

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

ACC

10000/101/483

SUMMAR
BETWE
MAR. -

785015

10000/101/483

SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS TO BE DISCUSSED AT MEETING
BETWEEN COMMISSION & ITALIAN GOV'T
MAR. - MAY 1944

This has not been checked
with Salerno files. I don't
propose checking it in this condition.

The papers should be properly
filed, bound and listed before
anybody can do much useful
work on it.

af

21 May

Chief Commission -

Here are reports on ^{the} various questions raised in the Marshall's Reg. memo of 13 April, 24 Sept. for the Army Sub-Commission. A check with them reveals that they are still getting data on the question applicable to them (Page 9, para 2).

100-21-1-100
100-21-1-100

~~C~~ out of date
Any use applying?

22
21

4760

Capt Stone has seen,
23 May

C.E. says tomorrow.

File

HQ ACC, APO 394
Sec'y Gen.
C'd 11 May 1944
By DFE

11th May 1944.

Chief Commissioner.

I submit suggested replies to the Italian Government on the
submissions made by them which effect the Regional Control and Military
Government Section. I have not answered para. 6 on page 7, which I have
referred to the Economic Section.

M.S.L. 11/5/44

Reference phase
12/2/44

4759

COMMENTS ON ITALIAN CABINET MEMORANDUM.

RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES.

1. Control by affiliated Allied Authorities.

The difficulty of assimilating themselves to new conditions after the handing over of occupied territory to the Italian Government is shared by both Allied Control Commission officers and Italian officials. On the one hand it is difficult immediately to change executive authority to advisory control. On the other hand it is difficult for the Italian authorities to take up executive authority at once. There must be a gradual and mutual assimilation. Nor must it be forgotten that the duties of the Allied Control Commission make it necessary for the officers of that Commission to advise and guide Italian officials and to call their attention to matters which need reform.

The administration of the prisons in liberated Italy is in many respects deplorable: the number of people awaiting trial excessive. Allied officers find it hard to tolerate such conditions in areas in which they are in the positions of advisors.

The Provincial Commissioner at Bari, at the request of the Allied military commander, met the leaders of the political parties in order to ensure that law and order would be maintained at any political meetings to be held. Lieut. Colonel Vining, who has been questioned in this matter, states that on every occasion he impressed upon the Prefect that it was the latter's responsibility to maintain order and to maintain order without the unreasonable use of force.

The Provincial Commissioner at Bari did advise the Prefect of that Province that merchandise sequestered in connection with food rationing crimes should be delivered to the section of the Allied Control Commission which was responsible for issuing such supplies, on the grounds that the merchandise had been imported into Italy from Allied sources, in Allied ships and was, therefore, morally, although perhaps not technically, their property.

It is the experience of Allied officers that Italian officials are inclined to depend too much on the authority of these officers, to refrain from taking responsible action themselves, and then, upon reflection, to complain that Allied officers have usurped their powers.

2. Behaviour of the Allied Forces.

The allegations about the behaviour of Allied Forces will be brought before the relevant authorities. It is, however, important to remember that generalities lead nowhere and that specific reports should be made at the time to the Allied Control Commission or AMG authorities on the spot.

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The damage to electrical insulators in the Province of Foggia 4758ell have been caused by persons other than Allied troops and specific details should be given to the Provincial Commissioner of that Province.

Instructions have already been given prohibiting the hunting of rosbuck in that area.

Every effort is made by the military authorities to prevent unreasonable cutting of firewood but it should be remembered that military units are often forced to do so for operational reasons.

4. Employment of Italian officers and soldiers by Allied Commands.

The agreement of the Italian Government will be sought in the event of the employment of Italian officers or soldiers by the Allied Forces.

-2-

PROBLEMS CONCERNING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.1. Administrative organization.

The Allied authorities have rightly suspended agencies and institutions of Fascist creation. It is understood that the High Commissioner of Sicily is now in agreement that the new offices set up by the AMG authorities are of value in the administration and can be assimilated in the new organization of government.

Consultation between the Allied Control Commission and the Italian Government regarding legislation is constantly made and will be continued.

2. Appointments and Movements of Prefects.

Prefects have been removed by AMG authorities because of their Fascist tendencies.

The Italian Government will probably agree that far too few Italian officials of Fascist tendencies have been removed in the Provinces of Apulia and Sardinia in the early stages of administration. It is often impossible to find persons with sufficient experience to take the place of Prefects. As long ago as December this fact was made clear to Marshal Badoglio with the suggestion that his Minister of Interior should furnish AMG authorities with lists of Italian officials suitable to take office in replacement of officials who had been removed. Up to date no such list has been received. Every opportunity will be taken to consult with the Italian Government before new appointments are made and, if possible, before officials are removed, although in forward areas this may not always be possible. The Italian Government should be earnestly requested to provide the Allied Control Commission with a list of suitable officials for appointment in forward areas with the least possible delay.

3. Appointments, promotions and dismissals of personnel.

The suggestions are largely covered by the comments made in 2 above. It is agreed that every effort will be made to consult with the Italian Government before appointments, promotions and dismissals of Italian personnel are made, always with the proviso that maintenance of efficient administration and rapid re-establishment of law and order must be of paramount importance.

The Italian Government will agree that consultation takes time and that it is very difficult for them to find sufficient Italian officials at short notice.

4. Salaries of Personnel.

The anomalies referred to took place in the early stages of occupation, have now to a great extent been removed and will be avoided in future.

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5. De-fascistization.

The Italian Government will probably agree that de-fascistization has been carried out with greater effect in territory administered by AMG than in territory administered by the Royal Italian Government.

The Allied Control Commission is prepared to act in accordance with any decree on this subject promulgated by the Royal Italian Government, so long as that decree deals effectively with the removal of fascists from office.

6. Utilization of Personnel.

Military operations in the early stages of occupation forbid the handling of communications by any persons other than Allied military personnel. Every effort will be made to re-establish communications in accordance with military exigencies.

7. Premises for Public Offices.

The first submission has already been referred to the military authorities who are in sympathy with the Italian requests but are unable to meet them at present owing to the necessity of maintaining troops in the Salerno area.

Every effort is being made to protect Italian Government buildings for the use of the Italian Government. It is hoped that in the future Government buildings will be made available for local Government officials but the Italian Government will understand that military operations must have precedence.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS.

5 & Motor vehicles for supplying of civilian population and for collection of 6. taxes.

Every effort is being made to provide the Italian Government with sufficient motor vehicles for the feeding of the population and the administration of the country. The Italian Government is probably aware that no less than 700 motor trucks have been made available for distribution of supplies. The Allied Control Commission is astonished that no reference should be made to this great assistance in the remarks of the Italian Government.

ASSISTANCE TO WAR REFUGEES.

The Allied Control Commission has limited, and will continue to limit, to an absolute minimum evacuations from any place in Italy. The Allied Control Commission has provided adequate food for refugees throughout the present operations. The same cannot be said of the Italian local authorities responsible for the distribution of that food.

The accommodation of refugees in public buildings is not in accordance with the advice constantly given to Italian authorities by the Allied authorities. The Italian local authorities have failed continually to make these unfortunate people part of the community in the reception areas. These refugees in the reception areas are treated with little sympathy and given inadequate accommodation and assistance. Far more can and must be done by the Italian Government in this respect.

The Italian Government realises that transportation is limited. The 700 trucks already referred to can be used for the transportation of refugees if co-ordinated efforts are made by the local Italian authorities. The transportation of the Italian refugees in the forward areas on the trains has been adequate. It has broken down in the reception areas where the Italian local Government are responsible.

Medical supplies have been provided for refugees in all forward areas during transit. Many clothes have been distributed. Medical supplies

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THEATRES AND CINEMAS.

Priority for the use of theatres and cinemas in Italy is rightly given to the Allied troops who are fighting the common enemy in that country. A number of cinemas and theatres have been left for the use of the civilian population. The management of these cinemas and theatres must for the moment be left in the hands of the Allied authorities who, however, employ a great number of Italians (e.g. the Operatic Company in Naples), in so doing.

HOTELS.

As in every other country involved in war the requisitioning of hotels is necessarily considerable. In this theatre many of the Italian staff are employed and will continue to be employed provided they give satisfaction. The Allied Control Commission can see no reason for this submission.

-4-

The Allied Control Commission finds in the memorandum submitted by the Italian Government a tendency on the part of that Government to forget that the common enemy in their country is being driven back by the Allied forces and that sacrifices in every respect must be made by every member of the Italian population, however far that may be from the battle front. Moreover, it is incumbent upon Italian officials to remember that in order to carry out military operations successfully in this theatre, everything must give way before military necessity and that the administration of the country must be maintained at a level compatible with the necessities of war.

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

9/3.3/AS.

SUBJECT : Points Raised by the Italian Government.

TO : Sec. Gen. HQ ACC.

- 1 I shall be obliged if this letter can be placed before the Chief Commissioner when he is dealing with Marshal Badoglio's letter enclosing particulars of a number of matters for discussion (your reference SG 000.1 of 9 May 44).
- 2 Is not some lack of perspective shown by the Italian Government in some of their complaints? Do they really understand how hardly the war bears upon the Allied people?
- 3 I cannot speak for America, but do the Italians understand that in England every man up to 51 is either conscripted or engaged in essential work, that boys of all classes are sent to the coal mines, that all women up to 50 (except those with young children) are either in the services or engaged on essential work, that no civilian can use his car, that large areas of England are closed to all non-residents, that considerable areas have been compulsorily evacuated so that the area can be used for war purposes, that a substantial population has been compulsorily moved because it resided in the neighborhood of targets or because their houses have been destroyed or because they have been directed to work in some other part of the country and that this state has continued for several years? That all (men and women) engaged in civil occupations including those in war industries have in addition to their work to spend long hours as Home Guards, Fire Watchers or on other civil defence work and that income tax runs from 10/- in the £ up to 19/6d?
- 4 If we could make this plain it might not only be educational but also facilitate the reaching of agreement on the points raised.

S.
STANSGATE,
VP Adm Sec.

HEADQUARTERS
19 MAY 1944 4755
A. C. C.

~~Dear Sir~~
The attached note
by Major White
might be worth while
mentioning to the CC.
although I consider the points
are familiar. They are
well catalogued here S

8170

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

8114
18 May 1945
JLD

9/3.3/AS.

16 May 44.

SUBJECT : Points submitted by Italian Government.

TO : Sec. Gen. HQ ACC.

Attached are the comments asked for by your SG 000.1 of 9 May 44 which I have to make upon those portions of the enclosure to Marshal Badoglio's letter which have been referred to the Adm Section.

They are submitted loose so that they can be easily assembled by you in such order as may best meet your convenience.



Slansgac

STANBATE,
VP Adm Sec.

4754

RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIED AUTHORITIES.2 Allied Forces' Police.

a So far as the extract may be construed as an allegation that persons are kept in gaol for a long time "even for months" before trial before an AMG Court I am satisfied that the allegation is without foundation. There was at one time a delay in NAPLES but this was cured by the appointment of a commission which released all persons who had been in prison awaiting trial before an AMG Court for an unreasonable time and their work has been completed.

b I do not doubt that a number of Italians have been arrested by the Allied Forces and sent for trial before an Italian Court and that they have remained in prison for a long time before trial. This is a matter over which the Allied Control Commission has been complaining repeatedly to the Italian Government but I hardly think that the Marshal is referring to this class of case.

c I do not doubt that a number of Italians have been thrown into gaol from time to time by the Allied Forces for security and other reasons but this is a matter which does not concern this Section. I understand that nearly all such persons have been "re-screened" by HQ AAI and those not released have been sent to PADULA.

d The only power of imprisonment of persons without trial which is exercised by ACC personnel is that provided for by Proclamation 2, Article VII (old series). There are at the moment only two such persons in prison.

e Royal Decree Law of 31 January 44 No 45 confers extended powers of arrest on Italian Police in certain circumstances. I feel that it would be entirely inappropriate for us to bind the Allied Authorities to observe such regulations. It may well be necessary for Allied Military Police to make arrests in circumstances not provided for by this decree. If it be true that officers and soldiers of the Italian Army have been interned without informing the Italian Army Commanders this would seem to be wrong. HQ AAI Directive lays down that in unoccupied territory arrests, will, except in emergency, only be carried out through the Italian Police and where emergency requires an arrest by Allied Military personnel a report will immediately be made to ACC. A reminder as to this procedure may be desirable and I am prepared to issue one if desired.

PROBLEMS CONCERNING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

9 School Services.

1. The Education Sub-Comm is in full accord with the need of assuring unity of direction in school services and is in frequent contact with the Minister of Education. All matters of policy, time tables, calendars, programmes, examinations etc., for occupied Italy are presented to him for comment and counsel and, up to the present, nothing has been done contrary to his advice. It is the policy of the Education Sub-Comm to advise all Regional Education Officers in occupied Italy to incorporate in their Region the policies, programmes etc, which are from time to time agreed between the Minister of Education and the Education Sub-Comm, insofar as military and local situations permit. As of the present date no disagreement or conflict of policy has appeared.
2. The Education Sub-Comm has organised in Naples a Youth Commission of which the present Minister of Education has been the Chairman. This Youth Commission has prepared a statute for submission to the Minister providing for a reorganised Patronato Scolastico to give aid to needy students. The Minister is, of course, fully acquainted with this work and is in hearty agreement with it. The full report will be submitted to him this week.
3. A committee of the Youth Commission has worked out a comprehensive plan for hot school lunches in Naples, has secured the approval and promise of assignment of desiccated soup from the Food Sub-Comm, has analysed the practical problems of distribution, etc., all in the hope of demonstrating in Naples what can be done in all large cities. This programme has, however, been halted by the Regional Commissioner of Region III who disapproves, for the present, any plan for serving school lunches.

INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY.

7 Institutions of technical - professional instruction.

The Education Sub-Comm is in full agreement with the Italian Government regarding the necessity of releasing buildings and reconstructing scientific and technical institutions. Through its Regional Officers it is taking such steps as can be taken locally but the practical difficulties have in most cases temporarily insuperable. The Education Sub-Comm will welcome suggestions from the Italian Government as to concrete ways in which it can be of assistance in this highly important work.

ARTISTIC PATRIMONY.

All possible measures are being taken to assure the conservation of monuments and works of art as set forth in 20900/2/MFAA of 23 April 44, copy attached. (See also ACC/040.-6/AS of 25 April 44 and the Chief Commissioner's letter to Marshal Badoglio, 341/73/CA of 30 April 44).

Close liaison has been established with the representatives of the Italian Government and with the Royal Superintendents. Several conferences have already been held with the newly appointed director of Monuments and the inspector general of Monuments in the new government to discuss plans and action in the territory administered by the Italian Government. It is proposed to have regular fortnightly meetings with these Italian officials.

All along, both in the Sub-Commission and in the various Regions, Italian officials have been consulted in the making of plans and in the execution of them.

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Subcommission for Monuments Fine Arts and Archives

HEW/exp

20900/2/123AA

25 April 1944

Subject: Damage to Historical Monuments.

To : Vice President, Administrative Section.

1. Comment upon Marshal Badoglio's letter of 6 April on the subject of Historical and Artistic Monuments in Italy falls under two headings:

- a. The facts of the present situation,
- b. Concrete proposals for the future put forward in his attached memorandum.

2. The facts are that during the initial stages of occupation a certain amount of damage was undoubtedly done. This was investigated by a Commission of Enquiry appointed by the C.-in-C. sitting under Major-General Collier. The findings of this Commission (which have been fully borne out by the experience of the MPAA Subcommission) were that, while some of the damage alleged to have been done by troops was attributable to civilians, a proportion was undoubtedly the work of troops, and that both could in many cases have been prevented. Certain specific recommendations were therefore made with a view to preventing or minimizing such damage in the future.

3. In addition the Commission made a certain number of recommendations particular to individual buildings in Naples, including the Royal Palace. Except in one instance these recommendations have not since been put into effect, and the failure to implement them is undoubtedly the prime cause of the Marshal's letter. In each case it may be added that the MPAA Subcommission has been presented from the start with a fait-accompli.

4. The Royal Palace at Naples was badly damaged prior to the occupation and undoubtedly suffered considerably from neglect in the early stages of the occupation. The careless damage and pilfering disclosed by the Commission's enquiry ceased some months ago; but the subsequent sweeping work of repair, undertaken by the RE's with a view to the installation of an R.F.I. rest-centre, has been carried on with only a very superficial regard for the historical importance of the building. The advice of the MPAA Subcommission's representative has been frequently overruled and the Italian Superintendent for Monuments and his staff denied admittance and treated with great discourtesy. After all efforts at liaison had failed to produce any noticeable improvement, the matter was reported in detail to the Chief Commissioner, who on 17 *h* wrote to the C.-in-C. on the matter. His letter was referred to the C.A.O. for investigation, and a full report is still awaited.

4750

5. Castoria Palace. The actual structure has not suffered to any extent from occupation, and is not likely to suffer; the fittings and pictures on the other hand have suffered severely from indiscriminate "requisition" and it was not until 19 March that the Royal Subcommission, by agreement with A.S.I., was finally able to secure the necessary storage-space within the palace and an authorization to withdraw to it what remained of the more important historical fittings and furniture. This arrangement is now threatened with cancellation by A.S.I. (see attached document C).

6. The Accademia di Belle Arti is an educational institution housed in a building of little historic or artistic importance. This building is not used as a hospital, and, while the necessity for the requisition of any cultural institution is a matter of regret, in the opinion of the Royal Subcommission it is, under present conditions, very properly so employed. The Comm. of Enquiry could find no evidence of misappropriation (see attached excerpt from findings).

7. Marshal Badoglio's proposals for action against the repetition of damage in the future. In addition to the letters written by General Maresca (12 Nov 41) and General Alexander (17 Jan 42), A.S.I. Administrative Instruction (appended herewith - A), which was issued on 30 Mar 42 after consultation with A.S.I. and embodies the general recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry, specifically covers all the points raised by the Marshal, except that (as already clearly defined by General Maresca) it is considered that no absolute prohibitions to occupation can be made.

- a. Lists of buildings, graded by importance, have been drawn up. These buildings may only be occupied under certain very clearly defined conditions and authority from a Major General or officer of equivalent rank. Publishing of these lists was necessarily withheld until the final approval of the Administrative Instruction covering them, but the first list (Rome - General) is now in proof. (Adm. Instr., paras. 3-5.)
- b. The Italian Superintendents have already been consulted over the preparation of these lists (Adm. Instr., para. 6).
- c. Where it is found necessary to occupy a listed monument, provision is made for the dispersal of contents on the lines suggested (Adm. Instr., para 7).
- d. Police arrangements are covered in general terms (Adm. Instr., para. 8) and have already been prepared in detail for Rome.

8. Liaison with the Italian Superintendents in Naples has throughout been close, continuous, and cordial, although there has evidently been a certain lack of firmness on the part of Doctor Castelfranco, Director General of Belle Arti under the Ministry of Education at Salerno.

9. While it is false to say that "many irreparable acts of damage continue to be committed", there is no doubt that the two Royal Palaces mentioned are a sore spot and are nullifying the effect of the good work

What is being done by AGI in regard to any other comments. Furthermore a lot of the damage done has been most unnecessary, and the recent episodes do not augur well for the future application of the terms of Administrative Instruction No. 10.

10. Specifically the AGI Subcommittee suggests:-

- a. The Royal Palace, Mexico, that in view of the Chief Commissioner's letter of 27 Mar and the virtual completion of the repair-work, no further action is at present needed. The Officer I.O. S.F.I. has expressed anxiety to cooperate, and the Subcommission, in conjunction with the Italian Government, is producing a suitable guide-book for the use of troops.

There is some confusion still on the ultimate fate of that part of the Palace due for allocation to American troops. The very significant item in this section is the National Library, and it is hoped that this can be safeguarded without further recourse to Higher Authority.

- b. General Royal Palace, that AGI be urged to reconsider their decision to appropriate the storage-space at present allocated by I.S.I. (see attached correspondence C, /).

(see 2)

HENRY T. DE WILD
Major, Spec. Res.
Director.

Attachment to letter 20900/2/AFM
12 APR 47

Extract from "Report of the Allied Commission of Enquiry Appointed to Investigate Damage Alleged to Have Been Caused to Civil and Personal Property of Historical and Educational Importance in Italy":

* * * * *

Regia Accademia di Belle Arti.

