

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ACC

10000/101/435

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10000/101/435

CIVIL DISTURBANCES  
FEB. - SEPT. 1944

# LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 250.1

"B" FILES

HQ ACC

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL

CIVIL DISTURBANCES

(1)

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
1) Fargo 696	Gen MacFarlane	3 Feb	AFHQ	Food riot Taranto. Prefect removed by Italian Admiral.
2) - -	Capt Stone	6 "	CC ACC	Suggestion for dealing Taranto & other Labor situations, riots.
3) - -	Lt Col Wayne	7 "	Capt Stone	Memo on Taranto riot.
4) - -	Capt Stone	7 "	Gen MacFarlane	Suggestion for dealing with Taranto situation.
5) Fargo 786	Gen MacFarlane	7 "	AFHQ	Report on Taranto riot.
6) 4887	F.O.T.A.L.I.	8 March	ACC	Sit-down strike in Taranto- half-hearted. No incidents.
7) Fargo 788	Gen MacFarlane	7 Feb	AFHQ MGS	Do you agree on my approaching Ital Govt on establishment of local Arbitration Board?
8) - -	Comd 2 District	17 "	Gen MacFarlane	Disturbances in Distwo; suggests increase of food ration & purge of ex-Fascists officials.
9) CC/P/106	Gen MacFarlane	26 "	Maj Gen Nares	Replies that Apulia is now under ACC control & things will look up.
10) RHO 000.5	ACC Region I	4 March	Birg Lush	Riot at Galtanissetta, Sicily, instigated by Communist agitators.
11) N. 1350	Badoglio	5 May	Gen MacFarlane	Public order at Bari in which PC exceeded his powers.
12) CC 250	Gen MacFarlane	12 "	Badoglio	Wages disputes among PU workers in Naples. Threat to strike called off.
13) M-204	Gen MacFarlane	18 "	AFHQ MGS	Increase already sanctioned.
14) N. 7488	Bonomi	25 June	Capt Stone	Resuscitates 11&12. Asks that sections in Ital territory shd confine themselves to advisory & not executive duties.
15) 2290	Region 6	26 "	ACC Main	Disturbance at Villanova Monteleone
16) - -	Brig Lush	28 "	A/CC	Clarifies position re telegram fr FOEALI on Disturbances, Taranto.
17) 091.1	Capt Stone	30 "	Bonomi	Re 14. Please inform of similar instances coming to yr notice.
18) 091.1	Col Densmore	30 "	Col Upjohn	Disturbances at Taranto Tosis Yards
19) 6691	ACC Main	25 "	ACC Adv for Lush	" " " "
20) 250.1	Col Densmore	6 Sept	VP Admin Sec	5 Army AME request for member PS S/C to come up view expect riots.
21) S-335	Capt Stone	18 "	AFHQ SAC USPA HRM	
22) F-27379	AFHQ G5	19 "	ACC for Stone	
23) - -	Mr Caccia	19 "	A/CC	Trial of Pietro Caruso and lynching of Carretta.
24) 250-2	Capt Stone	20 "	Bonomi	
25) S-338	Capt Stone	21 "	AFHQ SAC USPA HRM	
26) S-340	Capt Stone	22 "	AFHQ SAC USPA HRM	
27) 250	May Quayle	26 "	Admin Sec	
28) 5379	Bonomi	19 "	Capt Stone	Asks for battalion of Ital troops for Rome to prevent riots like one on Caruso's trial.
29) 14613/PS	Capt Stone	24 "	Bonomi	

1890

MCX/14613/PS.

24th September, 1944.

28

My dear Prime Minister:

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter N.5379 dated 19th September.

The question of providing a regiment of Italian troops in Rome will be considered but in view of the limited ceiling laid down for the Italian Army and the necessity of organising combat units for operational purposes and internal security divisions in other parts of the country, I can assure you that the provision of troops for Rome will only be permitted if it is considered absolutely necessary to maintain law and order.

The preservation of law and order is the primary duty of the CC.NR, CC.FF and other police agencies. Only if they are likely to fail can the presence of troops be deemed necessary. While in the opinion of my advisers your request is not unreasonable, they consider that a great improvement is essential in the loyalty, initiative, energy and sense of public duty of the CC.NR, CC.FF and other police agencies, and that we must be assured of far greater effort to instil these qualities into the forces of law and order: this is an immediate and paramount necessity.

Eye witnesses have informed me that the unhappy incidents on Monday were due not to any lack of numbers of CC.NR but to extremely bad organisation connected with the arrangements for the trial itself, and to complete lack of organisation, initiative and fortitude displayed by the CC.NR, CC.FF and other police agencies themselves. In conference with General Orlando, General Aymonig and H.E. Ferrari, Brigadier Upjohn urged upon them the necessity of instilling greater enthusiasm, energy and esprit de corps among the various forces. Much can and must be done by Commanding Officers to instil the qualities of leadership into their subordinates, to teach them to regain their pride and their authority. Epuration of the Fascist elements and of others whose conduct has been lacking, must be carried out more rapidly and with greater vigour. The confidence of the public in the various forces must be re-established by sympathetic investigation into complaints and immediate action to remove those complaints.

There should be no delay in taking steps to effect these remedies and I beg you in the interests of law and order in Italy to use your personal influence with General Orlando, General Aymonig and H.E. Ferrari to see that this is done.

250.1

FILES 1889  
29

Moreover, I think that much could be done to increase the morale of your police forces if you yourself and your colleagues in the Government would influence the press in their present campaign against the police, persuading them to adopt a new note of encouragement by pointing out the very good work done by them rather than criticising and discouraging the forces.

I do not under estimate, my dear Prime Minister, the difficulties which face your Government and your police forces: I am fully aware of the distressing shortage of boots and clothing, and the difficulties under which the police forces are working, and I assure you that I am doing all that is possible to assist you. In particular I hope it may be possible to increase the ration of the G.C.F.R. and the police agencies and to bring over from North Africa more C.C.R.R.

For operational reasons it has been necessary to remove one battalion of troops from Sicily but I hope that they will be replaced without delay by a battalion or battalions from Sardinia. I shall be in a position to give you more information on this subject in a few days.

HILARY W. STONE  
Captain, USMR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,  
President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government,  
R O M E.

59 347

Hq ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCH 26 SEP 1944
Date-time
Via 19 0941
Initials CH

*Drafted by Admin. Sec. (Public Safety S/c)*

cc: Admin. Sec.

1883  
24

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner

JAQ/hd

A/CC 250.1

22 September 1944

Subject: Public Order in Rome

To: Vice President, Administrative Section

28

The Acting Chief Commissioner wishes to call your attention to attached copy of a communication from the Prime Minister, requesting that you put up a suitable reply for his signature in the light of your recommendations.

J. A. QUAYLE  
Major, R. A.  
Chief Staff Officer

01413

1 Incl:  
Ltr fr Bonomi, No. 5379  
dated 19 Sept 1944, with  
enclosure thereto.

FILES A B

523 306  
HQ ACC Secy 1887  
DISPATCHED  
Date 22 Sept 1944  
Via Major  
Initials JRR

28a

TRANSLATION

THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Rome 19 September 1944

n. 5379

HQ ACE, APO 394  
283 Sec y Gen.  
Rec'd 2-2-45  
By ORC.

Dear Captain,

Here is a copy of the letter which I sent to the Allied Control Commission, Public Safety Sub-Commission; will you kindly see that the competent Allied organs provide without delay adequate reinforcements to face the present urgent need of the public order in the Capital.

I take the liberty of drawing your attention on this subject and of appealing to your kind comprehension.

Trusting in your help to solve in a satisfactory way a problem, the importance, the gravity and the urgency of which have been but too emphasized by the regrettable incident of yesterday, I thank you and remain,

Sincerely yours,

/s/ I. Bonomi

Admiral BILEY W. STONE  
Chief Commissioner  
Allied Control Commission

R o m e

FILES A-B

1886

Trans. L.C.

28

X-2501  
5113

TRANSLATION

THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

Rome, 19 September 1944

TO THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Public Safety sub-commission

R O M E

The painful events of yesterday morning have tragically proved the grave numerical deficiency of the forces for the public order services in the Capital, as well as the urgent necessity to appoint adequate reinforcements to face the needs of the services during the present moment.

If, because of the limited efficiency of the cadres of the P.S. Agenti' Corps, it should prove impossible to transfer more police contingents, to employ troops would be the only solution left.

Even this solution could not be put to immediate execution, for, from what the competent military organ say, no army unit can be disposed of in Rome.

If this was to be a lasting deficiency, other unpleasant repercussions might occur; it is therefore necessary that we should be able to dispose of the forces of one regiment at least, to fulfill the above mentioned duties.

This could be done by transferring temporarily from Calabria here two battalions of the Mantova Division. An other infantry regiment could be formed with the elements which will come to Rome from the districts of the Latium, following the levy now taking place. As soon as this unit should be formed, the battalions of the 'Mantova' could be sent back.

As the chief difficulty seems to be the lack of foodstuffs, the competent Allied Authorities would have to grant a greater number of rations, corresponding to a regiment of about 1200 men.

If this should not prove possible, will you ask the above mentioned Authorities to authorize that these rations should be taken from the contingent assigned to the carabinieri, which is not entirely drawn as the present force of the Corps does not reach the number of the fixed effectives.

I hope that the Allied Control Commission will agree with these proposals, considering the special gravity of the problem and the necessity of finding a solution. These proposals have been made in agreement with the Minister of War.

1885

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR

/s/ Bonomi

Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner

Colonel Pollock's Evidence Before  
Court of Enquiry  
Administrative Section

A/CC 250  
26 September 4

The attached letter is passed to you for action.

J. A. QUAYLE  
Major, R.A.  
Chief Staff Officer

1 Incl: Ltr fr President of the  
Court of Inquiry, ref: N. 1004

FILES 0

59 353

HQ ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED 108
Date-Time 26 SEP 1945
Via Msr. 1170
785015 CH.

25011

21

HQ ACC. APO 394  
378  
Recd 26/9-1030  
By DFE

TRANSLATION

COURT OF INQUIRY

(about the facts which happened in the Palazzo di Giustizia on 18/8/1944)

N. 1004

Palazzo di Giustizia, 25/9/1944

TO: Captain Stone  
U.F.N.  
Acting Chief Commissioner A.C.C.  
R O M E

This court needs to hear Colonel Pollock's account of the events which took place on Sept. 19th in the Palazzo di Giustizia.

Will you kindly inform Colonel Pollock of the request of this court, and let us know on what day and at what time the Colonel would like to give his evidence.

Yours very truly,

THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY

/s/

25011

TRANS. E.C.

FILED

1883

27

COPY

DIRECTIVE ON FASCIST THREATS TO  
EXECUTE HOSTAGES IF CARUSO IS EXECUTED.

We will report Fascist statements without undue prominence. There will be no question of any threats being allowed to interfere with the course of justice; if the Fascists take the threatened action justice will in turn inevitably and inexorably catch up with them.

Franc T. Rayner  
P.M.B.

