

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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ORG & ADMIN, INTERNAL SECURITY
JULY 1944 - OCT. 1945

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

IN-HOUSE OFFICE MEMO

TO: C33

At the Executive Commissioner's Meeting this morning I raised the matter of some modification in the conditions under which senior officials are admitted into this building.

Sections were asked to let the Establishment Section have their view on the matter.

Apart from the question of giving high officials, say Ministers and their Under-Secretaries, a permanent pass, there is the question as to what extent they should be allowed to roam about the building. During the discussion, Economic Section suggested that there should be two types of pass - a special pass should be issued to very high officials which would enable them to use the building without any restriction and a second permanent pass which would necessitate the use of a guide. I feel that this would make the business much too complicated.

I feel that probably the best way to deal with the matter would be to let the present system stand but to have a special room or table at which those with priority passes could be expeditiously dealt with and it might be possible to give them other privileges, such as not having to hand in all their documents, etc.

Please check.

MC

A. JARR, Esq.,
VP 3A Section.

J. DODD.

4833

VP

I agree - a strictly limited issue of a priority pass should be issued only except Ministers and the Under-Secretary & other principal assistants.

A priority pass with special facilities including a special table for important officials.

Other persons to queue at the ordinary desks.

A check sheet on enrolment forms - no need to introduce names unless the names are introduced during the visit to the building in the form - the official concerned should be notified for an introduction - possibly the very alternatively of the name before the visit receives the pass.

Minutes

590
16
ALTO COMMISSARIATO
PER LE SANZIONI CONTRO IL FASCISMO

2 - NOV 1945

IL COMMISSARIO PER L'EPURAZIONE

Roma, 30 ottobre 1945

3/13/CA ✓

21A

49A
Pre.mo Sig. Solomello White,

ho ricevuto il permesso trasmessomi
con la sua lettera 3/13 P/C A del 23 ottobre. Le dò
assicurazione che restituirò il permesso quando non
avrò più necessità di usarlo. La ringrazio sentita-
mente della Sua cortesia e saluto cordialmente.

IL COMMISSARIO PER L'EPURAZIONE
(Avv. D. L. Farretti Criva)

[Signature]

Mr S.M. White
U.S.C. Ca Section
Headquarters Allied Commission
A.P.O. 304
Civil Affairs Section

R O M A

4838

5446

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

(209)

3/13B/CA

2 Nov 45

SUBJECT: Pass to enter HQ AC

TO : Headquarters Commandant HQ AC

It is requested that passes be issued to the under-mentioned Italian draughtsmen employed by this Section

Bardiotti Tullio
Buccolini Riccardo
Lenzi Luigi
Paterniani Renato
Scarpellini Armando
Sgrigna Ezio

plc

S.H. WHITE Lt. Colonel
CSO CA Section

4857

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

19A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref : 3/13 W/CA

23 Oct 45

Dear Sir,

The enclosed pass has been issued for your personal convenience; it will exempt you from having to obtain a permit at the enquiry desk. It is not transferable and purely personal. If on your visit you are accompanied by any colleague it will be necessary for him to obtain a permit in the usual manner. When the pass is no longer required, will you please see that it is returned. If by mischance it is lost, will you please report the loss without delay.

Please acknowledge its receipt.

Yours truly

S.H. WHITE Lt Col,
CSO CA Section

AK

4856

Avv. Domenico PERETTI-GRIVA
Alto Commissario Aggiunto per l'Epurazione
Palazzo del Viminale,
R O M A

2805

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref 3/13.B/GA

24 Oct 45

SUBJECT : Passes for HQ AG.

TO : Internal Security Officer

Reference this Office letter 3/13.B/GA of 20 Oct 45.

Please issue a special pass to Lt CARLONI. This Officer is ADC to General BRUNETTI and is always with him. Card No 482 is returned for cancellation.

JK
J. S. REAKES Maj,
for CMO GA Sec.

Copy to: PS 3/C (Card No 9 for Gen. Brunetti is returned herewith).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Internal Security

17A

HRC/13

23 October 1945

SUBJECT: AC Passes

TO : Civil Affairs Section, Hq. AC.

23 OCT. 1945

Herewith enclosed are the AC. passes requested in your letter dated October 20 - 3/13.H/CA.

169

C. A. Bengtson
C.A. BENGTSON
1st Lt. AUS
Security Officer

4855

5/107

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref 3/13.B/CA

20 Oct 45

SUBJECT: Passes for HQ AG

TO: HQ Commandant

Attached is a list of Italian Ministers and Under-Secretaries who are entitled to special pass.

H.E. Anson
H.E. ANSON, Major,
for CSO CA Section

Ref. to HQ letter
Please issue a special pass to
Colonel. This officer is ADC to General
Barnette and is always with him. Card
482 is returned for cancellation.

4804

*Copy to P.S. of C. (Card 9 for Gen
is returned herewith)*

942

Ref: wire to 1/13, 3/CA of 20 Oct

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Pos. 1

Avv. Domenico BRUNETTI-GRIVA 6 - Assistant High Commissioner for Defascism.

