

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ACC

10000/105/564

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

105/564

CA, PATRIOTS
JUNE 1944 - SEPT. 1945

To Public Health

- (6)
- 1) Please note folio 63A
 - 2) Will you please consider the steps which will have to be taken to put this hospital plan in action.

27 Apr. 45

W. C. S. Dillard, Mayor
C. A. Sec

C. A. Sec

(7)

Ref. minute 6, we are awaiting a formal plan from H.C.C. on this subject.
which I understand is in its way.

Do you?

Conveying to
H. J. H.

0 2 3 4

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6410

(6)

To Pat

Refer 32 for your information. V.P. about
on duty, would probably like to see.

W. G. D. D. M. M. M.
C. A. S.

30 October 1944

C. A. S.

Thank you. I agree.

P. D. D. M. M. M.

30 Oct 44 Major

W. G. D.

P. D. D. M. M. M.

C. A. S.

W. G. D.

(7)

To Patriots Br

(4) for action, please

W. G. D. D. M. M. M.
C. A. S.

6440

W. G. D.

(5)

C. A. S.

See signal at 44(a)

W. G. D.

P. D. D. M. M. M.

15 Nov 44

0 2 3 6

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1001.1945

6/12 B/CA ✓
INCOMING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

82A
CHS 1/10

Originator's Reference:

Date/Time of Origin: SEP NFT

Message Centre No: F 9444

Date Time Rec'd: SEP 29 1500A

Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM SOMMATINO

29 SET 1945

TO : ADMIRAL STONE ALLIED COMMISSION ROME

ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED

In adhering to the Italian Unionist Movement, this section of Partisans wishes to extend to your Govt its feelings of brotherhood and gratitude.

CO OF PARTISANS GROUP DOMENICO ARRICO

Dist

Action - CA Sect
Info - Chief Commissioner
Econ Sec 2
Labor SC
File 2 Float

M/C Note Above is translation

HEADQUARTERS
SEP 29 1945

131644

To. C.R.S. of information, last para is of particular interest.
6/12/45
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION
PATRIOTS BRANCH

Ref: 141/3/FAT

11th July 1945.

SUMMARY OF A CONFERENCE HELD WITH THE MINISTRY FOR
POST WAR ASSISTANCE AND THE DIRECTOR OF LOCAL GOVT. S/C.
ON 10 JULY 1945

Present: Signor LUSU, Minister for Post War Assistance.
Colonel R.R. CRIPPS, Director, Patriots Branch.
Colonel G. PAVA.
Captain G.P. di ROBILLANT.

COLONEL CRIPPS

stated that his visit was in the nature of a courtesy call in order to introduce himself to the Minister. Colonel CRIPPS explained that the subject of Patriots was one of his particular responsibilities and he would therefore like to know to which of the Minister's officials matters of ordinary routine business concerning Patriots would be referred.

SIGNOR LUSU

stated in reply that matters of paramount and immediate importance would be dealt with personally by him and he would be glad if Colonel CRIPPS' office would telephone to him at any time when the matter was of real urgency. The Under Secretaries ~~EXHIBITION~~ and FERRARA would deal with matters executive. As for as detail matters were concerned Mr. MOSCONI would be the Director General of the Patriot Department in the Ministry. Signor LUSU said that there would always be present in the Ministry one or both of the Under Secretaries when he, the Minister, was absent. He anticipated being away in the near future for varying periods. He stated that he had already appointed Signor CHIABO as a permanent delegate of the Ministry in the North. He will have offices in MILAN.

SIGNOR LUSU

COLONEL CRIPPS

suggested that it would be useful if Mr. CHIABO was put in touch with the Regional Commissioners.

COLONEL CRIPPS

then raised the question of the payment of Patriot bounties to ITALIAN individuals claiming to have taken part in patriot activities in countries other than ITALY. Colonel CRIPPS stated that in his view ITALY should not pay these individuals except in very exceptional circumstances such as those persons who had formed part of the D'Italia Garibaldi Division in Yugoslavia and had recently been repatriated. In his opinion, these formed a recognized Italian Patriot band. The Division was very largely composed of soldiers in service at the time of the Armistice (8

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Concerning Patriots would be referred. stated in reply that matters of paramount and immediate importance would be dealt with personally by him and he would be glad if Colonel CRIPPS' office would telephone to him at any time when the matter was of real urgency. The Under Secretaries BERNARDINI and FERRARA would deal with matters executive. As far as detail matters were concerned Mr. MOSCONI would be the Director General of the Patriot Department in the Ministry. Signor LUSU said that there would always be present in the Ministry one or both of the Under Secretaries when he, the Minister, was absent. He anticipated being away in the near future for varying periods. He stated that he had already appointed Signor CHIAROF as a permanent delegate of the Ministry in the North. He will have offices in MILAN.

SIGNOR LUSU

suggested that it would be useful if Mr. CHIAROF was put in touch with the Regional Commissioners.

COLONEL CRIPPS

then raised the question of the payment of Patriot bonuses to ITALIAN individuals claiming to have taken part in patriot activities in countries other than ITALY. Colonel CRIPPS stated that in his view BANDS should not pay these individuals except in very exceptional circumstances such as those persons who had formed part of the D'Italia Garibaldi Division in Yugoslavia and had recently been repatriated. In his opinion, these formed a recognized Italian Patriot band. The Division was very largely composed of soldiers in service at the time of the Armistice (8 Sept 1943) and arrangements had accordingly been made to pay their back-pay from military sources. Where, however, they were not in service but had completed the obligatory 6 months service in the Division he had ordered that they should be paid as Patriots. It was his opinion that only members of recognized Italian formations should be acknowledged as Patriots.

SIGNOR LUSU

said that concerning single or stray individuals entering Italy who report to Allied or Italian authorities and claim to be Partisans he would like to suggest that a full record of each individual be taken and forwarded for examination and/or documentation to some central office.