250

FILES A0

250

We will report Fascist statements without undue prominence. There will be no question of any threats being allowed to interfere with the course of justice; if the Fascists take the threatened action justice will in turn inevitably and inexorably catch up with them.

Franco T. Rayner  
F.W.B.

FILES A ⊕

1882

27

SECRET

AFHQ

HQ ACC

S-340

22 SEPT

25

SECRET  
PRIORITY  
ACTING CHIEF COM. 1

SECRET PD FURTHER BY JUGAR THREE THREE EIGHT PAREN TO AFHQ FOR SACRED CMA UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISOR AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM HQ ACC FROM STONE PERSONAL PAREN CARUSO TRIAL CONCLUDED TWENTY FIRST PD CONVICTED CMA SENTENCED TO DEATH CMA APPEAL DENIED CMA EXECUTED TODAY ONE FOUR ONE ZERO HOURS PD COCHLETTO CMA HIS ASSISTANT CMA CONVICTED CMA SENTENCED TO THIRTY YEARS IMPRISONMENT PD NO UNTOWARD INCIDENTS

AUTHENTICATED:

MILLYN W. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

2501

DISTRIBUTION:  
Sir Noel Charles  
Hon. Alexander Kirk  
Political Section  
CA Branch  
Exec Commissioner  
Public Safety  
Security Branch  
CG, RAAC

FILES A (B)

54310

Hq ACC - Secy Gen.  
DISPATCHED  
Date Time 22 Sept 1945  
Via Sigs  
Initials JORRE

1881

SECRET

26

**SECRET**

AFHQ

~~SECRET~~  
HQ ACC  
S-338

**SECRET**  
**PRIORITY**  
**ACTING CHIEF COMM.**

21 SEPT

23

21

YOUR FOX TWO SEVEN THREE SEVEN NINE FURTHER BY SUGAR THREE THREE FIVE PAREN TO  
AFHQ FOR SACRED CIA UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISOR AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER  
FROM ACC FROM STONE PERSONAL PAREN CARUSO TRIAL ADJOURNED LATE YESTERDAY AND HAS  
RESUMED THIS MORNING PD ALL WITNESSES HEARD PD ARGUMENTS OF PROSECUTION AND  
DEFENSE WILL BE MADE TODAY AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT TRIAL WILL BE CONCLUDED TODAY  
PD THERE WERE NO UNLAWFUL INCIDENTS YESTERDAY OF ANY KIND EITHER WITHIN OR OUTSIDE  
THE COURT

AUTHENTICATED:

See 26

ELLERY W. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

**DISTRIBUTION:**  
Sir Noel Charles  
Hon. Alexander Kirk  
Political Section  
Exec Commissioner  
CA Branch  
Security Branch  
Public Safety S/C  
General Brown, RAAG

Hq ACC - Soc'y Gen.  
**DISPATCHED**  
Date time 21 SEP 1944  
via *drop* 1115  
initials *W*

2501

FILES A-B

1889

**SECRET**

25

EMS/ajp

A/CO 250-2

20 September 1944

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Enclosed are some photographs which were taken at Pietro Caruso's trial on September 18th 1944 and may assist you in detecting and apprehending the principal offenders who took part in this distressing affair and assisted in the lynching of Caretta.

Yours very truly,

ELLERY W. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

7 Incls:  
Photographs.

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,  
President of the Council of Ministers,  
Italian Government,  
Rome.

Hq. ACC Sec'y Gen.  
DISPATCHED  
Date Time 21 SEP 1944  
via *Omnia* 1000  
nr/15 *ls*

*250.1*  
*1000*

FILES A-1879

*24*

C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
SECTION IV  
APC. 394

Regional Public Safety HQ.

19th Sept. 1944

TRIAL OF CARUSO - 20th Sept. 1944

- 1) Place of trial: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Via della Lungara N°10
- 2) Only one entrance: Lungotevere Farnesina gates, through Accademia d'Italia
- 3) Portion of Via Lungara will be cordoned off and closed to traffic.
- 4) Case will commence promptly at 8 a.m. and hearing will continue throughout the day and evening. It is hoped to finish the hearing in one day, and the Court will sit 20 hours if necessary (Col. Pollock arranging about electric light and emergency lighting of necessary).
- 5) President of the Court: H.E. Maroni - 9 judges will sit and 3 other reserve judges to remain in attendance.
- 6) Separate room for witnesses available. 24 witnesses to be produced - they will be taken direct from their rooms with police passes in 5 cars to be found by AMG police (Col. Pollock has this in hand)
- 7) Separate room at opposite end of the courtroom for prisoner..
- 8) In event of any ugly situation he can be withdrawn immediately into separate ante room - door locked and barricaded and shut off entirely from the court.
- 9) All persons having business in the case will have special police card issued by Questore. **1878**
- 10) Only 50 members of the public will be admitted, who will be

19th Sept. 1944

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- 9) All persons having business in the case will have special police card issued by Questore. **1878**
- 10) Only 50 members of the public will be admitted, who will be chosen through Italian Govt. by leaders of the parties. Members of the public subject to search on entry.
- 11) All unnecessary doors in the building closed and locked.
- 12) Italian Press limited and issued with special police pass by Questore.
- 13) Allied Press - 25 reservations made by special tickets which

24

- 2 -

will be handed to Col. Poletti for distribution through P.R.O.

- 14) Three or four special reservations for senior allied officers if necessary.
- 15) Italian Govt. have asked through President of the Court to refrain from filming the case unless the Allies feel that this should be done, in which case they have no objection, but they prefer it not to be done.
- 16) The President suggests only 3 or not more than 5 cameramen to handle a few shots only.
- 17) No radio.
- 18) No relatives of victims. Prisoner is not on trial for murder of victims but for high treason against the State.
- 19) Only a few Allied officers will be present:  
Maj. Coxhead on duty below, at foot of stairs.  
It is recommended that only those Allied officers with real business be admitted.
- 20) Chief of Public Safety will be with Questore on duty in Courtroom. There will be police control room outside:  
Tel. 55236. Downstairs telephone in courtyard No. 51929.
- 21) AMG Police: One officer in Court  
" with Caruso  
" at foot of stairs (Maj. Coxhead)  
" patrolling outside
- 22) Regina Coeli only 300 yds. away and prisoner will be brought from prison to place of trial early tomorrow morning + 20th Sept. before dawn.
- 23) Civil police arrangements:  
Not yet completed but:  
200 for cordons outside  
100 patrolling back of building and grounds  
50 in gardens opposite  
100 mounted outside

1877

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- 23) Civil police arrangements:  
Not yet completed but:  
200 for cordons outside  
100 patrolling back of building and grounds  
50 in gardens opposite  
100 mounted outside  
50 in corridors  
50 in vicinity of prisoner and his detention room  
Reserves at Questura. Tel. 481663.

1877

Pollock going over these arrangements with Questore later tonight. They will be in position by 7 a.m. 20th Sept. 1944.

24) Military:

24

- a) Col. Dodgean G-3 R.A.C. Liaison officer for Rome Command will be in close touch with Polloch throughout.
- b) No military will be in evidence anywhere near the court unless grave emergency arises when matter will be reported to Col. Poletti R.C.
- c) Col. Dodgeon is arranging for military police reserves at Regina Coeli prison and others at 5th Canadian Hospital (parachute troop 100), plus Rome Military Police if necessary.

25) All the above arrangements have the approval of the President of the Court of Appeal, Questore and Officer in charge of CC. RR.

/s/ J.R. POLLOCK  
 /t/ J.R. POLLOCK  
 Chief Public Safety  
 REGION IV.

Canadian Hospital (parachute troop 100), plus Rome  
Military Police if necessary.

25) All the above arrangements have the approval of the  
President of the Court of Appeal, Questore and Officer  
in charge of CC. RR.

/s/ J.R.POLLOCK  
/t/ J.R.POLLOCK  
Chief Public Safety  
REGION IV.

1876

24

5674

C O P Y

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
INCOMING MESSAGE

ACC FOR STONE

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No N68/19

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SCAMED

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REFERENCE No: F 27379

PRECEDENCE: URGENT

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: 191631

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE FHGG

2

REPORT IN S - 335 RECEIVED PD YOUR CONDUCT APPROVED PD KEEP  
THIS HEADQUARTERS CLOSELY INFORMED PD THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION  
OF INSTITUTING ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT WITHOUT REMITTANCE TO  
THIS HQ

ACC DIST

ACTION: C.S.O.

INFO: A/CC

FILE

1092

See 25

FILES A-①

DATE and Time of RECEIPT: 191820

1875

23

C O P Y

TO: Acting Chief Commissioner

19 September 1944

FROM: Political Section

21

One aspect of yesterday's incident over Caretta that seems to me particularly serious is the signal demonstration of the supineness of the Carabinieri and of their lack of authority with the Italian public. The explanation for this is of course *not* far to seek. It derives (1) from their use by the Fascist Regime, (2) from their poor standard of pay, equipment, feeding, etc. and (3) from the total disregard with which they are treated by Allied Forces. There is nothing much I think that we can do about (1) and (3). But is there not something that could be effected on (2) and might it not be as well to increase the ceiling at present allowed? We must look forward to the period when the whole of Italy is our responsibility by which time the number of Allied troops in Italy may be greatly reduced by commitments in Austria and elsewhere. It is therefore a direct Allied interest that there should be some Italian forces capable of keeping order. The difficulties are obvious and the time may be short.

/s/ H.A. Caccia.

To: - Brig. Uffjohn

I think we must pass again for increase in the ceiling

5-

FILES A-B 1876

22

TOP SECRET  
TOP SECRET

AFHQ

HQ ACC

8-335

18 SEPT

TOP SECRET  
PRIORITY

ACTING CHIEF COMM.

