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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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INTELLIGENCE
NOV. 1943 - JAN. 1944

147pp



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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IN COLLECTION

58. 16.

MOST SECRET
GS 1 NO 17

F 1 FEB Recd

HQ 2 DISTRICT GMP
2112/9 G

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HQ 2 DISTRICT

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 8

Based on Information Received up to

1800 hrs 28 Jan 44

1. Enemy Situation

The FIFTH Army's landing at ANZIO on 22 Jan, with one American and one British Infantry Divisions augmented by Commandos, Rangers and Tanks, caught the enemy unawares. Six days previously he he had already been surprised by a two divisional attack across the lower reaches of the GARIGLIANO, supported by an amphibious landing north of the river mouth. This operation made rapid progress in the initial stages and the attacking troops were soon established on the whole line of hills west of the river. MINTURNO fell but CASTELFORTE defied capture. A footing was at first gained on the M. DAMIANO to the west of the town, but a strong enemy counter attack compelled a withdrawal from this feature. 94 Inf Div opposed the attack and after it had recovered from the first surprise, which cost it some 300 prisoners, it held its ground till support came in the shape of an armoured group of the HERMANN GOERING DIV, which attacked along the coast road with tanks. In spite of repeated efforts the enemy was unable to retake MINTURNO or to throw our troops back across the river.

1769

The bridgehead is a narrow plain running up to a line of hills where lie MINTURNO, TUFO, SUVO and CASTELFORTE. The struggle now in progress is for the control of the three roads north through the hills. The road north from MINTURNO., the AUSENTE Valley and through CASTELFORTE. All three routes converge at AUSONIA (G 7905) whence a narrow valley leads to the more open valley of the R LIRI. The main enemy effort so far has been directed against the MINTURNO and CASTELFORTE.

A second crossing was made opposite S AMBROGIO (G 8909). This attack was brought to nought by a sudden rise in the river, which made bridging impossible. The rise was caused, it is thought, by the blowing of a dam high up the river.

A crossing was also attempted over the RAPIDO

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A crossing was also attempted over the RAPIDO river south of CASSINO opposite S ANGELO, the strong point on which the whole CASSINO line pivots, heavily fortified with pill boxes, wire and with the surrounding country thickly sown with mines. The assault here was made in the face of withering fire from artillery, nebelwerfer, mortars and M.Gs. So heavy was the fire put down on the landing troops that they were compelled to withdraw and take up strong positions behind the RAPIDO.

Meanwhile on the right flank, the FRENCH CORPS has made progress south of S ELIGIO against fierce enemy resistance. M CROCE was taken after a long and stubborn fight. Its capture was followed by heavy counter attacks to restore the situation. All these attacks were/...

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attacks were repulsed with heavy losses inflicted on the enemy.

The launching of this new offensive across the GARIGLIANO found the enmy in the course of reorganisation on the EIGHTH ARMY front. 3 P.G. DIV which had been in reserve in the ROME Area had begun to move over to 76 CORPS to take the place of 90 P.G.DIV, which had already started on its journey towards ROME. When the offensive started a switch was made and at least one Regiment of 3 P.G.DIV came to support 5 MTN DIV opposite the FRENCH CORPS at about the same time. The two Infantry Regiments of 90 P.G. DIV were brought down to the aid of 94 INF DIV in the area of MINTURNO and CASTELFORTE. Yet another division appeared, 71 INF DIV, a new comer to 10 ARMY, sent down hurriedly from ISTRIA. This brought the total of divisions opposing FIVE ARMY up to 13, a formidable array. It must however be borne in mind that many of these divisions are sorely depleted. Few of them have more than two infantry regiments and the strength of companies is often below 50. 344 Inf Div is so pressed for men that its Engineer Bn is being used as ordinary Infantry and its Reinforcement Bn is being used it the line. 94 DIV'S Ersatz Bn was also made responsible for a sector.

There can be no doubt that the enemy was determined to prevent a break through at all costs and in doing so he was prepared to denude 76 CORPS and to disregard the coast line in his rear. 76 CORPS is now left with the PARA DIV, 26 Pz DIV, 334 DIV and 146 INF REGT left behind by 65 DIV. There are even signs of the pending departure of 26 Pz DIV. 15 Tanks and possibly 67 PGR have already departed. Their place is likely to be taken by 577 I.R., 305 INF DIV, about the only formation immediately available.

One of the most striking features of recent enemy troop movements, which may be a sign of dire distress, is the way even fresh units are committed piecemeal, and Regts and even Bns are separated from their parent formations and put in wherever the sudden need arises. The resulting conglomerated mixture on all fronts will make it remarkable if the administration does not break down.

The landing at ANZIO soon showed how completely the possibility of an Allied combined Operation in the rear of the main line had been disregarded. Little opposition was encountered to the first landing and even the GAF did not intervene till the six hours after the first flight had touched down. PW taken included men

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In the meantime advancing up the road north from ANZIO fwd elements have reached CARROCETO (F 8733). Northwest American troops approach CISTERNA and patrols have been reported in LITTORIA. Resistance to our eastward drive is stiffening.

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Appreciation

(1) The surprise landing in the vicinity of ANZIO (F-8516) caught the enemy completely unprepared to meet the attack. This attack threatens to cut his supply lines leading south through ROME, the capture of ROME and the destruction of part of the German TENTH ARMY. The landing, therefore, becomes a grave emergency for the enemy, which calls for speedy and aggressive action to meet the situation. It becomes necessary for him to concentrate the maximum force consistent with the situation to meet the attack. From his point of view it would be highly desirable to launch a counteroffensive for the destruction of the landing force, as first priority; second priority, employ the force to prevent further advance and thereby reduce the threat to the rear of the army, and also prevent reinforcements. If he permits the landing force to continue reinforcement he may not be able to limit the advance. The line of action which he will take will depend on the size of the force he is able to concentrate against the landing force.

(2) As indicated by motor movements on D Day, it has become necessary for the enemy to transfer troops from the southern front to the northern front to begin his build up in that area. His future action on the southern front will depend to a large extent on the force it will be necessary for him to transfer to the northern front. He may find it necessary to weaken the southern front to such an extent that he is no longer able to continue the defence, in which case delaying action will be necessary because the road net and transportation requirements will not permit him to make a simultaneous withdrawal of the entire German TENTH ARMY. With even more mobile troops than the enemy has on the southern front, it has always taken him three days to evacuate a position. With less mobile troops currently on the enemy front a greater period of time is indicated. It is impossible to accurately estimate the amount of time that will be necessary for the enemy to withdraw the TENTH ARMY north of the Tiber River by means of delaying action.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(3) It seems that the more probable action which the enemy is likely to take is to concentrate the maximum force against the northern front for the purpose of defeating the Allied landing force and drive it into the sea. If he fails to defeat the landing force or estimates that he is not capable of doing so then his most probable line of action would be to defend, attempt to isolate it and prevent its further advance. It is likely that the enemy on the southern front will continue his defence in that area until he finds out whether or not he can defeat the landing force on the northern front.

Failing to defeat/..

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
Failing to defeat the landing force on the Northern Front then he/most likely to begin a delaying action to the northwest with the object of withdrawing north of the Tiber River. There being no prepared defensive position north of the Tiber River until the line Spezia-Rimini is reached it seems likely that such a delaying action would continue until a well organised defensive position along the line is occupied.

(Source 5 Army G-2 Summary)

Lieutenant Colonel
General Staff

FOS
Jan 44

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



1.

23 JAN 1944

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HEADQUARTERS PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
A.P.O. 782

BPGEI

19 January 1944

Subject: Italian Political Intelligence.

To : Brigadier M.S. Lush,
Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer
Headquarters, A.M.G., 15 Army Group.

1. Our Italian Political Intelligence reports are intermittent rather than periodic issues. They are normally distributed to the Commanding General, P.B.S.; G.S.I. 15 Army Group and A. C. of S., G-2, A.F.H.Q., through the A. C. of S., G-2, NATOUSA.

2. In view of your interest in these reports I shall be glad to attach second copies to all future reports sent to G.S.I. 15 Army Group with the request that they be forwarded to you.

Henry H. Cumming

HENRY H. CUMMING
Lt. Colonel, GSC
A. C. of S., G-2

AG 2/11

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P/A

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TRIPOLITANIA 1 JAN 1944

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY - DECEMBER 1943

A. ITALIAN AFFAIRS

The revival of Fascism in Tripoli to which reference was made in last month's report has suffered two serious setbacks during the period under review.

The high cost of living was always contrasted with pre-occupation days and the Administration received blame for this at the hands of Fascists. During this month, however, the cost of living has fallen considerably and thus deprived Fascist elements of one of their principal arguments.

On 17th December Matteo INGRAVALLE, Presidente of the Colonial Hospital was arrested and interned. Secretary of the P.N.F. in Tripoli before the occupation, he was appointed to this other post on 20th January 1943, only three days before the occupation. He had for some time been suspected of having connections with the O.V.R.A. and was known to all in Tripoli as an ardent Fascist. Suspicions were confirmed when, on his arrest, a piece of paper was found in his handwriting containing details of various anti-Fascist and anti-Mussolini personalities in Tripoli. His arrest was gratifying to the majority of the population and a hard blow to the preachers of the Fascist creed.

The Italians show no signs of awakening from their apathy towards the war; they hope that the present reduced prices will continue and are anxiously awaiting the opening of postal facilities which will enable them to have news of their relatives on the Italian mainland.

Rumours that children were being taken by the British and Americans from Italy to Russia and the U.S.A. caused some alarm. The publication in the "Corriere di Tripoli" of the B.B.C. denial of this story, which had its origin in a broadcast from Rome Radio, had a soothing effect.

Reports from the Western Province say that rumours that B.M.A. is about to depart and be replaced by an Italian administration are unpopular with Italians and Arabs alike.

B. ARAB AFFAIRS

The sharp fall in market prices which took place in the middle of December has been very welcome to the Arabs, who find some satisfaction in seeing Jewish and, to a lesser extent, Arab profiteer caught with stocks on their hands. The fall has come at a fortunate time: the decline of employment with the Forces and the approach of the colder weather will certainly lead to some destitution among the urban Arabs.

The 800-odd PW who have returned from Egypt have praised the treatment they received whilst in prison. The return from Sicily of Arab political prisoners and their release on arrival here has also [illegible] inquiries about the return of PW from Egypt

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The 200-odd PW who have returned from Egypt have praised the treatment they received whilst in prison. The return from Sicily of Arab political prisoners and their release on arrival here has also given satisfaction. Enquiries about the return of PW from Egypt continue and also about the Arab civilian internees, with a hint that the time has come for an amnesty for the latter.

The M. of I. mobile film unit continues to be much welcomed in the country districts.

C. JEWISH AFFAIRS

The good relations between the Jewish, Italian and Arab communities referred to in previous reports have continued.

No political activity of any kind has shown itself, Jews having devoted themselves assiduously to business and club affairs.

Apart from the above there is nothing to add to last month's report.

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D. PUBLIC SECURITY

It is satisfactory to note that the number of crimes reported for the month of November show a decrease of 217 against the number reported in October. It is possible that the principal contributory factor to this decrease is the fact that the Arabs in the provinces are all occupied on the land. Three cases of murder are reported, in two of which the guilty parties have been arrested and are awaiting trial.

Distribution:- C.C.A.G., M.E.F. (2)
C.C.A.G., 15 Army Gp., C.M.F.
Chief Administrator, Eritrea.
D.C.C.A.G., Cyrenaica.
Commander, Tripolitania Area.
D.C.C., Tripolitania.

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U. S. SECRET
Radio British Embassy 19 JAN 1944

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) AFHQ
c/o HQ ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394 U.S. ARMY

15 January, 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 272.

Source: SIM Bulletin No. 75, dated 14 January, 1944.

POLITICAL NEWS

Occupied Italy.

1. According to Radio Brazzaville the trial against Carlo Scorza, accused of treason because he had not mobilized the CC.NN. on the fall of Mussolini, will take place next Saturday.

2. The following information has been learned concerning the trial against the nineteen members of the FASCIST Grand Council accused of high treason:

On the 8th, 9th, and 10th of January the trial of the nineteen members of the FASCIST Grand Council took place at VERONA, before a special extraordinary court. The Special Court was presided over by His Excellency, the lawyer ALDO VECCHINI, and was composed of the following: Celso Riva, Renzo Montagna, Domenico Cannà, Giovanni Riggi, Vito Casanova, Enrico Vittadini and Otello Gaba. The prosecuting attorney was ANDREA FORTUNATO.

The trial took place on the morning of the eighth, at 9 o'clock in the Palazzo Castel Vecchio in VERONA. After the reading of the names of the accused, Marshal DE BONO was the first to be questioned. The accused stated that he never took any part in politics, and he had not acquiesced with the order of the day set up by Grandi, with regard to the military power in the hands of the King. He denied having anything to do with the Royal House.

The next to be questioned was PARESCHI, who declared that he only became aware of events during the time of the meeting of the Grand Council.

CIANETTI denied every accusation and declared that he had always been FASCIST. He continually made reference to the FASCIST activities and also to his report on the treachery of the Army, which he had made when he was fighting in ALBANIA. GOTTARDI stated that he had the impression that the discussion also in the Grand Council, were aimed at strengthening their efforts for the continuation of the war.

U. S. SECRET
Equipped by British Embassy

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) Marinelli declared that he had voted favorably in the full conviction that FASCISM could receive no harm from it.

CIANO declared, "I confess to have made a mistake, but this is not high treason!" He stated that he had asked for a passport for himself and his family. He made reference to a meeting which was held in the House of Bottai.

The memoirs of Marshal UGO CAVALLERO was read out on the ninth of January. These memoirs stated that since November, 1942, they had always been considering the possibilities of replacing MUSSOLINI. Several meetings were held by the high military heads, and it appeared the most suitable person to succeed him was Marshal BADOGLIO. "When I resigned from the position of Head of the General Staff in December," said Marshal CAVALLERO in his memoirs, "I never ceased to concern myself with it."

On the fall of SICILY, the plans of CAVALLERO, which wanted the military power to return to the Sovereign, and to the new Government, which was to be under Marshal BADOGLIO assumed a more concrete form.

In his memoirs Marshal CAVALLERO added, that in the meantime he had made active propaganda with several persons of the magistracy and the senate, and also with the great industrialist Luigi Burgo, who declared himself ready to place a thousand millions at their disposal to help them.

Marshal CAVALLERO also had a conversation with General AMBROSIO, during which it was decided that in order to give their plans a more constitutional character, it was necessary to do it through the Grand Council.

Then the prosecuter spoke. He stated, among other things, that the greatest crime was the continual sabotaging by the Italian Staff. He said that the CAVALLERO plan was a great and incontestable proof of the guilt of the Royal House and the Army. He then stated that he was compelled to consider the nineteen accused to be fully responsible for these crimes. The council ended, but turning to the accused he said: "In this way I have sacrificed four lives for the sake of ITALY.--Would that my life, too, were sacrificed for the future of ITALY!"

C. FORGIONE,
Lieutenant,
Advance G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:
Allied Control Commission.
Colonel Thorne-Thorne, AMG,
c/o G.S.I., 15 Army Group.

C-Forgione 21-1707 1/1

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Equals British CONFIDENTIAL
16 JAN 1944

G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) AFHQ
c/o HQ ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394 U.S. ARMY

We have asked that copies of this be sent to AFHQ & 5 Army

14 January, 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 270

Source: SIM Bulletin No. 74, dated 13 January.

INTERNAL SITUATION.

1. A civilian who escaped from occupied territory about the middle of December states that the REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT is paying out war pensions regularly.

2. The following measures have been adopted by the police in ROME about the middle of December last:

a. No one is allowed to leave the city without special permission.
b. GERMAN patrols and elements from the 'M' Bn. are controlling railways and roads by means of road and railway blocks.
c. A strict watch is being kept in the suburbs of ROME on all road traffic to prevent people entering the city. (vide Bulletin No. 56, of 26 December, last)
d. At ROME the water and electricity supply is satisfactory, but the supply of gas has been reduced.

3. At MILAN the situation was normal. The workers in war industries were subjected to a strict surveillance.

POLITICAL SITUATION.

1. A civilian who escaped from occupied territory about the middle of December states:

1. The REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT has NOT ordered reprisals against the families of those who have escaped into Allied territory.

2. The Carabinieri and the agents of the P.S. in the execution of their duties are exhorting the population to escape from the clutches of the FASCISTS and not to give in to the demands for the requisitioning of food and materials.

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3. At MILAN the relief centres have been opened again.

ECONOMIC SITUATION.

Reports of soldiers and civilians who have escaped from NORTH ITALY about the middle of December last give the following information:

1. During the middle of September last the GERMAN Authorities have issued Marks. There are 10 Lire to each Mark. In the beginning of October the Mark was withdrawn from circulation.

2. Many bank cheques are in circulation to make up for the deficiency of paper money.

3. Commercial activity is limited. Many shops are closed.

4. The food situation has worsened in ROME during the middle of December. The daily ration of bread has been reduced to 70 grams. Other commodities are rationed with the exception of fats and are regularly distributed, though somewhat small in quantity. At MILAN the distribution of food, though small, is satisfactory.
Generally in NORTH ITALY the food situation is fair in the smaller cities, and good in the country.

5. Reliable source states that the GERMANS have dismantled a great part of the powder plants in COLLEFERRO.

C. Forgione Lt

for R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G--2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.
Colonel Thorne-Thorne, AMG,
c/o G.S.I., 15 Army Group.

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U.S. SECRET



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Equals D / C SECRET

58 18 JAN 1944

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) AFHQ
c/o H.Q. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ITALY

12 January, 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 262.

Source: SIM Bulletin No. 71, dated 10 Jan., 1944.

Internal Situation.

An officer who escaped from the province of ANCONA, where he had been up to the third of this month states:

1. The food situation can be said to be good.

2. The FASCIST Authorities have ordered the arrest of the fathers of the men who have not enrolled in the Armed Forces.

3. The behaviour of the GERMAN troops is correct and no incidents are reported.

4. The Special Court and the Provincial Courts have been ordered to assemble on the eighth and fifteenth of this month.

5. A very reliable authority states that the FASCIST and GERMAN Authorities are at loggerheads and distrust each other.

6. In spite of the fact that the REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT have undertaken to adopt various measures to renew the authority of the State in the national life, they have been only partially successful owing to the passive resistance offered by the majority of the population.

1761

for R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.
Colonel Thorne-Thorne, AMG,
c/o G.S.I., 15 Army Group.

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Equals D / C SECRET

AMG 15 Army gp

11 JAN 1944

21.

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MOST SECRET
COPY No. 18

HQ 2 DISTRICT CMF
2112/9G

HQ 2 DISTRICT

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.6

Based on Information Received up to

1800 hrs 11 Jan 44

1.

1. Enemy Situation.

Bad weather and heavy falls of snow in the mountain districts have rendered movement almost impossible on 6 Army's front. Roads have been blocked and units have been completely cut off, thus necessitating the dropping of supplies by air. This operation has been successfully carried out and now as improvement in the weather has enabled the clearance of some of the roads.

The fighting, which has been heavy has been focussed on Pt 59 (C.)119), an important OP on the coast, which dominates the road to GAETA. The struggle for this feature continued for several days and it required determined attack strongly supported by artillery before the resistance of the men of 1 Fliegerdivision was overcome. PW taken in the final assault have spoken of heavy casualties suffered from artillery fire and from exposure.

Since the capture of Pt 59 there has been a lull in the fighting during which our forces have been regrouping. Recently enemy patrols have been increasingly active probing our positions in an attempt to discover our intentions and avoid surprise. Even 334 Inf Division ventured a patrol the first since its arrival in the line. Previously it had adopted an entirely defensive attitude. The fighting spirit of this division thus appears to be little higher than that of 65 Inf Div and there are signs that 76 Corps is becoming daily more worried about its weakness. Attention is directed towards ROME, where the only readily available reinforcement can come.

In the meantime 90 PG Div is still back in reserve tending the preparation of the new line. There is much speculation as to where this line will actually be. Photo P does not disclose any important works from which a definite conclusion may be drawn. Digging between the rivers GARIGLIANO and PESCARA continues; but a line based on the GRAN SASSO is now suggested as preferable owing to the narrower stretch of country between this pass and the sea. The road from PESCARA to ROME across the APENNINES could be readily be blocked from this line.

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weather and heavy falls of snow in the mountain districts have rendered movement almost impossible on 8 Army's front. Roads have been blocked and units have been completely cut off, thus necessitating the dropping of supplies by air. This operation has been successfully carried out and now an improvement in the weather has enabled the clearance of some of the roads.

The fighting, which has been heavy has been focussed on Pt 59 (C.3119), an important OP on the coast, which dominates the road to ORTONA. The struggle for this feature continued for several days and it required determined attack strongly supported by artillery before the resistance of the men of 1 Fliegerdivision was overcome. PW taken in the final assault have spoken of heavy casualties suffered from artillery fire and from exposure.

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On the Southern sector of the front a patrol had a clash at CASACANDITELLA with a patrol of 305 Recce Bn. This confirms the impression the 305 Inf Div had taken over control as far north as the R.ARIELLA. It may be that its troops extend to the flank of 3 Mountain Bn, though it seems more probable that the mountain battalions are merely under its command and have the support of the Divisional Recce Bn.

/On the left...

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On the left flank of 305 Inf Div holding the high ground NW of VENAFRO, a sector running roughly from SW of PIZZONE down as far as VIRTICUSO is to be found Ø and 100 Mtn Regts of 5 Mtn Div. Opposite to these regts the French Expeditionary Corps has taken over command. The enemy here has had to give but little ground during the past week. Small wonder since heavy snowfalls and mist have curtailed movement to a minimum.

The main road to Rome has been the scene of action this week. After a period of consolidation and reorganisation after the capture of S. Pietro, the attack was launched by American troops on S. Vittore. This village did not prove such a hard nut to crack as had S. PIETRO, nevertheless elements of 134 Inf Regt held out there sometime after the right flank had moved on to S. ELIA and the left up the road towards CASSINO. Small groups of men clung tenaciously to houses which had been fortified, or in some cases converted into pillboxes. One PW did not report too favourably on this form of defence post. In many cases the houses had collapsed and buried the defenders.

The fall of S. VITTORE, though an important gain did not open the road to CASSINO. Three formidable heights still stood guard in front of the main defence line. To the north of the road and North West of S. VITTORE, Mt CHIAIA some 1500 feet high; between the road and the railway, Mt PORCHIA, and South West of the railway M CEDRO. Between Mt. PORCHIA and Mt CHIAIA there is a subsidiary feature, Colle CIOCCHELLI from which MGs and mortars were able to intervene to some effect in the attacks on either of the neighbouring hills. This position has a very familiar features. Some three thousand yards further to the West is the even more commanding feature of M. CROCCHIO.
These positions have been hotly contested by men of the 44 Inf Div and of 1ª PG Div. The attackers had to advance on all three heights in the face of heavy MG and mortar fire. So severe was the shelling received by one British company that had succeeded in reaching the summit of M. CEDRO that it was compelled to withdraw. The low ground leading up to the hills was sown thick with every type of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mine. Fresh units of the 1ª Div have been identified in the line. From this can be judged how important these positions were in the eyes of the enemy. The 1ª Div is one of the remaining mobile reserves at the disposal of the 10 Army and would only be used to avert a serious threat.

The three heights are now clear of enemy, and the battle moves on towards CASSINO. From reports received resistance will be desperate and many will be the hazards encountered. Dams on the river LIRI, five in number, are said to be prepared for demolition. The sudden emptying of the basins will cause the [illegible] of the GARI and [illegible] rivers and transform the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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2. Enemy Methods.

(a) The White Feather

The enemy employed the "white flag ruse" several times. On the first occasion a Captain who went forward to accept a prisoner advancing under a white flag was shot by the enemy. After that the ruse was attempted on several occasions, but failed completely. The method used to defeat it was for one man to order the bearer of the flag to continue forward to our forces rather than allow any of our men to move to him. During the process the troops in the vicinity would cover the prisoner and probable hiding places with their weapons, at the same time remaining in concealed and covered positions. The general opinion was that the white flag is entirely unreliable, most often being a ruse.

(b) Casualties.

A surprisingly small number of enemy officers were killed or captured, and these were of the lowest ranks. It appeared that officers were pulled out of a position habitually and their men were left to fight whenever capture seemed imminent.

(c) Leadership

The officer is leader and educator in all fields. Aside from having the ability to size up his men and a sense of justice, he must possess superior knowledge and experience, a sense of moral responsibility; and he must excel in self-discipline and courage.

(d) Foxholes.

1759

PW states that despite almost daily bombing by our airforce they had no losses because their positions were dug in very deeply. Foxes are changed frequently. Fire is opened on entire formations of enemy planes. Firing on single planes is considered a waste of ammunition. The ammunition recently a shortage of ammunition has been reported.

(e) Remote Control.

It is reported that approximately 4700 12.7 Kilogram bombs with pins removed were recently taken to FOXAL 5206 with attachments for detonation. It is rumored that the Germans intend to place them under buildings as they retreat and detonate them electrically after the Allies enter buildings.

3. Engineers.

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3. Engineers.

(a) In the vicinity of CERASUOLO (H.0132) an engineer detachment lifted many "S" mines that had been placed in the tracks left on the ground by an automobile tire. It appeared that a vehicle had been driven over the place chosen for the mine positions and once the mines were put into position they were camouflaged with the aid of special apparatus allowing the print of the tire to be replaced over the newly emplaced mine. This being true, one can no longer consider vehicle tracks safe.

(b) PW stated that many MG positions and strong points in SAN PIETRO were built inside houses. When shelled by arty and mortars, many of them collapsed, burying the defenders.

/6. Supply and Equipment

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4. Supply and Equipment

(a) PW reports that much Italian mortar ammunition was used. The heavy type German mortar bomb which requires extra charges is fired with great reluctance, inasmuch as crews fear premature explosions. The number of duds in mortar ammunition is very high.

(b) The Mtn troops have been issued waterproof blouse and trousers. The blouse has a combined collar and hood which is laced in front from the inside and buttoned on the outside. The small side and one large center pocket are sewn breast high across the front of the blouse. Two hip pockets are sewn on the back of the blouse. The sleeves have windbreaker straps at wrists and a cord permits the blouse to be gathered in at the waist. The back has a long strap which is passed between the legs and affixed to a button on the lower front of the blouse.

(c) PW from 14th Co, 274th Inf Regt, said that food was received every night, it was plentiful and good since sheep and goats were kept in the kitchen area. Ration trucks arrived at irregular hours in the evening and place of issue was constantly changed due to our arty fire. At times platoon food carriers being away for three hours as they were unable to run the gauntlet of our concentrations.

5. Air.

As far as can be judged from Photo & the enemy aircraft situation in Italy at present is as follows:-

FIGHTERS.	Rome Area	70
	Po Valley	118
BOMBERS.	Po Valley	60 JU 88's

The above figures are necessarily only approximate.

Comment:

The most significant aspect of the present order of battle appears to be the small number of JU-88's now present in the PO VALLEY. Their withdrawal has not as yet been accounted for and two possibilities concerning their intended use may be:

(a) Returned to GERMANY for re-equipping to be used as twin-engine fighters against the anticipated accelerating bomber offensive by the Allies from ENGLAND, or to be used from a central GERMAN point either against ENGLAND based or Italy-based long range bombers.

(b) Returned to GERMANY for use in support of bomber offensive against the BRITISH ISLES in retaliation and/or the purpose of bolstering civilian morale.

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(b) Returned to GERMANY for some degree of bomber offensive against the BRITISH ISLES in retaliation and/or the purpose of bolstering civilian morale.

(SOURCE: AFI ASC)

6. APPENDIX A - Estimate of the scale and probability of enemy sabotage operations by Naval and Air Forces.

7. APPENDIX B - Analysis of German Troops in Italy, France and the Low Countries.

R C Wilson Capt

Lieutenant Colonal
General Staff

IOS/316/60A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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APPENDIX "A"
To 2 DIRECT INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 6

Estimate of the Scale and Probability of Enemy Sabotage Operations by Naval and Air Forces.

1. Parachutists.

Experience has shown to date that the Germans do not undertake large scale sabotage operations, but prefer small parties directed against communications or airfields. It is possible, however, that as our air striking power against Germany increases, they may be constrained to land one or two parachute battalions against airfields (e.g. FOGGIA), which the enemy knew were being used in raids on Germany.

The probability of such an operation is, however, remote and one might reasonably expect to get some indication from secret sources or photo reconnaissance of such an intention. Operations are more likely to be confined as in the past to small parties directed on airfields or communications.

2. Limpet Operations. (Seaborne Raids)

It is probable that the enemy may carry out limpet and human torpedo attacks against ships in harbors, similar to those carried out at ALEXANDRIA, GIBRALTAR and ALGIERS. Such attacks might be carried out by Germans or Italians. Official Italian sources also hold this view. The most likely targets, at present, are the Allied held ports in ITALY, SICILY, CORSICA and SARDINIA. It is possible that NAPLES, BARI, BRINDISI and MADDELENA might be selected as targets. If, however, the enemy is able to repair the ex-Italian carrier submarines, he could carry out attacks anywhere in the MEDITERRANEAN. Warning from photo reconnaissance might be expected, but this is by no means certain.

3. Italian Participation.

It must be expected that the Republican Italians will take part in operations. It is known that the Germans took over the Italian sabotage school and will no doubt continue to train willing Italians.

NOTE: The bulk of the operations carried out during the Tunisian campaign was of Italian origin, and only on very few occasions did the Germans undertake them.

4. Timing of attacks.

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NOTE: The bulk of the operations carried out during the Tunisian campaign was of Italian origin, and only on very few occasions did the Germans undertake them.

4. Timing of Attacks.

Parachute operations are likely to take place during a favorable moon period. Limpet operations are usually undertaken on dark nights.

(COPIES: 15 Army Group)

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ANNEXURE "B"
To 2 DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 6

Analysis of German Troops in Italy, France and the Low Countries.

1. ITALIAN COMMAND — Army Group B (?)

Northern and Central ITALY

14 Army (Southern boundary possibly inclusive GROSSETO-ANCONA)

Upper ITALY District (Area MILANO-)

22 G.A.F. Field Division	BRESCIA
Mountain Brigade BOELL.	BOLZANO
188 Reserve Mountain Division	BELLUNO
Unidentified Division	BOLOGNA
Unidentified Division (forming)	Unlocated

ISTRIA - SLOVENIA Army Corps (No. unknown)

71 Infantry Division	FIUME
162 Infantry Division	SLOVENIA
S.S. ?.S.Division Reichsfuehrer (forming)	Unlocated

LIGURIA Army Corps (LA SPEZIA)

148 Reserve Division	VENTIMIGLIA
356 Infantry Division	LEGHORN

Central Army Corps (LI Mountain)

Elements S.S. Brigade Reichsfuehrer	LEGHORN area
Unidentified Division (forming)	RIMINI

1757

XI Fliegerkorps (Coastal area TERRACINA -GROSSETO)

3 Panzer Grenadier Division	North of ROME
New Fliegerdivision (forming)	ROME area
Sicherungsdivision	CIVITA CASTELLANA

10 Army (Southern front)

LXXVI Panzer Corps

1 Fliegerdivision	8 Army front
26 Panzer Division	8 Army front
334 Infantry Division	8 Army front

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Upper ITALY District (Area WITHDRAWN)

22 G.A.F. Field Division	BRESCIA
Mountain Brigade BOELL	BOLZANO
188 Reserve Mountain Division	BELLUNO
Unidentified Division	BOLOGNA
Unidentified Division (forming)	Unlocated

ISTRIA - SLOVENIA Army Corps (No. unknown)

71 Infantry Division	FIUME
192 Infantry Division	SLOVENIA
S.S. A.G.Division Reichsfuehrer (forming)	Unlocated

LIGURIA Army Corps (LI.A.V.I) HQ. GENOA

148 Reserve Division	VENTIMIGLIA
356 Infantry Division	LEGHORN

Central Army Corps (LI Mountain)

Elements S.S. Brigade Reichsfuehrer	LEGHORN area
Unidentified Division (forming)	RIMINI

1757

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3 Panzer Grenadier Division	North of ROME
New Fliegerdivision (forming)	ROME area
Sicherungsdivision	CIVITA CASTELLANA

10 Army (Southern front)

LXXVI Panzer Corps

1 Fliegerdivision	8 Army front
26 Panzer Division	8 Army front
334 Infantry Division	8 Army front
90 Panzer Grenadier Division	Corps reserve
65 Infantry Division	Now being relieved

Independant Group (?)

