

0368

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

10000/105/476

AC, SECURITY, SARDINIA
SEPT. 1944 - FEB. 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
SARONATA REGION

2nd February 1945

REFERENCE: HQ/2151

SUBJECT: Demonstration - CAGLIARI

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission

1. With reference to my report HQ/1021 of 19th January 1945 on the demonstrations against the Army call-up of the 18th of January, police reports show that those responsible for throwing bombs belonged to the Hard Action Party and have been identified with persons said to have had previous "anti-Fascist activities".
2. A small demonstration in favour of the call-up for the Italian Army was held in VIGEVAS and an organised demonstration in CAGLIARI has been arranged for Sunday next the 4th of February with the same object in view.
3. This demonstration has received advance publicity in the Press and it appears that the High Commissioner, who I asked to come and see me, is partly responsible for its organisation. He returned from ROME on the 18th January, the day the casualties took place.
4. I made it quite clear to the High Commissioner that it was against my advice that any large meetings should be held in view of the proceedings of the 17th and 18th of January. He was very insistent that the propaganda now prepared would be beneficial, he also said that to stop the meeting at this stage would have a very bad effect.
5. Precautions are being taken and I do not anticipate counter demonstrations. In view of the publicity already given I have agreed that the meeting should go forward on the 4th but send this report to inform you of the situation. I have explained to the High Commissioner that an avoidance of incidents or the risk of incidents is the right contribution to the Allied war effort and I have told him I should appreciate being informed in advance before arrangements are sponsored for demonstrations in future so as not to create risks.

JACP/Bch

Copy to: File PS/1520

J. A. C. PETHYQUICK,
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

3246

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

0370

0371

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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JACP/ach

J. A. C. Perryquich
J. A. C. PERRYQUICH,
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

3246

Copy to: File PS/1520

RECORDED

0372

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

1435.3/CA

26 Jan 45

SUBJECT: Internal Security

TO: Land Forces S/C.

Herewith a copy of two letters recently received from RO Sardegna, (HQ/1021 of 16 and 19 Jan), for your information and such action as may appear necessary.

As regards para 3 of the former a signal was despatched on 18 Jan.

As regards para 7 it is considered undesirable that any further troops should be moved from Sardegna until there has been full consideration of the security position and consultation with the RO. The Public Safety Sub-Commission will be consulting you on some of the recommendations contained in this para.

S.H. WHITE Lt Col,
for VP CA Section

Copy to: Public Safety S/C.

3245

0373

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AFO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

4/39.3/24

26 Jan 45

SUBJECT : Internal Security
TO : Economic Section

Herewith a copy of two letters (HY/1021 of 16 and 19 Jan) recently received from PG Barcelona for such action as you may consider desirable. You will no doubt be interested in para 4 of the former and para 6 of the latter.

S.E. WHITE Lt Col.
for VP CA Section

Copy to: Public Safety S/C
Land Forces S/C.

3244

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
SARDINIA REGION

19 January 1945

REFERENCE: HQ/1021

SUBJECT: Internal Security

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission

1. In continuation of my HQ/1021 of 16 January 1945, there have been two demonstrations, on the 17th and 18th January, against the call-up for the Italian Army. There were no casualties on the 17th but on the 18th January one police agent was killed and eleven persons, including four Italian soldiers, injured. The casualties were caused by grenades and the police agent died in hospital. The Carabinieri seem to have acted well and they kept cool, no firing was reported.

2. The High Commissioner, who has been in to see me, has prohibited further meetings, ordered the arrest of certain agitators and organised a search for arms, particularly in the students' quarters. Carabinieri and Police patrols are in the city, and the P.W.B. are also fixing up a loud speaker in the Piazza Jena. The town is now quiet.

3. The demonstration on the 17th seems to have been a more or less spontaneous affair got up by students who wanted the local newspaper, the *Unione Sarda*, to publish a manifesto they had prepared protesting against the call-up, and publish the Armistice Terms. The newspaper obviously could not comply with these requests.

4. On the evening of the 18th an organised demonstration took place, again led by students, in the Piazza Jena. One speaker was allowed and a man by the name of MOCCI put forward his views. He said he was a Lieutenant in the Army released for study and he protested against the call-up, arguments brought forward being:

(a) Senior Officers in the Italian Army under the Fascists were inefficient and the same Officers are with the Army now.

