

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

ACC - Italy

10000/105/140

13pp

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

10000/105/148

I/23.2/CA - Officers - AC
Discipline - Staff Duties - Officers
P.S. Sub. Commission, Jan. 1944 - Jan. 1945

13 pp.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

RESTRICTED

14 APR 1945

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

F 59507

AFR 131754B

D/7592

AFR 132104B

ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED MONAGNEY CITE FRANK

ALCOM HOME

RESTRICTED.

Reference our F-2887 of 17 February.

Chief Public Safety Sub-Commission A C ITALY, BRUCE SMITH and DON STIVER
unavailable.

HARWOOD and ADAMS are available. Request your preference.

HEADQUARTERS
14 APR 1945

DLT

ACTION: Est Sec 2

INFO: A/President

Chief Commissioner

Executive Commissioner

CA Sec

File

384

VP requests HARWOOD.

Est Sec informed by phone

14 April

Attn: Bureau of...

RESTRICTED

3899

RESTRICTED

F28889

Feb 12/1949A

PA See
D/2326

Feb 18/0940

ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGEG
ALCOM ROME

*Ch See not on orig distribution
this copy rec'd on request 14 Feb 49*

RESTRICTED.

AGWAR cable W-36812, 13 February 45 is paraphrased for your information.

"BRUCE SMITH came to WASHINGTON subsequent to General SPOFFORDS departure and was interviewed. He stated at this time \$1500 per month was the least salary at which he could make himself available.

We attempted to try to procure his service by letter at the current top salary plus allowances being paid in ITALY of approximately 11,600 dollars to Mr ANTOLINI and requested that he recommend qualified substitute if he were not available at that salary. SMITH did not accept this proposal but made 3 recommendations:

(1) Colonel JONATHAN H HARWOOD, who has been for last 20 years Executive Officer to RHODE ISLAND State Police. He holds a Bachelor Degree from HARVARD and is highly recommended by Captain VANDERBILT USNR (former Governor of RHODE ISLAND under whom he served). His age is 52 years.

(2) Colonel LYNN G ADAMS, formerly Provost Marshall of PARIS during last war, Superintendent and later Commissioner to the PENNSYLVANIA State Police, age 60 or slightly over. Since retiring from PENNSYLVANIA Police has acted in matters pertaining to state governments war time activities as aide to Governor MARTIN.

(3) Colonel DON SAIL STIVER, for 10 years superintendent of INDIANA State Police and who resigned December 1944 upon change of state administration. Was chairman of state and provisional section of International association of chiefs of police. Holds arts and law degrees from University of MICHIGAN".

Request your comments and action desired.

Dist (over)

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref. 23-2
1/23/CA

8th January, 1945.

SUBJECT: Public Safety Sub-Commission.

TO : Chief of Staff.

1. I desire to raise for the consideration of the Chief Commissioner and yourself the question of the future of the Public Safety Sub-Commission.

2. As you know, Colonel Young is due to go home before the 1st April, but on the 5th January we received a signal asking whether it was possible to release him as the Home Office are anxious that he should take up his civil appointment at the earliest opportunity.

3. I am far from satisfied with the work of the Public Safety Sub-Commission and have sent you a copy of some notes of a meeting I held with Col. Chapman and Col. Young on the 29th December last, (see my 1/23.2/CA of the 31st December).

The position does not seem to be improving substantially and it is my considered opinion that there should be a change in the Director of the Sub-Commission. In my opinion we made a mistake in putting in a non professional head and I feel that Col. Chapman has not the necessary technical equipment and background to enable him properly to direct the activities of this Sub-

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4. The real truth is that there are no American professional policemen in this theatre and I am not prepared to be responsible for the conduct of the Public Safety Sub-Commission, whose duties I need hardly point out assume an increasing importance as we move into the industrial north, unless a proper professionally qualified and experienced police officer is in charge of its activities. You might just as well put a policeman in charge of the Legal Sub-Commission, or a lawyer in charge of the Public Health Sub-Commission, and expect those Sub-Commissions to function properly.

