

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

10000/101/428

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ITALIAN ARMED FORCES, #4
AUG. - OCT. 1944

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091.711

"B" FILES

HQ ACC

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL

(13)

TOP SECRET

ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
344) - -	Capt Stone	13 Sept	- - (Files)	Conference with Bonomi: Appointment of Pinna As C/S to Piacentini Extract of memo - full in 000.1
345) 091.711-2	Capt Stone	16 "	Bonomi	Salvage operations in Ital waters.
346) 014.13	Capt Stone	16 "	GOC 3 District	Promotions certain CC.PP NCOs.
347) 091.711	Capt Stone	17 "	AFHQ	Italian Troops in the Balkans & Military Mission therefor.
348) 5323 Gab.	Bonomi	18 "	Capt Stone	Transfer of 2 bns fr Sardinia to Sicily to preserve public order.
349) 091.711	Capt Stone	18 "	Prunas	Italian troops in the Balkans & Military Mission therefor. (343)
350) 091.711-1	Capt Stone	19 "	AFHQ	CUNEO Div (also REGINA) whether or not it is infact considered PW.
351) 091.711	Capt Stone	19 "	Gen Browning	Reminder to 337. Operational Zone of all Italian territory.
352) - -	Capt Stone	19 "	AVM Buscarlet	Bonomi agreed not press for Pinna as C/S to Ministry for Air.
353) 091.711-1	Capt Stone	21 "	Gen Robertson, CAO	Prince of Piedmont touring 8 Army Zone without permission.
354) 091.711-1	Capt Stone	23 "	Messe	Extension of Denomination Zone of Operations to whole National Territory OK.
355) SD/28	MMIA	22 "	ACC	Strength of CC.PP - need for increase in ceiling, etc.
356) 9/12.P/AS	Capt Stone	23 "	G5 AFHQ	Transfer of 2 bns fr Sardinia to Sicily for public order (Re 348)
357) 823/6/CA	Capt Stone	25 "	AFHQ	Reduction of Ital Garrison-Sicily
358) 01932/123	Visconti Venosta	25 "	Capt Stone	Ital tps in Balkans & Military Mission therefor.
359) 4/1/GSI	3 District	21 "	A/CC	Promotion of certain CC.PP NCOs
360) 014.13	Capt Stone	27 "	GOC 3 District	for gallantry in Salerno landing.
361) 014.13	Capt Stone	30 "	Brig Iush, Upjohn & Col Chapman	Phone call fr G5 in re (355) CC.PP increase of, etc.
361) - -	Brig Upjohn	25 "	A/CC	Public Safety in Sicily & transfer of 2 Bn fr Sardinia (see 348-356)
362) 014.33-1	Capt Stone	2 Oct	Gen Spofford	Employment of Gen Castellano

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346) 014.13	Capt Stone	16 "	GOC 3 District	Promotions certain CC.PP NOOs.
347) 091.711	Capt Stone	17 "	AFHQ	Italian Troops in the Balkans & Military Mission therefor.
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361) - -	Brig Upjohn	30 "	Brig Lush, Upjohn & Col Chayman	Phone call fr G5 in re (355) CC.PP increase of, etc.
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		2 Oct	Gen Spofford	Employment of Gen Castellano

1331

TOP SECRET

LIST OF PAPERS

PART IV

"B" FILES

File under No. 091.711

ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(12) TOP SECRET

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
321) 1605/50/44/ G(SDI) 014.13	CGS, AAI	13 Aug	ACC	Re 309. Strength of Carabinieri. Increase not authorized.
322) 04/6	Capt Stone MMIA - Col Kerr	15 " 15 "	Adm Sec Hq ACC	Italian Troops in Balkans: MMIA cannot accept responsibility Dope on Italian Officer Cadet College at Lecce
323) F 83483 2131	AFHQ ACC - Maj Doe	15 " 23 "	ACC AFHQ	Suggested statement re increase of, and furnishing of equipment to, Italian Corps of Liberation
324) 1/201 -- -- 000.7	Venosta Gen Browning Mr. Schott Capt Stone	10 " 14 " 21 " 23 "	Capt Stone CC A/CC Venosta	Re 316- Italian ships APOLLO, HER- MAD, Etc to be scuttled by Allies. Extension of Denomination Zone of Operations to whole National Territory.
325) 091.711	Capt Stone	24 "	Bonomi	
326) 104571/AV	Messe	24 "	CC ACC	
327) --	Capt Stone	24 "	Gen Browning	Job for Gen Castellano. Re 296.
328) -- 091.711	Adm Morgan Capt Stone	1 " 25 "	CC ACC Adm Morgan	Comando Supremo - Connection with Italian Navy
329)	Capt Stone	26 "	Hd, Adm Sec	Strength of Carabinieri - request report at VP meeting
330) DCGS 277	Adv AAI	28 "	ACC, AAI, TAF, etc	Air Activities in Sardinia closed out: no Ital air or army officer in Sardinia with Allies shd be transferred, discharged, etc.
331) 091.711	Capt Stone	28 "	Gen Browning	Italian Troops in Balkans (Re 322) MMIA shd deal with this matter
332) 091.711	Capt Stone	31 "	G5 AFHQ	Post Hostilities Planning - Questionnaire by Col Geddes, London
333) 809/7/CA (091.711	Capt Stone	4 Sept	G5 AFHQ	
334) (014.13 (14622/PS	Capt Stone	6 "	C-in-C AAI	Re 321. Strength of Carabinieri - Reasons of proposed increase and outline of organ., strength and location of CC.RR
335) 014.13	Capt Stone	6 "	C-in-C AAI	Must accept British equipment for Italian Combat divisions
336) FX92422 (NAF 773) G3 AFHQ		5 "	CCS, SHAEF, etc	Extension of Denomination Operation
337)	Capt Stone	7 "	Gen Browning	

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321) 1605/50/44/ G(SDI) 014.13	CGS, AAI	13 Aug	ACC	Re 309. Strength of Carabinieri. Increase not authorized.
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327) - - 328) - - 091.711	Capt Stone Adm Morgan Capt Stone Capt Stone	24 " 1 " 25 "	Gen Browning CC ACC Adm Morgan Hq, Adm Sec	Air Activities in Sardinia closed out: no Ital air or army officer in Sardinia with Allies shd be trans- ferred, discharged, etc. Italian Troops in Balkans (Re 322) MMIA shd deal with this matter
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330) 091.711	Capt Stone	28 "	Gen Browning	Re 321. Strength of Carabinieri - Reasons of proposed increase and outline of organ., strength and location of CC.RR
331) 091.711	Capt Stone	31 "	C-in-C AAI	Must accept British equipment for Italian Combat divisions
332) 809/7/CA (091.711)	Capt Stone	4 Sept	G5 AFHQ G5 AFHQ	Extension of Denomination Operation Zone to whole National territory
333) 014.13 (14622/PS)	Capt Stone	6 "	C-in-C AAI	Gen Pinna as Chief of Staff to Air Minister.
334) 014.13	Capt Stone	6 "	CCS, SHAF, etc	Promotions certain CC.RR NCOs Prince of Piedmont touring 8 Army area without permission.
335) 014.13	Capt Stone	5 "	Gen Browning	Cables on case of 2 Distr trying to move Air S/C & IAF fr Bari Hq.
336) FX92422 (NAF 773) G3 AFHQ	Capt Stone	7 "	Air Minister	Italian Troops in the Balkans & Military Mission therefor.
337) - -	Capt Stone	6 "	Adm Sec Capt Stone	
338) AFSC/INT/15 Buscarlet	Capt Stone	10 "	9-13 Sept	
339) 014.13	Capt Stone	12 "	Political Sec Capt Stone	
340) 5001/9/QAO Gen Robertson	Capt Stone	13 "		
341)	Capt Stone	12 "		
342) 091.711	Capt Stone			
343) 01471/S	Prunas			

Instructions.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made of the serial.

1330

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015**SECRET**

EWS/hjp

A/CC 014.33-1

2 October 1944

Brigadier General Charles M. Spofford, U.S.A.
 Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5
 Allied Force Headquarters

Dear Chuck:

You inquired about General Castellano. Some weeks ago, as I telephoned General Gammell, he was offered a post at Ankara as military attache, but did not care to accept it.

Since then, he has been awaiting assignment.

The Ministry of War advises that he is expected to be assigned to the command of a Division shortly.

He appears to have been in no difficulties since his return, due to the role which he played in connection with the Armistice.

Sincerely,

ELLEN W. STONE
 Captain, USNR
 Acting Chief Commissioner

SECRET

246
327

041.711

RE ACC	1329
DISP	001
Date Time	1001
Via	AG 1200
Initials	CH.

FILES 412 362

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APC 394

SUBJECT : Public Safety in Sicily

Tel: 525

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner

Reference the attached correspondence.

1. I have seen General Browning and discussed with him
 - a) the question of leaving 2 battalions in Sicily and therefore sending 2 battalions from Sardinia to Calabria, and
 - b) sending an additional 2 battalions from Sardinia to Sicily as suggested by the Minister of War.

2. With regard to (a) General Browning had already discussed this matter with the Minister of War and he agrees that it would be better to leave the existing SABAUDA Division in Sicily and to transfer 2 battalions from SARDINIA to CALABRIA. He has accordingly written a letter (copy attached) to HQ AAI.

3. With regard to (b) so far as General Browning is concerned he has no objection to ordering a further 2 battalions from Sardinia to Sicily, but he points out that we shall have to consider whether the transfer of these additional battalions to Sicily will not leave Sardinia dangerously low in armed forces from a public safety point of view especially having regard to the airfields there.

4. Accordingly I propose to write a Regional Commissioner Region VI and ask his views.

091.711

/s/ G.P. Upjohn, Brigadier
/t/ G.R. UPJOHN, Brigadier
V.P. Admin. Section.

Reference the attached correspondence.

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3. With regard to (b) so far as General Browning is concerned he has no objection to ordering a further 2 battalions from Sardinia to Sicily, but he points out that we shall have to consider whether the transfer of these additional battalions to Sicily will not leave Sardinia dangerously low in armed forces from a public safety point of view especially having regard to the airfields there.
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Pen-note: CK EWS.

Brig. returned to Brig. Upjohn 25/2

0916.711
/s/ G.E. Upjohn, Brigadier
/t/ G.R. UPJOHN, Brigadier
V.P. Admin. Section.

YTB C C P Y.

1328

FILES A-8

361

SUBJECT : SICILYCOPYSECRET

Military Mission Italian Army.
R O M E .

SD/25

19th Sept. 44.

HQ. AAI (2)

1. The Italian Ministry of War are anxious about Sicily. They say that conditions there are unsettled and trouble may come from Communists, Separatists, etc.
2. As you know, SABAUDA Division in Sicily is being reorganised and split into two "standard I.S. Divisions," which will be named SABAUDA and AOSTA.
3. I understand that the idea is to transfer two bns from Sicily to replace two bns of MANTOVA division when the latter are concentrated for training and formation into a Combat Group.
4. I suggest that it may be better if two bns of CALABRIA standard I.S. Division (earmarked for garrison of SARDINIA) were transferred to replace the two bns of MANTOVA. This would leave less than in Sicily.
5. I do not know whether you are dealing with all this now or whether it is an AFHQ responsibility. But I send this letter to you as a suggestion for onward transmission, with your remarks if necessary, to AFHQ.

(SGD)

Major General
M.M.I.A.

Copy to : H.Q. No. 3 district.

etc.

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(SCT)

Major General
M.M.I.A.

Copy to : H.Q. No. 3 district.

1327

361

SD/25 dated 9 Sept Secret
to H.Q., AAI.

In order to meet the pressing needs of the services connected with public order in Sicily, I had asked the Minister of War to order the transfer of two battalions of the R.Arm from Sardinia to Sicily for the 1st of October when the Allied troops will leave Sicily, deeming it absolutely necessary that the garrison of the island be reinforced.

However, I am now informed that the Allied Command has ordered two battalions now in Sicily be transferred immediately to Calabria.

If this is true, I must draw the Commission's particular attention on the serious repercussions that the execution of such an order would bring on the conditions of public safety in Sicily, where the lack of two, and from 1 Oct. of four battalions would aggravate a situation which is already hardly reassuring because of the shortage of police forces.

Hence I wish to beg the Commission to examine with particular attention the advisability of not transfer two battalions at present in Sicily to Calabria, and of permitting two more battalions to be transferred, as already pointed out above, from Sardinia to Sicily on 1 October.

The two battalions requested for Calabria could be transferred immediately to that region from Sardinia.

We shall appreciate your kind reply on the matter.

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The two battalions requested for Calabria could be transferred immediately to that region from Sardinia.

We shall appreciate your kind reply on the matter.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

HHS/dfe

A/CC 014.13

30 September 1944

TO: Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner
Brigadier Upjohn, Admin. Section
Colonel Chapman

(35)

I had a telephone call this morning from Lt. Col. Mitchell of G-5 AFHQ with reference to my recent letter on Carabinieri. He stated that AFHQ had decided to press to secure us additional bodies on a temporary basis for the next three or four months—leaving to be handled as a separate issue the question of permanent increase in the Carabinieri strength or ceiling.

He further stated that G-5 felt that notwithstanding the possibility of our securing additional temporary personnel, ACC should put into effect urgently such recommendations made by General Browning on a long term basis for reorganizing and improving the efficiency of the CC.M. as we approve.

11/12/44

56.407

Hq. ACC Sec'y Gen.

DISPATCHED

Date - Time 1 OCT 1944

Via msj lrv

Initials CH

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1325
FILES A (B)
360

2 1, 9 31

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FMS/arr

A/CC 014.13

27 September 1944

SUBJECT: Promotions - CC.RR.

TO : Major General G. Lammie, CBE, MC,
Headquarters 3 District, C. M. F.

1. In reply to your 4/1/CSI of 21 September and further to my ACC 014.13 dated 10th September I have now been informed that the Minister for War has approved promotion of the three members of the CC.RR. concerned.

2. The matter is now in the hands of the Commanding General Carabinieri for final approval and regularization.

HILARY W. STONE
Captain, USMR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Administrative Section

~~011113~~
091.711

2 1 9 6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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MILLEY W. STONE
Captain, USMR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Administrative Section

~~0711.13~~
091.711

FILES A (B)

54 372 1326
Hq ACC Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date Time 28 SEP 1944
Via AG. 0910
Initials CH

359

SUBJECT : Promotions - CC.PP.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 District
Ext 9
4/1/GSI
21 September 1944

Acting Chief Commissioner,
HQ ACC, APC N 394.

1. Your A/CC 014.13 of 16 September is acknowledged with thanks, and it is noted that you anticipate that the promotions will be made shortly.
2. As a year has now passed since our lendings at SAERNO, and many months since the recommendations were first made, you are requested to do all in your power to ensure that there are no further delays in this matter on the part of the Italian Ministry of War.
3. As the District Commander stated in his letter of 25 June, this is a matter of our own prestige and CC.PP regulations must NOT be allowed to stand in the way of these men receiving confirmation of the promotions which were given to them in the field by the British Commander in reward for their services to the Allied Cause.
4. Please inform this HQ as soon as the promotions have been confirmed.

Lieutenant Colonel
General Staff
for
Major General
Commanding
3 District

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

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Lieutenant Colonel
General Staff

for

Major General
Commanding
District

1323

359

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

MEMORANDUM

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

ACC/14601/17/2 PS

SUBJECT : Promotions CC.RR

25 Sept., 44.

Further reference to your A/CC 014.13 dated 10th September, additional information has been received from the Military Mission to the Italian Army on this subject (a copy of which is attached for your information).

