

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

10000/100/709

SECURITY, POST HUSKY
AUG., SEPT. 1943

20p.

15AG/1400/2/G(16)	21 Aug	From: HQ 15 A.G.
15AG/1400/2/G(16)	23 AUG.	From: HQ 15 A.G.
15AG/1400/2/G(16)	23 "	From: HQ 15 AG TO 5TH Army
-do	-do	" " " TO 7.
"	"	" " " TO 8
NR 8259	31 Aug	" " " Cine
15AG/4644/8/G(14)	29 "	" " " DGMG, 15 Army Gp
15AG/1400/2/G(16)	26 "	" " " CGS, 15 Army Gp
15AG/1400/2/G(16)	9 SEP.	" " " CAS, 15 Army Gp.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

777

SUBJECT: Cover and Deception Plans

TO: Fifth Army
Seventh Army
Eighth Army
FORTEBASE

77/110
1 SEP 1943
AMGOT
22
9
MOST SECRET

H.Q., 15 Army Group
C.M.F.

15AG/1400/2/G(Ib)

9 Sep 43

1. Cases have been reported of insufficient care being exercised in keeping secret the existence of cover and deception plans.
2. It must be realised that should the enemy obtain information concerning our cover plan and recognise it as such, a grave danger would result of his uncovering our actual plan of operation.
3. The distribution of information regarding cover plans should be confined to those whose duty makes it essential that they should receive such information.
4. The fact that deception methods have been successful or otherwise, should not be mentioned unless absolutely necessary.

I have no knowledge of cover plan

E. Runcie
Major General 1,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

Copy to: List 'B'

10/12
C.S.O.

Will you confirm that we do not know the cover plan for ops. now being undertaken and to be undertaken in the future?

WEG/EGM

P.R. 13/9.

P.A.

T.B. 13/9.

COPY NO. 8

SUBJECT: Amend. it



MOST SECRET
15AG/1400/2/G(Ib)
26 Aug 43

FIFTH ARMY (3-5)
EIGHTH ARMY (1-2)

Amendment to 15AG/1400/2/G(Ib) dated 23 Aug 43 on Security Arrests in WINDSOCK.

Para 4, 3rd line - delete "If it is,"

substitute "In any case, those who are or were "

Amended 3/9/43
ET

Shumway Capt
Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

Re: 2
H.Q. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

Copy to: A.F.H.Q. G-2 (C.I.)
Seventh Army
AMGOT H.Q.,
Fortbase
A Branch

P/A 4/9
ET

30/5
Plut 4/9

Col T. T. O'Brien

(13) 7

HEADQUARTERS
17/HQ
31 AUG 1943
AMGOT

15AG/4614/8/Q(M)

29 Aug 43.

SECURITY.

TO:- List "A"

1. It is notified for information that with effect from 30th Aug and until 8th September inclusive no traffic will be permitted on the Catania - Theresa Road without a pass; Ambulances, Flag Cars and D.Rs. excepted.

2. Passes may be obtained from Q. Branches of Main 8th Army, Rear 8th Army, Portbase and TAC. H.Q. 13 Corps.

JMV
Brigadier,
D.Q. H.Q. (Mov. & Tr).

Q. (Mov. & Tr).
H.Q. 15 Army Group.
FIELD.

(13)

C.P.O.

To see G.

*See Note
there*

(13) 2/9

775

Bigot Amgot 6

310500-B
FROM: CINC

M/C 5587-A

~~BIGOT~~

RAD

REF NR

259

AG: 310728-B

CG SEVENTH ARMY

REG: 310500-B

SECRET ROUTINE

MSG BEGINS X CONSIDER MESSAGE 1241 FROM FINANCE AMGOT PALERMO DATED 29 AUGUST
SHOULD HAVE INCORPORATED CODE WORD BIGOT X G-2 SEVENTH ARMY FROM G-2 FREEDOM
SIGNED CINC CITE FHGBI

C/S

G-2(ACTION)

AMGOT

Regisler

A. file and pass to Finance to note. Bigot

must be used when the contents of the message show the
nature of future operations e.g. use of place names, dates
etc. etc.

Q13 31/8.

Noted by Cfo H/9.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

SUBJECT: Security Policy in WINDSOCK

MOST SECRET

15AG/1400/2/G(Ib)

23 Aug 43

EIGHTH ARMY

The general principles laid down in the Directive on Security in SICILY issued by this H.Q. under reference 141F/1424/G(Ib) dated 2 June will be applied in the case of WINDSOCK, except where modified by the attached instruction on Security Arrests in WINDSOCK. This latter instruction is also now applicable to SICILY.

