

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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HQ, ACC, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
POLITICS (1)
JAN., FEB. 1944

M. C. Form 303 (Old No. 400)
revised July 28, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

SECRETARY GENERAL

File under No. 000.1

POLITICS. (1)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

8-5793

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1) FREEDOM 25700	C. M. C.	8 JAN.	FATIMA	ITALIAN FAVORING OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN PORTUGAL UNDER ITALIAN PROTECTION.
2) C. M. C. 152/49	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 JAN. 44	GEN. GAZZARD	RE ARRIVAL OF BARI CONGRESS.
3) FATIMA 2114	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 JAN. 44	FREEDOM	KING COMPLAINS BASTI (BARI) ARRIVES. BARI AND LONDON UNFAVORABLE TO HIM. NECESSARY TO FORM SOME GOVERNMENT BEFORE ENTERING ROME. KING THROWS PEOPLE FORMING FOR DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT. NECESSARY FOR KING TO ENTER ROME EARLY.
4) FATIMA 2115	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 JAN. 44	FREEDOM	SUMMARY OF KING'S POLITICAL SITUATION.
5) FATIMA 2117	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 JAN. 44	FREEDOM	KING AND BASTI DESIRE EARLY ENTRY INTO ROME. BASTI'S DESIRE TO QUIT.
6) FATIMA 2118	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 JAN. 44	FREEDOM	BASTI'S COMMENTS ON KING'S STATEMENT THAT KING WOULD ABDICATE.
7) FATIMA 2119	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 JAN. 44	FREEDOM	BASTI'S ASSURANCE THAT KING WILL BE MAINTAINED AT BARI CONGRESS.
8) —	AT C. M. C. 152/49 P. M. B. BARI.	25 JAN. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	PREPARATIONS FOR BARI CONGRESS. OFFICIALS SUBMITTING AT C. M. C. LONDON, C. M. C. P. M. B. BARI.
9) FARGO 498	GEN. MACFARLANE	15 JAN. 44	FREEDOM	BASTI'S ATTEMPT TO STRENGTHEN HIS GOVERNMENT. GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN UNDER AT BARI CONGRESS.
10) —	—	26 JAN. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	RE. PROPOSITIONS FOR BARI CONGRESS. BASTI'S COMMENTS ON C. M. C. LONDON P. M. B.
11) —	CAPT. STONE	28 JAN. 44	MR. SACCA, P. M. B. BARI	RE. REPORT OF THE NO. 25700 HAVING BEEN FORWARDED TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.
12) FARGO 379	GEN. MACFARLANE	28 JAN. 44	CAPT. STONE	RE. KING'S 26 JAN. VERSION OF SITUATION. INTERVIEW LETTER TO KING, REBASTI'S, ROYAL, BASTI'S, BASTI'S, BASTI'S, BASTI'S.
13) FARGO 389	MACFARLANE	29 JAN. 44	FREEDOM	SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE AT BARI.
14) FARGO 602	MACFARLANE	30 JAN. 44	AFRIC FOR C. M. C.	FORWARDED AT BARI REPORTS CONCERNING PROGRESS — — — — —
15) 650-1	RECEIVED C. M. C. (C. M. C.)	1 FEB. 44	CAPT. STONE	RE. 25700 AT BARI NOT TO BE FORWARDED TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.
16) D. P. 6/14	GEN. MACFARLANE	1 FEB. 44	H. MACFARLANE	ENCLOSING MEMORANDUM TO LONDON, H. MACFARLANE 4 TO 11.38 PM 1944. ENCLOSING TWO MEMORANDUMS FROM LONDON SPOKES TO PORTUGAL KING, BASTI'S REPORT ON SPOKES' VIEW ON BARI CONGRESS.
17) FARGO 619	GEN. MACFARLANE	1 FEB. 44	FREEDOM	—
18) FARGO 746	GEN. MACFARLANE	5 FEB. 44	FREEDOM FOR 1765	REPORTS RECEIVED WITH EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF SIX PARTS. STATEMENT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

TOP SECRET

57-9

Q. M. C. Form 258 (Old No. 490)
Received July 26, 1948

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1

POLITICS

TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
19) 303 A1 PROT	BADOLIO	5 FEB 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	ITALIAN ABSENCE TO ATLANTIC CHARTER
20) FREEDOM 42169	C. IN. C.	9 FEB 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	B.A. & AM. GOVERNMENTS NOT GET AGREED ON ITALIAN POLICY.
21) FREEDOM 50145	C. IN. C.	10 FEB 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	DESIRE REPORT ON EFFECT OF ABANDONING ARMY ON PROGRESS OF MILIT. ACT. AND NAVY.
22) CC/6/44	GEN. MACFARLANE	11 FEB 44	GEN. WILSON	POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY.
23) CC/6/44	GEN. MACFARLANE	11 FEB 44	C. IN. C.	SPAIN'S SUCCESS'S TELEGRAMS TO ROMA, HULL & MOULTON DISCUSSING OF POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY.
24) CC/6/44	GEN. MACFARLANE	12 FEB 44	GEN. ALEXANDER	REPORT AS REQUESTED BY 21.
25) CC/6/44	GEN. MACFARLANE	13 FEB 44	GEN. WILSON	DR. SERRAO TO DISCUSS PROPOSITION IN MILITARY REPORT ON POLITICAL SITUATION RE ABOLITION OF KING.
26) FARGO 996	GEN. MACFARLANE	15 FEB 44	GEN. ALEXANDER	RE MEMO. 50145. REPORT ON ABANDONING OF ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE LEAVES AN ABOLITION OF KING.
27) FARGO 1037	GEN. MACFARLANE	17 FEB 44	C. IN. C.	REPORT ON INTERVIEW WITH KING. KING BASED AT RAVENNA, CLAIMS ABOLITION WOULD HAVE BAD EFFECT ON ITALY. JAMES SPANGLER AND HIS UNBORN CHILDREN.
28) —	MR. CACCIA	—	GEN. MACFARLANE	REPORTS TO POLICE FORCE OF BADOLIO WITH SOME FILES
29) CC/5/71	GEN. MACFARLANE	18 FEB 44	DR. SERRAO TO DISCUSS PROPOSITION	REPORTS INCREASINGLY ACTIVE OPPOSITION TO BADOLIO'S PROPOSAL OF ABOLITION OF KING. (2) KING NOT AGREED TO ABOLITION UNTIL SOME FILES
30) —	POL. SECT. (TH. REAR)	19 FEB 44	ADJ. COUNCIL FOR ITALY	POLITICAL PROGRESS OF THE EXECUTIVE (GIVEN BY COMMITTEE) OF LIBERATION (ITALY)
31) AFMG 806	C. IN. C.	13 FEB 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	POLITICAL SITUATION DEVELOPING QUICKLY. BADOLIO GOVERN. TO HOLD UNTIL SOME IS TAKEN. ABSENT TO HOLD OFFICE UNTIL WHEN IS OVER.
32) RA/49/PROT	BADOLIO	14 FEB 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	BADOLIO WANTS TO FORMALLY RESIGN. GOVERNMENT'S HANDS TO LEAVE & ABANDONING.
33) FARGO 1112	MR. REED	14 FEB 44	FREEDOM	REPORT OF ITALIAN GOVT'S REACTION TO KING'S ABOLITION. ETC.
34) CC/6/81	GEN. MACFARLANE	20 FEB 44	BADOLIO	RE 12. ABOLITION TO FORMALLY ABANDON GOVERNMENTS, VIEWS OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS.
35) —	GEN. WILSON	—	CCS FOR PRESIDENT FEB - PRIME MINISTER	COMMENTS ON OPERATION PROGRESS RE. 4093.
36) 2318	FROM PATINA (GOWANKE)	21 FEB	C. IN. C.	COUNT ACQUAINTANCE (GOWANKE) GIVE AS HIS OWN DECISION. TO ABOLITION WITH SOME FILES CROWN PRINCE TO BRING HOME OF REPLY.
37) —	GEN. MACFARLANE	22 FEB 44	GEN. ALEXANDER	FILE'S COPY OF RE. TO COMMISSION (RE 30)
38) CC/6/44	GEN. MACFARLANE	22 FEB 44	GEN. WILSON	FILE'S COPY TO BE SENT TO ALEXANDER (RE 30) TOGETHER WITH COPY OF RE. 1201 REPLY.
39) FARGO 1191	GEN. MACFARLANE	22 FEB 44	GEN. WILSON	KING INFORMS BADOLIO OF HIS DECISION ABANDONING IS THE MIND OF 4093.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made by this form.

TOP SECRET

SECRET

FARGO 1191

FARGO

22 FEB 44

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FRANCON

file #36

CONTINUING MY NUMBER TWO THREE FIVE EIGHT FROM FATIMA TO PENTAGE
FARGO FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FARGO TO AFHQ FOR EYES ONLY COMMANDER IN CHIEF CMA
BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND REINHARDT PD CITE FARGO ONE ONE NINE ONE PD THE KING
INFORMED ME YESTERDAY THAT HE WAS INFORMING BARAGLIO TODAY CMA TWO TWO FEBRUARY CMA
THROUGH AQUARONE OF THE PROPOSALS HE MADE TO ME YESTERDAY PD HE ALSO ASKED ME TO MEET
DI NICOLA AND UNLESS YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTIONS I AM ARRANGING TO MEET HIM AT FOUR PETER
MINE THURSDAY

L. F. NICKER 5747
Lt. Col., AGO
Adjutant General

SECRET

39

SECRET AND PERSONAL

CC/84/P/

FRM/rj

22nd. February. 1944.

file #36
file 37

I enclose herewith a copy of a letter I have just sent to General Alexander with a copy of the telegram I sent you yesterday regarding my interview with the King. The letter explains itself.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,
Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

5748

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mm/rip

22 February 1944

General Sir Harold Alexander, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.

folio #36
I enclose herewith a copy of telegram which I sent last night to General Wilson. It explains itself and at the moment I have nothing to add to my comments at the end of the telegram.

I think that it brings out at least two points fairly clearly.

a. If any further proof were needed of the difficulties which have been created for us by the publicity given by P.M.R. and the press to attacks on the King and the present administration, we have it here. As I have said over and over again, it is no good giving the opposition every encouragement and facilities for attacking Badoglio's Government and the King if it is the policy of the Allied Governments to cooperate with them and naturally give them at any rate temporarily their support.

b. The King and others of his followers have always stressed the fact that the opposition made a great deal of noise but in fact represented a matter of only two or three thousand people. It is at least unlikely that the King would have made his proposal yesterday if he really thought that the feeling against him was limited to such small numbers. I think we have now indirect proof that the King himself recognizes the strength of opposition feeling against him.

I have hardly had time to think over thoroughly this new development but my first reaction is not to let it affect in any way the views I have previously expressed. If something in the nature of the King's proposal came to pass, we would probably be landed with a Government of the right wing center with a very considerable left wing opposition. I don't think this would help us very much.

I still think that we ought to produce a more radical solution before we get to Rome. At any rate, we have given the Allied Governments two clear cut alternatives from which to choose and to my mind the King's proposal of yesterday only goes to show how necessary it is to come to an early decision.

*Copy sent to
General Wilson
A.S.M.*

W. M. M.
NORL HAYSON MAGFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner

57:R

(37)

CLASS: MOST SECRET
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
FROM: FATIMA
TO: FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR CINC

M/C NO 21
REF NO 2358
FILED FEB
REC'D 212225A

Count Acquarone saw me in Salerno this afternoon. He told me that the King wished to make a very important communication to me and gave me the gist of what the King wished to say. We proceeded at once to Ravello and saw the King. (To Freedom personal for the eyes only of the Commander in Chief, British Resident Minister, and Civil Affairs from Fatima signed Macfarlane.) The King asked me to inform the Allied Governments that owing to the fact that the Allies had permitted him to be openly discredited and attacked through PWB and our lax censorship, he felt his position had become almost impossible. He therefore proposed to create a Lieutenantancy in accordance with precedent and to nominate the Crown Prince as Lieutenant of the Realm with full power. He was prepared to make the announcement at once, but the Lieutenantancy would come into operation only when we reach Rome. The King desired this postponement because he wished to re-enter Rome himself and it would be easier for the Crown Prince to form a Government there. On reaching Rome the Badoglio Government would resign and the Crown Prince would be able to form another Government. He mentioned the names of Di Nicola, Bonomi, and Orlando. The King stated that he made this proposal on the understanding that he would be given an undertaking that

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there would be no more publicity given to attacks upon him by press or radio in Italy. He said that he was making a very great personal sacrifice in the interest of his country and that he would not go an inch further. If he had to abdicate he would not permit the Crown Prince or his grandson to succeed him and the House of Savoy would come to an end. The King said that he had discussed the above proposal with Di Nicola who was in favor of it. The only people on the Italian side who know it has been definitely made are Umberto, Acquarone, and Ferace of the Italian Foreign Ministry. I promised the King to forward his proposal and to let him know the reaction of the Allied Governments in due course.

Comments: (1) This proposal is principally of interest as being the first indication that the King has really been impressed by the weight of the attacks made upon him.

(2) We should treat with reserve his categorical statement that this is the limit to which he will go.

(3) There is no evidence to show that the King's proposal might be acceptable to more than the Right wing of the anti-Fascist groups.

AUTHENTICATED:

(signed) Roger B. Derby

Roger B. Derby
1st Lt. ACD
AG

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57: (36)

2/20

TELEGRAM TO: CCS FOR PRESIDENT AND STATE DEPARTMENT, TO JCS FOR
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN OFFICE TO FREEDOM FOR
INFORMATION CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER

FROM: WILSON

#33
file

After consultation with Devers, Alexander, Macfarlane, Jaccola
and Heber, my comments on opposition program forwarded in Fargo #1112-
February 19, are as follows:

1. This program is as moderate as anything with which we are
likely to be faced. If Allied answer is long delayed or insists
upon a status quo till Rome, Parties will no doubt turn towards
more positive action to gain their ends. Some of them might even
welcome arrest and consequent "martyrdom."

2. Should Allied Governments be prepared to agree to this
program as a basis of discussion between the Parties and the Crown
there are several points needing clarification and possible negotia-
tion in which we may well have to intervene.

(a) Present program calls for delegation of all powers by
the new King. There are, however, indications that the Parties might
be prepared to accept the retention by the Crown of some nominal
powers. It might be possible to persuade Humbert to take a command
in the field in which case there would be ample precedent for a

Identities.

were positive action to gain their ends. Some of them might even welcome arrest and consequent "martyrdom."

2. Should Allied Governments be prepared to agree to this program as a basis of discussion between the Parties and the Crown there are several points needing clarification and possible negotiation in which we may well have to intervene.

(a) Present program calls for delegation of all powers by the new King. There are, however, indications that the Parties might be prepared to accept the retention by the Crown of some nominal powers. It might be possible to persuade Humbert to take a command in the field in which case there would be ample precedent for a Lieutenantancy.

(b) Present proposal for Lieutenantancy excludes appointment of a soldier. This is aimed amongst others at Badoglio; but provided that there were not a single Lieutenant, it might be possible for him to be included. The advantages of a collective Lieutenantancy or say three are obvious. We should, of course, require to be ⁵⁷⁴formed who the Parties propose as candidates for Lieutenantancy.

(c) Present program does not indicate who would be Parties' candidate for post of Prime Minister.

(d) It is noteworthy that this program contains no specific mention of any envisaged change in the composition of the Government on reaching Rome.

-2-

(e) As program does not indicate period for which it should run, it would be necessary that explicit guarantees be given both by Crown and Parties that they will not attempt to revise the basic principles of any settlement now reached until Constituent Assembly has decided future regime and that they will abide by its decisions.

3. As the opposition is not able to effect a change in the present Government without Allied assistance and has requested Allied intervention, we are at the moment in a particularly advantageous position to obtain anything deemed in our interest including naturally the reaffirmation of all Badoglio's commitments. This could not necessarily be the case to the same degree in other circumstances or in Rome.