Should you wish to make a further reply to Major General LAMITE Commanding District, a letter has been prepared for your signature and has been also attached hereto.

G.R. UPTON. Brigadier.
V.P. Admin. Section.

VEN

C O P Y

Information has been received from the military
on this subject (a copy of which is attached for your information).

Should you wish to make a further reply to Major General LAMITE
Commanding District, a letter has been prepared for your signature
and has been also attached hereto.

G.R. UPJOHN. Brigadier.
V.P. Admin. Section.

YEM

COPY

1322

359

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Copy

SUBJECT:- Promotion of CC.RR. for Gallantry

Military Mission
Italian Army
R O M E
AQ/11/2

22 Sept 44

ADM Section, HQ ACC.

Further to this HQ letter AQ/11/2 of 12
Sept (copy to you).

1. Information has now been received that regularisation of the promotion of the three Carabinieri mentioned in the a/q letter has been approved by the Ministry of War, and that the matter has now been passed to HQ CC.RR. for final approval by G.O.C. Carabinieri.
2. You will be advised when further information is received.

5sgd) S.P.ARCHER Capt.
A.O.D.
for Major General M.M.I.A.

Copy to HQ No.3 dist.

1321

359

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

TO:- Major General G. LAMIE, C.B.E., M.C.

SUBJECT:- Promotions - CC.HR.

25th Sept., '44.

In furtherance of my AGC/014.13 dated 10th September I have now been informed that the Minister for War has approved promotion of the three members of the CC.HR. concerned.

The matter is now in the hands of the Commanding General Carabinieri for final approval and regularisation.

ELIJAH W. STONE
Captain USNR,
Acting Chief Commissioner

YAB.

13218

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015SECRET.Ref: 823/6/CA.25th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Italian Garrison in SICILY.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

1. I refer to my telegram 3362 of 25th September. The Italian garrison in SICILY has been reduced under orders from AAI by one battalion and possibly will be reduced by a further battalion, without reference to myself.
2. I fully appreciate that the battalions are needed to relieve other battalions required for operational purposes. But the maintenance of law and order is a responsibility which I have assumed on behalf of the S.A.C. The methods adopted to maintain law and order and the numbers of Carabinieri and other police agencies employed to do so are naturally affected by the strength of the Italian garrisons in any particular area.
3. I would ask you, therefore, that in future I should be consulted when any change is contemplated in the Italian military garrisons in SICILY, SARDINIA and those parts of Italy which come under AFHQ, in order that I can advise the S.A.C. on the effect of this reduction on the general maintenance of law and order, and may make my own arrangements regarding the police agencies in those areas.
4. In the particular case of SICILY I would ask that the Italian garrison be not reduced below two internal security battalions, that is to say, 10,000 men. The situation in Calabria is less difficult than in SICILY but if it required to replace the two battalions of the Mantova Division about to be removed from Calabria, I would ask that they should be replaced by troops from SARDINIA and not from SICILY.

ELMER W. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to: HQ AAI
Army Sub-Com
No.3 District

FILES A-B

56 366

HQ A.F.C.	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED	
Date: 26	26 SEP 1944
1319	
via HAND OF A/CY. SEPT.	
Initials	CH

SECRET

357

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TRANSLATION

5972/142

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

CABINET

Telegraph and cipher office

384

26/9-1510
DFE

Rome 25 September 1944

Admiral Ellery W. STONE
Chief Commissioner Allied Control Commission

R O M E

318
5972/142 period High Commissioner Sicily signals conditions public order of the island growing worse period referring letter sent to you 18 present month, renew request for your kind intervention so that units Italian military forces should not at the present moment be withdrawn from Sicily period Thanks period

PRESIDENT COUNCIL MINISTERS INTERIOR

BONONI

Trans. E.O.

1318
356

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APC 394

Ref: 9/12.B/A.S.

23 September, 1944.

SUBJECT : CARABINIERI.

TO : G-5 Section, A.F.H.Q.

1. The primary duty of this Commission is to maintain, or to ensure that the Italian Government maintains, order and law throughout this territory. The Carabinieri (CC.RR) form the principal force for the maintenance of law and order. Hitherto, with one notable exception in Rome, they have been moderately successful in achieving this object. The future, however, has filled me with great anxiety for some months. There are not sufficient Carabinieri in the country to ensure the maintenance of law and order in Italy after the occupation of the Northern Regions. In these Regions particularly we shall be faced with a situation in which security problems will be more difficult than any we have hitherto met.

2. Foreseeing this, I have for some time been in communication with AAI in an attempt to secure sufficient men for the Carabinieri in order that I may fulfil the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order which are properly mine.

3. I enclose copies of correspondence which has passed between my HQ and HQ AAI. I would summarise the position as follows:-

- a) In my opinion 65,000 is the absolute minimum strength of Carabinieri necessary for the maintenance of law and order for the whole of Italy. My reasons are set forth in my letter A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug. (marked "A"), addressed to HQ AAI.
- b) HQ AAI has so far refused permission for this ceiling which accordingly remains at 55,000. This is insufficient. Of these 55,000 it has been found possible to recruit only 43,000. It seems unlikely that I shall be able to reach the ceiling of 65,000 by drawing upon the Carabinieri in the normal way, i.e. by finding them in liberated areas as the Armies progress northwards. The reasons for this are set out in my A/CC 014.13 A/CC 014.622/PS of 6 September addressed to HQ AAI, para 3 (marked "B"). It is

Regions. In these Regions particularly we shall be faced with a situation in which security problems will be more difficult than any we have hitherto met.

2. Foreseeing this, I have for some time been in communication with AAI in an attempt to secure sufficient men for the Carabinieri in order that I may fulfil the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order which are properly mine.

3. I enclose copies of correspondence which has passed between my HQ and HQ AAI. I would summarise the position as follows:-

- a) In my opinion 65,000 is the absolute minimum strength of Carabinieri necessary for the maintenance of law and order for the whole of Italy. My reasons are set forth in my letter A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug. (marked "A"), addressed to HQ AAI.
- b) HQ AAI has so far refused permission for this ceiling which accordingly remains at 55,000. This is insufficient. Of these 55,000 it has been found possible to recruit only 43,000. It seems unlikely that I shall be able to reach the ceiling of 65,000 by drawing upon the Carabinieri in the normal way, i.e. by finding them in liberated areas as the Armies progress northwards. The reasons for this are set out in my A/CC 014.13 A/CCL4622/PS of 6 September addressed to HQ AAI, para 3 (marked "B"). It is hoped that the reports of scarcity of Carabinieri in the Northern Regions may be exaggerated: it is possible that we may be able to find as many as 10,666 - 15,000 but although I cannot possibly count on finding a single man north of the Rimini-Pisa Line, I am prepared to run a certain risk by anticipating picking up between 10,000 - 15,000.
- c) This still leaves me with the necessity of finding at least 8,000 - 13,000 carabinieri to police the area north of the Rimini-Pisa Line. This is an absolute minimum. I am prepared to plan on a basis of 11,000.
- d) In the letter of 6th Sept referred to above (marked "B"), I accordingly suggested that 11,000 soldiers should be attached from the Regular Army by MMA to the Carabinieri as a temporary measure. GOC Army Sub-Commission has told my Public Safety Sub-Commission that clothed and equipped soldiers are not available but no reply has been received from AAI.

See 360

FILES A/B

355

- 2 -

4. In view of this refusal I have had to strip the rest of Italy, particularly Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy to a dangerously low limit. I have already sent 4,000 Carabinieri to Florence where a holding centre for the North will be formed and am planning to send a further 2,000 making a total of 6,000 Carabinieri against 11,000 needed.
5. I must therefore repeat my request for an allocation of troops from Regular Army by MMIA and I now formally ask that 5,000 soldiers should be released immediately for duty with the Carabinieri in Sicily, Sardinia and Southern Italy (an experiment which has worked very well as a temporary measure in connection with grain collection in Sicily) in order that I can release a further 5,000 highly trained Carabinieri from these areas for duty in the North. Such an arrangement would give me the minimum of 11,000 required as an initial nucleus to go forward to the Northern areas.
6. I would add that it is essential that such soldiers should be fully equipped and clothed.
7. I attach comments of the GOG, Army Sub-Commission on this request and I would ask that an immediate decision be made ~~in order that plans can be made~~ in order that plans can be formulated at once. I need not stress here the primary necessity for the maintenance of law and order and even at the expense of the planned organisation of the MMIA now proceeding. We have reached a stage when a decision must be made either to risk the occurrence of grave disorder in the North without the necessary force to control it or to accept a setback to the reorganisation of the regular Army. I would remind you in this connection that it is the Commander-in-Chief's intention to send very small forces for the occupation of Western Italy and that he undoubtedly counts upon the Carabinieri for the bulk of the police work in those areas.
8. Without the Carabinieri I shall be compelled to ask for more Allied troops in newly liberated areas.
9. With a view to saving time I have shown a draft of the above letter to C.O.C., MMIA and his comments are attached (marked "C"). I do not want to comment in detail on his letter but would point out
- a) valuable though his suggestion are for a reorganisation of the CC.PP. they will take time. It takes far longer to train a good policeman than a good soldier.
 - b) we are already proposing to ~~skim~~ a further 2,000 Carabinieri from the South of Italy (see para 4 above).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

I would ask that an immediate decision be made in order that plans can be made in order that plans can be formulated at once. I need not stress here the primary necessity for the maintenance of law and order and even at the expense of the planned organization of the MMIA now proceeding. We have reached a stage when a decision must be made either to risk the occurrence of grave disorder in the North without the necessary force to control it or to accept a setback to the reorganization of the regular Army. I would remind you in this connection that it is the Commander-in-Chief's intention to send very small forces for the occupation of Western Italy and that he undoubtedly counts upon the Carabinieri for the bulk of the police work in those areas.

8. Without the Carabinieri I shall be compelled to ask for more Allied troops in newly liberated areas.

9. With a view to saving time I have shown a draft of the above letter to G.O.C., MMIA and his comments are attached (marked "C"). I do not want to comment in detail on his letter but would point out

- a) valuable though his suggestion are for a reorganization of the CC.PR. they will take time. It takes far longer to train a good policeman than a good soldier.
- b) we are already proposing to skim a further 2,000 Carabinieri from the South of Italy (see para 4 above).
- c) it is the view of this HQ that the use of patriots who are completely untrained in police work would be extremely hazardous.
- d) we must accept the fact that the best men must be taken for the Carabinieri. This has been the case in the past with good reason. Having in view the future of the Italian Army consequent on the demilitarization of Italy which presumably must take place when hostilities have ceased it is now even more necessary that the Carabinieri should take the cream.

It is precisely because of the above difficulties and because my problem is immediate (especially in view of the reported fall of Rimini) that I have asked for the allocation as a temporary measure of 5,000 soldiery so as to enable me to send 5,000 fully trained Carabinieri for duty in the North. I need hardly say that the suggestion made by G.O.C. MMIA are being examined immediately in detail with a view to reorganization of the Carabinieri.

ELLEY W. STONE

Captain, USNR

Acting Chief Commissioner.

Hq A.C.C. Secy Gen.

DISPATCHED
Date Time 23 SEP 1944

YMB COPY.

Via MEX 1110

Initials CM

353

C O P Y .

SUBJECT : Carabinieri Reali (CC.RR.)

R E S T R I C T E D

Military Mission Italian Army.
R O M E .

SD/28

22 Sept 44.
-----H.Q. AOC (2)

Ref your proposals re CC.RR., I have the following comments to offer:

1. QUALIFICATION FOR CC.RR.

- (a) Applications are voluntary. CC.RR. are not conscripted.
- (b) Men must have completed their voluntary school studies.
- (c) They must have passed all medical requirements.
- (d) They must be 1.65 metres in height for foot CC.RR. and 1.70 metres for mounted CC.RR.
- (e) If already in the Army, they must have C.O.s recommendation.
- (f) They must pass tests for CC.RR. training.

Obviously a high class type of man is necessary.

2. TRANSFER OF SOLDIERS TO CC.RR.

(a) If this is permanent, it involves a vast selection project covering the whole Army, which would take weeks if not months. It would produce transport difficulties in getting the soldiers to some central depot or depots from all over ITALY. It would skim the cream off an already indiffer Army, whose efficiency would in consequence suffer deplorably by the removal of 5000 of its superior personnel.

(b) If this is temporary I cannot see where it is to come from, except at the expense of some vital Army requirement. Vide Appx 'A' (latest ceiling proposals), there is no category or combination of categories which can transfer any soldiers, let alone 5000. Also, a transfer en bloc as formed units is useless, as CC.RR. work is individual and a large proportion of the personnel of such units would be quite unsuitable, if not a positive menace.

(c) They must have passed all medical requirements.

(d) They must be 1.65 metres in height for foot CC.RR and 1.70 metres for mounted CC.RR.

(e) If already in the Army, they must have C.Os recommendation.

(f) They must pass tests for CC.RR training.

Obviously a high class type of man is necessary.

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I would mention that the Allied Garrison in CORSIKA is composed of men of Yugo-Slav origin; that ACC and M. of W. are pressing for the retention of both 2 Divs in SICILY owing to unrest; that Internal Security troops 4100' is already earmarked by AAI to be organised into essential guard battalions.

The figure of 18400 for reinforcements etc is illusory. A large proportion are not available, as this covers sick in hospital, men in transit men being called up etc. It is the only 'cushion' (and in 19315 opinion too small a one) for the operation of the personnel side of the always changing Italian Army.

(c) From the above, it is obvious that NO transfers of soldiers from the Army proper to CC.RR is possible. Some other solution must be sought.

#3 HOW TO INCREASE STRENGTH OF CC.RR

(a) From para 2 it can be seen that the strength of CC.RR can

355

Sheet 2.3. HOW TO INCREASE SERVICEMEN OF CC.FR. (Contd.)

a) contd. be increased ONLY by some new kind of organisation, special call-up or tapping of some other (than the Army) existing organisation.

(b) It would be possible to reinforce the Army conscription law and call back men from the older age groups. BUT -

(i) many would not answer the call. We are having great difficulty, as it is, in calling up men for the Army. Only a small proportion present themselves and if comprehensive action is taken to apprehend and punish delinquents, the trial and jail problem for this large number would produce another problem impossible of solution

(ii) those that did present themselves would for the most part come unwillingly (a wrong basis on which to coopt guardians of law and order) or be unsuitable.

(c) It would be possible to extend the existing Army conscription law all over liberated ITALY and to 'screen' the resultant call-up for men suitable for CC.FR. BUT this would mean that -

(i) the cream would be skimmed to go to CC.FR and the Army would get the 'leavings'. This would have serious repercussions in the Army, particularly as regards the 57,000 Combat Force. The great problems for the latter is the getting of specialists without which the Combat Groups cannot be effective. If CC.FR had first pick, these specialists would not be forthcoming.

(ii) the whole process, to get 5000 suitable men, would take a considerable time.

(d) There are in Rome the 'Metropolitani', i.e. the local auxiliary police. They exist, I understand, under other names, in all big towns. Here is one solution. Auxiliary police could be enlisted locally on a volunteer basis in all big towns, under a national charter for (say) one year only, with attractive terms of service and pay, to ensure the necessary number of applicants.

The CC.FR nucleus in any town would control this auxiliary police.

(e) Another solution is to use the ready-made patriot organisation in any locality; using these as auxiliary police as in para 3 (d). This would have the great advantage of:

all over liberated Italy and to 'screen' the resultant call-up for men suitable for CC.FR. BUT this would mean that -

- (i) the cream would be skimmed to go to CC.FR and the Army would get the 'leavings'. This would have serious repercussions in the Army, particularly as regards the 57,000 Combat Force. The great problems for the latter is the getting of specialists without which the Combat Groups cannot be effective. If CC.FR had first pick, these specialists would not be forthcoming.

