

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

ACC - Italy

10000/105/144

63 pp.

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I/19.2/CA-Release - American Officers
September 1945 - February 1946

6388

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Education Subcommittee
AFO 394

ED/CWW/ams

ED/1C/1.O/AC

9 October, 1945

SUBJECT : Retaining of Essential
American Officers.

-9 OCT. 1945

TO : CA Section.

1. 1st Lt. John P. SIMONI, Chief Education Officer in Venezia Giulia, is essential and indispensable.
2. There is no suitable officer replacement available.

Carleton W. Washburne
CARLETON W. WASHBURNE
Lt. Col., A. U. S.
Director of Education.

Ex. Of. (A)

Refce 1A. With the exception of the advice the return from Civil Affairs and its Subcommittee is NIL.

You will note that 1A does not give very fully the information requested in 33 of 1A. If it is not sufficient will you please communicate direct with the Director of Education (X-502)

CA-S
1000.1945
X-608.

minutes

Washburne

now Class A

3/12

CMF 10/22/45

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4692

Civil Affairs Section

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 512

/ff

AG 210.1/046 4-0

14 FEB 1946
12 February 1946

SUBJECT: Officers Appointed Under Public Law 281

TO : All Concerned

The following War Department cable is quoted for the information of all concerned:

"1. The following policies for Officers appointed under Pub Law 281-79th Congress, 28 December 45, are announced:

(A) An Officer so appointed will be assumed to have for retirement eligibility purposes, under the 15-29 year and the 30 year laws, at least the same length(?) of continuous Regular commissioned service as any Officer junior to him on the promotion list. All Officers applying for commission will be informed that retirement under the 15-29 year law is at the discretion of the Secretary of War and under the 30 year law the discretion of the President.

(B) Pay will be as provided under the present Pay Act for Officers in the Grade to which appointed.

2. The following policies for processing applicants under law referred to in paragraph 1 above are announced:

(A) NO waiver may be made in the Age and Grade requirements as outlined in paragraph 4, Cir 392, 14, 1945, either with or without the consent of Officer concerned. NO Officer will be appointed in a Grade higher than that which he held in war time.

(B) The Gen Survey Test is an elimination device only and is NOT scored for selective purposes.

(C) All applicants must appear before an examining board prior to 20 April 1946 regardless of extenuating circumstances.

(D) Grade received under the provisions of Cir 10 10 1946 will be considered as Grade held in war time."

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:



Edmund R. Shugart
EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"2"

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T	Init	Date
VP CA Sec	<i>PK</i>	
Public Safety	<i>Conley</i>	
Public Health	<i>Ant</i>	
Legal	<i>200</i>	
Local Govt	<i>1/2/45</i>	
Patriots		
Disper	<i>Sec</i>	
Education	<i>and</i>	
MFA & A	<i>HEB</i>	<i>12/2/45</i>
Ca Sec		

PLEASE PASS QUICKLY

HEADQUARTERS

WESTERN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES ARMY

AGO 512

Carl P. ...
PJS/jh



NO 370.01/030 C/S-0

25 January 1946

SUBJECT: Statement by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

TO: All Concerned.

1. Inclosed is complete text of General Eisenhower's address to members of Congress on 15 January 1946.

2. a. To facilitate reproduction of the charts it has been necessary to change the color scheme. The charts are self explanatory.

b. On the chart showing "Strength of the Army" the bar on the left of each group of three (3) shows strength as of 1 September 1945, center bar shows strength as of 1 January 1946 and bar on the right shows strength as of 1 July 1946. These bars are referred to in "Explanation of Charts" as green, black and red respectively.

3. It is desired that the complete text be given the widest possible dissemination among troops.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:

1 Incl:

As stated above

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Edmund R. ...
EDMUND R. ...
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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dissemination among troops.


BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:

Edmund R. Stewart

EDMUND R. STEWART
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

1 Incl:
As stated above

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STATEMENT BY
GENERAL OF THE ARMY FIGHT D. EISENHOWER
CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES ON DEBILITATION
MADE TO THE SENATE OF CONGRESS
IN THE AUDITORIUM, U. S. ARMY OF CONGRESS
10:00 A.M., 30, TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1946.

INTRODUCTION

I have come here this morning because a very human desire to get soldiers home in a hurry has clashed with the Army's manpower needs to do the job which has been assigned to us by the Government. It is a big job. Even with the fighting over it takes a great many men to carry out our mission. Overseen requirements in manpower for the long-term occupation job and for the temporary, but still unfinished, business of winding up the affairs of our great war establishment in both Europe and the Pacific are matters of cold, hard fact. They cannot be obscured by emotion and near hysteria. Evidently, the relation of demobilization to these tasks which remain to be done is understood only partially by some and not understood at all by others. I believe the thing needed now is the fullest clarification.

There is no mystery in demobilization. There are no hidden ball plays. Long before our victory in Europe General Marshall approved a master plan which has served as the basis of establishing a priority of men for discharge. In our job as far as this one there are bound to be modifications and in the light of experience. But I assure you that I have made and intend to make no changes in the basic plan. The plan was simply this: to discharge men as quickly as possible and to the limit of available carrying with priority on those with the longest and hardest service - that is, with the most points. These priorities were to govern until we reached the point where minimum personnel requirements to do the jobs in hand were threatened by the rate of discharge. We have been in the business of discharging veterans from the Army under the point system for eight months, with the system at full blast for the past four months since V-J Day. You have been directed so fast that the five millions passed through one of the separation centers last week.

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carry out our mission. Overseas requirements in manpower for the long-term occupation job and for the temporary, but still unfinished, business of winding up the affairs of our great war establishment in both Europe and the Pacific are matters of cold, hard fact. They cannot be obscured by emotion and near hysteria. Evidently, the situation of demobilization to these tasks which remain to be done is understood only partially by some and not understood at all by others. I believe the thing needed now is the fullest clarification.

There is no mystery in the explanation. There are no hidden ball plays. Long before our victory in Europe General Marshall approved a master plan which has served and still serves as the basis of establishing priorities of men for discharge. In any job as big as this one there are bound to be modifications here and there in the light of experience. But I assure you that I have made and intend to make no changes in the basic plan. The plan was simple: those to discharge men as quickly as possible and to the limit of available skill and with priority on those with the longest and hardest service - that is, with the most points. These criteria were to govern until we reached the point where minimum national requirements to do the jobs in hand were threatened by the rate of discharge. We have been in the business of discharging veterans from the Army under the point system for eight months, with the system at full blast for the past four months since V-J Day. Men have been discharged so fast that the five million men passed through one of the Super Colon camps in last week.

We used shipping to the point and secured the complete cooperation of the Navy in our deal to get every man and woman back from overseas who could be cleared. There is no longer any shortage of troops or, and the winning people assure me they will have vessels where and when we need them to bring troops home. The fact is that we worked so fast that about ten days ago we had to slow the pace so that the work of our forces in Europe and the Pacific would not suffer too much from lack of manpower. The announcement of that slowdown was what touched off the fireworks.

If there has been any confusion in the minds of the soldiers overseas or their families at home, I propose to clear it up now.

CAUSES OF CONFUSION

Primarily, two underlying causes are responsible for the present confusion, which for a time has quite evidently exceeded the power of any mobilization program to control. The first is that the nation's release from the urgency of war started an emotional wave to get men out of the army. This is wholly understandable. It was to be expected. But I am frank to say that I had never anticipated this emotional wave would reach proportions of mass hysteria. I am confident that members of the Congress are as anxious as I that straight thinking be substituted for emotion in this matter which strikes close to the firesides of several million families. The second cause of our present discontent rises, I believe, from the almost incredible speed with which the War Department moved in bringing men home from V-J Day to the close of the year. Including discharged men and women who were already in this country, more than 5,000,000 members of our V-E Day Army, 83 percent of them veterans of foreign service, have now returned to civilian life. While the vast majority of the combat men are home, there still remain some who have not been returned. These men are our greatest concern, and every effort will be made to return them as soon as possible.

All sorts of emergency measures were devised by the War Department to step up the speed of its demobilization processes. Performance has far exceeded the most optimistic schedules announced by our planners at the time Japan surrendered.

WAR DEPARTMENT ESTIMATES AND PERFORMANCE

Between the close of hostilities in Germany and the collapse of Japan, we had discharged just under 600,000. When General Marshall addressed a joint meeting of the Congress last September he told you that estimates then called for the release in September of 450,000; in October of 550,000, and during one month thereafter of between 700,000 and 800,000. (See charts: "Cumulative Returns to Civilian Life" and "Progress of Demobilization".)

But compare performance with prediction! In September, instead of 450,000, the number actually released was 597,000; in October, we more than doubled our estimate, releasing 1,270,000 instead of the 550,000 predicted. In November, instead of between 700,000 and 800,000 we discharged 2,150,000; in December, the number was 1,112,000. So that, with the estimates for these months fixed at about 2,500,000, we actually exceeded our prediction by 1,665,000. This means that 1,665,000 men and women who had no expectation, in September, of coming home so soon, were already reunited with their families by the close of the year. That is the extent to which the War Department has exceeded any so-called commitment to the men.

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But compare performance with prediction! In September, instead of 450,000, the number actually released was 597,000; in October, we more than doubled our estimate, releasing 1,210,000 instead of the 550,000 predicted. In November, instead of between 700,000 and 800,000 we discharged 1,126,000; in December, the number was 1,112,000. So that, with the estimates for these months fixed at about 2,500,000, we actually exceeded our prediction by 1,605,000. This means that 1,605,000 men and women who had no expectation, in September, of coming home so soon, were already reunited with their families by the close of the year. That is the extent to which the War Department has exceeded any so-called commitment to the men.

The very stepping up of these returning shipments undoubtedly helped to create confusion by stimulating optimism among servicemen and their families. But in addition, during this same period a great many misleading statements were made by individuals, some of whom were in the Army itself, that served to cloud the issue. All this time, which was long before I came to Washington, the War Department was doing a job which I believe must be considered as one of its greatest achievements. Certainly, there has never been such a planned movement of men over great distances in the history of any nation. Yet, in the face of this unprecedented performance, criticisms based largely on individual cases were deliberately confusing matters further. The presence of a high-print red still in service at some one station, because of some special need at that station, came to be interpreted, loudly, as a failure of the entire demobilization program. We must admit that there have been irregularities caused by the immensity of the problem, by the fact that the Army has been spread all over the world, and that we could not have a perfectly uniform application of the

point score system. Discovery of the fact that a man had been released as surplus, with fewer than the official number of points, raised cries of injustice!

While these criticisms were being aired, ships poured the combat veterans of long service into home ports in scheduled-by-the-month numbers. The War Department and overseas commanders made every effort to get as many men home for Christmas with their families as was humanly possible.

THE DEMOBILIZATION

But in this spectacular process of demobilization between V-J Day and the first of the year, the program rapidly approached the foreseen juncture of two incompatibilities: the speed of demobilization and our limited at home and overseas -- the occupation mission delegated to us by higher authority and the protection and disposal of millions of tons of government property throughout the world, representing billions of dollars of American taxpayers' money.

Then General Marshall spoke to you last September, the War Department planners estimated that the point of definite interference between these objectives would be reached some time in the coming Spring. The whole fact is that the speed-up in demobilization during the fall and early winter advanced that situation to the present.

That is the crux of the whole matter

If we were to continue shipping men home at the rate we reached during the past few months, about April we would have nothing left but a possibly inadequate number of volunteers -- we would literally have "run out of Army" (that is the reason for the slowdown). There is no change in policy -- there is no change in plan. I have merely reached a point in the pursuance of our plans and policies which we know we must face when the time comes. That time is now. I look all possible care to meet the occupational needs without slowing the pace of demobilization. In regard to the recruiting campaign to the utmost in order to bring volunteers into the Army who could take the place of those overseas. I urged that positive steps be taken to provide us our full quota of 50,000 men monthly through the Selective Service System. We required all theater commanders overseas to institute the most careful drive to cut down their estimates in manpower needed for occupational duties, for supply and for the extensive personnel required to clear up overseas debts, rents, warehouses, homes. We had also to cooperate with the designated disposal agencies in disposing of government property and unconditionally as possible while still taking all necessary precautions to protect it. Similar instructions were issued to all commands at home.

Pursuant to the instructions both General MacArthur in the Pacific and General Hottel in the Army.

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That is the crux of the whole matter

If we were to continue shipping men home at the rate we reached during the past few months, about April we would have nothing left but a woefully inadequate number of volunteers -- we would literally have "run out of Army". That is the reason for the slowdown. There is no change in policy -- there is no change in plan. The Navy merely reached a point in the pursuance of our plans and policies which we knew we must face when the time came. That time is now. We took all possible steps to meet the emergency needs without slowing the pace of demobilization. We delayed the recruiting campaign to the utmost in order to bring volunteers into the Army who could take the place of those overseas. We urged that civilian steps be taken to provide us our full quotas of 50,000 men monthly through the Selective Service System. We required all theater commanders overseas to institute the most "rocking drive to cut down their ententes in manpower needed for occupation duties, for supply and for the extensive personnel required to clog up evacuation depots, ports, warehouses, bases. We had also to cooperate with the designated disposal agencies in disposing of government property and unconditionally as possible while still taking all necessary precautions to protect it. Similar instructions were issued to all commands in the land.

Pursuant to the instructions both General MacArthur in the Pacific and General McNamara in Europe have made extensive economies. The training of recruits in this country was recently cut from 17 to 13 weeks so that these men would be available sooner for overseas. We have taken every measure we could think of, and by no system of mathematics of arithmetic magic is it possible to make the flow of available replacements equal all the men we would like to bring home now but who must be replaced if we are to do our job.

Now, understand this -- the men who do not need replacement when their jobs are finished will come home immediately. So far as possible they will be in the order of their point scores and length of service. There will be the "earliest" men -- the men "unavailable for discharge." But if we are not to disintegrate our occupation forces certain men must be kept until trained replacements are available of their job finished.

Now, whenever there are individual exceptions to a general rule, bitterness is sure to arise -- especially in the hearts of "overlooked" boys.

I realize that fully and it is absolutely essential that the immediate commanding officer if every man so affected realizes it also. He must personally explain to him how he fits into the big picture and what his duty is.

Surely, where remaining on foreign duty for one, two, or three months longer -- that is the most involved here -- makes the difference between our Army's doing its job for failing to do its job -- I believe I know the American soldier well enough to be certain what he will do -- if he understands the need. He will stick there and do a good job -- and grime!

LAC IN REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

One thing right here on this matter of replacements which I believe is generally misunderstood is why, if we recruit 5,000 men today, we cannot release 5,000 men from the Army tomorrow or next week or next month. The answer is quite simple when you analyze the problem. So far as essential jobs in the theater are concerned, the recruits become available not when they enlist but only when they arrive overseas, trained to take over their assignments. If an 18 year old enlistee or is inducted through Selective Service in this country, he goes off to a camp for three months to learn the rudiments of being a soldier.

If a trained man already in the Army chooses to volunteer for regular enlistment, he is entitled to a furlough in the United States which will make him useless as a replacement until he returns. Any way you work it, there is bound to be a lag of three to six months in this replacement business. It cannot be avoided. The men who enlist or are drafted between now and next July will not be available in time to solve the immediate problem before us, even if there were enough of them. They are the effective replacements for men to be discharged three to six months from now. The lack of replacements facing the Army now is due to the shortage of Selective Service men and the volunteers of the last six months of 1945. Because they did not come in fast enough, we must slow down our discharge rate now.

OUR JOB OVERSEAS

The people at home must understand this too. Acceptance of the need for keeping large numbers of men overseas at the present time line, I believe, is a understanding of all the necessary tasks they must perform. I was a theater commander myself, you will remember, until I was brought back here. I am thoroughly familiar with the problems which General McNamara, the present theater commander, faces in Germany. From my personal knowledge of conditions in Europe, it is easy to project in my mind the comparable -- and in a geographical sense, -- far more difficult problems which General MacArthur faces in the Pacific.

EUROPE

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EUROPE

Perhaps we sometimes speak in too general terms of what our troops are doing in Europe, obscuring the manifold tasks to which men are assigned. We speak of "commitments" and "obligations". Let me translate such words into a picture of their meaning, as an army of occupation goes about the daily task of policing an enemy country and disposing of the prodigious stores assembled to fight the war.

Start with our primary and continuing mission of occupation duties. Troops assigned to this work supervise the German and Austrian Governments. It is a complex job. We are going through the throes of reconversion in this country. No one is more familiar than you gentlemen with the problems and the difficulties encountered even in this peaceful land. Germany and Austria are going through reconversion, too. In our areas in these two unhappy countries the Army is responsible for supervising all the headaches of a changeover from war to peace, with the added directive that we must make certain these people are so disarmed, both economically and in a military

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sense, that they cannot make war again. Reconversion measures in these two countries are enormously complicated by devastation. Normal facilities of living have been destroyed in all the cities and there is scarcity of even the barest essentials in consumer goods which Americans expect to find in any corner store. It requires a great many men to supervise the local governments in our zone in Germany and Austria with a civilian population of over 15,000,000. However much you may delegate local work to Germans you still have the responsibility for policing these people, their industry, trade and commerce, food and agriculture, education, finance, telephones and telegraph and transportation. For details of the men used see chart attached, "Overseas Employment of the Army." The figures represent the total air and ground troops required.