PATRIOTIC BRANCH

Dott. Enrico BERLANDINO 7 - Undersecretary to Ministry of Post-War Assistance

LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB-COMMISSION

Pos. 10

- | | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Prof. Ferruccio MARI | 1 | - Minister of the Interior |
| Avv. Giuseppe SPATARO | 3 | - Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Interior |
| Avv. Mario REGGIO | 4 | - Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Consulta Nazionale. |
| Sig. Pietro MARI | 2 | - Vice President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for the Constituent Assembly and High Commissioner for Defascism. |
| Dott. Corrado CATENACCI | 5 | - Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Interior. |

PUBLIC HEALTH SUB-COMMISSION

Prof. Cino BERGAMI 8 - High Commissioner for Public Health & Hygiene.

PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION

4500

- | | | |
|-------------------------|-----|--|
| General BRUNETTI | 9 | - C.O. CHER |
| Lt. CARLONI | 482 | - Aide D/C of Gen. Brunetti (Priority Pass only) |
| Dott. Gabriella VOLPE | 10 | - Director General Istituto Prevenzionale e Renna Ministry of Grace and Justice |
| Comm. Salvatore ARIENZA | 11 | - Councillor Court of Appeals Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Grace & Justice |

Prof. Partecipio MARI 1 - Minister of the Interior
 Avv. Giuseppe SERRARO 3 - Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Interior
 Avv. Mario PROSIO 4 - Vice President of the Council of Ministers
 and Minister of the Consulta Nazionale.
 Sig. Pietro NESI 2 - Vice President of the Council of Ministers,
 Minister for the Constituent Assembly and
 High Commissioner for Defascism.
 Dott. Corrado CATINACCI 5 - Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Interior.

PUBLIC HEALTH SUB-COMMISSION

Prof. Gino BERLAMI 8 - High Commissioner for Public Health & Hygiene.

PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION

General IRONZENTI 9 - C.G. CODE
 Lt. CARLONI 102 - Aide D/O of Gen. Brunetti (Priority Pass only)
 Dott. Gabriello VOLPI 10 - Director General Istituto Previsionale e Renda
 Ministry of Grace and Justice
 Comm. Salvatore ARINOSA 11 - Councillor Court of Appeals
 Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Grace & Justice

MONUMENTS AND FINE ARTS SUB-COMMISSION

Sig. Carlo Ludovico RACCHIANTI 12 - Undersecretary of State for Fine Arts
 Sig. Remigio MANCHI-SANDINELLI 13 - Director-General of Antiquities and Fine Arts.

ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR DIVISION

Gen. Alberto MARINELLI 14 - Head of the Autonomous Office for War Veterans
 and Repatriated PW, Ministry of War.

5/13.B/CA

ISA

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION

15 OCT. 1945

Tel: 478706

AC/9/A/LG

SUBJECT: Permanent passes for HQ AC

15 October 1945

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. Reference your 5/13.B/CA of 11 October, the following information is submitted:

PARRI, Professore Ferruccio, Minister of the Interior

(NOTE: It is probable that a permanent pass is being issued to Professor PARRI through other channels in his capacity of Prime Minister.)

SPATARO Avv. Giuseppe, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior

BROSIO Avv. Mario Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Consulta Nazionale

NERI Sgr. Pietro Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for the Constituent Assembly

2. It is also recommended that a permanent pass be issued to Dott. Corrado CATENACCI, Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of the Interior. The nearest British equivalent to Dott. CATENACCI's post is that of Permanent Under-Secretary of State, and he has more occasion to visit this Sub-Commission than any of the others mentioned above.

[Signature]
for *Napoli*

RALPH R. TEMPLE 4802
Major
Director
Local Government Sub Commission

CGHW/pec

4802

5344

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref 3/13.B/CA

11 Oct 45

SUBJECT : Passes for HQ AC

TO : All CA Sub-Commissions

- 1 It has been agreed that Permanent Passes to this HQ shall be issued to Ministers and Under Secretaries and strictly limited to such persons.
- 2 In order that the passes may be prepared, please submit full particulars of the names, initials and appointments of the persons to whom you recommend such passes should be issued.

S.H. WHITE Lt Col,
OSO CA Section

4851

13A
11 OCT 1945

HQC/13/2- 1st Ind. CAB/ojb
OFFICE OF THE HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT, HQ, Allied Commission, APO 394,
10 October 1945.

TO: Vice President, Civil Affairs Section, Allied Commission.

1. The present pass system is being changed to conform with suggestion in Par. 1 (a), basic communication.

2. Steps have been taken to further safeguard identity papers left at the information tables.

3. It is requested that a list be submitted to this Section of Italian Ministers who are entitled to special pass.

Elmer J. Bocchino
ELMER J. BOCCINO,
Major, Infantry,
Asst Hq Commandant.

4850

173

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: 3/12B/CA.

8 Oct 45

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Passes for Italian AG.

TO: Establishment Section.

Reference Minutes of Executive Commissioner's Meeting of 5 October, 1945, para 5.

