

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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HQ, ACC, SECRETARY GENERAL'S OFFICE
POLITICS (MISC.)
JAN. - SEPT. 1944

FRENCH ARMY "B"

HEADQUARTERS

N° 9-3
929/3.S.

5 July 1944.

SUBJECT : Military Government in Elba.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

1.- In answer to your letter of 29 June, I agree to your letter appointing Colonel PETIT in place of General MAGNIAN as Deputy Military Governor on the Island of ELBA.

2.- We are to-day forwarding to Colonel PETIT your letter of appointment and hereby notify your Headquarters.

General de LATTES de TASSIGNY

Commander French Army B.

sg/ Olie

6212

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Q. M. C. Form 800 (104 2nd 400)
Revised July 26, 1918

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1-2

POLITICS (misc)

HQ ACC. APO 394
Sec Y Gen.

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
36) 1798 6172	ACC ABAD ACC MAIN	13 JUNE —	COL. HANFERT ACC ROME (CACCIA)	UNDERSECRETARIES SHOULD REMAIN IN ROME.
17) 1840	BARI	18 JUNE	GEN. MACFARLANE	LIBERATION COM. PRESENTS LIST OF PERSONS DESIGNATED TO BARI PROV. & COMMUNAL ADMIN.
38) 4 - (2) - (1) CC/MA/0004	D'AMBROSIO (SEN. DOM.) D'AMBROSIO COL. 'GENERAL'	16 JUNE 44 14 JUNE 44 22 JUNE 44	A.C.C. GEN. MACFARLANE REF. D'AMBROSIO	EXAMINES GUARDIANSHIP FOR LIBERATION OF ROME ENCLOSURES (A). EXAMINES THINGS FOR RECEIPT OF (A)
39) A/FG/235 (3) 255. 1939 (6) CC/P/411 (2) 929/1.5. (8) - (F) 25/6(00) (3) - (1) - (1) 93.04.1-4	AFHQ 340 SARNO GEN. ALEXANDER GEN. MACFARLANE GEN. DE B. MAGNAN COL. 340 SARNO C. M. C. GEN. GATTELLI GEN. GATTELLI COL. 340 SARNO	18 JUNE 30 JUNE 44 10 JUNE 44 5 JULY 44 5 JULY 44 2 JULY 44 30 JUNE 44 14 JUNE 44 8 JULY 44	ACC MAIN GEN. DE B. MAGNAN GEN. ALEXANDER 3. A.C., M.F. ADV. HQ., A.A.I. A.F.H.Q. COL. F. PETIT GEN. DETASSIGN H.Q., A.C.C.	ADMINISTRATION OF F-34.
40) - (1) A - (6) 9150/93 (1) 912 1941.1	- COL. 44000. 4. 1940. 93 CAPT. STONE	21 JUNE 44 24 JUNE 44 25 JUNE 44	- H.E. BONDI H.E. BONDI	ENCL'Y LIST OF CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL FOR SARNOVA. MINUTES OF MEETING HELD ON 21 JUNE 44 AFTER OF RESOLVE FOR 120 OFFICERS TO BE RE-ORGANIZED TO RE-ORGANIZE RECENTLY LIBERATED AREAS.
41) 912 1941.1	CAPT. STONE	25 JUNE 44	H.E. BONDI	DISCUSS PLANNING OF PARTY CIVIL ADMIN. OF NAPLES CONTINUE UNDER RESPONS. OF ITALIAN GOVT.
42) 912 1941.1	CAPT. STONE	26 JUNE 44	H.E. BONDI	ENCL'Y, MRS. GAMBOSI'S REPORT ON ITALIAN SITUATION.
43) - (1) 912 1941.1	MAJ. BATTLE CAPT. STONE	11 JULY 44 12 JULY 44	CAPT. STONE H.E. BONDI	I SHOULD LIKE YOUR SUGGESTIONS ON CIVIL ADMIN. OF NAPLES (RETHINK).
44) - (1) 912 1941.1	MR. SCHOTT MAJ. STEWART	17 " 18 "	ACC EX. Comm.	COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN BLACK MARKET IN ROME & TABIATTI'S REFUSING SUMMONS
45) - (1) 912 1941.1	L'UNIONE PROLETARIA	4 SEPT.	-	OPEN LTR TO PALETTI: DEMAGOGY AT WORK.
46) 912 1941.1	CAPT. STONE	29 AUG	H.E. BONDI	CIVIL ADMIN. OF NAPLES COMMUNE.

Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 400)
Revised July 26, 1965

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000.1

Politics (misc.)

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
20 DCC 091-1 T9945.	CAPT. STONE DR. CALLEMAN	5 MAR. 44 1 MAR. 44	DR. CALLEMAN CAPT. STONE	THANKS FOR FWD'G TEXT OF H.E. REALE'S SPEECH AT POTENZA.
21) CC/P/87 TEL. 6753.	GEN. MICHAELANGE MUSOTTI	5 APR. 44 6 APR. 44	H. COMMISSIONER FOR SICILY GEN. MICHAELANGE	MUSOTTI ADDS H. COMMISSIONER FOR SICILY. GEN. MACE. REAUX.
22) ROM. LHM DEMBE 3483-1402 (KMS)	BADOLIO BADOLIO	3 JAN. 44 14 MAR. 44	C. C. GEN. MICHAELANGE	PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED AND COUNCIL NOT FORMED YET AT ROMA OFFICES. J. SHOULD LIKE DEVISION OF H. P. IN THIS MATTER.
23) PROT. N-64 54 000-1 56 000-1	PROF. GIANNA, MARCEL PALACE FOR EMB. GIANNA HAT. DOE HAT. DOE	5 APR. 44 12 APR. 44 15 APR. 44 18 APR. 44	GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE SIG. V. CALACE	DOCUMENTS CONCERNING SITUATION IN THE COMUNE DI ARZANO. REDIRECTED TO GEN. COM. REG. III.
24) 3711/145 (GOS)	BADOLIO	APRIL 22	GEN. MICHAELANGE	PROTESTS AGAINST METHOD OF ILLEG. REQUEST FOR SUPPLIES AT BRINDISI.
25) 3420/145 (GOS)	BADOLIO	23 APRIL	GEN. MICHAELANGE	METHODS OF ARMY ADMIN. AT CREMA VOLTURNO. BADOLIO PROTESTS.
26) M. 172.	GEN. MICHAELANGE	25 APR. 44	FREEDOM RTD. H.A.I.	BADOLIO STRESSES DIFFICULTIES FROM SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN SICILY.
27) 398/21/CA 398/22/CA	GEN. MICHAELANGE COL. FIDAE	21 APR. 44 28 APR. 44	1465 AFHQ C.C. ACC.	ANTI-FASSIST ACTIVITIES IN SICILY - INVESTIGATION PROVES COMPLAINTS WITHOUT FOUNDATION.
28) 38/10/CA	GEN. MICHAELANGE	5 MAY. 44	BADOLIO	METHODS OF ARMY ADMIN. AT CREMA VOLTURNO. GEN. M. APPROVES AN UNUSUAL STATE OF TOWN.
29) 504/12/CA	GEN. A. BYRONSON	6 MAY 44	GEN. MICHAELANGE	DECIDES TO TAKE AN ARMED POLICE REPORT WITH COMRADES. KIDNAPERS CRIMINALS OF H.E. WORK IN PALACE AT NAPLES.
30) 145-114 28 — S.C. 001	COL. SANDRO HAT. DOE HAT. DOE	1 MAY 44 7 MAY 44	HQ. ACC. MEMBERS AT ADV. COM.	DISTRIBUTION OF DOCS TO ADV. COM. DRAFT OF LETTER TO BADOLIO.
31) 1589	BADOLIO	9 MAY 44	GEN. MICHAELANGE	EXCEL. TRANSLATIONS OF 2 LETTERS BY MAXIMIL. BADOLIO FWD'S PARTICULARS OF THE GRIFFARDI BROS.
32) 129/15/CA	GEN. MICHAELANGE	22 MAY 44	GEN. ROBERTSON	DISORGANIZED NEWS ITEM. P.S. MUST HAVE CORRECT VERSION.
33) 26/12/CA	EXEC. COMMISSIONER	26 MAY 44	C. C.	POLITICAL MEETING.
34) CC/P/367	GEN. MICHAELANGE	5 JUN. 44	GEN. MICHAELANGE	1. FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH PARTICULARLY TOOK TO NAUCCI.
35) M. 195 65 001/294 C. 1458 D. 11 199 E. 001/245 F. 11 110 G. 11 23	GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE BADOLIO GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE	12 MAY. 44 13 MAY. 44 13 MAY. 44 14 MAY. 44 14 MAY. 44 14 MAY. 44 14 MAY. 44	APHA BADOLIO GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE GEN. MICHAELANGE	{ (ROMA PRINCE) STATEMENT.

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Q. M. C. Form 253 (104 No. 480)
Revised July 26, 1948

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 000 1

POLITICS. (MISC.)

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1) ADC/22	GEN. WILSON	5 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	APPOINTMENT OF OFFICER AT HQ. HQ. 12 WORK ON OCCUPATIONAL SEC. OF P. W. B. WORK.
2) CCW/GOVERNS	MR. BADOLLO	14 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	FORWARDING LETTER FROM UNKNOWN LAWYER (CONTENT) ON COMMUNIST VIEWS AT BARI RADIO.
3) BICULAR N°1	—	16 FEB. 44	—	RESUME OF ITALIAN POLITICAL THEATRE SINCE 1922
4) CC/P/54	GEN. MACFARLANE	16 FEB. 44	INDOULT	MR. S. RECEIPT OF BADOLLO LETTER (RE #1)
5) CC/P/41	GEN. MACFARLANE	16 FEB. 44	GEN. WILSON	FORWARDS LAWYER'S LETTER RECEIVED FROM BADOLLO. ASKS THAT PRESENT POLIT. IMASSE SHOULD BE CLARIFIED.
6) ACC/M34/L	—	17 FEB. 44	—	CAREER OF H.E. CASATI, MINISTER OF JUSTICE
7) 4361	GEN. WILSON	17 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	WAR CABINET DECISION CONTRARY TO RECAPITULATION.
8) —	TARCHIANI	24 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	ASTONISHED AT CHURCHILL'S STATEMENT ON ITALIAN SITUATION.
9) —	C. ALABGIA	25 FEB. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	SHOWS DISAPPOINTMENT AT CHURCHILL'S SPEECH.
10) CC/P/96	GEN. MACFARLANE	25 FEB. 44	MANING (OFFICER B.M.)	COMMENTS ON PECULIAR BEHAVIOR OF SOLODOVNIK O. A. D. C.
11) 56007	C. W. C.	26 FEB. 44	FARGO	CABLE DATES DEPARTURE IN ISLAND OF BADOLLO GOVERNMENT.
12) 2408	GEN. MACFARLANE	27 FEB. 44	FREEDOM FORWARDS	PARTICULARS OF DATES OF MOVEMENT OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT (RE #11.)
13) 000-1	SECRE. GEN.	27 FEB. 44	CARLO ANTONIA	C.O. IS GRATEFUL FOR THE EXPRESSION OF OPINION REGARDING A.M.'S SPEECH (RE #9).
14) FARGO 1431	GEN. MACFARLANE	27 FEB. 44	ADJUTANT GENERAL	AM DISCUSSING THIS QUESTION WITH C. IN C. HQ.
15) — 000-1	PIETROVITA DE ROSA MAJOR DOE	7 MAR. 44 13 MAR. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE PIETROVITA DE ROSA	ORIGINAL & TRANSLATION OF A LETTER OF HUMILIATION AT A.M.'S SPEECH. AM. RECEIPT OF 2408.
16) 755 187-7 150404-2	ACTING CHIEF, 1795 R. 4445	15 MAR. 44 15 MAR. 44	ALL (ATT. C. C.) GEN. WILSON.	ENCL. 4 COPIES OF T. 1795, MESSAGE 2147 SE 1795, CONTAINING OF DIRECTION ON APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 25 OF T. 1795, CONDITIONS OF ARMISTICE.
17) 54. 250 N° 47 — 1817 —	MAJ. DOE CABLE FOR EXEC. HQ. PRIENLA CORINADEN CORINADEN	15 MAR. 44 15 MAR. 44 27 FEB. 44 5 MAR. 44 15 MAR. 44	EXEC. HQ. GEN. MACFARLANE PERMANENT FARGO WORTH.	AM'S RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS RE #13 BY GILLEN AND POTENZA CORINADEN, REGARDING LOCAL EVENTS.
18) —	ALDO TRACANTINI	20 MAR. 44	GEN. MACFARLANE	NOTES AT INT. WORKSHOP RECAPITULATION AT LEGGE.
19) 215 011 4321	BANK (INT. 4908 S. C.)	20 MAR. 44	C. C.	NECESSARY FOR BADOLLO GOVERNMENT TO GIVE HONOR TO AM, CASATI, ETC. IN VIEW WITH DEBATE AND CONCLUDE.

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TRANSLATION

'L'Unione Proletaria'
4 settembre 1944

Language at work (open letter to Toletti)

Our poor Italy is steadily going towards the abyss. The situation is quite clear. On one hand, the lack of comprehension and the indifference of the Allies who have a war to fight and cannot trouble about us. On the other the presence of an inept Government, made of politicians without any serious technical and economical preparation and talking of nothing but their personal ambitions and interests: Government without legitimacy, factious representative of the inadmissible dictatorship of some parties.

On the other hand also, a tired, demoralized, diffident, sceptical, pessimistic country to which 20 years of fascism have taken what little political education it had before, giving it instead dangerously confusing mental and spiritual superstructure.

What is being done in such a dark and tragic atmosphere? Nothing good. Souls are angry. The ideological Pabel is reaching its apex. Individualism, arrivisme are spreading; the fever of power and gain is consuming the unfortunate body of the nation. Fascist mentality survives antifascism and fascist methods are the methods of antifascism. There is no change.

A Monarchy desperately clutching at power; a capitalism trying to survive by corruption; a militarist and nationalist 'form mentis' which tries not to give up before the dialytic of events; bourgeois habits which won't take a lesson from history and don't mean to change; an ephemeral and deceitful democracy; pharisaic and false, garrulous and inconsistent; a hopelessly ignorant proletarian class.

Which is greater, the moral or the material ruin of the country? The upper class thinks of nothing but saving its interests, and creating new ones, and sees everything from a sordidly individualistic point of view; the people are disappointed, unoccupied and starving and demand sanctions, execution, gallies and gallows.

Now let us try and understand each other. Sentimentally, nobody can dismiss the problems of punishment and recuperation. Execution must take place, punishment must be inflicted, the profiteers must be discovered and made to give up their gain.

Yet is it possible for our national life in this time of decisive events and tragical contingencies to revolve exclusively round negative factors, torn and shattered and devastated? A stark dry advance from base to enrich

What is being done in such a dark and tragic atmosphere? Nothing good. Souls are crying. The ideological school is reaching its apex. Individualism, arrivism are spreading; the fever of power and gain is consuming the unfortunate body of the nation. Fascist mentality survives anti-fascism and fascist methods are the methods of anti-fascism. There is no chance.

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Yet is it possible for our national life in this time of decisive events and tragical contingencies to revolve exclusively round negative factors, torn by persecution and vengeance? A shark drew advantage from fascism to enrich himself and his artimes. Let us have an inquest, but don't let us remove him from the management of the firm which entirely depends on him; don't let us sabotage the firm or ruin national economy because of him. Such games crop up every day; a kind of mania of destruction has taken hold of the public powers. Politicians know nothing about economics and aim blows at the trunk of the state to disfigure and to purify. Taking the place of democracy and organization of undertakings which have been the lymph of the nation, and which it would be of national interest to protect and to keep alive today, are now improvising Commissioners whose anti-fascist writs (prison, banishment) suit the commanding post to which they are appointed as the squadron or fighting units of the hierarchy of yesterday suited the representative and directing posts allotted to them by Mussolini.

Because he was a Jew, he has lost his job as head overseer of the United Hospital? Let us make him Vice Commissioner of the canal. A geometer of the Institute has been persecuted for a long time because he was an anti-fascist? Let us appoint him Commissioner of the Institute of the Fascist Director of the school has sacked the usher because he spoke ill of Mussolini. Let us appoint him Director of the school.

This for public functions'. But trade, economical organizations?

Don't the advocates of the Government know that sometimes one man is the life and incarnation of the firm, with a capitalist regime.

A substitute, even if he is anti-fascist and a gentleman cannot take his place without great harm to the firm.

A large number of managers are burning our lives, but we are not here to defend people or their more or less clean interests. Numerous cases when incompetent and pushing people, or false anti-fascists were appointed Commission ers of Firms which they will most certainly lead to ruin, are to be found. Meanwhile these firms have come to a standstill, to the prejudice of numerous workmen, while the offices of the firm are busy inquiring and washing their dirty linen in public.

Then there are the sequestrators who seize everything, even the machinery and the working tools, seal everything, start raking and locking up everything... and prevent other people from working. As antifascists, the workmen are de-lighted, but as workmen they can tighten their belts.

This question has also a legal aspect. Why condemn before the sentence? If there is an inquest why not wait for the result of this very inquest?

And what is the legitimacy of all this? Whom did the Government who is organizing this illegal confusion set his power from? Where are the legal laws authorizing the interference of public authority in private firms?

Mussolini after forsaking Socialism, took to pseudo-socialism, leading private and public economy to disaster. The self-styled Roman Democracy having forsaken democracy, is becoming dictatorial to lead to disaster what had remained after Mussolini.

This is pure demagoguery. Let us punish, let us operate, but can judicial let us try and understand whether it is better to save a useful offender, or to punish him, causing damage to the collectivity. Couldn't the art of govern-ing invent some measures which would save both justice and public interest? It seems to us that these measures are easy to find. Take away from the offender everything that is to be taken away, but leave him at his post, under control, and oblige him to work for the interest of all.

The same thing can be said about the 'separated' functionaries. If we go on like this, public offices will be filled with more or less sincere anti-fascists (alas! what subtle manoeuvres! ...), of very uncertain competence, while many competent fascists get the sack, and make another serious national, psychological and economic problem. Now, we are not saying leave the whole thing alone. We say: be careful of national interest! Mind not to create dissatisfaction! Mind not to create nuclear and causes of civil war!

Be careful not to spoil what little remained of our economic activity!

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The same thing can be said about the 'reputed' functionaries. If we go on like this, public offices will be filled with more or less sincere anti-fascists (albeit what subtle manoeuvres! ...), of very uncertain competence, while many competent fascists get the sack, and make another serious national, psychological and economic problem. Now, we are not saying leave the whole thing alone. We say: be careful of national interest! Mind not to create dissatisfaction! Mind not to create nuclear and causes of civil war!

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6207

18th August 1944

Executive Commissioner

1. I have spoken to Colonel Polatti this morning and he has given the following information.
2. Some time ago Colonel Polatti informed Lt. Col. Pollock and Lieut. Lipius that bands of Communists were going around the shops that were charging high prices and closing them down. The Regional Commissioner would not have any party or group taking the law into their own hands and he gave instructions that a stop must be put to these activities.
3. Lieut. Lipius tried to make some of the junior officials take action but with no success and at last, after many attempts, he asked Foglietti to come and see him. Foglietti instead asked Lipius to visit him. Eventually after being unable to see Foglietti he ordered Foglietti to come and see him.
4. I understand that Foglietti did call and that Lieut. Lipius explained to him the reason for summoning him as the other officials of the Communist Party were unable to stop the illegal action.
5. Colonel Polatti fully approved of the action taken by Lieut. Lipius.

AFS/JS

Major.

END

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200-1 Mac

Brig. Lusk: Please e me-

EWS

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION

17 August 1944

SUBJECT: Communist Activities in the Black Market

TO: Captain E. W. Stone, Acting Chief Commissioner, Hq A.C.C.

Dott. Grifone, who introduced himself as the private secretary to Togliatti, called at 6 p.m. on August 15 to say that two military police had called at Togliatti's office for the purpose of conducting him to the Black Market Control Office. They were told that Togliatti was a member of the Government and at that moment occupied in official affairs. They replied that his presence was desired at the Black Market Control Station where he should present himself before noon on the subsequent day or be apprehended by the military police. Grifone went on to say that he thought Lt. Lipsius of the Black Market Control wished to speak to Togliatti concerning illegal communist activities in the black market which Grifone inferred actually were going on. I attempted to communicate until 7 o'clock but unsuccessfully with the offices of Colonel Poletti, Colonel Polluck and Lt. Lipsius.

On the subsequent morning I reported the matter to Brigadier Lusk who in turn communicated with Colonel Ames, Poletti's Deputy, to request him to investigate the matter. Later in the morning Dott. Grifone telephoned to me to say that Lt. Lipsius again was in quest of Togliatti. I thereupon telephoned to Lt. Lipsius to enquire into the matter. He said that there were illegal communist activities being carried on in the black market and that all attempts to obtain some information regarding them from minor members of the Communist Party led to no result, and to obtain the information desired he was obliged to appeal to Togliatti. He latter, however, refused either to receive Lipsius or to call upon him. Whereupon Lipsius acting, as he says, within the scope of his orders, virtually ordered Togliatti to report to him. Ultimately, he said, Togliatti agreed to call on the morning of August 16, failing which Lipsius agreed to telephone me again before taking further action. This he has not done.

Toward noon of August 16, Sig. Winspeare of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called to discuss this matter regarding Togliatti and I told him what had transpired and that I reported the entire matter to you for your information in the event that the matter was brought to his attention by the Italian Government.

/s/ W. W. Schott

/t/ WILLIAM W. SCHOTT

Vice-President, Political Section 6205

file 154490

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INTER OFFICE MEMO

From: Major J.A. Quayle

FILE No. 23 July 1944

SUBJECT: Maj. Gawronski's Report

23 July 1944

TO: Captain Stone

The attached report(*) was written by Maj. GAWRONSKI. This officer now holds a commission in the British Army, but was at the outbreak of war in the Polish Diplomatic Corps (Minister in Vienna, I believe).

On reading his report, General Mason had expressed the wish to see him when he was next in Rome. He is now here. Do you wish to see him?

J.A. QUAYLE,
Major.

(*) A general report of considerable intelligence and understanding, covering such points as

1. Co-belligerency
2. Future of Democracy in Italy
3. The Partisan Movement.

etc.

See 785013

file B 6-6/3

NOTES ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN ITALY AND ITALY

When I came through from German occupied Italy at the beginning of October 1943, I was asked to write a report on the political situation. The conclusion of this report were the following:

1) Fascism has stamped out in Italy all interest for the State. No Italian really cares about its future, provided he is left in peace personally.

2) In the anti-fascist parties there is no outstanding man. Able to give a lead to the country in its present crisis, nor is there any group of men capable of forming and directing an efficient administration.

3) Neither the King nor his son will be able to play his part of monarch. If the Italian monarchy is to be preserved, this is only conceivable by a double abdication in favour of the baby Prince of Naples and a Regency by his mother.

4) In these conditions the only solution for the time being in direct government by the Allies through Italian officials responsible to them. I venture to suggest that the experience of the last seven months gives support to these conclusions. That has that experience been, considered under the above four headings?

1) When the Fascism started the Italian State had existed for just one generation. There was no historic tradition behind it, and therefore there could be no inherent devotion to it. It was still generally looked upon as an experiment. Mussolini realised that a moral foundation for it would first have to be created in the consciousness of the Italian people, and his main effort was directed towards fostering a public spirit. But the methods he used produced exactly the opposite result, and Fascism went far to convince the population that the State was more of a liability than an asset. That explains the present general lack for the broader issues which the war involves for this country, and the general unwillingness to make any serious effort towards training its future. Any efforts which the new Italian Government might make to mobilise public opinion for a more active participation in the war are hopeless from the outset and will therefore probably never be even made, in spite of all the talking on the subject. It might be discussed whether it was not a mistake not giving the Italians the full status of Allies from the outset and thus stimulating their enthusiasm for the war against Germany. But as things stand, they are in fact not even co-belligerents in spirit. Nowhere is there the slightest interest for the cause of the Allies, beyond an anxiety that the scourge of war should be removed from Italy as soon as possible, and that normal life should set in no matter under what regime, under whose domination or within what frontiers.

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On this side of the front line the political parties which have formed the Government are interested solely in settling personal accounts and taking vengeance for old grievances. Nowhere in their midst is there any thought about broader future issues, with the one exception of the Communists who are actively organizing their forces and working out their program for the day when the rice fruit will fall into their lap.

On the other side, the Fascist movement is developing, but has not yet joined it who could have remained at home peacefully. It is fostered by the fighting spirit is said to be high, and that has come as a surprise to many Allied leaders. But the current contempt for the Italian soldier is not justified. He will fight as well as anybody if he knows that he is fighting for. Outrages are the very thing to give him the necessary stimulus, as vendetta has a far longer tradition in Italy than personal sacrifices for the country, a general interest. But the efficiency of the "artisans" is no proof of a general public spirit. They are most significantly referred to as "patriots", an implicit acknowledgment that all other Italians have no patriotic feelings.

Now the point I wish stress is that, as long as this general lack of interest in the common weal prevails, there is no chance whatever for the efficient working of democracy in Italy. In practice democracy cannot yet be ushered in by giving the country a Democratic Constitution, as is nowadays often thought, especially on the other side of the Atlantic. Such a Constitution is merely a

Cy: Mr. Cagaria
 This last

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conscience that no outside influence will prevent the people being governed by the people for the people. It is merely the necessary framework, and the benefits of democracy can never be secured unless this framework is properly established, i.e. there exists a majority which has a sense of responsibility for the state and is ready to implement it by its efforts and personal sacrifice. This is not the case in Italy. As a matter of fact it never was the case, and that is why Democratic Government never worked properly in Italy. CIGLIOTTI, who is considered the most glorious representative of Italian liberalism, did more than anybody to democratize life in Italy. His methods of government were based on a most efficient system of graft tempered by blackmail. He is universally called "the Sly Fox of Rome". In view of the lack of any public spirit to build upon, he had no other means of gaining a majority. Under his leadership corruption became so general that decent people welcomed fascism as a beginning of national revival that explosive its original success many further liberalized it at first only to be so bitterly disappointed by its cancerous methods. This critical deterioration is by no means to imply that in ITALY there is no general understanding for Democracy or no yearning for life under its benefits. On the contrary individual liberty is almost the inborn religion of every Italian and a long tradition of efficient self-government does exist, but was always smothered on a local where personal merits more easily find their reward than on the vastest scene of State politics. From the level of communal interest the Democratic spirit in Italy has still to be developed to a higher sense of responsibility for the welfare of the State. This development can more surely and sooner be fostered under the guidance of experience democratic than by to and fro haphazard experiments of the great Western Democracies can supply them. Nor is there any reason to say that foreign control or the administration would be resented by public opinion as a humiliating interference with the nation's sovereign rights. Military defeat will readily be accepted as a sufficient reason for these being temporarily suspended; and provided that this Allied organ leaves a wide field of action to local self-government and limits its activities to general lines of policy and to the effective control of the Assembly and the democratic spirit of the administration, it will undoubtedly be welcomed by the majority of the population, even if it comes as a disengagement to some budding political careers.