35. This institution consists partly of a gallery of modern art (19th Century) and partly of an art school. The Commission felt that the evidence as to damage was unreliable. The only Italian witness was the director, an old man who was obviously breaking up as a result of seeing his institution taken over by Allied troops. The Commission do not wish to imply that he deliberately tried to mislead them, but his memory was failing and he could not say what damage or loss had occurred. The Commission therefore examined the commanding officer and adjutant of the occupying unit. All that the Commission were able to establish was that the American hospital now in occupation of the institution had gone to an immense amount of trouble on their first arrival to help the director and his assistants either to remove the more important contents of the institution to another building, or to carry them to another part of the institution where they were walled up. This took about three weeks. The commanding officer admitted that, although every care was taken, some damage was done, but as far as the Commission could ascertain the objects damaged were either plaster casts or student paintings. The Commission were unable to see the damage for themselves, as all the objects removed had been stored in special rooms and walled up. So far as they could ~~xxxxx~~ find out, nothing had been lost or damaged that falls properly within the scope of this enquiry.

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ECONOMIC SECTION
APO 394

30 May 1944
JBT/iab

ES/35

20 May 44

SUBJECT: Letter from Marshal Badoglio.

TO : The Secretary General.

Reference your SG 000.1 dated 9 May 44 herewith comments on Marshal Badoglio's letter as requested.

Page 5, Section 10 - Paper for the Public Administration.

By far the bulk of the paper from the Foggia Paper Mill was allocated by members of the Allied Forces Local Resources (Italian) Board at a meeting at Foggia in February at which representatives of the Italian Government were present. Of the remaining allocations made to other branches and services, these were substantially for purposes in connection with the public administration, e.g. the paper assigned to A.C.C. was for ration cards. All this paper has been distributed from the mill and is in use. In addition paper for ration cards and similar purposes has been imported.

Future requirements for paper unobtainable in Italy, must be met by imports either of paper or of cellulose for its manufacture, preferably the latter. In this case a schedule of detailed requirements covering a six months' period, commencing sufficiently far ahead to allow for requisitions to be made and approved and shipments to arrive, should be submitted, together with samples of the paper required.

Page 6, Section 1 - De-requisitioning of Industrial Plants.

It is agreed that derequisitioning of vital industrial establishments is desirable where this does not conflict with military occupation essential to the prosecution of the war, and it is recommended that a careful survey of these shall be made, not only with the intention of de-requisitioning, but also to coordinate productive capacity and to ensure the balanced distribution of materials and plant between competing interests, in order that the most economical use can be made of indigenous facilities and stocks of materials. The survey recommended should be made by the Italian Government engineers who should be given all facilities. Only essential minimum civilian needs can be considered, bearing in mind the shortage of power and coal.

It would be appreciated if the Italian Government will provide this H.Q. with a schedule of plant and installations which it considers should be so derequisitioned. Representations can then be made with a view to such a policy of coordination being put into effect, or alternatively for access to be granted to proprietors and executives for the recovery of essential documents or equipment not otherwise deemed essential to the occupying authorities. 4748

- 2 -

Page 6, Section 2 - Operation of Industries which work for the
Royal Navy

The whole question of large scale rehabilitation of heavy industries or the completion of public works is subject to three limiting factors -- global deficiencies, shipping and power production -- factors which primarily arise on account of the non-self-sufficient character of the Italian industry, particularly in the South, a characteristic which has been further aggravated as a result of military action. For example the production of power is in many cases dependent upon the provision of imported coal, which is not only critically short in the producing countries, but would involve the diversion of considerable tonnage from the shipment of operational military supplies and immediately essential civilian equipment. An additional and not unimportant factor is the labour which would be required for large works such as the completion of the Taranto dry dock. It is considered that this labour is more usefully employed in speeding repairs rather than in undertaking new works.

The lack of clothing, especially footwear, is a need which is reproduced throughout all sections of the Italian population. Although extensive requisitions have been made on their behalf, it will inevitably be some time before these are met, and it is therefore suggested that the specific requirements of the Italian Navy in this respect should be submitted through the Navy Sub-Commission so that, if necessary, a special justification can be made out for urgent supplies to be obtained. In this case preference should be given to semi-manufacture, i.e., piece goods and leather rather than to fully manufactured articles.

The reactivation of the plants of the Man. Cotoniere Meridionale to maximum capacity is also closely engaging the attention of this H.Q. and a study is in course of preparation of raw materials replacements and spare parts, which will enable the three relatively undamaged and inter-balanced factories to become fully operational. This will involve, amongst considerable other supplies, the importation of 250 tons of raw cotton monthly, any increase on which, in view of the extensive rehabilitation necessary before the other damaged factories can be brought into production, is unlikely to be approved.

It is further pointed out that the occupation of the Naples plant by the military authorities has been confirmed on the grounds of essential and expanding military necessity.

The possibility of opening a shoe factory for the Royal Navy is considered impracticable for two reasons. Firstly, in the unlikely event, in view of world shortages, of importation of machinery being approved, it will take anything from six to twelve months before it could be installed and operated. Secondly, adequate

- 3 -

facilities exist elsewhere, e.g. in the Naples area amongst shoe manufacturers, who are at present working short time on account of the shortage of leather and who could consequently deal with any reasonable requirement without the necessity of setting up a special plant.

Page 7, Section 3 - Allocation of coal and other raw materials for industry

The coal situation has been briefly referred to above. Coal is in critically short supply even in the primary producing centres and this, coupled with the shipping position, in the case of other ores and lumber, makes it essential that every consuming unit shall be the subject of a special study for which the sole admissible justifications are either operational necessity or essential civilian needs. For example, the production of window glass, to which reference is made in the Memorandum, has been rejected by AFHQ on the sole grounds of coal consumption.

Page 7, Section 4 - Destruction of Works, equipment and installations.

It is agreed that these should be confined to cases of military necessity, and where possible, in agreement with the Italian authorities, although naturally cases may arise where on account of urgency or other overriding considerations, immediate action may be called for.

Page 7, Section 5 - Requisition of machinery, raw materials, finished and semifinished materials

It is agreed that this, in the same way as the requisitioning and derequisitioning of industrial plants, should be coordinated, in order to make the most economical use of available materials, and preserve those for which there is no immediate use, from deterioration. The extent to which materials at present unused can be released to the War Ministry or to industry is a subject for individual study, otherwise the evil which it is particularly desired to avoid, namely unavoidable demands on shipping may be aggravated.

The setting up of a coordinating committee with terms of reference to cover such a policy is already receiving the attention of this H.Q. In the meantime the submission of a specific schedule incorporating the views and recommendations of the Italian Government would provide material for the recommendation of such a committee.

The refusal by military authorities to issue receipts for requisitions is a practice which is not condoned, as it is detrimental to the interests of both parties and can only lead to confusion in the future. Steps will be taken to bring this to the notice of all concerned with a view to its immediate discontinuance.

- 4 -

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Page 7, Section 6 - Freezing of goods and prices.

Materials considered by the Allied military authorities as essential now, or likely so to be, in the immediate future, for the prosecution of the war effort are the subject of "freezing" orders. Sympathetic consideration will be given to any case where stocks remain "frozen" for an unreasonable period without being utilised. It is realised that the free exchange of goods and services is an essential for healthy trade conditions, and it is not intended to strangle civilian enterprise.

12
Page 8, Section 1 - Transportation by railroad and ordinary traffic.

The entire control and supervision of the operation of the Italian State Railways is undertaken by the D.G.M.R.S. who is not for the present prepared to increase passenger or freight train service, due to a shortage of coal, locomotives, rolling stock and spare parts, but it is prepared to treat each application for increases in train service on its merits. It must be clearly shown in making out a justification for additional trains that it is absolutely essential to the needs of the country.

12
Page 8, Section 2 - Communications with Sardinia and Sicily.

A request has already been put forward to MEDBO by the Italians for four ships, the vessels being named. These ships meantime are operating under the direction of the Principal Sea Transport Officer, Mediterranean, and could not be released to run on a regular service to the Islands. Other tonnage does not appear to be available.

Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, has issued instructions that passengers will only be carried for the purposes directly concerned with the war effort, or where essential to the economic interests of the locality: also all persons moving by sea, crews or passengers, must be approved by Field Security Police or Counter Intelligence Corps. Whilst this directive covers passengers on schooners specifically, presumably the same regulations apply to those proceeding as passengers on other vessels. It would appear that in view of these restrictions the number of people entitled to travel must be limited and would not justify running four or even one ship in any regular service.

12
Page 8, Section 3 - Railroad cars for the transportation of Salt and other monopoly goods.

With regard to the transportation of salt from Margherita, near Barletta. There are weekly consignments up to 34 wagons per week from Barletta to the Sud-Est and Foggia Province and the question of importing salt by schooner from Sicily where salt is

- 5 -

plentiful to Castellamare or Naples is under investigation. 1000 tons has been arranged for transport by sea from Margherita to Castellamare, but Margherita is only a small port capable of loading about 50 tons per day.

Page 8, Section 4 - Railroad cars and motor vehicles for the services of the Military Commissariat.

If Military Commissariat refers to supplies for the Italian Military authorities this is arranged for with Movements by the M.M.I.A.

Page 9, Section 5 - Motor vehicles for supplying Civilian Population.

720 motor vehicles have recently been issued to Regions and AMG 5th and 8th Armies and 400 additional vehicles will be made available shortly.

This will relieve the acute motor transport shortage in the Provinces for food distribution, etc.

Page 9, Section 6 - Motor Vehicles for Collection of Taxes.

The Agriculture Sub-Commission is endeavouring to requisition 31 motor vehicles, one car for each Province - and requisitioning of cars is also being undertaken by the Transportation Sub-Commission.

Every effort will be made to furnish necessary tyres for requisitioned vehicles.

The present policy of G-4 AFHQ does not permit the issue, by A.C.C. of tyres for civilian vehicles. It is however possible that this policy may be changed. At present there are insufficient tyres to meet all essential civilian services.

Page 9, Section 7 - Auto Spare parts.

An appreciable amount of Italian transport is out of commission due to lack of spare parts, such as tyres, batteries and electrical equipment, etc.

In order to meet the demand for tyres for Italian vehicles, A.C.C. has requested authority for supplies of materials for a tyre re-treading plant at Bari, in Region II.

The only cars requisitioned are those which do not require spare parts to put them on the road. Spare parts for Italian cars are, at present, practically unobtainable but machine shops have been inspected with a view to manufacturing spare parts which cannot be obtained otherwise.

- 6 -

12
Page 9, Section 8 - Transport of Lignite.

Castelluccio is situated on the narrow gauge line Lagonegro-Spezzano Albanese but rail haulage is impossible owing to bridge destruction 16 km. from Lagonegro.

Presuming road transport is available to haul the lignite 40 km. from the mines at Castelluccio to I.S.R. main railroad terminal Lagonegro, little difficulty would be experienced in securing wagons for loading and transport.

144
Page 9, Section 9 - Transport of Asphalt dust from Sicily.

If shipment of this commodity is considered as being high priority by the Allies, bids for tonnage should be put through the appropriate channels, when space will be allotted.

144
Page 9, Section 10 - Requisition of Cars.

Certain civilian vehicles must be permitted to circulate but in cases where it is found that cars which have been granted permits to circulate are required for military needs, or for more important functions than that for which the permit was issued, the permits are cancelled and the cars are requisitioned. It is not practicable to requisition all cars which are in circulation by civilians.

Note: It may be that the Italian Government's proposal means the requisitioning of all cars licensed up to 30 Apr 44, but whose permits were not renewed on 1 May 44. In this case such requisitioning could be done through Hq Regions which screened the permit renewal applications.

144
Page 9, Section 11 - Ships of Small Tonnage.

Every effort is being made to control and direct these little ships into the most useful trades, and it is not clear why transferring to the Italian Government all vessels under 100 tons deadweight should result in increased efficiency. Under the present schooner scheme, it is proposed to hand over to the Italian Government (COGENA) all schooners of under 50 tons deadweight. Cargoes carried by these schooners must be approved by Allied Control Commission.

The completion of schooners building in shipyards in Italy is primarily a question for the Naval Authorities.

4741

- 7 -

Page 10, Section 12 - Telegraph and Telephone Communication.

Not Economic Section.

Page 10, Section 13 - Measures of a Financial Character.

Shipping and Finance Sub-Commissions have been consulted regarding this request, but both report that without further information as to the exact nature of the measures to which the Italian Government refers, it is impossible to deal with the question raised.

Page 10, Section 1 - Seed Potatoes.

Seed potato failures reported in Sicily and on the mainland resulted largely from heating due to long voyage and high piling too close to boiler rooms on ships, improper storage and handling after arrival in Italy and planting in wet ground in early spring sometimes in unfavorable weather conditions as was the case in Sicily. Sicily sowings were affected mainly in two areas, Catania and Messina, where failures reached as high as 40%.

All seed potatoes shipped from U.K. are properly inspected and bear all necessary certificates as to purity and freedom from disease. The Agricultural Departments continue to be very particular in this matter as also does the Ministry of Food which is responsible for collection and dispatch. There will be no such thing as land infection and future plantings on the same ground will not be in any way affected.

Reports reaching this office indicate that aside from two spots in Sicily, a small area near Naples and another near Lecce, the potato crop is doing very well.

Page 10, Section 2 - Resumption of Fishing Activities.

Permits: In occupied areas as well as in Italian territory licenses for fishing are issued by the Italian Captain of the Port Offices. These licenses have the approval of Allied Naval authorities.

The orders putting these licenses into effect emanate usually from Regional and/or Provincial Commissioners so that offenders may be tried in AMG courts.

In Italian Government territory it is being recommended that the present fishing regulations be put in form of ordinances by the *Dir-*
ezioni Marittime.

For occupied territory it is recommended that the issuance of the regulations remain under the jurisdiction of local Allied authority.

- 8 -

It is considered that the present order requiring authorization by the Naval office to enter a port or to moor the craft should remain in effect in both Occupied areas and Italian territory.

Night Fishing: Flag Officer, Western Italy has under date of 13 May granted the following relaxations:

a. Fishing throughout the night, with lights, will be permitted from a point 2 miles south of Salerno to the parallel 39° 40' N. This must be within two miles of the coast.

b. Night fishing is already being practiced from 39° 40' N. Southwards. An official authorization order is being sought, however.

c. In the Gulf of Naples and Salerno, fishing is to be permitted from one and a half hours before sunrise to one and one-half hours after sunset. Fishing with lights during the hours of darkness within the specified hours will be permitted.

d. From the point two miles south of Salerno to the parallel 39° 40' N. fishing in the daylight hours will be within four miles from the coast.

Night fishing is permitted all over Sicily and in certain parts of Sardinia.

It is pointed out that in view of certain activities by the American Naval Command at Salerno, the limits of the area where night fishing is to be permitted is subject to change.

De-requisition of Fishing Boats: Some craft have been de-requisitioned already and those that remain in a requisitioned status will be released when there is no further naval necessity to keep them. Those engaged in fishing are being registered as such by the Divisional Sea Transport Office, Naples.



D. S. ADAMS,
Colonel, C.E.
Executive Officer,
Economic Section.

4739

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

JLH/tjj

Sec. Gen.
04543

In reply refer
to: CS/1/4/2

13th May, 1944.

Subject: Report.

REC. A.C.C. APO 394
15 May 1944
BY *JLH*

To: Secretary General, Allied Control Commission, Naples.

Reference your letter No. SG.000.1 dated 9th May, 1944.

A report by this Sub-Commission on the points requested is appended.

J. L. Henderson

J. L. HENDERSON
Colonel,
Director, Communications Sub-Commission.

INCL. One Report.



4738

1. Problems Concerning Public Administration, Para 8.

The statement that Allied Censorship Control is the chief cause of postal delays is popular with the Italian Government, but is unfounded. Normally not more than 24 hours delay is caused by censorship; there have been cases of mistakes being made resulting in excessive delays, and these have been noted and corrected; there have been and will be cases of letters having to be referred to higher authority for examination, causing delays in the interests of military security. These causes of delay, which are being eliminated as far as possible, are small compared with the delays caused by lack of transport and by the postal service generally.

Official correspondence is not subject to censorship, but is required to be inspected to ascertain that it is certified by an official of the requisite grade. There have been many cases of infringement of the use of official service for private correspondence, and it is not considered that this rule can be relaxed. In this connection, attention is drawn to the fact that official diplomatic correspondence from England of our Allies (except the U.S. and Russia) and of all neutrals is now subject not merely to a check to ensure that it is certified official, but to censorship inspection.

2. Transport and Communications Para 12.

The utilisation of military circuits is a military problem which rarely affects civil facilities. In the special cases quoted, the Naples-Palermo cable has been operated by teletype ever since the restoration to service; the Palermo-Cagliari cable was operated by morse, but teletype has recently been installed. The proposal that Italian Baudot equipment should be used on these cables was suggested to AFHQ, but rejected, on the grounds that it would involve the employment of Italian operators in Allied Military Signal offices dealing with military traffic, as our personnel cannot operate this apparatus.

3. General Comment.

In general, in the view of this Sub-Commission, the Italian authorities have been liberally dealt with by the higher military authorities in the sphere of communications, considering that this is an active theatre of war.

On the postal side, internal and external mail services have been restored practically up to the Rear Army boundaries.

On the telecommunications side, internal telegraph services have been authorised and mostly restored up to the same boundary. Civil telephone service has been permitted within provincial boundaries. For official purposes, an adequate long-distance telephone service has been restored.

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On the telecommunications side, internal telegraph services have been authorised and mostly restored up to the same boundary. Civil telephone service has been permitted within provincial boundaries. For official purposes, an adequate long-distance telephone service has been restored.

Despite the difficulties mentioned by the Italian authorities therefore, the restrictions on communications have not been such as to make government control impossible or even unduly difficult.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Public Relations Branch

15 May 1944
JL

14 May 1944

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Through SECRETARY GENERAL

REFERENCE : S G 000.1 of 9 May 44.

1. The following are my reactions in writing:
2. Control of Press, Para 1, Page 11

There is no "excessive increase." On the contrary, there is a decrease. There was at one time a very large number of clandestine publications. The APB considered that it was impracticable to take drastic action against them until such time as a satisfactory number of publications had been licensed. As soon as this was done, necessary action was taken. Relevant documents are attached (Appendices A and B). It is doubtful whether ACC can take further action.

3. Para 2, Page 11

I have not yet been able to get details of the case cited. Censorship was done by the Press Liaison Censorship at Bari (Captain Aspley). I have asked for a report on the case from Major Alexander, PWB Press Censor. The Italian Government is not in a good position to talk about such matters as bad breaches of military security have occurred in IL CORRIERE (in spite of our detailed directive of 16 April) and pre-censorship has been abolished. It is obvious that censorship is in most cases extremely tolerant.

4. Radio Communiques

I learn from Mr. Edman of the PWB that there has recently been a meeting between Captain Stone and the PWB and Italian government representatives to discuss the matter and arrangements are in hand to provide a satisfactory solution in so far as Italian government communiques are concerned. To "limit to the absolute minimum the Allied control over broadcasting programmes" seems to raise a very wide issue.

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5. Cultural Relations

Education Sub-Commission has already taken the first steps in this matter. AFHQ were asked in April to contact the proper authorities at home in order to obtain an exchange of books and periodicals. Publications such as IL MESE and POLITICA ESTERA also follow this line. The matter of cultural relations has also been under consideration for some time: a committee was formed by Lord Stansgate and the (late) Minister of Education in Salerno some six weeks ago. It has not done much so far. Lord Stansgate is much interested in it and Major Bergin of this Branch is also a member.

Lionel Fielden
LIONEL FIELDEN

Major

Director of Public Relations

4735

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Public Relations Branch

Appendix A

16 April 1944

PRB LHA

SUBJECT : Action against unauthorized publications

TO : REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS, Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS, AMG Fifth and Eighth Armies.

1. The Allied Publications Board, with the concurrence of the ACC members of the Board, considers that the time has come when appropriate action, without discrimination, should be taken against all unauthorized newspapers or periodicals, i.e., those not included in the list enclosed.
2. The enclosed list is the latest issued by APB. It is requested, however, that action against publications listed as "under consideration" be delayed until issuance of the next list of authorized publications, which list will hereafter be issued monthly.
3. A directive on the subject issued by Region 3 is also enclosed for your information.