305 Infantry Division	8 Army front

XIV Panzer Corps

5 Mountain Division	Fifth Army front
44 Infantry Division	Fifth Army front
Hermann Goering Panzer Division	Fifth Army front and corps reserve
15 Panzer Grenadier Division	Fifth Army front

/94 Infantry Division...

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

94 Infantry Division — Fifth Army front
29 Panzer Grenadier Division — Corps reserve

Notes: ≠ Defensive Division.
@ Possibly part of 19 Army (ADVANCE)

Total: (excluding 148 Reserve Division)

21½ offensive divisions of which 4 are forming
3 defensive divisions.

2. Analysis of the German Garrison of FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES.

Offensive Divisions.

Panzer Divisions	2	
S.S. Divisions	3	
P.G. Divisions	1	and 1 probable re-forming (3864)
Infantry Divisions	4	and 1 probably re-forming (345)
Parachute Divisions	0	but 1 now forming (possibly No. 3)

Defensive Divisions.

Two-Regt Inf Divisions	6
Res and Static InfDivs	17
G...F. Field Divisions	4


Unidentified Divisions.

Type unspecified	4
Total	41 plus 3 now forming.

This total represents an increase of one offensive division.

(Source: ...F.H.Q. Weekly Intelligence)
(Summary No 71)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

86

SUBJECT:- Intelligence Reports.

H.Q. AMG.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

AMG/58/86.
15.Jan.44.

TO: G-2 (Advanced Intelligence)
A.F.H.Q.,

A.C.C.,
A.P.O. 394.

83

Reference AMG/58 of 12.Jan.44.

It would be appreciated if copies of your Intelligence Reports could also be sent to S.C.A.O., AMG 5 Army to whom they would be useful for Rome planning.

Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

1705



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58.

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Equals British SECRET

G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) AFHQ
c/o HQ ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394 ITALY

12 January, 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 265.
Source: SIM Bulletin, No. 72, dated 11 Jan., 1944.
OCCUPIED ITALY

According to news from neutral sources MUSSOLINI is suffering from cancer of the stomach, and his condition is considered grave.

From information received from SWITZERLAND, it is learned that strikes are spreading in NORTH ITALY, and that work has stopped at LA SPEZIA. There were encounters between patriots and GERMAN troops at PRATO.

The following information has been extracted from C.S.D.I.C. (East) Report No. SIM/25, dated 7 January, 1944.

POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC.

a) Republican Government The head of TERAMO province is the prefect IPPOLITI. Reprisals and threats are very severe against:- Workers who leave their work; conscripts of 1924/1925 classes who fail to report; officers who disregard proclamations and fail to report to the district of TERAMO; families of the above who are threatened with arrest until the husband reports.

b) Fascist Republican Party The federal secretary of TERAMO is Prof MORRICONE of the local High school. The Fascist authorities actively cooperate with the Germans; in some places however there are serious difficulties about constituting Fasci and the selection of leaders, because most of the inhabitants stay away from the Party, showing contempt and hostility towards it. There are however here and there elements with Fascist sympathies, who furnish the Germans and 'M' bns. with information for rounding up officers, patriots, parachutists, escapees and anti-Fascists, ensuring their arrest.

The following are examples of what such people are responsible for:-

- Murder of Dr. Mario CAPUANI, who was working with patriots in the MARTESA wood.
- The rounding up and murder of various patriots in the MARTESA wood.
- The arrest of Commendatore DRILLI of COLONNELLA, an old friend of BADOGLIO.
- The arrest of three British escapees hiding in S. OMERO area.

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The arrest of 4 British escapees in TORTORETO LIDO (given away by Vincenzo IANACONE, photographer of the village, who is believed to be in the employ of prefect IPPOLITI.)- The denunciation to the Germans at S. BENEDETTO DEL TRONTO of preparations made by Sources to leave MARTIN SICURO in a motor fishing boat.

c) Police and security organisations In the various localities CC.RR and R.G.F. (customs guards) continue as before, performing police duties under the Germans. However it was made obvious by conversations and many signs, that some of these soldiers are putting up with things with bad grace, chiefly because of the fear of reprisals against their families, and doing their best to oblige patriots, escapees and the civilian population.

d) Economic The agricultural situation in the area is considered good. Work goes on regularly, thanks to the presence of many soldiers who have left the army. Naturally work falls off when the area is being searched, because everybody goes away. There is little or NO industrial activity in the area because the machinery has been rendered useless, to prevent the Germans from removing it.

C. Forgione Lt

for R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.
Colonel Thorne-Thorne, AMF,
c/o G.S.I., 15 Army Group.

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Equals British SECRET

1754

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

File 83

SUBJECT:- Intelligence Reports.

H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

G2 (Advanced Intelligence) A.F.H.Q.,
Allied Control Commission,
Italy.

AMG/58/

12th January 1944

1. Receipt is acknowledged on attached form of Intelligence report No. 254.

2. It would be appreciated if further reports could be addressed to the Chief Staff Officer, A.M.G., 15 Army Group.

for Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

Encl.

1753

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1

12 JAN 1944

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) AFHQ
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ITALY

58

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 254.

Source: S.I.M. No. 69, dated 8 January, 1944.

1. A very reliable source states that measures have been taken to hasten the removal of the ITALIAN ministries from ROME.

2. The ITALIAN industries have not received any raw materials since the beginning of November.

3. At ROME the police have adopted new restrictive measures.

4. The REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT has laid down that from today the Ministry of National Defence shall be called the Ministry of the Armed Forces. (Radio News)

5. By the decree of MUSSOLINI a 'Corpo degli INTERPRETI' (Interpreter Corps) has been formed.

6. The Secretary of the FASCIST Party has ordered that enrolment centres for FASCISTS, non-military, between the ages of 17 and 57 years should be instituted in the Provincial Federations (Federazioni Provinciali). Even those not enrolled in the Party are invited to join. Other measures have been taken to enroll the older elements of the Parties in the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL GUARD or in auxiliary formations. (Radio News)

7. An airforce officer who escaped from NORTH ITALY states that toward the end of November last about 400-500 mobile GERMAN police [illegible] to BOLOGNA and brought about numerous arrests of JEWS, relieving them of all their belongings.

8. According to the SWISS newspaper "LIBERA STAMPA," the failure on the part of the GERMANS to form a strong FASCIST Government in ITALY, has forced them to take upon themselves the political direction of the country. The call up of young men has not been very successful, and reprisals against families have been of no avail. In PIEDMONT the population rebelled and set free several women who had been convicted because they helped patriots.

9. According to RADIO BERLIN, the trial of COUNT GALEAZZO CIANO is taking place in camera. The COUNT is shut up in a prison in VERONA with another five members of the GRAND COUNCIL.

10. Allied news service states that several thousand of workers have refused to work at MILAN. The FASCIST authorities have been carrying on negotiations for three consecutive days with the representatives of these workers, without, however, any definites agreement being

1732

785015

4. The REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT has laid down that from today the Ministry of National Defence shall be called the Ministry of the Armed Forces. (Radio News)

5. By the decree of MUSSOLINI a 'Corpo degli INTERPRETI' (Interpreter Corps) has been formed.

6. The Secretary of the FASCIST Party has ordered that enrolment centres for FASCISTS, non-military, between the ages of 17 and 57 years should be instituted in the Provincial Federations (Federazioni Provinciali). Even those not enrolled in the Party are invited to join. Other measures have been taken to enroll the older elements of the Parties in the REPUBLICAN NATIONAL GUARD or in auxiliary formations. (Radio News)

7. An airforce officer who escaped from NORTH ITALY states that toward the end of November last about 400-500 mobile GERMAN police arrived to BOLOGNA and brought about numerous arrests of JEWS, relieving them of all their belongings.

8. According to the SWISS newspaper "LIBERA STAMPA," the failure on the part of the GERMANS to form a strong FASCIST Government in ITALY, has forced them to take upon themselves the political direction of the country. The call up of young men has not been very successful, and reprisals against families have been of no avail. In PIEDMONT the population rebelled and set free several women who had been convicted because they helped patriots.

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
for R.J.S. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) AFHQ
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ITALY

10 January, 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 258.

OCCUPIED ITALY

1750

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin, dated 9 January, 1944.

The strikes still continue at MILAN, about which the following particulars have been received.

The delegates of the workers have complained that the wages, notwithstanding the recent increases, are not sufficient owing to the high cost of living. The FASCIST authorities have promised to improve, within certain limits, the present situation; but the workers are not content with mere words, and the strike continues.

1751

for R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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c/o G.S.I., 15 Army Group.

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10 JAN 1944

80

G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ.,
c/o Allied Control Commission,
Italy.

7th January 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.252.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.68 dated 7th January 1944.

Internal Situation:

1749

An officer coming from occupied territory about the middle of December last states :

1. In those provinces of NORTH and CENTRAL ITALY furthest away from the battle front the administration is going on smoothly, and is in part independent although subject to GERMAN military revision.

2. The Ministry of the Interior is situated at CREMONA.

3. The Secretary of the FASCIST REPUBLICAN PARTY has his office at MILAN.

4. The embassies accredited to the REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT are at VENICE.

5. The GERMANS are now paying compensation to those whose property has been damaged by GERMAN troops.

6. The food situation in NORTH ITALY is good, but at ROME there is a scarcity owing to the deficiency of transport which is necessary to bring provisions from the centres of production.

Communications.

The electric line up to RIMINI on the ADRIATIC railroad is functioning , and as far as ROME on the BOLOGNA-ROME line. The latter, however, in consequence of the damage caused by Allied bombing, has a steam service for a distance of 4 Km. near CHIUSI.

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G;S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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Col. Thorne-Thorne, AM.G.,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY. 58

7th January 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.249.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.67 dated 6th January 1944. 17-8

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1. According to news from ZURICH, two hundred hostages have been shot as reprisals for the killing of nineteen FASCISTS during the recent disorders.

2. Radio ROME broadcasts that on 3rd December, 1943, the GERMAN military court in BOLOGNA condemned to death three people accused of acts of terrorism and concealing arms. The sentence was carried out on the 3rd January, 1944.

3. From the same source it is learnt that GIOVANNI ORGERA(?) former mayor of NAPLES has been nominated governor of ROME.

4. Radio ROME states that Gen. MAETZER, GERMAN commander in the open city of ROME, and the chief of the press of the German Embassy Dr.BOSCH, attended at Palazzo Venezia on the handing over to the Republican Government of the works of art saved by the Herman Goering Division which were at Teano and the Monte Cassino Abbey.

C-Forgiveness

for R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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/ Col.Thorne-Thorne, A.M.G.,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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for R.J.C.CAVE,
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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

6th January 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.246.

Source: S.I.M.Bulletin No.66 dated 5th January 1943.

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18 JAN 1944
178 58

Internal Situation.

(a) Political Situation:

A senior officer who has escaped from occupied territory about the middle of December states :

1. Towards the end of September in all the provinces controlled by the REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL POLICE units were formed with the object of removing all anti-fascist elements and suppressing the black market. The members of the FEDERAL POLICE wear a kind of overall for a uniform and are armed with Tommy guns, hand grenades, and MAUSER pistols. In the execution of their duties the FEDERAL POLICE have been guilty of illegal arrests and indiscriminate requisitioning.

2. Those whose responsibilities are the provision of rations for the populace and the call-up of young men for the services, try with every means within their power to eschew their duty, and are being replaced by commissioners chosen from the FASCISTS.

3. The clergy are secretly waging a clever and patriot propagandist campaign, especially amongst the country people.

4. In all the provinces, by the order of the Chief of Police, TULLIO TAMBURINI, relations and people in the public eye have been arrested as hostages, to be used as possible reprisals for the measures taken by the ANGLO-AMERICAN forces against friends and families of FASCISTS in Allied territory.

5. The ITALIAN population in occupied territory is overwhelmingly patriotic, and favour the monarchy. They deplore the action of certain political groups which place their personal interests before the prime duty of all ITALIANS - which is to contribute to the expulsion of the GERMANS from ITALY.

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(b) <u>Economic Situation:</u>

An officer who escaped from occupied territory has given the following description of the economic situation in the province of ASCOLI PICENO up to 20th December 1943.

1. Owing to the fact that the province is mainly agricultural, the food situation is good. A stock of 300,000 cwt. of wheat still remains in spite of the fact that several hundreds of cwts of corn were distributed to the people in lieu of coupons for the period up to the month of February 1944.

The sowing of corn is going on well, and the winter crop is favourable.

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2. Owing to the lack of transport to send out the vegetables, such products exist in large quantities on the market and prices are exceedingly cheap.

3. The scarcity of salt, sugar, tobacco, and matches, is causing deep resentment.

4. Paper money has greatly increased and the peasants (contadini) have frequent recourse to barter.

5. The banks are doing less business, and one is only allowed to draw a limited amount.

6. Recently a commission authorised by the Chief of Police has taken measures for the requisitioning of gold (240 lire a gram) in the hands of all the goldsmiths and jewellers in the province. In the city of ASCOLI PICENO 10 Kg. of gold were taken.

Similar measures were taken in the provinces of AQUILA, CHIETI, PESCARA and TERAMO.

7. Trade is paralysed by the lack of transport. The railway ASCOLI - PICENO - PORTO d'ASCOLI - SAN BENEDETTO of the TRONTO is unusable because the GERMANS have taken away all the rolling stock.

8. The fishing industry is at a complete standstill owing to the lack of motor fishing boats, which have taken refuge for the most part in the ports of PUGLIA.

for C Forgione Lt.
R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.
Col.Thorne-Thorne, A.M.G.,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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Hdq. 15 Army Gp.

9 JAN 1944

MOST SECRET

HQ 2 DISTRICT CMF
2112/9 G

5 Jan 44

HQ 2 DISTRICT

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 5

Based on Information Received up to

1800 hrs 4 Jan 44

1. ENEMY SITUATION

It might have been hoped that the fall of ORTONA might bring a speeding up to the 8 Army's advance on the Italian East Coast. It seemed likely that after such a stubborn resistance the Paratroops in the coastal sectors would be exhausted and that at last the flood would burst through and sweep on up the coast of PESCARA. In spite of severe losses suffered by the enemy in repeated counter attacks, despite the desperate house to house fights through the streets of ORTONA no collapse has yet occurred, and the Paratroops continue to fight every yard of our advance. Their stubborn resistance has continued to be aided by the weather and terrain, which have resulted in small progress for our forces during the past week.

The usual delay was caused by the demolition of the bridges west of ORTONA. This has been followed by some fierce fighting for the dominating feature on the coast, PUNTE MACCHIA, two miles beyond ORTONA. Our troops had a bitter struggle for this feature and when it was finally won, they had to withstand severe counter attacks. The struggle still continues. In the early stages of the battle one battalion moved round to the left and succeeded in gaining a dominating ridge 1/2 mile to the north of S. TOMASSO. There was however another ridge beyond behind which the enemy's guns, and mortars were emplaced and their heavy fire compelled a withdrawal.

Further inland still another struggle has been in progress. A force, having finally taken VILLA GRANDE, pushed on down the road to TOLLO. At a point one mile before the crossing over the R. ARIELLI, our troops struck a stone wall hill resistance which has now lasted for several days. The fall of the village of S. TOMASSO may help our advance, but the country will continue to be formidable. Ridge follows ridge as river follows river and from one to the other the enemy falls back, always having time to reorganise in his new positions.

From ORSOGNA and GUARDIAGRELE little is reported. Both these towns are firmly in enemy hands, and he shows little signs of vacating them. Such is the lie of the land that they are likely to form the enemy's right flank for some time yet.

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No great change has taken place in the enemy order of battle opposite 8 Army. The main resistence continues to be offered by 1 Para Div. The main body is now thought to have withdrawn to the next delaying line, behind the R. ARIELLI, leaving only outposts on the East bank of the river.

The arrival

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The arrival on the Southern front of 334 Inf. Div. seems to be completed, at last as far as its Inf. units are concerned. All three Regts of the Division have been identified in the area of ORSOGNA and GUARDIAGRELE, where they have relieved 65 Inf. Div.

The mountainous district between CASOLI and RIVISONDOLI is now believed to be the responsibility of 98 Mtn Regt. It is possible that other independent Mtn Bns have arrived in this area. There have been an increasing number of reports of large numbers of Mtn Tps in the SULMONA and CARAMANICO Areas. This sector is too vast to be held in any strength or in any rigid defence line. Its defence consists of occupying such towns and villages as PALENA - TARANTA H1479 TORICELLA H2180 - QUADRI - COLLE DI MACCHINE H1677. These places are not necessarily permanently garrisoned, but kept under continual observation, visited frequently and this surrounding country is continually patrolled. The area of RIVISONDOLI H 0562 and PESCOCOSTANZA contains many weapon pits, dugouts, milefields and anty tank ditches.

On the West side of the front progress has been as slow as on the East coast. Here the terrain is far more formidable and at this time of year in the recent deplorable weather the progress would be slow without opposition from the enemy and without the many mines and demolitions placed in the way of the Allied Forces. The main progress has been through the mountains North West of VENAFRO. Against the toughest resistance, under almost insurmountable difficulties of supplies and in rain, hail, snow and a gale of wind, our forces have captured the important heights of M. CASALE G9930, M. MOLINO G9726 and M. PINO G9727. All three heights were hotly contested and the assaults on the last two were made with the support of Tanks. Hardly ideal country for tank warfare. With the capture of these three hills the Town of AQUAFONDATA is now dominated. Nevertheless the latest reports say that it is firmly held by the enemy.

East of CARPINETO G9733, 85 Mtn. Regt., offered strong opposition to our troops trying to take Hill 1029. South of the Rome road Elements of 15 P G Div reacted strongly to our fighting patrols sent down from the M. LUNGO to the road and to the railway. Along the CANIGLIANO patrols have been active on either side and several clashes have resulted. A fierce fight ensued when 5 Army 5 Army Troops made a raid North of the River into the M. ARGENTE area. Here 274 Inf. Regt. of 94 Inf. Div were unable to prevent the success of the mission, the blowing up of an important bridge.

Astride the Rome road and in the Area of S. VITTORE there are still elements of 29 P G Div though PW continue to speak of the division's relief by 44 Div. The fact that this division is only one completed will doubtless account for the delay in carrying out the relief. Such a delay was also also suffered by 65 Div on the East coast and is significant of the dislocation caused by the raids by our Aircraft on the enemy L of C.

2. ENEMY DEFENCE LINES.

THE PRESENT ENEMY LINE IS BASED ON S. ANGELO G8615.
This main strong pint is protected by many MG posts and communications trenches. There are strong points all along the river., in hillocks, farm buildings and houses. From the junction of the LIRI and RAPIDO tributaries there is wire almost all the way to CASSINO on the West bank. On the rising ground, west of the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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A civilian has described the second German Line from TERRACINA (M5799) to M. delle PALE (G4217) - M. CALVILLI (G5318) - CEPRANO (G4027) CASTELLIRI (G6251) to M. PERNICINO (G5749) - M. PIZ CIELO (G5955) - M.CORNACCHIA (G7055) - MONTAGNA GRANDE (G9566) - M. GENNARO G9171. Confluence of the rivers SACCO and PESCARA, valley of LIRI. The line consists of mainly field works, Anti Tank obstacles and on MG posts. Artillery deployment is stronger at the western end. Behind the line there are defences against sea borne landings at OSTIA and against airborne landings at TARQUINIA.

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3. ENEMY METHODS.

American Engineers report that during the period they were in S. PIETRO they found:

1. 3 or 4 1,000 lb charges buried and attached to trip wires.
2. Several 200 - 600 lbs charges.
3. Teller Mines laid in the ground with igniters in the side, Pairs of mines, connected by 30 ft wires, some upside down with a hand grenade with the pin removed beneath them.
4. Potatoe Masher grenades with trip wires.
5. Grenades in trees.
6. All house doors booby trapped.
7. On rocky ground 'S' mines concealed among the rocks. Most of them had trip wires.

4. JUGOSLAVIA.

The long expected offensive against the Dalmation Islands was started on Dec 22 with landing from the PELJESAC Peninsular on the island of KORCULLA. Three seperate landings were made at KORCULLA BAY PACISTE and TEKLINA BAY. Those at KORCULLA BAY and PACISTE were supported by artillery from the mainland. The initial landings were made by a force of about 1,000 strong reinforced later by some 2,500 men of the 118 Jaeger Regt. The offensive had been delayed until the weather became suitable, and when zero hour originally came a low lying mist prevented any interference by the allied airforces. This, and the Partisans lack of heavy weapons caused the rapid fall of the island. The enemy were soon able to land artillery and light tanks. The Partisans were compelled to withdraw and during the night of Dec 25/26 succeeded in evacuating 1,500 of their troops. Thus the island fell into enemy hands.

On the mainland German efforts to subdue the Partisans met with little success. Rail communications have continued to be interrupted. Trains have been diarailed, bridges blown, and long streches of line demolished. So much disturbance to the German L of C has occurred, infact, that the enemy is said to have proposed an agreement, by which, for the unimpeded use of the LJUBLJANA - TRIESTE and LJUBLJANA - SUSAK railways the Partisans in that area would have their authority and safety respected.

Three enemy columns attacking Westward from TRAVENIK and ZENICA have been driven back, though in the South the Germans supported by tanks made a rapid advance and captured GLAMOC. Nevertheless the Partisans counter attacked here and the Germans were thrown out again.

In the drive Northwards all attempts to advance North of LIVNO SUSICA and TOMISLAVGRAD were repelled and on Dec 21 an enemy attack towards KUPRES was driven back with losses. The fighting on this front has now died down, and it is possible that the enemy has decided that the advance so far made is sufficient to safeguard his rear, while he continues his offensive against the islands.

There have been increasing signs of late that the offensive is about to begin, and an attack is expected any time in PRAC, HVAR and SOLTA. Concentrations of shipping have been reported at SIBENIK, LOVISTE, TROGIR, MAKARSKA, OMIS and SPLIT. Reinforcements are said to have arrived at OMIS and SPLIT. Arty, which could cover an assault on SOLTA, a stepping stone to BRAC, has been landed on BRENNIK, SOLTA ISLAND and the North coast of BRAC have already been shelled. It is hoped that in this occasion

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was started on Dec 22 with landins from the PELJESSAC Peninsular on the island of KORCULLA. Three seperate landings were made at KORCULLA BAY RACISTE and TEKLINA BAY. Those at KORCULLA BAY and RACISTE were supported by artillary from the mainland. The initial landings were made by a force of about 1,000 strong reinforced later by some 2,500 men of the 118 Jaeger Div. Regt. The offensive had been delayed until the weather became suitable, and when zero hour originally came a low lying mist prevented any interference by the allied airforces. This, and the Partisans lack of heavy weapons caused the rapid fall of the island. The enemy were soon able to land artillery and light tanks. The Partisans were compelled to withdraw and during the night of Dec 25/26 succeeded in evacuating 1,500 of their troops. Thus the island fell into enemy hands.

On the mainland German efforts to subdue the Partisans met with little success. Rail communications have continued to be interrupted. Trains have been diarailed, bridges blown, and long streches of line demolished. So much disturbence to the German L of C has occurred, infact, that the enemy is said to have proposed an agreement, by which, for the unimpeded use of the LJUBLJANA - TRIESTE and LJUBLJANA - SUSAK railways the Partisans in that area would have their authority and safety respected.

Three enemy columns attacking Westward from TRAVENIK and ZENICA have been driven back, though in the South the Germans supported by tanks made a rapid advance and captured GLAMOC. Nevertheless the Partisans counter attacked here and the Germans were thrown out again.

In the drive Northwards all attemps to advance North of LIVNO SUSICA and TOMISLAVGRAD were repelled and on Dec 21 an enemy attack towards KUPRES was driven back with losses. The fighting on this front has now died down, and it is possible that the enemy has decided that the advance so far made is sufficient to safeguard his rear, while he continues his offensive against the islands.

There have been increasing signs of late that the offensive is about to begin, and an attack is expected any time in BRAC, HVAR and SOLTA. Concentrations of shipping have been reported at SIBENIK, LOVISTE, TRUGIR, MAKARSKA, OMIS and SPLIT. Reinforcements are said to have arrived at OMIS and SPLIT. Arty. which could cover an assault on SOLTA, a stepping stone to BRAC, has been landed on LASTOVNIK, SOLTA ISLAND and the North coast of BRAC have already been shelled. It is hoped that in this occasion the weather will be kinder to the Partisans, and enable Allied Aircraft to come to their assistance. In the meantime their moral remains high; they are as confident as ever of ultimate victory.

5. <u>BULGARIA'S ATTITUDE TO THE WAR.</u>

BULGARIA is at war with BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, but she still maintains diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. TURKEY and BULGARIA are hereditary enemies and relations between the two countries are cool.

The BULGARIAN Government is pro-German. The vast marjority of the people is, however, pro-Russian and is therefore unenthusiastic about the German alliance, even though they have no sympathy for the UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN.

.....BULGARIA'S contribution

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

BULGARIA'S contribution to the German war effort has nevertheless been extremely useful for she has sent eleven of her twenty divisions to SERBIA and northern GREECE. Parts of this territory have been annexed by her.

The bombing of SOFIA and the visit of the Turkish President to CAIRO, following closely on the TEHERAN talks have brought the war a lot closer to the people of BULGARIA and caused a political crisis. The present government is faced with keeping a balance between German pressure and the main desire of the people not to be further involved in the war. The situation is further complicated by unwillingness to withdraw from SERBIA and northern GREECE.

6. ROUMANIA

ROUMANIA - a vital cog in the German war machine. The Russian advance towards CRESSA has caused some alarm among the population, evidenced by the evacuation of civilians from TRANSNITRIA, CONSTANZA and BUCHAREST, and demand for visas to neutral countries, while the Allied bombing of PLOESTI and the neighbouring capital of SOFIA will not have improved their peace of mind.

Fear of Russian occupation and possible Hungarian agression are still uppermost in the minds of the Roumanians, whereas the good treatment extended to American prisoners from the PLOESTI raid and other indications suggest a milder attitude towards the Anglo- Saxons.

It is believed Germany could not continue the war on the present scale if she were deprived of Roumanian oil. The air protection of PLOESTI and eventually the defence of Roumanian territory are therefore cardinal points in the German strategy and their efforts can be seen on German Generalship both in Russia and the eastern MEDITERRANEAN.

The main L of C to South Russia pass through ROUMANIA and the Roumanian Army, though a spent force, still keeps the remnants of some ten divisions in Russia and is expected to defend its eastern frontier against the Russians. GERMANY will therefore make strenuous efforts to keep ROUMANIA in the war. This will require increased deliveries of equipment, whose provision may be difficult.

7. GERMAN CASUALTIES.

Total permanent losses for the period 1 September 1939 to 30 Scuptember 1943 are estimated at 4,565,000 of which battle losses amounted to 3,985,000 and non-battle losses to 580,000. The hopital pool on 30 September 1943 is estimated at 700,000. Thus, net casualties in the German Armed Forces, including both permanent losses and the hospital pool of men temporarily immobilised, were 5,265,000.

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R C Wilson Capt.
for
Lieutenant Colonel.
General Staff.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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APPENDIX "A" TO 2 DISTRICT
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 5 dated
5 Jan 44.

THE ENEMY OIL POSITION.

Oil continues to be a major factor contributing towards Germany's economic difficulties. At the beginning of this year stocks in enemy Europe, estimated at about 4,000,000 tons, were barely sufficient to maintain efficient distribution. Current supplies at that time were about equal to consumption, and if stocks were to be brought to a safer level it was necessary either for production to be increased or for further reductions to be made in allocations for military and civil requirements.

It is now evident that the attempts to bring about an improvement in the position have not met with much success.

Strenuous efforts to increase production during the year have not resulted in important dividends. In the case of crude oil, valuable new discoveries have been made in the VIENNA Basin, but these have probably been offset by the declining output of the Roumanian and Polish fields. Total supplies of mineral oil from all sources have approximately maintained the same level as in 1942.

The slow rate of expansion of the synthetic oil industry has also been a disappointment to the Germans. The construction of new plants and the extensions to existing plants have been seriously slowed down on account of the difficulties of obtaining the equipment required. Such additional production as has been obtained from new plants has probably been counter-balanced by the reduced operating efficiency of the plants in the RUHR. It is consequently believed that the output of synthetic oil during 1943 will not have increased to any important extent.

Consumption of oil during the first eight months of the year has been at levels that have not permitted of any restoration of the stock position. Military consumption has been dictated by the Allied offensives, and the high rate of expenditure that has been maintained throughout the summer and autumn shows no signs of slackening. Furthermore the destruction or capture of stocks of oil, estimated at 400,000 tons from January to August inclusive, has been a costly adverse factor.

It is apparent too, that notwithstanding the high priority given to the conversion of liquid fuel consuming units to substitute fuels, the further savings that have been achieved during this year have been relatively small. Many reports confirm the increasing difficulties of maintaining producer gas-driven vehicles in operation.

With stocks as low at the time of the collapse of Italy as they were at the beginning of the year, and with the additional threat of attacks from new bases in South Italy, Germany has had to take further steps to safeguard her supplies of liquid fuels. The dislocation caused by the attack on the Roumanian refineries, which has seriously taxed the remaining refining capacity in South-East Europe must have added emphasis

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Further restrictions in consumption all at the expense of efficiency, have had to be imposed. The occupied countries, which have already been existing on but a small fraction of their pre-war requirements have had their quotas still further reduced and apparently without regard to the economic difficulties that must inevitably arise when oil supplies are restricted to negligible amounts.

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It is clear, from the policy that has been adopted of converting large numbers of military vehicles to producer gas, that allocations of oil for the home front are at what must be considered to be the essential minimum. Whereas there is no evidence that gas driven Wehrmacht vehicles have been operating on the fighting fronts, the restrictions in the consumption of liquid fuel in the army must be causing some impairment in efficiency. The shortage of bunker fuel has resulted in the activities of naval oil-burning ships having to be principally confined to essential escort duties. On the other hand, supplies for the Luftwaffe appear to have been adequate and there have been no signs of a recurrence of the shortages of aviation spirit that impeded flying training during 1942.

In assessing the future outlook the position may well become improved in some respects. The retreats in Russia and in the Mediterranean zone have not only shortened the lines of communication but have also meant a certain reduction in commitments. These savings are not easily estimated, but it is probable that they are offset by the additional stocks that have become tied up in establishing strategic reserves to meet assaults on new fronts.

The collapse of Italy should result in a valuable gain in supplies if Germany acquires the oil formerly imported by Italy from Roumania and Hungary, these imports amounting to approximately one million tons per annum.

It is estimated that in September 1943, the production of crude oil in German Europe was at a rate of nearly 8½ million tons a year, reckoned in terms of finished products, to which should be added synthetic-oil production at a rate of about 5,400,000 tons. Tars and substitute oils provide a further 2,500,000 tons per annum. Of the countries producing crude oil, Roumania and Poland show a declining trend, and it appears that Austria is the only country from which increased production can be expected. Hungary could increase output if she chose, but her policy has been to conserve her oil assets instead of squandering them for the benefit of Germany. The internal consumption of Roumania and Hungary continues to be in excess of a total of 2,000,000 tons annually, and it does not appear likely that these countries will reduce their consumption to any useful extent for the purpose of increasing exports to Germany. Assuming that these satellites do not modify their policies, the total production of mineral oil available to Germany may be expected to remain at about the same level as last year. Nor can any startling rise in synthetic production be expected shortly. The additions being made to existing plants are proceeding slowly, and the same tardiness is evident in the completion of the new plants at BRUX and BLECHHAMMER. On the present showing it is unlikely that the actual improvement in synthetic oil supplies during the six months, September 1943 to February 1944, will be more than 250,000 tons.