In any case such a policy of effective control will surely not create more ill-feeling than the policy now practiced. Though it is liberal to a degree quite unprecedented as towards a conquered country, it does not satisfy the Italians, at any rate not those who expected more because they considered themselves old friends. A harsh military rule would have been accepted as the inevitable consequence of defeat, and even those who would have deplored it as unwarranted would have not considered it unnatural. Also whole-hearted policy of friendship and alliance from the outset would have perhaps kindled general enthusiasm for the Allied cause. But the policy of "co-belligerency" as now practiced has disappointed and estranged many old friends; it has not won over the diffident. Public opinion does not understand it, and suspects it of being a diagonal between two opposing currents, rather than a clear-cut programme. In the Italian minds a deep misunderstanding is being created as to who is about to win this war: "US or THEM?" "Which side are we on?" And the

that foreign control or the administration would be resented by public opinion as a humiliating interference with the nation's sovereign rights. Military defeat will readily be accepted as a sufficient reason for there being temporarily imposed; and provided that this Allied organ leaves a wide field of action to local self-government and limits its activities to general lines of policy and to the effective control of the economy and the democratic spirit of the administration, it will undoubtedly be welcomed by the majority of the population, even if it comes as a disappointment to some budding political careerist.

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with their own men. I know of two cases where a German soldier was court-martialed for having stolen the watch of two owner of his billet. The Italians cannot understand the liberal treatment meted out to them by the Allies, seeing that it is not dictated by outright friendship bringing them Allied status. It is a very old experience that the liberal treatment of former enemies, whose it goes far enough to win their gratitude, is taken as a sign of weakness. That is the cause now in Italy; there can be no doubt that the prestige of the Allied Forces with the local population is steadily declining since they first arrived on Italian soil. No officer who has been here since October can fail to notice what a difference there is the attitude of the man in the street towards an Allied uniform; it has ceased to be awe-inspiring, but has not come to be considered with friendliness.

In the same measure as Anglo-American prestige and popularity has been declining, the Russian legend has been growing. It is difficult to exaggerate how great an impression was made on the Cabinet and on public opinion by Russia's official recognition of the Badoglio government, the resumption of diplomatic relations and the help given by Russia's Embassy in the formation of the Government. The first country to draw out to us a friendly hand in the hour of need is what one hears everywhere. Belief in Russia's friendliness and only Russia's is spreading rapidly among the Englishfolk. Booksellers tell me that English publishers sold out in autumn and reprinted, are no longer asked for, but people who can give Russians lessons have not a free moment.

4) There being in Italy no general public spirit to build a Democracy on, is there perhaps a group of men capable of running an administration for the people in the name of the people? My experience of the last few years during which I did all I could to find them in the anti-Fascist circles, leads me to the conclusion that they do not exist.

Under the Fascist Dictatorship there was no chance of a political career for a man of independent mind. Consequently in the last twenty-five years all the best men took to professions or to business and have developed the mentality of their occupation. They are either full of theories or cut for money, thus neither are fit for administering the country. We are already witnessing what havoc is wrought by theories applied to practical politics. The businessmen are now getting preparing for their future harvest.

I have been seeing lately most of the local leaders, as I prefer to refrain from criticism which could only be based on the intimacy of friendly talks, but the known facts of the last few months speak for themselves. The six months deadlock was an illustration of how theories and technical grudges can go before the country's most vital interests.

The present Government is probably the best solution that could be found under the existing circumstances, but this should lead nobody to think that it is a lasting solution to be built upon when the country is free of the invaders. No coalition Gov-

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 the existing circumstances, but this should lead nobody to think that it is a lasting
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 ernment can ever have a general programme, but it usually has a broad backing to
 fulfill some special task. But the members of the present cabinet have nobody behind
 them, or at any rate no numbers. The various anti-Fascist parties they represent
 are mostly non-existent, and they must disappear as soon as it comes to the test of a
 vote. Then it will be seen that there are only two forces in Italy which count: the
 town population organised by the Communists and the country side united round the
 Church. The former are already working hard to rally their forces. The city
 yet does not seem to have taken up the challenge, but its potential strength is very
 considerable and will probably start going as soon as the state is liberated. The
 future will be a tug of war between the two, for there is no change whatever of
 cooperation between them. However progressive the social policy of the Catholic
 Church may be, however similar its programme of Social reforms may be to that of the
 Communists, their basic principles and final aims are so diametrically different that
 there can be no question of their ever really joining hands; there therefore is no
 smooth going ahead.

The present Government was constituted for the double object of intensifying the
 Italian participation in the war and making-up what was left of Fascism in the public
 services.

The first will in all probability prove a failure as there is no desire to fight

anywhere. It would need a miracle to kindle real enthusiasm for the war, but it is only the Germans that perhaps could do the miracle by some outrage, not the Cabinet by its talking. Of course, miracles do happen.

The anti-Fascist clean up is gradually becoming a public joke. All the press and all public speeches are full of it, and this may impress the foreigners, but the local people who know the characters in the scene for years, realise how little seriousness there is behind all their high-flown verbosity. Everybody who watched the growth of Fascism and anti-Fascism from the outset is inwardly aware that only a very small minority on each side was moved by principles - that just as most Fascists joined the Party for reasons of personal advantage, so also most of today's socialist anti-Fascist joined the ranks of the opposition because they could not get in the other side or else were dismissed for inefficiency. Their present hate of Fascism grew up on a life line of immanent jealousy, and today are more anxious to take revenge for their personal disappointment than to set about any task which is above their means. This tendency to settle private accounts under the banner of anti-Fascism has already created heated discussions at Cabinet meetings when Croce, who is hundred percent honest, took the defence of neo, untried, for Fascism but in reality for reasons which had nothing to do with their political views. He is of the opinion that Fascist crimes should be punished, not opinions, and that after that has been done, the most useful weapon against survival of Fascism, is to forget about it. If his opinion is not followed, the anti-Fascist force which is today a cause of birth, will soon be considered a public nuisance and anti-Fascism become as unpopular as are all other "isms" in Italy.

The two chief forces in the Cabinet are undoubtedly Croce at the head of the liberals and Togliatti, leader of the revolution to come. Minor clashes have already occurred between them. One represents the past and is on the defensive, the other stands for the future and is visibly attacking. The liberals are determined to defend their ideas, the liberty of the individual against any dictatorship, even that of the proletarian. Togliatti has no use for principles at this stage; he is out for power and is playing a game of tactics. If these can be judged by past experiences, it is the Fascist stage; cooperation with the conservative forces of the country with the double object of saving the structure of the State and getting public opinion accustomed to the sight of moderate Communists who are really not so bad. That is to save the way for power. We witnessed the success of these methods in Russia and Spain; they were well on their way in France with Blum; we can watch them today in Yugoslavia and Greece. Here the Communists are already making an excellent impression on public opinion by their statesmanlike attitude, while the anti-Fascist purge gives them the means to disrupt the structure of the administration. Ingenious intellectuals are appointed to posts where the safety of the State would rather need men with guts.

From what one hears from single Communists there can be no doubt that they are out for taking over the Government in due course of time and that they consider the present Coalition as an intermediate stage. But what will they get there? About their Social programme they know no words; it is the nationalisation of industry, banking and transport and a "redistribution" of the land. As they do not touch the property

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From what one hears from single Communists there can be no doubt that they are out for taking over the Government in due course of time and that they consider the present Coalition as an intermediate stage. But what will they do there? About their Social programme they make no words: it is the nationalization of industry, banning and transport and a "Redistribution" of the land. As they do not touch the property rights of the small owner, it is difficult to see from what quarter they might meet with opposition. They openly say that if they are allowed to carry through their programme, their general policy will be Italian. If not, it will be based on Russian support. The ensuing dilemma is most poignant for every Italian statesman who understands it clearly. He is aware of the danger, but is confident he can steer it. So were his predecessors in other countries. The danger is of course not that of nationalization, which is a subject freely discussed today in all countries, but of the use which the then all-powerful State will make of it; will it serve to assure the true freedom of the individual, or will he be completely subordinated to the machinery of the State as was, and is still the case in Russia? That is the dilemma, and as yet there are no signs as to which way the Italian Communists may go. The liberals are trying to muster the support of the Church for their ideal of individual liberty, but are meeting with little response, as they are traditionally anti-clerical. In view of the difference of basic principles, there is little chance of long-range cooperation between them.

(iii) There was never any chance that the King could have been the stabilizing factor in the critical days following the fall of Fascism, though, strange to say, the monarchy of the House of Savoia is popular in the lower classes. The King was never liked by anyone who approached him. The anti-Fascist leaders, however, against him the quite unjustified grudge that he was never more anti-Fascist than themselves and did not personally oppose a regime against which they themselves were only brave enough

.....to grumble....

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to crumble. It must never be forgotten that, but for those who took the precaution of placing a frontier between themselves and Mussolini, none of the present fascists ever implemented their opposition in any way whatever. Never in any way did they give public testimony to their anti-Fascist views. The interviewers they are now so freely giving to foreign correspondents might just as well have been given when they saw, as they say, Mussolini leading the country to its ruin. The courses would have involved no greater risk than deportation. But not one of them was ready to take that risk. Besides they preferred not to commit themselves to public opposition against courses of policy which after all might turn out advantageous. That was the case with the Abyssinian campaign; none of them found fault with its victorious issue. There was also their attitude when Mussolini joined in with Hitler who looked a probable winner. They all were undoubtedly against the war inwardly, but by no means for moral reasons; only because they did not believe the country could stand its strain. Yet they preferred not to voice their views in case the adventure might once again turn out right in the end. Some of the anti-Fascists were ever placed at the outbreak of war because they hoped that foreign armies would overthrow a regime which they themselves had no courage to fight against. I was there myself among them to bear witness to the above.

A scapegoat must be found before their own guilt has been pinned down. For years the King has been pointed out by them as mainly responsible for fascism and all its misdeeds. That is why he now must go, even though he is the only factor around which the troubled situation could consolidate. Croce told him so when they first met. The King refused. To find some way out of the deadlock Croce, de Nicola both proposed the lieutenantcy of the Prince as a solution which both sides could represent as a success of their own. Under pressure from all sides, also those round him, the King finally accepted. The agreement on the subject was already even before the Communists publicly advocated cooperation with the King. In public opinion however it is the letter who made all the benefits of having enabled the promotion of Italy's first Democratic Government.

The proposed lieutenantcy is however, no solution at all. Those who have proposed it are fully aware of the fact, but that is one of the reasons why they did propose it. All liberal leaders here are republicans at heart. They are against the monarchy as such though they publicly profess the contrary. Fascists are apt to forget that in Italy words are more often used to hide thoughts than to express them. Inevitably the Prince was made for the part, they trust that his will be the last chapter of the Italian Kingdom's short lived history. Judging from their attitude towards the King, the liberals do not seem to understand that a constitutional monarch has to reign but not to govern. They seem to expect the King to take a part anything but unbiased in party strife. The Prince has certainly neither the brains nor the character to rule, but, judging from his last interview given to the Times, he also seems not to understand his constitutional part. That he said, as right in substance. That is why it aroused such a storm of indignation: it touched the sensitive point. But the very fact of his making such an utterance was tactless in the extreme as things stand. It is only one more proof, for those who still wanted any, that he cannot be a success on the Italian throne. His wife remains the only hope of the

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My conclusion is that no effectively working Democratic regime can come out of beginnings now centering round Salerno. If not controlled and directed by the Allied, the whole set up will muddle along, cause general dissatisfaction and end up in the hands of the Communists. Nor will the situation be any better if the present atmosphere will not be improved by new measures, who is the taken. The present atmosphere will not be improved by new measures, who is the same set. If is of course a matter of approval and opinion, if allowing the Communist's the responsibilities of Government is not the best way of redressing the The implication of this question are obviously far reaching.

The situation on the other side of the front looks more hopeful. The partisan movement may be the beginning of national revival. Allied leaders acquainted with their doings, are increasingly surprised at the fighting spirit and courage which they show. German outrages have succeeded in kindling an enthusiasm and traditional spirit of Italian vendetta. Also their whole organization seems to be working efficiently. There can be no doubt that it is a living thing and that the future leaders of Italy will come from these small beginnings. But they need help, moral and material support. It is being given them but to a limited extent. They

.....are more.....

are more than co-belligerents. By their deeds they are proving that they are allies
like all other underground movements in Europe. They are all united to fight the
Germans but their party allegiances and political sympathies are varied. Those will
depend largely on the quarter from which help is given them, and in the case of Tito
the experience was that moral support carries more weight than material aid. That was
also the experience in Italy. If some kind of public recognition is not given them
presently, it may soon be too late and the situation may easily develop on the lines
it followed in Yugoslavia. It is a question of being first to back the right horse.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
The Undersecretary of State

Rome, 24 July 1944

My dear Admiral,

The Royal Law Decree (7) 16/3/1944, No. 90, bearing the complementary regulations to the measures which have appointed the High Commissariat for Sardinia, Art. 6 orders that "the High Commission should be assisted by a consultative council, composed of six members, nominated by a decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, approved by the Council of Ministers."

The following have been nominated as members of this Council:

- Segni, Prof. Avv. Antonio, professor of law in the Sassari University,
free professional advocate
- Sale, Dr. Ing. Salvatore, Sassari, free professionalist.
- Tanponi, Dr. Giuseppe, Tempio, doctor in social sciences.
- Siotto, Avv. Jago;
- Musio, Dr. Ing. Enrico, Cagliari, engineer, director of the "Monteponi"
mining society.
- Zoccheddu, Dr. Ing. Guido, Cagliari, pensioned by the State, free professionalist.

Should it be necessary to get a substitute for one of the above mentioned, the Avv. Salvatore Mannireni of Nuoro has also been designated.

I wish to make the preceding facts known to the A.C.C., according to the existing accords, regarding the nominations to public functions.

I remain,
orig. passed to Col. Uffelen to deal
with (per Col. Deamond) 27 July
Admiral Ellery W. Stone
President, A.C.C., Rome

/s/ S. Fenoltea

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SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

Files A (B)

CMS/TBJ/JW
8 July 1944

G-5: OL4.1-4

SUBJECT: Administration of Elba.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission,
APO 394.

Herewith for your information are two copies of the following relating to the appointment of Colonel Petit as Deputy Governor of Elba, Vice General Magman.

- a) Letter of 29 June signed by the Chief of Staff and addressed to General de Tassigny. *OK*
- b) Letter of appointment of Colonel Petit which was enclosed with (a). *OK*
- c) Letter 25/G/Ops of 2 July to this HQ from Adv. HQ AAI. *OK*
- d) Letter of 5 July from this Section in reply to (c). *OK*
- e) Letter of 5 July from General de Tassigny. *(?)*
- f) Letter of 8 July from this Section to Adv. HQ AAI with copy of enclosure. *(?)*

*Seen by Stone +
Capt. John
Col. John*
Incl: as above

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD 39
Colonel, U. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5.

SECRET

SECRET

COPY

29 June 1944

Copy

SUBJECT: Military Government in Elba

TO : General of Army de Lattre de Tassigny,
Commanding General Army B

1. Paragraph 2 of my letter to you of 5 May envisaged that when General Maguan left Elba a senior French officer on the Island would be appointed in his stead as Deputy Military Governor on the Island.

2. As General Maguan has now left Elba and it is understood that Colonel Petit is the senior French officer who has taken over from General Maguan it is desirable that the fact that he thus succeeds to the appointment be made a matter of record.

3. A letter appointing Colonel Petit vice General Maguan is accordingly attached. It would be appreciated if you would agree to this letter of appointment and advise this Headquarters when it has been forwarded to Colonel Petit. General Alexander is being informed from this Headquarters.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater:

J. A. H. GAMBELL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

Incl:
as above.

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SECRET

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SECRET

COPY

30 June 1944

copy

SUBJECT: Military Government in Elba.

To : Colonel Jean L. Petit

1. You are designated as Deputy Military Governor of the Island of Elba as from the time when General Magnan relinquished that appointment.

2. A copy of the original letter of 5 May appointing General Magnan as Deputy Military Governor is attached, and your appointment is subject in all respects to the same terms and conditions.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater:

J. A. H. GABELL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff

Incl
as above.

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SECRET

N 360/3 B.D. Du 26-6-44.

JASON

a

RPMED

1. Au départ prochain du General MAGNAN, Colonel PETIT désigné comme Cdt. Militaire des Iles d'EHRE et PIANOSA - sera responsable de la Défense vis à vis 1er C.A. Sera responsable de l'Administration avec aide commission de Contrôle allies vis à vis General ALEXANDER; 6/11

2. Disposera momentanément des troupes suivantes : 6 R.T.S. - I Bn. 4 R.T.S. - Groupe de Commandos moins I commando - un groupe d'artillerie Coloniale - 101e Genie - F.T.A. - F.T.A. - 15 groupe et 26 groupe - Transmissions nécessaires aux liaisons radio avec la COME - Batteries MARINA et F.T.A. du Cdt. PINKI - I Section de transport de la 9 D.I.C. Services sans changement jusqu'à nouvel ordre - FIN.

A.B.

9eme DIVISION D'INFANTERIE
COLONIALE

COPIE CONFORME NOTIFIEE

"Pour Information"

Etat-Major-3 Bureau

P.C. le 26 Juin 1944

Le General de Brigade MAGNAN, Cdt. la
9 D.I.C.

P.O. Le Lt-Colonel BOURGUIN, Chef d'E.M.

N 37 / 1

DESTINAIRES :

- Colonel PETIT
- Major MURCHIE

6/11

COPY

Commandement Français des
Opérations de Corée.

et

1er Corps d'Armée

Etat - Major

3^e Bureau

N 371 / /.BD

P.C., le 26 Juni 1944

REC T I F I C A T I F

A l'ordre d'opérations n 355/3-B.D.
du 25 Juin 1944

III.- Lorsque le General Commandant La 9 D.I.C.

quittera l'île le Commandant Militaire et Administratif sera exerce
par le Colonel PETIT, Deputy Governor.

Le Colonel SALAN sera l'Adjoint du Colonel PETIT pour
toutes les questions Militaires et en particulier la Commandant
de l'ensemble des troupes.

Le General Commandant La 9 D.I.C. conserve son droit d'inspection
sur les elements de la 9 D.I.C. restant dans l'île jusqu'à
leur depart.

Le General de Corps d'Armée HENRY
MARTIN Cdt les Forces Terrestres
Françaises et Alliées de Corée.

Signe: MARTIN

Destinataires.

Monsieur Le General d'Armée Commandant

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Le General de Corps d'Armes HENRY
MARTIN Cdt les Forces Terrestres
Francaises et Allies de Corse.

Signe: MARTIN

Destinataires.

Monsieur le General d'Armees Commandant
L'Armees "B" - A titre de C.R.

- pour execution -

- M. le General Cdt la 9 D.I.C.
- le Colonel PETIT (a/c du
- du General Cdt la 9 D.I.C.)
- le Cdt du Detachement de Liaison
- de la 9 D.I.C. a BASTIA.
- 9 D.I.C. (P.C. Arriere CORSE)

- pour information -

- M. le General Gouverneur Militaire de la Corse
- le General Commandant la MOBS.
- le General Commandant l'Artillerie du C.A.
- le Commandant du Genie
- le Commandant des Transmissions
- le Commandant du Train.
- le Commandant des F.T.A.
- le Directeur du Service de Sante.
- Copie : a 1 - 2 - 3 4 Bureaux.

COMMISSARIAT A LA GUERRE

Le 22 Juin 1944.

ORDRE DE MISSION

Le Colonel PETIT, affecté pour ordre à l'Etat-Major du Ier Corps d'Armée est désigné, d'accord avec le Commandement Allié pour prendre les fonctions de "DEPUTY COMMANDANT" de l'île d'ELBE au départ du Général MACHAN.

Il est mis, dès maintenant, à la disposition du Général MACHAN pour se préparer à ses futures fonctions.

Le Commandant à la Guerre

Signé: DIEZEL.

Commandement Français des
Opérations de Corse
et Ier Corps d'Armée

Etat - Major

3^e Bureau

N° 2.188/3

COPIE CONFORME NOTIFIEE,

Pour exécution, à :

M. le Général Cdt La 9^e D.I.C.

Le Colonel PETIT

P.C., le 23 Juin 1944.
Le Général de Corps d'Armée Henry MARTIN
Commandant le Ier Corps d'Armée
Commandant les Forces Terrestres
Françaises et Alliées de Corse,

Signé : MARTIN

P.A., Le Colonel DESAZARS de MONTAILLARD

Commandement Français des
Opérations de Corse
et 1er Corps d'Armée

Etat - Major

3^e Bureau

n° 2.188/3

COPIE CONFORME NOTIFIÉE,

Pour exécution, à :

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P.C., le 23 Juin 1944.
Le Général de Corps d'Armée Henry MARTIN
Commandant le 1er Corps d'Armée
Commandant les Forces Terrestres
Françaises et Alliées de Corse,

Signe : MARTIN

P.A. Le Colonel DESAIGRES de MONTGAILLARD
Chef d'Etat-Major.

Signe : DESAIGRES DE MONTGAILLARD

6192

SUBJECT: Administration of ELBA

Advance Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

25/G(One)

To: A.F.H.Q.

1. In accordance with A.F.H.Q. letter of May 1st (Brassard) General Magnan was appointed Deputy Military Governor of Elba.
2. In the final paragraph of this letter it was stated that on relief of General Magnan the senior French officer would be appointed by your H.Q. as Deputy Military Governor.
3. General Magnan has been relieved and as will be seen from the attached Ordre de Mission Col Petit has been appointed Deputy Governor of Elba by the Commissaire de La Guerre in Algiers, with Col SALAN as his adjutant.

A.F.H.Q. letter of May 1st (para 2) stated that the French would not participate actively in the administration of the Island.

4. The instructions sent to Col Petit, who is reported to be a French Colonial Administrator, lay down that he will be "responsable de l'Administration avec aide commission de Controle allies vis a vis General Alexander" (videC). His adjoint has been appointed to deal with military questions and command of troops.
5. It would appear proper that the Deputy Military Governor (if the title is to continue) should be appointed by your H.Q. with instructions to delegate his powers to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, A.H.G., as was done in the case of General Magnan. It may be thought more desirable that Col Petit should be appointed O.C. Troops and that the civil administration should be left to the S.C.A.O. who would have instructions (as elsewhere) to consult the O.C. Troops on all matters of Policy.
6. It is proposed that as soon as Livorno Province passes to the control of Region VIII Allied Military Government that Elba should return to its original status under Italian regime as part of that Province.
7. It is important, in the interests of administration in Elba that the position be clarified as soon as possible.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785013

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5. It would appear proper that the Deputy Military Governor (if the title is to continue) should be appointed by your H.Q. with instructions to delegate his powers to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, A.M.G., as was done in the case of General Magran. It may be thought more desirable that Col Petit should be appointed O.C. Troops and that the civil administration should be left to the S.C.A.O. who would have instructions (as elsewhere) to consult the O.C. Troops on all matters of Policy.

6. It is proposed that as soon as Livorno Province passes to the control of Region VIII Allied Military Government that Alba should return to its original status under Italian regime as part of that Province.

7. It is important, in the interests of administration in Elba that the position be clarified as soon as possible.

2
/p3a

General,
Commander-in-Chief.

619:

2 July 1944
/WJH

39

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 912

CMS/TBJ/mit

5 July 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of ELBA.

TO : Advance HQ AAI.

1. Reference is made to your 25/G/Ops of 2 July.
2. In a recent cable received here from CG Force 255, it was stated that General Magnan had left the island and that Col. Petit had taken over the function of 'Military Governor and Governor of ELBA' assisted by Col. Salan for Command of troops and Major Murchie (SCAG) for Administration.
3. In the light of the above cable and having regard to the last paragraph of the letter of 1st May which appointed General Magnan as Deputy Military Governor, it was thought proper to take steps from this HQ at once to make Col. Petit's appointment as Deputy Military Governor a matter of record, such appointment to be subject in all respects to the same terms and conditions as in the case of General Magnan. Letters as attached have accordingly been signed by the Chief of Staff and have been despatched to General de Tassigny. A letter from the Chief of Staff to General Alexander acquainting him with the action taken is being held ready on the instructions of the Chief of Staff for despatch on receipt of confirmation from General de Tassigny that the letter of appointment has been transmitted to Col. Petit.
4. In the circumstances it will be seen that action as contemplated in your letter has already been taken.
5. It is desirable that this HQ should be notified as such in advance as possible of the date when Livorno Province will pass to AMG control in order that the appointment of Col. Petit as Deputy Military Governor may be officially revoked as from that date.

(sp) CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-5.

Incls.

- 1) Ltr Lt Gen Gammell to Gen de Tassigny, 29 Jun
- 2) Ltr Lt Gen Gammell to Col Petit, 30 Jun
(both on sub: "Mil Gov in ELBA")

619

SECRET

39

Traduction

"B" "B"
STAT - MAJOR
3ème BUREAU

SECRET

5 Juillet 1944.

N° 929/3.3.

OBJET: Gouvernement Militaire de l'Île d'ELBE.

AU : Commandant Suprême Allié, M.T.