- 1 It is considered that the arrangement for passes for Italian nationals to enter this Headquarters should be:
 - (a) Ministers and Under-Secretaries should receive a permanent pass entitling them to enter this building without reporting at the enquiry table or being conducted by a guide. This pass should be very strictly limited.
 - (b) Senior Government Officials should receive a priority pass entitling them to be received at a special enquiry table, to the privilege of which only a limited number of persons would be entitled so that they will not have to wait in queues.
 - (c) Ordinary visitors should be dealt with as at present.
- 2 It is considered that the identity papers left at the enquiry table should not be left lying on the surface of the table from which they might easily be stolen and are subject to inspection by other persons.

me

LT. COLONEL, Brigadier,
VF CA Section.

4849

2407

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 994
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: 3/138 '44

18 July 45

SUBJECT: Internal Security

TO: Major Harvey,
Security Division.

I understand that Col. Cripps has spoken to you about this.
I would be very glad of any action which you can initiate.

AB
C.M. UFFORD, Brig.,
VP C.A. Section.

4810

3074

COPIES

CONFIDENTIAL

(BA)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APC 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB - COMMISSION

10/3/45

16 July 45.

Subject: Security.

TO: 305 Civil Affairs Section.

1. There has been for some time in this Headquarters, and to my knowledge within the Civil Affairs Section, a certain amount of pilfering from officers. This has not only included items of some value, such as fountain pens, cigarettes, and so forth, but on one or two occasions personal documents have disappeared. AV. 439 in respect of the undersigned disappeared some time ago and within the last 48 hours a wallet containing my personal papers, including my identity certificate, has been removed.
2. The wallet was in my possession at 2/30 p.m. on Saturday 16 July. No trace of it could be found when, at 6/30 p.m. the loss was discovered and a search made of my office. While it is possible that it might have been dropped in the passage near the office earlier in the afternoon, it would seem more likely that it was removed from my desk.
3. The wallet, minus the complete contents, was discovered this morning (16 July) in the cistern of one of the lavatories on this floor.
4. The fact that persons in this building, even if they had discovered the wallet in the passageway, did not see fit to return any of the contents, including the identity papers, coupled with the fact that my AB. 439 also remains unaccounted for, would seem to indicate that there is a possibility of a serious lack of security existing and it is suggested that it might be appropriate for a special security investigation and observation to be made of all persons using offices on this floor.

4847

(Sgd.) R.R. Cripps, Col.
Director,
Local Government Sub-Com.

10/3/45

HEADQUARTERS ARMY COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: 3, 13B/CA

2 March 45.

SUBJECT: Supply Security Control.

To: Establishment Section, HQ., AG.

Reference your 1st Ind. of 3 March 45 to HCSBA
letter ref. AG 400.73, 346-2 dated 24 Feb 45.

1. Attached are the replies from the only three
Sub Commissions of the C.A. Section, Education, Public Health,
Displaced Persons and Repatriation, which have U.S. W.D.
property other than office equipment.

2. From their replies it will be seen that all reason-
able precautions are being taken to safeguard this property
through the use of directives, inspections, reports and
guards.

3. Office equipment of all Sub Commissions is safeguard-
ed in accordance with instructions issued by this HQ.

4. Typewriters used in the C.A. Section itself have
been signed for by W.J. Dollard and are locked up every night.

R. R. Lipe
G.R. UPICHA Brig
VP CA Section

Enclosures

4816

1 2 4 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

R E S T R I C T E D

3448.1945

(8A)

HEADQUARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 512

24 February 1945

AG 400.73/346-0

SUBJECT: Supply Security Control.

TO : President, Allied Commission, Rome.

1. Loss of supplies through pilferage, organized thefts, barter and the illegal diversion of government property, will continue to be an acute command problem so long as the present economic situation in Italy continues. It is an important command responsibility to reduce these losses to a minimum and this will require the continuing attention of all commanders to prevent any relaxation of strict supply-security control measures.

2. The principal contributing factors in the loss of supplies through illegal acts (the phrase 'pilferage' is generally used) are as follows:

- a. Carelessness and looseness of control measures.
- b. Pilferage by civilian population who are destitute.
- c. Dishonest personnel, including laborers, checkers, drivers, guards, etc., whom it is difficult to screen effectively.
- d. A most inviting Black-Market where huge profits prevail.
- e. Pilferage and organized thefts by military personnel and civilians.
- f. Improper loading of trucks and railway cars.

3. There is attached hereto for transmission to each command unit and installation, for the personal attention of commanding officers, a guide for the preparation of Standard Operating Procedures for the safeguarding of U.S. Government Property. This guide will be studied, a review of present control measures conducted, and then such changes will be effected as may be dictated by the resulting comparisons wherein present safeguard measures are not as adequate as those contained in the guide, or where changes are considered impossible or impracticable due to operational demands.

4845

4. It is desired that you call to the attention of your principal subordinate commands the importance of continuing the command attention to the end that high standards may be maintained on supply-security control. A report will be made on 31 March 1945 to the Theater Commander on supply-security control measures to include the following:

R E S T R I C T E D

(308)

R E S T R I C T E D

ALCOM, 24 Feb 1945

- a. Action taken in compliance with this directive inclosing copies of directives issued.
- b. Explanation of circumstances which make it impracticable to adopt prescribed control measures with a statement of what substitute measures are in force.