(Sgd) LIONEL FIELDEN
Major
Director of Public Relations

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Appendix B

HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394, U.S. Army

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION)

13 April 1944

NUMBER 22)

1. With reference to the list of newspapers issued by the Allied Publications Board on 4 March 1944, indicating those for which approval has been given to circulate or those still under consideration for circulation in Liberated Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, a further list is now forwarded in respect of Salerno Province. (A copy of this list sent to Provincial Safety Officers of Avellino, Benevento, Salerno and Naples Province only.)
2. The Board considers that the time has now come when appropriate action, without discrimination, should be taken in Naples against all unauthorized newspapers or periodicals, i.e. those not included in the list.
3. Before action is taken against unauthorized newspapers in Region 3, outside of Naples, please make sure that such outlying papers have not been authorized by the local Allied authorities and not yet notified to the APB.
4. Although prosecutions will normally be undertaken by or through local Questori, APB are prepared to send a representative to Court where prosecutions ensue, in order to certify that a paper has been rejected by APB.
5. Questori are therefore to be suitably instructed in accordance with the terms of this directive, in order that the necessary measures to seize all unauthorized newspapers and periodicals, and institute all necessary proceedings against offenders be taken.
6. PSOs are to ensure that all seizures and prosecutions under the circumstances indicated are reported to this office.

For the Regional Commissioner:

C. T. FRANCIS
Lieutenant Colonel
Reg Pub Safety Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

"D"
10 - Public Safety Section
HQ Region 3

SUBJECT: Complaints by Marshal BADOLIO.

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main HQ (A.A.)
LEQUIS (LECOS)
AG/9

15 May 41.

H.C. ACC (Secretary General.)

HQ ACC AGO 34

Recd 12 May 1941
by *[initials]*

Ref your MEMORANDUM SO 608.1 dated 9th May on Marshal BADOLIO's complaints.

Para 4.

As a result of certain letters I wrote to AI, the letter issued the attached AI/3074/A(O) dated 4th May.

If Italian Commanders will report to M. of W. or A.I.R.E. specifically (quoting Name, Unit, Location etc) what Italian soldiers are being employed by Allied formations or units contrary to the terms of the AI letter and/or the wishes of the Italian Army authorities, and S.I.R.E. pass on to me such collected lists, I could pass to AI through ACC for action.

Para 5.

There undoubtedly is a great deal of this YUGOSLAV incitement. I reported this to Chief Commissioner in my I/103/T dated 9 May. As the matter is outside the powers of this Commission or the Italian authorities, I suggest that Chief Commissioner authorize the issue of orders to the YUGOSLAWS (particularly the Refugee Camps) by decree that such incitement will be triable and punishable under Italian law. The Italian authorities will then have power to see to the implementing of the decree. I consider this is a serious business and should be stamped on heavily.

Para 6.

I understand repatriation is a matter of high policy for decision on a high level. I consider the Italian military authorities should be asked to furnish lists of who they want repatriated and these should be approved in a far less niggardly fashion than hitherto. It would, on the lowest grounds, pay the Allies, both now and post-war, to put the Italian Army on its feet as soon as possible.

[Handwritten signature]

tvs.18.

Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

Para 1.
As a result of certain letters I wrote to AAI, the letter issued the attached AAI/307/A(0) dated 4th May.

If Italian Commanders will report to M. of W. or C.M.E.E. specifically (quoting Name, Unit, Location etc) what Italian soldiers are being employed by Allied formations or units contrary to the terms of the AAI letter and/or the wishes of the Italian Army authorities, and C.M.E.E. pass on to me such collected lists, I could pass to AAI through AFCC for action.

Para 2.

There undoubtedly is a great deal of this YUGOSLAV incitement. I reported this to Chief Commissioner in my I/103/I dated 9 May. As the matter is outside the powers of this Commission or the Italian authorities, I suggest that Chief Commissioner authorize the issue of orders to the YUGOSLAVS (particularly the Refugee Camps) by decree that such incitement will be triable and punishable under Italian law. The Italian authorities will then have power to see to the implementing of the decree. I consider this is a serious business and should be stamped on heavily.

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A. Brown

Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

tvs.LB.

4732

SECRETSubject:- Italian Army - Calling up of classes

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
AAI/3074/A(O)
4 May 44

1. Ref this HQ 3110/A(O) dated 17 Mar and 3074/A(O) dated 20 Mar.
2. In order that the requirements of the Allied Forces of Italian Military personnel can be met it is essential that every available Italian liable for calling up under the classes referred to in the above quoted letters should be released.
3. It is also essential to the prestige, authority and morale of the Italian Army that the release of such personnel is not unnecessarily impeded by the units etc. employing them. Authority for exemption granted under para 1 of the above quoted letter dated 20 Mar will, therefore, be limited to skilled personnel only whose continued employment is considered vitally or operationally necessary, and provided such employment is within War Establishment or has been specially authorised.

TW/JLH

T Welch Lt Col
for Major General
Chief Administrative Officer

Distribution:- Main Eighth Army

5 (US) Army
5 (US) Army (Br Incr)

5 Corps

1 Dist

2 Dist

3 Dist

PBS

C in C Med

HQ MAAF

HQ 2 NZEF

Adm HQ UDF CHF

Rear Pol Base

AMG FOGGIA Province

FILPOT List 'B' less Serials 12, 17, 22, 28, 40, 43,
44, 46, 49 and 50.

Plus. CAO Welfare
Camp AKS
Def Coy EPI
15 HQ Sigs V & R
A6 Catering
A7 Coal Sec

above quoted letters should be released.

3. It is also essential to the prestige, authority and morale of the Italian Army that the release of such personnel is not unnecessarily impeded by the units etc. employing them. Authority for exemption granted under para 1 of the above quoted letter dated 20 Mar will, therefore, be limited to skilled personnel only whose continued employment is considered vitally or operationally necessary, and provided such employment is within War Establishment or has been specially authorised.

TW/JLH

T Welch Lt Col
for Major General
Chief Administrative Officer

Distribution:- Main Eighth Army

5 (US) Army
5 (US) Army (Br Incr)

5 Corps
1 Dist
2 Dist
3 Dist

PBS

C in C Med

HQ MAAF

HQ 2 NZEF

Adm HQ UDF CMF

Rear Pol Base

AMG FOGGIA Province

FILPOT List 'B' less Serials 12, 17, 22, 23, 40, 43, 44, 46, 49 and 50.

Plus.

CAO Welfare

Camp

Def Coy AKS

15 HQ Sigs V & R

A6

A7

Salvage

Prints

ACC LO

JAG

Catering

Coal Sec

Local Res (2)

DSTO

Army Sub Comm LO

Cdn Sec, GHQ 1st Echelon.

Copies to:- AFHQ G-1(Br)

Force 133

ACC (6)

IBS

War Diary

4737

785015

RESTRICTED

#

5217

SECRETARY GENERAL

17 MAY 1944

RESTRICTED

174

ROUTINE

MAJOR DOE

MEMO

MEMO SUGAR GEORGE ZERO ZERO ZERO POINT ONE DATED NINE MAY PD PAREN TO
DIRECTOR ARMY SUBCOMMISSION DEQUILIZ FROM SECRETARY GENERAL AGO MAIN
PAREN PD YOUR REPLY NOT YET RECEIVED

4730

L. T. MONTANT, JR.
1st Lt., AGO
Adjutant

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Secretary General
APO 394

REPLY/are

SO 000.1

9 May 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner, E.C. & I.C. Section ✓
Vice President, Administrative Section ✓
Vice President, Economic Section ✓
Director, Communications Sub-Commission ✓
Chief, Naval Sub-Commission *(relate to Comm. Palmer for information)*
Director, Public Relations Branch ✓
Director, Army Sub-Commission ✓

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Marshal Badoglio addressed to the Chief Commissioner dated 13 April 1944, together with a copy of the inclosure thereto.

2. The Chief Commissioner desires that you examine the questions raised by the Marshal which concern your section and present your reactions in writing at the earliest possible date, in order that the Chief Commissioner may make arrangements for the meeting requested by the Marshal.

3. Each paragraph in the inclosure of the Marshal's letter has been marked to indicate the section of action. It may well be, however, that certain items will also have interest to another section. In such case it is suggested that the section concerned contact direct the section of action as indicated on the document.

ROBERT E. DOE
Major, A.C.D.
Secretary General

Distribution:

- 1cc - Addressee (action)
- 1 - Comm. Palmer, Naval S/C, Salerno (info)
- 1 - Capt. Stone for info

4729

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

TRANSLATION

Salerno, 13 April 1944

No. 1941

Office of the Chief of the Government

Encl. 1.

Dear General:

On March 10 I welcomed the opportunity of explaining to you my point of view concerning the criteria which in my opinion should have inspired the actions of the Allied Control Commission. I also proposed a meeting between the Commission and members of my Government in order that they might examine together the problems requiring a more urgent solution for the industrial, agricultural and military rebirth of Italy so as to provide a still more effective contribution in the fight against the common enemy.

You suggested that I draw up a Memorandum of the subjects to be discussed and I am pleased to send you a resume of the questions which could be examined at the meeting.

As you will note, there are many questions of which several are complex, but all of which require an urgent solution in the common interest for the realization of that plan of reconstruction of my country to which my Government and I are pledged.

I am certain that a frank exchange of views between the members of my Government and the Allied Control Commission would bring about a settlement of even the most difficult problems: all the more if it should be possible, as I hope, to place the relations between the Commission and Government on a different level from the present one, so that they may be carried on with greater mutual trust.

Without doubt this would expedite the action of the Government thus eliminating the detailed checks which hinder the reconstruction effort of the Italian authorities and their loyal desire to make every possible contribution to the common war effort.

If you agree, I ask you, dear General, kindly to advise me of the date when the projected meeting can be held.

With my cordial greetings,

(signed) Badoglio

4728

Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Cabinet

Summary of the problems presented by the various departments and for discussion at the meeting to be held with the Allied Control Commission.

Relations with the Allied Authorities.

1. Control by affiliated Allied authorities:

While in general the relations with the central Allied authorities are carried on with great cordiality, there are grounds for complaint as regards incomprehension and mistrust on the part of affiliated Allied agencies. Their control, which often extends to the most detailed particulars, in addition to being too complicated, concludes by taking on a character of interference in the entire administrative activity.

In other words, the tendency of the affiliated Allied agencies to continue to exercise the powers formerly belonging to AMGOT in the territories occupied by the Allied troops, even after the restoration of these territories to the Italian Administration, and to extend the exercise of these powers even to the provinces which have always been under the full sovereignty of the Italian Government has been noted.

For instance, there are grounds for complaint in connection with an unjustified interference by the local Allied authorities in prison matters in the provinces returned to the Italian Administration in particular in the provinces of Bari and Brindisi.

To cite another example, public order in territories administered by the Italian Government is maintained by the Italian military authorities. On the other hand on March 19 last, the Allied Control Commission in Bari province there authorized a meeting of the Socialist Party. Members of the said Commission, Lt. Colonel Vining and Major Reveley, when they were approached in this matter by the Italian authorities, stated that the preservation of public order was the responsibility of the provincial Allied Control Commission, with whom the local Italian military should cooperate.

On March 29 the Control Commission in Bari Province gave orders that merchandise sequestered in connection with food rationing crimes should be delivered to the Supply Section of the Commission, whereas according to the Royal Decree Law of January 20, 1944, No. 44, the authority who has power to assign such sequestered merchandise is the Prefect. Very definite instructions by the Allied Control Commission to its affiliated offices would appear opportune in this connection.

-2-

2. Allied Forces' Police:

Numerous cases of arrests made by the Allied authorities of Italian citizens who are detained for a long time, sometimes even for months, without a trial or hearing of any kind, are to be deplored.

In matters concerning personal liberty it would also be desirable if the Allied authorities followed the regulations of the Royal Decree Law of January 31, 1944, No. 45. It has happened that the Allied military authorities have arrested Italian officers and soldiers and have detained them, also for a long time, in concentration camps without informing the Italian military commands at all.

Any arrest of an Italian soldier by the Allied Forces should immediately be communicated to the appropriate Italian command.

3. Behavior of the Allied Forces:

The behavior of some elements of the Allied Forces with regard to the Italian citizens, civilians and soldiers, is deplorable.

Increasingly frequent cases of pillage are reported by all centers where Allied troops are stationed.

The matter is a painful one, and in view of its political repercussions it should be eliminated.

Use of fire arms: It also appears that Allied soldiers make use of fire arms for non-warlike reasons, much too carelessly, seriously endangering the life of the populations and damaging their private property.

Between Jacotenente and Puntone Turco, in the territory of Vico del Gargano (Foggia) 51 electrical insulators have been for instance damaged by pistol or rifle fire. This causes the conductors to fall down or to break, thus interrupting communications.

In the same locality, Allied soldiers hunt roebuck, which is forbidden by Italian laws. They shoot wildly in the woods of the Government forest called "Umbra", and jeopardize the safety of those engaged in the production of charcoal for the use of the Allied Forces. Allied soldiers do not even refrain from shooting domestic animals, close to houses.

It is indispensable that a greater discipline be reflected in the use of fire arms by isolated military personnel.

Abusive cutting of plants: It also appears that Allied troops proceed to cut wood and to requisition charcoal without previous

-3-

agreement with our forestry authorities, thus jeopardizing, sometimes beyond repair, forests and the Italian wood production.

It would be highly desirable that the supplies of wood and charcoal to the Allied Forces be made in agreement with the appropriate Italian Forestry Agencies.

4. Employment of Italian officers and soldiers by Allied Commands:

No Italian officer or soldier should be employed by the Allied Forces without the approval of the Italian military commands.

5. Yugoslav propaganda and incitement to desertion:

There exists in Italian liberated territory a Yugoslav organization which carries out an active campaign among the Italian foreign soldiers in order to induce them to desert.

These desertions, which up to now have reached the number of several dozens as regards the Air Force, 1080 in the Army, and a considerable number also for the Navy, have a bad effect on the morale of the troops and the composition of units.

The Allies should intervene energetically so that such a revolutionary activity be stopped and that soldiers who are still in great part in the Yugoslav training camps in Italian territory be returned.

6. Repatriation of some categories of prisoners:

In the work of reconstruction of the Armed Forces, the Italian military commands have great need of Generals, Chiefs of Staff, Engineer and Supply officers, officers, NCO's and soldiers of the RR Carabinieri.

Repatriation of Italian prisoners of war belonging to these categories would be very useful in this connection.

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PROBLEM CONCERNING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

1. Administrative organization.

It has happened that the Allied authorities have suppressed in the territories under their control, agencies and institutions of fundamental importance to the Italian administrative organization such as the Economy Provincial Councils, which are only the old Chambers of Commerce; and, as for instance, in Sicily they have established in some regions new offices which have nothing to do with the administrative organization of the remaining provinces of the Kingdom.

In order to assure unity of directive in the administration of free Italy, it would be desirable if the Italian and the Allied Governments should consult one another before issuing ordinances that might have differing effects upon the organization of the public administrations.

2. Appointments and movements of Prefects.

In some provinces as, for instance, in Sicily, in Cosenza, in Matera and in Reggio Calabria, the occupying Allied authorities have proceeded to remove the Prefects in charge, substituting for them local elements or functionaries of low rank with little experience or administrative ability.

In view of the importance of the position and of their functions it would be desirable for the Allied authorities to request the opinion of the Ministry of the Interior before adopting, in the territories under Allied control, provisions calling for the appointment, recall and transfer of Prefects. The opportunity could be taken to proceed in agreement with the Allied authorities, to review the appointments already made.

3. Appointments, promotions and dismissals of personnel.

In the territories controlled by them, the Allied authorities have similarly disposed of appointments and public positions, promotions in the administrative posts and dismissals without any attention to the Italian administrative set-up.

The Italian authorities are, therefore now at a loss as regards the regularization of these appointments which also alter the classification and lists of the personnel and cause damage to the interests of many categories of employees.

It seems desirable in this connection that:

The Allied authorities should always request ⁴⁷²⁴ personnel needed in the territories controlled by them from the appropriate Ministries which might have an overstrength of personnel.

In case of necessity only temporary or special personnel, and

-2-

always with initial rank, should always be employed.

The Allied authorities should refrain from granting promotions to State and Public Administration personnel, limiting themselves to the grant, in very particular cases, of promotions to a grade immediately above that previously held by the employee.

The Allied authorities should request, at least, the opinion of the Ministries concerned before adopting any provision concerning personnel.

4. Salaries of personnel:

The personnel employed in territories directly administered by the A.M.G. often receive salaries quite different from those under Italian administration.

It therefore results that the greater number of employees all claim higher salaries throughout the territory. It would be advisable that the economic treatment of the state personnel be decided upon with the Allied authorities, even when the personnel is working in territories still under ANGOI administration.

5. Defascistization:

It has happened that the personnel of the public administrations has received different treatment in connection with the defascistization. It has varied in territories controlled directly by the Allied authorities and in those administered by the Royal Italian Government.

In order to obviate this inconvenience, in a matter so important, it is necessary to establish uniform directives in agreement with the Allied authorities.

6. Utilization of the personnel:

In the zones of operations, the Allied military commands do not allow the specialized post-telegraphic personnel to approach the electric lines, the setting of poles and the power stations.

In consequence the personnel is not employed, and many lines and telephone central stations such as those of Campobasso and Foggia, remain unusable.

It should not be difficult to make use also in the zones of operations, of this personnel with great advantage to the communications, the importance of which in war time is superfluous to emphasize.

7. Premises for Public Offices:

In Salerno the Italian Government must meet an ever increasing request for offices by the public administrations in connection

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with the increased requirements of their services.

It is submitted that the Allied Control Commission might examine the advisability of suspending the assignment of other commands offices or units of Allied troops to Salerno and instead, transferring to different localities some command or office now in Salerno in order to allow the Italian Government to have at its disposal a greater number of premises.

It is also submitted that the Commission might examine the advisability of returning to the Italian Government the Prefecture buildings, so that the Prefects and the other Governmental authorities might, with the necessary dignity, be able to carry out the public services in the main towns of the provinces.

It is also necessary to avoid possession being taken by Allied troops of premises allocated to public services and where there are machines, installations, valuable equipment such as the Railway Offices and the Post-Telegraph buildings and that such premises be used for billeting troops. In several localities (Taranto, Naples, Palermo, Foggia) such occurrences have provoked serious deficiencies in the performance of the services, damages, often beyond repair, to the plants, and the loss of valuable equipment.

8. Post Offices:

Considerable delays in postal and telegraph service are to be noted. Such poor service is of special disadvantage to the public administration. The cause may be sought in the slowness of censorship operations, to which official Italian correspondence is still subject in some provinces, notwithstanding the agreements of December 27, 1943. It is suggested that official mail be presented, where necessary, to the censorship office in a separate bag to be examined and returned to the Post Office on the same day.

9. School services:

a. Unity of direction: Proper agreements are necessary to assure unity of direction in school services, especially as regards time tables, the school calendar, text books, programs and examinations.

b. Aid to students: Similar agreements would be desirable to assure aid to students in the form of hot meals, distribution of garments, etc., to needy students.

10. Paper for the Public Administration:

The Allied authorities have requisitioned all the paper in stock at the Foggia Paper Mill (about 18,000 quintals). The delivery of quantities already assigned to Government Administrations is urgent.

This applies to all Administrations, but is especially urgent

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as regards the Financial Administration which must make provision for the preparation of forms required for collection of taxes and as regards the Railroad Administration which encounters difficulties even in printing railroad tickets.

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(8)

INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY

1. Derequisitioning of industrial plants:

ECAN
In effect the Allied military occupation of industrial establishments hinders the resumption of work. Derequisitioning of industrial establishments would be desirable where proprietors intend to resume production, or at least partial evacuation of premises.

This problem is particularly urgent as regards those factories and plants which formerly worked for the railroads. The latter urgently require restoration of lines and installations, repair of rails and restoration to operating conditions of the train materiel that has been largely destroyed or is rapidly deteriorating.

The same urgency is called for in regard to naval plants and dockyards. In every case the heads of companies should be authorized to enter offices to remove whatever documents are needed for the settlement of legal and tax matters.

2. Operation of industries which work for the Royal Navy:

NAVY
The Royal Navy is particularly interested in prompt re-opening of some industrial plants and improvement of operating conditions in its own establishments. In the present situation it is impossible to provide for the normal maintenance needs of the fleet. As a result there is a constantly increasing number of warships which are laid up and awaiting their turn. Consequently it is important that the Taranto Arsenal, the Tosi Shipyards of the same city and the Brindisi shops operate with at least half of their personnel for the repair of Italian warships. The difficulties resulting from lack of equipment and materiel might be provided for through reactivation and derequisitioning of industrial establishments and plants, unfreezing of stocks on hand and proceeding to the recovery of missing materials and valuable machinery given by the Allies to private persons and carried away.