THIS MORNING AT TRIAL OF FIDELIO CARRO CMA FORMER FASCIST CHIEF OF POLICE OF  
ROME CMA PUBLIC WERE INTO COURTROOM CMA CLAMORING FOR THE LYCHING OF DEFENDANT  
PD BECAUSE OF DISORDER JUDGES HAD NOT BEEN SEATED AND DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN  
BROUGHT INTO COURT BUT CROWD ATTACKED DONATO CARRETTA CMA FORMER DIRECTOR OF  
REGINA COELI PRISON CMA DRAGGED HIM FROM COURTROOM CMA BEAT HIM INTO INSSENSIBILITY  
AND THREW HIM INTO TIER 2 PD DISCOVERING THAT HE WAS STILL ALIVE CMA MEMBERS OF  
THE CROWD BEAT HIS BODY WITH STICKS TILL HE WAS DEAD PD LATER HIS BODY WAS TAKEN  
TO THE JAIL HE HAD FORMERLY DIRECTED UNDER GERMAN OCCUPATION CMA WHILE IT WAS  
TIED FOR A SHORT TIME TO A WINDOW GRATING PD FARA PAREN TO AFHQ FOR SACRED CMA  
UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISOR AND BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER FROM ACC FROM  
STONE PERSONAL PAREN DISORDERS AROSE THROUGH LACK OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES  
TAKEN BY THE TRIAL COURT AND TO INEFFECTIVE <sup>OF</sup> THE POLICE AND CARABINIERI PD  
EMILIAN POLICE WERE ON HAND TO HAVE PROTECTED HIM BUT AS IN THE CASE OF PAST  
DISTURBANCES AT TARANTO CMA THEY LACKED LEADERSHIP CMA ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUAL  
CARABINIERI MADE EFFORTS TO DEFEND HIM PD FARA BECAUSE OF PRESENCE OF ALLIED  
PRISONERS IN REGINA COELI JAIL CMA <sup>RAAC</sup> MILITARY POLICE CUT DOWN CARRETTAS

150.1

TOP SECRET  
- 1 -

See 23

1873

with 5 applications

21

TOP SECRET

CABLE TO AFHQ, NO. 8-335, 18 SEPT 44, continued:

BODY AND DISPERSED CROWD WITHOUT DIFFICULTY PD PARA I CONFERRED WITH BONORI  
 AND SPERZA THIS AFTERNOON CMA ACCOMPANIED BY REGIONAL COMMISSIONER VOLPETTI PD  
 SPERZA IS IN CHARGE OF TRIALS PD I WARNED THEM OF THE NECESSITY OF PREVENTING  
 RECURRENCE OR RESUMPTION OF TRIAL WHICH CMA ON MY ADVICE CMA WILL BE POSTPONED  
 TO WEDNESDAY CMA PERMITTING PREPARATIONS TO BE MADE TOMORROW FOR LIMITING  
 ATTENDANCE IN COURTROOM AND ADEQUATE POLICE ~~MEASURES~~ <sup>MEASURES</sup> PD THE GOVERNMENT  
 WILL ISSUE STATEMENT DENIGRATING SHAMEFUL INCIDENT AND STATING THAT POLICE AND  
 CARABINIERI OFFICERS RESPONSIBLE HAVE BEEN DISPERSED PENDING INVESTIGATION PD  
 I WARNED BONORI THAT IF CIVIL DISORDERS BREAK OUT AGAIN IN ROME CMA IT MIGHT  
 BE NECESSARY TO CALL OUT ALLIED TROOPS AND HE WOULD REALIZE THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES  
 THAT WOULD ENTAIL PD PARA WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SPECIFIC  
 PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THEM WHICH WILL BE CHECKED BY REGION FOUR OFFICERS  
 PD PARA IF GOVERNMENT IS CLEARLY UNABLE TO PRESERVE ORDER AND I DEEM IT NECESSARY  
 TO ASK NAAC TO CALL OUT ALLIED TROOPS TO DEAL WITH EXCESSES CMA I PROPOSE UNDER  
 SUCH CONDITIONS TO REESTABLISH COINCIDENT THEREWITH ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
 WITHIN THE ROME GOVERNATE PD PARA THE SERIOUSNESS OF TODAY'S OCCURRENCES AND  
 THEIR IMPLICATIONS IS FULLY APPRECIATED BY BONORI AND SPERZA AND I AM HOPEFUL  
 THAT THEY WILL MEASURE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES

AUTHENTICATED:

MERRY W. STONE  
 Captain, USNR  
 Acting Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:  
 1  
 Sir Noel Charles : Security Branch  
 Hon. Alexander Kirk : Public Safety Sub-Comm.  
 Political Section, ACC : General Brown, NAAC  
 Ex. Commissioner :  
 CA Branch :

34 261  
 HQ ACC 1872  
 DISPATCHED  
 Date Recd 18 Sept 2000  
 VIA  
 DNR 21

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
REGION IV  
APO 394

C O P Y

Regional Public Safety HQ.

18th Sept 1944

SUBJECT: Disorder at Palazzo di Giustizia - 18th Sept. 1944 -  
Caruso Trial

TO : Col. C. Poletti, Regional Commissioner.  
copy to Capt. Stone, Acting Chief Commissioner  
General Brown, Rome Commander

FACTS BRIEFLY

1. The trial of Pietro CARUSO (45) ex-Chief of Police, Rome, was due to commence at 8.30 a.m. 18th Sept. 1944, at the Palazzo di Giustizia.

2. Considerable publicity had been given to the case and special police arrangements had been made.

3. Considerable public disorder occurred inside the Court. At 9.30 a.m. I advised the President of the Court to adjourn the case in the interest of public order.

4. Whilst order was being restored inside the Court, an important witness of the case, Dr. Donato CARRETTA, ex Governor of Regina Coeli prison, who had been removed from office by AMG. police some weeks ago was seized by an infuriated mob outside the building. The mob inflicted severe violence on Dr. Carretta; he was thrown over the wall into the Tiber River, then retrieved from the river and taken by the crowd to Regina Coeli prison, where he was hung, strung up by the feet, until cut down, when he was certified dead from fractured skull and multiple injuries.

DETAILS AS FOLLOWS:

Brief history of Caruso:

5. Age 45, born at Naples, formerly a Consul of the Fascist Partuaria Militia at Trieste. Appointed Chief of the Police for Rome on 1st Feb. 1944, being regarded as the best man 'entirely faithful to the Fascist Republic'.

6. As soon as he took up office he became ruthless, gathered around him a number of close collaborators, most of whom fled before our arrival in Rome on 4th/5th June, 1944. Caruso's work found favour and praise from Fascist Government - he was personally congratulated by Mussolini who termed him 'my faithful Questore'.

7. On the 24th Mch. 1944, Caruso submitted the names of 50 persons to the German Command. These persons were shot and only last week their

General Brown, Rome Commander

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7. On the 24th Mch. 1944, Caruso submitted the names of 50 persons to the German Command. These persons were shot and only last week their bodies were recovered from the Ardeatine Caves. **187!**
8. Caruso fled north with retreating Germans on the eve of our entry into Rome, and took with him a large quantity of valuables, including Questura property eg. gold bars (obviously jewellery melted down) rings, watches, gold and silver jewellery, pearl ear-rings, a large number of bonds and over half a million lire in notes - total value worth at least eight or nine million lire.
9. By a trick of fate his car was extensively damaged by mine or bombing and he sustained a fractured leg and was taken to a nearby hospital with his valuables under an assumed name.
10. On 14th June 1944, I received information from the partisan

APP A

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group that he was lying at Bagno Regio, being guarded by patriots. I sent for him, he was brought back under police escort and for several weeks has been kept in Regina Coeli prison infirmary recovering from serious leg injuries. Practically the whole of the loot was recovered intact, and I passed this over with all papers in the case to the Questore. The official document signed by Caruso setting out the names of victims to be passed over to the Germans was also confiscated and handed over to the Italian authorities. In prison Caruso admitted to me that he signed that document.

BRIEF HISTORY OF CAPRETTA killed by the mob on 18th Sept, 1944.

11. About 43 years of age, with Fascist background. Was prison governor on our arrival in Rome. There were mixed opinions about him but Col. Poletti ordered me to remove him on 15th July, 1944 and this was done. He was not arrested but simply removed from his post. He had been called by the prosecution as a witness at the trial of Caruso.

POLICE ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIAL - 18th Sept, 1944

12. Owing to the strong public feeling against Caruso, the following police arrangements were made:

Palazzo Giustizia: Interior - 105 P.S. officers and men	205
100 CC.RR.	
Exterior - 103 P.S. officers and men and CC.RR.	
10 P.S. mounted	123
10 CC.RR.	
Regina Coeli	
- 22 P.S. officers and men with machine guns & hand grenades	
4 motorcycles	22
2 lorries	
Police reserves ready for alarm at other places	200
TOTAL	550

The Questore Morazzini was in charge of the Police arrangements.

DISORDER INSIDE THE PALAZZO DI GIUSTIZIA

13. Unfortunately most of the entrance to the Palazzo di Giustizia were open to the public, and it is estimated that 5000 to 6000 at least swarmed into the building between 8.30 and 9 a.m. - they were in the corridors upstairs, downstairs - in fact all over the building.

14. At 9.5 a.m. I received a message from Rome Command about 1879

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14. At 9.5 a.m. I received a message from Rome Command about <sup>187</sup>the disorder and I at once went to the Court where the trial was to take place. The place was in a complete uproar and it was packed with screaming and yelling civilians, witnesses, court officials and relatives of Ardeatine Caves victims. The two balconies above were crowded, and I estimated there were 600 to 700 people at least cramping into this fairly small courtroom. Between 40 to 50 police were present but were completely powerless and had no control over the public.

15. I conferred with Col. Dodgson and we agreed that to introduce military would only make matters worse.

16. I ensured that there was an adequate guard on the person of Ceruso and he was kept safe in another part of the building under strong guard.

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17. I advised the President of the Court that it would be unwise from a public order point of view to attempt to open the case, and he made an announcement to the public present that the case would be postponed. With considerable difficulty I established some sort of order in the court and removed all the public except essential witnesses. There were then several thousand civilians swarming the corridors outside and it took over an hour to clear them out of the building.

DISORDER OUTSIDE THE PALAZZO DI GIUSTIZIA

18. Whilst I was handling the inside situation and preventing the mob from smashing down doors and getting at Caruso, there was trouble outside the building.

19. Carretta who <sup>As</sup> ~~was~~ said above, was a witness, was seized by a mob of at least 100 strong, who use considerable violence on the unfortunate man. He was dragged and kicked unconscious, thrown down the stairs and placed in a taxi cab outside. The driver, however, refused to take him away.

20. Carretta was dragged from the cab, again subjected to violence, dragged across the road and thrown into the Tiber River. It is said that some person with an ear kept on striking the body in the water. Carretta was apparently dragged out of the river and taken by some means to Regina Coeli prison where he was hung up by the feet, tied with rope. He was quickly cut down however, and the body taken inside the prison entrance. I arrived at the prison when the body was examined by Doctor Alfredo Monaco, Prison Surgeon, who pronounced life extinct death being caused by fracture of skull and multiple head and body injuries. The body was removed later to the Mortuary at Verano Cemetery, San Lorenzo, where I arranged an adequate C.C.F.R. guard.

\*21. Military police remained on reserve at the prison--were not called in but held in reserve to safeguard the security wing of the prison where over 200 security prisoners are held by ~~the~~ C-2 of R.A.C.

SUGGESTIONS FOR NEXT HEARING

22. At 4 p.m. 18th Sept. 1944, I submitted a separate list containing suggestions for general arrangements at the resumed trial which should not take place tomorrow. In accordance with orders I will personally supervise the arrangement with Maj. Coxhead.

CONCLUSION

23. The whole trouble was not insufficient policing, but bad organisation. The courtroom was too large and the whole large building was thrown to the public, which simply invited trouble. The police leadership and instructions in their duties, These matters will be rectified at the next hearing. 1869

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/s/ J.R. POLLOCK  
/t/ J.R. POLLOCK  
Lt.Colonel  
Chief, Public Safety  
REGION IV

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C O P Y HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
REGION IV  
APO. 394

Regional Public Safety HQ.

18th September 1944

SUBJECT: Suggested arrangements for CARUSO trial,  
Place of trial etc.