COLONEL CRIPPS

agreed and suggested that the office be that of his delegate in the North, Signor CHIAROF, at MILAN.

SIGNOR LUSU

then stated that he proposed to advise his Regional Patriot Officers accordingly in regard to these individuals and that as far as persons entering Italy in formed bands were concerned he would issue instructions to his Regional Patriot Officers that in no case in the future would they pay Patriot bonuses to such persons without first referring the matter to the Patriot Branch of the Allied

COLONEL CRIPPS

Commission. This would provide an opportunity both to the Allied Commission and to the Italian Government to study the matter before making any decision. said that he would like to know the Minister's plan for the hand-over of Patriot work when the Italian Administration takes over further territory from MS. He felt it was a matter of immediate consideration.

replies that the problem was of such importance that he intended to deal with it personally. suggested that in future it would be of advantage if meetings were held weekly with the Under Secretary PERAZZA and SIGNOR MOSCHETTI. As he understood the offices of the Ministry were likely to be somewhat overcrowded he would be very glad to offer the use of his own office for this purpose. The conference should be simple and in the nature of a round table discussion for the purpose of dealing with current items and should facilitate an exchange of views on policy.

agreed. And then stated that he proposed to go to the North from 16 - 20 July. During the period 18, 19 and 20 it would probably be useful if he could meet Colonel CHIAPPAS in MILAN.

agreed that he would like to do this but would have to refer the matter to his Vice President in view of the fact that a high percentage of his staff were at present away on surveys connected with local government matters and it might therefore be a little difficult to be away from HQ at that time. told Colonel CHIAPPAS that if he desired it, one of the Under Secretaries of the Ministry would travel with him in order to discuss on the spot immediate problems.

summarised the points covered in the above notes and added that it was his intention to deal firmly with all bogus partisans, to prosecute and eliminate them. His intention being to give real prestige to bona fide partisans; he was particularly anxious to stamp out all forms of extortion.

COLONEL CHIAPPAS

SIGNOR LUSIGNI

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COLONEL CHIAPPAS

SIGNOR LUSIGNI

SIGNOR LUSIGNI

R. R. Chiappas
R. R. CHIAPPAS, Colonel.
Director

SIGNOR LUSCH

SIGNOR LUSCH

the matter to his Vice President in view of the fact that a high percentage of his staff were at present away on surveys connected with local government matters and it might therefore be a little difficult to be away from HQ at that time. He told Colonel CRUMP that if he desired it, one of the Under Secretaries of the Ministry would travel with him in order to discuss on the spot immediate problems. He summarized the points covered in the above notes and added that it was his intention to deal firmly with all bogus partisans, to prosecute and eliminate them. His intention being to give real prestige to bona fide partisans; he was particularly anxious to stamp out all forms of abortion.

R.R. Crump

R.R. CRUMP, Colonel,
Director
Local Government Sub Commission.

Distribution

Signor LUSCH, Minister for Post War Assistance.
Civil Affairs Section.
Liaison Officer, Patriotic Branch.

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6/12 B/CA ✓
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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ref: 155/PAT

Tel: 620

SUBJECT: Treatment of Partisans in XIII Corps area.

26 June 1945

TO : SCAG 8 Army.

1. In order to determine the policy with regard to the handling of patriots found in XIII Corps area, information is requested on the situation as it obtains at present.

2. It has to be determined, for instance, whether any payment under present directives will be made to Partisans who are found operating in this area. The questions that arise are:—

(a) if they are Italian citizens and with Italian sympathies, are they to be paid?

(b) if they are Italian citizens but of Yugoslav sympathies, are they to be paid?

If there are any who have been operating under the control of Allied Forces Headquarters, should they be paid, and if so are those who are directed by Yugoslav forces also to be paid. If not, discrimination will arise.

3. It is considered that there may well be very few, if any, Patriot bands operating in this area which are in fact of Italian sympathies and can generally claim the rights and privileges of the normal Italian Patriot hitherto encountered. May your views, therefore, be furnished to this HQ, together with a report on the situation. If you agree, the Director, Local Government Sub-Commission, will visit you to discuss the matter at an early date. It is suggested that he arrive on or about Tuesday, 3 July 1945.

4. In the meantime, no Italian Military Patriot Representatives will enter AMG XIII Corps area.

BY COMMAND OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

6441

HJ/peo

G. R. VERUEH, Brig.
VP CA SectionCopies to: HQ Venetia Region
SCAG XIII Corps

1468

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6/12/3/PA ✓

11 GIU. 1945 79A

Note on discussion on 11 June 45 between Lt Col Ingledew (MIA), J/Comd Proby (Patriots Branch), and Capt Elms, (Regional Patriot Officer Venezia) re possibility of enlisting Patriots from N.E. Italy into the Italian Army.

1. Capt Elms referred to signals RXII/034.IL and RXII/034 from the Regional Commissioner Venezia Region to HQ A/C.
2. Lt Col Ingledew pointed out that in view of the policy laid down by AFHQ, Patriots could only be enlisted into the Italian army as individuals, and complete bands could not be absorbed.
3. Capt Elms stated that he thought that if a definite number of individual volunteer enlistments in Venezia could be sanctioned, it would meet the case. He estimated that approx 5000 Patriots wished to enlist, but that the army was only accepting men in the 18 - 26 age groups, a considerable number of these would be ruled out. He undertook to draw up and forward to Patriots Branch, on his return to Venezia, a more accurate estimate of the number of vacancies required; MIA would then consider what number of individual enlistments they were able to sanction.
4. Lt Col Ingledew stated that no new Alpine units could be formed, but that Patriots enlisting could ask to be sent to existing Alpine units as reinforcements.

A. Proby
for Proby

M. PROBY,
J/Comd,
Executive Officer,
Patriots Branch.

C.A. Section
Executive Commissioner

} for information.