(b) The Army lacks essential equipment, boots, clothes, etc.

(c) The Armistice Terms have not been published.

(d) Economic arguments.

The speaker did not take up an unreasonable attitude and when he finished the Carabinieri stopped further speeches and kept the crowd moving. Just after dark, after 1900 hrs., thunder flashes and then grenades were thrown by people in the crowd and attempts were made to move on the office of the *Unione Sarda* and the Italian Army Headquarters. It was at this period that the casualties occurred.

5. The call-up is, I understand, to affect 10 classes, 1914 to 1924, which means 40,000 to 50,000 men in SARDINIA. Of this more than half are now on indefinite leave from the Colours. A special point being made is the economic effect of the call-up. Soldiers only get some 5 Lire a day pay and dependents receive an allowance which amounts to 8 Lire per day for the wife and 2 Lire per day for each child. This is the approximate position and families cannot live on these sums. I am informed, therefore, that there is considerable feeling on the subject.

6. I suggest for your consideration that men who are being called up be given the option of working in the coal mines instead of going into the Army. They would

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6. I suggest for your consideration that men who are being called up be given the option of working in the coal mines instead of going into the Army. They would then get good pay though conditions would have to be made to ensure the immediate call-up of any man who did not work full time or give satisfactory service. As we want 2,000 to 3,000 more miners immediately this may be a way to get them.

JACP/ech

Copy to: H.Q. No. 3 District.
Files HQ/2151 & HQ/2157

J. A. C. P. M. M. M. M.
J. A. C. P. M. M. M.
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
SARDINIA REGION

19 JAN 1945

SECRET

19 GEN 1945

16 January 1945

REFERENCE: HQ/1021

SUBJECT: Internal Security

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission

19 GEN 1945

1. With reference to your AC/14056/5/PS of the 6th January 1945, the situation as regards SICILY is noted. Should not Para.6 refer, however, to SARDINIA and not SICILY? The endeavour of this Headquarters has been to keep Sardinian affairs quiet as being the best contribution to the war effort. I do not know what repercussions there may be if disturbances start on this island and if they would have any outside material effect. I feel, however, that I should repeat previous warnings that trouble is not far below the surface and if it once starts it may be difficult to stop without considerable expenditure of force, and therefore the points below are set out for your consideration.

2. There are two immediate causes that are likely to bring unrest:

- (a) A call up of new classes for the Italian Army.
- (b) Organised upheaval at the mining centres of IGLESIAS and CARBONIA.

3. As regards 2(a), I have received no information of the proposed call up as yet except for a reference in AC/14056/5/PS dated 11th January 1945 and received on the 16th January 1945, and so cannot yet comment on the proposals; but the implications might be serious in view of what has happened in SICILY.

4. As regards 2(b), instructions have been received from A.P.H.Q. to step up the local production from its present rate of about 40,000 tons a month to 100,000 tons a month. This will mean the importation of a large number of miners from the mainland, and the adoption of firm measures in the mining districts where there has been some unrest. We must, therefore, be able to show force if it becomes necessary.

The Italian Army troops in SARDINIA have, however, been reduced below the minimum considered essential for internal security in the island, and troops have been taken away from the mining centre of IGLESIAS. In this connection your Para.5 does not appear to represent the whole position. You refer to two battalions, but I understand that 800 men were taken from the Calabria Division early this month; and I am informed that the organisation required for battalions sent to the mainland does not match that of the battalions now in the Calabria Division. The despatch of 800 men has, therefore, unless I am misinformed, upset to some extent the organisation and effectiveness of four out of the eight battalions ~~presently~~ in SARDINIA. The choice of the mining centre of IGLESIAS as one of the two places from which the 800 men were with-^{drawn} is unfortunate. I have had to ask the High Commissioner to arrange to send Carabinieri to replace them at IGLESIAS in an endeavour to re-establish strength at this centre.

5. The reduction of troops is partly offset by the creation in the island of a new Italian Army unit 500 strong to assist the Carabinieri, and some of these men are already being used as train guards, etc. The unit has, however, no transport and I understand it may only be regarded as a temporary re-inforcement to the Carabinieri. We may be able to send part of this unit immediately to IGLESIAS.