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The CC.FR nucleus in any town would control this auxiliary police.

- (e) Another solution is to use the ready-made patriot organisation in any locality; using these as auxiliary police as in para 3 (d). This would have the great advantage of:

- (i) using an existing organisation which could be effective at once.
(ii) affording an outlet and recompense for patriot enthusiasm and good work.

Any political difference in the bands could be forbidden and negatived by the terms of the national charter and a form of oath.

1314

- (f) I do not know if any attempt has been made to recruit new CC.FR from the population as a whole. I think not. This is the obvious solution and should have been carried out by the CC.FR themselves long ago. A proclamation and appeals in the press, radio etc should even now bring forth applicants.

- (g) Finally, it can be noted that any of the combat groups may be made available for I.S. control where necessary.

4. REORGANISATION OF CC.FR. ITSELF.

- (a) I am not in a position to say whether a figure of 55,000 to ~~say~~ whether a figure of 55,000 (or 65,000) is really necessary. If the figure is put forward on the basis of pre-war it does NOT by any means follow that the figure need be so large. The Italians have always been extravagant in man-power, which

3/.....

355a

Sheet 3.

4. REORGANISATION OF CC.PR. ITSELF. (Contd)

(a) (Contd) which was always in plentiful supply.

(b) I suggest that there should be such scope for reorganisation within CC.PR., so as to do the job with less men. This would involve an examination into :-

(i) the decree of danger of trouble in the various areas and allotment of priorities, "risking" quiet areas such as APULIA etc.

(ii) The subdivision of allotment in all areas to reduce the wide distribution of CC.PR and achieve greater concentration of forces with the necessary reserves.

(iii) the actual duties required under present circumstances including the hours of work, number of reliefs provided per man per job etc.

(c) This in effect means that the CC.PR would be "cutting their coat according to their cloth", as the Army proper are doing. The whole 5000 required might be saved thereby.

5. TO SUM UP.

(a) The Army can NOT be tapped by either the temporary or permanent transfer of either personnel or units, without serious harm to the vital military effort.

Another solution must be found.

(b) The most likely solutions for exploration are:-

(i) for CC.PR to recruit fresh personnel themselves, launching a press and radio campaign to this end.

(ii) to extend the local "Metropolitani" or other auxiliary police in the towns, CC.PR retaining control.

(iii) to use the existing patriot organization as auxiliary police, with national charter and attractive terms of service on a volunteer basis.

(c) This in effect means that the CC.FR would be "cutting their coat according to their cloth", as the Army proper are doing. The whole 5000 required might be saved thereby.

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(a) The Army can NOT be tapped by either the temporary or permanent transfer of either personnel or units, without serious harm to the vital military effort.

Another solution must be found.

(b) The most likely solutions for exploration are:-

(i) for CC.FR to recruit fresh personnel themselves, launching a press and radio campaign to this end.

(ii) to extend the local "Metropolitani" or other auxiliary police in the towns, CC.FR retaining control.

(iii) to use the existing patriot organization as auxiliary police, with national charter and attractive terms of service on a volunteer basis.

(iv) to reorganise the CC.FR itself, to enable fewer men to do the same job.

(v) to use Combat Groups as and where necessary. Should the war end within the next few months, these would certainly be available.

L. BROWNING. 1313

Major General.
Military Mission-Italian Army.

trs. 12.
3. c.
encis.1.

355a

Appendix "A" to SD/28
dated 22 Sept 44.

ITALIAN ARMY

1.	Administrative Installations	27,000
2.	Combat formations, including C.I.L.	57,000
3.	Service Units under Allied Command	
	(a) P.B.S.	53,000
	(b) FIFTH Army	12,660
	(c) Allied Garrison Sardinia	9,000
	(d) Allied Garrison CORSICA	5,000
	(e) British Command	93,000
4.	A.A. & C.D.	600
5.	Internal Security troops, including	
	(a) A.C.C.	3,000
	(b) 18 Guard Battalion (800)	14,000
	(c) S.I.M.	1,500
	(d) 2 Divs SICILY	10,000
	(e) 1 Div SARDINIA	5,000
	(f) Internal Security troops	4,100
6.	Reinforcements, sick in hospital not assigned to units, and unassigned personnel including Liaison Officers, Interpreters, etc.	18,400
7.	CC.P.R., including CC.P.R. assigned to Military formations	55,000
		368,000

A.A. & C.D.

600

5.	Internal Security troops, including	
	(a) A.C.C.	3.000
	(b) 18 Guard Battalion (800)	14.000
	(c) S.I.M.	1.500
	(d) 2 Divs SICILY	10.000
	(e) 1 Div SARDINIA	5.000
	(f) Internal Security troops	4.100
6.	Reinforcements, sick in hospital not assigned to units, and unassigned personnel including Liaison Officers, Interpreters, etc.	18.400
7.	CC.PP., including CC.PP assigned to Military formations	55.000
		368.000

1312

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

FJS/afe

SG 091.711

23 September 1944

Subject: "Proposals for Alleviating the Situation of Italian Forces in Yugoslavia"

To: Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

1. Reference is made to the following communications:

- a. Memorandum, this Hq, to AFHQ, A/CC 091.711, 17 Sep 44
- b. Ltr, this Hq, to AFHQ, A/CC 091.711, 20 Sep 44, subject: "Proposals for Alleviating the Situation of Italian Forces in Yugoslavia."
- c. AFHQ cable F27839, 20 Sep 44, cite FHGCT
- d. ACC cable S-339, 20 Sep 44
- e. AFHQ cable F28650, 22 Sep 44, cite FHGCT

2. Letter referred to in para 1b forwarded the inclosure for the memorandum listed in para 1a. Letter 435/OK, 8 Sep 44, from Ministry of War, addressed to LMA, is the only "missing paper", and it is believed that you did receive it with our letter of 20 Sep 44. Please confirm by indorsement.

3. Duplicate copies of our correspondence are forwarded herewith as requested in your cable F28650 of 22 September.

FRANK J. SLAUGHTER
Captain, A.G.D.
Acting Secretary General

2 Incls:

- 1 - Para 1a above is reference
- 2 - Para 1b above is reference

FILES A-(B)
1311

347

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

LINKS V LAKE NRS P P
 FROM AFHQ (LAKK) 221451A
 TO (LINKS) ASC
 GN CG BT

72365B CONFIDENTIAL § 339

REFERENCE YOUR S THREE THREE NINE OF TWENTY FIRST SEPT AND
 OUR F TWO SEVEN EIGHT THREE NINE OF TWENTY SEPT PD

SIGNED SIGNED CITE G/ GN// FRSGT PD YOUR ENVELOPE WAS OPENED

BY THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE AFHQ MAIL AND DISTRIBUTION AND

THE PAPERS WERE NOT REPEAT NOT ATTACHED PD REQUEST YOU SEND

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HQ ACC, APO 394
 318 Sec'y Gen.
 Rec'd 22 Sept 1915
 by 1024

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221713 347

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EWS/drr

A/CC 091.711-1

23 September 1944

SUBJECT: "Operational Zones"

Dear Marshal Messe:

Reference is made to your letter 104871/AV of 24 August 1944.

The delay in replying is regretted but has been caused by the necessity of obtaining approval from AAI to the measure proposed.

I have now to inform you that there is no objection to your issuing such a proclamation providing you make it quite clear that your "Operational Zone" has no connection at all with the "Operational Zone" of the Allied Forces.

The Minister for War has been informed of this in similar terms by M.M.I.A.

Very truly yours,

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Marshal Messe
Chief of Italian General Staff
Stato Maggiore Generale

FILES A-8

56 324
MA ACC Secy Gen
DISPATCHED
Date Time 24 SEP 1944 1640
Via H.G.
Priority 04 1304

111.100

3542

C O P Y

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E

AQ/8

20 Sept. 44

Minister of War

Ref attached -

H.Q., A.A.I. have now informed me that is no objection to you issuing such a proclamation, provided that you make it quite clear that your "Operational Zone" has NO connection with the "Operational Zone" of the Allied Forces.

cc3/LB

/s/ Q. Browning
Major General
M.N.I.A.

Copy to:- Acting Chief Commissioner, ACC (ref his A/CC 091.711 dated 19 sept.)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

351

Ref attached -

H.Q., A.A.I. have now informed me that is no objection to you issuing such a proclamation, provided that you make it quite clear that your "Operational Zone" has NO connection with the "Operational Zone" of the Allied Forces.

cc3/LB

/s/ Q. Browning
Major General
M.N.I.A.

Copy to:- Acting Chief Commissioner, ACC (ref his A/CC 091.711 dated 19 sept.)

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1308

334a

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015P ONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

EW3/ajp

A/CC 091.711-1

21 September 1944

Dear General Robertson:

On receiving your letter 5001/9/GAO of 12 September 1944, I made enquiries of the Prince's household as to what steps they had taken to ask permission or forewarn your Headquarters of any proposed visit of the Lieutenant of the Realm into the forward areas.

Apparently the Lieutenant was told by General Alexander that, the military situation permitting, his visits forward were welcome provided he gave prior notice (this in effect being merely another way of asking permission). The Lieutenant's General Aide-de-Camp alleges that he has always scrupulously adhered to this and in support of his statement has sent me a short memorandum (see copy attached).

I entirely agree with your paragraph 3, but at the same time my impression is that the Lieutenant is quite amenable and ready to conform with whatever procedure is laid down for him. If his present method of telephoning Colonel Negroni is unsatisfactory--and apparently it is--perhaps you would suggest a better procedure to which I will then tell him that he must adhere.

Yours sincerely,

ELJERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Major General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Bt.,
Chief Administrative Officer,
Headquarters Allied Armies in Italy,
C. M. F.

Hq ACC	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED	
Date	Time
Via	16.00
Initials	4

FILES A-B

1307

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM on Movement in Forward Areas of the Lieutenant of the Realm

11 August: Visit to the Groupment of Italian Forces at the disposal of the 8th Army.

During the afternoon of August 8th, Col. Negroni, head of the Italian Mission to the Army Group Command, was informed by telephone, as it is the custom to do, of the program of the visit of H.R.H.

Morning of the 11, departure by plane for the airport of Castiglione del Lago. Gen. Tomaselli, Commanding the Groupment of Italian Forces at the Disposal of the 8th Army, informed beforehand by the Armies Group, meets H.R.H. at the airport and accompanies him in a car during the visit to the Italian troops distributed in this zone. Units distributed in the periphery of Florence are reached, and H.R.H. visits the part of the city which has already been liberated. On the next day, H.R.H. inspects the Perugia hospitals. From there, he leaves for Rome by plane.

24 August: Visit to the Italian Liberation Corps in the Marche.

On the 21st, Col. Negroni, head of the Italian Mission to the Armies Group Command, is informed by telephone of the program of the visit of H.R.H. and the necessary arrangements for a meeting between H.R.H. and the Commander of the 8th Army are made.

In the afternoon of the 24th, departure by plane for the airport of Fermo; from there, to S. Ginesio to inspect the Nembo Division. On the 25th, H.R.H. visits several units of the C.I.L.; on the 26th visit to the Command of the 8th Army; he has lunch with Gen. Leese. In the afternoon, he flies back to Rome.

In the first days of September, always through Col. Negroni, H.R.H. let it be known that he means to visit the towns of Florence and Pisa; Gen. Alexander notifies that he cannot take such a responsibility, because of the state of the operations, for security reasons, which had prevented the visit of Prime Minister Churchill. H.R.H. postpones his journey because of the reasons given by Gen. Alexander.

7 September: Visit to the 210th Division.

In the afternoon of the 2nd, Col. Negroni is informed by tele-

hospitals. From there, he leaves for Rome by plane.

24 August Visit to the Italian Liberation Corps in the Marche.

On the 21st, Col. Negroni, head of the Italian Mission to the Armies Group Command, is informed by telephone of the program of the visit of H.R.H. and the necessary arrangements for a meeting between H.R.H. and the Commander of the 8th Army are made.

In the afternoon of the 24th, departure by plane for the airport of Fermo; from there, to S. Ginesio to inspect the Memba Division. On the 25th, H.R.H. visits several units of the C.I.L.; on the 26th visit to the Command of the 8th Army; he has lunch with Gen. Leese. In the afternoon, he flies back to Rome.

In the first days of September, always through Col. Negroni, H.R.H. let it be known that he means to visit the towns of Florence and Pisa; Gen. Alexander notifies that he cannot take such a responsibility, because of the state of the operations, for security reasons, which had prevented the visit of Prime Minister Churchill. H.R.H. postpones his journey because of the reasons given by Gen. Alexander.

7 September Visit to the 210th Division.

In the afternoon of the 2nd, Col. Negroni is informed by telephone of the program of the visit of H.R.H.; as members of the March of Time sent by A.C.C. outfit to accompany H.R.H. to film the visit to the Italian units which are with the Allied Armies, General Tomaselli commanding the Groupment of Italian Forces to the 8th Army is asked to come to Rome to make the necessary arrangements. Difficulties having arisen, the film is not made.

1306

In the afternoon of the 7th, departure by plane for the airport of Siena. From there, he joins the Command of the 210th Division. The next day, during the inspection of the Units of this division, H.R.H. visits Florence and Pisa.

According to former agreements, he goes to the Command of the 5th Army where he has lunch with Gen. Clark.

The next morning he flies back to Rome.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APC 394

END/BJP

19 September 1944

338
344-

TO: Air Vice-Marshal Bowen Buscarlet, Air Forces Sub-Commission

Prime Minister Bonomi has agreed yesterday not to press the question of General Pinna's transfer from his present post as High Commissioner of Sardinia to accept a post in the Air Ministry because of the possibility of unfavorable reaction, both within the Air Force and from the public.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

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5/13 264

FILES A-B

19 Sept 1944

unsg
reser.

1305

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EIS/ajp

A/CC 091.711

19 September 1944

Subject: Proposed Proclamation Suggested by Italian General Staff

To : Major General L. Browning,
Army Sub-Commission (AMIA), Hq. ACC.

With reference to the above subject, I would be grateful if
you let me have your reply to my note of 7 Sept 44.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

See 354a

FILES A (B)

3/3 2 11

Hq. ACC	Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED	
19 Sept 1800	
msg.	
1804	

351

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Prepared by:

Lt. Col.

JAC/mina

Director WMD & IPW Sub. Comm.

In reply refer to:
A/CC 091.711-1

19 September 1944

Subject: "Cuneo" Division.To: Allied Force Headquarters, APO 612, U.S. Army.The attached memorandum from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs is forwarded. 68In a letter from General GAMMELL dated 7 March, 1944, it was clearly stated that personnel of the "Cuneo" Division were not to be considered in any way as Prisoners of War. 95This information was passed to the Italian Government by letter on 16 March, 1944. 284

On 10 July, 1944, I wrote forwarding a translation of a letter from the Italian Comando Supremo complaining that they had received information that the Command in Cairo had issued an order stating that Italian soldiers of the "Cuneo" Division were to be treated as Cooperating Prisoners of War. I requested that I be informed as to the position so that I could reply to the Comando Supremo, but so far I have received no reply to my letter.

I shall be pleased therefore if I may now receive an early reply to this letter so that I may be able to answer the enclosed letter from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 6 September, 1944. 11/150284
28 Sept 1115
Hb
DKRELLERY W. STONE,
Captain, U.S.N.R.,
Acting Chief CommissionerEncl. Memo from Italian Minister
of Foreign Affairs dated 6 Sep-
tember, 1944.