6430

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6/20/CA ✓

78A

21 GIU 1945

AFHQ CITE PERAB

RPTD 15 ARMY GROUP

AFHQ
EMILIA REGION

196

20 June 1945

ROUTINE

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD REFERENCE YOUR FOR XRAY NINE FOUR FIVE TWO THREE AND REPLY OF
 MILIA REFERENCE SUGAR DOG SLANT TWO SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN PD IT IS CONSIDERED
 THAT IT WILL BE OF ASSISTANCE IN DISPERSING THE MALELLA PATRIOT BATTALION
 IF THE STAND DOWN PARADE COULD BE AS CEREMONIOUS AS POSSIBLE

No Trace

PARAH TO FOR ACTION AFHQ CITE PERAB RPTD 15 ARMY GROUP EMILIA REGION
FROM HQ ALONG CITE A C F A T PARAH

PARA TWO PD IT IS BELIEVED THAT IF A PRESENTATION IN RECOGNITION OF THE
 SERVICES OF THIS BAND COULD BE MADE BY A SENIOR OFFICER OF EIGHTH ARMY IT
 WOULD BE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED CMA ESPECIALLY AS IT IS NOT CONSIDERED
 ADVISABLE TO BRING THIS BAND TO ROME FOR THE CEREMONY

Internal Distribution

M.M.I.A.
 Civil Affairs Section.

6429

Patriots Branch

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A.P.

R.R. CRIPPS, Col. Director, Local Govt. S/O.

8301

890

0 2 4 4

6/12/84

CIA Section 77A

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
LOMBARDI, REGION
AOC 394

7 June 1945

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION)

NUMBER : 11)

PAYMENTS TO PATRIOTS ON DEMOBILIZATION

1. A program for payments to patriots immediately upon their demobilization has been worked out and it is effective immediately in Lombardy.
2. This program, which cancels all previous instructions on the subject, provides for demobilization payments to patriots and families according to the following scales:

To recognized patriots:

- (a) Recognized patriots who have completed less than three months active service prior to 1 June 1945 will be paid 1,000 lire.
- (b) Recognized patriots who have completed three or more months active service prior to 1 June 1945 will be paid a total sum of 5,000 lire.
- (c) Recognized patriots who have sustained serious injuries, irrespective of their total length of active service prior to 1 June 1945, will be paid a total sum of 10,000 lire.

To families of recognized patriots killed or missing:

- (a) The nearest of kin of recognized patriots missing or killed in action or who died as a result of reprisals or of wounds or illness contracted on active service rendered prior to 1 June 1945, will be paid a total sum of 20,000 lire.

By order of Colonel POLITTI:

CHARLES POLITTI
Colonel

(b) Recognized patriots who have completed three or more months active service prior to 1 June 1945 will be paid a total sum of 5,000 lire.

(c) Recognized patriots who have sustained serious injuries, irrespective of their total length of active service prior to 1 June 1945, will be paid a total sum of 10,000 lire.

To families of recognized patriots killed or missing:

(a) The nearest of kin of recognized patriots missing or killed in action or who died as a result of reprisals or of wounds or illness contracted on active service rendered prior to 1 June 1945, will be paid a total sum of 20,000 lire.

By order of Colonel POLLETTI:

CHARLES POLLETTI
Colonel
Regional Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Provincial Commissioners & Division Chiefs.
- 25- Patriots Division

Cc: Ex-Comm. De
Patriots
Financed Sic
1945

6350

1945

COMANDO MILITARE MILANO
PER LA LOMBARDIA

ISTRUZIONI AMMINISTRATIVE)

7 Giugno 1945
No 11)

PREMIO DI SOBLITAZIONE AI PATRIOTI

1. E' stato realizzato un progetto per il pagamento del premio di sobblitazone ai patrioti, che ha immediato effetto nella Lombardia.
2. Questo progetto, che annulla ogni precedente disposizione in materia, dispone per il pagamento del premio ai patrioti e alle famiglie nelle seguenti misure:

Ai patrioti riconosciuti:

- (a) che abbiano prestato servizio attivo per un periodo inferiore ai tre mesi prima del 1 Giugno 1945, saranno pagate L. 1000
- (b) che abbiano prestato servizio attivo per un periodo di tre o piu' mesi, prima del 1 Giugno 1945, sara' pagata una somma complessiva di L. 5000
- (c) che abbiano subito gravi ferite, indipendentemente dalla durata del periodo di servizio attivo prestato prima del 1 Giugno 1945, sara' pagata una somma complessiva di L. 10.000

Alle Famiglie dei patrioti riconosciuti, morti o dispersi:

- (a) Al parente piu' vicino in grado del patriota riconosciuto, morto o disperso in azione di guerra, o ucciso in conseguenza di rappresaglie, o deceduto in conseguenza di ferite o malattia contratta in servizio attivo prestato prima del 1 Giugno 1945, sara' pagata una somma complessiva di L. 20.000.

Ai patrioti riconosciuti:

- (a) che abbiano prestato servizio attivo per un periodo inferiore ai tre mesi prima del 1 Giugno 1945, saranno pagate L. 1000
- (b) che abbiano prestato servizio attivo per un periodo di tre o piu' mesi, prima del 1 Giugno 1945, sara' pagata una somma complessiva di L. 5000
- (c) che abbiano subito gravi ferite, indipendentemente dalla durata del periodo di servizio attivo prestato prima del 1 Giugno 1945, sara' pagata una somma complessiva di L. 10.000

Alle Famiglie dei patrioti riconosciuti, morti o dispersi:

- (a) Al parente piu' vicino in grado del patriota riconosciuto, morto o disperso in azione di guerra, o ucciso in conseguenza di rappresaglie, o deceduto in conseguenza di ferite o malattia contratta in servizio attivo prestato prima del 1 Giugno 1945, sara' pagata una somma complessiva di L. 20.000.

