

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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10000/100/717

41 pp.

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785015

10000/100/717

REPORTS FROM REGION II
SEPT, OCT. 1943

41 pp.

FOLIO	DATE	REF.	TO/FROM
1-2	3 Sep.		From: AMCOT, 8 ARMY.
3	8 "	357/HQ	To: C.C.A.O.
4-6	6 "	HSQ-1	From: AMCOT, 8 ARMY.
7	12 "		Note from Andy Deil
8	12 "	91 HQ	To: AMCOT, 8 ARMY
9-13	12 "	91 HQ	To: " " " " " "
14	13 "	-	Note by ACSO
15-16	19 "	ECA/7/35	From: AMCOT Region 2.
17-18	22 "	AL/4/197	" " " " " "
19-21	24 "	91/HQ.	To: GOC in C 15 AG.
22	25 "	296	From: To AFHQ.
23	24 "	91/HQ.	To: MGS AFHQ
24	24 "	91/HQ.	To: MGS AFHQ
25-6	15 "		From: Maj. F. W. Wilson
27-9	24 "	3064/PH.	" " " " " "
30	20 "	ECA/1/25A/RCAC	" " " " " "
31	21 "	ECA/26/2A/RCAC	" " " " " "
32	21 "	ECA/7/37A/RCAC	" " " " " "
33	30 "	91/HQ.	To: GOC in C
34-6	21 "		From: Lt. Col. Gerry
37	2 Oct	91/HQ.	Minute from ACSO
38	29 Sep		From: AFHQ MGS
39-42	17 Sept	-	" " " " " "
43	3 Oct	ECA/21/13	" " " " " "
44	5 Oct	-	" " " " " "
45	5 Oct	FA. 10.	" " " " " "

17-18	22	AL/4/197	"	Ancot Liaison.
19-21	24	91/HQ.	To: GOC in C	is AG.
22	25	296	From: To AFHQ.	
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24	24	91/HQ.	To: MGS	AFHQ
25-6	15		From: Maj. P. W. Wilson	
27-9	24	3064 PH.	"	D. P. H.
30	20	ECA/1/25A/RCAD	"	L. P. Capt. Benson
31	21	ECA/26/2A/RCAD	"	"
32	21	ECA/7/37A/RCAD	"	"
33	30	91/HQ.	To: GOC in C	
34-6	21		From: Lt. Col. Gerry	
37	2 Oct	91/HQ.	Minute from	ACSO
38	29 Sep		From: AFHQ	MGS
39-42	17 Sept		"	Lt. Cisar
43	3 Oct	ECA/21/13	"	RCAD. Reg. 2.
44	5 Oct		"	RCAD. Reg. 2.
45	5 Oct	F.A. 10.	"	Filpot

946

TELEGRAM OUT.

TO : SEARS FOR AMGOT
 FROM : FILIPOT FROM AMGOT.
 Orig's No. FA 10



Date: 5.Oct

SECRET (.) Situation CALABRIA satisfactory (.) Law order good (.)
 Small sporadic typhoid especially SCILLA declining (.) Food
 situation ~~except~~ REGGIO area better than expected (.) REGGIO
 area especially account demolitions very difficult (.) Many
 Italian Army stragglers on roads mostly moving South (.) Ostensibly
 Sicilian POW (.) Italian 31 Corps CATANZARO sending party officers
 and MO contact SCAO REGGIO to round up non Sicilian (.) Inform
 A.F.H.Q.

Para Two (.) Am inspecting LUCANIA (.)

Para Three (.) LUCANIA and CALABRIA handed over by 8th Army to
 CCAO effective 4 Oct by order GOC in C (.) Original order by
 mail (.) Region Two and Benson advised (.)

Para Four (.) APULIA with Montfort under MILMISS, BRINDISI,
 as previously arranged (.) Includes FOGGIA Town but not
 northern part of province for present still with Benson (.)

Arrangement satisfactory all concerned here (.)
 If liable to be intercepted
 to be sent IN CIPHER.

Major.
 MA to CCAO.

2. Cia 24
 Dy

TOO : 14.45
 THU : 05.16

AMOT IN REGION II

5 October 1943

RESTRICTED

1. The present location of this Headquarters is at Corigliano, 1630-3935. It is proposed to remain here until further notice.
2. Mail from Palermo can continue to be sent via Messina and Reggio.
3. Visitors from Sicily coming overland are advised at present to follow the route: Reggio, Palmi, Catanzaro, Cosenza, Corigliano. There is a long detour between Catanzaro and Cosenza (Soverino, Calisano, Parente, Rogliano). Exact road directions should be requested en route at Provincial Civil Affairs Offices in Reggio, Catanzaro and Cosenza.
4. Visitors from Bari, Brindisi and Taranto are advised to follow the coastal route from Taranto to Corigliano.
5. The Headquarters is not on a line of telephone or signal communications at present. Telegraphic messages, however, can be sent through 8 Army Main with whom we shall maintain contact by dispatch rider through Matera. They should be addressed as follows:

8 Army Main - For AMOT Region 2 (For Gerry)

/s/ Harvey S. Gerry,
Lt. Col. AUS.,
R.C.A.O., AMOT, Region 2

Distribution to Heads of All Divisions

Distributed 12/10/43 E.S.

Subject :- Location Sta ent.

To :- ANGOT, H.Q.,
PALERMO.

MOST SECRET.

Ref : ECA/21/13.

ANGOT, H.Q. REGION 2.

3 Oct 43.

MOST SECRET

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8 Army Main - For ANGOT Region 2 (For Gerry)

Harry Gerry
Lt. Col. AUS.,
R.C.A.O., ANGOT, Region 2.

Copy to :- ANGOT liaison, 15 Army Group.
ANGOT, 8th Army Main.

Copies of paras 1-5 to all
Heads of Division

For information 943

8 OCT 1943

Sept 17, 1943
42

Paola - population 15,000



Public Utilities - Water - good - plentiful (not in some homes within city due to water main breaks - under repair)

Electricity - functioning

Telephone & Telegraph - not functioning

Public Health - Good - No malaria or typhoid

Medical supplies are needed - esp. bandages & iodine

Public Safety - 11 Officers - 23 Carabinieri

Prison - 30 Capacity - 1 prisoner

Public Property - Municipio, Railroad Station, Post Office Bldg.

Railroad ready to operate when blown bridges are repaired

Rail Road - Men ordered back to work - Trains in operating condition

Banks - Bank of Naples and Small Local Savings Bank have evacuated from city.

Post Office - is closed & statement is on file

Mills - 1 water operated - In operating condition

Bakeries - 3 in operation & 4 more being repaired

Civil Supply - enough for 3 days

About 1/3 of the homes are damaged or destroyed. There are 400 refugees living at St Francis di Paola Church - which is a very unhealthy condition. 17 killed by bombs - 200 injured - being treated.

IMMEDIATE NEEDS - TRANSPORTATION (TRUCK).
FOOD, Sugar, Oil, Salt.
MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

Sept 15

H1

Finisfreddo - Population 5400

Public Utilities - Electricity - in operation
 Water - scarce - being rationed - on 2 hours
 per day. (Additional pipe line costing 30,000 lire
 would solve problem.
 T&T not functioning

Public Health - (2 doctors)
 Typhoid 10 cases. Diphtheria 2 cases. - no malaria
 A house in the country will be used to isolate
 these cases. Medical supplies & vaccines are urgent

Public Safety
 1 Brig & 4 Carabinieri
 1 Municipal Guard.

Public Safety Property - Municipio and 1000 acres in the country used
 for agriculture

Civilian Supply - None - Transportation is needed to obtain
 grain & flour from Cosenza.

Jail - two room detention jail
 Hospital - none
 Bank - local - balance sheet submitted - closed.
 Post Office - closed.

Very urgent - Medical Supplies & Food

San Lucido 7000

Sept 18

40

Public Utilities - Electricity operating
T & T not in operation
Water - good and plentiful

Public Health - Fair - few cases of malaria - be convalescent
nothing to worry about.

Public Safety - 4 Officers - 12 Carabiniere (see all)
12 Finance Guards.
2 Municipal Guards.

Civil Supply - None - Need transportation. Ordered farmers
who have not as made their contribution to
the Acumasso to do so - Supply will last
a few days - 3 or four.

Hospital - none.

Banks + Post Office - closed.

39
Fuscaldo

4159 population

Public Utilities - Water good & plentiful
Electricity - in operation
Tel & Telgraph - lines down

Public Health - Good - no hospital

Public Property - Municipal

Civil Supply - None - Need transportation

Public Safety - 3 officers & 10 carabineros
3 Muni. Guards.

No report as yet on Financ. Guards - about 5
No jail

Bank & Post Office - closed & inventory ordered.

Immediate needs - salt - some food

Town not damaged by bombs.

Lieut. F. J. Cesar
AMGOT CAPO

LIEUT. E. J. CISAR (A)

785015

2 OCT 1943

38

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

14
ATM/cags
29th September, 1943

SUBJECT: Group Captain C.E. BENSON (ref AMGOT/91/HQ).
TO : AMG H.Q. Sicily.

24?

1. Your letter of 29th September reference the above is acknowledged, and the action taken is noted.
2. It is agreed that the ten additional officers required by Group Captain BENSON should be provided from the draft from Middle East.
3. Your proposals for the TO/WE of Group Captain Benson's H.Q., and also similar proposals for an AMG H.Q. with Fifth Army, should please be submitted to this H.Q. as soon as possible.



[Handwritten signature]

A. T. MAXWELL,
Colonel,
Deputy Chief, Military Government Section.

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37

C. P. S.

Balle *slip*

D. P. H.

James

C. E. S.

He

To see 36-34.

Please pass quickly

2. You will note that

report was written on 21 Sep.

and is maybe a bit behind

the times.

J. E.

2/10

920

ROUTING SLIP.

C.C.A.O.
D.C.C.A.O.
C.S.O.
A.C.S.O.
Lt. Col. Clough
Major Smith
Major McDougall
Major Peary
Captain Talbot
Captain Farmer
Captain Sherwood
Captain Graham
Lieut. Van Houselom
Lieut. Kruga
P.R.O.
Adviser P.A. & M.
Education Officer.