In this connection it is pointed out that the Royal Navy might make a contribution to the common fight even greater than the present one if only it were enabled to stop the deterioration of machinery and plants or, better still, if it were permitted to restore to operation its port installations, drydocks, storage warehouses, barracks, hospitals, all fields in which the Allies constantly require greater effort.

For that purpose it will be necessary to refloat all sunken ships; to complete the large Taranto drydock; to restore to operation lime, cement and brick factories; to establish collection centers for scrap metals; to permit by supplying the necessary fuel and power the production of metal products, importing if necessary required machinery; to furnish necessary transportation of lumber from Calabria; to increase the production of bituminous material; and to facilitate in every way possible the transport of materials and manufactured goods from one region to another.

-2-

For instance, there are at present some thousands of sailors who can not be employed for lack of clothing, especially shoes; and the situation is growing worse from day to day.

For that reason normal recruiting has had to be suspended and consequently also the normal rotation of personnel.

It is natural that this state of affairs has influenced the effective cooperation which the Royal Navy can give in the fight against the common enemy.

To meet these compelling needs the following are indispensable:

Derequisition and place in operation at the earliest possible time the plants of the Cotoniére Meridionali of Naples which in meeting the entire needs of the Royal Navy could give work to about 3,000 workers;

Install at Taranto a shoe factory for the Royal Navy importing the small amount of machinery needed.

3. Allocation of coal and other raw materials for industry:

Many metallurgical plants and mechanical workshops could resume operations if they could count on the necessary supplies of coal, metallic materials and lumber.

To resume such work is very important, especially for the railroad installations, repair of railroad lines and material, naval constructions and repairs.

With a monthly allocation of about 17,000 tons of coal, a monthly production could be assured of, for instance, 62,000 tons of cement, 23,000 tons of lime and 120,000 square meters of window glass.

4. Destruction of works, equipment and installations:

Such destruction should be effected only in case of absolute necessity, and, in every case, in agreement with the Italian authorities.

5. Requisition of machinery, raw materials, finished and semi-finished materials:

Requisition of machinery or its removal from plants should be avoided so as to permit industries to resume operation. Obviously this would reduce imports and consequently maritime transportation from America and England.

The raw materials and finished and semi-finished products requisitioned in plants are often used in an uneconomical fashion. They are thus deteriorating and often going to waste without being used, whereas the few industries of liberated Italy need everything.

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-3-

For instance, it is vital to place at disposal of the Ministry of War the raw materials, the materials and machinery lying at present unused in various artillery establishments assigned to Allied troops as billets.

As regards requisitions, the Allied authorities have often refused to issue written statements attesting to the requisitions effected and sometimes have even shown resentment when faced with the requests of the parties concerned.

Such certificates are, however, necessary in order that Italian citizens may make claim for any possible compensation to the State.

The Allied authorities should issue such certificates without raising difficulties.

6. Freezing of goods and prices:

Referred to Sec. Sec. by 10/10/45
The freezing by Allied authorities of almost all available goods makes impossible exchanges and consumption which are considered indispensable for an economic recovery and for the better utilization of existing resources with consequent reduction in imports from across the sea.

The freezing of goods also prevents the adjustment of prices to the changed monetary situation.

Major freedom of action would be desirable for the Italian Government.

7. Institutions of technical-professional instruction:

Admission
A major part of the premises of the teaching material and of the equipment of Institutes of technical and professional instruction, so closely linked to the industrial recovery of the country, have been lost through war developments or requisitions. It is indispensable to proceed with release of buildings and reconstruction of scientific institutions.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Transportation by railroad and ordinary traffic:

Throughout peninsular and insular Italy, the transport situation is most serious. The means of communication both by railroad and road are completely inadequate for the needs of the people. Such deficiency stands in the way of any economic recovery. The prevailing system of controls and authorizations under the Allied Committee at Naples has proven itself in practice so long and so laborious that it has resulted in the paralysis of every kind of traffic. This is also due to the deplorable shortcomings in postal telegraphic and telephonic service.

The following measures are considered urgent and indispensable to restore to the Italian Railroad Administration the operation of the entire network of liberated Italy south of the line including Foggia, Benevento, Caserta, Naples:

to entrust to the Italian administration the task and responsibility of satisfying the demands of the Allied military authorities;

to assure two passenger trains each way and one freight train each way on the principal lines;

to assure one passenger train each way and one freight train each way on the secondary lines;

to assure continuity of service.

2. Communications with Sardinia and Sicily:

The relations between the Peninsula and Sardinia do not permit further delay in the establishment of a regular service of sea and air transportation between the Island and the Continent. For the present a daily air service and a bi-weekly sea service might be sufficient. Similar need exists as regards communication with Sicily. It would be necessary to have at least four ships of medium tonnage which might call at the minor ports of the two islands and the Continent, without disturbing the traffic of the Allies in the large ports.

3. Railroad cars for the transportation of salt and other monopoly goods:

The scarcity of salt on the market causes great discontent among the people. In some localities popular demonstrations have even taken place. At Margherita di Savoia, near Barletta, 47,100 tons of salt are available, largely sufficient for the needs of the southern population, but means of transportation are lacking. To arrange for distribution of this most important foodstuff and other monopoly goods, it would be necessary to assign to the Ministry of Finance the railroad cars which are asked for every ten days or

-2-

at least of a couple of freighters of small tonnage, with a useful loading capacity of no more than a thousand tons.

4. Railroad cars and motor vehicles for the services of the Military Commissariat:

For the operation of the vital services of the Military Commissariat, a greater supply of railroad cars and motor vehicles is required.

5. Motor vehicles for supplying the civilian population:

The most important service of supply is greatly hindered in all provinces by the great scarcity of motor vehicles.

Therefore, the allocation of a suitable number of motor vehicles is necessary to provide for the food requirements of the population.

6. Motor vehicles for collection of taxes:

For the most important service of inspection in the provincial tax offices at least two cars for every province would be needed.

Requisitions now being practically impossible, the Allies would have to supply at least the tires and wheels to permit requisition of cars which are now put up for lack of such spare parts.

7. Auto spare parts:

Such lack of spare parts is very marked especially for military transport, which, in the absence of suitable measures, may within a short time be completely paralyzed.

Therefore, it would be necessary that the Allies arrange for supply of rubber tires and spare parts for the repair and operation of motor vehicles, the production factories of which are all, as is known, in enemy-occupied Italy.

Also collection centers for non-operational motor vehicles could be established, including those of private ownership to be requisitioned, and suitable repair shops to put such vehicles back into operating condition using part of them to provide spare parts. In view of the great scarcity of vehicles, it would furthermore be necessary to restrict requisitions to the lowest possible limits.

8. Transport of lignite:

In the mercury mines (Castelluccio Inferiore) there are 10,000 tons of dry lignite which would be very suitable for the manufacture of bricks.

Railroad cars and the allocation of a truck per day for every railroad car made available are needed to haul the lignite from

-3-

Castelluccio to the main railroad point of Lagonegro (Km.40)

9. Transport of asphalt dust from Sicily:

It would prove very useful for repair and operation of main roads, also for military purposes, to be able to transport asphalt dust from Siracuse to Bari, Salerno and Naples.

10. Requisition of cars:

To meet the increasing demands of motor vehicles by the Italian Government, it is requested that the Allied authorities also agree to requisition those cars for which they have issued permits of free circulation, up to April 30, 1944.

11. Ships of small tonnage:

The great difficulties, which the Italian Government private individuals and even the Allies encounter in railroad and ordinary transportation, might be considerably reduced if all the motor sailboats of a capacity under 100 tons were left at the disposal of the Italian Government for interregional traffic of the products most essential to consumption and industry: oil, wine, firewood, charcoal, vegetables, cheese, hides, etc. Also, the construction of 64 motorboats and small motorvessels, now in shipyards, might be completed with a total gross tonnage of 10,000 tons. For that purpose the allocation of 1,200 tons of steel plates, 9,000 cu. meters of oak lumber, 6,000 cu. meters of pine lumber in addition to nails, cork, ropes, chains and motors should be made. At present there is no assurance that these materials previously ordered will be delivered.

12. Telegraph and telephone communications:

The available means are not used in the most useful way so as to derive the best return possible.

For instance, the cables Palermo-Naples and Palermo-Cagliari are still used by the Allied Commands with a simple morse circuit. The Italian administration could utilize these circuits, as always, with its trained personnel and its machinery, with four channels (with quadruple Baudot) enabling the Allies to double their communications and the Italian Government to take advantage of two independent circuits.

13. Measures of a financial character:

It would be desirable that without prior agreement with the Navy Ministry the Allied authorities take no measures in regard to the steamship and shipping companies subsidized by the Government and in regard to FINMARE which is a subsidiary group of IRI.

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AGRICULTURE AND FISHING1. Seed potatoes:

Notwithstanding contrary assurances in regard thereto by the Allied authorities, it has been ascertained that the seed potatoes shipped to Italy were affected with "humid gangrene."

Sowings effected in Sicily have resulted that in many lots the percentage of rot and ungerminated potatoes on account of the aforesaid disease reached from 95 to 98 per cent. To the grave present economic damage, there is added a future even greater damage, because for years the infected land can not be used for potato growing on account of disease germs.

The Allied Control Commission must require that the seed potatoes shipped to Italy be subject upon shipment to rigorous guaranteed plant pathological control as required in the past by proper international agreements. Appropriate immunization certificates should be issued by the proper authorities.

2. Resumption of fishing activities:

The resumption of fishing activities, so useful at this moment, due to food scarcity, is hindered by the fact that the Allied authorities require a double authorization order, one issued by the Naval Office to obtain entry into Port and mooring of the craft, the other by the local Allied authority authorizing the fishing.

To render fishing easier, the second authorization should be abolished, since fishing licenses^{are} already issued by the Royal Port Offices. If not in conflict with military operations, permission might also be given for night fishing with under-water lights along the coasts of Southern Italy and the large islands (Sardinia and Sicily) which is more profitable and would employ a large number of maritime laborers.

For the purpose the Allies should release the motor fishing boats hired by them for other purposes.

ASSISTANCE TO WAR REFUGEES

To assure effective help for the people most directly affected by war, the following provisions are considered necessary:

limit to the absolute minimum forced evacuations from immediately behind the front lines;

provide adequate food for the refugees;

arrange for release of all public and private buildings no longer needed for the Allied Forces;

place at the disposal of the local authorities the means needed for the transportation of refugees and their household goods, in the greatest quantity possible;

place garments and medical supplies at the disposal of the local authorities.

CONTROL OF PRESS

1. Periodical press:

An excessive increase of all types of periodical publications, including clandestine ones, is regrettable. They have no well-defined programs and are produced at the initiative of more or less irresponsible elements.

To check the increase of these sheets and leaflets, which only result in an increasing confusion and disorientation of public opinion, it would seem opportune to limit the publication of periodicals to not more than one newspaper for every political party in each provincial capital, requiring prior political censorship for all publications. The provisions now in effect for military censorship would remain unchanged.

At the same time sanctions against offenders should be provided.

2. Allied military press censorship:

The allied military press censorship is at times too strict in its criteria. For instance, in an article of the "Giornale dell'Aviatore" (Paper of the Pilot) No. 10, the Allied censor wished the phrase "under orders of the King" to be eliminated, on the pretext that the Allied authorities do not intend to interfere in the internal Italian situation.

Facts of this kind have a bearing on the military traditions of the paper, and are cause for confusion among the troops to whom the paper is addressed, and harm the efforts being made to gather all energies for the purpose of assuring a more effective collabor-

-2-

ation with the Allies. It is desirable that military censorship be exercised with greater understanding.

ARTISTIC PATRIMONY

ADMIN. Particularly grave are the devastations which the Italian artistic patrimony, the patrimony indeed of all civilized nations has suffered due to war. All possible measures to assure conservation of works of art, monuments still existing, bibliographical material and the repair and reconstruction of the galleries, institutes of art should be put into effect at once. In this respect joint undertakings would be desirable as to the action to be taken in the territory administered by the Italian Government and in that still controlled by the Allies.

THEATERS AND CINEMAS

RC+MA Many theaters and cinemas have been requisitioned by the Allied Forces which manage them themselves to the serious loss of many classes of executive, administrative and artistic personnel who made their living from theaters and cinema theaters.

It would seem desirable to allow the owners and directors of theaters and cinemas to resume their management, requiring them to give a certain number of free performances for the Allied Forces but permitting them also to work in day time.

RADIO COMMUNIQUE

PRB The communiques of the Italian Government are not always transmitted by the radio stations.

Agreements would be desirable in the matter, which would also limit to the absolute minimum the Allied control over broadcasting programs.

HOTELS

RC+MA The requisitioning of hotels assumes constantly vaster proportions. It would be desirable to limit such requisitions to strictly indispensable cases, utilizing, if possible, during the period of requisition the personnel formerly employed therein.

CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

PRB Fascist policy resulted in that important expressions of Anglo-American political thought and valuable writings of Italian authors remained totally unknown to the Italian public.

Therefore, the preparation of a plan of exchange of 4712a- tions between Italy and the Allied nations both in the original

-3-

editions, as well as in translations would be very useful.

In this respect the establishment of a cultural Italo-Anglo-American Union for the purposes of promoting a more intimate spiritual understanding and a more strict collaboration between Italy and the Allied Nations would be extremely desirable.

Special agreements might be effected with the Psychological Warfare Branch of AMGOT in order to establish the means necessary to the concrete activation of the undertaking.

Salerno, 6 April 1944.

4711

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18

para 2 How can the war effort be
furthered if we break up, rather than
rehabilitate, the plan?

para 11 j For Colonelle Mensionale
presumably read Cantine Metallurgici
Mensionale

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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File No.
A3-2

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION
Navy House, Taranto, Italy

Serial: (0077)

25 May 1944

S-E-C-R-E-T:

30 May 1530
The

From: Chief, Naval Sub-Commission, Allied Control Commission.
To : Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

Subject: Conference with Italian Government.

File

Enclosure: (A) CinC MED ltr MED 829/4/18 of 24 March 1944.
(B) Industry & Commerce Sub-Com. ltr ACC/5111/IC of 31 March 1944. (Subject: Oxygen - Crotona Plant).

1. A copy of a letter dated 13 April 1944 from Marshal Badoglio, enclosing a summary of problems which the Italian Government desires to discuss with the Allied Control Commission, was forwarded to the Naval Sub-Commission, ACC by HQ. ACC., letter SG000.1 of 9 May 1944 for comment. The primary matter raised for consideration by the Naval Sub-Commission relates to the operation and use of shipbuilding and repair facilities formerly employed by the Italian Navy, as outlined under the heading "Industrial Recovery" on page 6 of the summary.

2. From a review of the arguments made that industrial plants should be returned to Italian control, it is quite apparent that the primary concern is to rehabilitate Italian industries, rather than to further the immediate war effort. This matter was previously raised by a report submitted by an Italian Committee of Experts which was referred to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for instructions. A copy of the policy established and directive issued by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for the utilization of Italian shipbuilding and repair facilities is attached hereto.

3. A specific request is made on page 6, paragraph 2 of the summary that at least one half of the repair facilities in the Taranto area be used for the repair of Italian Naval vessels. The present policy for the Naval Dockyard and Tosi Shipyard at Taranto is to employ 70% of the personnel on Allied ships and the remaining 30% on Italian ships. The Naval Dockyard is used wholly for ship repairs. The Tosi Shipyard is fully employed for repair and new construction work. It is operated under contracts between the Allies and the Italian owners. In this manner both yards are provided with employment and maintained in excellent operating condition. Under the policy established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Allied resources and facilities for the repair, overhaul and maintenance of combatant ships are to be devoted only to ships which will contribute immediately and profitably to the war effort. It is unfortunate that many Italian Naval vessels at the time of the Armistice were in such a condition that repairs are not warranted in the interest of the war effort or that the same status now obtains for these vessels, either due to the lack of modern armament or subsequent materiel failures. At the present time every available ship repair facility is being used for the

000.1 (Confidential)

File No.
A3-2

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION
Navy House, Taranto, Italy

Serial: ()

25 May 1944.

S-E-C-R-E-T:

Subject: Conference with Italian Government.

best interests of the Allied war effort. The proposal that 50% of the repair facilities in the Taranto area be reserved for Italian Naval vessels is not worthy of serious consideration.

4. Additional points raised in the summary are discussed briefly below:

(a) All requests by company officials for access to documents needed for the settlement of legal and tax matters will receive every consideration when submitted through proper channels.

(b) The salvage of sunken ships is a responsibility of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in accordance with FOWIT ltr No. 223 of 3 May 1944 to the Chief Commissioner ACC. Considerable progress has been made, however, in turning over Maritime services, particularly in Sicily, to Italian control. In this area the Italian Navy is performing essential services such as harbour clearance and mine sweeping.

(c) The Minister of Marine in January 1944 requested authority to obtain materials such as lime, cement and brick and complete the Dry Dock in Mar Grande at Taranto. The Minister was advised on 16 January 1944 that on account of the acute shortage of skilled labour and material the work was not justified. Moreover, there is no immediate need for such a large drydock, especially without elaborate repair facilities, including buildings and machine tools, which it would be practically impossible to procure in time to serve any use in the immediate future.

(d) There appears to be no objection to the establishment of collection centers for scrap material.

(e) The supply of fuel and power for the production of metal products can only be considered based on specific requests.

(f) The Minister of Marine on 27 November 1943, requested that transport be furnished for lumber from Calabria. The matter was the subject of lengthy correspondence terminating in a letter from the Italian Commander-in-Chief, Ionian on 13 March 1944, stating that the transport was no longer necessary because the timber had been requisitioned by Allied authorities.

(g) The increase in production of bituminous material and the transport of manufactured goods are general subjects. It is recommended that the Italian Government submit details for consideration.

File No.
A3-2

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION
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25 May 1944.

S-E-C-R-E-T:

Subject: Conference with Italian Government.

(h) Every effort is being made to obtain clothing for the Italian Navy. The Army Sub-Commission ACC., has been designated by HQ. AAI letter 5 May 1944 to the Chief Commissioner ACC., as responsible for the supervision and control of the supply of clothing for the Italian Armed Forces, including the Navy. Allied Force Headquarters recently made recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding the supply of clothes for the Navy. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has been advised by Flag Officer Taranto and Adriatic, Liaison Italy, that this procedure will result in considerable delay in the supply of clothing. For this reason it was recommended that the Army Sub-Commission continue to supply clothing to the Italian Navy for the present.

(i) The Minister of Marine on 15 January 1944, requested that material and equipment be provided for the manufacture of 40,000 pairs of shoes. This matter has been referred to the Admiralty, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and Flag Officer Western Italy. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, was advised by Flag Officer Taranto and Adriatic Liaison, Italy on 21 March 1944, that no arrangements could be made for the repair of shoes due to lack of materials.

(j) The return of the Cotoniere Meridionali plant at Naples to the Italian Navy is governed by the same principles enumerated in Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean letter MED 829/4/18 of 24/3 attached, which establishes the policy that Italian ship repair facilities are reserved for Allied use until such times as a surplus exists. Attached hereto is a copy of Industry and Commerce Sub-Commission, Allied Control Commission, letter reference ACC/5111/IC of 31 March 1944, in which it is proposed that this plant be used for the manufacture of oxygen.

5. The subject of Italian Naval deserters to Jugo-Slav forces has been referred by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission, to higher authorities for a statement of policy. In the interim, every effort is being made to discourage such practices. Individual reports of desertion are being investigated. If the deserters are found to be under Allied control, they will be returned to Italian authorities.

6. In conclusion, it is observed that practically all questions raised are of long standing and have either been acted upon or are of a continuing nature, involving supply and repair facilities.

Copy to:
NAVAL REP ACC - Salerno.
FOTALI.

B. Morgan
REAR-ADMIRAL.

4708

SECRET:

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean Station,
Allied Force Headquarters,
ALGIERS.

24th March, 1944.

Med.829/4/18.

THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION, ITALY.

(Copies to:- The Flag Officer, Taranto and Adriatic.
(Ref. 1048/8 of 8th March, 1944).

The Flag Officer, Western Italy.

(Ref.437 dated 17th February, 1944).

The Commodore Superintendent, Taranto.

The Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest
African Waters.

The Ministry of War Transport Representative,
Mediterranean.