4. It will be seen, therefore, that if it is decided to support program of opposition, the following action by the representatives of the Allied Governments will be necessary (a) ascertain from the opposition their candidate for the Premiership. (b) Obtain through him a guarantee from all parties of opposition that they subscribe to all engagements entered into by the Badoglio Government with the Allies. (c) Ascertain the nominees of the opposition for the "Lieutenancy."

5. If and only if these three points are all settled satisfactorily from the Allied point of view should we proceed with following steps: (a) Inform the King that the Allied Governments in-

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4. It will be seen, therefore, that if it is decided to support program of opposition, the following action by the representatives of the Allied Governments will be necessary (a) ascertain from the opposition their candidate for the Premiership. (b) Obtain through him a guarantee from all parties of opposition that they subscribe to all engagements entered into by the Badoglio Government with the Allies. (c) Ascertain the nominees of the opposition for the "Lieutenancy."

5. If and only if these three points are all settled satisfactorily from the Allied point of view should we proceed with following steps: (a) Inform the King that the Allied Governments insist upon his bowing to the will of the people and abdicating. (b) Inform the Crown Prince that he must call upon the opposition candidate for the Premiership to form a Government. (c) Assist if necessary in persuading Humbert to delegate such of his powers as the opposition requires and the Allies deem advisable to the Lieutenancy.

WILSON

Orig. and 2 c.c.

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CC/P/31

FIVE/RJ

20th. February, 1944.

Thank you for your No. 496/NOT of 19th. February.

I will be very glad indeed to receive a memorandum as suggested by you, and to forward it immediately to the Allied Governments.

You need have no fear that the Allied Governments are only hearing one side of the case. They have been kept informed of the political picture in this country from both sides to the best of our ability throughout.

NOEL MAISON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

S.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Capo del Governo.

Wp. to Salerno

5740

34

FARGO

SECRET

ROUTINE

FARGO 1112

19 FEB 44

10050 MR. REBER

FREEDOM

PASS FOLLOWING TO CCS FOR PRESIDENT AND STATE DEPARTMENT AND TO LONDON FOR PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN OFFICE INFORMATION CIVIL AFFAIRS AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER PD PENBASE PAREN FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PAREN TO AFHQ FOR MGS PD CITE FARGO ONE ONE ONE TWO PD OPPOSITIONS PROGRAM OF ACTION IS CONTAINED IN A MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO ME FOR SUBMISSION TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD COPIES IN TRANSLATION ARE BEING FORWARDED BY AIR TO ALGIERS TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL PD NEW PARA PD IN SUBMITTING ITS PROPOSALS THE EXECUTIVE GIUNTA STATES THAT ITS OBJECT IS TO PERMIT WITHIN THE FRAME WORK OF THE CONSTITUTION A POSTPONE-MENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM UNTIL THE END OF HOSTILITIES CMA AND THE CREATION OF AN ANTI DASH FASCIST GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ITALIAN NATION PD NEW PARA PD THE SIX PARTIES AGREE THAT THE PRESENT KING SHOULD ABDICATE FORTHWITH TO BE SUCCEEDED BY THE PRINCE OF PIEDMONT WHO CMA HOWEVER CMA MUST AGREE TO DELEGATE THE EXERCISE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS TO A SINGLE OR COLLECTIVE LIEUTENANCY WHICH WOULD NOT INCLUDE EITHER A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF SAVOY OR A SOLDIER BUT WOULD HAVE POWERS ENABLING IT TO PROCEED AT ONCE TO THE IMMEDIATE CONSTITUTION OF AN ANTI DASH FASCIST REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT PD THIS DELEGATION OF POWERS WOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL WAR CONDITIONS WOULD PERMIT THE CONVOCAION OF AN ASSEMBLY REGULARLY ELECTED BY THE ITALIAN PEOPLE PD IN AGREEING TO THE ACCESSION OF HUMBERT CMA THE GIUNTA NEVERTHELESS POINTS OUT THAT HIS ADHERENCE TO FASCISM AND HIS RESPONSIBILITY ~~FOR~~ FOR THE ATTACK ON FRANCE CAN NOT BE FORGOTTEN PD NEW PARA PD INASMUCH AS NOT ONLY HAD ROYAL POWERS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DELEGATED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO A LIEUTENANT CMA BUT THE PRESENT KING HAD ALSO CEDED CERTAIN OF HIS ROYAL PREROGATIVES IN PERMITTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FASCIST GRAND COUNCIL AND GRANTING TO MUSSOLINI THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES CMA THERE IS NO JURIDICAL REASON WHY IN THE OPINION OF THE GIUNTA THE CROWN SHOULD NOT AT PRESENT ACCEPT FOR A LIMITED PERIOD THE FOREGOING PROCEDURE THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS CLEARLY DEFINED PD NEW PARA PD THE EXPRESSED POLICY OF THE ALLIES IS TO GUARANTEE TO THE ITALIAN PEOPLE THE FREE CHOICE OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS AND TO MAINTAIN STRICT NEUTRALITY IN ALL INTERNAL ITALIAN POLITICAL MATTERS PD BUT SINCE THIS NEUTRALITY DOES IN FACT CONSTITUTE SUPPORT FOR THE KING WHO HAS STUBBORNLY REFUSED TO GIVE WAY THE GIUNTA CONSIDERS THAT IT BECOMES NECESSARY IF THE ALLIES APPROVE THE GIUNTAS PROGRAM FOR THE ALLIES TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE KING AND HUMBERT THAT THEY

SECRET

FARGO 1112

FARGO

19 FEB 44

SECRET

10050 MR. REBER

ROUTINE

FREEDOM

MUST FOLLOW THE PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION PD ONLY BY TAKING SUCH ACTION CAN THE ALLIES AVOID BLOCKING THE WILL OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE AND MAINTAIN THEIR EXPRESSED PRINCIPLES. PD NEW PARA ACCORDING TO THE GIUNTA CMA ACTION IS REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY FOR TWO REASONS CMA FIRST CMA BECAUSE THE SITUATION IS STEADILY WORSENING AND THE MODERATE SOLUTION NOW ADVANCED MIGHT NOT LATER PROVE POSSIBLE EITHER BECAUSE OF THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION OR BECAUSE OF MORE SERIOUS EVENTS SEMICLN AND SECOND CMA THE PARTIES AND PATIOTS OF NORTHERN ITALY CMA FACED BY THE PROLONGATION OF THIS UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION CMA MIGHT DECIDE TO HAVE RECOURSE TO MORE RADICAL SOLUTIONS OF THEIR OWN PD SUCH ACTION MIGHT IN TURN FORCE THE GIUNTA TO REVIEW ITS PRESENT ATTITUDE PD IN SUBMITTING THESE PROPOSALS TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS THE GIUNTA FURTHER STATES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE FULFILLING ITS DUTY IF ID DID NOT POINT OUT THE GRAVITY OF THE ITALIAN SITUATION AND CITES SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF ALLEGED REACTIONARY TACTICS OF THE KING OF CAUSES OF FRICTION PD NEW PARA PD I HAVE INFORMED THE GIUNTA THAT IN AGREEING TO FORWARD THE ABOVE PROGRAM TOTHE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS I MUST INSIST THE PENDING A REPLY CMA NO ACTION BE TAKEN TO INTERFERE WITH THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT OR TO AGGRAVATE THE PRESENT SITUATION AND LIKEWISE THAT THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED CONFIDENTIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE COMMUNICATED TO THE PRESS PD TO FORESTALL POSSIBLE INDISCREET ANNOUNCEMENTS ON THE PART OF THE GIUNTA OR ANY OF ITS MEMBERS I AM CMA HOWEVER CMA INFORMING THE PRESS THAT I HAVE RECEIVED A PROGRAM AND AM FORWARDING IT TO THE SAID GOVERNMENTS FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION PD NEW PARA PD OUR COMMENTS FOLLOW

END

5734

2- SECRET

33

RR. 496/Prot.

THE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

19 February 1944

Dear General MacFarlane:

You have notified me this morning that you have transmitted to the Allied Governments a report of the members of the Congress in Bari.

As I told you briefly over the telephone, it might be opportune that the arguments of the present government be made known to the Allied Governments, in order that these might be able to form an exact picture of the situation, or that the Allied Governments decide to send a commission here which might ascertain for itself the morale and viewpoints of the population.

One cannot form a precise idea of happenings by listening to one side only; no judge could pass judgment under those circumstances.

If you think it opportune, I will have a memorandum prepared which will express the reasons which this Government thinks are necessary to be made known to the Allied Governments, and will send it to you.

Heartiest Greetings,

Badoglio.

~~Political Section~~

Spoke

action

Taken

+ Badoglio answered
20/2/44

~~What are your intentions?~~

5737

Copy to Latham

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NR. 496 PROT.



IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

19 FEBBRAIO 1944 -

CARO GENERALE MACFARLANE,

ELLA MI HA COMUNICATO STAMANE DI AVER TRASMESSO AI GOVERNÌ ALLEATI UN ESPOSTO DEI CONGRESSISTI DI BARI.

COME LE HO ACCENNATO BREVEMENTE A VOCE, AFFINCHÉ I GOVERNÌ ALLEATI POSSANO FORMARSI UN ESATTO CONCETTO DELLA SITUAZIONE SAREBBE OPPORTUNO CHE FOSSERO TRASMESSE AGLI STESSI GOVERNÌ LE ARGOMENTAZIONI DELL'ATTUALE GOVERNO - ORRURE CHE I GOVERNÌ ALLEATI SI DECIDESSERO AD INVIARE QUÌ UNA LORO COMMISSIONE CON L'INCARICO DI RENDERSI CONTO SUL POSTO DEGLI UNORI E DELLE TENDENZE DELLA POPOLAZIONE.

NON È ASCOLTANDO SOLTANTO UNA PARTE CHE CI SI PUÒ FAR UNA IDEA PRECISA; NESSUN GIUDICE POTREBBE IN QUESTE CONDIZIONI EMETTERE UNA SENTENZA.

SE ELLA RITIENE OPPORTUNO FAREI REDIMERE UN PRO-MEMORIA CON LE RAGIONI CHE QUESTO GOVERNO RITIENE UTILI DI FAR CONOSCERE AI GOVERNÌ ALLEATI E GLIE LO MANDAREI.

CON MOLTA CORDIALITÀ

Paulus

VERNI ALLEATI POSSANO FORMARSI UN ESATTO CONCETTO DELLA SITUAZIONE SAREBBE OPPORTUNO CHE FOSSE TRASMESSE AGLI STESSI GOVERNI LE ARGOMENTAZIONI DELL'ATTUALE GOVERNO - OPPURE CHE I GOVERNI ALLEATI SI DECIDESSERO AD INVIARE QUI UNA LORO COMMISSIONE CON L'INCARICO DI RENDERSI CONTO SUL POSTO DEGLI UMORI E DELLE TENDENZE DELLA POPOLAZIONE.

NON E' ASCOLTANDO SOLTANTO UNA PARTE CHE CI SI PUO' FAR UNA IDEA PRECISA; NESSUN GIUDICE POTREBBE IN QUESTE CONDIZIONI EMETTERE UNA SENTENZA.

SE ELLA RITIENE OPPORTUNO FAREI REDIGERE UN PRO-MEMORIA CON LE RAGIONI CHE QUESTO GOVERNO RITIENE UTILI DI FAR CONOSCERE AI GOVERNI ALLEATI E GLIE LO MANDAREI.

CON MOLTA CORDIALITA'

Paulus

GENERALE MASON MACFARLANE

CAPO DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO

N A P O L I

5738

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AFHQ MESSAGE FORM

CALL TAJB VJJOQ	CIRCUIT No. NR	PRIORITY 0	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS T A JJOQ 193000A WAR JBJBW JATO
SPACES WITHIN HEAVY LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY			
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(Ref No.) **861**(CLASSIFICATION) **SECRET**

POLITICAL SITUATION IS DEVELOPING FASTER THAN HAD BEEN FORESEEN AND HAS OUTSIDE PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS FROM ALGIERS PD TO AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF PLEASE PASS TO PRESIDENT AND STATE DEPARTMENT CMA USFOR FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF PLEASE PASS TO PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN OFFICE REPEATED FREEDOM AND SHAF FROM GENERAL MILSON PD THIS IS WAF SIX TWO TWO THERE ARE ALREADY INDICATIONS THAT OPPOSITION TACTICS MAY THREATEN TO DISLOCATE ADMINISTRATION PD I REPEAT ITEM HAVE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH DEVERS CMA ALEXANDER CMA SAUFARLANE CMA CACOLA AND HERER AND SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING CSM PARA ONE I REPEAT ITEM AM CONVINCED THAT A CLEAR DECISION CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE DELAYED AND CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE MADE DEPENDENT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE FOR BOMB PD PARA TWO THE OPPOSITION HAVE AGREED A POLICY AND HAVE SUBMITTED FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS THEIR SUGGESTED PROGRAM OF ACTION PD PARAN IN ACCEPTING THIS FOR FORWARD TRANSMISSION I REPEAT ITEM AM TELLING THEM THAT IT IS BEING FORWARDED ONLY ON CONDITION THAT THEY INCLUDE IN NO REPEAT NO ACTIVITY AGAINST THE BADGLIO GOVERNMENT WHILE UNDER

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DISTRIBUTION
NONEPRECEDENCE: **URGENT**ORIGINATING SECTION: **CINC**

CONTENT AND CLASSIFICATION AUTHENTICATED BY:

NAME TYPED
TEL No. **H.M. FINLATER, MAJ. GS**THI or TOR **63 ST** Opr

TIME CLEARED

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URGENT

CONSIDERATION PD UNPAID BRIEFLY PUT CMA THE SIX OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE AGREED UPON A REPEAT ABLE PROGRAM TO PERMIT THE ACCESSION OF THE CROWN PRINCE PROVIDED THE LATTER WOULD AGREE TO DELEGATE HIS POWERS TO A REPEAT ABLE LIEUTENANCY OF A REPEAT ABLE SINGLE INDIVIDUAL OR OF A REPEAT ABLE GROUP UNTIL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY CAN DECIDE THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION AT THE END OF THIS WAR PD THEY HAVE REQUESTED ALLIED ASSISTANCE IN PUTTING THIS PROGRAM INTO EFFECT CMA POINTING OUT THAT IF NO REPEAT NO ACTION IS TAKEN THEY CANNOT CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE ACTIONS OF LESS RESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS PD AT THE SAME TIME THEIR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAVE ISSUED AN APPEAL TO ALL THOSE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE TO REGARD THE KING AND GOVERNMENT AS REBELS AND NOT REPEAT NOT TO TAKE PART IN THEIR REBELLION AGAINST THE ITALIAN PEOPLE PD CIRCULATION OF AND PUBLICITY FOR THIS APEAL HAVE BEEN STOPPED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE PD THE COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN INFORMED SUCH ACTION CANNOT BE TOLERATED AND THEY HAVE BEEN VERY SEVERELY WARNED PD THEY HAVE BEEN OPERATING FROM ANCOT ITALY AND ANY ACTION AGAINST THEM FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT CAN ONLY BE TAKEN BY US PD WE CANNOT REPEAT NOT POSSIBLY ALLOW THIS SORT OF THING TO GO ON PD THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF THE OPPOSITION THREATENS TO INTERFERE WITH OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS MORE SERIOUSLY THAN ANY LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS TO AN ABDICATION AND A REPEAT ABLE CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT PD IF WE TAKE THE OBVIOUS COURSE IN SUPPORT OF BADOGLIOS ADMINISTRATION OR ALLOW BADOGLIO TO DO SO IN KINGS ITALY AND ARREST AND TAKE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WE LAY OURSELVES OPEN TO A REPEAT ABLE STORM OF PROTEST FROM ALMOST EVERY DIRECTION PD BUT IF WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT BADOGLIO WE CAN HARDLY ADOPT ANY OTHER COURSE PARA THREE THERE ARE TWO MAIN ALTERNATIVE COURSES PD ONE CMA TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE KING TO ABDICATE IN FAVOR OF HUMBERT WHOSE SUCCESSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD IN OUR OPINION INSURE THE LOYALTY OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES PD AND CMA TWO CMA TO INFORM THE OPPOSITION THAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT TOLERATE ANY CHANGE

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IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION UNTIL ROME IS REACHED AND THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE WITH THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT WILL BE INSTANTLY REPRESSSED PD IN EITHER CASE INTERVENTION ON OUR PART IS NOW REQUIRED PD PARA FOUR IN VIEW OF SITUATION DESCRIBED IN PARA TWO CMA WE ARE INEVITABLY FACED WITH HAVING TO DECIDE BETWEEN THESE TWO COURSES AT A VERY EARLY DATE AND WE ARE IN A BETTER POSITION TO CONTROL THE CONSEQUENCES NOW THAN WE SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE OR AFTER CAPTURE OF ROME PD PARA FIVE FROM LOCAL ANGLE CMA I REPEAT ITEM RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS SHOULD AGREE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT TO INFORM THE KING THAT THEY INSIST UPON HIS BOWING TO THE WILL OF HIS PEOPLE AND ABDICATING IMMEDIATELY IN FAVOR OF THE CROWN PRINCE AND THAT THE CROWN PRINCE SHOULD THEN BE INFORMED THAT HE SHOULD SUMMON THE CHOSEN REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OPPOSITION TO FORM IMMEDIATELY A REPEAT ABLE FRESH GOVERNMENT PD IT OF COURSE GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT BEFORE ANY STEPS ARE INITIATED WE WOULD OBTAIN AN UNDERTAKING FROM THE OPPOSITION CMA SEVERALLY AND COLLECTIVELY CMA TO SUBSCRIBE TO ALL THE ENGAGEMENTS ENTERED INTO WITH THE ALLIES BY BADOGLIO PD PARA SIX FULL DETAILS OF OPOSITION PROGRAM AND OUR COMMENTS FOLLOW EARLIEST POSSIBLE

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 396 U. S. Army

NF

February 19, 1945.

