

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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14 pp

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AMGOT, INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
JULY, AUG. 1943

14 pp

HMAOT/215/HQ

Folio.	Date	To/From WHOM	CONTENTS.
1-5	25 July	2m S.C. Report 15 H.G. to SCAO	Intelligence Reports
	5 July	13 S.C. (E) Report 15 H.G. to SCAO	Intelligence Reports
6-9	17 Aug	From Supt. C.P. to C.S.O.	Maj. Raffia's Report
10	21 "	To C.S.O.	Ref. Maj. Raffia's Report
11	25 "	from SCAO ENNA	Intelligence Reports
12	27 "	" C.S.O.	Intelligence Reports

2530

0968

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

File

1808

AMGOT 18/HQ.

AMGOT HQ. Sicily.

27th August, 43.

12

Subject:- Intelligence Reports.

To : S.C.A.O. - Emma.

Reference your 7/1/AQ of 25 Aug. 43, forwarded herewith is a copy of the P.W. Zone handbook on Sicily to which it is thought that you are referring.

CR

*P/A
29/8
65*

Jr CHARLES M. SPOMFORD,
Lt. Col. G. S. C.,
Chief Staff Officer.

2529

A. M. G. O. T.
PROVINCE OF ENNA

Your ref.

OFFICE OF THE SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER

my ref. 7/1/AQ

Enna, 25 Aug 43

Subject: Intelligence

AMGOT HQ,
15 Army Group.



At Chree Major Henry Rowell had a supply of information or intelligence reports prepared by the British Government. These were marked "Secret" and were used for the purposes of the School. They were much more comprehensive than the intelligence material in the AMGOT Plan.

Would it be possible to get a copy of that Report for use in this office? It would be a great favour to us if you could supply us with one.

Captain Ambrose Fuller

ECM.

Capt.,
for Lt Col.,
S.C.A.O.

2528

HEADQUARTERS A. M. C. O. T.
Public Safety Division
Civil Police Section

21 August, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief Staff Officer, thru Deputy Commissioner of Public Safety

1. I have read the memorandum submitted to the Chief Staff Officer by Major Raffa and my comments thereon are contained herein.

2. The memorandum is based on false premises in that it states nothing has been done on this problem. The Public Safety Division, through the Civil Police Section, has been cooperating with CIC for some time. This cooperation has reached a point where there is a complete exchange of information concerning individuals. Furthermore, intelligence, criminal and political, as it affects AMCT, has been organized and is now in operation.

3. There is, however, some merit in part II, "Suggested Program", in that the situation regarding Fascism should be clarified. This is a matter I have discussed with the Chief Staff Officer briefly. We were in agreement that definite policies should be established for AMCT. Before the policies can be clearly established it is necessary to collect and analyze all of the facts. This is now being done.

4. I do not believe any additional intelligence agency is necessary in conjunction with AMCT. Agencies with whom we have coordinated are in agreement that the present system is sound and should be continued. Furthermore, it agrees with the policies which have been expressed by the C. C. A. O., and in the handbooks on military government.

5. Major Raffa's knowledge on the subject of Fascism may be utilized in an advisory capacity in the development of the present system.

Russell A. Shook
RUSSELL A. SHOOK 2527
Lt. Colonel
Public Safety Division
Supt. Civil Police

The Civil Police Section, has been cooperating with CIO for some time. This cooperation has reached a point where there is a complete exchange of information concerning individuals. Furthermore, intelligence, criminal and political, as it affects AMGOT, has been organized and is now in operation.

3. There is, however, some merit in part II, "Suggested Program", in that the situation regarding Fascism should be clarified. This is a matter I have discussed with the Chief Staff Officer briefly. We were in agreement that definite policies should be established for AMGOT. Before the policies can be clearly established it is necessary to collect and analyze all of the facts. This is now being done.

4. I do not believe any additional intelligence agency is necessary in conjunction with AMGOT. Agencies with which we have coordinated are in agreement that the present system is sound and should be continued. Furthermore, it agrees with the policies which have been expressed by the U. S. A. O., and in the handbooks on military government.

5. Major Raffa's knowledge on the subject of Fascism may be utilized in an advisory capacity in the development of the present system.