1. It was suggested to hold the trial outside Rome, but I recommend that the trial continue to be held within the Palazzo di Giustizia, Rome.
2. There should be only one entrance and one exit open, all other gates and doors locked.
3. No other trials or courts to be held during Caruso's trial in any other part of the building.
4. A smaller court room with no balcony.
5. One entrance at the back for judges and Council and one exit only.
6. Witnesses and relatives not to remain in court as today but in an adjacent waiting room.
7. Witnesses in the case to be issued with a simple witnesses' admission ticket signed by the Procuratore's Department.
8. Only witnesses for that day's hearing should be summoned.
9. Special admission ticket for counsel, press etc.
10. No admission to the court without a ticket.
11. Admission to public: Only a few members of the public should be admitted. Today there were 5000 or 6000 people attempting to storm the building. 150 to 200 and no more should

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APPENDIX B

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be allowed, even less. They should only be allowed in by tickets which should be evenly distributed to the leaders of the political parties, and let them select their own public.

12. Public should be subject to search on entry into Court, and public not allowed to enter until preliminaries are commenced in the court.

13. Court corridors to be kept clear, and barricades erected where necessary.

Prisoner Caruso

14. To be kept under separate guard in adjacent room - not be brought into court until ready commence case. Before he is brought in the President should announce to the public present that if there is any hostile demonstration or disturbance proceedings will be adjourned forthwith.

15. Caruso should be stand in a special dock near the exit door to his waiting room. The front should be boarded up at an angle in a corner as high as his shoulders with no access to his stand from the court itself.

Police arrangements:

16. AMG. Three officers in court, 2 AMG. officers outside the court and two police officers outside the building - 4 E/M at disposal public safety chief in Court.

Civil police:

20 P.S. agents in plain clothes inside the courtroom  
30 " " " uniform  
10 CC. RR.

in corridors leading to the court room:

50 CC. RR. in uniform  
20 P.S. agents "

Near Caruso: 40 mixed police outside and inside his detention room - 2 CC.RR. and 2 P.S. agents on either side.

These men will be especially instructed in the event of the slightest sign of trouble to withdraw Caruso and place again into detention room.

1867

Outside entrance: 40 P.S. agents and CC.RR. mixed

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patrolling exist.

40 CC. RR. on foot  
100 mounted police

patrolling outside.

Court officials :

Far too many today. Every second individual in the mob claimed to be in some way connected with the case.

Procuratore to limited essential counsel and court officials to minimum - not one unnecessary official to be in the place. This is highly important.

Regina Coeli prison:

30 P.S. agents and CC.RR. on reserve inside entrance.

Reserve police:

Two separate police reserves and 100 men mixed CC.RR. and P.S. agents at two places in building (Palazzo Giustizia) held in reserve in direct telephone communication with the Court.

Police officers in Charge: Questore of Rome, Chief of Public Safety and two Vice-questori in attendance.

I will personally see that all police receive adequate instructions from the Questore as to their individual post and individual duties.

/s/ J. POLLOCK  
Lt. Colonel  
Public Safety  
Region IV

1866

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C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
ROME REGION  
APO. 394

Public Safety Division

18th July, 1944

CASE OF PIETRO CARUSO

Age 45 (born at Maddaloni, Naples  
Nov. 10th, 1899)

Ex-Questore of the City of Rome

It is known that Caruso fled north with the retreating Germans on the eve of our entry into Rome i.e. night of 4th June, 1944, and it is also established that Caruso took away with him a considerable quantity of valuables, including Questura property.

On 14th June, 1944, Col. Pollock received information from a representative of the partisan group that Caruso, under assumed name, was lying in a small hospital north of Viterbo, being guarded by patriots.

Enquiries were made and the hospital in question was found to be a military hospital at Bagno Regio, some 70 miles from Rome.

Col. Pollock sent an ambulance for Caruso on 16th June, 1944, but the journey was fruitless because the F.S.S. refused to release him. Anyhow after Col. Pollock consulted AMG 8th Army, Caruso was sent back to Rome on 22nd June, 1944 and is now recovering from a leg wound in Regina Coeli prison infirmary.

The property found in Caruso's possession at the hospital (Caruso accepted a receipt for it all) is shown in the attached list. The gold bars alone are worth several millions liras I am told. There is almost half a million ~~liras~~ in Italian cash money. In his possession was also found ~~965~~ 965

APPENDIX C

- 2 -

watches, golden sovereigns, emerald broach, diamond and pearl ear-rings assorted etc.

Caruso's history briefly is as follows:

he is 45 years old, formerly a Consul of the Fascist Portuaria Militia, serving at Trieste.

The Fascist Government appointed him Chief of the Rome City Police Forces (Questore) about 1st February, 1944, because he was regarded as a suitable man entirely faithful to the Fascist Republic.

As soon as he took up office, he warned all under him at the Questura that they had to crush all enemies of Fascism and Nazism. He gathered around him a number of men of ruthless character to act as his close collaborators. I think it is safe to say that all his confederates fled before our arrival.

Caruso's work found favour and praise from the Fascist Government and he was personally congratulated by Mussolini, who called him "my faithful Questore".

On March 23rd, Caruso was asked by the German Command to submit names of political prisoners who were to be shot as a reprisal for the killing of the German soldiers. It is alleged that Caruso gave a list of 50 names of persons in no way connected with the outrage, and it is also alleged that the list included names of his political rivals.

It is clear from all accounts that Caruso collaborated hand in glove with the Germans and Fascists. It is also clear that Caruso was one of the prime movers in the Caves Massacre. Has admitted this in his cross-examination attached.

The case is very involved, and there are many other charges levelled against Caruso, all of which are being investigated.

Public feeling is very high against Caruso, 1887 I have strengthened the guard on his cell.

/s/ J. POLLOCK

21

C O P Y

FROM ITALIAN LIAISON OFFICE TO A/CC

TRANSLATION

After yesterday's lynching

AT THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM - by Pietro Nenni, from the "Avanti!" of 19 September 1944

The tragic episode of yesterday, at the opening of Caruso's trial, is the symptom of that exasperation on which for some time we have been calling the attention of public powers.

We deeply deplore the savage action which cost the ex-warden of Regina Coeli prison his life: he was an official who had given his support to resistance against the Nazi-Fascists, during the nine months of Rome's occupation.

He has not been lynched and thrown into the river because of his past faults or of his recent merits, but simply because he has been designed by fate to be the victim sacrificed to the bloodthirsty spite which is one of Fascism's and war's inheritances.

To deplore, to feel indignant and stirred is not enough. It is necessary to understand.

Last night, in official and popular circles one heard a lot of talk about "suborners".

There can be some truth in this.

But one has to admit that the most serious suborning fact lies in the state of minds and the state of things.

It lies in the fact that Caruso's trial is being made three months after Rome's liberation, whereas it should have been made three days later.

It lies in the people's irritation for the contradictions and the slownesses, among which justice is following - or rather not following - its course.

It lies in the impopularity of the police corps, which, with its present organization - that is still the fascist one - does not have the moral authority to enforce, by its mere presence, the respect of law.

It lies also in the absolutely ridiculous way in which the Director of Public Safety, the Questore and the Carabinieri HQ had organized the trial, as if it had been a feast. It was

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APPENDIX "D"

- 2 -

instead the first tragic contact between the exasperated part of the people - the one that is mourning for the crimes of Nazi-Fascism - and one of the executors of those crimes. But considered beyond its causes and its immediate consequences, yesterday's episode does open once more the problem of the country's political direction. It seems to us that the problem points out to the need of an energetic concentration of powers in the hands of a committee of public emergency (Comitato di Salute Pubblica). A Committee of this sort should deal with the problems of sanctions, of epurations, of a rehabilitation of a public morals and of a reform of the political and social structure of the State, not with the spirit of a weary and sluggish bureaucracy, but with the energy of an emergency committee, feeling itself supported by all the vital forces of the Nation, in an effort to save the country from its most dangerous enemy, the distrust in itself and in justice.

1862

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C O P Y

18 September 1944

Captain Stone:

General Browning informs this office that there are two companies of Grenadiers (Italian Troops), **approximate** strength 90 each, under command of RAAC, now in Rome.

/s/ F. J. S.

APPENDIX "E"

21

1861

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**URGENT**

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner  
APO 394

LDD/ajp

A/CC 250.1

6 September 1944

**Subject:** AMG 5 Army Conference with Public Safety Sub-Commission Representative.

**To :** Vice President, Administrative Section.

1. Reference is made to confidential message 8470 of 3 Sept 44 from AMG 5 Army, which follows:

"CONFIRMING PHONE CONVERSATION 1 SEPTEMBER CONSIDER VERY DESIRABLE REPRESENTATIVE PUBLIC SAFETY SUBCOMMISSION CONFER WITH THIS HQ SOON AS POSSIBLE ON PLANS TO MEET EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN NEAR FUTURE. CAN YOU ARRANGE REPRESENTATIVE VISIT THIS HQ. ACKNOWLEDGE."

2. The Acting Chief Commissioner desires to be informed promptly as to what action has been taken on the above request for visit.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner:

L. D. DENSMORE  
Colonel, Sig C  
Chief Staff Officer

5-11-44

Hq ACC	Soc'y Gen.
DISPATCH 1865	
Date time	6 Sept 1500
Via	Hand
Initials	LDD

**CONFIDENTIAL**

20

Reference 6691

122

TO ROSS AREA COMAND FOR ACC  
PERSONAL FOR KING LIES  
FROM ACC MAIN

SECRET  
PRIORITY

12521409

FOLLOWING FROM TOTALY. QUOTE UNOFFICIAL STRIKE INVOLVING 1000 MEN STARTED  
IN DOCKYARD TUESDAY FOR MORE FOOD OR WAGES.

PARA 2. MINISTRY HAS PROMISED AN INCREASE IN WAGES OF 12 TO 15 PER CENT ON  
1 JULY.

PARA 3. TOLLS YARD ARE ON STRIKE FOR INCREASE OF 30 LIRE A DAY ALL ROUND.

PARA 4. SHIPYARD NEW UNDER SUPERVISORY VICE ALREADY COMING DOWN.

PARA 5. IT IS HOPEED THAT WORK WILL BE RESUMED TOMORROW 21.

PARA 6. MOST OF THESE MEN ARE RECEIVING CIVILIAN A RATION FOR HEAVY WORKERS.

PARA 7. C IN C MED NAPLES PASS TO ADMIRAL MORGAN.

UNLIKE LABOR AND COMMISSION ARE DEALING INDIVIDUALLY IN CONSULTATION  
MUCHESD SUSTION AND EXISTING NO INCREASE IN WAGES BE MADE.

2514378

DISTRIBUTION:  
(act) GAB - 2  
(Info) ACC Main - 1  
file - 1  
plot - 2

D  
Q.

250.1

NF

1859

21 June 1944

MEMO TO: Economic Section, HQ ACO  
(Attention: Col. Adams)

" Re attached copy of secret message No. 6537, 21 Jun 44.  
Please notice Acting Chief Commissioner's note on bot-  
tom of message. Will you please see that the A/CO's instruc-  
tions are carried out.