1303

FILES-A/B
11/150

Copy to Political Section.

350

C C P Y

Nr 6/431

MINISTERO DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION

The Allied Control Commission is aware that troops of the "Cuneo" and "Regina" divisions, as well as elements of the Italian Air Force and of the Royal Navy, after having gallantly fought alongside the Allied against the Germans in some of the Aegean Islands were, after the evacuation of the Islands, sent to Egypt.

In the aggregate they amount to 7000 men. The exact position of these men who have never been taken prisoners by the Allies with whom, instead, they have fought, has been made clear in two letters addressed to Marshall Messe by General Duschesne and Admiral Stone, respectively dated 18th February and 16th March, 1944, wherein it is specified that they would be employed under the same conditions as those obtaining for the units of the Italian Army in the rear of the Allied Armies and in no case were they to be considered as prisoners of war.

According, however, to subsequent information received from various sources it appears that the British Command in the Middle East has ruled that the Italian servicemen in question are to be considered as "co-operating prisoners" and not as "co-belligerents". The difference is considerable not only from the juridical and moral standpoint, but also from that of the material treatment afforded to them.

The Italian General Staff has already invited, on 3rd July, the technically competent Military Section of the Allied Control Commission to examine the question: however, given that the question bears also a political character, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deems it advisable to draw the attention also of the Political Section on the matter.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would therefore much appreciate the kind intervention of the Allied Control Commission in order to obtain that the treatment that was originally accorded

whom, instead, they have fought, has been made clear in two reports addressed to Marshall Messe by General Dushesne and Admiral Stone, respectively dated 18th February and 15th March, 1944, wherein it is specified that they would be employed under the same conditions as those obtaining for the units of the Italian Army in the rear of the Allied Armies and in no case were they to be considered as prisoners of war.

According, however, to subsequent information received from various sources it appears that the British Command in the Middle East has ruled that the Italian servicemen in question are to be considered as "co-operating prisoners" and not as "co-belligerents". The difference is considerable not only from the juridical and moral standpoint, but also from that of the material treatment afforded to them.

The Italian General Staff has already invited, on 3rd July, the technically competent Military Section of the Allied Control Commission to examine the question: however, given that the question bears also a political character, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deems it advisable to draw the attention also of the Political Section on the matter.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would therefore much appreciate the kind intervention of the Allied Control Commission in order to obtain that the treatment that was originally accorded to the Italian troops who have fought alongside the Allies and which was probably inadvertently modified by the British Command in the Middle East be re-established without undue delay.

/s/ GdB.

Rome, 6th September 1944.

1302

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015TRANSLATION

THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

N. 2323 Gab.

Rome, 16 September 1944

282

20 Sept 1930

1942

Admiral HENRY W. STONE

Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied

Control Commission

R O M E

I want to draw your particular attention to the enclosed letter sent by me to the public safety sub-commission; I should appreciate it very much if you adopted the solution I suggest.

Thanking you in advance for everything you will be able to do, I remain,
my dear Admiral,

Truly Yours,

/s/ I. Bonomi

See 337

REDO. E.O.

FILES A

1301

348

091711

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TRANSLATION

C O P Y

THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

Rome, 18 September 1944

TO THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
P.S. Sub-Commission

R O M E

and for information:

TO H.M. THE MINISTER OF WAR - WAR
TO THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF P.S. - SEAF

I had interested the Minister of War for the needs of the services of public order in Sicily, so that he should order two battalions of the R. Army to be transferred from Sardinia to Sicily, on the 1st of October, in view of the fact that the Allied troops will leave Sicily, and I deem it absolutely necessary that the garrison of the island should be reinforced.

Nevertheless I have been informed that the Allied Command has ordered that the two battalions now in Sicily should be sent to Calabria.

If this is true, I must draw the special attention of the Commission on the serious repercussions that the execution of such a disposition would determine on the conditions of public safety of Sicily, where the absence of two battalions - and on October 1st of four - would take us to a situation which is already little encouraging because of the lack of police troops.

Therefore, I ask the Commission to take in particular consideration the fact that it is necessary that the two battalions now in Sicily should not be transferred to Calabria and that two other battalions should be transferred - as mentioned above - from Sardinia to Sicily, on the 1st of October.

If necessary, the two battalions requested for Calabria could be immediately transferred in this region of Sardinia.

A communication on this subject will be welcome.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

1300

348

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HNS/ajp

A/CC 014.13

16 September 1944

Subject: Promotions - CC. RR.

To : Major General G. Lammie, CBE, MC.
Headquarters 3 District, C. M. F.

1. It is regretted that as yet the promotions referred to in your confidential letter of 6 September 44 have not been confirmed. However, it is anticipated that they will be forthcoming shortly. A copy of Army Sub-Commission's letter on the subject to the Minister of War is attached herewith for your information.

2. The delay was largely entailed by the difficulty in securing proper citations for the individuals concerned. These have been forwarded with the original of the letter to the Minister of War.

WILLIAM W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Incl:
Ltr fr Army S.C., dtd Sept 44.

5/2 2 2 7

Mo	ACC	Secy Gen.
DISPATCHED		
Date	17 Sept 1970	
File	12b.	
Index	12b.	

1294

346

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Subject: Promotion of CCRR for Gallantry

Army Sub Commission (MOMIA)
H. Q., A. C. C.
R O M E
AQ/11/2

Sep 44

MINISTRY OF WAR

- - - - -

Brigadiere LINORO Quinto
V/Brigadiere GALVINO Nicola
V/Brigadiere ZAZZARO Vincenzo

1. The above Carabinieri showed outstanding bravery, devotion to duty, and co-operation during the Allied landings on 9 Sep 43, and were promoted on the field to the rank of officers.
2. Copies of the recommendations from Comd. 94 Sub Area, which have the full approval of Maj - Gen. Collier, Comd. No. 3 District, are forwarded herewith.
3. It is requested that the Ministry of War confirm with effect from 9 Sep 43, the promotions, which were given to these Carabinieri for their excellent service.
4. Please treat as urgent.

JB/hh

s/ Major Generale.
Army Sub Commission (MOMIA)

Copy to: HQ No. 3 District.
HQ ACC. Adm Sec.

1298

(C O P Y)

3414

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

RUS/wfs

A/ CC 091.711-2

16 September 1944.

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Up to the present time the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has exercised complete control over all salvage operations in Italian waters, including Sicily and Sardinia. It is now planned to retain direct control only over operational salvage, including port clearance necessary in all harbors required for the use of Allied forces and the salvage of such ships and crafts in non-operational areas as may be required for use by the Allied forces. All other non-operational salvage will be gradually turned over to the Italian Government under the Allied Control Commission.

Salvage facilities of the Italian Navy and commercial salvage firms have been utilized through the Italian Ministry of Marine to excellent advantage for salvage work. The Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, will continue to employ a proportion of these facilities, the remainder will be available for non-operational salvage. In order that appropriate instructions may be issued, information is requested as to whether the Italian Ministry of Marine or the Italian Ministry of Public Works is responsible for the broad planning and co-ordination of harbor clearance and re-construction work and the actual salvage operations.

Yours very truly,

Hq ACC	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED	
Date Time	18 Sept 0910
Via	RR
Initials	WKR.

BILLY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

Copy to:
Naval CinC-Med.
PW & U SC ACC.
Navy Sub-Com.

Prepared By: H. St. John Butler
H. St. John Butler,
Commander, U.S. Navy
Navy Sub-Commission.

1297

2 2 3 50

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

ENS/hjp

13 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR FILES:

I had a conference with Prime Minister Bonomi on September 11th at 1630 hours.

+ + + +

Just before leaving, he stated that the Council of Ministers desired to appoint General Pinna as Chief of Staff to General Piacentini, Minister for Aeronautics, but that Air Vice-Marshal Bowen Buscarlet had asked that the matter be held up. He desired to inform me that all ~~six~~ parties agreed that General Pinna was acceptable from an anti-Fascist viewpoint, notwithstanding the fact that he held the position of Deputy to General Valle, when the latter was Undersecretary of the Air Ministry.

E. W. S.

This is an extract copy - full memo in file 000.1

091.711

1296

344

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

TO: ACC FOR STONE FOR LEWIN-HARRIS INFO ACC BARI FOR AIR FORCES SC
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 18.14
FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACHED CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
REFERENCE No: FX 24661 PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: SEP 13 1837Z OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE FHGEG

AS RESULT OF REPRESENTATIONS AIR FORCES SC AND ITALIAN AIR FORCE HQ WILL NOT
BE REQUIRED TO VACATE PRESENT ACCOMODATION AT BARI REUR S325 AND 327

DIST

INFO
AIR FORCE S/C (2)
ACTION C.S.O.
A/CC
FILE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

091.711 air

2 2 3 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AS REQUEST OF REPRESENTATIONS AIR FORCES SC AND ITALIAN AIR FORCE HQ WILL NOT
BE REQUIRED TO VACATE PRESENT ACCOMMODATION AT BARI REUR S325 AND 327

DIST

INFO
AIR FORCE S/C (2)
ACTION C.S.O.
A/CC
FILE

091.711 air Force

0 1295

341

DATE and Time of RECEIPT SEP 140800B.....

Distribution:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

AFHQ FOR C-5

HQ AGO

S-327

SEPT 12

SECRET

PRIORITY

A/CC

SUBJECT IS AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION AND ITALIAN AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS ACCOMMODATION
 HARI SEE MY SUGAR DASH THREE TWO FIVE OF NINE SEPTEMBER PD PARM TO AFHQ FOR
GEORGE DASH FIVE FROM HQ AGO FROM STONE PARM PRIME MINISTER BONOMI HAS MADE
 PROTEST TO ME IN STRONGEST TERMS PD HAS GENERAL BAKER BEEN ACQUAINTED WITH ALL
 FACTS SUBMITTED BY AIR VICE MARSHAL BOWEN DASH BUNCARLET PD FEEL IF FULL FACTS
 KNOWN TO HIM SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT BE SANCTIONED PD CANNOT STRESS TOO MUCH THE
 ADVERSE EFFECT ON MORALE OF IAF AS WHOLE CMA AND DAMAGING EFFECTS UPON OPERATIONS
 AT MOST CRITICAL TIME FOR BALKAN AIR FORCE PD HAS POSSIBILITY OF GIVING ONE FIVE
 AIR FORCE RECCO GOUP THE AMMINISTRAZIONE PROVINCIALE BUILDING HARI BEEN EXAMINED
 PD HAVE INSTRUCTED AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION AND ITALIAN AIR FORCE NOT TO MOVE
 AS IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION FOR ONE FIVE AIR
 FORCE PD

AUTHENTICATED:

DISTRIBUTION:

Air Forces S/C 1
 Sec Gen File 2
 " " Float 1

J. A. QUAYLE
 Major, R. A.
 Chief Staff Officer

1294

12 Sept

Sign

1944

341

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

AFHQ FOR G-5

HQ ACC

S-325

SEPT 9

SECRET

PRIORITY

A/CC

AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION ADVISES THAT HEADQUARTERS TWO DISTRICT IS REQUESTING THAT AIR MINISTRY AND OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS AND AFSC BE REQUESTED TO VACATE BUILDING IN BARI IN FAVOR OF PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE GROUP OF ONE FIVE AIR FORCE PD ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION NOT PROVIDED AND NO PRIOR CLEARANCE HAD PD PARM TO AFHQ FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE FROM HQ ACC FROM STONE PARM IF BUILDING TAKEN ACTION WILL DISORGANIZED ITALIAN HEADQUARTERS WHICH ADMINISTERS THEIR OPERATIONAL UNITS PD AFSC PROPOSES THAT ARMY VACATE AMMINISTRIZIONE PROVINCIALE BUILDING NEAR BY FOR ONE FIVE AIR FORCE USE PD DUE TO GEOGRAPHICAL JURISDICTIONAL CHANGE HEADQUARTERS AMI UNABLE TO SETTLE PD THE AFSC IS RESPONSIBLE TO BAF FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF ALL IAF UNITS WORKING WITH BAF AND IT IS ESSENTIAL IN THE VIEW OF AIR VICE MARSHAL BOWEN BUSCARLET THAT THE AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION AND THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE RETAIN ITS PRESENT ACCOMMODATION OR OTHERWISE BAF OPERATIONS WILL BE SERIOUSLY HANDICAPPED AT A MOST CRITICAL AND IMPORTANT TIME PD URGENTLY REQUEST STRONG REPRESENTATION BE MADE TO APPROPRIATE SECTION YOUR HEADQUARTERS AGAINST PROPOSED ACTION AND REQUEST WE BE NOTIFIED

AUTHENTICATED:

DISTRIBUTION:

Air Forces S/C	1
Sec Gen File	2
" " Float	1

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date Time 9 Sept 14.30
Via hand to Sec'y.
initials D.R.

L. D. DENSMORE
Colonel, Sig C
Chief Staff Officer

1293

f00

341

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: HQ ACC ROME FOR ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 74/9
FROM: AIR FORCES SC BARI, BUSCARLET CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
REFERENCE No: 0955 PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: SEP 09 OFFICE OF ORIGIN:

FURTHER MY O. 950 SEPT 8. HAVE DISCUSSED MATTER WITH HQ BALKAN AIR FORCE
WHO STATE THAT A S WE ARE RESPONSIBLE TO THEM FOR ORGANISATION ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL
MATTERS AND EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE THIS SUBCOMMISSION AND DETACHMENT OF
ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABOVE MUST REMAIN IN BARI

2241

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

WHO STATE THAT AS WE ARE RESPONSIBLE TO THEM FOR ORGANISATION ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL
MATTERS AND EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE THIS SUBCOMMISSION AND DETACHMENT OF
ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABOVE MUST REMAIN IN BARI

1292

DATE and Time of RECEIPT SEP 09 21 23B

Distribution:

341

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: HQ MAAF AIR FORCES SC ACC NAPLES AIR FORCES SC ACC ROME HQ BAF
 FROM: AIR FORCES SC ACC BARI
 REFERENCE No: C.954
 DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: SEP 09
 SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 75/09
 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
 PRECEDENCE: NONE
 OFFICE OF ORIGIN:

PERSONAL FOR BAKER FROM BUSCARLET. FURTHER MY O. 951 SEP 8. HAVE DISCUSSED
 MATTER WITH BALKAN AIR FORCE WHO AGREE THAT AS WE ARE RESPONSIBLE TO THEM FOR
 ORGANIZATION ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL MATTERS AND EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN AIR
 FORCE SQUADRONS IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT AIR FORCES SC AND DETACHMENT OF ITALIAN
 AIR MINISTRY DEALING WITH ABOVE MATTERS MUST REMAIN IN BARI.

DIST

INFO-SECTION - Air SC (2)
 INFO - A/CC
 C.S.O.
 FILE (2)
 FLOAT

2 2 4 3

MATTER WITH BALKAN AIR FORCE WHO AGREE THAT AS WE ARE RESPONSIBLE TO THEM FOR ORGANIZATION ADMINISTRATION TECHNICAL MATTERS AND EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN AIR FORCE SQUADRONS IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT AIR FORCES SC AND DETACHMENT OF ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY DEALING WITH ABOVE MATTERS MUST REMAIN IN BARI.