The Chief Administrative Officer, Allied Force
Headquarters.
U.S.A.)

REPORT ON SHIPBUILDING YARDS IN ITALY.

The reports of the sub-commission of Italian experts on the ship building and repairing facilities in occupied and unoccupied Italy (excluding Sicily) deal primarily with the private shipyards. With the exception of Franco Tosi Yard at Taranto, and Navale Meccanica at Castellamare, all the large ship building yards are situated in Northern Italy. There are no facilities for the manufacture of main machinery installations, large forgings and castings in Southern Italy.

2. The following is the general policy worked to in the Naval and private shipyards already under Allied control:-

- (a) Assist and encourage the Italians to restore facilities which are required for the immediate war effort.
- (b) First priority is accorded to all ship repairs. Yards which were formerly engaged only on ship construction are taking an increasing share in this work. This policy to be extended as quickly as possible.
- (c) New construction orders already placed have generally been confined to barges, floating docks, and other craft of simple construction which can be produced with the minimum of

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Mediterranean.
The Chief Administrative Officer, Allied Force
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- (b) First priority is accorded to all ship repairs. Yards which were formerly engaged only on ship construction are taking an increasing share in this work. This policy to be extended as quickly as possible.
- (c) New construction orders already placed have generally been confined to barges, floating docks, and other craft of simple construction which are urgently needed, and which can be produced with the minimum of equipment.
- (d) It is considered that surplus skilled labour in ship building yards should be transferred to large ship repairing centres, e.g. Naples, Taranto and Brindisi. This additional labour would assist in the introduction of regular day and night shifts, which is necessary to speed repairs, and get the maximum value out of the available docks.

NOTE:- Towards the end of March all the dry docks at Naples will probably be in operation. A new caisson for No. 3 dock has been expeditiously constructed at Castellamare.

3. It will be seen that the above stated policy is chiefly concerned with the immediate war effort, and not the general rehabilitation of the Italian ship-building industry.

4. Arrangements are made with the British Admiralty for the supply of repair materials to meet this programme. Italian stocks of ship repair materials should continue to be reserved for this work.

5. It is requested that any orders which the Allied Control Commission propose to place with Italian Shipyards should be referred to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean for consideration. Copies of such proposals to be sent to the Flag Officer, Taranto and Adriatic and the Flag Officer, Western Italy. Any proposals for construction or repair of shipbuilding facilities such as shipyards, docks, slips etc. should be treated similarly.

6. The following technical officers on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean have an office in Naples addressed c/o The Flag Officer, Western Italy, Navy House, Naples :-

Principal Base Engineer Officer:- Captain (E) C.M. Morrell O.E.E.,
(P.B.E.O.)
Royal Navy.

Principal Base Constructor Officer:- Constructor Commander J.A. Mavor,
(P.B.C.O.) (Italy)
Royal Navy.

Officer in Charge of Works (West Italy):- Commander (Sp), D.L.Bell,
(O.C.W.)
R.N.V.R.

7. The Commodore Superintendent, Taranto (Commodore J. Powell, D.S.O. Royal Navy) is responsible for all ship repair and shipbuilding activities in the "Heel" ports viz. Taranto, Brindisi, and Bari.

8. British Admiralty technical officers are stationed in all ports where there are ship repair or building facilities.

9. It is considered that the above policy should continue in operation until the termination of European hostilities.

10. In view of the considerable work outstanding in the construction of the new Graving docks at Taranto, Naples and Brindisi, labour should not be employed on completing these projects.

/s/ J. H. D. Cunningham

A D M I R A L.

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/s/ J. H. D. Cunningham

A D M I R A L.

4706

- 2 -

(ENCLOSURE (A)).

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INDUSTRY & COMMERCE SUB-COMMISSION

APPENDIX "A"

MEM/eje

31 March 1944.

Ref. ACC/5111/IC

SUBJECT: Oxygen - Crotone Plant

TO : H. Q. A. A. I. (Adm. Echelon) (Attn.: Brig. Ritchie).

1. Oxygen gas can be manufactured at Crotone. With the 1,300,000 KWH per month of electric power already allocated to oxygen production at this plant, about 3,500,000 cu.ft. per month could be produced on a continuous operating basis.
2. There is some question as to whether the oxygen produced electrolytically at this plant is suitable or can be made suitable for breathing purposes. At present the oxygen purity runs between the limit of 96-98%, and the manager of the plant states that very small amounts of caustic potash spray exist in this gas, thus rendering it unsuitable for breathing purposes. The plant manager is now undertaking some tests proposed by Capt. Mydans to ascertain whether this oxygen can be purified to meet breathing oxygen requirements. This procedure is to involve two operations: a) passage of the gas over hot copper to remove the 2% impurity of hydrogen, b) passage of the gas up a packed tower in contact with concentrated sulphuric acid to remove both caustic potash spray and water vapor. The results of these tests are to be communicated to HQ/ACC/Mining representative in the Crotone area.
as soon as available via ACC
3. Assuming that a satisfactory result is obtained from the tests referred to in par. 2 above, equipment to carry out these operations on plant scale will have to be designed and constructed. Further, the installation of high pressure piping, valves, cylinder filling racks, oxygen compressors, and auxiliary equipment is still to be done. It is estimated that given all assistance to secure necessary materials, this phase of the work may well consume three to four months.
4. Suitable oxygen compressors are lacking. For the proper compression of 3,500,000 cu.ft. of oxygen per month three 100 cu.meter/hour compressors are required. Such equipment would provide sufficient excess capacity to ensure continuous operations.

Signals have been sent by HQ/ACC to all regions of liberated Italy, Sicily and Sardinia in an effort to locate oxygen compressors. No adequate equipment has yet been discovered. Accordingly, stops must be taken without delay to secure such compressors by importation. Suitable electric motors to drive these compressors are already available in Italy and need not be imported.
5. To produce oxygen at Crotone, certain other essential materials must be made available and include:

the production of distilled water

now undertaking some tests proposed by Capt. Mydans to ascertain whether this oxygen can be purified to meet breathing oxygen requirements. This procedure is to involve two operations: a) passage of the gas over hot copper to remove the 2% impurity of hydrogen, b) passage of the gas up a packed tower in contact with concentrated sulphuric acid to remove both caustic potash spray and water vapor. The results of these tests are to be communicated to HQ/ACC/Mining representative in the Crotone area.

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5. To produce oxygen at Crotone, certain other essential materials must be made available and include:

- a) 500 m. tons of coal per month for the production of distilled water necessary to the electrolytic cells.
- b) A considerable stock of rubber tubing for the gas exit tubes of the cells.
- c) 3 tons of calcium carbide.
- d) A long list of small but important miscellaneous materials including wire, insulating varnish, etc.

6. Pending a final decision by technical experts on the possibility of employing the IMAD plant, Naples for the production of oxygen, further work on the Crotone plant has been held in abeyance. The tests mentioned in para. 2, however, are to be undertaken without delay.

For Lieutenant General MASON MACFARLANE:

W. P. EVANS,
Colonel
Director, Industry & Commerce
Sub-Commission.

5 APRIL 1944.

(ENCLOSURE (B)).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015File No.
A3-2ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION
Navy House, Toronto, Italy

Serial: (0071)

25 May 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Chief, Naval Sub-Commission, Allied Control Commission.
To: Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.
Subject: Conference with Italian Government.
Enclosures: (A) CINC MED ltr MED 829/L/18 of 24 March 1944.
(B) Industry & Commerce Sub-Com. ltr ACC/5111/10 of 31 March 1944. (Subject: Oxygen - Crotone Plant).

1. A copy of a letter dated 13 April 1944 from Marshal Badoglio, enclosing a summary of problems which the Italian Government desires to discuss with the Allied Control Commission, was forwarded to the Naval Sub-Commission, ACC by M. ACC., letter 80000.1 of 9 May 1944 for comment. The primary matter raised for consideration by the Naval Sub-Commission relates to the operation and use of shipbuilding and repair facilities formerly employed by the Italian Navy, as outlined under the heading "Industrial Recovery" on page 6 of the summary.

2. From a review of the arguments made that industrial plants should be returned to Italian control, it is quite apparent that the primary concern is to rehabilitate Italian industries, rather than to further the immediate war effort. This matter was previously raised by a report submitted by an Italian Committee of Experts which was referred to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for instructions. A copy of the policy established and directive issued by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for the utilization of Italian shipbuilding and repair facilities is attached hereto.

3. A specific request is made on page 6, paragraph 2 of the summary that at least one half of the repair facilities in the Taranto area be used for the repair of Italian Naval vessels. The present policy for the Naval Dockyard and Tosi Shipyard at Taranto is to employ 70% of the personnel on Allied ships and the remaining 30% on Italian ships. The Naval Dockyard is used wholly for ship repairs. The Tosi Shipyard is fully employed for repair and new construction work. It is operated under contracts between the Allies and the Italian owners. In this manner both yards are provided with employment and maintained in excellent operating condition. Under the policy established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Allied resources and facilities for the repair, overhaul and maintenance of combatant ships are to be devoted only to ships which will contribute immediately and profitably to the war effort. It is unfortunate that many Italian Naval vessels at the time of the Armistice were in such a condition that repairs are not warranted in the interest of the war effort or that the same status now obtains for these vessels, either due to the lack of modern armament or subsequent material failures. At the present time every available ship repair facility is being used for the

File No.
83-2ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION
Navy House, Taranto, Italy

Serial: ()

25 May 1944.

S-R-C-H-S-T:

Subject: Conference with Italian Government.

best interests of the Allied war effort. The proposal that 50% of the repair facilities in the Taranto area be reserved for Italian Naval vessels is not worthy of serious consideration.

4. Additional points raised in the summary are discussed briefly below:

(a) All requests by company officials for access to documents needed for the settlement of legal and tax matters will receive every consideration when submitted through proper channels.

(b) The salvage of sunken ships is a responsibility of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in accordance with COMINT ltr No. 223 of 3 May 1944 to the Chief Commissioner AGC. Considerable progress has been made, however, in turning over Maritime services, particularly in Sicily, to Italian control. In this area the Italian Navy is performing essential services such as harbour clearance and mine sweeping.

(c) The Minister of Marine in January 1944 requested authority to obtain materials such as lime, cement and brick and complete the Dry Dock in War Grande at Taranto. The Minister was advised on 16 January 1944 that on account of the acute shortage of skilled labour and material the work was not justified. Moreover, there is no immediate need for such a large drydock, especially without elaborate repair facilities, including buildings and machine tools, which it would be practically impossible to procure in time to serve any use in the immediate future.

(d) There appears to be no objection to the establishment of collection centers for scrap material.

(e) The supply of fuel and power for the production of metal products can only be considered based on specific requests.

(f) The Minister of Marine on 27 November 1943, requested that transport be furnished for lumber from Calabria. The matter was the subject of lengthy correspondence terminating in a letter from the Italian Commander-in-Chief, Ionian on 13 March 1944, stating that the transport was no longer necessary because the timber had been requisitioned by Allied authorities. 4703

(g) The increase in production of bituminous material and the transport of manufactured goods are general subjects. It is recommended that the Italian Government submit details for consideration.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

File No.
A3-2ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION
Navy House, Taranto, Italy

Serial: ()

25 May 1944.

RECORDED:Subject: Conference with Italian Government.

(h) Every effort is being made to obtain clothing for the Italian Navy. The Army Sub-Commission AGC., has been designated by AGC. letter 5 May 1944 to the Chief Commissioner AGC., as responsible for the supervision and control of the supply of clothing for the Italian Armed Forces, including the Navy. Allied Force Headquarters recently made recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding the supply of clothes for the Navy. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has been advised by Flag Officer Taranto and Adriatic, Liaison Italy, that this procedure will result in considerable delay in the supply of clothing. For this reason it was recommended that the Army Sub-Commission continue to supply clothing to the Italian Navy for the present.

(i) The Minister of Marine on 15 January 1944, requested that material and equipment be provided for the manufacture of 40,000 pairs of shoes. This matter has been referred to the Admiralty, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and Flag Officer Eastern Italy. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, was advised by Flag Officer Taranto and Adriatic Liaison, Italy on 31 March 1944, that no arrangements could be made for the repair of shoes due to lack of materials.

(j) The return of the Coteniere Meridionale plant at Naples to the Italian Navy is governed by the same principles enumerated in Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean letter MED 829/4/18 of 24/3 attached, which establishes the policy that Italian ship repair facilities are reserved for Allied use until such time as a surplus exists. Attached hereto is a copy of Industry and Commerce Sub-Commission, Allied Control Commission, letter reference AGC/5111/10 of 31 March 1944, in which it is proposed that this plant be used for the manufacture of oxygen.

5. The subject of Italian Naval deserters to Jugo-Slav forces has been referred by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission, to higher authorities for a statement of policy. In the interim, every effort is being made to discourage such practices. Individual reports of desertion are being investigated. If the deserters are found to be under Allied control, they will be returned to Italian authorities.

6. In conclusion, it is observed that practically all questions raised are of long standing and have either been acted upon or are of a continuing nature, involving supply and repair facilities.

4702

Copy to:
NAVAL STP AGC - Salerno.
FOCAL.

RECAP-ADMIRAL.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785015

Duplications in
correspondence ref problems
to be taken up at meeting
between AEC and Italian
Govt. Remains for C.C. 2/11/74

Decla. 12256 Section 3 3/NND No.

785015

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Public Relations Branch

15 May 1944
HJ

14 May 1944

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Through SECRETARY GENERAL

REFERENCE : S G 000.1 of 9 May 44.

1. The following are my reactions in writing:
2. Control of Press, Para 1, Page 11

There is no "excessive increase." On the contrary, there is a decrease. There was at one time a very large number of clandestine publications. The APC considered that it was impracticable to take drastic action against them until such time as a satisfactory number of publications had been licensed. As soon as this was done, necessary action was taken. Relevant documents are attached (Appendices A and B). It is doubtful whether ACC can take further action.

3. Para 2, Page 11

I have not yet been able to get details of the case cited. Censorship was done by the Press Liaison Censorship at Bari (Captain Aspley). I have asked for a report on the case from Major Alexander, PWB Press Censor. The Italian Government is not in a good position to talk about such matters as bad breaches of military security have occurred in IL CORRIERE (in spite of our detailed directive of 18 April) and pre-censorship has been abolished. It is obvious that censorship is in most cases extremely tolerant.

4. Radio Communiqués

I learn from Mr. Edman of the PWB that there has recently been a meeting between Captain Stone and the PWB and Italian government representatives to discuss the matter and arrangements are in hand to provide a satisfactory solution in so far as Italian government communiques are concerned. To "limit to the absolute minimum the Allied control over broadcasting programmes" seems to raise a very wide issue.

4701

5. Cultural Relations

Education Sub-Commission has already taken the first steps in this matter. AFHQ were asked in April to contact the proper authorities at home in order to obtain an exchange of books and periodicals. Publications such as IL MESE and POLITICA ESTERA also follow this line. The matter of cultural relations has also been under consideration for some time; a committee was formed by Lord Stanagate and the (late) Minister of Education in Salerno some six weeks ago. It has not done much so far. Lord Stanagate is much interested in it and Major Bergin of this Branch is also a member.

Lionel Fielden

LIONEL FIELDEN
Major
Director of Public Relations

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
Public Relations Branch

Appendix A

16 April 1944

PRB 11A

SUBJECT : Action against unauthorized publications

TO : REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS, Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS, AMG Fifth and Eighth Armies.

1. The Allied Publications Board, with the concurrence of the ACC members of the Board, considers that the time has come when appropriate action, without discrimination, should be taken against all unauthorized newspapers or periodicals, i.e., those not included in the list enclosed.
2. The enclosed list is the latest issued by APB. It is requested, however, that action against publications listed as "under consideration" be delayed until issuance of the next list of authorized publications, which list will hereafter be issued monthly.
3. A directive on the subject issued by Region 3 is also enclosed for your information.

(Sgd) LIONEL FIELDEN
Major
Director of Public Relations

Appendix B

HEADQUARTERS
REGION 3, ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394, U.S. Army

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION)

13 April 1944

NUMBER 22)

1. With reference to the list of newspapers issued by the Allied Publications Board on 4 March 1944, indicating those for which approval has been given to circulate or those still under consideration for circulation in liberated Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, a further list is now forwarded in respect of Salerno Province. (A copy of this list sent to Provincial Safety Officers of Avellino, Benevento, Salerno and Naples Province only.)

2. The Board considers that the time has now come when appropriate action, without discrimination, should be taken in Naples against all unauthorized newspapers or periodicals, i.e. those not included in the list.

3. Before action is taken against unauthorized newspapers in Region 3, outside of Naples, please make sure that such outlying papers have not been authorized by the local Allied authorities and not yet notified to the APB.

4. Although prosecutions will normally be undertaken by or through local Questori, APB are prepared to send a representative to Court where prosecutions ensue, in order to certify that a paper has been rejected by APB.

5. Questori are therefore to be suitably instructed in accordance with the terms of this directive, in order that the necessary measures to seize all unauthorized newspapers and periodicals, and institute all necessary proceedings against offenders be taken.

6. PSOs are to ensure that all seizures and prosecutions under the circumstances indicated are reported to this office.

For the Regional Commissioner:

C. T. FRANCIS
Lieutenant Colonel
Reg Pub Safety Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

"D"
10 - Public Safety Section
HQ Region 3

4698

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Secretary General
APO 394

REL/afw

SG 000.1

9 May 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner, R.C. & I.C. Section
Vice President, Administrative Section
Vice President, Economic Section
Director, Communications Sub-Commission
Chief, Naval Sub-Commission
Director, Public Relations Branch
Director, Army Sub-Commission

1. Attached is a copy of a letter from Marshal Badoglio addressed to the Chief Commissioner dated 13 April 1944 together with a copy of the inclosure thereto.
2. The Chief Commissioner desires that you examine the questions raised by the Marshal which concern your section and present your reactions in writing at the earliest possible date, in order that the Chief Commissioner may make arrangements for the meeting requested by the Marshal.
3. Each paragraph in the inclosure of the Marshal's letter has been marked to indicate the section of action. It may well be, however, that certain items will also have interest to another section. In such case it is suggested that the section concerned contact direct the section of action as indicated on the document.

ROBERT E. DOR
Major, A.G.D.
Secretary General

4697

TRANSLATION

Rome, 13 April 1944

No. 1941

Office of the Chief of the Government

Encl. 1.

Dear General:

In March I welcomed the opportunity of explaining to you my point of view concerning the criteria which in my opinion should have inspired the actions of the Allied Control Commission. I also proposed a meeting between the Commission and members of my Government in order that they might examine together the problems requiring a more urgent solution for the industrial, agricultural and military rebirth of Italy so as to provide a still more effective contribution in the fight against the common enemy.

You suggested that I draw up a memorandum of the subjects to be discussed and I am pleased to send you a resume of the questions which could be examined at the meeting.

As you will note, there are many questions of which several are complex, but all of which require an urgent solution in the common interest for the realization of that plan of reconstruction of my country to which my Government and I are pledged.

I am certain that a frank exchange of views between the members of my Government and the Allied Control Commission would bring about a settlement of even the most difficult problems: all the more if it should be possible, as I hope, to place the relations between the Commission and Government on a different level from the present one, so that they may be carried on with greater mutual trust.

Without doubt this would expedite the action of the Government thus eliminating the detailed checks which hinder the reconstruction effort of the Italian authorities and their loyal desire to make every possible contribution to the common war effort.

If you agree, I ask you, dear General, kindly to advise me of the date when the projected meeting can be held.

With my cordial greetings,

(Signed) Badoglio

4696

Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Cabinet

Summary of the problems presented by the various Governments
and for discussion at the meeting to be held with the Allied
Control Commission.

Relations with the Allied Authorities.

1. Control by affiliated Allied authorities:

While in general the relations with the central Allied au-
thorities are marked on with great cordiality, there are
grounds for complaint as regards incomprehension and distrust
on the part of affiliated Allied agencies. Their control, which
often extends to the most detailed particulars, in addition to
being too complicated, concludes by taking on a character of in-
terference in the entire administrative activity.

In other words, the tendency of the affiliated Allied agen-
cies to continue to exercise the powers formerly belonging to
AMST in the territories controlled by the Allied troops, even
after the restoration of these territories to the Italian ad-
ministration, and to extend the exercise of these powers even
to the provinces which have always been under the full sovereignty
of the Italian Government has been noted.

