

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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10000/100/1009

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
FILE NO. 403
OCT. - DEC. 1943

785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

FILMED AS FOUND
IN COLLECTION

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

$$\Delta \phi \approx \pi/2$$

1943-01-15
Hans G. Borchert

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• 115 • has received orders to make motion for recognition
of Cuban Government, to the U.S.A. 3-10-4.

to the two "men of God" who had come to order him to act. On the morning of the next day, he was taken to the provincial capital, Gaozhou, in South China, where he was confined.

• 35. The following conclusions were drawn:

b) Significant differences are considered significant if $p < 0.05$.

Continued from page 192 back number
July 1943, etc.

3) DATA ACCESS LEVELS AND RIGHTS

THE JOURNAL OF CLIMATE

THE LOSING SECTION

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

4) Sugar - Glucose - C6H12O6? Glucosamine as 278 42 2063
Glucosamine - Glucosamine - C6H12O5.

b) Such additional personnel as are considered necessary
should be placed under Control. Control of
the Building Clearance Unit, Construction
and Service Bureau, and the
Construction Control Unit, also
Control of the Engineering Services.

c) Since government should be responsible to legislature, it is better to have a separate executive.

2021: *Vegan Section*
2022: *Vegetarian Section*

THE JOURNAL OF CLIMATE

Mr. George See (5176) (2)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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October

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

8 December 1943

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL YOUNG: (For Information)

SUBJECT: Local agencies engaged in collecting political intelligence.

1. In the course of routine duties with the Allied Intelligence Committee, the undersigned officer has discovered that, in addition to AMG (ACC) Security Intelligence, the following Allied agencies are engaged in collecting political intelligence in Sicily:

- a. Office of Strategic Services, Research & Analysis Branch, 188 Via Vittorio Emanuele, Palermo; Telephone: 14499. Mr. Donald McKay is in charge. His assistants are Ensign Roberts, USNA, and a Mr. Fales. Mr. McKay expects to leave shortly for Naples, where O.S.S. has a considerable staff, presumably doing the same sort of work for the Italian mainland.
- b. Office of Strategic Services, Secret Intelligence Branch, 81 Via D'Annunzio, Palermo; Telephone: 12023. Captain Max Gorvo, USA, in charge, assisted by a Mr. Russo, etc. Collection of political intelligence is a secondary function of this office. Such intelligence is used in OSS espionage and other operational work in Italy (and Sicily).
- c. Joint Counter-Intelligence Company, Island Base Section, 2 Via XII Gennaio, Palermo; Telephone: Clover 157. Major Snowden in charge, assisted by Agent Murphy, etc. This office collects political intelligence in connection with military security matters. (Incidentally, it has a file of some 5,000 to 10,000 dossiers of prominent Fascists in Sicily. This file probably could be secured, either on loan or outright allocation, by Security Intelligence.)
- d. 7th Army Counter-Intelligence, 7th Army Hqcts, PO Bldg. Telephone: Cadet exchange. Major Bruskin in charge, assisted by small staff. This office also collects political intelligence in connection with military security matters.
- e. The Joint Intelligence Collecting Agency (JICA), a US Army-Navy collecting agency operating directly under G-2, AFHQ. Major Pimpelly in charge, assisted by Captain Bruno, Agents Farored and Driscoll, etc. 5 Via Sabotino; Telephone: 18476. This office collects all sorts of economic, political, technical, etc. intelligence reports, and makes weekly report to AFHQ on political situation in Sicily. Major Pimpelly now in Brindisi setting up JICA office there. Captain Bruno in charge temporarily.