DIST

INFO-ACTION - Air SC (2)
INFO - A/CC
C.S.C.
FILE (2)
FLOAT

1291

DATE and Time of RECEIPT SEP 09 21 23B

Distribution:

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: HQ MAAT SSO (R) AFSC ACC ROME, FSC NAPLES, HQ BA FRA CME
 SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 18/9
 FROM: AFSC ACC BARI
 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
 REFERENCE No: o 951
 PRECEDENCE: NONE
 DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: Sep 08 OFFICE OF ORIGIN:

PERSONAL FOR BAKER FROM BUSCARLET. ON MY RETURN HERE I HAVE BEEN SHOWN HQ 2 DISTRICT LETTER TO AAI 1468/98/Q2 OF 4TH SEPT UNDER SIGNATURE GENERAL NARES WHICH RECOMMENDS MOST STRONGLY TO AAI THAT ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY AND OPERATIONAL HQ AND AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION SHOULD BE TURNED OUT OF OUR BUILDING HERE TO MAKE ROOM FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE GROUP OF 15TH AIR FORCE. THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE WHATEVER TO ME OR MY STAFF. NO ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE TO PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION EXCEPT BOLD STATEMENT THAT NONE EXISTS IN BARI. THIS ACTION WOULD INEVITABLY DISORGANISE ITALIAN HQ WHICH ADMINISTERS THEIR OPERATIONAL UNITS. MY COUNTER PROPOSAL IS THAT ARMY VACATE AMMINISTRAZIONE PROVINCIALE BUILDING NEXT DOOR TO US WHICH, IN MY VIEW, FULFILLS REQUIREMENTS AND IS USED AS BILLETTS AND OFFICES WHICH COULD WELL BE MOVED INTO HUTS OR UNDER CANVAS. IS BAKER AWARE OF THIS AND DOES HE APPROVE. NOTE YOUR HQ HAS NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN DISTRIBUTION OF ABOVE QUOTED LETTER. IN ANY CASE THIS ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTING ME AT ALL SEEMS GROSSLY DISCOURTEOUS. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE TO HAVE THIS STOPPED. HAVE MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO AAI AND CHIEF COMMISSIONER ACC.

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: Sep 08 OFFICE OF ORIGIN:

PERSONAL FOR BAKER FROM BUSCARLET. ON MY RETURN HERE HAVE BEEN SHOWN HQ 2 DISTRICT LETTER TO AAI 1468/98/Q2 OF 4TH SEPT UNDER SIGNATURE GENERAL NARES WHICH RE COMMENDS MOST STRONGLY TO AAI THAT ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY AND OPERATIONAL HQ AND AIR FORCES SUBCOMMISSION SHOULD BE TURNED OUT OF OUR BUILDING HERE TO MAKE ROOM FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE GROUP OF 15TH AIR FORCE. THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE WHATEVER TO ME OR MY STAFF. NO ATTEMPT HAS BEEN MADE TO PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE ACCOMODATION EXCEPT BOLD STATEMENT THAT NONE EXISTS IN BARI. THIS ACTION WOULD INEVITABLY DISORGANISE ITALIAN HQ WHICH ADMINISTERS THEIR OPERATIONAL UNITS. MY COUNTER PROPOSAL IS THAT ARMY VACATE ADMINISTRAZIONE PROVINCIALE BUILDING NEXT DOOR TO US WHICH, IN MY VIEW, FULFILLS REQUIREMENTS AND IS USED AS BILLETTS AND OFFICES WHICH COULD WELL BE MOVED INTO HUTS OR UNDER CANVAS. IS BAKER AWARE OF THIS AND DOES HE APPROVE. NOTE YOUR HQ HAS NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN DISTRIBUTION OF ABOVE QUOTED LETTER. IN ANY CASE THIS ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTING ME AT ALL SEEMS GROSSLY DISCOURTEOUS. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE TO HAVE THIS STOPPED. HAVE MADE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS TO AAI AND CHIEF COMMISSIONER ACC.

DIST
INFO-ACTION - Air Forces SC
INFO - CSO
A/CC
FILE (M)

DATE and Time of RECEIPT SEP 090920B

Distribution:

129

4838

HQ ACC ROME (14 SIGC CENTRE PASS) FOR ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER

32/09

AF SC ACC BARI, BOWEN BUSCARLET

O 950

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

HQ ACC. APO 394

133 Sec'y Gen.

Rec'd - 9 Sept 1948

By 1948

SEP 08

WOULD APPRECIATE ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE TO SQUASH PROPOSAL MADE BY HQ NO 2 DISTRICT TO AAI TO TURN ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY AND THIS SUBCOMMITTEE SIGN OUT OF THEIR BARI OFFICE BY SEPT 17TH TO ACCOMMODATE A PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE GROUP OF 15TH AIR FORCE. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN PUT UP MOST STRONGLY TO AAI UNDER GENERAL MARE'S SIGNATURE BUT NEITHER I OR MY STAFF WERE CONSULTED IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER. HQ 2 DISTRICT LETTER 1468/98 D2 OF SEPT 4TH ADDRESSED TO AAI IN THE REPERMENCE. NOT THE SLIGHTEST EFFORT IS MADE TO PROVIDE ANY ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION EXCEPT A STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NONE IN BARI AREA. PURPOSE FOR WHICH OUR BUILDING IS REQUIRED IS UNQUESTIONABLY OPERATIONAL AND OF HIGH PRIORITY BUT THIS IS HQ OF OPERATIONAL ITALIAN AIR FORCE AND A MOVE WOULD SERIOUSLY UPSET OUR RADIO AND LAND LINE LINKS ON WHICH ADMINISTRATION OF OUR UNITS DEPENDS. MY O 949 OF SEPT 9TH TO AAI REPEATED TO AIR FORCES SO ROME REFERS AND SUGGEST YOU SEE THIS. MY COUNTER PROPOSAL IS THAT ARMY VACATE AMMINISTRAZIONE PROVINCIALE BUILDING ON LONGOMARE NAZARIO SAURO WHICH THEY ARE USING AS BILLETES AND OFFICES AND MOVE INTO HUTS OR TENTAGE. THIS BUILDING WOULD I FEEL SURE FULFIL NECESSARY PROVISION

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SION OUT OF THEIR BARI OFFICES BY SEPT 17TH TO ACCOMMODATE A PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE GROUP OF 15TH AIR FORCE. PROPOSAL HAS BEEN PUT UP MOST STRONGLY TO AAI UNDER GENERAL NAKES SIGNATURE BUT NEITHER I OR MY STAFF WERE CONSULTED IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER. HQ 2 DISTRICT LETTER 1468/98 Q2 OF SEPT 4TH ADDRESSED TO AAI IS THE REFERENCE. NOT THE SLIGHTEST EFFORT IS MADE TO PROVIDE ANY ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION EXCEPT A STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NONE IN BARI AREA. PURPOSE FOR WHICH OUR BUILDING IS REQUIRED IS UNQUESTIONABLY OPERATIONAL AND OF HIGH PRIORITY BUT THIS IS HQ OF OPERATIONAL ITALIAN AIR FORCE AND A MOVE WOULD SERIOUSLY UPSET OUR RADIO AND LAND LINE LINKS ON WHICH ADMINISTRATION OF OUR UNITS DEPENDS. MY C 949 OF SEPT 9TH TO AAI REPEATED TO AIR FORCES SC HOME REFERS AND SUGGEST YOU SEE THIS. MY COUNTER PROPOSAL IS THAT ARMY VACATE AMMINISTRAZIONE PROVINCIALE BUILDING ON LONGOMARE NAZARIO SAURO WHICH THEY ARE USING AS BILINGS AND OFFICES AND MOVE INTO HUTS OR TENTAGE. THIS BUILDING WOULD I FEEL SURE FULFIL NECESSARY PROVISION FOR WHICH ACCOMMODATION IS REQUIRED.

DIST
ACTION - G S O (2)
INFO - A/CO
AIR SQ (2) 1289
FILE
FLOAT

SEP 091435B

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: AFHQ INFO: DISTWO AIRFORCES SC BARI AIR FORCES SC ACC
FROM: MAIN AAI
REFERENCE No: QR 3002
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: SEP 09

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 28/09
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
PRECEDENCE: NONE
OFFICE OF ORIGIN:

REF MY Q 2947 AND 2030/10/Q2 OF 8 SEP. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF
SIGNAL FROM AIR FORCES SC WHICH REFERS.

"REF 0.949 OF 8. REF HQ 2 DISTRICT LETTER TO AMAME.1468/98/2
OF SEPT.4. TAKE STRONGEST POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TO THIS LETTER. NEITHER
I OR MY STAFF HAVE BEEN CONSULTED IN ANY DEGREE WHATEVER OVER THIS
QUESTION. BARI IS THE OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HQ OF THE
ITALIAN AIR FORCE WORKING IN ACTIVE SUPPORT OF ALLIED WAR EFFORT
AND CONTROLS W SQUADRONS. NO ATTENTION HA APPARENTLY BEEN PAID
TO RADIO LINKS AND LANDLINES WHICH EXIST FROM THIS BUILDING TO AIR
MINISTRY ROME AND OPERATIONAL UNITS ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY HAS ALREADY
BEEN THROWN-OUT OF THEIR OWN BUILDING IN BARI TO ACCOMODATE 15TH AIR
FORCE HQ. THE ABOVE QUOTED LETTER MAKES NO ATTEMPT EVEN TO PROVIDE
ALTERNATIVE ACCOMODATION M LEAVE CEPEC YOUR HQ LETTER 2030/12/Q2
OF 1ST JULY 1944."

DIST

INFO-ACTION - AIR SC (2)
INFO - CSO
A/CC
FILE (2)

SIGNAL FROM AIR FORCES SC WHICH REFERS.

"REF 0.949 OF 8. REF HQ 2 DISTRICT LETTER TO AMAME.1468/98/2 OF SEPT.4. TAKE STRONGEST POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TO THIS LETTER. NEITHER I OR MY STAFF HAVE BEEN CONSULTED IN ANY DEGREE WHATEVER OVER THIS QUESTION. BARI IS THE OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HQ OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE WORKING IN ACTIVE SUPPORT OF ALLIED WAR EFFORT AND CONTROLS W SQUADRONS. NO ATTENTION HA APPARENTLY BEEN PAID TO RADIO LINKS AND LANDLINES WHICH EXIST FROM THIS BUILDING TO AIR MINISTRY ROME AND OPERATIONAL UNITS ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY HAS ALREADY BEEN THROWN-OUT OF THEIR OWN BUILDING IN BARI TO ACCOMODATE 15TH AIR FORCE HQ. THE ABOVE QUOTED LETTER MAKES NO ATTEMPT EVEN TO PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE ACCOMODATION M LEAVE CEFEC YOUR HQ LETTER 2030/12/Q2 OF 1ST JULY 1944."

DIST

INFO-ACTION - AIR SC (2)
INFO - CSO
A/CC
FILE (2)
FLOAT

1288

DATE and Time of RECEIPT ...SEP 091225B

Distribution:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C O P Y

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Maj.Gen.Sir Brian H.Robertson, Bt,
Chief Administrative Officer
HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.

5001/9/CAO

12 Sep 44.

My dear Stone,

I have received a complaint from G.O.C. EIGHTH ARMY to the effect that the PRINCE of PIEDMONT, according to his information, visited the forward EIGHTH ARMY area on 26 Aug without notification.

I have had other reports from different sources regarding the movements of the PRINCE of PIEDMONT in the operational zone.

I am sure that you will agree that the PRINCE of PIEDMONT, like other visitors, should have permission before he goes forward into the operational zone and that this HQ should always be informed of his movements when he is in our area.

I should be grateful to have an assurance from you that this matter will receive attention.

Yours sincerely

/s/ B.H. ROBERTSON

Capt. Ellery W. Stone, USNR,
Chief Commissioner,
AQ A.C.C.

11 C 160
A 7 (B)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

Captain Stone,

I have spoken to General Infante. He says that notification was given to the Italian Liaison officer AAI.

The proof that the message was received lies in the fact that the Prince's plane was met by General Leese's car and that the Prince lunched with General Leese at the General's express invitation.

In light of this, Gen. Robertson's letter does not seem to make sense.

General Infante is coming in to explain the matter further to me in the morning.

Q.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/hjp

A/CC 014.13

10 September 1944

TO: Vice President, Administrative Section, Hq ACC

1. On 29 June 44 there was sent to your office A/CC 014.13 subject "Promotions - CC.ER" and letter dated 25 June 44, 4/GSI from Gen. Collier, 3 District, for action.
2. On 17 July 44 a follow-up was sent you.
3. Attached is copy of letter on the subject from Gen. Lammie, HQ 3 Dist, CMF, dated 6 Sept 44.
4. May I have report upon which to base a reply to General Lammie.

Stone

1 Incl:
as per para 3 above

FILES A-18

Hq ACC
DISTRIBUTION
11 Sep 1944
1285
- Maggi
BKP.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C O P Y

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Maj Gen G LAMMIE, CBE, MC.

HQ 3 District
C.M.F.

6 Sep 44

SUBJECT: Promotions - CC.RR.

May I be informed whether the promotions referred to in your A/CC 014.13 dated 29 June 1944 have been confirmed by the Italian Authorities.

/s/ G. Lammie

Major General.

Captain Ellery W. Stone, USNR,
Acting Chief Commissioner,
HQ ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C O P Y

A.V.M. Bowen-Buscarlet

Will you see me regarding this - please?
(S.)

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED CONTROL
COMMISSION
B A R I

AFSC/INT/15.

6th September 1944

Your Excellency

With reference to our conversation this morning on the subject of General Pinna, I should be obliged if you would defer any action to get this Officer over from Sardinia until you hear further from me as the Chief Commissioner is interested in the matter.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

51.711

The Italian Air Minister

1283
FILES A (B)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

ENS/hjp

7 September 1944

TO: General Browning, Army Sub-Commission, Hq ACC

1. The Italian General Staff has proposed the issuance of a proclamation which will declare all of the Mainland an "operation zone" within the meaning of Italian law. The reasons for the issuance of the proposed proclamation are set forth in the attached aide-memoire.

2. I can see no objection to this, and if you concur, will so advise the Italian Government.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Incl:
Personal memo to
Captain Stone

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date - Time 7 Sept 1430
Via *Major*
Initials *JS*

FILES A-B

1282

See 351

331

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C O P Y

Personal

MEMO TO CAPTAIN STONE

The areas of liberated Italy still considered "operation zones" are those which had been proclaimed such before September 8th, 1943. They include Sicily, Calabria, etc., up to the provinces of Naples, Benevento and Foggia included.

On the other hand, the areas in which actual fighting is now taking place are not considered "operation zones". This leads to the absurd consequence that for instance a member of the Italian Armed Forces stationed in Palermo draws (or should, at least, legitimately draw) higher wages, have more career advantages, etc., than another man in the same conditions now fighting or working near Pisa or Florence.

CIL troops on the battlefield do draw the so-called "operations indemnity" (roughly amounting to half the total pay, or more), but they really draw it illegitimately, because Sicily or Apulia are considered "operation zones", Ancona or Pesaro are not!

Logically, the whole situation ought to be completely reversed; but owing to economic reasons, mainly in order not to cut down abruptly the wages of military personnel in the South of about 50%, the General Staff proposed to simply extend the "operation zone" to the whole of the liberated territory.

The scheme is therefore of a purely economic nature; it merely aims to regularize an abnormal situation.

It has been stressed that it would only refer to the regular Armed Forces, and that it would not affect the status of partisans, or lead to their inclusion in the regular Army.

4569
300 pgs
3/5/66
7/6-1730

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

TOP SECRET

CIPHER MESSAGE IN

FOLIO NO: 40750
5 SEPT 44
TOC: 1646B, 08
TOR: 2325B, 06

FROM: SIGNED: WILSON CITE FRGCT

TO: AGWAR FOR THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO: SHAFF
FOR EISENHOWER AND US FOR PASS TO BRITISH CHIEFS OF
STAFF TROOPERS, AAL, ACC (FOR ARMY SUB COMMISSION) QUARTERS

ORIG NO: EX 92422

THIS IS NAF 773.