/s/ Joseph T. McNarney
JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

1 Incl
Supply Security Guide

Reproduced by Hq 2675th Regt, Allied Commission,
(OVHD), APO 394, 3 March 1945 file.

400.73

(24 Feb 45)

1st Ind.

CMT/jtg

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ESTABLISHMENT SECTION, APO 394, U. S. Army,
3 March 1945.

TO: Vice President, Civil Affairs Section, Allied Commission, APO 394, U. S. Army.

1. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to each sub-commission under your section.

2. Reports as required in par 4, basic communication, will be forwarded to this headquarters not later than 23 March 1945.

BY COMMAND OF REAR ADMIRAL STONE:

C. M. Parkin

C. M. PARKIN
Colonel, Infantry
Executive Officer (US)

1 Incl:
Supply Security Control Guide.

RHF/at

SUPPLY SECURITY
A Guide For the Preparation of Standard
Operating Procedures for Safeguarding
US Government Supplies

(Prepared under the direction of the Provost Marshal General)

INDEX TO SUPPLY SECURITY GUIDE

FORWARD (Page 1)

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PARAGRAPH</u>	<u>AND</u>	<u>PAGE NUMBER</u>
Fencing	1		1
Guard Towers	2		1
Guards	3		1
Entrances and Exits	4		1
Flood Lights	5		1
Traffic Control	6		1 and 2
Pass System	7		2
Guards and Laborers	8		2 and 3
Checks and Tallies	9		3
Port Areas and Associated Railway			
Marshalling Yards	10		3 and 4
Railways and Marshalling Yards	11		4 and 5
Vehicle Movement of Supplies	12		5
Showdown Inspections of Troops	13		5 and 6
Mobile Road Blocks	14		6
Illegal Disposition of Govt Property	15		6
Reports	16		6 and 7

4844

2128

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SUPPLY SECURITYA Guide For the Preparation of Standard
Operating Procedures for Safeguarding
US Government Supplies

(Prepared under the direction of the Provost Marshal General)

Prevention of Loss by Pilferage - Prevention of loss by pilferage of United States government property is the purpose of these supply security measures. Commanders in all echelons must accept this responsibility. Recommendations gleaned from experiences in active theaters are submitted herewith as guides and assistance to supply security.

Sensitive Supply - Post exchange items, rations, gasoline, liquor, drugs, mail, clothing, personal baggage are the most common items which invite pilferage. Greater guard strength must be assigned to protect these items whether they are stored at docks, depots, dumps, railheads or in transit. Other supplies require constant guard but less personnel and modified general security measures can afford adequate protection.

GENERAL SECURITY MEASURES

1. Fencing - Barbed wire fencing will be erected at installations where its use will prohibit access to sensitive supplies or other pilferable material and equipment. The erection of such barricades for other storage areas and installations will be governed by judgment and the extent of losses experienced. The fence should be of sufficient height, durability, and center spacing, and be independent of buildings, damaged walls or rubble heaps. Open space on each side of fence, no obscured approaches permit guarding from one side. Serpentine rolls should only be used as a temporary expedient -- it has been proven that these can be crushed and an entrance made.

2. Guard Towers - Guard towers should be constructed of sufficient height and platform area to permit a free field of fire and observation.

3. Guards - Spacing of guards on perimeter fencing should be so planned that guards are either within sight or calling distance of each other at all times.

4. Entrances and Exits - Entrances, exits and fence perimeter should be under twenty-four (24) hour guard observation. Entrances and exits to any installation must be kept to a minimum consistent with the operation, size and design of the area, and the road net serving installation. Establishment of "in" and "out" gates is advisable for both vehicular and pedestrian traffic. The limiting of foot traffic, both in and out, to a single "pedestrian only" opening, provides a maximum in security and pass control. Reduction in the number of exits and entrances, for economy in guard personnel and localization of movement, can be accomplished by the use of double entrances or exits.

5. Flood Lights - All fencing and approach areas should be flood lighted at night where appropriate, except those areas in which black-out is in effect.

6. Traffic Control - Traffic control should consider the following: 48

a. An uninterrupted in and out flow.

b. Special exits for out loaded vehicles during heavy traffic periods, and the routing of outgoing supplies to these gates for checking. The use by any other traffic should be prohibited.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Supply Security (cont'd)

c. Designation of emergency gates for incoming and outgoing convoys of troop movements.

d. Army, Navy, Merchant Marine and civilian employees will use designated gates to insure effectiveness of pass system.