Assuming that production from existing sources is maintained, it may therefore be possible for Germany, during the six months ended February next, to add three-quarters of a million tons to her supplies, comprising half-a-million tons as representing Italy's former oil imports and a

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Assuming that production from existing sources is maintained, it may therefore be possible for Germany, during the six months ended February next, to add three-quarters of a million tons to her supplies, comprising half-a-million tons as representing Italy's former oil imports and a quarter of a million tons from increased synthetic oil production capacity. Furthermore, if Germany does not incur the same losses from the destruction of stocks by Allied attacks as happened during the first eight months of the year, then this should result in further additions to her resources.

It remains to be seen, however, to what extent those additional quantities of oil may alleviate a position that is already extremely strained.

(AFHQ Weekly Summary of World Events No 46)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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7 JAN 1944

G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ
C/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ITALY

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 240.

Source: S. I. M. No. 64, 3 January, 1944.

1. Radio CAIRO has broadcast the news that the trial of a number of FASCIST Gaolers accused of ill-treating political prisoners will take place in the near future.

2. According to radio ALGIERS, the "Corriere della Sera" states that five ITALIAN patriots have been accused at a special court in FLORENCE of helping the escape of Allied prisoners.

3. LONDON states that the activity of the patriots in NORTH ITALY is co-ordinated by a Committee which has the power of ordering or suspending acts of sabotage and attacks against the GERMAN troops.

for R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.
Colonel Thorne-Thorne, AMG,
c/o 15 Army Group.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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C. Forgione Lt
for R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.


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c/o 15 Army Group.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

58 18 JAN 1944

Subject:- Correspondence Addressees. G 6 Jan 44. 72

To:- G-2.(Adv.Int). A.F.H.Q.
s/c, A.C.C.

From:- A.M.G. Liaison,
15 Army Group. Ref. MG/1/153.

71

1. Receipt from Col.Thorne Thorne for Int.Report No.338 is attached. 1741

2. Will you please address subsequent reports to AMG HQ, 15 Army Group, and not to Col.Thorne Thorne personally, the reason being that if he is away, correspondence directed to him would probably remain unopened.

(Sgd) P. FRIEND JAMES

Major,
A.M.G. Liaison.

Copy for AMG
HQ 15 ARMY Gp.

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6 JAN 1944

G-2 (Advanced Intelligence)
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ITALY

3 January, 1944.

Intelligence Report No. 238.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin, No. 65, dated 2 Jan., 1944.

Method Used by GERMAN Troops for the exploitation and destruction of forward areas.

In the operational zone, the GERMANS are proceeding, as is known, with the integral exploitation of all resources and with the destruction of everything which, when they withdraw, might be of use to the Allies or to the resumption of life in the liberated territory.

The methods adopted by the GERMANS in order to reach their aim, present well-defined and persistent characteristics, which show that a plan is being carried out generally on the following lines.

In the areas in question, all railways and roads, telephonic, telegraphic and postal communications are either interrupted or their use is prohibited to the civil population, who are therefore completely isolated and unaware of what is taking place even at short distances from them.

On a certain day several cars or lorries arrive and stop in a town or village. The cars contain officers who commence to study the lay-out of the village and the topography of the area; the lorries have NCO's and men who commence to fire bursts from automatic rifles into the air. The flow of vehicles increases and a systematic robbery commences in the township and along the roads and in the surrounding country.

A Headquarters is set up in the town where they pretend not to know what is going on, or at the most, in the event of complaint by some courageous person or of some particularly serious act, they limit themselves to blaming a section belonging to some other command.

Then come those charged with the requisition of cattle, who order the mayor to deliver a certain number of cattle, sheep, pigs, horses, mules and donkeys, threatening fierce reprisals on the town if the order is not fulfilled. While the delivery of the number of animals required is being carried out in order to avoid worse misfortunes, troops go around the district in lorries and make a clean sweep, not only of all animals, but of wheat, flour, oil, and objects of value.

The robbery is generally accompanied by the firing of bullets in order to intimidate the peasants, who are trying as far as possible to hide their possessions.

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On a certain day several cars or lorries arrive and stop in a town or village. The cars contain officers who commence to study the lay-out of the village and the topography of the area; the lorries have NCO's and men who commence to fire bursts from automatic rifles into the air. The flow of vehicles increases and a systematic robbery commences in the township and along the roads and in the surrounding country.

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The robbery is generally accompanied by the firing of bullets in order to intimidate the peasants, who are trying as far as possible to hide their possessions.

When the population is in stark terror owing to the continuous violences, the hunt for men commences. The township is surrounded by special troops, often S.S. men, and continually firing, they search the houses one by one and capture all men irrespective of their ages.

The families then, being without the support of their menfolk, are unable to prevent their dwelling places from being systematically ransacked, and anything of value or which catches the eye of the searcher is taken away.

At last, when Allied pressure becomes more threatening, the wrecking engineers arrive and order the evacuation of the people and destroy the township with mines and fire.

C. Forgue Lt.

R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:
Allied Control Commission.
Colonel Thorne-Thorne,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ., 58 M
c/o Allied Control Commission,
ITALY.

2nd January 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.231.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletins. 1739

The SWISS radio states that a FASCIST has been assassinated in MILAN. Reprisals were taken against ten hostages. They were shot.

According to RADIO ROME the special tribunal set up in BOLOGNA has condemned three COMMUNISTS to death.

Radio LONDRA states that the CORRIERE DELLA SERA admit the chaotic conditions existing in NORTH ITALY, and among other things that the FASCIST REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT has still no fixed policy.

Radio MOSCOW has broadcast that the GERMANS have confiscated all the ITALIAN gold reserves.

(S.I.M. Bulletin No.61 dated 31st December 1943.)

S.M. VITTORIO EMANUELE III has directed a New Year message to the ITALIAN people in which he exhorts all the nation to unite and drive the GERMANS from ITALY.

(S.I.M. Bulletin No.62 dated 1st January 1944.)

for C. Forgna Lt.
R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.
/Col/Thorne-Thorne, A.M.C.,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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Equals British [illegible] 58/DR 69

C-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ.,
c/o Allied Control Commission,
ITALY.

2nd January 1944.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.234.

Source: Reports of interrogations made by H.Q., F/W Sub-Commission, C.M.F.

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1708

About 1st November, 1943, a deserter from the German Army was met at CARPINETO (Sheet 29(R)R8815). He was an Alsatian, aged about 30, and had three years service. He had been in Germany in the early part of 1943. He had deserted while en route for TERMOLI, during an air raid. This man stated: (a) "The main FOCKE-WULF factories had been completely devastated by Allied bombing" (Source does not remember if the locality of such factories was given); (b) "There was a great shortage of benzine in Germany proper in the early part of this year".

for C. Forgue H

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission-
/ Col.Thorne-Thorne, A.M.C.,
c/o 15 Army Group.
Mediterranean Air Command (Air "I"9.
H.Q., Tactical Air Force.

Re 51

4/1/44

U. S. SECRET 158
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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) AFHQ., 2 JAN 1944
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

31st December 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.229.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.60 dated 30th December 1943.

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INTERNAL SITUATION - ROME.

1737

An officer who escaped from occupied territory states that up to 12th December the situation in NORTH ITALY was as follows.

1. The majority of the people are hostile to the FASCISTS.

2. The FASCIST FEDERATION in MILAN has formed an action group with the job of taking reprisals against anti-fascists.

3. The GERMAN troops are maintaining a correct attitude towards the population.

4. The railways are working, and the number of passenger trains have been greatly reduced.

5. The electric railway is working as before as far as RIMINI. SOUTH of this city, steam is used instead.

6.. The peasants, through fear of the GERMAN powers of requisitioning, have tilled the land and sown seed. For this work they had plenty of help, owing to the labour furnished by the demobilized.

7. The distribution of rationed foods is going on alright, except for sugar, which has not been distributed for two months. The rationing of salt (½ kg. per person per month) and of tobacco (40 gr. a week for men over 18 years of age) began on December 1st.

8. The black market is active, and prices are not excessive.

for R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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for R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.

Col. Thorne-Thorne, A.D.C.,
c/o 15 Army Group.

U. S. SECRET
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U.S. SECRET 58
Equals BRITISH SECRET 2 JAN 44 67

G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE) A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

30th December 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.227.

Source: S.I.M.Bulletin No.59 dated 28th December 1943.

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1725

Political News.

According to news from RADIO BRAZZAVILLE the GERMAN authorities at ROME as a result of incidents and acts of sabotage carried out by terrorists on bicycles, have ordered that all bicycles should be confiscated. In consequence of this, as from today no civilian will be allowed to use a bicycle in ROME. The decree has caused deep resentment.

ROME Radio communicates that the FASCIST REPUBLICAN Party has invited Doctor C. ANDREOLI, CARLO GIULIANI and Doctor DANTE MORI to help in the administration of the party.

The national commission for labour has informed the provincial heads of the varying increase of wages. Increases from 15% to 30% are envisaged.

ROME Radio gives out news that four JEWS were accused at a special court in FLORENCE on the charge of acting in connivance with foreign agents.

LONDON reports that the GERMANS have taken special measures to break the resistance of the patriots at BIELLA. The police are mounting guard at almost all the cross-roads. Every civilian found in possession of arms will be immediately shot. Hostages will be put to death on the breaking out of new disorders. Those houses from which shots are seen to be fired will be razed to the ground. In the last few days the people of BIELLA have carried out several acts of sabotage and killed many GERMAN soldiers in the vicinity of the city.

C Forrest M

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for R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.

Col.Thorne-Thorne, AMG.,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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686

31 DEC 1943

MOST SECRET

HQ 2 DISTRICT CRF
2112/9 G

30 Dec 43

14
66
21

HQ 2 DISTRICT

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.4.

Based on Information Received up to

1800 hrs 29 Dec 43

1730

1. ENEMY SITUATION

Today comes the long awaited news that ORTONA has been cleared of enemy. It has been a bitter fight and it has taken 8 Army more than a week to drive the men of the 1 Para Div from the town. They clung grimly to every stone. Whereas in the past it has customary to report advances of at least two miles, it has been thought fit to mention the gain of a block of houses. The enemy has had to be driven from each building. Tanks and A/T guns were emplaced in the basements of buildings, which had to be reduced to piles of rubble by our own tanks and 17 pdrs before the enemy would withdraw. The weather which has continued throughout to hamper the movements of our forces has now turned to sleet, snow and wind of gale force. The battle in ORTONA has been the main feature of the recent fighting on the 8 Army front although an attempt was made to by-pass the town on the west. Here enemy infiltration caused considerable trouble on Christmas Eve. The Parachutists have also been fiercely resisting our advance further south. Good progress however has been made in the direction of TOLLO (C2715) and [illegible] CASA VECCHIA and then VILLA GRANDE were over-run. Enemy reaction to our advance here was particularly violent, owing to the importance to 26 Pz Div of the ARIELLI - ORTONA Road as a line of eventual withdrawal.

North east of ORSOGNA another advance has been made to capture dominating features. Here, too, the chief opposition, strong as elsewhere, has come from members of the Parachute Division. There has been little activity around GUARDIAGRELE and most recent reports tell of patrols as far as PENNAPIEDIMONTE where no movement was seen. In the sector between CASOLI and ALFEDENA, that part of the front facing the slopes of M. MAIELLA, the only recent activity reported was a raid on one of our patrol HQ at PESCO PENNATARO by two enemy companies. The attack was easily beaten off, but no prisoners were taken, so the rumour that the attackers were Alpine Tps is not confirmed. Along the whole of the sector snow fell recently.

It would appear that at present troops from 1 - 2 Para Divisions form the backbone of the defence from the coast to the MAIELLA. The withdrawal of 90 PG Div behind the R. FORO has continued behind the screen of Para Tps.

Six bns of Para tps are disposed between ORTONA and VILLA GRANDE supported by 190 Tk bn. From VILLA GRANDE to excl ORSOGNA is 26 Pz Div's responsibility. From ORSOGNA to PENNA PIEDIMONTE is probably still taken care of by 65 Div with a stiffening of Para Tps, although the most recent identification, that of 2 Bn 754 Inf Regt, of 334 Inf Div, south of ORSOGNA, may indicate that a change over is taking place. That the enemy is once more able to bring to the south another new division inspite of all that has been written about his shortage of fresh divisions may seem a little remarkable. [illegible] Para Tps fighting Bn has been identified in the line, and this may be a

has been a bitter fight and it has taken 8 Army more than a week to drive the men of the 1 Para Div from the town. They clung grimly to every stone. Whereas in the past it has customary to report advances of at least two miles, it has been thought fit to mention the gain of a block of houses. The enemy has had to be driven from each building. Tanks and A/T guns were emplaced in the basements of buildings, which had to be reduced to piles of rubble by our own tanks and 17 pdrs before the enemy would withdraw. The weather which has continued throughout to hamper the movements of our forces has now turned to sleet, snow and wind of gale force. The battle in ORTONA has been the main feature of the recent fighting on the 8 Army front although an attempt was made to by-pass the town on the west. Here enemy infiltration caused considerable trouble on Christmas Eve. The Parachutists have also been fiercely resisting our advance further south. Good progress however has been made in the direction of TOLLO (0271S) and PIZZO CASA VEZZANI and then VILLA GRANDE were over-run. Enemy reaction to our advance here was particularly violent, owing to the importance to 26 Pz Div of the ARIELLI - ORSOGNA Road as a line of eventual withdrawal.

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There is little change in the dispositions on 5 Army front. More elements of 5 Mtn Division have arrived and 44 Inf Div is now almost complete. 29 P G Div is still in the line north of the CAPUA - ROME road, but a PW of 71 PGR stated that it was rumoured that his division is to be relieved by 44 Inf. Between the road and the coast the left half is still held by 15 PG Div supported by a strong Battle Group from 90 Div and on the right is 94 Inf Div.

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The recent fighting on this front has consisted of gruelling battles for the many heights. The crests are frequently strongly held and as happened so frequently in North Africa, arrival at the top, in a state of exhaustion, would be greeted by a fierce counter-attack or by heavy shell and mortar fire. Inspite of all the difficulties of terrain and of weather, the peaks fall one by one, and 5 Army troops slowly make their way towards CASSINO. On the way S. VITTORE must first fall. Fresh reports continue to come in from Patrols of the strong defences of this town. South of the road Patrols have been active on both sides.

2. ARTILLERY.

Recent PW state that German arty is seriously affected by the shortage of ammunition and the prevalence of duds. One PW claimed that he saw a troop fire between 20 and 30 rounds, none of which exploded. He also stated that time fuses were seldom used because they were badly made. This deterioration in quality in has also led to inaccuracy in the fall of shot. It is believed that sabotage in the factories is the main cause.

The efficiency of batteries is also wasted by the control of ammunition. Opportunity targets can seldom be engaged. The OP officer must report a target to the Troop Commander for his approval, and he in turn must consult the BC. By that time the opportunity has gone. It was PW's impression that one target in three was all that managed to find the double approval in any case.

(Source: Fifth Army)

3. MARSHALL TITO.

JOSIP BROZ, who is known under the pseudonym of TITO, was born about 50 years ago in a Croat village near ZAGREB. He is a metal worker by trade who played an important part in the organisation of the Jugoslav working class movement. He fought through the Spanish Civil War with the Republicans and on his return to JUGOSLAVIA worked actively for the Communist Party. From the outbreak of the patriotic Jugoslav rising BROZ has played a leading part in the conduct of military operations and the political and administrative organisation of the liberated areas. He is a man of great energy and resource and is without a doubt the leading figure in the National Committee of Liberation, whose President and acting Minister for National Defence he is with the title of Marshal of JUGOSLAVIA.

4. APPENDIX.

A: The Interception of the Hospital Ship "GRADISCA".

R C Lucas
for
Lieutenant-Colonel
General Staff

TOS/2 2X.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

APPENDIX "A" to 2 DISTRICT
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 4 dated
Dec 43.

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THE INTERCEPTION OF THE HOSPITAL SHIP "GRADISCA". (From a report on the Interrogation of British Personnel rescued from the ship).

On Dec 9, the German hospital ship "GRADISCA" was intercepted by units of the Royal Navy and forced to anchor off BRINDISI. A number of British and Italian wounded were taken off and the "GRADISCA" was allowed to proceed. The wounded were mainly from LEROS and interesting comments have been made on the operation against LEROS, and on conditions after the surrender.

1734


Many of the invasion troops had been twelve months on the Eastern Front and a number won the CRETE - STALINGRAD medals. They were surprised by the resistance they had met as they had been led to believe that the Island would be taken without opposition. As it was, medical personnel said that casualties amounting to 4000 killed and wounded had been suffered. British troops had received valuable assistance from the Italian Garrison, who had fought well especially the CD Battalions.

The invasion forces arrived in a number of LCI, LCT. Some British LCT had been seen in PORTOLAGO during after the surrender, No attempt was made to land tanks, but the enemy made use of several tracked motor-cycle combinations. He also brought with him a number of jeeps. These had been repainted black or dark blue. The enemy is also making use of British battle dress. The invasion troops only remained three days after the Island had surrendered. They were relieved by some 400 older men. This occupying force arrived in khaki drill and very quickly adopted battle dress so that it became quite a problem to distinguish between British and German Troops.

The occupying forces do not seem greatly concerned about the security of the Island. A party of R.A.O. personnel who were permitted to tour the Island for the purpose of burying the dead, met very few German Soldiers, only one patrol of seven heavily armed men, who covered the area of ALINDA Bay. This lack of vigilance should supplement the efforts of a Greek Organisation, said to be aiding the escape from Leros of a number of British Troops still in hiding in the interior.

The enemy appeared to be making a special effort to be friendly. All ranks spoke of the excellent treatment received from the Germans, who were surprised and grateful for the medical attention their wounded had received. The Italians on the other hand received less rations than our men and were treated like cattle. The older members of the occupation troops and the personnel of the "GRADISCA" harped on the old theme that the two great Cultural Nations, Germany and Britain, should unite against the Russian menace. They also spoke as if an Allied victory were inevitable. Nevertheless, the younger wounded, those of the invasion force, though no longer confident of swift victory, spoke about secret weapons, a great bombardment of Britain, and a great airborne attack against our Island in the Spring.

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30 DEC 1943

C-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), AFHQ,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

28th December 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.226.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.88 dated 23th December 1943.

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INTERNAL SITUATION-ITALY.

The FASCIST police has arrested the Communist Leader GIOVANNI ROVERA (radio news).

According to the New York Radio the TURIN newspaper "LA STAMPA" is lamenting the increasing acts of sabotage to telephone and telegraph lines in NORTH ITALY.

Radio NAPOLI has broadcast the following news: A meeting of patriots was held in NORTH ITALY during which the commander-in-chief of the guerrilla bands was elected. Five others were chosen to collaborate with him.

Radio BARI gives the news that 5000 persons were arrested during the last few days at ROME for anti-GERMAN activity.

Radio LONDRA communicates that according to the SWISS newspaper "TRIBUNE de GENEVE", the workers in MILAN and SESTO S.GIOVANNI are on strike to obtain from the GERMAN authorities the release of political prisoners.

for R.J.O.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.

✓ Col.Thorne-Thorne, A.M.G.,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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G-2 (Advanced Intelligence), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o Allied Control Commission,
ITALY.

25th December 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.223.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.57 dated 17th December 1943.

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1731

Internal Situation - ITALY.

The FASCIST REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT has ordered that all men living in ROME and belonging to the 1910 - 1924 classes should present themselves at the proper recruiting authorities by the 31st of December. (Radio news.)

Such action, together with the measures to limit the influx to ROME (vide Bulletin No.56 dated 16th December) indicate that the GERMAN authorities are having trouble with saboteurs and resistance groups.

W.J.C. DAVIS, Major
for Major, G.S.O.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

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/ Col. Thorne-Thorne, A.F.H.Q.,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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C.C. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION ITALY.

29 DEC 1943

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27 December, 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 216.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No. 36, dated 20 December.

A senior officer who escaped from enemy territory in the middle of December states: 173

In order not to aggravate the food situation in ROME the Ministry of the Interior (Ministero dell 'Interno), acting in conjunction with the GERMAN command in ITALY, has forbidden anyone to go to ROME unless they have the special authorisation of the GERMAN military command.

The prefect, who is the consul of the FOLGIO TANDORINI militia, is discharging the duties of the head of police.

The National Commissioner of Labour has ordered that a census taking of the whole population in the communes of the REPUBBLICA SOCIALE ITALIANA, with view to finding out all men from 16 --70 years of age capable either of intellectual or manual work who, if unemployed, could be forced to work. Food coupons will not be given to those who are not included in the census and will be taken away from those who refuse to obey the call up for conscripted labour. Those who favour the delinquents will be treated in the same way. (Radio News)

The above repressive and intimidating measures are evident proofs of the efforts the GERMANS are making to increase the call up for labour and military service.

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According to information received from Radio London, an epidemic of typhus has broken out in Naples, in consequence of which military authorities have forbidden anyone entering the city unless on very important business. Up to now 250 cases have been reported.

for C. Fitzgerald
R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission.
Colonel Therne-Therne, AMG,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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9 DEC 1943

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By auth C-in-C, AFHQ
Initials: K.W.D.S.
Date: 23 Dec 1943

732

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

23 December 1943.

INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTION)
NUMBER 34)

Provisional Directive
concerning
Collation and Distribution of Intelligence
between
AFHQ and MIDDLE EAST

1729

Division of Responsibility.

1. Attached are two appendices showing the division of responsibility for collating operational intelligence, except naval and air, between G-2, AFHQ and G.S.(I), Middle East, as a result of the unified command.

2. This division of responsibility may be subject to alteration in the light of experiences, and in the development of operations. It is realised that some duplication will be inevitable but it is hoped that this has been reduced to a minimum. G-2, AFHQ, will from time to time indicate priorities for collation work.

Collection and Dissemination of Intelligence.

3. Agencies and persons responsible for the collection and distribution of information will ensure that those responsible for collation receive the information pertinent to their responsibilities.

4. Collated information on the respective spheres of responsibility will be exchanged between G-2, AFHQ, and G.S.(I), Middle East, as necessary. In this connection, Intelligence Notes on German Army Organisation, training and methods, produced weekly by AFHQ, will be available for issue to formations under command Middle East if desired.

Technical Intelligence.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

NUMBER 34)

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Technical Intelligence.

5. All technical intelligence obtained in the theater will be distributed by G-2, AFHQ, in the form of periodical technical intelligence summaries. This does not apply to intelligence collected during operations by Middle East, who will disseminate information as necessary.

Security Intelligence.

6. AFHQ will be responsible for defining the security policy to be followed and particularly measures to implement this policy in the whole of the AFHQ area. The channels of control for security measures in regard to projected operations shall in the main be the same as those for operational intelligence.

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7. A liaison detachment will be provided by S.I.M.E. for attachment to G-2 (C.I.), AFHQ, to work under the control of G-2 (C.I.) to deal with all matters in connection with projected operations in AFHQ area in southeast Europe and the Aegean.

8. The provision of Field Security Sections for forces in operation in southeast Europe and the Aegean shall be the responsibility of G.H.Q., M.E.F.

By Command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

K. W. D. STRONG,
Major-General, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Appendix A - Responsibilities of G-2, AFHQ
Appendix B - Responsibilities of G.S.(I), MIDDLE EAST.

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Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

K. W. D. STRONG,
Major-General, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

Appendix A - Responsibilities of G-2, AFHQ
Appendix B - Responsibilities of G.S.(I), MIDDLE EAST.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

23 December 1943

APPENDIX A TO)
:
INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTION)
:
NUMBER 34)

1728

Responsibilities
of
G-2, A.F.H.Q.

Order of Battle of German Army.

All A.F.H.Q. area.

Topography.

All A.F.H.Q. area except those portions allotted to G.S.(I), Middle East.

Defence Collations.

All A.F.H.Q. area except those portions allotted to G.S.(I), Middle East.

Technical Intelligence.

All A.F.H.Q. area except immediate operational requirements.

Economic Intelligence.

Italy, Greater Germany, Jugoslavia and Albania (as mutually agreed between M.E.W., Middle East and Economic Warfare Analysis Section, A.F.H.Q.).

Political Intelligence.

Italy and South of France.

All other Military Intelligence.

All A.F.H.Q. area except those portions allotted to G.S.(I), Middle East.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Order of Battle of German Army.

All A.F.H.Q. area.

Topography.

All A.F.H.Q. area except those portions allotted to G.S.(I), Middle East.

Defence Collations.

All A.F.H.Q. area except those portions allotted to G.S.(I), Middle East.

Technical Intelligence.

All A.F.H.Q. area except immediate operational requirements.

Economic Intelligence.

Italy, Greater Germany, Jugoslavia and Albania (as mutually agreed between M.E.W., Middle East and Economic Warfare Analysis Section, A.F.H.Q.).

Political Intelligence.

Italy and South of France.

All other Military Intelligence.

All A.F.H.Q. area except those portions allotted to G.S.(I), Middle East.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

23 December 1943

APPENDIX B TO)
:
INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTION)
:
NUMBER 34)

1727

Responsibilities
of
G.S.(I) Middle East

Order of Battle of German Army.

Greece
Aegean
Bulgaria
Turkey
Jugoslavia and Albania so long as M.O.4 remains in Middle East.

Order of Battle, Other Countries.

Hungary
Roumania
Bulgaria

Topography.

Greece
Bulgaria
Aegean
Roumania
Turkey
Hungary
Jugoslavia
Albania

Defence Collations.

Greece
Aegean
Bulgaria
Turkey
Hungary
Roumania
Jugoslavia and Albania so long as M.O.4 remains in Middle East.

Economic Intelligence.

Greece
Roumania
Bulgaria
Turkey
Hungary
Jugoslavia and Albania as mutually agreed between M.E.W., Middle East and Economic Warfare Analysis Section, A.F.H.Q.

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Order of Battle of German Army.

Greece
Aegean
Bulgaria
Turkey
Jugoslavia and Albania so long as M.O.4 remains in Middle East.

Order of Battle, Other Countries.

Hungary
Roumania
Bulgaria

Topography.

Greece
Bulgaria
Aegean
Roumania
Turkey
Hungary
Jugoslavia
Albania

Defence Collations.

Greece
Aegean
Bulgaria
Turkey
Hungary
Roumania
Jugoslavia and Albania so long as M.O.4 remains in Middle East.

Economic Intelligence.

Greece
Roumania
Bulgaria
Turkey
Hungary
Jugoslavia and Albania as mutually agreed between M.E.W., Middle East and Economic Warfare Analysis Section, A.F.H.Q.

Political Intelligence (Summaries from P.I.C., M.E.).

A.F.H.Q. area except Italy and South of France.

All Other Military Intelligence.

Greece
Roumania
Bulgaria
Turkey
Hungary

U. S. SECRET
(Equals British MOST SECRET)

U.S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET

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U. S. SECRET

Equals British SECRET

58/E

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

28 DEC 1943

26th December 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.203.

ITALY - INTERNAL SITUATION.

1726

The Minister of National Education in the FASCIST REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT - BIGGINI, has ordered the directors of the institutions of learning to immediately make a list of the names of every scholar attending school, with a view to finding out the names of those belonging to the 1923, 1924 and 1925 classes.

The Minister has ordered that these young men should give up their course of study and immediately report to their respective military districts. (Fascist radio news.)

These actions go to confirm the poor results obtained in the call up of the young classes (vide Bulletin No.52, 22nd December, 1943).

(Source: S.I.M.Bulletin No.54 dated 24th December 1943.)

A University student who escaped from CREMONA on the 24th November, 1943, has given the following details about the city.

The cabinet of the Presidency of the Council of the FASCIST REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT, the Ministry for ITALIAN AFRICA, and part of the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry resided there.

The FASCIST REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT was very active, intimidating the people, especially the families of those who did not obey the call-up. Reprisal measures were taken against dissentients.

The police authorities, particularly the CARABINIERI, in general showed themselves favourable to the patriots (in the Questura, however, there were many FASCIST elements).

In the country-side the system of barter was being employed.

Rationing of food was working regularly, but the quantity distributed was small. The banks were paying out in paper money, and often with cheques.

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S.P. Meadows Capt
for R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

DISTRIBUTION:

Allied Control Commission,
Col.Thorne-Thorne.
A.M.G., c/o 15 Army Group.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

26 DEC 1943

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MOST SECRET

HQ 2 DISTRICT CMP
2012/9 G

22 Dec 43

HQ 2 DISTRICT

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 5

Based on Information Received up to

1100 hrs 17 Dec 43

1726

1. ENEMY SITUATION

A week has passed and the three main strong points in the enemy defence lines on the East Coast are still firmly held by him. Throughout the week he has fought fiercely and clung tenaciously to his positions, opposing every move that the Eighth Army troops might make. Every available reserve has been flung in to be destroyed piecemeal in attacks, which could only be designed as delaying actions. Prisoners on this front alone have mounted to 1300 since the battle began, but in spite of ever mounting losses, first the troops of the 90 Div in the coastal region counter attacked unceasingly, then later elements of 1 Para Div took up the struggle with equal ferocity. The infantry have generally been supported by tanks and flame throwers.

The terrain continues to favour the defender. Some 15 miles long the line is anchored on its right flank to the M. ERRAPPELLA, still looked after by the 2 Bns of 90 Mtn Regt., and on the left is the sea. The intervening country consists of ridges and gullies, ideal for defence.

There is some speculation as to why the resistance is so stubborn, and as to why the enemy reserves, already so scarce, are being frittered away. It is thought to indicate that reinforcements are expected immediately. 334 Inf Div may already be on its way from the North. Mountain Divs would be more suitable; but the road is dire and there are none known to be readily available. As it is 5 Mtn Div, which has been recently identified on the Fifth Army front was sent from the Leningrad Sector of the Eastern front. The remainder of 1 Mtn. Div to which 98 Mtn Regt formerly belonged is said to be fully occupied by the Partisans.

It is possible that the next defence line is not yet ready to receive the retiring enemy forces. This would also account for the determination to make a stand. It is not exactly known where the next line will be, but in 65 Div's area round S.ELPIDIO (G 1761) much digging has been reported. It is possible that these defence works may be the anchor for a line behind the R.TRONTO or the rivers immediately in front of it. Civilians have spoken of the preparation of defences North of the river PESCARA in the PIANELLA area, on which many Italian civilians including women have been compelled to work.

As the Eighth Army gradually increases its penetration into the enemy line, there begin to be signs of a pending withdrawal. Fires have been reported in ORTONA. An attempt has been made to extricate 90 Div, with the probable intention of sending it back to regenerate and complete preparations on the new line. In the

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[illegible] proved that the three main strong points in the enemy defence lines on the East Coast are still firmly held by him. Throughout the week he has fought fiercely and clung tenaciously to his positions, opposing every move that the Eighth Army Troops might make. Every available reserve has been flung in to be destroyed piecemeal in attacks, which could only be designed as delaying actions. Prisoners on this front alone have amounted to 1000 since the battle began, but in spite of our mounting losses, first the troops of the 90 Div in the coastal region counter attacked unceasingly, then later elements of 1 Para Div took up the struggle with equal ferocity. The infantry have generally been supported by tanks and flame throwers.

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As the Eighth Army gradually increases its penetration into the enemy line, there begin to be signs of a pending withdrawal. Fires have been reported in ORTONA. An attempt has been made to evacuate 90 Div, with the probable intention of sending it back to recuperate and complete preparations on the new line. In the coastal sector, two Bns of 361 Regt were relieved by two Bns of Parachutists but our pressure was such that after readjustment into one Bn, they were returned to the line at JUNCTION.

The winter line at it's eastern extremity is not yet broken, though badly crumpled. During the week pressure has been exerted on it at three main points. The most important, and therefore most stubbornly defended was the crossroads at JOLI, where 1 Para Regt barred the way to ORTONA for some days. This point finally fell on the 19 Dec, and enabled our troops to reach the outskirts of ORTONA. A second thrust across the road to PRETORO (C 2711) has made good progress. A third is about at SCHIELI (C 265). As yet there is no news of the fall of these two places. ORSOGNA is also still in enemy hands though infiltration by our troops to the North

...../of

of the town, may become too serious a threat to permit the defenders to tarry any longer.