SEP 1944
A.C.C.

PAN 887 AND PAN 881 ARE REFERENCE. ONE. BECAUSE OF NON
AVAILABILITY OF SUCH EQUIPMENT AND CONTINUING MAINTENANCE,
IMPOSSIBLE TO ATTEMPT TO EQUIP ANY SUCH UNITS OF ITALIAN COMBAT
DIVISIONS WITH EITHER ITALIAN OR CAPTURED GERM. MATERIAL THEREFORE
MUST ACCEPT BRITISH EQUIPMENT OFFERED IN TROOPERS 67588 LSH
5 OF 12 AUG (NOT TO ALL), DETAILS OF WHICH ARE AT PRESENT
BEING WORKED OUT BETWEEN TROOPERS AND OURSELVES. IN CONSEQUENCE
OR DIVISIONS RECEIVING BRITISH COMBAT EQUIPMENT, IT IS CONSIDERED
ESSENTIAL THAT THESE TROOPS BE REGARDED ENTIRELY AS A BRITISH
NATIONAL SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIAL EQUIPMENT AND
MAINTENANCE AND ARE CONSIDERED AS SUCH IN TAKING OF CARRYING
INTO CATEGORY UNDER TERMS OF PAN 881
TWO. PARA TWO OF PAN 887 PRESUMED TO REFER TO US EQUIPMENT
ISSUED THROUGH WAR DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AND NOT TO EQUIPMENT OF
US ORIGIN SUPPLIED TO BRITISH UNDER LEASE TERMS.
THREE. FOLLOWING ANSWERS TO PARA FOUR PAN 887 WHICH REQUESTED
OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR AUXILIARY UNITS IN COMBAT DIVISIONS, THE
FIVE REQUESTED TO TRAIN ANOTHER SYSTEM OF EQUIPMENT AND STAFFABILITY
OF ITALIAN TROOPERS. SUB PARA A. REQUIREMENTS FOR AUXILIARY
ARTILLERY - NIL. FOR SERVICE UNITS AS FOLLOWS: READ IN TWO
COLUMNS. A TYPE OF SERVICE. B NUMBER AND TYPE OF UNITS.
A ENGINEERS. B 3 FIELD PARK COMPANIES. A SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT
B THREE GENERAL TRANSPORT COMPANIES, ONE MOTOR AMBULANCE COMPANY.
A MEDICAL. B FOUR GENERAL HOSPITALS - TOTAL TWO THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED BEDS, 6-100 BED EXPANSION. ONE ADVANCE DIRECT MEDICAL
STORES. A ORDNANCE. B ONE MOB LAUNDRY COMPANY, FOUR TOR PATH
UNITS. A PROVOST. B ONE L OF C PROVOST COY. A DISCHARGEABLES.
B TWO TRANSIT COYS. ONE REINFORCEMENT TRAINING DEPOT, ONE GRAVES

DIVISIONS. THE EITHER ITALIAN OR CAPTURED BRITISH MATERIAL IN RESPONSE
 MUST ACCEPT BRITISH EQUIPMENT OFFERED IN TROOPERS 67583 LSH
 5 OF 12 AUG (NOT TO ALL), DETAILS OF WHICH ARE AT PRESENT
 BEING WORKED OUT BETWEEN TROOPERS AND OURSELVES. IN CONSEQUENCE
 OR DIVISIONS RECEIVING BRITISH COMBAT EQUIPMENT, IT IS CONSIDERED
 ESSENTIAL THAT THESE TROOPS BE REGARDED ENTIRELY AS A BRITISH
 NATIONAL SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIAL EQUIPMENT AND
 MAINTENANCE AND ARE CONSIDERED AS SUCH IN A BAKKOUT OF CEILING
 INTO CATEGORIES UNDER TERMS OF PAR 391.
 TWO PARAS TWO OF PAR 397 PRESUMED TO REFER TO US EQUIPMENT OF
 ISSUED THROUGH WAR DEPARTMENT CHANNELS AND NOT TO EQUIPMENT OF
 US ORIGIN SUPPLIED TO BRITISH UNDER LEASE TERMS.
 THREE FOLLOWING ANSWERS TO PARA FOUR PAR 387 WITH REQUESTED
 OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AUXILIARY UNITS IN COMBAT DIVISIONS, TWO
 FIVE REQUIRED TO REPAIR ARMOR REPAIR OF EQUIPMENT AND AUXILIARY
 OF ITALIAN TANKS. SUB PARA A, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AUXILIARY
 ARTILLERY. NIS. FOR SERVICE UNITS AS FOLLOWS: READ IT TWO
 COLUMNS. A TYPE OF SERVICE. B NUMBER AND TYPE OF UNITS.
 A ENGINEERS. B 3 FIELD PARK COMPANIES. A SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT
 B THREE GENERAL TRANSPORT COMPANIES. ONE MOTOR AMBULANCE COMPANY.
 A MEDICAL. B FOUR GENERAL HOSPITALS - TOTAL TWO THOUSAND TWO
 HUNDRED BEDS. 6-100 BED EXPANSION. ONE ADVANCE DEPOT MEDICAL
 STORES. A ORDNANCE. B ONE MOB LAUNDRY COMPANY. FOUR MOB BATH
 UNITS. A PROVOST. B ONE C PROVOST COY. A MISCELLANEOUS
 B TWO TRANSIT COMP. ONE REINFORCEMENT TRAINING DETACH. ONE GRAVES
 REGISTRATION UNIT. SUB PARA B. ESTIMATED UNITS WILL BE TRAINED
 AND READY FOR COMBAT TWO MONTHS AFTER RECEIPT OF FULL SCALE OF
 EQUIPMENT. FOR THIS TIME COULD BE REDUCED DEPENDENT UPON SCALE
 OF TRAINING EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO BE REFORCED. SUB PARA C. THREE
 IS AMPLIFIED AVAILABLE TO BE ALL REQUIREMENTS TO PAR 391. **1280**
 FOR ITALIAN MILITARY FORCES.
 FOUR. THE RECOMMENDED CEILING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT
 IS 128000. UNDER OUR INTERPRETATION OF PAR 391 AS IS ASSUMED
 THAT YOU WILL CONSIDER OR ESTABLISH THIS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT.
 HOWEVER, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE NATIONAL COMMITMENTS BE
 VARIED WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS IN ORDER TO INCREASE OPERATIONAL
 REQUIREMENTS. BREAKDOWN OF THE PRESENT COMMITMENT
 UTILIZATION OF ITALIAN MILITARY FORCES (INCLUDING NAVAL AND AIR)
 INTO CATEGORIES FOLLOWS: US COMMITMENT - TWENTY THOUSAND. BRITISH
 COMMITMENT - 280000. INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT 128000. GRAND TOTAL
 474000. REINFORCEMENTS, EQUIVALENT TO US REINFORCEMENTS, ARE

CONTINUED

FILES A D

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CONTINUED - SHEET 2 ORIG NO: FX 92422 FOLIO NO: 40750

INCLUDED FOR ALL UNITS EXCEPT AIR FORCE AND NAVY, AND ARE FIGURED AS FIVE PER CENT FOR SERVICE UNITS AND TEN PER CENT FOR COMBAT UNITS, AND WILL PROVIDE A RESERVE TO COVER ABSENTEES, HOSPITALIZATION, ETC, AND ALLOW ITALIAN UNITS TO BE AT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AT ALL TIMES.

FIVE. THE NEW POLICY CREATED IN FAN 391 WILL REQUIRE CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES. SINCE SUPPLY CHANNELS PRESENTLY ESTABLISHED BY FAN 338 ARE OPERATIVE TO COVER ALL STRENGTHS IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE DATE FOR THE NEW ORDER OF SEPARATE RESPONSIBILITIES BE SET AS FIFTEEN SEPTEMBER 1944. IN THE EVENT OF YOUR APPROVAL OF THIS DATE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT LEASE PROCEDURE WITHIN THE THEATRE BE UTILISED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SUPPLY ACTION OF THE SEPARATE AGENCIES CAN BE MADE EFFECTIVE. THE TERM SUPPLY IS TAKEN TO COVER PROVISION OF ALL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT, RATIONS, CLOTHING ETC.

SIX. CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL ALL CATEGORIES ITALIAN ARMED FORCES RECEIVE COMMON STANDARD OF TREATMENT, BOTH REGARDING RATIONS, PERSONAL EQUIPMENT, CLOTHING AND ALSO DISCIPLINE AND ADMINISTRATION. RECOMMEND EXISTING SCALES UNDER INTERNATIONAL BASIS AS MOST SUITABLE. THESE SCALES PROVIDE FOR FOOD IN PARTS OF 2368 CALORIES PER MAN PER DAY UNDER PROVISION OF FAN 355 AND ISSUES OF CLOTHING AND OTHER SUPPLIES UNDER TERMS OF FAN 338.

SEVEN. ALL ITEMS OF ITALIAN EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY AVAILABLE OR BECOMING AVAILABLE IN THE FUTURE WILL BE ALLOCATED AMONGST THE UNITS OF THE THREE CATEGORIES UNDER PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED HERE TO ENSURE THAT EQUIPABLE DISTRIBUTION OF SUCH EQUIPMENT IS MADE, HAVING REGARD TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

EIGHT. REFERENCE FAN 392. THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT OF THE ARMY SUB - COMMISSION WAS COVERED BY THEATRE OVERHEAD AND ANY ALTERATIONS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGE IN POLICY IN FAN 391 CAN BE ADJUSTED WITHIN THE THEATRE. NO SUCH ALTERATIONS ARE ENVISAGED UNTIL THE NEW SUPPLY ORGANISATION IS OPERATING SATISFACTORILY.

TO COVER PROVISION OF ALL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT, RATIONS, CLOTHING ETC.

SIX. CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL ALL CATEGORIES ITALIAN ARMED FORCES RECEIVE COMMON STANDARD OF TREATMENT, BOTH REGARDING RATIONS, PERSONAL EQUIPMENT, CLOTHING AND ALSO DISCIPLINE AND ADMINISTRATION. RECOMMEND EXISTING SCALES UNDER INTERNATIONAL BASIS AS MOST SUITABLE. THESE SCALES PROVIDE FOR FOOD IN PARTS OF 2363 CALORIES PER MAN PER DAY UNDER PROVISION OF FAN 355 AND ISSUES OF CLOTHING AND OTHER SUPPLIES UNDER TERMS OF FAN 338.

SEVEN. ALL ITEMS OF ITALIAN EQUIPMENT PRESENTLY AVAILABLE OR BECOMING AVAILABLE IN THE FUTURE WILL BE ALLOCATED AMONGST THE UNITS OF THE THREE CATEGORIES UNDER PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED HERE TO ENSURE THAT EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF SUCH EQUIPMENT IS MADE, HAVING REGARD TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

EIGHT. REFERENCE FAN 392. THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT OF THE ARMY SUB - COMMISSION WAS COVERED BY THEATRE OVERHEAD AND ANY ALTERATIONS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGE IN POLICY IN FAN 391 CAN BE ADJUSTED WITHIN THE NEW THEATRE. NO SUCH ALTERATIONS ARE ENVISAGED UNTIL THE NEW SUPPLY ORGANISATION IS OPERATING SATISFACTORILY.

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DCAO
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Q(AE)
ACC

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SMT. 0200B. 06
TT. 0235B. 06
TK

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NOTE BY SMC - PASSED TO ADV



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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015**SECRET**

EWS/hjp

A/CC 014.13

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali

TO : Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. Reference your 1605/50/44/G (SDI) dated 13 Aug 44.

2. In compliance with para 4 of the above letter, I submit as Appendix "A" hereto a brief outline showing the organization, strength and location of the Carabinieri.

3. With respect to the suggestions made in para 3 of your letter, it would seem desirable first to clarify the expressions "Carabinieri maintained by the Italian Government" and "Carabinieri maintained by the Allies". With respect there cannot be two such classes any more than you could have part of the Italian Army maintained by the Allies and part by the Italian Government.

The reason briefly is that the Carabinieri are an integral part of the Italian Army and the senior corps in the Army; this fact coupled with the importance of their duties (especially in connection with the black market) make it essential for them to continue to receive Army rations, Army petrol and Army clothing as at present; there is no other source from which these essential supplies can come.

4. As already pointed out in para 2 above, for all administrative purposes the Carabinieri are under the control of the Italian Government. It is true that in Military Government Territory, ACC Public Safety Officers supervise the duties of the Carabinieri, but the functions and organization remains unchanged. In fact, territory can be handed over to the Italian Government without the necessity of making any changes whatever in Carabinieri organization and administration. Rations, petrol, clothing and supplies are unaffected by the assumption of control by the Italian Government.

Again this proposal will not have the effect of reducing the Carabinieri strength.

5. It appears that the purpose of the proposed changes is to limit the amount of food and equipment to be supplied from Allied sources. In this connection it is our view that fundamental changes in the organization of the Italian police ought not to be made merely

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015**SECRET**

because of a temporary shortage of supplies. The organization of the Italian Police Forces is complex, affecting numerous Government Departments and civilian agencies. This Commission is not charged with the task of making constitutional changes in Italian national institutions, which is a matter for the Italian Government.

6. The following observations are offered regarding the specific suggestions made in para 3 of your letter:

a. Formation of separate corps of Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia.

Separate Carabinieri Brigades exist in Sicily and Sardinia. If it is proposed that these Brigades should be treated differently from other Brigades in the matter of rations and supplies this Commission advises most strongly against any such discrimination, which would be fatal to the "esprit de corps" of the Carabinieri.

From the political standpoint any proposal to divorce Carabinieri in Sicily and Sardinia from Carabinieri on the mainland would almost certainly be taken as a sign of encouragement by the "Separatist" parties.

It is pointed out that this proposal will do nothing to reduce the Carabinieri ceiling.

b. Transfer of Carabinieri to Finance Guards.

It will be appreciated that the functions of the Carabinieri are entirely different from those of the Finance Guards, who, under the control of the Ministry of Finance, are mainly engaged in enforcing revenue laws.

This is specialized work for which the Carabinieri are not trained. Carabinieri duties, on the other hand, are quite outside the experience of the Finance Guards. Further, the method and standards of selection and recruitment are different; lastly, such a transfer would be fatal to the esprit de corps of the CGMR.

7. In general it must be emphasized that the Carabinieri is part of the Italian Army with proud traditions and high morale. Any attempt to break up the Carabinieri at this stage would be disastrous to a body which has already done much to aid the Allied cause and whose services are still essential to the war effort in Italy.

1 Incl:
Appendix "A"

Draft submitted by:
Brig. Upjohn, Admin Sec

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date Time <u>16 Sept 1946</u>
Via <u>176</u>
Initials <u>ARD</u>
SECRET

ELLENY S. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1277

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015**SECRET**APPENDIX "A"

6 September 1944

CARABINIERI REALI1. Present Organization

a. The present organization of the Carabinieri consists of a General Headquarters at Rome; two divisions (2nd and 3rd) with Hqs at Rome and Naples, respectively. Each division normally consists of two brigades. Thus far three brigades have been activated: Rome, Naples and Palermo. A fourth brigade will soon be activated at Florence. Eventually the first Division will be reactivated with Hqs at Milan.

b. The brigades are sub-divided into Legions, the strength of which varies with the density of population and the area covered. At the moment, there are nine Legions namely: Abruzzi, Bari, Cagliari, Catanzaro, Lazio, Messina, Naples, Palermo and Rome. The nuclei for the Legions of Florence and Leghorn are now being organized.

c. Each Legion is sub-divided into progressively small units: Groups, Companies, Lieutenancies, Sections and Stations. The jurisdiction of Group corresponds to that of Province.