7. Pass System - A pass system to deny entrance to all unauthorized individuals should be adopted for all supply installations which prohibits entry, in general, to unauthorized persons. Passes should be issued and accounted for by the Security Officer.

a. A pass bureau should be located at the main "in gates" with trained personnel on twenty-four (24) hour service or on duty during all operational hours.

b. Lesser installations should control entrance to area by installation operational action through issuance of local passes or creation of a recognized identification system.

c. The issuance of photographic passes, due to temporary duration, reduction, and abandonment of installations, is not advocated, yet where practical the added security advantage warrants adoption.

d. Pass authority must be constantly on the person of the holder and be subjected to examination by proper authority at any time. Spot checks and roving inspections should be a continuous process. This procedure offers assurance that no unauthorized persons are in the area.

e. Revision of pass systems is necessary at periodic intervals, constant turnover of civilian employees, unreturned and lost passes, creates its own dangers. No system is wholly fool proof and its effectiveness is dependent on continued instruction, supervision, and checking.

(1) Permanent Passes - Issued for thirty (30), sixty (60) or ninety (90) day periods. Definite expiration dates and dates of renewal are most important. Records of issue, cancellation and expiration must be accurately kept.

(2) General Type Pass - Issued to authorized persons, reduces error and confusion and is good general identification. Distinguishing marks may be employed dependent on whether the installation is a temporary or lengthy operation. These markings may permit persons to enter further restricted areas and also show time of validity of pass.

(3) Photographs - Photographs will be attached to all drivers' licenses of all drivers other than American military personnel.

(4) Visitor's Passes - Must be immediately distinguishable from regular passes and must be surrendered by visitor on departure.

8. Guards and Laborers - A distraction of guards or military police, whose training has been in military police security work, by utilizing same as cargo checkers, tally clerks or inspectors is poor operation. Definite and complete orders must be given to guards. Instruction, constant briefing, and regular inspection by a commissioned officer is an absolute necessity. Italian military or

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Ship Security (cont'd)

Civilian guards do not afford the security offered by American personnel. Employment of this type personnel as guards, drivers, etc. may frequently open channels for loss of supplies. Increased American supervision must be provided in such instances. Loading and unloading operations performed by civilian labor or prisoners of war demand constant American supervision and guard. Intentional breakage of packaged goods for later pilferage is a common practice. Damaged and broken packages should be immediately collected and turned in to installation storeroom. All installations handling sensitive supplies must have civilians searched before leaving area.

9. Checks and Tallies.

a. Shortages and overages are often the result of error in count. Estimating tonnage or number of packages is forbidden. Responsibility for loss of supplies will be charged to the agency failing to provide sufficient and competent personnel to guard and account for supplies under their control.

b. Checking Errors - Comparison of totals of supplies received with totals shipped is a part of the mechanics of both the transfer of supplies themselves and the responsibility for them. Prompt exchange of data as to type and quantity of all supplies shipped and received must be arranged between shipper and consignee, and immediate action taken to account for all differences. Delay in compiling or exchanging this information may prevent tracing, recovering, or accounting for supplies involved.

10. Port Areas and Associated Railway Marshalling Yards.

a. Security of supply begins on arrival of a ship in port. Discharging and getting supplies out of ports is only a part of the port responsibility. Further responsibilities are accurate checks, tallies, records and guarding of supplies while in the port. Estimation of tonnage denies possibility of correct initial inventory which in turn prohibits accurate future receipts or consumption records. This must be done before opportunity for "shrinkage" occurs. Warehoused or back piles of supplies are a guard and security function of the agency concerned.

b. Joint utilization of a port by agencies not under the control of the Port Commander demands an amicable arrangement for easy identification of said agency employees, also instructive briefing of guard personnel with reference to privilege of said employees.

c. (1) All items arriving at ports in this theater in charge of Ship's Cargo Security Officers will be considered protected critical cargo.

(2) Base Section and similar commanders will designate a Cargo Security Officer at each port. This officer, or his authorized representative, will contact the Ship's Cargo Security Officer immediately upon arrival in port and arrange to receive security cargo and deliver it to the consignees. If the consignee of any part of the security cargo is located elsewhere, arrangements with the Transportation Officer shall be made to ship it to destination as soon as practicable, consistent with military requirements.

4812

Supply Security (cont'd)

(3) When a shipment of supplies or equipment from the United States is to be classified and shipped as Protected Critical Cargo, this will be indicated on all requisitions and cables to PEIBARK. When shipments originate in this theater, the shipper will notify the Transportation Officer at the port of loading as to all cargo which is to be shipped in charge of the Cargo Security Officer.

(4) Protected Critical Cargo will be held to a minimum and will be requested only for valuable supplies such as dental gold, medical spirits, narcotics, currency, stamps, watches, medals, decorations and awards, pistols, binoculars and items normally exposed to pilferage because of their usefulness and value to the individual, or where prompt delivery to Supply Services of small packages is necessary.