On January 1 there were 622,000 American soldiers assigned to the European Theater. General McNamara estimates that this number will be cut to 400,000 by April 1 and to 300,000 by the first of July. In the Western Theater on January 1 we had 51,000 American troops, a number which will be gradually reduced to 26,000 by July. The sum of the July figures for both European and Mediterranean Theaters -- 335,000 -- is the total number of American troops who will remain stationed in these areas at the end of the first half of 1946.

Let me tell you in some detail what our men are doing Germany and Austria. Demilitarization of Germany, for example, means demolition of her fortifications and other installations including industrial plants selected for destruction under our economic program. Approximately 3,000 enemy military installations will be destroyed under the supervision of American soldiers in Germany.

The total area of our zone is about 60,000 square miles and contains 55 major centers of population and much rural territory. We have turned over the job of maintaining law and order to local police forces, but they have to be supervised and reinforced by a mechanized constabulary force of American soldiers. Two thousand miles of international or internal boundaries must be patrolled. If this is not done effectively thousands of refugees from other sections of Europe infiltrate into our zone adding to our burden of feeding, housing and extending medical care to them, victims of war. Military stores, telephone exchanges, electrical plants, road and railroad bridges and other points which might be targets of enemy sabotage must be guarded.

Then there is the extensive intelligence and counter-intelligence work required to carry out the work of demilitarization and pacification. This includes a constant watch for subversive activities, evaluation and processing of Nazi documents, supervision of civilian censorship and the conduct of counter intelligence which alone is expected to result in the arrest of an overall total of 500,000 persons. Undoubtedly, many prominent Nazis are still at large because of a shortage of trained counter-intelligence personnel.

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I must remind you that we are operating in an enemy country where the most constant surveillance must be maintained over the civilian population to make certain that no elements are allowed to develop organized opposition. In addition to this, serious crime, minor thievery and pilferage are a constant concern of our military police. Post exchanges, railroad trains and supply depots are frequent targets and vehicles are stolen. In most cases, the thieves are quickly taken, but happenings of this sort are so frequent that we can never relax our alertness.

Discipline in this respect has a wider significance than the simple protection of the lives of American soldiers and of Government stores. Our example in maintaining law and order throughout the conquered countries will have the most far-reaching effect in hastening the pacification of

the German people. If, through curtailment of manpower, lawlessness and contempt for the American brand of justice should be permitted to develop, it would not only hurt our progress in Germany but would weaken our prestige throughout Europe. Quickly, our Commanders and forces would be in an impossible position.

In addition to these operations, recruits from this country, who have already been given their basic training as soldiers, must be further trained in occupation duties after arrival. This means that experienced men from the occupation force must be detailed to instruct them -- another drain on the over-all manpower assigned to this work.

These duties have taken no account of the men who must be assigned to the procurement, storage and distribution of supplies. Besides the normal function of supplying the military forces, General McFarney's theater has the responsibility of providing for such agencies as United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Foreign Liquidation Commission. The problem is complicated by the limited amount of rail transportation. Although civilians are employed as much as possible, there are limits to the effectiveness of their use. In order to reduce stealing in a land where goods are very scarce, civilians are usually worked in depot areas where they can be closely supervised. To give you an idea of the economies in military manpower obtained by the use of civilian labor, the Theater Engineer employs 50 per cent German prisoners of war, 20 per cent German civilians and only 21 per cent American soldiers.

The task of providing communications throughout the United States zone was greatly hampered by the damaged and chaotic condition in which the established lines of communication were found when we took over. These facilities must provide not only for the occupational forces but for the minimum needs of the civilian population. Considerable construction of bridges and, to a lesser extent, of highways and waterways is necessary. Civilian labor under military supervision is utilized in construction, but because of the technical nature of the work, our own Signal Corps troops are required to perform maintenance on signal communication facilities. German civilians are operating such ground transport as exists, under our Army's supervision. The system of air transport must be operated entirely by our troops.

DISPOSAL OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

Of considerable importance is the disposal of United States property remaining in the theater, as well as the storage and orderly destruction of captured enemy material. The size of this latter part of the task is indicated by the fact that 100 depots and dumps are in operation for storage of material captured from the enemy. One such depot alone contains over 400,000 tons of ammunition.

At the present time, United States property valued at more than \$1,000,000,000 is being stored, guarded and maintained by troops in the

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At the present time, United States property valued at more than \$7,000,000,000 is being stored, guarded and maintained by troops in the European Theater. A great deal of effort has gone into the roll-up and concentration of this property, but there still remains a vast amount to be done.

Regardless of whether this property is stored for the use of our occupation forces, returned to the United States for current and future needs of the Army, in process of being declared surplus, or already declared surplus but not disposed of by the disposal agencies, the Army has the complete responsibility for care, maintenance, protection, delivery and fiscal accounting for such property. These responsibilities also apply to captured enemy property. All of these vast stores require a large force of men not only to inventory, pack and supervise their disposal but to guard them. This is property belonging to the United States Government,

its care entrusted to the Army. Some of it is machinery or instruments requiring special maintenance for protection from deterioration.

That is a very brief and a very rough summary of the present duties of troops engaged on the strictly military duties incident to occupation. This work now requires the assignment of some 293,000 American troops. General McNamara's estimate is that by next July first, their number may be cut to 171,000, of which 98,000 will be performing the duties of supervising the German Government and population and 73,000 will be performing the direct supply requirements of this force. The figure includes the considerable number who carry on constant occupational negotiations with British, Russian and French members of Allied Control Councils.

SUPERVISION OF ENEMY PERSONNEL

Another of our duties is the guarding, screening, supervision, administration and eventual release of enemy personnel held by United States forces. In addition to persons in this category already in the theater, a large number of enemy prisoners of war are being returned from the United States to Germany. General McNamara estimates that 135,000 will be under detention in the United States zone in May 1946. We are now operating about 150 camps, inclosures and hospitals for various classes of enemy personnel.

The care of displaced persons has been an enormous problem from the time of our entry into Germany. The repatriation of millions of these individuals has already been carried out with sympathy and high regard for the humanitarian nature of the problem involved. Estimates are that some 442,622 displaced persons still remain in our zone in Germany on the first of January and that this number might be cut to 200,000 by June. We are now operating 365 installations for these tragic victims of Nazi brutality. But despite our sympathy for them they do add tremendously to our responsibility for police security, housing, and medical care. In the United States zone in Austria there were on January 1, an additional 150,000 displaced persons housed in 86 camps. Their number is expected to decrease to 109,000 by June 1 with UNRRA and the Austrian Central Government administering many camps.

Numbers of our troops are also engaged in the emergency program of providing supplies in Germany and Austria to minimize starvation, disease, and disorder among the civilian population. In Austria we are also helping to sustain vital economic projects on a minimum scale. Before the winter is over, the distribution of emergency food supplies will undoubtedly become necessary.

At the present time some 50,000 of our men are directly concerned in control and direction of prisoners of war and displaced persons. By July 1, 1946, their number will have been reduced by half - to 25,000.

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Some 111,000 service troops are now assigned to the European Theater, to take care of the needs of the occupation force and troops engaged in winding up our surplus property installations. They include Medical Department personnel, doctors, nurses, technicians, Signal Corps, Ordnance and Engineer troops. These men staff the camps, run the railroads and truck routes, man the hospitals and lines of communications, see that roads are kept repaired, run the Post Exchanges, the Army Postal Service and furnish all the customary services which must be provided to men in the field. Our troops are scattered over a wide area. Lack of the usual civilian facilities, has placed unusual burdens on the service units. These service units must also carry on a limited amount of construction and considerable maintenance work. This includes airfields, landmines, American Red Cross installations for the recreation of the troops, winterized billets, and hospitals. Maintenance is constantly necessary in all the ports. Prisoners of war and local civilian labor are largely used in this work under our military supervision, but the problems are so extensive that thousands of Americans are required for these jobs.

Last in this category I mention the Graves Registration service which involves the location, identification, concentration care and disposition of the remains of our heroic dead. There are still many unlocated graves and bodies to be moved to established military cemeteries. I have 20 United States cemeteries requiring administration of records, supervision of construction, reburials and the general upkeep of graves. According to present plans, the Graves Registration project will be completed by May 1946.

At present, as I have said, some 111,000 troops are assigned to these various service missions. By July 1, 1946, General Lohmeyer expects to have cut this total to 61,000.

There is a final manpower category for the Theater consisting of men temporarily unavailable for duty which the Army calls "ineffectives." For want of a better word. This lumps together individuals who may be charged against the Theater roster but are actually not, for one reason or another, performing any part of its duties. In this category are troops who are being moved in order to be discharged or to replace those troops; men on sick leave, pass and recreation; men in schools, in confinement or in transit to station; men absent from the theater on rest, recuperation and rehabilitation; men on furlough in the United States after re-enlisting in the theater. The total number of these individuals on January 1 was about 163,000. This number will be cut to 50,000 by July 1.

I have gone into this description in some detail because I wanted to show you how ramified are the duties on which our troops must engage to carry out their mission overseas. And I wanted to put some flesh on the bones of those two words "commitments" and "obligations." They are something more than high-sounding generalities. I can assure you that they are very real to the men in Europe and to their commander who is responsible for discharging them.

Within the broad categories I have indicated I believe you may imagine the thousands of daily tasks which must be performed by thousands of men. I know, and you know, that many of them are homesick men. But there is a job to be finished. Although our allies are carrying a heavy load, Americans have assumed the definite commitment and the responsibility of carrying out their own share. To the Army has been delegated the principal job in performing this work. The work can only be done with men. Remember, this is your Army -- not the War Department's Army and not the Generals' Army. It belongs to the country -- to the Congress and the people. It carries out their wishes and their orders.

PACIFIC

Let's turn now to the Pacific where similar heavy responsibilities are being carried out by troops under command of General Curtis. In addition to occupation duties, closing up supply bases, ports, roads, etc., and the disposal of great stores of property assembled for the invasion of Japan, this theater has an additional duty in occupying bases which our troops seized in the island campaigns during the advance toward the home

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PACIFIC

Let's turn now to the Pacific where similar heavy responsibilities are being carried out by troops under command of General MacArthur. In addition to occupation duties, closing up supply bases, ports, rivers, etc., and the disposal of great stores of property assembled for the invasion of Japan, this theater has an additional duty in occupying bases which our troops seized in the island campaigns during the advance toward the home islands. The build-up of supply, concentrated in New Guinea and the Philippines, was well along when the Japs gave up. As a matter of fact, our tonnage of supplies in the Philippines actually increased after the close of hostilities in the Pacific, due to the great number of ships nearing port and our uncertainty at that time of what our needs would be when we landed in Japan. While the majority of these ships are coming from the United States, many others of them carried supplies redeployed from Europe and other inactive theaters to support the invasion of Japan scheduled for November 1945.

General MacArthur has reported 7,000,000 tons of supplies as being on hand January 1 in the Pacific Theater. The duties our troops are performing out there are almost exactly similar to those I have described for the European Theater. Our occupation functions involve most of the islands captured from the Japanese as well as Japan proper. We are in Korea. We are still accepting the surrender of Japanese troops in the Philippines, Iwo Jima and other localities, long after their nation has surrendered.

In Japan, our forces are engaged in the destruction of enemy fortifications as well as in the numerous other tasks growing out of enforcement of the surrender terms. Law and order must be maintained. There is considerable work to be done in the disposal of great quantities of enemy property seized in the home islands, some of which is destroyed, some salvaged, some shipped to the United States and our Allies. The remainder is disposed of according to the most practical use that can be made of it. All this requires the services of a considerable force. The supply system, operating over thousands of miles, is a formidable problem in the Pacific. The Army is exerting every effort to maintain a never-ending flow of fresh foods to all bases and areas where our forces are located, but transport by air, water and land is made difficult by great distances.

I should like to speak in some detail of the care of Government property in the Pacific, because the direct connection between its efficient handling and the availability of constant manpower is so obvious. It takes expert officers, experienced in the handling of supplies -- men qualified to direct the dismantling of a hospital, a power plant, or a laundry, for example. Of course, a great many of such officers are being taken off the job constantly by the operation of the point system.

A great part of the work our men are now doing on many of these small Pacific islands whose conquest made savage headlines for a brief spell two and three years ago, is concerned with the disposition of property. Once these islands were battle grounds, hard-won steps in the progress of our troops through the Southwest Pacific. Then they were forward bases, with perhaps an airstrip from which the dogged Japs on other islands just ahead were bombed. Their development for military use required engineers with bulldozers and other heavy equipment to widen and lengthen the airstrip and clear the jungle for buildings and supply dumps. When islands were big enough, docks were constructed so that ships could come in to unload their cargoes instead of having them brought to the beaches by landing craft and "dolphins." Such islands became the springboards for further progress--overwater hops to other islands, which left many as rear supply areas in the backwash of war.

Then the war finally ended, and all need for these bases ceased. The business of "disposing" even these bits of temporary American soil began. Our troops commenced to "roll them up," in the phrase the soldiers use.

This process of rolling up our bases occupies the time of a great many soldiers in the Pacific. These islands have been piled high with American goods, brought in to push our soldiers along the way to Tokyo. This is Government property, and now these things which the Army no longer needs must be disposed of through the proper disposal agency. They must be inventoried, inspected, packed and guarded until the Army's responsibility is discharged. And out in the Pacific there is an army of property far more dangerous than thieves. It is the tropical elements which mellow and rot and destroy unless the utmost precaution is used.

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January, 1945

A great part of the work our men are now doing on many of these small Pacific islands whose conquest made savage headlines for a brief spell two and three years ago, is concerned with the disposition of property. These islands were battle grounds, hard-won strongholds in the progress of our troops through the Southwest Pacific. Then they were forward bases, with perhaps an airstrip from which the dogged Japs on other islands just ahead were bombed. Their development for military use required Engineers with bulldozers and other heavy equipment to widen and lengthen the airstrip and clear the jungle for buildings and supply dumps. Men islands were big enough, docks were constructed so that ships could come in to unload their cargoes instead of having them brought to the beaches by landing craft and "docks." Such islands became the springboards for further progress--overwater hops to other islands, which left many as rear supply areas in the backland of war.

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All too often these men are veterans of long service through these islands. Many of them went home with the first loads of high-point troops who returned from the Pacific. There are leaving every day. For each one who departs without a trained replacement, the danger is increased that the roll-up will not be accomplished efficiently and speedily. There is no question but that the normal operation of the point system is slowing us up in this process. It was bound to. With the veterans gone and garrisons reduced, the task of preparing for the disposal of the infinitely varied items which our troops used in the Pacific is made more difficult. The danger of deterioration is likewise enormously increased. The machinery rusts, the planking of docks and buildings rots, the dustiest destroys delicate instruments. It is this aspect of the task and the tremendous distances involved which govern demobilization in the Pacific.

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The property-demoral problem is a definite part of this nation's mission in the Pacific. It is my responsibility, it is the soldier's responsibility out there - in the end, it is your responsibility as members of the Congress, to the American people. Except when necessary for health, safety or security, we do not have the authority to abandon this property; it must be taken off our hands by properly constituted civil authority. It is one of the inalienable rights of the American people of demobilization. It will continue to be a charge against our military manpower until it is liquidated.

ROLLING UP BASES

Don't let me give the impression that, in spite of difficulties, we haven't been making progress in rolling up bases and rear areas which were once battlefields or great forward points of supply. As an example, there were 44,000 troops and 31,000 tons of supplies on New Guinea September 1, 1945, when the Japs signed the terms of surrender. Those figures were reduced to 7,000 troops and 12,000 tons of supplies by January 1, 1946. All troops and supplies are expected to be completely evacuated from these bases by April 1, 1946.

In Australia, our first great far-Pacific base, about 104,000 tons of supplies remain on hand. The theater expects them to be finally disposed of and all army activities there completely closed up by April 15, 1946.

On Okinawa a garrison of approximately 33,000 Air and Service Force troops will be permanently stationed. In this strategic location our heavier occupational air strength remains secure against potential civil uprising but not in position to strike a deadly retaliatory blow against any action of the Japanese homeland.

PHILIPPINES

I will not go into the service functions of our Pacific troops in detail, since in most particulars they parallel those I described for the European theater, complicated by long supply lines, the tropical enemy, and difficulties of transport within many areas. But I should like to say a special word about the mission of our troops in the Philippines. You are familiar with the tragic destruction perpetrated by the Japanese during the final days of fighting. Their unwarmed and brutal acts of savagery destroyed not only lives and property but much of the functioning of orderly government and its agencies. There is no effective Philippine agency now in position to maintain law and order. As a result of the war the Philippines were left without an effective police force and the splendid Philippine scout organizations were practically destroyed. Now armed bands of guerrillas roam the

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There are now 665,000 American troops engaged in carrying out our overall mission in the Pacific. General MacArthur has made a careful re-study of his requirements and assures me that he can operate with a total of 375,000 as of July 1, 1946. This number will later be gradually reduced.