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting United States Member, Advisory
Council for Italy

SUBJECT: Political Program of the Executive Giunta of Com-
mittees of Liberation.

By direction of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission, there are transmitted herewith copies of a Memorandum received from the Executive Giunta of the Italian Committees of Liberation setting forth their agreed program of action. They have requested that this Memorandum be submitted to the Allied Governments and have agreed that their program shall be regarded as a confidential proposal until the Allied Governments have had an opportunity to consider it and to reply.

The Chief Commissioner requests that this Memorandum be communicated to the Office of the British Resident Minister and to such other members of the Advisory Council as the American and British members deem advisable. General Salodovnik has been informed of the contents of the Memorandum.

By Command of Lt. General Mason Macfarlane

Samuel Reber
Political Section

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COPY 5732

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COPY

MEMORANDUM OF THE EXECUTIVE JUNTA
FOR GENERAL MACFARIANE

COPY

I. PREMISE:

The Executive Junta has received a mandate from the Congress of Bari to prepare the way for a strong Government which reflects the anti-Fascist spirit of the Italian people. The Executive Junta believes, therefore, that it is its duty to submit to the Allied Governments a plan of solution of the Italian crisis which, while remaining within the limits of our constitutional law, would postpone to the end of hostilities the institutional problem, would reduce to a minimum the harshness of the present political strife, would allow the formation of a truly anti-Fascist Government representative of the Italian nation, and would create that harmony of the people as necessary to the war effort, as it is to the effort of reconstruction.

II. PROPOSAL OF SOLUTION:

For well known reasons the anti-Fascist parties do not under any condition intend to collaborate with the present King of Italy. Victor Emmanuel III ought, therefore, to abdicate.

The present Prince of Piedmont would succeed. It can not be forgotten that the Prince was personally in command of the group of armies that attacked France, and that as "Inspector of the Infantry" he has his share of responsibility in the dark page written by the Italian army on the 8th of September. Nor can his numerous acts of friendly support of Fascism and its Duce be forgotten. It may, however, be admitted that his responsibilities are less great than those of his father.

The Parties would, therefore, accept his presence with the express reservation that he should delegate the exercise of his constitutional powers by a specific act of his own and for a definite period of time.

This reservation is essential because all of the most dangerous elements of Fascism, in alliance with those military gangs which, afraid of being called to account and intending to defend their untenable positions at any cost, are regrouping themselves automatically around the Monarchy and the surviving Monarchical forces.

By accepting the Government under different conditions, Italian anti-Fascism would expose itself to three most serious dangers:

(1) To see the reforming and re-organization of Fascist military and reactionary groups in the heart of the state administration and around the person and prerogatives of the King. By an act of force or by a simple gesture of the Sovereign these groups might return to power and at an opportune moment nullify the will of the people. Sooner or later this would mean revolution;

(2) To see unconscious or open sabotage of the war effort as happening today;

(3) To see itself disavowed by the Italian people as a whole and by its supporters in that part of Italy which is still occupied. These supporters have al-

ready made it explicitly known that they do not accept any other solution.

In summary, it is today necessary that the King abdicate and that upon ascending the Throne, Humbert cede his constitutional powers to an individual or collective Lieutenant which can inspire the trust of the country and which in any event does not include a member of the House of Savoy or a soldier. The Lieutenant should then proceed to the immediate constitution of an anti-Fascist Government. All of the foregoing should last to the time when war conditions will permit the convocation of an Assembly regularly elected by the Italian people.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL:

The proposal as outlined above is consistent with the practice of our constitutional law. In fact, Victor Emmanuel II as well as Humbert I and Victor Emmanuel III have in the past ceded some of the powers granted them by the "Statuto Albertino" in favor of Lieutenants.

Moreover the present King approved the law which created the Fascist Grand Council and which even permitted that body to intervene to determine the order of succession to the Throne. He has also divested himself of the most specifically royal of the powers granted him by the constitution when he yielded the supreme command of the armed forces to Mussolini.

Therefore, on juridical grounds, it can not be seen why the Crown should hesitate to adopt a procedure the duration of which would be strictly limited and the purpose of which would be clearly defined more particularly so since now this procedure would correspond to the desires and to the requirements of the country.

IV. MEANS OF ACHIEVING THE DETERMINED GOAL:

The Allies have always declared that they desire the Italian people to be free to choose their own Government and the institutions which will in the future govern their political life. Consequently they are affirming their strict neutrality in Italian political strife on the condition that this strife not be harmful to their war effort against Germany.

The Executive Junta deeply appreciates this view and is grateful for the sincerity of the effort to put it in practice.

It must nevertheless point out that in spite of everything Allied action in Italy takes the form of a support given to the personal Government of the King and of Badoglio. A clear indication has been given to the King in every way possible in existing circumstances that his person stands as an obstacle to national unity. No one who is political or morally responsible has agreed to collaborate with him and the unanimous vote of the Grand Congress has disqualified him. He, however, stubbornly refuses to give way and poses the question of using force which for the present the Parties refuse to use because of their sense of responsibility to the Allies.

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Therefore should the Allies approve the moderate and transactional formula posed by the Executive Junta they must make this clearly understood by Victor Emmanuel III and the House of Savoy.

Only in this way will it be possible without violence and disturbance, to achieve the result for which all true Italians are longing. Whereas the present status quo is guaranteed through the weight of Allied strength and through the respect which the anti-Fascist Parties have for the Allies, they unwillingly find themselves in the position of blocking the will of the Italian people and acting not only against the principles which they themselves have affirmed but even against their most obvious interests.

V. WHEN ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN:

It is necessary to act immediately first because the situation is tense and is worsening every day. The solution now presented is valid today but may be superseded tomorrow by the state of public opinion or by more serious events; secondly because the parties and the patriots of occupied Italy see that this equivocal situation is being prolonged, depriving them of any organic direction and help and preventing free Italians from fighting. Should the occasion arise they might therefore decide to have recourse to their own solutions far more radical than those put forward by the Junta. Such initiatives would not only make the already tense political situation even more grave, but they would in all probability force the Junta radically to review its attitude toward the people responsible for further Italian suffering.

VI. CONCLUSION:

The Executive Junta believes that it is fulfilling its duty by submitting these proposals to the Allied Governments. Its duty would not be fulfilled entirely until the Junta did not also call the attention of the Allied Governments to the extreme gravity of the Italian situation and to the urgency of a solution. The Allies know that the King and his Government, conscious of their faults which are perhaps even greater than we think, do not hesitate to use the worst scoundrels who may become efficacious instruments of the reaction and of the civil war that is being prepared. A few of these have apparently been eliminated, only after direct Allied intervention.

The Allies know that an absolutely unjustifiable increase of the "Arma dei Carabinieri" and of the "Guardia di Finanza" is in the course of development. Ex-Fascists, ex-members of the Fascist militia are being shamelessly recruited even for the highest ranks.

The Allies know that except in the large towns and in places directly controlled by them freedom of press, freedom of meeting and even personal freedom are nothing but verbal expressions. The Allies also know that the blood of the anti-Fascists has already been spilled as a result of royal reaction. As an example, the sanguinary incidents which took place in Montessano on the 12th of December may be cited.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the leaders of the Parties of the masses to restrain the understandable impatience of the population. The recent events occurring in Puglia (riots at Taranto, Canosa and in other communes) are of significance in this respect.

The Executive Junta therefore requests the Allied Governments to ⁵⁷²⁴⁹ that its proposals are not the fruit of animosity or of party passions. They are the result of an examination developed with full knowledge of the causes

and with the most serene objectivity. They represent the strict minimum by which a solution of the Italian situation can still be achieved.

Should this situation develop for the worse, it should be clear that the responsibility for it must neither be ascribed to the Italian people nor to their legitimate representatives.

Signed for the Executive Committee
The Secretary

Filippo Caracciolo

Naples 18th of February 1944

5728

MEMORANDUM

The present declared policy of Marshal Badoglio is to continue until Rome, and once there, place the resignation of his Government in the King's hands. This decision was taken early in November last at a time when the King and the Marshal thought that the capture of Rome would not be a matter of more than a few weeks. At that time it was accepted by the Allied Governments and not seriously challenged by the opposition. If the capture of Rome were close, there would be little advantage to the Allies in any divergence from Badoglio's decision; but on the assumption that the city may not fall for a month or more, the question will have to be reconsidered, if for no other reason because there are clearly signs that the opposition will not acquiesce quietly in an indefinite continuance in power of the present Government. After the Bari meeting their issue is at stake. It is, therefore, necessary to strike a balance for and against change from the point of view of Allied interest.

Against change, it should first be said that the Badoglio Government have lived up to their armistice obligations and have done what is required of them, except in one case, the prisoners of war agreement. Marshal Badoglio knows that though now a cobelligerent, Italy is a beaten enemy and the internal weakness of his Government makes it less able to with-

Received from
Mr. Caccia

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may be filed.

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Against change, it should first be said that the Badoglio Government have lived up to their armistice obligations and have done what is required of them, except in one case, the prisoners of war agreement. Marshal Badoglio knows that though now a cobelligerent, Italy is a beaten enemy and the internal weakness of his Government makes it less able to withstand Allied pressure. Secondly, the Government has been willing to postpone any institutional question and thereby done nothing to jeopardize the loyal cooperation of the armed services, especially the navy who responded to the King's call to join the Allies. Loyalty to the Crown does mean something in the armed services, particularly in the higher ranks, and it is impossible to tell how much this is loyalty to the present King or to the institution of monarchy. The same is true of the attitude of the Italian diplomatic missions abroad, and there is evidence of it in prisoners of war camps in the United States. Thirdly, there is something a little ridiculous in any change if it must be on the condition laid down at Bari, the abdication of the King, when so little of Italy can directly participate. The Badoglio Government may be weak, but the opposition can not

provide any better or more experienced team of administrators. Also there can be no absolute guarantee that any "solution" reached in South Italy will be accepted without question by the Rome leaders. ^{Lastly,} ~~surely,~~ there is the fact that an opposition Government will regard themselves as liberated friends rather than defeated enemies and Sforza in his speech at Bari has already come out with a claim for the retention of the sacred frontiers of Metropolitan Italy and the "ancient and venerable" pre-Fascist colonies. This shows the sort of difficulties with which we shall certainly be faced by an opposition Government whenever it comes into power. Badoglio may have the same aspirations, but he intends to resign at Rome and will scarcely be likely to raise such contentious issues in the intervening period.

Before giving arguments in favor of a change, it should be said what such a change would involve. From the Allied point of view, there are at least three prerequisites. The new Government must specifically recognize that it is bound by the Armistice and all other engagements into which the Badoglio Government has entered and must prefer a solution of the institutional question which does not pre-judge the freedom of the whole Italian people to choose between Monarchy and Republic at the end of the war. In addition, the "solution" must be put forward as an agreed

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Granted these prerequisites, the main argument in favor of change is that we shall be dealing with a Government which will have some ⁵⁷²⁵ over and influence on the Italian people. We have already twice been threatened with labor difficulties in the discussions at Taranto; the ostensible causes were wages and food, the real reasons, political. So long as the Middle and Left parties are all in opposition, there will be a constant threat of trouble and it will not look well in Europe and elsewhere if our "Quisling" Government, as it will unfairly be dubbed, has to resort to force. Even if only fools contend over forms of Government, the Badoglio Government cannot offer any promise of good administration and

although an opposition, Government may not be more talented. It can certainly not be less so. Next, in view of the fact that Badoglio signed the Armistice, it will be a convenience for us if he has a prominent place in Italy while the Armistice lasts. He still has a considerable standing in the country, even with members of the opposition. But the longer he is associated with the present Government, the more difficult it will be for the opposition to put him in a place of authority if they form a Government. For such the same reasons, the longer a solution is postponed, the more radical it is likely to be when it comes. Finally, all recent evidence from Rome shows that the Rome leaders are already tending toward more extreme courses and the obvious way of spiking their guns is to have a Government of their friends already in office by the time that Rome is taken, on the understanding that there shall be a reconstruction of that Government directly Rome is free.

So much for the material advantages for and against a change. There is another consideration which cannot be excluded. "He best serves the state", Spicetetus observed, "who raises not the roofs of its houses, but the souls of its citizens." It is doubtful whether the Badoglio Government can do either; it certainly cannot inspire and is blamed for not having overcome many of the present economic difficulties. These will remain whoever is in power; but it is the fate of unpopular governments to be as often blamed unjustly as justly. If the life of the Badoglio

the obvious way of spiking their guns is to have a Government of their friends already in office by the time that Rome is taken, on the understanding that there shall be a reconstruction of that Government directly Rome is free.

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CC/31/71

PERSONAL, MOST SECRET & IMMEDIATE.

FM/rlj

18th. February, 1944.

MEMORANDUM,

TO: Private Secretary to The Prime Minister.
10, Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

John 22 (???)

file 28 (???)

1. In my telegram of 17th. February to the Prime Minister via S.L.U. I said that I would send the Prime Minister a copy of my recent memorandum to General Wilson on the political situation in Southern Italy.
2. I now enclose the memorandum in question.
3. Please tell the Prime Minister that this memorandum still represents my views on the situation. The only modifications I would make are:
 - (a) The opposition are becoming increasingly active and potentially a greater source of embarrassment to Badoglio.
 - (b) They have not yet reached complete agreement on their policy and programmes. They have promised to let me have this in writing for transmission to the Allied Governments as soon as they have reached agreement.
 - (c) The King will almost certainly not be prepared to abdicate except under Allied pressure before we reach Rome.