11. Railways and Marshalling Yards.

a. Operation of railways hauling United States government supplies is often the problem of several agencies. The guarding and security of same has, as war progress expediency, been assigned to allied components. Operation of trains is turned back to civilians at the earliest opportunity and this creates further perplexities. Complete liaison, cooperation, and understanding must be had between American Army agencies, Allied or co-belligerent guards, and civilian railway operating agencies.

b. Inspection of Cars - Preloading inspection of all cars and a report of same is a must. Car load checker may do this in addition to his checking duty and an appropriate entry of car inspection made on tally sheet. Cars should not be accepted or loaded which have holes in the floor, roof or walls unless same are repaired. Emergency use of a damaged car demands assignment of a guard.

c. Improper Loading - Loose and careless loading causes waste space, breakage, loss of supply and is an invitation to pilferage. Load inspection of cars is as fixed a responsibility as the initial tally of contents.

d. Open Cars - No pilferable items will be shipped in open or gondola cars except in extreme emergencies, and in such cases a special guard will be placed on such cars.

e. Grouping of Cars - Grouping of cars containing pilferable merchandise is highly desirable. Wherever possible trains will be made up in such a way as to group together those cars carrying the most highly pilferable items in order to facilitate guarding. Economy of guard personnel is effected and this economy is further aided by planned posting of said guard. Guards riding the caboose or guard escort cars are completely inefficient and this practice is prohibited.

f. Tally Sheets - Tally sheets of car content must be affixed in prominent place on inside wall of car upon completion of loading. The accuracy of this tally is highly important in determining completeness of car content on arrival at its destination.

g. Sealing of Cars - All railroad boxcars will without exception have the doors closed, sealed and fastened securely with no less than 5mm wire or with a bolt the threads of which have been burred after the nut is fastened. When wire is used for sealing, a piece about fifteen (15) inches long should be passed through the eye of the car lock. The ends will be drawn together and tightly

Supply Security (cont'd)

twisted three (3) or four (4) times with a tommy bar. To avoid possibility of the seals being unwound, the ends of the wire will be cut short with a cropper so as to finish together.

b. Cars will be inspected enroute, whenever practicable, to determine if cars have been opened or pilferage has occurred. Appropriate reports will be made when cars are found unsealed or where theft is suspected. Cars will be resealed and relabeled when necessary.

1. Civilians - The carrying of unauthorized civilians on supply trains is prohibited. Where authorized civilians are permitted to ride on supply trains they will not be permitted to ride on cars carrying supplies.

2. Responsibility - Responsibility of supply proceeding movement is the absolute responsibility of the source or shipping agency concerned. Checking supplies and furnishing an accurate tally sheet of goods loaded is a part of this responsibility. Railway military police or other railway guards accept the responsibility after the cars are loaded, wired or bolted and sealed. There is a continuing responsibility until the receiving agency physically accepts the car.

12. Vehicle Movement of Supplies.

a. Substantial amounts of truck cargo are lost within the zone of communications through pilferage, theft enroute, hi-jacking, illegal diversion, breakage, careless vehicle handling. Trucks from port installations, dumps, and depots will be moved in small convoys of from three (3) to six (6) vehicles at close interval, one individual being responsible for the movement. Guards will be supplied for these vehicles by the dispatching installation whenever possible and only in exceptional cases will individual vehicles be dispatched. Specific routes will be designated for truck drivers to follow, trucks found off the designated route will be impounded and drivers of same given immediate trial by courts-martial. All truck loads leaving an installation will be checked by count and not by estimation. Drivers will be responsible for loads on trucks and will inspect and sign for their load before departure. This responsibility remains even though guards are employed.

b. Trucks loaded with sensitive supply, stopped due to mechanical failure or for any reason will have a guard stand by. Frequent change of guards on trucks will be a procedure which discourages guard and driver collusions.

c. Unloading at destination will be accompanied by a check of truck content against load dispatch slip and any discrepancies will be reported immediately.

d. All precautions will be taken against alteration and forging of trip tickets, tallies and other records as well as collusion with hi-jacking gangs. Special and alert attention must be exercised on routes having steep grades, obstructions, one way defiles or heavy traffic to prevent loss of supply.

13. Showdown Inspections of Troops - Special emphasis will be placed upon frequent unannounced showdown inspections of all troops. When such inspections disclose illegal disposition of government property, strict disciplinary action will be taken. Statements of Charges cannot be relied upon as an effective

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Supply Security (cont'd)

deterrent, and will not be used as a substitute for disciplinary action. Publicity programs will be instituted which will effect a wide dissemination to the troops of the results of such disciplinary action.

14. Mobile Road Blocks - To prevent the movement of illegally acquired supplies into black market channels by civilians or soldiers, all major commands will establish mobile road blocks to prevent the passage of pilfered material, AWOLs, stolen vehicles, and vehicles without proper trip tickets. Control points will also inspect all military personnel for passes, and military vehicles for illegal articles. Wherever possible, commanders will secure the cooperation of Italian authorities to have Carabinieri or other Italian police personnel utilized to make similar inspections of civilian vehicles and personnel at these same control points. Military Police patrols will frequently inspect small communities for AWOLs and supply trucks which may be found off the proscribed route to destination.