For instance, there are grounds for complaint in connec-
tion with an unjustified interference by the local Allied au-
thorities in prison matters in the provinces returned to the
Italian Administration in particular in the provinces of Bari
and Brindisi.

To cite another example, public order in territories ad-
ministered by the Italian Government is maintained by the
Italian military authorities. On the other hand on March 19
last, the Allied Control Commission in Bari province there
authorized a meeting of the Socialist Party. Members of the
said Commission, Lt. Colonel Vining and Major Reveley, when
they were approached in this matter by the Italian authorities,
stated that the preservation of public order was the responsi-
bility of the provincial Allied Control Commission, with whom
the local Italian military should cooperate.

On March 29 the Control Commission in Bari Province **4695** gave
orders that merchandise sequestered in connection with food
rationing crimes should be delivered to the Supply Section of
the Commission, whereas according to the Royal Decree Law of
January 29, 1944, No. 44, the authority who has power to assign
such sequestered merchandise is the Prefect. Very definite
instructions by the Allied Control Commission to its affiliated
offices would appear opportune in this connection.

-2-

2. Allied Forces' Police:

Numerous cases of arrests made by the Allied authorities of Italian citizens who are detained for a long time, sometimes even for months, without a trial or hearing of any kind, are to be deplored.

In matters concerning personal liberty it would also be desirable if the Allied authorities followed the regulations of the Royal Decree Law of January 31, 1944, No. 49. It has happened that the Allied military authorities have arrested Italian officers and soldiers and have put them, also for a long time, in concentration camps without informing the Italian military commands at all.

Any arrest of an Italian soldier by the Allied Forces should immediately be communicated to the appropriate Italian command.

3. Behavior of the Allied Forces:

The behavior of some elements of the Allied Forces with regard to the Italian citizens, civilians and soldiers, is deplorable.

Increasingly frequent cases of pillage are reported by all centers where Allied troops are stationed.

The matter is a painful one, and in view of its political repercussions it should be eliminated.

Use of fire arms: It also appears that Allied soldiers make use of fire arms for non-warlike reasons, such too carelessly, seriously endangering the life of the population and damaging their private property.

Between Jacotenente and Puntone Turco, in the territory of Vico del Gargano (Foggia) 51 electrical insulators have been for instance damaged by pistol or rifle fire. This causes the conductors to fall down or to break, thus interrupting communications.

In the same locality, Allied soldiers hunt roebuck, which is forbidden by Italian laws. They shoot wildly in the woods of the Government forest called "Umbra", and jeopardize the safety of those engaged in the production of charcoal for the use of the Allied Forces. Allied soldiers do not even refrain from shooting domestic animals, close to houses.

It is indispensable that a greater discipline be effected in the use of fire arms by isolated military personnel.

4694

Abusive cutting of plants: It also appears that Allied troops proceed to cut wood and to requisition charcoal without previous

-3-

agreement with our Forestry authorities, thus jeopardizing, sometimes beyond repair, forests and the Italian wood production.

It would be highly desirable that the supplier of wood and charcoal to the Allied Forces be made in agreement with the appropriate Italian Forestry Agencies.

4. Employment of Italian officers and soldiers by Allied Commands:

No Italian officer or soldier should be employed by the Allied Forces without the approval of the Italian military commands.

5. Yugoslav propaganda and incitement to desertion:

There exists in Italian liberated territory a Yugoslav organization which carries out an active campaign among the Italian foreign soldiers in order to induce them to desert.

These desertions, which up to now have reached the number of several dozens as regards the Air Force, 1000 in the Army, and a considerable number also for the Navy, have a bad effect on the morale of the troops and the composition of units.

The Allies should intervene energetically so that such a revolutionary activity be stopped and that soldiers who are still in great part in the Yugoslav training camps in Italian territory be returned.

6. Repatriation of some categories of prisoners:

In the work of reconstruction of the Armed Forces, the Italian military commands have great need of Generals, Chiefs of Staff, Engineer and Supply officers, officers, NCO's and soldiers of the SR Carabinieri.

Repatriation of Italian prisoners of war belonging to these categories would be very useful in this connection.

THE CONCENTRATED PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

1. Administrative organization.

It has happened that the Allied authorities have suppressed in the territories under their control, agencies and institutions of fundamental importance to the Italian administrative organization such as the Economy Provincial Councils, which are only the old Chambers of Commerce; and as for instance, in Sicily they have established in some regions new offices which have nothing to do with the administrative organization of the remaining provinces of the Kingdom.

In order to assure unity of directive in the administration of free Italy, it would be desirable if the Italian and the Allied Governments should consult one another before issuing ordinances that might have differing effects upon the organization of the public administrations.

2. Appointments and movements of Prefects.

In some provinces as, for instance, in Sicily, in Cosenza, in Matera and in Reggio Calabria, the occupying Allied authorities have proceeded to remove the Prefects in charge, substituting for them local elements or functionaries of low rank with little experience or administrative ability.

In view of the importance of the position and of their functions it would be desirable for the Allied authorities to request the opinion of the Ministry of the Interior before adopting, in the territories under Allied control, provisions calling for the appointment, recall and transfer of Prefects. The opportunity could be taken to proceed in agreement with the Allied authorities, to review the appointments already made.

3. Appointments, promotions and dismissals of personnel.

In the territories controlled by them, the Allied authorities have similarly disposed of appointments and public positions, promotions in the administrative posts and dismissals without any attention to the Italian administrative set-up.

The Italian authorities are, therefore now at a loss as regards the regularization of these appointments which also alter the classification and lists of the personnel and cause damage to the interests of many categories of employees.

It seems desirable in this connection that:

The Allied authorities should always request the personnel needed in the territories controlled by them from the appropriate Ministries which might have an overstrength of personnel. 4697

In case of necessity only temporary or special personnel, and

-2-

always with initial rank, should always be employed.

The Allied authorities should refrain from granting promotions to State and Public Administration personnel, limiting themselves to the grant, in very particular cases, of promotions to a grade immediately above that previously held by the employee.

The Allied authorities should request, at least, the opinion of the Ministries concerned before adopting any provision concerning personnel.

4. Salaries of personnel:

The personnel employed in territories directly administered by the A.M.G. often receive salaries quite different from those under Italian administration.

It therefore results that the greater number of employees all claim higher salaries throughout the territory. It would be advisable that the economic treatment of the state personnel be decided upon by the Allied authorities, even when the personnel is working in territories still under ANGO administration.

5. Defascistization:

It has happened that the personnel of the public administrations has received different treatment in connection with the defascistization. It has varied in territories controlled directly by the Allied authorities and in those administered by the Royal Italian Government.

In order to obviate this inconvenience, in a matter so important, it is necessary to establish uniform directives in agreement with the Allied authorities.

6. Utilization of the personnel:

In the zones of operations, the Allied military commands do not allow the specialized post-telegraphic personnel to approach the electric lines, the setting of poles and the power stations.

In consequence the personnel is not employed, and many lines and telephone central stations such as those of Campobasso and Foggia, remain unusable.

It should not be difficult to make use also in the zones of operations, of this personnel with great advantage to the communications, the importance of which in war time is superfluous to emphasize.

7. Premises for Public Offices:

In Salerno the Italian Government must meet an ever increasing request for offices by the public administrations in connection

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with the increased requirements of their services.

It is submitted that the Allied Control Commission might examine the advisability of suspending the assignment of other commands offices or units of Allied troops to Salerno and instead, transferring to different localities some command or office now in Salerno in order to allow the Italian Government to have at its disposal a greater number of premises.

It is also submitted that the Commission might examine the advisability of returning to the Italian Government the Prefecture buildings, so that the Prefects and the other governmental authorities might, with the necessary dignity, be able to carry out the public services in the main towns of the provinces.

It is also necessary to avoid possession being taken by Allied troops of premises allocated to public services and where there are machines, installations, valuable equipment such as the Railway Offices and the Post-Telegraph buildings and that such premises be used for billeting troops. In several localities (Taranto, Naples, Salerno, Foggia) such occurrences have provoked serious deficiencies in the performance of the services, damages, often beyond repair, to the plants, and the loss of valuable equipment.

8. Post Offices:

Considerable delays in postal and telegraph service are to be noted. Such poor service is of special disadvantage to the public administration. The cause may be sought in the slowness of censorship operations, to which official Italian correspondence is still subject in some provinces, notwithstanding the agreements of December 27, 1943. It is suggested that official mail be presented, where necessary, to the censorship office in a separate bag to be examined and returned to the Post Office on the same day.

9. School services:

a. Unity of direction: Proper agreements are necessary to assure unity of direction in school services, especially as regards time tables, the school calendar, text books, programs and examinations.

b. Aid to students: Similar agreements would be desirable to assure aid to students in the form of hot meals, distribution of garments, etc., to needy students.

10. Paper for the Public Administration:

The Allied authorities have requisitioned all the paper in stock at the Foggia Paper Mill (about 18,000 quintals). The delivery of quantities already assigned to Government Administrations is urgent.

This applies to all Administration, but is especially urgent

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as regards the Financial Administration which must make provision for the preparation of forms required for collection of taxes and as regards the Railroad Administration which encounters difficulties even in printing railroad tickets.

4688

INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY

1. Derequisitioning of industrial plants:

In effect the Allied military occupation of industrial establishments hinders the resumption of work. Derequisitioning of industrial establishments would be desirable where proprietors intend to resume production, or at least partial evacuation of premises.

This problem is particularly urgent as regards those factories and plants which formerly worked for the railroads. The latter urgently require restoration of lines and installations, repair of rails and restoration to operating condition of the train material that has been largely destroyed or is rapidly deteriorating.

The same urgency is called for in regard to naval plants and dockyards. In every case the heads of companies should be authorized to enter offices to remove whatever documents are needed for the settlement of legal and tax matters.

2. Operation of industries which work for the Royal Navy:

The Royal Navy is particularly interested in prompt re-opening of some industrial plants and improvement of operating conditions in its own establishments. In the present situation it is impossible to provide for the normal maintenance needs of the fleet. As a result there is a constantly increasing number of warships which are laid up and awaiting their turn. Consequently it is important that the Taranto Arsenal, the Poul shipyards of the same city and the Brindisi shops operate with at least half of their personnel for the repair of Italian warships. The difficulties resulting from lack of equipment and materiel might be provided for through reactivation and derequisitioning of industrial establishments and plants, unfreezing of stocks on hand and proceeding to the recovery of missing materials and valuable machinery given by the Allies to private persons and carried away.

In this connection it is pointed out that the Royal Navy might make a contribution to the common fight even greater than the present one if only it were enabled to stop the deterioration of machinery and plants or, better still, if it were permitted to restore to operation its port installations, drydocks, storage warehouses, barracks, hospitals, all fields in which the Allies constantly require greater effort.

For that purpose it will be necessary to refloat all sunken ships; to complete the large Taranto drydock; to restore to operation lime, cement and brick factories; to establish collection centers for scrap metals; to permit by supplying the necessary fuel and power the production of metal products, importing necessary required machinery; to furnish necessary transportation of lumber from Calabria; to increase the production of bituminous material; and to facilitate in every way possible the transport of materials and manufactured goods from one region to another.

-2-

For instance, there are at present some thousands of sailors who cannot be employed for lack of clothing, especially shoes; and the situation is growing worse from day to day.

For that reason normal recruiting has had to be suspended and consequently also the normal retention of personnel.

It is natural that this state of affairs has influenced the effective cooperation which the Royal Navy can give in the fight against the common enemy.

To meet these compelling needs the following are indispensable:

Derequisition and place in operation at the earliest possible time the plants of the Cantieri Meridionali of Naples which in meeting the entire needs of the Royal Navy could give work to about 3,000 workers;

Install at Taranto a shoe factory for the Royal Navy imparting the small amount of machinery needed.

3. Allocation of coal and other raw materials for industry:

Many metallurgical plants and mechanical workshops could resume operations if they could count on the necessary supplies of coal, metallic materials and lumber.

To resume such work is very important, especially for the railroad installations, repair of railroad lines and material, naval constructions and repairs.

With a monthly allocation of about 17,000 tons of coal, a monthly production could be assured of, for instance, 52,000 tons of cement, 23,000 tons of lime and 120,000 square meters of window glass.

4. Destruction of works, equipment and installations:

Such destruction should be effected only in case of absolute necessity, and, in every case, in agreement with the Italian authorities.

5. Requisition of machinery, raw materials, finished and semi-finished materials:

Requisition of machinery or its removal from plants should be avoided so as to permit industries to resume operation. Obviously this would reduce imports and consequently maritime transportation from America and England.

The raw materials and finished and semi-finished products requisitioned in plants are often used in an uneconomical fashion. They are thus deteriorating and often going to waste without being used, whereas the few industries of liberated Italy need everything.

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-3-

For instance, it is vital to place at disposal of the Ministry of War the raw materials, the materials and machinery lying at present unused in various artillery establishments assigned to Allied troops as billets.

As regards requisitions, the Allied authorities have often refused to issue written statements attesting to the requisitions effected and sometimes have even shown resentment when faced with the requests of the parties concerned.

Such certificates are, however, necessary in order that Italian citizens may make claim for any possible compensation to the State.

The Allied authorities should issue such certificates without raising difficulties.

6. Freezing of goods and prices:

The freezing by Allied authorities of almost all available goods makes impossible exchanges and consumption which are considered indispensable for an economic recovery and for the better utilization of existing resources with consequent reduction in imports from across the sea.

The freezing of goods also prevents the adjustment of prices to the changed monetary situation.

Major freedom of action would be desirable for the Italian Government.

7. Institutions of technical-professional instruction:

A major part of the premises of the teaching material and of the equipment of Institutes of technical and professional instruction, so closely linked to the industrial recovery of the country, have been lost through war developments or requisitions. It is indispensable to proceed with release of buildings and reconstruction of scientific institutions.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Transportation by railroad and ordinary traffic:

Throughout peninsular and insular Italy, the transport situation is most serious. The means of communication both by railroad and road are completely inadequate for the needs of the people. Such deficiency stands in the way of any economic recovery. The prevailing system of controls and authorizations under the Allied Committee at Naples has proven itself in practice so long and so laborious that it has resulted in the paralysis of every kind of traffic. This is also due to the deplorable shortcomings in postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.

The following measures are considered urgent and indispensable to restore to the Italian Railroad Administration the operation of the entire network of liberated Italy south of the line including Foggia, Benevento, Caserta, Naples:

to entrust to the Italian administration the task and responsibility of satisfying the demands of the Allied military authorities;

to assure two passenger trains each way and one freight train each way on the principal lines;

to assure one passenger train each way and one freight train each way on the secondary lines;

to assure continuity of service.

2. Communications with Sardinia and Sicily:

The relations between the Peninsula and Sardinia do not permit further delay in the establishment of a regular service of sea and air transportation between the Island and the Continent. For the present a daily air service and a bi-weekly sea service might be sufficient. Similar need exists as regards communication with Sicily. It would be necessary to have at least four ships of medium tonnage which might call at the minor ports of the two islands and the Continent, without disturbing the traffic of the Allies in the large ports.

3. Railroad care for the transportation of salt and other monopoly goods:

The scarcity of salt on the market causes great discontent among the people. In some localities popular demonstrations have even taken place. At Margherita di Savoia, near Barietta, 150,000 tons of salt are available, largely sufficient for the needs of the southern population, but means of transportation are lacking. To arrange for distribution of this most important foodstuff and other monopoly goods, it would be necessary to assign to the Ministry of Finance the railroad cars which are asked for every ten days or

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at least of a couple of freighters of small tonnage, with a useful loading capacity of no more than a thousand tons.

4. Railroad cars and motor vehicles for the services of the Military Commissariat:

For the operation of the vital services of the Military Commissariat, a greater supply of railroad cars and motor vehicles is required.

5. Motor vehicles for supplying the civilian population:

The most important service of supply is greatly hindered in all provinces by the great scarcity of motor vehicles.

Therefore, the allocation of a suitable number of motor vehicles is necessary to provide for the food requirements of the population.

6. Motor vehicles for collection of taxes:

For the most important service of inspection in the provincial tax offices at least two cars for every province would be needed.

Requisitions now being practically impossible, the Allies would have to supply at least the tires and wheels to permit requisition of cars which are now put up for lack of such spare parts.

7. Auto spare parts:

Such lack of spare parts is very marked especially for military transport, which, in the absence of suitable measures, may within a short time be completely paralyzed.

Therefore, it would be necessary that the Allies arrange for supply of rubber tires and spare parts for the repair and operation of motor vehicles, the production factories of which are all, as is known, in enemy-occupied Italy.

Also collection centers for non-operational motor vehicles could be established, including those of private ownership to be requisitioned, and suitable repair shops to put such vehicles back into operating condition using part of them to provide spare parts. In view of the great scarcity of vehicles, it would furthermore be necessary to restrict requisitions to the lowest possible limits.

8. Transport of lignite:

In the mercury mines (Castelluccio Inferiore) there are 10,000 tons of dry lignite which would be very suitable for manufacture of bricks. 4683

Railroad cars and the allocation of a truck per day for every railroad car made available are needed to haul the lignite from

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Castelluccio to the main railroad point of Lagonegro (Km.40)

9. Transport of asphalt from Sicily:

It would prove very useful for repair and operation of main roads, also for military purposes, to be able to transport asphalt just from Siracusa to Bari, Salerno and Naples.

10. Requisition of cars:

To meet the increasing demands of motor vehicles by the Italian Government, it is requested that the Allied authorities also agree to requisition those cars for which they have issued permits of free circulation, up to April 30, 1944.

11. Ships of small tonnage:

The great difficulties, which the Italian Government, private individuals and even the Allies encounter in railroad and ordinary transportation, might be considerably reduced if all the motor sailboats of a capacity under 100 tons were left at the disposal of the Italian Government for interregional traffic of the products most essential to consumption and industry: oil, wine, firewood, charcoal, vegetables, cheese, hides, etc. Also, the construction of 64 motorboats and small motorvessels, now in shipyards, might be completed with a total gross tonnage of 10,000 tons. For that purpose the allocation of 1,200 tons of steel plates, 9,000 cu. meters of oak lumber, 6,000 cu. meters of pine lumber in addition to nails, cork, ropes, chains and motors should be made. At present there is no assurance that these materials previously ordered will be delivered.

12. Telegraph and telephone communications:

The available means are not used in the most useful way so as to derive the best return possible.

For instance, the cables Palermo-Naples and Palermo-Cagliari are still used by the Allied Commands with a simple Morse circuit. The Italian administration could utilize these circuits, as always, with its trained personnel and its machinery, with four channels (with quadruple Baudot), enabling the Allies to enable their communications and the Italian Government to take advantage of two independent circuits.

13. Measures of a financial character:

It would be desirable that with prior agreement with the Navy Ministry the Allied authorities take no measures in regard to the steamship and shipping companies subsidized by the Government and in regard to FINMARE which is a subsidiary group of IRI.

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AGRICULTURE AND FISHING1. Seed potatoes:

Edon
Notwithstanding contrary assurances in regard thereto by the Allied authorities, it has been ascertained that the seed potatoes shipped to Italy were affected with "humid gangrene."

Savings effected in Sicily have resulted that in many lots the percentage of rot and ungerminated potatoes on account of the aforesaid disease reached from 95 to 98 per cent. To the grave present economic damage, there is added a future even greater damage, because for years the infected land can not be used for potato growing on account of disease germs.

The Allied Control Commission must require that the seed potatoes shipped to Italy be subject upon shipment to rigorous guaranteed plant pathological control as required in the past by proper international agreements. Appropriate immunization certification should be issued by the proper authorities.

2. Resumption of fishing activities:

Edon
The resumption of fishing activities, so useful at this moment, due to food scarcity, is hindered by the fact that the Allied authorities require a double authorization order, one issued by the Naval Office to obtain entry into Port and mooring of the craft, the other by the local Allied authority authorizing the fishing.

To render fishing easier, the second authorization should be abolished, since fishing licenses are already issued by the Royal Port Offices. If not in conflict with military operations, permission might also be given for night fishing with under-water lights along the coasts of Southern Italy and the large islands (Sardinia and Sicily) which is more profitable and would employ a large number of maritime laborers.

For the purpose the Allies should release the motor fishing boats hired by them for other purposes.

ASSISTANCE TO WAR REFUGEES

22.10.6 To assure effective help for the people most directly affected by war, the following provisions are considered necessary:

limit to the absolute minimum forced evictions from immediately behind the front lines;

provide adequate food for the refugees;

arrange for release of all public and private buildings no longer needed for the Allied Forces;

place at the disposal of the local authorities the means needed for the transportation of refugees and their household goods, in the greatest quantity possible;

place garments and medical supplies at the disposal of the local authorities.