REMARKS.

folio 36

1/10
Date

64
Registry.

Subject: REGION II

296
X P 36
MOST SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS
9/11 H.D.
22 OCT 1943
E. J. AMGOT

AMGOT,
MAIN EIGHTH ARMY.
21 Sep 43.

CCAO,
AMGOT HQ,
PALERMO.

1. Events have been moving rapidly and it has been difficult to keep you advised on developments in Region 2. Three days after we arrived on the mainland we sent you a brief report on the situation as we found it at the time and you will since have received two reports on the supply situation as well as reports on finance. A regular schedule of reports will be started as soon as we settle down in our static headquarters, which we hope will be soon.

2. As reported we made temporary headquarters at REGGIO. Later it was felt that we should move to a point nearer the centre of Region 2, at the same time remaining near Eighth Army. So on Sep 17 we started on the road to CATANZARO, arriving there in the afternoon. En route we visited Eighth Army and learned that Brigadier GRAHAM, DA & QMG, had arranged an LCI to take him from CATRONE to TARANTO that night. We felt that this would give us an opportunity to make contact with the AMGOT officers in APULIA, so the undersigned went straight on through to CATRONE reaching there in time to take the LCI with Brigadier GRAHAM, leaving Gp Capt BENSON and staff at CATANZARO.

3. I spent Sep 18 at TARANTO and BRINDISI, returning the following day to CATANZARO to find that HQ had packed up again and moved on to look for a suitable location near ROSANO. To keep contact with Eighth Army I returned to their Main HQ and have remained until today. Army will probably move near ROSANO tomorrow and we shall then be conveniently situated with respect to them. A location report will be sent to you as soon as possible.

4. We should like to give you a few of the high points

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4. We should like to give you a few of the high points of Region 2, and then report on the situation in APULIA. All three provinces in CALABRIA are now taken care of. In REGGIO, Major HENTON JONES is in charge but when we left there on the 17th he was down with sand fly or malaria, and Major POLLOCK was carrying on in his place. Major HOLSTROM is in charge of CATANZARO and seems to be taking hold. Major WATTS is running the province of COZENSA. All our men are in the field with the exception of a reserve that we are holding to send into POTENZA which has just been taken. We have kept up our liaison with the fighting divisions and have had men in the towns immediately after the troops. Everything has gone well in the initial stages. I am glad to say that both military and civilian looting has been kept to a minimum, partly because we have had good co-operation

339

/2.....

from the Army, and partly because of the vigorous action of our police officers. Broadly speaking services such as water and sanitation are in satisfactory condition throughout the territory. The flour stocks that we found in REGGIO, followed by the timely arrival of the SS. MIRIAM, have enabled us to take care of basic food requirements in REGGIO province although we still have a transportation problem in getting supplies up the coast to the PALMI area and down the coast to LOCRI. In CATANZARO and COSENZA there is a fair amount of grain and the situation is not serious, although we lack complete reports from the town of COSENZA which was badly hit by bombing and shelling. The presence of a considerable number of political refugees and the quasi-release of Italian soldiers who are living off the countryside is complicating our feeding problem but I believe we can cope with it if we can continue to count on imports of flour from North Africa and SICILY.

5. The political situation in CALABRIA is interesting. RADOGLIO removed a number of top party officials but his reform did not extend down to the Podestas and minor officials, many of whom we have had to remove. We have continued to follow a strict policy of removing all former active Fascist Party members, in collaboration with the FSS. At CUNIGERONDI we found virtually the entire personnel of the provincial government of REGGIO and have brought back more than a hundred of them, together with official records, and have put them back to work. In CATANZARO and COSENZA conditions were more normal. As our personnel is rather thin we are going to try to run the Region more on the basis of indirect control centralized in the provincial capitals.

6. As to political refugees, we have already sent several french citizens back to their places of origin in North Africa. We have not yet developed a policy for others, such as Greeks, and some guidance from you in this respect would be appreciated.

7. We hope to hasten a return to something like normal conditions in CALABRIA by re-opening the banks in the near future, but our ability to do so may depend upon whether bank funds have to be used to pay Italian soldiers.

8. As regards APULIA, I arrived in TARANTO to find that AMGOT was virtually unknown there. No proclamations had been posted, and instead of proclamations the first things visible were large posters put up over the signature of the Prefet to the effect that no currency would be recognised except that expressed in Lire. Capt. BARRING was the first AMGOT officer to arrive

785015

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-3-

I went over to BRINDISI and found the most appalling disorder throughout the countryside, with armed bands of Italian soldiers roaming about, living off the farmers and generally making a nuisance of themselves. I was stopped a dozen times both going to and returning from BRINDISI by Italian Military road guards asking for identification papers. They are understood to be protecting the region against Germanist General MACFARLANE asked AMGOT to provide 100,000,000 Allied Military Lire to pay the troops and a signal was, I understand, sent from BRINDISI to Group Captain HENSON through 15 Army Group about September 15th. I don't think it ever reached the Group Captain, but no doubt the matter has been attended to by this time, by 15 Army Group.

9. The terms of the Armistice are unknown here. If we are dealing with Italy as a friendly power, the question naturally arises as to whether we should carry on in the same way as we have in areas already occupied by Eighth Army. Word has already begun to trickle through from the 'heel' and there is a noticeable change in the attitude of some of the officials over here. At CATRONE the other day the CAO tried to get some transport and was told by an Italian Officer that they are allies now, and don't have to release transport to us!

10. During the last two days I have held several conferences at Army on the question of the future of AMGOT in areas already occupied, as well as in the line of Eighth Army advance. It is thought likely that the line of advance will take us through or adjacent to territory presumably falling under the jurisdiction of the BRINDISI Mission of General MACFARLANE. The position that Army are taking is that they will press for recognition of AMGOT Eighth Army under command of Group Captain HENSON to serve as the Eighth Army spearhead, taking over captured and occupied territories according to the AMGOT plan. The Army Commander has asked that a representative of the BRINDISI Mission meet him in TARANTO to discuss the matter. After this meeting a signal will be sent to Group Captain HENSON advising him of the policy to be pursued and indicating whether we are to send a representative to General MACFARLANE to discuss the practical details. Meanwhile we are anxiously awaiting word from you as to our position.

11. If we are to carry on we shall urgently require a further substantial supply of all procurements authorised for posting, and we shall need the remainder of our official and other ranks establishments.

12. With regard to the food and medical situation, a report was received recently from Col HAYS instructing us to arrange that Army requisition civilian supplies through their own maintenance channels. We have discussed this with Q and they state that they are not in a position to do it. They say that it merely introduces another step which they

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Copy to:- COS, EIGHTH ARMY.
AMGOT LIAISON - 15 ARMY GROUP.

Harvey Perry
Lt. Col. AUS.
AMGOT REGION II.

785015

S e c r e t.OFFICER ONLY.

32

SUBJECT: Political Repercussions

AMGOT H.Q. 8th Army.

H.Q. AMGOT,
Palermo.Ref.No. ECA/1/37A/RCAO
21st September 1943.

Throughout the whole area of Reggio Calabria Compartimento varying reports come through of political disturbances of a Communist nature which have occurred, particularly in the Reggio Commune and at Cosenza.

2. There is however no evidence to show that there is any Communist tendency in the Compartimento and the more reasonable explanation is that these disturbances are caused by the usual Calabrian unruly element who have always been against law and order and now for the first time after years of oppression see an opportunity of going back to their old days of Brigandage.
3. I should mention that nowhere has there been any serious disturbance. Frequently one hears of the action of the Camorra. Whenever anything goes astray or something cannot be obtained, it is put down to the Camorra, but in fact the Camorra never have been suppressed even by the Fascists.
4. Generally speaking, Calabria would appear curiously free of real politics. The Calabrese are an agricultural people and appear to want to be left alone to pursue their agricultural work. There is no evidence of any ~~separatist element~~ ^{separatist element} as was found in Sicily.
5. There is however a definite feeling that sufficient Fascists have not been put in prison. There may be an element of truth in this particularly in places where the Army have passed through quickly or by passed and which are occupied by the Italian Army. In the Reggio region I have given instructions to tighten up on the question of weeding out Fascists.

Cp. Capt. Benson arrived here
days after receipt of this & discussed with
DCAA.O. & C.S.O.

PS 25/9

Agnew.
Group Captain,
R.C.A.O.
Amgot H.Q. Region 2.

935

8327

33

AMCOT/91/HQ

Reports from Region II.

G.O.C.-in-C.,
15 Army Group.

21
30. Sept. 3.

1. In continuation of AMCOT/91/HQ of 24 Sept. 45, copies of two further reports are forwarded for information. Additional copies are enclosed for forwarding to MGS., A.F.H.Q., if so desired.
2. In the absence of the C.C.A.O. from H.Q., Gp. Capt. Hanson's instructions that officers will not be stationed in cities which are in the sole possession of organized Italian Units have been confirmed.



CHARLES M. SPOFFORD.
Colonel, G.S.C.
Chief Staff Officer.

B.U 6/10 Noted 11/15
J. C. C. A. O.
MY 36
P/A 11/10/85

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

MOST SECRET.

SUBJECT: Apulia Situation.H.Q. AMGOT,
Palermo.

AMGOT H.Q. Region 2.

Ref.No. ECA/26/2A/RCAO.
21st September 1943.

1. A report has been received from Lt.-Col. Gerry, who was despatched to TARANTO for the purpose of making contact and ascertaining the AMGOT position in that region.
2. This report shows that there is in the Province of Apulia a complete breakdown in the administration through AMGOT. It would appear that the Italian Army and the Italian Government (sic) do not recognise the Allied Military Government on the grounds that they are now our Allies and are capable of administering their own country themselves.
3. In consequence of this advice was given by General McFarlane that AMGOT officers should stand by and do nothing until the position was clarified. As a result no proclamations have been posted and AMGOT is not functioning.
4. From the point of view of administration Region II the situation is chaotic and Gilbertian. A similar situation to that in Apulia was foreshadowed in my ECA/1/25A/RCAO of 20th Sept. and in the view of the news from Apulia, there can be no question that the position will become aggravated as more contact is made between the Italians on this side and Taranto and Brindisi.
5. In my letter ECA/7/35 of 19th Sept., I referred to the difficulties in connection with the Italian Army, which is really part and parcel of the same problem. Para. 5 sets out the facts and in para. 5 (e) I refer to the question as being one which can only be solved by the highest authority.
6. In view of the situation and the possibility of serious developments which may arise, I consider it essential that I should see General Rennell. I am not sure of his whereabouts but am given to understand he has gone to Naples. I would be glad if information as to when and where I can get hold of the General.

