before a plan can be made to clarify certain points: and that a further letter will be addressed to C.-in-C.

therefore suggested that H.M.G.'s views should be ascertained at once.

11. General Alexander may therefore consider it proper to embody in a letter to C.-in-C. now:-

(i) The conclusions of paragraphs 1-5 that up to Lat. 41°N. the civil administration is the concern of his C.C.A.O. who will provide whatever staff and orders are necessary to take over this territory as an extension of Amgot Horrified, and that no separate plans or organisation are necessary.

(ii) The submission that any extension of occupation beyond Lat. 41°N. will require a directive before a plan can be made to clarify certain points: and that a further letter will be addressed to C.-in-C. shortly on this issue on which he will probably want to consult his staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

12. In the meanwhile Reamir may consider it proper to enquire H.M.G.'s views on the points in paragraph 6 which can readily be set out by C.C.A.O. on whom will eventually fall the responsibility for any plan of government under General Alexander's authority.

25th June, 1942.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

BIGOT

Headquarters,

MOST SECRET

Force 141.

7A

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces.

From: General Alexander.

Subject: Problem of Military Government.

I have been thinking about the implications as far as military government is concerned of a successful Husky, and I foresee certain complications.

In the first post-Husky phase (up to and including all territory as far as Lat. 41°N.) no serious difficulties arise. The administration of the additional territory will only be an extension of the civil administration of Norway. No separate planning is required. The existing machinery is adequate, and the necessary staff arrangements will be made by my C.C.A.O. to deal with the situation.

The real problem arises in the second phase, namely, when occupation, as the result of military operations or other developments, expands north of latitude 41° N.

New factors then enter into the problem, and a plan is necessary to take care of the capital and all the territory occupied prior to the actual occupation of the capital itself.

At this point the centre of gravity of the administration changes and the type of civil administration must necessarily undergo modification according to whether:-

- (a) there is or is not a central government;
- (b) that government should or should not, under proper control, exercise authority in the occupied area;

To Sec 141
CSO

(c) 397

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(c) it is intended either to extend the occupation, or to avoid any extension, to the whole country;

(d) if the whole country is not occupied, the central government should or should not exercise authority from the occupied capital over the unoccupied area.

Before a plan can be drawn for the extension of the civil administration of the Allied armies north of latitude 41° N. a directive clarifying points (b), (c) and (d) is necessary.

I propose to send you a further memorandum on these matters. After you have had an opportunity of studying this, I shall need a directive from you for my guidance.

I am sending a copy of this memorandum to the British Resident Minister, as I understand that arrangements have now been agreed, between Washington and London, for him to be directly concerned in these matters.

(Signed) H.R. ALEXANDER.

General.

June 25th, 1943.

1. GENERAL

- (a) Security of planning depends on early and constant attention to security detail in staff work, as well as on the maintenance of strict security discipline by all concerned.
- (b) Although the enemy may be expected to deduce in due course the likelihood of operations against the general area with which COMINT and HUSHNESS are concerned, the vital details of these plans, i.e. actual DATES, OBJECTIVES and ORDER OF BATTLE, can and must be concealed.
- (c) The ordinary security precautions which should be taken by officers and others planning an operation should by now be well known, and are not set out in detail in these instructions, which deal only with certain aspects of particular importance or specific application.

2. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLANS

- (a) It is NOT proposed to maintain classification lists of officers 'in the know' at A.F.I.C. or this Headquarters, as was done in the early planning stages of TORCH and HUSKY. There is, however, no objection to the use of such lists within Corps for as long as they are considered effective and desirable.
- (b) The following essential security principle will be strictly adhered to throughout: INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PLANS WILL ONLY BE DIVULGED TO, OR DISCUSSED WITH, THOSE PERSONS WHO REQUIRE SUCH KNOWLEDGE TO ENJOIN THEM PROPERLY TO CARRY OUT THEIR DUTIES, AND THEN ONLY AT SUCH TIME AND IN SUCH DETAIL AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE.
- (c) The number of clerks having access to such information must be confined to the minimum, and they must be carefully selected.