1.- En réponse à votre lettre du 29 Juin, je donne mon
agrément à votre lettre nommant le Colonel PETIT au poste occupé
précédemment par le General MAGNAN comme Délégué Gouverneur Militaire
de l'Île d'ELBE.

2.- Nous faisons suivre aujourd'hui cette lettre d'affectation
au Colonel PETIT et par la présente en prévenons votre Quartier
General.

Le General d'Armes de LATOUR de TASSIGNY

Commandant l'Armes "B"

ugd/

lettre

SECRET

6189

39

TOP SECRET

7180/rj

Ref. CC/P/All.

20th. June, 1944.

I enclose the following:-

1. A letter to General Waghorn for your signature and onward despatch.

This is all in order but A.F.H.Q. are anxious that the question should be regularised by you, in accordance with the letter submitted for your signature.

2. A letter from my Chief Legal Officer with a form for your signature delegating the power to confirm death sentences to my Deputy, Captain Stone, during my absence.

There is also a similar form with delegation to Brigadier Lush.

Stone is on the point of being promoted Rear Admiral and when this occurs he will have the necessary rank to confirm death sentences. Should however any cases arise before his promotion comes through, Lush would be able to deal with them.

I would be grateful if you could return these forms when signed to my Headquarters.

NOEL MARION MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Harold R. Alexander, GCB, CMI, DSO, MC,
Commander-in-Chief, Advanced H.Q., A.A.I..

Ho ACC Secy Gen
DISPATCHED
Date: 22 June 1944
Via: AG 246
Initials: 10

6182

39

1540

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

Subject: Military Government in MPA.

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED ARMS IN ITALY,
C. S. F.

June 1944.

General de Brigade Magnan,
Commandant la 9th D.I.C.

DSM 1454
50 JUN 1944

*not read
this by*

1. I refer to letter dated 5th May 1944 addressed to you by Lieut. General Carroll, Chief of Staff, on the subject of Military Government in MPA. I have already appointed Major C.P. MARCHE as Senior Civil Affairs Officer, A.M.G. for the operation "BRASSARD" under your command by a letter which he holds.
2. You should delegate to Major Marchie in his capacity as Senior Civil Affairs Officer all civil powers in the territory which you may occupy and over its inhabitants. The power to impose the death sentence is retained by me and any such cases in which the death penalty is imposed should be referred to me for confirmation.
3. It is particularly important that you should not set up French Courts to try Italians. All Italians should be tried as necessary by Allied Military Courts set up by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer.

(Sgd) H. B. Alexander
General,
Commander-in-Chief.

*Ref AFHQ cable F61235
18 June*

*RF
DCC
6187*

TOP SECRET

1817

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

FOR ACTION HQ AAI FOR INFO A CC MAIN AND AFHQ ADV CP

TO:

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: N6/19
FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED
CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET BRASSARD
REFERENCE No: F61235
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: JUNE 18 1923
OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE..FHGEG

UNDERSTAND THROUGH ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION THAT NO INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY YOU TO GENERAL MAGNAN AS TO DELEGATION OF POWERS AS DEPUTY MILITARY GOVERNOR TO SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER ELBA AND THAT RELIANCE PLACED ON INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED HERE TO MAGNAN 5 MAY. THESE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFINE LIMITATIONS ON MAGNAN AND ENABLE SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER TO ACT AND IN ADDITION MAGNAN MUST KNOW OFFICIALLY THAT POWER TO IMPOSE DEATH SENTENCE RESERVED TO YOU. COMMUNICATION NOW RECEIVED FROM FRENCH HERE POSES QUESTION AS TO INTENTION TO SET UP ALLIED MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN EPUA AND AS TO ITS JURISDICTION AND STATES FRENCH ON THEIR SIDE ARE ABOUT TO SET UP A PERMANENT MILITARY TRIBUNAL THERE. ESSENTIAL THAT FRENCH DO NOT TRY ITALIAN CIVILIANS. REQUEST AS MILITARY GOVERNOR YOU IMMEDIATELY ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO MAGNAN (COPY TO THIS HEADQUARTERS) AS CONTEMPLATED IN ORIGINAL DIRECTIVE TO YOU AND SPECIFICALLY COVER POINT THAT FRENCH THEMSELVES WILL NOT TRY ITALIANS, WHO WILL BE TRIED AS NECESSARY BY ALLIED MILITARY COURTS SET UP BY SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER.

UNDERSTAND THROUGH ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION THAT NO INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY YOU TO GENERAL MAGNAN AS TO DELEGATION OF POWERS AS DEPUTY MILITARY GOVERNOR TO SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER ELBA AND THAT RELIANCE PLACED ON INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED HERE TO MAGNAN 5 MAY. THESE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFINE LIMITATIONS ON MAGNAN AND ENABLE SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER TO ACT AND IN ADDITION MAGNAN MUST KNOW OFFICIALLY THAT POWER TO IMPOSE DEATH SENTENCE RESERVED TO YOU. COMMUNICATION NOW RECEIVED FROM FRENCH HERE POSES QUESTION AS TO INTENTION TO SET UP ALLIED MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN EPUA AND AS TO ITS JURISDICTION AND STATES FRENCH ON THEIR SIDE ARE ABOUT TO SET UP A PERMANENT MILITARY TRIBUNAL THERE. ESSENTIAL THAT FRENCH DO NOT TRY ITALIAN CIVILIANS. REQUEST AS MILITARY GOVERNOR YOU IMMEDIATELY ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO MAGNAN (COPY TO THIS HEADQUARTERS) AS CONTEMPLATED IN ORIGINAL DIRECTIVE TO YOU AND SPECIFICALLY COVER POINT THAT FRENCH THEMSELVES WILL NOT TRY ITALIANS, WHO WILL BE TRIED AS NECESSARY BY ALLIED MILITARY COURTS SET UP BY SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER.

ACC DISTN

Info..Secy Gen —

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Admin Sec

File

613

DATE and Time of RECEIPT JUNE 190610

Distribution:

39

ME/hd

CC/PA 000.1

22 June 1944

Dear Sir:

General Mason MacFarlane has asked me to thank you for the message from the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party which you sent to him with your letter of the 11th June. The expressions of recognition and gratitude for the Allied effort are much appreciated and the Chief Commissioner thanks you also for your personal good wishes.

NELSON W. MONFORT
Colonel
Personal Assistant to Chief Commissioner

Onorevole Avvocato
Prof. Manlio A. D'Ambrosio
via Duomo, 167
Napoli

*(Destroyed by S/Ldr Perry.
Addressee could not be found.
Address given was in ruins.)*

618

38

Onorevole Avvocato
Prof. MANLIO A. D'AMBROSIO
della R. Università
Patrete in Corte di Cassazione
Via Duomo, 167 - NAPOLI - Telef. 33084 52627
(Casa propria)

Napoli 14-5-844

N° 2799

AL CAPO DELLA COMMISSIONE INTERALLEATA DI CONTROLLO
SIR. NOEL MASON MAC FARLANE

N A P O L I

Compio il gradito incarico di rimetterle l'unito messaggio
deliberato, in occasione della liberazione di Roma, dall'Esecu-
tivo Centrale del Partito Democratico Sociale, del quale sono
il Presidente.

Aggiungo anche i miei personali omaggi augurali.
Vogliam gradire, Signor Presidente, le espressioni più vive
della mia deferenza.

Dea

Dea

TRANSLATION

I welcome the opportunity to send to you the attached message deliberated,
upon the liberation of Rome, by the Central Committee of the Social Democratic
Party of which I am President.

I also add my personal well-wishing messages.

Compio il gradito incarico di rimetterle l'unito messaggio
deliberato, in occasione della liberazione di Roma, dall'Esecu-
tivo Centrale del Partito Democratico Sociale, del quale sono
il Presidente.

Aggiungo anche i miei personali omaggi augurali.
Vogliam gradire, Signor Presidente, le espressioni più vive
della mia deferenza.

Duca

De Ambrosio

TRANSLATION

Trans. from 19 Jan 44

I welcome the opportunity to send to you the attached message celebrating,
upon the liberation of Rome, by the Central Committee of the Social Democratic
Party of which I am President.

I also add my personal well-wishing messages.

Please accept, Dear President, the warmest expressions of my esteem

Very devotedly yours

1st M. A. D'Ambrasio

Political letter to Kennedy's Mr
Please draft

copy - Kennedy

TRANSLATION

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Trans. 19 Jun 44
by [signature]

Naples, 14 June 1944.
Via Roma, 210

To the Inter-Allied control commission:

The central Committee of the Social Democratic Party, meeting at the Naples office, under the presidency of Hon. D'Ambrosio to celebrate the liberation of Rome from the implacable enemy and from its oppressor servants, extends a fervent thought of recognition to the Inter-Allied control commission and the United Nations, who are fighting so hard for the liberty of Europe.

It sends its warmest expression of admiration to the Allied Armed Forces, the Italian combatants and the patriots who must intensify their work to cast the Germans from Italian soil.

With the liberation of the capital of Italy, it votes that all the Italian parties be given equal representation in the government and in the public administrations so that the harmony of opinions fraternizes in true sense all the Italians to a single purpose under the free flag of liberty and democracy.

The President

/s/ Prof. Manlio D'Ambrosio

6181

38

PARTITO DEMOCRATICO SOCIALE

Napoli, 14-6-44
Via Roma, 210

Sec. Gen.
Rec. d. 18 June 1945
by J.D.

ALLA COMMISSIONE INTERALLEATA DI CONTROLLO

L'Esecutivo Centrale del Partito Democratico Sociale riunitosi nella Sede di Napoli, sotto la Presidenza dell'On.le D'Ambrosio per celebrare la liberazione di Roma dall'implacabile nemico e dai suoi servi oppressori, rivolge un fervido pensiero di riconoscenza alla Commissione Interalleata di Controllo e alle Nazioni Unite, che combattono strenuamente per la libertà dell'Europa.

Invia la espressione della più viva ammirazione alle Forze Armate Alleate, ai combattenti italiani ed ai patrioti che debbono intensificare la loro opera per cacciare i tedeschi dal suolo italiano.

Fa voti che, liberata la Capitale d'Italia, a tutti i Partiti italiani sia data un'equa rappresentanza nel Governo e nelle Pubbliche Amministrazioni, affinché la concordia degli animi affratelli veramente tutti gli italiani in un palpito solo sotto la bandiera affrancatrice della libertà e della democrazia.

IL PRESIDENTE

(On. Avv. Prof. MANLIO D'AMBROSIO)

M. D'Ambrosio

61834
38

TO GENERAL MAC FARLANE

ACC, NAPLES

NAPLES BARI 13700 64 18 13

WE ARE AWARE THAT LIBERATION COMMITTEE HAS PRESENTED LIST PERSONS DESIGNATED BARI PROVINCIAL AND COMMUNAL ADMINISTRATIONS EXCLUDING DEMO-LIBERAL PARTY WHICH WAS IN THE CAPITAL TOWN AND PROVINCE MANY THOUSAND MEMBERS STOP WE RAISE VIBRANT ~~PRIZE~~ PROTEST UNJUST EXCLUSION VAST POLITICAL CURRENT THAT DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE HOMAGES SOLEMNLY AND REPEATEDLY AFFIRMED VICTORIOUS UNITED NATIONS WOULD RESOUND OFFENSE ~~RESTORED~~ RESTORED REGIME FREE AND JUSTICE MARANO VICE SECRETARY PROV.

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Pol Sec

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RECEIVED
20 JUL 1964

DEMO-LIBERAL PARTY WHICH WAS IN THE CAPITAL TOWN AND PROVINCE MANY
THOUSAND MEMBERS STOP WE RAISE VIBRANT ~~FAITH~~ PROTEST UNJUST EXCLUSION
VAST POLITICAL CURRENT THAT DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE HOMAGES SOLEMNLY
AND REPEATEDLY AFFIRMED VICTORIOUS UNITED NATIONS WOULD RESOUND
OFFENSE ~~RESISTED~~ RESTORED REGIME FREE AND JUSTICE MARANO VICE
SECRETARY PROV.

ACC DIST

ACTION/ POL SEC 2

INFO/ DCC

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ORIGINAL COPY

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1600

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Pol Sec

MODIFICARIO Telegr. 63		Il Governo non assume alcuna responsabilità civile in conseguenza del servizio della telegrafia. Le tasse riscosse in meno per errore ed in seguito a rifiuto o inesperienza del destinatario devono essere rimborsate dal mittente. Il destinatario è tenuto a firmare la ricevuta presentata dal fattorino e a segnare la data e l'ora della consegna del telegramma. In mancanza di tali indicazioni il destinatario perde il diritto di reclamare in caso di ritardo nella consegna.		Mod. 30 (1941) XIX	
Indicazioni di urgenza		Ricevuto il 19	late	Ricevente	
Qualifica		DESTINAZIONE	PROVENIENZA	PAROLE	DATA DELLA PRESENTAZIONE
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					Giorno e mese Ore e minuti
					VIA INDICAZIONI
					PRINCIPALI D'UFFICIO
					MIANI - 1-5-1241 - Ord. No. - 15.000.000

SIAMO CONSCENZA KE COMITATO LIBERAZIONE HA
PRESENTATO ELENCO PERSONE DESIGNATE AMMINISTRAZIONE
PROVINCIALE ET COMUNALE BARI ESCLUDENDO PARTITO
DEMOCRATICO KE CONTA CAPOLUOGO ET PROVINCIA MOLTE
MIGLIAIA ISCRITTI ALT ELEVIAMO VIBRATA PROTESTA
INGIUSTA ESCLUSIONE VASTA CORRENTE POLITICA KE OMAGGI
PRINCIPI DEMOCRATICI SOLENNEMENTE ET RIPETUTAMENTE
AFFERMATI VITTORIOSE NAZIONI UNITE SUONEREBBERO
OFFESA INSTAURATO REGIME LIBERE ET GIUSTIZIA
VARANO VICESEGRETERARIO PROV -

37

1 6 0 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TELEGRAMMA

N. di recapito. Rimesso al fattorino ad ore ...
Nulla è dovuto al fattorino per recapito. Il lavoro rito
secondo.

DD GENERAL MAK FARLAN

JAPV ACC NAPOLI

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

6170

131750

SECRETARY GENERAL

13 JUNE 1944

SECRET

174

PRIORITY

CAPT COLLINS

ACC ROME

FOLLOWING MESSAGE TRANSMITTED AT REQUEST OF ACC REAR LD PAREN TO ACC ROME FOR
REAR OR CACCIA FROM ACC MAIN SIGNED MACFARLANE PAREN QUOTE URGENCY NO LONGER
EXISTS FOR UNDERSECRETARIES OF STATE TO BE SENT TO SALERNO PD UNTIL FURTHER
NOTICE THEY SHOULD REMAIN AT ROME END QUOTE PD ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AT SALERNO
INITIATED ABOVE MESSAGE

525.1 per Staff Room Memo

ROGER B. (Signature)
captain, ACC
Adjutant

36

SECRET

02
Acc Recd.

12/15/10

13 June 095

1398

Sec Gen
N 49/12

ACTION COPY

(CLASSIFICATION NOT GIVEN)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

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NE

A.F.H.R. REPEATED A.A.I.

ACC. MAIN

15231

6 JUN 64

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

GEN. MACFARLANE (6 COPIES)

BY IMMEDIATELY PRESENTING CHIEFMAN OF DEFENSE TO AMEL FOR MAC. ONE BRITISH BUREAU MINISTER
 ONE AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISOR AND ONE DEPUTY HEADQUARTERS FOR ALL FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER
 KING AND FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL NAME FOLLOWING IN VIEW OF RESOLUTION OF 1958 IN
 AT THE HOUSE IN WHICH THE PRIME HAS ADVISED THE OFFICE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL ONE SOME
 MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ONE REPRESENTING CURRENTS OF OPINION ONE DECIDED TO PUBLISH THEIR
 PROCEEDS FOR THE BIRTH DEBATEMENT CONCERNED IN THE INTERVIEW WITH THE TIMES OF 1960
 THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL OF WINDSTON HAS MAINTAINED INSTEAD THAT THE QUESTION SHOULD
 BE CONSIDERED AS NEW LED BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTAL DECLARATION IN THE MATTER OF 1958
 TO THE GOVERNMENT ONE ASSISTED BY THE INTERVIEW TO FAVOR IN EVERY WAY THE DEVELOPMENT
 OF AMERICAN DISCOVERY IN THE ITALIAN SITUATION ONE HAS THEREFORE BEEN TRANSMITTED
 IN REAFFIRMING THE NECESSITY THAT THE ALLIES IN THE COMMON INTEREST ARE THE SAME
 WOULD AS THESE DECISIONS INDISPENSABLE FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION ONE PRESENT
 ONE FUTURE ONE OF ITALY FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE COMMON AIMS OF 1958

 HENRY MACFARLANE
 Lieutenant-General
 Chief Commissioner

TOP SECRET

6177

35h

TOP SECRET

1830

NR

A.P.H.3. REISSUED A.A.I.

1830

6 June 44

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

ACC MAIN (GEN MACFARLANE
& CORR)

BAROOLIC CAME TO SEE ME IN HAWAII TODAY TO REPORT TO ATIA FOR SAC OF A BRITISH INTELLECT
MEMBER OF A AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER AND OF RESEA IN RESEARCHING AAI FOR GENERAL
ALEXANDER FROM ACC MAIN FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL WHEN DATA TWO FROM ME TOLD ME THAT AT THE
CABINET MEETING LAST NIGHT THE ACTION PARTY MEMBERS HAD PROPOSED THAT THE CABINET SHOULD
RENEW THEIR PROTESTS REGARDING THE OPEN HOUSE'S INTERVIEW WITH THE FIBER AT BAROOLIC
AND POLLA-TE OPPOSED THIS STRONGLY AND A RESOLUTION WAS PASSED STATING THAT THE MAJORITY
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CONSIDERED THAT THE QUESTION SHOULD BE REGARDED AS FINALLY
DISPOSED OF BY THE CABINET'S PREVIOUS DECLARATION OF TEXT OF RESOLUTION WHICH WAS NAMED
TO ME BY BAROOLIC IS IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM

NOEL MARION MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner

617

TOP SECRET

358

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
CABINET

Salerno, 6 June 1944

Regius

At the moment in which the Prince has assumed the office of Lieutenant General, some members of the Government, representing currents of opinion, desired to renew their protests for the known statements contained in the interview with the "Times".

The majority of the Council of Ministers has maintained instead that this question should be considered as settled by the previous governmental declaration in the matter.

The Government, animated by the intention to favor in every way the development of anticipated improvements in the Italian situation, has therefore been unanimous in reaffirming the necessity that the Allies in the common interest arrive at the earliest moment at those decisions indispensable for a more effective collaboration, present and future, of Italy for the attainment of the common aims.

End

/s/ RADOGLIO

PA.

File please

6/7/44

356



*Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
Gabinetto*

*Prot. N.
Risposta alla lettera N.
del*

Salerno li 6 giugno 19 44

OGGETTO

Nel momento in cui il Principe ha assunto la carica di Luogotenente generale, alcuni membri del Governo, in rappresentanza di correnti di opinione, volevano rinnovare le loro proteste per le note affermazioni contenute nell'intervista al "Times".

La maggioranza del Consiglio dei Ministri ha ritenuto, invece, che tale questione debba essere considerata come risolta dalla precedente dichiarazione governativa al riguardo.

Il Governo, animato dal proposito di favorire in tutti i modi lo sviluppo di attesi miglioramenti della situazione dell'Italia, è stato quindi unanime nel riaffermare la necessità che gli Alleati, nell'interesse comune, arrivino al più presto a quelle decisioni indispensabili per una più efficace collaborazione presente e futura dell'Italia per il raggiungimento degli scopi comuni.

6178

Carlo 358

F. H/rj

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND SECRET

NF
SF

Ref. CC/P/295.

14th. May, 1944.

Thank you for your letter which I received last night.

2. I was very glad to note its contents.
3. I saw the Crown Prince last night and I think that I can safely say that the Crown Prince will not reopen the question provided that no further publicity is given to it. In any case I am sure that he will take no further action without first consulting me.
4. I hope very much that we shall hear no more of this very unfortunate incident

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

S.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Capo del Governo.

6175

~~SECRET~~

35e

TOP SECRET

#199

NF
also SF

ACC MAIN (GEN MASPARLANE & COMV)

14th. May, 1944.

TOP SECRET

V16

PRIORITY

GEN MASPARLANE

A.P.H.C.

DECLASSIFIED
LD 11652-500-401-472-5(1) of (E)
By JCS 1/4/74
1/10/74

SUBJECT RECENT INTERVIEW GIVEN BY CROWN PRINCE TO TIMES CORRESPONDENT AND
RESOLUTION ON THIS SUBJECT PASSED BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT PD PARA TWO PD AFHQ
FOR HQS CHA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER FROM
ACC MAIN FROM MASPARLANE PERSONAL PAREN PARA TWO PD HAVING RECEIVED
INFORMATION THAT THE CROWN PRINCE WAS CONTEMPLATING PUBLISHING A REPLY TO
THE CABINET'S RESOLUTION I VISITED HIM LAST NIGHT PD PARA THREE PEX I FOUND
HIM OBVIOUSLY UPSET AND MOST ANXIOUS TO REPUTE PUBLICLY REMARKS ATTRIBUTED
TO HIM BY THE TIMES CORRESPONDENT PD AFTER A LONG TALK IN WHICH I URGED
HIM VERY STRONGLY NOT TO REOPEN THE WHOLE UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT HE AGREED
NOT TO DO SO PROVIDED NO FURTHER PUBLIC MENTION WAS MADE ON THE SUBJECT PD
HE PROMISED THAT IN ANY EVENT HE WOULD CONSULT ME BEFORE RAISING THE QUESTION
HIMSELF PD I ASSURED HIM THAT FOR MY PART I WOULD DO MY BEST TO SEE THAT
NO FURTHER PUBLICITY WAS GIVEN TO THE MATTER PD PARA FOUR PD I HAD
PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN PRIVATELY TO BADOGLIO ASKING HIM TO ENSURE THAT NO
FURTHER REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE CASE IN PUBLIC AND ASSURING HIM THAT I
WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO PERSUADE THE CROWN PRINCE FROM RAISING THE QUESTION
AGAIN ON HIS SIDE PD I HAVE RECEIVED IN REPLY A CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE

6172 35a

TOP SECRET

#199 - - 2

FROM BADOGLIO THAT AS FAR AS THE GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED NO FURTHER
PUBLICITY WILL BE GIVEN TO THE CASE UNLESS THE CROWN PRINCE REOPENS IT
HIMSELF PD BADOGLIO AGREES THAT THE WHOLE INCIDENT IS BEST HANDLED AS
ENTIRELY CLOSED AND HE IS SENDING A CONFIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS OWN
TO URGE THE CROWN PRINCE TO LET THE MATTER DROP PD BADOGLIO EXPRESSED
HIMSELF AS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE ACTION I HAD TAKEN

NOEL MASON MACCARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner

~~TOP SECRET~~

35d

TRANSLATION

TOP SECRET

"PERSONAL AND PRIVATE"

File No. 1158

Chief of the Government

Salerno, 13 May 1944

TO: General Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane
Chief of the Allied Control Commission
Naples

14 May 0920
Jed

Dear General,

Thanks for having warned me with your letter of today.

I am certain that it is only gossip made around the Prince, and that he will make no further communications.

He knows too well that this is his supreme concern, as it is also the interest of the country.

At any rate, I thank you from my heart for your thought in warning him.

Concerning future discussions of the Ministers, I am happy to assure you that they have decided, already since Thursday night, to no longer say one word regarding a discussion which was not opened by them, but by the Prince.

Further replies would explain only new manifestations of the Prince.

This letter has been read to the Council of Ministers.

I have also assigned a person of trust to advise the Prince to keep quiet in the matter.

Most cordial greetings.

(sgd) BADOGLIO

TOP SECRET

6.350

FMOM/rj

STRICTLY PRIVATE AND MOST SECRET

Ref. CC/P/294.

13th. May. 1944.

I hear on very good authority that the Crown Prince is seriously considering reopening the question of his interview with "The Times" correspondent and the resolution passed by your Government on Thursday.

2. I think you will agree that this would be a very great mistake and I shall for my part do everything I can to dissuade him from doing this. I hope very much that he will see the wisdom of this.

3. In the meantime I have been told that it is possible that further publicity to the case may be given by members of your Government. I am sure you will agree with me that we ought if possible to regard the whole unfortunate incident as closed and that it is a great mistake to call attention to it any further in public. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to persuade the members of your Government to refrain from giving any further publicity to the question.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

*I will keep you informed if I have
any more information.*

S.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Capo del Governo.

616956

TOP SECRET

M125

NE
class 5F

ACC MAIN (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

12th. May, 1944.

TOP SECRET

V16

PRIORITY

GEN MACFARLANE

A.F.H.C.

I DROVE VERY HEAVILY TO RAIOLIO TODAY AND STRESSED THE EXTREMELY UNFORTUNATE
IMPRESSION WHICH THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLUTION OF YESTERDAY REGARDING THE CROWN PRINCE'S
PRESS INTERVIEW WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE PD PARAN TO ASK FOR MY GMA BRITISH RESIDENT
MINISTER AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER FROM ACC MAIN FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PARAN
RAIOLIO SAID HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF THIS AND NATURALLY REQUESTED THE WHOLE AFFAIR
VERY SOON PD ON THE OTHER HAND HE SAID THAT IF I HAD BEEN THE ORIGINAL RESOLUTION AS
PROPOSED BY SPURER AND OKOZO HE THOUGHT I WOULD CONSIDER THAT HE HAD ACHIEVED A
CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN GETTING IT WATERED DOWN PD PARAN TWO PD BYZACMA OKOZO AND DI
NAPOLI HAD ALL MADE VIOLENT SPEECHES AND TOGLIATTI ALSO HAD SPOKEN IN FAVOUR OF THE
RESOLUTION THOUGH IN LESS VIOLENT TERMS PD THE ACTION PARTY HAD THREATENED TO RESIGN
UNLESS A RESOLUTION ON THE SUBJECT WAS PASSED AND RAIOLIO THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE ALLIES TO FORCE THE ISSUE TO THIS
POINT PD PARAN THREE PD RAIOLIO CONDEMNED ONCE AGAIN THE FOLLY OF THE CROWN PRINCE'S
PRESS INTERVIEW AND BLAMED THE PRINCE'S PERSONAL STAFF EVEN MORE PD HE TOLD ME THAT HE
WAS GOING TO HAVE THEM ALL DISMISSED AND THAT HE WAS NOW ARRANGING FOR THEIR REPLACEMENT
PD THE REPLACEMENTS WOULD INCLUDE GENERAL PRALFORD GMA COLONEL LUTINI AND AT LEAST ONE

61635a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

M195 - 2

RELIABLE CIVILIAN POLITICAL ADVISER

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General.
Chief Comms 6107

TOP SECRET

35a

SECRET

FHM/rj

NF
only

Ref. CC/P/367.