NOEL MA ON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Commissioner. 5727

FARGO 1037 ✓

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE & COSBY)

17th. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM FOR C-IN-C. MACMILLAN AND CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

Para One. King and Queen are living in Villa at Ravello. King asked me to see him yesterday. Para Two. Count Aquarone and members King's personal staff told my personal assistant during my interview with the King that the King was going to talk to me on the following lines. Italy is rapidly splitting up into two camps. This is a dangerous development and the worst possible for the country. Should the King abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince did I think it would be possible to obtain guarantees that the Crown Prince would not be subjected to the same attacks as the King had experienced. Would there be any objection to the King moving to Naples. Para Three. In fact the King spoke to me on quite different lines. After inquiring regarding the progress of the fighting he stressed and continued to stress throughout the interview the urgency of his getting to Rome at the earliest possible moment. He claimed that he would have no difficulty in Rome in getting either Orlando or Bonomi or some other responsible politician to form a government. He claimed that abdication even in favour of the Crown Prince would have a very bad effect in the country. He complained that our censorship and

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publicity in Bari were most unfair and displayed marked partiality in favour of his opponents. He thought that Badoglio was getting very tired and that he was making a great mistake in filling all the ministerial posts in his cabinet with comparatively unknown men. He attributed most of his present difficulties to Count Sforza. He had heard stories that the Allies wished him to abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince and to install a government representing the Bari Congress Parties. He hoped there was no truth in these rumours. He inquired whether I thought he should make some personal reply to the pronouncements of the Bari Congress. In reply to his last two remarks I stated firstly that the country was full of irresponsible rumours and secondly that he must decide for himself on the question of issuing any personal reply to the Bari pronouncements. Para Four. Comments. I gained the following definite impressions. One. The King is apparently either misinformed or not fully informed of the present political situation. I very much doubt if the message to him from the Executive Junta of the Committees of Liberation has been allowed to reach him. Two. The King failed to speak to me on the lines anticipated by his immediate advisers and it seems clear

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that there is little possibility of his considering the question of abdication before reaching Rome except under very strong outside pressure

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*Signal Landed
to General Alexander
personally 16/2*

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

15th. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

A.C.M.F. PERSONAL FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

Ex folio 21 in file

_____ With reference Freedom No. 50145 FROGS. I have discussed question personally with McGregor, Duchesne and Foster. We are all agreed that provided abdication took place in favour of Crown Prince and that Crown Prince was acceptable to the opposition the likelihood of reactions in any of the three Services would be remote. The main factor would appear to be the question of the Crown Prince succeeding to the Throne. So long as this is assured the probability of any trouble with the Services is very small. Naturally this probability would be very much reduced by a voluntary or apparently voluntary abdication. It would be equally naturally increased according to the degree and form in which pressure were applied. Should it be necessary to apply pressure it is obvious that every endeavour should be made to prevent publicity. In the unlikely event of any reactions manifesting themselves they are least likely to occur in the Army and probably most likely in the Navy

0911-4-16-44

PERCUSSION AND MOST SECRET

CC/F/5.

13th. February, 1944.

Thank you for your ALC/22 of 5th. February.

1. I think that the arrangements you have made regarding P.W.B. should work out quite well. I am going over tomorrow to see, among other things, their party in Bari.
2. I was amused the other day after Badoglio had begged me in the morning to take P.W.B. under my control to receive an exactly similar and pressing request from the firm of Aforza and Croce in the evening.
3. I am watching my Italian manned road transport organisation and intend to keep as strict a control over it as possible. We are very alive to the possibility of local rackets if we don't watch them closely.
4. My Russians are becoming rather less disturbing in their ways. The General has given up changing his room every night for fear of microphones, and his A.D.C. has for the moment at any rate given up his nocturnal visits to Naples city in mufti. From various things that the General has said he is apparently anxious to change his A.D.C. and at the same time seems to think that he himself may not be staying here very much longer.
5. Colonel Spofford, who is leaving me for M.G.S. almost at once, is going to discuss the question of promotion of American Officers in my organisation. At the moment their promotion is completely blocked, which not only places them at a disadvantage vis a vis my British Officers but doubles my difficulty in finding Americans to fill appointments as they become vacant and which I would like to fill with Americans to keep the balance of power. I suggest that it would be an excellent thing if you could write personally to either C.C.S. or to the War Department at Washington - possibly through, or by means of, Devers urging that at any rate in the case of a small priority list in Spofford's possession the hold-up in promotion might be waived.
6. I am sorry to have had to inflict so long a political story on you yesterday but I do regard the question as of the first importance and the

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more I see of the situation here the more convinced I am in my opinions, and I find that these are shared by nearly all the people whose advice I value most.

7. As regards reactions to an abdication by the King in the Italian armed forces, my own opinion is that provided it is a straight abdication in favour of the Crown Prince everything should pass off entirely quietly. Fortunately, as I have already told you, the opposition are prepared to accept the Crown Prince as successor to his father. They may try to creep his style a bit but I doubt if that will present much difficulty. He is thoroughly weak and wet and will probably agree to anything provided he is left as King.

8. It is always possible that if the Allies have to bring pressure to bear upon the King to abdicate, reactions in the armed forces might occur. But so long as pressure is brought discreetly and secretly I see no reason why it should ever be made public.

9. As the subject is one which is rather dangerous to handle through my available channels of telegraphy, I am flying tomorrow to Bari and Lecce and Teramo to get the opinions of the Heads of my R.A.F., Army and Navy Sub-Commissions. I expect that as regards the Air Force and the Navy I will be told that the abdication of the King might produce dangerous repercussions. I do not attach very much importance to this as both my airman and my sailor were told to expect all sorts of dangerous repercussions to the Bari congress and as we know they never took place. These stories were, I think, given to them in the hope that we might be induced to veto the holding of the congress, and they emanated from pronouncedly monarchist circles.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE.
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.
C.B.E., E.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,
Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

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CC/P/48

SECRET PERSONAL

12th. February, 1944.

See file 21

I have just received my very delayed copy of Freedom telegram 50145. Do you wish me to ask Duchesne, MacGregor and Foster urgently for their respective opinions?

As you will see from the political memorandum which I am also sending you, an abdication by the King would apparently now be followed by the succession of the Crown Prince. All my information goes to show that the opposition parties have agreed on this.

Clearly, therefore, an abdication under these conditions would cause much less repercussion in monarchist circles than an abdication including the elimination of the Crown Prince and the establishment of a Regency.

Voluntary abdication by the King would obviously cause less comment than an abdication under Allied pressure unless such pressure were very discreetly and secretly applied.

My personal view for what it is worth is that an abdication by the present King in favour of the Crown Prince would be unlikely to cause serious repercussions in the armed forces.

Would you please let me know by my returning messenger what action, if any, you would like me to take on the telegram under reference.

General Sir Harold R. Alexander,
G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C.,
Commander-in-Chief.

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Ref. CC/G/4.

~~SECRET~~
FMB/rj

11th. February, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

1. I enclose herewith three documents -
 - "A" - draft telegram from Count Sforza and Signor Croce to Messrs Eden, Hull and Molotov.
 - "B" - a document on the constitutional complications of the existing political situation in Italy handed to me by Count Sforza and written by Italian legal experts in Bari.
 - "C" - a redraft of the message referred to in "A", above, produced by Count Sforza and Signor Croce after I had discussed documents "A" and "B" with Sforza.
2. Before you forward the telegram at "C" to London, Washington and Moscow you may like to have my latest views on the problem presented by the existing political situation in Italy, and I attach a memorandum on the subject which I have endeavoured to keep as short as possible.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

*04/11 - Genl Mason
+ 10/11 - Sforza*

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY 11TH FEBRUARY, 1944.

1. We have in Italy a constitutional government under the King. It was with Badoglio, its Prime Minister, that we concluded the Armistice.
2. This Government has been unable to enlist the support of any of the leaders of the existing political parties in Italy. It functions as an administration of Under-Secretaries and available technicians. Up to date, with the bulk of liberated Italy under A.M.C. it has succeeded in keeping the machine running and has apparently cooperated with the Allied authorities to the best of its ability.
3. From the earliest days after the Armistice it has been clear that there was very considerable opposition to this Government and that this opposition included the leaders of all political parties represented in liberated Italy.
4. This opposition has latterly become much more vocal and claims to speak for the majority of the population of Italy. This may be open to doubt but that it claims a large measure of support among the population is obvious.
5. The degree of unanimity existing between the parties forming the opposition is in some respects uncertain but they are united in two respects. Firstly, that the King should abdicate and, secondly, that a government representing the opposition parties should replace that of Badoglio.
6. We are up against the following difficulty. -
7. We are collaborating with a government which is unpopular with a large section of the community. It is accused of being unrepresentative and weak, and of employing many individuals who are regarded as being badly compromised with Fascism. The King with his record of collaboration with Mussolini and at least partial responsibility for Italy's entry into the war is anathema to the opposition. On the other hand, we have a strong and apparently growing opposition to which we have given the opportunity of voicing its ideas and aims to an extent which is proving most embarrassing to the Government which we are supporting.
8. But although this opposition is reasonably well organised and claims, probably with right, to represent a very considerable following, it has no constitutional possibility of implementing its programme and of superseding in office a government which it regards, possibly also rightly, as unrepresentative, reactionary and weak.
9. As the opposition have no constitutional possibility of attaining their object they may well be tempted to resort to direct action. This

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might initially take the form of sabotaging Badoglio's administration in the considerable territory which has now been handed over to him and might eventually lead to something in the nature of a putch and the formation of an opposition government.

10. It used to appear that the opposition would be content to await our arrival in Rome before bringing matters to a head. But with the delay in the advance on Rome there are many indications which are confirmed by the expressed opinions of opposition leaders that the opposition wish to take action at the earliest possible moment. One cogent reason which they advance is that the extremist elements in Rome will be tempted to establish a government in Rome as soon as the Germans evacuate and that the Allies entering Rome in collaboration with Badoglio's Government may find an opposition government already installed.

11. The Executive Junta of the opposition parties represented at the Bari Congress have already despatched a communication to the King calling upon him to abdicate. This may or may not produce immediate repercussions but the fact remains that events may start moving rapidly and it is essential that we should have a clear policy as to the line we should adopt.

12. It is ideologically sound to say that the Italian people should work out their political salvation for themselves. But in the existing set-up the only way in which a formidable opposition can achieve its aims is by direct action which may well cause considerable dislocation of our war effort.

13. As I see it, we can no longer safely sit by and do nothing. There are two alternative courses of action open to us. -

(a) To warn the opposition, including their leaders in Rome, that we will not tolerate any interference with Badoglio's administration until we get to Rome. We might get the available leaders to agree to this but they have already told me that they cannot guarantee the action of less responsible elements.

(b) To bring pressure on the King to abdicate if, as seems likely, he refuses of his own volition to do so. This would leave the way clear to the succession of the Crown Prince and the formation of a representative Government which might include Badoglio.

14. I will briefly summarise the arguments for and against either course. The arguments for the first course and against the second are as follows:

(a) Leave well alone. Badoglio's Government has delivered the goods reasonably well up to date.

(b) There is a possibility that bringing pressure to bear on the King might have serious repercussions in the Italian armed forces, especially in the officer class and also in Italian diplomatic missions abroad.

(c) The opposition can hardly pretend to speak for all Italy and it is difficult to determine the exact measure of support which it enjoys even

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even in a liberated Italy although it is clear that it is considerable.
(d) An opposition might well regard themselves much more as liberated friends than as defeated enemies. They would naturally have to subscribe to all the Armistice and other conditions subscribed to by Badoglio, but subsequent dealings with them might be more difficult. The arguments in favour of the second course and against the first are as follows:

(a) We will be dealing with a government of known political leaders who will have more authority over, and influence on, the Italian people than the existing Government.

(b) The whole of the Centre and Left parties are now in opposition. Without intervention there will be a constant threat of trouble. If the Badoglio Government has to resort to force against the Centre and the Left a very bad impression will be made throughout the world. There are already indications that at any rate in America and Russia the Badoglio Government is looked upon as a weak, reactionary and almost neo-Fascist organisation.

(c) All recent evidence from Rome shows that the Rome leaders are already tending towards more extreme courses. The best way of keeping them quiet is by having a government of their friends already in office by the time that Rome is taken.

(d) The longer we postpone a solution the more difficult is it likely to be to achieve one tranquilly and the more radical is it likely to have to be.

15. I would emphasize that in my opinion which is shared by all my responsible advisors here, it is necessary for us to take one course or the other. From the local point of view we are all agreed that the second presents greater advantages and less dangers to the Allied cause. What is still more important is that one course or the other should be approved by the Allied Governments without delay.

16. Only if the King should decide to abdicate voluntarily in response to the invitation of the Six Party Junta, will intervention be unnecessary. Should he refuse and should we decide to bring pressure to bear upon him the sequence of events is likely to be as follows. -

(a) The King abdicates in favour of the Crown Prince.

(b) The Six Parties have at last agreed that in order to secure the abdication of the King they are prepared to accept the Crown Prince as his successor.

(c) The Crown Prince would invite a suitable representative of the Six Parties to form a government. We might have to bring pressure to bear upon him to do so but I consider this very unlikely.

(d) A government representing the opposition would be formed. It is likely that such a government might call upon the new King to delegate to it certain of his powers but agreement on this point has not yet been reached by the Six Parties. That the new King would fail to accede to any request in this connection is most unlikely.

17. According to statements by leading members of the Six Parties such a government would be unwilling to dislocate administration by a ruthless and

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widespread purge but would confine itself to dealing severely with a few hundred only of the principal Fascists still at large. These leaders have also pledged themselves to produce much more vigorous assistance in the prosecution of the war against Germany than the present Government has been able to ensure.

18. The opposition leaders have also agreed categorically to leave the question of the ultimate government of Italy for decision by the Italian electorate after the whole of Italy has been freed.

19. The comparatively recent decision by the six Parties to accept the Crown Prince as successor to the King may well facilitate the question of the King's abdication and reduce the possibility of repercussions.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

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C O P Y

23

SECRET. CONFIDENTIAL

Naples, February 10 1944

TELEGRAM to the Honorable Cordell Hall, Washington
Right Honorable Anthony Eden, London
Mr. Molotoff, Moscow.

The following statements and considerations are the result of careful consultations with some of the most distinguished elements in liberated Italy, including high legal authorities and the Executive Junta. All join in our description of imminent danger and necessity of urgent decisions.

1 - The Bari Congress and the deep echo it has provoked throughout Italy have proved the will of the nation.

2 - The indignity of the king is acknowledged by all the Italians; and the so-called "monarchist" group staged at present are promoted by the pro-German and pro-fascist elements which are afraid that they will be held accountable for their political corruption and military crimes.

3 - The growing congenital weakness of the Badoglio government and its incapacity to solve any problem are equally proved.

4 - It is vain to hope that Italy finds again the moral forces needed to join the war against Germany which is our first duty - a war which a government issued of our free political parties might rapidly and successfully organize - if the Allies continue to admit a king and a government supported only by the elements which look to the king or his son as the alibi of their own pro-German and pro-fascist activities.

5 - We showed in Bari our moderation and our desire of political continuity by offering a compromise on the basis of the conservation of the monarchy until a final decision of the whole nation is legally reached, but on condition that the monarch and the gang around him are placed in the impossibility to go on plotting against the Italian freedom and - in spite of empty words - against the war effort which we want to put on the top of all our duties.

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6 - A juridical consultation which we have submitted to General MacFarlane proves that a delegation from the future king of all his powers to an extraordinary government or - we add as our personal opinion - to a Lieutenant general of the Realm or to a Regent (the appointment going to some highly respected private citizen) are consistent with our political traditions. It is true that if our past Kings have often delegated all civil powers they never delegated their military powers as this time it is essential that it is done for the safety of our freedoms and for a true war effort; but the present King did delegate all his supreme military powers to a criminal adventurer who used them for the worst anti-national of wars in 1940.

7 - By submitting a moderate solution based on our historical and even monarchical traditions we have done our duty. Now the duty of the Allies begins. Until now only a theoretical freedom of the Italians to decide has been admitted. But the Italians have no such freedom unless they resort to a revolution, which we want to avoid even for the sake of the war effort; the armed forces are only in the hand of the King and of the generals who betrayed the Allied cause last September.

8 - By delaying the solution of the Italian problem the Allies harm their own position because - by collaborating in Italy with dubious elements (and all are dubious since all served the Germans) they make deeper and deeper a confusion which amounts to a sabotage of the war.