5.

I therefore make the following recommendations:

- (a) That Col. Young be released in one month's time. I do not want him to leave before as he is in the middle of extremely important negotiations over the Carabinieri.
- (b) That Col. Doherty, who has had a very wide experience of police work at home where he was Assistant Chief Constable of Glasgow, and also out here where he has been R.P.S.O. Fifth Army for some months, be brought in to this Headquarters as soon as possible with a view to taking over when Col. Young leaves.
- (c) That Col. Chapman be relieved of his position and that Col. Young and then Col. Doherty be appointed Acting Director, unless and until a fully trained, experienced and high level professional police officer can be sent from the United States.

G.P. UPJOHN, Brig.
VF CA Section.
DCOS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INTER OFFICE MEMO

5 JAN 1945

From: Executive Officer (B)

5 GEN 1944

FILE No.

SUBJECT:

5 Jan. 1944

TO: D.C.O.S. Civil Affairs Section

Attached copy of signal for your information. *Original has been minutes to C.O.S.*

J.L.I.

381

7030

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Copy of S-1 received 5 January 44.

Reference F79045

Date Jan 041721A

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHGEC

TO : ALCOM

RESTRICTED.

"Is possible to release Col. YOUNG yet? Your 5165 of 21 October 44.

"Home Office anxious he should take up civil appointment earliest opportunity."

DIST.

ACTION: G-1(B)

INFO : Chief Commissioner

Estab Sec

File

Float

380

7030

Ry. haps. —
haps. 51040

1. By Durlap may arrive as late as 845-90.
Please keep a dinner.
2. No work tonight.
3. By Durlap is not camp up again if R. is here again.

Further policies for Austria & Hungary.

ALLIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Discipline and Staff Duties,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.
TO : COS.

FILE No. 1/23.2/CA

31st Dec. 1944.

Attached are two copies of a Memorandum of a meeting held in my office at 1700 hrs. on the 29th December, 1944. They are passed to you for information and for submission to the Chief Commissioner should you deem fit.

G.R. UFJOHN, Brig.
VP CA Section.
DCOS.

Encls.

379

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Tel: 608

Ref. 1/23.2/GA

30th December, 1944.

SUBJECT: Discipline and Staff Duties
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

MEMORANDUM of Meeting held in VP's office 1700 hrs. 29th December, 1944.

There were present Brigadier Upjohn, Col. Gripps, Col. Chapman, Director of the Public Safety Sub-Commission, and his Deputy, Col. Young.

The VP opened the meeting by stating that the COS had officially informed him that he was dissatisfied with the work of the Public Safety Sub-Commission. VP stated that he entirely concurred with the views of the COS and he was very worried about the position. He had therefore called the meeting in order to consider what steps should be taken to reorganise the Sub-Commission.

VP stated that he proposed, in order to show the Director and the Deputy Director the sort of thing that was happening in the Sub-Commission, to go through a number of files all of which represented current business and indicated either a failure to take follow-up action, unnecessary and prolonged delays, or bad staff work in the preparation of minutes, memoranda, or letters.

(a) The Strength of the Carabinieri: File 14601/21/RS.

VP stated that a letter had been put in front of him which was addressed to AFHQ enclosing a long statement of figures relating to the Carabinieri. This was obviously a highly important document but on looking at the figures it was quite impossible to tell what was the real strength of the Carabinieri. For instance there was an "actual strength" figure return shown of nearly 53000. Col. Young then explained the various strength returns and what they meant, and pointed out that the actual strength included P.O.W.s, etc. VP pointed out that that was a perfect example of bad staff work for without such explanation, which made the matter quite clear, 398 would have come back with an appalling rocket. Such explanation should have been, and must now be included in the letter to AFHQ.