In the central sector, between CAROLI H 2491 and RIVISONDOLI (H 0560) this waste tract of mountainous country is now held by even fewer Parachutists. It is however, possible that the arrival of 5 Mtn Div on the XIV Pz Korp front may permit 305 Inf to take over some of this area.

14 Pz Korps have also been offering a stiff resistance in the Western Sector. Only after hard fighting through desperate country have our forces been able to achieve any success. M.CASTEL 4000 H 0337 has been won and the troops on Fifth Army's right flank gained a footing on the S.MICHELE Pass. Fierce counter attacks were however made by men of 305 Inf Div and a withdrawal had to be made. Further South two important heights have been wrested from the enemy, M.PANTANO H 0 229 and M.CAVALLO G 9927 fell only after severe fighting. Throughout the week elements of 15 PGR have clung doggedly to S.PIETRO in spite of a heavy pounding by our artillery and aircraft. It was only reported captured on 19 Dec, and our forward elements were then pressing on to S.VITTORE. It was at CASALE G 9928 that 100 Mtn Regt of 5 Mtn Div was identified for the first time.

The MIGNANO defile is now completely in our hands, but it remains to be seen with what speed our forces are now able to pour through it, 25 PW's said that defile had to be held till the 21st after which the enemy were to retire to the CASSINO winter line. The road to CASSINO is not very long, but it is likely to be rough.

2. PROGRESS IN JUGOSLAVIA.

The Germans in their recent activities against the Partisans in Jugoslavia have achieved small success. After the capture of LIVNO and TOMISLAV their offensive in this region came to a dead end. Since this the Partisans have succeeded in cutting off and surrounding some 4,000 German troops in LIVNO, who confined in this small town became very vulnerable to air attack.

Fighting has also been in progress in CROATIA. This is not thought to be an offensive so much as the relief of one German Div by another carried out in face of considerable Partisan interference. The move of 373 Div from KARLOVAC and OGULIN to KNIN had to pass through Partisan controlled territory and it cost the div some three hundred casualties and certain losses in MT. 373 Div left KARLO for DOBOJ NOVI and was harassed all the way by Partisan forces.

The more important enemy activity has been operations from BOSNIA to SANJAK in North MONTENEGRO. These operations are thought to be aimed at driving the Partisans to the borre mountains of MONTENEGRO, where their resistance would be so weakened by lack of food and ammunition that in the event of an Allied landing in the Balkans, they would cease to be a menace to the Germans rear. The Germans are fully aware of the impossibility of occupying waste tracts of mountainous country, but before they withdraw they burn all the villages and habitations. Food supplies are systematically looted or destroyed.

The situation on coast is more in favour of the Partisans, who have [illegible] MT. Here enemy is of G are continually

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Attacks were however made by men of 305 Inf Div and a withdrawal had to be made. Further South two important heights have been wrested from the enemy, M.PANTANO H © 229 and M.CAVALLO G 9927 fell only after severe fighting. Throughout the week elements of 15 PGR have clung doggedly to S.PIETRO in spite of a heavy pounding by our artillery and aircraft. It was only reported captured on 19 Dec, and our forward elements were then pressing on to S.VITTORE. It was at CASALE G 9923 that 100 Mtn Regt of 5 Mtn Div was identified for the first time.

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The more important enemy activity has been operations from East BOSNIA to SARAJEVO in North MONTENEGRO. These operations are thought to be aimed at driving the Partisans to the barren mountains of MONTENEGRO, where their resistance would be so weakened by lack of food and exposure that in the event of an Allied landing in the Balkans, they would cease to be a menace to the Germans rear. The Germans are fully aware of the impossibility of occupying vast tracts of mountainous country, but before they withdraw they burn all the villages and habitations. Food supplies are systematically looted or destroyed.

The situation on coast is more in favour of the Partisans, who have infiltrated SW of KNIN and behind SPLIT. Here enemy lines of C are continually harassed. The islands opposite ZARA have been evacuated by the Germans, and the Partisans have occupied DUGI. Raids by Allied aircraft on LISSA have caused such heavy casualties among the German Forces, that the town has been evacuated. Commando raids by Partisans have been made on the mainland opposite ISSA, and on the PELJESAC Peninsular. Reports tell of supplies now being taken from VIS to the CROATIAN mainland in Partisan ships.

Despite the German efforts to suppress this, the Partisans continue to be very active. In an order of the day Marshall TITO told all Partisans not being attacked by the Germans to take up the offensive. All over JUGOSLAVIA this call is being answered.

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The efforts of the JUGOSLAVS are being even more enhanced by those of the Allied Airforces, and of the Royal Navy. Light naval forces had a rare haul last weekend sinking a ferry laden with fuel, two E Boats and a Torpedo boat. Two torpedo hits were registered on a merchant ship. The enemy is very worried and most conscious of the threat of an Allied Landing on the DALMATIAN Coast.

3. ENEMY METHODS

(a) Air OP

Twenty-two prisoners were questioned recently on the subject of our air OP. They all said that they had no specific orders what to do if it came over. Opinion was divided - half said it was stupid to open fire, thereby giving away their positions, and bringing down subsequently murderous barrage. The others said they always opened up with small arms if it was within range, but that this was ineffective. The air OP ('Flying Flea') was known amongst them as O.d.T., or the 'Orderly Officer' owing to the regularity with which he visited them. Others know him rather more affectionately as "Josef".

(b) Grenadier Regt (mot)

Another Army order dated 25 June 43, read as follows:-

"The 'Inf Divs (mot)' will be known as PG Divs from now on by order of the Fuhrer. The Inf Div Grossdeutschland receives the title PG Div. Grossdeutschland.

The Gren Regts(mot) of the PG Divs will retain the white piping of their arm of the service.

This seems to imply that all infantry regiments in Panzer Grenadier Divisions should be called Gren Regt (mot), in which case Panzer Grenadier Regiments will only be found in Armoured Divisions. This would explain the final designation of 200 and 361 Regiments in 90 Panzer Grenadier Division.

(c) Camouflage

PW from 1 Coy PGR 2 MG was captured wearing a camouflage jacket. It is worn over the blouse and extends to the knee. It looks similar to the camouflaged German shelter-halves. PW states that all personnel in his Coy were equipped with these jackets, which are worn only in battle and are prohibited in rest areas.

(d) Enemy Intelligence

The following is a translation of a signal from GSI 26 Panzer Div to 26 Recce Battalion, dated 8 Dec 43.

"Division requests investigations to be undertaken to establish whether the enemy, immediately before attacking or attempting a breakthrough, [illegible] with ammunition which merely makes a bang and has

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fire, thereby giving away their positions, and bringing down subsequently a murderous barrage. The others said they always opened up with small arms fire if it was within range, but that this was ineffective. The Air OP ('Flying Fred') was known amongst them as O.d.T., or the 'Orderly Officer' owing to the regularity with which he visited them. Others knew him rather more affectionately as "Josef".

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(d) Enemy Intelligence

The following is a translation of a signal from GSI 26 Panzer Div to 26 Recce Battalion, dated 8 Dec 43.

"Division requests investigations to be undertaken to establish whether the enemy, immediately before attacking or attempting a breakthrough, sustains his artillery fire with ammunition which merely makes a bang and has no shrapnel effect, the object being to make us remain under cover while the enemy is already breaking into our positions".

4. APPENDICES.

A: Effects of our Artillery on the Enemy as taken from PW Reports 1 Dec to 10 Dec 43.
B: Greek Political-Military Organisations (War Office).

Lieutenant-Colonel
General Staff

TOS [illegible] 4

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APPENDIX "A" TO NO.2 DISTRICT
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.5 DATED
( ) Dec 43.

54

Effects of our Artillery on the Enemy as Taken from PW Reports 1 Dec to 10 Dec 43.

While casualties from artillery do not seem to have been excessive, the effect on the morale of the enemy was very great, especially among the green troops. The fighting efficiency of these green troops was very low after a heavy concentration of fire. A PW from 3 Coy 115 Recce Bn which was on Hill 960 (9508) stated that the men's nerves were shattered even though many casualties had not been suffered. On 5 Dec., when barrage opened up, the entire 2 Coy, led by their Lieutenant CO returned without being ordered to, to the village of CAMINO. The company was immediately sent back under the first sergeant. The Lieutenant did not return to the Company.

Some prisoners from the MT. CAMINO area claim that they saw no casualties. Having been on the mountain for 3 weeks preceding the attack, they were able to select their cover very carefully. However, 1 PW from that same area feels that although the arty preparations did not play an important part, the continued artillery fire while the infantary attached prevented the Germans from bringing up reinforcements, since it covered all approaches to the hill-top very effectively. This greatly contributed to the success of the American troops. It would seem from the statements of prisoners concerning artillery that our artillery is effective in that it does have a demoralising effect, even though casualties are not exceptionally heavy due to the natural protection afforded by the ground.

Following are general impressions given by prisoners from various units;
Prisoner from 115 Recce Bn. American arty depressing. Does not believe that arty fire alone could have driven them out of MT. CAMINO.

Prisoners from 7 Coy 577 Gren Regt, captured west of MONTEQUILLA on 2 Dec; There were more casualties due to SA fire than from arty. Between 29 Nov and 2 Dec his company had 10 killed and 15 wounded from arty fire.

Prisoners from 3 Sqn 115 Recce Bn: They were impressed by our arty, but as much of it went over MT. CAMINO, relatively few casualties to personnel and material. All agreed that it did have a demoralising effect. It was described as plentiful and nerve-racking. Not many duds.

Prisoner from 3 Coy 15 PGR. Very effective casualties daily.

Prisoner from 6 Tp, 55 Arty Regt: They were on slope just east of MT. CAMINO. Our arty was excellent. The air burst were not effective because men had good positions.

Prisoner from 5 Coy, PGR 1 MG located at 920155. Suffered 10 casualties from our artillery.

Prisoner from 11 Coy, 104 PGR: Plentiful and nerve-wracking.

12 Coy, 104 PGR: Nerve-racking, but few casualties because of positions.

9 Coy, 104 PGR: Frightening. Awed by volume. Not many duds.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Prisoner from 3 Coy 15 PGR. Very effective casualties daily.

Prisoner from 6 Tp, 33 Arty Regt: They were on slope just west of MT. CAMINO. Our arty was excellent. The air burst were not effective because men had good positions.

Prisoner from 5 Coy, PGR 1 BG located at 920135. Suffered 10 casualties from our artillery.

Prisoner from 11 Coy, 104 PGR: Plentiful and much-dreaded.

12 Coy, 104 PGR: Nerve-racking, but few casualties because of positions.

9 Coy, 104 PGR: Frightening. Awed by volume. Not many duds.

Prisoner from 3 Coy, 131 Gren Regt, captured 2 Dec, stated "If the enemy had attacked during the heavy fire, we could not have done a thing. As it was, our lines were very thin. A whole neighbouring platoon was wiped out by artillery".


Following are some comments made by PW's in the way of criticism of our arty.

MONTE CAMINO: (Statements of 6 PW's)

Because there had been few losses, PW's felt that our artillery had overplayed its part. Of the PW's who made definite statements on this point, 2 maintained that the artillery support had aided the American infantry only to a very limited extent

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(one of these PW's was an arty officer), I went so far as to say that the arty effort had been entirely wasted, 3 claimed that the heavy arty concentration had served as a very definite warning of the coming infantry attack. The element of surprise had thus been lacking.

Other Remarks

Two PW's stated that our guns had been in full view and apparently without any camouflage during the barrage.

Two PW's stated that in the previous arty fire on their positions there had been a number of wounded, but that, just as in the case of the fire that immediately preceded the infantry attack, those men who remained under cover had not been affected.

One PW said that our arty had fired many rounds on an unoccupied gun position which showed poor observation on our part.

Evaluation: Due to the large number of prisoners interrogated, the above probably represents a fairly accurate picture of the effectiveness of the artillery fire in forward areas. However, no prisoners have been taken from rear areas where more casualties from artillery fire are usually inflicted due to the grouping of personnel and their being more vulnerable. Due to the volume of the artillery fire placed behind the front line in this operation, many casualties were undoubtedly inflicted.

1329

(Source: Fifth Army)

APPENDIX "B" TO NO.2 DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.3 DATED 22 Dec 43

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GREEK POLITICO-MILITARY ORGANISATIONS. (WAR OFFICE)

The Balkans have always afforded a fertile soil for secret societies. In Greece they have been less popular than further north partly because the country was freed earlier from the Ottoman yoke, and partly because of the people's innate individualism. This individualism has also prevented mutual cooperation between the numerous little cliques which collected soon after the German conquest to plot against the day of liberation, and has made most of them as ineffective as their names are high-sounding. But since about August 1942, some of them have raised guerilla forces and acquired considerable power, which they may hope to retain after the Germans have disappeared. This article is an attempt to shed some light upon the welter of initials which consequently confronts the student of Greek internal affairs.

E.A.M. (Ethnikon Apeloutherotikon Metopon, National Liberty Front) is the most powerful organisation in Greece, apart from the German Army. It is directed by a committee presided over by the Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, and is undoubtedly that party disguised to attract the anti-communist peasant. Its support is strongest in the towns, where it has organised many successful strikes against Axis oppression, including one last March which forced the Germans to abandon their attempt to mobilise civilian labour. It also has representatives in the mountain villages, who are in many cases their effective, if unpopular rulers. It would undoubtedly like to emerge as the effective Government of Greece, and conducts virulent propaganda against the return of the King.

E.L.A.S. (Ellenikos Laikos Apeloutherotikos Stratos, Greek People's Army of Liberation). This is the private army of E.A.M. who claim that it is really the national army of Greece. It comprises at least two-thirds of the effective guerillas, and controls most of free Greece. It is organised on the old communist model with non-communist personnel under the thumb of political commissars. Its present military C-in-C is one Colonel Saraphis, a republican regular officer whose ambition exceeds his ability and strength of character. Under the orders of E...M. it has at various times tried to eliminate rival forces, ostensibly on the ground that they are pro-German, and has sometimes itself swelled battle with the Germans against the advice of British Liaison Officers. On the other hand, in certain areas, it has rendered extremely valuable services against the enemy. At the beginning of October it attacked E.D.E.S., in breach of the inter-guerilla Agreement of July, 1943, and its relations with the British Mission have consequently been disturbed.

E.D.E.S. (Ellenikos Demokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos, Greek Democratic National League). This body has a weak political organisation in the towns. Its importance lies in its guerilla force, commanded by Colonel Napoleon Zervas, in west Greece. It is better disciplined than E.L...S., but it is much weaker on the administrative side, and so only controls a relatively small area, although its politics and conduct are far more congenial to the population. Its sympathies are republican, but its main political principles are cooperation with the British, now and in the future, and opposition to the control of Greece by E...M. It has always worked well with the British Mission and contentions that it is pro-German are merely put about by E...M. (and perhaps the Germans also) for their own ends. However, there is in Athens a

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E.A.M. (Ethnikon Apeleutherotikon Metopon, National Liberty Front) is the most powerful organisation in Greece, apart from the German Army. It is directed by a committee presided over by the Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, and is undoubtedly that party disguised to attract the anti-communist peasant. Its support is strongest in the towns, where it has organised many successful strikes against Axis oppression, including one last March which forced the Germans to abandon their attempt to mobilise civilian labour. It also has representatives in the mountain villages, who are in many cases their effective, if unregular rulers. It would undoubtedly like to emerge as the effective Government of Greece, and conducts virulent propaganda against the return of the King.

E.L..S. (Ellenikos Laikos Apeleutherotikos Stratos, Greek People's Army of Liberation). This is the private army of E.A.M. who claim that it is really the national army of Greece. It comprises at least two-thirds of the effective guerillas, and controls most of Free Greece. It is organised on the old communist model with non-communist personnel under the thumb of political commissars. Its present military C-in-C is one Colonel Sarafis, a republican regular officer whose ambition exceeds his ability and strength of character. Under the orders of E..A.M. it has at various times tried to eliminate rival forces, ostensibly on the ground that they are pro-German, and has sometimes itself avoided battle with the Germans against the advice of British Liaison Officers. On the other hand, in certain areas, it has rendered extremely valuable services against the enemy. At the beginning of October it attacked E.D.E.S., in breach of the inter-guerilla agreement of July, 1943, and its relations with the British Mission have consequently been disturbed.

E.D.E.S. (Ellenikos Demokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos, Greek Democratic National League). This body has a weak political organisation in the towns. Its importance lies in its guerilla force, commanded by Colonel Napoleon Zervas, in west Greece. It is better disciplined than E.L..S., but it is much weaker on the administrative side, and so only controls a relatively small area, although its politics and conduct are far more congenial to the population. Its sympathies are republican, but its main political principles are cooperation with the British, now and in the future, and opposition to the control of Greece by E.A.M. It has always worked well with the British Mission and accusations that it is pro-German are merely put about by E..A.M. (and perhaps the Germans also) for their own ends. However, there is in Athens a group of politicians also styled E.D.E.S., which was originally associated with Colonel Zervas' guerillas, but quarrelled with them owing to Zervas' political authority, and has now been joined by a number of notorious pro-Germans.

E.K.K.A. (Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleutherosis, National and Socialist Liberation). This organisation is led by two distinguished soldiers, Lt-Col Psaros and Lt-Col Bakirdzis, D.S.O. It has the same aims as E.D.E.S., but stands aloof because of a personal objection to Colonel Zervas. In consequence of past persecution by the E.A.M. its armed forces are not strong, but E..A. now seem disposed to let it grow in the area west of Athens. It stood neutral in the recent clash between E.L..S. and E.D.E.S.

...../E.A.C.


Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

E.A.O. (Panhellenike Antistattike Organosis, All-Greek Resistance Organisation). This is a body of right-wing republicans in Salonika, who originally combined to combat Bulgarian activities. In July, 1943, it started to raise guerillas in Macedonia who came into conflict with E.L.A.S. and were like E.D.E.S., accused by them of cooperating with the Germans. Whatever the original provocation, the balance of evidence suggests that some E.A.O. bands have shown an active preference for the Germans over E.L.A.S.

E.O.A. (Ellenike Organosis Axiomatikon, Greek Officers' Organisation). This is a body of officers which started last summer to raise guerilla bands in the Peloponnese. It has been periodically attacked by E.L.A.S. who have consistently refused to obey the inter-guerilla agreement in this area. Consequently one of its more prominent officers made a pact with the Italians against E.L.A.S. last August, and another was intimidated into joining E.L.A.S. Its forces are naturally as much anti-E.L.A.S. as they are anti-German.

CONCLUSION It was hoped that the Agreement of July, 1943, by which all the Greek guerillas were to cooperate with each other under the operational orders of British G.H.Q. in Middle East, would solve their internal differences and enable them to be used to the best effect against the Germans. The agreement has foundered owing to the unscrupulous ambitions of E.A.M., abetted perhaps by German propaganda; though these seemed at one time to have been nullified, they were revived when the expected British invasion of the Balkans did not materialise. Recent events have shown the rank and file of E.L.A.S. that only the Germans profit from these quarrels, and it is to be hoped that the lesson will be taken to heart.

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DISTRIBUTION:-	COPY NO.		COPY NO.
57 Area	1	[illegible] GHQ	26
6 Base Sub-Area	2	3 CMU	27
71 Sub-Area	3	16 Ind Roint Comd	28
94 Sub-Area	4	81 Adv Base Depot	29
151 Sub-Area	5	[illegible] for GCC	30
81 Sub-Area	6	Co. 1/c Adm	31
5 Sth Armd Div	7	[illegible]	32
4 Ind Div	8	Q	33
1 Brit Div	9	E	34
7 Armd Div	10	I	35
2 SS Bde	11	T	36
2 Indep Para Bde Gp (Rear Party)	12	X	37
AMA	13	SF	38
HQ Special Forces	14	[illegible]	39
HDF Adv Adm HQ	15	GS	40
8 AA Bde	16	ENS	41
62 AA Bde	17	[illegible]	42
203 Fixed Defences	18	P/S	43
NOIC NAD	19	Postal	44
214 Gp RAF	20	Ldg	45
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AMG 15 Army Gp	22	Hirings	47
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DEC 1943

G-2 (Advanced Intelligence), A.F.
c/o Allied Control Commission,
ITALY.

23rd December 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 206.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.52 dated 22nd December 1943.

- - - - - - - -

The GERMAN authorities in ITALY have set up special departments for the voluntary enrolment of ITALIAN workers destined for GERMANY at every provincial organisation of industrial workers.

The head of these departments is SAUCKEL, the GERMAN delegate for the ITALIAN workers.

Increase of pay, and decent treatment have been promised to all voluntary workers.

L.P. Bradora Capt
for R.J.C. DAVIS,
Major, A.A.G.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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✓Col. Thorne-Thorne, A.A.G.,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

58 22nd December 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.205.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.51 dated 21st December 1943.

INTERNAL SITUATION:

A senior officer of C.C.R.R. (BLACKSHIRTS) was in LE MARCHE up to 15th December. and states that :

The call-up of the 1923, 1924, 1925 classes was entirely unsuccessful. Hardly anybody turned up. The GERMANS have taken repricals and have thrown numerous heads of families in the SERVIGLIANO (NORTH ASCOLI PICENO) concentration camp where there are also several JEWS and political prisoners.

At ASCOLI PICENO a federal police squad composed of extremists has been formed. They are armed with tommy-guns and are searching out patriots and Allied P.W.

In the SILOS there is still a notable reserve of corn (about 300,000 hundred-weight).

MISCELLANEOUS.

Officers escaping from CENTRAL ITALY state that in the middle of December the GERMANS took away the machinery of the S.I.C.E.S. (SOCIETA ITALIANA CARBONI ELETTRICI) in ASCOLI PICENO: the local establishment for the production of carbide is working instead for the GERMAN command.

The GERMANS have dismantled the plants of the electric depot of the barracks, and of the mills in the province of ASCOLI PICENO in case of a retreat.

C. Fougnet Lt

for R.J.C.GIVEN,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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C. Forgnet Jr.

for R.J.D.CAVE,
Major, U.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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✔Col:Thorne-Thorne, AMG.:
c/o 15 Army Group.

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58 AB 23 DEC 1943

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G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ
C/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

20 December, 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 402.

Source: S.I.S. Bulletin No. 49, dated 19 December, 1943.

There is news of further action on the part of the GERMANS in NORTH ITALY against the increasing activity of ITALIAN patriots.

ALDO RESEGA, Federal Commissioner, was assassinated at MILAN. Acts of sabotage have been carried out at GENOA, CUNEO, BRESCIA, SIENA, and BOLOGNA. Military tribunals have issued the death sentence for such acts.

The GERMAN authorities have imposed severe restrictive measures to ensure public order and in some localities have imposed collective fines on the civilian population.

Gen. ZIMMERMAN, commanding the GERMAN S.S. in NORTH ITALY, has been commissioned to examine the ITALIAN labour question. In particular, the industries in TORINO and MILAN. He has met the workers and has promised to revise, in their favor, the previous wage agreements.

Gen. ZIMMERMAN has also promised them GERMAN help in the fight against the black market.

- - - - - -

Source: Partisan Headquarters, SLOVENIA.

Date of Information: 15 December, 1943.

TRIESTE heavy industry is working as before ITALIAN collapse. Blast furnaces have even increased output.

for C-Forgione Lt
R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

23/XII

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Col. Thorne-Thorne, AMGOT,
c/o 15 Army Group.

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Subject Intelligence Reports.

42

Memorandum to all Divisions.

AMG/58/47.
22.Dec.43.

Please see Intelligence Reports at Folios 31-45 and take any action necessary in respect of planning for Rome and in the areas to be occupied by us in the near future.

R.J.P. THORNE THORNE,
Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

716

RJPT/JG.

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058

22 DEC 1943 46

To: olonel Thorne+Thorne,
Allied Military Government,
c/o 15 Army Group, APO.777.

Spare copies of Intelligence Reports sent to Allied Control Commission from G-2(Advanced Intelligence) A.F.H.Q. Numbers as follows:

No.44.
" 59.
" 61.
" 67.
" 68.
" 85.
" 88.
" 91.
" 104.
" 112.
" 132.
" 138.

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Date 18 DEC
A.F.H.Q.

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ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

5 November 1943

I.I.S.S. REPORT NO. 44

The following is a summary of several messages from the Venezia Division to the Italian High Command:- 1714

With reference to our I.I.S.S. Report No. 30, General OXILIA is now informed by the HQ of 2 Partisan Corps that General Vivalda, Commanding Taurinense Division, has been contacted. General Oxilia has since requested that this General be sent to Plievlja and questioned regarding the Castagnero case.

Later information shows that Col. Castagnero is still in the hands of the Partisans awaiting sentence. Since the Partisan Command wishes to satisfy public opinion, which is demanding punishment for this officer, the Colonel's fate is still very much in the balance.

Situation reports received to date from the Venezia Division indicate that Partisan troops in Yugoslavia number approximately 100,000 men and that in Montenegro operations are conducted by 2 Corps comprising the Second, Third and Fifth Divisions, each of brigade strength, making a total figure for Montenegro, including local formations, of approximately 8,000 men. (sic)

The fighting spirit of the guerrilla Partisan troops is high, but they are very badly equipped. The scale of weapons is as that of a normal infantry unit with a few automatic weapons. In the whole of Montenegro, they have two anti-tank guns and twelve 100 mm Howitzers.

Italian POWs attached to the HQ of the Partisans and employed on various duties have now been drafted into labour battalions. The division has so far been unsuccessful in obtaining the release of these men.

W. Hid Rt.

R.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
I.I.S.S. (FMC)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

eral Vivida, Commanding Maurienne Division, has been contacted. General Cadia has since requested that this General be sent to Algiers and questioned regarding the Castagnero case.

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N.W. Hid Rl.

B.J.C. CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
I.I.S.S. (JIC)

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Mr. Caccia

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), APHQ.,
c/o ALLIED COMMISSION,
ITALY.

12th November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.58.

1713

From the interrogation of a refugee ITALIAN Alpine Artillery Officer who made his way on foot from the BRENNER FRONTIER (STRIGNO), where he was stationed at the time of the Armistice, and who arrived at our lines on 3rd October 1943, the following information was obtained which is thought to be of interest to ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.

Treatment of JEWS.

(a) In TRIESTE informant heard from another escapee that after the Armistice Germans asked the municipality of TRIESTE for lists of all JEWS in the town. Municipal employees however burnt them and advised a number of the JEWS concerned.


(b) At PRZEMSL in September 1942 when informant passed through this town on the way to the RUSSIAN Front, he saw a number of bolted railway cattle trucks on the station, from which terrific wailing issued. He was informed that they were JEWS who, after being locked in these trucks, were shunted up and down the line without food or drink till they died. Other JEWS were then ordered to bury the bodies. A fresh batch were then taken for the death ride.

(Source: C.S.D.I.C.(East) No.5.)

H.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv: G-2 Section.

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

13th November 1943.

1712

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.61.

The following incident reported by an escaped Allied prisoner of war (a Technical Sergeant, U.S.Army Air Forces) is thought to be of interest to the Allied Control Commission as an example of GERMAN treatment of ITALIANS.

On or about the 11th October 1943 while he was being fed by the ITALIANS in a farmhouse about 20 miles North of ISTONIA he witnessed the shooting out of hand of an ITALIAN farmer who refused to hand over his horse to a GERMAN officer.

(Source: H.Q. P/W Sub-Commission, C.A.F.
9th November 1943.)

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv: G-2 Section.

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

14th November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.67.

711

The Comando Supremo has received information that the GERMANS are carrying away the art treasures of the world famous BORGHESE ART GALLERIES of ROME.

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv: G-2 Section.

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(A.F.H.Q. G-2 informed.)



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c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

14th November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.68.

From reports of interrogation of escaped Allied prisoners of war furnished this Section by the P/W Sub-Commission, C.M.F., the following are thought to be of special interest to the Allied Control Commission.

1. At ORVINIO (Map reference: Sheet 28, Roma, Italy 1:250,000) an escapee (Private R.A.M.C.) observed a considerable number of GERMAN trucks carrying cattle proceeding on the road TIVOLI-ORVINO. He was informed by ITALIAN civilians that the GERMANS were operating a big canning factory, the factory reported to be working day and night.

This story was corroborated by another escapee, a member of the South African Defence Force.

(Source: P/W Sub-Commission CMF.CIF/D6/12.)

2. At VALLEPIETRA,(map reference: Sheet 28(R)G.3769) an escapee reports, which is corroborated by two other escapees, that the GERMANS were mining the POWER STATION which supplies ROME with electric power. This was in mid-October.

JOHN M.PHILLIPS,
Major, Infantry,
G-2 (Adv:Intell:), A.F.H.Q.

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40

G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

17th November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.85.

1709

The following information received by this Section from the Italian Supreme Command is considered to be of interest to the Allied Control Commission.

1. The GERMAN authorities continue to enforce mobilization of labour for defence work in ITALY, or for despatch into GERMANY.

In the provinces of AQUILA and CHIETI over 90,000 workers have been pressed into service, part of whom have been sent to GERMANY.

(Source: S.I.M. Information Bulletin No.14)

2. On 29th September 1943 at ALESSANDRIA the GERMANS began dismantling and sending into GERMANY all machinery in the BORSALINO Factory.

(Source: S.I.M. Information Bulletin No.16)

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

39

19th November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.88.

The following information received by this Section is considered to be of interest to the Allied Control Commission.

In the SULMONA zone another 4000 workers are to be forced into labour on the defences.

1708

Escapees from TORINO state that on 10th October 1943 no defence work had been carried out on the line of the PO.

On 25th October 1943 at SULMONA station the GERMANS had already sent Northwards all rolling stock and engines. The engine repair shop was being dismantled.

About 10th October 1943 the Carabiniers in ROME were dissolved after a fight between the Cuirassiers and German troops who were trying to enter the Quirinal: most of the Carabiniers will be sent to GERMANY.

After their dissolution public order was kept in ROME by the town police, the auxiliaries and the Customs Guards.

The GERMAN authorities have ordered complete civilian evacuation of LEGHORN to begin on 12th November 1943.

Inhabited localities in the BOGLIASCO, RECCO, and ZOAGLI areas (LIGURIA) are to be evacuated.

(Source: S.I.M. Information Bulletin No.17.)

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION;
ITALY.

20th November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.91.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.18 dated
18th November 1943.

- - - - - -

Escapees from the NORTH give the following information for the first week of November. 1707

In the SANGRO valley the GERMANS were destroying all houses.

The GERMANS were feverishly working to finish the road joining CAMPO di GIOVE - PALENA station (S.E. of SULMONA).

Many GERMAN military deserters were in the area TERAMO-CHIETI.

The electrical stations on the River PESCARA were already mined.

The main buildings in PESCARA were mined.

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

21st November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.104.

ITALIAN INTERNAL SITUATION.

1705

Source: S.I.M.Bulletin No.20 dated 20th November 1943.

Reliable refugees from the North give the following picture.

In October and November the internal situation of the areas not near the front had nearly returned to normal.

The public services were functioning more or less regularly.

In general; control and press-ganging of civilians were limited to those registered in the 1912-1925 classes.

Considerable police activity is evident against those more suspect, and those particularly in the public eye. However, the regular police forces (Caribiniers) in North Italy; African Police Force (P.A.I.), Customs Guards, civil police, etc.) assist escapees, evasion of control, and passive resistance to the Germans. In this scope, the railwaymen merit particular mention.

Almost the entire population is anti-German and anti-Fascist; it is calculated that not more than 10% of officers and officials collaborate spontaneously with the Germans: their activities are limited to spying and denunciation. Others co-operate only for material necessities and out of fear of severe sanctions.

The politico-police activities are carried out by the Germans and by the Militia (Fascists).

Orders have been published to hand in all wireless sets, guns and sporting cartridges, which previously had remained in their owners' hands.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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The politico-police activities are carried out by the Germans and by the Militia (Fascists).

Orders have been published to hand in all wireless sets, guns and sporting cartridges, which previously had remained in their owners' hands.

Following the dismissal of ministers, many officials have taken to the hills.

Ministries have taken up new locations as follows:

Ministry of Marine ..... BELLUNO.
Air Ministry ..... VERONA.
Foreign Office ..... BRESCIA.
Ministry of Popular Culture.. VENICE.

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36

Italian political interests main objective is to expel the GERMANS from the country. To this end they are willing to devote their whole energy, putting aside political and party issues.