File 7982 folio 29

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

W. J. Gibson. Lt. Col
Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

Copy to: G-2 (C.I.) A.F.H.Q.,
AMCOT H.Q.,
FORTEASE

SUBJECT: Counter-Intelligence Policy in WINDSOCK

3
MOST SECRET

15AG/1400/2/G(Ib)

FIFTH ARMY

23 Aug 43

The attached instruction on Security Arrests in WINDSOCK is issued in amplification of the general Directive for Counter Intelligence in WINDSOCK issued under reference 15AG/1400/2/G(Ib) dated 21 Aug 43.

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

W.D. Gibson. Lt Col
Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

Copy to: G-2 (C.I.) A.F.H.Q.,
AMGOT H.Q., —

785015

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Policy

MOST SECRET

15AG/1400/2/G(Ib)

23 Aug 43

SEVENTH ARMY

1. The principles enunciated in the attached directive, published for security guidance in WINDSOCK, are in every way applicable to current conditions in SICILY and will be accepted by your command as supplementing, modifying or clarifying, as the case may be, your present governing policy.

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

W.D. Gibson. Lt. Col
Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

Copy to: G-2 (C.I.) A.F.H.Q.
AMGOT H.Q., —

SUBJECT: Security Arrests in WINDSOCK

MOST SECRET

COPY NO ... 8

15AG/1400/2/G(Ib)

23 Aug 43

EIGHTH ARMY (1-2)
FIFTH ARMY (3-5)

1. The following policy with regard to security arrests will be adopted in WINDSOCK.

2. Enemy Intelligence Services

Members of the German Abwehr or Italian S.I.M. will be arrested, if found. Special arrangements will be made for their custody under supervision of Security personnel, and both this H.Q. and the nearest S.I.(b) Officer will be informed immediately.

3. Carabinieri Counter-Espionage Organization

Members of the Carabinieri Counter-espionage organization will be arrested. They will be interrogated to determine the identity of other members of the organization and to discover whether they have had any connection with the enemy Intelligence Services.

This H.Q. and the nearest S.I.(b) officer will be informed of any cases of special interest, e.g. officers possessing information about the ABWEHR, S.I.M. or general counter-espionage activities: such persons should be kept available for further interrogation by S.I.(b).

All officers of this organization and those N.C.O's who have taken an active or individual part in counter-espionage activities will be interned after interrogation.

4. O.V.R.A.

It is not yet known whether the O.V.R.A. is continuing to function under the new regime in WINDSOCK either under its old or a new name. ~~Only~~ O.V.R.A. agents will be dealt with in the same way as counter-espionage members of the Carabinieri. Real members of the O.V.R.A. should be distinguished if possible from petty local informers who may have made periodical reports to O.V.R.A. agents: the former should be arrested and interned, but normally not the latter.

my case, those who are or were

arrested, if found. Special arrangements will be made for their custody under supervision of Security personnel, and both this H.Q. and the nearest S.I(b) Officer will be informed immediately.

3. Carabinieri Counter-Espionage Organisation

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This H.Q. and the nearest S.I(b) officer will be informed of any cases of special interest, e.g. officers possessing information about the ARMY, S.I.X. or general counter-espionage activities: such persons should be kept available for further interrogation by S.I(b).

All officers of this organisation and those N.C.O's who have taken an active or individual part in counter-espionage activities will be interned after interrogation.

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5. Consular and Diplomatic Officials

German Consular and diplomatic officials will be taken into custody and placed under special guard.

Such officials of other hostile Powers will be placed under house arrest.

In either case this H.Q. will be informed immediately.

Such officials of Neutral Governments will NOT be molested in any way.

6. Civilians - General

Where enquiries and investigation show reasonable evidence that a civilian is likely to endanger our security if left at liberty, he will be arrested and interned.

7. Civilians committing security offences

Civilians who have committed or who are believed to have

.../committed

* In any case, those who are or were

committed security offences will be arrested and handed over to AMGOT for trial, except in the case of any civilian acting in conjunction with the enemy intelligence services, who will be handled as in para 2 above.

3. Officials

The Fascist Party Organisation has been dissolved by the BADOGLIO Government, and it is believed that the latter has arrested or deposed many of the more prominent and ardent Fascists holding important official administrative positions. It is not yet known what policy is to be adopted by AMGOT in respect of the deposing and internment of officials on political grounds.

Security personnel in any case will normally confine their arrests to those of purely security significance: i.e. they will not arrest officials or other civilians because they are BADOGLIO nominees or because they are Fascists, but only because enquiries and investigation show reasonable evidence that their continued liberty would constitute a threat to our security. Purely political arrests may be made by security personnel but at the request of a competent AMGOT officer.

9. Co-ordination with AMGOT

The local AMGOT C.A.O. (Civil Affairs Officer) or C.A.P.O. (Civil Affairs Police Officer) will wherever possible be consulted before a civilian is arrested on security grounds, in order that the demands of security may be balanced against the needs of civil administration.