MORE

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1. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Naval Operating Base, Palermo; Commander Murphy, USNR, in charge, assisted by Ensigns Bruscia and Flubacher, USNR. Ensign Bruscia, in particular, is well-versed on local political intelligence. Tel. 23
2. Psychological Warfare Branch, 1 Via Giostra. Captain Gosgrove, (B), is charge, assisted by Lieutenant DeGrassi, (A), Mr. Eugene Warner (A), and between 30 to 35 others. Makes weekly political report on conditions in Sicily to Algiers. Tel. 14691.
3. B-2 Office, Island Base Section. Lieutenant Spielman in charge, assisted by several non-commissioned personnel. Works in close collaboration with 401st U.I.C. (Major Snowden). Telephone: CLOver 2.
4. B-2 Office, Twelfth Troop Carrier Command. Via Libertà. Telephone: Invader 2. Major Louis Salomon in charge, assisted by several other officers. Nominal interest only in political situation in Sicily. Extent of political reports, if any, unknown.
5. Mr. Alfred Nestor, former U.S. Consul-General at Palermo, and slated to be next US Consul-General here. Office: 5 Via Sabotino (with JICA) Tel. 18476. Residence: Hotel Excelsior. Now in Malta for short time; thence to Naples; thence to Palermo. Makes frequent political reports to US State Department on situation in Sicily.
6. Security Office, Military District No. 1. headquarters: Catania. Major Coventry, Security Officer. Interested in political intelligence principally from security viewpoint.

John V. Hinkel,
Major, M.I.
Acting Secretary,
Allied Intelligence Committee

B.C. 2 Nov 43
U.S. SECRET EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

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U. S. SECRET
(Equals British Most Secret)

HEADQUARTERS
76 NOV 1943
AMG

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

SECRET
By auth C-in-C, AF
Initials: TCL
Date: 1/21 Nov 1943

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
A20 512

21 November 1943

HEADQUARTERS
HEADQUARTERS
76 NOV 1943
A.M.G

ADDRESSEES TO:

INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTION
NUMBER: 53
AMG

The above numbered Intelligence Instruction does NOT apply to Prisoners of War, the procedure for whom will remain as heretofore.

By command of General INSTRUCTER:

"W. B. SMITH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

T. E. G. W.
Lt. T. D. STRONG,
2nd Lieutenant, C.S.
As C. of S., C-2,

DISTRIBUTION:

AHQ "B" and HQ "C".

plus

C. of S., C-2, War Department (thru JICs, AMG)	5
D.A. I., War Office	3
D.E.I., G.P., M.R.P.	3
E.G.S. (Int), HQ, 15 Int Group	4
C. of S., C-2, HQ, First Army	5
C.S. (Int), HQ, 8 Army	3
12th Central Commission	3
C.S. (Int), HQ, No. 2 District	3
C. of S., C-2, HQ, Panmunjom Bus Section	3

33)

26 NOV 1945

AMG

NAMES:

The above numbered Intelligence Instruction does NOT apply to Prisoners of War, the procedure for whom will remain as heretofore.

By command of General INSTRUCTEE:

"V. J. SMITH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

OFFICERS:

Tech. Chief

Asst. Dir. D. SEC'D,
Brigadier, G.S.,
As C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

AHQ "B" and HQ QM, "W".

plus

• C. of S., G-2, War Department (thru JICs, JHQ)	3
• D.W.I., War Office	3
• D.W.I., G.H.Q. M.R.P.	3
• B.G.S. (Int.), HQ, 15 Army Group	3
• C. of S., G-2, HQ, First Army	3
• C.S. (Int.), HQ, 8 Army	3
• Int'l Central Commission	3
• G.S. (Int.), HQ, No. 2 District	3
• C. of S., G-2, HQ, Antisubmariner Base Section	3
• G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) .HQ, c/o Allied Control Commission	3

U. S. SECRET EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET
(Equals British Most Secret)

U. S. SECRET EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

4 P.D.J.

PA

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
APO 512

26 November 1943

SUBJECT: Amended Directive - Organization of Intelligence Work in the AGO.

TO : Chief of Staff.

1. The following is an analysis of the changes made by the amended directive.

PARAGRAPH	APP. GY TO DIRECTIVE NO. 1 DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1943.	NEW DIRECTIVE (AMD.).
1. (a)	to provide "a sound basis".	to provide "intelligence for a sound basis".
1. (b)	"to provide the United Nations with intelligence...."	"to transmit to JIC (AM) or such agencies as may be designated... all relevant intelligence".
2.	-	No change.
3.	Indicates one (first) source of intelligence	Indicates two sources of intelligence: a) sub-commissions b) a co-belligerent and co-operative Italy.
4.	Indicates another (second) source of intelligence i.e. co-belligerent co-operative Italy and states no need to set up Special Intelligence staffs in sub-commissions.	No need to set up Special Intelligence staffs in sub-commissions.
5.	Composition of AGO Intelligence Committee.	Duties of Intelligence Committee (5 items, instead of 6). The item deleted is included in new para 1 (b).
6.	Duties of Intelligence Committee	Composition of Intelligence Committee (as old para 5).
7.	Duties of Intelligence staffs of Sections.	No change.