OTHER THEATERS

In India-Burma, our strength has been rapidly withdrawn since the end of August. From a figure of 165,600 on V-J Day it reduced to 55,000 on January 1. It is being further cut by large slices until on July 1, 1946, only 4,000 soldiers are expected to remain in the theater. Their mission is entirely concerned in guarding surplus property or in providing services and supply for those who are doing so.

Last August I had some 63,000 troops in the China Theater under command of General Banfill. Following the Japanese surrender, the great majority was withdrawn. By January 1 the force he had had 9,000, a figure which will be reduced to 6,000 on July 1. While there may be some reduction in this number later on, General Banfill has informed the War Department that he will require this small force of Army air force and ground troops. In part of our Potsdam commitment, this Government assumed responsibility of assisting and advising the Chinese in repatriation of Japanese nationals to the home island.

We have no considerable amounts of supplies in China. Most of what we have is dedicated for the use of our smaller number of troops. While our aircraft flow thousands of combat missions against the Japs in China, our ground support of the Chinese Army was confined to training and liaison work. We had no army combat ground units in the China Theater.

What I have said of the Pacific and of Europe applies to all the other areas overseas where we have American troops and property. The same problems exist in varying degrees in all theaters and, in the last analysis, we must rely on the professional judgment and ability of our Theater Commanders to find the solutions. I have the utmost confidence in them.

I have spoken to you this fully of the situation and the mission of our forces overseas because only in the light of all these jobs, which complete the "commitments and obligations" placed on the Army by higher authority, is it possible to understand the continuing necessity of adjusting the demobilization program to the job in hand.

THE JOB AT HAND

These foreign commitments and obligations cannot be met, our demobilization cannot continue in an orderly fashion, we cannot

ground troops. It is part of our postwar commitments, the government assumes responsibility of assisting and advising the Chinese in repatriation of Japanese nationals to the home island.

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THE JOB AT HOME

These foreign "commitments and obligations" cannot be met, our demobilization cannot continue in an orderly fashion, we cannot carry on the business of our day-to-day forces unless we keep a proportionate force on duty in the United States during this interim period. In this respect we are like a snake swallowing his tail. We are trying to gobble ourselves up as fast as we can but we must take care to keep the head big enough to absorb the body passing through it. The head of the snake is the force in this country. This force varies as the gobbling-up process goes on.

As of January 1 there were 2,100,000 on our rolls in the United States, including over 100,000 officers already on terminal leave. Of the 2,000,000 men of the ground, air and service forces in this country nearly 1,000,000 are operating personnel administering our posts, camps, stations, ports--generally engaged in housekeeping and supply activities, and caring for the sick and wounded. For example, 100,000 of these alone are engaged in

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what we call "housekeeping duties", i.e., they are operating the separation centers through which 3 1/2 million individuals will have passed between VE-Day and next July. They also operate induction centers and handle the selectees and volunteers as fast as they are brought into the Army. Another 100,000 of the 1,000,000 are engaged in the care of the 150,000 sick and wounded in our hospitals on the first of the year. Approximately 350,000 are engaged in the administration and training of individuals for air crews and the maintenance of our planes, transports, and flying activities. A total of 150,000 trainers are required for ground and service troops, including some housekeepers at schools and depots.

Another 50,000 are guarding prisoners, both our own and enemy prisoners of war. Finally some 50,000 others are at ports and staging areas taking care of the flow of personnel in and out of the country. The rest (200,000) are engaged at posts, camps, and stations, and in manufacture and storage of supplies, in special activities, such as the BOM, care of returnees, housekeeping details, proving and demonstration activities, and other home-front jobs.

Aside from the 1,000,000 of the operating personnel there are the 150,000 that are stationed in hospitals, at least 300,000 actually in process of separation, 200,000 or more on furlough and in transit, 200,000 students in training and a balance of 100,000 in units and miscellaneous activities.

This is a very rough breakdown only, the details of which will be brought out no doubt in the subcommittee hearings which will be held these coming days. But I have endeavored to show here in a general way as nearly what the task of the nation is doing and why it must be kept as large as it is. On July 1, 1946, it is estimated that our forces in this country will be cut to 650,000. This figure is broken down between 350,000 operating personnel and the balance to cover men in training or reserve overseas, and to provide a small reserve of combat air and ground troops.

The question may well be asked -- and it has been -- if you have two million men in this country now and are cutting them to 650,000 by next July, why not send some of the difference overseas to replace veterans who might then come home? That is exactly what we are doing. All of the replacements going overseas are carried as surplus in this country until they arrive at a foreign port. But there is no economy in sending a man overseas if he is so close to availability for discharge that we should have to turn him right around and send him back. Nor is there any sound reason for keeping him in the Army if he no longer has a job for him here. So we discharge him. I realize that it is a source of irritation to veterans overseas to have a man discharged in this country with fewer points than the veteran over there. From his angle, it is rank injustice. But from the point of view of this country, the only realistic and practical decision is to let him out.

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This is a very rough breakdown only, the detail of which will be brought out no doubt in the subcommittee hearings which will be held these coming days. What I have uncovered to show here in a general way is merely what the head of the snake is doing and why it must be kept as large as it is. As of May 1, 1965, it is estimated that our force in this country will be out to 650,000. This figure is broken down between 360,000 overseas personnel and the balance to cover men in training for overseas overseas, and to provide a small reserve of combat air and ground troops.

The question may well be asked -- and it has been -- if you have two million men in this country now and are cutting them to 650,000 by next July, why not send some of the difference overseas to replace veterans who might then come home? That is exactly what we are doing. All of the replacements going overseas are carried as strength in this country until they arrive at a foreign port. But there is no economy in sending a man overseas if he is so close to eligibility for discharge that we should have to turn him right around and send him back. Now is there any sound reason for keeping him in the army if we no longer have a job for him here. So we discharge him. I realize that it is a source of irritation to veterans overseas to have a man discharged in this country with fewer points than the veteran over there. From his angle, it is a rank injustice. But from the point of view of the country, the only realistic and practical decision is to let him out. We can't make an economic tax cut of this demobilization job without breaking a few eggs.

THE SCORE OF THE FIGHT

I have discussed for you the composition and duties of our January 1 Army of 4,200,000 and of our Army of 1,500,000 as it will be next July 1. Our present problem lies wholly between these two figures.

Between now and the first of July, based on the best estimates of the performance of Selective Service and the Army Recruiting Service, we expect that 400,000 men will enter the Army from civilian life. Three million more soldiers will return to civilian life. A million of these individuals are in the separation process already. They should be civilians within no later than early February. This leaves 2,000,000 men to be discharged in late February, March, April, May and June. (See Chart - "Progress of Demobilization")

Many of these would not have been discharged in any case until May or June. They will still be discharged by that time. Many others will be discharged in February, March and April just as they expired. The soldiers who are actually effected by this necessary readjustment over the next few months are approximately 700,000 (the red area on Chart) two year men who served for discharge in March and April and who, because no replacements are available for them will not now get out until May or June. Of these, 700,000 an estimated 300,000 are now overseas.

10-11-44 PM

These two questions looked for discharge in March because of the statement which General Marshall said in his talk before you last September. I should like to refresh your memories on the text of his statement. General Marshall said: "We have by late winter we will have reached a stage in carrying out the point system -- which is now governing policy and which we must not tamper with -- which is now governing almost chaotic to develop -- then, in effect the point system may be relaxed and the years of service will govern. That will mean that men of two years service will be eligible for demobilization."

Later on, a War Department spokesman set the date for the expected discharge of two-year men as March 20.

Now, this estimate was based on all the facts available at that time. As was stated at the same time, the initial discharge rate was not geared to any definite Army strength which might be required to complete our duties in the war, but to existing facilities. In discussing this point, General Marshall said: "There has been no relationship whatsoever between the rate of demobilization and any future plans of the Army. I mean by that that all the facilities available in transportation and in personnel trained to handle demobilization have been devoted to release from the service as rapidly as possible the largest number of men. It will be most surprising, therefore, if the estimates in occupation forces now being made are accurate. It will be even later than early spring -- before we will reach a point where the rate of demobilization will be influenced in any way by consideration of the strength of occupation forces."

General Marshall based his statement on the fact for sure that could be made at the time. Matters governing the initial demobilization picture have changed tremendously in the five intervening months, all but one resulting in an accumulation of the rate of return from overseas and discharge. It is a great deal of satisfaction to consider the happiness of the 1,605,000 men and women who returned to their homes long before they expected because of the speed up in demobilization. I am equally sorry that the failure of the placement rate to meet our continuing obligations overseas has now forced a much smaller number of individuals to wait on, two, or three months longer for discharge.

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General Marshall based his statement on the best forecast that could be made at the time. Others governing the initial demobilization picture have changed frequently in the five intervening months, all but one, resulting in an accumulation of the rate of return from overseas and discharge. It gave the general idea of satisfaction to consider the discharge of the 1,565,000 men and women who returned to their homes long before they expected because of the speed up in demobilization. I am equally sure that the failure of the replacement rate to meet our continuing obligations overseas has now forced a much smaller number of individuals to wait one, two, or three months longer for discharge.

Unfortunately, the War Department has no choice in this matter. I repeat that every possible measure was taken before our announcement was made on January 20th. We had no alternative. To delay every soldier with two years' service eligible for discharge on March 20 would mean that, in addition to the 1,000,000 now in process of discharge, another 2,000,000 would have gone out by that date. The results would have been catastrophic. Our operating forces in this country would be far short of the numbers required. Among other casualties, it would mean the complete collapse of the Army Airway communication system. Without technicians, there would have been a consequent grounding of our air forces all over the world. It would mean the practical abandonment of billions of dollars in American

equipment. It would mean such a complete rearrange of our occupational forces as to jeopardize the results of months of work in bringing order out of chaos. It would mean such a collapse of military organization in this country as to impair gravely our ability to care for our hospitalized veterans or to supply the soldiers remaining overseas. In a final burst of irony, it would delay these very veterans for days and possibly weeks in the ports and the Separation Centers because the technicians who ran the Centers would themselves have left the Army.

If there were any possible way to discharge all two-year men on March 20 without dismantling the Army, it would be done. We simply cannot do it.

I have the utmost respect and a most profound affection for the American soldier, and I believe that he knows me well enough to have confidence that I will always deal justly with him. I believe I am doing that now when I say -- to him and to you -- that we cannot discharge all two-year men on March 20 and that this is dictated solely by the necessity of assuring our discharge rate to our replacement rate and to the continuing job which the Army must do both in this country and overseas.

I state categorically that he is not being held in the Army to get a Universal Military Training bill or any other legislation through the Congress. It should be unnecessary to say that, but the point has been raised, so I call attention to the fact that the President's program of Universal Military Training stipulated training only and does not provide for any service. No trainee would replace a single soldier.

In this same connection I have seen the point made several times that the Army is deliberately being kept at greater strength than is needed so that the generals could keep their stars. I believe a single statement will clarify that. The Army is proceeding with dispatch to train or reduce or relieve from active duty its temporary general officers in the Army. To date, 700 -- more than half the 1,550 general officers of the V-2 say Army will have been either reduced, superseded, or are now under orders for such action and by June 30, 261 more will have been processed.

THE PROSE T PLAN

To each man who expected to be discharged in March or April and who will not be out until May or June, I say as I say to you -- that the Government is taking every possible measure to insure that he is not held in the service one day longer than is absolutely necessary. In order to insure this and to make clear to every man in the Army exactly where he stands, the War Department has issued an order to all major commanders. It is recorded in full to the statement. The salient points affecting enlisted men are:

- (1) By 30 April 1946 all enlisted men (except volunteers) with 45 points

I state categorically that no is not being held in the Army to get a Universal Military Training bill or any other legislation through the Congress. It should be unnecessary to say that, but the point has been raised, so I call attention to the fact that the President's program of Universal Military Training stipulates training only and does not provide for any service. No business would replace a single soldier.

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THE PRESENT PLAN

To each man who expected to be discharged in March or April and who will not be out until May or June, I say as I say to you -- that the War Department is taking every possible measure to insure that he is not held in the service one day longer than is absolutely necessary. In order to insure this and to make clear to every man in the Army exactly where he stands, the War Department has issued an order to all major commanders. It is excerpted in full to the statement. The salient points affecting enlisted men are:

- (1) By 30 April 1946 all enlisted men (except volunteers) with 45 points as of 2 September 1945 or with 30 months service as of 30 April 1946 will be separated from the Army or aboard ship returning home.
- (2) By 30 June 1946 all enlisted men (except volunteers) with 40 points as of 2 September 1945 or with 24 months service as of 30 June 1946 will be separated from the Army or aboard ship returning home.

Whether or not these criteria can continue to be observed after July 1 depends directly upon the rate of inflow. Meeting the necessary monthly intake either these criteria will have to be abandoned or constant authority -- I repeat the Congress itself -- will have to relieve the Army of its vitally important mission. None of us can escape the realization that this will be a most fateful decision -- therefore -- let us report at once that the commitment I now make is limited to July 1, 1946.

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ANALYSIS OF REPLACEMENTS

Now let me talk of the replacement rate itself. Present estimates are based on past performance of Selective Service and our Recruiting Service. Only if future rates keep pace can the Army's recruitment requirements of 1,500,000 men in the service on July 1 be met. Let me examine those data for you. First, as to Selective Service: In July, the Army received 50,000 men through induction. In August, with the capitulation of Japan at hand and with the consequent easing of pressure by local beards, this figure fell to 55,000. Beginning with September, the Army arbitrarily reduced its monthly call to a total of 50,000. In September we actually received through Selective Service 41,000; in October, 37,000; in November, 35,000; and in December only 21,000.

As to enlistments, the Personnel Procurement Service, consisting of over 10,000 officers and men, is exclusively concerned with obtaining the maximum number of enlistments from every source — men in the service, those who have had previous service and now discharged, and from the vast number of men in civilian life who are eligible to serve. The most stringent orders are in effect to stress to the utmost all the inducements for enlistment which the Congress so recently authorized. Through the press and radio, a most comprehensive program of advertising has been launched. In November, when this program actually got into full swing, all previous records were broken when the Army enlisted 185,000. In December this number dropped off to 131,000. By January 1, our enlistments totaled slightly less than 400,000, but of this number approximately forty-four (44) percent are men who have enlisted for the minimum periods of one (1) year or eighteen (18) months service. A great many in this latter group are men who have been discharged from the Army shortly after their induction to enlist for the purpose of determining their own date of release, or are men who enlisted for the minimum period rather than await induction. Of those who have enlisted for three years, a large number are old Regular Army soldiers whose previous enlistments had run out, and who have re-enlisted to protect their seniority and retirement privileges. Our enlistment record has been good, but, like taken together with Selective Service, it has not been high enough to provide required replacements. We shall continue to push this enlistment program, but only if Selective Service is able to provide the 50,000 men per month we are asking for will the 1,500,000 men army be guaranteed under our present discharge policy.

THE "POST-WAR ARMY"

Let me make clear that the basic figure of 1,500,000 has no connection with the permanent peacetime military establishment. In this regard, I should like to dispel once and for all the confusion which apparently exists in the minds of many in the meaning of the term, "Post-war Army."

The vast number of men in civilian life who are eligible to serve. The most stringent orders are in effect to stress to the utmost all the inducements for enlistment which the Congress so recently authorized. Through the press and radio, a most comprehensive program of advertising has been launched. In November, when this program actually got into full swing, all previous records were broken for the Army enlisted 165,000. In December this number dropped off to 151,000. By January 1, our enlistments totaled slightly less than 400,000, but of this number approximately forty-four (44) percent are men who have enlisted for the minimum periods of one (1) year or eighteen (18) months service. A great many in this latter group are men who have been discharged from the Army shortly after their induction to enlist for the purpose of determining their own acts of release, or are men who enlisted for the minimum period rather than await induction. Of those who have enlisted for three years, a large number are old Regular Army soldiers whose previous enlistments had run out, and who have re-enlisted to protect their seniority and retirement privileges. Our enlistment record has been good, but, like taken together with Selective Service, it has not been high enough to provide required replacements. We shall continue to push this enlistment program, but only if Selective Service is able to provide the 50,000 men per month we are asking for till the 1,500,000 men army be guaranteed under our present discharge policy.

THE POST-WAR ARMY

Let me make clear that the basic figure of 1,500,000 has no connection with the permanent peace-time military establishment. In this regard, I should like to dispel once and for all the confusion which apparently exists in the minds of many in the hearing of the term, "Post-war Army." The Army that men the war needs no definition, apology or justification by me or anyone else. Its record speaks for it. It was the finest military organization the world has ever seen. It was perfectly adapted in quantity and quality to the tasks assigned it. Is the accomplishment of these tasks it covered itself with everlasting glory.