In addition the local AMGOT C.A.O. or C.A.P.O. will be notified in writing of all cases involving the arrest of a civilian: this notification will include the particulars of the civilian, the reason for the arrest, by whom arrested and the method of disposal. If there is no C.A.O. or C.A.P.O. readily available in the early stages, or in the forward area, the record of the arrest must be passed to the next higher H.Q. for transmission to AMGOT.

10. Method of Disposal

Persons arrested in the course of operations simply on the grounds that their continued liberty would constitute a threat to our security, will be disposed of through the civil compartments of prisoner of war cages for eventual internment.

Those arrested for the commission of security offences will, if possible, be placed in a civil prison or police station approved by AMGOT pending trial. If no such establishment is available, they should be held in the nearest Prisoner of War Cage.

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Those arrested for the commission of security offences will, if possible, be placed in a civil prison or police station approved by AMGOT pending trial. If no such establishment is available, they should be held in the nearest Prisoner of War Cage.

Persons whom it is desired to hold for further interrogation or investigation can be held temporarily in the local prison or the local P/W cage, and arrangements made with the authorities in charge that such persons are NOT evacuated immediately as internees. Such detentions, however, must be only a temporary expedient of strictly limited duration; the persons concerned must be either released, interned or charged with an offence as soon as possible.

11. Record of Arrests

When a civilian is arrested by security personnel, a short record of the case must be supplied to AMGOT, as set out in para 9 above: if he is dispatched to a prisoner of war cage a similar record must be handed

...../to the.....

- 3 -

to the authority in charge of the case. These two records are in addition to that which would naturally be submitted to the security staff.

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

W. D. Gibson - Lt. Col
Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

Copy to: A.F.H.Q. G-2 (C.I.)
Seventh Army
AMGOT H.Q.,
Forces
Tranch

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7
8
9
10

COPY NO. 91

BIGOT
BIGOT AVALANCHE

SUBJECT: Directive for Counter-Intelligence in WINDSOCK.

MOST SECRET

TO : Fifth Army

LSAC/1400/2/6(1b)

21 Aug 43

W. G. Smith
30/8

HEADQUARTERS

23 AUG 1943

AMGOT

1. OBJECT

Our security object in WINDSOCK is to prevent the conduct of our operations being prejudiced by leakage of information through espionage or other causes, by damage to our material and communications, etc., through sabotage, or by subversive influences at work in the area of operation.

This directive is designed to lay down the general principles which will be followed in the achievement of this object, with special reference to the functions of military security personnel (Counterintelligence Corps, Field Security Sections, Special I(b), and O.S.S. Units) working under the direction of the Security (I(b) and Counterintelligence) Staffs.

This directive is perhaps in greater detail than would be normal because it is appreciated that shortness of time will require its distribution to subordinate units without opportunity of revision by intermediate headquarters.

2. RESPONSIBILITY

Security Staff and military security personnel are responsible for ensuring that all possible measures in the spheres of both military and civil security, are taken to achieve the above object at all stages of the operation.

In addition all ranks are responsible for taking all normal military security precautions, which are of vital importance in a hostile country no matter what the general temper of the population may appear to be, and for taking appropriate action in all cases involving a threat to our security on the part of civilians.

While Security Staffs and security personnel are reminded that the security of our operation is of paramount importance, nevertheless AMGOT is responsible for all civil administration and political matters. Security Staffs and security personnel are not concerned with civil administration or political matters except so far as the individuals concerned therein constitute themselves or their position as a threat to the security of operations, in which case action is to be taken only in conjunction with AMGOT if in any way possible. As a general rule, in all security matters affecting civilians, military personnel must work in the very closest cooperation with the representatives of AMGOT, in particular with the C.A.P.O's (Civil Affairs Police Officers) who are responsible for supervising the civilian police forces.

It is the responsibility of commanders to see to it that all concerned

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It is the responsibility of commanders to see to it that all concerned should be informed of the matters contained in this general directive and should submit reports as requested herein. Without the appropriate reports and information from subordinate units any headquarters is powerless to assist in any situation, to give guidance when matters of higher policy are approached or to supplement information known to be possessed by such subordinate units.

3. SECURITY ORGANISATION

C.I.C. Sections are allotted on the scale of one per division or higher headquarters.

One Port Section is attached to the Army Headquarters and another will be available on call.

A Special Intelligence (b) Unit (British), working under the direction of A.I.H.Q., will cooperate fully with the Fifth Army. It is the function of this unit to carry out special counterespionage and countersabotage tasks, to organise a system of informers and counterintelligence agents and to collaborate with the C.I.C.

As soon as it becomes available, it is planned to attach to Fifth Army a mobile team for the detection of illicit transmitting sets.

-2-

4. MILITARY SECURITY PERSONNEL - GENERAL

(a) It should be ensured that commanders and staffs of formations and units appreciate the functions of Field Security and Counterintelligence personnel.