2. The present strength is indicated as follows as of 1 August:

General Hq	129	Replacement Centre, Bari	381
Abruzzi Legion	2502	Replacement Centre, Rome	3013
Bari Legion	4564	Nucleus for the activation	
Cagliari Legion	4053	of Florence Legion	300
Catanzaro Legion	2797	Nucleus for the activation	
Lazio Legion	4446	of Leghorn Legion	100
Messina Legion	3546	MO's Bn Bari	231
Napoli Legion	5726	Cadet Bn Andria	728
Rome Legion	4602	Cadet Bn Barietta	514
Palermo Legion	4764	Cadet Bn Gallipoli	409
Replacement Centre, Naples	255	Cadet Bn Cagliari	515
		Cadet Bn Palermo	379
			<u>43954</u>

Strength of the Leghorn nucleus is not available at this time.

The total strength shown of 41,892 includes all Carabinieri serving with troops.

Total strength of Carabinieri serving with troops is 3,011.

3. Future Organization.

It is planned that the future organization on the basis of ¹²⁷⁶ authorized strength of 65,000 will be approximately as indicated below. Allowance of course must be made for developments which might warrant

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015**SECRET**

an increase in strength in a particular area.

Strength of CC.M. for all of Italy
based on a ceiling of 65,000

Torino	4211	Napoli	3220
Alessandria	2544	Sari	2640
Genova	4793	Catanzaro	2037
Livorno	2543	Palermo	2870
Milano	5289	Messina	2105
Verona	2244	Commando Generale	84
Bolzano	2715	Inspectorates of Brigades	30
Padova	2698	Central School	158
Trieste	3256	Cadet Legion	3960
Bologna	3285	Rome Battalion	1200
Firenze	3001	Palermo Bn	500
Abruzzi	2094	Squadron Groups	300
Cagliari	2134	Band	80
Roma	2487	King's Guards	90
Lazio	2132		
			<u>65000</u>

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SECRET

335

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015**SECRET**

EWS/hjp

A/CC 014.13
ACC/14622/PS

6 September 1944

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali

TO : Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in Italy

1. Reference 1605/50/44/G (EDI), dated 13 Aug 44.

2. A communication, giving the data requested paragraph 4 and stating our view of the proposals made in paragraph 3 of the above reference, is being forwarded under separate cover.

3. However, since my letter to you of 1 August, which dealt with the ceiling strength of the Carabinieri, new circumstances have arisen which present an acute problem of immediate importance insofar as policing of the industrial north of Italy is concerned. The fact of outstanding importance is that it has recently been reported that 14,000 of the Carabinieri north of the PIUA - MEDIAN line have been sent away to Germany, and will therefore not be available for duty. This eliminates one of the principal sources of manpower upon which this Commission relied for the proper policing of the civil community in that area.

4. At the moment the actual strength of the Carabinieri is 43,954 men. A ceiling of 55,000 is authorized and for the above reason it may be impossible even to fill this ceiling. Since the Carabinieri is a part of the Italian Army, it follows that the overall strength of the Italian Army is short at least 11,000 men. It is accordingly proposed that the Ministry of War in conjunction with the MMIA be authorized to arrange for the immediate transfer of 11,000 qualified men from other elements of the Army to the Carabinieri Reali. The deficit thus created in the other elements could be compensated for by calling up a new class. This would fill up the CCAR to its presently authorized strength, and would form a nucleus for policing the North.

5. Furthermore if no CCAR are found in the North it may be necessary to go further and ask that in order to make up the balance of 23,000, which in my opinion is the minimum necessary for policing the North (see my A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug para 5 and 6), part of the Italian Army be temporarily attached to the CCAR to work with them on police duties. Such an attachment has been arranged in Sicily in connection with the grain system and is working well.

SECRETFILES A-B
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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015**SECRET**

6. This Commission is still of the view that a Carabinieri strength of 65,000 is necessary. The need therefore was set forth in my letter of 1 August. But since the prospect of reaching the present authorized ceiling is made virtually impossible by the action of the Germans, it is urgently requested that favorable consideration be given to the proposal made above, while the question of ceiling is still being considered.

MURRAY W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Army Sub-Commission

Draft submitted by:
Brig. Upjohn, Admin Section

SECRET

5/10/55

Hq ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCH 1273
Date - Time 6 Sept 1915
Via 145
Incls 200

334

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

REFERENCES

Ref: 8027/CA.
A/CO 091.711

4th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Post Hostilities Planning.

To : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. Further to my letter A/CC 091.711 of August 31st, I attach herewith comments by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station, in reply to the questions raised by the Post Hostilities Planning staff. I would also add that Major-General Browning, G. O. C., Army Sub-Commission, has stated that he is in agreement with the drafted replies forwarded with my above-quoted letter.

2. Would you please arrange for this further information to be forwarded to Lieut. Colonel Godes.

ELIJAH S. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

No copies of enclosure for files.
Copy in CH & file 809/2/cn

FILES AND

No. A.C.C. Sat'y Gen.
 DISBURSEMENT
 5-24-92 1995
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 DRD

333

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C O P Y

S E C R E T

POST HOSTILITIES PLANNING - ITALY.

(Executive Commissioner H.C.M.G. Section, A.C.C.'s letter of
29th August 1944).

II

No. L.341/1.

COMMANDER-in-CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN STATION.
(Copy to: Flag Officer Taranto, Adriatic
and Liaison, Italy).

In view of urgency of reply am sending enclosed direct by
car for your comments etc.

2. I have informed the Executive Commissioner that his comments
are all that can be given at the present time and that I have referred
the matter to you.

ROME.
30th August 1944.

(Sgd) ? Palmer.
for Rear Admiral.

Med.00700/1
THE FLAG OFFICER,
TARANTO, ADRIATIC & LIAISON
ITALY (ROME).

The Commander-in-Chief's comments have been added and corres-
pondence is returned to you.

Mediterranean.
31st August 1944.

(Sgd M. B. LAING.
for ADMIRAL)

1271

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

COMMENTS BY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN:

1. None, beyond the terms of the Armistice, Cunningham - De Courten agreement, CCS 515/1 and the possibility of certain ships being turned over to the Russians.

All naval forces are under allied control.

2. None, except that at present the Forces are under Allied control;

3. In fact we have added to the defences as the Italians now man A/S stations etc. although the apparatus remains our property.

4. Additional reply:

Not only will many of Italian forces be necessary for internal security and frontier defence and quite apart from the volte-face which disarmament and disbandment would be, there are many practical difficulties in carrying it out. The very suggestion would create a political crisis of the highest order.

Concur Executive Commissioner.

5. Concur Executive Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015SECRET.Ref: A/CC 091.71131st August 1944.

SUBJECT: Post Hostilities Planning.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. Lieut. Colonel A.C. GEDDES from the War Office sent the attached questionnaire to the Executive Commissioner on 29th August and asked for reply by 1st September.
2. The questions raise such important matters of principle that it is impossible adequately to reply. I have, however, made replies and pass these to you in case you wish to add comment or reject them.
3. Will you ensure that Lieut. Colonel Geddes receives the papers by noon, 1st September, c/o H.A. to S.A.C.

(333)

333

ELBERT W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

*Original returned to
Brig Lusk for Marking
700*

FILES A/B 1269

332

1. Question: It would be of great assistance to P.H.P. if you could discover from the Control Commission what plans (if any) they have in mind for the disarming and demobilization of the Italian Forces (including Naval and Air) some of which we understand are under Allied control, while others are under Italian control. We would appreciate the latest figures of this with breakdown showing Carabinieri Territoriale and Guardia Finanza separately.
Answer: No plans have been made and while all the Italian armed forces are fighting with the Allied forces it would seem premature to make them. It is certainly impossible to make them until the policy of the Allied Nations regarding the disarmament of co-belligerents is known.
2. Question: What plans, if any, have been formulated for restricting the construction of Italian merchant ships or warships?
Answer: No plans have been made.
3. Question: We shall have to consider the restrictions to be imposed on Italian coastal and frontier defenses. It is understood from C.A.7 that the Germans either destroyed the coastal defenses or removed the guns, etc. Is this correct? If not, have essential parts of guns been removed by the Control Commission? Have the Control Commission any plan for dealing with any frontier fortifications which the Germans may not be able to destroy, e.g., those seized by Italian patriots?
Answer: Such defenses as were not destroyed by the Germans are now manned by Italians as co-belligerents in aid of the Allies. It is not the Control Commission's responsibility to deal with frontier fortifications.
4. Question: Politically, there are obvious difficulties in disarming Italians after making use of their forces, and even equipping them, but do the Control Commission foresee any practical difficulties in carrying this out?
Answer: Yes.
5. Question: Temporarily, at any rate, the United Nations must be responsible for the administration and internal security of the disputed frontier areas, but, ultimately, when the frontiers have been decided on the Italians will have to undertake this task. If they are to do this some skeleton organization will have to be left in addition to the Carabinieri, etc. Have the Control Commission any ideas on this subject?
Answer: It is impossible to give a reasonable estimate of the strength of the internal security forces until the political and administrative picture in the North is known. The present ceiling of the Carabinieri is 55,000. This should be raised as soon as possible to 65,000 (representations have already been made).

If not, have essential parts of guns been removed by the Control Commission? Have the Control Commission any plan for dealing with any frontier fortifications which the Germans may not be able to destroy, e.g., those seized by Italian patriots?

Answer: Such defenses as were not destroyed by the Germans are now manned by Italians as co-belligerents in aid of the Allies. It is not the Control Commission's responsibility to deal with frontier fortifications.

4. Question: Politically, there are obvious difficulties in disarming Italians after making use of their forces, and even organizing them, but do the Control Commission foresee any practical difficulties in carrying this out?

Answer: Yes.

5. Question: Temporarily, at any rate, the United Nations must be responsible for the administration and internal security of the disputed frontier areas, but, ultimately, when the frontiers have been decided on the Italians will have to undertake this task. If they are to do this some skeleton organization will have to be left in addition to the Carabinieri, etc. Have the Control Commission any ideas on this subject?

Answer: It is impossible to give a reasonable estimate of the strength of the internal security forces until the political and administrative picture in the North is known. The present ceiling of the Carabinieri is 55,000. This should be raised as soon as possible to 65,000 (representations have already been made).

1508

337

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015**TOPSEC**

A/cc.

ACC ROME FOR ACTION RPT AAI FOR INFO TO TAF CORSICA, ALLIED GARRISON COMMANDER,
SARDINIA 73/28

ADV AAI

NONE

AID 28/1800

HO 1000 1000 000

870 27 Aug 0940

By 1940

TOP SECRET

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

CITE: DCS 277

IT IS EXPECTED THAT ALLIED AIR ACTIVITIES IN SARDINIA WILL BE CLOSED OUT IN
NEAR FUTURE. ITALIAN AIR AND ARMY OFFICER PERSONNEL NOW ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE
ACTIVITIES ARE GIVING EXCELLENT COOPERATION AND SERVICE DISCHARGE. TRANSFER OR
OTHERWISE REPLACING THIS PERSONNEL IS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE AT THIS TIME SINCE
ALLIED COMMANDERS WILL NOT HAVE TIME TO BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH NEW PERSONALITIES
WHO WOULD THEMSELVES NOT HAVE TIME TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH NEW ASSIGNMENTS. IN
ANY EVENT NO ITALIAN AIR OR ARMY OFFICER NOW ENGAGED IN WORK PRIMARILY ASSOCIATED
WITH ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SARDINIA SHOULD BE RELIEVED OR DISCHARGED FROM HIS
PRESENT ASSIGNMENT TO DUTY WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING CONCURRENCE OF GENERAL WEBSTER,
ALLIED GARRISON COMMANDER IN SARDINIA. IT IS DESIRED THAT YOU ISSUE APPROPRIATE
INSTRUCTIONS TO THAT EFFECT TO ITALIAN AIR AND WAR MINISTRIES EARLIEST

091.711

File (B)
File A
File A/cc

Acc Hist

ACTION: ARMY SC

AIR SC

INFO: SEC 1267

A/cc

FILE (SKELETON)

330

TOPSEC

2274

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EWS/afe

Acting Chief Commissioner

Strength of Carabinieri

Acting Head, Administrative Section 26 August 4

I think it is of the greatest importance, both in the administration of Italy and as tactics to secure upward revision of the authorized strength of the Carabinieri to 65,000 as the Public Safety Sub-Commission recommends, to recruit to fill immediately the vacancies between the present actual strength of 42,000 and the present authorized strength of 55,000.

Kindly let me have your report on this at the Vice Presidents' Meeting on August 28th.

ELLENY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

041.791
A-014.13

FILES A
60

24-160
Hq. E.O. Sec'y
P. 10
26 Aug 1945
Maj.
KRR

1266

329

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EWS/ajp

A/ CC 091.711

25 August 1944

SUBJECT: Comando Supremo - Connection with Italian Navy

TO : Rear Admiral C. E. Morgan, FOTALI

1. Your letter of August 1st was not received until August 18th and I discussed its contents with you on August 21st. This will confirm, however, my statement that the name of the Comando Supremo has been changed to Stato Maggiore Generale, that it has been instructed that it is to exercise no command or operational functions of either the Italian Navy, Army, or Air Force, and that its former duties of operation of Navy, Army and Air Force officers would be turned over to the Ministries of Marine, War and Aeronautics, respectively.

2. These changes were made subsequent to your letter of August 1st.

3. I shall therefore be grateful if you would advise me if the instances referred to in the first paragraph of your letter still continue. If so, I shall be glad to make suitable representations to Marshal Messe.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

c.c. Navy Sub-Commission

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date Time 25 Aug 1945
Via
Initials

1265

8

091711

File A-13
P-13

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COMANDO SUPREMO - CONNECTION WITH ITALIAN NAVY

FROM FLAG OFFICER, TARANTO AND ADRIATIC

DATE 1st August, 1944

TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.
(Copy to: Naval Sub-Commission Representative, ACC, HQ.
Rome.)

It has been brought to my notice that the Marshal Supremo, Marshal Messe, has been interesting himself in certain matters connected with the Italian Navy. The particular instances quoted were a) that he had been making enquiries about the screening of Italian naval personnel and b) that he was connected with the appointment of Italian Flag Officers.

2. It is pointed out that in accordance with both the Cunningham - De Courten agreement and the Combined Chiefs of Staff memorandum on the Italian Navy, the Italian Navy is controlled by the Minister of Marine acting under orders from Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, transmitted through Flag Officer Liaison Italy. The Marshal Supremo does not, therefore, play any part in the control of the Italian Navy, either operationally or administratively. Appointments of all Flag and Senior Officers, for instance, are proposed by the Minister of Marine and submitted to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean for approval.

3. It would be appreciated if the Marshal Supremo could be informed that the Minister of Marine is under the orders of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean and that the Marshal's interference in Italian naval matters is superfluous and undesirable.

/s/ C.E. Morgan
REAR ADMIRAL.

1264

328

2277

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EMB/dfe

24 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: General Browning

It is some time since I referred to you General Gammoll's desire that General Castellano be assigned a suitable position. Can you advise me please what arrangements have been made for him so that I may advise General Gammoll.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

See 362

Ha ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-June 25 Aug 1944
via Mgt.
initials CRR

FILES A-1263

SECRET

327

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EWS/ejp

A/CC 250

29 August 1944

My dear Marshal Messe:

attached

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter N. 104871/AV of 24 August 1944, subject "Extension of the Denomination of Zone of Operations to the Whole National Territory".