PARAGRAPH APP. G3 TO DIRECTIVE NO.1 DATED NEW DIRECTIVE (A TD).
 10 NOVEMBER 1945.

8. Chief I.O. of sections to be members of committee. No change.

9. LIAISON. SECURITY.

10. SECURITY. (refers to App. G4) LIAISON + as old para 10.
and nominates principal Security officer as member.

11. NEW PARAGRAPH - reference to SECURITY ORDERS.

2. The only material change is in para 1 (b); other changes are in form.

3. Shall new Appendix G3 to Directive No.1 dated 10 November 1945 be prepared with necessary modifications?

W. DUDLEY WHITE
Major
Staff D.O. of S. (O. & S. I.)

U.S. SECRET **UNITED STATES BRITISH MOS, SECRET**

Military Government Section

Dec 45 (or 45)

MS 322-12

13 November 1943.

SUBJECT: Amendment to Directive to Acting Deputy President,
Allied Control Commission.

TO : SEE DISTRIBUTION BELOW.

1. App. B 2 to P.D. No. 12 dated 22 October 1943, a part of Annex C to
Directive to Acting Deputy President, Allied Control Commission, MS-322-12 dated
4 November 1943 issued by this Section is revoked and the attached will please be
substituted therefor.

For the Chief of Section:

1 Incl. - as above

DISTRIBUTION:

Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff (2)

SCS

CAO

DTC

G-1(A)

G-1(B)

G-2

G-3

G-4

JACS

OCCAO HQ AMG -

OCCAO 15 Army Group

The Resident American Minister

The Resident British Minister

Allied Regional Commissioner, Sardinia

JAC

Claims and Writings (E)

Civil Affairs (E) MEF

Chief, Civil Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. (3)

Director of Civil Affairs, Whitehall, S.W.1. (3)

PB

CG - 15 Army Group

CG - 5 Army

CG - 8 Army

Brig. General Holmes

Colonel Maxwell

Major Jackson

Chief Legal Officer

Lt. Colonel Fairman

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS

21 NOV 1943

AMG.

FOR THE CHIEF OF SECTION:

1 Incl. - as above

T. E. JACKMAN
Major

DISTRIBUTION:

Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff (2)

SCS

CAO

DTC
C-1(A)
C-1(B)

C-2

C-3

C-4

JCS

CCAO HQ A&G ✓

CCAO 15 Army Group

The Resident American Minister

The Resident British Minister

Allied Regional Commissioner, Sardinia

JAG

Claims and Hirings (E)

Civil Affairs (ER) MEW

Chief, Civil Affairs Division, Washington, D.C. (3)

Director of Civil Affairs, Whitewall, S.W.1. (3)

PAB

HO

CG - 15 Army Group

CG - 5 Army

CG - 8 Army

Brig. General Holmes

Colonel Maxwell

Major Jackman

Chief Legal Officer

Lt. Colonel Faithman

Major Howell

MSS 322-12

RETURN TO: Military Government Section, AFHQ, APO 512.

✓ 5167

Received copy of Amendment to General Instructions to Acting Deputy President
Armistice Control Commission.

Signed _____

Rank and Org. _____

U.S. SECRET EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

U.S. SECRET EYALS BRITISH MOSI SECRET

ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE WORK IN THE ALLIED COMMISSION

1. GENERAL

The task of the Intelligence organization in the Allied Commission will be twofold:

- (a) to provide intelligence for a sound basis for plans and operations of the Commission.
 - (b) to transmit to JIC (AF), or to such agencies as may be designated by them all relevant intelligence.
2. It must be remembered that this occupation and supervision of an enemy country provides a unique opportunity for gaining intelligence about our enemies. Full and early advantage must be taken of this.
3. Whereas normally military intelligence has to be obtained from observation of an enemy, in the case of the allied commission intelligence is gained from direct sources, i.e. from the ordinary work of sub-commission and from a co-operative nation. Thus information will be largely collected and collated in the normal course of work without necessitating setting up separate intelligence staffs.
4. It follows that it will normally be unnecessary to allocate special intelligence officers to sub-commissions.

