

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

10000/101/406

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

000/101/406

HQ, ACC, SECRETARY GENERAL'S OFFICE
POLITICS (2)
FEB., MAR. 1944

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490)
Revised July 26, 1948

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1.

POLITICS (2).

TOP SECRET

B
SECRETARY
GENERAL'S
OFFICE

8-0705

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM	DATE	TO	SYNOPSIS
62) CC/P/120	GEN. MACFARLANE	1 MAR. 44.	BADOLLO	(CONVEYS PRIME MINISTER) THOMAS HAS BEEN
63) 49, 400 07	BRIG. GEN. PENCE	1 MAR. 44.	CHIEF COMMISSIONER	REQUESTS ACTION FOR ABANDONMENT OF STRIKE INTERFERING WITH WARTIME INSTAURATIONS.
64) FATH 1471	GEN. MACFARLANE	1 MAR. 44.	GEN. WILSON	REASONS OF MEETING WITH THOMAS REACTS. STRIKE NOT TO BE RESUMED. AGREES TO FURTHER MESSAGE TO ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.
65) FATH 1476	GEN. MACFARLANE	1 MAR. 44.	GEN. WILSON	THOMAS OF THOMAS HAS BEEN TO D.C.
66) —	GEN. MACFARLANE	2 MAR. 44.	GEN. MACFARLANE	REPORTS ACTION OF CARRIAGES IN TERMS OF CARDS OF STRIKE NOTICE.
67) FATH 1523	GEN. MACFARLANE	2 MAR. 44.	GEN. WILSON	REPORTS CONTENTS OF PRINTED MATERIAL. SUGGESTS 'COUNCIL' ACTION TO BE TAKEN.
68) FATH 1527	GEN. MACFARLANE	2 MAR. 44.	FREEDOM	GEN. WILSON INFORMED THAT SITUATION IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH THOMAS (RE. NO. 71).
69) FATH 1530	GEN. MACFARLANE	2 MAR. 44.	GEN. WILSON	SITUATION DISCUSSED WITH ALEXANDER - EVIDENCE OF PARTY LEADERS CONSIDERED LEFT CHANCE. REPORTS HAD ON SITUATION WERE. I WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR FURTHER NEWS.
70) REE 122(002)	GEN. MACFARLANE	2 MAR. 44.	BRIG. GEN. A. W. PENCE	REASONS OF B.M.G. THAT STRIKE WILL BE CALLED OFF.
71) 121(000.1)	GEN. MACFARLANE	2 MAR. 44.	SECRETARY OF PARTY OF ACTION, SOCIALIST COMMUNIST	NOTIFICATION OF ARMS FACILITIES FOR CARRYING OFF THE STRIKE.
72) FREEDOM 59358	GEN. WILSON	3 MAR. 44.	GEN. MACFARLANE	ABANDON OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN SINCE STRIKE BE HELD.
73) —	HEADS OF PARTIES.	3 MAR. 44.	GEN. MACFARLANE	VIEWS OF THOMAS PARTIES (RE. NO. 71).
74) FATH 1609.	GEN. MACFARLANE	4 MAR. 44.	FREEDOM GEN. WILSON, THOMAS REINHARDT	MEETING WITH ALEXANDER HEADS OF PARTY LEADERS. PREPARATION OF LEAD. ADMINISTRATION SANCTION GIVEN FOR PARTY MEETING. ALEXANDER'S APPROVED BY R.C. NO. 71.
75) FATH 1610	GEN. MACFARLANE	4 MAR. 44.	GEN. WILSON, THOMAS REINHARDT	TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE PUBLIC (RE. 74).
76) FATH 2430	GEN. MACFARLANE	4 MAR. 44.	GEN. WILSON	INTERVIEWED THOMAS BADOLLO. THOMAS TO RESUME. AGREES TO WITHDRAW HANDS WITH CERTAIN AT. OFFERED OF HANDING OVER OF ITALIAN PART.
77) FREEDOM 60398	GEN. WILSON	5 MAR. 44.	BYRON GEN. ANCHING	COORDINATION ACTION TAKEN. QUANT POLITICAL GUIDANCE.
78) —	—	5 MAR.	—	RE BADOLLO'S REMAINS IF FOR PARTY IS HANDLED OVER TO RUSSIA.
79) FATH 1643	GEN. MACFARLANE	5 MAR.	YES ONLY GEN. WILSON	ASSISTANCE FOR OFFICIAL TEXT OF INDIVIDUAL STATEMENT BE RECEIVED QUICKLY. WILL BE URGENT TO PREPARE BADOLLO WITH RUSSIA.
80) FATH 1643	V. CALICE	6 MAR.	GEN. MACFARLANE	REINHARDT RESPONSE TO DISAGREEMENTS ACTIONS IN NORMAL AUTHORITY OF WILSON IN HANDS.
81) FREEDOM 60899	GEN. WILSON	7 MAR. 44.	GEN. MACFARLANE	TELL BADOLLO REASONS OF FIRST THOMAS (RE. NO. 71).
82) FATH 1110	GEN. MACFARLANE	8 MAR. 44.	GEN. WILSON	(RE. NO. 71) AM INFORMING CARRIAGES ALEX. THAT PRESIDENT'S REMAINS IN DISAGREEMENT. BADOLLO STILL BEING CONSIDERED EXPLANATION.
83) FREEDOM 21620	GEN. WILSON	8 MAR. 44.	GEN. MACFARLANE	RE. INSTRUCTIONS TO THOMAS REAGREEMENT TO EFFECT THAT NO CHANGE COMING. IN DISAGREEMENTS TAKEN WITH THOMAS. GEN. WILSON HAS BEEN DISCUSSING GEN. WILSON. (RE. NO. 71) TWO TIMES. SAME TO BE RE. RADIO DISAGREEMENTS OF ONE PART IN THOMAS. BADOLLO.
84) 121(121/000.1)	GEN. MACFARLANE	8 MAR. 44.	GEN. ALEXANDER	—

Instructions.—When papers on a subject become numerous, they should be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

TOP SECRET

5306

Q. M. C. Form 358 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1948

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1

POLITICS (2).

TOP SECRET

8-4711

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
40) 55576	GEN. WILSON	21 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	SUBSTANCE OF PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN HOUSE OF COMMONS.
41) 55581	GEN. WILSON	21 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	NO PROTECTION TO FREEDOM.
42) PAR 1257	GEN. MACFARLANE	23 FEB. 44	GEN. WILSON	REPORTS SOLDIER'S SAY (CHATELAIN, STAFF) DISAPPOINTMENT ON PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN HOUSE OF COMMONS.
43) NP 526/PNOT.	BADOLLO	23 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	I HAVE SENT (VIA AIRMAIL) TO PRIME MINISTER — GEN. MACFARLANE.
44) CC/P/92	GEN. MACFARLANE	23 FEB. 44	COUNT SPARKS	INTERVIEW RE: READER OF THE INFORMATION FOR PARSED IN CONFERENCE TO THE FREEDOM.
45) PAR 1270	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 FEB. 44	FREEDOM	FORWARDING BADOLLO'S REPORT (RE - NP 43).
46) CC/P/93	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 FEB. 44	GEN. WILSON	ASKS FOR FREE PRESS IN CONTACT WITH POLITICAL LEADERS. SUGGESTS A MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TO EXPLAIN SITUATION.
47) CC/P/94	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 FEB. 44	BADOLLO	ASSURES BADOLLO THAT HIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED (RE - NP 43).
48) PAR 1291	GEN. MACFARLANE	24 FEB. 44	FREEDOM FOR C.I.C.	REPORTS OUT BY AIRMAIL. SPARKS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN APPROVAL. DISAPPOINTMENT OF ACTION WITH FREE PRESS. ASSIGNED OF GEN. WILSON'S NAME. LITTLE POINT STRONG INTER.
49) PAR 1292	GEN. MACFARLANE	25 FEB. 44	FREEDOM FOR C.I.C.	REPORTS ACTION 9 THRU. FROM SPARKS. LEADS FROM OR TO. TO DISCUSSION OF RESIDENTS' PROBLEMS.
50) CC/P/97	GEN. MACFARLANE	25 FEB. 44	GEN. WILSON	ENCLOSURE SPARKS' LETTER & COPY OF TELETYPE TO A. T. CHATELAIN. FURTHER ADVISES IN THEIR WITH SPARKS.
51) CC/P/98	GEN. MACFARLANE	26 FEB. 44	COUNT SPARKS	HAVE FORWARDED A COPY (RE - NP 43) OF MY TELETYPE TO MR. CHATELAIN.
52) PAR 1302	GEN. MACFARLANE	26 FEB. 44	GEN. WILSON	I HAVE NOT RECEIVED SUBSTANCE OF THE KING'S DECISION (RE - NP 36). I FEEL I SHOULD LET YOU KNOW.
53) PAR 1302A	BADOLLO	26 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	ASKS FOR PARTICIPATION OF THEM IN ADVISORY COUNCIL.
54) CC/P/102	GEN. MACFARLANE	27 FEB. 44	GEN. WILSON	ENDS MESSAGE. RE. BADOLLO'S LETTER (RE - NP 36) ASKS FOR STATEMENT TO BADOLLO.
55) ALBERT TEL.	FREEDOM	27/2	CARLIS	PRIME MINISTER ACKNOWLEDGES BADOLLO'S MESSAGE (RE - NP 43).
56) DEC. QUANTA	CHATELAIN	29 FEB. 44	A. C. C.	ENCLOSURE MESSAGE FOR A. T. CHATELAIN. EXECUTIVE QUANTA.
57) 57951	GEN. WILSON	29 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	APPROX TO CIRCULATE TO RESIDENTS. A MESSAGE (RE - NP 36) IN ITALY. MESSAGE HANDLED TO GEN. WILSON.
58) 58004	GEN. WILSON	29 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	QUOTES INFORMATION TO BE HANDLED TO SOLDIER'S (RE - NP 36). ADV. COUNCIL FOR ITALY INFORMED.
59) PAR 1442	GEN. MACFARLANE	29 FEB. 44	FREEDOM	FOR. SPARKS INFORMED LEADERS OF 3 PARTIES. INTEND TO HOLD 15 THRU. STAFF IN MINUTES BY 1944. Q. INTEND TO INFORM LEADERS IN QUANTA THIS CANNOT BE REUNITED. IN MY ACTION (CARLIS & A. T.) STATEMENT 29/2.
60) CC/P/118	GEN. MACFARLANE	29 FEB. 44	GEN. ALVAREZ	ENCLOSURE COPY OF TELETYPE TO FREEDOM (RE - NP 36) ADVISES TO HAVE ADVISORY COUNCIL AT JAVIER TRADING. RETURN INFORMATION TO ADVISORY COUNCIL. ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JAVIER TRADING.
61) 58250	GEN. WILSON	29 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	ANSWER TO JAVIER TRADING NOT TO BE TRANSMITTED. ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JAVIER TRADING.

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form.

TOP SECRET

58250

127(000.1)

~~TOP SECRET AND PRIVATE.~~

FNEB/rj

8th. March, 1944.

I enclose herewith copies of two telegrams which I sent to A.F.H.Q. yesterday.

2. I have little doubt that the Russians intend to take very considerable interest in this theatre and their infiltration is likely to increase. From my latest talks with Bogomolov and Golodovnik I gain the very clear impression that the Russians disapprove of our support of the Badoglio Government and they appear to think that we are not giving the opposition a fair deal. I think equally that they are unlikely to confine themselves to criticism and that we may expect their increasing number of representatives in this country to give the opposition the benefit of their support and advice.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Harold R. Alexander, GCB, CSI, DSO, MC,
COMMANDEER-IN-CHIEF,
HEADQUARTERS, A. C. M. F..

5824

(84)

SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION - INCOMING MESSAGE

CLASS: SECRET

PREC: PRIORITY

FROM: WILSON

TO: MACFARLANE (PERSONAL FOR HIS EYES ONLY)

W/C NO: 31/08

REF NO: 61570

081250A :FILED

RECD: 001425



file #81

REF MY 61489 OF 7 MARCH. (PERSONAL FOR MASON MACFARLANE FOR HIS EYES ONLY FROM WILSON SIGNED CINC CITE PHOCS.) ONE. YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION NOW ALSO INFORM BADOGLIO THAT THE PRIME MINISTER INTENDS TO MAKE^A STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO THE EFFECT THAT AT PRESENT NO CHANGE IS CONTEMPLATED IN THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES. PART TWO. FOR YOUR INFORMATION THE TEXT OF THIS STATEMENT IS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT.

ACC DISTRIBUTION:
Secy Gen

kw *5* *28*

No Other Dist

SECRET

582 *(83)*

8 MAR
1945

SECRET

FATIMA 1103

NF

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMB)

8th. March, 1964.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

SECRET

URGENT

folder #81
Relieved by [signature]

YOUR MESSAGE OF ONE FOUR EIGHT NINE TO PARIS TO ADVISE FOR GENERAL BILSON FOR HIS INFO
ONLY FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAPER

PART ONE PD I HAVE INFORMED ALEXANDER AND CUNNINGHAM TO BEWARE IN INFORMING PRINCE THAT REPORTS OF INCIDENT'S REMAINS ARE INACCURATE ET. THIS WILL HELP TO DEAR THE PAROLE TO KNOW THAT PAROLE REQUIRES IN DETERMINING CONCRETE TO WHICH HE CAN GIVE PUBLICITY IT UNLESS THE SITUATION DEMANDS I DO NOT WISH TO SEE PAROLE MYSELF UNTIL I HAVE SOMETHING OFFICIAL AND CONCRETE TO TELL HIM PD

PART TWO PD IT IS NOW FOUR DAYS SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT RE ITALIAN ARREST AND APPREHENSION REMAIN GREAT BUT I DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DEVELOPMENTS FROM RECEIPT OF OFFICIAL EXPLANATION PD I SINCERELY HOPE IT WILL ARRIVE SOONEST POSSIBLE

L.T. MONTAGU JR
2 Lt. AGO
Actg. Adjutant.