I conferred with H. E. Bonomi on Saturday, 26 August, and I understand that he will discuss the matter with you in the near future.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

11/1/45

His Excellency Marshal Giovanni Messe,
Capo di S. M. Stato Maggiore Generale,
Rome.

501

Hq. ACC - Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date: 29 Aug 1730
Via: 146.
Initials: ER12

FILES AFD

1262

326

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015TRANSLATIONGENERAL STAFF

D/a

ufficio affari vari

Prot.n. 101871/AV

enclosure : 1

HQ ACC, APO 394
 824 Sec'y Gen.
 Rec'd 2 Aug 1944
 By 10/14

Rome, 24 August 1944

TO THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
 Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

SUBJECT: extension of the denomination of zone of operations to the whole national territory.

By R. decree 4 August 1943, n. 714 the whole territory of the Italian State is declared in state of war (enclosure 1).

Moreover by proclamation of the comando supremo of April 15th, June 15th and July 15th 1943, Sicily, Sardinia and the neighbouring islands, the provinces of Foggia, Bari, Brindisi, Lecce, Taranto, Cosenza, Catanzaro, Reggio Calabria, Matera, Potenza, Napoli, Benevento, Avellino and Salerno have been declared zone of operations and still keep this denomination.

With the forward march of the operations and the ensuing liberation of greater and greater parts of the national territory, it is necessary to give the denomination of zone of operation to the entire national territory.

This to avoid unequal treatments for the personnel of the FF. AA. detached in zones of operations, and those who are not, and also to protect the legal and matriculated situation of the operating troops and of the patriots, ~~absent~~ all in connection with the various moral and material benefits they are entitled to for having taken part in war operations in territories declared zones of operations.

To reach this aim, a proclamation from the Chief of Staff giving the denomination of zone of operations to the whole national territory is enough.

As for the date of the proclamation, it would be advisable to choose 8 September 1943, 20 hours, which was the beginning of the state of war against Germany, and from then on operations of war against the Germans took place in the national territory.

This measure, though having as particular and limited motive, the situation of the personnel of the Italian FF. AA., will have effect in the

See 354

326

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

territories which are still under the direct administration of the Allies, I think it is necessary that I should first inform this Commission.

MARSHAL OF ITALY

CHIEF OF STAFF
(Giovanni Messe)

/s/ G. Messe

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

TRANSLATION

N. 554. - Laws and decrees related to the general service of the state. -
R. decree 4 August 1943; n. 714. - Extension of the state of war
to all the territory of the state. - (Cabinet). - (Gazzetta ufficiale n. 182
7 August 1943).

VITTORIO EMANUELE III

by the grace of God and by the will of the nation

KING OF ITALY AND ALBANIA

EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA

Having:

Seen art. 11 of the text of the law of war, approved by R. decree 8 July 1943
n. 1515;

Seen R. decree 10 June 1940, n. 556, which orders the enforcement of the above
mentioned law in the territory of the state;

Heard the Council of Ministers;

On the proposal of the Chief of Government, Prime Minister Secretary of State;
We have decreed and decree;

Art. 1

The declaration of the state of war is extended to all the territory of the
state.

Art. 2

The present decree will be enforced the day after its publication in the
Gazzetta ufficiale of the kingdom.

We order that the present decree, sealed with the seal of the state, shall be
inserted into the body of official laws and decrees of the Kingdom of Italy,
ordering those it may concern to obey them and to see that they are obeyed.

Made in Rome, August 4th 1943

VITTORIO EMANUELE

BADOGGIO

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EWS/afp

A/CC 091.711

24 August 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The ships mentioned in memorandum No. 220/108 of 10 August are being prepared for special service by order of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.


After being surveyed, they were selected for this service because they were found to be too seriously damaged to justify repairing them in the present circumstances.

There could be no question of bringing these ships into use for the Italian Government only. If fit for normal service, they would pass into the Mediterranean Shipping Board pool for the general use of all the Allied war efforts.

Yours very truly,

HILARY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.



1259

FILES A-B

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

EWS/ajp

A/CC 000.7

23 August 1944

Dear Dr. Visconti Venosta:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter N. 1/201 of August 10, 1944, regarding the publishing of a statement anent an increase in number of, and the furnishing of war equipment to, the Italian Corps of Liberation.

The issue of such a statement is inopportune at this juncture. Permission has not yet been granted and may not be. Therefore, it would be worse to raise morale and then lower it, than to leave things as they are pro tem. As soon as the matter is settled we will let you know. Then, if favourable, a statement such as you propose would be suitable but reference to the size of the increase ("il Corpo Italiano ne risultera raddoppiato in numero e potenza di mezzi") must not be mentioned. Instead, the words "considerably increased" may be used.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Via Excellency Marchese Giovanni Visconti Venosta,
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Rome.

Hq	ACC	Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED		
Date: Aug 24/8		
Via	Rm 32	
Initials	RT	

1258

c.c. Political Section

FILES A-B

324

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION

HQ ACC, APO 394

776 Sec'y Gen.

Rec'd 23 Aug 0900By ARR

21 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Chief Commissioner, Hq A.C.C.

SUBJECT : Italian Corps of Liberation.

The Political Section agrees with the view of General Browning who suggests the following reply to Visconti Venosta:-

"This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter N. 1/201 of August 10, 1944, regarding the publishing of a statement anent an increase in number of, and the furnishing of war equipment to, the Italian Corps of Liberation.

"The issue of such a statement is inopportune at this juncture. Permission has not yet been granted and may not be. Therefore, it would be worse to raise morale and then lower it, that to leave things as they are pro tem. As soon as the matter is settled we will let you know. Then, if favourable, a statement such as you propose would be suitable but reference to the size of the increase ("il Corpo Italiano ne risultera raddoppiato in numero e potenza di mezzi") must not be mentioned. Instead, the words "considerably increased" may be used."

WILLIAM W. SCHOTT
Vice-President, Political Section

1257

324

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

C O P Y

Chief Commissioner, ACC

I do not think we can allow any statement such as this at present.

The issue of British equipment has not yet been authorized by CCS.

Gen. Alexander told me I could tell the Italians that the equipment has been asked for but ~~they~~ were not to be disappointed if permission was refused.

The preparations (training etc.) now being made are only a matter of taking time by the forelock, in case permission is granted.

L. Browning
Maj. Gen.
LIA

Rome
14 Aug 44

1256

324

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

LWS/hjp

Acting Chief Commissioner

Letter from Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs proposing statement re Italian
Corps of Liberation

11 August 4

Political Section (In turn)
Army Sub-Commission

May I have your views please with return of attached.

MILBY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner1 Incl:
Ltr, Undersec of State for Foreign
Affairs, M. I/201, 10 August 1944

777

Hq AGC - Sec'y Gen.	
DISPATCHED	
Date-Time	12 Aug 1600
Via	Reg.
By	DRH

Files A-11 12550

324

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ROUGH TRANSLATION

N. I/201

Rome, August 10th, 1944

Dear Admiral,

As I mentioned to you some time ago, the Italian Government consider it necessary to give publicity to the news, already explicitly mentioned by Prime Minister Churchill in his last speech and by President Bonomi in his statement on foreign policy, concerning the greater efficiency in number and equipment, to be given to the Italian Corps of Liberation.

I would perhaps be sufficient to issue a short statement, more or less on the following lines :

"Measures and provisions are in course to give greater efficiency in number and equipment, with the cordial aid of the United Nations, to the Italian Corps of Liberation. These measures and provisions are being carried out as speedily as possible, so that in every short time the Italian Corps will be doubled in number and war equipment. It will thus represent, on the battlefields and in the most adequate manner, the will and fighting spirit of the Nation. To this work of reorganization of the Italian Corps of Liberation have contributed, and still continue to contribute, in a spirit of true comradeship, the Italian Commands and the Allied High Commands".

I shall be glad, dear Admiral, if you will kindly submit the above draft statement to the competent Allied Authorities emphasizing the advisability of its publication.

With my kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

sgd. VISCONTI VENOSTA.

Admiral Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.
Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.
R O M E .

1254

324

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

AFHQ

HQ ACC

2131

AUG 23

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

SECRETARY GENERAL

REFERENCE YOUR FOX EIGHT THREE FOUR EIGHT THREE OF FIFTEEN AUGUST CITE FBEG PD
ITALIAN ARMY HAS AN AUTHORIZED OFFICER CADET COLLEGE AT LECCE MAP REF LOVE
FIVE FIVE ZERO THREE PD PAREN TO AFHQ FROM HQ ACC SIGNED STONE PAREN AUTHORIZED
STRENGTH MAXIMUM AS FOLLOWS CLN CADETS TWO FIVE ZERO CMA INSTRUCTORS AND STAFF
TWO TWO ZERO PD LAST COURSE STARTED ONE MAY FOUR FOUR PD DURATION OF EACH COURSE
CMA
IS TWO YEARS ■■■ CONSISTS OF FIRST YEAR TRAINING CMA SECOND YEAR TRAINING PD ON
AN AVERAGE EIGHTY DASH EIGHTYFIVE PERCENT OF CADETS ON EACH COURSE BECOME
OFFICERS

Cable prepared by M.M.I.A.

see Attached

L. T. MONTANT, Jr., 1st Lt., ¹²⁵1st Lt., ²⁵1st Lt., ²⁵1st Lt.

ROBERT E. DOE, Major. AGD. Secy General

CONFIDENTIAL

091.711

○

323

ALLIED ARMY COMMISSION
CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS

-3554-141

A. C. C.

TO: ACC

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: N21/22

FROM: MMIA

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE No: SD 1330

PRECEDENCE: IMPORTANT

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: AUG221000B OFFICE OF ORIGIN: HQ ACC, APO 384

763 Sec'y Gen.

Rec'd 12 Aug 1948

REF AFHQ'S F83483 OF 15 AUG CITE FHGEG. ITALIAN ARMY HAS AN

AUTHORISED OFFICER CADET COLLEGE AT LECCE MAP REF I5503. AUTHORISED STRENGTH MAXIMUM AS FOLLOWS CADETS 250, INSTRUCTORS AND STAFF 220. LAST COURSE STARTED 1 MAY 44. DURATION OF EACH COURSE IS 2 YEARS, CONSISTS OF 1ST YEAR TRG, 2ND YEAR TRG. ON AN AVERAGE 80-85% OF CADETS ON EACH COURSE BECOME OFFICERS

ACC DIST

ACTION- SEC GEN 2

INFO- A/CC

FILE 2

FLOAT

2 2 4 0

AUTHORISED OFFICER CADET COLLEGE AT LECCE MAP REF L5503. AUTHORISED STRENGTH MAXIMUM AS FOLLOWS CADETS 250, INSTRUCTORS AND STAFF 220. LAST COURSE STARTED 1 MAY 44. DURATION OF EACH COURSE IS 2 YEARS, CONSISTS OF 1ST YEAR TRG, 2ND YEAR TRG. ON AN AVERAGE 80-85% OF CADETS ON EACH COURSE BECOME OFFICERS

<u>ACC DIST</u>	
ACTION- SEC GEN	2
INFO- A/CC	
FILE	2
FLOAT	

1252

DATE and Time of RECEIPT AUG221135

Distribution:

CONFIDENTIAL

223

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: HQ ACC
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: N30/21
FROM: AFHQ SGD SACMED
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
REFERENCE No: F85625
PRECEDENCE: priority
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: AUG2111508 OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE/SHGEG

VERY EARLY REPLY NECESSARY TO OUR F 83483 OF 15 AUG. REQUEST YOU EXPEDITE

ACC/DIST

ACTION - ARMY SC 2
INFO - SEC GEN
A/CC
FILE 2
Float

VERY EARLY REPLY NECESSARY TO OUR F 83483 OF 15 AUG. REQUEST YOU EXPEDITE

ACC/DIST

ACTION - ARMY SC 2
INFO - SEC GEN
A/CC
FILE 2
Float

DATE and Time of RECEIPT AUG211500.....

Distribution:

1251

323

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2 2 9 2

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: ACC
SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 76/15
FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED
CLASSIFICATION: NONE
REFERENCE No: F83483
PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: AUG 15 1955B OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE FHGEG

PARTICULARS REQUIRED HERE URGENTLY AS TO WHETHER ITALIAN ARMY HAS OFFICER CADET
COLLEGE OR OFFICER PRODUCING UNIT AUTHORIZED AND FUNCTION REQUEST REPLY WITH DETAILS
INCLUDING LOCATION, NUMBER OF STUDENTS, LENGTH OF COURSE AND AMOUNT OF TURNOVER.

DIST

ACTION - ARMY SC
INFO - SEC GEN
A/CC
FDLE (2)
FLOAT

2 2 9 4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

COLLEGE OR OFFICER PRODUCING UNIT AUTHORIZED AND FUNCTION REQUEST REPLY WITH DETAILS
INCLUDING LOCATION, NUMBER OF STUDENTS, LENGTH OF COURSE AND AMOUNT OF TURNOVER.

DIST
ACTION - ARMY SC
INFO - SEC GEN
A/CC
FILE (2)
FLOAT

DATE and Time of RECEIPT AUG 152150B

Distribution:

1250

323

091.70
A 014.13

ENS/dfe

Acting Chief Commissioner

Italian Carabinieri

A/CC 014.13

Acting Head, Administrative Section

15 August

4

1. Reference is AAI's letter 1605/50/44/G(SD1) of 13 August attached hereto.

2. Forwarded for action.

ELMER W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Encl.
AAI ltr (see para 1 above)

See (334 + 335)
229 335

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

2. Forwarded for action.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Encl.
AAI ltr (see para 1
above)

329 335
334
See

091.70
A 014.13

Mo AGC - Sec'y Gen.	
DISPATCHED	
Date-Time	15 Aug 1972
Via	mag.
Initials	exp.

files H-1249

321

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015SECRETSUBJECT:- Italian CarabinieriHEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.
1605/50/44/G(SDL)

13 Aug 44

COPY

ACC

Ref your A/CC 014.13 of 1 Aug 44.

1. It will be appreciated that the manpower ceiling for the Italian Army, of which the Carabinieri form part, has been reduced and that it is essential, therefore, that the reduced number pay the best dividend in the interest of the war effort as a whole.

2. It is regretted that approval to hold personnel in excess of 55,000 and to pay such personnel a ration allowance cannot be agreed, as clothing, petrol etc all have to be taken into account.

3. It is requested that you will examine the practicability of:-

- (a) Forming a separate corps of Carabinieri to be stationed in SICILY and SARDINIA to be entirely supported by the Italian Government as is now the case with the Guardia Finanza. Transfers from SICILY and SARDINIA to the mainland to be on a one for one basis. It might prove simpler to transfer Carabinieri to the Guardia Finanza.
- (b) Carabinieri in Regions on the mainland which have been handed back to the Italian Government being formed into a separate corps and entirely maintained by the Italian Government. In this case there could be no question of transfer of individuals or formed bodies between Carabinieri maintained by the Allies and those maintained by the Italian Government, and they would have to be stationed in areas in which the Italian Government could maintain them.

4. While the proposals in para 3 are under examination by you, it would be appreciated if a statement could be forwarded showing:-

- (a) the present organisation of the Carabinieri
- (b) present strengths and location of all units and detachments
- (c) the future organisation in outline required to cover the whole of Italy.

This information will serve as a basis for further examination of the problem.

1248

/s/

for Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.Copy to:- MMIA, MA to CGS, MA to CAO, DCAO
G(Ops), A, QSECRET

321

2 2 9 8