L. D. DENSMORE  
Colonel, Sig C  
PA to A/CO



1858

185

COPY

SECRET

ROME AREA COMMAND

6537

ACC MAIN  
6537

JUNE 21/1645

SECRET

PRIORITY

ADJUTANT

ENQUIRY IS PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE FROM POTAY TO CING MID REPEATED FOR INFO TO  
 ADMIRAL MORGAN PAREN TO ROME AREA COMMAND FOR ACC ROME FOR URGENT RPED COLSON  
TARANTO FOR MORGAN FROM ACC MAIN SIGNED MACFARLANE PAREN NO REFERENCE DATED TWO  
 ZERO DASH ONE EIGHT THREE ONE DASHER JUNE PD TO READ ARRANGE PARAS IN NUMERICAL  
 ORDER PD PARA FIVE PD WORK IT IS HOPED WILL BE RESUMED TWO ONE JUNE PD PARA  
 THREE PD TOSIS YARD ARE ON STRIKE FOR INCREASE OF THIRTY FIVE A DAY ALL ROUND  
 PD PARA SIX PD CIVILIAN ABLE RATIONS FOR HEAVY WORKERS BEING RECEIVED BY MOST  
 OF THESE MEN PD PARA ONE PD OFFICIAL STRIKE STARTED IN DOCKYARD TODAY FOR MORE  
 FOOD AND WAGES PD ONE THOUSAND MEN INVOLVED PD PARA FOUR PD RAMINEZ NOW UNDER  
 SECRETARY VICE ALBAGO IS COMING DOWN PD PARA TWO PD AN INCREASE IN WAGES OF  
TWELVE TO FIFTEEN PER CENT ON THE FIRST JULY HAS BEEN PROMISED BY MINISTRY

1. Official strike started in dockyard today for more food and wages. 1,000 men involved.
2. An increase in wages of 12 to 15% on the 1st July has been promised by ministry.
3. Tosis yard are on strike for increase of 30 five a day all around.
4. Ramirez, now undersecretary vice Albago, is coming down.
5. Work, it is hoped, will be resumed 21 June.
6. Civilian "A" rations for heavy workers being received by most of these men.

7

Col. Densmore  
 Col. Bein should look into this. See  
 that Mr. Grady is advised.

/s/ S---

NICHOLAS FIORELLI  
 CW3, U.S.A.  
 Asst Adjutant

SECRET

19

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner  
APC 394

*2/11*

A/CC 091.1

30 June 1944

Dear Colonel Upjohn:

*folio # 11*

*folio # 12*

30 JUN 1944

*17*

Reference is made to attached translation of letter N. 7488 from Prime Minister Doncaï relative to instances of interference in the maintenance of public order. Also attached is copy of letters N. 1350 of 5 May and N. 250 of 12 May, both mentioned in reference letter.

The Acting Chief Commissioner placed the following note on the original translation of reference letter:

"Acknowledge. Refer to Col. Upjohn - to draft instructions for AC & BC."

*folio # 17  
800.1*

Attached also is copy of Acting Chief Commissioner's acknowledgment to Prime Minister Doncaï.

Will you please comply with the Acting Chief Commissioner's instructions in this matter.

- 4 Incls:
- Incl 1 - Copy of #7488
- Incl 2 - " " #1350
- Incl 3 - " " #250
- Incl 4 - " " acknowledgment

L. D. DUNBAR  
Colonel, Sig C  
PA to A/CC

Colonel Gerald Upjohn  
Administrative Section  
HQ ACC

*RF*  
*1856*  
*NT + ACC*  
*18*

ms/hjp

*File*

A/CC 091.1

30 June 1944

*#14*

30 JUN 1944

Dear Prime Minister Boncasi:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter N. 7438 of 25 June 1944, relative to instances of interference in the maintenance of public order.

Instructions are being issued which will, I hope, clear the matter. If there are recurrences of similar incidents in the future, will you please inform me.

Yours very truly,

HERBERT W. STONE  
Captain, USMC  
Acting Chief Commissioner

*100-1*

His Excellency Ivanoe Boncasi  
President of Council of Ministers  
Italian Government

1855

WF 8 DEC

*17*

30 JUN 44

COPY

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section  
\*\*\*\*\*

28 June 1944

Ref: 359/4/CA

SUBJECT: Disturbance at TARANTO.

DS/13 1944  
28 JUN 1944

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

1. I should like to clarify the position regarding the telegram received from FOTALI, TARANTO, relating to the unofficial strike at TARANTO.
2. The telegram was received by this Section and Economic Section on 21st June. On the same day a copy was sent to the Labour Sub-Commission from the Economic Section and an officer of this Section discussed the matter with the Economic Section who stated that repercussions were not expected.
3. The telegram was repeated to me in ROME by my Section in order to keep me informed. The telegram terminated with the information that the Labour Sub-Commission were dealing with the matter in consultation with the Economic Section.
4. If you will read Pages 1 - 3 of this file, I think you will agree that everything possible has been done to keep the Economic Section and the Labour Sub-Commission fully informed and that no action has been taken by this Section except that my Staff Officer here thought it fit to inform me personally in Rome.

100-1

/s/

Brigadier 1854  
Executive Commissioner

MSL/JG

Copy to: Vice President  
Economic Section

16

*1/100*  
*Informants*

*SEC GEN*  
2290

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ ACC, APO 394  
Rec'd *27 June 1944*  
by *AD*

ACC MAIN

62/26

ACC REGION 6

CONFIDENTIAL

WM 921

PRIORITY

JUN261351

CITE/486

SPECIAL SITREP. DISTURBANCE TOOK PLACE AT VILLANOVA MONTELEONE PROVINCE OF SASSARI AFTERNOON 24 JUNE. 500 PERSONS ATTEMPTED TO FORCE LOCAL MILLS TO GRIND WITHOUT AUTHORITY. 1 CARABINIERI AND 3 FORESTRY GUARD INTERVENED WERE STONED AND ATTEMPTS MADE TO DISARM THEM. FIRE WAS OPENED. 1 FARMER KILLED 8 CIVILIANS AND 2 OFFICIALS WOUNDED. 3 RING LEADERS ARRESTED. SITUATION NOW QUIET. INVESTIGATIONS PROCEEDING AND DETAILED REPORT FOLLOWS.

*100-1*

ACC DIST

*ACTION - PUB. SAFETY*  
*INFO - SEC GEN*  
*DEP CC*  
*C.A. BT*  
*ADMIN SEC*  
*FILE*  
*FLOAT*

CONFIDENTIAL

1853  
HEADQUARTERS  
27 JUN 1944  
A. C. C.

*15*

JUN261421

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

DSD 1434  
29 JUN 1944

No. 7438

Salerno, 25 June 1944

#11  
f

My dear Captain Stone,

Marshal Badoglio, with letter No. 1350 dated 5 May 1944, advised General Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane of instances of interference by the Allied Control Commission for the Province of Bari in the maintenance of public order in that city and made the observation that similar intervention, contrary to the nature of the agreements in existence on this subject between the Italian Government and the Allied Military Government, while these instances constituted grounds for prejudicial uncertainty, did not fail to lessen the prestige of the Italian authorities to the detriment of the effectiveness of administrative action.

General MacFarlane, with letter No. 250 dated 12 May, explaining simply that the facts reported were ascribed merely to extenuating circumstances, nevertheless recognized that the police officer of the AGC, Bari, had gone too far in giving certain instructions to the Regional Command of the 9th Army Corps. Furthermore gave assurance of having given his officers precise instructions to abstain from carrying out executive duties in the territory administered by the Italian Government, and finally let it be known that he had taken steps to call the attention of the Regional Commissioner of Region 2 to the error committed by one of his officers.

Notwithstanding this, the Minister of War informs me that several regional branches of the Commission even now consider as within their realm of authority actions concerning public order and that, for example in Bari, the abovementioned branches have denied His Excellency Resenti, Undersecretary of State for Finance, authorization to deliver a lecture announced beforehand for 23 May 1944, basing the refusal on the circumstance that the authorization itself had not been requested, as stipulated, at least five days before.

I am inclined to admit that the refusal was made in error. It is certain, however, that on this occasion the Allied authorities <sup>did not</sup> did not hold themselves to the instructions given by the head of the Allied Control Commission.

I therefore ask you, dear Captain, to please re-examine the delicate question in all its possible aspects and to be kind enough to give

0001

by dear Captain Stone.

March 1 Badoglio, with letter No. 1350 dated 5 May 1944, advised General Sir Noel Mason Macfarlane of instances of interference by the Allied Control Commission for the Province of Bari in the maintenance of public order in that city and made the observation that similar intervention, contrary to the nature of the agreements in existence on this subject between the Italian Government and the Allied Military Government, while these instances constituted grounds for prejudicial uncertainty, did not fail to lessen the prestige of the Italian authorities to the detriment of the effectiveness of administrative action.

*Handwritten initials: V. H. 17*

General Macfarlane, with letter No. 250 dated 12 May, explaining simply that the facts reported were ascribed merely to extenuating circumstances, nevertheless recognized that the police officer of the ACC, Bari, had gone too far in giving certain instructions to the Regional Command of the 9th Army Corps, furthermore gave assurance of having given his officers precise instructions to abstain from carrying out executive duties in the territory administered by the Italian Government, and finally let it be known that he had taken steps to call the attention of the Regional Commissioner of Region 2 to the error committed by one of his officers.

*Handwritten mark: 000+*

Notwithstanding this, the Minister of War informs me that several regional branches of the Commission even now consider as within their realm of authority actions concerning public order and that, for example in Bari, the abovementioned branches have denied His Excellency Presenti, Undersecretary of State for Finance, authorization to deliver a lecture announced beforehand for 28 May 1944, basing the refusal on the circumstance that the authorization itself had not been requested, as stipulated, at least five days before.

I am inclined to admit that the refusal was made in error. It is certain, however, that on this occasion the Allied authorities did not hold themselves to the instructions given by the head of the Allied Control Commission.

I therefore ask you, dear Captain, to please re-examine the delicate question in all its possible aspects and to be kind enough to give instructions to the sections concerned to the effect that in the territory restored to the Italian administration they limit their intervention to the function of control, that is, to a circumspect examination of the conformity of the actions of the Italian authorities to the conditions of the armistice and to the interests of the common war effort.

My sincere thanks and cordial greetings.

/s/ Ivanoe Bonomi

Trans - Sgt Shenfield/lws

*Handwritten signature: R.F. Macfarlane*

*Handwritten circled number: 14*

SECRET

1204

NF  
also SF

GEN MACFARLANE (CHIEF COMM)

18 MAY 1944

SECRET

v. 16

PRIORITY

GEN MACFARLANE

A.F.H.Q.