6. The internal security situation has been further complicated by the transfer of

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6. The internal security situation has been further complicated by the transfer of Public Safety Officers out of the Region and the departure of Allied Military Police. A great deal of the time of the small Public Safety staff is taken up over constant incidents between Naval personnel and seamen from merchant ships and civilians. Firearms have been freely drawn and used and the Italian Authorities have expressed concern over relations with the Allies. This affects in particular the Port of CAGLIARI and has been the subject of a separate report.

7. I do not wish to be in any way an alarmist, but I have already reported that crime is increasing. More coal is being demanded from the mining district and firm action may well be required to get it. Although conditions in SARDINIA have been kept quiet we do not, therefore, want to allow disturbances to break out if they can be foreseen and prevented. I suggest, for your consideration, the following urgent requirements :-

- (a) Movement of Italian troops out of SARDINIA to cease, and the return of the 800 men removed to be considered so as to leave the Calabria Division complete.
- (b) The Regional Commissioner to be informed, and consulted before further moves of troops take place now that the minimum recommended for internal security has been reached.
- (c) Transport and equipment to be provided at once to enable one fully mobile Carabinieri Battalion to be formed from the Carabinieri now in this Island, as recommended in your AO 14056/5/PS of 11th January 1945 with which I entirely concur.
- (d) Transport (5 trucks) to be provided to enable the five companies of the battalion already formed to help the Carabinieri to be used, if necessary, on detached duties.
- (e) The Regional Public Safety Officers not to be reduced but if possible to be re-inforced by an additional Officer.
- (f) A detachment of Allied Military Police, British and American, to be sent over to CAGLIARI. Details have been communicated separately.

JAGP/ajs.

J.A.C. PENNYCUIK
Colonel

J.A.C. PENNYCUIK.
Colonel.
Regional Commissioner.

Copy to : No. 3 District (with copy of AO/14056/5/PS)
O.C. 63 Staging Wing, for information.
File PS/1528.

3241

Copy to P.S.

0379

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

21 JAN 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

397

JAN 19

3/8765

JAN 20 110a

ROUTINE

ALCOM BARDINIA REGION, CASIARI

21 JAN 1945

BY ALCOM

CONFIDENTIAL.

Special Sitrep. 1 killed 11 injured in anti-call up law demonstration held CASIARI 18 January. City now quiet.

Dist

Action - P Safety

Info - A/Tres

Chief Commissioner

C o S

SA Sec

Pol Sec


P R Br

Navy

L. Forces

Air

File



CONFIDENTIAL

3240

32

343

0380

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

17/2/62

file

6A

ALCOM SARDINIA REGION FOR REGIONAL COMMISSIONER

9865

15 Jan.

PRIORITY

SECRET ID.

PARA ONE ID CALL UP FOR ITALIAN ARMY WILL PROBABLY TAKE PLACE IN SARDINIA
ON FIRST FEBRUARY FOUR FIVE AND CONTINUE FOR TWO MONTHS ID ONE NINE ONE FOUR
DASH ONE NINE TWO FOUR AGE GROUPS AFFECTED ID YOU ARE AUTHORISED TO INFORM
HIGH COMMISSIONER ID

PAREN TO ALCOM SARDINIA REGION FROM HQ ALCOM PAREN

PARA TWO ID TEN THOUSAND MEN ARE REQUIRED IN EACH MONTH ID

PARA THREE ID CHARLIE CHARLIE ROGER ROGER MOBILE BATTALION BEING FORMED WITH
TWELVE THREE TON TRUCKS AND TWELVE ARMoured VEHICLES TO BE ALLOTTED BY LAND
FORCES SUB COMMISSION

Distribution :

CC COS
FUS SAFETY
LAND FORCES S/C

CA SEC

437

R. R. CRITHS COL

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA, Asst Adjutant.

3222

0381

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

RESTRICTED

P.P. Sect.