But that Army no longer exists! Most of the long-service combat veterans are already back in civilian life. They are largely among the 5,000,000 who have already been discharged. As I said before, we are particularly concerned about the combat men still in service.

What we have today is the remnant of that combat Army in a state of reorganization and reduction to an interim Army assigned an entirely different mission or task. It is still a World War II task. But is not

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yet a task for a permanent peace-time Regular Army. It is the task of re-conversion and of "securing the peace." When we have secured the peace, and liquidated our emergency tasks, we shall then have a third task -- to preserve the force. This is the long-term, continuing peace-time mission of the Army. It will be the job of our permanent peace-time military establishment. The size and composition of that establishment are, of course, up to you.

But that is not the issue here. We are not talking about our permanent peace-time military establishment but the establishment to do the job now in hand. I know of no reasonable officer who would not infinitely prefer to drive both our present interim Army as well as our future Regular Army on a 100 percent voluntary basis at the earliest possible moment. The War Department will recommend the immediate termination of Selective Service as soon as it is secured of a steady flow of replacements adequate to maintain the size of force required to perform the tasks assigned to us. But we cannot escape the simple fact that Selective Service and voluntary recruiting together have been unable to furnish an adequate flow of replacements to compensate for the rate of discharge under our mobilization policy until the rate was necessarily changed in January 4th.

EXCERPT OF PAST T-13 CONVERSION PLAN

Now just where does this leave us? On V-2 Day we had 8,200,000 troops. We have already discharged 5,000,000 and by July 1 we shall have discharged another 2 3/4 million men who were in the Army the day Germany collapsed. This leaves but half a million or so of the V-2 Day men. Except for veteran volunteers, this is all that will be left of our own V-2 Day Army on July 1, 1946, less than 14 months after the last shot was fired in Europe. All the rest will be recruits. It is with this relatively untrained Army in the throes of reconversion that we must undertake the grave tasks still ahead.

This has been the worst crisis and broad-scale demobilization in history. I consider our July 1 figure to be almost without a safety factor. It is a risk which, under any other circumstances than the vastly appalling one of routing men with their families, I should be unwilling to take.

The order on 2 1/2 year men seems the balance of 2,200,000 by the end of April. It takes an estimated 500,000 men now in the Pacific, 400,000 in Europe, 400,000 from other Army sources or already en route home, 900,000 now on duty in this country. This order has not been issued without the gravest consideration. As an example of how close this order is to the end of April, General LeMay has just informed a short statement concerning performance of duty in his theater it will be necessary to eliminate the present rest and recuperation programs and drastically curtail leave and furloughs, to suspend all military training except on-the-job training, to abandon or transfer to liberated countries certain types of Government property surplus to his needs, and to scrutinize very closely all requests for emergency returns to this country.

Now just three goes this leave us? On V-2 day we had 8,300,000 troops. We have already discharged 5,000,000 and by July 1 we shall have discharged another 2 3/4 million men who were in the army the day Germany collapsed. This leaves but half a million or so of the V-2 day men. Except for veteran volunteers, this is all that will be left of our own V-2 day army on July 1, 1946, less than 15 months after the first shot was fired in Europe. All the rest will be recruits. It is with this relatively untrained army in the throes of reconversion that we must undertake the grave tasks still ahead.

This has been the most rapid and broad-scale demobilization in history. I consider our July 1 picture to be almost without a safety factor. It is a risk which, under any other circumstances than the vastly appealing one of reuniting men with their families, I should be unwilling to take.

The order on 21st year men means the release of 2,200,000 by the end of April. It takes an estimated 500,000 men now in the Pacific, 400,000 in Europe, 400,000 from other areas overseas or already en route home, 900,000 men on duty in this country. This order has not been issued without the gravest consideration. As an example of how close this order came to being performed at the end of April, General LeMay has just informed me that to continue performance of duty in his theater it will be necessary to eliminate the present rest and recuperation programs and drastically curtail leaves and furloughs, to suspend all military training except on-the-job training, to abandon or transfer to liberated countries certain types of Government property surplus to his needs, and to scrutinize and classify all requests for emergency returns to this country. Even these measures you will appreciate how close the margin is between the efficient performance of duties and virtual abandonment of them.

THE RISKS

It certainly will indicate to you that should we fail to obtain the 1,500,000 men we require on July 1, something would have to be done in the tight little net which we have now woven to perform our job in this country and discharge the nation's overseas commitments. If we are not relieved of the still huge supplies of Government property entrusted to our custody overseas, we shall have no choice but to abandon that where they lie. But even if you consider this would approve such action on the order between two

evils, I know you would not tolerate the reduction of occupational forces below the levels required by General MacArthur and General Boardman to carry out their duties. There is no possible doubling up of work load which could enable us to accomplish that part of our present mission with fewer men. If that situation should develop, you gentlemen will have to decide what we must do. Other functions would have to be abandoned, too, with tragic results. Fared down to the bone, the Army Air, Ground and Service troops are still just able to discharge the duties I have outlined to you. We can function with no less. For my part, I can assure you that the Army will continue to carry out faithfully its planned reduction through the coming months, in accordance with the directive I have read to you. In the light of its terms, there will no longer be any useful purpose in such demonstrations as our troops have conducted during the past week in various areas around the world. Unfortunately our meetings are always subject to misinterpretation. No disorders accompanied them. They were occasioned by homesickness. I sympathize with the hearts of that longing for home and loved ones. For three and one-half years in Great Britain, in North Africa, in Italy, and on the continent of Europe I shared the feeling of every soldier in wanting to come home.

CONCLUSION

During the war in Europe, I had the heavy responsibility of sending into action the gallant sons of America, knowing full well that many would not come back alive. That is a commander's responsibility in a time of unrelenting need to defeat a menacing enemy. I did everything in my power to insure a sound plan of action and to implement this plan with the necessary troops and material to keep our losses at a minimum. Throughout this campaign the welfare and best interests of our men were always close to the hearts of their commanders of every grade. I regard the responsibility placed upon me in the current situation as a continuation of that I bore during the war. Along with that responsibility, I carry the same vital interest in the welfare of our men and the same determination to see that their interests are fully weighed and protected. In no question involving the G. I. will I ever appear except as his friend and his advocate, although I may be of the "Grass." I feel confident that when the reasons for the change in pace in the demobilization program are recognized by our soldiers and they have full knowledge of their outlook for the next six months, they will accept, with that mature judgment Americans always show, their own responsibility for finishing the job. The time has now arrived to replace hysteria with calm judgment and sound discipline.

The War Department is prepared to answer any further questions which you gentlemen may have to propose. The Acting Secretary of War is appearing before the special sub-committee designated by the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee for this purpose. I have placed

CONCLUSION

During the war in Europe, I had the heavy responsibility of sending into action the gallant sons of America, knowing full well that many would not come back alive. That is a commander's responsibility in a time of increasing need to defeat a menacing enemy. I did everything in my power to insure a sound plan of action and to implement this plan with the necessary troops and materiel to keep our losses at a minimum. Throughout this campaign the welfare and best interests of our men were always close to the hearts of their commanders of every grade. I regard the responsibility placed upon me in the current situation as a continuation of what I bore during the war. Along with that responsibility, I carry the same vital interest in the welfare of our men and the same determination to see that their interests are fully weighed and protected. In no question involving the G. I. will I ever appear except as his friend and his advocate, although I may be of the "Press." I feel confident that when the reasons for the change in pace in the demobilization program are recognized by our soldiers and they have full knowledge of their outlook for the next six months, they will accept, with that mature judgment Americans always show, their own responsibility for finishing the job. The time has now arrived to replace hysteria with calm judgment and sound discipline.

The War Department is prepared to answer any further questions which you gentlemen may have to propose. The Acting Secretary of War is appearing before the special sub-committee designated by the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee for this purpose. I have placed myself at the disposal of this same committee.

One last thought I should like to leave with you. The War Department has no intention of abandoning the mission assigned to it by the Government, the Congress and the people of the United States, so long as we have the troops to accomplish it. For myself, I feel it as a personal trust. I should be unworthy of those who gave their lives to gain the victory if I failed now to do everything in my power to protect it. We want to bring home quickly any man that has borne the brunt of battle and replace him, when necessary, by a man who has not.

My sole purpose, which I am certain you share, is that the army which did so much to win the victory will be left fit to preserve it.

EXPLANATION OF CHARTS

To Accompany Statement by General Eisenhower

15 January 1946

Cumulative Returns to Civilian Life

The dotted green line represents the War Department plan for returning soldiers to civilian life made prior to V-J Day and added to the actual returns from V-E Day through V-J Day; the dotted blue line shows the estimate given by General Marshall on September 20, similarly so added to the actual returns through V-J Day; and the solid red line represents actual discharges through early January. Present War Department estimates discharges are shown by the dotted portion of the red line. Note that the present cumulative total is far in excess of both previous estimates.

Progress of Demobilization

This chart shows the actual and planned decline in Army strength from V-E Day to July 1, 1946. The red area represents those men held in through delay of the two year rule through July 1. Although small in comparison with the Army as it was on V-E Day, the peak 100,000 men involved represents a large share of the strength to remain in service during April, May and June.

Overseas Employment of the Army

This chart shows employment of our total overseas Air, Ground and Service troops by theater in January 1, 1946, and the planned employment by theater on July 1, 1946. Figures are broken down into the five principal categories shown.

changes are shown by the dotted portion of the red line. Note that the present cumulative total is far in excess of both previous estimates.

Progress of Demobilization

This chart shows the actual and planned decline in Army strength from V-E day to July 1, 1946. The red area represents those men held in through delay of the two year rule through July 1. Although small in comparison with the Army as it was on V-E Day, the peak 700,000 men involved represents a large share of the strength to remain in service during April, May and June.

Overseas Employment of the Army

This chart shows employment of our total overseas Air, Ground and Service troops by theater on January 1, 1946, and the planned employment by theater on July 1, 1946. Duties are broken down into the five principal categories shown.

Strength of the Army

This chart shows the total Air, Ground and Service troops in each theater on the three dates indicated. Totals on September 1, 1945 are shown by the area below those on January 1, 1946 by the black bars, and

on July 1, 1946 by the red bars.

FIRST ATTACHMENT

Demobilization Directive of 15 January 1946

Washington, D. C.

To: CG UNITED MAIN FRANKFURT GERMANY

CHICAGO ADVANCE TOKYO JAPAN

CG LOS ANGELES DELHI INDIA

CG U.S. CHINA THEATER SHANGHAI CHINA (Pass to Secretary of War)

CG U.S. MIDDLE EAST CAIRO EGYPT

CG MTO CASERTA ITALY

1. Effective immediately, the following will govern the demobilization of the Army until 30 June 1946:

a. By 30 April 1946 the following will be separated from the Army or aboard ship returning home:

- (1) All enlisted men (except volunteers) with 45 points as of 2 September 1945 or with 30 months service as of 30 April 1946.
- (2) All enlisted MAC (except volunteers) with 24 months service as of 30 April 1946.
- (3) All rate officers (except Regular Army, Volunteers, and Medical Department officers) with 67 points as of 2 September 1945 or 48 months service as of 30 April 1946.

2. Effective immediately, the following will govern the mobilization of the Army until 30 June 1946:

a. By 30 April 1946 the following will be accounted for in the Army or aboard ship returning home:

- (1) All enlisted men (except volunteers) with 45 points as of 2 September 1945 or with 30 months service as of 30 April 1946.
- (2) All enlisted WAC (except volunteers) with 24 months service as of 30 April 1946.
- (3) All male officers (except Regular Army, Volunteers, and Medical Department officers) with 67 points as of 2 September 1945 or 45 months service as of 30 April 1946.
- (4) All WAC officers (except Volunteers) with 36 months length of service as of 30 April 1946.

b. By 30 June 1946 the following will be separated from the Army or branch and returning home:

- (1) All enlisted men (except Volunteers) with 40 points as of 2 September 1945 or with 24 months service as of 30 June 1946.
- (2) All male officers (except Regular Army, Volunteers, and Medical Department officers) with 65 points as of 2 September 1945 or with 42 months service as of 30 June 1946.
- (3) Separate instructions covering the discharge of MAC personnel, officer and enlisted, for the period after 30 April will be issued by the War Department.
- c. Medical Corps officers will be demobilized by separate orders established by the War Department.
- d. In accordance with the tabulation of the desires of officers according to Category as prescribed in War Department Circular 366, 1945, has been made further instructions on their separation will follow.
- e. It is emphasized request emphasized that release of all personnel will follow the principle of priority of release for those with highest points and longest length of service, particularly combat.
- f. Computation of length of service will include total active enlistment and enlisted honorable service, continuous or interrupted, since 16

1946.

(2) General instructions covering the discharge of SAC personnel, officer and enlisted, for the period after 30 April will be issued by the War Department.

c. Medical Corps officers will be demobilized by separate criteria established by the War Department.

d. As soon as the tabulation of the desires of officers according to category as prescribed in War Department Circular 206, 1945, has been made further instructions in their connection will follow.

e. It is emphasized repeat emphasized that release of all personnel will follow the principle of priority of release for those with highest points and longest length of service, particularly combat.

2. Computation of length of service will include total active commissions and enlisted honorable service, continuous or interrupted, since 15 September 1940. Time lost under AW 107 will not be included.

3. Eligibility for separation of personnel made eligible by previously published criteria is not affected by this message. Such personnel will be given priority for separation over personnel demobilized in accordance with paragraphs and above.


4. The term "Volunteers" as used herein includes enlisted personnel who have volunteered under provisions of change 2 of AR 1-11 or who have enlisted in the Regular Army. Officer volunteers are those who sign certificates under War Department Circular 366, 1945, as Category I, II, or III, or Category IV until date specified in the certificate.

5. Source category personnel whose MCS appear in Circular 321, WD, 1945 and in Circular 362, WD, 1945 may be retained in the service until replaced provided they are utilized in their specialty, but in no case longer than 6 months beyond date upon which he would be discharged under these instructions.

6. The above constitutes the War Department Program of demobilization for the period until 30 June 1946. Z/I and Theater Commanders are responsible for the immediate release of every individual for whom there is no military need, and for releasing officers and men in sufficient time to carry out these instructions. However, no individual will be discharged under this directive with less service of smaller scores than set forth herein. The bulk of the men made eligible for discharge by this order should be discharged in the early part of the periods January to April and May to June respectively. Theater Commanders will notify War Department without delay of revised discharging requirements by month through June. End Directive

CUMULATIVE RETURNS TO CIVILIAN

(ALL FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)




* SINCE VE DAY

VE RETURNS TO CIVILIAN LIFE

(ALL FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

27




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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PROGRESS OF DEMOBILIZATION

(ALL FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)



RETURNS TO CIVILIAN LIFE


	MAY 1945	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN 1946	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY
SEPTEMBER ESTIMATE					450	550	750	750					
PRESENT ESTIMATE									800	500	500	400	400
ACTUAL PERFORMANCE	56	156	164	205	597	1,270	1,186	1,112					

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PROGRESS OF DEMOBILIZATION

(ALL FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

26



RETURNS TO CIVILIAN LIFE

			450	550	750	750							
							800	500	500	400	400	400	
156	164	205	597	1,270	1,186	1,112							

OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT OF THE

(ALL FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

FUNCTION	DATE	EUROPE	MEDITER- -RANEAN	AFRICA MIDDLE- EAST	INDIA BURMA	CHINA	PACIFIC
1. POLICE & SUPERVISORY DUTIES SUPERVISION OF ENEMY GOV'TS DEMOLITION OF FORTIFICATIONS SECURITY UNIT TRAINING	1 JAN '46	132	15		2	5	311
	1 JUL '46	98	15		1	3	153
2. SUPPLY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT & MAINTENANCE OF LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS PROCUREMENT, STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES OPERATION & SUPERVISION OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM SURPLUS PROPERTY AND ENEMY MATERIAL	1 JAN '46	166	14	13	22	3	259
	1 JUL '46	73	2	4	2	2	80
3. SERVICES PROVISION OF SERVICES (Medical, Signal, Engineer, Postal, Etc.) CONSTRUCTION & MAINTENANCE GRAVES REGISTRATION MORALE, I & E	1 JAN '46	111	13	5	3	1	164
	1 JUL '46	61	6	1	1	1	82
4. PRISONERS OF WAR AND DISPLACED PERSONS	1 JAN '46	50	4				43
	1 JUL '46	25	3				25
5. INEFFECTIVES REDEPLOYMENT FURLOUGHS SICK	1 JAN '46	163	5		28		88
	1 JUL '46	50	2				35
TOTAL	1 JAN '46	622	51	18	55	9	865
	1 JUL '46	307	28	5	4	6	375

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AREAS EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY

(ALL FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

25

DATE	EUROPE	MEDITER- -RANEAN	AFRICA MIDDLE- EAST	INDIA BURMA	CHINA	PACIFIC	ALASKAN DEPART- MENT	CARIB. DEFCOM'D. & SO. ATL.	NORTH ATLANTIC BASES	TOTAL
JAN '46	132	15		2	5	311	11	14		490
JUL '46	98	15		1	3	153	10	17		297
JAN '46	166	14	13	22	3	259	5	9	6	497
JUL '46	73	2	4	2	2	80	5	9	6	183
JAN '46	111	13	5	3	1	164	4	9		310
JUL '46	61	6	1	1	1	82	4	9		165
JAN '46	50	4				43				97
JUL '46	25	3				25				53
JAN '46	163	5		28		88	4	6	1	295
JUL '46	50	2				35	3	5	1	96
JAN '46	622	51	18	55	9	865	24	38	7	1,689
JUL '46	307	28	5	4	6	375	22	40	7	794


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STRENGTH OF THE ARMY

1 SEPT '45 1 JAN '46 1 JUL '46

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
STRENGTH OF THE ARMY

1 SEPT '45

1 JAN '46

1 JUL '46

24



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

NTN/to

Subcommission for Monuments Fine Arts and Archives
(Tel. 489081, ext 442 & 254; 478480)

12 GEN 1946

20200/NEW/MFAA

12 Jan 46

SUBJECT: Relief from active duty .