BADOLIO ASKED ME TO SEE HIM URGENTLY THIS AFTERNOON PD PAREN TO AFHQ FOR MSG  
BRITISH MINISTER RESIDENT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISER FROM FATIMA FROM  
MACFARLANE PERSONAL PAREN MINISTERS RODINO OMA DE NAPOLI AND TOGLIATTI WERE  
ALSO PRESENT PD PARA TWO PD THERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN A WAGES DISPUTE AMONG  
THE PUBLIC UTILITY WORKERS IN NAPLES PD THIS CAME TO A HEAD THIS MORNING AND  
THE WORKERS HAD THREATENED TO STRIKE TOMORROW PD IN POINT OF FACT THE LABOUR  
SUBCOMMISSION HAD ALREADY BEEN DEALING WITH THIS QUESTION PD PARA THREE PD  
LEGITIMATE INCREASES IN WAGES HAD ALREADY BEEN SANCTIONED BY ACC AND ONLY  
POINT AT ISSUE WAS QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION OF WORKERS PD IT WAS AGREED  
THAT A JOINT MEETING WOULD BE HELD TOMORROW MORNING TO SETTLE THIS AND THE  
STRIKE WILL NOT TAKE PLACE PD A FURTHER JOINT MEETING TO DISCUSS CONNECTED  
GENERAL WAGES QUESTIONS BETWEEN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND ACC  
HAS BEEN FIXED FOR SATURDAY MORNING

1204

1857

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief Commissioner

SECRET

13

/dfe

MF  
SF

CC 250

12 May 1944

*folia 11*

I have caused enquiries to be made in connection with the report made to you by the Minister of Interior regarding public order at BARI. (No. 517/AG dated 2nd May 1944).

Lieutenant Colonel Vining, who was Provincial Commissioner of Bari in March, states that during that month there occurred a considerable number of demonstrations. He was in constant touch with the Prefect but found him unwilling or unable to deal with these demonstrations except by the use of force. In view of the large number of Allied troops in the area and the importance of maintaining law and order by peaceful means, Lieutenant Colonel Vining did his utmost to persuade the Prefect to deal with these demonstrations without the use of force. He found it impossible for the Prefect to do this and, therefore, with the full agreement of the Prefect, took upon himself the responsibility of going personally to the demonstrations and explaining to the people the fact that the riotous meetings were contrary to law and order and the Allied war effort. Lieutenant Colonel Vining stated that in every case he succeeded in dispersing the crowds without incident, except on one occasion when the son of the local Mayor fired a shot into the crowd and wounded a demonstrator.

Although I agree that Major Reveloy, who was acting on the orders of the Provincial Commissioner, went beyond his powers in instructing the Territorial Defence Commander that no military personnel should be attached for service with the Military Police without reference to the Allied Control Commission offices, I think you will agree that the action taken by the Provincial Commissioner effected, without resort to force, a restoration of public order.

I can assure you that Provincial Officers have my instructions to refrain from executive action in territory administered by the Italian Government and that specific orders have been sent to the Regional Commissioner, Region II, calling his attention to the technical mistake made by his officer in this case.

1859

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE  
Lieutenant General  
Chief Commissioner

S. E. Marshall Pietro Badoglio  
Capo del Governo

(12)

.....  
:: HQ ACC, AFO 394 ::  
:: Secy Gen ::  
:: Rec'd 8 May 1130g ::  
:: BY H.D. ::  
.....

TRANSLATION

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT

File No. 1350

Salerno, 5 May 1944

Dear General MacFarlane:

I submit herewith a copy of a letter with two enclosures which were sent to my by the Ministry of War concerning the subject of "Public Order at Bari."

I would be grateful to you, my dear General, if you will kindly make provision so that interventions of the kind on the part of the Provincial Commission at Bari be avoided, be it for the prejudice which such interferences can cause to the maintenance of public order in the Province, or for the necessary safeguard of our prestige.

Very cordially,

/s/ BADOGLIO

TO: General Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane  
Chief of the Allied Control Commission  
Naples

*Brief. Last*

*Please sort this out. P.V. Bari has clearly exceeded his powers. Presume this was in Capet? A. draft outside*

*Reply.*

*Wm W. 2f* 1849

(11)

785015

TRANSLATION

MINISTRY OF WAR  
CABINET

COPY

No. 517/AC

APC 107, 2 May 1944

subject: Public Order at Bari

2 inclosures

TO: His Excellency The Chief of the Government SALERNO

With reference to what I have already had occasion to indicate to you in the matter, I deem it necessary that the powers of the Provincial Bari Commission of the Allied Control Commission be clarified with the Allied Authorities concerning public order, the responsibility of which rests exclusively with the Italian Military Authorities.

On the 20th of March last, Major Reveley, Provincial ACC Police Official at Bari wrote to the Territorial Command of the IXth Army Corps that the Provincial Commissioner of the ACC had issued instructions to the effect that no military personnel could be used for services of public order without prior approval of the aforesaid police official. In reply to this communication the IXth Army Corps Command ordered that reply be made by the Territorial Command to the effect that this regulation could not be accepted because it conflicted with the orders of the Central Italian Authorities and that eventual modifications to the regulations in effect should have been notified by the same Central Italian Authorities. (Inclosures 1 and 2).

In addition I wish to state--this being an interference which, similarly, under the formal aspect appears even less in harmony with the limits of jurisdiction of the provincial organs of the Allies Control Commission--that the aforementioned Provincial Commission, in regard to the question raised in the item "Antifascists in Prison", which appeared in the March 26th issue of "Civiltà Proletaria", has requested information on the proceedings under hearing directly of the military prosecution at the Territorial Military War Court at Bari, instead of turning, as the case would have been eventually, to the appropriate superior Italian Military Authorities.

The Minister

/s/ TADDEO ORLANDO

(11)

TRANSLATION

COPY

Inclosure No. 2

COMMAND OF THE IX ARMY CORPS  
S.M. - Operations Office

No. 2950/op.

AFO 67, 31 March 1944

Reply to communication of March 30, No. 1354/op.

Subject: Public order in the Province of Bari

To: TERRITORIAL COMMAND OF THE IXTH ARMY CORPS  
Office of the Chief of Staff  
Bari

*attached*

In reply to the communication made by the local Allied Control Commission with letter No. PS/8/8 dated March 20th, this Command states that it cannot accept the disposition given by the Provincial Commissioner because it is in conflict with the dispositions issued by the Central Italian Authorities.

Eventual modifications to the dispositions in effect must be notified to us by the same central Italian Authorities.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL

/s/ Roberto Lerici

(11)

TRANSLATION

COPY

Inclosure No. 1

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

Ref. PS/8/8

March 20, 1944

TO THE TERRITORIAL DEFENSE COMMANDER

BARI

Following our communication of this morning, March 20, 1944, the Provincial Commissioner has issued specific instructions to the effect that no military personnel shall be detached for service with the Civil Police, unless request has directly been made of this office.

G. M. REVELEY, Major  
Provincial Police Officer  
(Bari) A.C.C.

Provincial Commissioner  
Palazzo del Governo  
BARI

1846

(11)



IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO  
NR. 1340 DI PROT.

SALERNO, 5 MAGGIO 1944

HQ ACC, APO 394  
Sec'y Gen.  
Rec'd. 7 May 1944  
By STB

CARO GENERALE MACFARLANE,

RIMETTO ALLA S.V. COPIA DI UNA LETTERA, CON  
2 ALLEGATI, PERVENUTAMI DAL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA  
AVENTE PER OGGETTO : "ORDINE PUBBLICO A BARI".

LE SARÒ GRATO, CARO GENERALE, SE VORRÀ COR-  
TESEMENTE PROVVEDERE AFFINCHÈ INTERVENTI DEL GENERE  
DA PARTE DELLA COMMISSIONE PROVINCIALE DI BARI SIA-  
NO EVITATI SIA PER IL PREGIUDIZIO CHE DA SIFFATTE  
INTERFERENZE PUÒ DERIVARE PER LA TUTELA DELL'ORDINE  
PUBBLICO NELLA PROVINCIA, SIA PER L'OPPORTUNA SALVA-  
GUARDIA DEL NOSTRO PRESTIGIO.

MOLTO CORDIALMENTE.

AL SIGNOR GENERALE NOEL MASON MACFARLANE  
CAPO DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO  
NAPOLI

1845

(11)

7 May 1944  
S.P.

C O P I A

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA  
- GABINETTO -

=====

P.M. 107 - 2 MAGGIO 1944 -

NR. 517/AC DI PROT.

OGGETTO: ORDINE PUBBLICO A BARI

ALLEGATI NR.2

A S.E. IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

S A L E R N O

\*\*\*\*\*

IN RELAZIONE A QUANTO EBBI GIÀ OCCASIONE DI SEGNALARE IN ARGOMENTO A V.E., RITENGO NECESSARIO SIANO CHIARITE CON L'AUTORITÀ ALLEATA LE FACOLTÀ SPETTANTI ALLA COMMISSIONE PROVINCIALE DI BARI DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO IN MATERIA DI ORDINE PUBBLICO, LA CUI RESPONSABILITÀ SPETTA ESCLUSIVAMENTE ALLE AUTORITÀ MILITARI ITALIANE.

IN DATA 20 MARZO U.S. IL MAGGIORE REVELEY UFFICIALE PROVINCIALE DI POLIZIA A.C.C. DI BARI SCRIVEVA AL COMANDO TERRITORIALE DEL IX CORPO D'ARMATA CHE IL COMMISSARIO PROVINCIALE DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO AVEVA DATO ISTRUZIONI NEL SENSO CHE NESSUN MILITARE DOVESSO ESSERE UTILIZZATO PER SERVIZI D'ORDINE PUBBLICO SENZA IL PREVENTIVO BENESTARE DEL PREDETTO UFFICIALE DI POLIZIA. - A TALE COMUNICAZIONE IL COMANDO DEL IX CORPO D'ARMATA DISPONEVA FOSSE RISPOSTO DAL COMANDO TERRITORIALE CHE LA DISPOSIZIONE NON POTEVA ESSERE ACCETTATA PERCHÉ IN CONTRASTO CON GLI ORDINI DELLE AUTORITÀ CENTRALI ITALIANE, E CHE EVENTUALI MODIFICHE ALLE DISPOSIZIONI IN VIGORE DOVEVANO ESSERE NOTIFICATE DALLE STESSA AUTORITÀ CENTRALI ITALIANE (ALLEGATI 1 E 2).

COMUNICO INOLTRE - TRATTANDOSI DI UN'INGERENZA CHE APPARE QUANTO MENO SOTTO L'ASPETTO FORMALE ANALOGAMENTE NON IN ARMONIA COI LIMITI DI COMPETENZA DEGLI ORGANI PROVINCIALI DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO, - CHE LA PREDETTA COMMISSIONE PROVINCIALE, IN RELAZIONE ALLA QUESTIONE SOLLEVATA DAL TRAFILETTO "ANTIFASCISTI IN PRIGIONE" APPARSO NEL NUMERO DEL 26 MARZO U.S. DI "CIVILTÀ PROLETARIA", HA CHIESTO NOTIZIE SUI PROCEDIMENTI IN CORSO DIRETTAMENTE ALLA PROCURA MILITARE PRESSO IL TRIBUNALE MILITARE LEONTOLOGO DI GUERRA DI BARI, ANZICHÉ RIVOLGERSI, COME SAREBBE

OGGETTO: ORDINE PUBBLICO A BARI

ALLEGATI NR.2

A S.E. IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

S A L E R N O

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IN RELAZIONE A QUANTO EBBI GIÀ OCCASIONE DI SEGNALARE IN ARGOMENTO A V.E., RITENGO NECESSARIO SIANO CHIARITE CON L'AUTORITÀ ALLEATA LE FACOLTÀ SPETTANTI ALLA COMMISSIONE PROVINCIALE DI BARI DELLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO IN MATERIA DI ORDINE PUBBLICO, LA CUI RESPONSABILITÀ SPETTA ESCLUSIVAMENTE ALLE AUTORITÀ MILITARI ITALIANE.