9 - From their constant loyalty to the cause of the Allies, even when all present official Italy was branding them and their friends as "anti-Italians" - the two undersigned draw the certainty that their sincerity is not doubted. They have no personal ambitions, they think only of the honor of Italy and of an orderly democratic Europe. Ready to do anything for the victory of the

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democracies, they know that they may leave to General Macfarlane, who has a solid grasp of the situation, to inform the Allies of the shameful revealing incidents which show how urgent is a complete radical transformation; enough to remind the recent appointment as secret political adviser of the Badoglio government of a man (Balbo) who helped Mussolini to disrupt and cheat France in 1939 - 40; and the arrival in Naples and his reception by the highest authorities of a disreputable fascist military adventurer (Mussolini's brother) with the aim of confusing any action for war effort. Of such incidents General Macfarlane is fully informed and we confide that he is informed of something worse; the growing suspicion of the nation for the new governmental army which puts in key places some of the most insolent fascist officers of the past; nothing could be more harmful to the war effort; the Italians being afraid that a defeated gang of pro-German generals wanting to escape punishment and the reduction of our standing army (which will be the first decision of a free cabinet) uses the king as an alibi hoping to reduce Italy to the condition of defeated Spain after Cuba, a Spain with thousands of generals but with needs of future revolutions.

10 - Once the king (present or future) and the defeated gang around him enter the road of plots and intrigues there will be no limit to degradation and dangers. What happened with Badoglio who certainly went well at the beginning is a proof. With the present leaders Italy goes to a neo-fascism more dangerous than the old one because more hypocritical; the disintegration increases; the sense of the state is disappearing; nobody obeys; nobody believes. We rely on the Allies to make it possible for us to help their cause which is our cause. Only the Allies have the force - but force means responsibility and action.

(Beneditto Croce)

(Sforza)

5709

"B"

PROPOSALS FOR A SOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN CRISIS

The Congress of Bari has given proof to the world of the full political maturity of the Italian people, who are ready to discard temporarily every ideological fight in order to unite toward the common aim: make war. After that event, the Italian crisis could reach a solution, at one condition: that on both sides further sacrifices be made in order to attain a supreme harmony. Otherwise, all sides concerned will use their strength in a political conflict, and the war effort, which should be paramount, will suffer most from this state of affairs.

There is a possibility, we believe, of eliminating the present discord.

The points on which an agreement has already been reached are the following:

1) Necessity of an efficient Italian participation to the war. Such a necessity is proclaimed by both the "monarchists" and the people, and is exemplified by the daring fight put up by the patriots in the regions still occupied.

2) Advisability of postponing until the end of the war the solution of the institutional problem and the judgment on the responsibilities of the dynasty. Such a postponement - always claimed on the monarchist side - is accepted by the Committees of Liberation, because of the present impossibility of deciding the issue in a legitimate way.

3) Necessity of forming a serious government, which would unite all forces, regardless of the monarchical or anti-monarchical creed of the individuals concerned, for the war of liberation. Such a government should also provide for the most pressing needs of the populations, assuring them a minimum standard of life and restoring, mainly through moral prestige, the meaning of authority, now completely lost.

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The points on which an agreement has not yet been reached are the following:

1) On the "monarchical" side it is commonly assumed that the king has no co-responsibility in the past Mussolini government; and that anyway only the whole of the Italian people, legally assembled after Italy's liberation, will have the right to decide on such matters. The parties, on the contrary, affirm that the sovereign is fully co-involved in the responsibilities of the past regime, that the crown prince is heavily compromised too, having been among those generals more guilty of delivering the army to the Germans. Therefore the parties are asking the abdication

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of the king and the formation of an extraordinary government with full powers.

2) The "monarchists" want the king to constitute the new government with a representation of all parties. The parties, on the contrary, refuse any sort of collaboration with the king, and believe that the right to form the government rests only with the people, who can exercise it through representatives of all the anti-fascist parties, which interpret the general opinion of the country, or at least of a very great majority.

These being the only remaining grounds for disunity among the Italians, one must find a way to reconcile the opposed tendencies, by putting - for the time being - the king and his dynasty in a condition not to carry on personally and directly the regal powers, and by giving at the same time to the Italian people the kind of government they need and deserve.

The problem examined in constitutional terms.

A solution cannot be found in the letter of the Constitution. It is well known that the "Statute" was a royal act by which a king, who considered himself of divine right, granted his subjects the basic liberties required by their civic consciousness. It is only too natural that, due to this original character of the Constitution, no rule was foreseen, regarding the responsibility of the king as head of the state, nor regarding the way to ensure the loyal execution of the Constitution itself, with the one exception of art. 22, which imposes an oath on the king. And logically there are no provisions enabling the people to compel the king to observe the Constitution. Lacking written rules, we must make use of the spirit of the Statute, especially the one it has acquired following the free plebiscites by which the other peoples of Italy have declared their will to unite with the kingdom of Sardinia. On the strength of these plebiscites, by which it has been solemn-

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the ways to achieve them, and sufficient guarantees of liberty and legitimacy. But such a gap, explainable by the historical origin of the albertine and Italian constitution, cannot be interpreted as meaning that the 1848 constitution is intangible and that the people have no right to declare the decadence of the king, if guilty of attempting at their liberties.

To establish a legitimate procedure it is necessary to look into the spirit of the Constitution as well as in the customary precedents.

The spirit of the Constitution, so far as Italian unity is concerned, is that of a reciprocal entente. This entente cannot be broken arbitrarily by one of the two parties. It can be broken either by mutual consent, or by violation of the obligations thereof. Our Constitution does not provide for a body empowered to establish the existence of such a violation and to impose the respect of the statutory rules. All that is left then, as in all cases in which the law does not ensure the means of its own actuation is self-protection, a primitive weapon, but an effective one, used in a fully legitimate way throughout the whole history of civilization. Nevertheless the Italian people, conscious of the seriousness of the hour and of their duties toward the Allies, do not intend to have recourse to self-protection. One last possibility is left: that the king himself - who cannot deny the part played by him in the present ruin of Italy and of its traditional ideals of liberty and civilization - transfer to the people by a regal and spontaneous gesture the exercise of those powers the people had intrusted him with. The king should do this as any gentleman who, having received a mandate and a doubt having arisen as to his good use of it, submits to the mandatory party his acts for judgment, and suspends the exercise of his powers. Should we do the

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By doing so, the king would suspend all discussions around the monarchy until a constituent assembly in which monarchist members, if elected, would sit; he would also free the minds of the people, appeasing their fears of a political reaction and enable them to devote all their energies to the war.

Solution of the problem according to Law.

To reach this end the parties must stop all anti-monarchical, anti-king, or anti-prince activities; while the king and his successors must intrust temporarily the actual exercise of their powers to a body presenting full guarantees of impartiality and freedom. This temporary surrender of powers may take place by a sovereign act of ⁵⁷⁰delegation or by an intrustment - not foreseen by the Constitution but far from alien to its spirit

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and to the precedents of our public law. Indeed the Constitution does not forbid the king to delegate his powers in case of pressing necessity, and the possibility of such a delegation has always been recognized by our law: as far back as the Rimorgimento and at the time of our wars of independence the king used to appoint a lieutenant in exceptional cases; this was being done for the exigencies of war or for purposes of personal representation in newly annexed territories (1). These precedents are not mentioned here because of a desire to have a lieutenant created today, but to show that the kings of Italy always used liberally their delegatory power, even though it is not mentioned in the Statute (2).

It being proved that the king can delegate all or part of his powers, we must find a procedure for a similar delegation, enabling morally the government to act with assured firmness - and enabling the king and his house to assume a nobler and more dignified attitude than that presently chosen, while waiting for the free manifestation of the popular will.

Delegation of powers and the king's position.

The king should intrust his powers to an extraordinary body - with the express reserve that such a delegation does not impair his rights or those of his family to the throne of Italy, but is simply meant to enable the formation of a government with full powers. In granting such a delegation the king shall renounce the right of revoking said delegation for the duration of the war and of the works of the Constituent Assembly.

The delegation of powers will not modify the constitutional position of the king. Nominally he will continue to be the head of the State, laws and decrees will continue

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The delegation of powers will not modify the constitutional position of the king. Nominally he will continue to be the head of the State, laws and decrees will continue to be promulgated in his name; the same for judicial sentences and the naming of officials. National insignia will remain what they are. The inviolability of the king (art. 4 Stat.) will be maintained, same as the use of the royal palaces and of all liquid assets of the Crown, not to speak of all private property.

In short the delegation of powers will simply enable a temporary government to re-

- (1) In 1848 Carlo Alberto delegated all civil powers to Eugenio Carignano. In 1859 and 1866 Victor Emmanuel II did the same. In 1915 Victor Emmanuel III named Tomaso di Savoia his Lieutenant General for ordinary affairs and urgent matters (royal decree 25/5/1915 n. 659).
- (2) In 1849 V.E. II delegated the royal signature to the duke of Genoa (see for all this Marchi: "General Lieutenantcies in Italian constitutional Law").

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organize Italy and its war effort, and to prepare with complete impartiality and freedom the Constituent Assembly for the day circumstances and the Allied authorities will render it possible. The king would remain nominally and formally head of the State. But, urged by a high and disinterested feeling, with a sovereign act inspired by the best traditions of his predecessors, he would relinquish temporarily the powers he derives from a popular election, as a true gentleman whose reputation has been tarnished by a suspicion, and who wants to await the judgement of public opinion expressed in all impartiality and objectivity.

In reality the temporary delegation of powers will not seem so exceptional if one recalls the way the constitutional regime degenerated in the past twenty fascist years. The Italian government, in October 1922, stopped being a parliamentary one, first de facto, then de jure, and became responsible only to the king (L.24/1/1925, n.2263). This new type of government was held by some to be analogous to the monarchies of old or to the German empire. But there the head of the State was also the head of the government, or he had a chancellor - while here the head of the government, though theoretically responsible to the king alone, in reality carried out for twenty years the policies he chose, so much so that his powers could have come from a formal, total delegation by the king.

Still more: the highest of all regal powers, that of commander in chief of all armed forces (art. 5, Statute) was conferred by the king to the fascist duce. This was the supreme step on a long road of abdications of the constitutional rights and powers of the king.

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The delegated body.

Our public law records only the formula of the lieutenantcy, general or regional, for a set group of affairs. What is required now is the delegation of all civil and military powers. This step, seemingly very important, is in reality of lesser consequence and especially less dangerous than that taken under fascism. The king should realize that the people are not asking him too much when they request him to delegate temporarily his powers, that under fascism he had permanently transferred to the duce. This sovereign who for twenty years sanctioned all the violations of the Constitution and of all the Italian liberties, who accepted to submit the legal succession to the throne to a vote of the fascist Grand Council, this man, in a word, who had fully agreed to the absolutistic dictatorship of Mussolini, should not ~~refuse~~ ^{refuse} today to the Italian people, anxious to attain complete unity in this tragic hour, what he did not deny to a man who was promising the Italians only slavery and wars. The

democratic forces of Italy believe to have more of a right than Fascism to ask for a time today what was so lightly given away permanently yesterday.

Consequently nothing - constitutionally or juridically speaking - stands in the way of a delegation, by the king to an extraordinary government, of all powers including that of calling a Constituent Assembly at the end of the war. Politically and morally speaking this temporary delegation is a duty for the King, a fundamental contribution to unity for the common goal of waging war. The king has asserted that he wants to be the first to serve the fatherland: the political parties are pointing him a way to do so.

Constitutional consequences of the delegation.

The distinction, fundamental in all constitutional governments, between head of the State and head of the government, was almost entirely suppressed in fascist Italy. Must it reappear today? Most certainly yes; but in the only political climate in which it is possible, namely a parliamentary regime which would enable the free interplay of the parties and the normal succession of governments, and therefore legitimate the existence of a head of the State superior to all parties.

Today there is no Parliament, the Senate harbours the worst elements of fascism, the people are in the material impossibility of electing their representatives. At the present juncture the distinction between head of the State and head of the government is ephemereal, for the government being responsible only to the king, the fundamental rule of our public law - "the king reigns and does not govern" - becomes devoid of any practical significance. A government responsible to the king only, and not concurrently to a parliament, would indeed be nothing but "the king's go-

the State and head of the government, was almost entirely suppressed in fascist Italy. Must it reappear today? Most certainly yes; but in the only political climate in which it is possible, namely a parliamentary regime which would enable the free interplay of the parties and the normal succession of governments, and therefore legitimate the existence of a head of the State superior to all parties.

Today there is no Parliament, the Senate harbours the worst elements of fascism, the people are in the material impossibility of electing their representatives. At the present juncture the distinction between head of the State and head of the government is ephemeral, for the government being responsible only to the king, the fundamental rule of our public law - "the king reigns and does not govern" - becomes devoid of any practical significance. A government responsible to the king only, and not concurrently to a parliament, would indeed be nothing but "the king's government". As soon as such a government would depart from a line willed by the king, the latter would have no difficulty in dismissing it. In Italy, in the present situation, the interplay of free and representative institutions is no longer possible.

In short the temporary delegation of the regal powers not only would not really destroy the above distinction, but it would give the government that necessary independence towards the king, which would normally be assured by a freely working parliament, and which can only be assured, now, by the unanimous consent of the parties, interpreters of the will of the nation. The government being responsible not to the king, but to public opinion, such a responsibility might take the form of a responsibility to an assembly constituted along the lines of the Algiers national

570

- 7 -

consultative assembly. Such a body would answer for the acts of the government.

The other formula: the Lieutenantcy (or Regency).

A similar solution might be the creation of a general Lieutenantcy (or Regency). It would have the advantage of being closer to Italian constitutional precedents, but it would be less welcomed by the parties which would see in it a proof of the king's obstinate determination to interfere in the actual government of the State. Should this be the solution adopted, the lieutenant or regent would have to be a person of the highest moral prestige, of great personal authority - chosen outside the reigning dynasty - who would exercise the powers of the king in his name and in completely autonomous manner. The lieutenant or regent would appoint the government, to which full powers, necessary for the reconstruction of Italy, would be granted.

Outline of a law of delegation.

Here is, concretely formulated, a project of law which would bring about the much desired harmony of the nation, and would insure for the morrow a free reassembling of the country:

We, Victor Emmanuel III, by the grace of God and the will of the nation king of Italy, in all loyalty as king, in all affection as Italian, having pondered upon the grievous conditions in which our country has fallen, and the tragedies which have befallen our beloved Italy, moved by a fatherly feeling, anxious to see our unfortunate people reflourish under free civic institutions, conscious of the necessity for all the energies of the country to unite in the

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5702

have sovereignly decided to transfer temporarily our regal powers to a provisional government until the cessation of hostilities; this government will exercise them in our name and with our full preventive consent. Said government will promulgate the laws necessary for the people to freely express their will, and for the constitutional, economic and social asset of Italy. With the same spirit of complete devotion to the fatherland as our great ancestors, we shall partake with joyfull and fatherly feelings to the rebirth of Italy, inviting all citizens to unite around us and around the government delegated by us for this common sacred task.

With reference to the decrees of

1848;

1859;

1860;

6 of Nov. 1860;

1860; 9 Oct. 1870 n.5905; 2 of May 1915 n. 699;

23

- 8 -

With certain science, regal authority and having heard the advice of our Crown

Council, we have decreed and we decree:

Art. 1 Our regal powers are temporarily delegated to an extraordinary government (or to a "luogotenente generale straordinario", or to a Regent), which will exercise them in our name for the whole duration of the war (1).

Art. 2 At the end of the state of war and as soon as the clauses of the armistice (or of the peace?) will allow, the government will summon a constituent assembly freely elected by the people.

Art. 3 The assembly will be elected in the way prescribed by the laws which the extraordinary government can and will emanate in summoning the people.

Art. 4 The assembly will establish the Statute of the Italian State and the economic and social directives to be followed by it.

Art. 5 The assembly once summoned, the extraordinary government will delegate its powers to it, and will retain only the administration of ordinary affairs.

Art. 6 The delegation we have conferred to the government is, for the period of time established, irrevocable.

Art. 7 Nothing is changed in regards to the legal succession to the throne, to the guarantees of inviolability of the king, to the rights upon the properties of the Crown and of the private patrimony, to the titles of nobility, etc. The provisions concerning the oath of allegiance of the ministers, of the officials and of all the members of the armed forces, the national insignias and seals, the use of the national flag et similia, will continue to be in full force.