5. DUTIES OF COMMISSION INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

This committee will be responsible for:

- (a) Collation of information received from sub-commission.
- (b) Provision of collated information to sections, sub-commissions, staffs and committees of the Allied Commission as required.
- (c) Provision of collated information to JIC (AF), as requested by latter.
- (d) Ensuring that the necessary records and statistics are maintained.
- (e) Receiving and dealing with questions asked by AFHQ or the JIC (AF).

6. The Commission Intelligence Committee will be composed in accordance with instructions issued by the Deputy President from time to time presided over by the Chief of Staff or one of his staff officers, and will have a secretary and assistants. Additional members may be added as required for special purposes. AFHQ will be represented on this Committee by representatives of JIC (AF).

7. DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS OF SECTIONS.

The Intelligence staff of a section will:

- (a) Collect information collected by the sub-commission of that section.
- (b) Provide collated information for the Commission Intelligence Committee.
- (c) deal with questions asked by the Commission Intelligence Committee.
- (d) frame questionnaires for the sub-commissions of that section.
- (e) ensure that the necessary records and statistics are maintained in accordance with the instructions of the Commission Intelligence Committee.

8. The Chief Intelligence Officer of each section will be ex officio a member

785015

3. Whereas normally military intelligence has to be obtained from observation of an enemy, in the case of the Allied commission intelligence is gained from direct sources, i.e. from the ordinary work of sub-commission and from a co-belligerent and possibly co-operative nation. Thus information will be largely collected and collated in the normal course of work without necessitating setting up separate intelligence staffs.

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- (c) Deal with questions asked by the Commission Intelligence Committee.
- (d) Frame questionnaires for the sub-commissions of that section.
- (e) Ensure that the necessary records and statistics are maintained in accordance with the instructions of the Commission Intelligence Committee.

8. The Chief Intelligence Officer of each section will be ex officio a member of the Commission Intelligence Committee.

9. SECURITY.


A small Security staff will work in the Headquarters Section, and if possible for issuing the necessary Security orders for the Allied Commission and for Security work within the Commission.

10. The Principal Security Officer will maintain close touch with the Security organization at AFHQ, and will be an ex officio member of the Commission Intelligence Committee.

11. The Security orders for the Allied Commission will conform to the general security policy laid down by AFHQ.

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


201925A 08 1040 BACKER PRIORITY 100-3915
FROM : FAIRFA
TO : 1 SHARE FOR AMG
210932A

Have considered censorship proposal which you requested Foley to present. We have recently made strong representations to Italy Government that they must not carry on unauthorized political activity in ANGOT territory and have solicited their cooperation in this connection. It is our view that anything more than self imposed control would be inservable and ineffective from administrative standpoint. No ANGOT censor desired here at this time.

(1 SHARE FOR AMG FOR BUSTARBOOK FROM FAIRFA FROM FOLEY SIGNED JOYCE)

DIRE:
AMG (ASST)
OO
100-3920
INITIALS



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③ NO. 785015

P.A. / Schreiter

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HEADQUARTERS

— 10 —

11-2-43
(date)

Sus: _____
(date)

FROM	TO
C. C. A. O.	
D. C. C. A. O.	
O. S. O.	
D. C. S. O.	
A C. of G.	
Adjutant	
Personnel Officer	
Civ. Supply Div.	
Legal Div.	
Contr. of Prop. Div.	
Public Safety Div.	
Finance Div.	
Public Health Div.	
Civil Affairs Div.	

FOR

Sophomore
Recommendation and remark
Information and guidance
Approval or disapproval
Necessary action
Action taken
Investigation and Report
To note and return
File
Dispatch

第十一章

File
Dispatch

In Col. Young's opinion
No. 116.