Per ordine del Colonnello POLETTI

CHARLES POLETTI
Colonnello
Commissario Regionale

DISTRIBUZIONE:

- 1 - Commissari Provinciali & Capi Divisione.
- 25- Divisione Patrioti.

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1656

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6/12B/CA

76A

FOR ACTION LOMBARDIA REGION FOR COLONEL CRIPPS PIERMONT REGION FOR COLONEL
CRIPPS RPTD AND LOMBARDIA REGION AND PIERMONT REGION AND VENEZIA REGION

9441

9 June 45

PRIORITY

- 9 CIU 1212

RESTRICTED PD

PARA ONE PD MINISTRY OF OCCUPIED ITALY REPORTS RECEIPT INFORMATION MILAN PATRIOTS
RESTLESS AND MAY DEMONSTRATE ON GROUNDS NON PAYMENT BONUS PD MINISTRY PROPOSES
SEND FUNDS VIA PARRI TO MILAN BY DRAFTS PD MINISTRY INFORMED UNHUNGARIAN AS AMPL
FUNDS AVAILABLE AND PAYMENTS BEING MADE PD PARRI INSTRUCTED CONTACT REGIONAL
COMMISSIONER AND EXPLAIN ALLEGED TROUBLE PD MAY BE DESIRABLE ARRANGE DRAFTS SHALL NOT
BE CASHED WITHOUT CONSENT REGIONAL COMMISSIONER PD

PARRI TO FOR ACTION LOMBARDIA REGION FOR COLONEL CRIPPS PIERMONT REGION FOR COLONEL
CRIPPS RPTD AND LOMBARDIA REGION AND PIERMONT REGION AND VENEZIA REGION FROM
HQ ALCON CITE ACAT PARRI

PARA TWO PD UNDERSTAND PARRI PROPOSES VISIT TORIN AND VENEZIA PD WILL YOU SEE HIM
AND TAKE NECESSARY ACTION REGARDING THESE VISIONS

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

C.A. Section
Finance Sub Commission

Patriots Branch

321

M. Proby

J/Comd

for Lt Col SH WHITE

6420

735

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FOR ACTION FIVEHARTY FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION EIGHTHARTY FOUR AND IV CORPS, AND
 TORONIA REGION AND EMILIA REGION 57 AREA REAR FOR AND LIGURIA REGION AND PIERMATE
 REGION AND LOMBARDIA REGION AND VENETIA REGION REPTD 15 ARMY GROUP FOR GEORGE FIVE
 SECTION

9153

5 June 45

PRIORITY

IN CLEAR PD

- 5 GIU. 1945

PARA ONE PD DEF OUR EIGHT SEVEN EIGHT FOUR PD

PARA TWO PD PAYMENT TO PATRIOTS ON DEMERITISATION IS AGREED TO FOLLOWING SCALE WHICH

WILL COME INTO FORCE IMMEDIATELY ~~AND BE ENTERED INTO ACTIVE PD~~ PAYMENT SHALL BE PAID TO

RECOGNISED PATRIOTS OF LESS THAN THREE MONTHS SERVICE ONE THOUSAND LIRE PARAN BAKER

PARAN TO RECOGNISED PATRIOTS OF THREE MONTHS SERVICE OR OVER PARAN IN PLACE OF ABLE PARAN

FIFTYTHOUSAND LIRE PARAN CHARLES PARAN TO RECOGNISED PATRIOTS SERIOUSLY INJURED

IRRESPECTIVE OF SERVICE PARAN IN PLACE OF ABLE OR BAKER PARAN TEN THOUSAND LIRE PARAN

DOE PARAN TO FAMILIES OF THOSE MISSING OR KILLED IN ACTION OR WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF

REPTD 15 ARMY GROUP FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION EIGHTHARTY FOUR AND IV CORPS, AND

TORONIA REGION AND EMILIA REGION 57 AREA REAR FOR AND LIGURIA REGION AND PIERMATE

REGION AND LOMBARDIA REGION AND VENETIA REGION REPTD 15 ARMY GROUP FOR GEORGE FIVE

SECTION FROM HQ ALCON CITE ACPT PARAN

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0 2 3 0
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PARA THREE PD YOU WILL BE ADVISED IN DUE COURSE OF ANY RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF
THIS AMENDMENT

Internal Distribution,

Executive Commissioner,
Civil Affairs Section,
Finance Sub Commission,
Col. Cripps.
Liaison Officer - Patriots Branch,

Patriots Branch

321

A.P.

R.R. CRIPPS. Colonel, Director, Local Govt. S/C.

6-22-23
(4223)

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94/PAT

74A

file

1. The following statement of the present patriot position is made after a visit by Major V.M.J.C. SMER, Executive Officer, Patriots Branch A.C. to 45 Army Group, IV Corps, 5th and 8th Armies, and the Patriot Centres on the 5th and 8th Army Front from 15th - 23rd March 1945.

2, The urgency of the problem cannot be overstressed. It must be realised by all concerned that the Patriot organisation in Armdes, A.M.G. and A.G. is NOT ready to deal with Patriots in N. Italy in the event of an immediate withdrawal of the enemy.

PRESSENT POSITION.

- It is understood that similar plans for 5th and 8th Armies have been drafted by 15 Army Group and will be issued in due course. In the meantime, Warrenton Group A.C. IV **Grp. 5th** and 8th Armies are all making tentative plans, based on the

- 2 -

proposal contained in the original 15 Army Group draft (ref. A.G. 091.711 dated 2 March 45). The receipt of the final 15 Army Group plan for all N. Italy is essential if a final plan, now long overdue, is to be made by Patriots Branch.

(D) Materials.