(b) Carabinieri in Elba: File 14601/55/RS.

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(b) Carabinieri in Elba: File 14601/55/PS.

This file showed a complete lack of follow-up on instructions given for the evacuation of the Carabinieri from Elba. The COS had written asking the position on the 29th November and 6th December, and all information had been collected by the 11th December, yet it was not until the 23rd December that the Minute arrived on VP's desk, so that COS has had to wait nearly a month for a reply on a simple matter.

(c) War Graves (Missing Air Personnel): File 14116/PS.

The U.S. Air Force had sent a long letter asking that the Carabinieri should make an intensive search all over the country for wrecked aircraft; all that the Sub-Commission had done was to prepare for VP's signature a letter quoting in extenso the original letter which it was proposed to send out to Regions. VP queried

whether it was proper to ask the Carabinieri to make an intensive search in view of their other duties, and suggested that the most we could properly ask the Carabinieri to do would be to notify at once any cases of crashed aircraft which came to their notice.

Col. Chapman and Col. Young entirely agreed with this VP. VP stated that the fault appeared to have been that of the Executive Officer. PS would re-draft a proper letter.

(d) Military Police for Sardegna: File 14137/PS.

VP stated that a good letter had been submitted for signature by Brig. Parkinson on the 21st December, but had been withdrawn and a bad letter, apparently drafted by Col. Chapman, had been put before him together with the original letter for Brig. Parkinson's signature, and was a perfect example of extremely bad staff work.

(e) Garrison Troops for Sardegna: File 14056/5/PS.

Col. Chapman had submitted a very strong Minute pointing out the strong and frequently expressed views of the R.C. Sardegna, protesting against reduction of the garrison below 5000. But VP remembered some of the history of the case and looked back through the file and found that we had been a party to many of the transfers from the island and what, in fact, had happened was that PS had failed to take action at the right moment and had encouraged Land Forces Sub-Commission, who acted in perfect good faith, to withdraw more troops from the island than was prudent. We were now plainly stopped from complaining. VP suggested that, in fact, 4,200 troops now left in Sardegna were probably sufficient and Col. Chapman and Col. Young agreed. VP said he would recommend COS in that sense and pointed out that Col. Chapman's original Minute though good on the face of it was quite misleading.

(f) Clothing for Guardia di Finanza: File 14012/4/PS.

A letter dated 14th December had passed through CA Section from Land Forces but no answer had come back. Col. Chapman said the file was now on his table.

(g) Move of Montegrone Bn.: File 14622/1/PS.

VP said that we had got a very bad name from AFHQ in connection with this matter, and he referred to the latest memorandum on the subject from COS. Col. Chapman said that he did not think in this case that the behaviour of PS was wrong and he considered that confusion was caused by last minute operational moves out of the control of PS. VP thought that whatever might be said in favour of PS two things 397

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Col. Chapman said that he did not think in this case that the behaviour of PS was wrong and he considered that confusion was caused by last minute operational moves out of the control of PS.

VP thought that whatever might be said in favour of PS two things could not: (i) that it failed to answer a letter from AFHQ on the 9th November, and (ii) that it never bothered to write to the PS officer in Ancona to find out whether or not accommodation was available there. Had PS done so at an early stage much confusion would have been saved.

VP said that these cases, all of which were current cases selected at random, showed that the PS Sub-Commission wanted substantial reorganisation in its staff. He was not satisfied either that Col. Chapman or Col. Young were sufficiently in the picture and it appeared that a number of their staff were operating independently without reference to them. It had always been his practice when Chief Legal Officer to sit in the same room with his Deputy, Col. Wilmer, and both he and Col. Wilmer considered everything, except purely routine matters, which went through the office. He appreciated that PS had a very large volume of work and he did not expect the Director and his Deputy to

see everything, but he was convinced that it was essential that there should be a much greater degree of coordination between Col. Chapman, Col. Young, and their staff; (collaboration and cooperation was not in question), and although he would not insist on it he thought it would be a very good plan for Col. Chapman and Col. Young to sit in the same room.