3.3/NND No. 183013

785015

PG AM90T (US car)

BICK SEWIP

(ante)

S: _____
(date)

1001

- Information and guidance
 - Approval or disapproval
 - Necessary action
 - Action taken
 - Investigation and report
 - To note and return
 - File
 - Dismissal

VERITAS

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
AFO 512

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

2 November 1943

SUBJECT: Security Measures.

TO : MGS, A.F.H.Q.

1. Among the important security measures for which provision must be made, are the following:
 - (a) Security of operations and communications of the Commission.
 - (b) Security supervision of personnel of the Commission.
 - (c) Coordination with A.F.H.Q.
 - (d) Coordination with I.N.C. and issue of censorship instructions both to the Commission and to the Italian Government.
 - (e) Security control of Italian communications.
 - (f) Screening of Italian Officials from the point of view of:
 - (1) political reliability
 - (2) criminal record.
2. It is proposed to appoint a Principal Security Officer who will be the Chief of G-2. He will be assisted by a small staff. He will be responsible for the coordination of all security measures in the Allied Commission, although executive action will be taken by the appropriate sub-commission or other branch concerned. In carrying out his work, he will consult and be assisted by sub-commissions concerned.
3. It is clear that the appointment of Principal Security Officer carries great responsibilities which make it essential to assign an officer of wide security experience and sound judgement. It is considered that Major MATTEI (British) would be suitable and it is therefore requested that he be made immediately available in an acting capacity.
4. Major MATTEI is at present assigned to No. L Region according to information at our disposal. It is requested that he be released from No. L Region and ordered to report to these H.Q. If he is still in North Africa, he should, before reporting here, consult G-2 A.F.H.Q. in order to make himself conversant with their security policy.
5. Re Paragraph 1 (f), Screening of Italian Officials, it will be important to receive the advice of a representative of the Political Section. Practical difficulties preclude close liaison with Messers CACCIA and REAM. It is therefore requested that a representative of the Political Section be sent to this headquarters to assist in this task, which has become urgent and is already reaching a considerable magnitude.

Percy J. McCarthy
Percy J. McCarthy
Brigadier General, United States Army

785015

- (c) Security supervision of personnel of the Commission.
- (c) Coordination with A.F.H.Q.
- (c) Coordination with I.N.C. and issue of censorship instructions both to the Commission and to the Italian Government.
- (e) Security control of Italian communications.
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3. It is clear that the appointment of Principal Security Officer carries great responsibilities which make it essential to assign an officer of wide security experience and sound judgement. It is considered that Major MATTEI (British) would be suitable and it is therefore requested that he be made immediately available in an acting capacity.
4. Major MATTEI is at present assigned to No. 4 Region according to information at our disposal. It is requested that he be released from No. 4 Region and ordered to report to these H.Q. If he is still in North Africa, he should, before reporting here, consult G-2 A.F.H.Q. in order to make himself conversant with their security policy.
5. Re Paragraph 1 (f), Screening of Italian Officials, it will be important to receive the advice of a representative of the Political Section. Practical difficulties preclude close liaison with Messers CACCIA and PEGG. It is therefore requested that a representative of the Political Section be sent to this headquarters to assist in this task, which has become urgent and is already reaching a considerable magnitude.

Frank J. McSherry

Frank J. McSherry
Brigadier General, United States Army

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ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

OK
SUBJECT: *AMGOT* INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS
TO: *General McSherry*
UNITED COMMISSION

FILE No.

AMGOT HQ SICILY

October 20 1943

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

In accordance with instructions from General McSherry, the following is submitted as a proposal looking toward the unification of various intelligence and security activities already contained within the general framework of the proposed organization of the Allied Commission. Such unification would (1) Give central direction under the responsible heads of the Allied Commission to a series of vitally important activities; (2) avoid duplication, overlap or possible conflicts of jurisdiction between divisions or sections of the Commission insofar as such activities are concerned; (3) be in tune with standard American and British army procedure and practice.