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18/4



IL MINISTRO  
F. TO IADDEO ORLANDO

(11)

C O P I A

ALL. 1

REG. NO. 304

7 May 1944  
GMB

COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO

REF./PS. 8/8

20 MARZO 1944 -

AL COMANDANTE LA DIFESA TERRITORIALE

B A R I

.....  
A SEGUITO NOSTRA COMUNICAZIONE DI STAMANE, 20 MARZO 1944, IL PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER HA DATO PRECISE ISTRUZIONI IN MERITO ALLE QUALI NESSUN MILITARE POTRÀ ESSERE STACCATO IN SERVIZIO DI POLIZIA CIVILE A MENO CHE NON SIA DIRETTAMENTE RICHIESTO DA QUESTO UFFICIO.

G.M. REVELEY, MAJOR  
PROVINCIAL POLICE OFFICER  
(BARI) A. C. C.

PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER  
PALAZZO DEL GOVERNO  
BARI



20 MARZO 1944 -

AL COMANDANTE LA DIFESA TERRITORIALE

B A R I

.....  
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G.M. REVELEY, MAJOR  
PROVINCIAL POLICE OFFICIER  
(BARI) A. C. C.

PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER  
PALAZZO DEL GOVERNO  
BARI



1843

(11)

COPIA

CL. 2

HQ ACC, APO 394

*7 May 1944  
J.P.P.*

COMANDO DEL IX CORPO D'ARMAIA  
S.M. - UFF. OPERAZIONI

Nr. 2550/OP.

P.M. 67, 31 MARZO 1944

RISP. AL FOGLIO DEL 30 MARZO C.A.NR.1354/OP.

OGGETTO: ORDINE PUBBLICO PER LA PROVINCIA DI BARI.

AL COMANDO TERRITORIALE DEL IX CORPO D'ARMAIA  
- UFFICIO STATO MAGGIORE -

B A R I

ALLA COMUNICAZIONE FATTA DALLA LOCALE COMMISSIONE ALLEATE  
DI CONTROLLO CON FOGLIO NR. PS/8/8 IN DATA 20 MARZO C.A. CODESTO  
COMANDO RISPONDA CHE NON PUO ACCETTARE LA DISPOSIZIONE DATA DAL  
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER, PERCHE IN CONTRASTO CON LE DISPOSIZIONI  
IMPARTITE DALLE AUTORITÀ CENTRALI ITALIANE.

EVENTUALI MODIFICHE ALLE DISPOSIZIONI IN VIGORE DEVONO  
ESSERE A NOI NOTIFICATE DALLE STESSE AUTORITÀ CENTRALI ITALIANE.

IL GENERALE COMANDANTE  
F.TO ROBERTO LERICI



1842

NR. 2550/OP.

P.M. 67, 31 MARZO 1944

RISP. AL FOGLIO DEL 30 MARZO C.A.NR.1354/OP.

OGGETTO: ORDINE PUBBLICO PER LA PROVINCIA DI BARI.

AL COMANDO TERRITORIALE DEL IX CORPO D'ARMAIA

- UFFICIO STATO MAGGIORE -

B A R I

ALLA COMUNICAZIONE FATTA DALLA LOCALE COMMISSIONE ALLEATE DI CONTROLLO CON FOGLIO NR.PS/8/8 IN DATA 20 MARZO C.A. CODESTO COMANDO RISPONDA CHE NON PUÒ ACCETTARE LA DISPOSIZIONE DATA DAL PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER, PERCHÉ IN CONTRASTO CON LE DISPOSIZIONI IMPARTITE DALLE AUTORITÀ CENTRALI ITALIANE.

EVENTUALI MODIFICHE ALLE DISPOSIZIONI IN VIGORE DEVONO ESSERE A NOI NOTIFICATE DALLE STESSE AUTORITÀ CENTRALI ITALIANE.

IL GENERALE COMANDANTE  
F.TO ROBERTO LERICI



1842

11

HQ / CC, APO 374  
Recd 11 May 0900  
By *[initials]*

10th March 1944.

Chief Commissioner.

NF  
*copies sent to Salerno*

I attach report on the civil disturbance at Caltanissetta, on 1st and 3rd March 1944. Caltanissetta is not far from Enna in the centre of Sicily.

Recent telegrams show that the incident was unique and that no further trouble has followed.

1-001

*MSL*

Copy to: V.P. Admin. Section.

1841

*Mar 11 3 21*

(10)

11 Mar 0900  
JB

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS

4 March 1944

APQ 394

FILE: REO 000.5

SUBJECT: Report of Civil Disturbance in Caltanissetta.

TO : Brig. M. LUSH, Executive Commissioner,  
THRU : P.C. & M.G. Section, A.C.C.H.Q.

1. Particulars concerning a serious riot in the city of Caltanissetta which occurred on 3 March 1944 and continued throughout the day, are forwarded herewith:

Beginning at 0730 hours on 3 March 1944 about 1500 people demonstrated in the main streets of Caltanissetta to complain against a decrease in food rations, high prices and Fascist tendencies of employers. A few shots were fired and windows were broken. Attempts were made to break into the food warehouses but members of the Carabinieri and ACC officers on duty prevented this from taking place. One boy age thirteen was shot trying to steal bread from a local bakery. The crowd was dispersed by Fire Brigade hoses around 0900 hours.

A crowd of about 2500 collected again around 1100 hours and proceeded to march to the Prefettura and stopped about 150 feet from the Prefettura when they were faced with Carabinieri and ACC officers with drawn weapons. A committee of rioters then called on the Prefect after which the Prefect and other officials addressed the mob. After the various speeches the crowd seemed to quiet down but shortly after they dispersed another crowd of about 300 marched to the Prefettura and attempted to break down the doors but CRR managed to prevent it. Throughout the day mobs gathered but no further damage was done. At approximately 1830 hours a crowd of 5000 collected in the Piazza, flew a Red flag and sang a Communist song. It appeared that the entire day's activity was instigated by members of the Christian Democratic and Communist Parties. The agitation was believed to have been instigated by a member of agitators apparently sent into the city from communes in the Province. None of the leading agitators were found to be local citizens. It was reported that the Italian soldiers, called out by the Prefect to break up the mob, said to various rioters that they would not shoot them.

000.1

Beginning at 0730 hours on 3 march 1944 about 1500 people demonstrated in the main streets of Caltanissetta to complain against a decrease in food rations, high prices and Fascist tendencies of employers. A few shots were fired and windows were broken. Attempts were made to break into the food warehouses but members of the Carabinieri and ACC officers on duty prevented this from taking place. One boy age thirteen was shot trying to steal bread from a local bakery. The crowd was dispersed by Fire Brigade hoses around 0900 hours.

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A further demonstration was said to have been scheduled for the morning of 4 March 1944 but up to this writing normal public order has prevailed in the city today. During the activities on 3 March 1944 rocks were thrown at Capt. Smith, an ACC officer in Caltanissetta and threats reported to have been made on his life. During the day arrests were made but the persons were released.

2. This is all the information received to date and is forwarded for your consideration and action.

For the Regional Commissioner:

*William R. Jordan*  
WILLIAM R. JORDAN  
Lt. Col., CAC  
Regional Executive Officer

5841

000.1

HQ ACC. DIV. 11 Mar 1944  
JLB

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
SICILY REGION HEADQUARTERS

AFPO 394

4 March 1944

FILE: REO 000.5

SUBJECT: Report of Civilian Disturbance (SERRADIFALCO).

TO : Brig. M. LUSH, Executive Commissioner,  
R.C. & M.G. Section, A.C.C.H.Q.

1. Particulars, concerning an incident which occurred at SERRADIFALCO, Province of Caltanissetta, at 0930 hours on 1 March 1944, are forwarded herewith:

On 1st March 1944 at 0930 hours, one thousand persons, majority of which were unemployed sulphur workers and women, assembled in front of the Municipio at Serradifalco demanding that the Sindaco Chiarella, Carmelo be dismissed.

Both at the Municipio and the Mayor's home windows were broken by stones thrown by boy members of group. Participants in the disturbances complained that unemployment was very prevalent, that employment in the commune was impossible to obtain, that their bread ration was insufficient and that prices of essential food commodities were too high.

2. Competent authorities have obtained authorization to commence work which will alleviate the existing unemployment and work will consequently begin in the mines located there. The bread ration however could not be increased for general dispositions.

3. An appropriate commission has gone to the Provincial Capital and complained to the Prefect on behalf of the population.

4. Local Carabinieri members have arrested the main instigators of the demonstration and other violators of Public Order.

5. Public order has been restored.

6. This information is forwarded for your consideration and action, supplemental to radio, this date.

For the Regional Commissioner:

*William R. Jordan*  
WILLIAM R. JORDAN 1839  
Lt. Col., CAC  
Regional Executive Officer

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On 1st March 1944 at 0930 hours, one thousand persons, majority of which were unemployed sulphur workers and women, assembled in front of the Municipio at Serradifalco demanding that the Sindico Chiarella, Carmelo be dismissed. Both at the Municipio and the Mayor's home windows were broken by stones thrown by boy members of group. Participants in the disturbances complained that unemployment was very prevalent, that employment in the commune was impossible to obtain, that their bread ration was insufficient and that prices of essential food commodities were too high.

2. Competent authorities have obtained authorization to commence work which will alleviate the existing unemployment and work will consequently begin in the mines located there. The bread ration however could not be increased for general dispositions.
3. An appropriate commission has gone to the Provincial Capital and complained to the Prefect on behalf of the population.
4. Local Carabinieri members have arrested the main instigators of the demonstration and other violators of Public Order.
5. Public order has been restored.
6. This information is forwarded for your consideration and action, supplemental to radio, this date.

For the Regional Commissioner:

*William R. Jordan*  
 WILLIAM R. JORDAN 1839  
 Lt. Col., CAC  
 Regional Executive Officer

CC/P/106

PERSONAL

NF

FRM.rj

26th. February, 1944.

*folio #8*

Your letter of 17th. February No. 2022/60 has only just reached me. I am sorry for the delay but it appears to have been held up here.

2. I think that probably most of your troubles have been in Apulia which, as you know, has never been under A.M.G. control. Now that Apulia is under McCaffery and included in my Region II, A.C.C., I hope that there will be an improvement.

3. The question of getting rid of officials, etc., who were either willy-nilly Fascist members or collaborated with the Fascist administration is one of the greatest difficulty. If we get rid of everyone who collaborated in the Fascist administration we are left with practically no one of any use for carrying on. That there are still undesirables in office is, I am afraid, almost inevitable but I am continually urging all concerned to get rid of all those, at any rate, who were pronouncedly Fascist. It is a most difficult job for my fellows in the provinces and communes where most of the population turn informer against each other, and sifting truth from false accusation is sometimes almost impossible. I am doing my best and hope that the situation will improve.