- (i) No authority has been yet received from A.P.H.Q. for the provision and stockpiling forward of the materials required to implement the plans outlined above.
- (ii) It is vitally important that this stockpiling forward should begin immediately, as, without it, any plan is doomed to failure.
- (iii) Suggested stockpiling points at which warehouse accommodation is available are IV Corps - Florence, 5th and 8th Armies - Berlin.
- (iv) AFHQ must supply transport for this. No other transport is available, and it is entirely an army responsibility.

(v) Materials Required. Present Position Remarks

a.	Clothing for 100,000	Authority awaited from combined C. of S. for AFHQ to stockpile forward.	This is the most urgent problem of all. Even if immediate authority is received from combined C. of S., clothing will probably have to be dyed, and this will cause delay. At present there are 1500 battle dresses available at Pescia and Florence and about 2000 at Vienna, but boots and many other items of clothing are in short supply.
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- 3 -

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|------------------------|--|--|
| b. Food for 100,000 | Ditto | |
| c. Kess tins | None in hand, 1500 have been asked for from Salvage | |
| d. Cigarettes and soap | AFHQ asked to authorize supply from Allied sources (ref 121/9/PAT dated 16 March 1945) | Normally supplied to Italian army by Italian Government as supplement to the military ration.

In addition Capt. Limbert AB 5 Army has suggested that authority be obtained for spearhead officers to draw cigarettes from Army supplies to give to Patriots at first meeting. |

(c) (1) Spearhead Patriot Officers. Capt. Limbert 5 Army AMG suggests that in 5 Army area the A.M.G. officers at present engaged in Patriot work (Capt. Limbert, Capt. Hammond and Lt. Woolford) go forward during the advance as spearhead officers to make the first contact with Patriots, taking with them a supply of cigarettes and other comforts. In other areas this work could be done by Regional Patriot Officers.

(2) Regional Patriot Officers. No Regional Patriot Officer has yet been selected by Venezia Region. He is required for training forthwith: R.P.O. for Liguria, Piemonte, and Lombardia Regions are already received training R.P.O. Lombardia is expected to report to Patriots Branch for training this week.

6-1

- 4 -

(3) Provincial Patriot Officers. Although it has been agreed in principle that Patriot Officers additional to normal establishment shall not be assigned to Provinces, it is essential for the smooth working of the Plan for N. Italy that one Officer per Province receive immediate training in Patriot work, and be ready to move forward in the Corps and armies.

Patriots Branch wish the following Provincial Officers to report to Patriots Branch for 10 days training at Patriot Centres. (7 days) 3 days
(All No. 1 (REGAL FORCE))
After completion of training they would return to their Regions and be at 48 hours call by Armies.

	Provincial
Piemonte Region	3 officers
Liguria "	4 "
Lombardia "	10 "
Emilia "	6 "
Venezia "	14 "

(4) Italian Patriot Representatives. Position satisfactory - all at 48 hours notice.

(5) Recruiting Agencies (1 per Region). Negotiations are still taking place with R.M.I.A.

(4) Transport .

Each Regional and Provincial Patriot Officer will need a car (preferably a Jeep and trailer). In addition ⁶⁴⁰⁰ ~~needed~~ ^{and} / or Regional Patriot Officers will need one three ton truck each

- 5 -

to carry forward comforts for their initial contact with Patriots.

The source of this transport has yet to be decided.

(c) Finance (Italian Government).

The Italian Government has agreed in principle to pay all expenses connected with Patriot Centres.

R. Lee *Pa, n*
D. R. Lee
Patriot branch

26 March 1975

6-2-75

A.P.H.Q. G-5. 9th FEBRUARY, 1945.

MEETING LT. COL. JACKLING - LT. COL. CRAIG.

Subject: Feeding, Clothing and Hospitalisation of Patriots.

1. Col. Craig pointed out that A.C. were not prepared to act unless the Army shouldered its responsibilities by supplying rations, clothing and hospitalisation for the Patriots.

2. Col. Jackling stated that the Army proposed to provide a ration equivalent to the Italian Military Ration, which meant Patriots would get the basic civil ration augmented by items from Military sources to a calorific value not exceeding 3,000 calories (1650). These requirements calculated in respect of 90,000 Patriots. The ration will be produced from three sources:

- (a) A.C. What can they provide? Nil.
- (b) Bought. Wine, mits and vegetables, etc.
- (c) British and U.S. Stocks go to civilians.

A.C. must hand over to Q the imported portion of the basic ration for 100,000 Patriots, approximately 2,000 tons of flour which is merely a transaction at Q level.

3. Again, clothing will be supplied to Patriots on the following scale:

(a)	B.D. Suit	1
(b)	Boots with laces	1
(c)	Drawers, pairs	2
(d)	Jersey pullover	1

the Army shouldered its responsibilities by supplying rations, clothing and hospitalisation for the Patriots.

2. Col. Jackling stated that the Army proposed to provide a ration equivalent to the Italian Military Ration, which meant Patriots would get the basic civil ration augmented by items from Military sources to a caloric value not exceeding 3,000 calories (1650). These requirements calculated in respect of 90,000 Patriots. The ration will be produced from three sources:

- | | | | |
|-----|------------------|---------------------------------|------|
| (a) | A.C. | What can they provide? | Nil. |
| (b) | Bought. | Wine, nuts and vegetables, etc. | |
| (c) | British and U.S. | Stocks go to civilians. | |

A.C. must hand over to Q the imported portion of the basic ration for 100,000 Patriots, approximately 2,000 tons of flour which is merely a transaction at Q level.

3. Again, clothing will be supplied to Patriots on the following scale:

(a)	B.D. Suit		1
(b)	Boots with laces		1
(c)	Drawers, pairs		2
(d)	Jersey pullover		1
(e)	Shirts		2
(f)	Socks, prs		2
(g)	Vest		2
(h)	Blanket		1

4. The commitment, both as regards food and clothing, would be a 50/50 US/Br responsibility. 6420

5. Hospitalisation is still unsettled. Col. Jackling awaited the return of General Robertson for this decision.

Ref: 34/Tuc.