I. THE BACKGROUND AND THE PROGRAM

The need for Intelligence and Security—of a type specifically adapted to the problems of military government of occupied territory—became strikingly apparent soon after the occupation of Sicily. It became obvious ~~to~~, for example, that in carrying out the Allied Government's policy of removing important Fascists from public office, and in the proper and just determination of cases of political prisoners, AMGOT could not depend on other military intelligence agencies. These other agencies, such as the standard G-2's or M.I. sections of tactical armies, CIC or FS units attached to such armies, no matter how useful their work in the first phases of occupation, could not be expected either in terms of their own missions or personnel requirements, to perform functions which became those of AMGOT itself in the later phases of occupation.

A modest and experimental start was made by AMGOT in the direction of providing its own intelligence service by the establishment early in September of the Political Intelligence Section in the Chief Staff Officer's Office. The mission of this section was to formulate a dependable method of fact-finding and analysis with respect to the Fascist backgrounds of public officials and of persons imprisoned by Allied armed forces as actual/potentially dangerous to Allied military or political security. This method developed substituted a number of specific norms for determining the degree to which any individual may have been an important and leading Fascist as against mere membership in the Party which was forced upon practically every Sicilian as part of his conditions of employment. Specification was thus substituted for generalities, guesswork or unsubstantiated accusations, and provided a pattern which would more clearly define the kind of Fascist against whom action should be taken.

The items thus drawn up were incorporated into a questionnaire which every public official is required to fill out and which are carefully reviewed and coordinated with other existing information about the individual. At this writing the questionnaire has been distributed to some 10,000 public officials.

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B The items thus drawn up were incorporated into a questionnaire which every public official is required to fill out and which are carefully reviewed and coordinated with other existing information about the individual. At this writing the questionnaire has been distributed to some 10,000 public officials (including university professors and school teachers as well as other types of public officials) and to many hundreds of political prisoners whose cases must be reviewed. From current reports it appears that at least 20,000 questionnaires will have to be distributed in order to get basic coverage of public ~~MINISTERS~~ officials and other important individuals in Sicily. At all stages the closest collaboration has been maintained with G-2's and counterintelligence units wherever such units still remain in being and have not moved on with combat organizations.

An important by-product of this operation with respect to individuals has been the gathering of a large amount of information—political intelligence in the larger sense—concerning Fascist as well as other political situations in Sicily. This information, and the contacts established with outstanding Anti-Fascist leaders, have proved of considerable interest and value to representatives of the State Department, the Political Warfare Executive Executive (British) and the Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (AFHQ) to whom special service was given by this section.

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ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT

TO

PAGE 2

FILE No.

AMGOT HQ SICILY

134

Other phases of Intelligence or Security initiated by AMGOT were the appointment of a Financial Intelligence Officer and the appointment of an Internal Security Officer.

Under the proposed plan of organization of the Allied Commission, there appear to be the following functions, indicated as indicated:

1.A G-2 section in the HQ administrative staff, apparently to be concerned solely with internal security.

Public Safety Div.

(This function is not indicated on the organization chart but is said to be part of the directive governing the Public Safety Division. Its function is similar, in part, to that of the old AMGOT Political Intelligence Section but does not include much of the work carried on by the old R.I. section, particularly those activities having to do with the educational field and the review of public officials generally, nor with the broader aspects of political intelligence. From the very general description of the mission of this unit, given this officer, its duties would appear to be those of a special police ~~intelligence~~ unit, devoted solely to the formulation of policy with respect to political investigations to be carried out within each Nation.)

2. An Intelligence Committee, operating separately from other branches of the Allied Commission. The function of this Committee is unknown to this officer but it is said that the Committee, to be headed by an executive secretary, would attempt to coordinate the intelligence activities of the Allied Commission with those of other intelligence agencies.

3. A part of the Political Division to be concerned with liaison with PWB, DEC, and presumably other similar agencies concerned with the larger fields of political information and activity.

It appears, therefore, that there is a multitude of intelligence and security activities which are closely related by nature and which logically could be brought together in one interests/better coordination and efficiency. In so doing, the Allied Commission would not be departing on untried paths but would in fact be following the standard pattern of both the British and American armies in having a centralized intelligence body, directly responsible to the Commanding Officer.

The following is suggested as a plan for the creation of such a unified Intelligence branch.

1.A C-2 section in the HQ administrative staff, apparently to be concerned solely with internal security.

Public Safety Div.