C. J. F. M.
Group Captain,
R.C.A.O.

Amgot H.Q. Region 2.

SECRETOFFICER ONLY.SUBJECT: Relationship between AMGOT and the Italian Army.

A.A.G.

~~8th Army Main H.Q.~~

H.Q. AMGOT 8th Army.

Ref. No. ECA/1/25A/SCAO.
20th September 1943.

When the original BAYTON operation was planned, an armistice had not been arranged, but it was envisaged that there was a possibility of 8th Army going through the toe of Italy without much resistance and the German and Italian armies retiring into a line further north. This would have meant that there were likely to be areas in which there would be no British Troops and no Italian Troops.

2. A directive was given by General Alexander in connection with the distribution of AMGOT officers where there were no British Troops and instructions were given me along the lines of the Directive by Major General Lord Rennell, H.Q. AMGOT Palermo, a copy of which is attached.

3. As it has turned out, a situation has turned out somewhat different. There are many places which are now not in occupation of British Troops, particularly in the South, in Reggio Province and in places such as COSENZA. As far as possible AMGOT officers have been limited to towns where there are British Troops, or through which L. of Gs. run. Exceptions however must be made owing to the necessity of the supply problem.

4. There is however a different problem arising now on which a policy ruling is required. Cities are being found in which there are no British Troops but an organised Italian Unit. Such instances are for example ROSSANO and CASTROVILLARI.

5. The point arises as to the position of AMGOT officers in such cities. Is the AMGOT officer empowered to give definite orders as regards supply, the running of the Carabinieri (which is a military body) and the general maintenance of law and order, which must be obeyed by the Italian Military Commander whatever may be his rank.

6. A typical example is for instance the imposition of curfew, which if it is to be of any value must also include Italian Military.

7. Pending a decision in these matters, I have given instructions that AMGOT officers will not be stationed in cities which are in sole possession of organised Italian Units.

8. It must however be realised that such orders will inevitably affect the administrative chain of Military Government, which cannot function if certain areas are excluded, particularly in the allocation of Supplies etc.

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8. It must however be realised that such orders will inevitably affect the administrative chain of Military Government, which cannot function if certain areas are excluded, particularly in the allocation of Supplies etc.

Captain
Group Captain
R.C.S.D.
H.Q. AMOT 8th Army.

Copy to: H.Q. AMOT, ✓
Palermo.

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT:

TO: Chief Staff Officer
Chief Legal Officer
Chief of Public Safety Division
Chief Financial Officer.

91/40 FILE No. AMGOT/3064/HI

AMGOT HQ., SICILY

24 Sept. 1943

also copy to Civil Supply

I send herewith notes on my visit to the mainland.

The information was given by Major McFadzean and Capt. Pollock with the request that I would hand it on.

The hospital situation in Reggio is satisfactory. 20 Tons of medical stores have been dispatched to Reggio.

[Signature]

D. GORDON CHEYNE

Colonel

Director of Public Health.

932

P.A. 28/9

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

REPORT FROM NORTH AFRICASAIDPrisoners of War

Thousands of prisoners of war are now going all over the place, and they are being ordered to prisoner of war camps. There are no guards available for them.

Refugees are coming in from all quarters and some villages are being clustered up with them. The policy at the present moment is that there are still to be no arrangements over to Sicily. Is this to continue, as many prisoners of war want to go to Sicily, and also many Sicilians want to go to North Africa.

There are many destitute. Financial relief is being started and appears to be highly desirable.

In the small towns where new Podestats have been appointed the people are getting definitely "upset" and are breaking together. The Carabinieri do not appear to have any grip on the people and it is known that many are refusing to take in their arms. At Caserta, a town of 5,000 inhabitants, the C.A.F. has raided many houses and has confiscated rifles. 15 people have been arrested in one place. The C.A.F. raided thirty houses at San Giovanni, a town of 6,000 inhabitants. 8 arrests have been made. Machine gun parts, four pistols, one rifle, three shot-guns and hand-grenades were found. These had been hidden.

It is reckoned that prompt judgment of cases is required, so that allegations of incursions can be made. The legal officer is being asked to hold a General Court at once. There are 900 Carabinieri in the Province. The situation is not serious at present, but it is felt that the army should be put on its toes. Police Staff 2000 is very deficient.

Since leaving the army, there are some initial remarks:-

1. Food is steadily getting out to consume and we have enough flour left for only 17 or 18 days. Another shipment is needed.

2. Prisoners of War. What is the latest policy? P.O.W.s are full, hundreds are wandering all over the place, some are wandering north and passing their fellow prisoners going south. As far as I am able, I am sending them on to the nearest P.O.W. camp - at least to report.

3. Civilian refugees. Drifting into Reggio from all parts. Some want to get to Sicily, others to Africa; Palestine, others want to go north. They are destitute and need to be fed. We are loaded with them on our hands (getting rid of as many as we can, but we have to start a camp if numbers become excessive).

4. Crossing to Sicily. We are not allowing civilians or prisoners to cross to Sicily although I know some are getting across. If we were allowed to do this, the situation would be eased.

5. Carabinieri. After 18 days experience, I am sorry to say the standard of efficiency of Carabinieri is lower than Sicily (which was not high) in order of our efforts to bring them up. The officers want to cooperate, but the men

27

- 2 -

themselves have lost their grip on the public. We are doing what we can.

6. Civilians. Since Italy quit the war, the civilians are now feeling a new sense of freedom and liberty, which has led to a lot of petty quarrelling amongst themselves. If they don't like a certain Podesta, they are inclined to 'shoot' a bit. The position is NOT bad at the moment but unless we put on the scene, there is a possibility of many civilians getting out of hand.

FINANCE.

Major Macfarlane has asked that 1,500 million Liras be sent immediately, as we might have to pay the 11 Italian Corps which has come over.

Conditions at Codomo are said to be bad. Financial Branch require more officers.

There are 2,000 refugees at Pesenna, who will have to be checked.

from dem
The food situation in the province of Reggio is satisfactory, approximately 10 days food in hand. There are transport difficulties. It is proposed to send a welfare officer and a sanitation officer up as soon as possible.

All are agreed that the general nutritional standard is good, and by our views on passing through many villages have been out. The ration is 120 grams.

22nd September 1943.

Major.

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

FROM: SCAO

TO: Hq Allied Military Government
KATOUSA
Algiers

SECRET

TARANTO, ITALY.

15 September, 1943.

HEADQUARTERS
D.O.
24 SEP 1943

AMGOT

SUBJECT: Civil Affairs in Taranto

1. This officer, together with Lt Col Charles J Tarinacci, Capt E.L. Hewer and 2nd Lt E.O. Kahn, arrived at this station at a late hour 12 Sept, 1943. Since the GOC and other higher officers of the unit to which we were attached had moved forward, we reported immediately on arrival to Major McGuire, Intelligence Officer at Div Hq, who said he had instructions from his superior officers for us to report to Brigadier Palmer, 6th Base Sub-area, Taranto, which was done.

2. It was found that Capt R.A. Rawling, (B) CAO, had arrived from Sicily two days prior to my arrival and had opened an AMG office in a small room next to the office of the Podesta in the Municipio. He had made contact with officials of the Commune and the Prefecture, and was doing an heroic job of handling some of the numerous problems arising between civilians and the military. At his request, the Prefect had arranged a meeting for the morning of 14 September which was attended by some 30-odd heads of departments and offices of the communal and provincial governments and by the writer and the other officers who arrived with him. Full cooperation was pledged by the Prefect, who ordered the same degree of cooperation by his subordinates.

3. Offices for AMG officers responsible for civil affairs of both the Province and the Commune were opened the afternoon of 14 September in the commodious and luxurious space formerly occupied by the Federal Secretary on the second floor of the Casa del Fasci, the entire 4-story building having been turned over to AMG by the Prefect. Immediately the colors of Britain and America were raised on the staffs which formerly carried Fascist and Italian flags. Shortly after the offices were occupied, Admiral Peters of Royal Navy appeared, with his staff, looked the space over and requisitioned the entire building. Later, most generously compromised by allowing us to stay where we were and the Navy is occupying the remainder of the building, and splendid mutual cooperation has developed.

4. Two major problems have been encountered and are being handled as indicated:

785015

runner, 6th Base Sub-area, Taranto, which was done.

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4. Two major problems have been encountered and are being handled as indicated:
 - (a) That of removing the debris in bombed sections in order to eliminate health menace and odors of dead bodies, of which there must be many. Local civil authorities have been unable to cope with the situation, claim their trucks have been taken by the army. Work proceeding slowly. While no Public Works Officer was assigned to this group, it developed that Capt Hunt, assigned for Economics, had been in construction business, and today an appointment was arranged for him and Lt Col Farinacci, Public Health, to meet with the Prefect. They will follow through in matter of aiding in finding necessary labor and motor equipment.

Lt. Ramus

P.T.O.

929

Can you do anything about para. 7 at 25

G.B.

25/4.

-2-

25

(b) The monetary situation is unsatisfactory. Banks have delayed in making decision to accept Allied military currency. A meeting was being held in Brindisi today to try to reach decision. Local banks say they must have higher authority before acting, meanwhile allied troops face difficulty in making purchases. This office has exchanged the money of several British officers for lira. Talked with Messrs Murphy and McMillan in this office this morning and again by telephone to Brindisi this afternoon. Tomorrow will go to Brindisi to see them. We have urged early action and have made a threat to close banks, but are hopeful things will work out later today.