5822

SECRET

82

Form 123D 072129A

N-1141

CABLE

SECRET**Signal Corps, United States Army
Telegram****URGENT**

GPO 8-10008

Received at PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER7 MARCH 1944 19

- SECRET
- URGENT

TO (ACTION) : CG PBS FOR PERSONAL MASON MACFARLANE FOR HIS
(INFORMATION): EYES ONLY
NONE

FROM : WILSON SIGNED CINC

DATE TIME SIGNED: 071930A

DATE TIME REC'D : 072129A

REFERENCE NR. : 61489

DATE : FHCOS

WHILE I HAVE STILL NO OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS AS TO REPLY
TO BE MADE TO BADOGLIO, YOU CAN INFORM HIM THAT REPORTS HE HAS
RECEIVED OF PRESIDENTS REMARKS ARE INACCURATE. FOR YOUR OWN
INFORMATION WE CAN TELL YOU THAT NO TRANSFER HAS BEEN ARRANGED.

*Action Hq acc
Info Secy
- C. G.*

*Alas
Cinc not
informed*

*Disbursed
Unit 3*

5821

SECRET

Naples 6 March, 1944

To General MacFarlane
Chief of Allied Control Commission
Naples

We submit to you a copy of a communication which the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties have sent to the Risorgimento in response to the article which appeared in that paper on March 5th under the title of "Normale ritmo di lavoro a Napoli nella giornata di ieri." (Normal rhythm of work in Naples during the day, yesterday)

Respectfully yours,

The Action, Socialist and Communist Parties
Signed V. Calace

~~Political Section~~

Any comments?

Wm J. Sp
3

Commented only to General

MacFarlane 2 weeks 5880

This signed dear the 2013

*

THE ACTION, SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES COMMUNICATE:

8 Mar 1964
JLH

A communication from evidently official sources identically as is transmitted by radio and in the columns of the Risorgimento, informs that during the day of Saturday March 4, the rhythm of work was normal.

It is not easy to understand how else the rhythm of work could be when the Directorates of the three Parties had adhered to the Allied injunction ordering appropriate working masses to desist from the all ready decided stoppage of work for ten minutes and when this decision had been given ample publicity even through the Risorgimento of March 4th.

Still more incomprehensible appears the difficulty given in the newspaper in sending an appropriate editor who is not limited to extract the information in question, but has, directly--so says the communication--written a report which ignores, among other things, from whom it is requested and to whom it is directed.

Still less justifiable is seen the attitude of the Allied Military Command which, after having pleaded insistently with the initiatory parties of the demonstration to prevent the stoppage, today believes it necessary, opportune and permissible to defend the publication of a communication which, affirming the normalcy of work at Naples which was the logical result of the deliberation of March 4 of the three Parties, would tend, in substance to demerit the possibilities of action of those political organs which instead, so justly, had concerned the same Allied Command up to the time of the agreement.

As for the statements, then, of the writer responsible for the writing of the report in the Risorgimento of March 5th, the Parties do not logically believe it possible to engage in polemics with individuals who, by family and personal traditions have, for more than twenty years, been accustomed to use lies and obedience as the only means for life, action and success.

6 March 1964

5819

80

Napoli 6.3.1944

HO ACC
L. MARINIS
D.F.E.

AL GENERALE MACFARLANE

CAPO DELLA COMMISSIONE DI CONTROLLO ALLEATO

N A P O L I

Vi mandiamo copia di un comunicato che i partiti d'Azione, Socialista e Comunista hanno inviato al "Risorgimento" in risposta alla notizia di cronaca apparsa in quel giornale il 5 corr. del titolo "Normale ritmo di lavoro a Napoli nella giornata di ieri." -

Con ogni osservanza. -

p. i. Partito d'Azione, Socialista
e Comunista
V. Caluso
000.1

5818

(80)

Il Partito d'Azione Socialista e Comunista comunicano:

6 MAR 1977
DFE

Un comunicato di evidente fonte ufficiosa come che trasmesse, identico, per radio e dalle colonne del "Risorgimento", informa che "nella giornata di sabato 4 corr. il ritmo del lavoro fu normale".

Non è facile comprendere come diverse potesse essere il ritmo del lavoro quando le direzioni dei tre Partiti avevano aderito all'ingiunzione allentata ordinando alle proprie masse operaie di desistere dalla già decisa astensione dal lavoro per dieci minuti e quando a tale decisione era stata data ampia pubblicità anche attraverso il "Risorgimento" del 4 marzo.

Ancora più incomprensibile appare la pena data dal giornale nell'inviare un proprio redattore il quale non si è limitato a distillare un'informazione in preesistente ma ha, addirittura, a quanto informa il comunicato, vergato una "relazione" che si ignora, peraltro, da chi richiesta ed a chi diretta.

Meno giustificabile ancora si rivela l'atteggiamento del Comando Militare Allente che, dopo avere insistentemente pregato i partiti iniziatori della manifestazione di desistere da essa, crede oggi necessarie, opportune e lecite, il patrocinare la pubblicazione di un comunicato che, affermando quella normalità di ritmo del lavoro a Napoli che era la logica conseguenza del deliberato del 4 corr. dei tre Partiti, tenderebbe, in sostanza, a svalutare le possibilità di azione di quegli organismi politici che invece, tanto giustamente, avevano preoccupato le stesse Comande Allente fino al momento dell'accordo.

Quanto, poi, alle affermazioni del giornalista ingaggiato per la stesura della "relazione" di cui al Risorgimento del 5, i Partiti non credono, logicamente,

000-1

pubblicità anche attraverso il Risergimento del 4 marzo.

Ancora più incomprensibile appare la pena data dal giornale nell'inviare un proprio redattore il quale non si è limitato a distillare un'informazione in preposate ma ha, addirittura, a quante informa il communicate- ver- gata una "relazione" che si ignora, peraltro, da chi richiesta ed a chi diretta.

Kene giustificabile ancora si rivela l'atteggiamento del Comande Militare Alleato che, dopo avere insistentemente pregato i partiti inizisteri della manifestazione di assistere da essa, crede oggi necessarie, opportune e lecite, il patrecinare la pubblicazione di un communicate che, affermando quella normalità di ritme del lavoro a Napoli che era la logica conseguenza del deliberato del 4 corr. dei tre Partiti, tenderebbe, in sostanza, a svalutare le possibilità di azione di quegli organismi politici che invece, tanto giustamente, avevano preoccupato le stesse Comande Alleate fino al momento dell'accordo.

Quanto, poi, alle affermazioni del giornalista ingaggiato per la stesura della "relazione" di cui al Risergimento del 5, i Partiti non credono, logicamente, possibile la polemica con individui che, per tradizione familiare e personale, sono, da molte più di un ventennio, adusi ad adoperare la penna e l'essequio come unici mezzi divita, d'azione e di successo.

~~PARTITO DIAZIANI~~

~~PARTITO SOCIALISTA~~

~~PARTITO COMUNISTA~~ 5817

6 marzo 1944

SECRET

FATIMA 1643

NP

FATIMA (CON MACAPALAN & COON)

5th. March. 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACAPALAN

URGENT

URGENT

PART ONE PD IT IS STILL NEARLY CERTAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BALOGLIO SHOULD CONTINUE
IN OFFICE IN THE MEANTIME TO KEEP TO AND RUN ONLY GENERAL WILLIAM SNA MARINE AND
RAD HEADQUARTERS ACME EYES ONLY GENERAL ALEXANDER
REINFORCE FROM FATIMA FROM MACAPALAN GENERAL SNA IN THIS CASE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT AN
OFFICIAL SENT AND IF NECESSARY AMPLIFICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT SHOULD BE
IMMEDIATELY FURNISHED PD IF NOT COME SUCH CLARIFICATION I DUBIT IF I SHALL SUCCEED IN
DISSUADING BALOGLIO FROM RESIGNING PD I MAY FAIL. BUT IF PD SUCCESS DEPENDS UPON ITS
CONTENTS IT

PART TWO PD SHOULD BALOGLIO RESIGN WE WILL AT ONCE BE FACED WITH POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES
PD IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE KING MIGHT SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR AS A
PROTECTOR IN FAVOR OF THE CROWN PRINCE PD WHETHER HE DOES THIS OR NOT I MUST KNOW WHAT
ACTION THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WISH ME TO TAKE AS USUALLY I TAKE ACTION AT ANY DATE TO THE
EXTENT OF BEING THE WISHES OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS KNOWN HE HAS THE RIGHT OF GREAT
CONFIDENCE PD I MUST KNOW WHETHER IN THE GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES I SHOULD PERSIST FOR A
CONTINUATION OF THE BALOGLIO GOVERNMENT WITH SOME OTHER MEMBER OF THIS GOVERNMENT AS
PRIME MINISTER OR WHETHER I SHOULD LEAVE WHATEVER MAY BE THE KING TO SUSPEND A RE-
5815

Stallings

1643

- - 2 - -

OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT WITHOUT BADOLLO MIGHT WELL PROVE
DANGEROUSLY NEAR IT

PART THREE PD I SHALL NATURALLY DO MY UTMOST TO STOP BADOLLO FROM RESIGNING BUT
I DO WANT YOU TO REALISE THAT IF I FAIL I MUST KNOW WHAT THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WISH
TO HAPPEN PD I MAY HAVE TO ACT VERY QUICKLY IN THE INTERESTS OF LAW AND ORDER AND IF I
RECEIVE NO DIRECTIVE I SHALL HAVE TO CARRY ON AS I THINK BEST

Subsequent Cables:-

*From Freedom, Cables nos 60388, 61489, and 61670, all
held by General Macfarlane.*

5815

L. S. NORTON JR
2 LT AGD
Actg. Adjutant.

79

*78
by [unclear]*

*↑ from [unclear] Radio (as [unclear] agency, Moscow.)
(Italian [unclear])*

Badoglio and his Government intend to resign if they do not receive satisfaction concerning Roosevelt's announcement that a third of the Italian fleet will be transferred to the Soviet Union because no responsible government could continue to exercise its functions in the present situation. The Government circles communicate that Badoglio has decided to resign Monday if he does not receive further details.

Circles of the Badoglio Government state that the Head of the Allied Control Commission, General MacFarlane, was called by Badoglio Saturday on Badoglio's own request and communicate that MacFarlane himself had expressed surprise at Roosevelt's announcement. The Badoglio Government and its Cabinet assert that the division of the Italian fleet would obviously be a special slight for King Victor Emmanuel who is entirely responsible for the surrender of the fleet to the Allies. Badoglio said that only a small part of the fleet actually is at present free in Italian harbours principally in Taranto.

*no action
PWB put a "stop" on this 78
Wm 581 [unclear]*

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE

SVC/RELAY NO.

M/C NO : 19/05

CLASS: SECRET

REF NO: 60388

PREC : URGENT

FILED : 051524L *March*

FROM : FREEDOM

REC'D : 051534A

TO : FATIMA

file # 76

Announcement a complete surprise here. FOR MACFARLANES EYES ONLY FROM WILSON
CITE PHOOS REFERENCE 2420. Your action correct. Keep Beloglio in play. Expect
political guidance.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MOST SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION OUTGOING MESSAGE FNMM/hjp

SVC/RELAY NO.