TO : Commanding Officer, 2675th Regt, AC (Ovhd).

1. Ref: letter 370.01, dtd 4 Jan 46, and Sec IV,
WD Circ 366, dtd 7 Dec 45.

2. In order to finish my work as Director of this
Subcommission, I volunteered in September to remain on active
duty to 1 Feb 46.

3. In accordance with the revised regulation, I now
submit my request for relief from active duty, with the
understanding that it will take until 1 Feb 46 for the request
to be effectively acted on. By that time the work I had agreed
to do will have been completed.

Norman T. Newton
NORMAN T. NEWTON
Major, Air Corps
Director

Inclosure: 1

Copy to :
VP CA Sec *mc*



1/19-2/CA ✓

HEADQUARTERS
235TH REGIMENT
ALLIED COMMISSION (OVERHEAD)
AND 394

Civil affairs det

RFB/rs1

(3A)

File: 370.01

13 November 1945

SUBJECT: Redeployment of Civil Affairs Officers.

TO : Units this Regiment.

The following MFOUSA cable, FX 52457, dated 9 November 1945 is quoted for the information of all concerned.

"Clarification second sentence paragraph 2 Dated FX 50262 regarding Civil Affairs officers which reads 'date agreed on must be subsequent to date officer becomes eligible for relief from active duty' follows.

'Date officer becomes eligible for relief from active duty' is date critical score is equal to or below officers adjusted service rating score. One whose Mos is included on list of scarce categories officer specialists may be retained 6 months beyond date of his separation eligibility without his consent. Same officer may be continued on extended active duty beyond 6 months period referred to in preceding sentence with his consent by signing specified volunteer statement.

If an officer whose Mos is on list scarce categories of officer specialists consents to remain on active duty for a period which expires less than 6 months from date of his separation eligibility he may be retained without his consent for remaining portion of 6 months period but not longer."

BY ORDER OF COLONEL PARKIN:

Richard B. Bullock
RICHARD B. BULLOCK
Major Inf
Adjutant

ALLIED COMMISSION
5450
HEADQUARTERS

HEADQUARTERS
2675TH REGIMENT
ALLIED COMMISSION (OVERHEAD)
APO 394

RBB/rel

File: 370.

16 October 1945

SUBJECT: Redeployment of Officers.

TO : See Distribution.

Reference letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 15 October 1945, the following named officers are additions to the report attached thereto:

a. Class "B" Officers

ANSELMO, Oswald R. 1st Lt 0104384 CAC 82 8104 5 Mar 46

b. Officers Desiring Immediate Release

HUNTLEY, Richard S. Captain 0497062 CMP 100 9000

BY ORDER OF COLONEL PARKIN:

Richard B. Bullock
RICHARD B. BULLOCK
Capt Inf
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

- 5 - Chief Commissioner ALCOM
- 5 - CO this Regt
- 5 - Ex Off this Regt
- 3 - G-1 (A) ALCOM
- 3 - Units this Regt
- 5 - Regions, Communes & Zones
ALCOM
- 2 - Sub-Commissions ALCOM

HEADQUARTERS
2675TH REGIMENT
ALLIED COMMISSION (OVERHEAD)
APO 394

REB/pf

File: 370.

15 October 1945

SUBJECT: Redeployment of Officers.

17 OCT. 1945

TO : See Distribution.

1. Attached herewith is a consolidated report reflecting the re-deployment status of all officers assigned to this Regiment for the information of all concerned.

2. Regular Army	10
Class "A"	59
Class "B"	90
Class "X"	178
Under ASRC 75	<u>94</u>
Total as of 15 Oct 45	431

BY ORDER OF COLONEL PARKIN:

Richard B. Bullock
RICHARD B BULLOCK
Capt Inf
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

- 5 - Chief Commissioner AICOM
- 5 - CO this Regt
- 5 - Ex Off this Regt
- 3 - G-1 (A) AICOM
- 3 - Units this Regt
- 5 - Regions, Communes & Zones AICOM
- 2 - Sub-Commissions AICOM

(1945)

20

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>ARM</u>	<u>MOS</u>
BULLOCK Richard B	Capt	024298	Inf	2110
EARNES James J	Col	015510	Inf	2902
CRAIG Clayton C	Major	025262	Inf	4010
FALCK Waldemar A	Col	06750	Cav	8104
FISKE Norman E	Col	04741	Cav	2902-2
NEPRUD Leif	Lt Col	015237	CAC	9120
PAGE Thomas N	Col	012500	MC	2025
PARKIN Charles M	Col	05206	Inf	2902-2
QUARTIER Harry C	Lt Col	018379	QMC	8000
WALTON Charles W	Col	06715	AC	2025

785016

CLASS "A" OFFICERS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>BR</u>	<u>ASRC SCORE</u>	<u>MCS</u>
Arnold, John S.	Lt Col	0245277	Inf	95	8104
Bellotti, Joseph	1st Lt	0527504	MI	113	4310
Bernard, Louis B.	1st Lt	01797026	CMF	82	2124
Bickley, William G. Jr.	Capt	0405161	Inf	116	2902
Bocchino, Eliot J.	Major	0377876	Inf	111	2901
Bradley, Bernard W.	Lt Col	0248604	QMC	96	6200
Brownlee, Thomas R.	Capt	0152813	CMF	83	7020
Cammarata, Jack S.	1st Lt	01315138	Inf	73	8000
Cantilli, James J.	1st Lt	01307921	Inf	145	2331
Carpenter, Ward D. Jr.	1st Lt	01824576	Inf	79	
Carrilio, Carl J.	Major	0202568	FA	102	8104
Chapman, Donald M. Sr.	Major	0290399	JAGD	123	2120
Cobel, Paul S.	Major	0332223	QMC	128	2902
Coker, Harold T.	1st Lt	01796579	CMF	98	8104
Coleman, Daniel L.	Capt	0360205	Inf	101	4110
Condict, Stephan H.	1st Lt	01797605	CMF	98	4000
Cunliffe, James W.	Major	0307278	AGD	125	2124
Daugherty, Martin M.	Major	0533398	SR	54	6010
De Angelis, Frederick	Capt	0199180	C.V	118	8104
Dockmejian, Carl B.	Lt Col	0288546	CMS	107	
Downor, Harry M.	Major	0360942	ORD	116	0605
Glerum, Laurence D.	Major	0253012	Inf	96	8107
Hall, Sidney C.	Capt	0437766	TC	63	0700
Harmon, Paul E.	Capt	0287286	CMF	105	0600
Hildebrand, Richard D.	Major	0142155	CMF	91	9301
Hill, Woodrow W.	WOJG	W2126951	AUS	86	0605
Holmes, Lorenzo R.	Lt Col	0108208	QMC	80	4010
Holsten, Ned A.	Capt	0906233	QMC	99	2330
Keim, James F.	Capt	0522710	SR	101	8104
Kenny, Raymond	Lt Col	0520679	SR	76	8104
Kurlan, Charles T.	1st Lt	01013347	Inf	90	2902
Leacaccs, John P.	Major	0914269	NMB	86	5403
Lo Faso, Carmelo	Capt	0504385	FIN	102	6101
Mathis, Otis H.	Major	0901703	CMF	84	9000
Matson, Peter G.	Major	0516750	TC	51	0700
Mavis, Fred O.	Major	0252797	Inf	117	8104
Mc Phail, Arthur M.	Capt	0494536	CMF	119	0600
Mc Phee, Eugene R.	Col	0220462	ORD	111	8104
Monson, Leigh J.	Capt	0440760	CMF	97	8104
Neal, Young A.	Capt	0909879	AC	97	8104
Nugent, Anthony R.	Major	0130270	SR	61	8107
Oakley, Lawrence W.	Capt	0338521	Inf	119	4000
Oliszewski, Casimir	Lt Col	0300907	CE	136	2120
Pankratz, Alvin M.	1st Lt	01584708	QMC	96	4010
Regis, James E.	Lt Col	0228539	MI	122	2025
Reilly, Harold B.	Major	0524473	SR	68	8104
Richert, Robert E. A.	Capt	01583556	QMC	99	4000
Riggio, Steve	Capt	0506362	AGD	141	2120
Ritner, John A.	1st Lt	01634515	Sig C	132	8104
Scoggins, Walter R.	Lt Col	0277640	QMC	91	2120
Scott, Marion H.	Capt	0522200	SR	106	9000
Seith, Howard K.	Lt Col	0342585	F.	134	2902-6

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CLASS "B" OFFICERS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>		<u>SCORE</u>	<u>MCS</u>	<u>DATE OF TEST</u>
GUIDETTE Abdon F	Major	0411798	Inf	97	4000	1 November 1945
ZITTEL Charles B	Capt	01797538	CMP	94	9000	"
MARKER George L	Capt	01035311	CWS	107	8104	4 November 1945
GIAMMARCO John	Capt	0296889	CAC	91	2330	5 November 1945
ALIEN Arthur J	Capt	01016137	CAV	75	0030	15 November 1945
MARTINO Robert A	Lt Col	0272815	SR	78	8000	"
NEVANS Edward E Jr	1st Lt	01797692	CMP	85	8107	"
SNEDECKER Lenon	Lt Col	0460612	MC	110	3005	"
GRUDZINSKI Joseph A	Capt	0335288	CMP	100	6101	30 November 1945
MEFAPACE Robert B	Col	0169581	SR	88	2025	"
RIVELY Joseph C	Major	0317309	Inf	113	2120	"
ALIEN Wilfred S	1st Lt	01578107	QMC	102	0600	1 December 1945
ANDERSON Clarence	Capt	01797584	CMP	86	9000	"
AYRE Richard H	Major	0173533	Inf	98	0200	"
BOWMAN Alfred C	Col	0320343	JAGD	133	8104	"
BRENNAN Thomas C	Major	0166421	CMP	83	8104	"
BUMP Gardiner	Major	0520281	SR	107	8104	"
CILIMINTI Anthony	Capt	0915142	CE	84	8104	"
CLEGG George M	Capt	01797436	CMP	99	9000	"
DE LUCA Joseph M	1st Lt	01106037	CE	96	9120	"
ELLIS James F	Capt	0201383	CMP	80	9124	"
FIORE Hannibal M	Lt Col	0506147	CMP	86	8104	"
GILL John W	Major	0229397	Inf	86	4850	"
HESSLER Earl	Major	0461882	CMP	101	8104	"
HENSLEY Lester J	Col	0174226	CE	136	8104	"
HOWELL Edmund O Jr	Col	0138157	Inf	90	8104	"
JORDAN William R	Col	0121579	CAC	109	8104	"
KIEM Eugene R	1st Lt	01797479	CMP	75	9124	"
LEONE Gerard J	CWO	W2118296	AUS	110	2202	"
LOTT Herbert	Capt	0387420	Sig C	123	0500	"
LUCKMAN Franklin P Sr	Major	0901608	AC	80	9000	"
MOORE Leslie S	Lt Col	021697	AGD	102	2120	"
O'TOOLE David L	Capt	01797518	CMP	85	6010	"
RUSHING William R	1st Lt	0320118	Sig C	89	0200	"
TESAURO Dominic A	1st Lt	01110287	CE	102	8104	"
TURNER Charles I	Major	0483655	AGD	93	0030	"
WILCOX Clarence S	Major	0256932	ORD	133	7611	"
AMORUSO Frank J	Capt	01302414	Inf	99	4010	15 December 1945
ELLENBAST Henry L	CWO	W211468	AUS	104	4010	"
AULT Clement H	Capt	0909386	CE	93	8104	31 December 1945
CASALE Salvatore A	Capt	01317271	Inf	85	2902	"
DONAHUE Eurali	WOJG	W2105693	AUS	92	2600	"
DONF Alfred L	Capt	0358375	QMC	125	2330	"
GAZIANO Rosario A	Capt	0343094	Inf	119	8107	"
GERMANN Ralph S	Capt	01303138	Inf	80	8104	"
GOODMAN Walter F Jr	1st Lt	0519190	PA	75	8104	"

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CLASS "B" OFFICERS (Contd)

NAME	RANK	ASN		SCORE	MOS	DATE OF PROMOTION
HADAM Andrew Jr	Major	0454271	CAC	96	7020	31 December 1945
PETRILLO Clement C	Capt	01995320	NMB	90	2120	"
RICCOMINI Bruno J	1st Lt	01312593	Inf	88	4210	"
STEINBERG Milton	Capt	01042954	ORD	94	6101	"
DENSMORE Leonard P	Col	0181447	FA	120	2025	1 January 1946
DIVINE George F	1st Lt	01635786	Sig C	87	4710	"
SCOTTEN William E	Major	0921625	NI	78	2225	"
SCAFIDI Anthony	Capt	0570085	AC	79	8104	10 January 1946
HENLEY Reginald W	1st Lt	0492765	Inf	91	0600	15 January 1946
RICHARDSON Edward H	Major	0264535	FA	124	7020	"
MITCHELL George	1st Lt	01797505	CMP	80	4710	1 February 1946
NEWTOM Norman T	Major	0905915	AC	82	5554	"
CRAGO William H Jr	1st Lt	01051918	CAC	89	8107	1 March 1946
MILLER Marshall A	1st Lt	01636338	Sig C	100	8107	"
VEBER John K	Col	0102751	Inf	100	8107	"
ALSUP William J	1st Lt	0903855	CE	88	7020	4 March 1946
BARONE Roy E	1st Lt	01171184	FA	96	2110	"
ALIYN Almond M	Capt	01644539	CE	80	2902	5 March 1946
BARNES George W III	Capt	01030727	CAV	112	8104	"
BERNARD Albert L	Capt	01796565	CMP	95	9000	"
CHAPMAN John W	Col	0204184	JAGD	107	2025	"
DAVIS John G	1st Lt	01797445	CMP	75	8104	"
DEJOHN Delos	1st Lt	01015525	Inf	86	8104	"
DEMASI Henri A	Capt	0521811	SR	102	8104	"
FISCHER Karl W	Major	0121488	SR	94	9000	"
GALLAGHER Paul L	1st Lt	01303134	Inf	90	0600	"
GASPALINI Attilio	1st Lt	02053941	AC	93	8104	"
LANDSMAN Harry	1st Lt	0439007	CMP	86	8104	"
LAUGHLIN Louis W	Major	0521392	CE	83	7020	"
LEMO John J	Capt	01296545	Inf	90	6010	"
LESTER Gord	1st Lt	02053921	QMC	96	0200	"
MICOSSI Frank S	1st Lt	01316852	Inf	80	8000	"
MILLER Lawrence L	Capt	01796131	CMP	90	8107	"
MOLITTO Charles J	1st Lt	015053264	CAC	88	0600	"
NARDINI John S	1st Lt	01015145	Inf	98	4000	"
NATALE Peter F	1st Lt	01691537	CE	82	7020	"
O'DONNELL Robert T	1st Lt	01797341	CMP	81	0600	"
PAINTER Clarke	Capt	0510054	CMP	94	8104	"
PARKER George F	Lt Col	0249063	Inf	83	7020	"
PETERSON Warner G	Capt	0454713	CAC	133	2025	"
SASS Edward J Jr	Major	0405875	AC	159	2120	"
STIMPSON Alva A	Capt	01797027	CMP	105	7060	"
STRAIGHT Bertel W Jr	1st Lt	01586246	QMC	91	4950	"
SULLIVAN Edward D S	Major	0391207	AC	122	2260	"