2000 o'clock - AMG lira currency to be accepted.

5. When it appeared that there was no legal officer in the group, request was made that one be assigned. It now develops that 2nd Lt G.W. Cashman has had legal training and this request is hereby cancelled.

6. Splendid billet quarters have been obtained for officers in a modern building on water-front a block away from AMG Hq. Enlisted men and OR temporarily quartered in a hotel. Mess is a problem, as rations for British troops are short, but this should iron itself out. *Later - Have found excellent quarters for the men.*

7. No cigarettes are available anywhere here. Request is made that a months' ration of American cigarettes for 17 officers and men be sent, for payment of which the writer will be personally responsible.

8. A tour of territory occupied by forces to which we are assigned will be made beginning tomorrow and such steps taken in other cities as may be deemed necessary.

Ray Wilson
Ray Wilson
Major; CMP, SCAG-28

Group-Captain C.E. BENSON.

24
M.G.S./SI/HQ

M.G.S.
A.P.H.Q.

24th September 3

I have to inform you that G.O.C. Eighth Army has requested that Group-Captain C.E. Benson's services be made available at Eighth Army H.Q. to move forward, and that another officer be appointed to take charge of Region II and conduct the administration of the settled areas.

In deference to the wishes expressed by G.O.C. Eighth Army, I have directed Group-Captain Benson to place himself at the disposal of H.Q., Eighth Army and that Lt. Col. Harvey Garry take charge of the static administration in Region II pending movement.

Group-Captain Benson is also in urgent need of an additional ten officers as a reserve for the administration of Calabria and ~~Lucania~~. It was with this in mind that I ruled that the draft of twenty officers to arrive from Middle East be not cancelled. I propose that a part of these officers, who will not all be required by Lt. Col. Montfort, provide the necessary reserve asked for by Group-Captain Benson.


Major General,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

Copy to: Group-Captain C.E. Benson.

Lt. Col. Montfort,
c/o Allied Military Mission,
BRINDISI.

Copy To FILE 98/HQ 927

23

Report from Region II.

ADOF/21/43

M.G.S.,
A.F.H.O.

24th September 3

In the course of an interim report dated 19th September, a copy of which will no doubt be sent to you by G.O.C. in C., 15th Army Group, Group-Captain G.E. Benson, Regional Civil Affairs Officer, Region II, has reported the existence of 2,000 civil internees at GUELMA, consisting in the main of Poles, Czechs, Jews and French.

Owing to difficulties of feeding these internees in Calais, where supplies are very short, I consider that arrangements should be made, at the earliest possible date, to evacuate these internees to North Africa, pending their removal to other destinations.

I shall be glad of telegraphic concurrence in this proposal in principle in order that the necessary arrangements may be set in train.


Major General,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

Copy to: Group-Captain G.E. Benson.

COPY TO 385/HQ

926

22

AMMO 25 AMMO GROUP

25 Sept. 43.

RECEIVED

PRIORITY

AMMO

REPOUNDER CAMP OKLAHOMA. AMMO FROM AMMO GROUP AMMO TO AMMO OFFICE
AMMO 296 AMMO INVENTORY YOUR AMMO 22 SEP. AMMO TO AMMO
2000 AMMO UNDER JESS AND FURBER. OFFICE AMMO AMMO AMMO.
FULL REPORT WITHIN FIVE DAYS

ORIGINAL ON 385/HQ

Copy to: Group Captain C.E. Benson.
Regional Civil Affairs Officer, AMGOT H.Q.
Eighth Army.

Report.

AMGOT/91/HQ

General Officer Commanding in Chief,
15th Army Group.

24th September 3

I enclose copy of an interim report from Group-Captain C.E. Benson, Regional Civil Affairs Officer for Region II.

Additional copies are enclosed for you to send on if you think fit to Military Government Section, A.P.H.Q.

The principal point in Group-Captain Benson's report is the disposal of Italian troops referred to in para 5, sub-para (a) to (e). I do not consider that it is part of Civil Affairs administration to deal with units of the Italian Army and shall be glad, if you concur, if you will so inform G.O.C., Eighth Army.

In the course of my recent visit to Brindisi, I learned that the subject of the disposal of Italian troops into Calabria was discussed between Lieut-General Mason MacFarlane, G.O.C. Eighth Army and Marshal Badoglio. I feel that this is the correct channel to deal with the matter. In the present political circumstances it would, in my view, be entirely undesirable for Civil Affairs Officers who have not the background of recent negotiations to have anything to do with Italian military personnel, whether armed or disarmed.

The question of internees is somewhat different. These will have to be dealt with by Civil Affairs, and it is clear that they should be evacuated at the earliest possible moment. I am communicating with the H.C.S. on this subject.

I have instructed Group-Captain Benson to hand over the static administration of Region II to Lt.Col. Harvey Garry, and to hold himself at the disposal of G.O.C. Eighth Army with his own personal staff to proceed forward. I hope to be in a position to supply Region II with additional officers from a draft of 20 officers we are expecting to arrive shortly from Middle East and approval will be required.

SECRET

SECRET
1/3/5000 1711

1. The position in the Government of Syria is still uncertain, but the report from Damascus is to return to the city and the city is to be the capital of the country. The report is dated 17th September 1943.

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8. The position in the Government of Syria is still uncertain, but the report from Damascus is to return to the city and the city is to be the capital of the country. The report is dated 17th September 1943.

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- 2 -

19
 requirements have already been established.

5. ITALIAN ARMY. This problem is a major one and has already been discussed between 9th Army and myself, but no solution has been arrived at. The problem is as follows:-

(a) The Italian 1st Corps has been organized in the Carabinieri division as a liaison corps to follow up behind the army. It is under the command of Major-General Blandini and his staff working through the Italian officers. This Corps is at the moment living on its own any ration which will be exhausted in 7 days. It is also fully armed. 8th Army tentatively suggests that ARMY should feed them which I have refused to do.

(b) Other units of the Italian Army are disintegrating and the units are clustered with soldiers going back to their villages -- or trying to find somewhere to live. Many of them too are armed. The army wish to have nothing to do with them, and do not care if they go back to the town or village, so long as they do not have to feed them.

(c) Other units are still under their own officers fully armed. As an example there are 4,000 in MESSINA and 500 in CATANZARO and BOLOGNA army are in other places, not yet visited. This too will be a headache as the ARMY continues.

(d) Para (b) presents a difficulty in that none of these soldiers possess ration cards and presumably have to be fed by ARMY. There is no organization set up for keeping check on their numbers and distribution.

Para (c) presents a further problem in that shortly these units will have exhausted their army rations and will then begin to fall back on local civil supplies. In my opinion there is a grave risk of disaster then taking place, bearing in mind that British troops are few and far between in the boot area.

(e) The problem set out in para (b) and (c) appear to be one which calls for a decisive firm I.C.S. under the auspices of ARMY. I have discussed this with the I.C.S. of 9th Army, who do not exercise over the matter and is endeavoring to obtain a clear cut policy from the I.C.S. Division. He, however, agrees to that the Italian and one from higher authority. In the meantime I am not allowing Italian officers in town where there are no British troops and only Italian armed troops.

6. DISORDERLY. This will develop into a problem. As the month ends the concentration camp has been set up of any size. This is at CATANZARO, where there are 2,000 Internees, chiefly Italians, awaiting supply of food, some trying to get to Palermo, Catania and Prato. They will have to be fed and eventually repatriated. Quadrone is requested as to the action to be adopted for repatriation. At the moment they are being looked after and fed but delay in moving them may lead to trouble and it is probable that ARMY will be forced on the very worst forward.

7. ITALIANS. Of course have been placed in the concentration of Catania mostly in connection with the organization plan made by this I.C.S. a copy of which was given you I.C.S. on August 14th. If referring to the Italian Italians there are sufficient officers to deal with Italians, but there are no reserves and already there have been cases of Italians, a reserve of Italian officers is urgently required. So far as Italian is concerned, there are only the officers sent over from I.C.S. and those sent on your instruction by this I.C.S. No other

785015

to live. Many of them too are armed. The army tends to move towards the hills, and do not care if they go back to the town or village, so long as they do not have to feed them.

(c) Other units are still in or their own officers fully armed. As an example there are 4,000 in Mission and 500 in Ombaka and soldiers may move in other places, not yet visited. This too will be a setback on the advance continues.

(d) Item (b) presents a difficulty in that none of these soldiers receive orders and presumably have to be fed by them. There is an important on set up for keeping track of their numbers and this is relevant.

Item (c) presents a further problem in that shortly these units will have exhausted their own weapons and will then begin to fall back on local civil supplies. In my opinion there is a grave risk of disaster then taking place, bearing in mind that Federal troops are few and far between in the local areas.

(e) The problems set out in para (b) and (c) appear to be one which exists for a division from L.S.A., under the situation there. I have discussed this with the L.S.A. of P.M. and who is next concerned over the matter and is endeavouring to obtain a clear cut policy from the P.M. In the interim agrees to limit the situation must come from higher authority. In the interim I am not allowing that all soldiers advance in areas where there are no British troops and only Italian armed troops.

6. Recommendations. This will develop into a problem. At the moment only one recommendation can be made, of any kind. This is at Ombaka, where there are 2,000 Italian, directly civilian, including mostly of Italian, French trying to get to Puloth, Goma and there. They will have to be fed and eventually repatriated. Guidance is requested as to how best to be accepted for repatriation. At the moment they are being looked after and fed but delay in moving them may lead to trouble and it is probable that they will be forced to the army move forward.

7. Recommendations. Of course have been placed in the competence of Ombaka directly in accordance with the organization plans made by this H.A. a copy of which was given to H.A. on August 1968. By referring to the latest limits there are sufficient officers to deal with Ombaka, but there are no reserves and already there have been cases of sickness, a reserve of an officer is urgently required. So far as Avila is concerned, there are only the officers sent over from H.A. and there sent at your instruction by this H.A. No other officers are available from here.

8. Recommendations. The position is well known to H.A. Palermo. Only any can provide no more and some and H.A. owing to the various distances are a vital necessity. H.A. must supply these.