At all events, the staff system operating in PS must be reorganised so that the desired degree of coordination was achieved. He reiterated that he wanted Col. Chapman and Col. Young put in the picture very much more and to discuss the affairs of the Sub-Commission together to a much greater degree than hitherto.

VP also suggested that the work of the Executive Officer was not up to standard and it might be desirable to make a change. Col. Chapman thought that Major Luckman was a good man but admitted that he required a great deal of training. He and Col. Young would consider this matter.

Col. Chapman also said that he felt he was not in the picture and he wanted to get into it much more.

VP said that he thought he was now able to arrange for the Security Division to be moved up on to the same floor as the rest of the Sub-Commission. Col. Cripps and Col. Young would discuss details after the meeting.

VP closed the meeting by stating that he was sure matters could be improved and the object of the meeting had not been mere criticism but to see that the Director and his Deputy undertook the required coordination which appeared to be the outstanding matter that needed attention.

The meeting closed at approximately 1750 hrs.

Dictated 1100 hrs. 30th Dec.
by GHI.

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Dictated 1100 hrs. 30th Dec.
by CHU.

Copy to: COS.

376

Lit Nos

1. Strength of CLRR. 14601/21/PS.
2. Police & Military ELBA. 14601/55/PS.
3. War Graves. (MISSING AIR PERSONNEL) 14116/PS.
4. Military Police for SARDEGNA. 14137/PS.
5. Garrison Troops. Italy (SARDEGNA) 14056/5/PS.
6. Monte GRANERO Co. 14622/1/PS.
7. Clothing for Guardia Finanza 14012/4/PS.

NOTE TO VP RE PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION FILES

29.12.44.

✓ Montegrano Bn. File AC/14622/1/PS

This file speaks for itself; a digest of the action taken has been prepared by COS Office.

I made no comment in forwarding the explanation 56A as I accepted the F.S. statement and was not in possession of the remarks submitted by Land Forces Sub-Commission.

✓ Missing Air Crew Personnel: File AC/14116/PS.

You are asked to sign or approve of 100A, which deals with enquiries into casualties to personnel and craft of M.A.A.F. The document is simply a complete transposition of the letter addressed to us (99A) with an unnumbered para at foot instructing R.C.s to instruct police agencies to comply with a procedure that is not set out.

It needs thought, and possibly a separate approach in each AMG and Italian Government Territory?

Also letter to Ministry of Interior asking their assistance.

Note letter date: 16th Dec. answer prepared 27th Dec.

3. —

✓ Police and Military. Elba: File AC/14601/55/PS.

Note dates and time elapsed in para 3.

The red references in the Minute 8 have been inserted by this office. Omission led to considerable search in order to staff the file.

Note also that between 29th Nov. and 6th Dec. no interim reply was sent to COS advising of the position.

2. —

Military Police for Sardegna: File AC/14137/PS.

This letter is also an almost complete quotation of another (not yet numbered on file). It does not really help R.C. Sardegna very much, nor deal with the problems raised in R.C.s letter of 14th Dec. The ref. no. of AFHQ reply should have been inserted in para 1.

A very much better letter is on the file for signature of A/VP in your absence, but does not appear to have been submitted ^{by PS}.

4. —

*No action taken to answer further enquiry
The report by Land Forces Sub-Commission*

Also letter to Ministry of Interior asking their assistance.
Note letter date: 16th Dec. answer prepared 27th Dec.

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*he action taken in Sardinia position was
to report by Lancia over overboard.*

Sardinia

374

Chilly for G. de F.

1. Letter to AFHQ with CCRP figures. 14601/24/PS
5. Garrison troops for Sardinia 14056/5/PS

Note dates and time elapsed in para 3.

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Sardinia

374

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