(b) It has happened in the past that these personnel have been employed in a manner prejudicial to the efficiency of their proper work. It should be generally realised that they have very definite and numerous Counterintelligence functions to perform throughout the areas occupied by our forces - functions which must, especially in a hostile country, play an important part in the successful conduct of our operations: accordingly they should only be diverted from their proper role in exceptional cases of urgent operational necessity. For instance, they should NOT be employed as interpreters, guards, dispatch-riders, prisoner-of-war escorts, etc., or for the investigation of thefts and crimes other than security offences.

(c) It should also be appreciated that security personnel cannot, on their own, carry out all measures which may need to be taken for security purposes. For instance, they are not sufficiently numerous to act as anti-sabotage guards on installations, etc.; their task is rather to advise on anti-sabotage precautions and investigate cases of attempted or suspected sabotage. Similarly, they will probably require the assistance of combat troops to seize suspect premises, etc., scheduled for search and to deal with other special targets.

(d) All ranks should be ready to give such assistance as they can when requested by security personnel in the performance of their duties.

(e) Military Security personnel may be identified as follows:

(i) Counterintelligence Corps (U.S.). Each agent and special agent carries a leather bound folder containing his photograph and particulars of his identification; he also carries a War Department Military Intelligence Division Gold Badge, the number of which is recorded in the folder.

(ii) Field Security Personnel (British). All Field Security Personnel will carry an officers' identity card (A.F. B2638 or Middle East) with photograph and particulars, and an endorsement to the effect that they are engaged on Field Security duties.

(f) All suspicious incidents and persons and other such matters of security interest should be referred immediately by units to the nearest security personnel.

5. INFORMATION

(a) Such information as may become available from time to time will be forwarded to Fifth Army, and this will include details as to the following:

(i) Methods and Head-

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(f) All suspicious incidents and persons and other such matters of security interest should be referred immediately by units to the nearest security personnel.

5. INFORMATION

(a) Such information as may become available from time to time will be forwarded to Fifth Army, and this will include details as to the following:

(i) Italian Secret Service Organisation, methods and Headquarters.

(ii) Enemy agents and suspects likely to be encountered in WINDSOCK.

(iii) Enemy's espionage and sabotage plans to meet Allied invasion.

(iv) Any German organisations such as ABWEHR or GESTAPO operating in WINDSOCK.

(v) Native civil police organisations and personalities.

(vi) Persons, Political elements or organisations likely to prove especially friendly or hostile to Allies.

(b) The above information, when received, must be most carefully safeguarded, as much of it will have been obtained from MOST SECRET sources. The names of pro-allied elements must, in particular, be treated with the highest degree of discretion and secrecy. Such information will not be passed to or through individuals whose duties do not strictly require knowledge thereof.

-3-

(c) Although little evidence is as yet available, it can be taken for granted that the enemy will have made plans for the organization and functioning of espionage and sabotage agents in preparation for our possible invasion of WINDSOCK.

(d) The earliest opportunity must be taken after arrival to supplement our security intelligence, by the questioning of civilians, the examination of records and other documents, and by the interrogation of prisoners. Any important information obtained should be forwarded at earliest opportunity to this Headquarters.

(e) From time to time specific instructions will be issued with regard to policy in the arrest and detention of specific persons or classes of persons, such as those listed in publications.

6. SECURITY MEASURES AND TASKS

(a) General

The necessary security measures and tasks and the methods by which they will be carried out will vary to a certain extent in the forward battle areas and in the early stages from those in rear areas and in the later stages.

In the former case efforts will be concentrated mainly on certain urgent operational security tasks, which will be carried out mostly by military security personnel in conjunction with the combat troops. In the latter case, security measures will tend to become more of a long term and preventative nature, and will be carried out mainly by military security personnel in conjunction with the appropriate AMGOT representatives.

As a general principle, counterintelligence measures should be imposed as swiftly as possible in order to give the impression that we have good and correct information. Such an impression will make much easier the task of security staffs and personnel in their dealings with the civil population at all stages.

(b) Proclamations

Proclamations and orders to the civil population have been prepared and their display in towns and villages as soon as these are captured will be arranged by AMGOT.

These proclamations and orders, which are designed to control the conduct of civilians, cover the main security requirements. They provide for the immediate surrender of arms and W/T transmitters, and deal with such security matters as the imposition of curfew, the use of cameras and binoculars, carrier pigeons, prohibited areas, subversive propaganda, etc. The published list of war crimes includes all security offences.

Security staffs should take an early opportunity of studying a copy

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Security staffs should take an early opportunity of studying a copy of the proclamations.

(c) Immediate Tasks of Security Personnel in Forward Combat Areas

The immediate tasks of security personnel in the forward areas will include the following:

- (i) To search for and detain when found all known enemy agents and listed suspects except when expressly instructed to the contrary to discover and detain for enquiry all other persons deemed likely to work actively against the security of our forces or operation: to investigate suspicious incidents and persons reported by units.
- (ii) To discover and prevent all possible means of communication with the enemy by persons within the area overrun by our forces, particularly any clandestine W/T transmitters which have not been surrendered.