15. Illegal Disposition of Government Property.

a. Articles of War 84 and 94 prohibit the sale, wrongful disposition, misappropriation or diversion of United States government property to unauthorized persons. In this connection, particular attention is directed to the fact that abandonment, misappropriation or bartering in any way of Army rations, gasoline and oils, captured material, clothing and equipment and Army exchange supplies of all types fall under the provisions of these articles and Army Regulations.

b. All military personnel who observe any act of abandonment, pilferage or illegal diversion of United States government property will, without delay, apprehend the offender, obtain the name, grade, organization and serial number of the offender. They will also obtain similar information concerning witnesses, if any, and submit a detailed report of the incident to the appropriate commander having courts-martial jurisdiction. If apprehension is not possible, all information available will be obtained, and a similar detailed report of the incident will be made. The information obtained from military offenders will be checked against their War Department Identification Cards and Tags. When there is no doubt as to the veracity of information given, the individual will be turned over to the Military Police.

c. Negligence on the part of any United States military personnel in reporting crimes of this nature will be considered dereliction of duty and will be punished accordingly.

d. All commanders having courts-martial jurisdiction will issue such additional instructions as may be necessary to enforce compliance with the foregoing and will take strict disciplinary action in all cases.

16. Reports.

a. Incidents of major pilferage will be immediately reported to the Provost Marshal General, this headquarters, by cable. Reports will contain the following: date, time, name or number of installation and location, type of supplies indicating the amount and value; brief resume surrounding loss; action instigated and date thereof and the results obtained as of the time report was rendered. Weekly letter reports on progress will also be rendered. These reports are required when supply loss is \$100.00 or more in value.

Supply Security (cont'd)

b. Further required is a letter report as of the 20th of each month, to arrive not later than the 28th, showing all other pilferage not reported by cable and containing the same type information as required in cable reports.

DISTRIBUTION:

250 - CG, AAF/MTD
325 - CG, Repl Comd
75 - DD, MRS I
75 - CG, MRS
110 - CG, Rome Area, MTOUSA
135 - CG, Adriatic Depot
75 - CG, MORBS
200 - CG, Hq Comd AFHQ
100 - CG, IES
100 - ALCON
100 - CG, Fifth Army
1 - D/TC, MTOUSA
1 - CG, MTOUSA
1 - G-1
1 - G-2
1 - G-3
1 - G-5
1 - AG
1 - JAG
1 - Fis Dir
1 - IES
1 - MRS
5 - G-4
5 - IG
5 - JAG
5 - Ordnance
5 - ALS
5 - Pol Sect
5 - Engineer
5 - Signals
5 - Surgeon
5 - CWS
5 - W&Th
50 - FMG

CONFIDENTIAL
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AP 233

RHP/gem

2173

AG 530.01/221 GBI-C

2 December 1944

6 DEC 1944

SUBJECT: Security of Information.

TO : All Concerned.

6 DEC 1944

1. Evidence continues to be received from widely divergent sources that the enemy derives valuable tactical intelligence from captured documents found on Allied prisoners of war.

2. A German Intelligence officer on the Eastern Front related recently, under interrogation, the following types of breaches which he had encountered regarding the security of documents:

- a. TOP SECRET documents were frequently found in pockets of prisoners of war, and in cars in the front lines.
- b. Notebooks containing SECRET and TOP SECRET information were found in large numbers in the possession of prisoners of war.
- c. Distribution lists on nearly all documents were one of the most valuable sources of information.

3. As an example of 2 a, the German Intelligence officer recalled finding a TOP SECRET Order of Battle document on a lieutenant shortly before the breakthrough at AVRAICHES (base of Cherbourg peninsula), giving the complete regrouping of Allied forces in that sector. The comment which he received from the lieutenant was: "Well, you cannot keep all this in your head".

4. Carelessness and breaches of security as illustrated by paragraphs 2 a and b above must be eradicated by constant training and strict security discipline. As a general rule all documents, whether private or official, will be considered to contain matter of interest to the enemy. Commanders will ensure that the following are collected from troops before going into action or on patrol: letters, official documents, diaries, memoranda, marked maps, notebooks, photographs and other private papers.

5. Regarding paragraph 2 c above, attention has already been drawn to the danger of wide distribution lists in letter, this headquarters, file AG 461-S GBI-AGM, dated 21 January 1944, subject: "Security Danger of Wide Distribution Lists". Commanders will ensure that, whenever possible, one of the two alternative expedients enumerated in the letter referred to is adopted, and that when it is essential to show a wide distribution, the document is properly classified and handled accordingly.

By command of General NIXON:

G. M. CHRISTENSEN,
Colonel, AGP,
Acting Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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SECRET

LCK/ar

AF124

-3 DEC. 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

3/138/CA

.....
: SECRET :
: Auth: SAC, MT :
: Initials: s/D.O.K. :
: 23 November 1944 :
:.....

6A

3 DEC. 1944

23 November 1944

AG 371.2/209 GHI - 0

MEMO TO: All Concerned.

SUBJECT: Security of Telephone Conversations.

1. An analysis of the subjects of telephone conversations for the two month period ending 31 October 1944, indicated security is being violated in that the conversations included information as to:

- a. Date, time group, reference numbers and plain text of many highly classified messages (violation of cryptographic security).
- b. Movement of troops and convoys with dates of departure and arrival and origin and destinations.
- c. Critical supply situation such as ammunition and gasoline requirements for armies in this theater and in France.
- d. Replacement and casualty situation in theater and requirements for additional personnel.
- e. Plans for various operations.
- f. Arrival and plans for military missions.
- g. Discussion of political developments.
- h. Movement of high ranking officers, officials and diplomats.