*100*

4. You will doubtless refer any specific cases which come to your notice to McCaffery and if he is unable to produce results he will let me know and I will bring pressure to bear through the Italian Government.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,  
Lieutenant-General,  
Chief Commissioner

1838

Major-General E.P. Nares, C.B.E., M.C.,  
G. O. C.,  
No.2. District,  
B A H I.

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*10107/10/10/10*

From: Maj. Gen. E.P. Sares, CBE, MC,  
HQ 2 District CMB  
2022/6 G

*17 Feb 44*

Dear *General*

1 Civil disturbances are constantly being reported from widely scattered areas in No 2 District; these disturbances may well have an adverse effect on our war effort; indeed on a recent occasion in TARANTO they resulted in the loss of a considerable number of working hours in the docks and military establishments.

2 While the main cause is the shortage of food a contributory one is invariably found to be the retention in office of ex-Fascist officials who represent to the ordinary people the corrupt regime which landed Italy in her present plight.

3 In this I think that the Italians have a very real grievance and I feel that the replacement of some of these officials should go a long way towards calming unrest and consequently ensuring a more vigorous co-operation from Italians engaged on work for the Allied Military authorities.

Yours *Sincerely*

*E.P. Sares*

Lt. Gen. P.H. Mason MacFarlane, KCB, DSO, MC,  
Deputy President Allied Control Commission,  
HQ Allied Control Commission.

JHC

1837

SECRET

FARGO 788 48

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMB)

7th. February. 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

PREVIOUS FOR INFO. GENERAL GAMMEL, MR MACMILLAN AND CIVIL AFFAIRS REPEATED  
HEADQUARTERS ACME FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

\_\_\_\_\_ In connection with recent trouble and threat of trouble at  
Taranto and possibility of similar difficulties elsewhere I think that it might be  
useful to consider possibility of establishment if and when necessary of local  
arbitration committees to deal with questions affecting labour conditions. Please  
let me know earliest possible if you agree to my approaching Italian Government on  
this question

*0/4/43 - Air - Mr. Macmillan*

1836

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NAVAL MESSAGE

*6.0.0.04*  
*Sec. Gen.* *4887*

CINC MED (ADMIRAL AND NAFLS)  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

**SECRET**

FROM: ROTALI

HO ACC, APC, 524

Rec'd *8 MAR 09 11 A*

MOST SECRET

**HEADQUARTERS**  
**8 MAR 1944**  
**A.C.C.**

A SIT DOWN STRIKE FOR 15 MINUTES IN TARANTO DOCKYARD AND YARD WAS ARRANGED FOR 1000 TO-DAY SATURDAY AS A PROTEST AGAINST PRIME MINISTER'S ALLEGED RECENT STATEMENT IN HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT HE SUPPORTED BADOLIO GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THEY HAD ARRANGED ARMISTICE AND GOT RID OF FASCISTS AND IS THE ONLY WORKABLE GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT. IT WAS CLAIMED THAT THIS IS NOT TRUE. THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO WHETHER STRIKE TOOK PLACE OR WORK WAS PROCEEDING NORMALLY. IF IT DID, IT WAS HALF HEARTED AND WITHOUT INCIDENTS

T.O.C.04 1637 MAR

DIST: LOG 4 SHU TO ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION VIA FLAMCO

ACC DIST

ACTION CA BH  
INFO SECRETARY BSN  
DEP CC  
POLSEC  
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*Mar 8 21*  
*3*

**SECRET**

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*6*

SECRET

46  
FARGO 786 ✓

FARGO (GEN MACFARLANE C COMM)

7th. February, 1944.

SECRET

10050 MACFARLANE

PRIORITY

FREEDOM FOR MGS, GENERAL GAMMEL, MR MACMILLAN AND CIVIL AFFAIRS REPEATED  
HEADQUARTERS ACME FROM MACFARLANE PERSONAL

I received warning last night of possibility of sit-down strike in Taranto dockyard today. I sent messages to Badoglio through both Jung and Stone impressing absolute necessity for prevention dislocation work in dockyard. Although wages and bread ration are the ostensible causes of disaffection there is evidence that political agitators are stirring up trouble in Taranto to embarrass Badoglio Government at this rather critical moment. I have sent Monfort to make special investigation and am holding A.M.C. team ready to put into Taranto in case I have to impose Military Government. While dictating above message arrived from Stone at Brindisi to say that all was quiet at Taranto. That Badoglio held a special meeting last night with Reale, De Courten, Acosta and others and the situation appears to be well in hand. The Minister of Marine made it quite clear that he intended to take the firmest possible line in dealing with any threat of dislocation of work

*file # 4*

1834

*01413 - Gen + Maj  
Baltimore  
(5)*

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394

EWS/hip  
DSB 16  
14 FEB 1944

7 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: General MacFarlane

In the interest of preserving an orderly L of C; here is a suggestion for dealing with the Taranto labor situation, and others as they may arise.

In consideration of a no-strike (including sit-downs, slow-downs, mass absences, etc) pledge from labor unions and unorganized workers for the duration of the war, the Government could agree, in each case of a labor dispute, to establish an Arbitration Board composed as follows:

- 1 Representative from Government
- 1 Representative from Labor
- 1 Representative from Employers

(Or 3 each--to avoid a tie vote)

The subjects to be dealt with by the Board in the case of the Taranto workers would be:

- (a) Food ration
- (b) Wages
- (c) Elimination of Black Market

In the last analysis, topics (a) and (b) could only be finally determined by us--under our actual control of imports and our desire, at least, to control inflation, but that need not prevent the Board from making findings on these subjects.

As to topic (c), the Government could request labor's suggestions for, and cooperation in, the elimination of black markets. The Board could propose new legislation, if need be, and penalties to implement. The Government would pledge itself to remove any corrupt or incompetent officials whom labour could prove are supporting black market operations.

Because of our interest in points (a) and (b), we might consider having an observer on the Board, without vote. The advantage to us of this would be to discourage the Government making a settlement with the workers by acceding to wage and food ration demands which we might finally have to veto. In other words, we might want to sit in, without official voice or vote, just to keep from having the first two points dumped, in the last analysis, in our lap.

183

E. W. S.

(A copy from a copy)

01412-

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DSB 12  
13 FEB 1944

7 February 1944

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Taranto Situation.  
TO : Capt Ellery W. Stone, Acting Chief of Staff, ACC.  
FROM : Lt Col E. B. Mayne, Regional Liaison Officer, ACC (APULIA)

1. Recent events in Taranto are, I consider, straws in the wind.
2. On the one hand, there is an important body of workers in the dockyards and associated plants. The workers are organized and there is every indication that political influences are active in their leadership.
3. On the other hand is the local Italian Naval Command, who have taken charge of the situation. Their intention, as far as we know it, is to handle matters with firmness, while attempting to remove abuses and improve local conditions. Admiral Fioravango however, by his handling of recent events, has not given grounds for confidence. Against this, I am informed that the Italian Ministry of Marine under S E de Courten is remaining at Taranto.
4. I consider that it is quite on the cards that the labor leaders will bring about a trial of strength. What occurs in Taranto will then be a kind of test case for similar developments elsewhere.
5. Questions of high policy are likely to arise without warnings:
  - a) In the event of serious trouble, the Italian Naval Commander may seek the military assistance of the Area Commander. This, in effect, is what has already occurred twice.
  - b) Allied support, short of military intervention, may be sought, e.g. in a proclamation, in a public statement, or at a meeting.
  - c) Questions involving the alteration of wages or rations, which require coordination for all of liberated Italy, can be foreseen.
6. With reference to c), I recommend that a member of the Labor Sub-Commission should be sent to Taranto immediately, in order to make himself familiar with conditions of labor and the problems involved. This can be done without his appearing to interfere in the situation.
7. In view of the uncertain situation, I propose to post myself at Taranto from tomorrow. My office will be in the ACC Liaison Office, Prefettura, Taranto; Tel No Taranto 3455.

01413-

E B Mayne 1832

M. C. A.

(3)

*file as 2000  
from Property Dept  
Commissioner*      *100 C 13*

HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 394

6 February 1944

*I have with AFAC asking if  
I can approach Italian Government  
on these lines.*

TO: Chief Commissioner

Deputy Chief Commissioner has made the following suggestion for dealing with Taranto and other labor situations in the interests of insuring orderly L O C :-

In consideration of a pledge from labor union and unorganized workers that there will be no strikes, mass absences, etc., for duration of war, the Government would agree to establish an arbitration board composed as follows:

- 1 representative from Government
- 1 representative from Labor
- 1 representative from Employers
- ( or 3 from each to avoid tie vote)

Subjects to be dealt with by the Boards:-

- (a) Wages
- (b) Food Rationing
- (c) Elimination of black market

In the last analysis topics (a) and (b) and only the final settlement by us -- under our actual control of imports and our desire at least to control inflation, but that need not stop the Board making findings on these subjects.

As to topic (c) the Government should request labor suggestions for, and cooperation, in eliminating the black market. The Government must pledge itself to remove any corrupt or incompetent officials whom labor can prove are assisting black market operations.

Because of our interests in points (a) and (b), we might consider having an observer on the Board without vote. The advantage to us of this would be to discourage the Government from making settlement with the workers by acceding to wage and food demands we might finally have to veto. In other words we might want to sit in without official voice or vote to keep from having the first two points dumped in the last analysis in our laps.

*from Capt Stone?*

*Wm 7/2/44*

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*2*

*01413-*

Date  
File  
E.O. (?)  
pub

RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

GENERAL CAUSES:

1. Low level of family ration - 150 gra. of bread per person per day.
2. The general decline in the governmental authority, following collapse of Fascism and lack of strong local command - partly due to uncertainty as to how far Allies will support the putting down of political demonstrations.

PARTICULAR CAUSES:

3. Large industrial population of Taranto due to dock yards. By nature unruly and susceptible to political agitation.
4. Poor local administration, with particular reference to food distribution organizations. (Col. Morfort knows details.)

EVENTS:

In spite of the generally peaceful nature of the crowds and the presence of units of Carabinieri and Italian troops, no effective steps were taken to handle the crowds. Conspicuous lack of command.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

By Italians

1. Inquire into the lack of command and its immediate rectification.
2. Appointment of the best Questori available.
3. Appointment of the best Prefect available.
4. Effective reorganization of the food distribution services. ACC Supply Officers to assist.

By Allies:

1. See whether ration can be improved immediately. Notably (830) regular, if small, pasta ration.

014.13

014.13

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- 3. Appointment of the best Prefect available.
- 4. Effective reorganization of the food distribution services. AGO Supply Officers to assist.

By Allies.

- 1. See whether ration can be improved immediately. Notably <sup>880</sup> regular, if small, pasta ration.
- 2. The immediate supply of some transport for civilian supplies - say 20 trucks. Taranto Province is particularly short of transport for distributing supplies and for bringing local supplies to the town.

NOTE: Since dictating above have learned of recommendation to increase bread ration. In my opinion, this should be made effective before transfer in order to avoid any criticism by opposition that increase was held back by Allies to support Government upon taking over.

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E. W. S.

To: General MacFarlane

Recd. over phone 0940 from Capt. Stone