(iii) To discover and collect any hidden arms, ammunition or explosives which have not been handed in in accordance with the proclamation.

(iv) To give early assistance in the application of security precautions for the protection of vital installations, dock facilities, communications, etc., against sabotage.

Lists of such installations, etc., requiring early capture, guarding and anti-sabotage precautions should be prepared beforehand and detailed plans made for the implementation of the necessary measures.

(v) To collect all possible security intelligence by contacting any persons known to be friendly disposed, and by the questioning of civilians while they are still unnerved by the battle.

(vi) To obtain all possible information of security interest by the discovery and examination of relevant documents.

Any premises likely to contain documents of security value will be scheduled for search. Such premises should include, in particular, any buildings occupied by the enemy intelligence personnel or suspects; Fascist, O.V.R.A. or Abwehr Headquarters; hostile Consular offices, etc.; and, in general, post offices, police and other administrative offices. Detailed plans must be made for the early capture and guarding of such buildings to prevent the destruction of the documents they contain, and to allow of their early examination by the competent personnel, who will collect, copy, or arrange for the proper safeguarding of those of special interest. Such tasks must be definitely allotted and carefully coordinated so that the needs of all those interested are catered for. It is expected that the FANTALON area will be a fruitful source of valuable documents, particularly those of naval importance.

In this connection it should be borne in mind that the general policy regarding documents in public administrative offices such as police stations, is that they should be preserved intact and in situ, and not seized and carried away in bulk. This does not, however, apply to post offices, from which all mail in transit should be seized as soon as possible for immediate examination by or delivery to the censorship authorities.

(vii) To assist in the interrogation of selected prisoners of war in order to elicit security intelligence.

(viii) To ensure as far as possible the proper observance by the civil population of all security provisions of the proclamations and orders posted by AMGOT representatives.

(d) Disposal of Civil Suspects and Security Detainees.

Any premises likely to contain documents of security value will be scheduled for search. Such premises should include, in particular, any buildings occupied by the enemy intelligence personnel or suspects; Fascist, O.V.R.A. or Abwehr Headquarters; hostile Consular offices, etc., and, in general, post offices, police and other administrative offices. Detailed plans must be made for the early capture and guarding of such buildings to prevent the destruction of the documents they contain, and to allow of their early examination by the competent personnel, who will collect, copy, or arrange for the proper safeguarding of those of special interest. Such tasks must be definitely allotted and carefully coordinated so that the needs of all those interested are catered for. It is expected that the PANTALOON area will be a fruitful source of valuable documents, particularly those of naval importance.

In this connection it should be borne in mind that the general policy regarding documents in public administrative offices such as police stations, is that they should be preserved intact and in situ, and not seized and carried away in bulk. This does not, however, apply to post offices, from which all mail in transit should be seized as soon as possible for immediate examination by or delivery to the censorship authorities.

(vii) To assist in the interrogation of selected prisoners of war in order to elicit security intelligence.

(viii) To ensure as far as possible the proper observance by the civil population of all security provisions of the proclamations and orders posted by AMGOT representatives.

(d) Disposal of Civil Suspects and Security Detainees.

(i) When a civilian is detained for security reasons by combat troops the nearest military security personnel will be informed immediately so that the case can be investigated and the person interrogated.

(ii) In forward areas and in the early stages, civil suspects and security detainees should normally be disposed of through the civil section of Division and Corps prisoner of war cages. At each level the formation Security Officer must decide whether they can be cleared of suspicion and freed at once or whether they should be detained further.

Arrangements must be made with the appropriate Provost Marshal and the Military Police for the reception and handling of such civilians in a special civilian wing of prisoner of war cages along with persons arrested and turn over by AMGOT.

Civil suspects cannot remain at division or Corps cages pending lengthy investigation, as it is the policy for these cages to be evacuated as quickly as possible.

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Fifth Army Headquarters must, therefore, make arrangements for the removal of those whose continued detention is necessary from Corps cages to special premises where they can be temporarily accommodated and guarded pending trial or further investigation. Care in this respect is essential so that persons will not be evacuated until their usefulness in the area is ended.

When the situation permits, they will be removed to proper civil prisons or detention establishments by arrangement with AMGOT.

(iii) When a person who has been detained appears, after interrogation and investigation by security personnel, to be an enemy agent, this Headquarters will be informed immediately, and the agent held under the strictest supervision of security personnel, and in such case will not be turned over for processing in the normal manner. The earliest opportunity must be afforded to the Special Intelligence (b) Unit to interrogate and handle such prisoner. The fact that such a person has been captured will be treated with all possible secrecy.

(iv) When a civil suspect or detainee is passed back to be held for further investigation, a complete case record must accompany him or be forwarded as rapidly as possible for the guidance of higher headquarters. It is desired to point out that failure to make and forward such reports had, during the Sicilian campaign, unfortunate effect upon the proper coordination of this work.