CLASS: MOST SECRET

PREC : URGENT

FROM : FATIMA

TO : FREEDOM RPTD HQ ACMF

M/C NO :

REF NO :

FILED :

REC'D :

MARSHAL BADOGLIO ASKED ME TO SEE HIM THIS MORNING PD PAREN TO FREEDOM FOR EYES
ONLY OF GENERAL WILSON CMA REINHARDT AND MAKINS REPEATED TO HQ ACMF FOR EYES ONLY
OF GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL FROM FATIMA PAREN PART ONE PD HE WAS
MOST UPSET AT PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT APOSTROPHE S STATEMENT REGARDING THE ITALIAN
FLEET PD HE STATED THAT THIS STATEMENT MADE HIS POSITION QUITE IMPOSSIBLE AND THAT
HE WOULD LOSE ENTIRELY THE CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT NOT ONLY OF THE ITALIAN NAVY BUT
OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY PD HE WAS VERY HURT AT THE FACT THAT THE FIRST INTIMATION OF
THE PRESIDENT APOSTROPHE S STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE REACHED HIM THROUGH REUTERS PD
HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SUBMIT HIS RESIGNATION TO THE KING AT ONCE PD HE HAD
NO DESIRE TO MAKE A DIFFICULT SITUATION EVEN MORE DIFFICULT BY TAKING THIS ACTION
AND CONSIDERED THAT IT MIGHT VERY WELL LEAD TO THE KING APOSTROPHE S ABDICATION
BUT THE MARSHAL CONSIDERED THAT HIS PERSONAL AUTHORITY HAD BEEN UNDERMINED AND HE
HAD NO ALTERNATIVE PD PART TWO PD I INFORMED THE MARSHAL THAT NEITHER I NOR THE
AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES ON THE ACC HAD HAD PREVIOUS NOTICE OF THE PRESIDENT
APOSTROPHE S STATEMENT AND THAT OUR KNOWLEDGE OF IT CONSISTED ONLY OF RADIO AND
PRESS REPORTS PD I TOLD THE MARSHAL THAT I WOULD TELEGRAPH AT ONCE ASKING FOR
OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT AND EARNESTLY BEGGED THE MARSHAL NOT TO TAKE
HIS PROPOSED ACTION UNTIL I RECEIVED A REPLY PD PART THREE PD THE MARSHAL PROMISED
TO HOLD HIS HAND PENDING MY RECEIPT OF A REPLY BUT EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR GREAT
URGENCY AS HIS POSITION HAD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE

MOST SECRET

5812

(76)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MOST SECRET

COPY
0

OUTGOING MESSAGE NO. _____ TO FREEDOM RPTD HQ ACMF (Cont'd)

AUTHENTICATED:

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Deputy Chief Commissioner

MOST SECRET

(76)

SECRET

FATIMA

1610

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COM)

4th. March, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

Handwritten signature

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.C.M.F.

74

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT REFERRED TO IN PART THREE OF IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM PD PAREN TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MAKINS AND REINHARDT REPEATED HEADQUARTERS ACME PERSONAL FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN BEGINS PD ON THE PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE ALLIED SUPREME COMMAND CMA AND PROMPTED BY THE DESIRE OF UPHOLDING THE WAR EFFORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CMA THE ACTION CMA SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES CMA DESPITE THEIR ABSOLUTE DISAPPROVAL OF THE POLICY BEING PURSUED IN ITALY CMA HAVE DECIDED WHILE AWAITING THE ANSWER OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE EXECUTIVE GIUNTA FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN CRISIS CMA TO SUSPEND THE DEMONSTRATIONS ORGANISED FOR SATURDAY CMA MARCH FOUR FOR A TEN MINUTE SUSPENSION OF WORK PD

0001

THE THREE PARTIES DESIRE IN THIS WAY TO PROVIDE YET ANOTHER PROOF OF THEIR COMPLETE SUPPORT OF THE MEASURES NECESSITATED BY THE WAR CMA WHICH IS BEING FOUGHT AGAINST THE COMMON ENEMY PD

IN PLACE OF THE SUSPENSION OF WORK CMA THE THREE PARTIES ARE ORGANISING A MASS MEETING WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE IN A LARGE CITY SQUARE ON SUNDAY CMA MARCH TWELFTH PD AT THE SAME

SECRET

5875

SECRET

Fulton 1610

- - 2 - -

TIME ALL NECESSARY MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN FROM MARCH THIRTEENTH TO INITIATE A POPULAR
PETITION TAKEN BY SIGNATURE PD

THIS DECISION HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WORKERS' TRADE UNIONS
BELONGING TO THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR PD ENDS

10001

L.T. MONTANT JR
2 Lt AGD
Actg. Adjutant.

SECRET

5811
75

SECRET

FATIMA

1609

NF

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

4th. March. 1944.

SECRET

1050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEBORN REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.C.M.F.

PART ONE PD YESTERDAY MORNING THE THREE PARTIES PUBLISHED A CIRCULAR STATING THAT WORK IN THE DOCKYARD AND ON ESSENTIAL SERVICES WAS NOT TO BE AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED STRIKE PD
PAREN TO AFR. PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON CMA MARINE AND REINHARDT REPEATED HEADQUARTERS
AGRE PD PD FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN REGIONAL
COMMISSIONER OF REGION THREE INTERVIEWED LABOUR LEADERS AND WITH EXCESSION OF THE NAPLES
CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR UNION LEADERS AGREED NOT TO TAKE PART IN THE STRIKE PD LEADERS
OF CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR AGREED THAT STRIKE ACTION WAS UNDESIRABLE BUT DID NOT WISH TO
LET THE PARTY LEADERS DOWN PD THEY ASKED IF I WOULD RECEIVE THEM AND THE PARTY LEADERS PD
PART TWO PD I SAW THEM YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND REPEATED MY INSTRUCTION THAT STRIKE
ACTION WOULD NOT BE TOLERATED PD

COO.1

PART THREE PD LATER IN THE EVENING THE SAME DELEGATION CAME TO SEE ME WITH A DRAFT
ANNOUNCEMENT FOR PRESS AND RADIO CALLING OFF THE STRIKE PD WITH CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS I
APPROVED ITS ISSUE AND FINAL TEXT FOLLOWS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM PD

PART FOUR PD YOU WILL NOTE THAT I HAVE RAISED NO OBJECTION TO THE PARTIES HOLDING A
PUBLIC MEETING ON WEDNESDAY MARCH TWELFTH NOR TO THEIR PREPARING A PETITION PD IT WAS

NOT float

SECRET

5809

75

74

SECRET

Intive 1609

- - 2- -

NATURALLY MADE VERY CLEAR THAT THE MEETING COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ARRANGEMENTS APPROVED BY REGIONAL COMMISSIONER THIRD REGION PD IN MY OPINION AND THAT OF
MY ADVISERS INCLUDING RISER AND SOLODOVNIK IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ALLOW THE PARTIES SOME
LAWFUL AND ORDERLY METHOD OF DEMONSTRATING THE WEIGHT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT WHICH THEY CLAIM
AND WHICH THEY CONSIDER HAS BEEN CALLED IN QUESTION PD FAILURE TO DO THIS WILL INEVITABLY
BRING MATTERS TO A HEAD PD WE WOULD THEN BE FORCED TO APPREHEND PARTY LEADERS AND THE
PROSPECTS OF A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE UNAVOIDABLE POLITICAL REORGANISATION WHICH
WE REACH HOME WOULD BE GRAVELY PREJUDICED AS WOULD THE CONTINUANCE OF ORDERLY
ADMINISTRATION IN THE COUNTRY

800.1

L.P. MONTANT JR
2 Lt AGD
Actg Assistant.

5808

SECRET

74

Naples, 3/3/1944

TO: GENERAL MACFARLANE
CHIEF OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

The Heads of the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties have received the Memorandum sent by your Excellency on 2/3/44, to the Secretaries of the respective Parties.

They point out:

1. With reference to paragraph No. 3, that the projected demonstration can in no way harm the War effort; that it has instead the precise aim of paving the way for that Anti-Fascist Government, which alone, in spite of the defeatism and betrayal which today regain strength and reemerge, favoured by the Monarchy and the Government, can lead Italy towards a truly effective popular War effort.
2. With reference to Paragraph No. 4, and in accord with the principles of liberty, independence and democracy, which are the bannerhead of the United Nations, the Leaders of the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties retain, that inasmuch as being political organisms they can accept instructions from only their members and their Central Organizations at Rome; those same Centrals which from Rome direct unitedly the armed fight against the Nazi-Fascism.
3. The Dirigents of the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties reaffirm solemnly, that the demonstration of next Saturday is intended as a grave notice to the Government of traitors, which poisons and paralyzes Italy and to those who might think, on the basis of mistaken appraisals, to prolong artificially its existence; it is intended as a useful index of the situation for the occupying Authority.

It, in unfolding normally and in accordance with our instructions, will in no way paralyze the war effort, nor in the very least disturb the public order. It is conceived in the same spirit which has animated and still animates, on both sides of the line, the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties to fight by every means against Fascists and Nazis.

4. With profound regret the leaders of the Action, Socialist and Communist Parties note that by a mistaken "sizing-up" of the problem the Allied Authorities can make a demonstration of absolutely antifascist character appear as a manifestation of conflict between the Allied Authorities and the Parties of Liberty. They refute all consequences thereof, without any recrimination and with that same faith in the ideal cause of the United Nations, which has sustained them yesterday and which still sustains today their comrades on the other side of the lines in the fight against Fascist and Nazi Tyranny.

THE ACTION PARTY /s/ Pasquale Schiano

THE SOCIALIST PARTY /s/ Lello Pordio

THE COMMUNIST PARTY /s/ Eugenio Reale

58673

Napoli 5/5/1944

AL GENERALE MACFARLANE

CAPO DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO

Le direzioni dei Partiti d'Azione, Socialista, Comunista, hanno ricevuto il memorandum inviato dall'Ecc.V. in data 2/5/44 ai Segretari dei rispettivi Partiti.

Esse fanno notare:

- 1°) Con riferimento al paragrafo N°5, che la dimostrazione progettata non può in nessun modo danneggiare lo sforzo di guerra; che essa anzi ha lo scopo preciso di preparare la strada a quel governo antifascista che solo può, malgrado il disfattismo ed il tradimento che oggi riprendono forza e riemergono, favoriti dalla monarchia e dal governo, condurre l'Italia ad un vero efficace popolare sforzo di guerra.
- 2) Con riferimento al paragrafo 4 ed in armonia con i principii di libertà, indipendenza e democrazia, che sono la bandiera della N.U., le Direzioni dei Partiti d'Azione, Socialista, Comunista, ritengono che in quanto organismi politici esse non possono ricevere istruzioni che dai loro organizzati e dalle Direzioni Centrali esistenti in Roma; quelle stesse Direzioni che da Roma dirigono unitariamente la lotta armata contro il Nazi - fascismo.
- 3) Le Direzioni dei Partiti d'Azione Socialista e Comunista riaffermano solennemente che la manifestazione di sabato prossimo va intesa come un grave avvertimento al governo di traditori che avvelena e paralizza l'Italia ed a quanti pensassero, in base ad errate valutazioni, di prolungarne artificialmente l'esistenza; va intesa come un utile indice della situazione per l'Autorità occupante.
Essa, svolgendosi normalmente e secondo le nostre istruzioni, non paralizzerà in nessun modo lo sforzo di guerra, ne turberà minimamente l'ordine pubblico. E' concepita nello stesso spirito che ha animato ed anima, di qua e di là dalle linee, i Partiti d'Azione Socialista e Comunista a lottare con ogni mezzo contro fascisti e nazisti.
- 4) Con profondo rammarico le direzioni dei Partiti d'Azione Socialista e Comunista constatano che per un errata impostazione della questione l'Autorità Alleata può fare apparire una manifestazione di carattere assolutamente antifascista come una manifestazione

di contrasto fra le Autorità Alleate ed i Partiti della Libertà. Esse respingono tale impostazione della vertenza ed i loro componenti sono pronti a subire tutte le conseguenze, senza nessuna recriminazione e con quella stessa fede nella causa ideale delle Nazioni Unite, che la ha sostenuti ieri e che sostiene oggi i loro compagni di là delle linee nella lotta contro la tirannide fascista e nazista.

IL PARTITO D'AZIONE	<i>Paquale Schiano</i>
IL PARTITO SOCIALISTA	<i>Leone Porzio</i>
IL PARTITO COMUNISTA	<i>Eugenio Rale</i>

ACTION COPY
SECRET

Secretary General
4745
Col Wright

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION...INCOMING MESSAGE...3 MAR 44

CLASS.....S
PREC....."O"
FROM.....FREEDOM
TO.....FATIMA



M/C NO.....21/03
REF NO.....59358
FILED.....031320
RECD.....031435
J LEE

should #1550 (file #69)

FHCIC. PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE FROM GENERAL WILSON (PAREN TO FATIMA REPEATED FIFTH ARMY REAR). REFERENCE YOUR 1150 OF 2ND MARCH. I APPROVE YOUR PROPOSAL THAT IN THE EVENT OF STRIKE NOT BEING CALLED OFF, THE LEADERS OF THE 3 PARTIES SHOULD BE GIVEN 24 HOURS TO LEAVE AMG TERRITORY AND STRONG WARNING FOR THE FUTURE SHOULD BE ISSUED AT THE SAME TIME.

ACC DISTRIBUTION:

Action.....Secretary General
Info.....Dep C C
C A Br
File

HQ ACC, APO 374

Mar 03 1600 A

LD

ACTION COPY

SECRET

580/2

FM/afe

121 (000.1)

2 March 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : The Secretaries of the Party of Action, Socialist Party and Communist Party.

1. Copies of a pamphlet issued by the Party of Action, Socialist Party and Communist Party calling upon all workmen, employees, business and professional men to suspend work for ten minutes on Saturday, 4th March, and to paralyze for ten minutes the economic and administrative life of the city of Naples have come into my possession.

2. I can only assume that these had been issued before my talk with the Junta yesterday morning.

3. I have already made it quite clear to the members of the Junta representing your three parties that no action of the kind contemplated can be permitted. Action designed to paralyze the economic and administrative life of the city cannot in the present military situation be tolerated under any circumstances.

4. My instructions to the leaders of your three parties are as follows:

In the press tomorrow morning, the 3rd March, and on the radio commencing this evening, the 2nd March, your three parties will issue an announcement stating that the suspension of work referred to in your manifesto will not take place.

5. Failure to comply with these instructions satisfactorily by 12:00 noon tomorrow, 3rd March, will entail inevitable regrettable consequences.