10th February, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL.

PLAN FOR PATRIOTS IN NORTH WEST ITALY.

1. INCORPORATION.

In the event of a sudden withdrawal by the enemy from the Regions of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA, it is known that we shall have to deal with large numbers of armed and organized Patriot Bands.

2. INTENTION.

The intention is to contact the Patriots, disarm them, enlist as many as possible into the Italian Armed Forces, and to return the remainder to normal civilian life as early as possible.

3. METHOD.

Regional and Provincial Patriot Bands, each consisting of one Allied Patriot Officer, and one Italian Military Officer, will be with Armed Forces along their respective provinces. This will enable them to begin their duties immediately the province is occupied, and they will remain behind as the Army goes forward. A local Civil Representative and a local representative of the Prefecture will join the Patriot Officer's team in every Region and Province.

On entering his Province, the Patriot Officer will immediately contact the British Liaison Officer of No. 1. Special Force and pre-arranged rendezvous. The BEO will have the Patriots organized and will be ready to hand them over to the Patriot Officer.

Having received from the BEO information as to the location of concentrations of Patriots within the province, the Allied Patriot Officer will open a Liaison Office as near as possible to the concentration area. If it is not possible to disarm Patriots to their homes immediately, it will be necessary for him to establish a Patriot Centre where they can be housed until dispersed. For this purpose he will take on a permanent staff of Patriots to prepare the Centre for occupation and to maintain it efficiently. His military and civilian Patriot representatives should be made responsible for the proper running and interior economy of the Centre. The pay of the Patriots taken on to this permanent staff should be met from the BEO funds.

their duties immediately the province is occupied, and they will remain behind as the army goes forward. A local CIP representative and a local representative of the Prefecture will join the Patriot Officer's team in every Region and Province.

On entering the Province, the Patriot Officer will immediately contact the British Liaison Officer of the 1st Special Force who is pre-arranged to meet him. The Liaison Officer will advise the Patriot Officer and will be ready to hand him over to the Patriot Officer.

Having received from the BLO information as to the location of concentrations of Patriots within the province, the Allied Patriot Officer will open a Patriot Office as near as possible to the concentration area. If it is not possible to draw the Patriots to their homes immediately, it will be necessary for him to establish a Patriot Centre where they can be housed until dispersed. For this purpose he will take on a permanent staff of Patriots to prepare the Centre for occupation and to maintain it efficiently. His military and civilian Patriot representatives should be made responsible for the proper running and interior economy of the Centre. The pay of the Patriots taken on in this permanent staff should be met from the Funds.

The Patriot Officer will:

- (a) Arrange to draw millions from DIB or M Stores.
- (b) Make immediate arrangements working through the Patriot Leaders for the dispersing of Patriots if they have not already done so. **6421**
Army.
- (c) With the help of Patriot Leaders, decide which of the claimants are bona fide patriots.
- (d) Arrange for wounded patriots to be treated in Italian Army Hospitals as far as operations permit. As soon as possible, patriots will be evacuated to Civilian Hospitals (ref: AG.400/02) (33-0 of 13th January.)
- (e) Issue necessary clothing.
- (f) Arrange to issue to bona fide patriots the Certificate signed by the Commander-in-Chief.

2.

- (g) arrange for patriots to be interviewed by the Italian Army Recruiting Agency.
- (h) arrange for "disposition" of patriots into employment through labor organizations of the army and A.S.
- (i) wherever possible arrange for patriots to their homes, using refugee channels if their homes are some distance away.

4. ADMINISTRATION.

The Patriotic organization within the Regions of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE, LOMBARDIA, will be: one Allied Regional Patriot Officer for each Region and an Allied Provincial Patriot Officer for each province. Attached to each Regional and Provincial Officer will be one Italian Army Officer, one local civilian representative of the CIN, and one local representative of the Patriotic.

The Allied Patriot Officer will take with him into his Region or Province:

- (a) Authority to draw rations or the full Italian Army rations from local DIDs or QM Depots.
- (b) Authority to send wounded and sick Patriots to Italian Military Hospitals.
- (c) Details of clothing held at Regional HQ which may be drawn on demand.
- (d) Patriot Certificates.
- (e) Copies of the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation to Patriots.

There is no local scale for Patriot Centers. The Patriot Officer must use his own initiative in obtaining equipment.

It is anticipated that the Italian Government will reward Patriots for their services with grants of money. If so, it will be the responsibility of the Italian Military representatives to apply for the required funds through the official Italian Patriotic Committee. The distribution of the funds, however, will be supervised by the Allied Patriot Officer, receipts will be obtained for payment, and nominal rolls forwarded to the Italian organization making the payment.

- (b) Authority to send wounded and sick Patriots to Italian Military Hospitals.
 - (c) Details of clothing held at nominal HQ which may be drawn on demand.
 - (d) Patriot Certificates.
 - (e) Copies of the Commander-in-Chief's proclamation to Patriots.
- There is no 1008 code for Patriot Certificates. The Patriot Officer must use his own initiative in obtaining equipment.

It is anticipated that the Italian Government will reward Patriots for their services with awards of money. If so, it will be the responsibility of the Italian Military representatives to apply for the required funds through the official Italian Patriot Committee. The distribution of the funds, however, will be supervised by the Allied Patriot Officer, receipts will be obtained for payment, and nominal rolls forwarded to the Italian organization making the payment.

Lists will be made of all arms and ammunition collected from Patriots, receipts will be given to each individual and the arms will be placed in safe custody, either in local Carabinieri barracks or with Ordnance. Copy of lists of arms will be forwarded to Patriot Branch at HQ.