5th. June, 1944.

I enclose herewith copies of the various messages which Harold Macmillan took back with him to Algiers.

I am sorry that they did not reach you yesterday. I think you will find most of them of interest.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

General Sir Harold R. Alexander, GCB, CSI, DSO, MC,
Commander-in-Chief,
Headquarters, Allied Armies in Italy.

6165

34

Secretary General

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
APO 394

Ref/266/12/CA

26 May 1944

SUBJECT: Political Meetings.

TC : R.C. Regions I, II, III, IV, V, VIII and IX,
S.C.A.O.'s. 5th and 8th Armies.

1. Permits to hold public meetings in occupied territory will be issued only in accordance with General Order No. 25. The permits will be in the form contained in Exhibit "A" attached. Proper records of all such permits issued will be maintained by P.C.'s. and S.C.A.O.'s.

2. Arrangements will be made for important meetings to be reliably reported in order that the trend of public opinion may be assessed. A reference to this matter will be made in the monthly reports under the heading "Political Reactions and Popular Opinion".

3. Whenever an application to hold a public meeting is refused, this Headquarters will be informed by cable without delay of:

- i. the nature of the banned meeting.
- ii. auspices under which it was to be held.
- iii. date, time and place proposed.
- iv. brief reasons for prohibition.

such cables will be followed by a full report.

4. Regional Commissioners Regions I and II will note that under those instructions any statement given to the public stating the reasons for the banning of a meeting, must now be issued by R.C. & M.G. Section of Hq. Allied Control Commission and thus they alter the instructions contained in para 4 of AMG/202 of 16 January 1944 under which the responsibility for issuing such a statement rested with the Regional Commissioner.

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DISTRIBUTION:
"B"

plus serial Nos. 6,7,11,20
less " " 56
AAI. (CSL(b))

M.C. Lush
6165

M.S. LUSH
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Exhibit "A"

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

No. _____

Permit to hold a Public
Meeting _____

+ Region _____
+ SCAO _____th Army

Date _____
Province of _____

The person or persons named below are authorized to hold a public meeting in accordance with the provisions of General Order No. 25 and the terms and conditions detailed below:

TERMS

Name of Person (or Persons) authorized to hold meeting _____

Identity Card No. _____

Address _____

+ Name of Party, Society or Group _____

Authorized date of meeting _____

Time meeting is scheduled to commence _____

Place where the meeting is to be held _____

Object of the Meeting _____

CONDITIONS

1. The meeting shall be conducted throughout in an orderly manner, and no person shall do or say anything:

(a) Which supports, or encourages any other person to support, any of the enemies of any of the United Nations, or any of the Fascist or Nazi parties.

(b) Which leads or may lead to public disorder.

Address _____

+ Name of Party, Society or Group _____

Authorized date of meeting _____

Time meeting is scheduled to commence _____

Place where the meeting is to be held _____

Object of the Meeting _____

CONDITIONS

1. The meeting shall be conducted throughout in an orderly manner, and no person shall do or say anything:

(a) Which supports, or encourages any other person to support, any of the enemies of any of the United Nations, or any of the Fascist or Nazi parties.

(b) Which leads or may lead to public disorder.

(c) Which causes or may cause, or encourage or may encourage any other person to cause, any interruption of or interference with the military effort of Italy or any of the United Nations.

2. Where the meeting is held outdoors, traffic, whether pedestrian or vehicular, must not be interfered with in any manner whatsoever.

3. This permit must be returned to the Questore of the province in which the meeting is to take place within three days after the authorized date of the meeting.

4. (Insert any additional conditions required) _____

Stamp

+ Provincial Commissioner
+ Senior Civil Affairs Officer.

+strike out if not applicable.

33

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

NE
SE except
references

Ref: 169/15/3422nd May 1944

My dear Brian,

In reply to your letter MAI/5001/9/GAO of 11th May, the news item appearing in "Risorgimento" issue dated 9th May was not provided by A.S.O. but, according to my information, by Chief of the P.A.S. Liaison Section. The sense of the paragraph, moreover, is altered completely so far as we are concerned by an error in translation. "Comando Alleato" in the translation quoted by you is given as "A.S.O."; it should be, of course, "Allied Command".

I think the best solution, from both our points of view, would be to ask P.A.S. to print the correct version of the order.

Yours ever,

(Signed) Noel MacFarlane.

Major-General Sir Brian H. Robertson, M.C.,
C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.,
Chief Administrative Officer,
Headquarters,
Allied Forces in Italy,
C. E. F.

This letter prepared by
Executive Comm. who
has references.

6163

32

TRANSLATION

FA No. 1389

Salerno, 9 May 1944

Chief of the Government

To: General Noel Mason MacFarlane
Chief of the Allied Control Commission
 Naples

REC'D
11 May 10 46 - Transd.
By JCO

Dear General,

The Italian Supreme Command informs me that the Consul General Ezio Caribaldi has been arrested by the English Authorities.

I know, on the other hand, that a brother of his, Ricciotti, had established contact with the Allied Authorities.

I am anxious to tell you what I know regarding these two gentlemen:

1. Ricciotti - Apparently in disagreement with the Fascist regime. He was in France, instead, as an agent of the fascist police who mainly reported activities of the antifascist refugees on French soil.

2. Ezio - Consul General of the Fascist militia. He was one of the most conspicuous exponents of the Party.

It would be well if both of them were to be put out of circulation and placed where they could do no harm.

Very Cordially Yours,

/s/ Badoglio

6162

31

NF
also SP

RED/afe

7 May 1944

SG 000.1

His Excellency Alexander Bogomoloff
Soviet Representative to the Advisory Council for Italy

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to forward to Your Excellency the enclosed translations of two letters by Prime Minister Marshal Badoglio dated 24 April 1944 concerning the undertakings of the new Italian Government.

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

2 Incls.

- 1 - Ltr No. 1246
- 2 - Ltr No. 1240

6161
30

NF
also SF

RED/afe

90 000.1

7 May 1944

His Excellency Couvo de Murville
French Representative to the Advisory Council for Italy

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to forward to Your Excellency the enclosed translations of two letters by Prime Minister Marshal Badoglio dated 24 April 1944 concerning the undertakings of the new Italian Government.

ROBERT M. DOE
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

2 Incls.
1 - Ltr No. 1246
2 - Ltr No. 1240

61630

NYF
also SE

RED/afe

SG 000.1

7 May 1944

His Excellency John Poletis
Greek Representative to the Advisory Council for Italy

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to forward to Your Excellency the enclosed translations of two letters by Prime Minister Marshal Badoglio dated 24 April 1944 concerning the undertakings of the new Italian Government.

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.C.D.
Secretary General

2 Incls.
1 - Ltr No. 1246
2 - Ltr No. 1240

6154
30

NF
also SF

RED/afe

30 000.1

7 May 1944

His Excellency Doctor Krek
Yugoslav Representative to the Advisory Council for Italy

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to forward to Your Excellency the enclosed translations of two letters by Prime Minister Marshal Badoglio dated 24 April 1944 concerning the undertakings of the new Italian Government.

ROBERT E. DOK
Major, A.C.D.
Secretary General

2 Incls.
1 - Ltr No. 1246
2 - Ltr No. 1240

6158

30

DRAFT

NF

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to forward to Your
Excellency the enclosed translations of two letters by Prime Minister
Marshal Badoglio ^{dated 24 April 1944} concerning the undertakings of the new Italian
Government.

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

2 Encs.
1- Mr. M1246
2- Mr. No. 240

Chief Commissioner,
I propose to send copies
of the Marshal's letters, as suggested
by Col Spafford, to the Social & French
League, and your local members of the
advisory Council. Do you agree?

Sec. General (P20)

OK. but don't send anything
to Advisory Council member 6159
without consulting me. 30
(over) Wm? - 21

(12184)

Name of Advisory Council ^{Member}

Soviet

Alexander Bogomoloff

French

Couve de Murville

Greek

John P. Petis

Yugoslav

Doctor Kerk

"Representative to the Advisory Council for
Italy"

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

CMS/CF/jjr

MGS-334-28

1 May 1944.

SUBJECT: Distribution of Documents to Advisory Council.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission

From time to time the Allied Control Commission transmits to this Headquarters formal documents expressing relations between the United Nations and the Italian Government:- e.g., the documents for the transfer of certain territory to the administration of the Italian Government, and more recently the "undertaking" and the "acknowledgement" by Marshal Badoglio transmitted by your letters CC/G/228 of 24 April and CC/G/231 of 26 April, respectively. Formerly it was the practice of this Section to distribute copies to the American and the British Ministers, and through the office of one of the Ministers to the Soviet, French, Greek and Yugoslav members of the Advisory Council. Now that the members of the Council have established themselves in Italy, this method of distribution appears inappropriate. Accordingly, this Section has supplied one copy each of the two documents last mentioned above to the British Resident Minister and the American Political Advisor at this Headquarters, and looks to the Allied Control Commission to effect distribution to the members of the Advisory Council of these and like documents in the future.


CHARLES M. SPOFFORD
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief of Section.

Copy to:-

American Political Advisor
British Resident Minister

615

30

General The Hon. Sir H. R. L. G. Alexander,
Commander-in-Chief,

H.Q.

ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

ADM. ECHELON, C.M.F.

6 May 44.

8 May 1944
JHC

Dear Mason Mac.

Thank you for your letter of 28 Apr., 44, regarding a report made by Admiral Morse on conditions among the civil population of NAPLES.

Since receiving your letter I have had an opportunity to examine the report in question. I must say that I agree with your point of view in this matter. I do not propose to make any form of official protest, but I intend to take the matter up personally with Admiral Cunningham when next I see him.

Whatever may be one's views, it is undoubtedly unwise to indulge in criticism, particularly when committed to writing of the work of others, unless one is in the position to verify facts very carefully. It so happens that some rather trenchant criticisms by your art experts on the work of the Royal Engineers in the Royal Palace, NAPLES, has also come before me to-day. The two cases are by no means parallel, but I feel they have this much in common that they represent a somewhat fiery criticism not entirely justified by the facts.

I wish to add that you have my full sympathy and support in your difficult job and I am sorry that you have been subjected to this annoyance, which you are quite justified in resenting.

Yours True.

H. R. Alexander

Lieut-General F. N. Mason Macfarlane, KCB., DSO., MC.,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

Brig Lush
A pity - I shall
never understand this - 615 per
to put people's backs up

29

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Sec Sec

NF
SFRef: 88/11/CA.5th May 1944.

SUBJECT: Criticism of AME at Colli a Volturmo.

TO : S. Excellency Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Capo del Governo,
SALONICA.- *polio* #25

1. I referred your letter No. 2460/Pres. Cons. of 23rd April to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer concerned who has reported to me that the points raised had already come to his notice before receipt of your letter.
2. Complete investigation has been made and where, in his opinion, the officer was at fault, the practices have been stopped and instructions to prevent recurrence have been given.
3. It has been found that the officer at COLLI A VOLTURMO has not been impolite in his contacts with the civilian population.
4. It is further reported to me that the distribution of food was not actually suspended though a notice stating the intention to do so was posted. This was not a wise measure and is contrary to my wishes. In the matter of cleanliness, the town of COLLI A VOLTURMO still leaves much to be desired; and it cannot be entirely attributed to the passing of Moroccan troops or the presence of numerous military contingents in the area; more must be done by the Italian authorities themselves.
5. You will, of course, agree that for the sake of the health of the military forces cleanliness in areas occupied by troops is essential and the co-operation of the inhabitants in this matter is expected.

ROSE MARION MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant General,
Chief Commissioner.

6154

28

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. SECTION
APO 394

Ref/392/22/51

29 April 1944

SUBJECT: Freedom of Political Activities

HRG A.C. 420 374

TO : Chief Commissioner, ACO

Sec. 1
Rec'd 28 Apr 1630
By OFE

1. On the 31st of January Mr. Vyshinsky raised a query about four Italians who were said to have been imprisoned in Sicily for anti-fascist political activities. It was taken up through the Chairman of the Advisory Council and forwarded to us by R.C.S. for investigation on the 1th of March.

2. An interim reply was sent to R.C.S. on the 22nd of March and a full report has since been received from Regional Commissioner, Sicily, which shows that the complaints are entirely without foundation.

3. A reply is submitted for your signature.

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel
Deputy Executive Commissioner

61527

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. Section
APO 394

Ref/398/EL/CA.

27 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Freedom of Political Activities.

TO : Military Government Section, A.F.H.Q.

1. I refer to your letter MES 000.1 of 4 March 1944 and to my letter to you No.129/20/CA of the 22nd March 1944, in the latter of which a full report was promised.

2. The facts of the case are as follows :

The advocates Sessa Cesare and Mr Diana Paolo were arrested at Raffadali in the Province of Agrigento on the 8th November following a demonstration in which some two thousand people were involved. The demonstration was directed against the Municipal authorities and against the provisions of the General Order issued by the Regional Commissioner, A.M.C. Region I (Sicily) relating to Amasai, and resulted in considerable damage to furniture and documents. The Municipio, tax office and alimentation office were invaded by the crowd. The C.A.O. and his orderly were manhandled and their jeep was damaged. A search of Diana's house revealed a store of weapons and ammunition, but some technicality prevented preferment of a specific charge.

3. Sessa Cesare and Diana Paolo, it will be seen therefore, were arrested for causing a disturbance and not as suggested for anti-Fascist activities. They were released on January 8th because it was not found possible to substantiate a charge against them of organising or taking part in the demonstration. It may be added that they have returned to Raffadali, where they have been allowed full freedom in the expression of their political views and the dissemination of propaganda.

4. It has not been possible to trace Pardella or Di Cesu, unless the former is Pardella Giovanni, who was arrested for wrongful possession of Allied Military property on 17 November 1943 and released two days later, and the latter is Di Cesu Edmario who on 18 February 1944 completed a sentence of 16 days imprisonment for petty theft imposed by the Italian Courts. It is possible that Pardella was a mistake for Pardella Calogero, who was detained as being one of the

the municipal authorities and against the provisions of the General Order issued by the Regional Commissioner, A.M.G. Region I (Sicily) relating to Amasai, and resulted in considerable damage to furniture and documents. The Municipio, tax office and alimentation office were invaded by the crowd. The C.A.O. and his orderly were manhandled and their jeep was damaged. A search of Diana's house revealed a store of weapons and ammunition, but some technicality prevented preferment of a specific charge.

3. Sessa Cesare and Diana Paolo, it will be seen therefore, were arrested for causing a disturbance and not as suggested for anti-fascist activities. They were released on January 8th because it was not found possible to substantiate a charge against them of organizing or taking part in the demonstration. It may be added that they have returned to Raffadali, where they have been allowed full freedom in the expression of their political views and the dissemination of propaganda.

4. It has not been possible to trace Pardella or Di Gesu, unless the former is Pardella Giovanni, who was arrested for wrongful possession of Allied Military property on 17 November 1943 and released two days later, and the latter is Di Gesu Eduardo who on 18 February 1944 completed a sentence of 16 days imprisonment for petty theft imposed by the Italian Courts. It is possible that Pardella might be a mistake for Pradella Calogero, who was detained as being one of the leading gangsters in Favara, Province of Agrigento and a man with a long criminal record, but he does not appear to have any political background. This man is now held at the disposition of the Questura pending the application of measures of public security. If further information can be supplied regarding Pardella and Di Gesu, every effort will be made to trace their cases and to report on them.

5. Similar cases have sometimes arisen and any arrests which are made are always made in the interests of public order. Participants frequently bring out in their defense that they are anti-Fascists who are making demonstrations against Fascists. In all these cases the accused and their lawyers are told that the Allied Military Government will not tolerate riotous demonstrations or disturbances of public order and impose sentences on such as they are able to convict of taking a prominent part. Exaggerated, not to say groundless reports such as these waste the time of my officers who are concerned in the investigation of them and I should be grateful if steps could be taken in future to prevent such serious allegations being made by people in incomplete possession of the facts.

NORL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieut-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TOP SECRET

FATIMA M172

FATIMA (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

25th. April, 1944.

TOP SECRET

v16

PRIORITY

GEN MACFARLANE

FREEDOM REPEATED HEADQUARTERS A.A.I.

DURING OUR DISCUSSION THIS MORNING BADOGLIO STRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES HE ANTICIPATED FROM THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN SICILY PD PAREN TO FREEDOM FOR MOS CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTERS OFFICE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER REPEATED HEADQUARTERS AAI FOR GENERAL ALEXANDER AND MACMILLAN FROM FATIMA FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN HE IS MOST ANXIOUS THAT THE QUOTE JUNTA CONSULTIVA UNQUOTE FOR SICILY SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF NON SEPARATIST MEMBERS PD HE REPEATED PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED HIGH APPRECIATION OF COLONEL HANCOCK OUR REGIONAL COMMISSIONER CMA FOR OUR ASSISTANCE TO SICILIAN ADMINISTRATION AND ASKED ME TO ARRANGE FOR A MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF CMA MYSELF CMA COLONEL HANCOCK AND MUCOTTO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER CMA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

Copy to Capt. Stone

615
NOEL MASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

TOP SECRET

TRANSLATION

CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT
No. 2460/Pres. Cons.

Salerno, 23 April 1944

Dear General MacFarlane,

Vivid protests have been brought to my attention concerning the methods of administration adopted by AMG of Colli A Volturno (Venafro), which exercises its power with grave harshness, contrary to humanitarian directives and to the generous methods with which the actions of the Allied authorities in Italy are associated.

In particular, there has been indicated to me that officers of the above-mentioned AMG, as a general rule, receive their public with impolite manners; they have ordered that for the milling of the grain, the interested parties must contribute 10% of the flour; they subordinate the granting of travel permits to undue payments on the part of the applicants, amounts which seemingly are later distributed for assistance purposes.

Particularly serious is, however, the order of suspending the distribution of all the rationed items to the citizens who have not complied with the tax payments for 1943, also without discrimination of the families of which the heads have been deported or killed by Germans and which lack every resource. For the execution of such order, AMG has furnished each dealer of Colli with the list of delinquent contributors.

With another ordinance, copy of which is attached, there is effected, in addition, the suspension of the bread and flour ration, to all the inhabitants of the town, because the "roads, the squares and the side streets are not clean." In this connection, it has been ascertained that if the cleanliness leaves something to be desired, the temporary inconvenience must be attributed to:

- the great filth left in the town by passing Moroccan troops.
- the unusual traffic caused by the presence of numerous military contingencies in the area.

I am sure, dear General, that you will reprimand the above-mentioned officers so as they will respect the spirit of humanity and understanding which is inherent to the Allied Armies.

I thank you in advance for the courteous information which I kindly ask of you in this matter.

Cordial greetings,

/s/ BADOGLIO

6159
25

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
NO. 100-100000

100-100000

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These records have been placed in the custody of the Secretary of the Department of Defense, and are being maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Department of Defense Records Management Regulation, 32 CFR 201.16, which requires that records of the Department of Defense be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Department of Defense Records Management Regulation, 32 CFR 201.16.

It is requested that you advise the Secretary of the Department of Defense of any changes in the location of these records, and that you advise the Secretary of the Department of Defense of any changes in the location of these records, and that you advise the Secretary of the Department of Defense of any changes in the location of these records.

It is requested that you advise the Secretary of the Department of Defense of any changes in the location of these records, and that you advise the Secretary of the Department of Defense of any changes in the location of these records, and that you advise the Secretary of the Department of Defense of any changes in the location of these records.

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It is requested that you advise the Secretary of the Department of Defense of any changes in the location of these records, and that you advise the Secretary of the Department of Defense of any changes in the location of these records, and that you advise the Secretary of the Department of Defense of any changes in the location of these records.

RECEIVED
28 APR 1960
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DSG ACC

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TRANSLATION

COPY OF WALL MANIFESTO

COMUNE OF COLLI A VOLTURNO

Colli a Volturno, 6 April 1944

Because the roads, the squares and the sidestreets of the town are not clean, the suspension of the bread and flour ration is ordered for the entire town for Saturday.

If the cleaning-up is not completed by tomorrow, the suspension of bread and flour shall be ordered for six days.

Cleanliness must be practiced by all without distinction.

/s/ OFFICIAL

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

6149

(NOTE: Inclosure to Marshal Badoglio's letter 2460 of 23 Apr 44).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015TRANSLATION

CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

No. 3711/Pres. Cons.

My dear General MacFarlane:

I am advised:

- that the Allied Office for Civilian Supply at Brindisi has requested of the Prefect the urgent delivery of 1.500 quintals of comestible oil for the rearguard of the Allied Army.
- that A.C.C. of Sardinia has asked of the High Commissioner the delivery of 56.000 lambs and 1.400 sheep per week for the feeding of Indian troops;
- that from Sicily, by order of the Allied Authorities, 24.000 quintals of sulphur have been obtained.

In this connection I believe necessary to call to your attention, my dear General, that requests and requisitions of this kind, effected by direct orders to outlying Italian Authorities, do not appear to me to be in line with the spirit of the Armistice clauses and the conditions of retrocession of the Provinces to the R. Government and, above all, they do not appear to take into consideration the grave difficulties of supply in which the liberated territory finds itself. These difficulties are quite well known to the Allies who do not fail, upon every occasion, to lend assistance to the Italian people, acquiring in this way always greater gratitude from the Nation.

I am forced to believe, however, dear General, that this ambiguity springs from the circumstances that some outlying Allied Authorities, in view of the relative abundance of some products in the respectively controlled regions, deem to be able to take away, without harm for the population, considerable quantities for military supply. Said authorities do not take into consideration, however, that in the present precarious situation the Italian agencies responsible for supplies have no other alternative to procure for the population goods which are deficient, but to effect barter between region and region where goods are relatively in excess of local consumption.

From this derives that only the central authorities who gather relative data from all provinces can pronounce themselves on the real availability of a certain product, with respect to the minimum requirements of a consumption of all the liberated territory.

For instance I will say that in the Province of Brindisi there are immediately available for export only 693 quintals of oil, while there are no stocks of meat and pasta for the local population.

Shipment of the abovementioned considerably quantity of bovine cattle requested by the Allies in Sardinia, would bring about within a short time, the destruction of the entire relative stock there in existence, and would at any rate definitely compromise the possibility of procuring for the Island the goods which it requires, through barter of the eventual excess of cattle.

HQ ACC, APO 394
 Sec'y Gen
 Rec'd 26 Apr 1920
 By D.F.E.

6143

24

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Furthermore, the above mentioned request does not take into consideration the fact that in all the liberated territory there exists a very serious deficiency of meat products.

A similar consideration exists for Sicilian sulphur, where the effects of the removal previously ordered by the Allies, will be perniciously felt in the agrarian cultivations for which the product was intended.

I, therefore, beg of you, my dear General, to examine the possibility of effecting revocation of the above mentioned orders and that similar requests in the future be made by the Allied authorities through the Control Commission, which on its part is in position to evaluate the suitability thereof even before submitting same to the study of the Central Italian Government.

I thank you in advance and extend to you my cordial greetings.

/s/ BADOGLIO

TO:
General Sir Noel M. MacFarlane
President of the Allied Control Commission
SALERNO.

61.7

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28 APR 1960
DSQ ACC

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Secretary General
APO 394

SO 000.1

18 April 1944

Sig. V. Calace
Giunta Esecutiva dell'Italia Liberata
Via Paolo Emilio Dabiani, 53
NAPLES

Dear Sir,

The Chief Commissioner directs me to acknowledge your communication of 17 April, your file No. 64, forwarding documents concerning the situation in the Comune di Arzano. This information will receive the attention of the proper officer.

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

v3

SG 0001.

18 April 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt Col C. Poletti, Regional Commissioner, Region III.

The Chief Commissioner directs me to forward the attached documents, which are self-explanatory, to you.

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

1 Incl;
Ltr fr Giunta Executiva, No. 64
of 17 Apr 44 - w/inclosures.

6145

23

TRANSLATION

GIUNTA ESECUTIVA DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA
NAPLES

Naples, 17/4/1944

PROT. N-64.

To: General MacFarlane
President of the Allied Control Commission
Naples

We are forwarding herewith copies of documents concerning the situation which has developed in the Comune of Arzano (Naples Province), where once more people of ill will are trying to deceive the good faith of the United Nations authorities to the damage of the population of the Community.

Will you kindly intercede with your good offices for re-establishment of the truth and fair play in the Comune of Arzano.

With the highest consideration please accept our thanks.

for The Giunta Esecutiva

(sgd) V. Calace

2 Inclosures

23

TRANSLATION

Inclosure No. 1

GIUNTA ESECUTIVA ITALIA LIBERATA

NAPLES

We, the undersigned, members of the Committee for National Liberation of Arzano make known that after the fall of the defunct Fascist Party in said Comune there occurred spontaneously a huge popular demonstration against the Fascist Hierarch Prefect Commissioner Mr. Giudetti Giuseppe.

Several carried on their shoulders to the Comune the antifascist Mr. Diligenza Ciro, who appearing on the balcony of the Municipality asked the demonstrators to restore peace and order, which was promptly complied with. H.E. the Prefect of Naples on January 2 with the approval of the Allied Headquarters appointed Mr. Diligenza Ciro Prefect Commissioner of the Comune of Arzano, as is seen in the attached copy. However, after only 2 days the Allied Governor of Frattamaggiore asked Diligenza and Giudetti to appear before him; having appeared through an interpreter who interpreted everything except the wishes and the words of the Governor and of the concerned who spoke the Italian language, as the official facts later showed, the interpreter being in prison for corruption, he stated that because the accusations made against Giudetti were unfounded, he was again in charge, and due to this act the antifascists and all the people of Arzano have no peace and are therefore in constant uproar.