Russell A. Shook
 RUSSELL A. SHOOK 2527
 Lt. Colonel
 Public Safety Division
 Supt. Civil Police

RAS/pk

*C. P. O. I endorse these views and would
 go so far as to recommend that (1) the
 AGO be designated the channel of communication
 between the CIO and AMGOT HQ and (2) that
 intelligence, other than military intelligence of an
 operational nature, should be the responsibility
 of the Public Safety Div.*

21 Aug 43

*Responsible
 Supt. C. P. O.*

9854
CONFIDENTIAL

AMGOT/218/HQ

17 August 1943

Subject: Coordination of Intelligence and Security Measures

To : Lt. Col. Spofford, Chief Staff Officer, AMGOT HQ

This memorandum is written in accordance with the request of the Chief Staff Officer, AMGOT, following the conference with this officer, August 14.

The observations and suggestions contained herein are based on this officer's recent tour of four provinces, on the views of several AMGOT officers and other British and American officers operating in various security and counterintelligence capacities, and on this officer's previous experience with comparable or related problems.

I. THE CURRENT SITUATION

One of AMGOT's basic responsibilities is to remove from office or from participation in any way in the civil affairs of Sicily any person who is found to be a Fascist or to have Fascist sympathies.

Further, AMGOT has the responsibility of making sure that proper security against Fascist activities is maintained in all territory under its control. Finally, AMGOT has a longer-range responsibility of giving evidence that it intends in its administration of occupied territory to substitute Anglo-American concepts and practices for those of the Fascist regime. Thus the task is a dual one of getting rid of the real enemies of the Allies and of the Italian people while at the same time making certain that serious injustices do not occur.

Until now, AMGOT has been unable to carry out these responsibilities in any really effective or equitable manner because of the following factors:

1. AMGOT has at present no specifically delegated officer or unit for defining the specific objectives to be achieved, devising proper and consistent procedures, drawing up directives or programs, or coordinating activity of this character among the several provinces and communes.

2. The task of rounding up, removing (and imprisoning) Fascists has so far been performed by military agencies totally separate and in no way responsible to AMGOT. Primarily these agencies have been the British Field Security and the American Counterintelligence Corps. Their mission and their operations have been performed as part of tactical units and have been necessarily regarded as emergency security measures exercised as part of the combat

with comparable or related problems.

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1. AMGOT has at present no specifically delegated officer or unit for defining the specific objectives to be achieved, devising proper and consistent procedures, drawing up directives or programs, or coordinating activity of this character among the several provinces and communes.
2. The task of rounding up, removing (and imprisoning) Fascists has so far been performed by military agencies totally separate and in no way responsible to AMGOT. Primarily these agencies have been the British Field Security and the American Counterintelligence Corps. Their mission and their operations have been performed as part of tactical units and have been necessarily regarded as emergency security measures exercised as part of the combat phase. After their job is done they move on with the armies. In many instances by the time AMGOT moves in, the security or counterintelligence officers have gone ahead, leaving no opportunity for checking or coordinating with them. In instances where they have remained behind, their cooperation with AMGOT officers has had to be on purely personal rather than regularized basis because no official lines of contact or procedure have been laid down.

The result has been that there has been no effective way for AMGOT officers to determine which, or precisely why, various persons have been removed and sent off to detention camps; nor has it been possible to determine whether the clean-up has been spotty or reasonably complete, nor to get any clear record of the individual or the causes for his arrest. Instances were cited to this officer, as they have been to many other AMGOT officers, in which many real Fascists have been left at large while others of a much milder character--and even anti-fascists--have been taken away.

3. In addition to Field Security and Counterintelligence there is a multitude of other agencies, British and American which are concerned with some aspect of this problem and with which AMGOT has had no prescribed or organized channels of contact. Among these are:

- (a) Military Intelligence generally. U. S. G-2, which is found at all levels of command within the Army, and A-2 within the Air Corps, with comparable units within the British Army and RAF. Much of the information gathered by these intelligence services would be of value to AMGOT in dealing with the problems in hand.
- (b) As a special part of military intelligence--representing a joint effort on the part of the British and American Armies--the AIO (Allied Interrogation Organization) which is now engaged in interrogating civilian prisoners and political prisoners in the former Fascists penal colonies can be of inestimable value in providing useful information to AMGOT bearing on the problem of arriving at sound conclusions with respect to Fascists. Similarly with CSDIC (Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center)
- (c) The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) which has a number of representatives in Sicily--and which had a hand in preparing information and manuals for AMGOT--has a continuing mission very closely allied to this common problem.
- (d) The Psychological Warfare Board is still another organization operating within the sphere of eliminating Fascism from the current scene, with which continuing contact should be established and maintained.

4. Above all, AMGOT needs clearer definition of what is meant precisely by the term "Fascist;" and to develop some criteria for determining just who should, or should not, be maintained in office or allowed to represent the various civil agencies with which AMGOT has to deal.