Patriot Officers will forward through their Provincial Offices to Patriot Branch at HQ, a Weekly Report of arms collected, under the following headings:

1. Arms Visited
2. Arms surrendered (quantity and type)
3. Number of Patriots received at Centre.
4. Number of Patriots released into the Italian Army.
5. Number of Patriots re-employed.
6. Number of Patriots returned to their homes.
7. Number of Patriots in hospital.
8. Number of Patriots remaining in Centre.
9. Alexander Certification:
 - (a) Number issued (with nominal roll)
 - (b) Number of certificates in stock.

6420

QUESTIONS FOR C.O.S.

0830. 8th Feb.

4 - Officers for Patriots

1. Are we going to get the 40 Allied Patriot Officers?

2. 25 are required for LIGURIA, PIZMONTE and LOMBARDIA. Are they likely to be available at once?

3. In view of the fact that AFHQ have not yet taken over the responsibility for supplying clothing for the Patriots where will we get the 10,000 sets of clothing and 20,000 blankets?

I S. 18th by AFHQ

2. 23 are required for LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA. Are they likely to be available at once?

3. In view of the fact that AMHQ have not yet taken over the responsibility for supplying clothing for the Patriots where will we get the 10,000 sets of clothing and 20,000 blankets?

I.S. 1844 by Mr. Simon

- 6420

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

6/12/13/CA ✓

1/2/ef

72A

FOR ACTION AFTER CITE HAGED

ROUTED FIVEWAY FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION PARTICULAR BASE SECTION

8939

1 Jun 45

PRIORITY

2 - CIO, 1945

SECRET PD REF YOUR FOX XRAY RIGHT FIVE FOUR ZERO THREE PD

PARISH PD FOR ACTION AFTER CITE HAGED ROUTED FIVEWAY FOR GEORGE FIVE SECTION

PARTICULAR BASE SECTION FROM HQ ALONG CITE AFTER PARISH

PARA TWO PD ALONG HAS NOW NO RESERVES OF CLOTHING

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

Chief Commissioner
 OA Section
 Commerce Sub Commission
 Land Forces Sub Commission 2

Patriots Branch

321 H.P.

J/Comm M. PROBY for
 R.R. GRIFFS, Col, Director, Local Govt.

893
 6424

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

6/28/CA ✓

FOR ACTION AFTER CITY MEETING

31 MAG 1945

Yla

8764

30 May 45

PRIORITY

IN CLEAR TO

PARA ONE PD REVEREND YOUR BOX EIGHT THREE THREE FIVE ZERO PD RECRUITMENT OF PATRIOTS IN ANY LARGE NUMBER IS DEPENDENT UPON THE FUTURE POLICY REGARDING ITALIAN ARMY AND ITS GRILING PD

PARA TWO PD MATTER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH MR. MIAK ITM ABLE WHO CMA WITHIN THEIR RESOURCES CMA HAVE AUTHORIZED THE IMMEDIATE RECRUITMENT OF UP TO FOUR THOUSAND PATRIOTS PD

PARA TO FOR ACTION AFTER CITY MEETING FROM HQ ALACHUA CITY ALPAC RARE

PARA THREE PD WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY ASSISTANCE YOU CAN GIVE TO ALLOW OF FURTHER RECRUITMENT OF UP TO TEN THOUSAND PATRIOTS CMA WHICH IS THE MINIMUM NUMBER REQUESTED BY GENERAL CALDWELL

Internal Distribution

Executive Commissioner
Land Forces Sub Commission (MCLA)
Civil Affairs
Public Safety

Patriots Branch

321

A. P. Kelly

J/Comm M. PRO for

R.R. CHIPPES, Col., Director, Local Govt. S/C

6423

6261

6/2

0 2 6 5

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

70A

SUBJECT: Italian Patriot Recon Bn

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

SD/26/2

14 May 45

TO : EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER, A.C.
CIVIL AFFAIRS SEC, A.C.
PATRIOTS BRANCH, A.C.

15 MAY 1945

USA

Further to MMIA Signal SD 2655 of 4 May, copy to you.

1. Attached for information at Appx "A" is AFEC reply and attached at Appx "B" is interim letter sent to Italian Ministry of War.

S. M. Ingledew
Major General
MMIA
H. C.

WB

5930 6422

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

C O P Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

ATTN: 'A' to WHIA
Letter SD/26/2 of
11 May 45.

70B

AG 091.711/047 GCT-O

11 May 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Patriot Recce Bn

TO : Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
FOR: Land Forces Sub Commission (WHIA)

1. Reference is made to your SD/26 dated 1 March 1945.
2. It has been decided that the Patriot Recce Bns which were to operate with the Italian Combat Groups are no longer required.
3. In consequence the proposal contained in the letter under reference will not be submitted for consideration of the W.E.C.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

/s/ Robert V. Bonham
/t/ ROBERT V. BENHAM
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

WS

6421

5939

20. CHURCHMAN BILL was LINDSEY BARR to be effected in the normal way - to 03, wishing to join the Army to b. dealt with by the screening team. The remittance to b. reversed.

3. A further letter will follow enclosing this HQ letter SF/94 of 24 Apr and 1 May and reallocating the total of 2500 now rendered unallocated within the Category 2 (Independent Subbel Troops) ceiling of 5921. It is probable that the 2500 will be counted within an increased allocation to category 1.

L.M. Folsom.

1000 = 1000 BWC ICE

<u>Copy to:</u>	<u>Initial</u>	<u>to</u>
5 Army	"	10
8 Army	"	"
5 Army Dist	"	"
2 District	"	"
8 District	"	"

Initial: =

M4 TO
CGS
CSD
CSI
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ORG
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SD/94
SD/I/4
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8720
6420
(2 copies)
(2 copies)



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

69A

Ref: 6/12 B/CL ✓

13 May 45

TO: Major General R. GARDINA,
Chief of Army General Staff,
Italian Army.

Dear Sir,

I have discussed the matter of the Government's declaration on the absorption of partisans into the Army and Police Forces with the Chief Commissioner, Admiral Stone. He has expressed the view that it would be better for you to receive any instructions as to the publication of the Government's declaration in the North of Italy solely from the Minister of War.