On the following issues public opinion is unanimous:-

The B.B.C. announcements regarding the recent political crisi in liberated Italy have had a tremendous effect on public and party opinion:

All very harshly criticize the behaviour of those most prominent politicians in Free Italy who, caring not at all for the voice of the Italian people which cannot make itself heard, abandon themselves in so delicate a moment to debates, posturing and probing; which materially and morally harm the national unity, and even harm the prosecution of the war. 1705

Also, public opinion in Italy still under German control is aware that the entry of Italian forces from free Italy into the line against the Germans could be an active contribution to the moral and material cause. Also, in fact, that it could produce a breaking up of the already feeble republican military organisation which co-operates with the Germans in the rear areas, and not only that, but also that it would render less likely the active intervention in the fighting line of those forces.

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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AFHQ., G-2.
15 Army Group.
Allied Control Commission.
C.I.

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Equale Enrico LIBERTI

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

35

23rd November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO.112.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.21 dated 21st November 1943.

1. Miscellaneous.

The following information was obtained from a Naval officer.

At the beginning of November an order was issued from CHIETI to clear all inhabited localities in the province.

On 6th November clearing out of undergrowth along the coast from PESCARA to S.BENEDETTO del TRONTO was being carried out to a depth of 5 Km.

At the same period the electrical centres of PESCARA situated at - PIANO d'ORTA (near TORRE dei PASSERI),
ALANNO station, and
N.E. of CHIETI station

where the second; third and fourth weirs on the PESCARA are, had been prepared for demolition.

Carabiniers escaping from the North declare that on the days following the armistice at SPEZIA the Germans sacked all military stores, took over the arsenal, and began dismantling all machinery for transmission to Germany.

2. Internal Military Situation.
(Radio Report)

(a) The re-constitution of the Republican Army, according to a decree by Marshal GRAZIANI, will be on the following lines :-

(i) Fighting Troops and Services in Corps.
(ii) Fighting Troops: Infantry - Cavalry - Artillery - Engineers - Tank Corps.
Specialists - for Infantry: bersaglieri, Alpine, Blackshirts, paratroops;
for Engineers: wireless operators

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Specialists - for Infantry: bersaglieri, Alpine, Blackshirts, paratroops;
for Engineers: wireless operators, bridgers, sappers, assault engineers;
for Artillery: coastal artillery, A.A. artillery.
(iii) Services: Artillery, engineers, M.T.personnel, chemical transport, medical, commisariat, administrative, veterinary, Judge Advocate, topographical and survey, working and specialized companys for chemical warfare.
(iv) The command will be regional and provincial, with local area organisation.

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(b) Naval: The 10th MAS (MTB) Flotilla, already reconstituted, is under the command of Prince BORGHESE: it is also a recruiting centre for the Navy.

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

1703

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

27th November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.132.

Source: C.S.D.I.C.(East) Report No.20.

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764

The following information regarding ITALIAN treatment of prisoners has been extracted from a report on a 15-year old RUSSIAN captured in August 1942 while fighting with the partisans as leader of a band of 65 children.

After capture by the GERMANS source considered that he and the band were fortunate to get into the hands of ITALIAN forces who sent them to the No.10 Reserve Hospital at LWOW, treating them very well.

Source, being the leader, was however seperated from the others by the GERMANS and taken to SALZBURG. He escaped and was recaptured in the SOUTH of FRANCE by the ITALIAN Road Militia. He was kept in a dry well for a number of days before being taken by train to VIPITENO, Near BOLZANO. Here he was kept at 149 Comando Tappa and also found 30 of his former band there. At the Comando Tappa they were treated very kindly by the ITALIANS who allowed them a certain amount of freedom.

After the armistice the ITALIANS surrendered to GERMAN forces, but the Russian children put up a fight before being forced to surrender. They were transported to a concentration camp at INNSBRUCK where they were given the option of joining the FASCISTS or being transported to GERMANY. Source, as leader, refused but told the others to accept the offer in order to be free to continue to fight the Axis. The others were transferred to VERONA but source escaped. Later, after travelling around Northern Italy he decided to go to VERONA to contact them. He found; in fact, that 15 of the 30 had joined up with the Fascists, whilst the others had been adopted by various families. The local papers took the opportunity of using the fact of the Russian children joining the Fascist party for propaganda purposes.

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R.J.C.CAVE,
Major, G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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G-2 (ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE), A.F.H.Q.,
c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

27th November 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.138.

Source:S.I.M.Bulletin No.26 dated 26th November 1943.

An artillery N.C.O. from NORTH ITALY has stated :

After the armistice he and a great part of the soldiers of his unit were sent to GERMANY in railway trucks completely closed. When they arrived at INNSBRUCK, towards the end of September last, they were all set free by an Austrian captain who gave them civilian clothes to escape into ITALY.

AT BUSSI (50 Km. WEST of PESCARA) the GERMANS have stripped all the heavy machinery used in the production of war gases and have transferred it to GERMANY in bulk together with some skilled workers. The whole civilian population of the district LAMA dei PIELIGNI-FARA SAN MARTINO-CIVITELLA-CASOLI (S.E. of SULMONA) has been forcibly evacuated by the GERMAN authorities and concentrated at POPOLI (N.W. of SULMONA).

On the mountains of MAIELLA, in the beginning of November there were many British ex-P.W.

R.J.C.CAVE,
Major; G.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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c/o ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
ITALY.

18th December 1943.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT No.195.

Source: S.I.M. Bulletin No.47 dated 17th December 1943.

- - - - - - -

An American radio, referring to an article in the SWISS news-paper "BASLER NACHRICHTEN", gives news of dissension between FARINACCI and PAVOLINI. PAVOLINI appears to favour a moderate attitude towards the JEWS, whilst FARINACCI has lately been conducting a violent radio campaign against them from RADIO [illegible] (1).


A reliable source states that the GERMANS have adopted severer security measures in ROME. The police has already brought about several arrests.

for G. Torrini
R.J.C. DAVIS,
Major, U.S.,
Adv. G-2 Section.

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Col. Thorne-Thorne, AMGOT,
c/o 15 Army Group.

U.S. ARMY
Equals Bolton [illegible]



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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SUBJECT:- German Proclamation.

H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

Military Government Section,
A.F.H.Q.


AMG/58/30
13th December 1943

Attached for your information are copies of the Italian version of a proclamation issued by the German forces in Italy. 1699

You may wish to forward a copy to Civil Affairs Branch at the War Office.

Major General
Chief Civil Affairs Officer

TPS/SCH
Encls.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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SECRET

SUBJECT:- Return of Documents.

H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

AMG/58/29
6th December 1943.

H.Q.,
15 Army Group.

As requested in 15AG/1404/10/G(Ib) dated 30th November 43, P.B.S. Semi-Monthly Counter Intelligence Report dated 16th November 43 is returned herewith.

The contents have been noted, and found both useful and interesting.

Major General,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer.

/SCH.



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2 DEC 1943 28

H.Q. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

BR SECRET EQUALS U.S.SECRET

15AG/1404/10/G(I)

30 Nov 43

TO: A.A.G. Hq.
15 Army Group

---

1. The attached Counter Intelligence Report from P.B.3. cated 16 Nov 43 is passed to you for information.

2. After perusal will you please return it to this office,

R.K.Stanhope-Wright

R.K.STANHOPE WRIGHT,
Capt.,
Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

HRS-W/EHK

4/12

1698

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

27

SUBJECT:- Semi-Monthly Counter Intelligence Report.

H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

AMG/58/27
5th December 1943

A.M.G. H.Q.,
Fifth Army.

If you are not already receiving copies of the Semi-Monthly Counter Intelligence Reports, it is suggested that you arrange to obtain these from H.Q., Peninsular Base Section.

R.J.F. THORNE THORNE,
Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

/SCH.

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29/11/43 AF

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

B 385.232 OI(Library) 21 November, 1943.

GUIDE TO INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS (No. 3)

ITALY, FRANCE, ALBANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE, and BULGARIA

1. This list replaces the "Guide to Intelligence Publications--Italy," dated 25 September, 1943.

2. The publications are available upon application through channels to G-2, OI(Library), A.F.H.Q., situated in Room 167 (Phone: Freedom 166) or Ecole Normale (Phone: Fortune 115).

3. So far as possible the list has been divided into "Subject" headings, but many W. D. Studies cover so many subjects that analysis is difficult. To discover what intelligence is available on any particular subject in Italy, it is necessary to examine both SECTION A (all sources) and SECTION B (intelligence prepared in Washington, D. C., such as O.S.S. I.O4 and Strategic Engineering Studies). To determine what intelligence is available on France, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, it is necessary to examine SECTION C (intelligence prepared in Washington, D. C. and in the United Kingdom).

4. Areas covered as at 21 November, 1943.

ITALY.

(1) Southern ITALY, up to line Gaeta - Foggia.
(2) West Central ITALY, west of line:
Gaeta - Sora - Rieti - Florence - Spezia.
(3) East Central ITALY, east of line:
Florence - Terni - Rieti - Avezzano - Caiazzo.
(4) Northern ITALY, covers the whole of ITALY,
North of approximately 44° N. Latitude.

FRANCE.

(1) Area covered is from Spanish-French Frontier up to a line approximately 40° 30'N, passing through Les Sables - Poitiers - Moulins - Lausanne (O.S.S. Study, prepared in Washington).

(2) Mediterranean France (I.S.I.S. GB 4096 J, prepared in United Kingdom).

ALBANIA.

(1) Area covered: Whole of Albania (S.I.S. & I.S.I.S. GB 4096 Y).

1897

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Normale (Phone: Fortune 115).

3. So far as possible the list has been divided into "Subject" headings, but many M. I. Studies cover so many subjects that analysis is difficult. To discover what intelligence is available on any particular subject in Italy, it is necessary to examine both SECTION A (all sources) and SECTION B (intelligence prepared in Washington, D. C., such as O.S.S. 104 and Strategic Engineering Studies). To determine what intelligence is available on France, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria, it is necessary to examine SECTION C (intelligence prepared in Washington, D. C. and in the United Kingdom).

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1697

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(2) Mediterranean France (I.S.I.S. CB 4096 J, prepared in United Kingdom).

ALBANIA.

(1) Area covered: Whole of Albania (S.O.S. & I.S.I.S. CB 4096 Y).

YUGOSLAVIA.

(1) Area covered: Whole of Yugoslavia (Strategic Engineering Studies, prepared in Washington).
(2) Southern Yugoslavia (I.S.I.S. CB 4096 Y).

GREECE.

(1) Area covered: Whole of Greece and Dodecanese Islands (S.E.S.).

BULGARIA.

(1) Area covered: Whole of Bulgaria.

5. The intelligence in SECTION C shows only the material available at present. However, each country will be fully covered by Strategic Engineering Studies and by other publications prepared in the U.K. in the near future.

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SECTION A

I. a. History.

O.N.I. 104, page 2.

b. Geography.

(1) Topography and Geology.

I.S.U.S. CB 4096 H (8) (reprinted also as I.S.T.D. D/223) covers Southern Calabria up to line Crotone - Amantea.
I.S.T.D. C/174 covers HEEL up to line Barletta - Canosa - Alta - Muro - Mottola - Ginosa - Metaponto.
I.S.T.D. C/196 covers Southern Italy, up to line Gaeta - Foggia - Manfredonia, excluding Southern Calabria and the Heel.
I.S.T.D. C/218 covers a strip of West Coast, 20 miles deep, from Gaeta to Civitavecchia.
I.S.T.D. C/218A covers a strip of West Central Italy, 20 miles deep, from Civitavecchia to Spezia.
I.S.T.D. A/272, East Central Italy.- Topography.
..reas covered are: Gargano Promontory; North Tavoliere Plain; Coastal Belt East of Termoli; ..driatic Sub-Appennines; Monti Della Daunia, Monti Del Sannio, and Molise Plateau; Matese Plateau and Upper Volturno Valley; Abruzzi Appennines.

I.S.T.D. C/237 - Northern Italy, covers the whole of Italy North of 44° N. latitude, excluding the Spezia area (treated in I.S.T.D./C/218A) and Liguria. The area thus consists topographically of the Northern Flank of the Northern Appennines, the Western Flank of the Piedmontese ..lps, the Southern Flank of the Alps, the Peninsula of Istria, with the great Lombardy Plain of the Po Valley in the middle.

I.S.T.D./E/204 - French-Italian Frontier to La Spezia - Topography.

Provisional Tactical Study of the Terrain - Southern Italy, South of the line Naples - Bari, (9 June, 1943).
A.F.H.Q., Terrain, S. Calabria (29 July, 1943).
A.F.H.Q., Tactical Study of Terrain, Central Italy, line excluding Naples to Northern Boundaries of the provinces of Tuscany and Marche, (13 September, 1943).
A.F.H.Q., Provisional Report of Terrain, Rome Area, (12 August, 1943).
..F.H.Q., Notes on PO Valley, (22 September, 1943).
..F.H.Q., River data and Stream Discharge - Italy.
..reas: Calabria and Lucania.
..F.H.Q., Paper, "Topographical Factors Involved in a Defensive Stand on Pisa - Florence - Rimini."

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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I.S.T.D./K/204 - French-Italian Frontier to La Spezia - Topography.

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A.F.H.Q., River data and Stream Discharge - Italy.
Areas: Calabria and Lucania.
A.F.H.Q., Paper, "Topographical Factors Involved in a Defensive Stand on Pisa - Florence - Rimini."

A.F.H.Q., Tactical Study of the Terrain - Northern Italy, (November, 1943). Area: North of Provinces of Tuscany and Marches.
S.E.S. No. 59 - Whole of Italy.

S.E.S. No. 73, Part II, Puglia and Lucania.

S.E.S. No. 74, Part II, Calabria.

S.E.S. No. 75, Part II, Campania.

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(2) Climate.

I.S.T.D. C/213 - SOUTHERN ITALY.
I.S.T.D. C/234 - WEST CENTRAL ITALY.
I.S.T.D. C/238 - NORTHERN ITALY.

c. Medical.

I.S.T.D. C/213 - SOUTHERN ITALY.
I.S.T.D. C/234 - WEST CENTRAL ITALY.
I.S.T.D. C/238 - NORTHERN ITALY.

II RESOURCES.

a. General.

(1) I.S.T.D. C/210 - SOUTHERN ITALY. Area covered: CALABRIA, LUCANIA, APULIA, CAMPANIA.

(a) Subjects:
Electricity.
Quarries.
Water.
Oil Storage.
Agriculture.

(2) I.S.T.D. C/228 - WEST CENTRAL ITALY. Area covered: TUSCANY, UMBRIA, LAZIO.
(a) Subjects:
Water Supply.
Electricity.
Quarries.
Construction Material.

(3) I.S.T.D. K/278 - EAST CENTRAL ITALY.
(a) Subjects:
Water.
Electricity.
Quarries.
Industries.

(4) I.S.T.D. C/239 - NORTHERN ITALY,--whole of Northern Italy from 44° N. latitude.
(a) Subjects:
Water.
Electricity.
Quarries.
Industries.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(a) Subjects:
Electricity.
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Water.
Oil Storage.
Agriculture.

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(a) Subjects:
Water Supply.
Electricity.
Quarries.
Construction Material.

(3) I.S.T.D. W/278 - EAST CENTRAL ITALY.
(a) Subjects:
Water.
Electricity.
Quarries.
Industries.

(4) I.S.T.D. C/239 - NORTHERN ITALY,--whole of Northern Italy from 44° N. latitude.
(a) Subjects:
Water.
Electricity.
Quarries.
Industries.

(5) P.P.R. "SOUTHERN ITALY - Resources" (19 pages). Area: South of latitude 42° North.
(a) Subjects:
Coal;
Electric Power;
Industries:
clothing, chemical factories,
breweries, cold storage,
cement works, bakeries,
laundries, metal manufactures,
repair shops, warehouses,
refrigerator plants.

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(6) PAPER - M. E. W., 30 September, 1943 - EAST CENTRAL ITALY.
(a) Resources:
General.
Agriculture and Fisheries.
Fuel.
Manufacturing Industries.

b. Water Supply.

(1) I.S.T.D. C/210, SOUTHERN ITALY,
C/228, WEST CENTRAL ITALY.
K/278, EAST CENTRAL ITALY.
C/239 NORTHERN ITALY.

(2) Two reports by M.I. (3) "Notes on Water Supply, EAST CENTRAL ITALY."
(a) ABRUZZI - MOLISE and Northern PUGLIA.
(b) MARCHE and S.E. EMILIA.

(3) See also S.E.S. 73, 74, and 75, P.R. II, for water supplies in PUGLIA, LUCANIA., CALABRIA. and CAMPANIA respectively.

(4) Water overprint (A.F.H.Q., Engineer Section), Scale: 1/500,000, two sheets:-
(a) CALABRIA.
(b) NAPLES Area.

(5) Water Supply to certain CENTRAL and NORTH ITALY Towns - PAPER, M. I. 3.b., 30 October, 1943.

(6) Water Supply and River discharge overprints, October, 1943, 1:250,000, Sheets 26, 27, 28, and 34. (Supplied by Engineer.)

c. Oil Storage Capacity.

(1) I.S.T.D. C/210.

(2) Short reports by M. I. 10 "Petroleum Storage Installations."

(a) No. I - West Coast between GAETA and CIVITAVECCHIA.
(b) No. II - East Coast between PESCARA and FOGGIA and inland.
(c) No. III - Area CIVITAVECCHIA - PESCARA - SPEZIA - RAVENNA.
(d) No. IV - North of SPEZIA - RAVENNA. (exlusive) excluding LIGURIA.
(e) N. ITALY (VENICE), M.I. 10(c), August, 1943.
(f) Oil Storage, Northern Adriatic Ocean Installations: FIUME, POLA, TRIESTE, M. I. 10(c)

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(b) MARCHE and S.E. EMILIA.

(3) See also S.E.S. 73, 74, and 75, PART II, for water supplies in PUGLIA, LUCANIA, CALABRIA and CAMPANIA respectively.

(4) Water overprint (A.F.H.Q., Engineer Section), Scale: 1/500,000, two sheets:-
(a) CALABRIA.
(b) NAPLES Area.

(5) Water Supply to certain CENTRAL and NORTH ITALY Towns - PAPER, M. I. 3.b., 30 October, 1943.

(6) Water Supply and River discharge overprints, October, 1943, 1:250,000, Sheets 26, 27, 28, and 34. (Supplied by Engineer.)

c. Oil Storage Capacity.

(1) I.S.T.D. C/210.

(2) Short reports by M. I. 10 "Petroleum Storage Installations."

(a) No. I - West Coast between GAETA and CIVITAVECCHIA.
(b) No. II - East Coast between PESCARA and FOGGIA and Inland.
(c) No. III - Area CIVITAVECCHIA - PESCARA - SPEZIA - RAVENNA.
(d) No. IV - North of SPEZIA - RAVENNA. (exclusive) excluding LIGURIA.
(e) N. ITALY (VENICE), M.I. 10(c), August, 1943.
(f) Oil Storage, Northern Adriatic Ocean Installations: FIUME, POLA, TRIESTE, M. I. 10(c) Report.

(3) PAPER - M.E.W. "Note on Oil Industry of Italy." (A.O.S/2, 9 October, 1943.).

d. Solid Fuels.

(1) Paper "Southern ITALY - Resources" (see under para. II c (5) above.) Contains 4 pages concerning coal.

(2) Short paper "ITALY - Solid Fuels." (A.F.H.Q., Reference No. A.F.H.(O.I.3)125)--Area: From 42° N. to

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SPEZIA, with the APENNINES as the Eastern boundary.

(3) PAPER - EAST CENTRAL ITALY - "Resources," Section 3, Fuels.

e. Electricity.

M.I. 10(c) "ITALY - Report on Electricity Supply." Area: Whole of ITALY (few copies available).
I.S.T.D. C/210 - Southern ITALY.
I.S.T.D. C/226 - West Central ITALY.
I.S.T.D. K/278 - East Central ITALY.
I.S.T.D. C/239 - Northern ITALY, Resources.
PAPER - Southern ITALY, Resources, (see para g., Resources.)

f. Accommodation and Billetting.

(1) Notes on Accommodation, Central ITALY, Part I.

(2) Notes on Accommodation, Central ITALY, Part II, (bounded by VIAREGGIO - RAVENNA in the North, and PESCARA - CIVITAVECCHIA in the South.)

(3) Southern ITALY, excluding NAPLES.
(4) Northern ITALY,

g. Resources.

(1) Southern ITALY (Provinces of: CALABRIA, CAMPANIA, APULIA, LAZIO, ABRUZZI.)

Produced by Engineer Section, A.F.H.Q., 15 August, 1943, Containing information on:
(a) Water Supply. (e) Lumber and Sawmills.
(b) Quarries. (f) Oil Storage.
(c) Cement Plants. (g) Oil Refineries.
(d) Industries. (h) Electricity.

h. Population and Labor Breakdown for Towns N. of 42° (M.E.I. Paper, 1 October, 1943).

II COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Railways.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

f. Accommodation and Billetting.

(1) Notes on Accommodation, Central ITALY, Part I.

(2) Notes on Accommodation, Central ITALY, Part II, (bounded by VILAREGGIO - RAVENNA in the North, and PESCARA - CIVITAVECCHIA in the South.)

(3) Southern ITALY, excluding NAPLES.
(4) Northern ITALY,

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(d) Industries.
(e) Lumber and Sawmills.
(f) Oil Storage.
(g) Oil Refineries.
(h) Electricity.

h. Population and Labor Breakdown for Towns N. of 42° (M.E.I. Paper, 1 October, 1943).

II COMMUNICATIONS.

a. Railways.

I.S.I.S. CB 40?6 M (8) (and I.S.T.D. D/223) covers Southern CALABRIA.
I.S.T.D. C/176 covers the Heel up to the line BARI - ALTAMURA - MISTIOCI - MONTALBANO.
I.S.T.D. C/211 covers Northern CALABRIA and Southern ITALY (excluding the Heel up to GAETA (excl.) - FORMIA - FOGGIA (both incl.).
I.S.T.D. C/219 Central ITALY, Railroad. Area covered: Northern boundary SPEZIA - BOLOGNA (both exclusive) RIMINI (inclusive), and the Southern boundary GAET. (inclusive) - FORMIA - FOGGIA (both exclusive).

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NOTE: M.I. 10 Report "The Railways of the Eastern part of Central ITALY" is superseded by I.S.T.D. C/219.

I.S.T.D. C/240 - Northern ITALY.
Area covered is whole of North ITALY; southern boundary runs from La SPEZIA to BOLOGNA (both inclusive) and RIMINI (exclusive). Area includes LIGURIA.

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O.I.(Topo) - Two sheets of maps showing railroads, whole of ITALY (prepared by Gov't and Tn).

A I 3 (C) Report on Italian railways, May, 1943.
(One copy available for Loan only.)

b. Roads.

I.S.I.S. CB 4096 H (8), (reprinted as I.S.T.D. D/223) covers Southern C.L.BRIA.
NOTE: AFHQ Amendments supersede many road reports covered in I.S.I.S. or I.S.T.D.)

A.F.H.Q. Amendt. No. 1--6, covering many of road routes in I.S.I.S. CB 4096 H and I.S.T.D. D/223.

I.S.T.D. C/175, covers the Heel up to line R.RI - M.TER. - T.R.NTO.
NOTE: ..F.H.Q. Amendments Nos. 1, 2 covering road route in I.S.T.D. C/175.

I.S.T.D. C/212, Southern ITALY up to line G.ET. - FOGGI. but excluding Southern C.L.BRI. and the Heel.
NOTE: ...F.H.Q. Amendments Nos. 1--5 to I.S.T.D. C/212.

I.S.T.D. C/220 - West Central ITALY, Area west of line SPEZI. - FLORENCE - RIETI - SORA - G.ET..

...F.H.Q. Road Amendments to I.S.T.D. C/212 and 220, in addition to those listed above, are now under preparation.

I.S.T.D. C/241 Northern ITALY,
Area covered: Whole of Northern Italy, from line RIMINI - FIRENZE, excluding LIGURIA and ISTRIA.

I.S.T.D. R/277 - East Central ITALY (enroute from U.K.).
I.S.T.D. A/267 - North East ITALY (under preparation).
I.S.T.D. R/226 - Island of Elba - Roads.

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b. Roads.

I.S.I.S. CB 4096 H (8), (reprinted as I.S.T.D. D/223) covers Southern C..L.BRIA.

NOTE: .FHQ .mendments supersede many road reports covered in I.S.I.S. or I.S.T.D.)

..F.H.Q. .mendt. No. 1--6, covering many of road routes in I.S.I.S. CB 4096 H and I.S.T.D. D/223.

I.S.T.D. C/175, covers the Heel up to line B.RI - M.TER. - T.R.NTO.

NOTE: ..F.H.Q. .mendments Nos. 1, 2 covering road route in I.S.T.D. C/175.

I.S.T.D. C/212, Southern IT.LY up to line G.ET. - FOGGI. but excluding Southern C..L.BRI. and the Heel.

NOTE: ..F.H.Q. .mendments Nos. 1--5 to I.S.T.D. C/212.

I.S.T.D. C/220 - West Central IT.LY, .rea west of line S.ZZ.. - FLORENCE - RIETI - SORA - G.ET..

..F.H.Q. Road .mendments to I.S.T.D. C/212 and 220, in addition to those listed above, are now under preparation.

I.S.T.D. C/241 Northern IT.LY,
Area covered: Whole of Northern Italy, from line RIMINI - FIRENZE, excluding LIGURIA and ISTRIA.

I.S.T.D. K/277 - East Central IT.LY (enroute from U.K.).
I.S.T.D. A/267 - North East IT.LY (under preparation).
I.S.T.D. K/226 - Island of Elba - Roads.

M. I. 10(c) Paper, Central and N. IT.LY - Road Routes.
Areas covered: Eastern Side.
South line - G.ET. - FOGGI..
North line - C.STELVECCHIO. - PESCARA.
West line - TERNI - RIETI - AVEZZANO.

M. I. 10(c) Paper Road Routes, Central and N. ITALY, Part II.
.rea covered: Eastern Side.
North - R.VENNA - BOLOGNA - PISTOIA.
South - PESC..R. - RIETI.

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West- PISTOIA - AREZZO -
SIENA - PERUGIA - TERNI -
RIETI.

A.F.H.Q. Report "Effect of Snow on Road Communications, The ALPS - FRANCO - Italian Frontier." (loan only)

A.F.H.Q. Roads overprint, (Engineer Section), Area: North of CALABRIA to NAPLES. (Indicates Road classifications and principal bridges - Scale: 1/250,000.)

c. Signals.

I.S.T.D. C/215 Southern ITALY, up to line GAETA - FOGGIA.
I.S.T.D. C/233 and 251 - Central and Northern ITALY - (South of line GENOVA - RAVENNA).
Part I Line Communications, and Plans illustrating Part II.
Part II Wireless Installations.
C/233, Central Italy (North of line NAPLES - ALBEROBELLO);
C/251, Northern Italy (South of line GENOVA - RAVENNA).

I.S.T.D. C/281 Northern ITALY (North of line GENOVA - RAVENNA).
Part I Line Communications, and Plans illustrating Part II.
Part II Wireless Installations, from a line GENOVA - RAVENNA in the South to the international Frontiers in the North.
Part III Italy, Submarine cables (all coasts).

M.I. 8/B2573/7 and 8 (Appendix A), CALABRIA - SICILY.
M.I. 8/B2573/13 up to line GAETA - FOGGIA.
M.I. 8/B2573/14 Area boundary line:
NAPLES - FOGGIA - ORBETELLO - PESCARA.
M.I. 8/B2573/17 Area bounded by ORBETELLO - PESCARA - GENOA - RAVENNA.
M.I. 8/B2573/18 Area: PISA - RAVENNA up to Frontier.
NOTE: M.I. 8 Signal Intelligence is very limited as to the number of copies available.

IV. GROUND PHOTOGRAPHS

Usually contained in most I.S.T.D. and S.E.S. Reports.

V. a. Beaches and Exits.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

I.S.T.D. C/215 Southern ITALY, up to line GAETA - FOGGIA.
I.S.T.D. C/233 and 251 - Central and Northern ITALY - (South of line GENOVA - RAVENNA).
Part I Line Communications, and Plans illustrating Part II.
Part II Wireless Installations.
C/253, Central Italy (North of line NAPLES - ANCONA);
C/251, Northern Italy (South of line GENOVA - RAVENNA).

I.S.T.D. C/281 Northern ITALY (North of line GENOVA - RAVENNA).
Part I Line Communications, and Plans illustrating Part II.
Part II Wireless Installations, from a line GENOVA - RAVENNA in the South to the international Frontiers in the North.
Part III Italy, Submarine cables (all coasts).

M.I. 8/B2573/7 and 8 (Appendix A), CALABRIA - SICILY.
M.I. 8/B2573/13 up to line GAETA - FOGGIA.
M.I. 8/B2573/14 Area boundary line:
NAPLES - FOGGIA - ORBETELLO - PESCARA.
M.I. 8/B2573/17 Area bounded by ORBETELLO - PESCARA - GENOA - RAVENNA.
M.I. 8/B2573/18 Area: PISA - RAVENNA up to Frontier.
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V. a. Beaches and Exits.

I.S.T.D. C/17 - GIOVINAZZO - BARLETTA.
I.S.T.D. C/178 - BRINDISI - CAPO S. MARIA DI LEUCA.
I.S.T.D. C/163 - CAPO S. MARIA DI LEUCA - CAPO S. VITO.
I.S.T.D. C/164 - CAPO S. VITO - CROTONE.
I.S.T.D. C/165 - CROTONE - C. DELL' ARMI.
I.S.T.D. C/180 - C. DELL' ARMI - C. SUVERO.
I.S.T.D. C/181 - C. SUVERO - C. PALINURO.
I.S.T.D. C/209 - C. PALINURO - GAETA.
I.S.T.D. C/217 - GAETA - CIVITAVECCHIA.
I.S.T.D. C/226 - ISLAND OF ELBA.
I.S.T.D. C/227 - CIVITAVECCHIA - LEGHORN.
I.S.T.D. C/202 - Coast SICILY TO French Frontier.
I.S.T.D. C/205A - French Italian Frontier to GENOA - Photographs.

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I.S.T.D. C/212 - Coast RAVENNA - ROLA.

STRATEGIC ENGINEERING STUDIES:

S.E.S. 73, Part I (also called Appendix III to O.N.I. 104)
Area: APULIAN and LUCANIAN Coasts.

S.E.S. 74, Part I (also called Appendix IV to O.N.I. 104)
Area: CALABRIAN Coasts.

S.E.S. 75, Part I (also called Appendix V to O.N.I. 104)
Area: CAMPANIA.

Separate Appendix II to O.N.I. 104.
Area: Beaches, East and West coasts, North of line GAETA - FOGGIA.

A.F.H.Q. Joint Beach Intelligence Summary - Southern ITALY, (dated 20 July, 1943).
A.F.H.Q. Joint Beach Intelligence Summary - NAPLES Area, (dated 6 August, 1943.).
A.F.H.Q. Joint Beach Intelligence Summary - Gulf of MANFREDONIA, (18 September, 1943).

b. Ports and Towns.

I.S.T.D. C/186 - BARI.
I.S.T.D. C/187 - BRINDISI.
I.S.T.D. C/185 - GALLIPOLI - MONOPOLI - OTRANTO.
I.S.T.D. C/173 - TARANTO.
I.S.I.S. CB 4096 H (Calabrian Supplement) includes VILLA SAN GIOVANNI - REGGIO - CROTONE. This has also been republished as I.S.T.D. D/223 and D/223 (a) (Photographs).

I.S.T.D. C/200 - NAPLES (Photographs included in separate volume).
I.S.T.D. C/221 - ROME.
I.S.T.D. M/279A East Central ITALY (Towns).
(1) VASTO.
(2) ORTONA.
(3) PESCARA.
(4) AVEZZANO.
(5) LANCIANO.
(6) CHIETI.
(7) SULMONA.
(8) AQUILA.
I.S.T.D. C/222 - CIVITAVECCHIA.
I.S.T.D. C/232 - PIOMBINO.
I.S.T.D. M/206 - GENOA.
I.S.T.D. M/208 - LIVORNO.
I.S.T.D. M/207 - SPEZIA.
I.S.T.D. M/ - SAVONA (enroute from U.K.).
I.S.T.D. M/295 - LIVORNO.
I.S.T.D. M/226 - Island of ELBA.