9327

5A

ACTION: ABC GARDINIA

INFO: AFHQ G-3000, SD AAI, ACC

76/27

28 OCT 1944

ACIA

SD 1680

REPORT

OCT 27/1530

FOR INFORMATION ONLY

RESTRICTED. For ELASIS. Form from personnel destined for mainland one bn inf on approx following 75. 15 all ranks under Lt Col. Five Coys under Capt each of three pls of 30 all ranks and Coy B 10 all ranks. On completion report to D.C. Region GARDINIA for temp duty with CGRA until 31 Dec. Personnel arms and equip to accompany. Documentation through all channels as before. On completion of duty unit will be placed on Shipping List 7. These are ITI-ITI. Adds to authorized strength of garrison. Remain in Italian outer uniform. Advise quantity and items of Italian and Allied clothing necessary to equip to scale. All available Italian items will be utilized



Dist
 Inf-Act: P. Supply @
 inf: A/CC
 A.O.S.
 P.A. Sect.
 File

3238

RESTRICTED

3285

OCTOBER 27 1944

0382

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
REGION VI.

26 September 1944

TO: Vice President, Administrative Section, A.C.C.
Attention Brigadier UPJOHN.

SUBJECT: Italian Troops and Carabinieri in SARDINIA

REFERENCE: HQ/1021

1. With reference to your 4/35.1/AS of 22 Sep 44 which reached me by the hand of Major ALEXANDER, I have despatched a cable to give you my views and follow up with this brief report. I want to sound a note of caution, however, as my report is based on scanty information. I have received no official information of contemplated changes in the Allied Garrison or of moves of CARABINIERI, or of the Italian Army, and I feel I could give you a more reliable report if I was kept informed as to the position officially and did not have to seek information by a process of informal visit and enquiry.

2. I assume that when you refer to the move of 2 Battalions of the Italian Army from SARDINIA that this means the move of Italian troops from the final remnants left and exclusive of the moves now in progress which will take some weeks to complete.

3. Present Italian Troops in SARDINIA.

By courtesy of Colonel SIMONS I have been informed that Italian troops in SARDINIA now consist of:-

Military H.Q.		150
Administrative Personnel)		
Services	about	1,500
Calabria Division		5,000
205 Division		9,000
A.A. & C.D.		5,400
Plus about 15,000 Italian troops now on the move from SARDINIA.		

4. Strength of Carabinieri.

I have already reported on the strength of the CARABINIERI in my Monthly Report. The pre-war establishment was about 2,000 and their present strength about 3,000. Their present effectiveness is reduced as compared to pre-war effectiveness because all means of transport - cars, bicycles, horses - are reduced in efficiency. If a reduction in CARABINIERI is contemplated it will affect the Security position and we shall require very early notice of such proposals. Their strength is also insufficient to provide guards for R.A.F. staging units etc. if these come to SARDINIA. It is proposed to augment the effective strength of the CARABINIERI by borrowing 500 men from the Italian Army (Calabria Division) and pairing them with CARABINIERI

5. Internal Security Problems

(a) SARDINIA has been the home of banditry for many years and there are bands of lawless men situated, in particular, in the hills South and East of

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5. Internal Security Problems

- (a) SARDINIA has been the home of banditry for many years and there are bands of lawless men situated, in particular, in the hills South and East of NUORO and smaller parties North of IGLESIAS. Large scale trouble is not anticipated from these parties, but cattle thieving and robbery is on the increase and they cannot be ignored. There have also been recent cases of attacks on Officers and vehicles on the roads at night.
- (b) Industrial Workers. The largest concentration is in the mining district of CARBONIA not far from IGLESIAS, but they are also distributed throughout SARDINIA. These men have enjoyed special rations with the approval of A.C.C. for over 10 months and are now to have their privileges reduced, so that they come into line with the rest of Italy, as from 1st of October. Workers all over SARDINIA will be affected and careful arrangements have been made to explain our motives with the help of the various Italian party leaders. There will undoubtedly be

/discontent.....

discontent as the workers find it difficult to understand why their rations were increased two months ago and now have to be decreased, but I do not anticipate organised trouble on a large scale.

(c) Apart from the above, large scale disaffection is not reported in the Island although the people are very poor and may easily become discontented if there is any hitch over the arrival of essential imported grain.

C. Final Strengths

Of the troops in Para. 3 the 205 Division and the A.A. & C.D. are due to leave SARDINIA in addition to troops now on the move. The final position will therefore be about 6,500 Italian troops of whom 5,000 are effective useful personnel plus 3,000 CARABINIERI, i.e. the Calabria Division plus CARABINIERI. I have asked for a detail of the proposed distribution of these troops and if they are left, as stated, the requirements of the Island as regards Internal Security should be covered, but there will be no margin to meet unexpected emergencies.