2. A political security function within the Special Police Section / (This function is not indicated on the organization chart but is said to be part of the directive governing the Public Safety Division. Its function is similar, in part, to that of the old AMGOT Political Intelligence Section but does not include much of the work carried on by the old P.I. section, particularly those activities having to do with the educational field and the review of public officials generally, nor with the broader aspects of political intelligence. From the very general description of the mission of this unit, given this officer, its duties would appear to be those of a special police ~~intelligence~~ unit, devoted solely to the formulation of policy with respect to political investigations to be carried out within each Region.)

3. An Intelligence Committee, operating separately from other branches of the Allied Commission. The function of this Committee is unknown to this officer but it is said that the Committee, to be headed by an executive secretary, would attempt to coordinate the intelligence activities of the Allied Commission with those of other intelligence agencies.

4. A part of the Political Division to be concerned with liaison with PIB, DIC, and presumably other similar agencies concerned with the larger fields of political information and activity.

It appears, therefore, that there is a multitude of intelligence and security activities which are closely related by nature and which logically could be brought together in the interests/greater coordination and efficiency. In so doing, the Allied Commission would not be departing on untried paths but would in fact be following the standard pattern of both the British and American armies in having a centralized intelligence body, directly responsible to the Commanding Officer.

The following is suggested as a plan for the creation of such a unified Intelligence branch.

II. SUGGESTED PLAN

That there be established within the Allied Commission an Intelligence and Security Division (or Branch) in place of the various sections or units described above, with the following mission, functions and sections:

Mission: To act ~~as~~ as the staff agency within the Allied Commission, directly responsible to the ~~head~~ head or heads of the Commission, for the collection, analysis, evaluation and dissemination of all information concerning (a) political situations, including the scope and extent of Fascist doctrines and practices, still in existence within the occupied territory, any current Fascist activities or infiltrations within that territory, and the purposes and activities of other political parties or organizations; (b) the Fascist background of public officials and other individuals ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~used~~ positions which, if occupied by persons intimical to the Allied cause, would

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT

TO

Date 2

FILE No.

AMGOT 40. SICILY

'94

would constitute a danger to the security of the Allied Commission and to the proper carrying out of its policies and commitments; (c) persons imprisoned by Allied authorities as dangerous fascists or as otherwise politically dangerous to the Allied cause; (d) the internal security of the Allied and Security Commission.

The Intelligence Division would also act as the central reporting agency of the Allied Commission with respect to all reports which are required by higher echelons of intelligence of the American and British governments or by other properly authorized agencies of those governments. Further, it would establish and maintain liaison with other intelligence and security agencies of the British and American governments within the occupied territory, and, wherever necessary, with the appropriate agencies of the Italian Government, and would serve generally as the intelligence coordination agency.

The degree to which financial, economic and industrial intelligence might be made a part of the over-all Intelligence & Security Division would depend on the scope and extent of those functions.

Organization: The Intelligence and Security Division should be headed by an Intelligence and Security Officer. The qualifications of such an officer should obviously be a thorough knowledge of the background of the occupied territory, including, in particular, knowledge of the fascist government, its doctrines, organization and practices; knowledge of the various existing or developing political organizations and parties; preferably a fluent knowledge of the language, and previous background and experience in intelligence and security activities and procedure. These should also be the qualifications of other officers in this division, insofar as they can be obtained.

Tentatively, the I & S Division, should have the following sections:

1. Political Intelligence Section

Functions: To collect, analyse and evaluate all data with respect to individuals or general situations having to do with elimination of fascism, or with the policies or programs of other political parties.

Of value to the entire Allied Commission but more specifically to the Political Division, to appropriate Regional Directors, to the Educational Advisers and to the Public ~~Security~~ Division. Information of particular interest, in addition, to higher agencies of the British and American governments, to military intelligence generally, to PBS, INC, OSS, PES, etc.

785015

by higher echelons of intelligence of the American and British governments or by other properly authorized agencies of those governments. Further, it would establish and maintain liaison with other intelligence and security agencies of the British and American governments within the occupied territory, and, wherever necessary, with the appropriate agencies of the I&S in government, and would serve generally as the intelligence coordination agency.