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North of line GAETA - FOGGIA.

...F.H.Q. Joint Beach Intelligence Summary - Southern ITALY, (dated 20 July, 1943).
...F.H.Q. Joint Beach Intelligence Summary - NAPLES Area, (dated 6 August, 1943.).
...F.H.Q. Joint Beach Intelligence Summary - Gulf of MANFREDONIA, (18 September, 1943).

b. Ports and Towns.

I.S.T.D. C/186 - BARI.
I.S.T.D. C/187 - BRINDISI.
I.S.T.D. C/185 - GALLIPOLI - MONOPOLI - OTRANTO.
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I.S.T.D. C/222 - CIVITAVECCHIA.
I.S.T.D. C/232 - PIOMBINO.
I.S.T.D. M/206 - GENOA.
I.S.T.D. M/208 - LEGHORN.
I.S.T.D. M/207 - SPEZIA.
I.S.T.D. M/ - SAVONA (enroute from U.K.).
I.S.T.D. M/295 - LEVOCCO.
I.S.T.D. M/226 - Island of ELBA.
I.S.T.D. M/265 - ROME (under preparation).
I.S.T.D. M/266 - TIVOLI (under preparation).
I.S.T.D. 274 - VITERBO (under preparation).
I.S.T.D. 275 - TERNI (under preparation).
I.S.T.D. 276 - MONTALCONE. (under preparation)
I.S.T.D. M/202 - Contains information on the small ports of:

1. San Remo.
2. Pegli.
3. Sestri Ponente.
4. Nervi.
5. Recco.
6. Camogli
7. Portofino.
8. Santa Margherita.
9. Rapallo.
10. Chiavari.
11. Levanto.
12. Sestri Levante.

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13. Reva Trigoso.
14. Moneglia.
15. Levanto.
16. Portovenere.
17. Isolo Palmaria.
18. Isolotto Del Tino.
19. Isolotto Del Tinetto.
20. Lerici.

I.S.T.D. C/209 - Contains information on the small ports of:

1. Gaeta.
2. Formia.
3. Baia.
4. Pozzuoli.
5. Barnoli.
6. Porticci.
7. Torre Del Greco.
8. Torre Annunziata.
9. Castellamare Di Stabia.
10. Sorrento.
11. Amalfi.
12. Salerno.

I.S.T.D. C/217 contains information on the small ports of:

1. Canale Di Fiumicino.
2. Porto d' Anzio.

I.S.T.D. C/227 contains information on the small ports of:

1. Punta Corvo.
2. Marina Di Carrara.
3. Marina Di Massa.
4. Forte Dei Marmi.
5. Viareggio.
6. Vada.
7. Follonica.
8. Castiglione della Pescaia.
9. Porto Santo Stefano.
10. Port Ercole

A.F.H.Q. PAPER, "Ancona, the Port," (B389.260.6), dated 5 Nov., 1943.
M. E. T. PAPER, "Population and Labor Breakdown for Towns North of 42°"

VI. DEFENSES.

For latest information, apply to A. C. of S., G-2., A.F.H.Q.

VII. AVIATION.

a. Airfields.

(1) A.I.2.(B) "List of Aerodromes, Landing Grounds, and Seaplane Bases."
(2) Possible airfield sites, S. E. S. 73, 74, and 75, Part II.
(3) I.S.T.D./C/264A -"Plan--Suitability for Landing Grounds."

b. Air Intelligence.

For latest information, apply to Air Intelligence, Mediterranean Air Command.

VIII MAPS AND PLANS.

Generally included in individual reports.

X INFORMATION on Southern C.L.B.M. (all Subjects).

I.S.I.S. CB 4096 M (Calabrian Supplement).

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1. Canale Di Fiumicino.
2. Porto d' Anzio.

I.S.T.D. C/227 contains information on the small ports of:

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3. Marina Di Massa.
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5. Viareggio.
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(3) I.S.T.D./S/264 -"Plan--Suitability for Landing Grounds."

b. Air Intelligence.

For latest information, apply to Air Intelligence, Mediterranean Air Command.

VIII MAPS AND PLANS.

Generally included in individual reports.

I INFORMATION on Southern C.L.B.L. (all Subjects).

I.S.I.S. CB 4096 H (Calabrian Supplement).
I.S.T.D. D/223 (Reprint of the above).
I.S.T.D. D/223X. - Photographs.

G. H. Q. 104., Appendix I, (same as CB 4096 H Supplement plus additional information).

K. ORDER OF BATTLE (Ground Forces).

Planning Staffs requiring order of battle for specific areas should apply to A. C. of S., G-2.

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XI. MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS.

A few copies are held of reports covering a variety of subjects. These have been circulated to those most likely to be interested.

XII. a. Basic Handbook - ITALY (prepared by P.W.E.).

Containing:
1. Internal Organisations and Policy.
2. Economic Structure.
3. Foreign Policy and Territorial Development.
4. Map Section.

b. Zone Handbooks.

These available at present:

No. 3. Calabria.
4. Lucania.
5. Apulia.
6. Campania.
7. Abruzzi and Molise.
8. Lazio.
9. Tuscany.
10. Marche and Umbria.
11. Leguria.
12. Emilia.
13. Venezia Euganea
14. Venezia Tridentina.
15. Venezia Giulia E Zara.

NOTE: These contain four parts and are to be read in conjunction with the basic handbook.

I People and Administration.
II Economic Conditions.
III Local Information. (Who's Who).
IV Map Section.

All other Zone Handbooks to be completed in United Kingdon soon.

III PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE.

For current photographic intelligence, application should be made to A. C. of S., G-2., A.F.H.Q.

SECTION B.

(Intelligence Publications prepared in Washington, D. C.)

I SURVEY OF ITALY (3 Volumes, April, 1943, MIS (S30--722).

Containing information on:
(1) Location and Strategic Importance.
(2) Geography.
(3) Population and Social Conditions.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

b. Zone Handbooks.

Those available at present:

No. 3. Calabria.	No. 9. Tuscany.
4. Lucania.	10. Marche and Umbria.
5. Apulia.	11. Leguria.
6. Campania.	12. Emilia.
7. Abruzzi and Molise.	13. Venezia Euganea
8. Lazio.	14. Venezia Tridentina.
	15. Venezia Giulia E Zara.

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(4) Political.
(5) Economic.
   a. General.
   b. Utilities.
   c. Railroads.
   d. Roads.
   e. Communications.
   f. Finance.

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II. O.N.I. 104 and Appendices.

A. No. 104 - Strategic Study of Italy.

Containing information on:

1. Location and Importance.
2. Geography.
3. People.
4. Political.
5. Economic.
6. Ports, Anchorages, and their Defences.
7. Defended Areas.
8. Resume of Italian Transport and Vulnerable Points Thereof.
9. Beaches and Landing Places.
10. Army.
11. Air Force.
12. Navy.

B. No. 104 - Separate Appendix No. 1, "Supplement on Calabria."
(This is almost a duplicate of U.S.I.S. GB 4096 H.)

Containing information on:

1. Topography, Climate, and Medical.
2. Communications.
3. Coast and Ports.
4. Coast Defences.

C. No. 104 - Separate Appendix II "Coasts and Beaches of Northern Italy."
(East and West Coasts)

Containing information on:

1. Beach Studies.
2. Railways.
3. Resources.
4. General Terrain Appreciation.
5. Communications.
6. Weather Conditions.

III. STRATEGIC ENGINEERING STUDY (as Appendices to O. N. I. 104).

A. No. 53 (Appendix No. 12) "Apulian Aqueduct."

B. No. 59 (Appendix No. 8) "ITALY - Terrain Intelligence."

Containing information on:

1. Water Supply - Rivers.
2. Suitability for Airfields.
3. Construction Materials.

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9. Beaches and Landing Places.
10. Army.
11. Air Force.
12. Navy.

B. No. 104 - Separate Appendix No. 1, "Supplement on Calabria."
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B. No. 59 (Appendix No. 8) "ITALY - Terrain Intelligence."

Containing information on:

1. Water Supply - Rivers.
2. Suitability for Airfields.
3. Construction Materials.
4. Geology.
5. Quarries and Cement.
6. Mineral Resources.
7. Railroads as Objectives.

C. No. 60, Volume 1, (Appendix No. 6) Italy--West Coast."

Containing information on:

1. Port and Terminal Facilities.
2. Port and Harbor Conditions.
3. Fuel and Supplies.

This report also includes information on the Sole and Heel of the Boot as far East as Gallipoli. Photographs are incorporated.

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D. No. 60, Volume II (Appendix No. 7), in two parts, "Italy - East Coast" North of Capo St. Maria Di Leuca.

Containing information on:

1. Port and Harbor Conditions.
2. Port and Terminal Facilities.
3. Fuel and Supplies.
4. Conditions of Current and Weather in North Adriatic Sea.
5. Inland Navigation Facilities.

E. No. 73 Part I, (Appendix No. 3) "Puglia and Lucania Provinces - Landing Beaches" from Metaponto to Chieuti (North of Spur on Adriatic.)

1691

Containing information on:

1. General Landing Area Reports.
2. Detailed Description of Coast.

F. No. 73, Part II (Appendix No. 9) "Puglia and Lucania Provinces - Terrain Intelligence."

Containing information on:

1. Water Supply - Maps and Tables.
2. Construction Materials.
3. Road Construction and Maintenance.
4. Possible Air-field Sites.
5. Geology.

G. No. 74, Part I (Appendix No. 4) "Calabria Landing Beaches" from Punta Di Cadno to Fuima Sinni.

Containing information on:

1. General Landing Area Reports.
2. Description of Coast and Landing Beaches.
3. Communications.
4. Weather Conditions.

H. No. 74, Part II (Appendix No. 10) "Calabria Province," Terrain Intelligence.

Containing information on:

1. Water Supply.
2. Construction Materials.
3. Road Construction and Maintenance.
4. Possible Airfield Sites.

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of Spur on Adriatic.)

Containing information on:

1. General Landing Area Reports.
2. Detailed Description of Coast.

F. No. 73, Part II (Appendix No. 9) "Puglia and Lucania Provinces - Terrain Intelligence."

Containing information on:

1. Water Supply - Maps and Tables.
2. Construction Materials.
3. Road Construction and Maintenance.
4. Possible Air-field Sites.
5. Geology.

G. No. 74, Part I (Appendix No. 4) "Calabria Landing Beaches" from Punta Di Caino to Fiumm Sinni.

Containing information on:

1. General Landing Area Reports.
2. Description of Coast and Landing Beaches.
3. Communications.
4. Weather Conditions.

H. No. 74, Part II (Appendix No. 10) "Calabria Province," Terrain Intelligence.

Containing information on:

1. Water Supply.
2. Construction Materials.
3. Road Construction and Maintenance.
4. Possible Airfield Sites.
5. Geology, General Terrain Appreciation.
6. Land Reclamation.
7. Hydroelectric Power Development.
8. Communications.

I. No. 75, Part I, (Appendix No. 5) "Campania Province," Landing Beaches, Gaeta to Belvedere Marittimo.

Containing information on:

1. General Landing Area Report.
2. Description of the Coast.
3. General Information - Tides, Currents, Weather, and Hydrography.
4. Communications.

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J. No. 75, Part II (Appendix No. 11) "Campanic Province," Terrain Appreciation.

Containing information on:

1. Water Supply.
2. Construction Materials.
3. Quarries.
4. Airfield Construction.
5. Geology.
6. Population Density.
7. Settlements and Communications.

SECTION C.

I.

A. O. S. S., SOUTHERN FRANCE (in 15 Sections), - Topographic Intelligence Study.

Office of Strategic Services,
Research and Analysis Branch (R & A, No. 891)

1. The area covered by this study is from the Spanish-French Frontier up to a line approximately 46° 30' N., passing through Les Sables, Poitiers, Moulins, and Lausanne.

2. A few subjects in this Survey cover the whole of FRANCE, as it would be impractical to do otherwise.

3. Photographs, plans, tables, and maps are incorporated into the individual sections where available.

4. This report is available for distribution as a complete study, or where only certain information is needed, by individual sections.

Section I — Physical Landscape.
- a. Terrain.
- b. Vegetation.

Section II — Coastline Features.
- a. Coastal Terrain.
- b. Beaches.

Section III — Climate.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Section I — Physical Landscape.
- a. Terrain.
- b. Vegetation.

Section II — Coastline Features.
- a. Coastal Terrain.
- b. Beaches.

Section III — Climate.
- a. Features Significant to Groud Operations
- b. Features Significant to Air Operations.

Section IV — Air Facilities.
- a. General.
- b. Detailed Description.

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Section V Ports.

(1) Atlantic Ports.

a. Major Biscayan Port.
b. Secondary Biscayan Port.
c. Minor Biscayan Port.
d. Very Small Biscayan Port.

(2) Mediterranean Port.

a. Major Mediterranean Port.
b. Secondary Mediterranean Port.
c. Minor Mediterranean Port.
d. Very Small Mediterranean Port.

Section VI Roads.

a. Pattern of the Network.
b. Administration.
c. Construction.
d. Natural Conditions.
e. Transport Facilities.
f. Descriptions of Main Roads.

Section VII Railroads.

a. Pattern and Strategy of the System.
b. Administration.
c. Personnel.
d. Track and Right of Way.
e. Equipment.
f. Repair Shops and Terminals.
g. Traffic.
h. Capacity.
i. Vulnerable Points.

Section VIII Inland Waterways.

a. General.
b. The Rhone--Suone System.
c. The Garonne--Midi System.
d. The Charente River.
e. The Adour and other Basque Rivers.

Section IX Telecommunications.

a. Radio.
b. Telephone and Telegraph.
c. Submarine Cable.
d. Vulnerable Features.

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d. Very Small Mediterranean Port.

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c. Construction.
d. Natural Conditions.
e. Transport Facilities.
f. Descriptions of Main Roads.

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Section IX — Telecommunications.

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b. Telephone and Telegraph.
c. Submarine Cable.
d. Vulnerable Features.

Section X — Utilities.

a. Electric Power.
b. Water Supply.

Section XI — Industrial Resources.

a. Fuel.
b. Metals and Machine Industry.
c. The Chemical Industry.
d. Other Industries.

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Section XII — Food Resources.

a. Agriculture.
b. Fishing Industry.

Section XIII — Health and Sanitation.

a. Public Administration.
b. Medical Facilities and Personnel.
c. Diseases.
d. Conditions affecting Public Health.

Section XIV — People and Government.

a. Population.
b. Political Forces.
c. Governmental Organization.

Section XV — Cities and Towns.

a. Distribution and Importance.
b. Physical Characteristics.
c. Billeting.
d. Public Utilities.

B. S.E.S. 84, Volume I, "Landing Beaches, (Mediterranean France)."

Containing:

1. General Landing Report.
2. Detailed Description of Coast and Landing Beaches.
   a. Location.
   b. Sea Approach.
   c. Beach.
   d. Inland Terrain.

C. S.E.S. 84, Volume 3, "Mediterranean France, Port and Terminal Facilities."

Containing:

1. Port and Harbor Condition
2. Fuel and Supplies.
3. Port and Harbor Facilities.
   (on every port on the South Coast of FRANCE.)

D. S.E.S. 87,"Terrain Intelligence, (Whole of France)."

Containing:

1. General Maps.
2. Terrain Diagrams and Appreciations.
3. Climate.
4. Water Supply.
5. Roads and Maintenance.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

a. Population.
b. Political Forces.
c. Governmental Organization.

Section XV Cities and Towns.

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b. Physical Characteristics.
c. Billeting.
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Containing:

1. General Maps.
2. Terrain Diagrams and Appreciations.
3. Climate.
4. Water Supply.
5. Roads, Railroads, and Maintenance.
6. Airfield Suitability.
7. Resources -construction materials, fuels, mineral resources, etc.

E. "Mediterranean France" U.S.I.S. Report, CB 4086 J, Volume 5.

PART I Geography.

a. Topography.
   1. Description of Country.
   2. Suitability of Country for Military Operations.
   3. Topographical Suitability for Landing Grounds.

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b. Climate.

1. General Description.
2. The Effect on Climate on Operations.

c. Gazetteer.

PART III

a. Railways.

1. Maps and Gradient Profiles.
2. General Description of System.
3. Organization and Personnel.
4. Mileage and Gauges.
5. Permanent Way.
6. Signalling.
7. Electrification.
8. Locomotives.
9. Rolling Stock.
10. Traffic.
11. Capacity.
12. Vulnerable Points.
13. Net Works.
14. Itineraries.

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b. Roads.

1. General.
2. General Itinerary.
3. Method of Construction.
4. Present Conditions and Capacity.
5. Bridges.
6. Ferries.
7. Gradients.
8. Sharp Turns.
9. Defiles.
10. Observation Points.
11. Seasonal Variations.
12. Photographs.

c. Waterways.

1. Description of System.
2. Sources of Water.
3. Dimensions.
4. Docks.
5. Bridges.
6. Banks.
7. Barges.
8. Ports and Quays.

PART IV.

a. Photographs of PART I, Geography.
b. Photographs of PART III (b) Roads.

PART V. COAST, PORTS, and INLAND TOWNS.

a. Coast, Beaches, and Exits.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

3. Organization and Personnel.
4. Mileage and Gauges.
5. Permanent Way.
6. Signalling.
7. Electrification.
10. Traffic.
11. Capacity.
12. Vulnerable Points.
13. Key Works.
14. Itineraries.

b. Roads.

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2. General Itinerary.
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PART V. COAST, PORTS, and INLAND TOWNS.

a. Coast, Beaches, and Exits.

1. Coast.
2. Beach.
   a. Dimensions.
   b. Landing.
   c. Weather.
   d. Approach.
   e. Anchorage.
   f. Obstacles.
   g. Exits.
   h. Routes Inland.
   i. Cover.

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b. Ports (Port Vendres to Nice) (Ports and Towns).

1. General.
2. Anchorage.
3. Conspicuous Objects.
4. Tides and Currents.
5. Weather.
6. Description of Harbour.
7. Mooring Buoys.
8. Accommodations.
9. Method of Discharge.
10. Quayage, Cranage, and Clearance from Quays.
11. Other Cranage.
12. Trade.
13. Essential Civil Traffic.
14. Estimated Daily Capacity.
15. Harbour Craft.
16. Landing of Men and Stores by Water Transport.
17. Warehouses and Stacking Space.
18. Coal, Oil, and Water.
19. Docks, Slipways, and Repair Facilities.
20. Facilities for Clearing Port Area.

F. FRENCH Basic Handbook (prepared by P.W.E.).
Containing:
1. Pre-Armistice Background.
2. The Armistice.
3. France, since June 1940.
4. Map Section.

G. FRENCH Zone Handbooks.

These available at present:

No. 1. Corsica.
2. The Marseille Region.
3. Montpellier.

NOTE: These contain three parts and are to be read in conjunction with the Basic Handbook.
I People and Administration.
II Economic Conditions.
III Local Information and Administrative Personalities (Who's Who).

III A.F.H.Q.

A. S.H.S. 81, Volume 1, Landing Beaches.

Containing:

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12. Trade.
13. Essential Civil Traffic.
14. Estimated Daily Capacity.
15. Harbour Craft.
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II A.B.C.M.A.

A. S.I.S. 61, Volume 1, Landing Beaches.

Containing:

1. General Landing Area Report.
2. Detailed Description of the Coast and Landing Beaches.
a. Location and Extent.
b. Sea Approach.
c. Beach.
d. Inland Terrain.

B. S.I.S. 61, Volume II, Terrain Intelligence.

Containing:
1. General Maps.
2. Terrain Diagrams and Appreciations.
3. Climate.
4. Water Supply.

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5. Roads and Maintenance.
6. Airfield Suitability.
7. Resources:
   Construction materials.
   Fuels.
   Mineral Resources, etc.

C. S.I.S. 81, Volume III, Port and Terminal Facilities.

Containing:

1. Distinctive Regional Characteristics.
2. Landing Facilities.
3. Supplies, Availability of
4. Repair Facilities.
5. Vulnerability.

On the Ports of:

1. Durazzo.
2. Porto San Nicolo.
3. San Giovanni.
4. Sarando.
5. Valona.
6. Patok.
7. Port Palermo.
8. Scutari.
9. Semeni.

D. Basic Handbook (Albania).

Containing:

1. Pre-Invasion.
2. Post-Invasion.
3. Map Section.

II and III ALBANIA and Southern YUGOSLAVIA--OB 4096 Y (Uncorrected Proof).

A. Text.

PART I (B) (2) Climate.

PART II Resources.

1. General.
2. Agriculture.
3. Industries.
4. Oil Storage.
5. Coal Depots.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

4. Repair Facilities.
5. Vulnerability.

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On the Ports of:

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PART I (8) (2) Climate.

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3. Industries.
4. Oil Storage.
5. Coal Depots.
6. Quarries.
7. Water.
8. Electricity.
9. Labour.
10. Billeting.

PART III Communications.

a. Railroads.

(1) Maps.
(2) General Description of System.
(3) Organisation and Personnel.
(4) Mileage and Gauges.

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(5) Permanent Way.
(6) Signalling and Safety Appliances.
(7) Electrification.
(8) Locomotives.
(9) Rolling Stock.
(10) Traffic.
(11) Capacity.
(12) Vulnerability of System.
(13) New Works.
(14) Itineraries of Lines.

b. Roads.

(1) Introductory Notes.
(2) Deployment.
(3) Constructions and Conditions.
(4) Bridges.
(5) Gradients.
(6) Sharp Turns.
(7) Vulnerable Points.
(8) Itinerary.

d. Signals.

(1) General.
(2) Fixed Stations.
(3) Submarine Cables.

PART V PORTS.

a. The Port.

(1) General.
(2) Anchorages.
(3) Conspicuous Objects.
(4) Tides, Tidal Streams, and Currents.
(5) Weather.
(6) Description of Harbour.
(7) Mooring Buoys.
(8) Accommodations.
(9) Method of Discharge.
(10) Quayage, Cranage, and Clearance from Quays.
(11) Other Cranage.
(12) Trade.
(13) Essential Civil Traffic.
(14) Estimated Daily Capacity.
(15) Harbour Craft.
(16) Landing of men, stores, and vehicles by Water-transport.
(17) Warehouses and Stacking Space.
(18) Coal, Oil, and Water.
(19) Docks, Slipways, and Repair Facilities.
(20) Facilities for Clearing Port Area.

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(5) Gradients.
(6) Sharp Turns.
(7) Vulnerable Points.
(8) Itinerary.

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(18) Coal, Oil, and Water.
(19) Docks, Slipways, and Repair Facilities.
(20) Facilities for Clearing Port Area.

b. The Town.

(1) Description of Town.
(2) Population.
(3) Labour.
(4) Billeting.
(5) Light and Power.
(6) Water and Sanitation.
(7) Government and Municipal Establishments.
(8) Industrial Establishments.
(9) Local Agriculture and Fishing.

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(10) M/T and Garages.
(11) Areas for Dumps and Parks.
(12) Vulnerable Points.

ON THE PORTS AND TOWNS OF:

1. VLONE (Valona) (40° 28'N., 19° 30'E.).
2. DURRES (Durazzo) (41° 18'N., 19° 27'E.).
3. GULF OF KOTOR (Boka Kotorska) (Approx. 42° 25'N. 19°E.).
4. DUBROVNIK (Ragusa) (42° 38'N., 18° 07'E.).

PART V (C) Base Facilities and Maintenance of the Fleet: SUMMARY.

PART VII Aviation. (List of Airfields, Landing Grounds, Seaplane Stations, and Alighting Areas.)

B. Electric Power Notes--"Albania and Yugoslavia."

Containing: (with map and tables & ground photos) 1887

1. General information.
2. Electric Power plants.
3. Current Characteristics.

VI YUGOSLAVIA.

A. S. B. S. 82, Volume II, Terrain Intelligence.

Containing:

1. General Maps.
2. Terrain diagram and appreciations.
3. Climate.
4. Water Supply.
5. Roads and Maintenance.
6. Airfield Suitability.
7. Resources:
   - Construction Materials.
   - Fuels.
   - Mineral Resources, etc.

B. Jugoslavia Basic Handbook.

Containing:

1. Pre-Invasion.
2. Post-Invasion.
3. Map Section.

VII CHINA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

B. Electric Power Notes--"Albania and Yugoslavia."

Containing: (with map and tables & ground photos)

1. General information.
2. Electric Power plants.
3. Current Characteristics.

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II YUGOSLAVIA.

A. S. E. S. 82, Volume II, Terrain Intelligence.

Containing:

1. General Maps.
2. Terrain diagram and appreciations.
3. Climate.
4. Water Supply.
5. Roads and Maintenance.
6. Airfield Suitability.
7. Resources:
   - Construction Materials.
   - Fuels.
   - Mineral Resources, etc.

B. Jugoslavia Basic Handbook.

Containing:

1. Pre-Invasion.
2. Post-Invasion.
3. Map Section.

III GREECE.

A. S. E. S. 55, Terrain Intelligence.

Containing: (with Maps, Photographs, and Tables)

1. General Information.
2. Terrain Appreciation.
3. Water Supply
4. Suitability for Airfields.
5. Suitability for Temporary Roads.
6. Construction Materials.
7. Geology.
8. Mineral Resources.

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B. S. E. S. 85, Port and Terminal Facilities.(Greece and the Dodecanese Islands).

Containing: (with plans, maps, and ground photos)

1. Port and Harbor Conditions.
2. Fuel and Supplies.
3. Port and Harbor Facilities.

C. O.N.I. 113, Strategic Study of Greece. (in 2 parts).

Containing: (with plans, maps, tables, and ground photos)

Section 1. Location and Importance.
2. Political Forces.
3. Social Forces.
4. Economic Forces.
5. Inland Terrain.
6. Coastal Terrain.
7. Meteorological Conditions.
8. Hydrography.
9. Geology and Water Supply.
10. Ionian Islands.
11. Ports.
12. Landing Beaches.
13. Inland Towns.
14. Railroads.
15. Roads and Bridges.
16. Telecommunications.
17. Electric Power Facilities.
18. Defences.
19. Historical Background.

D. Greek Basic Handbook.

Containing:

1. Pre-Invasion.
2. Post-Invasion.
3. Map Section.

V BULGARIA.

A. S. E. S. 83, Volume 1, Landing Beaches.

Containing:

1. General Landing Report.
2. Detailed Description of Coast and Landing Beaches.
   a. Location and Extent.
   b. Sea Approach.
   c. Beach.
   d. Inland Terrain.

B. S. E. S. 83, Volume 2, Terrain Intelligence.

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4. Economic Forces.
5. Inland Terrain.
6. Coastal Terrain.
7. Meteorological Conditions.
8. Hydrography.
9. Geology and Water Supply.
10. Ionian Islands.
11. Ports.
12. Landing Beaches.
13. Inland Towns.
14. Railroads.
15. Roads and Bridges.
16. Telecommunications.
17. Electric Power Facilities.
18. Defences.
19. Historical Background.

D. Greek Basic Handbook.

Containing:

1. Pre-Invasion.
2. Post-Invasion.
3. Map Section.

V BULGARIA.

A. S. I. S. 83, Volume 1, Landing Beaches.

Containing:

1. General Landing Report.
2. Detailed Description of Coast and Landing Beaches.
   a. Location and Extent.
   b. Sea Approach.
   c. Beach.
   d. Inland Terrain.

B. S. I. S. 83, Volume 2, Terrain Intelligence.

Containing:

1. General Maps.
2. Terrain diagrams and appreciation.
3. Climate.
4. Water Supply.
5. Roads and Maintenance.
6. Airfield Suitability.
7. Resources:
   Construction Materials.
   Fuels.
   Mineral Resources, etc.

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C. S. E. S. 83, Volume 3, Port and Terminal Facilities.

Containing:

1. Port and Harbor Conditions.
2. Port and Harbor Facilities.
3. Fuel and Supplies.
4. Repair Facilities.
5. Vulnerability.
6. Recent Changes.
   a. Burgas.
   b. Varna.
   c. Akhtopal.
   d. Nesebar.
   e. Tzarevo.

D. Bulgarian Basic Handbook.

Containing:

1. Political.
2. Economic.
3. Appendices I, II, III.

1685

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d. Nesebar.
e. Tzarevo.

D. Bulgarian Basic Handbook.

Containing:

1. Political.
2. Economic.
3. Appendices I, II, III.

1885

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LIST OF ISTD STUDIES AVAILABLE 21 NOVEMBER, 1943, ON ITALY (EXCLUDING SOUTHERN ITALY)

C/200	NAPLES - PORT and TOWN - PHOTOS
K/202	FRENCH - ITALIAN FRONTIER to LA SPEZIA - Coast Report.
K/205	FRENCH - ITALIAN FRONTIER to GENOA - PHOTOGRAPHS
C/217	GAETA to CIVITAVECCHIA - Coast Report
218	CIVITAVECCHIA to GAETA - Topography
218A	SPEZIA to CIVITAVECCHIA - Topography.
219	WEST CENTRAL ITALY: SPEZIA - BOLOGNA - ANCONA FOGGIA - NAPLES: Railways.
220	WEST CENTRAL ITALY - Roads
221	ROME
222	CIVITAVECCHIA - Port and Town.
K/226	ELBA
C/227	SPEZIA to CIVITAVECCHIA - Coast Report
228	WEST CENTRAL ITALY - Resources.
232	PIOMBINO - Port and Town.
233 and 251	CENTRAL AND NORTHERN ITALY - Signals, Plans and Text
234	WEST CENTRAL ITALY - Climate and Medical.
PLANS	WEST CENTRAL ITALY I.S.T.D. REPORTS
237	NORTHERN ITALY - Topography.
238	NORTHERN ITALY - Climate and Medical
239	NORTHERN ITALY - Resources. Text, Plans and Photos.
240	NORTHERN ITALY - Railways. Text and Plans
241	NORTHERN ITALY - Roads. Text and Photos.
242	RIMINI to ROMA - Coast Report.
252	GAETA, POZZUOLI, TORRE ANNUNZIATE, CASTELLAMARE DI STABIA, SALERNO (Port Study)
264A	ITALY - AVIATION (Map--SUITABILITY FOR LANDING

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219	FOGGIA - NAPLES: Railways.
220	WEST CENTRAL ITALY - Roads
221	ROME
222	CIVITAVECCHIA - Port and Town.
K/226	ELBA
C/227	SPEZIA to CIVITAVECCHIA - Coast Report
228	WEST CENTRAL ITALY - Resources.
232	PIOMBINO - Port and Town.
233 and 251	CENTRAL AND NORTHERN ITALY - Signals, Plans and Text
234	WEST CENTRAL ITALY - Climate and Medical.
PLANS	WEST CENTRAL ITALY I.S.T.D. REPORTS
237	NORTHERN ITALY - Topography.
238	NORTHERN ITALY - Climate and Medical
239	NORTHERN ITALY - Resources. Text, Plans and Photos.
240	NORTHERN ITALY - Railways. Text and Plans
241	NORTHERN ITALY - Roads. Text and Photos.
242	RIMINI to POLA. - Coast Report.
252	GENOA, POZZUOLI, TORRE, ANNUNZIATE, CASTELLAMARE DI STABIA, SALERNO (Port Study)
264A	ITALY - AVIATION (Map--SUITABILITY FOR LANDING GROUNDS)
L/272	EAST CENTRAL ITALY - Topography
K/278	EAST CENTRAL ITALY - Resources.
K/279A	EAST CENTRAL ITALY - Towns. (Group A)
C/281	NORTHERN ITALY - Signals.
295	LIVORNO - Port and Town.

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20 NOV 1943

AFHQ

Military Government Section

MGS 350.5

23 November 1943.

SUBJECT: AFHQ Intelligence Instruction No. 33.

TO : HQ Allied Control Commission, CMF, Brindisi.
HQ AMG 15 Army Group
HQ ACC (AMG) CMF, Palermo.

Reference our MGS 350.5 of 19 November 1943, forwarding copies of AFHQ Intelligence Instruction No. 33.