(e) Diplomatic and Consular Officials.

Great care must be taken at all times to ensure that the diplomatic immunity of the offices and officials of neutral governments is not violated. The consulates will not be searched or the officials molested.

Any accredited German civil officials, especially those with consular or diplomatic status found in WINDSOCK will be taken into custody, not treated as prisoners of war but placed under special guard, and this Headquarters notified at once. Such persons are required to facilitate release of Allied officials held by the Germans.

Hostile consular officials in general will be held under house arrest and the consulate will be searched.

(f) Subsequent Security Measures and Methods

In the rear areas and after the initial phase, security work should tend to develop from a series of hastily improvised local measures to a more coordinated system based on preventive security controls and close collaboration with AMGOT, backed by ever increasing security intelligence.

Guidance on certain aspects of such security is given below:

(i) Control of Movements

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Guidance on certain aspects of such security is given below:

(i) Control of Movements.

Restrictions on the local circulation of civilians will be determined by local AMGOT officers after consultation with the security staff and at the direction of the tactical commanders.

The general policy will be to restrict circulation after certain hours except for such special personnel as members of the medical profession and civil defence, and those doing essential work for the Allied Forces.

Civilian access to certain areas may be restricted or prohibited according to military needs. The perimeter of such areas should be marked by the posting of sentries or the placing of notice boards.

Circulation between towns and villages will in general be prohibited except with permission of Civil Affairs Police Officers and/or the Security Staffs.

It is the responsibility of security personnel to supervise the proper enforcement of the security regulations concerning civilian movement.

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(ii) Passes, etc.

Civilians are already in possession of identity cards, and it is not proposed to issue fresh ones or to carry out a special registration of the population.

The following pass system will be adopted:

Two kinds of passes will be issued by AMGOT officers to civilians, namely:

Firstly, a pass or permit for special personnel of essential services to circulate locally as required or to take certain action prohibited to the population as a whole. This will bear the number of the owner's identity card.

Secondly, a pass for approved civilians to journey beyond the normal limits of the town or village. This will be attached to the identity card and will be stamped for the journey or journeys.

The security staffs will keep AMGOT representatives supplied with a list of persons to whom no passes should be issued without reference to the former. In addition, before issuing passes or permits for long distance journeys or important privileges, AMGOT will submit the name of applicants to the Security Staff for a security check. Local passes and permits conferring minor privileges will be issued by AMGOT without a prior check by the security staff, but the latter will be kept informed of such passes issued.

The following kinds of pass will be issued by the security staffs, or their representatives:

No. 1. White Security Pass for issue to U.S. and British civilian organisations such as Y.M.C.A., Red Cross, etc.

No. 2. Brown Security Pass or permit for emergency issue to special individuals for counterintelligence purposes. The use of these should be strictly limited, and details of all holders forwarded to this Headquarters.

The above passes and special embossing stamps will be issued direct by A.F.H.Q.

In addition special date stamps in sets of three may be drawn for use in controlling civilian employees working in docks or other installations.

If the policy of releasing Italian prisoners of war to return to their homes in territory occupied by us is continued in WINDSOCK, each individual prisoner released must bear on his person, preferably endorsed upon his identity card,

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If the policy of releasing Italian prisoners of war to return to their homes in territory occupied by us is continued in WINDSOCK, each individual prisoner released must bear on his person, preferably endorsed upon his identity card, a statement showing the particulars of his release, including when and from where released and the location of his home, and a statement of such information furnished in duplicate to the nearest AMGOT representative. Such procedure was found in SICILY to be essential to the proper control of the population.

(iii) Control of Communications and Publications.

All arrangements for the censorship of civil mail, telephones and publications are handled by the Information and Censorship Section, representatives of which are to be attached to Fifth Army.

Security Staffs will maintain close liaison with these representatives so that the latter may be kept informed of security requirements and priorities as regards censorship.

It is intended that all private civil telephone communications should be suspended at the earliest possible moment under arrangements made by Signals, and that only certain official lines required for administrative, civil defence and other such essential purposes, will be available for use by selected civilians, as requested by AMGOT. At a later stage limited local use of the telephone may be permitted to approved subscribers.

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(C) 3/Am
The disorganisation of the civil postal service resulting from our operations will presumably prevent all civil mail communication in the occupied areas in the early stages; thereafter, such communication is to be limited for as long as necessary to post-cards only, which can be easily censored.

All necessary arrangements for the control of the press and other publications will be made by the Information and Censorship Section.

When Security Staffs require the application of special censorship measures in special cases or localities, they should request the Information and Censorship Section to make the necessary arrangements. Detailed censorship instructions and arrangements for AVALANCHE will be issued by the Information and Censorship Section.

(iv) Co-operation with AMGOT.