The degree to which financial, economic and industrial intelligence might be made a part of the overall Intelligence & Security Division would depend on the scope and extent of those functions.

Organization: The Intelligence and Security Division should be headed by an Intelligence and Security Officer. The qualifications of such an officer should obviously be a thorough knowledge of the background of the occupied territory, including, in particular, knowledge of the Fascist government, its doctrines, organization and practices; knowledge of the various existing or developing political doctrines and parties; preferably a fluent knowledge of the language, and previous background and experience in intelligence and security activities and procedure. These should also be the qualifications, of other officers in his division, insofar as they can be obtained.

Tentatively, the I & S Division, should have the following sections:

1. Political Intelligence Section

Functions: To collect, analyze and evaluate all data with respect to individuals or general situations having to/with the elimination of Fascism, or with the policies or programs of other political parties.

Of value to the entire Allied Commission but more specifically to the Political Division, to appropriate Regional Directors, to the Educational Advisers and to the Public Safety Division. Information of particular interest, in addition, to higher agencies of the British and American governments, to military intelligence generally, to FBI, DDC, OSS, PWI, etc.

2. Internal Security Section

Functions: To maintain control over all security and counterintelligence measures affecting the internal security of the Allied Commission. Of value to the proper administration of the Allied Commission.

3. Liaison Section

Functions: To establish and main air contact with all related intelligence or security agencies of other branches of the American and British armies and governments. The head of this section may well serve as "executive secret" of the Intelligence Coordination Committee envisaged in the present Allied Commission plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

SUBJECT

FILE No.

TO
Page 4

AMGOT HQ. SICILY

194

4. Reporting Section

Function: To prepare periodic reports for the heads of the Allied Commission and, as directed, for [redacted] higher agencies of the American and British governments; to maintain such situation maps and other methods of graphic presentation as may be useful in presenting essential information to interested officials, and generally to act as [redacted] the report-writing unit for the Intelligence & Security Division.

Regional Officers

In order to carry out its mission effectively, the HQ I&S Division could not hope to operate merely as a headquarters organization, and with headquarters personnel. The barest minimum—if the Division were to perform its duties properly—of field personnel required would be one Intelligence and Security Officer on the staff of each Regional Director.

Each Regional I&S would bear the same relationship to the Regional Director and to HQ I&S as a divisional Intelligence Officer bears to the commander of the division on the one hand, and to the Army Intelligence Section, on the other. [redacted] In terms of the American army, this means that the regional I&S officer would be similar to an S-2 who has a responsibility both to his own commander and to the topside G-2.

Regional I&S officers would perform the same function for the regional director that HQ I&S performs for the allied commission as a whole. At the same time he would serve as the channel for information, reports and necessary action required by HQ.

These are the bare outlines of a suggested program for integration of intelligence and security functions within the Allied Commission. This officer will be glad to work out the plan in further detail, if so desired, and to furnish a possible estimate of personnel should the basic idea be approved.

Aldo L. Raffa

ALDO L. RAFFA, M.A.C., A.O.
DIRECTOR

All other methods of graphic presentation as may be useful in presenting essential information to interested officials, and generally to act as a report-writing unit for the Intelligence & Security Division.

Regional Officers

In order to carry out its mission effectively, the HQ IIS Division could not hope to operate merely as a headquarters organization, and with headquarters personnel. The barest minimum—if the Division were to perform its duties properly—of field personnel required, would be one Intelligence and Security Officer on the staff of each Regional Director.

Each Regional IIS would bear the same relationship to the Regional Director and to HQ IIS as a divisional intelligence officer bears to the commander of the division on the one hand, and to the Army Intelligence Section, on the other. ~~Intelligence~~ In terms of the American army, this means that the regional IIS officer would be similar to an S-2 who has a responsibility both to his own commander and to the topside G-2.

Regional IIS officers would perform the same function for the Regional Director that HQ IIS performs for the Allied Commission as a whole. At the same time he would serve as the channel for information, reports and necessary action required by him.

These are the bare outlines of a suggested program for integration of intelligence and security functions within the Allied Commission. This officer will be glad to work out the plan in further detail, if so desired, and to furnish a possible estimate of personnel should the basic idea be approved.

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