Attached hereto is an addendum to the above instruction.

D. S. JACKLING
Lt. Colonel.

1 Incl.
As above

COPY TO:

M. G. Centre - with addendum.

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: SECRET :
: By Auth C-in-C, AF :
: Initials: T.J.C :
: K.W.D.S. :
: Date 21 Nov 1943 :

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

21 November 1943

ADDENDUM TO:

INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTION)
NUMBER 33)

Folio IIA
2

The above numbered Intelligence Instruction does NOT apply to Prisoners of War, the procedure for whom will remain as heretofore.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

T Kendrick

K. W. D. STRONG,
Brigadier, G.S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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B.G.S.(Int), HQ., 15 Army Group	4
A. C. of S., G-2, HQ., Fifth Army	3
G.S.(Int), HQ., 8 Army	3
Allied Control Commission	3
G.S.(Int), HQ., No. 2 District	3
A. C. of S., G-2, HQ., Peninsular Base Section	3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

NUMBER 33)

The above numbered Intelligence Instruction does NOT apply to Prisoners of War, the procedure for whom will remain as heretofore.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

T Strodtbeck

for K. W. D. STRONG,
Brigadier, G.S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

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B.G.S.(Int), HQ., 15 Army Group 4
A. C. of S., G-2, HQ., Fifth Army 3
G.S.(Int), HQ., 8 Army. 3
Allied Control Commission 3
G.S.(Int), HQ., No. 2 District. 3
A. C. of S., G-2, HQ., Peninsular Base Section. 3
G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ, c/o Allied Control Commission 3

1885

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Subject: Collection and dissemination of intelligence obtained in Italy. 12

H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C. M. F.

G.2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ.,
c/o Allied Control Commission,
BRINDISI.

AMG/58/12.
24.Nov.43.

IIA

Reference AFHQ Intelligence Instruction No.33 dated 13.Nov.43.

1. The information normally required by this H.Q. is on political and economic matters.

1002

2. We should be grateful of any other information of special interest which may be received.

R.J.P. THORNE THORNE,
Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

RJPT/JG.

B.U. to CCG 5
2nd 12-10A.
24/XI

BY FAST AIR COURIER

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

DGJ/DW/jw

19 November 1943.

MG 350.5

SUBJECT: Collection and dissemination of intelligence obtained in Italy.

TO : HQ Allied Control Commission, Brindisi (2 copies)
HQ AMG 15 Army Group
HQ ACC (AMG) CMF, Palermo (2 copies)

Reference is made to the attached copies of AFHQ Intelligence Instruction No. 33, of 13 November 1943. Two copies both of the instructions and of this covering letter are forwarded each to HQ Allied Control Commission, and to HQ ACC (AMG) with the request that one copy of each document shall be passed to the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission, or to the local representative thereof.

1. Every assistance and all available information should be given to G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ. Similarly, in order to ensure maximum efficiency and to obviate the supply of redundant information, HQ Allied Control Commission and HQ AMG 15 Army Group are requested to contact the same section, and to indicate what types of information they most require. HQ Allied Control Commission will also represent the requirements of HQ ACC (AMG) in this matter, and thus save the section receiving initial and un-coordinated policy requirements for information from all three Headquarters.

2. The stage at which the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission will become responsible for personnel, excepting Allied ex-PW, is defined in paragraph 5 a to c of the attached instruction. Whilst at first it may be necessary for the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission to assume responsibility for individuals of Italian nationality after such personnel have passed through R.I.Ps. for screening, vide paragraph 5 d, responsibility should be ceded to the Italian Government so soon as the organisation which the Italian authorities have appointed for that purpose is capable of functioning. In this connection reference is made to a message number 840 of 9 November from HQ Allied Military Mission.

D. W. JACKLING
Lt. Colonel

Copy to: M.G. Centre - who will note that a copy of AFHQ Intelligence Instruction Number 33 has previously been forwarded to your HQ.
G-2

Seen by D.P.H.

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: By Auth C-in-C, MTO :
: Initials: K.W.D.S. :
: Date: 13 Nov 1943 :

1123

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

13 November 1943

INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTION)
NUMBER 33)

Not applicable to POW
see 13 b. c/o

COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION
OF
INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED IN ITALY

1. G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ.

1581

To ensure that all intelligence required by AFHQ and M.E., is collected and disseminated, a section of the J.I.C.(A.F.) will be set up at BRINDISI known as G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ. It will be inter-service and be in charge of Major CAVE (British) and Major PHILLIPS (U.S.).

Address: c/o Allied Control Commission,
Hotel International,
BRINDISI.

2. Duties.

This section will

a. Act as the forward link of J.I.C.(A.F.) to collect and disseminate information required by AFHQ and M.E.

b. Ensure that results of interrogations are distributed.

3. Sources of Information.

The main sources of information available to the section will be

a. The Italian Commando Supremo.

b. C.S.D.I.C. Reports.

c. S.O.E., O.S.S. and S.I.(b).

d. Local information, e.g. libraries, local officials, etc.

e. Allied Military Government and Allied Commission.

f. Advanced G-2, C.I. (Security) Section.

4. Dissemination of Information.

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1681

1. G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ.

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c. S.O.E., O.S.S. and S.I.(b).

d. Local information, e.g. libraries, local officials, etc.

e. Allied Military Government and Allied Commission.

f. Advanced G-2, C.I. (Security) Section.

4. Dissemination of Information.

a. The section will distribute information as required to the following:

(1) AFHQ, GHQ Middle East, 15 Army Group, and Allied Control Commission.

(2) S.O.E., O.S.S., "A" Force and S.I.(b).

(3) M.A.C. (Air I), S.O.I. (Mediterranean), all S.O.I. in ITALY.

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b. The section and C.S.D.I.C. mutually will select and arrange to transport to .FHQ or Middle East for further interrogation any individuals who have capable knowledge.

5. Interrogation.

In order that the maximum information is available from escaped Prisoners of War, refugees, escapees and displaced personnel from enemy occupied IT.LY and the B.LK.NS the following arrangements have been made:

a. Refugee Interrogation Posts (R.I.P.).

Under control of each .rmy HQ there will be an R.I.P. It will be located at the .rmy P.O.W. cage. .ll invididuals (including ex-P.O.W.) passing through the lines or arriving at ports or airfields (except those possessing normal credentials) in the .rmy area will be taken to these posts.

Tactical interrogation will be carried out at the R.I.P. and the results distributed immediately to:

15 .rmy Group
5 and 8 .rmies
M. Sec., Tac. HQ '.' Force, 15 .rmy Group
.dvanced .ir Intelligence (M..C.)

The staff at the R.I.P. will consist of one C.I.(Ib) Officer, two C.I.C. (or F.S.) N.C.Os., one C.S.D.I.C. Officer, one Carabinieri N.C.O.

b. C.S.D.I.C.

Mobile C.S.D.I.C. Units for detailed interrogation will be opened at B.RI and N.PLES. .ll individuals, except those of Italian nationality and .llied ex-P.O.W. who have passed through R.I.P. or landed at ports and airfields or at other points outside the areas controlled by the .rmies (except those possessing normal credentials) will be sent to these units. Here detailed interrogation and any further security check necessary will be carried out. C.S.D.I.C. will be responsible for distributing direct to those concerned, including G-2 (.dvanced Intelligence) .FHQ, the results of interrogation. On points arising therefrom those interested may deal direct with C.S.D.I.C. or through G-2 (.dvanced Intelligence) .FHQ, whichever is more convenient.

.fter C.S.D.I.C. has completed its interrogation of personnel, arrangements are being made by .llied Control Commission (Displaced Persons Sub-commission) to take care of these individuals.

c. .rrival of refugees on the Coast at Places other than Controlled Ports.

.ll individuals arriving on the coast at places other than the controlled ports will be conducted to the nearest Port Security Officer if outside the army areas, or to the R.I.P. if arriving in the army area.

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those possessing normal credentials) in the Army area will be taken to these posts.

Tactical interrogation will be carried out at the R.I.P. and the results distributed immediately to:

15 Army Group
5 and 8 Armies
M. Sec., Tac. HQ 'A' Force, 15 Army Group
Advanced Air Intelligence (M.A.C.)

The staff at the R.I.P. will consist of one C.I.(Ib) Officer, two C.I.C. (or F.S.) N.C.Os., one C.S.D.I.C. Officer, one Carabinieri N.C.O.

b. C.S.D.I.C.

Mobile C.S.D.I.C. Units for detailed interrogation will be opened at R.R.I and M.F.E.S. All individuals, except those of Italian nationality and Allied ex-P.O.W. who have passed through R.I.P. or landed at ports and airfields or at other points outside the areas controlled by the Armies (except those possessing normal credentials) will be sent to these units. Here detailed interrogation and any further security check necessary will be carried out. C.S.D.I.C. will be responsible for distributing direct to those concerned, including G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ, the results of interrogation. On points arising therefrom those interested may deal direct with C.S.D.I.C. or through G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ, whichever is more convenient.

After C.S.D.I.C. has completed its interrogation of personnel, arrangements are being made by Allied Control Commission (Displaced Persons Sub-commission) to take care of these individuals.

c. Arrival of refugees on the Coast at Places other than Controlled Ports.

All individuals arriving on the coast at places other than the controlled ports will be conducted to the nearest Port Security Officer if outside the army areas, or to the R.I.P. if arriving in the army area.

d. Disposal of Italian Personnel.

The procedure for dealing with Italian personnel will be as follows:

After passing through the R.I.Ps. for screening all Italian Nationals (both military and civil), will pass under care of the Allied Control Commission (Displaced Persons Sub-commission) for feeding and conveyance to selected points in rear, when they will become the responsibility of the Italian authorities.

The Italians propose to open an interrogation centre, and

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personnel of intelligence or security interest will be taken to this centre, at which there will be an Allied liaison officer of C.S.D.I.C.

Italians of a special intelligence or security interest arriving at the Italian interrogation centre may be transferred to the C.S.D.I.C. centres at R.RI and N.PLES. They can in certain circumstances be routed direct from the R.I.P. to C.S.D.I.C. by the latter's organisation.

e. Identity Documents.

R.I.P. will send forward with all personnel, other than Allied P.O.W., a document showing their particulars and whether they are of intelligence or security interest.

6. Prisoner of War Sub-Commission (Venables Commission).

This organisation is responsible for collection and reception of Allied ex-P.O.W. They collect these after they have been screened at R.I.Ps. and convey them to the available camps.

The Sub-Commission is responsible for passing all information of operational interest which has not already been obtained and distributed at the R.I.P. to G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ.

7. Security.

Security of Italian Military and Civil personnel will be the responsibility of the Italian authorities in conjunction with the Allied security organisations.

a. An Advanced G-2, C.I. (Security) Section has been established at R.RI to deal with the C.I. (Security) problems involved. This will work in closest cooperation with G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ and C.S.D.I.C. Its address is 525 Via 28 Ottobre, R.RI.

b. Security control will be carried out at R.I.Ps. by C.I. (or F.S.) officers under arrangements made by Armies.

c. At selected ports, Port or F.S. (C.I.) Sections (or detachments) will establish security controls.

d. A Security Control will be established at each mobile C.S.D.I.C. Unit consisting of one F.S. (or C.I.) Officer, two F.S. (or C.I.) N.C.Os. to be nominated by AFHQ.

e. Individuals (except Allied P.O.W. and Italian Nationals arriving through Allied lines) will be supplied with a form showing their identity at the C.S.D.I.C. centre.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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By command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

K. W. D. SPROUL,
Brigadier, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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
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A. C. of S., G-2, Fifth Army	3
G.S.(I), 8 Army	3
Allied Control Commission	3
No. 2 District	3
Peninsular Base Section	3
G-2 (Advanced Intelligence) AFHQ, c/o Allied Control Commission, Hotel International, BRINDISI	3

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H.Q. 15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

15.G/20/1006/GSI(a)

19 Nov 43

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(less Annex)

10A

1. The attached copy/copies of "An Introduction to the German Forces in ITALY" are forwarded for information and retention.

2. Please acknowledge receipt on attached A.F. Al6. 1679

E.A.H. HEARD, Major,

For B.G.S. (I).

EAHH/ECM

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G'(Special Ops)
Naval Liaison Officer
Tac "A" Force
RA
RE
"X" Sigs

HQ AAC 15 Army Group
TAF
AC of S A-2 MMIP, APO 850
Com Nav Nav, US Navy, APHQ
AC of S G-2 APHQ (attn Col FORD)
H.Q. No.2. District
FLDMC (attn General ROBERTSON)
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Navy House (for Lieut Vesey R.N.V.R.)
CSDIC (RSS) C.M.F.
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G.S.(I) 15TH ARMY GROUP

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GERMAN FORCES IN ITALY

(May be issued down to Bn or equivalent I.Os)

1. For the last three years, since the Autumn of 1940, there have always been some German troops in Italy. German H.Qs. have been set up there to control the Mediterranean theatre and units have passed through on their way to Africa, but the first time that German divisions were actually stationed there for the country's defence was when the collapse of Tunisia in May 1943 found the nucleus of the new 15 P.G. Division and the surviving half of the Hermann Goering Division stranded in Sicily. It was clear, however, to the Axis high command that when the African bulwark collapsed the defence of the peninsula would have to be stiffened with a German backing. The collapse of Italy made the need ever more pressing but the almost simultaneous intensification of the danger in Russia and the increased activity on the part of the Jugoslav partisans have competed with these needs. As a result it has at times been difficult to be certain exactly how many German divisions there are in Italy and even if that figure can be established the extension of Rommel's Command to cover the operational area in Western Jugoslavia means that some formations shown in Northern Italy may actually be serving outside the boundaries of the country. The situation is not made easier by reports that changes in the higher command are taking place. There have been several circumstantial reports that Kesselring is taking over command of the whole of Italy and that Rommel is being restricted to the Balkans. Whatever be the truth in this some reorganisation in command will be inevitable as Kesselring's command gradually shrinks in size with our advance North.

1678

2. THE HIGH COMMAND

The Commander with whom the Allies are most immediately concerned is Generalfeldmarshall Albert Kesselring. It may be as well to sketch briefly his career. Born in 1885 near Bayreuth, the son of a Bavarian middle-class family, he entered the army in 1904 as an artillery officer in which arm he continued to serve until 1935 when he transferred to the recently created Luftwaffe. After two years regimental service in the last war he transferred to the Staff in 1916 and continued after the war in the Reichswehr. His career there was brilliant and after a period of regimental service in the same regiment as von Brauchitsch he was appointed to the "shadow" General Staff where he made many useful connections. During these years of preparation he studied in particular army/air cooperation and is believed to have been responsible for the concentration on the dive-bomber. He became Chief of Air Staff in 1936. On the outbreak of war he commanded Luftflotte 2 with success in Poland and France and was promoted Field Marshal after the successful conclusion of the French campaign. So far his career had been marked by steady success but he then received his first set-back. Together with Sperrle he planned and set in [illegible] offensive against Britain. For this his technique of

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in May 1943 found the nucleus of the new 15 P.G. Division and the surviving half of the Hermann Goering Division stranded in Sicily. It was clear, however, to the Axis high command that when the African bulwark collapsed the defence of the peninsula would have to be stiffened with a German backing. The collapse of Italy made the need ever more pressing but the almost simultaneous intensification of the danger in Russia and the increased activity on the part of the Jugoslav partisans have competed with these needs. As a result it has at times been difficult to be certain exactly how many German divisions there are in Italy and even if that figure can be established the extension of Rommel's Command to cover the operational area in Western Jugoslavia means that some formations shown in Northern Italy may actually be serving outside the boundaries of the country. The situation is not made easier by reports that changes in the higher command are taking place. There have been several circumstantial reports that Kesselring is taking over command of the whole of Italy and that Rommel is being restricted to the Balkans. Whatever be the truth in this some reorganisation in command will be inevitable as Kesselring's command gradually shrinks in size with our advance North.

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In April 1942 Kesselring became C in C South (Oberbefehlshaber Süd) which gave him supreme command over all units of the armed

.....forces throughout .....

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forces throughout his theatre, and he still retains the title though his theatre has been reduced by the creation of Rommel's Army Group B in North Italy. At present the German forces under his command are 10 Army and 11 Fliegerkorps. The latter at the moment consists only of 2 Parachute Division and possibly SS Die Reichsfuehrer SS and is responsible for the defence of the Rome area. The Corps Commander is Gen Student who has had the Corps since the Balkan campaign during which he was responsible for the attacks on the Corinth Canal and Crete. Since Crete there have been no large scale parachutist operations but the old 7 Parachute Division has provided detachments which have fought as infantry in Egypt, Tunisia, Sicily and Italy. Both 1 and 2 Para Divs were formed by dividing up 7 Para Div. 10th Army is commanded by Col.Gen Vietinghoff genannt Scheal who signs himself Vietinghoff. His speciality is tanks and he commanded an Armoured Corps in Russia; before coming to Italy in August he commanded 15th Army on the Channel coast where he made a reputation as a disciplinarian. Under command of 10 Army are 14 and 76 Corps which are composed of a varying number of different divisions. Nothing is known of the personalities of the Corps Commanders.

3. NORTH ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA

Some time in August a new H.Q. was set up in North Italy, Army Group B, and it was subsequently learnt that this was to be commanded by Generalfeldmarshal Erwin Rommel. General Rommel has had a meteoric career, not unassisted by press propaganda mainly supplied by the Allied side. He was born in 1891 in a family of small officials in Wurtemberg. He entered the army as a regular officer before the last war, in which he served on the French, Italian and Rumanian fronts rising eventually to command a Wurtemburg Mountain Rifle Battalion. He was taken into the Reichswehr after the war and rose by normal promotion until he obtained the command of an Infantry Brigade in the Polish campaign. For the French campaign he was given command of 7th Armoured Div which was particularly successful in France especially in the rapid advance to Le Havre. In January 1941 he came to Africa as Commander of the German-Afrika Corps which at that time consisted of only the 5 Light Division. Taking advantage of the weakness of British forces during the Balkan campaign he was able to make the first of his very rapid advances, clearing the whole of Cyrenaica except Tobruk. He was by now a Lt.Gen with two Armoured divisions under command. In February 1942, after his second recovery from Agheila to Gazala he was promoted Col.Gen and after the capture of Tobruk was made Field Marshal, and his command was raised to the title of Italo-German Panzer Army of Africa. It was at this time that his reputation was at its highest and the German press began to echo the somewhat exaggerated praises which had already been common form in the Allied press. He was not in command when the second battle of Alamein started as he had handed over to Gen Stumme, but returned two days later and commanded throughout the retreat. During the early stages of the operations of the combined African Panzer Army and 5th Panzer Army in Tunisia Rommel was acting as supreme commander, [illegible] April 5th he was recalled to Germany ostensibly for reasons of health.

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....Army Group B's.....

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Army Group B's area covers the whole of North Italy down to at least the line of the Apennines from Spezia to Rimini and probably a little in front of this and also an undefined area in Western Jugoslavia. His task in the former area is to prepare a defensive position against the Allied forces advancing from the South. In the latter area he already has operations of considerable scope on his hands. The forces available in Army Group B are treated as a total force and can be employed in either theatre; divisions have passed so far mainly from Italy to Yugoslavia but they may well return should the need become great. So far from Rommel's forces which were in Italy 162, 44, 71 and possibly 18 Pz Divs have gone to Yugoslavia. It is not known what other troops Rommel commands in Yugoslavia and it is possible that the chain of command there is rather flexible. A headquarters for the Balkans already exists in Army Group F at Belgrade under Field Marshal Weichs and it is probable that troops normally under his command are put under Rommel for operations; it is believed, for instance, that he has had one or two unidentified SS divisions under his command. The divisions shown as under Rommel are those which are known to have been in Italy and to have gone from there to operate in Yugoslavia.

It is not quite clear what is the organisation of Corps in Rommel's command. We know of 87 Corps in Liguria; it previously had under command 76, 94 and 305 Divs the first of which has probably gone to Russia while the second two have come South. It would be natural to expect that it now commands the divisions that have come from France, such as 334 and 356.

4. THE DIVISIONS.

The present distribution of divisions between Rommel and Kesselring appears to be as follows:-

ARMY GROUP B.

16 Armoured Div.
44 Inf Div.
71 Inf Div.
88 Inf Div.
90 P.G. Div.
157 Reserve Div.
162 Inf Div.
334 Inf Div.
356 Inf Div.
371 Inf Div.
Koehle Mountain Bde.

Under C.in.C South in 10 Army are:-

26 Armoured Div.
3 P.G. Div.
15 P.G. Div.
[illegible] Inf Div.

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334 Inf Div.
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371 Inf Div.
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Under C.in.C South in 10 Army are:-

26 Armoured Div.
3 P.G. Div.
15 P.G. Div.
94 Inf Div.
305 Inf Div.
1 Para Div.
16 Armoured Div.
65 Inf Div.

Directly under C.in.C South or in II Fliegerkorps:-

2 Para Div.
H.G. Armoured Div.
29 P.G. Div.
SS Bde Reichsfuhrer SS.

5. DETAILS OF DIVISIONS.....

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5. DETAILS OF DIVISIONS.

I ARMY GROUP B.

15 Armoured Div. (G.O.C. Maj.Gen MENNY.)

Gen Menny had a very distinguished career in Africa. Originally in the Signal Corps he was appointed to command 15 Lorried Inf Bde in 15 Armd Div. He was usually used to command Battle Groups of his own or other divs and made a great reputation in the withdrawal from Tobruk and the counter-attack from Agheila to Gazala for which he won the Ritterkreuz.

The Division has seen service in Russia. It is not certain whether it is actually under Army Group B but if it is it is almost certainly in Yugoslavia. Its principal units are:-

18 Tank Regt.
52 P.G.R.
101 P.G.R.
80 Armd Arty Regt.

44 Inf Div. (Gen. Faber du Faur).

Mainly an Austrian Div and not believed to be of very high morale. It suffered heavily in the Polish campaign, saw little fighting in France, and was destroyed at Stalingrad. Given the honorary title of Hoch-und Deutschmeister, a title associated with the Imperial Austrian Army. The re-constructed Div is now in Slovenia. Its principal units are:-

131 Inf Regt.
132 Inf Regt,
134 Inf Regt.
96 Arty Regt.

71 Inf Div. (G.O.C. Gen Rabka).

Fought in France, then in the early fighting in Russia, returned to France and finally returned to Russia to be destroyed at Stalingrad. The division, reformed in the spring of this year, is at present in Slovenia. Its principal units are:-

191 Inf Regt.
194 Inf Regt.
211 Inf Regt.
171 Arty Regt

88 Inf Div. (G.O.C. Lt.Gen. Gollwitzer).

A reserve division, formed in Autumn 1939, it played an [illegible] in the French campaign. It left France for Russia in

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The Division has seen service in Russia. It is not certain whether it is actually under Army Group E but if it is it is almost certainly in Yugoslavia. Its principal units are:-

18 Tank Regt.
52 P.G.R.
101 P.G.R.
88 Armd Arty Regt.

44 Inf Div. (Gen. Faber du Faur).

Mainly an Austrian Div and not believed to be of very high morale. It suffered heavily in the Polish campaign, saw little fighting in France, and was destroyed at Stalingrad. Given the honorary title of Hoch-und Deutschmeister, a title associated with the Imperial Austrian Army. The re-constructed Div is now in Slovenia. Its principal units are:-

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191 Inf Regt.
194 Inf Regt.
211 Inf Regt.
171 Arty Regt

88 Inf Div. (G.O.C. Lt.Gen.Gollwitzer).

A reserve division, formed in Autumn 1939, it played an inconspicuous part in the French campaign. It left France for Russia in early 1942 and fought on the Southern front. It has recently left Russia and is now believed to be in Slovenia. Its principal units are:-

245 Inf Regt.
246 Inf Regt.
248 Inf Regt.
188 Arty Regt.

90 P.G. Div.....

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90 P.G. Div (G.O.C. Maj.Gen Lungershausen).

A resuscitation of one of the most distinguished of the African divs (90 Lt Div). The present division was formed in Sardinia from various Marsch battalions and was at one time known as Division Sardinia. Gen. Lungershausen had a rather varied career in Africa during which he commanded for a short time both 90 Light and 164 Lt Divs. He had returned to Germany by the time of Alamein but whether for health or other reasons is not known. The division's only engagement so far has been an ordered withdrawal in the face of superior (numerically) Italian forces from Sardinia through Corsica where it was engaged by North African French Forces, back to the mainland, so that it has had little chance of showing itself a worthy successor to its forerunner. The divisional sign of the old 90 Light was a white diamond on a black background. It is at present in the area of Treviso. Its principal units are:-

190 Tank Bn.
155 P.G.R.
200 P.G.R.
361 P.G.R.
190 Arty Regt.

157 Res Div (Mtn) (G.O.C. Maj.Gen Pflaum).

Recently at Besancon now possibly at Bergamo. No details of its composition are known.

162 Div. (G.O.C. Maj.Gen Prof.Dr. Ritter von Niedermayer).

The division was formed in January 1940. It fought on the central Russian front right through from the beginning of the campaign to the Summer of 1942 when it was transferred to the Southern sector. The Commander is a distinguished authority on Central Asiatic archaeology and ethnology. It is not known whether this div is in North Italy or Slovenia. Its principal units are:-

303 Inf Regt.
314 Inf Regt.
(?) 329 Inf Regt.
236 Arty Regt.

334 Div. (G.O.C. unknown).

This division is another resuscitation of a destroyed African division. The orginal division had a very short career; formed in the autumn of 1942 and sent to Tunisia in December, it was destroyed in May 1943. The new division has recently arrived in North Italy from France. The unit numbers of the old division were:-

754 Inf Regt.

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303 Inf Regt.
314 Inf Regt.
(?) 329 Inf Regt.
256 Arty Regt.

334 Div. (G.O.C. unknown).

This division is another resuscitation of a destroyed African division. The orginal division had a very short career; formed in the autumn of 1942 and sent to Tunisia in December, it was destroyed in May 1943. The new division has recently arrived in North Italy from France. The unit numbers of the old division were:-

754 Inf Regt.
755 Inf Regt.
756 Mountain Regt.
334 Arty Regt.

356 Div. (G.O.C. unknown).

Nothing is known of this division, it appears to be an entirely new formation which absorbed some elements of cf 326 Inf Div. It has arrived recently in North Italy from Southern France.

371 Inf Div.....

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371 Inf Div (G.O.C. unknown).

The original div, a comparatively recent formation (France, May 1942), had a brief and unlucky career culminating in its destruction at Stalingrad. The revived div is in North Italy, probably South of Leghorn. Its principal units are:-

669 Inf Regt.
670 Inf Regt.
671 Inf Regt.
371 Arty Regt.

Doehla Mountain Brigade.

This formation is believed to be somewhere in North Italy in the Brenner area. Nothing is known of its composition or its commander, though there is a Lt.Gen Heinrich Doehla whose appointment is not known.

II 10 ARMY.

1 Para Div (G.O.C. Lt.Gen Heidrich).

This div was hastily brought from France to Sicily when the campaign opened there. It never completely arrived before that campaign was over and after the units involved there had suffered heavy losses the returned to the mainland on the Eastern side. Here the rest of the it assembled and the div has been falling back, continuously engaged, ever since. It has suffered heavy casualties and little attempt has been made to reinforce it. The division is at present on the Sangro. Its principal units are:-

1 Para Regt.
3 Para Regt.
4 Para Regt.
1 Para Arty Regt.

2 Para Div (G.O.C. Maj.Gen Ramcke).

This div was engaged in the fighting in Rome in September and is believed to be still in that area. Gen. Ramcke commanded the Parachute Brigade called by his name which came to Africa in August 1942 and fought with some distinction at Alamein as infantry. It suffered very heavy losses through being almost completely unmotorised and unable to make its escape. Ramcke returned to Germany in Jan 1943 allegedly as a result of a quarrel with Rommel. Its principal units are:-

2 Para Regt.
5 Para Regt.
6 Para Regt.
7 Para Regt.

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2 Para Regt.
5 Para Regt.
6 Para Regt.
7 Para Regt.
2 Para Arty Regt.

5 P.G. Div (.G.O.C. Lt.Gen Graeser).

The original division bearing this number was a Prussian div which participated in the Polish and French campaigns. It was motorised in the Autumn of 1940. It was engaged in Russia from the beginning and was destroyed at Stalingrad. The present division is made up almost entirely of units of 336 Div remembered. It was in Central Italy in early September and was moved into battle in the west central sector after the fall of Naples. Gen Graeser has a wooden leg. The morale of the div is reported to be rather low. Its principal units are:-

6 P.G.R.
29 P.G.R.
5 Arty Regt.

15 P.G. Div.....

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15 P.G. Div (G.O.C. Maj.Gen Rodt).

An Armoured Division bearing the same number was destroyed in North Africa. The present division was formed between May and July this year in Sicily from the miscellaneous units already there and drafts from Germany. It was known as the Sicily Division until the opening of the Sicilian campaign when it assumed its present title. One of its Regts, 115 P.G.R., appears to be permanently attached to the Hermann Göring Div. As compensation it appears to have been given 382 P.G.R. part of at least of which has been absorbed into the other two Infantry Regts of the Div. It is fighting at present on the coastal sector under 14 Corps. Its principal units are:-

115 Tank Bn.
104 P.G.R.
115 P.G.R. (to H.Göring Div).
129 P.G.R.
33 Arty Regt.

16 Armd Div (G.O.C. Gen Sieckenius).

Originally an Inf Div of the peace-time army, mainly from Westphalia. It took part in the battles of the Saar and was at Sedan. In late 1940, it was re-organised as an armoured div and was engaged in Russia from the start of the campaign there until its destruction at Stalingrad.

The restored div took the first brunt of the Allied landing at Salerno and received somewhat fulsome praise in an order of the day issued by Gen Vietinghoff. It has been constantly engaged, at first in the West and later on the East coast where it was rushed at the time of our landing at Termoli. Its principal units are:-

2 Tank Regt.
64 P.G.R.
79 P.G.R.
16 Arty Regt.

26 Armd Div. (G.O.C. Maj.Gen Frhr v. Lüttwitz).

This div was formerly 257 Inf Div and as such fought in Poland and France and then in Russia. In the spring of 1942 it was re-organised in France as an armoured division. It was in Southern Italy when the landings took place in Calabria and slowly retired before our advance until it joined the German forces in the Salerno sector. Its principal units are:-

26 Tank Regt.
9 P.G.R.
67 P.G.R.
93 Arty Regt.

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26 Tank Regt.
9 P.G.R.
67 P.G.R.
93 Arty Regt.

29 P.G. Div (G.O.C. Maj.Gen Fries.)

The original division of this number fought in the Polish and French campaigns. It was in Russia from July until its destruction at Stalingrad. The present division was reformed in France in spring of this year and took part in the Sicilian campaign and was in Calabria when our forces landed there in September. It withdrew North to take part in the Salerno battles and has been engaged continuously ever since. It may now be in reserve. Its principal units are:-

29 Tank Bn.
15 P.G.R.
71 P.G.R.
29 Arty Regt.

65 Inf Div.....

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65 Inf Div (G.O.C. Maj.Gen von Zielberg).

A fairly new created div including some elements of the former Danzig Heimwehr. At one time it appears to have been known as a Marine Div. It was formed in the summer of 1942 and was stationed at the end of 1942 in Holland. At the outset of the Italian campaign it was in the North of Italy, but has since come South to the Northern sector of 76 Corps front. Its principal units are:-

145 Inf Regt.
146 Inf Regt.
(?) Inf Regt.
165 Arty Regt.

There is some evidence that it possesses a Tank Bn.