Consequently the undersigned beg of this Giunta Esecutiva to take the necessary steps to avoid dangerous consequences.

The political offices of Giudetti,
Inscription to the Fascist Party in 1926
Commander of GIL
Member of Directorate for Fascist culture and propaganda 1935
Political Vice Secretary of the Fascio 1943
Lecturer many times against Anglo-Saxons from 1940 to 1943.
Communal Commissioner under the Mussolini Government

Diligenza Ciro
Head of Arzanese Antifascism
5 times in prison
20 house searches
Persecuted during the shameful fascist Ventennium.

For the National Committee for Liberation.

Arzano

For the Liberal Democratic Party - Vincenzo Peruti fu Pasquale
For the Socialist Party - Piscopo Giovanni fu Antonio
For the Communist Party - Dell'Averano Giovanni di Tommaso

Arzano, 5 April 1944.

6146

23

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Inclosure No. 27

R. Prefettura di Napoli

Naples, 11.1.1944

IT IS STATED

that Diligenza Ciro has been appointed Prefect Commissioner of the Comune of Arzano by Prefectial Decree No. 16046 of 2 January 1944 and that the Allied Headquarters at Naples has given its approval to this appointment by letter dated 27 December 1943.

THE PREFECT

(E. Cavallieri)

6143

23

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT

Salerno, 14 April 1944.

No. 3487-Pres.Cons.

2 Incls.

Dear General Mac Farlane:

As you know, the R. Italian Government, to determine the position of its civil servants, who have not been able to rejoin their original offices, because of the state of war, and to provide for the needs of public offices, has issued the provisions contained in the R. Decree-Law of 3 January 1944, No. 3, which I attach herewith in copy.

From the enclosed list, transmitted by Major Mastol, chief of CIVIL of the office of civil affairs at Campobasso, it appears that in said province there are at present several functionaries and employees who, although not having resumed their service, continue nevertheless to receive their salaries.

It is not to be excluded that numerous others find themselves in identical circumstances in localities still administered by the Allied Military Government.

To be able to proceed with the return of this personnel and normalize its position in all respects, I am pleased to call to your attention the necessity ~~WHICH~~ that provisions similar to those issued by the Italian Government be adopted also by the Allied Authorities within the territory under its own jurisdiction.

In such case the return to service and assignments to offices could be effected through the Regional Offices or the R. Prefecture.

I shall be pleased, my dear General, to know the decisions of the Allied Military Government in the matter.

/s/ RADOGLIO

TO: General
Sir Noel M. MAC FARLANE
Chief of the Allied Control Commission
S A L E R N O

*No copies made of enclosed list, which 6142
not translated except for pencil notes
Ltr in Ital. plus one copy of transl. to C.C.*

22

ROYAL LAW DECREE of Jan. 3, 1944, No. 3

PROVISIONS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WHO DID NOT RESUME THEIR WORK
AT THE ORIGINAL OFFICES FOR REASONS ORIGINATING FROM THE STATUS OF
WAR.

VICTOR EMANUEL THE III

by the grace of God and will of the nation

KING OF ITALY

Having seen art. 46 and 47 of the R.D. of Dec. 30, 1923, No. 2960, re-
garding the juridical status of the civilian employees of the State
Administration;

Having seen the regulation approved with R.D. of May 23, 1924, No. 827;

Having seen the various organic regulations of concerning the personnel
of the State Administrations and autonomous set-up administrations, and
relative changes and integrations;

Having seen the R.D.L. of Jan. 30, 1941, No. 12 on the judiciary set-up;

Having seen the R.D.L. of August 19, 1943, No. 730;

Having seen art. 18 of the law of Jan. 19, 1933, No. 129;

Having seen the R.D.L. of Dec. 30, 1943, No. 2/B;

Having seen the R.D.L. of Nov. 10, 1943, No. 5/B;

Considering the necessity and urgency caused by the status of war;

Having heard the Council of Ministers;

Under proposal of the Chief of the Government, Prime Minister State
Secretary, in agreement with the State Undersecretaries of Justice
and Finance;

WE HAVE DECREED AND DECREED

Art. 1

The functionaries and civilian employees of the State and of the State
Administrations with autonomous set-up, residing or living in the liberate
ted territories, who have been unable to reach their offices for reasons
originated from the status of war, must report without delay, and at any
rate not at later than fifteen days after the date of publication of the
present decree, to the nearest Prefecture in order to be sent to their
seats, if that is possible, or eventually to be sent or employed in other
offices.

Personnel which fails to comply within the time prescribed with the
order of the preceding paragraph shall be declared by its office as
dismissed from employment.

Similar penalty is applicable to the functionaries and employees
who do not comply within the time prescribed with the orders received
by the Prefectures.

22

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Art. 2

The assignment to a different seat or different employment as indicated in the preceding article with regard to State personnel, shall be disposed, whatever the rank and the category of the State employee, by the appropriate central Administrations and eventually, temporarily, by the Prefectures, with incontestable orders, giving credit to the normal qualifications of the above personnel and the requirements of the services.

Art. 3

Personnel which, when the present decree goes into effect, finds itself employed with State Offices different from the ones ^{to which} it usually belongs shall be reported, within the time prescribed in art. 1, by their respective office Chiefs, to the appropriate central Administrations, or, if this is impossible, to the nearest Prefecture.

Art. 4

From the date on which the present decree goes into effect, the continuation of payment of salaries and fixed allowances, or the registration of new components with the exceptional procedure indicated by the R.D.L. of August 19, 1943, No. 730, are subordinated to an appropriate declaration of effected hiring of the employee to be issued by the appropriate central administrations, or, in the impossibility of it, by the office Chiefs with whom the employees are working.

Art.5

The functionaries and civil servants of the State and of autonomous Administrations who are in the military service in the liberated areas are under obligation to notify the respective central administrations or, if unable to do so, ~~in~~ the Prefettura, of their presence and position, under provisions of art.1.

The personnel, which will not comply with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, will be subject to disciplinary proceedings, upon return to the civil Administration.

Art.6

Within the period as per art.1, the functionaries and state employees therein specified who are on furlough, regular or special, awaiting assignment or in position of availability, or absent from service through disciplinary suspension measures, must present themselves to the nearest Prefettura so that note be taken of the locality in which they reside and the reason which temporarily exempts them from service.

To these, communication will be made through the Prefettura, in consideration of their respective situations, of the dispositions of the case, with which they must comply, under penalty, if not complying, of incurring the sanctions provided in art. 1. of the present Decree.

Art.7

The provisions as per preceding paragraphs are applicable also to the Magistrates, ~~XXXXX~~ remaining expressly ~~excluded~~ from the provisions of the law on the judicial setup, which however, ~~conditions~~ transfers and applications with the consent of the interested party.

Art.8

The provisions under the present Decree also apply to personnel which may be in the liberated zones after the effective date of this Decree.

The period of fifteen days provided under article 1 will run from the date which will be fixed by Decrees of the Chief of the Government to be published in the Official Gazette of the Kingdom.

Art.9

The present Decree which goes into effect on the day of its publication in the Official Gazette of the Kingdom - special series- will be presented to the legislative Assemblies for conversion into law.

The Chief of the Government, proponent, is authorized to present the relative law draft.

We order ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ whom this may concern to comply with the present Decree and to have it obeyed as Law of the State.

6139

22

From the Supreme Command, 3 January 1944.

VITTORIO MANUELLE

Basoglio - De Santis - Jung

Approved: (in accordance with R.D. 30 October 1943, N. 1/B)

The Keeper of the Seal: MANUELLE

P.C.C.

The Chief of the Cabinet

CE/P/187

NF
alter SF

April 8, 1944.

I have received your telegram informing me that you have taken office as High Commissioner in Sicily, and take this occasion to send my good wishes for the successful accomplishment of the high tasks with which you have been entrusted.

I regret that I was unable to be present when you assumed office but hope to have the opportunity of seeing you in Sicily.

NOEL HASON MACFARLANE
Lieutenant General,
Chief Commissioner.

H. E. The High Commissioner
for Sicily.

6137

21

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Col. Meyer
TRANSLATION

Telegram;

URGENT

HQ ACC. APO 394
6 Apr. 1950
JPD

TO PENBASE FOR ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, GENERAL MACFARLANE'S HEADQUARTERS,
AOC APO 394.

HEADQUARTERS AOC APO 394 -

Palermo

I have taken office High Commissioner. I send your Excellency my
respectful regards. sorry you were unable to be present.

High Commissioner Sicily Palermo: MUSOTTO

Political Section

*Should I reply?
If so kindly draft.*

*Wm 7 sp
4*

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Mod. 25 - Telex - 1944 - 1/1

INDICAZIONI DI URGENZA

436

STATO URGENTE IMA

Fattorino ad ore

PENBASE FOR ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

GENERALE MAC FARLANE HEADQUARTER

A C C APO 394 =

6758

Rice

Per

QUALIFICAZIONE

DESTINAZIONE

Verificare il tempo della
del e con quale parte si
nomini, il tempo della
quello del telegiornale secondo
e i minuti della presentazione

VIS E INDICAZIONI
TELEGRAFICHE

SS HEAD QUARTERS A C C APO 394 PALERMO 23 33 1 15 = = =

ASSUNTO CARICA ALTO COMMISSARIO RIVOLGO V E MIO DEFERENTE
SALUTO DOLENTE SUA ASSENZA: = = =

ALTO COMMISSARIATO SICILIA PALERMO MUSOTTO

Acc IIIST
(ORIG Y TRANSHATION)
ACTION - SECT GEN
FILE

HEADQUARTERS
16 APR 1944
A.C.C.

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CAVEVI CORRENTISTI POS
MENTE LE DISCUSSIONI MEDIANTE POSTACIRO SONO ESEGUITI SENZA LIMITAZIONE DI SOMMA ED IN ESENZIONE DA QUALSIASI TASSA

1654

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Ses Gen



INDICAZIONI DI URGENZA		Il telegrafo non assume alcuna responsabilità civile o conseguenza. Il servizio della telegrafia Le tasse riscosse in nome per conto del destinatario devono essere compilate dal mittente. Il destinatario è invitato a firmare la ricevuta presentata dal fattorino e a segnare la data e l'ora della consegna del telegramma. In mancanza di tali indicazioni il destinatario perde il diritto a reclamare in caso di ritardo della consegna.				
Ricevuto il 193 ore Ricevente Per circuito N.		Le ore si contano sul meridiano corrispondente al tempo della Europa centrale e nei telegrammi interni e con quelli esteri si guida da una mezzanotte all'altra. Nel telegrammi impressi in caratteri romani il nome del luogo d'origine rappresenta quello del telegrafo secondo quello della parola, gli altri la data, l'ora e i minuti della presentazione.				
QUANTITÀ	DESTINAZIONE	PROVENIENZA	NUM.	PARTE	DATA DELL'ORIGINAZIONE	ALTO COMMISSARIATO
					Giorno e mese	Ora e minuti

SS HEAD QUARTERS A C C APO 394 PALERMO 23 33 1 15 = = =

ASSUNTO CARICA ALTO COMMISSARIO RIVOLGO V E MIO DEFERENTE
SALUTO DOLENTE SUA ASSENZA. = = =

ALTO COMMISSARIATO SICILIA PALERMO MUSOTTO

ACC DIST
(ORIG + TRANSHATION)
ACTION - SECY GEN
FILE



= = DE A C C APO 394 V E = =

CAVEI CORRENTISTI POS
MENTE LE RISCOSSIONI MEDIANTE POSTAGIRO SONO ESEGUITI SENZA LIMITAZIONE DI SOMMA ED IN ESEZIONE DA QUALSIASI TASSA

1655

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

6135

21



DSM 199

5 APR 1944

200/hjp

In reply refer to:
DOC 092.1

5 April 1944

My dear Dr. Gallenga:

I have received and read with the greatest interest the text of
M.E. Reale's speech given in Potenza, and I want to thank you for your
courtesy in sending it to me.

Sincerely yours,

MILBY W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Deputy Chief Commissioner

Dr. Mario Gallenga
Private Secretary to M.E. The
Minister of Interior
Italian Government

Political Section

Hum 6 6134
4

Sent by Air Mail
7 Apr 44

20

TRANSLATION

Personal Secretary to
H.E. the Minister of the Interior

Salerno 1 April 1944

Capt. Ellery W. Stone,
Vice-President and Deputy Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission, Salerno.

I have received the text of H. E. Reales' speech given in Potenza,
on 26 March, and, in the absence of the Minister, I take it upon myself to send
you a copy in his name.

The Personal Secretary

(Dr. Mario Gallenga)

/s/ Mario Gallenga.

Trans/Sgt. Sorisi/ajp.

6133

70

TRANSLATION

(Special Edition of "Il Gennettino", Potenza, 28 March, 1944)

H. E. Rouse Speake:

Citizens, Friends,

I greet the Allion and thank them, as I think the Committee which has given me this honor, and the citizenry which is so numerously represented.

After 20 years, this platform once more becomes the arena of liberty, a platform from which we can take up again the old conversation with the Italian people, to discuss the problem of its existence and its future.

The first rehearsals of Fascism were made here: in this noble city. Here, a blind agrarian and conservative reaction denied to men of liberty, who gave impulse to the noblest ideals with the Italian proletariat, the defense of their political ideas. Here, instead, in this same place, freedom of speech was given to organizers of armed bands.

Let us not forget this episode of whom some conscious and unconscious, voluntary and involuntary members today wish to regain virginity by cloaking themselves in an anti-fascist air which sound very much out of place as it pours from their lips.

The generation which has witnessed this political phase should keep on its toes and not allow damaged goods on the market. On that occasion might took the place of right for the first time, imposition became a substitute for conviction and common consent; the success of this method constitutes one of the causes for the downfall of liberty, for the coming into power of violent men over the legitimate representatives of the Country, for an Armed Militia at the will of Parliament.

The lesson will not go unlearned: The error must not be repeated.

Italy fights for its resurrection, fights for liberty. She must know where the enemy is to be found.

In this tragic hour, who is defending the liberty, the honor, the future of Italy: the opposition or the Government?

It is the Italian people who must solve this problem. That is why I am here, before you. The present government represents anti-fascist legitimacy, continuity of government, thought and action. So are the continuation of the Government of 25 July, of that government whom the Italian

place as it pours from their lips.

The generation which has witnessed this political phase should keep on its toes and not allow damaged goods on the street. On that occasion might took the place of right for the first time, imposition became a substitute for conviction and common consent; the success of this method constitutes one of the causes for the downfall of liberty. For the coming into power of violent men over the legitimate representatives of the Country, for an Armed Militia at the will of Parliament.

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It is the Italian people who must solve this problem. That is why I am here, before you. The present government represents anti-fascist legitimacy, continuity of government, thought and action. We are the continuation of the Government of 25 July, of that government whom the Italian people welcomed as a government which liberated Italy from fascist tyranny. That has changed from that day? There have been changes, but on the road away from fascism.

613?

There was the unistice declaration; there was the declaration of war against Germany; the government has proceeded with firm step toward the deepest aspirations of the Country, namely, to cut itself off from an infamous and dishonorable war, and to ransom the shame of 10 June 1940 by participating in the war of liberation which re-unites Italy with its glorious traditions, and reaffirms its solidarity, at the price of its blood, with the Nations which fight for justice and liberty.

This truth has been realized by the factions and reactionary Fascism, which changed itself into republican and socialist, and labels treason any revolt against fascism, treason the war against Germany.

Italy, this glorious part of Italy which fights desperately for liberty, can it be put on the same plane of criminal Fascism? Can it drain the reason, the essence, the legitimacy of the Roderigo Government, which is the opposite of the Mussolini government and has its reason for existence and its justification by fighting against Fascism?

20

1 6 6 0

It is possible that the opposition parties do not realize that any attempt to weaken the Badoglio Government helps the Mussolini band, which, under German guidance, and under the shadow of German bayonets, represent the line of obstacle against an Italy which desperately climbs the road of its liberation! The opposition parties, in trying to ascend to power, forget the harm they do to Italy, and are not aware that their methods bring back into play fascist methods of violence and invective, which do not place in a position of legitimacy, a government which must have the ideal representation of all Italy, the part already liberated and that which awaits freedom.

Their methods strangely evoke the methods of Fascism; assemblies are called meetings, the slogan "Italy to us!" is called full powers.

There is but one method to give to Italy a Government which represents it fully, which will give it vigor and unity: forget little divergencies of thought, and unite round the great flag of Italy. Only thus can this poor and torn country have a government whose prestige may not be contested, always a necessary thing, indispensable at the present hour; only thus will Italy regain the respect due to her.

Churchill, in his celebrated speech, said it with the vigor and clarity which are characteristic of his oratory.

Either this road, or wait until the Country, all of it, including prisoners and those deported to Germany, may have their say and may indicate the form of government and the government which shall represent Italy.

A country, such as Italy, which emerges from a grave travail, from a heartless tyranny, from a distressing war, from a defeat without precedence, cannot but review its entire political organization in every field, from the institutional to the administrative, from the economic to the cultural. But it is necessary, in order to make this study, that the country be reunited geographically and morally. The opposition parties forget the tragic conditions in which Italy lives, and they forget that the solution of the problem which they put forth needs the participation of all the Italian people. Outside of this participation there is revolution, worse yet, a succession of revolutions, namely the destruction of that little which our tragic fate has left to us.

Italians do not believe in wisdom which flourishes in their own soil, but they believe very much in the wisdom which comes from the outside, and that wisdom is all the more welcome since it comes from England, a name dear to the Italian Risorgimento, a name sacred to liberty, and still more dear, today, to the heart of every Italian, because it is bound with the liberation, with the reconstruction of Italy.

...the characteristic of his oratory.

either this road, or wait until the country, all of it, including prisoners and those deported to Germany, may have their say and may indicate the form of government and the government which shall represent Italy.

A country, such as Italy, which emerges from a grave travail, from a heartless tyranny, from a distressing war, from a defeat without precedence, cannot but review its entire political organization in every field, from the institutional to the administrative, from the economic to the cultural. But it is necessary, in order to make this study, that the country be reunited geographically and morally. The opposition parties forget the tragic conditions in which Italy lives, and they forget that the solution of the problem which they put forth needs the participation of all the Italian people. Outside of this participation there is revolution, worse yet, a succession of revolutions, namely the destruction of that little which our tragic fate has left to us.

Italians do not believe in wisdom which flourishes in their own soil, but they believe very much in the wisdom which comes from the outside, and that wisdom is all the more welcome since it comes from England, a name dear to the Italian Risorgimento, a name sacred to liberty, and still more dear, today, to the heart of every Italian, because it is bound with the liberation, with the reconstruction of Italy.

It is a member of labor who speaks, a man of the left wing who writes of Italy competently, with passion, with knowledge of our problems. The labor member, Ivor Thomas, discloses the method by which the Italian people may solve its problems:

"I can see only one satisfactory way; pre-arrange a constituent assembly to meet as soon as it is reasonably possible, at the end of hostilities." and he adds: "Matters would be considerably simplified if the King and Marshal Badoglio could announce 'We the convoking of such an assembly by means of free elections, within, let us say, six months after German capitulation, and to have it decide all internal questions'. The request of this eminent parliamentarian has been accepted; a declaration by the King was communicated to the Allies on 21 October, and was re-presented to the Allies and to the King's Government. Listen to it; I am in a position to give it to you in full:

"1. The present Ministry will continue in office until the return of the Italian Government to the Capital."

"2. As soon as Rome is liberated from the Germans, we will constitute a Ministry on a wide basis, which will include exponents of all parties and exclude men in any way compromised with Fascism."

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"3. Within 4 months from the peace a Chamber of Deputies must be elected."

"4. The Parliament may freely discuss the institutions and reform them, even totally."

"5. The Nation, freely consulted, shall be the arbiter of its fate."

"6. The Crown will faithfully follow the will of the Nation, as manifested by the representatives of the Nation, freely elected."

"7. Any other line of conduct would, in this delicate moment, weaken the authority, the legitimacy and the strength of the State, essential conditions to continue the fight against the Germans and against the residues of Fascism."

Marshal Badoglio has renounced this assurance and has repeated that in Rome, heart and mind of Italy, he is ready to form a new constitutional set-up on a wide basis, just as he is ready to leave his post to whoever may better serve the Nation.

It is superfluous to add that all the collaborators of Badoglio are united with their illustrious chief in his high decision.

But the Government finds its authority not only in its investiture, but also in the guaranty that is offered by its Head, who is Commander of the Army of Vittorio Veneto, injured to the most difficult and fatiguing hardships, and by the past history of its civilian members, who fought Fascism from its rise to its inglorious end.

This acknowledgement came solemnly from Prime Minister Churchill in a speech which will remain unforgettable for the echo it evoked in our Country, and from a personal letter of President Roosevelt to Marshal Badoglio which agrees in substance with the declarations of Churchill.

But facts possess a language more eloquent than words.

We lived hours of drama and anxiety because of a faulty transmission of some utterances by President Roosevelt in regard to the use of our fleet, which is the most glittering, the most glorious arm of our Country.

We heard, in words ascribed to the President, that our future would become cloudy; we heard that all our hopes were about to crash because of the words of the great President of the Starred Republic, whom

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It is superfluous to add that all the collaborators of Badoglio are united with their illustrious chief in his high decision.

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We heard, in words ascribed to the President, that our future would become cloudy; we heard that all our hopes were about to crash because of the words of the great President of the Starred Republic, whom we have always felt, and always shall feel, on the side of the Italian people.

The action of the Government, vigilant, ready, immediate, got the reply we expected, and which gave back our faith in the night. Our thoughts today go out to the sailors of Italy who sail all the seas with love of their motherland in their hearts, and who know yet once more that they are fighting a common cause, the cause of Italy, under the national ensign and flag.

A few days later, the great Russia, that Russia who each day writes a page of glory, generously extended her hand to the most proletarian of nations, and clasped the hand of the Badoglio Government.

Is it possible that just a few Italians must question this undeniable prestige? Don't they feel that harmony and unity are very urgent in order to save this great and unfortunate Nation?

I repeat once more from the soil of this generous soil, from the region whose thoughts have had high expression through Giustino Fortunato, Emanuele Giannino, Vincenzo Iannillo, from the land of Francesco Sita, who attempted in vain to dispel these dark hours for his Country, and

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and who most suffered for his Country, the invitation to harmony and sacred unitedness. I know I am voicing the soul and thought of the great statesman by affirming that this unity would be the desired reward of his sufferings.

The Government, knowing it has legitimate powers, exercise them all in the interest of the Nation, ready to cede them as soon as worthy men who wish to guide its destiny appear on the horizon.

But, meanwhile, it works. The greatest task is that of restoring moral order, to form the force of order. Order is the guaranty of liberty, it is the condition for the exercise of all liberties. The government will never fail this duty. The Nation asks only one thing: to be governed with justice and with the guaranty that its fundamental rights be the estate of all and that it be assured to all.

A hard task: it is necessary to impress all State agents that the hour for duty has rung and that there is no indulgence for those who violate the duties of office. It is necessary to restore the moral order so deeply upset by twenty years of Fascism.

This order must be stable, compact and of such a nature as to be borne from these provinces to those which slowly but inexorably are becoming reunited to the motherland.

The part played by the Piemonte region from 1948 onward has been transformed to our land, and we shall not fail in this great mission.

We must face and solve the problem which goes by the name of purification or defascistization. It must be solved by clear, precise, linear, coherent concepts.

1. The Nation has been deprived of its liberty for over 20 years, has been thrown into war and into the greatest national disaster. The major responsible parties are on the other side, and, not yet sated, continue to disseminate ruin. Some institutions have yielded and have renounced their functions. The participation must be judged by the entire Italian people. The people must initiate the great trial, must review the institutions which should have been the ramparts of liberty and were not; the government has already dissolved the Chamber, and now prepares to dissolve the Senate, to revise the Court of Accounts and the State Council.

2. There are also the less responsible ones, those who showed solidarity with the great criminals; these too must be punished, but in proportion to the importance of their action and the part of danger it represents in this hour when the country is at war.

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represents in this hour when the country is at war.

3. There are functionaries who took part in the infamous
banquet, who have been given to faction; they must be punished. There are
functionaries who have obeyed, these are victims more than accomplices; they
must be judged with humanity.

4. There is the great people of Italy; there are the small
ones who were not able and did not know how to escape the orders of the fas-
cist leaders, unscrupulous and without a conscience; one should stretch out
to them one's hand. This dispute which threatens to suffocate the country
must be ended. I have had the honour to be appointed president of the puri-
fying Commission and I intend to exercise my powers in obeying its orders.
Justice inspired by wisdom and kindness. I am accused of too much
kindness, of weakness; but I shall know how to do my duty without weakness
and I will fight fascism particularly on moral grounds. But having achieved
the painful task, I am certain that love is a better tie than hate. Italy
has been governed during twenty years by hate and we have reaped the fruit;
let us now govern differently. But, I pray you, do not make mistakes. The
liberty of the press has been in operation now for several months, but the
more objective observers have already had to agree that the press is navil-
gating full-stem ahead into unbridled licentiousness. We respect the
liberties of everyone, but do not imagine that liberty has its exact meaning
when the right is proclaimed of not collaborating with the Government or of

applying to the Government for a function or a position, to then exercise an action contrary to the Government's orders. Citizens cannot claim to be vested with the Government's authority and then fight against it, but they must, for that purpose, rely on the electorate body; and I am able to announce to you that I am about to present a bill which will recall the communal and provincial law of 1915, introducing in it certain alterations prompted by experience, for the preparation of electoral lists and to request of the electorate body the choice of its administrators. It is not possible to do the same thing regarding a political electorate law, because in this field the whole of Italy must be able to talk to decide in which way the elections must be carried out; to whom the vote should be given, and the formation of the electoral bodies.

Apart from the problem of liberty there is also that of the reconstruction of the country.