785016

OFFICERS DESIRING IMMEDIATE RELEASE * CRITICAL MOS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>		<u>POINTS</u>	<u>MOS</u>
LOMBARD Richard J	Capt	02046378	CAC	131	2902
TOSCANI Frank E	Lt Col	0349765	CA	128	2025
HANEURY Edward W	Major	0243559	CA	127	9121
SAUNDERS Raymond W	Major	0297827	Inf	122	0600
BAKER Neil C	Capt	01586416	QMC	120	2110
BORAK Fred A	Major	0370291	CMP	111	9000
FITZGERALD J Marion	Lt Col	0298330	QMC	107	0600
MALATESTA Andrew J	Major	0311039	Inf	106	8104 *
BIGHAM John C	Capt	0908886	AC	105	9000
CRAMER Forrest	Major	0361609	FA	105	4932
TORCELLINI Edmund E	Capt	01634406	Sig C	105	8104 *
LOLIAR Richard L	Lt Col	0208327	CMP	103	8104 *
HAWKSWORTH Thomas W	Capt	0391185	Inf	102	2902
THOMAS Floyd L	Col	0120717	Inf	102	8104 *
BRADBURY Harry B	Major	0518542	CMP	101	2124
BOLICK Clarence P	Col	0174447	FA	99	7010
GERMANE Domonic G	WOJG	W2129903	AUS	99	2120
MORTON Edward P	Lt Col	0108162	CE	99	8104 *
PALLOTTI Francis P	Major	0102293	FA	99	8104 *
HAWKINS Daniel W	1st Lt	01797644	CMP	98	6010
JOHNSON Burch R	Capt	0496539	CMP	98	9000
KAY John L	Capt	01584444	QMC	98	8104 *
VERMUTH Florian R	CWO	W2127041	AUS	98	2110
LEOS Paul	1st Lt	01643793	AC	97	2120
LEVITT Robert	Major	0343518	CMP	97	2902
MORTON Marmaduke B	1st Lt	01300362	Inf	97	8000
STEARNS Lloyd W	Major	0303781	AGD	97	2120
CHIARA Frank J	Major	0283537	Inf	96	4000
LISI Ugo J	Capt	01285447	Inf	96	6010
STEEL John A	Major	0508827	CMP	96	8104 *
WOOTEN Wooten	Capt	0351014	Inf	96	8104 *
AULISI Felix J	Major	0521686	SR	95	8107
POLLARD Harry S	Capt	0519953	SR	95	8104 *
ANDERSON Carl S	Capt	0473757	ORD	94	9000
ATKINSON John W	1st Lt	01797588	CMP	94	2120
DELMERICO George G	Capt	01796588	CMP	94	4710
FENDRICK Milton R	1st Lt	01796597	CMP	94	8104 *
HILL Robert M	Major	0517625	SR	94	8107
KEEGAN John J	Capt	0481348	CMP	94	8104 *
REITER Fred M	Lt Col	0185049	CWS	94	8000
ZERRA Jerry L	Capt	01299657	Inf	94	0600
BURNS Francis J	Major	0522394	SR	93	8104 *
CIULINI Fausto	Major	0496925	MC	93	3100
D'ELIASMO Pasquale	1st Lt	01591093	QMC	93	8104 *
SACKEN Erich H	1st Lt	01797536	CMP	93	8104 *
SIMMONS William B	1st Lt	01633547	Sig C	93	0200
FENDER Charles W Jr	1st Lt	01795779	CMP	92	4000
GAEDCKE Walter H	Capt	01795787	CMP	92	6010
KEENEY Herman F	Capt	0217794	CMP	92	2902
MAYFORTH Jesse B	Major	0140191	AC	92	9000
MONTFORT Louis P Jr	Capt	01001017	AGD	92	2124
BLACKWELL James M	Major	0107902	NMB	91	8104 *

OFFICERS DESIRING IMMEDIATE RELEASE * CRITICAL MOS (Contd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>		<u>POINTS</u>	<u>MOS</u>
SAVIN William H	Major	0511995	CMP	91	8104 *
VERDIRANE Frank J	1st Lt	0566982	AC	91	8104 *
AMORUSO Joseph E	1st Lt	01589665	QMC	90	9301
BROWN George M V	Capt	0157953	SR	90	5900
MCNARY Thomas D	Major	0158988	SR	90	8104 *
CAHN Bernard D	Capt	0523081	SR	89	8107
PETRUZZI Daniel J	Capt	01167156	FA	89	8104 *
RAVARINO Mario C	1st Lt	01588324	QMC	89	6010
THEODORE Nicholas P	1st Lt	01001062	AGD	89	2201
WOOLEY Boris S	1st Lt	01797407	CMP	89	8000
BALEONI Frederick H	1st Lt	01286764	Inf	88	8107
COOKSON Harold R	1st Lt	01796582	CMP	88	9307
CULLOTON Bernard A	Major	0522482	SR	88	8104 *
DAVIS James A	1st Lt	01585335	QMC	88	2902
DESIDERIO Michael J	1st Lt	01588581	QMC	88	8104 *
JOHNSON Paul L	Major	0231343	CMP	88	2901
RUSH Carol J	1st Lt	01105381	CE	88	6010
SABATINO Louis A	1st Lt	01175854	FA	88	8107
VECCHIOLLA Frank L	Major	0347524	JAGD	88	8107
VITI Caribaldi	1st Lt	01301059	Inf	88	8104 *
FRIESE Duane D	Major	0329509	Inf	87	2124
HARSE Walter W	1st Lt	01037822	CWS	87	8000
O'LEARY Patrick M	1st Lt	01797342	CMP	87	4000
POYET Henry F	Capt	0500135	CMP	87	8104 *
STONER Louis A	Major	0917145	CWS	87	8104 *
VOGEL James J	1st Lt	01797214	CMP	87	8107
WILEY Richard F	Capt	0375007	CAV	87	0600
BEARD Jamie C	Capt	0293786	Inf	86	2900
CRIGHTON Robert W	1st Lt	01796765	CMP	86	8104 *
HUDSON Henry E	Major	0397586	SR	86	9124
STUMP Walter D	Major	0123292	CMP	86	8107
BIRCHETT Clarence P	Col	0902256	CE	85	7020
BORDEN Glen L	1st Lt	01797597	CMP	85	8104 *
GUILLOTIA Frank A	Major	0519661	SR	85	4000
AUSTIN Allen S	Major	0516745	SR	84	8000
BONGLEZONE Cairus A	1st Lt	01894746	NMB	84	9231
CANTHORN Theodore	Capt	0468596	CMP	84	8104 *
GEMNETTE Adam	1st Lt	01031117	CWS	84	8104 *
GILLESPIE Francis E	1st Lt	01301814	Inf	84	2902
LADD Robert A	WOJG	W2131679	AUS	84	2120
LIPSIUS Harold B	1st Lt	01796974	CMP	84	8104 *
LUMMUS John N	Major	0521456	SR	84	8104 *
MARINKOV George M	Capt	01797681	CMP	84	9000
ROBERTS Donald B	Capt	0251973	FA	84	7421
ROSENBLUM Joel	Major	0304978	Inf	84	7421
ALBRIGHT Robert M	Major	0904004	NMB	83	2330
BEISER Irvine F	Col	0108975	FA	83	2124
BENNETT John S	Lt Col	0517954	SR	83	7020
DUNK Charles I	Capt	0224137	SR	83	8104 *
ELLIOTT John Y	Capt	0519277	SR	83	8104 *
FREEMAN Russell M	Capt	0255527	CMP	83	9121
GARRIGAN Robert E	Capt	0516798	SR	83	8104 *
GIUNTA Nicholas L	1st Lt	0521492	MI	83	6101

OFFICERS DESIRING IMMEDIATE RELEASE * CRITICAL MOS (Contd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>		<u>POINTS</u>	<u>MOS</u>
GLENN Henry L	Major	0162411	JAGD	83	8107
KUCERA Henry P	Lt Col	0521779	SR	83	8104*
MATHIAS David B	Major	0522687	SR	83	6101
MORAN Frank J	1st Lt	01797687	CMP	83	8107
NASH Edmund W Jr	1st Lt	01797169	CMP	83	9124
PAOLINO Virgil A	1st Lt	01176153	FA	83	0600
PASQUESI David	WOJG	W2129886	AUS	83	2110
ROSEN Morton M	Capt	01576579	QMC	83	2902
SANTINI Zachary M	Capt	0197137	TC	83	0600
STRLAND Irving	1st Lt	01048609	CAC	83	0600
TANNER Malcom Z	1st Lt	01306765	Inf	83	2901
TURNER Edmund A	Major	0473803	Sig C	83	0030
WHITE Harold L	1st Lt	01313360	Inf	83	9124
ALESSANDRINI Ubaldo	Capt	01304992	Inf	82	2330
ALEXANDER Charles C	Capt	0312351	CE	82	9320
BROWNSTONE Irving S	1st Lt	01797241	CMP	82	8104 *
CARTER Curry	Lt Col	0473375	QIP	82	8104 *
HARKOW Irvin W	1st Lt	01310245	Inf	82	2120
JOHNSON Arber	1st Lt	01796632	Inf	82	8107
NEUFELD Maurice F	Capt	0918527	QMC	82	2120
NORTHROP Willard B	1st Lt	01285281	Inf	82	4000
PUCCINELLI Arthur E	Major	0919782	Fin	82	6010
ROBB John A Jr	Major	0901613	Sig C	82	7020
VANNOY Paul M	Capt	0280920	CE	82	7611
WINTERSTEEN Thomas E	Capt	0517021	SR	82	5900
BAILEY Lionel H	Capt	0523970	SR	81	2330
CAPRIO Gene F	1st Lt	01299848	Inf	81	8104 *
CLARK Lionel E	1st Lt	01176577	FA	81	0600
FARRIS Neil	1st Lt	01004108	AGD	81	0030
GOODMAN David	Capt	01796607	CMP	81	8104 *
GRUELLE Orie P	Capt	0439623	CMP	81	8104 *
PHILLIPS Wendell E	Major	0160841	CAC	81	8104 *
RENTON Vinal S	Lt Col	0299699	Inf	81	7611
SULLIVAN John D	WOJG	W2131724	AUS	81	6010
WARREN Guy I	Lt Col	0122747	SR	81	8104 *
CORVINI Rudolph	1st Lt	01308926	Inf	80	2901
FERRARI Armando H	Capt	0463842	Inf	80	8104 *
HAMILTON Cecil W	Major	0240737	CE	80	7020
HUGHES James E	Major	0186803	CMP	80	9000
MCNEILOR Edward	1st Lt	01894699	NMB	80	6010
ROBERTSON Alexander	Capt	0528024	SR	80	8104 *
BECKER Lawrence C	1st Lt	01633216	Sig C	79	8107
EARDLEY Carl	Major	0262180	CMP	79	8000
FEHR Carl E	Capt	01798138	CMP	79	9320
GURIN Alfred A	Capt	01168261	FA	79	4950
HOELSCHER Francis S	Major	0524825	SR	79	9000
OFULENTE Blaise J	Capt	01176458	FA	79	2110
VOISTAD Roy L	Capt	0464415	CMP	79	0605
GENTRY William R	Capt	0224642	CMP	78	7020
LEE O Pierre	Major	0519827	SR	78	8104 *
RACCA Frank A	WOJG	W2109963	AUS	78	6010
DAVENAUGH George K	Major	0910550	ORD	77	4319
COMSTOCK Oliver D	Capt	0275871	CMP	82	8104

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OFFICERS DESIRING IMMEDIATE RELEASE * CRITICAL MOS (Contd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>		<u>POINTS</u>	<u>MOS</u>
GUARINI Joseph J	1st Lt	01049184	CAC	77	9000
HOLLADAY Truman G	Capt	0521475	SR	77	8000
MACK Ira	1st Lt	01309582	Inf	77	6010
MORRIS Thomas A	1st Lt	01797333	CMP	77	8107
RIDDELL Glenn E	Lt Col	0521059	SR	77	2124
WAISH John H	Capt	0522486	SR	77	7020
WHITE Emanuel M	Capt	05188006	SR	77	8000
ARENS Robert U	Capt	0485415	Inf	76	5000
BANNING Paul D	Lt Col	0524897	NMB	76	6010
BEATTY Stanley	Capt	0524891	SR	76	9000
DI CHELLO Albert A	WOJG	W2129876	AUS	76	6101
HORN Andrew J	1st Lt	01047823	CAC	76	2902
HOUSTON Charles W	1st Lt	01797136	CMP	76	0600
SAVAGE Paul S	Major	0522162	SR	76	2120
ARONOFF Meyer E	1st Lt	01797587	CMP	75	2124
BALLEW John F	Major	0518294	SR	75	5900
HERSHENSON Harry G	Lt Col	0518898	SR	75	8104 *
LAUBENSTEIN Morvin C	1st Lt	0341962	CAV	75	9124
TUZIO Vincent F	Capt	0499398	MC	75	3005
YOUNG Stephen M	Major	0510615	CMP	75	8104 *

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OFFICERS WITH LESS THAN 5 POINTS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>ARM</u>	<u>POINTS</u>	<u>MOS</u>
ABRUNZO Victor D	1st Lt	01377248	Inf	67	4000
ALPER Benedict S	Major	0519276	SR	65	2025
ANDREWS Paul S	Lt Col	0165179	NMB	74	8104 *
ARENBERG James M	1st Lt	01328867	Inf	55	4000
BANNO Carl C	Capt	0573175	AC	74	8107
BARRUS George W	1st Lt	01315658	Inf	62	2902
BAKRY Edmund A	Major	0925044	CE	74	7020
BATTAGLIA Russell L	Capt	01691030	MC	73	3100
BERGERSON Harold M	Capt	01575738	QMC	71	4000
BERGIN Thomas G	Lt Col	0528710	NMB	73	5403
BERN Lester C	Capt	0298868	Inf	68	8107
BOMBINO Robert M	1st Lt	01322513	Inf	67	4000
BOTWINIK Robert S	1st Lt	0556963	Inf	66	
BRANNIGAN Frank	Major	0136589	TC	72	9121
BREMER George H	1st Lt	0287068	Inf	66	2902
BRUCE Thomas H	Major	01697053	MC	69	3005
BURDICK Herman H	1st Lt	01327503	Inf	46	
CALVANESE Ideal M	Capt	01585241	QMC	68	0600
CHRISTLEMS George F Jr	WOJG	W2124302	AUS	73	0600
CICOLA Joseph A	Capt	01588473	QMC	74	2120
CICERELLE John	1st Lt	01327509	Inf	68	
CLARK Bernard D	1st Lt	01181840	FA	58	2902
CRUMP Stephen A	Lt Col	0539076	NMB	64	8000
CURRAN Kenneth J	Major	0215612	SR	62	0600
DAUGERT Paul A	1st Lt	01894793	NMB	43	2120
DECKER Stanley G	Capt	0525612	SR	63	9000
DEMETROPOLCS Demetrius	J 1st Lt	01111020	CE	70	9120
DERHAM Ray	Major	0520682	SR	69	8107
DI LORETO Richard A	1st Lt	01111577	CE	72	2030
DURBER Joseph W Jr	1st Lt	01327341	Inf	36	2202
DUST John E	Capt	0405757	Inf	71	0200
FARBER Clarence L	Capt	0921167	ORD	72	9000
FELDMAN Edmund B	Major	0251776	SR	71	7020
FISHER Thomas R	Major	0180195	SR	69	2330
FOURNIER Joseph N	Capt	01295359	Inf	64	8104 *
GALLUZZO Joseph	WOJG	W2129885	AUS	73	6201
GOLD Abraham E	Major	0517951	SR	69	8107
GRANAI Cornelius O	Capt	0534821	SR	73	8107
HARRIS Milton	Lt Col	0480903	CE	70	0600
HENETT George H	Major	0182399	SR	71	2124
HICKEY James W	Capt	0519952	SR	71	6010
HIGHLAND Cecil B Jr	Capt	0392653	Inf	68	2124
HOVELL James D	1st Lt	01582378	TC	71	0600
HUMPHREYS Sexson E	WOJG	W2127476	AUS	59	2110
HUNT William H	1st Lt	01824026	CAV	68	
HYLAND Norbert W	Major	0525877	SR	58	7020
KINGERY Donald S	Capt	0347393	CE	73	2025
KLEIN Robert H	Major	0482260	MAC	74	4710
KOETZ John M Jr	1st Lt	01317920	Inf	72	4000
KOCHAN George R	Major	0517750	SR	67	8104 *
KOPP Herman A	1st Lt	01012713	ORD	72	4005

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OFFICERS WITH LESS THAN 75 POINTS (Contd)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>ARM</u>	<u>POINTS</u>	<u>HQS</u>
LLOYD Thomas L	1st Lt	01050581	CAC	74	2902
LOCKWOOD Allen T S	Major	0516004	SR	66	8104 *
LONG Charles M	Major	0350502	CE	73	0700
LUND John	Major	0524366	SR	61	8104 *
MAHONEY Daniel J	Major	0497990	CMP	71	2110
MC DANIEL Harold C	Capt	0922439	NMB	74	6101
REHR Louis	Capt	0464603	AC	54	7121
MILLER Delbert W	Capt	0906084	AC	72	9000
MORGAN Thomas D	1st Lt	01822714	Inf	60	2124
MURPHY John T	1st Lt	01582473	CE	59	6010
NEUBERG Walter B	Capt	0519175	SR	59	8000
NEVELL Albert C	Major	0151082	SR	69	6010
OATES Ward J	Major	0518329	SR	61	6010
O'KEEFE Francis D	1st Lt	01797696	CMP	74	4000
PERRY Charles E	Capt	0127159	CMP	71	8000
RAMSEY Thomas E	Capt	0522781	SR	64	6101
RENFRO William W	Capt	0911526	TC	43	2110
RISTEDT Ernest J	Col	0104062	CE	43	2025
RODGERS Emmett E	Capt	0855350	AC	47	4823
RORIMER Jack S	Lt Col	0523738	SR	70	8000
RUTCHKE Sam	2nd Lt	0555989	FA	39	6010
RYAN Ralph A	Major	0520275	CE	73	7020
SAMPSON William W	1st Lt	0515531	Sn C	48	7960
SANSING Billy M	Major	0561975	AC	53	2611
SCANLAN John J	1st Lt	01797718	CMP	68	8107
SCHMIDT Harry A	Capt	0517643	SR	73	8104 *
SCUDDER Henry H	Lt Col	0205393	SC	74	2025
SHEPHERD Rufus W	Capt	0269899	SR	65	2025
SHIRK Kenelm L	Major	0520272	SR	66	8104 *
SHRIVER Paul D	Lt Col	0520149	SR	68	6010
SMITH Norman R	Major	0364499	ACD	70	2120
SPENCER Frank N Jr	1st Lt	01110269	CE	71	8000
TAYLOR Thomas J	Capt	0520270	SR	70	8104 *
TEMPLE Ralph R	Major	0523284	SR	64	2120
THOMPSON William R Jr	1st Lt	0176546	CMP	69	8104 *
TOR Michael	1st Lt	0579600	AC	58	2120
VALENTINE Edward A	Capt	0158984	SR	66	8104 *
VAN EERDE John A	1st Lt	01895003	NMB	72	8104 *
WARREN Clyde A	Major	0521383	SR	64	8104 *
WASHBURN Carleton W	Lt Col	0518332	SR	62	2025
WAUGH William S	Lt Col	0122479	JACD	72	8107
WEHRLE John S Jr	1st Lt	01050131	CAC	67	3315
WOODFORD Marion J	Capt	0245441	FA	64	2902

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AND 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: 1/19.2/CA.