94 Inf Div (G.O.C. Lt.Gen Pfeiffer).

Originally a reserve div formed in Sep 1939 and composed mainly of Saxons and Sudetens. Its divisional sign is two crossed swords (for Saxony) on the left hand side of a small vertically striped shield. It participated in the fighting in France and in Russia where it suffered heavy casualties while withdrawing from Stalingrad. It has only very recently appeared in the present fighting and is still not fully engaged. It is on the West coast. Gen. Pfeiffer commanded the division at Stalingrad; he is a doctor of philosphy. Its principal units are:-

267 Inf Regt.
274 Inf Regt.
276 Inf Regt.
194 Arty Regt.

305 Inf Div (G.O.C. Maj.Gen Hauck).

The original div, formed late in 1940, was in France from the end of 1941 till May 1942 when it went to Russia and was destroyed at Stalingrad. The present div is now in the central sector of the line under 14 Corps. Initial reports indicate that at least one of its regts is composed of very young and inadequately trained troops. Its divisional sign shows blue water on a white shield under the name Bodensee (Lake Constance). Its principal units are:-

576 Inf Regt.
577 Inf Regt.
578 Inf Regt.
305 Arty Regt.

Hermann Göring Armoured Division (G.O.C. Maj.Gen Conrath).

This div has received publicity on a scale in keeping with the figure of its creator. It originally consisted of a Brigade which fought in Russia with some success. It was formed into a division in France in the winter of 1942 and a large part of it came to Tunisia and was lost. It has been reformed on a rather less lavish scale as a normal Armoured Div.

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Hermann Göring Park Regt.
1 P.G.R.
2 P.G.R.
115 P.G.R. (ex 15 P.G. Div).
Hermann Göring Arty Regt.

SS Bde Reichsfuhrer.....

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SS Bde Reichsfuhrer (C.O.C. Obersturmbannfuhrer GEBBIE)

This formation, recently in Northern Italy, has moved South, but has not yet beenengaged in any fighting. It contains a tank bn, an infantry bn and an assault gun unit.

NOTE: The names of commanders given in the above are the latest recorded; it is possible that many changes may have since been made.

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5. DIVISIONAL ORGANISATION

The attached tables give the standard organisation for an Armoured, a Panzer Grenadier, an Infantry and a Parachute Division. These are intended merely as guides; variations will be very often found in detail in the divisions facing us and many divisions are below strength, as indicated above. It should also be remembered that the Germans are very fond of creating special "battle groups" for special purposes and for these no given table of organisation or war establishment holds good.

6. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

The Luftwaffe supporting German ground forces on the Italian battlefront is under Fliegerkorps II, which in turn is subordinated to Luftflotte 2, of which General der Flieger Kesselring is in command. This force can roughly be divided into "Strategical" and "Tactical" Air Forces having similar functions to their Allied counterparts. The Tactical Force supporting 14 and 76 Corps consists of 75 fighters (M.E. 109) and 25 fighter bombers (F.W.190s). Based on aerodromes in the Rome area these units (J.G. 53 and J.G. 77) are those which have borne the brunt of the air war in Tunisia, Sicily and Central Italy and are very experienced in working in conjunction with ground forces. Oberstleutnant Von Maltzahn, Geschwader Kommodore of J.G. 53, is believed to be in control of the fighter units based in the Rome area. He is an exceptionally experienced fighter pilot and often flies on operations. He is never flustered and exceedingly popular with all ranks but is sometimes over-ridden by General Galland, who is responsible for all fighter protection in Southern Germany and Northern Italy.

Tactical reconnaissance is carried out over the battle fronts by a special Tac/R squadron (2(F)14) who are responsible for observing our movement and build-up and taking photographs in the battle area. In addition to escorting the fighter bombers the fighter units have as their main task protection of their own airfields and communications against the Allied Tactical Air Force attacks. It is probable that this "Tactical Air Force" is under separate command to the fighter units carrying out protective duties in the PO Valley, where, operating under Fliegerkorps II there are other German fighters, totalling about 50, allotted for the

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Long range reconnaissance aircraft, J.U.88s and M.E. 410s based on Perugia and Forli carry out daily flights over the Adriatic and Tyrrhenean Seas and Southern Italy watching shipping movement, harbours, aerodromes and covering the general supply position and build-up of the Allied armies and Air Forces in Italy, Corsica and Sardinia. Results of those reconnaissances form the basis of operations by the German Air Force and destruction of such reconnaissance aircraft is of prime importance. There are approximately 15-20 of these aircraft available to cover this large area.

The long range bomber force in the Mediterranean also under Fliegerkorps II, can also be divided into two: (i) Units based in the

.....south of France .....

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south of France which are anti-shipping specialists using radio controlled bombs and torpedoes. These units in the main are employed against shipping off the North African coast. (ii) Units based in the PO Valley which have been organised by Oberst Peltz (formerly "O.C. Attacks against England", specialist in sharp blitz attacks). Due to deficiency in the number of fully qualified night flying crews it is considered that this force is not likely to strike with more than 100 aircraft at any one time as attacks are timed so that all aircraft are over a target, often a harbour, during a 15-20 minute period. The present enemy policy appears to ignore the use of this force for nuisance raids over our forward areas.

In conclusion the German Air Force as it effects the 5th and 8th Armies is definitely a declining force of which the small fighter and fighter-bomber elements are a rear guard to the Luftwaffe as it falls back to its main task of defending the Reich and German occupied countries against the increasing weight of the Allied Air bombardment. With its main force of fighters pinned to the Western Front and its bombers divided almost equally between the Western Front, Russia and Northern Italy, it is considered that there is little prospect of German reinforcement in this area unless units at present engaged in other essential tasks are withdrawn, e.g. the Balkans.

Fliegerkorps II is commanded by General der Flieger Loerzer, an ineffective organiser, aged 50. Not possessed of much initiative and a personal friend of Goering, he has often been described as "Goering's laziest General". In view of this the Luftwaffe in Italy is virtually under the direct control of Richthofen, A.O.C. of Luftflotte 2. Aged 43, he recently came from commanding Fliegerkorps VIII on the Russian front. He is best known as a cousin of the last war "aces" Manfred and Lother von Richthofen of whose "flying circus" he was a member. Previously Commander of the Condor Legion in the Spanish Civil War, he mainly distinguished himself through the campaigns in the Low Countries, France, the Balkans and Russia, where he supported most of the Army advances. A man with a good mind and appearance, brutal energy and great personal courage, he is the German ideal of an Air Force General.

The Luftwaffe in the Balkans comes under Fliegerkorps X in Greece, with its subordinate air commanders. Fliegerfuhrer Crete/in (Generalmajor Richmann) controls a few German Air Force units equipped with obsolete aircraft for movements against the Partisans, with headquarters at Agram and forward base at Mostar. Do 17s and H.E. 46s are employed for bombing and reconnaissance on a limited scale. Recent reconnaissance indicates that this force is supported by 20-30 Ju 87s. Fliegerfuhrer Albania appears to control only a very few German defensive units, including up to 10 Me 109 fighters. German Air Force strength in Yugoslavia and Albania is not considered to exceed 100 aircraft, including obsolescent types.

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
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GSI. 15 Army Group,
18 Nov 43

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
ORGANISATION OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION (4, 65, 71, 2, 162, 305, 334, 356, 371 DIVS



NOTE: 1. 65 Inf Div is believed to have still only two Infantry Regts.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ORGANISATION OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION (44, 65, 71, 76, 162, 305, 334, 356, 371 DIVISIONS).



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ORGANISATION OF A PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION (3,15,29,90 P.G. DIVS).

DIV H.Q.

Armd Recce Unit
HQ
Armd Car Coy (18 Lt, 6 Hy Armd Cars)
3 Lt Coys (cars or armd personnel Carriers)
Hy Coy (6 A/Tk Gun, 2 Lt Inf Guns Eng Pl).

Pz Gren Regt.

Pz Gren Regt
RHQ
HQ Coy | Bn | Bn | Bn | 13 (A/Tk) Coy 12x5cm or 7.5 cm A/Tk guns. | 14 (Inf Gun) Coy 6x7.5cm Inf Guns 2x15cm " "

H.Q.
Rifle Coy | Rifle Coy | Rifle Coy | Rifle Coy.
Three lt pls (each 6 LMGs).
One Hy pl (4 HMGs, 2 Hy Mortars).


Sig Bn
HQ
L/T Coy.
W/T Coy.

Fd Bty
HQ
3 Tps each 4 x 105 mm gun howrs.

Eng Bn
HQ
Three Mot Coy
One Bridging


Tank Bn
HQ
4 Sqns with a total of approx 75 Tks Mks. II, III and IV.

NOTES:
1. 90 P.G. Div has three instead of the normal two Pz Gren Regts.
2. In 3 and 29 P.G. Divs the Tank Bn is replaced by an assault Gun bn equipped with 105 mm gun how
3. An increasing proportion of the guns in the Arty Regt and A/Tk Bn are on S.P. mountings.
4. Cases have been known of the presence of 170 mm and 210 mm in the med bty of the Arty Regt.



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
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
ORGANISATION OF A PARACHUTE DIVISION (1 and 2 PARA DIVS).



NOTES:
1. 1 Para Arty Regt in Sicily appeared to have LGl in at least one bty, but the indications throughout. Little is known of 2 Para Arty Regt, but it is stated it had LGl.
2. Evidence as to the composition and armament of the Para M.G. Bn is lacking but a capture presence of an A/Tk tp with 2 x 5 cm A/Tk guns.
3. The evidence with regard to the Para MG Bn depends on the statement of one P.W. only. that so many coys exist or that they are so heavily armed. In any case they fight spli the Div.

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
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
OUTLINE ORGANISATION OF AN ARMOURED DIVISION (16,26,18,H.Göring



NOTES:
1. In the case of 16 Armd Div recce unit, there are two Coys of 18 Lt, 6 Hy armd ca
2. A high proportion of S.P. equipments may be met with in the Div Arty Regt.
3. The organisation of an SS Panzer Grenadier division is the same as an ordinary A that the tank regt in the former is equipped with Mk V and Mark VI Tanks.

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Subject: Questionnaire on Supply of Intelligence.

H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

AMG/58/10.

19 November, 43.

M.G.S.,
A.F.H.Q.

1. Reference your MGS. 350.05 of 7th November, 1943.

2. A consolidated reply to your questionnaire from this H.Q. and A.M.G. Eighth Army is submitted. Comments from A.M.G. 5th Army have not yet been received.

3. (i) I.S.I.S. Reports, I.S.T.D. Reports and Basic Handbooks contain both too much and too little information from the A.M.G. point of view. Such subjects as Coast Defences and Aviation are of no value to an A.M.G. Officer. On the other hand the notes in (ii) and (iii) below show the shortcomings of those publications.

(ii) As a basis for planning, the Italian basic handbook was deemed to be inadequate for the Finance Division. This handbook was supplemented later by valuable memoranda from B.E.W., M.E.W. and the Bank of England.

Experience shows that a wider treatise on Banking would be helpful. It is also recommended that there should be an exposition on the important and comprehensive subject of Postal Savings Banks which was omitted from the Italian handbook.

It is also recommended that in the paragraphs dealing with finance that some guidance be given on the following subjects:-

(a) full description of all functions of the Post Office, including the operation of Savings Accounts, Giro Accounts, Bonds, and services performed on behalf of the Government, such as the encashment of state salary and pension warrants. It is also important to know the location of Postal Savings records.

(b) full description of all credit instruments, e.g. Assegni and Vaglia.

(c) Prevailing rates of:-

(i) Military separation allowances.
(ii) Relief rates.
(iii) Unemployment benefits.
(iv) State salaries and war bonuses.
(v) State pensions.

(d) Are P.O.Ws remitting funds to their dependants, and if so in what volume?

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

A.M.G. Right Arm is submitted. Comments from A.M.G. [illegible] yet been received.

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(iv) State salaries and war bonuses.
(v) State pensions.

(d) Are P.O.Ws remitting funds to their dependants, and if so in what volume?

(e) Description of channels through which state salaries and pensions are paid. Are records kept locally or only in metropolis?

(f) Details of state subsidies paid on essential commodities, e.g., grain in Sicily and the Mainland.

(g) General and particular functions of the Central Bank.

(iii) Economic and Supply Division cannot be given too much or too detailed information. Details concerning food supplies are as important as details of flour mills, food stores and similar undertakings. It is frequently stated in these publications that there is a surplus of commodities; it is suggested that such surpluses should be analysed showing destinations to which they used to be sent and details of surpluses by commodities.

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4. P.W.E. Zone Handbooks are of the greatest value, especially to forward A.M.G's. No modification to the existing form of these books can be recommended, but they should be available in greater numbers and at an earlier date than has been the case in the past.

5. Photographs and town plans are by no means essential to planning; but they, like all other information, cannot be too numerous or detailed providing that they are received at an early enough date and in sufficient quantities to be sifted by the various Divisions of A.M.G. and put into the hands of those who need them by the time they need them.

T. FARLEY SMITH.
Lieut-Colonel.,
G.S.O.I.

TFS/EN

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SUBJECT: Questionnaire on Supply and Intelligence.

AMG.HQ.Eighth Army.
OA/61/5A.
15 Nov.43.

NOV 1943

AMG.15 Army Group.

1. The letter from A.F.H.Q. M.G.S. arrived on the same day as your signal expediting the reply. To give a considered answer to this questionnaire would necessitate obtaining the views of a large number of people, none of whom are available at a moment's notice to this H.Q. It is proposed, therefore, to give this H.Q's view, based on its own experience and bearing in mind that it has always been a mobile H.Q. and not a static one.

2. Questionnaire.

(i) ISIS is too bulky a document and cannot be conveniently carried round. It contains inter-alia information which is of no value to an AMG. Officer, e.g.

(a) Coast defences
(b) Photographs
(c) Aviation

ISIS Census so far as this H.Q., knows only Sicily and Calabria. No issues north of these regions have been received.

(ii) There are no real criticisms about the material supplied, which has been admirable. It is appreciated that the material is not confined to the necessities of one branch but must cover the requirements of all. Certain aspects as effecting AMG will be dealt with under (iii) below.

(iii) AMG difficulties arise fondamentally from two sources. Firstly Supply and secondly Distribution. All handbooks go too much into generalities on supply and give the bald fact that there is a surplus of commodities. Could surpluses be broken down showing destination to which they were accustomed to be sent and details of surpluses by commodities.

(iv) (a) dealt with under (i)
(b) By far and away the best document that this HQ. has yet received No criticism at all.
(c) Have no knowledge of them
(d) - ditto -
(e) It is doubtful whether details of factory capacities are of any particular value. A statement of industries is of value but under present war conditions it is better to leave the AMG officers to find out what capacity is available in face of damage done.
(f) Have no knowledge of ISTD or MEW Photographs and town plans so far as AMG officers are concerned are of no value whatsoever.

Group Captain
Commanding Officer
AMG H.Q., 8th Army.

C2 PRO
Secy

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(i) ISIS is too bulky a document and cannot be conveniently carried round. It contains inter-alia information which is of no value to an AMG. Officer, e.g.

(a) Coast defences
(b) Photographs
(c) Aviation

ISIS Census so far as this H.Q., knows only Sicily and Calabria. No issues north of these regions have been received.

(ii) There are no real criticisms about the material supplied, which has been admirable. It is appreciated that the material is not confined to the necessities of one branch but must cover the requirements of all. Certain aspects as effecting AMG will be dealt with under (iii) below. F667


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G2 PRJ
SSO Seen

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

S.S:O.

I have no comments to make as I am not in possession of any Zone Handbooks and am not aware of their contents.

Lt.Col.
C. L. O.

No comments, except a copy of the Handbook would be valuable.
15/11/43. W.D. Angus T/S.

166



Subject: MEMORANDUM on ISIS REPORTS. AMG/109/

The replies to the queries contained in A.F.H.Q.(M.G.S.) questionnaire MGS.350.05 of 7th November 1943 are the following:

i) For the purposes of Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory it is not possible for the reports to give too much information, nor too detailed information. Information on food supplies is of equal importance with information concerning flour mills, food stores and similar.

ii) In providing statistical information, care should be taken in every case to stress that the estimates or figures quoted do (or do not) make allowance for loss or damage to stocks, crops, property caused by bombardment or actual fighting.

iii) Only for the reason given in ii).

iv) -a-) The entire series of ISIS Reports and Handbooks has been
-b-) of invaluable service to the members of this Division
-c-) throughout the period devoted to pre-Occupation planning
-d-) and to post-Occupation administration

e-) A list of factories giving names, situation and type of product manufactured is indispensable. Where possible the most detailed additional information also should be given.

1665

f-) The photographs of towns, plants, etc., with which ISIS R eports have been supplemented heretofore have been of first importance in instructing and guiding Officers planning for Occupation of enemy territory. A decision to suppress these photographs will detract considerably from the value of the papers.

C. R. Merrall/Maj.
C.R. MERRALL
D.E.S.

15th November 1943.

To: S.S.O.

Subject: Questionnaire on supply of Intelligence.

AMG/sa/.
15 November, 43.

2

Senior Staff Officer
M.I., A.M.G.,
15 Arlington Square.

1. With reference to memorandum AMG/31 of 7th November, paragraph 2 (ii) contains only question with which the Financial Division is concerned. Material in the Italian basic handbook was entirely inadequate as a basis for planning, although information was supplemented later by some valuable memoranda from B.P.W., M.E.W., and the Bank of England.

2. The whole subject of Banking was covered in six short paragraphs considerably less than the Section devoted to Brothels. On the important and complicated subject of Postal Savings Banks, no information was available. Our information on the question of credit instruments was derived from private sources.

3. Little purpose is now served by stating what additional information would have been useful specifically for Sicily and the Mainland. For future Intelligence, I would suggest that the following might be added to the obvious sub-headings:-

1001

(a) Full description of all functions of the Post Office including the operation of Savings Accounts, Giro accounts, Bonds, and services performed on behalf of the Government, such as the assessment of state salary and pension warrants. It is also important to know the location of Postal Savings records.

(b) Full description of all credit instruments, e.g., Assegni and Vaglia.

(c) Prevailing rates of:

(i) Military occupation allowances.
(ii) Relief rates.
(iii) Unemployment benefits.
(iv) State salaries and war bonuses.
(v) State pensions.

(d) Are P.O.Ms remitting funds to their dependants, and if so in what volume?

(e) Description of channels through which state salaries and pensions are paid. Are records kept locally or only in Metropolis?

(f) Details of State subsidies paid on essential commodities, e.g., grain in Sicily and the Mainland.

(g) General and particular functions of the Central

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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(ii) Relief rates.
(iii) Unemployment benefits.
(iv) State salaries and war bonuses.
(v) State pensions.

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(g) General and particular functions of the Central Bank.

A.P. Chaffey/mm

A.P. CHAFFEY (MRS).
Colonel.
Chief Finance Officer.

APC/EC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET
******

IMPORTANT
US CIPHER MESSAGE
IN

5 NOV 1943

FOLIO 05467
UNDATED

TCO;-NIL-
TOR;0428

FROM; SIGNED EISENHOWER CITE FHMGS
TO; FILPOT FOR AMG, FIVE ARMY FOR AMG
EIGHTH ARMY FOR AMG AND FARGO

ORIG NO; 978

QUESTIONNAIRE ON SUPPLY OF INTELLIGENCE SENT OUT FROM HERE
ON 7TH NOVEMBER REPLIES URGENTLY REQUESTED.
REQUEST EXPEDITE REPLIES FROM ALL ADDRESSEES OF QUESTIONNAIR
UNDER YOUR CONTROL.

AMGOT

4 ACTION

SMC. 0430A/15
T.T. 0445A/[illegible]

(PASSED TO 5TH ARMY)
(" " 8TH ARMY)

IMPORTANT
****

38 / 5

11 NOV 194

3

Appn/712/43/M.I.3.b.

SECRET

Water supply to certain Central and North Italy towns

PISA

No details available, but it is known that the plain around PISA abounds in artesian wells not all the water of which is, however, fit for drinking. There is also an aqueduct running due north of the town, but further information on this point is lacking

FLORENCE

No information whatever obtainable.

1004

BOLOGNA

Receives its water by an underground aqueduct which arrives at the south-west outskirts of the town. There are no details available except that the water comes from the hills above the town.

RAVENNA

Ravenna aqueduct is fed by artesian water from Torre Pedrera near the Rimini-Ferrara railway 42 km. (26 miles) from Ravenna and 7 km. (4.3 miles) from Rimini. The total yield of the springs is 135 litres/sec. Nine borings have been made and 90 litres/sec. are collected into a settling basin by means of a network of pipes connecting the wells.

Two centrifugal electric pumps raise the water through 25 metres (another source says 49 metres) to a 100 cu. m. piezometric tower from which the water flows by gravity to Ravenna. The conduit ends in a partially buried reservoir at Mangagnina (capacity 4,000 cu. m.) from which the water is pumped to a water tower (capacity 750 cu. m.) which supplies the town's distribution system.

The general course of the main conduit is along the coastal road, though it avoids the town of Cervia.

MODENA

Although details are unobtainable, it is believed that water for the town is obtained from a group of artesian wells to the S.W. South and in the town itself.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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PARMA

The town of Parma receives water from two main sources which when fully exploited can supply about 300 litres/sec.

(i) The Marano aqueduct. Water is collected by galleries from several springs near Marano (119755 G.S.G.S. 4184 Sheet 73). At least two of these galleries act as reservoirs. The aqueduct consists of a cast-iron gravity conduit with a diameter of 400 to 450 mm. (15.7 to 17.7 inches). Water is also obtained from a well on the Mutti estate 2½ miles south of Marano, at about 128727 on Sheet 73; the well is 12 metres

32 MM

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

(39 feet) deep and yields from 16 to 40 litres/sec. The springs yield about 80 litres/sec.

(ii) Molini Bassi wells. Two wells north of the town, at about 105869 on Sheet 73, together yield 190 litres/sec. The water is stated to be of good quality, bacteriologically absolutely pure though it occasionally contains iron, hardness 12°. The wells are 180 metres (197 yards) apart and connected by pumping stations equipped with two groups of electric pumps (one of which is in reserve) each capable of raising 125 litres/sec. A cast-iron pipe of 450 mm. diameter leads to a water tower (capacity 1,000 cu.m.) outside the Nine Sixie gate between Viale Villette and Via Selari, at 059850 on Sheet 73.

1001

FERRARA

The water for distribution in the town of Ferrara is obtained from tubular wells 30-35 metres (98-115 feet) deep near Pontelagoscuro; the wells draw on a bank of sand 6 to 10 metres (19 to 33 feet) deep beneath thePe banks. Water can also be drawn from the river. It is thought that the pumping and filter plants may be near those used for the railway, and described below. The water is raised by electric pumps and purified; simple filtration without the addition of chemical reagents is normally sufficient, but during periods of high water in the river or when water is drawn direct from the river, aluminium sulphate is added, and in exceptional cases chlorine is added after filtering. Drinking water is collected in a 400 cu. m. reservoir from which a cast-iron conduit 550 mm. (21.6 inches) in diameter and 5 miles long, capable of carrying 150 litres/sec., runs to underground reservoirs at Montegnone dei Ferrara on the outskirts of the town. For distribution within the town water is raised from the underground reservoirs to a 600 cu. m. water tower of which the bottom is 75 m. (246 feet) above the level of the town; at the other end of the distribution system there is a compensating reservoir consisting of a 2,500 cu.m. water tower. All the pumps are driven by electricity.

Water from the river is used for Ferrara station. The pumping and filter plants are near the iron bridge of the Bologna-Ferrara-Padua railway near Pontelagoscuro. The catchment works (at 118913 on G.S.G.S. 4164 Sheet 76) consist of an underground collecting basin fed directly by a cement pipe (internal diameter 80 cm. or 31.5 inches and length about 32 m. or 105 feet) with its mouth at low-water level. There are two turbo-electric pumps each with a capacity of 45 cu.m./hour driven by 13 h.p. electric motors (2,440 r.p.m.) and a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

1,000 cu.m.) outside the Nino Bixio gate between Viale Villetta and Via Solari, at 089650 on Sheet 73.

1001

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ALESSANDRIA

The main source of water supply is obtained from artesian wells near the town. A supplementary source is that of the MONFERRATO aqueduct which draws its water from the DORA BALTEA sub-soil at GIARREA (328416 G.S.G.S. 4164 Sheet 57).

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MANTUA

Nothing has come to light regarding this town's water supply. There are artesian wells in the town itself, which may be sufficient for its needs.

CREMONA

No information to hand. There are artesian wells in and around the town, which quite likely are sufficient for its requirements.

TURIN

Part of the Torino water supply is provided by an aqueduct fed by sub-soil water from wells in an area of about 170 hectares situated about 14 miles south-west of the city. The wells are connected in groups of three: one 30.35 m. deep, one 65 to 75 metres deep and one 90 to 100 metres deep; each group is connected to another group and each set of six wells is connected to a central pumping system. The total yield varies from 1,000 to 1,200 litres/sec. The water is carried by conduit (diameter 350 to 800 mm. or 13.8 to 31.5 inches) to a reservoir from which a pressure pipe (3½ miles long and 4 feet in diameter with an average pressure 1 atmosphere) runs to the Pilone Giorgis reservoir. From this reservoir a surface conduit built of cement, capable of carrying 1,200 litres/sec. goes to the Beinasco reservoir (capacity 5,000 cu. m.); the conduit is 4 miles long, ovoid-shaped with a maximum width of 1.6 metres (5¼ feet) and 1.5 metres (5 feet) high. There are electric centrifugal pumps at Beinasco capable of raising 1,270 litres/sec. The Sangone torrent is crossed by two conduits carried on a five-span bridge 77 metres (84 yards) long and the aqueduct then divides. One of the conduits goes westward toward Beinasco-Rivole and after 2½ miles enters the old aqueduct of Val Sangone and supplies water to a new reservoir (capacity 55,000 cu. m.) at Barraccone; from this reservoir a pressure conduit (diameter 600-1,000 mm. or 23.6 to 39.4 inches) continues for 6 km. (3¾ miles) and joins the Torino aqueducts. The other conduit follows the Beinasco-Torino road for 3 km. (1.9 miles) and then divides into two conduits for another 5 km. (3.1 miles); the diameters of the pipes vary from 800 to 1,000 mm. (31.5 to 39.4 inches).

In 1932 a new reservoir of 10,000 cu. m. capacity (capable of being increased) was completed in the Gerolamo Napoleone Park in the San Paolo district in south-west Torino. The reservoir is at ground level, 265 metres above sea level; the water is raised to the height necessary for distribution by electric pumps. The average supply to the reservoir is about 100 litres/sec; water is used to generate power for the pumping plant. Some of the water is supplied to the distribution network which serves the communes of Grugliasco and Collegno. It is not clear whether the reservoir

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MILAN

The town water supply is obtained from underground water tables under or near the town. With the growth of the town more wells have been bored and new pumping plants installed: descriptions of all these installations are not available. The Marcello plant, built in 1936, and the Guzzard plant, built in 1937, can supply a total of 1,000 litres/sec. which can be increased for short periods to about 1,500 litres/sec.

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In 1939 a new plant was completed in Taliedo, in the south-east outskirts of the town outside Porta Vittoria. There are fifteen wells (later to be increased to 22) varying from 93 metres to 126 metres in depth. The wells give a continuous yield of 450 metres/sec. and a maximum temporary yield of 650 litres/sec; these figures will be increased to 640 litres/sec and 800 litres/sec. respectively. Each well has a pump (capacity 30 litres/sec.) which forces the water to a reinforced concrete collecting basin which acts as a settling basin and as a reservoir (capacity 1,660 cu. m.) to supply the peak load requirements. From this basin water is pumped by four pumps (capacity 200 litres/sec.) to the distributing network. All the pipes are of cast-iron; their diameters vary from 700 mm. (27.5 inches) to 300 mm. (11.8 inches).

1939

VERONA: PADOVA.

There is no information available. There are artesian wells situated in their vicinity, but it is not known whether water is drawn from them or aqueducts exist, the former is more likely the case.

BRESCIA

There is a group of artesian wells in the town, and no knowledge of an aqueduct.

M.I.3.b.
30th October, 1943.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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1859

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M.I.3.b.
30th October, 1943.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Military Government Section

1 1 NOV 1943

ATM/jl

MGS-350.05

7 November 1943

SUBJECT: Questionnaire on Supply of Intelligence.

1. Certain questions have arisen on the supply of intelligence, and answers to the under mentioned questionnaire are requested by return.

The matter is urgent from a future planning point on view.

The object is to ascertain our requirements so that they can be met to the fullest extent possible.

2. Questionnaire:-

(i) Do ISTD & MEW Zone Handbooks (PWE issue) & Basic Handbooks ISIS/Reports/[redacted] give too little or too much information? In particular it would be useful to know which subjects are regarded as being the most important e.g. if the information on food supplies is of little interest but details of flour mills are of special value, more attention could be devoted to the latter.

(ii) What are the criticisms of the material provided in the past?

(iii) Have recent operations shown up any further deficiencies in basic intelligence on resources?

(iv) Comments are requested on:-

(a) ISIS Reports Parts I History, Geography, Medical II Resources III Communications IV Photographs V Ports and Towns VI Coast Defences VII Aviation VIII Photographs - Coast Ports and Inland Towns.

(b) Zone Hand Books Parts I People and Administration II Economic Conditions III Local Directory and Personalities.

(c) ISTD Reports

(d) Italian Basic Hand book.

(e) Having regard to the fact that it has rarely been possible to give any information regarding capacities and details of plant under ISIS "maintenance industries" is it of any value to give a list of the known factories, milk etc.?

(f) ISTD are now only able to prepare short-term reports, frequently amplified by MEW reports on resources in the form of notes. This means that photographs, town plans etc. will not be available. Does this hinder

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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1057

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
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A. T. MAXWELL
Colonel
Deputy Chief

DISTRIBUTION:

HQ AMG	3
HQ Allied Control Commission	3
ACC Sub-Commissions	20
HQ ACC (Rear)	3
AMG (P)	1
HQ AMG 15 Army Group	3
HQ AMG 5 Army	3
HQ AMG 8 Army	3
Region 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9	1
Colonel Sanderson	1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Subject: Questionnaire on Supply of Intelligence. 1

H.Q., A.M.G.,
15 Army Group,
C.M.F.

AMG/58/5.
12 November, 1943.

5

H.Q. A.M.G. 5th Army.
H.Q. A.M.G. 8th Army. 4

The attached copy of a letter from A.F.H.Q. Military Government Section, MIS-350.05 dated 7th November, 43. is forwarded herewith.

Please forward your comments to this H.Q. at an early date.

for R.J.P. THORNE THORNE.
Colonel.,
Senior Staff Officer.

1658

RJPT/EN.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

58 gt

11 NOV 1943

3

CONFIDENTIAL

CLEAR MESSAGE
IN

CLIO NO. 04046
ON NOVEMBER 43.

FROM : MIDEAST FROM CIVAFFAIRS
TO : FILEOT FOR AMCOT
ORIG NO. : CET/32391

DTG HIL
TIC 1004B.08
TOR 2300A.10

MY CET/30572 NOVEMBER 2. PLEASE REPLY URGENTLY

EMO DISTRIBUTION


AMCOT 4 ACTION

see our Message #2

SSO NA

SEC 0046A.11
T T 0117A.11

1856



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MESSAGE OUT

To: MIDEAST FOR CIVAFFAIRS

FROM: PILPOT FROM AMC

Orig's No. FA 169 9 Nov

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your DET 30372 of 2 november (.) received 7 november (.) this is no concern msg 15 army group (.) you should take up direct with AMC

This message must be sent IN CIPHER if liable to interception or to fall into enemy hands.

.....
Colonel.

PRIORITY
1035
T.O.O.
T.H.I.
T.O.R.

IMPORTANT



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

68 15 - 8 NOV 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

OTELEGRAM MESSAGE
IN

PRIO NO. 02905
2ND NOVEMBER 43.

1

B

TOO NIL
CHI 1030B.03
TOR 1344A.07

FROM : MESSAGE FROM GIUSEPPE MS
TO : PILOT FOR ABBOT
CHIC NO. : CSTF 305/2

ISLD REQUESTING WHAT FORMALITIES ARE NECESSARY FOR ENTRY OF THEIR CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES INTO OCCUPIED ITALY. PLEASE REPLY AS URGENT

SHU DISTRIBUTION

ABBOT 4. ACTION

CCAO.
You may wish to speak to Brig Gen Ryan on this.

ACTION

Please dispose yourself. Must be referred to Middleast to AFHQ. This is covered by Algiers 15 Nov.

GC

8/XI
9/11/43

GSC 1450A.07
C I 1520A.07 NIL

1054

2261