CONTROL OF PRESS

1. Periodical press:

22.10.6 An excessive increase of all types of periodical publications, including clandestine ones, is regrettable. They have no well-defined programs and are produced at the initiative of more or less irresponsible elements.

To check the increase of these sheets and leaflets, which only result in an increasing confusion and disorientation of public opinion, it would seem opportune to limit the publication of periodicals to not more than one newspaper for every political party in each provincial capital, requiring prior political censorship for all publications. The provisions now in effect for military censorship would remain unchanged.

At the same time sanctions against offenders should be provided.

2. Allied military press censorship:

22.10.6 The allied military press censorship is at times too strict in its criteria. For instance, in an article of the "Giornale dell'Aviatore" (Paper of the Pilot) No. 10, the Allied censor wished the phrase "under orders of the King" to be eliminated, on the pretext that the Allied authorities do not intend to interfere in the internal Italian situation.

Facts of this kind have a bearing on the military traditions of the paper, and are cause for confusion among the troops to whom the paper is addressed, and harm the efforts being made to gather all energies for the purpose of assuring a more effective collabor-

-2-

ation with the Allies. It is desirable that military censorship be exercised with greater understanding.

ARTISTIC PATRIMONY

Abundant Particularly grave are the devastations which the Italian artistic patrimony, the patrimony indeed of all civilized nations has suffered due to war. All possible measures to assure conservation of works of art, monuments still existing, bibliographical material and the repair and reconstruction of the galleries, institutes of art should be put into effect at once. In this respect joint undertakings would be desirable as to the action to be taken in the territory administered by the Italian Government and in that still controlled by the Allies.

THEATERS AND CINEMAS

Abundant Many theaters and cinemas have been requisitioned by the Allied Forces which manage them themselves to the serious loss of many classes of executive, administrative and artistic personnel who made their living from theaters and cinema theaters.

It would seem desirable to allow the owners and directors of theaters and cinemas to resume their management, requiring them to give a certain number of free performances for the Allied forces but permitting them also to work in day time.

RADIO COMMUNIQUE

RR The communiques of the Italian Government are not always transmitted by the radio stations.

Agreements would be desirable in the matter, which would also limit to the absolute minimum the Allied control over broadcasting programs.

HOTELS

R. & M. The requisitioning of hotels assumes constantly vaster proportions. It would be desirable to limit such requisitions to strictly indispensable cases, utilizing, if possible, during the period of requisition the personnel formerly employed therein.

CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

F.R.B. Fascist policy resulted in that important expressions of Anglo-American political thought and valuable writings of Italian authors remained totally unknown to the Italian public.

Therefore, the preparation of a plan of exchange of publications between Italy and the Allied nations both in the original 4679

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editions, as well as in translations would be very useful.

In this respect the establishment of a cultural Italo-Anglo-American Union for the purposes of promoting a more intimate spiritual understanding and a more strict collaboration between Italy and the Allied Nations would be extremely desirable.

Special agreements might be effected with the Psychological Warfare Branch of AMCOT in order to establish the means necessary to the concrete activation of the undertaking.

Salerno, 6 April 1944.

N. 1941

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

All. 7

Selerno, 18 aprile 1944

Caro Generale,

il 10 marzo scorso ebbi la gradita occasione di esporle il mio punto di vista circa i criteri ai quali, secondo me, l'azione della Commissione Alleata di Controllo avrebbe dovuto ispirarsi e di proporre la riunione della Commissione stessa con i membri del mio Governo per esaminare assieme i problemi che richiedono una più urgente soluzione per la rinascita industriale, agricola e militare dell'Italia al fine di un contributo ancora più efficace nella lotta contro il comune nemico.

Elia mi suggerì di far predisporre una nota degli argomenti da trattare ed io sono ben lieto di inviarle ora un riassunto delle questioni che potrebbe ro essere esaminate nella detta riunione.

Come Ella rileverà, le questioni sono molte, e talune anche complesse, ma tutte richiedono una soluzione urgente, nel comune interesse, per la realizzazione di quel piano di ricostruzione del mio Paese al quale io e il mio Governo siamo votati.

Io sono certo che un chiaro scambio di vedute fra i membri del mio Governo e la Commissione Alleata di Controllo porterebbe alla soluzione anche dei problemi più difficili, tanto più se risulterà possibile, come io spero, porre i rapporti tra Commissione e Governo su di un piano diverso da quello attuale, da improntarsi cioè a maggiore scambievole fiducia.

Ciò consentirebbe, senza alcun dubbio, a dare

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Ciò consentirebbe, senza alcun dubbio, a dare all'azione di Governo più snelle procedure eliminando i minuziosi controlli su questioni di dettaglio che ora inceppano le Autorità italiane nello sforzo della ricostruzione e nel loro leale desiderio di da

IL CAPO DEL GOVERNO

re ogni possibile contributo al comune sforzo di guerra.

Se Ella condivide la mia opinione, La prego, caro Generale, di volermi comunicare la data nella quale la riunione progettata potrà tenersi.

Con i migliori cordiali saluti.

Barloggio

Al Signor Lieutenant General
Sir Noel Mason MAC FARLANE

4677

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Barloggio

Al Signor Lieutenant General
Sir Noel Mason MAC PARIANE
Capo della Commissione Alleata di Controllo

S A L E R N O

4677

PR. IDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI
- G a b i n e t t o -

Riassunto delle questioni sollevate dai vari Dicasteri
e da discutersi nella riunione da indire con la Commis-
sione Alleata di Controllo.

RAPPORTI CON LE AUTORITA' ALLEATE

1°) Controllo delle Autorità Alleate periferiche:

Mentre in genere i rapporti con le Autorità Centrali Al-
leate sono improntati alla maggiore cordialità, si lamen-
tano casi di incomprensione e talvolta di mal celata sfi-
ducia da parte degli organi periferici alleati il cui con-
trollo, estendentesi spesso sino ai più minuti particola-
ri, oltre a risultare troppo macchinoso, finisce con l'as-
sumere la veste di una vera e propria ingerenza in tutta
quanta l'attività amministrativa.

Si nota, in altri termini, la tendenza degli organi peri-
ferici alleati di continuare ad esercitare i poteri già
demandati all'A.M.G.O.F. nei territori occupati dalle trap-
pe alleate anche dopo la restituzione di tali territori al-
l'Amministrazione Italiana e di estendere l'esercizio di
tali poteri anche alle provincie che sono sempre state sot-
to la piena sovranità del Governo Italiano.

Si lamenta, per esempio, qualche ingiustificata ingerenza
da parte delle Autorità Alleate locali sui servizi carce-
rari delle provincie restituite all'Amministrazione Ita-
liana e persino delle provincie di Bari e Brindisi.

Il mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico, per fare un altro e
sempio, è affidato nei territori amministrati dal Governo
Italiano alle Autorità Militari Italiane.

Il 19 marzo u.s., invece, la Commissione Alleata di Con-
trollo per la provincia di Bari autorizzò in tale locali-
tà un comizio del partito socialista. Gli organi della pre-
detta Commissione (Ten.Col. Vining e Magg. Reveley) dichia-
ravano, nel prendere atto della segnalazione opportunamen-
te fatta dalle Autorità Italiane, che la tutela dell'ordi-
ne pubblico spettava alla Commissione provinciale alleata
di controllo con la quale il locale comando militare ita-
liano era tenuto a collaborare.

Dec

- 2 -

Il 29 marzo u.s. la stessa Commissione di controllo per la provincia di Bari dava disposizione perchè le merci sequestrate per reatiannonari venissero consegnate alla Supply Section della Commissione stessa, mentre l'autorità competente ad assegnare tali merci sequestrate è, a norma del R. decreto-legge 20/1/1944, n. 44, il Prefetto. Istruzioni inequivocabili da parte della Commissione Alleata di Controllo ai suoi organi periferici sembrano opportune al riguardo.

2°) Polizia delle Forze Alleate:

Si lamentano numerosi casi di arresto da parte delle Autorità Alleate di cittadini italiani che vengono trattati in istato di detenzione per lungo tempo, talvolta anche per mesi, senza alcuna forma di giudizio nè contestazioni di sorta.

Sarebbe desiderabile che anche le Autorità Alleate seguissero, in materia di restrizione della libertà personale, le norme del R. decreto-legge 31 gennaio 1944, n. 45. Si è verificato che ufficiali e militari italiani venissero trattati in arresto da parte delle Autorità militari alleate e trattenuti, anche lungamente, nei campi di concentramento senza che alcuna comunicazione fosse data ai Comandi militari italiani.

Ogni arresto di militare italiano da parte delle Forze Alleate dovrebbe essere segnalato senza indugio al Comando italiano competente.

3°) Comportamento delle Forze Alleate:

Si lamenta il comportamento di taluni elementi delle Forze Armate Alleate nei confronti dei cittadini italiani, civili e militari.

Casi sempre più frequenti di rapina vengono segnalati da tutti i centri nei quali risiedono militari alleati.

Il fenomeno è molto increscioso anche per i suoi riflessi politici e dovrebbe essere eliminato.

Uso delle armi da fuoco: Risulta anche che militari alleati facciano uso delle armi da fuoco, per scopi non bellici, con troppa leggerezza, mettendo in serio pericolo la vita delle popolazioni e compromettendone la proprietà privata.

Tra Jacotenente e Puntone Turco, nel territorio di Viç del Gargano (Foggia) sono stati, per esempio, danneggiati a colpi di pistola o di moschetto 51 isolatori con la conseguente caduta o spezzettamento del filo e relativa

2675

Decl

- 3 -

interruzione delle comunicazioni.

Nella stessa località, militari alleati si danno alla caccia al capriolo, caccia vietata dalle leggi italiane, sparando a casaccio nei boschi della foresta demaniale denominata "Umbra", compromettendo l'incolumità del personale addetto alla produzione del carbone vegetale per conto delle stesse forze alleate.

Essi non si astengono nemmeno dal tirare sul bestiame domestico in prossimità delle abitazioni.

E' indispensabile ottenere una maggiore disciplina nell'uso delle armi da fuoco da parte dei militari isolati.

Taglio abusivo di piante:

Si verifica anche che le truppe alleate procedano a tagli nei boschi e a requisizioni di carbone vegetale senza preventivi accordi con le nostre Autorità forestali, pregiudicando così, talvolta irreparabilmente, il patrimonio boschivo e la produzione legnosa italiana.

Sarebbe altamente desiderabile che le forniture di legna e di carbone vegetale alle forze alleate avvenissero di intesa con i competenti organi forestali italiani.

4°) Impiego di Ufficiali e militari italiani da parte di Comandi alleati:

Sarebbe opportuno che nessun ufficiale o militare italiano venisse impiegato dalle Forze alleate senza il nulla osta dei Comandi militari italiani.

5°) Propaganda jugoslava e incitamento alla diserzione:

Esiste nel territorio italiano liberato una organizzazione jugoslava che svolge attiva campagna fra i militari italiani allogeni per indurli a disertare.

Tali diserzioni, che fino ad oggi hanno raggiunto la cifra di alcune decine di unità per l'aviazione, di 1080 unità per l'esercito e una cifra cospicua anche per la marina, influiscono dannosamente sulla saldezza morale della truppa e sulla consistenza dei reparti.

Sarebbe opportuno che gli Alleati intervenissero energicamente per far cessare tale attività sediziosa e far restituire i disertori che si trovano ancora per la maggior parte nei campi di addestramento jugoslavi esistenti nel territorio italiano.

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5°) Rimpatrio di alcune categorie di prigionieri:

I Comandi militari italiani hanno grande bisogno, nell'opera di ricostruzione delle Forze Armate, di Ufficiali generali, Ufficiali di Stato Maggiore, Ufficiali del Genio e di Commissariato, Ufficiali, Sottufficiali e militari di truppa dell'Arma dei Carabinieri.

Il rimpatrio dei prigionieri di guerra italiani appartenenti a tali categorie riuscirebbe molto utile al riguardo.

QUESTIONI CONCERNENTI LA PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE

1°) Ordinamento amministrativo:

Si è verificato che le Autorità alleate abbiano soppresso, nei territori da esse controllati, enti ed istituti di importanza fondamentale per l'ordinamento amministrativo italiano, quali i Consigli provinciali dell'Economia, i quali non sono altro che le vecchie camere di commercio, e che abbiano invece istituito in talune regioni, come per esempio in Sicilia, nuovi uffici che non trovano alcun riscontro nella organizzazione amministrativa delle rimanenti province del Regno.

Sarebbe opportuno, allo scopo, di assicurare unità di indirizzo nell'amministrazione dell'Italia liberata, che il Governo italiano e quello Alleato si consultassero reciprocamente prima di adottare provvedimenti che possono incidere in modo difforme sulla organizzazione delle pubbliche amministrazioni.

2°) Nomina e movimento di Prefetti:

In alcune Province, come ad esempio in Sicilia, a Cosenza, a Matera e a Reggio Calabria, le Autorità Alleate di occupazione hanno proceduto alla rimozione dei Prefetti in carica sostituendoli con elementi locali o con funzionari di grado non elevato, di scarsa esperienza e capacità amministrativa.

Sarebbe opportuno, in considerazione della importanza della carica e della delicatezza delle mansioni, che le Autorità Alleate sentissero il parere del Ministero dell'Interno prima di adottare, nei territori dalle stesse controllati, provvedimenti di nomina, revoca e trasferimento di Prefetti. Si rappresenta con l'occasione la opportunità di procedere, d'intesa con le Autorità Alleate, alla revisione delle nomine già effettuate.

3°) Nomine, promozioni e licenziamenti di personale:

Le Autorità Alleate hanno parimenti disposto, nei territori da esse controllati, nomine e cariche pubbliche e promozioni nelle carriere amministrative e licenziamenti senza tener conto dell'ordinamento amministrativo italiano.

Le Autorità italiane si trovano ora, perciò, in grande imbarazzo per la regolarizzazione di tali provvedimenti i quali, tra l'altro, alterano le graduatorie e i ruoli del personale e ledono gli interessi di molte categorie di impiegati.

Sembra al riguardo opportuno che:

- le Autorità Alleate richiedano sempre il personale occorrente nei territori da esse controllati ai competenti Ministeri i quali potrebbero avere esuberanza di personale;
- che in caso di necessità venga assunto solamente personale avventizio o straordinario e sempre col grado iniziale;
- che le Autorità Alleate si astengano dal conferire promozioni al personale statale e delle pubbliche amministrazioni, limitandosi a conferire, in casi particolarissimi, l'incarico del grado immediatamente superiore a quello rivestito dal detto personale;
- che le dette Autorità chiedano almeno il parere dei Ministeri interessati prima di adottare qualunque provvedimento concernente il personale.

4°) Trattamento economico del personale:

Il personale in servizio nei territori direttamente amministrati dall'A.M.G. riceve spesso un trattamento economico molto diverso da quello amministrato dal Governo italiano.

Le masse impiegate finiscono perciò col reclamare in tutto il territorio il trattamento più favorevole.

Sarebbe opportuno che il trattamento economico del personale statale venisse concordato con le Autorità Alleate, anche quando si tratta di personale in servizio nei territori ancora amministrati dall'A.M.G.O.T.

5°) Defascistizzazione:

Si è verificato che il personale delle pubbliche amministrazioni è stato sottoposto a un diverso trattamento,

nei riguardi della defascistizzazione, a seconda che si trovava a prestare servizio nei territori direttamente controllati dalle Autorità Alleate o in quelli amministrati dal R. Governo.

Per ovviare a tale inconveniente, in materia tanto importante, è necessario di stabilire d'intesa con le Autorità Alleate delle direttive uniformi.

6°) Utilizzazione del personale:

I Comandi militari alleati non permettono al personale specializzato postelegrafonico di avvicinarsi, nelle zone di operazioni, alle linee, alla palificazione e agli impianti.

Ne deriva che il personale rimane inutilizzato e molte linee e centrali telefoniche, come quelle di Campobasso e di Foggia, restano inservibili.

Non dovrebbe riuscire difficile impiegare, anche in zona di operazioni, tale personale con tutto vantaggio per le comunicazioni, la cui importanza bellica è superfluo sottolineare.

7°) Locali per gli Uffici pubblici:

Il Governo Italiano deve far fronte in Salerno a una richiesta sempre maggiore di locali da parte delle pubbliche amministrazioni, in relazione alle aumentate esigenze dei servizi.

Si sottopone alla considerazione della Commissione Alleata di Controllo l'opportunità di sospendere l'invio in Salerno di altri Comandi, uffici o contingenti di truppe alleate e di esaminare, anzi, la possibilità di trasferire altrove qualche comando od ufficio attualmente dislocato in detta località in modo da permettere al Governo Italiano di poter disporre di un maggior numero di ambienti.

Si sottopone anche all'esame della Commissione l'opportunità di restituire al Governo Italiano i palazzi delle Prefetture, affinché i Prefetti e le altre maggiori autorità governative possano assicurare l'espletamento dei pubblici servizi, nei capoluoghi di provincia, con il necessario decoro.

Occorre inoltre evitare che le truppe alleate prendano possesso di locali adibiti a servizi pubblici e nei quali si trovino macchinari, impianti, valori, come gli

Uffici ferroviari e gli edifici postelegrafonici e che tali locali vengono usati per accantonamento di truppe. Vale fatto ha provocato in parecchie località (Taranto), Napoli, Palermo, Foggia) gravi disservizi, danni, spese irreparabili, agli impianti, e perdite di valori.

8°) Posta ufficiale:

Si lamentano considerevoli ritardi nel servizio postale e telegrafico. Tale disservizio riesce di grave pregiudizio specie alla pubblica amministrazione.

La causa sembra risalire alla lentezza delle operazioni di censura alla quale la corrispondenza ufficiale italiana è in qualche provincia ancora sottoposta, nonostante gli accordi intercorsi il 27 dicembre 1943.

Si propone che la posta ufficiale venga presentata, ove occorre, all'ufficio censura in un sacco a parte perché sia esaminata e restituita all'ufficio postale nella stessa giornata.

9°) Servizi scolastici:

a) Unità di indirizzo: Opportuni accordi si rendono necessari per assicurare unità di indirizzo nello svolgimento dei servizi scolastici, specie per quanto riguarda gli onari, il calendario scolastico, i libri di testo, i programmi e gli esami.

b) Assistenza scolastica: Analoghe intese sarebbero desiderabili per assicurare l'assistenza scolastica sotto forma di refezioni calde, distribuzione di indumenti, ecc. agli scolari non abbienti.

10°) Carte per la pubblica amministrazione:

Le Autorità Alleate hanno richiesto tutta la carta esistente nella cartiera di Foggia (circa 18.000 q.li).

E' urgente la consegna dei quantitativi già assegnati alle amministrazioni statali.

La questione interessa tutte le amministrazioni, ma è particolarmente pressante per l'amministrazione finanziaria che deve provvedere alla compilazione dei moduli necessari per la riscossione dei tributi e per l'amministrazione Ferroviaria che incontra difficoltà per

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RIPRESA INDUSTRIALE

1°)

Derequisizione degli stabilimenti industriali:
L'occupazione militare alleata degli stabilimenti industriali impedisce di fatto la ripresa del lavoro. Sarebbe auspicabile la derequisizione degli stabilimenti industriali i cui proprietari intendano riprendere la lavorazione o almeno uno sgombero parziale dei locali.

Il problema si presenta particolarmente urgente per quelle fabbriche e quegli stabilimenti che lavoravano per le ferrovie le quali hanno assoluta necessità di ripristinare le linee e gli impianti fissi, di riparsare il materiale rotabile e rimettere in efficienza il parco ferroviario in gran parte distrutto od in via di rapido deterioramento.

La stessa urgenza viene avvertita per gli stabilimenti e i cantieri navali.

Dovrebbe essere sempre permesso, in ogni caso, ai capi delle aziende di accedere nei locali degli uffici e ritirare eventuali documenti necessari per la definizione di pratiche legali o fiscali.

2°)

Potenziamento delle industrie che lavorano per la R. Marina:

La R. Marina ha particolare interesse al sollecito ripristino di alcuni impianti industriali e al miglioramento delle possibilità di lavoro dei propri stabilimenti. Nella situazione attuale non è assolutamente possibile provvedere alle normali esigenze di manutenzione della flotta. Ne consegue che va sempre aumentando il numero delle navi da guerra ferme in attesa di entrare in turno di lavoro.