This is not the time to draw up programs, to make a list of reforms; they would be worthless and meaningless. But one can now indicate how to orientate our program, and what are the most urgent problems in hand. The war, the division of North and South has demonstrated eloquently that southern Italy has no industries, it has not the possibilities to transform into industrial products the raw materials offered by her soil. Being to this we are suffering great privation. This great gap must be filled in. The Government must make reforms in order to create those industries which are necessary to the country. To this end it must face the problem of relations between capital and labor. The State representing the whole population cannot remain extraneous in this question of future industrial economy, the workmen cannot solely remain at the mercy of the work given him, but he must participate in the running and the profits of the concern, and he must secure its success not only with his work but also with his advice; to it he must give not only his toil but also his soul; and he must know that he is not working only for his directors but for himself and his family.

In all the world there is a fervor of planning for the solution of these problems, from the stove-angled republics to the venerable and glorious England; our organization must unite itself to the international organization, it must insert itself into its organism and contribute towards it with its experience and feel the pulse of evolution beating in the other great democracies.

The new world will certainly be much bigger than the one we have lived in. If also this hope were to disappear then the mornings and the ruins of this war would all have been in vain.

Together with the industrial and labour problem goes closely that of agriculture.

Government must make reforms in order to create these industries which are necessary to the country. To this end it must face the problem of relations between capital and labour. The State representing the whole population cannot remain extraneous in this question of future industrial economy, the workmen cannot solely remain at the mercy of the wage given him, but he must participate in the running and the profits of the concern, and he must ensure its success not only with his work but also with his advice; to it he must give not only his toil but also his soul; and he must know that he is not working only for his directors but for himself and his family.

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Together with the industrial and labour problem goes closely that of agriculture.

To represent a country of workers, of stubborn agricultural **peasants**, of stubborn agricultural **workers**, This problem can be solved in one way only by giving the land to the peasants, and arranging in such a way that each peasant becomes the owner of the piece of land he is cultivating; thus participating in an equal share its products. Here the problem is less complicated; there is no technical problem to solve. The peasant is at the same time the owner of his land and its indefatigable worker.

This problem is being solved slowly and naturally under our own eyes; we have to make it easier and more rapid. It is not only social peace we will be collecting but also prosperity and riches.

I have wanted to show you, rather than its reforms, the program, of the Government, the ends which it is aiming in elaborating its program, the solution of the most grave problems of the moment; but the real reforms must be created by the will of the Italian people only. At present one problem only dominates all others, it is a problem of huge dimensions, the problem of war, the problem of the reorganization of our army. The army which possesses the entire soul of the nation, the army which formed the unity of the country, in whose ranks have fallen the Piemontese, the Lombards, the Truceni and the Lusatians in order to allow the Italian citizen to place in

in the sun; the army which filled Italy with glory in the 1915-18 war and which will redeem Italy from its recent shame.

A new world is being forced on the horizon; the Italian army cannot be absent. Allow me to behold all the beauty of this new world which has been made fertile by so much Italian blood, which has been shaken, conceived and settled by Giuseppe Mazzini; allow me to believe that this is not only an illusion, but a certainty for tomorrow. Tomorrow there will not be soldiers of many nations, but soldiers of one nation only, the one big nation of liberty, of righteousness, of justice.

For this nation the battle is raging on the slopes of Cassino; and among the combatants there is a representative unit of the Italian Army; but it is too small; whereas it should be adequate to our passion, to our power. The army is being reconstructed fully. I wish that all Italy were present at the march-part of the *Belles' Regiment* at *Cava del Tirreno*; I should like all Italy to witness the forming of the glorious troops in the Puglia, under the magnificent supervision of my friend Orlando, the War Minister. Only so can we regain faith in ourselves.

And to regain this faith we must not repeat the errors of the past and close ourselves up in petty fights and factious behaviour. We will open our arms wide to those who return from the battle fields or from internment, even if their battle has not been ours; and to this cheated youth we will demand the sharing of the real fight, the big one, the noble one; but we must accomplish the unity of our mother country if we wish to be worthy of the big nation.

We must unite the warriors of all wars in order to feel the brotherhood, to unite all efforts for the great and only goal, the freedom of Italy. In them is the staunchest strength of the nation, and we must urge it on for the greatness of the mother country.

Unity and sacrifice are the two words which must translate the thought and the effort of every Italian.

The cry that is lurking in your heart as well as in mine is the same one: "Long live Italy! May it rise to new heights", but this cry has no meaning unless it has an echo in this other cry: "Long live the United Nations! May all those people live who with their sacrifices, their blood have come face to face with the terrible struggle, have won it, and have extended their hand to Italy in order to uplift her and to enable her to return to her ancient and glorious traditions."

carried up in petty fights and factious behaviour. We will open our arms wide to those who return from the battle fields or from internment, even if their battle has not been ours; and to this chosen youth we will demand the sharing of the real fight, the big one, the noble one; but we must accomplish the unity of our mother country if we wish to be worthy of the big nation.

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Unity and sacrifice are the two words which must translate the thought and the effort of every Italian.

The cry that is hurting in your heart as well as in mine is the same one: "Long Live Italy! May it rise to new heights", but this cry has no meaning unless it has an echo in this other cry: "Long live the United Nations! May all those people live who with their sacrifices, their blood have come face to face with the terrible struggle, have won it, and have extended their hand to Italy in order to uplift her and to enable her to return to her ancient and glorious traditions."

At the end of the speech which was listened by the public in religious silence and applauded during all its more salient phases, the illustrious Orator was heartily cheered by all the authorities present and an enthusiastic public demonstration accompanied him all the way from the Theatre to the Government Palace.

Trans/sgt. Soried/ejp.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
LABOR SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

LAB 091.4351

26 March 1944

SUBJECT: Status of AMG/ACC, Proclamations, Orders, Institutions, and Appointees in Territory Turned Over to Italian Government.

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

1. Labor Sub-Commission letter 14 January 1944, approved Economic Section, 29 January 1944, and received Legal Sub-Commission, Salerno, 2 February 1944, requested that the following orders and regulations pertaining to such orders remain in force and be recognized when AMG territory was turned over to the Italian Government, viz.:

a. General Order No. 8 (Region I), and Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto.

b. General Order No. 14 (Region I)

c. Regional Orders Nos. 5 and 6 (Region 2)

Letter from Colonel Upjohn, 4 February, stated these suggestions had been communicated to the Italian Government and terms of legislation agreed in principle with that Government. On 4 February 1944, this Sub-Commission requested inclusion of General Order No. 17 for similar treatment.

2. The English of proclamation presumed to be signed by Marshal Badoglio on date of 11 February turnover, made adequate provision for full validity of all proclamations and orders issued by the Allied Military Government.

3. Royal Decree Law 11 February 1944, No. 31, does not grant such validity.

4. Ordinance issued by Marshal Badoglio 11 February 1944, does not grant validity.

5. Letter of 22 March 1944, from the Legal Sub-Commission, in response to our inquiry, confirms the fact of non-validity and suggests that an agreement be made with the Italian Government for required recognition and payment of officials pending publication of Royal Decrees now being prepared.

6. As a result of the abrogation of AMG legislation and offices, the situation in Sicily during the past two weeks has become dangerously critical. Wages have been considered unfrozen and the following changes have been reported to one of our own officers:

necessary action taken
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a. Unskilled laborer in Palermo warehouse working for the State Organization, is being paid 100 lire daily plus usual indemnities.

b. Private stevedoring contractors are paying 100 lire plus usual indemnities, with 18.75 lire per hour for overtime; night shift is being paid at the rate of 150 lire.

c. Istituto Nazionale Trasporti, Syracuse, acting on recent instructions from Palermo headquarters, now paying drivers (MT) 120 lire, and mechanics and electricians 150 lire.

All of these cases represent substantial increases of recent vintage.

7. Wide-spread discontent, as a result, originated among the employees of the Armed Services of Sicily and many are transferring to more lucrative jobs. The Regional and Provincial Labor Offices are at a standstill, being stripped of their functions and without pay since 11 February 1944.

8. The situation on the Labor Front has become dangerous in Sicily, and is bound to become so in other areas, with this resultant, serious affect on the Armed Services labor picture, it is, therefore, urgent that immediate steps be taken for issuance by the Badoglio Government, of an order giving continuing validity to all proclamations, orders, offices, rules and regulations and appointees, instituted by AMG, such validity to be retroactive to 11 February 1944, and continue in force until the enactment of Royal Decrees now being prepared on these subjects.

J. T. R. BAIN,
Colonel,
Director, Labor Sub-Commission.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015TRANSLATIONRec'd
20 Mar 44

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

You should be informed that we have found a way of forwarding a copy of this letter but translated into English to your Prime Minister Churchill, for we considered it necessary to inform him of what is happening here.

Your Excellency, you have taken our Major Simcock away from Lecce. This has caused the people a great sorrow, but still more painful is the truth. Every one knows, not only civilians like ourselves, but even your officers, how hard Major Simcock has worked for the order of this town which was corrupted by the many fascists who are still in control of it. Every day hundreds of people stood in front of his office patiently waiting, but everyone knew that he, who was good and kind-hearted, would receive everybody one by one and we knew that in a few minutes we would be satisfied, even if his answer was a sharp "NO".

We felt sure that he was never wrong. He was loved by everybody, but also hated by many, that is by those who could not make him their accomplice to continue making themselves rich at the expense of the people. And you have supported the personal vengeance of one of your officers who is always by your side, transferring Major Simcock and thus thinking that you have pleased the people of Lecce. Instead, for us, it has been a betrayal.

Your Excellency, come to see what is happening at Lecce; come and ascertain with your own eyes what a shameful market your unfaithful officers are making; come and hear what your officers' friends are saying in public.

On the 25th of February at the house of the lawyer, Luigi Frudaccolo who lives at Lecce, a great reception for the American officers took place. Among them were those who collaborated with the Major himself (you know who they are). We shall tell more about them later on. At the reception, they drank to the departure of Major Simcock, a departure which they had been anticipating for some time. Then someone said that a Colonel who is always at your side promised them to remain tranquil that he had a personal score to settle with the Major and that he would give him no peace until he had been transferred and that his General, Jason MacFarlane always did what he wanted him to do. All this occurred while your men were drinking and talking about the front to about fifty people. But you do not know that while they were drinking in this house, a large truck loaded with stolen merchandise, whole cases of American canned goods, flour, sugar, etc., and everything in such large quantities. This merchandise was sold by the same American officers from the Prefecture to the lawyer Frudaccolo. The purpose of the reception was to cover the crime.

Come to see what scandals have occurred since the departure of the Major. Look for the Major who has succeeded him and you will find him only travelling about the city with his beautiful car in the company of girls. The whole city sees him and suffers from the injustice. People now wait in vain at his office. He never comes to the office and these poor people always wait for him. This is the wrong that you have done to us. These men have acquired nine automobiles, not because they need them for their work, but to please their sweethearts, of whom they have hired about fifteen as interpreters. It is no longer an office, but a worldly club.

Today we see that continuation of a regime which has exploited us for twenty years. It is well that you know that today at the Allied Command at Lecce, those who pay are given favours. Instead with Major Simcock, this did not exist.

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We have indicated the name of the Colonel who caused the transfer of the Major for the sake of revenge to the Prime Minister Churchill. It is not right that because of jealousy the whole town should suffer. It is a shameful and dishonorable thing. For six months we have had a little order. Today it is a scandal, an indecent spectacle.

The officers in charge of the food supply, Roberts and Kans, are earning a great deal of money by stealing. Documents to prove this are in our hands and if you will not return to us our Major Simpson or another man like him sending away these puppets in uniform who are dishonoring your country and are exploiting a still bleeding people, we will send the false permits which they are distributing of which some are in our hands to your great Chief.

We hope Your Excellency will forgive us, but perhaps against your own will you deprived us of a just, loyal, honest man, who was feared, but at the same time esteemed by all.

Come personally and you will see that things are even worse than what has been written.

We sent two copies of this letter, one to Marshal Badoglio and the other to His Majesty, the King, not because we are hoping they may help us, but because we think it right for them to know that we had an energetic man and now because of mean personal revenge, they deprived us of him, thus destroying all the work he had done.

We are sure that you will help us. Of course, we cannot compete with those men who are earning millions today with the assistance of your officers. We are poor, we can pay no one, but it is not just that we should not get justice and protection.

We thank you, Your Excellency. Please help us. We cannot bear to watch such masquerading while our hearts are still bleeding.

/s/ Rocco Marcantonio
Mario Pisani
Valerio Napoletano

IN THE NAME OF THE CITIZENRY, WE ASK FOR JUSTICE.

6123

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In reply
refer to: SG 250.

18 March 1944

Executive Giunta of Free Italy
Via Paolo Emilio Imbriani, 53
Naples

Gentlemen:

The Chief Commissioner directs me to acknowledge receipt of your
letter of 15 March, file number 47, which is receiving attention.

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.C.D.
Secretary General

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GIUNTA ESECUTIVA DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA

Naples, 16/3/1944

Via Paolo Emilio Imbriani, 53

Naples

File No. 47

TO: GEN. MAC FARLAND

CHIEF OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

We deem it our duty to send you copies of some documents which have reached us from Cerignola (Foggia Province) and from Potenza, in regard to local events which speak of an unpleasant situation which has come to pass in these places.

We appeal to your fairness so that you will kindly issue instructions so that the causes, which have brought about these lamentable facts, be eliminated.

And we repeat our appeal to your sense of justice for the unjustifiable and arbitrary arrest of Antifascists carried out by the still existing OVRA in Sardinia, as pointed out in our letter of February 24th, File No. 27, with which we enclosed a "Memorandum on a case of reaction in Sardinia" (and which we send anew) where men still languish in jail who are guilty only of not giving way to fascist usurpation.

Trusting in your authoritative intervention, please accept, General, the expression of our very highest consideration.

For la Giunta Esecutiva

/s/ V. Calace

4 Incls.

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Inclosure No. 1

PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE OF LIBERATION

Potenza, 29/3/1944

POTENZA

TO: Executive Giunta of the National Committee of Liberation
Naples

We call your attention to a grave inconvenience in our city which has come about through the Commande of the operating troops. Potenza had a magnificent hospital which has been almost completely destroyed during the bombings of last September.

A hospital service was then organized in the eye clinic which through the diligent labor of the health officials has been equipped in a manner just barely sufficient for the needs, and there are over 300 patients, many of them already operated upon or to be surgically treated.

But through an office of the Allied Army in charge of Sanitation and Hygiene an order was issued providing for immediate evacuation of the premises used as a hospital and transfer of the same to another building damaged by bombardment and in an unsanitary state, due to absolute lack of heat, for the most part without windows, air and light and without the most elementary sanitary and hygienic installations.

In this may be added that transfer to the new building of the instruments and sanitary material used by the hospital has been prohibited.

As a result of this deplorable state of affairs, mortality has greatly increased, especially among the refugee patients from liberated places.

Finally we wish to state that even though an order was given to evacuate the premises between evening and morning, now after fifteen days not a single wounded of the Allied Army has been placed into the hospital which remained completely empty.

The attention of the Hon. Giunta is called to this inhuman treatment which is in contrast with the directives and principles which are characteristic of the Allied Governments.

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Inclosure No. 2

Cerignola, 5/3/1944

FRONTA NAZIONALE D'AZIONE
CERIGNOLA COMMITTEE

File No. 1017

TO: Permanent Executive Giunta of the Committees for Liberation
Naples

I am ordered to forward herewith copy of the following order of the day
unanimously approved by this Committee for Liberation in today's session:

ORDER OF THE DAY

The Committee for Liberation of Cerignola, in the presence of the representatives
of its component parties (Christian Democracy, Socialist Party and Communist Party)
and the members of the Communal Giunta of Cerignola;
Having taken note of the order of the 3rd of this month of Lt. Colonel Clive A.
Temperley, Head of AMG for Foggia Province, by which order the Prof. Antonio Ronito,
President of this Committee, is enjoined to give up the post of Vice Mayor;
While re-affirming its full confidence and solidarity with Prof. Ronito, Vice
Chairman of this Committee;
Protests against this incomprehensible order, certainly a result of unfounded
reports and dictated by clearly political designs on the part of cliques and
fascist employees;
Votes that in homage to the principles for which the war is being fought, also
to this Province that needed political freedom be given, seriously undertaking
the political and moral cleanup desired by the Allied Governments;
And decides to communicate this Order of the Day to AMG of Foggia Province,
the Permanent Executive Giunta at Naples, and the Provincial Committee for
Liberation of Foggia.

Cerignola, 5/3/1944

Follow the signatures

With respect

THE SECRETARY

(Giovanni Pugliese)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015Inclosure No. 1FRONTE NAZIONALE D'AZIONE
CERIGNOLA COMMITTEE

Cerignola, 13/3/1944

TO THE EXECUTIVE GIUNTA OF LIBERATED ITALY

Here in the Province of Foggia, and particularly at Cerignola, we are still in full Fascism; AMGOT is ultrafascist. Very many Fascists and Squadristi have remained at their posts of command, while antifascists are seriously persecuted. Prof. Antonio Bonito, returning from Naples, on the way from Bari to Cerignola, on Saturday evening March 11th, was stopped and arrested at the control post of Barletta, by order of the local AMGOT. Yesterday he was provisionally set free, on L.10.000 bail, and after a most rigorous house search by the CC.RR. This morning his case is to come up in Court. Reason or motive for the arrest: Bonito is said to have left Foggia Province without AMGOT permit(the permit issued by P.W.B. not being considered(according to them)valid, a permit however which the District and Provincial Foggia AMGOT knew and know very well, having seen it a thousand times. Every liberty is granted to the fascists, including that of having the right to meet undisturbed, under the protection of the CC.RR. and the P.S. The local P.S. has induced AMGOT to prohibit the posting of printed stickers containing a sentence out of La Guardia's letter to Sforza: "The King should be removed," either because he deserves the rest or because Italy needs a rest: the main thing is that his retirement be effective, so that he have no longer any authority in the affairs of the Country."

We inform the Executive Giunta so that complaint be made to the Control Commission and an inquiry undertaken: here the situation is becoming most delicate....!!! Much has had to be done, to avoid incidents following the arrest of Prof. Bonito.

Inclosure No. 4

MEMORANDUM OF A CASE OF REACTION IN SARDINIA

In spite of the voices of protest raised by the Committees for Liberation of Sardinia, constituted after July 25th, the neo-fascist reaction has continued unrestrained ever more affirming itself in Sardinia, especially against the Communists.

The Sassari case is the most serious and typical. During two days in mid-January in Sassari, as in many other centers of the liberated territories, there took place demonstrations in which the populace, about one hundred persons, mostly women and children, participated. They went to the office of the Allied Commission where they applauded. Then they went to the Prefectura where they shouted. The police agents struck some of the demonstrators and there was some individual reaction limited to very few cases of insulting words and resistance. Bread was taken from a bakery. Some fascist elements had interspersed themselves among the demonstrators, but they did not succeed in creating disorders. The demonstrations, springing up spontaneously because of the food restrictions, were disavowed by all parties and appeared to everybody as manifestations with no seriousness or danger and without consequences.

On the other hand, there is in Sassari, in addition to a fascist and incapable Prefect, a discriminatory and unsound Questura. The Questore is Comm. Fabris, who until July 25th was directing all the OVRA services in Sardinia; the Commissioner is a certain Doctor Colonna, partial and known by everyone as unjust; another Commissioner is a certain Doctor Sebastiano who until July 25th was OVRA Commissioner for Sardinia. These men, acting according to the dictates of their fascist feelings and with the illusion that a reprisal against the communists would be viewed with pleasure by the other parties, did not hesitate to let loose an extremely severe form of reaction.

After the demonstrations were over, a Commissioner together with a group of agents went over to the Communist Party Headquarters and proceeded with the arrest of a few boys who were there and who had not participated in the demonstrations. But as there were very few of them, the Commissioner and the agents began to sing out the song "bandiera rossa" (red flag) in chorus, thus other boys and occasional passers-by were arrested and some were struck. One of the boys arrested had purchased some time before, for resale, some hand grenades from a soldier and sold them to another boy. The latter confessed the fact and the two hand grenades were found in his home. It is to be noticed that never during the demonstrations were there bombs or arms of any kind used. A red flag was seen instead. It seems that it is a flag that some months before a Communist, who shortly afterwards was expelled from the party on suspicion of being a spy, had thought it advisable to have made. The party never acquired the flag nor did it know of its existence.

The Provincial Committee for Liberation protested to the Prefect and the Questore because of these arrests, insidiously performed. The Questore promised the release of the arrested by the next day. However, there is reason to believe that some of the boys had already been mistreated; and therefore, fearing a scandal, the release did not take place and the accusation of a plot was built up. With methods which will be possible to demonstrate and by leading them into believing that by accusing the directors of the Communist Youth Group, they would have saved themselves, some of the boys were induced to make declarations at the Questura,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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according to which they would have been incited by the directors and especially the young secretary of the same group, the student, Enrico Berlinguer, son of the Hon. Berlinguer, anti-fascist ex-congressman and now a representative of the Action Party. The boys thought that by protecting his own son, he would have saved them, too. So Berlinguer, too, was arrested two days later. He had not participated in the demonstrations, and had maintained at a meeting of the old men of the party which he had attended, that the party should repudiate and disavow itself. He is a young student of Philosophy and Economics, a youth given more to learning than to organizing. In order to put more light on the situation it is sufficient to remember that the Hon. Berlinguer, although persecuted, was never arrested during the twenty years of the Fascist Regime, but was twice arrested after July 25th, and now he has to see his son arrested, motherless and in poor health. The Questore first stated that he was going to release the boys, then turn them over to the Royal Prosecutor, but after several days he forwarded the proceedings to the Military Court. The Liberation Committee then turned to General Magli, Commander of the Armed Forces of Sardinia, so that by applying Art. 245 of the Military War Penal Code, he could stop the proceedings and order release of the arrested, as was within his powers. Also the Press of the Island took up the case, in spite of heavy censorship restrictions.

In the meantime the Regional Liberation Committee had left Sardinia to take part in the Bari Congress, and while passing through Lecce, called on the Ministry of the Interior. In the name of all parties, the regional Delegate of the Communist Party, Doctor Giuseppe Tamponi, exposed the facts, which appeared so incredible, that the same Minister sent on January 26th a cable to the Commander of the Armed Forces, so that he might immediately arrange for liberation of the arrested boys.

But no use was made of the powers granted him under law and on Jan. 30th the proceedings were forwarded to the Sassari Royal Prosecutor. There are eight supposed crimes, three of which are punishable with death by shooting! Among the crimes listed, there are "armed conspiracy against the safety of the State" and even, charged against the Communist Party, "political defeatism, subversive association and subversive propaganda"! We are thus under a full fascist Regime. Probably now the Sassari R. Prosecutor would have to ask the Command of the Armed Forces in Sardinia for authorization to start proceedings under one of the charges (political defeatism), which will cause new delay and prolongation of detention of the accused.

And it is not to be excluded that such an authorization might even be granted, if protests are not immediately made and the case brought to the attention of the Brindisi Government and more especially of the Allied Commission, and particularly of the representative of the Soviet Union. In any case, if the proceedings are conducted by the Investigating Magistrate of Sassari, they would go on for many months, with no release of the arrested. In Sardinia somebody is of the opinion that there should be no opposition to the mass agitation created by this fascist reaction: all people with executive positions have succeeded in avoiding them, but it is evident, that among the parties, and especially the Communists of Sardinia, a feeling of bewilderment has taken hold, inasmuch as there is a general consensus that there is no guarantee against reprisals and no guarantee of freedom.

The Executive Junta, which represents the free Parties of Sardinia, could by protests, by calling attention and by suitable intervention, achieve that finally and without delay action be taken in this matter.

611/17

GIUNTA ESECUTIVA DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA

VIA PAOLO EMILIO IMBRIANI, 53

NAPOLI

Napoli, 15/3/1944

PROT. N° 47

AL GEN MACFARLANE

CAPO DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO

Riteniamo doveroso inviarvi copie di alcuni documenti pervenuti da Carignola (prov. di Foggia) e da Potenza, in merito ad avvenimenti locali che denunciano una spiacevole situazione venutasi a creare in quei luoghi.

Facciamo appello alla vostra equità, perché vogliate compiacervi di dare disposizioni affinché siano eliminate le cause che hanno generato i fatti lamentati.

Ripetiamo l'istanza al vostro senso di giustizia per l'inquadrabile e arbitrario arresto di antifascisti operanti nella nostra Ovre in Sardegna come vi abbiamo già segnalato nella nostra del 24 febbraio N-27 di Protocollo e cui allegiamo un "pro memoria per un caso di remissione in Sardegna" (e che inviamo adovante) dove ancora languiscono in carcere uomini solo colpevoli di non volersi piegare alla prepotenza fascista.

Fidando nel vostro autorevole intervento, gradite, Sig. Generale, i sensi della nostra alta considerazione.

P. La Giunta Esecutiva

V. Caluso

ALLEGATO N° 4

Riteniamo doveroso inviervi copie di alcuni documenti pervenuti da Cerignola (prov. di Foggia) e da Potenza, in merito ad avvenimenti locali che denunciano una spiacevole situazione venutasi a creare in quei luoghi.

Facciamo appello alla vostra equità, perché vogliate compiacervi di dare disposizioni affinché siano eliminate le cause che hanno generato i fatti lamentati.

E ripetiamo l'istanza al vostro senso di giustizia per l'inqualificabile e arbitrario arresto di antifascisti operato dalla non lontananza in Sardegna come vi abbiamo già segnalato nella nostra del 24 febbraio N. 27 di Protocollo a cui allegammo un "pro memoria per un caso di remissione in Sardegna" (e che inviamo nuovamente) dove ancora languiscono in carcere uomini solo colpevoli di non volersi piegare alla prepotenza fascista.

Fidando nel vostro autorevole intervento, gradite, Sig. Generale, i sensi della nostra alta considerazione.