J. A. C. Pennyquick

J. A. C. PENNYQUICK,
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

JACP/5ch

Copy to: File PS/1528

0385

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

Suspense _____

Date 28 Sep 44

FROM	TO	FROM	TO
Chief Staff Officer		Patriots Branch	
Secretary General		Security Branch	
Archivist		Establishments Branch	
✓ Admin Section		Director	
Interior		Executive Officer (A)	
Public Safety		Executive Officer (B)	
Public Health		G-1 (A)	
Property Control		G-1 (B)	
Legal		G-4 (A)	
Education		G-4 (B)	
Monuments & Fine Arts		H.Q. Comdt	
Economic Section		Adjutant	
Agriculture		Message Center	
Commerce		Orders & Bulletins	
Finance		2675 Rept	
Food		Political Section	
Industry		Navy	
Labor		Army	
Mining Division		Air	
Public Works & Utilities		Communications	
Requisition Division		Civil Censorship Group	
Shipping		W. M. D. & P. O. W.	
Transportation		Public Relations Branch	
R.C. & M.G. Section		U.N.R.R.A.	
P.A. to Executive Commissioner			
Civil Affairs Branch			
Information Division			
Liaison Division			
I. & D.P. S.C.			
Italian Refugees Branch			

OR

Signature _____
 Remarks/Recommendation _____
 Information _____
 Approval/Disposal _____
 Appropriate Action _____
 Investigation & Report _____
 Dispatch _____

REMARKS

V.P. has not yet seen this cable, before you to the 3200

Any action, will you please consult with V.P.

A copy is retained for his information.

C. R. P. 44

0386

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785016

CONFIDENTIAL
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

2a

6227

TO: HQ ACC FOR UPJOHN

SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 48/26

FROM: ACC REGION 6

CLASSIFICATION:

REFERENCE No: NONE

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: SEPT 26/1944

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: CITE: ACC 767

30 SEP 1944

CONFIDENTIAL. REFERENCE YOUR 4/35.1/AS OF 22 SEPTEMBER I UNDERSTAND STRENGTH OF ITALIAN ARMY IN SARDINIA IS COMING TO 6500 EFFECTIVES AND CARABINIERI TO 3000 ROUND FIGURES. NO ADDITIONAL REDUCTION BEYOND THESE FIGURES SHOULD BE MADE. INTERNAL POSITION IN SARDINIA QUIET BUT CONTENTMENT WILL BE DISTURBED BY THE REDUCTION IN WORKERS RATIONS WHICH IS BEING EFFECTED ON FIRST OCTOBER. REPORT FOLLOWS BY LETTER. FROM REGION SIX SIGNED PENNYCUICK CITE ACC 767

ACC HIST

ACTION : ADM SEC (2)

INFO : A/CC
FILE (2)
FLOAT

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CONFIDENTIAL

DATE and Time of RECEIPT SEPTEMBER 26/1944

Distribution:

RECEIVED
26 SEP 1944
A. C. C.

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SE IT

RA

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

4/35.1/25.SUBJECT:- Public Safety in Sardinia

Tel: 525

TO:- Regional Commissioner,
Region VI.

22nd Sept, '44

1. As you probably know, the AAI with the concurrence of this IT are considering the transfer in the very near future of 2 Battalions of the Italian Army from Sardinia to Calabria. In addition we are very anxious to transfer an additional two Battalions from Sardinia to Sicily in the course of the next month in order to deal with the internal security problem in Sicily.

2. The internal security problem in Sicily is much more serious than in Sardinia, and the Italian Government are very seriously concerned about the position in Sicily. Hence the suggestion which has been made by the Prime Minister himself with the consent of the Minister of War for the transfer of 2 Battalions to Sicily. Before consenting to this transfer, however, and thereby removing in the aggregate 4 Battalions from Sardinia within the next month or six weeks, I have been asked by the acting Chief Commissioner to ascertain your views as to how far the security problem in Sardinia would be affected by such a withdrawal.

3. Bearing in mind the seriousness of the position in Sicily you will not I am sure oppose the above suggestion unless in your opinion it is really necessary for your essential security to keep these 2 Battalions in Sardinia. Will you please signal your views on the above proposal as soon as possible.

4. I am sending this by the hand of Major Alexander.

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Copy to public Safety.
th

G.R. URJOHN, Brigadier.
V.P. Admin. Section.