Sarebbe pertanto indispensabile che l'arsenale di Taranto, il Cantiere Fosi della stessa città e le officine di Brindisi lavorassero con almeno metà del personale per le riparazioni delle navi da guerra italiane, mentre alle difficoltà derivanti dalla deficienza di attrezzature e di materiali si potrebbe provvedere riattivando e derequisendo gli stabilimenti e gli impianti

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Si deve fare, a questo proposito, presente che la R. Marina potrebbe concorrere ancora più di quanto non faccia ora alla lotta comune se avesse soltanto modo di

impedire il deterioramento dei macchinari e degli impianti o meglio ancora se le fosse data la possibilità di rimettere in efficienza le sue attrezzature portuali, i bacini di carenaggio, i ragazzini di deposito, le caserme, gli ospedali, tutti campi nei quali gli Alleati chiedono sempre nuove prestazioni.

Occorrerebbe recuperare a tale scopo tutte le unità affondate, ultimare il grande bacino di carenaggio di Taranto, rimettere in efficienza le fabbriche di calce, cementi e laterizi, istituire centri di raccolta di rottami metallici, permettere, con la fornitura di combustibile ed energia necessaria, la produzione di manufatti metallici, importando anche, allo scopo, se necessario, il macchinario strettamente necessario, fornire i mezzi occorrenti per trasportare legname dalla Calabria, incrementare la produzione delle materie bituminose e agevolare in ogni modo il trasferimento dei materiali e dei manufatti da una regione all'altra.

Vi sono attualmente, per esempio, alcune migliaia di marinai che non è possibile impiegare per mancanza di abiti e soprattutto di scarpe e la situazione si va aggravando giorno per giorno.

Per tale motivo si è dovuto sospendere il normale reclutamento e, in conseguenza, anche il normale avvicendamento del personale.

È naturale che tale stato di cose influisca sul rendimento che la R. Marina può dare nella lotta contro il comune nemico.

Per fronteggiare tali impellenti necessità si rende indispensabile:

- derequisire e rimettere al più presto in efficienza gli stabilimenti delle manifatture Cotoniere Meridionali di Napoli che col soddisfare a tutto il fabbisogno della Regia Marina potrebbero dar lavoro a circa 3.000 operai;

- impiantare a Taranto un calzaturificio della R. Marina importando il poco macchinario occorrente.

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3°) Assegnazioni di carbone e altre materie prime per l'industria:

Molti stabilimenti metallurgici e officine meccaniche potrebbero riprendere il lavoro se potessero contare sulle necessarie forniture di carbone, materiali metallici e legname.

466%

La ripresa di tale lavoro è molto importante, specie per gli impianti ferroviari, la riparazione delle linee e del materiale rotabile, le costruzioni e le riparazioni navali.

Con l'assegnazione mensile di circa 17.000 tonn. di carbone si potrebbe contare, per esempio, su una produzione mensile di 52.000 tonn. di cemento, 23.000 tonn. di calce e 120.000 mq. di lastre di vetro.

4°) Distruzione di opere, attrezzature ed impianti:
Tali distruzioni dovrebbero effettuarsi solo in caso di assoluta necessità e, in ogni caso, d'intesa con le Autorità Italiane.

5°) Requisizione di macchinari, materie prime, di prodotti finiti e semilavorati:
Si dovrebbe evitare la requisizione di macchinari o la loro asportazione dagli stabilimenti al fine di permettere la ripresa industriale che ridurrebbe, ovviamente, le importazioni e i conseguenti trasporti marittimi dall'America e dall'Inghilterra.

Le materie prime e i prodotti finiti e semilavorati requisiti negli stabilimenti vengono spesso impiegati in modo antieconomico, si deteriorano e vanno spesso distrutti senza utilità alcuna, mentre le poche industrie dell'Italia liberata hanno bisogno di tutto. E', per esempio, indispensabile mettere a disposizione del Ministero della Guerra le materie prime, i materiali e i macchinari attualmente giacenti inutilizzati in vari stabilimenti di artiglieria adibiti ad accantonamento di truppe Alleate.

In tema di requisizioni, le Autorità Alleate si sono spesso rifiutate di rilasciare dichiarazioni scritte attendenti le avvenute requisizioni e qualche volta hanno mostrato anche risentimento di fronte alle richieste degli interessati.

Tali attestati sono invece necessari ai cittadini italiani per poter richiedere ogni eventuale indennizzo allo Stato.

Le Autorità Alleate dovrebbero rilasciare tali attestazioni senza difficoltà.

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6°) Blocco delle merci e dei prezzi:

Il blocco da parte delle Autorità Alleate di quasi tutte le merci disponibili rende impossibile gli scambi e i consumi, presupposti indispensabili per la ripresa economica e per la migliore utilizzazione delle risorse esistenti con la conseguente diminuzione di importazioni dell'oltremare.

Il blocco delle merci impedisce poi l'adeguamento dei prezzi alla mutata situazione monetaria.

Sarebbe auspicabile una maggiore libertà d'azione per il Governo italiano.

7°) Istituti di istruzione tecnico-professionale:

Gran parte dei locali, del materiale didattico e delle attrezzature degli Istituti di istruzione tecnica e professionale, così strettamente connessi con la ripresa industriale del paese, sono andati perduti a motivo di eventi bellici o di requisizioni.

Si rende indispensabile procedere alla derequisizione degli edifici e alla ricostruzione delle dotazioni scientifiche.

TRASPORTI E COMUNICAZIONI

1°) Trasporti per ferrovia e per via ordinaria:

La situazione dei trasporti è gravissima in tutta l'Italia peninsulare e insulare. I mezzi di comunicazione sia per ferrovia che per via ordinaria sono assolutamente insufficienti ai bisogni delle popolazioni.

Tale deficienza impedisce ogni ripresa economica.

Il sistema vigente di controlli e autorizzazioni che fa capo al Comitato alleato di Napoli si è dimostrato in pratica così lungo e così laborioso, anche a motivo delle lamentate deficienze nel servizio postale, telegrafico e telefonico, che ha finito col paralizzare qualsiasi specie di traffico.

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Si ritiene indispensabile e urgente adottare i seguenti provvedimenti:
- restituire all'Amministrazione ferroviaria italiana l'esercizio di tutta la rete dell'Italia liberata a sud della linea (compresa) Foggia - Benevento - Caserta - Napoli,

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affidando all'amministrazione italiana il compito e la responsabilità di soddisfare alle richieste delle Autorità militari alleate:

- assicurare due coppie di treni viaggiatori e due coppie di treni merci sulle linee principali;
- assicurare una coppia di treni viaggiatori e una coppia di treni merci sulle linee secondarie;
- assicurare la continuità del servizio.

2°) Comunicazioni con la Sardegna e la Sicilia:

I rapporti tra la penisola e la Sardegna non permettono di procrastinare ancora l'istituzione di un regolare servizio di trasporti marittimi ed aerei fra l'isola e il continente.

Potrebbe per ora essere sufficiente un servizio aereo giornaliero e un servizio marittimo bisettimanale.

Eguale necessità si avverte per le comunicazioni con la Sicilia.

Occorrerebbe disporre in tutto di almeno quattro unità di medio tonnellaggio che potrebbero approdare nei porti minori delle due Isole e del continente, senza disturbare il traffico degli Alleati nei grandi porti.

3°) Vagoni ferroviari per il trasporto del sale e di altri generi di monopolio:

La scarsità di sale sul mercato provoca grande malcontento fra le popolazioni e in qualche località si sono verificate anche agitazioni popolari.

A Margherita di Savoia, presso Barletta, vi è una disponibilità di 150.000 tonn. di sale, largamente sufficiente al fabbisogno delle popolazioni meridionali, ma mancano i mezzi di trasporto.

Per poter provvedere alla distribuzione di tale importo tantissimo alimento e degli altri generi di monopolio occorrerebbe assegnare al Ministero delle Finanze i vagoni ferroviari che vengono richiesti ogni decade o almeno un paio di mercantili di piccolo tonnellaggio, della capacità di tonnellate di carichi.

- assicurare la continuità del servizio.

2°) Comunicazioni con la Sardegna e la Sicilia:
I rapporti tra la penisola e la Sardegna non permettono di procrastinare ancora l'istituzione di un regolare servizio di trasporti marittimi ed aerei fra l'isola e il continente.
Potrebbe per ora essere sufficiente un servizio aereo giornaliero e un servizio marittimo bisettimanale.
Eguale necessità si avverte per le comunicazioni con la Sicilia.
Occorrerebbe disporre in tutto di almeno quattro unità di medio tonnellaggio che potrebbero approdare nei porti minori delle due Isole e del continente, senza disturbare il traffico degli Alleati nei grandi porti.

3°) Vagoni ferroviari per il trasporto del sale e di altri generi di monopolio:
La scarsità di sale sul mercato provoca grande malcontento fra le popolazioni e in qualche località si sono verificate anche agitazioni popolari.
A Margherita di Savoia, presso Barletta, vi è una disponibilità di 150.000 tonn. di sale, largamente sufficiente al fabbisogno delle popolazioni meridionali, ma mancano i mezzi di trasporto.
Per poter provvedere alla distribuzione di tale importo per il trasporto di sale e degli altri generi di monopolio occorrerebbe assegnare al Ministero delle Finanze i vagoni ferroviari che vengono richiesti ogni decade o almeno un paio di mercantili di piccolo tonnellaggio, della capacità di non più di un migliaio di tonnellate di carico utile.

4°) Carri ferroviari e automezzi per i servizi di Commissariato Militare:
È indispensabile, per il funzionamento degli impianti di servizio del Commissariato Militare, una maggiore disponibilità di carri ferroviari e automezzi.

5°) Automezzi per il vettovagliamento della popolazione civile:
L'importantissimo servizio degli approvvigionamenti è fortemente ostacolato in tutte le provincie dalla grande scarsità di automezzi.

Si rende indispensabile, pertanto, l'assegnazione di un congruo numero di automezzi per provvedere ai bisogni alimentari della popolazione.

6°) Automezzi per la percezione delle imposte:
Sarebbero necessarie per l'importantissimo servizio delle ispezioni agli uffici provinciali delle imposte almeno due autovetture per ogni provincia.
Essendo le requisizioni ormai praticamente impossibili occorrerebbe che gli alleati fornissero almeno le gomme e le ruote per poter requisire le macchine ferme per mancanza di tali parti di ricambio.

7°) Parti di ricambio di automezzi:
Tale deficienza di parti di ricambio è fortemente sentita specialmente per i trasporti militari, che, in mancanza di provvedimenti adeguati, potrebbero essere in breve tempo addirittura paralizzati.
Sarebbe quindi necessario che gli Alleati provvedessero al rifornimento delle gomme e delle parti di ricambio per la riparazione e il funzionamento degli automezzi, le cui fabbriche di produzione sono tutte, come è noto, nell'Italia occupata dal nemico.

Si potrebbero anche istituire centri di raccolta degli automezzi non efficienti, compresi quelli di proprietà privata da requisire, e apposite officine di riparazione per la rimessa in efficienza di tali automezzi utilizzando parte di essi per trarne pezzi di ricambio. In considerazione della disponibilità molto scarsa di automezzi, sarebbe inoltre necessario contenere le requisizioni nei più bassi limiti possibili.

8°) Trasporto della lignite:
Nella miniera di Mercure (Castelluccio Inferiore) vi sono 10.000 tonn. di lignite essiccata che sarebbe mol-

6°) Automezzi per la percezione delle imposte:

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Occorrono carri ferroviari e l'assegnazione di un autocarro al giorno per ogni carro ferroviario messo a disposizione per trasportare la lignite da Castelluccio al capolinea ferroviario di La Onegro (Km.40).

9°) Trasporto polvere di asfalto dalla Sicilia:
Riuscirebbe molto utile, per la riparazione e la sistemazione delle strade di grande comunicazione, anche ai fini militari, poter trasportare la polvere di asfalto da Siracusa a Bari, Salerno e Napoli.

10°) Requisizione autovetture:
Per far fronte alle aumentate necessità di automezzi da parte del Governo italiano, si chiede che la Autorità Alleate consentano la requisizione anche di quelle autovetture per le quali esse hanno rilasciato permessi di libera circolazione, fino al 30 aprile 1944.

11°) Naviglio di piccolo tonnellaggio:
Le grandi difficoltà che il Governo Italiano, i privati e gli stessi alleati, incontrano nei trasporti per ferrovia e per via ordinaria potrebbero essere notevolmente ridotte lasciando a disposizione del Governo italiano tutti i motovelieri di capacità inferiore alle 100 tonn. per il traffico interregionale dei prodotti più necessari al consumo e all'industria: olio, vino, legna da ardere, carbone dolce, agrumi, formaggio, pelli, ecc. Si potrebbe anche completare la costruzione di 64 motobarche e piccole motonavi, attualmente in cantiere, per una stazza lorda complessiva di 10.000 tonn. Occorrerebbe a tale scopo l'assegnazione di 1200 tonn. di lamiera, 3000 mc. di legname di quercia, 6000 mc. di legname di pino oltre a chiodi, stoppa, cordame, catene e ai motori sulle consegna dei quali, già ordinati alle ditte fornitrici, non è possibile fare per il momento alcun affidamento.

12°) Comunicazioni telegrafiche e telefoniche:
I mezzi disponibili non sono impiegati nel modo più razionale al fine di ritrarne il maggiore rendimento possibile.
I cavi Palermo-Napoli e Palermo-Cagliari sono ancora, per esempio, utilizzati dai Comandi alleati con un semplice circuito Morse.

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L'Amministrazione italiana potrebbe utilizzare tali circuiti, come ha sempre fatto col suo personale addestrato e col suo macchinario, e quattro canali (con quadrupla Daudot), dando agli alleati la possibilità di raddoppiare le loro comunicazioni e al Governo italiano 460 possibilità di usufruire di due circuiti indipendenti.

13°) Provvedimenti di carattere finanziario:

Sarebbe desiderabile che le Autorità Alleate non prendessero alcun provvedimento nei riguardi delle Società di navigazione e armatrici sovvenzionate dallo Stato e della FINVARE, che è un sottogruppo dell'IRI, senza preventivi accordi col Ministero della Marina.

AGRICOLTURA E PESCA

1°) Patate da semina:

Si è riscontrato, nonostante le contrarie assicurazioni in proposito da parte delle Autorità Alleate, che le patate da semina inviate in Italia erano affette da cancrena umida.

Nelle semine effettuate in Sicilia è risultato che in molti appezzamenti la percentuale dei frammenti di patate marcite e non germinate a causa della indicata malattia raggiunge la percentuale del 95-98%.

Al grave danno economico attuale si aggiunge quello futuro, ancora maggiore, per non poter poi per anni adibire a coltura di patate il terreno infettato dai germi della malattia.

È necessario richiedere alla Commissione Alleata di Controllo che le patate da semina, da inviare in Italia, siano sottoposte in partenza a rigoroso controllo fitopatologico garantito, come stabilito in passato da appositi accordi internazionali, da regolari certificati di immunità rilasciati dalle autorità competenti.

2°) Ripresa dell'attività peschereccia:

La ripresa dell'attività peschereccia, così utile in questo momento per le scarse disponibilità alimentari, è ostacolata dal fatto che le Autorità Alleate richiedono un doppio ordine di autorizzazione: una rilasciata dal Naval Office per ottenere l'ingresso nel porto e l'ormeggio del natante, l'altra dalla Autorità Alleata locale autorizzante l'esercizio della pesca.

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Per rendere più agevole l'esercizio della pesca, sarebbe necessario che fosse abolita la seconda autorizzazione, essendo le licenze di pesca già rilasciate dalle Autorità di Porto.

Si potrebbe anche consentire, ove non costituisca pregiudizio per le operazioni militari, la pesca notturna con fonte luminosa subacquea lungo le coste dell'Italia me-

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ridionale e delle grandi isole (Sardegna e Sicilia) che è più redditizia, e impiegherebbe un buon numero di marittimi.

Occorrerebbe all'uopo che gli Alleati rilasciassero i motopescherecci da essi noleggiati per altri scopi.

ASSISTENZA AI PROFUGHI DI GUERRA

Per assicurare una efficace assistenza alle popolazioni più direttamente colpite dalla guerra, si reputano indispensabili i seguenti provvedimenti:

- limitare al minimo possibile gli sgomberi forzati dalle immediate retrovie del fronte;
- assicurare ai profughi un adeguato trattamento alimentare;
- disporre la carenquizzazione di tutti i locali pubblici e privati non più necessari alle forze alleate;
- mettere a disposizione delle Autorità locali i mezzi occorrenti per il trasporto dei profughi e delle loro masserizie, nella maggiore quantità possibile;
- mettere a disposizione delle Autorità locali indumenti e medicinali.

CONTROLLO NELLA STAMPA:

1°) Stampa periodica:

Si deplora una eccessiva fioritura, anche clandestina, di pubblicazioni periodiche di ogni specie e colore, senza programma ben definito, a iniziativa di elementi faziosi, più o meno irresponsabili.

Per porre un freno al dilagare di tali fogli e foglietti, il cui solo risultato è quello di disorientare sempre più l'opinione pubblica, sembrerebbe opportuno di limitare la pubblicazione dei periodici a non più di un giornale per ogni partito politico in

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Correlativamente dovrebbero essere stabilite sanzioni a carico dei trasgressori.

2°)

Censura militare alleata sulla stampa:

La censura militare alleata sulla stampa è fatta a volte con criteri troppo restrittivi.

Il censore alleato volle, per esempio, che fosse eliminata in un articolo del Giornale dell'Aviatore, n. 10, la frase: "agli ordini del Re", col pretesto che le Autorità alleate non intendono interferire nella situazione interna italiana.

Fatti del genere incidono sulle tradizioni militari cui il giornale obbedisce, sono causa di disorientamento per la truppa alla quale il giornale è rivolto, e si risolvono in un danno per gli sforzi che si fanno per raccogliere tutte le energie al fine di assicurare una più efficace collaborazione agli alleati.

Sarebbe desiderabile che la censura militare venisse esercitata con maggiore comprensione.

PATRIMONIO ARTISTICO

Particolarmente gravi sono le devastazioni che il patrimonio artistico italiano, patrimonio invero di tutte le Nazioni civili, ha subito a causa della guerra.

E' necessario mettere subito in opera tutte le provvidenze possibili per assicurare la conservazione delle opere d'arte, dei monumenti ancora esistenti, del materiale bibliografico e per riparare e ricostruire le gallerie, i musei, gli istituti d'arte.

Sarebbero opportune al riguardo comuni intese per la azione da svolgere sia nel territorio amministrato dal Governo italiano che in quello ancora controllato dagli Alleati.

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TEATRI E CINEMATOGRAFI

Molti teatri e cinematografi sono stati requisiti dalle forze alleate che li gestiscono in proprio con grave danno economico di molte categorie di personale direttivo, amministrativo e artistico che vivevano intorno al teatro e alle sale di proiezione.

Sembra opportuno permettere ai proprietari e direttori di teatri e cinematografi di riprendere la loro gestione, obbligandoli magari a un certo numero di rappresentazioni gratuite per le forze alleate, ma permettendo ad essi di lavorare anche nelle ore diurne.

COMUNICATI RADIO

Non sempre i comunicati del Governo Italiano vengo trasmessi dalle stazioni radio. Sarebbero opportuni accordi al riguardo intesi anche a limitare al minimo indispensabile il controllo alleato sui programmi radiofonici.

ALBERGHI

La requisizione degli alberghi assume sempre più vaste proporzioni.

Sarebbe auspicabile limitare tali requisizioni ai casi strettamente indispensabili, utilizzando, possibilmente, durante la requisizione, il personale già impiegato nell'esercizio.

RAPPORTI CULTURALI CON LE NAZIONI UNITE

La politica fascista ha fatto sì che notevoli espressioni del pensiero politico anglo-americano e pregevoli scritti di autori italiani rimanessero del tutto sconosciuti al pubblico italiano.

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A tale riguardo sembra oltremodo auspicabile istituire di un Sodalizio culturale italo-anglo-americano con lo scopo di promuovere una più intima intesa spirituale e una più stretta collaborazione fra l'Italia e le Nazioni alleate.

Particolari accordi potrebbero intervenire con la Psychological Warfare Branch dell'Angli al fine di stabilire i mezzi necessari alla concreta attuazione dell'iniziativa.

Salerno, 6 aprile 1944

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