II. SUGGESTED PROGRAM

The following are suggested as tentative steps which AMGOT can take to remedy the situation described in the preceding section of this memorandum: 2323

- 1. Preparation of directive--based on existing proclamations and orders--clarifying AMGOT's responsibility with respect to the removal of, or other action concerning, Fascists.
- 2. Establishment of a section^a and appointment of an officer in charge at HQ AMGOT; with the specific responsibility for:-

- the former fascists penal colonies and in providing useful information to AMGOT bearing on the problem of arriving at sound conclusions with respect to Fascists. Similarly with CSDIC (Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center)
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II. SUGGESTED PROGRAM

The following are suggested as tentative steps which AMGOT can take to remedy the situation described in the preceding section of this memorandum:

1. Preparation of directive--based on existing proclamations and orders--clarifying AMGOT's responsibility with respect to the removal of, or other action concerning, Fascists.
2. Establishment of a section* and appointment of an officer in charge at HQ AMGOT; with the specific responsibility for:--
 - (a) Establishing contact with and coordinating the plans, programs and activities of the several intelligence and security agencies previously mentioned with those of AMGOT in the subject field.

* The most direct title for such a section would be Intelligence and Security Section; AMGOT. (This is a generally descriptive title used at the present time in the U.S. Army in place of the old "G-2" or "A-2," e.g. the Section with which this officer was connected at HQ, Air Transport Command is known by that name and its problems are comparable in many respects with those of AMGOT. It is standard operating procedure for all military organizations to have such a section. In the case of AMGOT, in the light of the current situation, it is even more clearly indicated.

- (b) Devising plans and methods for the more effective and controlled use of existing intelligence and security agencies and personnel. (In this way duplication can be avoided and some central control over the situation established.)
- (c) Devising appropriate and effective procedures and material for instructing C.A.O.s or other interested officers in dealing with the problem of Fascist officials and personnel.

This function would include the establishment of some norms for determining what kind of persons or organizations need to be eliminated, the preparation of check lists and questionnaires and types and methods of interrogation to be used in developing records and useful evidence; background information concerning Fascism and the significance of various Fascist organizations and offices to which the suspect individual may have been attached, and methods of evaluating evidence provided by informers and others.

- (d) Making such field trips as may be necessary for the purpose of coordinating and improving the operations of AMGOT officers in the provinces and communes with respect to this problem.
- (e) Generally acting as the responsible staff officer of AMGOT, and as the adviser at Headquarters, concerning the subject problem, coordinating with other interested sections at AMGOT HQ and directing such operations in this field as may be prescribed by the Command of AMGOT.

This officer is ready to implement this memorandum with more specific details or data if so desired.

AMGOT HQ
15 Army Group

ALDO L. RAFFA
Major, A.C.
AMGOT

2024

HEADQUARTERS A. M. G. O. T.
Public Safety Division
Civil Police Section

AM GOT ^{28/HCS.}
~~10/1/45~~

17 August, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. Col. Spofford, thru Lt. Col. Martin,
Deputy Commissioner of Public Safety.

It is difficult to obtain a true appreciation of this
subject material. But in our investigation of Pasadena and
the compilation of facts relative thereto it would be helpful
to evaluate the material contained herein.

It is suggested that Maj. Ruffa be directed to study and
submit an impression to the Public Safety Division.

Russell A. Snook

RUSSELL A. SNOOK
Lt. Colonel
Public Safety Division
Capt. Civil Police

PAS/Sec.

2523

*Conference with
Maj Ruffa
8/17/45
Store*

7/16/43 218/140 5
SECRET

Subject: Intelligence Reports

15AG/7982/CA

C.C.A.O.

AMGOT, Adv. H.Q.
c/o 86 Area
Syracuse ✓

Gp. Capt. Benson
H.Q. Main Eighth Army

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of four letters from G(1b) giving information which, it is thought, will be of interest to you.
2. Copies are being forwarded direct in case you have not received them through 8 Army channels. Copies have also been sent to 7 Army for Lt. Col. Poletti.

P. Henry Smith
Lieut. Col.

COLONEL
S.S.O.
AMGOT

2522

AMGOT, H.Q.
15 Army Group
Field
25 Jul 43

P/B
7/14

2-4

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O P Y.

SUBJECT:- OVRA.

SECRET.

A.C. of S. G-2,
Seventh Army.

15AG/1402/8/G(Ib).

23 July 45.

The Special I(b) Officer with Eighth Army has made contact with the head OVRA agent at SYRACUSE and has obtained from him certain information about that organisation.

The name of the OVRA chief in SICILY, FORESTA Pietro of RALIERMO has already been transmitted to you my message.