Art. 8 Until the dispositions of the new Constitution will be promulgated, the

Art. 5 The assembly once summoned, the extraordinary government will delegate its powers to it, and will retain only the administration of ordinary affairs.

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Art. 8 Until the dispositions of the new Constitution will be promulgated, the dispositions of the Statute of the 4th of March 1848 will continue to apply, insofar as they are compatible with the present provisions.

5701

All other dispositions in contrast with the above ones are abrogated.

(1) If the solution of the Lieutenantcy or of the Regency prevails, one should add to art. 1: "The lieutenant (or regent) will form a provisional government, in which all parties be represented; said government will be responsible to the lieutenant (or regent)."

• C •

From Sforze and Croce to the three Allied Foreign Ministers.

Naples, February 10, 1944.

Being in constant intimate touch with the six parties but being personally independent our appraisal of the situation might perhaps be useful.

Junta sent letter to King urging him abdicate immediately for nation's and war effort's sake.

Most probably King will not, unless he receives secret hint from Allies who alone have the force.

If abdicating in favor of his son, present Cabinet is obliged by our laws to resign at once into hands new king.

But no responsible statesman will accept form new Cabinet unless new king signs decree yielding all military civil powers to an extraordinary government or to a Lieutenant General of Realm chose among some most respected private citizens. A scheme communicated to General MacFarlane shows all this is consistent with precedents.

New king will accept at once this condition if same secret hint takes place being it understood that new rulers assure respect of national consultation of whole liberated nation. All this should seem imperative to Allies as to us because a second cabinet of Generals and officials would mean complete lack of popular support and because only a Cabinet including six parties may save Italy from growing disintegration and may start war effort. We two, for example, are decided not to join Cabinet on different conditions since silent acceptance of this compromise has been maximum reached from Leftist parties and since a minor formula would not be accepted North.

Necessary to form new Cabinet at once in order to avoid possible serious danger of two governments one in Salerno and one in Rome dreamed of by daring elements there.

First duties of new Cabinet:

1) To include only four or five Ministers each keeping various interims in order to make it easy and immediate a reshaping of Cabinet when in Rome.

2) To reaffirm not only most complete loyalty to armistice rules but add that supreme duty is to organize much more intimate collaboration than at present with Allies for war effort and future general policy.

3) In order to avoid depressing influence of defeated pro-Nazi generals, to create only one civilian Minister for National Defence with three military Under-Secretaries, the names of which are ready.

4) In order to create new war atmosphere to try and eliminate a

big military and civil fascists who betrayed last September but for give to all minor fascists urging them to rehabilitate in war.

5) Knowing that present big army is definitely rotten, to create only a small decent standing army South, and organize volunteers North which has never been done in a national form.

6) New Government is sure of its will because it knows it has no other means to assert itself and save Italy.

5694

File 0

11/2/44

Covering letter for
CC/G/44 and General's
memo on Political
situation in Italy
to General Wilson

2 copies with
Political Section
and
1 with General Alexander

NO copy retained for
our file

AI

5698

1104

(21)

23414A
Form 12B

W-1287

RADIO

2761

Signal Corps, United States Army

SECRET

Telegram

PRIORITY

Received at

PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

9 FEBRUARY 1944 19

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO (ACTION)

HQ ACMF FOR ALEXANDER EYES ONLY (FARGO PERSONAL
FOR MACFARLANE) EYES ONLY

INFORMATION: NONE

FROM

SIGNED CINC

DATE TIME SIGNED: 231954A

DATE TIME REL'D: 232414A ✓

REFERENCE IR: 49169

CITE

FIGGS



FOR YOUR INFORMATION THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS
HAVE NOT YET REACHED FULL AGREEMENT UPON ITALIAN POLICY EITHER FOR
THE IMMEDIATE PERIOD OR THE PERIOD AFTER THE CAPTURE OF ROME. IT HAS
NOT BEEN THOUGHT WISE TO SUBMIT THESE QUESTIONS TO THE ADVISORY COUN-
CIL UNTIL THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED ON A POLICY. FOR THE SAME
REASON I SHOULD BE GLAD IF DISCUSSION COULD BE AVOIDED AS FAR AS
POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT WITH THE VARIOUS ITALIAN GROUPS. THE BRITISH
RESIDENT MINISTER AND THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE HAVE AGREED THIS

COURSE

HEADQUARTERS

9 FEB 1944

AMG.

DATE FORWARDED: 081954A

DATE TIME RECEIVED: 092414A

REFERENCE NO.: 43169

CITE: FMJGS

0961-Genl, Italy

FOR YOUR INFORMATION THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT YET REACHED FULL AGREEMENT UPON ITALIAN POLICY EITHER FOR THE IMMEDIATE PERIOD OR THE PERIOD AFTER THE CAPTURE OF ROME. IT HAS NOT BEEN THOUGHT WISE TO SUBMIT THESE QUESTIONS TO THE ADVISORY COUNCIL UNTIL THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED ON A POLICY. FOR THE SAME REASON I SHOULD BE GLAD IF DISCUSSION COULD BE AVOIDED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESENT WITH THE VARIOUS ITALIAN GROUPS. THE BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE HAVE AGREED THIS COURSE.

ACC DIST:

PA to CC only

5695

Wm D. L.

PLW:GAL-A

13328

SECRET

20

Feb. 44

TRANSLATION

CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

To General Mason MacFarlane
Chief of the Allied Control Commission

Dear General MacFarlane,

In my letter of last December 17th, I informed your predecessor General Joyce that the Council of Ministers, on my proposal, had unanimously pronounced itself in favor of Italian adherence to the Atlantic Charter.

At the same time I begged General Joyce to have the courtesy to let the Allied governments know of this Italian initiative and to inform me at the fitting moment as to what procedure should be followed by us to bring it to a concrete conclusion.

Not having yet received from the Allied Control Commission any statement, I presume that there are no obstacles, that our unilateral declaration is sufficient and that special executive procedures are not required.

Before bringing it to the attention of Italian public opinion, I would however, like to find out, since, as you know, I lack any other means of ascertainment, if the matter belongs precisely within the bounds of good taste, as I presume it does.

It is superfluous to assure you that the question has for us evident importance.

Believe me, with cordial friendship

/s/ Badoglio

Pfc H. F. Jaekel - Transl.
/hjp

#383/2 prot.

5695

n° 383 di prot

Febbraio 1944



IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

AL SIGNOR GENERALE MASON MAC FARLANE
Capo della Commissione Alleata di
Controllo

S E D E

Caro Generale Mac Farlane,

con lettera del 17 dicembre u.s. informavo il Suo predecessore Generale Joyce che il Consiglio dei Ministri, dietro mia proposta, si era pronunciato all'unanimità in favore dell'adesione italiana alla Carta Atlantica.

Pregavo nella stessa occasione il Generale Joyce di voler cortesemente portare a conoscenza dei Governi Alleati l'iniziativa italiana e di volermi a suo tempo comunicare quale procedura dovesse essere seguita da parte nostra per concretarla.

Non avendo da allora ricevuta da parte della Commissione Alleata di Controllo alcuna indicazione, presumo non ci siano ostacoli, che la nostra dichiarazione unilaterale sia sufficiente e che non occorrono speciali procedure esecutive.

Prima di darne notizia all'opinione pubblica italiana desidererei comunque conoscere, poichè, come sa, mi manca qualsiasi altro mezzo di accertamento, se le cose vanno esattamente nei termini in cui presumo esse stiano.

E' superfluo Le confermi che la questione ha per noi evidente importanza.

Mi creda con cordiale amicizia.

Benito Mussolini 569

SECRET

FARGO 746

40

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

5th. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM FOR M.G.S. (FOR ATTENTION COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MR MACMILLAN AND CIVIL AFFAIRS) REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.C.M.F. (FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER) FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL.

Para One. The Executive Junta of the six parties represented at the recent Bari Congress came to see me this morning. They confined themselves to communicating to me the immediate tasks which had been entrusted to them by the parties which they represented. These were as follows. One. To secure the abdication of the King. Two. To prepare the formation of a government with full powers including some of those exercised by the heads of the State. Such a government would continue in office until such time as proper elections should be possible after the liberation of all Italy.

Para Two. Several speakers stressed the fact that they represented a large majority of the population of liberated Italy. That they represented those elements of the Italian people who had always been anti-Fascist. That it was self-evident that the King would never be able to form a broad-based government and that His Government was and inevitably must remain weak and without influence. That an unfortunate situation was

5693

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- - 2 - -

now being created in Italy by what amounted to a complete political deadlock. They emphasised the necessity for dealing with the situation with urgency as the speedy substitution for the King's Government of government by the parties which they represented would enable Italy to pull its weight in the common fight against the Germans much more effectively than at present.

Para Three. I made no comment on their statement beyond saying that the Allied Governments were being kept closely informed of the political situation in Italy. I undertook to forward to the Allied Governments the programme of which they had just informed me, together with their representations regarding the urgency of dealing with the situation. I made it quite clear that the tranquility of the country and its administration must be preserved.

Para Four. It would appear that the Executive of the opposition parties are considering taking active steps to endeavour to implement their programme. It seems equally clear that they are uncertain as to the tactics they should adopt. They would

5692

- - 3 - -

appear also to be anxious to obtain some idea of the views of the Allied Governments on the political situation in general and on the tactics they might safely adopt. That the situation regarding the views of the Allied Governments in these respects requires clarifying with some degree of urgency is becoming daily more apparent.

5691

18

SECRET

FARGO 669 ✓

FARGO

1 FEBRUARY 44

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE ✓

PRIORITY

PHRECON

SPORZA ASKED TO SEE ME LAST NIGHT PD HE WAS VERY FULL
OF THE MODERATION AND ORDERLY CONDUCT OF THE ~~CONFERENCE~~ ^{BARI CONFERENCE} PD HE TOOK MOST OF THE
CREDIT FOR THIS HIMSELF PD PHRASE PARKS FARGO ~~MACFARLANE~~ ^{FROM} MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARKS TO AFHQ
FOR MGS FOR MACMILLAN AND FOR MURPHY PD CITE FARGO SIX SIX NINE PD HE STATED THAT IT
WAS HIS INFLUENCE WHICH HAD PREVENTED A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A REPUBLIC IN PLACE
OF THE MONARCHY PD HE HIMSELF HAD WISHED TO PASS A RESOLUTION DECLARING THE CROWN
PRINCE UNFIT TO SUCCEED THE KING AND HE STRESSED THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS STILL IN
FAVOR OF A REGENCY PD HE HAD HOWEVER WITHDRAWN HIS MOTION AT THE REQUEST OF RODRIGO
AND THE CATHOLICS PD GROCE AND HE HAD BEEN URGED TO TAKE OFFICE IN THE EXECUTIVE
JUNTA PD THEY HAD REFUSED AS THEY THOUGHT THAT ~~THEIR~~ ^{THEIR} STEADYING INFLUENCE WOULD BE
GREATER AS ELDER STATESMEN OUTSIDE THE JUNTA PD THE ONLY REASONABLY WELL KNOWN
MEMBER OF THE JUNTA IS TEDESCHI OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY PD SPORZA TOLD ME THAT THE
EXECUTIVE JUNTA DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO PRECIPITATE MATTERS AS A RESULT
OF THE CONGRESS RESOLUTIONS PD AS YOU WILL SEE FROM SPORZAS TELEGRAMS WHICH I AM
SENDING YOU SEPARATELY BY AIR THE EXECUTIVES ~~THE~~ ^{THE} CONGRESS ARE MAKING GREAT PLAY
OF THE FACT THAT ONLY LIMITED RADIO FACILITIES WERE PERMITTED TO THEM

J. F. NICKES 5693
Lt. Col., AGD,
Adjutant General.

SECRET

17

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

1 February 1944.

Harold MacMillan, Esq.,
British Resident Minister,
Algiers, Algeria.

I enclose herewith telegrams for Congress, to House of Commons, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which Sforza gave me last night and would like forwarded as soon as possible.

I also enclose two telegrams from Sforza and Croce to Cordell Hull, Eden and Molotov which he has also asked me to forward.

You will remember me mentioning these to you, and I think it wise that you should see them before dispatch.

HOWEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant General,
Chief Commissioner.

Note

H. Caccia group

that copies of these

telegrams were not retained

aff

2 Haines

5689

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION HAC/dnd

APO 394

Ref. No. 650.1

1 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Captain Stone

file #1
Many thanks for your memorandum of 28 January about telegram No. 25700 of 8 January giving a new political directive from the combined chiefs of staff. So far as we know, no action has been taken to communicate the substance of the directive to the Italian Government. The reason was that we did not take it as something to be passed on to the Italian Government as a formal communication. We took it to be a guidance to ACC-AMS in judging what to encourage or discourage in their day to day dealings with the Italian Government.

Unless you have strong reasons for thinking otherwise, we should be inclined therefore to continue to treat this directive as for internal consumption.

Handwritten signature: Harold Caccia

Political Section

File 5
5688

apt. 15
15

RESTRICTED

FARGO 582 ✓

602

26

FARGO

30 JANUARY 44

RESTRICTED

10050 EASTARLANE

URGENT

file
#13

AFHQ FOR CGS, CIVIL AFFAIRS, AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER RPTD
HQ ACFT FOR INFO FATIMA REAR FOR INFO

My Fargo 589 Jan 29 refers. The 6 Party Congress at Bari has today unanimously accepted a compromise program, which calls for (a) The prompt creation of a Government to include representatives of all the 6 parties and endowed with the powers necessary at this critical period. (b) The creation of a Constituent Assembly as soon as hostilities cease. (c) The abdication of the King. The Congress then voted to establish an executive committee composed of representatives of all parties for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing aims. It was further agreed that the present situation does not allow the immediate solution of the institutional question, but the Congress considered that the King's abdication was an essential condition of the unification of Italian effort. This compromise was reached after the Christian Democrat and Liberal parties refused to accept the program put forward by the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties. It is expected that the Congress will adjourn shortly with a resolution to reconvene within 30 days at which time it is hoped Rome may be freed. Please inform Ransigli and Vishinsky

5687

L.F. NICKER,
Lt. Col. ASD
Adjutant General

RESTRICTED

14

FARGO 589

FARGO
URGENT
SECRET

29 JAN 44
10050 MACFARLANE

FREEDOM (ACTION) FILPOT (Info) FATIMA (REAR) (Info)

THE BARI CONGRESS MET YESTERDAY UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF ALBERTO **GIANCA** PD PENTASE PAREN FARGO FOR MACFARLANE PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CGS CMA CIVIL AFFAIRS CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER RPTD FILPOT FOR INFO FATIMA REAR FOR INFO PD CITE FARGO FIVE EIGHT NINE PD IN THE OPENING ADDRESS CMA CROCE CRITICISED THE KINGS POSITION AND THE TENDENCY ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN IN POWER QUOTE PERSONS OF A FASCIST TENDENCY UNQUOTE PD HE ADMITTED HOWEVER THAT THE ANTI DASH FASCISTS CMA WHILE DEPLORING THE WAR HAD TAKEN QUOTE GREAT CARE NOT UTTER A WORD THAT COULD DISCOURAGE OUR SOLDIERS UNQUOTE PD NEW PARA PD THE SOCIALIST DELEGATE FROM ROME CMA LONGOBARDI PAREN SEE MY FOUR EIGHT NINE OF JANUARY TWO FIVE PAREN BROUGHT A MESSAGE FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION IN ROME WHICH REFERRED TO THE FIGHT IN WHICH THE COMMITTEES OF LIBERATION IN OCCUPIED ITALY WERE ENGAGED WITH ALL THEIR STRENGTH AGAINST THE INVADER AND HIS FASCIST SERVANTS PD IT WAS THEN STATED THAT IN THIS FIGHT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE EITHER TO ORGANIZE THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE NATION OR TO CONTRIBUTE TO RESISTANCE IN OCCUPIED ITALY PD THEREFORE IT MUST DISAPPEAR AND AN EXTRAORDINARY GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL LIBERATION SHOULD BE CREATED TO ASSUME ALL CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE STATE WITHOUT ENDANGERING NATIONAL UNITY AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FREE EXPRESSION OF THE POPULAR WILL AS REGARDS THE INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION THUS ENABLING ITALY TO WAGE THE WAR AND TO INSURE ITS OWN FUTURE PD NEW PARA PD BASED ON THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE ROME PARTIES CMA PROPOSAL OF THE ACTION CMA SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES WAS THEN PRESENTED TO THE CONGRESS WHICH MAINTAINED THAT SINCE THE FAILURE TO FORM A NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT RESTS SOLELY WITH THE KING AND THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT CMA THE THREE PARTIES WERE ACTING AS INTERPRETERS OF THE QUOTE UNANIMOUS UNQUOTE WISH OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE IN PUTTING FOR