9. Recommendations. Region II in the Competence of Region and I believe have 2 officers. There are none available from H.A. immediately.

10. Recommendations. For this H.A. should go via H.A. to H.A. to H.A. to H.A. is arranged from H.A. to H.A. and from H.A. to H.A.

(signed) C. J. Smith,
Group Captain,
R.A.F. C.

Area II, Region 2.


922

Most Sec

23
AL/4/197

22.Sep.43.

C.S.O.,
Headquarters,
AMGOT,
PALERMO.



I attach copy of personal letter received from Harvey Gerry this evening. You will be more in the picture than I am regarding the position in the heel of Italy and I should be grateful of any information that you may have in order that I can answer this letter and other enquiries of this kind.

Gunston has presumably arrived by now with his 50 million lira and I have no doubt that Grafftey-Smith is taking care of the financial situation there.

If you have any news of the General's movements I should be grateful for them as we have none here. Also any information whether AMGOT is to be or not to be and in what areas would be of assistance.

*CSO -
Have dealt
with German
man present: will
for det. in the sent.*

AMGOT Liaison,
15 Army Group Main,
FIELD
BJET/JG.

m/g

Rh
Colonel,
S. S. O.

Copies of 15-16 sent to

Civil Supply - 1
Public Health - 1
C.P.S. } Circulation 1
C.L.O. }
C.P.O. } *GB*

921

OOPI.

19.9.45.

My dear Thorne-Thorne,

I have just come back from a short trip to TARANTO-BRINDISI, and of CANTANZARO am writing you this note from Main 8 Army HQ. Con is up North looking for a new HQ for AGOT, Region II and I am momentarily out of him, though I shall probably join up tomorrow with him.

As you probably know AGOT has not been allowed to function in TARANTO-BRINDISI-BARI where everything is under the BRINDISI Mission (General McFarlane in Command). No Proclamations have been posted and General McFarlane has asked all AGOT Officers merely to stand by with the idea of taking over if need be, which, however, he said was unlikely.

He has however asked AGOT to supply 100 million Lire (LIRA) to pay the troops, since our new Italian "Allies" will not accept BMA Currency. A signal was sent three days ago (I believe) to Group Captain Benson, through 15 Army Group, asking for these Lire. As far as I know the Group Captain did not receive this Signal. I presume you did, and that the necessary action has been taken through PALERMO. The question is very urgent and if the troops in TARANTO area do not get some money soon to spend there is going to be hell to pay!

We are all anxiously awaiting word as to what the position of AGOT is to be in view of the new developments. I think our men were put in a stinking position in TARANTO. Rawlings, the first man to arrive, on Sept 10, had never been told anything other than that AGOT was to take over normally and he was given a disgracefully cold reception by arrogant Italian officials, whose position as our "Allies" appears already to have gone to their heads.

Before Region II puts its head in a noose please let us know whether we are to fold up or carry on!

You can reach us through 8 Army Main with which we shall keep daily contact.

Cheerio,

(Sgd) Harvey E Gerry.

Lt.Col. AUS.

PS. All goes well in Region II, we have everything covered up to and including CANTANZARO and COSENZA Provinces, and we are poised ready to go into POTENZA. Pls. advise Lord Rennell.

H.S.G.

signal was sent three days ago (I believe) to Group Captain Benson, through 15 Army Group, asking for these lives. As far as I know the Group Captain did not receive this signal. I presume you did, and that the necessary action has been taken through PIERRO. The question is very urgent and if the troops in TARANTO area do not get some money soon to spend there is going to be hell to pay!

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(Sgd) Harvey S Gerry.

It.Col. AUS.

P.S. All goes well in Region II, we have everything covered up to and including CATANZARO and COSSENZA Provinces, and we are poised ready to go into POTENZA. Pls. advise Lord Rennell.

H.S.G.

920

0750

785015

SUBJECT: Report.

ANGOT H.Q.,
Palermo.

HEADQUARTERS
46
SEP 21 1943
ANGOT

ANGOT H.Q. REGGIO 2. 16

Ref.No. ECA/7/35.
19th September 1943.

1. Main H.Q. Angot 8th Army has today moved to CORIGLIANO, Map Ref. Sheet 48 1/250000 1714.
2. The position in the Compartimento of Apulia is still unknown, but the coast road round from CROTONE to TARANTO is now open and Lt.-Col. Garry left by car on the evening of 17th Sept.
Communications will be facilitated when a ferry service from CROTONE to TARANTO is opened, which it is understood will be the case in a few days.
Rear H.Q. Angot is established at VIBO VALENTIA Map Ref. Sheet 52/53 1/250000 7806. with 8th Army Main and Rear and will be moving with them probably to CROTONE and possibly afterwards to TARANTO. This has not yet been decided by 8th Army.
3. COMMUNICATIONS This is a problem of major importance. The distances in Region II are very great and the road position is bad. The distance from REGGIO to POTENZA is over 300 miles by existing available roads, and from REGGIO to COSENZA is 230 miles. The central roads are blown and cannot be used and the west coast road is as yet unknown, but is in any case the main supply line for the Army. Railway communications except on a few short stretches is not yet available and the main Reggio - Naples line is unlikely to be available for a very long time owing to destruction of bridges the repair of which presents a major engineering job. Communications with Apulia as already stated is now open by road to Taranto, but the distance from Reggio is over 300 miles, and the only practical method is by sea from CROTONE.
4. SUPPLIES. (a) This must be considered in conjunction with the remarks in para 3. Broadly speaking the Province of REGGIO is the one which lacks food to the greatest degree and the reports that have so far come in from COSENZA seem to indicate that the position is not acute. POTENZA is not yet in our hands. The towns on the East Coast also appear to be fairly well supplied. But the problem is one of distribution. There are no harbours other than REGGIO and CROTONE into which to bring supplies and CROTONE is now being used as the Army Base supply until such time as the country north is sufficiently in our hands to enable supplies to be brought in through TARANTO. REGGIO as an Army Base will be abandoned in a few days.

(b) Civil Supplies not only food but other commodities can be brought into REGGIO, which post the Army agree can be handed over to us for our use, but in view of the distances and communications mentioned in para 3, this will present us with a major distribution problem. It is hoped however that at any rate in so far as food is concerned that the distribution will be largely confined to REGGIO Province.

(c) The normal method of obtaining supplies in through 8th Army who allocate tonnage priorities. In view however of the position of the Port of REGGIO which can be used by ANGOT, it is strongly suggested that a stickpile of flour be established there brought in by boat from N.A. direct, which can be done without interfering with Army tonnage. This was why the Miriam was suggested for making journeys from N.A. to REGGIO. A reply to this suggestion which has been already submitted to H.Q. Palermo, is urgently requested to enable further requirements for places further north to be handled in the usual manner and relieve 8th Army shipping position.

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(d) A survey is being got out as quickly as possible as to the whole requirements of the Civil Supplies for the Region, but it must be realised that owing to distances it is a matter of considerable time before the reports can come in and the Apulian position is as yet quite unknown. For the above reasons and in view of the fact that food supplies are the basis on which depends the quietness of the people it is considered that a stock pile of at least 50,000 tons, outside arrangements already made with 8th Army should be immediately made up at REGGIO in shipping directly arranged by N.A. and which will not interfere with 8th Army tonnage. In this connection it is doubtful whether the Miriam has a sufficient carrying capacity. Cannot surrendered Italian ships be allocated to bring in civil supplies? This stockpile should consist of flour entirely. (e) The question of Medical Supplies and other commodities must be considered separately and will form the subject of a further report when requirements have already been ascertained.

5. ITALIAN ARMY. This problem is a major one and has already been discussed between 8th Army and myself, but no solution has been arrived at. The problem is as follows:-

(a) The Italian 31st Corps has been organised in the CATANZARO district as a labour corps to follow up behind the army. It is under the command of

/Major-General.....

3 Copies on secret ops file

-2-

Major-General Kirkland and his staff working through Italian officers. This Corps is at the moment living on its own army rations which will be exhausted in 7 days. It is also fully armed, 8th Army tentatively suggests that AMGOT should feed them which I have refused to do.

(b) Other units of the Italian Army are disintegrating and the roads are cluttered with soldiers going back to their village - or trying to find somewhere to live. Many of them too are armed. The army wish to have nothing to do with them and do not care if they go back to the town or village, so long as they do not have to feed them.

(c) Other units are still under their own officers fully armed. As an example there are 4,000 in ROSSANO and 900 in COSENZA and doubtless many more in other places, not yet visited. This too will be a snowball as the advance continues.

(d) Para (b) presents a difficulty in that none of these soldiers possess ration cards and presumably have to be fed by AMGOT. There is an organization set up for keeping check on their numbers and distribution.

Para (e) presents a further problem in that shortly those units will have exhausted their army rations and will then begin to fall back on local civil supplies. In my opinion there is a grave risk of disorder then taking place, bearing in mind that British troops are few and far between in the back areas.

(e) The problems set out in para (b) and (c) appear to be one which calls for a directive from A.F.H.Q. under the armistice terms. I have discussed all this with the A.A.G. of 8th Army, who is most concerned over the matter and is endeavouring to obtain a clear cut policy from the 'Q' Branch. He however agrees to that the decision must come from higher authority. In the meantime I am not allowing Civil Affairs Officers in towns where there are no British troops and only Italian armed troops.

6. Internees. This will develop into a problem. At the moment only one concentration camp has been met with of any size. This is at COSENZA, where there are 2,000 internees, chiefly civilians, consisting mostly of Poles, Jews trying to get to Palestine, Czechs and French. They will have to be fed and eventually repatriated. Guidance is requested as to the method to be adopted for repatriation. At the moment they are being looked after and fed but delay in moving them may lead to trouble and it is probable that more will be found as the army moves forward.

7. PERSONNEL. Officers have been placed in the compartmento of Calabria exactly in accordance with the organization plans made by this H.Q., a copy of which was given your H.Q. on August 19th. By stretching to the utmost limits there are sufficient officers to deal with Lucania, but there are no reserves and already there have been cases of sickness, a reserve of ten officers is urgently required. So far as Apulia is concerned, there are only the officers sent over from N.A. and those sent on your instruction by this H.Q. No other officers are available from here.