4828

2. Violations of security committed in telephone conversations during the past month are of a more serious nature than those of the preceding period.

3. In all telephone conversations the operational necessity for a security violation must be carefully weighed. There may be occasions when operations will be unduly hampered by rigid adherence to security precautions.

4. Also in view of the fact that it must be assumed the conversing parties are familiar with the background of the material being discussed it should be sufficient in most cases to refer merely to reference number and paragraph rather than quote the entire message or even extracts of messages.

By command of General WILSON:

Reproduced by Hq 2675th Regt, Allied Commission,
(Ovhd), PO 394, 1 December 1944.

/s/ H. V. Roberts
H. V. ROBERTS,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

555

DISTRIBUTION:

Units this Regt.
Sub-Commissions Allied Commission.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

7 Sep 44

3/13.B/AS

SUBJECT : Permanent Pass to Enter HQ ACC.
TO : Headquarters Commandant, HQ ACC.

It is requested that a permanent pass be furnished the Admin Sec in the name of Col. Gazzino GAZZINI (Col del Genio) (S.M.O.) who is required to visit this Section frequently.

Ext: 608
HAF/ia

R.R.C.
R.R. CRIPPS Col.
GSO Admin Sec.

4837

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

JB (AR)

3/13B/AS

3 AUG 44

SUBJECT : Pass for Civilian Employee.

TO : G-1 (Civilians).

1 It is requested that arrangements may be made please for the undermentioned employee of this Section to be issued with another pass to enter the HQ building.

Miss Lidia ROSATI.

2 Yesterday, 2 AUG 44, Miss Rosati lost her purse containing among her other things, her HQ pass, and she reported this to Lt. Bongiorno, (Security) this morning.

S. A. WHITE, Lt Col
for USO Adm Sec.

Copy to: Security Officer for action as necessary.

48 6

1234

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 994
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

File (3A)

2 August 1944

SUBJECT: Permanent Pass to enter Hq. ACC.

TO : Hq. Commandant, Hq. ACC.

1. May the Education Sub-Commission please be furnished with a permanent pass for the undermentioned Italian functionary to enter the building of this headquarters.

Roberto Giordani

R. H. Power
R. H. POWER,
Lt. Col., Inf.
For A/Head Admin Sec.

48

3/13B/AS

(JA)

SECURITY

1 In no big concern even in peacetime e.g. Shell Mex or the London County Council, were visitors permitted in without filling in a form stating the person they wished to see and the subject to be discussed. This was not a security measure but merely a matter of business efficiency. In Government Departments the rule was the same though here there were also security reasons. In wartime the security reasons are multiplied tenfold.

2 In no Government Department is a permanent pass issued to any outsider. A Staff Officer of the War Office could not for instance obtain a pass for the Admiralty, nor was the War Office pass valid at HQ or vice versa.

3 Yet it is apparently proposed to issue a large number of permanent passes to co-belligerents and not only to senior officials but even to employees of utility and other trading concerns and even to journalists.

4 I see no reason why the small fry should not follow the usual commercial practice and fill in forms in the entrance hall. It is no hardship.

5 Really important officers can easily escape the indignity of having to stand in a queue by the Sub Comm. expecting them, obtaining the pass for them and handing it to them when they arrive. Or there could be a "Privy Door" and a special reception clerk.

6 It is understood that Economic Section have already got the H. Court to issue permanent passes. Political have apparently issued their own. Admin has another system. *W/L, R. (Check File CIVILIAN PASSES - OFFICIALS)*

7 It is also understood that there is no effective collection of expired day passes or check up time at which visitors leave the building.

8 If any permanent passes are to be issued, elaborate safeguards will have to be established to prevent transfer or loan, to secure collection of passes on a holder dying or changing his appointment etc. or less.

9 When a large part of the staff has become Italian the necessity for not allowing Italians in the building at their will is all the greater. They may well know members of the staff, and it is a hundred to one that if they were seen talking to one no one would think anything of it. That journalists whose job it is to pick up information should have passes seems particularly undesirable.

10 It is strongly recommended that NO permanent passes should be issued that the security check should be tightened, and that a general instruction on this subject should be issued.

M A White

What is our system?

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

3/2/AS

23 Jul 44

(1A)

SUBJECT: Security.

TO: All Admin Sub-Comms.

- 1 An Italian Minister has suggested that it is undesirable that he should queue up and state his business to obtain a pass to visit an ACC officer.
- 2 It is not courteous to a distinguished guest that he should be required nor is it desirable that he should state his business. 48
- 3 Sub-Comms should make it clear to those concerned in the Italian Government that if they will fix the time at which they will arrive, they will be met by an officer of the Sub-Commission who will have already completed the formalities and obtained the pass and who will escort them to the room in which the interview will take place.
- 4 A Permanent Pass or any other authority (other than the official pass) purporting to enable any person not a member of the staff of or employed by ACC to enter this HQ will not be issued.

Copy to Home
1000 1000

R. H. Chipp
R. H. CHIPP, Colonel,
for Acting Head, Admin Section.

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