6. The PEB and censorship authorities have been instructed to afford you the necessary press and radio facilities.

NOEL MASON MACPARRLANE
Lieutenant General
Deputy President and Chief Commissioner
of Allied Control Commission
for
General Sir Harold Alexander
Military Governor

71

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. 122(000.1)

FNM/rj

2nd. March, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Brigadier General A.W. Pence, USA.
Commanding, Peninsular Base Section.

SUBJECT: Strikes and Demonstrations by Civilian Employees of U.S. Army.

- file #63*
1. I have received your note of 1st. March, 1944, relative to the proposed ten minute strike on 4th. March.
 2. I am aware of the proposed strike and recognise that it is the responsibility of the Allied Control Commission to take all steps necessary to prevent any interference with the normal functioning of Army operations.
 3. I have personally been in contact with leaders of the various political parties and through Allied Military Government Officers with the heads of the various labour unions and I am hopeful that the proposed strike will be called off.

for *Lucy*
NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

5802 70

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

FATIMA 1550

FATIMA (GEN MACTARLANE C COMB)

2nd. March. 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACTARLANE

URGENT

PRIORITY

file 67

PART ONE OF REFERENCE BY FATIMA ONE FIVE TWO THREE IS PARA TO APIN PERSONAL FOR GENERAL
SILVERIA NAUROS AND BERNARDINI FROM FATIMA FROM MACTARLANE PERSONAL PARA. I HAVE JUST
DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH ALEXANDER AND WE ARE AGREEING THAT IF THE LEADERS OF THE THREE
PARTIES DO NOT COMPLY WITH MY INSTRUCTIONS WHICH I ISSUED IN GENERAL ALEXANDER'S NAME THEY
WILL BE GIVEN TWENTYFOUR HOURS IN WHICH TO LEAVE AND THE STORY IS THEY WOULD PROBABLY
REFUSE TO BE EVICTED AND LOCKED UP IN WHICH CASE THEY MAY REFUSE TO LEAVE AND IT WILL BE
NECESSARY TO APPREHEND THEM PD SUB-PARA PD THIS ACTION SEEMS TO US TO BE THE CASE BEST
AND IT WOULD BE COUPLED WITH A VERY STRONG WARNING AGAINST A REPRISAL OF VIOLENCE ACTION IN
YOU MAY HOWEVER THINK THAT WE OUGHT TO EVICT ALL THE PARTY EXECUTIVES ^{of the three parties} FROM AND TERRITORY
ON FORBID ALL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN AND TERRITORY PD SUB-PARA PD I WOULD BE GRATEFUL
TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS URGENTLY ALTHOUGH WE DOUBTED HERE AND ALEXANDER AGREES THAT IN THIS
INSTANCE EVICTION OF THE PARTY LEADERS IS VIGOROUSLY OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION PD
PART TWO PD I HAVE JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT A RAID WAS CARRIED OUT BY CARABINIERI
AND PUBLIC SECURITY AGENTS ON TWENTYTHREE MARCH ON A PRINTING OFFICE IN NAPLES PD THEY
SEIZED ABOUT SEVEN THOUSAND COPIES OF THE MANIFESTO OF THE THREE PARTIES PD INVESTIGATIONS

1000

file 66

69801

- - 2 - -

ARE IN PROGRESS BY THE ITALIAN POLICE PD

LATE AFTERNOON PD I HAVE RECEIVED A COMMUNICATION FROM THE LEADERS OF THE THREE PARTIES
WHICH AFTER MY MEETING WITH THEM YESTERDAY BUT BEFORE I HAD SENT THEM MY INSTRUCTIONS
IN WHICH THEY POINT OUT THAT THEIR PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION FOR MARCH FOURTH IS NOT
INTEND TO AND CANNOT COMPROMISE THE WAR EFFORT PD THEY EXPRESS PROFOUND DEVOTION TO
THE CAUSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PD SUB-PARA PD I HAVE HAD THIS COMMUNICATION
ACKNOWLEDGED AND HAVE INFORMED THEM THAT I WOULD FORWARD IT FOR THE INFORMATION OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE ACC BUT THAT MY VIEW ON SATURDAY'S STRIKE REMAINS ABSOLUTE

L. W. MONTAGNI JR.
2 Lt. ADP
Asstg. Adjutant.

69 5800

SECRET

FATIMA 1527

rf

FATIMA (GMR MACFARLANE G CDM)

2nd. March, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

URGENT

John 67

REFERENCE MY FATIMA ONE FIVE TWO THREE PD TAKEN TO AFHQ PERSONAL FOR GENERAL
ELSON CPA MATTHEW AND REINHARDT FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL LATER
YOU MAY LIKE TO KNOW THAT I HAVE DISCUSSED ALL THIS QUESTION WITH GENERAL
SOLOVNIKOV WHO IS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH MY PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION PD
HE TELLS ME THAT AFTER MY MEETING WITH THE JMWCA YESTERDAY HE HAD A SHORT TALK
WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE PARTIES OF THE LEFT AND HE WAS REASONABLY
CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD OBEY MY INSTRUCTIONS AND CALL OFF THE STRIKE

000.1

L.T. SCHEPARD JR
2 Lt. ADJ
Asst. Adjutant

5794 68

11777
MOST SECRET

NF

OUTGOING

Y182/af0

MOST SECRET

Fatima 1523

URGENT

MAR 2

FATIMA

FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON. MAKING
AND REINHARIT

#64

#66

1 4 7 5
REFERENCE BY FATIMA ONE FOUR SEVEN FIVE PD TO FREEDOM PERSONAL FOR GENERAL
WILSON CMA MAKING AND REINHARIT FROM FATIMA SIGNED MACFARLANE PD AFTER MY
MEETING YESTERDAY WITH THE JUNTA WE OBTAINED COPIES OF A MANIFESTO ISSUED
AS A PAMPHLET IN THE NAPLES AREA BY THE COMMUNIST CMA SOCIALIST AND ACTION
PARTIES PD IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS PAMPHLET WAS PRODUCED AND ISSUED BEFORE
MY MEETING WITH THE JUNTA PD PART TWO PD AFTER STATING THAT CHURCHILL APOTROPHE
S PEOPLE REMAINS SHOWED A FALSE APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION THE PAMPHLET CALLS
ON ALL WORKING CMA EMPLOYED CMA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL MEN TO STOP WORK
FOR TEN MINUTES FROM ELEVEN TO ELEVEN TEN AME NINE ON SATURDAY FOURTH MARCH PD
TO SHOW THAT SUCH ACTION IS NOT A STRIKE BUT ONLY A POLITICAL ANTI-FASCIST
MANIFESTATION THESE PARTICIPATING ARE CALLED ON TO WORK AN EXTRA QUARTER OF AN
HOUR FROM TWELVE TO TWELVE FIFTEEN ON THE SAME DAY PD THE PAMPHLET CONCLUDES
WITH FOLLOWING SENTENCE PD QUOTE BY PARALYZING FOR TEN MINUTES THE ECONOMIC
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LIFE OF THE CITY THE NEOPOLITANS WILL TELL CHURCHILL WHAT
OUR COUNTRY WANTS PD FULL TEXT OF PAMPHLET FOLLOWS SEPARATELY PD PART THREE PD
I AM TAKING THE FOLLOWING ACTION PD ONE PD COLONEL POLETTI CMA CHIEF OF REGION
THREE CMA IS SUMMONING ALL THE LABOR LEADERS IN NAPLES TO INFORM THEM THAT
THE PROPOSED STOPPAGE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED AND THAT THEY WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE
IF HIS OFFERS ARE NOT OBTAINED PD TWO PD I AM ORIGINING THE JUNTA REPRESENTATIVES

MOST SECRET

Outgoing cable. Reference No. 1523, continued:

OF THE THREE PARTIES CONCERNED TO ISSUE IN THE PRESS TOMORROW MORNING AND ON THE RADIO COMMENCING TONIGHT AN ANNOUNCEMENT INFORMING EVERYONE THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE PAMPHLET ARE NOT REPEAT NOT TO BE FOLLOWED PD I AM INFORMING THESE THREE MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA THAT IF MY INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN CARRIED OUT SATISFACTORILY BY NOON TOMORROW I WILL HAVE TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM PD PART FOUR PD IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION AND THAT OF MY ADVISERS THAT WE CAN ONLY DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION BY BEING TOUGH PD THE LEADERS OF THE THREE PARTIES OF THE LEFT CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO FLOUT OUR AUTHORITY IN THIS WAY AND ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MAY AS MARTINS WELCOME OUR TAKING ACTION AGAINST THEM THERE IS IN MY OPINION NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE OPEN TO US UNLESS THEY COMPLY WITH MY ORDERS

AUTHENTICATED:

L. T. MONTANT, Jr
2nd Lt. AGD
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - Gen. Alexander

HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394, U.S. ARMY

HQ ACC APO 394

EX-101 BY 1515A

BY *[Signature]*

2nd March 1944

SUBJECT: Strikes.

TO : General Macfarlane, Main HQ., ACC.

1. At 17.30 hours on the 29th February, 1944, a combined force of Carabinieri and Public Security Agents, acting on information received, raided the printing office of one GENOVESI, situated in Vico Pallonetto a S. Chiara N° 22, Naples, and there seized about 7,000 copies of a notice printed for the Partito D'Azione, (Socialist and Communist) parties.

2. This notice (or manifesto), after commenting on recent statements by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons, invited all workers, employees and professional men to cease work for 10 minutes (from 11.00 to 11.10 hours) on Saturday 4th March, but to work for an extra 15 minutes (from 12.00 to 12.15 hours) on the same day to make up for the time lost.

3. The information leading up to the raid was first acquired by the Carabinieri, who communicated the purport thereof to the Questore, and he authorized the raid and seizure.

4. This Headquarters was not consulted prior to this action being taken and the first intimation was received from Major Cardaci, Commander of the Internal Group of CC.RR, Naples, yesterday. This initiative and action on the part of the local Italian police agencies is to be commended.

5. The printer was under interrogation at the Questura yesterday but detailed particulars are not yet to hand. I have asked the Questore to expedite this.

6. Six copies of the Notice are attached.

Hum 3/21

Charles Poletti 579

CHARLES POLETTI
Lieut. Colonel, S.R.,
Regional Commissioner.

(66)

ITALIANI! LAVORATORI!

Churchill ha recentemente dichiarato che l'attuale governo Badoglio ha più autorità nel paese di quanta potrebbe averne un altro governo, affermando — sulla base di questo suo apprezzamento — che l'Italia continuerà a rimanere senza governo fino alla liberazione di Roma. E a Roma, sempre secondo Churchill, l'Italia non avrà un governo su basi nuove, ma semplicemente su basi più larghe.

LAVORATORI!

Questo falso apprezzamento rischia di fare al nostro paese un male incalcolabile. E' quindi necessario dimostrare, subito, a Churchill e agli alleati che fossero altrettanto male informati, che il popolo italiano vuole:

— Mettere ai margini della vita nazionale, fino alla fine della guerra, la monarchia di Savoia, corresponsabile e complice del fascismo; — Costituire un governo antifascista, veramente democratico, che possa fare la guerra sul serio contro il nazismo, epurare la vita del paese, dare inizio di soluzione alla disoccupazione e all'angosciosa situazione alimentare, rappresentare fra gli alleati gli interessi del popolo italiano e non quelli dei suoi nemici.

Per dare questa dimostrazione, domandiamo a tutti gli operai, gli impiegati, i commercianti, i professionisti,

di sospendere il lavoro per dieci minuti dalle undici alle undici e dieci del mattino, il giorno di sabato 4 marzo.

male inaccettabile. E' quindi necessario dimostrare, subito, a Churchill e agli alleati che fossero altrettanto male informati, che il popolo italiano vuole:

— Mettere ai margini della vita nazionale, fino alla fine della guerra, la monarchia di Savoia, corresponsabile e complice del fascismo; — Costituire un governo antifascista, veramente democratico, che possa fare la guerra sul serio contro il nazismo, epurare la vita del paese, dare inizio di soluzione alla disoccupazione e all'angosciosa situazione alimentare, rappresentare ira gli alleati gli interessi del popolo italiano e non quelli dei suoi nemici.

Per dare questa dimostrazione, domandiamo a tutti gli operai, gli impiegati, i commercianti, i professionisti,

di sospendere il lavoro per dieci minuti dalle undici alle undici e dieci del mattino, il giorno di sabato 4 marzo.

E per dimostrare a tutti che non si tratta di uno sciopero o di un boicottaggio della produzione, ma soltanto di una manifestazione patriottica e antifascista,

prolungate il lavoro per un quarto d'ora da mezzogiorno a mezzogiorno e un quarto della stessa giornata.

Paralizzando per dieci minuti la vita economica e amministrativa della città, i napoletani diranno a Churchill quello che vuole il nostro paese.