8. TRANSPORT. The position is well-known to H.Q. Palermo, 8th Army can produce no more and Jeeps and M/Cs owing to the enormous distances are a vital necessity.

N.A. must supply these.

9. CLERKS. Region II in the Compartimento of Reggio and Lucania have 2 clerks. There are none available from Army. The administration will break/through clerks are made available from N.A. immediately.

10. Communications for this H.Q. should go via S.C.A.O. Messina. A D.R. Service is arranged from REGGIO to MESSINA and from REGGIO to this H.Q.

g18

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Cipriani

Group Captain,
R.C.A.O.
Angot H.Q. Region 2

14

~~D.C.C.A.O.~~ *Tymes*

C.C.A.O.

To see whole file.

C.C.A.O. may have seen 1-2.

TR
1/4

917

785015

FROM: Courts.

AMCOT/21/13

AMCOT H.Q., SIBUR.

12th September 1943.

TO:-

AMCOT, Eighth Army Main,
c/o S.C.I.C. CATANIA.

1. Reference para 16 and 17 of your report on Section 2 of 3rd September 1943, it is confirmed that AMCOT LIAISON has been asked to expedite the transmission through the correct channels of the C.in C.'s Order for the establishment of Military Courts.

2. Four copies of GAI No. 7, which covers the points raised by you, are attached. Copies of this GAI are in the new AMCOT "Bible" now being printed.

3. As a Civil Affairs Officer does not need to obtain a written order of appointment to establish himself as a Summary Military Court (see para 9 of GAI No. 7) and as the Order referred to in the first sentence of para 3 of the GAI has in fact been signed, there is no objection to C.A.O.s sitting as Summary Courts forthwith.


CHARLES H. STEFFORD,
Lieut Colonel C.B.C.
Chief Staff Officer.

Copy to: C.I.C.

For information.

916

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS No. 7.GENERAL

Instructions to G.A.O's and Judicial Officers.

A. PROCLAMATIONS.

1. Copies of all Proclamations and General Orders which have been signed and contained in this folder, and all Civil Affairs Officers and Judicial Officers should be thoroughly acquainted with their provisions.
2. Proclamations Nos. 1, 2 and 3 will be posted immediately on occupation by Civil Affairs Officers. In addition to posting Proclamations Nos. 1, 2 and 3 immediately there are two notices to the public made under Proclamation No. 2, which must be posted at the same time. Copies of these two notices are also contained in this folder.
3. As soon as conditions allow after the commencement of the occupation and the terms of Proclamation are made available, Civil Affairs Officers will proceed to post Proclamations Nos. 4, 5, 8, 11, 13, and General Orders Nos. 1 and 2. Instructions will be issued by Allied Military Government Headquarters when the remainder of the Proclamations and General Orders, of which copies are contained in this folder, are to be posted.

B. ALLIED MILITARY COURTS.Constitution of Courts:-

1. Civilians charged with offences against the law of Military Government will be brought before Allied Military Courts as provided in Proclamations Nos. 2 and 4.
2. Allied Military Courts will comprise General Military Courts, Superior Military Courts and Summary Military Courts, each of which is competent to try any offence. The difference between the various Courts is as to their powers of punishment.

(a) General Military Courts will consist of not less than three officers at least one of whom shall be a Judicial Officer of the Allied Military Government. A General Military Court can impose any lawful punishment, including (subject to confirmation) the punishment of death.

(b) Superior Military Courts will consist of one or more officers at least one of whom shall be a Judicial Officer of the Allied Military Government, if available. A Superior Military Court can impose a sentence of imprisonment up to 10 years and any fine.

(c) Summary Military Courts will consist of one officer who shall be a

3. As soon as conditions allow after the commencement of the occupation and the forms of proclamation are made available, Civil Affairs Officers will proceed to post proclamations Nos. 1, 5, 8, 11, 13, and General Orders Nos. 1 and 2. Instructions will be issued by Allied Military Government Headquarters when the resumption of the proclamations and General Orders, of which copies are contained in this folder, are to be posted.

B. ALLIED MILITARY COURTS.

Constitution of Courts:

4. Civilians charged with offenses against the Law of Military Government will be brought before Allied Military Courts as provided in Proclamation No. 2 and 4. Allied Military Courts will comprise General Military Courts, Superior Military Courts and Summary Military Courts, each of which is competent to try any offense. The difference between the various Courts is as to their powers of punishment.

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(b) Superior Military Courts will consist of one or more officers at least one of whom shall be a Judicial Officer of the Allied Military Government, if available. A Superior Military Court can impose a sentence of imprisonment up to 10 years and any fine.

(c) Summary Military Courts will consist of one officer who shall be a Judicial Officer or a Civil Affairs Officer of the Allied Military Government, if available. A Summary Military Court can impose a sentence of imprisonment up to 1 year and a fine up to 50,000 lire.

5. Every officer of the Allied Military Government who is a qualified lawyer is a Judicial Officer within the meaning of Proclamation No. 4.

Establishment of Courts:

6. It is of the utmost importance for the restoration of law and order as soon as a locality is occupied that offenders be brought to trial and punished with a minimum of delay. The procedure for the establishment of General and Superior Military Courts is as follows:-

1. In areas where the Allied Military Government is functioning under the control of a Law-Force Commander acting for the Allied Government:-

General and Superior Military Courts are established by an Order in the following form:-

11

- 2 -

ALLIED MILITARY COMMISSIONS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

1. General Officer Commanding /
 Commanding General....., hereby appoint
 to be President and and
 to be members of a General/Superior Military Court for the trial of all persons
 who may be brought before it.

In the Field

1943.

.....
General Officer Commanding
 Commanding General.

A Task-Force Commander may authorize any officer in his command commanding a
 division or higher unit to sign an order in the above terms.

II. In areas where the Allied Military Government is functioning under
 the orders of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, acting for the Military Government -

General Military Courts are established by an order of the Chief Civil Affairs
 Officer or the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, acting on the advice of the Chief
 Legal Officer.

Superior Military Courts are established by an order of the Chief Civil Affairs
 Officer, the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer or any Senior Civil Affairs Officer.

The form of appointment is as above, subject to the necessary modifications in
 the description of the appointing officer.

7. The procedure for the establishment of Summary Military Courts is *set out*
 below.

8. An Order has been made authorizing all officers of the Allied Military
 Government who are acting for the time being as Civil Affairs Officers or Judicial
 Officers to sit as a Summary Military Court. This includes Civil Affairs Police
 Officers of the Allied Military Government who are acting for the time being as
 Civil Affairs Officers. This Order applies in any area, whether it is one in
 which the Allied Military Government is functioning under the orders of a Task-
 Force Commander or under the orders of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

9. Whenever a Task-Force Commander or a Sub Task-Force Commander desires that
 civilians in his area of control shall be brought to trial for offenses against

Commanding General.

A Task-Force Commander may authorize any officer in his command constituting a division or higher unit to sign an order in the above form.

II. In areas where the Allied Military Government is functioning under the orders of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, acting for the Military Government-

General Military Courts are established by an order of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer or the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, acting on the advice of the Chief Legal Officer.

Superior Military Courts are established by an order of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer or any Senior Civil Affairs Officer.

The form of appointment is as above, subject to the necessary modifications in the description of the appointing officer.

7. The procedure for the establishment of Summary Military Courts is set out below.

8. An Order has been made authorizing all officers of the Allied Military Government who are acting for the time being as Civil Affairs Officers or Judicial Officers to sit as a Summary Military Court. This includes Civil Affairs Police Officers of the Allied Military Government who are acting for the time being as Civil Affairs Officers. This Order applies in any area, whether it is one in which the Allied Military Government is functioning under the orders of a Task-Force Commander or under the orders of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

9. Whenever a Task-Force Commander or a Sub Task-Force Commander desires that a civilian in his area of control shall be brought to trial for offenses against the regulations and orders of the Allied Military Government or for war crimes, he may request any Civil Affairs Officer or Judicial Officer attached to his Staff to establish a Summary Military Court to deal with the case. The Civil Affairs Officer or Judicial Officer will then establish himself as a Summary Military Court without the need of obtaining a written order of appointment. If any case coming before such Officer is one which should be sent to a Superior or General Military Court, a written Order for the appointment of such Court will be obtained as outlined in para. 6 above.

10. In areas where the Allied Military Government is functioning under the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Civil Affairs Officers and Judicial Officers will establish themselves as Summary Military Courts when directed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer under whose command they may be, but no written order of appointment is necessary. Superior and General Military Courts in such areas will be constituted as the usual arises in accordance with para 6 above.

11. When it is desired to appoint an officer to be a Summary Military Court and such officer is not acting for the time being as a Civil Affairs Officer or a Judicial Officer, an appointment in writing must be obtained as outlined in para. 6 above.

785015

Prosecutions:-

12. In any area where the Allied Military Government is functioning under the orders of a Task-Force Commander and the Task-Force desires offenses by civilians to be dealt with by Allied Military Courts, it is most important that Civil Affairs Officers and Judicial Officers should make immediate contact with the Provost-Marshall's department and advise the Officer in charge of the department of the establishment of Allied Military Courts, of the manner in which they are conducted and of the procedure for bringing cases to trial before them.

13. Owing to the lack of Officers of the Allied Military Government in the early stages it is often necessary for the Military Police to prosecute, as in combat areas it is unlikely that the Carabinieri will be functioning completely.

14. Where the Carabinieri will be able to function fully in any area, it is permissible under the rules of Procedure for them to appear and prosecute in cases before Allied Military Courts. Members of the Carabinieri cannot be expected to do more than state shortly to the Court the facts of a case and then tender the witnesses in the event of the accused pleading "not guilty". Prosecuting Officers of the Allied Military Government will only be used in important cases.

15. An Allied Military Court will always, wherever is proceeding before it, lend such assistance to the prosecution and counsel as circumstances may require to enable the truth to be ascertained and justice to be done.