3. HANDLING OF DOCUMENTS AND MESSAGES

For Yehi Callers MAX/MSS
Yehi Kyr 21/6

100% SECRET
U/L/1400/G (1b)

OPERATIONS 'COMINT' AND 'HUSHNESS'

PLANNING SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

20 June 43

3

- (c) The ordinary security precautions which should be taken by officers and others planning an operation should by now be well known, and are not set out in detail in these instructions, which deal only with certain aspects of particular importance or specific application.

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- (c) The number of clerks having access to such information must be confined to the minimum, and they must be carefully selected.

3. HANDLING OF DOCUMENTS AND MESSAGES

- (a) BICOR procedure will NOT be used for these operations; the plain MOST SECRET classification will be used for all documents or messages referring to any vital details of the plans.
- It is emphasised that the use of MOST SECRET should be limited. The misuse of this highest security classification tends to reduce the care and respect with which the most vital and important papers are treated.
- (b) Envelopes containing such documents should be addressed to an individual officer by name or appointment, and should be opened only by the addressee or by an officer authorised by him: these documents must be handled only by those officers and clerks authorised by the heads of branches or sections.

4. DATES

Dates of the operations will only be shown in messages and other documents when absolutely necessary. Such occasions will be very rare.

Normally a date will be referred to in relation to D Day.

5. OBJECTIVES(a) General

Geographical data maps will be used as described in para 7 below.

(b) Specific

The promotion and widespread issue of charts and maps is one of the most likely causes of leakage of information regarding the objective, and the greatest care is required to insure that security is not compromised during their production, distribution or transportation.

Requests for and issue of Planning maps and charts will be reduced to a minimum, and in the early stages they should be marked to indicate the branch or section using them. Precise instructions regarding distribution and safeguards should accompany all such issues.

Instructions for the general issue of maps for operational use will be issued later.

6. ORDER OF BATTLE

Copies of the Order of Battle will be marked TOP SECRET, they will be kept in the custody of an officer, and they will be locked up when not in use.

Care must be taken that the order of battle is not given unnecessarily via publicity through distribution lists.

7. GEOGRAPHICAL CODE NAMES

(a) A list of geographical Code Names will be issued shortly.

(b) These will be used until P Day is:-

(i) Correspondence

(ii) Signal messages

(iii) Telephone conversations

(iv) Ordinary conversations, for as possible

They will not be used in:-

(i) Casualties

6. ORDER OF BATTLE

Instructions for the general issue of maps for operational use will be issued later.

Copies of the Order of Battle will be marked **KEEP SECRET**, they will be kept in the custody of an officer, and they will be locked up when not in use.

Care must be taken that the order of battle is not given unnecessarily wide publicity through distribution lists.

7. GEOGRAPHICAL CODE NAMES

(a) A list of geographical code names will be issued shortly.

(b) These will be used until D Day in:-

(i) Correspondence

(ii) Signal messages

(iii) Telephone conversations

(iv) Ordinary conversations, far as possible

They will NOT be used in:-

(i) Outline plans

(ii) Operation orders or instructions

(iii) Radio telephone conversations

(iv) **The marking of shipments.**

(c) There will be two categories of geographical code names:-

(1) Those used by the Royal Navy, the R.A.F., and 5 and 10 Corps upwards. These are issued by G-2 Section, AFHQ and are known as **KEEP SECRET** words; indication for additional words should be made through G (II) H.Q. Forces ILL.

(2) Those used within 5 and 10 Corps.

When an **ISSE** word has been allotted as described in (1) above it should also be used within these formations; when

/no

Code names chosen by Corps H.Q. and formations or organisations below for places within their own areas, will not be used outside the formation or organisation concerned.

no word has been allotted they can choose their own code words which should be of more than four letters. These

- (d) For reasons of security, circulation of the list of geographical code names will be restricted to those who require knowledge of the complete list.