The OVRA appears to have been concerned only with the security of the Fascist Regime, and not with counter-espionage in the wide sense. One of the special war-time tasks allotted to the OVRA has been to keep an eye on the activities of the Germans and particular of the Gestapo. Information on the Gestapo, and possibly even on the Abwehr may therefore be found in OVRA files; these appear to be generally kept at prefecture offices.

At SYRACUSE the OVRA representatives appear to have confined themselves largely to reporting on the general attitude and moral of the civil population.

There is as yet no indication that members of the OVRA have been instructed to carry out espionage in the event of an Allied landing: they should however be considered as a potential danger in this direction, until there is evidence to the contrary.

It has been ascertained that the functions of the OVRA are duplicated by a less secret body of plain clothes police, known as the Squadra Politica, to be found in every Questura. Members of this body, like those of the OVRA, should be regarded as security suspects.

(Signed)

W. D. Gibson, LT. COL.
Major-General,
Chief of General-Staff,
15 Army Group.

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
B.N.A.F.
Copy to:- A.M.G.O.T. H.Q.

Subject: German Intelligence Service in SICILY.

SECRET.

15AG/1403/1/G(Ib).

23 Jul 43.

Eighth Army.

Reference this H.Q. 1402/11/G(Ib) dated 23 Jul 43.

Major DI MODICA, who gave the information on the PARTITO DI AZIONE, states that he was informed by MARTINO Augusto, who is referred to in para.3 of the above letter, that there is a lieutenant of the Carabinieri at TAORMINA who is a member of the Partito di Azione. 2520

This lieutenant reported that a German officer had arrived at TAORMINA with the intention of placing agents with W/T in the district to remain in the event of an Axis evacuation.

According to DI MODICA the lieutenant will probably get in touch with our forces, but if he does not do so he can be identified through MARTINO Augusto.

(Sgd) W.D.GIBSON, Lt.Col.
for Major-General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
B.N.A.F.

Copy to: G-2 (C.I.) A.F.H.Q.
AMGOT H.Q.

Subject: Partito di one.

SECRET.

15AG/1402/11/8(Ib).

23 July 43.

C.G., H.Q. Seventh Army (for attention of A.C. of S, G-2)
G.S.I(b) H.Q. Eighth Army.

1. Interrogation of an Italian officer prisoner (Major Giovanni di Meda) who is believed sincere and reliable has elicited information concerning the members of an Italian political party, the members of which may be useful in furnishing information to security personnel. The political and propaganda aspects of the matter are in the hands of AMGOT and Psychological Warfare and are of no interest to security personnel except as background material for making contacts.

2. The party is known as Partito di Azione. It is of republican sentiments and feels that Italy should have a federal form of government modeled on Switzerland or the United States, all of this to be brought about by an election. Because of Fascist policy the party has been forced to remain under cover, but appears to be well organized throughout Sicily. The party has occupied itself with attempts to disaffect the army and the people from the Crown and the Fascist Party, and the prisoner claims that they were successful in weakening the resistance of the coastal divisions.

3. The head of the party is Count Sforza, one time Foreign Minister of Italy and at present in the United States. Organizers in Sicily are:

Major DI MODICA, Giovanni	-	(Professor of Economics at the University of TURIN) now a prisoner.
MARTINO, Augusto	-	for CATANIA and SYRACUSE, living at TAORMINA
MARTINO, Giuseppe, lawyer,	-	for MESSINA, living at S. STEPHANO, near
cousin of above	-	MESSINA.
CONSENTINO, Giuseppe, lawyer	-	for TRAPANI, living at TRAPARELLA, near
	-	TRAPANI.
NAPOLI, Guido	-	for PALERMO, living at CASTELBUONO, near
	-	PALERMO.

4. The party is stated to be well organized into regional groups, SICILY represents one region. Regional groups are divided into sections each of three members, only one of which knows who are the members of the adjoining sections.

5. The party publishes a periodical called "Italia Libera" which is circulated among the members. Members meet to exchange views at small inns called Circoli.

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MARTINO, Augusto	-	for CATANIA and SYRACUSE, living at TAORMINA
MARTINO, Giuseppe, lawyer, cousin of above	-	for MESSINA, living at S. STEPHANO, near MESSINA.
CONSENTINO, Giuseppe, lawyer	-	for TRAPANI, living at PAPARELLA, near TRAPANI.
NAPOLI, Guido	-	for PALERMO, living at CASTELBUONO, near PALERMO.

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(Sgd) W.D. GIBSON, Lt.Col.
for Major General,
Chief of General Staff,
15 Army Group.

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
B.N.A.F.