**Il Partito d'Azione
Il Partito Socialista
Il Partito Comunista**

SECRET

~~Page~~ 1476
FATIMA

FAMGO (GEN MACFARLANE C CODE)

1st. March, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM

folio #64

FATIMA

WITH REFERENCE TO MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM TO ~~THE~~ FAMGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL TO AIDE PERSONAL FOR GENERAL EILSON, MAKING AND HENRY RE CITE FAMGO ONE FOUR SEVEN SIX RE FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE FROM EXECUTIVE JUNTA TO PRIME MINISTER RE BEING RE THE PRESENT EXECUTIVE JUNTA OF LIBERATED ITALY, BEING CONVINCED THAT THE WAR EFFORT IS THE SUPREME OBJECTIVE, ASSURES YOU - CONTRARY TO OTHER INFORMATION THAT HAS REACHED YOU - THAT THE ITALIAN PEOPLE AND ARMY WILL MAKE A MUCH MORE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION THAN AT PRESENT AS SOON AS ITALIANS TOO ARE ALLOWED THAT LIBERTY WHICH IT IS THE AIM OF THE WAR TO BRING ABOUT RE ENDS

See folio #56 for Italian of this

1. Lt. COLONEL JF
2. Lt. COL
Actg. Adjutant.

5793

65

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ 1000
FATIMA 1475

NF

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMED)

1st. March, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

URGENT

FREEDOM

REFERENCE MY FARGO ONE FOUR FOUR TWO PD

fatima
PART ONE PD I HAVE JUST SEEN THE JUNTA PD ~~FROM~~ FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL TO ADJ. PERSONAL FOR GENERAL WILSON, MAKING AND ORDER PD CITE FARGO ONE FOUR SEVEN FIVE PD

I TOLD THEM MOST EMPHATICALLY THAT NO ACTION SUCH AS THE PROPOSED STRIKE FOR NEXT SATURDAY COULD BE PERMITTED PD THE CENTRE PARTIES POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE NOT INVOLVED AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES OF THE LEFT STATED THAT THEY WOULD INFORM THEIR PARTIES IMMEDIATELY OF MY INSTRUCTIONS PD

PART TWO PD SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA AFFIRMED THAT THEY REPRESENTED A FAR LARGER PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION THAN DID THE GOVERNMENT OF BARCELLO AND THAT THEY FOUND THEMSELVES IN A MOST DIFFICULT POSITION AS THEY WERE DEPRIVED OF ANY MEANS BY WHICH THEY COULD ATTAIN THEIR AIMS PD THEY HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO REPRESENT THE PARTIES IN OPPOSITION TO THE BARCELLO GOVERNMENT AND THEIR NERVOUS FOLLOWERS WERE BECOMING VERY SENSITIVE AT THEIR FAILURE TO PRODUCE RESULTS PD

PART THREE PD I REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO A POLITICAL DISCUSSION PD I INFORMED THEM THAT IT WAS MY DESIRE TO KEEP THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS FULLY INFORMED OF THE POLITICAL

000-1

5792
64

FATIMA 1475

naples

SECRET

- - 2 - -

SITUATION IN OCCUPIED ITALY PD THAT I WAS ALWAYS PREPARED TO FORWARD ANY COMMUNICATIONS THAT THE JUNTA MIGHT WISH TO MAKE TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD BUT THAT THIS WAS CONDITIONAL UPON THE JUNTA DOING NOTHING WHICH MIGHT DISLOCATE THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATION OR IMPERE THE WAR EFFORT PD

PAGE FOUR PD THE JUNTA TOOK NOTE OF THIS AND I HAVE NOW AGREED TO FORWARD A SHORT MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER WHICH THE JUNTA HANDLED IN YESTERDAY PD SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM PD

PAGE FIVE PD BEFORE MEETING THE JUNTA I INFORMED GENERAL SCHODOWSK OF MY PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION PD HE AGREED ENTIRELY AND WAS PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE MEETING PD LT-COL MINORITA ULA AND MR CACCIA WERE ALSO PRESENT

000.1

folio # 56

L. F. MONTANE, JR
2 Lt. AGD
Asst. Adjutant.

5724

CONFIDENTIAL

PB3 17459

HEADQUARTERS
PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
Office of the Commanding General
APO 782

1 March 1944

AG 004.07
HFPCG 1 MAR 44



Secretary
General

S-199

Subject: Strikes and Demonstrations by Civilian Employees of U. S. Army.

To : Chief Commissioner, Headquarters Allied Control Commission,
Office of the Deputy President, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to reports that Italian workers are to stage a 10 minute strike on 4 March 1944.
2. It is believed that all contact with the officials of the various unions or with the leaders of the political parties sponsoring them should be made by Allied Military Government officials.
3. This Headquarters is concerned with strikes and demonstrations only from the point of view of preventing any interference with the normal functioning of Army installations. Such action on the part of Allied Military Government authorities as will insure this objective is requested.

A. W. Pence
A. W. PENCE
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Rec'd Mar 21 1944
By *[Signature]*

AWP/js

CONFIDENTIAL

5790

63

CC/P/120(000.1)

PNM/rj

1st. March, 1944.

folio #45
As you asked, I telegraphed to the Prime Minister the message
which you gave to me on the 23rd. February.

Mr. Winston Churchill has now replied requesting me to
transmit to Y.E. his personal thanks for your message.

folio #43
1000
NOEL MAISON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

folio #55
S.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Capo del Governo.

5789

62

292030A

Form 133D

N-4994

RAD

Signal Corps, United States Army

Telegram

URGENT

0-0 8-10000

Received at

REINTEGRAL BASE SECTION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

29 FEBRUARY 1944 19

SECRET

URGENT

TO (ACTION) : PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MACFARLANE

(INFORMATION): NONE

FROM : GENERAL WILSON

DATE TIME SIGNED: 291849A

DATE TIME REC'D: 292030A

REFERENCE NR. : 58250 (REFERENCE YOUR 1442 OF 29 FEBRUARY)

SITE : FHCIC

YOU MAY INFORM THE JUNTA AS PROPOSED THAT ANY STRIKE ACTION IS INIMICAL TO THE WAR EFFORT AND CANNOT BE TOLERATED.

AGREE CENSORSHIP CONCERNING PROPOSED STRIKE ACTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN ITALY BUT NOT ON NEWS LEAVING THE THEATRE.

I AM AWAITING THE VIEWS OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALY. ALL YOU CAN SAY IS THAT YOU ARE AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS. IF PRESSED YOU COULD ADD THAT THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT MIGHT BE PRESUMED TO GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THE POSITION.

FROM : GENERAL WILSON

DATE TIME SIGNED: 291849A

DATE TIME REL'D : 292033Z

REFERENCE NR. : 58258 (REFERENCE YOUR 1442 OF 29 FEBRUARY)

NOTE : FHCIC

YOU MAY INFORM THE JUNTA AS PROPOSED THAT ANY STRIKE ACTION IS INIMICAL TO THE WAR EFFORT AND CANNOT BE TOLERATED.

AGREE CENSORSHIP CONCERNING PROPOSED STRIKE ACTION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN ITALY BUT NOT ON NEWS LEAVING THE THEATRE.

I AM AWAITING THE VIEWS OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALY. ALL YOU CAN SAY IS THAT YOU ARE AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS. IF PRESSED YOU COULD ADD THAT THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT MIGHT BE PRESUMED TO GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THE POSITION.

*Poston - Hy acc
info - G-2
1680*

5734

FORM 100-A

CRYPTIC *Suppl* 61

SECRET

CC/P/118

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

NF

FREM/rj

29th. February, 1944.

folio 59
1442

I enclose herewith copy of a telegram which I sent to Freedom this morning. It explains itself.

2. As there was sufficient time to get an answer from Algiers I thought it sound to get General Wilson's agreement to my proposed action with the Junta tomorrow.

3. I propose to have my Russian General present at my meeting with the Junta. He is already pretty thick with the leaders of the three parties of the Left but he is very sound on the question of stopping anything that might tend to dislocate war effort.

4. Incidentally, I have just heard that Bogulomov, the head of the Russian Section of the Advisory Council, is arriving in Naples tomorrow with a party of eleven to take up his permanent residence here. He and his party will doubtless find lots to occupy them in the political field but they can hardly come into our complicated picture here until the rest of the Advisory Council arrive. The Council can only give the agreed advice of all its members.

5. I hear that Harold MacMillan is due back in Algiers about March 8th. and that Bob Murphy should arrive from America shortly after that date.

6. I hope very much you will be able to come to my monthly meeting which I told you about on Friday, the 3rd, at 1100 a.m.. I think you might find it quite interesting. We meet in my Headquarters (Headquarters, A.C.C) in the Provincia Building in Naples.

NOEL MAISON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Gen Alexander

5787 60

SECRET

PARCO (GEN MASPARLANE 2 0000)

SECRET

URGENT

29th. February, 1944

10030 - MASPARLANE

PRISON

PART ONE. POLITICAL SECTION HAVE INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY OF JUNTA THAT LEADERS OF SOCIALIST, COMMUNIST AND ACTION PARTIES PROPOSE TO CALL THE "MUTUAL STRIKE" IN NAPLES AREA ON SATURDAY FOURTH MARCH AS PROTEST AGAINST PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT TO PARCO THAT MASPARLANE PERSONAL TO ASK FOR RETRACTION. MAKING AND AFTER PD CITE PARCO ONE FOUR FOUR TWO PD APPARENTLY THEY INTEND TO INSTRUCT WORKERS TO WORK FIFTEEN MINUTES OVERTIME DURING LUNCH INTERVAL TO COMPENSATE PD

PART TWO PD I HAVE ARRANGED TO RECEIVE THE LEADERS OF THE JUNTA AT AT ONE ONE ZERO ZERO HOUR TOMORROW FIRST MARCH AND PROPOSE TO INFORM THEM THAT NO SUCH ACTION CAN BE PERMITTED PD I HAVE ALSO PUT COMPLETE STOP ON PUBLICITY IN ITALY AS REGARDS INTENTION OF THE THREE PARTIES BUT PRESS MEMORANDUM ON THE SUBJECT HAVE BY NOW ALMOST CERTAINLY REACHED UK AND USA.

PART THREE PD JUNTA HAVE SUBMITTED A SHORT COMMENT ON PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT WHICH I HAVE REFUSED TO FORWARD UNLESS THEY GIVE DEFINITE UNDERTAKING TO CEASE ALL ACTIVITIES LIKELY TO INTERFERE WITH WAR EFFORT PD

PART FOUR PD PLEASE REPLY URGENT WHETHER YOU APPROVE ACTION I PROPOSE TO TAKE TOMORROW PD.

PART FIVE PD WE ARE BEING ASKED CONTINUALLY WHETHER THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IS TO BE REGARDED AS THE OFFICIAL ANSWER TO THE MEMORANDUM OF THE JUNTA TO THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PD IT WILL HELP ME VERY GREATLY IF I COULD BE INFORMED BEFORE TOMORROW'S MEETING WHETHER THIS IS THE CASE OR WHETHER THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS INTEND TO PRODUCE A SPECIFIC AGREED REPLY

Edw.
Reply - *Edw.* 58250 held by General Macfarlane

L. T. MONTANT, JR.
2d Lt AGO
Actg Adjutant

57859

(COPY)

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

291606A
14 Jan 1946

M-4962

RADIO

Signal Corps, United States Army

Telegram

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Received at

PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY
29 FEBRUARY 1946 19

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO (ACTION) : CG PBS PERSONNEL FOR GENERAL MACFARLANE

(INFORMATION): NONE

FROM : SIGNED WILSON

DATE TIME SIGNED: 291325A

DATE TIME REC'D : 291606A

REFERENCE NR. : 58008

SITE : FROSC REFERENCE YOUR FARGO 1340 AND FREEDOM
57951

THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM WITH REFERENCE TO THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF YOUR FATIMA 2358 HAS BEEN CIRCULATED TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ITALY: QUOTE INFORMATION HAS BEEN
RECEIVED OF A NEW PLAN FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT POLITICAL
IMPASSE IN ITALY WHICH IS BEING STUDIED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF CERTAIN OF THE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES AS WELL AS
THE SUPPORTERS OF THE KING.

THIS PLAN CALLS FOR THE CREATION OF A LIEUTENANT OF THE
REALM (LUOGOTENENTE) IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH HISTORICAL AND
LEGAL PRECEDENTS. IT PROPOSES THAT THE KING SHOULD NOMINATE THE
CROWN PRINCE AS LIEUTENANT OF THE REALM WITH FULL POWER, AND
THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS CHANGE SHOULD BE MADE IMMEDIATELY
ALTHOUGH THE LIEUTENANCY WOULD ONLY COME INTO OPERATION WHEN
ROME IS REACHED. THIS LATTER PROVISION WOULD PERMIT THE KING
TO PROCEED TO ROME UPON ITS LIBERATION WHERE HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY

SECRET 16836

58

SECRET

N-4962

OPERATIONAL

PRIORITY

GO INTO RETIREMENT; BADOGLIOS GOVERNMENT WOULD RESIGN AND THE CROWN PRINCE WOULD BE FREE TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT.

IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT CROCE AND SFORZA WOULD BE AGREE-
ABLE TO THIS PROPOSAL AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE KING HIMSELF
COULD BE INDUCED TO ACCEPT IT. END OF QUOTE.

*Info - 14 acc
14-2
C/S
Secy*

578

SECRET

16835

(58)

Most Secret
Mr. Casper ^{HAL} _{1/3} Personnel

I have given the
Quote — end of Quote
portion to Solodovnik.

I told him we were
not to discuss this with the
Sovietians or anyone and that
the information had come
from an anonymous
intermediary.