B. OFFICIAL AND GENERAL SECURITY

Offices occupied by planning staffs will be safeguarded with the greatest care; it is neither possible nor necessary to lay down detailed instructions as to how this should be done, but attention will be given to ensuring that those met on the planning staffs do not see pertinent maps or documents.

Proper arrangements must be made for the daily destruction by fire of secret waste, for the locking or guarding of offices etc., and for the handling of documents within such offices.

No vital details of the plan will be referred to on the telephone. "Double talk" on the telephone is usually unsuccessful.

Plans will only be discussed by officers in offices where they cannot be overheard; they will NEVER be discussed in messes or in public.

2. REPORTS OF POSSIBLE BREACHES

If there has been a breach of security it is the duty of anyone who knows of the breach to satisfy himself that it has been reported to G (In). To attempt to cover up a breach may have the most serious consequences; if it is reported promptly it may be possible to put the matter right or at least to mitigate the damage.

Any serious breach of security which might involve leakage to the enemy will be reported at once to this Headquarters.

P.S. Davies

1825
Major General.
Chief of General Staff.
U.K. Forces.

Copy to: List 'B'

5 Corps (3)
10 Corps (3)

No vital details of the plan will be referred to on the telephone.
"Double talk" on the telephone is usually unsuccessful.

Plans will only be discussed by officers in offices where they cannot be overheard; they will NEVER be discussed in messes or in public.

9. REPORTS OF POSSIBLE LEAKS

If there has been a breach of security it is the duty of anyone who knows of the breach to satisfy himself that it has been reported to G (ID). To attempt to cover up a breach may have the most serious consequences; if it is reported promptly it may be possible to put the matter right or at least to mitigate the damage.

Any serious breach of security which might involve leakage to the enemy will be reported at once to this headquarters.

P.S. Laidly

W Major General.
Chief of General Staff.
Mal Perce.

Copy to: List 'J'
5 Corps (3)
10 Corps (3)

#5
NOR on Post-Husky Operations

1. The present position is that General Alexander is in command of Husky and post-Husky operations. He has certain troops which are engaged in making plans for post-Husky operations. The result of the first phase of these post-Husky operations will be the occupation of certain territory beyond Honipied. (3)

2. General Alexander has a C.C. HQ. who is concerned with the enemy territories occupied by General Alexander's forces. Since the territories occupied by these forces beyond Honipied will be General Alexander's responsibility. The administration of these additional

formation

The result of the first phase of these post-Husky operations will be the occupation of certain territory beyond Honioka.

2 General Alexander has C.E.A.O. who is concerned with the enemy territories occupied by General Alexander's forces. Since the territories occupied by them pass beyond Honioka will be General Alexander's responsibility. The administration of these additional territories will, under General Alexander's decision otherwise, be dealt with by C.E.A.O.

3. But ^{while} ~~whereas~~ the formations engaged in post-Husky operations have to prepare an operational plan for General Alexander's approval and

do so

note proposed this plan in Algiers
in contact with AFHQ. but as 141
troops, no for the plan is necessary
for the ^{military movement} administration of the additional
territories which they will occupy.

The exist admin is broken of these
additional territories is as an
extension of the Civil admin is broken
of hurried with some staff drawn
from that area plus a certain amount
of additional staff from ^{U.K.} England and
America which C.E.F.O. has already
asked for. When the military plan
for the first phase of these operations
is ready C.E.F.O. will post officers to

The civil administration in India of these
additional territories is an
extension of the civil administration in India
of territories with some staff drawn
from that area plus a certain amount
of additional staff from ^{U.K.} England and
America which C.E.T.O. has already
asked for. When the military plan
for the first phase of these operations
is ready C.E.T.O. will post officers to
accompany ^{the} ~~the~~ formation and
detail them to areas and places ~~expected~~.