COPY TO: G-2 (C.I) A.F.H.Q.
AMGOT H.Q.

SUBJECT: Carabinieri.

SECRET.

15AG/1402/8 G(Ib).

AMGOT H.Q.

23 July 43.

1. The following information concerning the Italian espionage and counter espionage and the part played therein by the Carabinieri has been received from the Special I(b) officer working with Eighth Army. It is considered that the information may be regarded as reliable.

2. Italian counter espionage is directed by the CENTRO CONTRO SPIONAGGIO (C.C.S.) a combined Services Organisation forming part of the S.I.M.

The C.C.S. works entirely through the Carabinieri, and the S.I.M. also appears to make considerable use of the Carabinieri for espionage work. Both the C.C.S. and the S.I.M. use local Carabinieri stations as cover addresses.

Carabinieri chosen for counter espionage work wear plain clothes and are termed a military police as distinct from the ordinary Carabinieri who are a judicial police. Before the Allied landing, the local teams of Carabinieri engaged in counter espionage worked distinctly apart from the normal Carabinieri having, in keeping with their secret character, their own office, and never frequenting the Carabinieri barracks. They appear, however, to have been instructed to report, in the event of an Allied landing, to the local barracks for normal Carabinieri duties and to exchange their plain clothes for uniform.

3. An Italian officer prisoner, intelligent and apparently reliable, who was questioned yesterday by an officer of this branch, stated that all officers of ~~the~~ the Carabinieri are concerned in counter espionage and that all members of the S.I.M. are recruited from the Carabinieri. An M.I. 6 officer who was in TRIPOLI considers the first statement quite likely to be true.

4. Although there is as yet no direct evidence that the enemy has made plans for any members of the Carabinieri to carry out espionage work within the area of SICILY occupied by the Allies, it is clear that certain Carabinieri personnel, those who are working ^{of pay} for the C.C.S. or S.I.M., present a serious potential threat to our security.

It is considered that this danger can only be met by C.A.P.O's and security personnel in conjunction making every effort to segregate those Carabinieri connected with the C.C.S. or S.I.M. from those concerned solely with normal police functions. If the former can be discovered and arrested without delay, this should remove the security threat, while enabling the latter to be used as the basic national police body required by AMGOT.

It is requested that C.A.P.O's be instructed to give their co-operation and urgent attention to this task.

5. We have the following information concerning Carabinieri personalities connected with C.C.S. and ^{or} S.I.M., most of it received from the same source as above.

having, in keeping with their secret character, their own office, and never frequenting the Carabinieri barracks. They appear, however, to have been instructed to report, in the event of an Allied landing, to the local barracks for normal Carabinieri duties and to exchange their plain clothes for uniform.

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It is considered that this danger can only be met by C.A.P.O's and security personnel in conjunction making every effort to segregate those Carabinieri connected with the C.C.S. or S.I.M. from those concerned solely with normal police functions. If the former can be discovered and arrested without delay, this should remove the security threat, while enabling the latter to be used as the basic national police body required by AMGOT.

It is requested that C.A.P.O's be instructed to give their co-operation and urgent attention to this task.

5. We have the following information concerning Carabinieri personalities connected with C.C.S. and ^{or} S.I.M., most of it received from the same source as above.

(i) DE LEO, in charge of counter espionage in SICILY, is directly responsible to the CENTRO CONTRO SPIONAZZIO in ROME.

(ii) DE LEO's Counter Espionage HQ in SICILY, which used to be at PALERMO, moved to VILLA ISABELLA near SAN CATALDO in April this year.

(iii) DE LEO has an assistant called Capt. RICAGNI.

(iv) Correspondence for DE LEO and RICAGNI used to be addressed to c/o Gruppo Interno, Carabinieri Station, PALERMO. Since the move to SAN CATALDO, such correspondence has been addressed c/o Carabinieri Station, SAN CATALDO.

(v) Capt. PANNATO at CALTANISSESTO was responsible for counter espionage work in S. and S.E. SICILY. Responsible to DE LEO.

(vi) A small team of plain clothes Carabinieri worked under PANNATO at COMISO.

(vii) A team of one Warrant Officer - Maresciallo MACCA - and four other ranks worked for Capt. PANNATO in the SYRACUSE district. MACCA left SYRACUSE for CATANIA on the eve of the Allied landing.

contd....

-2-

(viii) North of CATANIA it appears that the local Warrant officers works directly under DE LEO.

6. Seventh and Eighth Armies have been informed of the contents of this letter.

H.Q. 15 Army Group
B.N.A.F.
(Sgd) W.D.GIBSON. Lt.Col.
for Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I),
15 Army Group

0986