568 THE FOL-

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-2-

FARGO 589

LOWING PROGRAM CLM NEW PARA PD FIRST CLN INASMUCH AS KING VICTOR EMMANUEL HAS NOT ABDICATED CMA A BILL OF INDICTMENT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT CMA BASED ON ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE STATUTES WHICH HE HAS COMMITTED CMA SHOULD BE DRAWN UP PD SECOND CLN THE CONGRESS SHOULD PROCLAIM ITSELF THE REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF LIBERATED ITALY AND RECONVENE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ROME CMA COMPLETING ITSELF WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OTHER PROVINCES IN ITALY AS LIBERATED CMA TO SIT IN PERMANENCE UNTIL THE FORMATION OF A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PD ITS TASKS WOULD BE CLN PAREN A PAREN TO PROCEED TO THE FORMATION OF AN EXTRAORDINARY GOVERNMENT WHICH UNITS THE POWERS OF THE DISSOLVED PARLIAMENT AND OF THE CROWN CMA TAKING CARE TO GIVE IT IMMEDIATELY A WIDE BASE PD PAREN BAKER PAREN TO INTENSIFY THE WAR EFFORT PD PAREN CHARLIES PAREN TO ENSURE THAT NO ONE TAKES AWAY NEWLY WON LIBERTIES PD NEW PARA PD THIRD CLN MEANTIME AND UNTIL THE LIBERATION OF ROME CMA AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR LIBERATED ITALY SHOULD BE APPOINTED PD PAREN ONE PAREN TO PERFORM ALL ACTS NECESSARY TO ATTAIN THE AIMS EXPRESSED IN PAREN BAKER PAREN AND PAREN CHARLIE PAREN ABOVE PD PAREN TWO PAREN PD TO REPRESENT THE ITALIAN PEOPLE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND PAREN THREE PAREN TO CARRY OUT CMA ON THE BASIS OF MASS ACTION TO BE IMMEDIATELY PROMOTED IN FORMS WHICH THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE WILL ITSELF DECIDE CMA THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE CONGRESS AND THE VERIFICATION OF ITS POWERS PD PAREN FOUR PAREN QUOTE MEASURES NECESSARY TO COMPENSATE THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO ALLEVIATE THE FOOD SITUATION CMA ELIMINATE UNEMPLOYMENT AND DESTROY THE BLACK MARKET UNQUOTE SHOULD BE TAKEN THROUGH THE COMMUNAL CMA PROVINCIAL AND TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS ESTABLISHED BY ANTI DASH FASCISTS IN LIBERATED TERRITORY PD NEW PARA PD BEFORE ANY ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE CONGRESS ON THE PROPOSAL CMA IT WAS DECIDED THAT TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH OF THE PARTIES SHOULD MEET TO PREPARE A DEFINITE PROGRAM TO BE ACCEPTED UNANIMOUS-

5685

13

FARGO 589

-3-

LY PD THIS GROUP WAS TO MEET LAST NIGHT AND TO SUBMIT ANY AGREEMENTS
TO THE CONGRESS TODAY FOR ITS APPROVAL PD NEW PARA PD THE CONGRESS
LIKEWISE ADOPTED MESSAGES OF GREETINGS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GOVERNMENTS
CMA THE TEXTS OF WHICH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WHEN RECEIVED OFFICIALLY PD
ACCORDING TO ALL REPORTS NO DISORDERS TOOK PLACE DURING THE FIRST
DAYS MEETING PD NEW PARA PD PLEASE INFORM THE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN
MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE FOREGOING PD THE RUSSIAN MEMBER
RETURN TO ALGIERS TODAY

568

185A

SECRET

FAROO 579

FAROO

28 JANUARY 1944

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE ✓

PRIORITY

10

FATIMA REAR

LETTER'S YOURS OF ^{TWO SIX} ~~THIRTY~~ JANUARY PD MANY THANKS
PD FORWARDED PAPER FROM MACFARLANE PAREN TO FATIMA REAR PERSONAL FOR STONE PD
CITE FAROO FIVE SEVEN NINE PD ONE PD HAVE SIGNED AND AM RETURNING SHORTER OF
ALTERNATIVE LETTERS TO MESSER PD TWO PD LETTER ABOUT MARI AND PETER WILLIAM
BAREN ENCLOSEURE GIVEN TO ECCOLA PD THREE PD HAVE ASKED FOR ORDERS RE SOLDARELLI
PD FOUR PD GENERAL SOLODOVNIK SHOULD COME TO NAPLES PD FIVE PD HAVE PRESSED
FOR RETURN SELECTED ITALIAN PETER WILLIAM OFFICERS PD ASK DUCHESNE PRODUCE
SHORT LIST OF MOST URGENT CASES PD REFERENCE BATTLESHIPS PD YOU SHOULD REPLY
IN THREE YOU SUGGEST PD I HAVE DEALT WITH KING'S POLITICAL INTENTIONS PD HAVE
SIGNED AND AM RETURNING LETTERS TO MESSER RE POINTS OF LACOE MEETING PD
BROOKLIE HAS JIBBED BADLY AT PETER WILLIAM AGREEMENT PD WILL TELEPHONE YOU
TODAY PD AM RETURNING ALL YOUR PAPERS.

*Copy to
McFarlane*

L.F. NICKEL, 568
Lt. Col. AGO
Adjutant General

SECRET

(12)

EW3/hjp

28 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Caccia

folio #1

There is no record in this office to indicate that the substance of the attached telegram No. 25700 dated January 8th has been communicated to the Italian Government. Will you arrange for this or shall I, and if the latter, what channel would you suggest?

ELBERT W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief of Staff

1 Incl:

As above

5682

(3) a 2

(11)

U. S. SECRET
Remains British SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

LWS/cfe

26 January 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: General MacFarlane

Re the attached. I had a very satisfactory interview with Reali who assures me that:

1. Although the application to the Earl Prefect for the holding of a meeting stated that the meeting would be concluded on January 28th, he would advise the committees tomorrow that the government had no objection to its continuing over to the following day or to the 30th, if this were necessary in order to conclude their deliberations, and word will also be given to the Gazzetta Del Mezzogiorno to that effect.
2. The typhus regulations will not be enforced against delegates to the convention.
3. A rigid application of the 90 persons limit will not be followed; that is to say, that an additional 10 to 20 persons will not be challenged.
4. Orders have already been issued that Italian guard troops will not patrol the streets but will be kept in barracks until such time as they are called out by Brigadier Fulmer in aid of the Carabinieri.

Real! is going to Bari tomorrow to button up all loose ends and will call on Brigadier Palmer. I will appreciate it if you will pass this on to Harold Caccia.

Many thanks. PWB appoints themselves as go
between to ensure success. On what
authority?

E.W.S.

Mi Caccia

E.W.S. like
Conville better
Lander better

Wm 2, 2p

U. S. SECRET

Table 1. *Continued*

568
Pl. returned
me 15 answers. (10)

SECRET

FARGO 498 ✓

12

FARGO

25 JAN 44

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE ✓

PRIORITY

Wm 76 21

FREEDOM IN AOMF (INFO)

IN AN EFFORT FURTHER TO STRENGTHEN HIS GOVERNMENT CMA
BADOGLIO RECENTLY ASKED THE LEADERS OF THE SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES IN NAPLES
TO SERVE IN THE CABINET UNTIL ROME COULD BE FREED AND A NEW GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED PD
BOTH REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SITUATION AS REGARDS THE KING HAD NOT ALTERED
SINCE BADOGLIO'S PREVIOUS REQUESTS TO THE PARTIES IN OCTOBER AND THEY SAW NO REASON TO
COMPROMISE THEIR POSITION IN REGARD TO THE KING FOR THIS INTERIM PERIOD PD IT IS
UNDERSTOOD THAT AN APPROACH WAS ALSO MADE TO THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WHO MIGHT HAVE
ACCEPTED IF IT COULD HAVE BEEN AGREED TO SUBSTITUTE HERBERT FOR HIS FATHER PD PENDING
PARAN FARGO PERSONAL FROM MACFARLANE PARAN TO AFHQ FOR MOS RPT HQ ~~ACMF~~ AOMF FOR INFO
PD CITE FARGO FOUR NINE EIGHT PD NEW PARA PD CONVERSATIONS WITH BADOGLIO AND PARTY
LEADERS IN NAPLES PRIOR TO THE BARI MEETING INDICATE THAT CMA WHEREAS THERE HAS BEEN
SOME TENSION FOR FEAR LEST THIS FIRST FREE POLITICAL MEETING IN TWENTY YEARS MIGHT
LEAD TO DISORDERS CMA THE GOVERNMENT IS RESOLVED TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER AND THE
MORE RESPONSIBLE PARTY LEADERS TO AVOID ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT PREJUDICE THEIR FUTURE
POSITION PD SPEECH WILL BE FREE BUT SFORZA ASSURES US THAT HE AND CROCE WILL USE THEIR

568

9

SECRET

CONTINUED

INFLUENCE TO KEEP THE MEETING IN LINE AND PRESERVE THE AGREED POLICY THAT NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE WILL BE MADE UNTIL THE ENTIRE COUNTRY IS FREE TO MAKE ITS OWN CHOICE PD IT IS CLEAR CMA HOWEVER CMA THAT THE TEND OF THE MEETING WILL DOUBTLESS BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE PERSON OF THE PRESENT KING AND HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW UNTIL AFTER THE WAR PD PAREN SEE MY TWO ONE ONE FIVE JANUARY TWO FOUR FROM FATIMA PAREN PD NEW PARA PD THREE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ROME COMMITTEE HAVE ARRIVED TO TAKE PART IN THE DELIBERATIONS BEARING A MESSAGE FROM THE COMMITTEE PD IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS MESSAGE RECAPITULATES THE OCTOBER ONE SIX DECLARATION WHICH CALLED FOR THE FORMATION OF AN EXTRAORDINARY GOVERNMENT TO ASSUME ALL CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE STATE PD THIS PHRASE IS PURPOSELY VAGUE SINCE IT SEEMS THAT THERE IS NOT FULL AGREEMENT AMONG ALL MEMBERS OF THE ROME COMMITTEE WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ITSELF ASSUME THESE POWERS OR WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE DELEGATED TO IT BY THE MONARCH PD NEW PARA PD IT HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED WHO WILL PRESIDE CMA BUT THE MEETING WILL OPEN WITH AN INAUGURAL ADDRESS BY CROCE PD EACH OF THE SIX PARTIES COMPOSING THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES REPRESENTED AT THE CONGRESS WILL HAVE ONE VOTE PER LOCALITY

L. F. NICKEL
Lt. Col., AGO
Adjutant General

5679

SECRET

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

A. P. O. 512

25th January, 1944.

General Mason McFarlane,
Allied Control Commission,
BRINDISI.

In view of the obstacles put in the path of the Bari Congress
the following points are submitted for your consideration.

Lt. Col. A. Lander.

Lt. Col. A. Lander, I.C.

C.C. P.W.B. Bari.

In view of the obstacles put in the path of the Earl Congress
the following points are submitted for your consideration.

Qu. handler.

Lt. Col. A. Lander, I.C.

C.C. P.W.B. Bari.

5678

8

pm

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

A. P. O. 512

Bari Congress (2)

9. Further instances of obstruction can be reported: - the "Idea Libérale" the organ of the Demo-Liberal or Government Party, submitted a proof of the number of January 23rd to P.W.B. Press Chief, Mr. Picard, who strongly objected to two articles. One of these attacked Bari Radio, designating it as "Londra Bari Radio" (in imitation of the nickname Berlin-Roma Radio which we use in our propaganda), while the other violently attacked the Congress announcing at the same time that the Demo-Liberal Party would hold a counter Congress of 90 anti-fascist liberals, also to take place on January 28th.

The Editor was told to suspend publication until the C.O. 6th Base Sub Area had been consulted. P.W.B. were informed by Major Rhys Roberts that No. 6 Base Sub Area would not tolerate this rival congress which they considered a provocative move. If the Demo-Liberals desired to hold a congress, they could do so at a later date. It should be noted that this Party had already, on January 5th, held a Congress attended by over 300 persons and addressed by four Under-Secretaries of the Badoglio Government.

10. P.W.B. Press Chief consequently informed the Editor of the "Idea Libérale" that in the interests of public order the counter-congress could not be held on the date mentioned and that the article announcing this congress had to be suppressed. The Editor had to admit that the paper had already gone to press. P.W.B. then ordered the suspension of the whole issue. The leaders of the party suggested that the paper should appear with the word "annulled" printed across the suppressed article in red ink, thereby drawing still more attention to it. This suggestion was, however, rejected. Eventually the paper appeared without the article.

11. On the morning of January 25th the Prefect of Bari, LiVoti, published in the Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno an ordinance prohibiting the entry into the city of travellers from Naples by train or car, unless they were provided with a health certificate. In the absence of such a certificate, the travellers would be subjected to quarantine and prophylactic measures.

The object of this belated concern of the Prefect for the health of Bari is obvious. It is a blatant effort to stop the delegation from Naples. Other

The Editor was told to suspend publication until the C.O. 6th Base Sub Area had been consulted. P.W.H. were informed by Major Rhys Roberts that No. 6 Base Sub Area would not tolerate this rival congress which they considered a provocative move. If the Demo-Liberals desired to hold a congress they could do so at a later date. It should be noted that this Party had already, on January 5th, held a Congress attended by over 300 persons and addressed by four Under-Secretaries of the Badoglio Government

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11. On the morning of January 25th the Prefect of Bari, Livotti, published in the *Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno* an ordinance prohibiting the entry into the city of travellers from Naples by train or car, unless they were provided with a health certificate. In the absence of such a certificate, the travellers would be subjected to quarantine and prophylactic measures.

The object of this belated concern of the Prefect for the health of Bari is obvious. It is a blatant effort to stop the delegation from Naples. Other measures of an exaggerated alarmistic nature have been the disarming of troops, their confinement to barracks and the stoppage of shore leave for the Navy.

Conclusion. It is clear that the Government is making every effort to sabotage the Congress by raising every obstacle which can be imagined by trying to spread in the minds of the Allied Military Authorities the idea that the wildest excesses are bound to occur.

In this connection it may be well to point out that the only threat to Bari Radio and to the Offices of the Gazzetta (where incidentally ~~The~~ Union Jack and ~~The~~ British Army News are printed) come from the monarchist circles.

In view of the moderate and orderly attitude adopted by the Congress parties in waiving their right to public demonstration, out of regard to considerations of public order and out of deference to Allied Authorities, P.W.E.

recommended that the Congress be allowed to carry out the arrangements agreed to by General Gazzera's Chief of Staff and 5th Base Sub Area, i.e.

- i. no public demonstrations at the opening or close of the Congress;
- ii. the Congress to last 28th and 29th January (the second day is not open to the public);
- iii. the sacred number of 90 refers only to delegates;
- iv. entrance to the theatre for supporters, correspondents, Allied Officers (officially interested) shall be permitted by ticket.

We consider that any demands made by the Questore in regard to names or the number of Allied journalists or Officers present is entirely out of his province.

Autograph.

Lt. Col. A. Lander, I.C.

C.O. P.W.B. Bari.

Distribution:

1. General Mason McFarlane
2. G.O.C. No. 2 District
3. G.O.C. No. 6 Base Sub Area
4. P.W.B. Algiers
5. File

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

A. P. O. 512

25th January, 1944

CONGRESS OF THE ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

BARI

1. On the 17th December 1943 the Congress of the Italian political parties, which was due to be held in Naples, was forbidden by the Allied Military Government on the grounds that Naples was too near the enemy lines.