It is essential that security staffs should maintain the closest liaison throughout with the AMGOT organisation, especially C.A.P.O's. The latter are to be allotted first on a formation or unit basis, then on a territorial basis: one is to be located at each main police headquarters, and it is their task to supervise the organisation and efficient working of a cooperative police force.

Although military security personnel may, in forward areas or where speed is essential, take any necessary security measures against civilians without reference to AMGOT (e. g. search of premises, detention and search of suspect persons, snap road checks, etc.), they should normally keep AMGOT advised of all contemplated security measures against civilians, and take such measures in conjunction with AMGOT where appropriate. For instance, any general regulations for the security control of the civil population, such as the declaration of prohibited areas or the registration of radio receiving sets, etc., will normally be arranged by AMGOT at the request of the security staff.

AMGOT is responsible for the removal and replacement of unreliable officials. No action will be taken by military security personnel in respect of officials without reference to AMGOT, unless the delay thus caused would result in the most serious prejudice to security.

(v) Co-operation with Civil Police.

There are several native police organisations and forces in WINSTON-SALEM. It is anticipated that AMGOT will arrange for the dissolution or reorganisation of some, and persuade others to continue their functions in cooperation with the Allies. Probably the Carabinieri, the Agents of Public Security and the Municipal Police will operate under orders of AMGOT.

Contact between military security personnel and the native

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Contact between military security personnel and the native police should normally be made in the early stages through the C.A.P.O's. Later, when conditions become more settled and C.A.P.O's have been able to appreciate the attitude and reliability of the police officials under their control, it will be possible for direct contact to be made on minor routine security matters.

Co-operation with the native police and other civil authorities should be welcomed and encouraged, but it must be borne in mind by security personnel that such authorities are innately hostile and the possibility of treachery must be guarded against. A correct but firm attitude must be adopted by security personnel. In their dealings with the native police, etc., they must confine themselves to obtaining information and assistance, and not giving any information unless advised by the C.A.P.O. concerned.

(vi) Collection of Information.

Owing to the incomplete nature of advance information about personalities, etc., in WINDSOCK, security staffs will have to depend to a large extent on information acquired locally after arrival. Military security personnel will therefore take the earliest opportunity of building up an informer service, but they must bear in mind that the inhabitants will be predominantly hostile, and all information received from them will require checking and confirmation before it can be

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considered reliable.

Interpreters and informers employed by security personnel must first be subjected to the closest scrutiny as to reliability, and informers, in addition, must be selected with an eye to their authoritative knowledge of the community as a whole. For example, a small neighbourhood business man, though perfectly reliable, cannot be expected to give authoritative information on personalities and affairs of the community as a whole.

(vii) Territorial Security Responsibility.

All territory occupied by our forces should be "covered" from the security point of view by Field Security or Counter Intelligence Personnel, and security staffs will arrange accordingly the allotment of areas or boundaries to F.S. and C.I.C. Sections.

Such areas will normally correspond in general to the area occupied by the formation to which the security personnel are attached. Experience has shown, however, that at times more advantageous use can be made of security personnel by splitting sections in order to reinforce where most needed. Formations and units should therefore realise that it may be necessary for higher Commanders to withdraw part of their sections for certain special requirements elsewhere.

As our forces advance and security personnel move on, these must arrange to hand over all relevant information to the security sections which are to take over the area which they are leaving. In this, reliance should not be placed on verbal information but complete files of relevant papers should be transferred.

(viii) Subversive Influences and Organisations.

Military Security Personnel will take steps to detect and investigate all cases of subversive influences, propaganda and rumours, etc., emanating from the population and likely to have an adverse effect on our forces.

Similarly it is their duty to detect and investigate any clandestine organisations or underground movements which might threaten any aspect of the security of our forces.

(ix) Civil Contractors and Employees.

When it is necessary to employ civilians in the service of our forces, the following security principles will be adopted:

In the case of civilians who are to be employed in a capacity in which they may have access to confidential military information, their names and particulars should be first submitted to the security staff for check, so that advice may be given as to suitability.

In the case of contractors

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In the case of contractors through whom civil labour is to be obtained, they should similarly be submitted for a security check before they are given a contract.

In the case of labourers, etc., who will not have access to confidential military information, they need not be checked before engagement; if, however, they are to be employed in any capacity in which they might endanger any aspect of our security, their names should be forwarded to the security staff on their engagement in order that a routine check can be made in due course.

(x) Military Security Precautions.

It is essential that the very highest standard of military security discipline should be maintained by all ranks in WINDSOCK. Routine security precautions in such matters as the handling of documents, conversation in public places, use of telephone, guarding of stores and Headquarters, etc., will be of even greater importance than in the North African or Middle East theatres, since virtually the entire native population of WINDSOCK are potentially hostile, and it can be taken for granted that its inhabitants would gladly strike a blow at our security, if they could do so undetected. Special care must be taken to ensure that no documents are

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left behind in vacated premises on the move of Headquarters.