P. La Giunta Esecutiva

V. Caluso

ALLEGATO N. 4

allegato N. 1 -

COMITATO PROVINCIALE DI LIBERAZIONE

POTENZA

10/11/1944

10/11/1944

ALLA GRUPPA ESECUTIVA DEL COMITATO PROVINCIALE

DI LIBERAZIONE

PAROLE

Richiamiamo la vostra attenzione su un grave inconveniente verificatosi nella nostra città ed opera del Comitato delle Truppe Operanti. Potenza aveva un ambulatorio ospedaliero che è stato quasi completamente distrutto durante i bombardamenti del 27 ottobre scorso. Si deve allora ad organizzare un servizio ospedaliero nel "braccio" toscano che, per la diligenza opera dei sanitari, è stato attrezzato in modo appena sufficiente alle bisogne, ed ivi si provvedono ricoverati oltre 300 ammalati, molti dei quali già sottoposti o da sottoporre ad operazione chirurgiche. Benché per ordine dell'Ufficio dell'Esercito Alleato adetto alle Sanità ed igiene veniva disposto il rinvio immediato del locale sanitario come ospedale ed il trasferimento dello stesso in altro locale danneggiato da bombardamenti ed in condizioni igieniche per essere privo assolutamente di riscaldamento, la gran parte privo di vetri, di aria e luce e privo del 60 per cento dell'elementare attrezzatura sanitaria ed igienica. A ciò si aggiunge che è stato fatto divieto di trasportare nel nuovo locale gli istrumenti ed il materiale sanitario in dotazione all'ospedale. In conseguenza di questo, l'ospedale è stato di cose in pessima condizione di mortalità è aumentata la malattia imprevista, specialmente tra i ricoverati profughi delle terre liberate. Si fa noto infine che malgrado fosse stato dato l'ordine di sgomberare il locale prima della sera alla mattina, pur essendo passati circa quindici giorni, non un solo ferito dell'Esercito Alleato è stato ricoverato all'ospedale, che è rimasto completamente vuoto. Si richiama l'attenzione dell'On. Giunta dei deputati su questo inteso trattamento in contrasto con le direttive dei Principi che sono caratteristiche dei Governi Alleati.

...e, per un'operazione alla bisogna, e' ivi si trovavano ricoverati
oltre 300 ammalati, molte dei quali gli sottoposti o da sottoporre ad
operazione chirurgica.
Secondo per ordine dell'Ufficio dell'Esercito Alleato addetto alla
Sanità ed igiene veniva disposto il ricovero immediato del locale adie-
bito come ospedale ed il trasferimento dello stesso in altro locale
dunque, dato lo bombardamento ed in condizioni antieconomiche per essere
privo assolutamente di riscaldamento, in gran parte privo di vetri, di
aria e luce e privo della più elementare attrezzatura sanitaria ad
igiene.
A ciò si aggiunge che è stato fatto caviato di trasportare nel nuovo
locale gli istrumenti ed il materiale sanitario in colazione all'ospede-
dale.
In conseguenza di questo deplorabile stato di cose la mortalità
mortalità è aumentata in maniera impressionante, specialmente tra i
ricoverati profughi delle terre liberate.
Si fa nota infine che malgrado fosse stato dato l'ordine di smobilitare
il locale xxxxxx della sera alla mattina, pur essendo passati circa
quindici giorni, non un solo ferito dell'Esercito Alleato è stato
ricoverato all'ospedale, che è rimasto completamente vuoto.
Si continua l'attenzione dell'on. Giunta del Culto su questo inumano
trattamento in contrasto con le direttive ed i principi che sono
caratteristici dei Governi Alleati.

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allegato N. 2

FRONTE NAZIONALE D'AZIONE

COMITATO DI CERIGNOLA

N-1017 DI PROT.

Cerignola 5/5/1944

ALLA GIUNTA ESECUTIVA PERMANENTE DEI COMITATI DI

LIBERAZIONE.

-MA POLI
CERIGNOLA 5/5/1944

Ho l'onore di trasmettervi copia del seguente ordine del giorno approvato all'unanimità da questo Comitato di Liberazione nella seduta odierna:

ORDINE DEL GIORNO

Il Comitato di Liberazione di Cerignola, presenti i rappresentanti dei partiti aderenti (Democrazia Cristiana, Partito Socialista e Partito Comunista) ed i componenti la Giunta Comunale di Cerignola;

venuto a conoscenza dell'ordine del giorno del 3 corrente mese del T. Colonello Clicheve E. Temperley, capo dell'A.M.G. per la provincia di Foggia, col quale ordine si ingiunge al prof. Antonio Bonito, presidente di questo Comitato, di abbandonare il posto di vice - sindaco;

mentre riafferma la propria piena fiducia e solidarietà al prog. Bogito designato vice - sindaco da questo Comitato
protesta contro tale ordine inaspettabile, frutto certamente di informazioni infondate e dettate da fini chiaramente politici da parte di eric- che e funzionari fascisti;

fa voti che, in omaggio ai principi per i quali la guerra viene combattuta, sia data anche in questa provincia quella necessaria libertà politica, procedendosi seriamente alla epurazione politica e morale, volta dei Governi Alleati;

e decide di comunicare il presente ordine del giorno all'A.M.G. della provincia di Foggia, alla Giunta Esecutiva Permanente in Napoli, ed al Comitato Provinciale di Liberazione di Foggia.

Cerignola 5/5/1944

Seguono le firme

Ho l'incarico di trasmettervi copia del seguente ordine del giorno approvato all'unanimità da questo Comitato di Liberazione nella seduta odierna:

ORDINE DEL GIORNO

Il Comitato di Liberazione di Cerignola, presenti i rappresentanti dei partiti aderenti (Democrazia Cristiana, Partito Socialista e Partito Comunista) ed i componenti la Giunta Comunale di Cerignola;

venuto a conoscenza dell'ordine del 3 corrente emanato dal Colonnello Olivero J. Temperley, capo dell'A.M.G. per la provincia di Foggia, nel quale ordine si ingiunge al prof. Antonio Bonito, presidente di questo Comitato, di abbandonare il posto di vice - sindaco;

mentre riafferma la propria piena fiducia e solidarietà al prof. Bogito designato vice - sindaco da questo Comitato

protesta contro tale ordine inaspettabile, frutto certamente di informazioni infondate e dettate da fini chiaramente politici da parte di cricche e funzionari fascisti;

fa voti che, in omaggio ai principi per i quali la guerra viene combattuta, sia data anche in questa provincia quella necessaria libertà politica, procedendosi seriamente alla epurazione politica e morale, volta del Governo Allent;

e decide di comunicare il presente ordine del giorno all'A.M.G. della provincia di Foggia, alla Giunta Esecutiva Regionale in Napoli, ed al Comitato Provinciale di Liberazione di Foggia.

Cerignola 2/3/47

Seguono le firme

Con osservanza

IL SEGRETARIO
(GIOVANNI UGLIESA)

611

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allegato N. 3

FRONTE NAZIONALE D'AZIONE

COMITATO DI CERIGNOLA

CERIGNOLA 13.3.1944

ALLA GIUNTA ESECUTIVA DELL'ITALIA LIBERATA

Qui in provincia di Foggia, ed a Cerignola in particolare siamo ancora in pieno fascismo; l'A.A.G.O.P. è ultrafascista. Sono rimasti ai loro posti di comando moltissimi fascisti e squadristi, mentre si perseguita no seriamente gli antifascisti. Il prof. Antonio Bonito, al ritorno da Napoli, rientrando da Bari a Cerignola, saputo sarà il mezzo, fu fermato ed arrestato al posto di blocco di Bariette, per ordine dell'A.A.G.O.P. di qui. Ieri è stato rilasciato in libertà provvisoria, previa cauzione di L. 10.000, e dopo una rigorosissima perquisizione domiciliare da parte dei CC.RR. Stamenti dove, essere processato. Ragione o motivo dell'arresto: il Bonito sarebbe uscito dalla provincia di Foggia senza il permesso dell'A.A.G.O.P. non potendosi, (secondo loro) ritenere valido il permesso rilasciato dal P.N.D., permesso però che l'A.A.G.O.P. distrettuale di Cerignola e provinciale di Foggia conoscevano e conoscevano benis- simo per averlo visto mille volte.

Al fascisti viene concessa tutta la libertà, compresa quella di potersi riunire indisturbatamente, sotto la protezione dei CC.RR. e delle P.S. La P.S. locale ha fatto proibire dall'A.A.G.O.P. la affissione di altri sole stampe riportanti una frase della lettera la Guardia e forza: "il re dovrebbe essere allontanato", o perché egli merita riposo o perché il "riposo è necessario all'Italia: l'importante è che il "suo ritiro sia effettivo, in modo che egli non abbia " più autorità negli affari del paese".

Informiamo la Giunta Esecutiva affinché presenti una protesta alla Com- missione di Controllo e provochi un'inchiesta: qui la situazione sta diventando delittuosa!!! Si è dovuto lavorare molto, per avi- tare incidenti e seguiti dall'arresto del N. prof. Bonito.

di qui. Ieri è stato rimesso in libertà provvisoria, previa cauzione di L. 10.000, e dopo una rigorosissima perquisizione domiciliare da parte del CC.RR. Stamattina dovrà essere processato. Ragione o motivo dell'arresto: il Bonito sarebbe uscito dalla provincia di Foggia senza il permesso dell'A.M.G.O.T. non potendosi, (secondo loro) ritenere valido il permesso rilasciato dal P.M.B., pernesso però che l'A.M.G.O.T. distrettuale di Corridonia e provinciale di Foggia conoscevano e conoscevano benissimo per averlo visto mille volte.

Al fascista viene concessa tutta la libertà, compresa quella di potersi riunire indisturbatamente, sotto la protezione del CC.RR. e delle P.S. La P.S. locale ha fatto proibire dall'A.M.G.O.T. la affissione di striscie stampate riportanti una frase della lettera La Guardia e sforzi: "Il re dovrebbe essere allontanato", o perone egli merita riposo o perché il "riposo è necessario all'Italia: l'importante è che il "Nuovo Ritiro sia effettivo, in modo che egli non abbia più autorità negli affari del paese".

Informiamo la Giunta Esecutiva affinché presenti una protesta alla Commissione di Controllo e provochi un'inchiesta: qui la situazione sta diventando delittuosa!! Si è dovuto lavorare molto, per evitare incidenti a seguito dell'arresto del X - prof. Bonito

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Allegato N. 4

MEMORIALE PER UN CASO DI AZIONE IN SARDEGNA

Malgrado la segnalazione dei Comitati di Liberazione sardi costituiti dopo il 25 luglio, la reazione neo fascista ha continuato a intervenire e si va sempre più affermando in Sardegna; specialmente contro i comunisti. Il caso più grave è quello di Sassari, in due giorni dalla metà di gennaio, a Sassari, come in tanti altri centri della terra liberata, ebbero luogo dimostrazioni di qualche centinaio di **pepolani** soprattutto donne e bambini, che si recarono ad applaudire alla sede della Commissione Alleata, poi ad urinare sotto la prefettura; gli agenti di P.S. percossero qualche dimostrante, vi fu qualche reazione individuale, limitata a pochissimi casi di oltraggio e resistenza; da un forno fu tolto il pane. Tra i dimostranti si erano insinuati elementi fascisti che però non riuscirono a creare disordini. Le dimostrazioni sorte spontaneamente per le note restrizioni alimentari, furono sconfessate da tutti i partiti ed appervero a tutti come manifestazioni prive di ogni serietà e di ogni pericolo senza conseguenze di sorta. Senonché a Sassari oltre un Prefetto fascista ed inetto, vi è una questura settaria e burocratica: è questore il Comm. Fabris che fino al 25 luglio dirigeva in Sardegna tutti i servizi dell'Opera: Commissario un certo dott. Colonna partigiano e additato da tutti come poco corretto; altro commissario è certo dott. Savastano che fino al 25 luglio era commissario dell'Ovre per la Sardegna. Costoro seguendo il loro sentimentale fascista e della illusione che una rappresentanza contro i comunisti fosse gradita agli altri partigiani non esitarono ad inscenare una forma di reazione inaudita. Finita le dimostrazioni un commissario con un gruppo di agenti si recò alla sede del partito comunista e propose di cedere all'arresto di pochi ragazzi che si trovavano e che non avevano partecipato alle dimostrazioni. Ma poiché essi erano pochissimi, il commissario e gli agenti intrapresero la loro "bandiera rossa" così alcuni ragazzi e vari passanti occasionali furono arrestati ed alcuni percosi. Uno dei ragazzi arrestati aveva acquistato tempo prima, per farne commercio, alcune bombe a mano da un soldato e lo aveva rivenduto ad un altro ragazzo; costui confessò il fatto e in casa sua furono trovati le due bombe. Si da notare che mai nelle manifestazioni furono usate bombe e armi di sorta. Fu invece vista una bandiera, pare si trattasse di una bandiera che essi prima un comunista, che poco dopo era stato espulso dal partito perché sospettato come spia, aveva pensato di far confezionare senza che il partito l'avesse mai ritirata se ne conoscesse l'esistenza. Il Comitato di Liberazione provinciale si recò a protestare col Prefetto e col questore per questi arresti operati con l'insidia; il questore promise la scarcerazione per l'indomani, ma si ha ragione di credere che alcuni ragazzi avessero già subito arrestamenti; e perciò per il timore di uno scandalo, la scarcerazione non avvenne e fu imbastita l'accusa di un complotto. Con sistemi che potranno essere dimostrati e col far loro credere che acciunano i dirigenti del gruppo giovanile comunista si sarebbero salvati, alcuni dei ragazzi furono indotti a rilasciare in questura

detto dott. Coionne partigiano e additato da tutti come poco corretto; l'altro commissario è certo dott. Savastano che fino al 25 luglio era commissario dell'Ovra per la Sardegna. Costoro seguendo il loro sentimento fascista e nella illusione che una rappresentanza contro i comunisti fosse gradita agli altri partigiani non esitarono ad accettare una forma di reazione inaudita. Finite le dimostrazioni il commissario con un gruppo di agenti si recò alla sede del partito comunista e procedette all'arresto di pochi ragazzi che si trovavano e che non avevano partecipato alle dimostrazioni. Ma poiché essi erano pochissimi, il commissario e gli agenti intesero in coro "bandiere rossa" così altri tre ragazzi e vari parenti occasionali furono arrestati ed alcuni percosi. Uno dei ragazzi arrestati aveva acquistato **tempo prima**, per farne commercio, alcune bombe a mano da un soldato e le aveva rivendute ad un altro ragazzo; costui confessò il fatto e in casa sua furono trovate le due bombe. Si da notare che nel mese di **luglio** furono usate bombe e armi di sorta. Fu invece vista una bandiera ^{rossa} pare si trattasse di una bandiera che essi prima un comunista, che poco dopo era stato espulso dal partito perché sospettato come spia, aveva pensato di far confezionare senza che il partito l'avesse mai ritirata né ne conoscesse l'esistenza. Il Comitato di Liberazione provinciale si recò a protestare col prefetto e col questore per questi arresti effettuati con l'insidia; il questore promise la scarcerazione per l'indomani. Ma gli fu ragione di credere che alcuni ragazzi avessero già subito arbitrariamente; e perciò per il timore di uno scandalo, la scarcerazione non avvenne e si imbastì l'accusa di un complotto. Con sistemi che potevano essere dimostrati e col far loro credere che accusando i dirigenti del gruppo giovanile comunista si sarebbero salvati, alcuni dei ragazzi furono indotti a rilasciare la querela di dichiarazioni secondo le quali i dirigenti li avrebbero istigati e specializzato il giovane segretario dello stesso gruppo, lo studente Enrico Berlinguer, figlio dell'On. Berlinguer ex deputato antifascista ed ora rappresentante del partito d'azione, sicché i ragazzi pensarono che questi, proteggendo il figliolo, avrebbe salvato anche loro. Così anche il Berlinguer fu arrestato dopo due giorni, egli non aveva partecipato alle dimostrazioni ed anzi intervenendo ad una riunione degli anziani del partito, aveva sostenuto che queste dovessero subito sconsigliarsi e sconsigliarsi. Si un giovane studioso di filosofia e di economia dell'Università di Roma che organizzatore. Per l'occasione la sua tuaione locale bastava ricordare che l'On. Berlinguer sebbene perseguitato, non fu mai arrestato durante il ventennio fascista, fu arrestato per due volte dopo il 25 luglio ed ora vede arrestato il suo figliolo, orfano di madre e debole di salute. Il questore dichiarò prima che avrebbe rilasciato in libertà i ragazzi, poi che li avrebbe deferiti al Procuratore nel re, ma dopo vari giorni trasmise gli atti al Tribunale Militare. I Comitati di Liberazione si rivisero

allora al Generale degli Comandante delle FF.AA. della Sardegna perché applicando l'art. 245 Codice Penale Militare di Guerra, arrestasse il provvedimento ed ordinasse la scarcerazione degli arrestati come era sua facoltà. Anche la stampa isolana si occupò del caso malgrado le gravi restrizioni della censura. Intanto il Comitato Regionale di Liberazione partito dalla Sardegna per partecipare al Congresso di Bari, di passaggio per Lecce, si recò presso il Ministro degli Interni: a nome di tutti i partiti il delegato regionale del partito comunista dott. Giuseppe Tamponi, espone il fatto, ed esso parve così aggrade che lo stesso ministro inviò il 26 gennaio un telegramma al comandante della 77.aa. perché provvedesse subito alla liberazione dei reggimenti arrestati. Questi invece non si valse delle facilità concessagli dalla legge e il 30 gennaio gli atti furono rimessi al procuratore del re di Sassari per convenienze. I reati contestati sono otto, tra dei quali comportano la fuellazione: 3 vi è tra i reati il completo armato contro la sicurezza dello stato e perfino, per il partito comunista, il disfattismo politico; l'associazione sovversiva e la propaganda sovversiva; si è dunque in pieno chiedere l'autorizzazione a procedere per uno dei reati (disfattismo politico) al comando delle FF.AA. della Sardegna: il che implicherebbe un nuovo ritardo ed il prolungarsi nella detenzione degli imputati. Ne è da escludere che la autorizzazione possa anche essere concessa, se non sarebbe subito sollevate proteste e segnalato il caso al governo di Brindisi. Soprattutto alla Commissione Alleata e particolarmente al rappresentante dell'Unione Sovietica: e il procedimento in ogni caso dovrebbe proseguire per così presso il Giudice Istruttore di Sassari, senza scarcerazione. In Sardegna taluno aveva in animo di non opporsi alle agitazioni di masse esasperate da queste reazioni fasciste: tutti i dirigenti sono riusciti ad evitarle; un è evidente che tra i partiti e specialmente tra i comunisti sardi si è diffuso un senso di disorientamento. In quanto tutti hanno la sensazione che mancherà ogni garanzia contro le rappresaglie ed ogni garanzia di libertà. La Giunta Esecutiva, che rappresenta anche i liberi partiti della Sardegna, potrebbe con le proteste, con le segnalazioni e gli interventi opportuni, ottenere che finalmente e prontamente si provveda.

comando delle F.F.A.A. della Sardegna: il che implicherà un nuovo ritardo ed il prolungarsi della detenzione degli imputati. Ne è da escludere che la autorizzazione possa anche essere concessa, se non saranno subito sollevate proteste e segnalato il caso al governo di Brindisi soprattutto alle Commissioni Alletta e particolarmente al rappresentante dell'Unione Sovietica: e il procedimento in ogni caso dovrebbe proseguire per mesi presso il Giudice Istruttore di Sassari, senza scarcerazione. La Sardegna taluno aveva in animo di non opporsi alle agitazioni di masse esasperate da queste reazioni fasciste: tutti i dirigenti sono riusciti ad evitarle: ma è evidente che tra i partiti e specialisti tra i comunisti sardi si è diffuso un senso di disorientamento, in quanto tutti hanno la sensazione che manca ogni garanzia contro le rappresaglie ed ogni garanzia di libertà. La Giunta Esecutiva, che rappresenta anche i liberi partiti della Sardegna, potrebbe con le proteste, con le segnalazioni e gli interventi opportuni, ottenere che finalmente e prontamente si provveda.

6119

17

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

HP/CF/Lml

MSG: 387.7

15 March 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of CCS Directive on Application of Article 28 of Additional Conditions of Armistice.

TO : Allied Control Commission.
(Attention: Chief Commissioner)

1. There are herewith transmitted, by official courier, four (4) copies of TAM 155, Message 2197 of 15 March, consisting of a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the application of Article 28 of the Additional Conditions of Armistice with Italy. The message is transmitted to you by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, for your guidance and necessary action.

2. It will be noted that paragraph 4 provides that the term "ownership" as used in the directive will be subject in any particular case to construction or to further definition by the Theater Commander. You are authorized and directed in proper instances to make such constructions and further definitions on his behalf.

3. You will keep this Headquarters advised of the manner in which, in the light of the present communication, you deal with problems arising under Article 28 of the Additional Conditions of Armistice.

Incls:

4 copies of Message TAM 155

HENRY PARKMAN, JR.
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.
Acting Chief, MGS.

Copies (less inclosures) to:
British Resident Minister
United States Minister
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Chief Finance Officer, AFHQ
Deputy Paymaster in Chief
Financial Advisor

6109

*Original of this letter plus
all inclosures to Brig. Lusk
13 Mar 44. (Copy of incl. attached)*

16

U. S. SECRET EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY

INCOMING MESSAGE
AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

COPY

NF

WAR

filed 150404Z

AFHQ H 360/15
150658Z
rjk

ROUTINE

FROM: ADMAR FROM CCS

TO : WILSON REPEATS UNFOR INFORMATION BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

REF. NO. THIS MESSAGE: 2197, 15 March 1944

For FIDDS.

Cite CCAG.

TAM 155.

Questions covered by article 28-long surrender terms. Questions covered by article 28 of the long surrender terms should be dealt with as follows:

1. The military, naval, and air personnel and the civilian nationals of friendly countries now occupied by the enemy such as BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, FRANCE, POLAND, LUXEMBOURG, NORWAY, GREECE, YUGOSLAVIA, et cetera, should not be interned or prevented from leaving ITALY solely on account of their nationality.

2. Persons mentioned in paragraph 1 above should be accorded the same treatment in this respect as the nationals of the United Nations not occupied by the Axis except that those who have or are suspected of having pro Axis tendencies or who are known or suspected of having aided the enemy should be investigated and depending upon the seriousness of their offense should either be interned or prevented from leaving ITALY.

3. All property in Italian territory belonging to the government of any of the nations referred to in paragraph 1 should be released from custody upon receipt of proper evidence of ownership from the accredited and recognized government of such country.

4. Where a national of any country contemplated in paragraph 1 above is actually residing outside enemy or enemy occupied territory and is the owner of any property in Italian territory, as a general rule it should be released from custody to such national or his accredited agent, upon receipt of proper evidence of ownership, provided, however, that the term ownership as used herein shall be subject to construction or further definition by the Theater Commander in any particular case. In no event should the benefits of this paragraph be accorded to individuals known or suspected of pro Axis tendencies.

Continuing message from AGRAR. AFSC M 37-/15, Ref. No. 2197.

5. The transmission to points outside of ITALY of any funds or property so released from custody will, of course, be subject to such transfer and exchange regulations as are generally in effect.

6. Appropriate instructions in conformity with this message should be given to the Italian Government. The Italian Government shall be responsible for notifying the Allied Control Commission of the names and particulars of persons referred to in paragraph 1 above. The Allied Control Commission shall determine which of the mentioned individuals are embraced within the exception contained in paragraph 2 above.

7. It is not the purpose of these instructions to afford the Governments or Nationals contemplated herein rights superior to those of the other United Nations or their Nationals.

8. These instructions apply only to property that was in ITALY at outbreak of hostilities with that country or when the territory concerned was occupied by the enemy as the case may be and further instructions will be given regarding looted property (that is, property imported since that date by the enemy).

ACTION: MGS

INFO:

SGS

G-2

MR MURPHY

MR MACMILLAN

LEADON

G-1 (B)

FINANCE

DPIC

FINANCIAL ADV

AG RECORDS

**

SUMMARY

ADD DIST: MGS, 15/3/44-4

MG IN 9653

15 Mar 44 1037A

Ref No 2197

a/z/H

6107

Copies to:
Economic Section
Adminis. "
Political "
Displaced Persons

(Brig. Lusk has 4
copies of this cable
as it was received)

- 2 -

16

NF

RED/dfe

000.1

13 March 1944

Prof. Giuseppe Pietrovita De Rosa
Via Giacinto Gigante 24
Naples

Dear Professor;

I am directed by the Chief Commissioner to acknowledge receipt
of your letter of 7 March 1944.

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

6106

15

11 Dec 1915
JAB
Naples, 7 March 1944

My dear General:-

In the painful hour in which we live, I feel authorized, in view of my political past, to speak to you with my heart on my lips.

Ever since 1924 my house was repeatedly violently invaded by the Fascist Militia.

In 1925 I was compelled to leave Naples, prohibited from returning for several years, and the newspapers directed by me "Vita Italiana", a political, and "8 and 90", humorous, were suppressed. After returning in 1930 I undertook the publication of the Tourism and Art magazine "Ausonia" in the English, French and Italian languages; but at the end of the year also "Ausonia" was suppressed and I underwent arrests, searches and unending annoyance, because I was accused of a political-military conspiracy, a charge which was brought also against his Excellency General Galati, Commander of the Bari Army Corps, who was retired to avoid sensational Court proceedings.

In 1935 I was arrested, together with the great comedy writer Roberto Bracco, and sent to prison for propaganda against Mussolini.

In 1936 I was forced once again to leave Naples and wander about Italy to escape the search and persecution of the Police and Fascists; by then I had undergone 15 house searches and over twenty street arrests.

After returning to Naples, in 1942 I was arrested and sent to prison together with many other professional notables, for conspiracy against the regime, while I was further charged with communicating with the British by means of the Radio.

Finally, on 28 September 1943, I was dragged by the Fascist Militia, to the Cuoco Barracks to be shot, and by a mere miracle I escaped execution.

I repeat, such a past gives me the right to speak freely to the British, whom for twenty years I praised and invoked at the risk of my life.

The speech of Prime Minister Churchill has dealt a severe blow to Italians, causing antifascist hearts to bleed because we never imagined that the Champion of Liberty of Free England would consider a pact of friendship with a King who led his People into slavery and ruin.