He was quite happy.

(I said of course that
Bogdanov had had a copy
too).

Handwritten
3

Pl. let me hear ⁵⁷⁸³
Tgm. back.

(58)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

291221A
Form 1231

N-4940

RADIO

Signal Corps, United States Army

Telegram

4611

Secretary Gen

GPO 3-11568

Received at

PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

29 FEBRUARY 1944

19

SECRET

URGENT

TO (ACTION)

(INFORMATION):

FROM

DATE TIME SIGNED:

DATE TIME RECD:

REFERENCE NR.

FILE

CG PENBASE PERSONAL FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANES
EYES ONLY

NONE

GENERAL WILSON

291129A

291221A

57951

FHCIC

YOUR FARGO 1340.



folio #

folio # 52

I AGREE THAT IT IS UNDESIRABLE FOR MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL TO LEARN OF POLITICAL EVENTS IN ITALY THROUGH LEAKAGE, AND IT IS PROPOSED TO CIRCULATE TO THE ADVISORY COUNCIL A NOTE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ITALY AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE DE NICOLA PLAN. THIS WILL BE IN GENERAL TERMS. IT WILL NOT MENTION DE NICOLA OR DISCLOSE THAT THE KING HAS DEFINITELY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT IT.

A COPY OF THE NOTE WILL BE TELEGRAPHED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

*Info Hqs ACC
see
CG*

Pol. Division

Jan 29

5782

St. Etienne

16809

SECRET

(57)

Information has been received of a new plan for the solution of the present political impasse in Italy which is being studied by the representatives of certain of the members of the opposition parties as well as the supporters of the King.

This plan calls for the creation of a lieutenant of the realm (Luogotenente) in strict accordance with historical and legal precedents. It proposes that the King should nominate the Crown Prince as Lieutenant of the Realm with full power, and that the announcement of this change should be made immediately although the Lieutenantcy would only come into operation when Rome is reached. This latter provision would permit the King to proceed to Rome upon its liberation where he would immediately go into retirement; Badoglio's Government would resign and the Crown Prince would be free to form a new government.

It has been reported that Croce and Sforza would be agreeable to this proposal and it is believed that the King himself could be induced to accept it.

Handwritten:
Handed to
Stolovnik
by [signature]

GIUNTA ESECUTIVA DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA

VIA PAOLO EMILIO IMBRIANI, 53

NAPOLI

Napoli, 29.2.1944

ALLA COMMISSIONE ALIATA DI CONTROLLO

Per incarico ricevuta dalla Giunta Esecutiva, ho l'onore di trasmettere il testo di un telegramma indirizzato al Primo Ministro Churchill dalla Giunta stessa.

Con la più alta considerazione

Il Segretario

Vittorio Lancia

Per incarico ricevute dalla Giunta esecutiva, ho l'onore di trasmettere il testo di un telegramma indirizzato al Primo Ministro Churchill della Giunta stessa.

Con la più alta considerazione

Il Segretario

W. de la Roche

5780

56

GIUNTA ESECUTIVA DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA

VIA PAOLO EMILIO IMBRIANI, 53

NAPOLI

Napoli, li 29.2.1944

AL PRIMO MINISTRO BRITANNICO - LONDRA -

La Giunta Esecutiva Permanente dell'Italia Liberata convinta che lo sforzo di guerra è l'imperativo supremo vi assicura - contrariamente a diverse informazioni giuntevi - che il popolo e l'esercito italiano daranno un contributo molto più importante dell'attuale appena sarà permessa anche in Italia la libertà che è scopo della guerra

La Giunta Esecutiva

*per autenti si vorrà della firma
il suo portatore*

Filippo Caracciolo

daranno un contributo molto più importante dell'attuale appena sarà
permesso anche in Italia la libertà che è scopo della guerra

La Giustizia esecutiva

per autenti fieri uni della prima

il suo ritorno

Dilettissimo

577a

56

Tel from Algiers of 29/2 (repeated FO Saving)

Following for Caccia.

See FARGO 1270 February 24th

The Prime Minister wishes Badoglio's message to be acknowledged in the third person with thanks.

2. Please inform General Macfarlane.

L.J.G. & J.C.E.

file #45

600.1—

575

CC/P/112

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

FROM/rj

28th. February, 1944.

I enclose herewith a translation of a letter to me from Badoglio.

2. This is not the first time that Badoglio has raised this question.
3. I am telling him that I have forwarded his request and will let him know in due course the reaction of the Allied Governments.
4. I would be grateful if in consultation with the Advisory Council or with the Allied Governments you would let me know what reply I should give to Badoglio.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, GBE, KCB, DSO, MC,
Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

5777
54

R. MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*Rec'd. Leg. Gen.
Feb 27 1944*
SALEMMO, 26 February 1944

General:-

I read in the Press that on the 18th the Consultative Committee for Italy met at Algiers, with the participation of two new members, representing respectively Yugoslavia and Greece.

The R. Government views without a shadow of disappointment or objection the participation in the Committee of two Countries with which it has the firm resolve to resume that policy of understanding and cooperation which should never have been abandoned.

After this premise, which incidentally is fundamental, it is also my duty to confirm to you again what I had already occasion to state last January, and that is the desire of the R. Government that Italy be represented in a permanent way in a Committee, which, whatever its present functions, nevertheless handles exclusively Italian problems, and as such, could only profit by our participation.

And if this participation should bring about a change in the functions of this Committee, I believe that this would certainly be a change for the better, inasmuch as its purposes and possibilities would thus be broadened, contributing in an effective manner at once to that pacification and understanding among the Mediterranean Peoples, which is our common aim.

Consequently, I would be very grateful to you, my dear General, if with your habitual friendly courtesy you would make yourself the spokesman of this our desire to the Allied Governments.

Very cordially Yours.

/s/ BADOGLIO

TO: Lieutenant General
Sir Noel F.N. Mason Mac Farlane
Chief Commissioner Allied Control Commission
Salemo.

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

N° 813

Quindici, 16 febbraio, 1941.

Signor Generale,

Leggo sulla stampa che lei si è ritirato ad Algeri il 28 corrente al Comitato Consultivo per l'Italia, con la partecipazione di due nuovi membri, la rappresentanza rispettivamente della Jugoslavia e della Grecia.

Il R. Governo vede a una ombra di disappunto e di contrasto la partecipazione al Comitato stesso di due Paesi coi quali si è una serena proposta riprendere quella politica di intesa e di collaborazione che non avrebbe dovuto essere mai abbandonata.

Dopo tale premessa, che è del resto fondamentale, si potrà più d'ora richiamare ancora una volta quanto già ebbe occasione di dichiarare nello scorso gennaio e cioè, il desiderio del R. Governo che l'Italia sia rappresentata in tutto permanentemente in seno al Comitato che, qualunque siano le sue attribuzioni attuali, si occupa tuttora ^{di} esclusivamente di cose italiane, come tale, non avrebbe alcun vantaggio della nostra partecipazione.

E se tale partecipazione dovesse apportare un qualche contributo nelle attribuzioni del Comitato stesso, io ritengo che sarebbe certamente un contributo per il meglio, in quanto

col quali e' suo scopo proposto riprendere quella politica di
intesa e di collaborazione che non avrebbe dovuto essere mai
abbandonata.

Dopo tale premessa, che e' del resto fondamentale,
e' pertanto mio lavoro ricercare, ancora una volta quanto
giu' ebbi occasione di dimostrare nelle parole pronunciate a nome
il desiderio del R. Governo che l'Italia sia rappresentata in
modo permanente in seno ad un Comitato che, qualunque siano le
sue attribuzioni attuali, si occupa tuttora esclusivamente
di cosa italiana e, per lozo, non avrebbe che ^{da} vantaggiarsi
della nostra partecipazione.

Il se tale partecipazione dovesse apportare un qual-
che contributo nelle attribuzioni del Comitato stesso, lo ritengo
che sarebbe certamente un contributo per il quale, in quanto
sa ne alleggeriremmo un po' gli oneri e le possibilita', fra
le quali quella di efficacemente contribuire con la sua a quella
pacificazione ed intesa, fra i popoli mediterranei, che e' nei
nostri voti comuni.

Lieutenant General

5775

Sir Noel V.N. Mason Mac Farlane,

Capo Comandante Commissione Alleata di Controllo

S.A.L.S.R.N.

53

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

813 26 FEB 1944

Io le sarò in conseguenza molto grato, Signor
Generale, se volesse rammentare l'interprete di tal nostro
desiderio presso i Governi alleati con la sua abituale,
amichevole cortesia.

Mi creda, cordialmente

Barloggio

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Barlog by

5774

53

SECRET

FARGO 1340

FARGO (GAM MACTAPLANE C COMB)

26th. February. 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACTAPLANE

URGENT

THROUGH EYES ONLY GENERAL WILSON FROM MACTAPLANE PERSONAL

folio #36

The King's offer which I communicated to you in my Patina
2358 is naturally secret. I have not informed General Solodovnik. I am,
however, anxious lest he might receive information on the subject from Russian
member of the Advisory Council. *or from local leakage. RQ* I feel, therefore, that I ought to let him
know the King's offer for his own information and for transmission if he
wishes only to Russian member of Advisory Council or Moscow

Retained by General MacFarlane

*he helpfully expected
from Friedman*

5773

52

CC/P/100

FMG/rj

26th. February. 1944.

filed #50

Thank you for your letter of 23rd. February in which you enclosed a telegram from Senator Croce and yourself to Mr. Churchill.

You asked me to use my discretion in the matter of forwarding this telegram and I did so to the extent of telegraphing at once a brief resumé of your telegram in which I made all the points you wished to stress.

I was very interested in your letter.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

COUNT CARLO SPORZA.

577

51

CC/P/17

~~MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

FRMM/rj

25th. February, 1944.

folio #44
I enclose herewith copies of a letter I received yesterday from Sforza.

2. I have just sent you a brief telegram on the subject but I thought you might like to see the letter and its enclosure in original.

3. I telegraphed you yesterday regarding my talk with de Nicola. He made a very much better impression on me than any other Italian politician I have seen up to date. Reber will be telling you about him.

attached folio #45
4. I think we ought to take very careful thought before accepting the de Nicola- Victor Emmanuel proposal as a solution to the political situation. It is almost certain to prove extremely distasteful to a considerable opposition who may place us in the position of still being the supporters of the unpopular King and opponents of the will of the people. I still think that this may lead to many kinds of difficult repercussions.

5. It is all too evident that the whole of this political business here is in a tangle. Very little of it makes sense and I am sure that only a drastic solution will do much good. Even de Nicola seems illogical. For instance, after describing to me his success as intermediary between the King and Sforza as representing the opposition, he told me that although Sforza clearly wished to be Prime Minister he had absolutely no following anywhere in Italy.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
GCB, KCB, DSO, MC,
Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

Pencilled note:

* - This is confirmed by de Nicola.

577

~~MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

50

Naples, February 23d, 1944.

Dear General MacFarlane,

Senator Croce to whom I told this morning your best wishes asked me to thank you most cordially. He is much better and will leave after tomorrow for Sorrento.

I found him sorry, almost in despair, for the dangerous phrases of Mr. Churchill's speech. Like me, he was more sorry for England's moral fame than for us.

I cannot hide from you that when I read it this morning in a text more complete than the one given by the Risorgimento I was most shocked, all the more so that I was afraid it might alter the chances of the happy solution of which I told you yesterday.

It is true that I have also seen, this morning, former speaker de Nicola who tells me that he is sure that the man in question will keep his word. But you see how dangerous and risky all that is. How difficult it is to judge political problems from some distant head quarters...

De Nicola relieved me of any secret about names - you have already felt it - and told me that he is going to see you. I am glad, he is a very honest man.

Croce and I feel that our duty - being above the parties - was to state to Mr. Churchill a few facts. Here is our telegram for him. But Croce agrees with me that since the most important fact is the realization of the decisions taken at Ravello, and since we have full confidence in your vision,

Amoroso
a *De Nicola*
recognition of the

I cannot hide from you that when I read it this morning in a text more complete than the one given by the Risorgimento I was most shocked, all the more so that I was afraid it might alter the chances of the happy solution of which I told you yesterday.

It is true that I have also seen, this morning, former speaker de Nicola who tells me that he is sure that the man in question will keep his word. But you see how dangerous and risky all that is. How difficult it is to judge political problems from some distant head quarters...

De Nicola relieved me of any secret about names - you have already felt it - and told me that he is going to see you. I am glad, he is a very honest man.

Croce and I feel that our duty - being above the parties - was to state to Mr. Churchill a few facts. Here is our telegram for him. But Croce agrees with me that since the most important fact is the realization of the decisions taken at Ravello, and since we have full confidence in your vision, we must leave it to you to decide whether to cable immediately our message to Mr. Churchill or to use it in the way you think best.

But I cannot hide from you that if you can succeed in eliminating the bad impression created by the speech you'll render a service even more to England's fame than to Italy. It should be avoided that some day historians will have some reason to say that Great Britain relied gladly in Italy on

fascists and pro-nazis to carry on a war for freedom.

Believe me

Very sincerely yours

(50)

PRIME MINISTER - LONDON

Naples, Febr. 23 1944

Being of those who, after a painful internal struggle felt and worked as allies and friends of Great Britain in spite of fascist Italy fighting against you, we consider it our duty to inform you that your speech has caused deepest dismay among the millions of Italians who feel like us.