Tel. Rpt. 525

SUBJECT: Release of Officers.

5 Oct 45

TO: See Distribution Below.

- 1 Permission has been received for the temporary retention of U.S. Officers who are key personnel and for whom a replacement is not available. This applies both to Headquarters and to the field.
- 2 The number to be retained is limited and officers will only be retained on the order of General McNarney.
- 3 If the loss of any particular key personnel will prevent a Sub-Commission from exercising essential functions, the names of such officers may be submitted with a request that they be retained. All such applications must be accompanied by a short but sufficient description of the essential work and that no replacement is available, and the period of retention.
- 4 It must be understood that all such retentions will be for a relatively short time.
- 5 Any applications must reach this office by Tuesday, 9 Oct 45.

[Signature]
S.M. WHITE, Lt Col,
CSO CA Sec.

DISTRIBUTION: Displaced Persons S/O,
Education S/O,
IPF S/O,
Monuments & Fine Arts S/O, N.Y.,
Legal S/O,
Local Government S/O,
Patriots Branch,
Public Health S/O,
Public Safety S/O.

HEADQUARTERS
2675TH REGIMENT
ALLIED COMMISSION (OVERHEAD)
APO 394

Civil affairs Sect.

FRW/rbl

File: 370.

28 September 1945

SUBJECT: Redeployment of Officers - Roster of Officer Personnel. 29 SET. 1945

TO : All Concerned.

1. The enclosed roster shows the status of all officers assigned to and present with this Regiment as of 28 September 1945.
2. The information shown on this roster and the computed scores, as shown, have been compiled from the official records on file at this headquarters. This roster is to be considered official for all redeployment purposes.
3. This roster is forwarded for the information and guidance of all concerned in connection with the redeployment of officers from this Regiment effective 1 October 1945, in connection with current War Department and MTOUSA directives, and in accordance with letter, file: 370, Subject: "Redeployment of Officers", this headquarters, dated 27 September 1945.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

F. R. Wernuth
F. R. WERNUTH
CWO USA
Asst Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Officers, All Companies this Regiment.
Regional Commissioners.
Directors, Sub-Commissions and Sections, Headquarters Allied Commission.
Commissioners, Zones and Communes, Allied Commission.

T	Int	Date
VP CA Sec	26	1 Oct 45
Public Safety	26	1 Oct 45
Public Health	26	1 Oct 45
Legal	26	1 Oct 45
Local Govt	26	1 Oct 45
Patriots	26	1 Oct 45
Dispers	26	1 Oct 45
Education	26	1 Oct 45
IPW	26	1 Oct 45
IPW	26	1 Oct 45

PLEASE PASS QUICKLY

All Officers should see and initial against their names.

Capt's are omitted from original - see every copy attached



1 OCT 1945

POINT SCORE

ROSTER OF OFFICERS, 2675TH REGIMENT, ALLIED COMMISSION (OVHD)

LEGEND

- A - Class "A" Volunteers (Signed for duration plus six months).
- B - Class "B" Volunteers (Signed for not later than 5 March 1946).
- X - Class "X" (Desires immediate release).
- # - Papers forwarded to Higher Headquarters for Relief from Active Duty under the provisions of Circular #485, War Department, 1944.
- * - Critical score was reached by officer on 12 May 1945.

THIS ROSTER SHOWS THE STRENGTH OF ASSIGNED OFFICERS OF THE 2675TH REGIMENT, ALLIED COMMISSION (OVHD), AS OF 28 SEPTEMBER 1945.

7/10/45

COLONELS

* - 136	Hensley, L. J.
* - 133	Bowman, A. C.
* - 120	Densmore, L. D.
* - 109	Jordan, W. R.
* - 107	Chapman, J. W.
105	Weber, J. K.
102	Thomas, F. E.
99	Bolick, C. P.
91	Thornhill, J. B.
90	Howell, E. O. Jr.
88	Menapace, R. B.
85	Birchett, C. R.
83	Belser, I. F.
43	Ristedt, E. J.

REGULAR ARMY

Hume, E. E. (Brig Gen)
McKinley, E. B. (Brig Gen)
Carnes, James J.
Falck, Waldemar A.
Fiske, Norman E.
Page, Thomas M.
Parkin, Charles M.
Walton, Charles W.

LIEUTENANT COLONELS

A* - 136	Oliszewski, C.
* - 134	Seith, H. K.
* - 128	Toscani, F. E.
A* - 122	Regis, J. E.
A* - 111	McPhee, E. R.
* - 110	Snedeker, L.
107	Fitzgerald, J. M.
103	Lollar, R. L.
102	Moore, L. S.
99	Morton, E. P.
# - 99	Birt, C. J.
99	Palmieri, E. L. - 53
96	Bradley, B. W.
95	Arnold, J. S.
95	Spencer, H.
94	Reiter, F. M.
92	Spann, W. M.
91	Scoggins, W. P.
86	Fiore, H. M.
83	Bennett, J. S.
A - 83	Parker, G. F.
83	Kucera, H. P.
82	Carter, C.
81	Renton, V. S.
81	Warren, G. I.
80	Holmes, L. R.
# - 79	King, E. C.
79	McBratney, W. E.
78	Martino, R. A.
77	Riddell, G. E.
76	Banning, P. D.
76	Kenny, R.
75	Hershenson, H. G.
74	Andrews, P. S.
73	Bergin, T. G.
# - 72	Waugh, W. F.
70	Harris, M.
# - 70	Rorimer, J. M.
68	Crump, S. A.
68	Shriver, P. D.
A - 64	Scudder, H. H.
62	Washburne, C. W.

REGULAR ARMY

Neprud, L.
Quartier, H. C.

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MAJORS

* - 159 Sass, E. J.
 * - 133 Wilcox, C. S.
 * - 128 Cobel, P. S.
 * - 127 Hanbury, E. W.
 A* - 125 Cunliffe, J. W.
 * - 124 Richardson, E. H.
 * - 123 Chapman, D. M.
 * - 122 Saunders, R. W.
 A* - 117 Mavis, F. O.
 * - 113 Rively, J. C.
 * - 111 Borak, F. A.
 * - 111 Downer, H. M.
 * - 107 Bump, G.
 A* - 106 Bocchino, E. J.
 106 Boyd, W. C.
 106 Malatesta, A. J.
 # - 105 Cranmer, F.
 104 Delafsky, H. A.
 102 Carrilio, C. J.
 101 Bradbury, H. B.
 A - 101 Heassler, E. A.
 100 Kennemur, D. H., Jr.
 99 Fallotti, F. P.
 98 Ayre, R. H.
 98 Cowan, J. R. K.
 A - 97 Stearns, L. W.
 97 Guidette, A. F.
 97 Levitt, R.
 96 Steel, J. A.
 A - 96 Timmons, B. E. L. III
 96 Chiara, F. J.
 96 Glorum, L. D.
 96 Haban, A., Jr.
 95 Aulisi, F. J.
 95 Goodwyn, G. F., Jr.
 94 Cox, L. L.
 94 Hill, R. M.
 94 Fischer, K. W.
 93 Burns, F. J.
 93 Turner, C. I.
 93 Civlini, F.
 92 Mayforth, J. B.
 91 Blackwell, J. M.
 91 Hildebrand, R. D.
 91 Savin, W. H.
 90 McNary, T. B.
 # - 89 Scott, J. B.
 88 Gulloton, B. A.
 88 Johnson, P. L.
 87 Clinkscales, A. S.
 87 Erenman, T. G.
 87 Freese, D. D.
 87 Stoner, L. A.
 86 Hudson, H. E.
 86 Reede, A. H.
 A - 86 Stump, W. D.

86 Gill, J. W.
 86 Leacacos, J. P.
 85 Gullotta, F. A.
 84 Austin, A. S.
 84 Lammus, J. H.
 84 Mathis, O. H.
 # - 84 Rosenbaum, J.
 83 Albright, R. M.
 83 Laughlin, L. W.
 83 Glenn, H. L.
 83 Turner, E. A.
 83 Vecchiolla, F. L.
 83 Mathias, D. B.
 83 Harrell, C. W.
 82 Newton, H. T.
 # - 82 Puccinelli, A. E.
 82 Robb, J. A., Jr.
 81 Phillips, W. E.
 80 Hamilton, C. W.
 80 Hughes, J. E.
 80 Luckman, F. F., Sr.
 79 Eardley, C.
 79 Hoelscher, F. F.
 78 Lee, O. P.
 78 Scotton, W. E.
 77 Cavanaugh, G. K.
 76 Savage, P. S.
 75 Ballow, J. W.
 75 Young, S. M.
 # - 74 Barry, E. J.
 74 Klein, R. H.
 73 Long, C. H.
 73 Ryan, R. A.
 72 Brannigan, F.
 71 Feldman, E. B.
 71 Hewett, G. H.
 71 Mahoney, D. J.
 70 McIntyre, L. W.
 70 Smith, N. R.
 69 Bruce, T. H.
 69 Fisher, T. R.
 69 Derham, R.
 69 Nowell, A. C.
 A - 68 Reilly, H. V.
 67 Koopman, G. R.
 66 Gold, A. E.
 66 Lockwood, A. T. S.
 66 Shirk, K. L.
 65 Alper, B. S.
 64 Temple, R. H.
 64 Warren, C. A.
 62 Curran, E. J.
 61 Lund, J.
 61 Nugent, A. F.
 61 Oates, W. J.
 A - 58 Hyland, N. W.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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MAJORS (Contd)

54 Daugherty, M. M.
51 Matson, P. G.

REGULAR ARMY

Craig, C. C.

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CAPTAINS

A* - 141	Riggio, S.	86	Beard, J. C.
* - 133	Peterson, W. G.	84	Roberts, D. B.
* - 131	Lombard, R. J.	84	Cawthorn, T.
* - 125	Dorf, A. L.	84	Ciliberti, A.
* - 120	Baker, N. C.	83	Santini, Z. M.
* - 119	Thomas R. F.	83	Dunn, C. I.
* - 119	Cakley, L. W.	83	Elliott, J. Y.
A* - 119	McPhail, A. M.	83	Garrigan, R. E.
* - 118	De Angelis, F.	A - 83	Brownlee, T. R.
A* - 116	Bickley, W. G., Jr.	83	Rosen, W. N.
* - 116	Alasia, G. A.	83	Freeman, R. M.
A* - 112	Earnes, G. W. III	82	Wintersteen, T. E.
* - 107	Marker, G. L.	82	Vannoy, P. M.
* - 107	Gaziano, R. A.	82	Alexander, C. C.
* - 105	Bigham, J. C.	82	Alessandrini, U.
* - 105	Terrellini, E. E.	82	Comstock, O. D.
* - 105	Simpson, A. A., Jr.	82	Neufeld, M. F.
* - 102	Hawksworth, T. W.	81	Bailey, L. H.
A* - 102	Lofaro, C.	81	Goodman, D.
A* - 102	De Nisi, H. A.	81	Noe, S. V.
* - 101	Reim, J. F.	81	Gruelle, O. P.
A* - 101	Coleman, D. L.	80	Elliman, J. F.
* - 100	Hartley, R. S.	80	Robertson, A.
* - 100	Grudzinski, J. A.	80	Ferrari, A. H.
* - 99	Holsten, N. A.	80	Allyn, A. M. (2696 TS Co)
* - 98	Kay, J. L.	79	Volstad, R. L.
A* - 98	Swisher, T. R.	79	Guarino, A. A.
* - 98	Johnson, B. R.	79	Scafidi, A.
* - 97	Monson, L. J.	78	Gentry, W. R.
A* - 97	Neal, Y. A.	78	Heilman, P. L.
* - 96	Wooten, W.	77	Holladay, T. G.
* - 96	Lisi, U. J.	77	Walsh, J. H.
* - 96	Loeb, R. A.	77	White, E. M.
* - 95	Pollard, H. S.	76	Arens, R. W.
* - 95	Bernard, A. L.	76	Beatty, S.
* - 94	Anderson, C. S.	75	Tuzio, V. F.
* - 94	Zerra, J. L.	74	McDaniel, H. C.
* - 94	Zittel, C. B.	73	Battaglia, R. L.
* - 94	Keegan, J. J.	73	Granai, C. O.
#* - 94	Lessa, W. A.	73	Kingery, D. S.
* - 94	Painter, C.	73	Schmitt, H. A.
* - 93	Ramsey, A. C.	72	Farber, C. L.
* - 93	Ault, C. H.	72	Miller, D. W.
92	Gaecke, W. H.	72	Stiles, F. C.
92	Keeney, H. F.	71	Bergersen, H. M.
91	Giammarco, J.	# - 71	Kickey, J. W.
90	Brown, G. M. V.	71	Perry, C. E.
90	Leno, J. J.	70	Taylor, T. J.
90	Miller, L. L.	68	Bern, L. C.
89	Cahn, B. D.	68	Calvanese, I. M.
89	Petruzzi, D. J.	68	Righland, C. B., Jr.
89	Jessup, O. C.	68	Pennoyer, A. S.
87	Poyet, H. F.	66	Valentine, E. A.
87	Montant, L. T., Jr.	65	Shepherd, R. W.
87	Koeller, H. L.	64	Fournier, J. M.
87	Wiley, R. F.	64	Ramsey, T. E.

CAPTAINS (Contd)

64 Woodford, M. J.
63 Decker, S. D.
63 Hall, S.
59 Arnoldy, A. B.
59 Neuburg, W. B.
43 Renfro, W. W.

REGULAR ARMY

Bullock, R. B.

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LIEUTENANTS

* - 145 Cantilli, J. J.
 * - 132 Ritner, J. A.
 A* - 123 Lott, H.
 * - 118 Ash, K. A.
 A* - 113 Bellotti, J.
 * - 108 Voil, D. H.
 * - 102 Teasuro, D. A.
 * - 102 Allen, W. S.
 * - 100 Miller, W. A.
 A* - 99 Amoruso, F. J.
 * - 99 Clegg, G. M.
 * - 98 Coker, H. D.
 * - 98 Hawkins, D. W.
 A* - 98 Condict, S. H.
 * - 97 Morton, N. B.
 A* - 96 Stuart, L. L.
 * - 96 Barone, R. E.
 * - 96 Deluca, J. M.
 * - 96 Jones, C. B., Jr.
 * - 96 Lester, G.
 * - 96 Pankrat, A. M.
 * - 94 Steinberg, M.
 * - 94 Atkinson, J. W.
 * - 94 Delmerico, G. G.
 * - 94 Pendrick, M. R.
 * - 93 Simmons, W. B.
 * - 93 D'Erasmus, P.
 * - 93 Gasparini, A. V.
 * - 93 Pollard, R. O.
 * - 93 Sacken, E. E.
 92 Fonder, C. W., Jr.
 92 Rancourt, H. P.
 92 Leos, P.
 91 Henley, R. W.
 91 Straight, B. W.
 91 Diamant, G.
 91 Verdirame, F. J.
 A - 90 Kurlan, C. T.
 90 Gallagher, P. L.
 A - 90 Petrillo, C. C.
 90 Nardini, J. S.
 89 Crago, W. H., Jr.
 89 Ravarino, M. C.
 89 Rushing, W. R.
 89 Theodore, N. P.
 89 Woolley, E. S.
 88 Cookson, H. R.
 88 Viti, G.
 88 Balboni, F. H.
 88 Cashman, G. W.
 88 Riccomini, B. J.
 88 Alsup, W. J.
 88 Davis, J. A.
 88 Molfetto, C. J.
 88 Rush, C. J.
 88 Sabatino, L. A.