Means and Procedure of Courts:-

16. Reference must be made to Proclamation No. 4, to ascertain the jurisdiction of Allied Military Courts. The Rules of Procedure and Special Administrative Instructions Legal Nos. 1 and 2 deal with the actual conduct of trials.

17. It is essential that all of these documents be closely studied by all Officers concerned in the Administration of Justice.

C. - ITALIAN COURTS.

18. Under Proclamation No. 1, all Italian Courts are to remain closed until reopened under the supervision of the Allied Military Government. It is to be expected that there will be found on first occupation a state of overcrowding of the jails and it is most important that Courts should be made to function again as early as date as possible and that persons in jail awaiting trial should be dealt with expeditiously.

19. The senior Judicial Official attached to the section of the Allied Military Government taking part in a court case should be kept informed of the progress of the case.

913

proceeds in cases before Allied Military Courts. Members of the Carabinieri cannot be expected to do more than state shortly to the Court the facts of a case and then tender the witnesses in the event of the accused pleading "not guilty". Prosecuting Officers of the Allied Military Government will only be used in important cases.

15. An Allied Military Court will always, wherever is proceeding before it, lend such assistance to the prosecution and examine all circumstances may require to enable the truth to be ascertained and justice to be done.

Reform and Procedure of Courts:-

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913

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19. The senior Judicial Official attached to the section of the Allied Military Government taking part in a new occupation should make it his immediate business, under the direction of the senior Civil Affairs Officer, to obtain particulars of the local judicial officials, interview them and ascertain from all available sources which of such officials may be trusted to continue in their duties and dispense justice impartially. It will be found as a general rule that the judicial officials with long services are the best to be relied upon.

20. The most important Courts to re-open as soon as possible are the Pretura and the Tribunale Penale and all officers acting as Civil Affairs Officers should re-open in their localities these Courts without delay, first satisfying themselves of the suitability of the existing Italian judicial officials.

21. After the Pretura and the Tribunale Penale have been re-opened, the following further Courts should be re-established as soon as the necessary number of suitable judicial officials can be obtained:-

Corte d' Appello (Criminal Chamber)
Corte d' Assisi

22. Approval to continue payment of the salaries of judicial officials should be obtained as soon as possible from the Finance Division.

25. The order of transfer, which may be signed by the Civil Affairs Officer as an officer acting under the authority of the Military Government will be in the following form:-

ALPHABETICALLY LISTED BY NAME

NOTHING TO DISRUPT

For information on the location of the various sections of the book, see the table of contents.

.....
(Signature)
Secretary, National Film Development Corporation (N) Ltd.

***** FOR THE OFFICE(S) OF *****

[illegible][illegible]

and for any other offences with which he/she/they may be charged, be enrolled

dated and filed by the Military Court at

Given under my hand this day of 1913. 912

Can't wait to

[illegible]

26. It may be found that in the jails are persons who have been confined on the order of the Quetzaro without trial. Full particulars of these should be obtained and their cases investigated. Revelation No. 13 relates to these persons. It will be found convenient to establish a committee in the main town of the occupied territory, consisting of judicial officers of the Allied Military Government and two reliable Italian Court Officials to make the investigations into the various cases and to prepare a report for the Chief Legal Officer. No action as to release should be taken until the orders of the Chief Legal Officer have been obtained, except that political prisoners may be released on the

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785015

SUBJECT:-

Grain Prices.

AMST/2/13.

2755-4

8

TO:-

AMST, Eighth Army Main,
c/o S.O.A.C., CATANIA.

AMST H.Q., SICILY.

12th September 1943.

Reference para 15 of your report on Region 2 of 3rd September 1943, it has been decided that the same prices for grain obtaining in Sicily shall be applied to Region 2. An advance copy of General Order No. 3, which deals with this subject, is attached. An adequate supply will follow in a day or two.

CHARLES M. SPENCER,
Lieut Colonel C.S.C.
Chief Staff Officer.

Copies to:-

D.O.S. & H.
C.A.C.

For information.

911

Note

Copies of paras. 15-17^{at p.1} sent to C.L.O. & D.C.S. & R.
for advice. IR 10/9

B.U. for C.L.A.O. & D.C.C.A.O.
to see
& for replies from C.L.O. & D.C.S. & R.

12/9 IR

910

HOST SECRET

HSG-1

Subject: Military Government in Region 2

Angot,
3 Army,

6 September 45

C. C. A. O.,
Angot Headquarters,
Sicily.

1. Military government under Angot 3 Army has been established in the areas occupied by 13 Corps.
2. General Eisenhower's declaration and Proclamations 1, 2, 3, with the relevant warning and notice were posted in Reggio city on D day (3 September 1943) and in coastal cities from Scilla to Melito on D plus 1.
3. Headquarters for Angot 3 Army Region 2 have been established temporarily in the Prefetto's palace at Reggio, and Angot provincial headquarters have been placed in the same building. The office of the CAO for Reggio city is in the Municipal building.
4. Reggio District is under the direction of 36 Area with Brigadier Trvollope commanding.
5. Regions covered by Angot administration on D day (3 September 1943) included Reggio city, Gallio, Catona, and S. Giovanni.
6. Places taken over on D plus one (4 September 1943) included Scilla, Regnara, Carlata, and Melito.
7. Those covered on D plus 2 (5 September 1943) were Lotta S. Giovanero, Alessia, and Laganadi-Calamina.
8. In addition to the coastal region from Dagnara at the north and Melito to the south, 13 Corps have virtually consolidated a rectangular area toward the interior: 3608-4330-3826-3865. In the latter region authority under Angot has been established as far as operations permit. Constant liaison is being maintained with the combat forces with a view to entering the newly liberated areas as promptly as possible.
9. Twelve officers including the undersigned were on the mainland on D day. Twenty-five officers with transport, rations and office equipment D plus 1. Eight more officers landed D plus 2, making a total of 45 including headquarters staff and specialists. Landings were advanced by two days over the original plan.

3. Headquarters for Angot 8 Army Region 2 have been established temporarily in the Prefetto's palace at Reggio, and Angot provincial headquarters have been placed in the same building. The office of the CAO for Reggio city is in the municipal building.

4. Reggio district is under the direction of 26 Area with Brigadier Troilo command.

5. Regions covered by Angot administration on D day (3 September 1943) included Reggio city, Gallio, Catona, and S. Giovanni.

6. Places taken over on D plus one (4 September 1943) included Scilla, Bagnara, Cariceto, and Melito.

7. Those covered on D plus 2 (5 September 1943) were Motte S. Giovanni, Alessia, and Lagundi-Salana.

8. In addition to the coastal region from Bagnara at the north and Melito to the south, 13 Corps have virtually consolidated a rectangular area toward the interior: 5438-4370-5826-5863. In the latter region Authority under Angot has been established as far as operations permit. Constant liaison is being maintained with the combat forces with a view to entering the newly liberated areas as promptly as possible.

9. Twelve officers including the undersigned were on the mainland on D day. Twenty-five officers with transport, rations and office equipment D plus 1. Eight more officers landed D plus 2, making a total of 45 including headquarters staff and specialists. Landings were advanced by two days over the original plan.

10. By D plus 2, sixteen officers had been posted in the field as CAO's and CAO's; ten were assigned to mainland headquarters; and the remaining 19 were assigned to anti-looting patrols in Reggio city pending their transfer to newly occupied territories.

11. There have been no casualties to Angot personnel other than one officer, Lt. Vitti, who after arriving at Reggio came down with fever and was sent to hospital.

12. Reggio city has suffered considerably from bombing and shelling but many of the principal buildings are still intact. It is thought that from 60 to 75 per cent of the residences either are, or shortly can be made, habitable. The Casa di Fascio was destroyed by bombing. Utilities have not been seriously affected.

13. Other towns, principally in the coastal sector, are not in bad shape with the outstanding exception of S. Giovanni, which has been virtually destroyed, and is not inhabited at the moment.

14. Approximately 15,000 persons were found to be in Reggio on D day.

-2-

The total population now is probably nearer 20,000. Normally some 20,000 are said to reside within the city limits. This figure will be checked.

15. Water is flowing in the city to the extent of nearly 50 per cent and the CRE's are at work to improve the supply. Civilian labour has been called up for this purpose. Water is on in the other coastal towns with the exception of S. Giovanni.

16. Electricity, generated by water power, was put on in Reggio city yesterday, 5 September 1943.

17. Through the prompt action of Angot officers arriving in the town, approximately 40 tons of flour recently received from Northern Italy, was saved from looting. Bakeries have been started again and on the present basic ration of 150 grams per person per day there should be sufficient flour for the city's present population for a fortnight. However, many inhabitants will undoubtedly be returning, and outlying towns which normally depend upon Reggio are already calling for help. If the additional needs are met the present known supply of flour will last only five or six days.

18. There is practically no grain grown in the countryside presently occupied. The captain of Carabinieri at Scilla reports that he recently spent several days scouring the surrounding districts and succeeded in finding only some 10 quintals of wheat. Most communes do not appear to have received any flour, except occasionally, for the last month to six weeks, but the people have managed to exist somehow, probably on their personal hoards plus fruit, maize, potatoes, and other vegetables.

19. It is reported that the Province of Reggio has in the past depended almost entirely upon imports of grain from Sicily and northern Italy.

20. Major Luck, acting supply officer, is preparing a detailed study on the whole supply picture and meanwhile efforts are being directed through the Army to arrange for the shipment of flour stocks from Augusta to the mainland, on the SS. Miriam.

21. With respect to law and order in Reggio the undersigned spoke before the beginning of the campaign to General Simons, Commanding General 1st Canadian Division, and secured his agreement to refrain from disarming the Carabinieri. This was lived up to in the main and 90 Carabinieri were at their posts on the afternoon of D day. The Captain of Carabinieri is co-operative but it remains to be seen if he will be vigorous enough.