Sure that you realize the sincerity of our feelings not only for Great Britain but also for you to whom European freedom owes so much, we would not be loyal devoted friends of your country if hesitating to submit you three points showing where we deeply disagree from sources of your information :

1. The alleged fear that a democratic government might "oppose requests from Allied armies" seems an unjustified attack on our loyalty to Allied cause, all the more so that our main opposition against present government is its inability to help you and validly cooperate with you.

2. Equally incomprehensible is statement about "representatives of parties anxious to get the power" since the second signer of this telegram was offered by king on November 5 to become Prime Minister and refused only because king's presence was obstacle to serious war effort - not to speak of the many offers of Badoglio to the parties to join at once the government.

3. To say that a democratic government could have "no valid authority on the armed forces" may only have been suggested to you by people who, being only in touch with the Badoglio government, ignore that we have great confidence in some Italian generals who have been always anti-nazi and who have no responsibility in the shameful disintegration of September last. Moreover we are decided to advise our friends when in Government to decide about choice of military leaders in full previous agreement with the Allied authorities. We conceive a future government with much more sincere collaboration with them - contrary to what is now.

B. CROCE

FF SFORZA

SECRET

FAJOS 1292

NF

FAJOS (SEN MAFFARLANE C. COSE)

15th. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MAFFARLANE

PRIORITY

MAKINS A
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER-IN-CHIEF AND ~~SECRETARY OF DEFENSE~~ FROM MAFFARLANE
PERSONAL

file #50

Part One. I have received letter from Storace in which he says that the Prime Minister's statement has come as a great shock to Croce and himself. He enclosed a typical long telegram from Croce and himself to the Prime Minister but left it to me whether to send it or not.

MAKINS A
Part Two. I suggest that ~~Assistant Minister~~ should telegraph MacMillan telling him that I have considered it unnecessary to send the complete telegram but that the principal points are as follows. One. Subject has caused deepest dismay among millions Italians. Two. The fear that a democratic government might oppose requests from Allied Armies seems an unjustified attack. Three. Statement regarding representatives of parties anxious to get the power is incomprehensible. Four. The statement that a democratic government could have no valid authority on the Armed Forces can only have been suggested by people in touch only with the Badoglio Government.

Part Three. I leave it to MacMillan to pass this to the Prime Minister if he sees fit.

5768

49

~~SECRET~~ FARGO 1291

NY

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMB)

24th. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

INFO ON

MISSION PERSONAL FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND REINHARDT FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

Part One. Signor de Nicola came to see me today. He said that the proposal made to me by the King and reported to you in my Petina 2358 had been the result of endeavours made by himself to arrive at a solution to the existing political impasse. He had first obtained the approval of Croce and Sforza to his proposals. He had then spent four hours inducing the King to come to a decision. And he had finally informed Croce and Sforza of **exactly** how far the King was prepared to go. He said that Croce and Sforza were definitely prepared to accept the King's proposal although they would much prefer that action should be taken at once instead of being postponed until Rome.

Part Two. De Nicola assures me that he is quite certain that the King's proposals will prove acceptable to the three parties of the Centre. He is, however, very doubtful if they will be acceptable to the three parties of the Left. He stressed the fact that a large proportion of the population are supporters of the Christian Democrat Party.

Part Three. In his opinion the King's proposal if adopted would ensure the loyalty of the armed forces as the King himself would remain as titular King while Humbert acted

576748

- - 2 - -

as Lieutenant of the Realm with full Royal powers.

Part Four. Should the Allied Governments permit the King to carry out his proposed course of action the sequence of events would be as follows. One. An immediate announcement by the King that on arrival in Rome he would create Humbert Lieutenant of the Realm with full powers while he himself retired from public life retaining only the title of King. Two. Having entered Rome the King would not even go to the Quirinal but would proceed to his villa. Three. On the same day the Badoglio Government would resign. Immediately after this Humbert would call upon the choice of the Centre Parties for Prime Minister to form a government. This government would have been agreed before arrival in Rome and would take office immediately.

PART FIVE. De Nicola was most insistent that the formation of the new government must precede our arrival in Rome and that certain vacancies in the Cabinet must be reserved for leading politicians now in Rome.

Part Six. De Nicola considers that it should not be difficult to induce the Centre parties to accept postponement of action until Rome. If this is so and if de Nicola's information is correct (and it is confirmed by a conversation today between Peter and

- - 3 - -

forms) we would appear to have an agreed solution between the King and the Centre Parties which would be in accord with the policy outlined in Mr. Churchill's statement in the House. We might, however, find ourselves after arrival in Rome with a government of the Centre alone and possibly a strong opposition of the Left with no more possibility of making themselves felt politically than they have at the moment. It is clear that they might easily become a very disturbing factor in the new administration

- - 3 - -

forces) we would appear to have an agreed solution between the King and the Centre parties which would be in accord with the policy outlined in Mr. Churchill's statement in the House. We might, however, find ourselves after arrival in Rome with a government of the Centre alone and possibly a strong opposition of the Left with no more possibility of making themselves felt politically than they have at the moment. It is clear that they might easily become a very disturbing factor in the new administration

CC/E/94

FISM/rj

24th. February, 1944.

file #43
Thank you for your letter No. 526.DP of 23rd. February.

I have transmitted your telegram to my Prime Minister and he should receive it today. I am sure he will be very glad to receive it.

NOEL MATON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

S.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Capo del Governo.

576

47

CC/P/93.

~~SECRET~~ ~~AND~~ ~~PERSONAL~~

*Delivered
Jan 19/74
FMS/rj*

24th. February, 1944.

It seems clear from the Prime Minister's statement in the House that at any rate H.M.G. have decided that there is to be no change in the political set-up until we get to Rome.

2. We gave H.M.G. two alternatives. We recommended one of them. We stressed the fact that immediate action one way or the other was essential. So far, H.M.G. have merely indicated that they do not agree with the course of action suggested by us. But they have not stated whether we should carry out our alternative suggestion. In my opinion it is most necessary that we should do this immediately and more especially in view of the Prime Minister's statement. That is to say that we ought to tell the opposition very firmly that we can tolerate no further attacks on the King or the Badoglio Government until we get to Rome; that we hold the opposition leaders responsible for ensuring that this is done; and that arrest and legal proceedings will follow any attacks on the present administration whether committed in A.M.G. areas or King's Italy.

3. I have already sent a message to P.S.B. throughout the country informing them that they must be scrupulously careful at the present juncture to ensure that nothing is broadcast or published which might increase political tension. I have no control over them and I can only hope that they will play.

I have just telegraphed you a suggested directive to P.S.B.

4. As you know, I have been instructed to keep off politics and any contact between me or members of my Commission and Italian political leaders is apparently regarded as undesirable.

5. I am responsible for ensuring the efficient administration of the country and for getting maximum assistance out of the Italians.

6. Unless I can keep my finger on the political pulse I cannot possibly discover or forestall potential difficulties and trouble, and my task may well become extremely difficult. Neither I nor any of my political advisers have the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

- - 2 - -

slightest desire to play politics or to encourage or back any political set-up. Our job is to support and cooperate with the existing administration. But with a powerful opposition deprived of any means of making political progress other than voicing its views under the umbrella of P.W.B. or by direct action, it is essential that I should keep in touch with their responsible leaders. Quite apart from discovering and meeting difficulties before they arise, it is obviously of advantage to get to know these leaders as they will clearly accept direction from one whom they know more readily than from a complete stranger.

7. I need hardly say that whenever I have met political leaders here I have refrained from giving any comment on, or encouragement to, anything they had to say beyond telling them that I refused to tolerate anything likely to give trouble. I have played this game in many parts of Europe and you need have no fear that I will commit myself in any way. I hope very much that you will leave my contacts with political leaders to my discretion.

8. In conclusion I would like to stress what I consider to be our most important immediate political task. That is to say, ensuring that we make up our minds before entering Rome exactly how the inevitable change of government is to be brought about. In my opinion we must have this cut and dried before we reach Rome. If we leave things indefinite and hope that after reaching Rome the political situation will solve itself quietly and by itself, we may well be in for a packet of trouble.

9. I do not think that this aspect of the situation is in any way realised at home and if you agree I suggest it would be a very good thing if I made a very quick trip home to give the complete picture to the Prime Minister and others. I will naturally do nothing about this until I hear from you and I suggest that if you think such a trip would be a good thing that you might consider proposing it to the authorities at home.

Wm 24/4

NOEL MARION MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, GBE, KCB,
150, 10..

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

Cope for General Alexander

5162

(46)

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

COPY

FARGO

24 FEBRUARY 44

CONFIDENTIAL

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM

KINDLY TRANSMIT FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM MARSHAL BADOGLIO TO THE
PRIME MINISTER PD PENBASE PAREN FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN TO AFHQ FOR MOS
PD CITE FARGO ONE TWO SEVEN ZERO PD QUOTE PD I HAVE HEARD THE RADIO BROADCAST OF YOUR
INSPIRING SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS PD I THANK YOU ON BEHALF OF THE ITALIAN ARMED
FORCES FOR THE FLATTERING JUDGEMENT YOU HAVE EXPRESSED ON THEIR PERFORMANCE PD MUCH MORE
INDEED COULD BE DONE AND CONSIDERABLE CONTINGENTS OF ITALIAN TROOPS ESPECIALLY SUITED FOR
MOUNTAIN WARFARE COULD EFFECTIVELY COOPERATE IN ALLIED SECTIONS IF ONLY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT
WE HAVE LONG BEEN ASKING FOR COULD BE SENT TO US PD TWO PD AS FOR THE GOVT I HAVE THE
HONOUR OF PRESIDING YOU HAVE CLEARLY REALISED THAT IT IS GUIDED AND INSPIRED BY A SINGLE
AND CLEAR CUT PURPOSE CAN HELP THE ALLIES IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO WIN THE WAR PD THREE
PD IT IS THE GOVTS OPINION THAT INTERNAL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH WHEN THE ENTIRE
ITALIAN PEOPLE WILL BE ABLE TO EXPRESS FREELY THEIR OWN WILL PD FOR THE TIME BEING A
SINGLE PURPOSE MUST OVER DASH RULE ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CAN BEAT THE GERMANS PD
SIGNED BADOGLIO

Copy to: Gen MacFarlane

CONFIDENTIAL

5761

45

CC/P/92

FM32/rj

23rd. February, 1944.

As you know, I have on my staff here Mr Reber who is the political representative in my Commission of the United States Government.

You were good enough yesterday to give me some interesting information for which I am very grateful. But, as you know, I do not represent the British Government alone and I hope very much that you might be good enough to tell Mr Reber in your own words the information which you gave me yesterday. I am naturally diffident about passing on the information which you gave me in confidence but I do feel that the Government of the United States should hear of it from their own political representative.

NOKI MAISON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Count Carlo Sforza.

NK.526 DI PROT.



IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

23 FEBBRAIO 1944

AL SIGNOR GENERALE
NOEL MASON MACFARLANE

CAPO DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO

NAPOLI

CARO GENERALE MACFARLANE,

LE RIMETTO L'UNITO TELEGRAMMA DA ME DIRETTO
AL PRIMO MINISTRO CHURCHILL CON PREGHIERA DI CORTESE E
IMMEDIATA TRASMISSIONE A DESTINAZIONE.

SONO LIETO DI CONFERMARE ANCHE A LEI CHE GLI
ACCENNI FATTI DAL PRIMO MINISTRO ALLA PARTECIPAZIONE DEL
LE FORZE ARMATE ITALIANE ALLA COMUNE LOTTA CONTRO I TE-
DESCHI, SONO STATI VIVAMENTE APPREZZATI DAL MIO GOVERNO
E DA TUTTA L'OPINIONE PUBBLICA ITALIANA.

LA RINGRAZIO E SALUTO CORDIALMENTE.

NAPOLI

CARO GENERALE MACFARLANE,

LE RIMETTO L'UNITO TELEGRAMMA DA ME DIRETTO
AL PRIMO MINISTRO CHURCHILL CON PREGHIERA DI CORTESE E
IMMEDIATA TRASMISSIONE A DESTINAZIONE.

SONO LIETO DI CONFERMARE ANCHE A LEI CHE GLI
ACCENNI FATTI DAL PRIMO MINISTRO ALLA PARTECIPAZIONE DEL
LE FORZE ARMATE ITALIANE ALLA COMUNE LOTTA CONTRO I TE-
DESCHI, SONO STATI VIVAMENTE APPREZZATI DAL MIO GOVERNO
E DA TUTTA L'OPINIONE PUBBLICA ITALIANA.

LA RINGRAZIO E SALUTO CORDIALMENTE.

Baron

Amel
575

43

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

SALERNO 23.2.44

*Please Transmit following Telegram from
Marshal Badoglio to the Prime Minister.*

Quoted

HON. WINSTON CHURCHILL
PRIME MINISTER OF

GREAT BRITAIN

I HAVE HEARD THE RADIO BROADCAST OF YOUR INSPIRING
SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. I THANK YOU ON BEHALF
OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES FOR THE FLATTERING JUDGE-
MENT YOU HAVE EXPRESSED ON THEIR PERFORMANCE. MUCH
MORE INDEED COULD BE DONE AND CONSIDERABLE CONTINGENTS
OF ITALIAN TROOPS ESPECIALLY SUITED FOR MOUNTAIN WAR-
FARE COULD EFFECTIVELY COOPERATE IN ALLIED ACTIONS IF
ONLY ARMS AND EQUIPEMENT WE HAVE LONG BEEN ASKING FOR
COULD BE SENT TO US.