88 Desiderio, M. J.
 87 Divine, G. F.
 87 Vogel, J. J.
 A - 87 Taylor, C. P.
 # - 87 Haase, W. W.
 87 O'Leary, P. M.
 A - 86 Landesman, H.
 86 Anderson, C.
 86 Crichton, R. W., Jr.
 86 De John, D.
 85 Moore, J. S.
 85 Borden, G. L.
 A - 85 Casale, S. A.
 85 Amoruso, J. E.
 85 Harnden, D. W.
 85 Nevans, E. E., Jr.
 85 O'Toole, D. L.
 84 Gillespie, F. E.
 84 Lipsius, H. B.
 84 Gennette, A.
 84 Marinkov, G. M.
 84 Bongarzone, C. A.
 83 White, H. L.
 83 Moran, F. J.
 83 Nash, E. W., Jr.
 83 Paolino, V. A.
 83 Strand, I.
 83 Tanner, M. Z.
 83 Giunta, N. I.
 82 Johnson, A.
 82 Anselmo, O. R.
 82 Brownstone, I. S.
 82 Harkow, I. W.
 82 Matala, P. F.
 82 Bernard, L. B.
 82 Northrop, W. B.
 81 Farris, N.
 # - 81 Caprio, G. F.
 81 Clark, L. E.
 81 O'Donnell, R. T.
 80 Corvini, R.
 80 Germann, R. F.
 80 Mitchell, G.
 80 O'Connor, E.
 80 Micossi, F. S.
 79 Fehr, C. E.
 79 Becker, L. C.
 79 Opulente, E. J.
 78 Cammarata, J. S.
 78 Simoni, J. P.
 77 Guarini, J. J.
 77 Morris, T. A.
 76 Houston, C. W.
 76 Horn, A. J., Jr.
 75 Allen, A. J.
 75 Aronoff, M. E.

LIEUTENANTS (Contd)

75	Laubenstein, N. C.
75	Davis, J. G.
75	Goodman, W. F., Jr.
75	Klemm, E. W.
74	Lloyd, T. D.
74	Cicala, J. A.
74	O'Keefe, F. D.
74	Banno, C. C.
72	Di Loreto, R. A.
72	Koetz, J. M., Jr.
72	Kopp, H. A.
72	Manck, I.
72	Van Eerde, J. A.
71	Howell, J. D.
71	Spencer, F. N., Jr.
71	Adamson, W. M.
70	Demetropoulos, D. J.
69	Thompson, W. R.
68	Scanlon, J. J.
67	Abrunzo, V. D.
67	Wehrle, J. S., Jr.
67	Bombino, R. M.
66	Brenner, G. H.
A - 62	Barrus, G. W.
60	Morgan, T. D.
59	Murphy, J. T.
58	Clark, B. E.
58	Tor, M.
55	Arensberg, J. M.
48	Sampson, W. W.
A - 43	Daughert, P. A.
39	Rutchke, S.
36	Durber, J. W.

WARRANT OFFICERS

* - 110	Leone, G. J.
* - 104	Ellenbast, H. L.
* - 99	Germane, D. G.
* - 98	Wermuth, F. R.
* - 92	Donahue, E.
86	Hill, W. W.
84	Ladd, R. A.
83	Pasquesi, D.
81	Sullivan, J. D.
78	Racca, F. A.
76	Di Chello, A. A.
73	Christians, G. F., Jr.
73	Galluzzo, J.
59	Humphreys, S. E.

CIRCULAR)

No. 290)

Civil Affairs Section

Cir 290

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, 25, D. C., 22 SEPTEMBER 1945

Effective until 22 March 1947 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

RELIEF OF OFFICERS, WARRANT OFFICERS, AND
FLIGHT OFFICERS FROM ACTIVE DUTY

31 OCT 1945

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SECTION I

GENERAL

	Paragraph
Introduction and applicability.....	1

1. INTRODUCTION AND APPLICABILITY. a. The purpose of this circular is to inform all concerned of current War Department policies regarding the relief from active duty of officers, warrant officers, or flight officers, hereinafter collectively referred to as officers, who have served honorably and who do not qualify for release under the Readjustment Regulations.

b. All applications for relief from active duty in accordance with the provisions of this circular will be considered first under the provisions of Readjustment Regulations 1-5, as amended. The separation, if approved, will be effected under the regulation which is the most appropriate in each case.

SECTION II

RELEASE OF SURPLUS OFFICERS

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2. GENERAL. The provisions of this section are applicable to officers--

- Who have completed a reasonable tour of service and
- Who are surplus to the needs of the Army on the basis of their present qualifications and
- Whose retraining in a skill needed by the Army would be uneconomical within the time they could reasonably be expected to serve

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before becoming otherwise eligible for separation.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RELIEF FROM ACTIVE DUTY. a. Recommendation for relief of an officer under paragraph 2 will be submitted by the officer's immediate commander under the provisions of this section whenever he becomes surplus to the needs of the command. Prior to recommending an officer for relief under this section, consideration will be given to retraining for a different category of assignment. In the event that retraining is considered uneconomical, the recommendation for relief from active duty will be submitted without further delay.

b. In cases of officers serving in the zone of the interior, recommendations will be forwarded through command channels for final approval to the commanding general of the major command or to the Adjutant General for those officers not under the assignment jurisdiction of a major command. Except in cases of Medical Corps officers and officers, who are eligible for overseas duty and have completed less than 2 years' active, honorable military service since 16 September 1940, the authority to finally approve recommendations may be delegated to, but not below those commanders specified in paragraph 9b(4), (5), and (6), AR 605-12, 17 August 1944. The authority to finally approve recommendations for the relief of Medical Corps officers and officers who are eligible for overseas duty and have completed less than two years' active honorable military service since 16 September 1940 will not be delegated below the War Department.

c. In cases of officers serving in overseas theaters, recommendations for relief from active duty will be made by the officers' immediate commander and forwarded through command channels to the Adjutant General, Attention Officers' Branch, Separations Section, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C. Recommendations disapproved by the theater commander will not be forwarded.

d. The recommendations will include the following:

(1) Date the officer reported on extended active duty, his age, his Adjusted Service Rating Score as of 2 September 1945 and his desires as to retention in the service.

(2) Statement of duty assignments for which the officer concerned is qualified by training and experience and by civilian occupational background.

(3) Statement that a surplus exists in the command jurisdiction of officers of the particular grade or any higher grade who are qualified to fill these duty assignments.

(4) Statement that the officer is entitled to separation under honorable conditions.

(5) Statement that no disciplinary action or reclassification proceedings under AR 605-230 are pending or appropriate in the case.

(6) Statement that no Hospital Disposition Board or Army

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Retiring Board proceedings are pending or believed to be appropriate.

(7) A complete and up-to-date copy of officer's qualification card (not original).

c. Each commander taking action on a recommendation for relief from active duty will either reassign the officer within his jurisdiction or forward the recommendation, including in his indorsement the statement required by d (3) above, pertaining to surplus of officers in his command.

4. REQUESTS FOR RELIEF FROM ACTIVE DUTY. Individual application for relief from active duty under the provisions of this section is not authorized.

5. APPROVAL. a. The headquarters in the Zone of the Interior authorized to finally approve recommendations for relief from active duty under this section will, upon approval of the recommendation, issue necessary instructions to accomplish the release of the officer.

b. Commanders of overseas theaters are authorized to return to the continental United States officers whose recommendations for relief from active duty they have approved. Radio report of such cases will be made to the Adjutant General. The return of officers from overseas under provisions of this Section will not serve to displace high score officers or enlisted men.

6. RELEASE OF OFFICERS OF PARTICULAR CATEGORIES. The use of the provisions of this section by the major forces to provide for bloc release of officers of particular categories surplus to the Army-wide needs may be authorized by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department General Staff on specific request of the major force. Such requests, when submitted, will be accompanied by complete data establishing the bloc as surplus to Army-wide needs.

7. CONTROLS. The Commanding Generals of the major commands will establish the necessary controls to insure that:

a. Releases of officers in accordance with the provisions of this section are accomplished generally in the order of merit established by their Adjusted Service Rating scores.

b. No releases of officers under this section will operate to defer the relief from active duty of officers or the discharge of enlisted personnel entitled to separation under the Readjustment Regulations.

8. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. a. Forwarding indorsements of recommendations for relief from active duty may contain any additional details deemed desirable but not specifically required by paragraph 3. In the event that approval is recommended when all the required statements cannot be made, full particulars justifying exceptional action in the case will be furnished.

b. Officers relieved from active duty under the provisions of this section are relieved for the convenience of the Government and if

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other-wise eligible, are entitled to mustering-out pay.

SECTION III

RELEASE ESSENTIAL TO NATIONAL HEALTH, SAFETY, OR INTEREST

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9. APPLICATIONS. In particular instances when it can be definitely determined on documentary evidence that an officer can render more valuable service to the Nation in a civilian capacity, he may apply for release from active duty under the provisions of this section. Releases in accordance with the provisions of this section will be held to a minimum, and applications for release will be carefully scrutinized and approved only in cases where it is clearly indicated that release of the individual from active military service is essential from a National point of view. Careful consideration will be given to determining that the application is based on the National interest rather than on the personal desire and interests of the individuals concerned. An application for relief from active duty under the provisions of this section must originate with the officer. An application submitted in his behalf will be referred to him without action. Applications will be accompanied by documentary evidence in the form of affidavits, statements, letters, or telegrams, setting forth the need of the services of the individual applicant. They will include the following information:

- a. Date the officer reported on extended active duty, his Adjusted Service Rating Score computed as of 2 September 1945 and age.
- b. Name of firm, or agency, or description of individual enterprise.
- c. Product manufactured or services rendered.
- d. Title and description of position to be filled.
- e. Connection with the activity prior to military service.
- f. His qualifications for the position.
- g. Letter from a responsible official of the firm, corporation, or Agency substantiating the facts given above.

10. FORWARDING OF APPLICATION. a. Applications will be forwarded as prescribed in paragraph 3b and c.

b. The first forwarding indorsement will include the following statements:

- (1) Approved or disapproved.

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(2) This officer is (or is not) occupying a "key" position and a replacement will (or will not) be required.

(3) Services of officer have been such as to entitle him to separation under Honorable conditions.

(4) No hospital disposition board or Army Retiring Board proceedings are pending or believed appropriate.

(5) Complete and up to date copies of officer's qualifications card (not original) are attached.

(6) No disciplinary action or reclassification proceedings under AR 605-230 are pending or appropriate in the case.

c. Subsequent forwarding indorsements will include statements b, (1) and (2) and such other remarks as may be deemed pertinent.

11. APPROVAL. a. The headquarters of the final approving authority will, upon approval of the application, issue necessary instructions to accomplish the release of the applicant. Disapproved applications will be forwarded to The Adjutant General, Attention: Officers' Branch, Separations Section for final consideration, accompanied by an indorsement stating reasons upon which action was based.

b. Eligibility for mustering-out pay will be determined by the provisions of AR 35-2490.

SECTION IV

RELEASE BECAUSE OF UNDUE HARDSHIP

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12. APPLICATION. a. Application of an officer may be made for relief from active duty because of undue hardship, either to the individual or his family. An application for relief from active duty under the provisions of this section must originate with the officer. An application submitted in his behalf will be referred to him without action. Applications will be forwarded in the manner prescribed in paragraphs 3b and c above and will include a statement of the date the officer reported on extended active duty, his Adjusted Service Rating Score computed as of 2 September 1945, and age.

b. Such applications must establish the following:

(1) The individual or his family is undergoing hardships greater than the normal hardships which are being experienced by all members or families of members of the military service.

(2) The hardship is not of temporary nature.

(3) There are no means of alleviating the condition other

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than by relieving the officer.

(4) Upon release, the officer will be able to eliminate or materially alleviate the condition.

c. Documentary evidence in the form of letters, telegrams, or affidavits establishing the necessity for relief from active duty will accompany each application.

d. Application for relief from active duty for undue hardship of officers temporarily in the United States from overseas theaters will be submitted to the commanding officer of the installation to which the individual concerned has been directed to report upon expiration of temporary duty or leave. The commanding officer of such station will process the application in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the major force having command jurisdiction over the installation.

e. The headquarters of the final approving authority will, upon approval of the application, issue necessary instructions to accomplish the relief of the applicant. Disapproved applications will be forwarded to The Adjutant General, Attention: Officers' Branch, Separation Section, for final consideration, accompanied by an indorsement stating reasons upon which action was based.

13. a. During the period of active hostilities the Army's pressing need for man over necessitated that extremely rigid standards be observed in reviewing applications for separation for hardship. With the Army now in the process of demobilization it is desired that these rigid standards be relaxed. However, the basic principle of demobilization which contemplates the release, in order of merit, of those most deserving of separation will be considered in reviewing requests under this section.

b. Eligibility for mustering-out pay will be determined by the provisions of AR 35-2490.

SECTION V

RELEASE BECAUSE OF AGE

	Paragraph
Requests.....	14
Separation.....	15

14. REQUESTS. Male officers who have attained the age of 50 years and female officers who have attained the age of 40 years will be relieved from active duty under the provisions of this Section providing:

a. They request such relief in writing.

b. They are entitled to separation under honorable conditions.

c. No disciplinary action or reclassification proceedings under AR 605-230 are pending or appropriate.

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d. No hospital disposition board or Army Retiring Board proceedings are pending or believed to be appropriate.

15. SEPARATION. Officers who apply for relief from active duty under provisions of this Section will be reported for separation without delay and in no case later than 60 days after application is made.

SECTION VI

MISCELLANEOUS GENERAL PROVISIONS

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Retention of commissions after relief from active duty.....	17
Special provisions for National Guard officers.....	18
Special provisions for battle wounded.....	19
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16. GRANTING OF ACCRUED LEAVE. a. An officer who has been recommended for or has requested relief from active duty may, with his consent, be granted accrued leave pending final action in the case.

b. An officer granted such leave will be specifically notified that he is subject to reassignment.

c. Prior to final separation from active service, an officer will be granted, when practicable, terminal leave under the provisions of AR 605-115.

17. RETENTION OF COMMISSIONS AFTER RELIEF FROM ACTIVE DUTY. A commissioned officer relieved from active duty under the provisions of this circular will be furnished a certificate of service and may retain his commissioned status, as following:

a. An officer holding an appointment in the National Guard of the United States or in the Officers' Reserve Corps will return to inactive status in the grade held upon relief from active duty. If he holds an appointment to higher temporary grade in the Army of the United States, he will retain this grade until 6 months after the termination of the war.

b. An officer holding an appointment in the Army of the United States only will retain his appointment on inactive status until 6 months after the termination of the war.

c. Any appointment to a temporary grade in the Army of the United States (Air Corps) made under the provisions of Public Law 453-77th Congress, will be terminated.

d. Any officer relieved from active duty under the provisions of this circular may submit his resignation, if he so desires, at the time of relief or at any time while on inactive duty.

18. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS. In the

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case of a National Guard officer relieved from active duty under the provisions of this circular, The Adjutant General will notify the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and The Adjutant General of the State of origin, in order that appropriate action may be taken with respect to the status of the officer in the State organization.

19. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR BATTLE WOUNDED. Special consideration will be given to the desires of combat wounded officers who, as a result of their wounds, are permanently below the physical standards for general service. Such personnel who so desire will be relieved from active duty whenever practicable. However, if any individual specifically requests to be retained on active duty, special consideration will be given his retention provided his physical condition, experience, and the needs of the service will permit useful employment. Combat disabled officers will not be encouraged to remain on active duty.

20. RESCISSION. a. The following publications are rescinded:

(1) War Department Circular 485, 1944, subject: "Relief of Officers, Warrant Officers and Flight Officers from Active Duty."

(2) Section VII, War Department Circular 137, 1945.

(3) Section V, War Department Circular 150, 1945.

(4) Letter, AGPO-S-A-220.8 (18 August 1945) dated 29 August 1945, subject: "Release of Physically Qualified Military Personnel by Means other than Readjustment Regulations."

b. Cases initiated under the provisions of rescinded publications prior to receipt of this circular will be processed for final action under the provisions of this circular.

(AG 210.8 (14 Sep 45))

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
Acting The Adjutant General

Reproduced by Hq 2675th Regt ALCOM (Ovhd)
APO 394, 19 October 1945 SEH

G. C. MARSHALL Chief of Staff	Init	Date
VP CA Sec		
Public Safety		22/10
Public Health		29/10
Legal		29/10
Local Govt		30/10
Personnel		
Disper		1/11
Education		1/11
MFA & A		2/11
Ca Sec		

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