4. So far there is no difficulty and
A.F.H.Q. (Mil. Sec. Sec.) need not
be concerned with this
subject which is solely General
Alexander's responsibility and that of his
Staff.

3

5. These considerations apply to the whole additional territory concerned in the first post-Husky phase up to and including all territory and towns as far as Lat. $41^{\circ}N$.

6. If however occupation, as a result of military operations or other developments, extends north of Lat. $41^{\circ}N$, new factors enter in the picture problem and a plan is necessary to take care of the capital and all the territory occupied prior to the actual occupation of the capital. With the occupation of the capital the center of gravity of the civil administration to the changes, and the type of the civil administration must necessarily

of military operations or other dual-
-purpose, extending north of lat. 41° N.,
new factors enter in the picture,
problem and a plan is necessary to
take care of the capital and all the
territory occupied prior to the actual
occupation of the capital. With the
occupation of the capital the center of
gravity of the civil administration to the
Champs, and the type of the civil
administration must necessarily undergo
modification according to the above:-

- (a) There is or is not a central post.
- (b) That government shall or shall
not, under proper control, 387
exercise authority in the occupied
area
- (c) It is intended to extend the
occupation, if possible, or to
avoid any extension, & the whole

country

(d) if the whole country is not occupied,
the central government should or
shall not exert authority over an
occupied capital over an occupied
area

7 Before a plan can be drawn
for the exterminating Civil Administration
of the Allied armies north of lat. 41° N.
a directive clarifying points
(b), (c), and (d) is necessary.

8. This clarification will have to
come to General Alexander
from C-in-C. who, before deciding,
will wish to consult his staff - (the
Military Staff -)

7 Before a plan can be drawn for the extendingth Civil Administration of the Allied armies north of lat. 41° N. a directive clarifying point (b), (c), and (d) is necessary.

8. This clarification will have to come to General Alexander from C-in-C. who, before deciding, will wish to consult his staff - (the Mil. for. Section) and the British and U.S. Ministers and may wish to refer to the Combined Chiefs

9. U.S. staff. In order to admit in³⁸ clarifying the point, General Alexander may wish to submit to C-in-C. his recommendations, for approval or otherwise, or point (c), (d).

10. The submission to C. P. J. General Alexander showed however bear lines which think at any rate are likely to approve when consulted of Washington. His letter suggested that H. G.'s views should be ascertained at once.

11. ~~Reminding that~~, General Alexander ^{therefore} may consider it proper to embody in a letter to C. P. J. now:-

(1) the conclusions of paras 1-5 that up to date. H. G. N. the Civil Administration is in the concern of his C. P. J. who will provide whatever staff and orders are necessary to take over ^{the} ~~and~~ territory as an

views should be ascertained at once.

11 ~~Reminding that~~, General Alexander
^{therefore} considers it proper to
embodiment in a letter to C. C. now:-

(i) the conclusions of paras 1-5
that up to Lat. 41° N. the Civil
Administration is the concern of
his C. C. T. O. who will provide whatever
staff and orders are necessary to
take over ^{the} territory as an
extension of August Herrick's
and that no separate plans or
organization are necessary.

(ii) the submission that any extension
of occupation beyond Lat. 41° N.
will require a directive before a
plan can be made to
clarify certain points: and that

81
a further letter will be addressed to
C-2C on this issue ^{Sorry} in a few days,
on which he will probably want
to comment his staff and ^{the} Combined
Chiefs of Staff.

12. In the meanwhile Res will
may consider it proper to express
Hunt's views on the point in
para 6 which can readily be
detent of C.C.A.O. or whom will,
eventually face the responsibility for
any plan of government under
General Alexander's Authority.

Chiefs of Staff.

12. In the meanwhile Res will
may consider it proper to express
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para 6 which can readily be
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any plan of government under
General Alexander's authority.

25/6/72
38%

2410