If acts were to follow words, we would see reformed the chains which we believed broken with the arrival of the Allies in Italy. But may God enlighten your Great Statesman to prevent that a revolution break out in our Country which would shake Europe to its foundations; because Italians prefer death to dishonor and slavery, while history would mark on its pages with characters of blood those responsible for the error which would cost thousands of Italians their lives, guilty only of loving their Country and liberty.

For such reasons, my dear General, please do us this special favor and make yourself the spokesman with the London Government of these our sentiments.

With profound devotion and respect.

611
/s/ G. Petrovita De Rosa

Prof. Giuseppe Petrovita De Rosa
Via Giacinto Gigante 24-

11 May 1944
F.L.

Ill.mo Sig. Generale,

Nell'ora dolorosa che viviamo mi sento autorizzato, per i miei precedenti politici, a parlarvi col cuore sulle labbra.-

Fino dal 1924 ebbi ripetutamente la casa invasa, violentemente, dalle milizie fasciste.-

Nel 1925 fui obbligato a lasciare Napoli, con divieto di ritornarvi per diversi anni, e venni soppressi i miei giornali diretti: "Vita italiana" politico e "8 e 90" umanistico. Ritornato nel 1930 intrapresi la pubblicazione della rivista di turismo ed arte "Aosonia" nelle lingue inglese, francese ed italiana, ma sul finire dell'anno anche "Aosonia" mi venne soppressa, e subii fermi, perquisizioni e note infamanti, perché accusato di complotto politico-militare: accusa che investi, con me, anche S.G. il Generale Galati, comandante il Corpo "Armata di Bari", che fu collocato a riposo per evitare processi sensazionali.-

Nel 1935 fui arrestato, unitamente al grande commediografo Roberto Bracco, e mandato al carcere per propaganda.

610

15

contro Mussolini.-

Nel 1936 fui obbligato di bel nuovo a lasciare Napoli e andar ramingo per l'Italia onde sfuggire alle ricerche e alle persecuzioni della polizia e dei fascisti: parlò che avevo subito 15 perquisizioni domiciliari ed oltre venti fermi sulle vie.

Reintegrato in Napoli, nel 1942 fui arrestato e mandato al carcere insieme a molti altri distinti professionisti, per cospirazione contro il regime, mentre a me veniva anche messa accusa di comunicare, con gli Inglesi, a mezzo della radio.-

Nel 28 settembre 1943, infine, mi si trascinava, dalle mani dei fascisti, alla Caserma Meco, per essere fucilato, e per puro miracolo sfuggii all'esecuzione.-

Tale passato, ripeto, mi dà il diritto di parlare liberamente agli Inglesi, che, per un ventennio esaltati e invocati a rischio della vita.-

Il discorso del Primo Ministro Churchill ha colpito profondamente gli italiani, facendo sanguinare il cuore degli antifascisti perché mai avremmo pensato che il campione di libertà della Libera Inghilterra potesse vagheggiare un patto di amicizia con un re che ha portato alla schiavitù e alla rovina il suo popolo.-

Se gli atti seguissero le parole vedremmo moltiplicate le catene che credevamo spezzate con la discesa degli Alleati

.../...

11 Mar 1910

AD

in Italia. Ma vorria iddio illuminare il Vostro Grande Statista, per impedire che nel nostro Paese si scateni una rivoluzione che squasserebbe, ah imo, l'Europa; però che gli italiani preferiscono la morte al disonore ed alla schiavitù, mentre la storia segnerà a carattere di sangue, nelle sue pagine, i responsabili del tale errore che dovesse costare la vita a migliaia di italiani colpevoli solo di amare la Patria e la libertà.-

Vorreste, per tanto, Sig. Generale, farvi interprete, per grazia speciale, dei nostri sentimenti presso il Governo di Londra.-

Con profondi omaggi di devozione

Giuseppe Pietrovita

Prof. Giuseppe Pietrovita De Rosa
Via Giacinto Gigante 24 -

610

15

SECRET

FARGO 1431

NE

FARGO (GIF MACFARLANE C COMB)

29th. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

TARANTO

YOUR MESSAGES TA 290/16 OF ELEVENTH FEBRUARY AND TWENTYFIRST FEBRUARY RECEIVED. PD
FARGO FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL TO TARANTO PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL MCGRIGOR FOLI PL
SITE FARGO ONE FOUR THREE ONE PLY. I AM DISCUSSING THIS QUESTION ON FIRST
OPPORTUNITY WITH C-IN-C MEDITERRANEAN. IT PLEASE REMEMBER THAT AS REGARDING VIOLATION
OF ASSISTANCE FROM ACTION WITH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TO BE TAKEN BY THE
AGC AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT AGC VOICES NOT ONLY OUR OPINION BUT ALSO THAT OF THE
REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR ALLIES

i. Ch. Commission saw C-in-C. Med. in two occasions
within a week of date of this cable. It is not known if
the matter was discussed.

all
- 18th Mar.

L.T. MONTANT JR
2Lt. AGC
Actg. Adjutant.

6102
14

RED/afe

000.1

28 February 1944

Mr. Carlo Almagia
6, Via Carducci
Napoli

Dear Sir:

The Chief Commissioner directs me to acknowledge your letter of 25th February concerning your reactions to the Prime Minister's speech about Italian affairs. The Chief Commissioner is grateful for this expression of your opinions.

Yours very truly,

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

61/3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OUTGOING~~E.S.G.~~ 719
FJB/ajp

CONFIDENTIAL

28 FEB 1944

PRIORITY

PATINA SIGNED MACFARLANE

FREEDOM FOR PRESS

271818A

FREEDOM CABLE FIVE SIX SIX SIX SEVEN OF TWO SIX FEBRUARY IS SUBJECT TO
 PAST MOVEMENTS AND PRESENT POSITION OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AS FOLLOWS
 PD MADONIA MOVED TO SALERNO WITH MR. PHILIPSON AND CLOSE ADVISERS NINE
 FEBRUARY PROCEEDED AT SHORT INTERVAL BY THE SPECIAL SECRETARIAT TO THE
 CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT CMA BY THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CMA TREASURY
 CMA PUBLIC WORKS CMA EDUCATION CMA AND INTERIOR CMA THE UNDERSECRETARY OF
 POSTAL COMMUNICATIONS CMA AND THE SENIOR CHARLES PETER OF THE AUTOGONOUS
 MINISTERIAL DEPARTMENT PD THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY CMA COMMERCE CMA AND
 LABOUR WAS PREVIOUSLY AT SALERNO SINCE TWO FIVE JANUARY PD TO FREEDOM
FOR PRESS FROM PATINA SIGNED MACFARLANE PD MOVED TO SALERNO ON ONE FIVE
 FEBRUARY CMA MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE CMA AGRICULTURE AND FORESTS PD AT
 CAVA DEI TIRRENI CMA NEAR SALERNO CMA SINCE APPROXIMATELY TWO THREE FEBRUARY
 CMA MINISTRY OF WAR CMA CHIEF OF STAFF MARSHALL MESSIE CMA AND THE PRESIDENCY
 OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS PD LIAISON OFFICES OF MINISTRY OF WAR AND OF GENERAL
 STAFF ROYAL ARMY AT SALERNO DISCONTINUED AS OF ABOVE DATE PD PRESENT SEAT OF
 GOVERNMENT IS PALAZZO DEL COMARKE CMA SALERNO PD TO NAPLES NINE FEBRUARY
 CMA UNDERSECRETARY OF MERCHANT MARINE CMA UNDERSECRETARY FOR RAILROADS CMA
 CIVIL MOTORIZATION CMA AND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISES SINCE NOW LOCATED NAPLES
 PD AT CAVA DEI TIRRENI SINCE MOVES OF TWO TWO AND TWO THREE FEBRUARY CMA
 ITALIAN SUPREME COMMAND AND AFFILIATED PERSONNEL PD LIAISON OFFICE OF SUPREME

CONFIDENTIAL

611

(12)

CONFIDENTIAL

28 FEB 1944

COMMAND DISCONTINUED PD REMAINDER OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT NOW LOCATED AS
FOLLOWS CLM GENERAL STAFF ROYAL ARMY PAREN WHERE RPT WHERE PAREN AT LECCE
CMA IN LIAISON WITH MMIA RPT MMIA OF LAND FORCES SUBCOMMISSION OF AGC
LOCATED AT LEQUILE SEMICLM MINISTRY FOR NAVY AT TARANTO SEMICLM AT SARI
THE MINISTRY FOR AIR

AUTHENTICATED:

FRANK J. BLAUGHTER
Captain, AGD
Deputy Secretary General

DISTRIBUTION:

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- 1 - DCC

6099

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SECRET

REFERENCE COPY
INCOMING CABLE

SECRET

PRIORITY

CG FBS FOR FARGO

NONE

SIGNED SINC

260812A

261020A

56667 ✓

FMGS

INQUIRY HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM AGWAR AS TO DATE WHEN
BADOGLIO GOVERNMENT MOVED TO SALERNO AND DATE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.
KNOWN HERE THAT BADOGLIO MOVED THERE PERSONALLY 9 FEBRUARY WITH SOME
MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT BUT NOT KNOWN IF AND WHEN ALL HIS MINISTRIES
WITH STAFF MOVED THERE. CABLE SOONEST PRESENT POSITION WITH DATES
ARRIVAL VARIOUS MINISTRIES AT NEW LOCATION TOGETHER WITH THOSE STILL
AT OLD LOCATION.

FBS DIST.

ACTION HQ ACC
INFO D. G.
SECY

ACC DIST.

(ACTION) SECY GEN
(INFO) DEP C G
FILE
FLOAT

See folio 81, this file

SECRET

6098

//

CC/P/96

PRIVATE AND MOST SECRET

FNM/rj

25th. February, 1944.

After a period of comparative inactivity my two Russians have again started receiving frequent visitors - most of them in plain clothes. Lieut. Golubev has also restarted his nocturnal excursions in plain clothes.

2. To a polite enquiry as to the identity of some of his visitors he replied that he did not feel called upon to answer and that he considered he was entitled to get his own political information as he got so little from the political section.

3. I am no longer quite as worried about these activities as I was, but I am continuing a discreet watch.

4. Neither Solodovnik nor his A.D.C. are very intelligent and they seem to be impressed with the necessity for avoiding disorder in the country while the war is still on.

5. They have a great thirst for political information, but beyond the fact that they may be reporting all kinds of strange facts and ideas to Moscow I don't think they are likely to be a source of much embarrassment.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Roger Makins, Esq.,
Office of the British Resident Minister,
Algiers.

CC/r/96

PRIVATE AND MOST SECRET

FMS/rj

25th. February, 1944.

After a period of comparative inactivity my two Russians have again started receiving frequent visitors - most of them in plain clothes. Lieut. Golubev has also restarted his nocturnal excursions in plain clothes.

2. To a polite enquiry as to the identity of some of his visitors he replied that he did not feel called upon to answer and that he considered he was entitled to get his own political information as he got so little from the political section.

3. I am no longer quite as worried about these activities as I was, but I am continuing a discreet watch.

4. Neither Solodovnik nor his A.F.C. are very intelligent and they seem to be impressed with the necessity for avoiding disorder in the country while the war is still on.

5. They have a great thirst for political information, but beyond the fact that they may be reporting all kinds of strange facts and ideas to Moscow I don't think they are likely to be a source of much embarrassment.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Roger Makins, Esq.,
Office of the British Resident Minister,
Algiers.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Napoli, 25th February 1944.

Dear Sir:

*Recd Secy Gen
Feb 26 1820 A 078*

Prime Minister Churchill's speech, in its parts regarding Italian matters, has produced a most distressing impression upon my mind.

It shows an opinion which no informed person will be able to share.

As a statement of facts, it is inaccurate. The Italian armed forces (with the exception of the Navy, in an auxiliary capacity), are unfortunately giving but little help to the United Nations: responsibility for this state of things is to be traced back to the continuous lack of moral prestige and of practical efficiency on the part of the King's government.

The exponents of the political parties are not eager to grab power; they had every opportunity to do so, would they have renounced those moral principles they hold dearer than fictitious honours.

As an interpretation of trends and ideals, it shows utter disregard for the anti-fascist and liberal thought of the Italian people, it is an offence to the same people and to their armed services, supposedly not the expression of their patriotic and anti-German will, but only devoted to the badoglio and monarchical clique. It forgets the resistance, active and passive, of the patriots in German-occupied Italy; who have no King and no marshal, yet are giving precious help to the cause of democracy.

Finally, the rather amazing idea that a truly anti-fascist government would perhaps not give the United Nations the same loyal help that the fascist King, the fascist marshal and their government are allegedly giving now, is entirely unwarranted.

This country, with very little material strength indeed, might still be capable of great spiritual influence, for good or evil. Let us not forget that we would not be fighting a war today, if fascism, born 25 years ago in Italy, would not have been propped and encouraged.

As an Italian, and as a friend of the United Nations, I feel it my duty to express to you - the highest political representative of the Allies here - my deep disappointment and sorrow concerning such statements as uttered by Mr. Churchill, the man to whom civilisation owes so much for his magnificent leadership in 1940.

Faithfully yours,

General Sir F. Noel Mason MacFarlane
Allied Control Commission
Palazzo della Provincia
Napoli

6, via Carducci

6093

⑨

Naples, February 24th, 1944

General N.M. Macfarlane
Allied Central Commission
Naples

Answered
Am 2/24

Dear Sir,

I have heard with painful astonishment the speech of Prime Minister Churchill in its part dealing with the Italian situation. As an anti-fascist since 1919 (at the time of D'Annunzio's adventure in Fiume), as an exile for 20 years, as an old and proved friend of France, England and the U.S., champion of freedom and fair play, I feel it is my duty to vehemently protest against the arguments adopted by the chief of the British Government to justify his ill-founded predilection for the Salerno Government formed of fascist and pro-Nazi elements, almost impotent for lack of consent and support of the Italian nation.

Mr. Churchill expressed the peculiar opinion that a government of anti-fascists, representing the Italian people, gathered in their political parties and tendencies, would not be able or willing to insure cooperation with the Allied fighting armies.

Everyone, who is not blind or deprived of information, knows that the war effort of the Italians is now mislaid and paralysed by the inefficiency and the want of prestige of those politicians and generals who, having collaborated for years with Mussolini and Hitler, are unable to impress the public opinion in an opposite direction, and then also incapable of organizing and making effective a vigorous national effort against the Nazis. Along this line Mr. Churchill has even entirely forgotten what the Italian patriots - who in their enormous majority oppose the King and Badoglio - are operating in Northern Italy in behalf of the United Nations.

Altogether, the declarations of the Prime Minister on Italian affairs are extraneous to historical and practical realities, and represent a serious offence against the best friends of England - as a champion, I repeat, of freedom and fair play - among the Italians in Italy, on both sides of the lines, and those of the two Americas and dispersed all over the earth.

It is with great amazement and sorrow that I express to you, as the highest political representative in Italy of the Allied interests, these personal impressions that I know are common to many pro-Allies Italians in my entourage.

The Italian people will find their way in spite of this regrettable episode. But it would perhaps be wise to cancel its very displeasing effect by an opportune and better inspired and informed statement on the Italian internal question and on the relations between the Italian people - who certainly will last more than Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio - and the Allies as independent nations and as a coalition. Because unhappy phrases of statesmen, especially if pronounced at moments of high tension, are not easily forgotten. I consider that it would be unwise to accumulate shadows between England and the Free Italian public opinion. Nobody knows what the future history of Europe will be during and after the present conflict.

Yours sincerely,

*former editor of
Corriere della
Sera
with me*

Alberto Tarchiani

Alberto Tarchiani
62 Via Francesco Crispi - Napoli

Hoag - 609
Sent on 2/24
8

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

230642A

N-3851

RAD-MSGR

Form 123D

Signal Corps, United States Army
Telegram

4361

SFO 2-1000

Received at

PENINSULAR BASE SECTION
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER

23 FEB 1944

19

• SECRET

• URGENT

TO (ACTION) : ACMF, PBS (FOR THE EYES OF GENERALS ALEXANDER AND
MACFARLANE ONLY)

(INFORMATION): NONE

FROM : GENERAL WILSON

DATE TIME SIGNED: 221700A

DATE TIME RECD: 230642A

REFERENCE NR. : NONE

CITE : FHCIC

230920

HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY PRIME MINISTER THAT WAR CABINET DECISION
HAS BEEN CONTRARY TO RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN PARA 5 OF SIGNAL
FROM FAIRBANKS NO 861 OF 18 FEB. REF WILL BE MADE IN HOUSE OF
COMMONS TODAY.

*Info - Hq. Acc
C/S
Secy*

6097

FORM 123-A

CRYPTO *W. H. Dwyer*

15754

7

ACC/ACB2/L

CONFIDENTIAL

Translation by
G.C. Hauneford
Major
19-2-44

DS 12
19 FEB 1944

CAREER of

H. E. EUGENE CASATI, GRAND CROSS OF THE KING'S ORDERS, MINISTER OF JUSTICE.

"Born at Chiavenna (Prov. of Sondrio) in the extreme North of Lombardy, where the Swiss customs and ways of life are still prevalent on 21 March 1873. H. E. Casati is 70.

He entered the judicial profession on the 21 May 1895.

His career was normal and his promotion regular, though his work on International Law and his reputation as a judge had already attracted the attention of his superiors, and their reports have been at all times extremely praiseful.

He was a successful pretore at Leghorn, "Giudice Istruttore" in Milan, "Procuratore del Re" at Brno and San Remo.

For exceptional merit he was promoted Counsellor of Court of Appeal and assigned to Genoa. A few years later in 1934, he was made Counsellor of Cassation and selected as President of Session. On Oct 4, he crowned his career by being appointed First President of Cassation, the highest post in the judicial hierarchy.

At the collapse of the Fascist regime, he was appointed President of the Commission to investigate into the unlawful enrichment of Fascist Officials and had already started the proceedings, when the Germans re-entered Rome. He had to escape and hide for some weeks, then he succeeded in crossing the German lines and reached Allied Occupied Territory. On his arrival in Salerno he was immediately appointed Minister of Justice."

Marshal Badoglio also chose him to be "Presidente del Consiglio Interministeriale," an appointment which in fact gives him authority over the other ministers and enables him to control interministerial activities.

COPY

609

(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

CC/F/61

NE
FMB/rj

16th. February, 1944.

- #2
1. I enclose herewith a copy of a note I have just received from Badoglio enclosing a copy of a letter received by him from a lawyer in Taranto.
 2. The lawyer's letter gives a fairly clear picture of the difficulty experienced by the Badoglio Government and its supporters through the activities of P.W.R..
 3. It also helps to explain the difficulty of the position in which I find myself. My duty is to support and collaborate with the Government of Badoglio and the King. But neither the King, nor Badoglio nor his Government can understand how I can possibly allow P.W.R. to broadcast and give publicity to frequent statements which amount to lose majesty and others calculated to bring the King and his Government into disrepute.
 4. As Badoglio always says to me himself, he has no desire to suppress freedom of speech but it should not be allowed to violate the laws of the country.
 5. To my mind this particular question is yet another argument in favour of getting the present political impasse clarified.
- 091412-
X 000 77-

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,
Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

6095

CG/F/59

FME/rj

16th. February, 1944.

file #2

I have received your letter of the 14th. February in which you enclose a letter to you from a lawyer in Taranto.

2. I was most interested to read it and the lawyer's remarks are very clear. I can assure you that I am very well aware of the difficulties of the situation.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

S.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio,
Capo del Governo.

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Naples, 16/2/1944

CIRCULAR NO.1

To the Executives and Personnel of all State Administrations, Corps and Civil and Military Agencies.

In October 1932, the King handed the power and Italy over to a Gang of adventurers, breaking thus the sacred pact of plebiscites between a People and the Crown. In 1924, after the assassination of the Parliamentary Deputy, Giacomo Matteotti, all attempts made by the true representatives of the Nation to obtain peace and justice and the return to the violated constitution turned out fruitless and in vain.

The Dictatorship, under the auspices of the crown, developed and perfected its rule and lead the country subsequently into a series of foreign and domestic undertakings and adventures which culminated in military defeat, shame, ruin, overthrow of every civilian, social and juridical relationship. The constitution violated and torn, Italy reduced to hunger and left at the mercy of frenzied enemies, the King in an inglorious flight from Rome, more than five months after the Armistice, the Country did not succeed in having a Government which undertook with uprightness and energy the tremendous task of the reorganization and purification of the life of the Nation. And the Nation now tired of the guilty inertia and resistance of the Supreme Powers of the State demanded, through its representatives meeting in Congress at Bari on January 28 and 29, 1944, the immediate abdication of Victor Emanuel III.

The Permanent Executive Giunta (Council), elected by the Congress, notified Victor Emanuel III of the decisions of the Congress on 9 February 1944, who in not abdicating openly rebelled against the Nation. In view of this situation, the Executive Giunta (Council) invited the executives and personnel of all State Administrations, Corps, Civil and Military Agencies not to take part in the rebellion of the King and his accomplices. No one lend himself to the intimidating manoeuvres of the monarchical Neo-Fascism, but all remain faithful to their own work, the scrupulous fulfillment of their duties, the exclusive service of the Nation returned into the possession of its sovereign powers. Those who permit themselves to have this sacred right of the Nation taken away and go outside the legal limits of their power to intimidate and obtain consent and complicity by methods so unfortunately used during the Fascist Ventennio, should know that upon a day not too distant, they will be called upon to answer for their actions and possible abuses of power to a Tribunal. The Committees for National Liberation of the Provinces and individual Communities, true and sole representatives of the restored sovereignty of the People, are entrusted with notification of this circular to the Administrations, Bodies, etc., as above.

609

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14 Feb. '44

100

Badoglio.

ation.

608"

②



IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

14 gennaio 44

Caro Generale Mac Farlane.

Ricevo questa lettera da un avvocato
di Taranto a me sconosciuto.

Ma è una pittura così fedele
della anomala situazione odierna
che io vi sarci pronto se la
leggete.

Con cordialissimi saluti

Bastogi

(See below for this file)

al Sig. Generale
Mason Mac Farlane
Capo della Commissione
alleata di controllo

608

(2)

Taranto, Jan. 23, 1944

I hope Your Excellency will forgive me if, among the many and important Government matters which Your Excellency has to attend to, I dare call Your Excellency's attention to two facts which many of us cannot completely understand.

1) How can it be explained that the Bari Radio broadcasting station, certainly controlled by the responsible organs of the Government, indeed calling itself "the free voice of the Italian Government" (which, until proved otherwise is Your Excellency's Government), may find pleasure in daily broadcasts of conversations, commentaries and news reports of that current public opinion which is headed by Croce and Sforza? Is this perhaps the order of the Republican Interior Undersecretary?

2) How can it be explained that the "Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno", which renewed its publications as official organ of the Government, is following the same policy of Radio Bari?

Does not Your Excellency believe that it has a bad influence?

Free press, yes; free speech, too. But all against Your Excellency's politics and the King's Majesty?

Very respectfully,

Lawyer Antonio De Gennaro

On
Taranto 13, gennaio 1944

Caro Luigi, finalmente ho la
lettera ed importanti cose di Franco ed ho 1.2.8.
e anche richiama l'attenzione alla 1.2.8.
su due parti che esula di cui non viene
comunicato a Napoli.

1° Parte, infatti, la lettera di Franco-Bona, con la
sua esultanza dopo avere raggiunto la
Franco, tanto che si qualifica "Libera co-
se del Franco al 'Mare'" che dico a Franco con
francese e il Franco di 1.2.8. /, se espressioni
a Franco di Franco con esultanza etc.
soprattutto, infatti, esultanza etc. etc. di
quella conosciuta di adizione pubblica che ha dato

su dei fatti che esaltò le sue cose ricorrendo
consistentemente a ipocrisi.

1° Come, infatti, si spiega che Radio-Roma, con la
sua eccellente classe degli organi radiofonici e
fonetici, tenesse una tale ipocrisia "Libera co-
se del Lavoro e l'Unità" (che vice a, invece con-
traria è il Lavoro di 1° 8°), se conosciuta
a proposito di "Lavoratori cattolici" e di
"Lavoratori, Papale", eccipiano etc. etc. di
quella corrente di ipocrisia, allora ad è già stato
a Dora e Lanza? E questa forse la diretta
del reclusione L'abbigliamento del Lavoro?

2° Come si spiega che la "Lavoratori del Lavoro"
non, che riprende le pubblicazioni quasi sempre
efficienze del Lavoro, segue la classe di lavoro

di Radio-Mare?

Non crede V. S. di la sua antenna stessa,
sì?

Antenna di stanza, sì; Antenna di stanza, bene.

Sì, tutta anche la antenna di V. S. e anche
la antenna del Re?

Non devono essere

Antenna di stanza

Antenna di stanza

MOST PERSONAL AND SECRET.

ADC/22.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

5th February 1944.

My Dear *hasn has* —

Thank you for your DP/P/24 of the 30th January.

I am very glad to hear of the progress you are making in bringing together A.M.G. and A.C.C.

You mentioned P.W.B. activities. Under the new organisation which I have just approved there will be a representative of P.W.B. at Headquarters, A.C.M.F., working under Alex subject to the general directives issued from here. There will also be an officer available to work under you particularly on the occupational side of this P.W.B. work. I think this should meet your requirements.

You mentioned your own Italian manned Road Transport Organisation. I assume that these will be on a military or para-military basis and not committed entirely into Italian civilian hands. I have seen many rackets in Persia and Syria which have arisen from our having done so.

I have discussed with G.2. your difficulty over your Russian general and cypher messages. There is no satisfactory method other than paraphrasing applicable to both American and British cypher systems which will achieve security. In no circumstances, therefore, must the literal texts of cypher messages be circulated to any officers of your Command other than American and British and consequently the provision of Staff is necessary to para-phrase the versions of all in-coming and out-going messages that require to be handed to other nationalities.

I hope we will hear no more about antiquities. I see that P.J.Grigg was attacked in the House a few days ago about it but put up a stubborn defence.

Yours *honestly*

Lt.Gen. Sir L. Mason MacFarlane,
Allied Control Commission,
APO 394.

H. A. Wilson
608

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