AS FOR THE GOVERNEMENT I HAVE THE HONOUR OF PRE-
SIDING YOU HAVE CLEARLY REALIZED THAT IT IS GUIDED AND
INSPIRED BY A SINGLE AND CLEARCUT PURPOSE :HELP THE
ALLIES IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO WIN THE WAR.

IT IS THE GOVERNEMENT'S OPINION THAT INTERNAL
QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH WHEN THE ENTIRE ITALIAN
PEOPLE WILL BE ABLE TO EXPRESS FREELY THEIR OWN WILL.

I HAVE HEARD THE RADIO BROADCAST OF YOUR INSPIRING SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS . I THANK YOU ON BEHALF OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES FOR THE FLATTERING JUDGEMENT YOU HAVE EXPRESSED ON THEIR PERFORMANCE. MUCH MORE INDEED COULD BE DONE AND CONSIDERABLE CONTINGENTS OF ITALIAN TROOPS ESPECIALLY SUITED FOR MOUNTAIN WARFARE COULD EFFECTIVELY COOPERATE IN ALLIED ACTIONS IF ONLY ARMS AND EQUIPEMENT WE HAVE LONG BEEN ASKING FOR COULD BE SENT TO US.

AS FOR THE GOVERNEMENT I HAVE THE HONOUR OF PRESIDING YOU HAVE CLEARLY REALIZED THAT IT IS GUIDED AND INSPIRED BY A SINGLE AND CLEARCUT PURPOSE :HELP THE ALLIES IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY TO WIN THE WAR.

IT IS THE GOVERNEMENT'S OPINION THAT INTERNAL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH WHEN THE ENTIRE ITALIAN PEOPLE WILL BE ABLE TO EXPRESS FREELY THEIR OWN WILL. FOR THE TIME BEEING A SINGLE PURPOSE MUST OVERULE ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: BEAT THE GERMANS.

BADOGLIO

unpublished 5752

Sample Document for

onward dispatch

. handwritten

43

SECRET

FARGO 1250

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

23rd. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM EYES ONLY GENERAL WILSON, BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND REINHARDT
FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

General Solodovnik saw Caracciola, Secretary of Executive Junta of opposition, today. He said Caracciola was disappointed and seemed rather depressed by Prime Minister's statement on Italy of yesterday. He said that feeling in the country against King and present Government was growing stronger and the Junta anticipated difficulty in keeping their less responsible supporters in check. The Junta had practically decided, if allowed to put their programme into effect, to invite Croce to be the Lieutenant of the Realm and to make him the sole Lieutenant. Up to date the Junta had reached no decision regarding their candidate for the Premiership.

5757

(42)

Form 250 159A

N-3879

RAD

4305

Signal Corps, United States Army

Telegram

URGENT

SECRET

4-0 3-2005

Received at

PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

23 FEBRUARY 1944 19

• SECRET

• URGENT

TO (ACTION)

CS PBS FOR GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE (EYES ONLY)

(INFORMATION)

NONE

FROM

GENERAL WILSON

DATE TIME SIGNED

231100A

DATE TIME REC'D

231159A

REFERENCE NR.

55381

DATE

FHCIC

HEADQUARTERS
23 FEB 1944
A. C. C.

1191 (file 439)
FAC 0000

REFERENCE YOUR PBS 9129 OF 22 FEB.

I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MEETING. YOU SHOULD IN NO WAY

COMMIT YOURSELF.

Info - 14 Dec
1000

ACC-0137

SEC. GENERAL

GENERAL WILSON

HEADQUARTERS
23 FEB 1944
A. C. C.

DATE TIME SIGNED: 231130A
DATE TIME REC'D: 231159A
REFERENCE NR.: 55381
NOTE: FHGIC

1941 (plus 439)
— 1940 0547

REFERENCE YOUR PBS 9129 OF 22 FEB.

I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MEETING. YOU SHOULD IN NO WAY
COMMIT YOURSELF.

Exp. by Dec
10/11
Long
ACC-DIST
SEC-GENERAL

Good
Wm 23/2

5756

W. B. Fisher

15780
SECRET

FORM 143-A

CRYPTO

(41)

GENERAL WILSON

DATE TIME SIGNED: 231601A

DATE TIME REL'D: 231911A

REFERENCE NO.: 55576

FHCIC

Info Hq ACC
CC
10/1/45
10/1/45
10/1/45

PRIME MINISTER HAD FORWARDED TO ME SUBSTANCE OF OBJECT ON THE ITALIAN SITUATION WHICH HE MADE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY. IT IS AS FOLLOWS: "ITALIAN ARMISTICE WAS SIGNED ON THE BASIS OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER WITH THE KING AND BADOGLIO WHO WERE AND ARE THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY. IN THEIR AUTHORITY ITALIAN NAVY, ARMY, AND AIR FORCE SURRENDERED TO US AND HAVE SINCE COOPERATED TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY. THE BATTLE IN ITALY WILL BE HARD AND LONG. I AM NOT YET CONVINCED THAT ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT CAN AT PRESENT BE FORMED WHICH WOULD COMMAND THE SAME OBEDIENCE FROM THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES. IF WE ENTER ROME WE SHALL BE FREE TO REVIEW THE WHOLE ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION AND SHOULD DO WITH ADVANTAGES WE DO NOT POSSESS AT PRESENT. IT IS FROM ROME THAT A SURE BROADLY BASED ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CAN BEST BE FORMED. WHETHER SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD BE EQUALLY HELPFUL TO ALLIES I CANNOT TELL. IT MIGHT TRY TO TAKE ITS POSITION GOOD WITH THE

FORM 215-A

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ 10833

40

N-3934 (PAGE 2)

~~SECRET~~

URGENT

ITALIAN PEOPLE BY RESISTING ALLIED DEMANDS. I SHOULD BE SORRY TO
SEE AN UNSETTLING CHANGE MADE AT A TIME WHEN THE BATTLE IS AT
ITS CLIMAX."

~~SECRET~~

15833

5751

40

TRANSLATION

The text of Churchill's speech that we were able to intercept is the following:

The Prime Minister then said that about a hundred Italian war ships are operating by the side of Allied naval forces, while other Italians are fighting on land and in the air, giving inestimable services to the Allied Commands. The battle in Italy, Churchill said, will be long and hard, nor do I believe that another government in place of the actual government could receive the approval of the people. Nevertheless, the entire political situation in Italy will be reviewed and re-examined after the occupation of Rome.

Radio London

1330 - 1430

- - -

Speaking of the battle for Italy, Churchill said that it will be long and hard. Regarding the actual political situation of liberated Italy, he does not personally believe that another government different from the actual one could receive the approval of the people. In this regard, Churchill recalled that at the moment of the Armistice the Italian Navy, not without great risks and perils, obeyed the orders of the Government, and today more than 100 war vessels are collaborating most efficiently with the Allied forces in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Besides, all the land and air forces, which were liberated from the Germans, obeyed the orders of Badoglio's Government. Italian armed forces have fought side by side with the Allied forces, and despite the great losses suffered by them, they continue to remain at our side. A still greater contribution is being made by the Italian armed forces, which are rendering indispensable services within Italy. Besides, we have signed the unconditional surrender terms for Italy with King Victor Emanuel and the Badoglio Government, and actually their government is to be considered the only legitimate one. Certainly the entire Italian political situation will be reviewed and re-examined after the occupation of Rome--which I am sure will come. The leaders of the anti-fascist parties who are anxious to govern the country, are perhaps in a condition to do so, but they would not have any constitutional power unless the present king abdicates, and providing his successor would invite them to take part in the government. He is not certain that they would have the same authority that the present government has; nor is it certain that they would have authority over the armed forces that are now fighting on our side. The Italian people are now in miserably poor conditions. Food is scarce, but no matter how much we may want to alleviate this condition of the Italians, the food supplies are small, because the greater part of our ships are engaged in war transports.

2030

King V. E. & Marshal Badoglio constitute the rightful Italian Government. Following their orders more than 100 war vessels collaborate with the Allied forces, as well as the land and air forces. I am not convinced that it is possible at this time to form a government to which the armed forces would respond with equal measure. When Rome is liberated, we can establish a government on a broader basis.

2330

40

EVENTS IN ITALY

Returning to the Italian situation, Mr. Churchill said, "The Italian Navy, not without risk, surrendered to us punctually. All Italian troops which were not dominated by the Germans also obeyed the order from the Crown. Since then these Italian forces have cooperation with us to the best of their ability.

"The battle for Italy will be long and hard. I am not yet convinced that any other government could be formed in Italy which would command the same obedience from the Italian armed forces."

"Should we succeed in the present battle and enter Rome as I believe we shall - I believe we shall be free to review the whole Italian political position, and we shall do so with many advantages which we do not possess at present. It is from Rome that a more broadly based Italian government can best be formed."

"I should be sorry, however, to see an unsettling change made at this when the battle is at its climax, swaying to and fro.

The representatives of the various Italian parties have of course no electoral authority and no constitutional authority until the present King either abdicates or his successor invites them to take office. We shall see much more clearly how to proceed and have much more varied resources at our disposal, if and when we are in possession of the capital city. 5752

"The policy, therefore upon which His Majesty's Government has agreed provisionally with the Government of the

-2-

United States, is to wage the battle for Rome and take a new view when we are there."

Turning to the Balkan scene Mr. Churchill stated, "In the vast mountain regions of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece magnificent resistance to the German invader is in full and violent progress. At the present time no fewer than twenty German divisions are engaged in the Balkans. There are twenty-five German divisions in Italy, of which eighteen are at present battling in front of Rome, and another twenty are spread over the vast area of the Balkans. They might be worse employed.

"In Yugoslavia in spite of the most ferocious and murderous cruelties and reprisals perpetrated by the Germans, the Partisan forces have the upper hand? They (the Germans,) ~~xxxxxxx~~ own the ground they stand on; but nothing else. All the rest belongs to the valiant Partisans. German losses have been very heavy, and as far as actual fighting is concerned, have greatly exceeded the losses of the Partisans."

REC-4000-APD 304

7766-207-1
Q&A/7766-207-1

1871-72

WALTER S. FISCH
Colonel, Cavalry
Deputy Executive Commissioner

Marston has inserted text of this portion of the Prime Minister's speech which deals with Italy.

202407 FROM THE DIRECTOR'S OFFICE TO THE CHIEF OF THE 22d

100

It is hard enough to understand the policy of one's own country. It is almost impossible to understand those of foreign countries. The urgent and constant request for us to "follow in to judge all parties and factions" demonstrates only by the fact of their persistence and ability to fight the Germans, and thus in fifteen the version of the Allied troops. This is no time for ideological preferences for one side or the other and especially so, His Majesty's Government, have not indulged ourselves in this way at all. Thus in Italy we are working for the agreement through the Government of the King and Imperio. In Yugoslavia, we give our aid to Marshal Tito. In Greece we agree of the fact that a British officer was murdered by the political organization called EAM, we are doing our best to bring about a reconciliation or at least a working agreement between the opposing forces.

7 of 1 may in word is the reason why now it is about each of those words.

000.1

PROPERTY OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

RECEIVED FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ON 12/12/2011

1944

ITALY

It is hard enough to understand the politics of one's own country. It is almost impossible to understand those of foreign countries. The most interesting course for us to follow is, in my opinion, the Italian situation. Only by the test of their own ability to fight the Germans, and then through the actions of the Italian troops, this is no time for ideological professions for any side or the other and certainly not, as Secretary's Government, have not indicated anywhere in this my at all. When in Italy we are working for the present through the Government of the King and Indro Montanelli. In Indro Montanelli we give our aid to Churchill. In Indro Montanelli we are also of the fact that a military officer can be considered by the political organization called Mussolini, we are doing our best to bring about a reconciliation or at least a working agreement between the two systems.

I will say a word if the Italian will permit me about each of these countries and the attitude which should govern us and which we are certainly following. We should have Italian resistance on the basis of unconditional surrender with Victor Emmanuel and Marshal Badoglio the hero, and up to the present are, the legitimate Government of Italy. On their authority the Italian Navy, not without a risk and loss, surrounded to us and practically all Italian troops and officers who were not followed by the German also obeyed the orders they received from the front. Since then these Italian Forces have cooperated with us to the best of their ability and courage and Italian side of our are achieving valuable services in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Italian troops have entered the front lines in Italy. Although on one occasion they suffered severe casualties, they continue to fight bravely and our own very small but very brave are engaged in the Italian north-east to the Allied Forces behind the front. Still a small army also fighting on our side. The battle in Italy for Europe which I have already mentioned will be hard and long, I do not yet consider that any other government can be formed at the present time in Italy which would command the two obediences from the Italian armed forces. Should we succeed in the present battle and enter Rome, as I trust we shall, we shall be free to discuss the whole Italian political situation and we shall be in a very good position that we do not intend at the present time. It is true that this is very heavily a political government can best be formed.

40

I 237