2. Allied Headquarters subsequently gave permission to hold the Congress a month later in any other town; Bari was selected. In an interview with Cecil Spriggs Marshal Badoglio stated that he had put no obstacles in the way and concluded with the following words: "I consider it necessary that all political parties should have the opportunity of putting forward their points of view".

3. Preparations were then made for the Congress, at the same time the most fantastic rumours were spread with the obvious intention of alarming the public and persuading Allied Military Command to forbid the Congress.

4. In order to allay public fears and to create a peaceful atmosphere, P.W.B. approached the organising Committee, who, recognising the difficulties of the local Allied Commander, at once agreed to abstain from any public demonstration either at the opening or the close of the Congress.

5. This arrangement was made public in the "Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno" of 22 January. On January 23rd the same paper published a declaration by Brigadier Palmer, welcoming the Congress and their intention not to use their right to a public demonstration, while announcing his determination to stop all disorder, from whichever quarter it may arise.

6. On January 20th General Gazzera arrived in Bari with full powers over the province and he immediately began to order troops to the city.

1. On the 14th December 1943 the Congress of the Italian political parties, which was due to be held in Naples, was forbidden by the Allied Military Government on the grounds that Naples was too near the enemy lines.

2. Allied Headquarters subsequently gave permission to hold the Congress a month later in any other town; Bari was selected. In an interview with Cecil Spriggs Marshal Badoglio stated that he had put no obstacles in the way and concluded with the following words: "I consider it necessary that all political parties should have the opportunity of putting forward their points of view".

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6. On January 20th General Gazzera arrived in Bari with full powers over the province and he immediately began to order troops to the city. The Officer Commanding No. 6 Base Sub Area disagreed with all these measures which he considered unnecessary and provocative.

7. On January 24th an agreement was reached between General Gazzera's Chief of Staff and Major Rhys Roberts, representing the C.C. 6th Base Sub Area. The text of this agreement is attached. The organisers of this Congress were notified and accepted all the terms of the agreement. 5671

8. On January 25th the "Questore" summoned the organisers and informed them of the dispositions taken by General Gazzera. These were in complete disagreement with the arrangements in para. 7 and the organisers rejected them. mentioned

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

OUTGOING

YRM/hjp

7/24 8
2119

JAN 24 0901A

SECRET

Priority

FATIMA

FREEDOM RPTD PARKS RPTD FILPOT

I SPOKE TO BADOLIO TONIGHT REGARDING THE URGENT NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING ORDER IN BARI ON TWO EIGHT JANUARY WHEN THE POLITICAL MEETING TAKES PLACE PARKS R. FREEDOM RPTD F. RPTD FILPOT PERSONAL FROM MAGFARLANE FROM FATIMA PARKS THERE HAVE BEEN MANY RUMORS AND EVEN FORECASTS FROM OFFICIAL QUARTERS THAT DISTURBANCES ARE LIKELY PD BADOLIO ASSURED ME THAT HE HAD TAKEN EVERY POSSIBLE PRECAUTION AND THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THAT LAW AND ORDER WOULD BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY PD ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE BY A RECENT MEETING IN BARI OF THE ITALIAN C C BRIGADS CMA THE COMMANDER OF THE CARABINIERI CMA THE PREFECT AND THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR PD THERE WILL BE AMPLE FORCES OF CARABINIERI AND POLICE AVAILABLE PD ADMISSION TO THE MEETING WILL BE LIMITED TO DELEGATES ONLY WHO MUST PRODUCE THEIR CARDS PD THE RECENT ANNOUNCEMENTS BY OUR LOCAL BASE AREA COMMANDER HAVE HAD A GOOD EFFECT PD COMMENT PD I STRESSED THE FACT THAT ANY MAJOR TROUBLE IN BARI ON THE EVE OF THE RETURN OF ITALIAN TERRITORY TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT FAIL TO HAVE A MOST DEPLORABLE IMPRESSION ON THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD I THINK MYSELF THAT THE DANGER OF SERIOUS DISTURBANCES IN BARI DURING THE MEETINGS HAS PROBABLY BEEN MINIMIZED

AUTHENTICATED:

Dist: Col. Spafford
Political Section
Adm. Div. (2)

F. M. HANSEN MAJ GEN
Lieutenant General
Deputy President

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2 - AG Files
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7

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OUTGOING

✓
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6/24
2118

JAN 290900H

SECRET

Priority

FATIMA

FREEDOM RPTD PAROD RPTD FILPOT

I ASKED MADUGLIO TONIGHT WHETHER HE APPROVED REALE APOSTOLPHE'S RECENT STATEMENT TO
REUTERS REPRESENTATIVE THAT THE KING OF ITALY WOULD ABDICATE WHEN THE RIGHT MOMENT
CAME PD PAREN TO FREEDOM RPTD PAROD RPTD FILPOT PERSONAL FROM MACFARLANE FROM FATIMA
PAREN MADUGLIO SAID HE CONSIDERED THE STATEMENT MOST UNFORTUNATE AND IMPROPER AND
HAD SPOKEEN FURCHELY TO REALE ON THE SUBJECT

AUTHENTICATED:

F. H. MACKIN MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Deputy President

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201- King of

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6

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U.S. SECRET

OUTGOING

FMA/djp

5/24 4
2117

JAN 29 0856A

SECRET

Priority

FATIMA

FREEDOM RPTD FILPOT RPTD FARGO

DURING INTERVIEWS THIS EVENING BOTH THE KING AND BADOLLO URGED VERY STRONGLY THAT THEY MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO ENTER ROME AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT AFTER THE ALLIES OCCUPY IT PD PAREN TO FREEDOM RPTD FARGO RPTD FILPOT PERSONAL FROM MACFARLANE FROM FATIMA PAREN BOTH DECLARED THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE KING SHOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH LEADING POLITICIANS IN ROME AND ENDEAVOR TO FORM A BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT PD BADOLLO AGAIN AFFIRMED THAT HE CONSIDERED THAT HIS TASK WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WHEN HE ENTERED ROME WITH THE KING PD HE HAD NO INTENTION OF REMAINING IN OFFICE ONCE HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED THIS BUT ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD ALWAYS REMAIN LOYALLY AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE ALLIES PD I TOLD BOTH THE KING AND BADOLLO THAT THE QUESTION OF ARRANGING FOR THEIR ENTRY INTO ROME AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION

AUTHENTICATED:

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Deputy President

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U.S. SECRET

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567

5

SECRET

OUTGOING

SECRET

Priority

FATIMA

FREEDOM RPTD FARGO RPTD FILFOT

3/24

2115 ✓

JAN 240858A

THE SECOND DOCUMENT PRODUCED BY THE KING CONTAINED A SUMMARY OF HIS POLITICAL INTENTIONS IN SEVEN POINTS PD FROM THE FREEDOM RPTD FARGO RPTD FILFOT PERSONAL FROM MACFARLANE FROM FATIMA PAREN THESE WERE AS FOLLOWS PD ONE PD THE PRESENT CABINET WILL REMAIN IN CHARGE UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT RETURNS TO HOME PD TWO PD AS SOON AS HOME IS FREED FROM THE GERMANS OR A NEW CABINET SHALL BE FORMED ON A WIDE BASIS INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PARTIES AND WITHOUT PARTICIPATION OF MEN IN ANY WAY COMPROMISED WITH FASCISM PD THREE PD WITHIN FOUR MONTHS FROM THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE A NEW CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES SHALL BE ELECTED PD FOUR PD PARLIAMENT WILL FREELY DISCUSS OUR INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEED TO ALL REFORMS HOWEVER FAR REACHING THEY MAY BE PD FIVE PD THE PEOPLE WILL BE CALLED TO FREELY EXPRESS THEIR WILL AND SHALL THUS BE THE SUPREME MASTER OF THEIR DESTINIES PD SIX PD THE CROWN WILL FAITHFULLY FOLLOW THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AS EXPRESSED BY THE FREELY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATION PD SEVEN PD ANY DIFFERENT LINE OF CONDUCT WOULD JEOPARDISE AT THIS DELICATE JUNCTURE THE AUTHORITY AND RIGHT AND POWER OF THE STATE AND CONDITIONS WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE FIGHT AGAINST THE GERMANS AND THE REMNANTS OF FASCISM PD THE KING WAS MOST ANXIOUS THAT THIS PROGRAM SHOULD BE BROADCAST OR OTHERWISE PUBLISHED BEFORE THE CONFERENCE AT BARI PD HE SUGGESTED THAT HIS PROGRAM SHOULD BE ISSUED AS INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM A RELIABLE AUTHORITY IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE KING PD FOR SOME REASON WHICH REMAINED OBSCURE HE WAS ANXIOUS THAT THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE ISSUED IN THIS WAY

*Sent from
Brindisi*

SECRET

(4)

OUTGOING RADIO TO FREEDOM RPTD FARGO RPTD FILPOT (CONTINUED)

AND NOT BY HIMSELF PD I TOLD HIM THAT IT SEEMED PREFERABLE TO ME THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD BE ISSUED DIRECT FROM HIM PD BUT HE INSISTED THAT HE PREFERRED THE METHOD HE HAD SUGGESTED AND I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD FORWARD HIS SUGGESTION

AUTHENTICATED:

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Deputy President

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U. S. SECRET
EQUALS D. L. 1001 SECRET

5671

4

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U.S. SECRET
SECRET

OUTGOING

FMB/RJP

2/24

2119

SECRET

Priority

FATIMA

FRANCE RPTD FARGO RPTD FILFOT

JAN 240845A

THE KING ASKED ME TO SEE HIM THIS EVENING PD IN THE COURSE OF A LONG ^{CONVERSATION} HE
HANDLED ME TWO DOCUMENTS PD PAREN TO FREEDOM RPTD FARGO RPTD FILFOT PERSONAL FROM
NACFARLANE FROM FATIMA PAREN I AM FORWARDING THESE BY AIR PD THE FIRST DOCUMENT
DEALS WITH FOUR POINTS PD ONE PD A COMPLAINT THAT OUR BROADCASTS FROM LONDON GIVE
NAFLES AND BART GIVE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO NEWS AND ITEMS UNFAVORABLE TO THE
KING AND HIS GOVERNMENT PD THE KING MADE A LENGTHY COMPLAINT REGARDING THE PARTIALITY
OF OUR BROADCASTS IN FAVOR OF HIS OPPONENTS PD I ASSURED THE KING THAT IT WAS OUR
INTENTION TO ENSURE THAT OUR BROADCASTS WERE IMPARTIAL BUT THAT THE SUPPLY OF
MATERIAL FROM HIMSELF AND HIS GOVERNMENT WAS VERY HEAVY IN COMPARISON WITH THAT
PRODUCED BY HIS OPPONENTS PD CURRENT PD IF HAVE ALREADY TAKEN UP THIS QUESTION LOCALLY
WITH FNB PD TWO PD THE NECESSITY OF DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BEFORE REACHING ROME
TO ENSURE THE FORMATION AND IMMEDIATE FUNCTIONING OF A SOUND POLITICAL GOVERNMENT PD
THREE PD THE NECESSITY FOR CONTRADICTING RUMORS THAT THE KING WAS OPPOSED TO LEAVING
TO THE ITALIAN PEOPLE THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE WHATEVER FORM OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
THEY MIGHT DESIRE AFTER THE PEACE PD FOUR PD THE NECESSITY FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE
ENTRY INTO ROME BY THE KING PD SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM

AUTHENTICATED:

5670

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1 - Encl. 111

Sent from Brindisi

F. N. MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General
Deputy President

(3)

Subject: Italian Political Congress

SECRET AND URGENT

6084/182/1/G

24 January 1944

General Gazzera

Presso il Comando IX Corpo d'Armata

In confirmation of today's discussion between GSO.II of this HQ and Sonto Capo di Stato Maggiore of your staff, the following points were agreed and adopted. A translation is attached for easy reference.

1. That all the guarding, picketing and patrolling in public were to be done by Carabinieri patrols; assisted where necessary (for the control of Allied troops) by Allied Military Police.
2. That all guard troops, both Allied and Italian, will be kept off the streets, out of sight and IN THEIR BARRACKS until such time as they are called out by this HQ in aid of the Carabinieri.
3. That on the 28th of January, for the purpose of unity of command, all reports and communications will be sent to this HQ, where a senior Italian Liaison Officer may be attached for the purpose of passing operational requirements to your HQ.

4. That no troops will be employed in keeping order unless and until assistance was called for by the Carabinieri and the Police. Moreover, if it was necessary to call out troops in aid of the Carabinieri, no force of arms would be used except as a last resort.

5. That General Gazzera's suggestion that the number of people admitted to the public meeting of the Congress should be limited to 90, referred only to the delegates and did not include the additional visitors such as members of the Press, P.W.B., Allied Forces...etc. However, no persons would be admitted to the hall, unless in possession of an official invitation card, a specimen of which would be available to both Headquarters and to the Carabinieri.

6. At the specific request of the Captain of the Carabinieri, in order to facilitate his work, and on the recommendation of General Gazzera, it was agreed that traffic should be diverted from the block in which

called out by this HQ in aid of the Carabinieri.

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6. At the specific request of the Captain of the Carabinieri, in order to facilitate his work, and on the recommendation of General Gazzera, it was agreed that traffic should be diverted from the block in which the Piccini Theater is situated, including that part of the Corso Vittorio Emanuele in front. For the purpose of this traffic diversion, signs would be prepared and put into position by the Allied Military Police.

5664

Brigadier,
Cmdr. 6 Base Sub-Area.

✓ THE/BTM

Copy to CC.MR.

2 District; OC British Columbia Dragoons; OC Can Comp Reg, RA

27-1

L'anno 1944 il 25 Gennaio nella R. Mestura di Bari

Davanti al sottoscritto Funzionario è presente il Sig. Avv. Michele Cifarelli, Segretario del Comitato organizzatore del Congresso del 28 e.s., al quale si dà comunicazione di quanto ha disposto S.E. il generale d'armata, incaricato straordinario per l'ordine pubblico nella provincia di Bari:

- 1) Presentare subito il modello delle tessere d'invito e l'elenco dei giornalisti invitati a presenziare il congresso;

- 2) Il Congresso deve aver luogo soltanto il giorno 28 Gennaio e concludersi nella giornata.

- 3) L'intervento al congresso deve essere limitato alle sole 90 persone già delegate e ai giornalisti già autorizzati.

Circa la presenza al congresso di Ufficiali alleati le Autorità Militari Italiane prenderanno accordi direttamente col Comando Inglese.

PER PRESA VISIONE: firmato CIFARELLI

Circa la presenza al congresso di Ufficiali alleati le
Autorità Militari Italiane preferanno accordi direttamente
col Comando Inglese.

per presa visione: firmato CIFARELLI

566

(2)

(2)

U. S. SECRET equals British MOST SECRET

INCOMING

/war

SECRET

38/8

PRIORITY

25700

FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE PUNNY

Jan 081256A

FATIMA, PARCO, FABIE, FILPET RPTD INC FOR BEARS FOR ROGERS

Jan 062355A

New Political Directive from combined chiefs of staff to CINC follows:

1. "Within your discretion, the Italian people may be permitted to participate in such political activities (other than fascist) as do not lead to rioting and disorder"
2. "These will include the right of peaceful assembly attendance at meetings of political committees, publication and distribution of political works and such other activities of similar nature as you may determine to be advisable"
3. "Upon their release, political prisoners shall be cautioned that political activity on their part which gives rise to or tends to give rise to rioting and disorder will not be tolerated".
4. "To insure a similar liberal policy, the Allied Control Commission should also see that the Italian Government permits similar freedom of political activity in the portions of Italy which are restored to Italian jurisdiction".

Instructions end here. They supersede all earlier instructions dealing with the same matters.

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG
1 - Diary
1 - Gen Taylor) INFO
1 - Mr. Gaccia)

5667

U. S. SECRET equals British MOST SECRET



1142