22. Civilian looting had started but was quickly curtailed, partly by the timely intervention of it. Looting was upon arrival in the town fired over the heads of transgressors caught in the act. Civilian looting is continuing but on a petty scale. Drastic penalties will be prescribed for those apprehended. All available Angot personnel is being used to this end. The Carabinieri are inclined to be lazy and lack force, and efforts will be made to ginger them up, under penalty if they fail manifestly in their duty. It is proposed to open Italian criminal courts as promptly as possible. With regard to military courts it is

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23. Looting by troops is also taking place to a certain extent in spite of all the efforts made through Army channels to prevent it. A conference was called yesterday under Angot direction with 86 Area and 1st Canadian Division. A.M.'s attending to organize an anti-looting campaign, and it is hoped that satisfactory results will ensue. Six soldiers caught red handed over by Angot CARO's to GMR. Details of these arrests will be furnished.

24. Representations have been made to AGMR, 1st Canadian Division with reference to the illegal taking of civilian cars. Some 40 vehicles are reported to have been removed from Reggio as the troops went through.

25. Good stocks of enemy medical stores were located on the first day and guards posted. An inventory is being made. So far as can be determined at the moment certain ordinary small things such as iodine are lacking.

26. Hospital facilities would appear adequate. Two institutions visited in Reggio have a total of 1000 available beds. A third hospital (municipal) is now being examined. 86 Area is taking other accommodation for its +have been turned

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General hospital and there is no indication at present that the Army will require civilian hospitals.

27. Health conditions appear satisfactory judging from surface indications, although it is too early to report accurately on this subject.

28. With respect to political conditions, the people are outwardly friendly and in some cases have demonstrated their pleasure by waving allied flags. No Fascist party officials have been found thus far. The Prefetto, Vice-Prefetto and Party Secretary, are reported to have left Reggio early in July for Cinquefrondi in the northern part of the Province. Most of the Provincial office records appear to have been taken to Cinquefrondi which is said to have served as a temporary provincial capital. This action is thought to have been motivated by fear of bombing and possible assault landings. The city administrative and police officials, principally the Podesta and the Captain of Carabinieri, are cooperative. They state that they have had no contact with Rome for months but they learned over the radio that the Fascist Party had been dissolved as of 25 July 1943. They believe that some of the Fascist officials who resided temporarily at Cinquefrondi must have been called to Rome for an accounting.

29. The Podesta reported that all funds and records of the banks were taken away at the time of the exodus to Cinquefrondi. However, Major Macfadden is arranging for entry into the premises of the twelve banks to see whether this is the case, and a report will be forwarded as soon as his investigation is completed.

30. A special effort will be made to enter Cinquefrondi as soon as it is conquered so as to do everything possible to apprehend officials and recover property and records.

31. It is suggested that written communications for Angot 8 Army Region 2 be sent by IR to the SCAG in Messina with whom arrangements have been made for onward transmission to Angot, 8 Army, Taormina. The mainland headquarters will maintain frequent contact with Taormina. For the moment written messages appear to be quicker than signals.

32. Contact has been made with Group Captain Benson today at Taormina. The Group Captain plans to remain here for the time being and the undersigned will return to Reggio tomorrow morning.

33. The above report is intended to provide you with early data on the Region 2 undertaking, and is of necessity brief and general in character. Detailed information will be sent forward in subsequent reports.

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Hamphrey
Lt. Col. AUS

P.S. There is a good, modern prison on the outskirts of Reggio, which can house criminals from other parts of the province if necessary. The inmates of the prison were turned loose, apparently by the troops, as the town was captured. The number released was reported to be 350. A list has been obtained and Angot will endeavor to round them up. A detailed report on the action of releasing the prisoners will be forwarded as soon as the facts can be confirmed.

Copied to C.L.O., C.R.O., C.P.D., D.C.S.R.,

L D.P.H.

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AMGOT/357/HQ

AMGOT HQ SICILY

8 September 1943

Memorandum to: C.G.A.O.

1. Attached is a copy of a report from Col. Harvey Gerry which Col. Borg brought with him. I have retained the original here.

C. S. O.

Encl.

906

MOST SECRET

C C A O

ANGOT Headquarters

Palermo

ANGOT,

8 Army Main,

5 September 1943



Subject: Daytown and Region 2

1. Two copies of operational instruction no. 2 of 31 August 1943 are enclosed for your information. This with the original operational plan already forwarded to Angot HQ will provide complete data on basic planning.

2. Five officers are now on the mainland: one with 13 Corps HQ, two with Can. Div. HQ, and two with 5 Div. HQ. Three of the officers are experienced in civil affairs administration and should be able to cope with the initial situation in the towns occupied by Allied Forces this morning.

3. In view of the rapidity with which ^{the} tactical situation is developing it has been decided in agreement with Major General de Guigani, M.G.S., to accelerate the arrival of Angot personnel on the mainland. Seven officers under Major Benton-Jones are leaving this afternoon with over-night kits and rations for 48 hours, to take over administration of the city of Reggio and surrounding territory, as well as S. Giovanni in case of need. Thirteen officers will leave tomorrow with transport and rations, ten on 5 September and the remaining seven on 6 September, by which time all transport, rations and supplies mentioned in the operational order will also have arrived on mainland.

4. The undersigned will leave this afternoon as requested by the M.G.S. and will arrange to send you a preliminary report on conditions as soon as possible.

5. Wing Commander Boer and Major Millard of Headquarters Staff will cross tomorrow morning, leaving Lt. Col. Lloyd-Carson at this Headquarters. It is expected that tomorrow Main Angot Headquarters for Region 2 will be established at or near Reggio. At the same time it is proposed to maintain close liaison with 8 Army Tac at their advance headquarters on the mainland, probably at or near 4552. Signals for Angot Region 2 should, however, until further notice be sent to this HQ for onward forwarding.

6. If possible the undersigned will return to Sicily tomorrow evening or the following day, 8 September, in order not to leave this headquarters without a G officer, and also for the purpose of facilitating the transmission of his initial report.

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6. If possible the undersigned will return to Sicily tomorrow evening or the following day, 5 September, in order not to leave this Headquarters without a G officer, and also for the purpose of facilitating the transmission of his initial report to you.

7. All proclamations, flags, posters, emblems and instructions considered necessary for the early phases have been placed in the hands of CAO's 4 CAO's, who have been fully briefed. Initial allocation of personnel for all provincial and district towns has been made. Pending the occupation of remaining territories in Calabria, personnel allocated thereto will be made available to Major Benton-Jones to meet the emergency situation which will undoubtedly exist in Reggio Province.

8. It is understood that the 8th Army may not extend its occupation beyond the Department of Calabria, which includes the three provinces of Reggio, Catanzaro, and Cosenza. The official personnel allocated to Region 2 thus far will probably suffice for this territory. If on the other hand we are suddenly called upon, as a result of operations further north, to complete the military administration of all of Region 2 there will be an urgent need for additional officers, ranks and transport. There is set forth below an analysis of the personnel situation.

9. Thus far 60 officers have reported to this headquarters. Twelve additional officers instructed to report here are expected shortly, making a total of 72. Of this total seven are on Headquarters staff, and six are specialists, leaving 59 field officers (i.e. CAO's and GAO's). The original plan

called for 115 field officers to man Region 2. It is hoped that prompt provision is being made to send the remaining 56 to this headquarters at Meorina to report to Lt. Col. Lloyd-Carson. It should be mentioned at this time that out of ten provinces in Region 2 there are available officers of the grade of Major qualified to handle provincial administration, to the extent of only three, or possibly four. It is therefore recommended that in sending additional official personnel here, an effort be made to include six majors who have had civil affairs experience. Otherwise, it is proposed to choose captains for such positions, if you agree. Even if we decide to give the provincial jobs to captains, in some instances, we shall be rather thin in experienced men.

10. Another point which we should appreciate receiving special attention is the fact that we are weak in CAO's. Out of our total number to date there are only 15 who have had police experience or training. It is therefore suggested from the 56 officers to be sent to us, about 30 should be police officers, thus rounding out the personnel equation as mentioned in the original plan.

11. As regards senior officers it is not yet known whether the grouping under "Comptendants" will be necessary or practicable. It will be recalled that it was proposed to place Lt. Col. Monfort in charge of the Department of Puglia; Lt. Col. Bory in charge of Lucania, and possibly Lt. Col. Nicholls or Major Ruck in Calabria. It may be found simpler to run the entire region from one central Angot headquarters. In any case the senior men mentioned above are being held in reserve and attached to Main Angot in Region 2, for the time being.

12. The situation with respect to specialist officers is as follows:

	Total Establishment	Total arrived
Legal	6	1
Financial	6	2
Medical	9	2
Supply	3	1 (now ill)
Customs	4	0

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All specialists will be attached to Angot Main Region 2 for the time being, and made available to all CAO's, until a sufficient number arrive to allocate them to the departments (or provinces).

13. As to other ranks, the total requested was 210, of which 155 were drivers and 75 clerks, supply HQ's, etc. We have obtained from 3 Army sufficient drivers for the transport thus far on hand but shall need drivers for the remaining transport to come from North Africa. We have no clerks and are urgently in need of them. Details of our requirements are set out in Appendix C of the original plan for the Allied Military Government of Region 2.

14. We have succeeded in obtaining six jeeps through General de Guingand of 3 Army, in addition to the transport mentioned in the operational order under the other categories.

15. There is one important matter ^{of} policy for Region 2 upon which a ruling

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Medical	9	2
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14. We have succeeded in obtaining six jeeps through General de Guingand of 8 Army, in addition to the transport mentioned in the operational order, under the other categories.

15. There is one important matter ^{of} policy for Region 2 upon which a ruling is desired as soon as possible, and that is whether the same prices for grain obtaining on this island should be applied on the mainland. If so it will be appreciated if Angot HQ would send us immediately ^{for} the complete order issued on this subject by the Supply Division and circulated in Syracuse and the other provinces.

16. It is also considered desirable to have an early ruling as to whether the Italian courts can be reopened.

17. As to Angot military courts, the question raised by Lt. Col. Chandler of delegating power to CAO's from the Commander-in-Chief down through divisional and corps commanders, has been referred to 15 Army Group, Angot Liaison for reference to the proper sources. Pending a decision on this point, and awaiting phase 2, it is ^{our} understanding that CAO's are not to sit on superior or general courts, nor are they to sit as summary courts.

HSG

Harvey Egan
Lt. Col. AUS

Allen
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