Sound military security precautions must go hand in hand with civil security measures if our security objective is to be effectively achieved, and security personnel will pay due attention to this aspect of their work, i. e. to the supervision of military security discipline.

7. SECURITY OF PORTS

(a) It is of vital importance to ensure the institution of proper security measures at ports with the minimum delay after their capture. In the early stages the main object of such security precautions will be the prevention of sabotage; the next object will be to prevent the leakage of information concerning our shipping and the disembarkation of troops and supplies through the access of unauthorized persons to the dock areas. The question of the security control of civilian travellers will not arise for some time, as there will be no such travellers in the early stages.

(b) Until the arrival of the Port Security Sections, which should be landed as soon as operational commitments permit, their functions should be undertaken as far as possible by the diversion to this task of a limited number of security personnel from formation sections.

(c) It will be the responsibility of Fifth Army to allot the Port Security Personnel available, so that all ports used by its forces are covered by such personnel as soon as possible after their capture, and to control and supervise their work.

(d) Port Security work is essentially an inter-service matter, in which both the Naval and Military authorities share considerable interest and responsibility. The best means of co-operating will no doubt evolve with experience, but the following general division of responsibility should be taken as a guide:

(i) Naval Responsibility.

Regulations for, and control of shipping (including small craft) and of seamen and crews.

Regulations for and control of entry and exit of individuals to and from port areas (jointly with Army, but with special emphasis on sea approach).

Counter sabotage precautions as regards ships.

Regulations for and security of those parts of port areas used exclusively by the Navy.

(ii) Military Responsibility.

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Counter sabotage precautions as regards ships.

Regulations for and security of those parts of port areas used exclusively by the Navy.

(ii) Military Responsibility.

Regulations for and control of entry and exit to and from port areas (jointly with Navy, but with special emphasis on land approach).

Provision of personnel for guards in port areas.

Provision and supervision of Port Security Sections.

Provision, issue and control of passes and permits.

Counter sabotage precautions and counter espionage activities in the port area as a whole.

Examination and control of transients (at a possible later stage).

8. SECURITY AND AIR FORCES.

Military security personnel of the ground forces will not be responsible for supervising the security of airfield or air force installations. They will, however, maintain close liaison with the security personnel of the air forces.

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9. REPORTS

(a) Special or individual reports on security matters of immediate interest or requiring action on the part of this Headquarters will be rendered as necessary.

(b) In addition, periodic general security reports will be rendered at not more than fortnightly intervals, evaluating the security situation as a whole and containing any recommendations. Such reports will be in the following form:

PART I - General Appraisal of Civil and Military Security situation during the period under review.

PART II - Particular cases and incidents including information that may be of value for future reference or that illustrates points of security importance under the following headings:

1. Military Security

- (a) Security of information.
- (b) Security of material and installations.
- (c) Security of personnel.
- (d) Security of personnel.

2. Civil Security

- (a) Individual suspects, etc.
- (b) Subversive movements and organisations
- (c) Relations between troops and civilians.
- (d) Civilian morale and reactions.
- (e) "Panama"

4. Any other matters of general security interest

5. Disposition of security personnel.

NOTE: A. Para (3) should be coordinated with AMGOI representatives.

B. Para (3) (c) should include remarks that are defeatist, over-optimistic or that show a possible breach of security.

C. The action taken and/or contemplated should be recorded: sources of information should be given and evaluated, the following symbols being used as defined:

AS TO SOURCE

1. Military Security

- (a) Security of information.
- (b) Security of material and installations.
- (c) Security of access to military establishments.
- (d) Security of personnel.

2. Civil Security

- (a) Individual suspects, etc.
 - (b) Subversive movements and organisations
 - (c) Relations between troops and civilians.
 - (d) Civilian morale and reactions.
 - (e) Rumors.
4. Any other matters of general security interest
5. Disposition of security personnel.
- Para (3) should be coordinated with AMGOT representatives.
- Para (3) (c) should include rumors that are defeatist, over-optimistic or that show a possible breach of security.

C. The action taken and/or contemplated should be recorded: sources of information should be given and evaluated, the following symbols being used as defined:

AS TO SOURCE

A	meaning	completely reliable
B	"	usually reliable
C	"	fairly reliable
D	"	not usually reliable
E	"	unreliable
S	"	reliability cannot be judged

AS TO TRUTH, CREDIBILITY OR PROBABILITY

1	meaning	confirmed by other sources
2	"	probable true report
3	"	possibly true report
4	"	doubtfully true report
5	"	improbable report
6	"	truth cannot be judged

(Thus a report marked 0 3 is evaluated as a report from a fairly reliable source and possibly true).

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H.Q. 15 Army Group
C.M.F.

for *Howard G. Young* *W. Lee S. C.*
Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

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