I should observe that in any event no publication in Military Government territory should be made without the prior consent of the local A.S.C. authorities.

Yours truly,

G. H. Wilson
G. H. WILSON, Brig.,
V. CA Section.

Copy to: Patriots Branch.
(Attn. Lt. Col. Craig.)

• 6419

124.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 725016

SECRET

CITE M984
MAY 111630B

12 MAG 1945

E/390
MAY 120830B
OF PRIORITY

MAIN ANG 8 ARMY

ACTION HQ ALCON FOR ACXIC FOR INFO RPTD FILIPOT FOR G-5 SECTION,
MAIN 8 ARMY FOR CHIEF OF STAFF, PADOVA FOR VENETIA REGION FOR REG
COM (ANG)

SECRET

Subject Patriots UDINE Area. Patriots are demanding payment. As previously stated impossible disarm either OSSOPPO or GARIBALDI Groups whilst present situation prevails. Neither group is operational, therefore not paid as members of Armed Forces, both groups are cooperating in helping Military Govt and the Allies. This applies to OSOPPO in practically their entirety and to GARIBALDI to a lesser degree. Impossible to state numbers, OSOPPO believed to be about 6,000, GARIBALDI claim larger numbers. Total combined Patriots reputed to be round 20,000 though this is doubtful, the amount payments asked for by Patriots is 10,000,000 lire a month. Emphasise this request is from them and the figures have not and cannot be checked accurately nor have any discussions taken place with Patriots regarding rates or any other subject. Request policy of ROME Govt and AC on this matter. Question of feeding Patriots also arises. At present they are feeding on a considerably higher ration scale than civilians, and consider to abruptly cut off supply and bring them down to ordinary civilian level would be impolitic if not impracticable at this stage. Request guidance on this matter also. All the

L 6413

- 1 -

SECRET



5133

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

above based upon these Patriots not being made operational which is extremely unlikely in view of Combined Chief of Staffs decision that the feeding of Patriot Forces on military scale shall be discontinued as far as possible.

Dist *CA Sec.*

Action - ~~Exec Comm~~
Info - A/President
 Chief Commissioner
 ~~GA Section~~ Ex c Comm:
 Econ Sec
 Land Forces 2
 Patriots Br
 File

6417

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

✓
INCCMING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

10 MAY 1945

Original's Reference 3853
Date Time of Origin MAY 10 1152B

Message Centre No. E/235
Date Time Recd MAY 10 1605B
Precedence ROUTINE

FROM HQ 5 ARMY FROM G-5 CITE 133

TO ACTION 15 ARMY GROUP FOR G-5, HQ ALCOM INFO TO 8TH ARMY FOR AMG

SECRET.

Reference your CAS 494.

MANTOVA parade held for 600 partisans of city and vicinity. Partisans not
disarmed yet. Matter in hand. VERONA parade held 5 May. 5000 partisans in parade,
~~15-2 1/2~~ tons truck loads of rifles and small arms, ~~5-2 1/2~~ ton truckloads
dynamite and hand grenades, 2 truckloads helmets and other equipment, 2 field
pieces, and 420 MM anti aircraft guns were turned in. Report on VICENZA to
follow.

DIST

ACTION: CA Sec
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
Patriots Br
File 2
Float

HEADQUARTERS
6410

5626

6/12/50 ✓

6/12/50

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION
PATRIOTS BRANCH

Tel. No 489081
Ext. 321

Ref : 94/PAT

5 May 1945

Subject : Patriots - Daily Payments

58B

-7 No

1. Ref 94/PAT dated 7 April 1945.
2. Authority has been given for a payment of 50 lire per head per day to Patriots while in centres or in hospitals.
3. The necessary funds will be obtained as laid down in para 10 of Appendix "A" to the directive referred to above.

F. CRAIG,
Lt. Colonel,
Deputy Director,
Local Govt. s/o.

DISTRIBUTION

Regions LIGURIA	10	IV CORPS	160
LOMBARDIA	10	S.O.(M) LIAISON STAFF	3
PIEMONTE	10	Ex. Commissioner	2
EMILIA	10	Economic Section	10
VENETIA	5	Civil Affairs Sec.	1
TOGOLIA	10	Finance Sub-Com.	2
AFHQ. (G-5)	1	Public Health S/G	1
15 Army Group	10	Land Forces SMO-Com.	2
5th Army	20	No 2 District A/G	4
8th Army	20	No 2 District Labor	4
AFHQ. G4 (A)	1	No 1 District A/G	4
AFHQ. G4 (B)	1	No 1 District Labor	4
		Budget Officer, Finance Sub Com.	1

6-110

5/12

ORIGINAL SIGNAL

FROM : 1011A

TO : AFHQ

INFO : EXEC COM
CIVIL AFFAIRS SEC
EXTRICONS BRANCH

REF : 3D 2655

SECRET

REF VISIT 1011A REFERS TO 03 DEC 5 APR (.) SUBJECT DEDICATED
FORMATION ORDER OF FIVE PATRIOT REVENUE (.) IN VIEW OF CIRCUMSTANCES
OF OPS IN I T A L Y RECOMMEND THAT ABOVE UNITS BE H O T FORMED
BUT THESE PATRIOTS TREATED IN NORMAL MANNER BY PATRIOT BRANCH AC (.)
CIVILIAN COULD BE USED FOR CD HIS ID IDENTIFIED (.) THIS SIGNAL AGREED AC
WHICH WE HAVE HEATED THAT INDIVIDUALS STILL WISHING TO JOIN THE ARMY WILL TO
BE CIVILIAN RECOMMEND TO DO SO (.) IN THIS CONNECTION THERE ARE AT THIS
TIME 50000 AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS PERSONNEL WHO ARE SUBJECT OF DEPARTURE
SIGNAL.

PSYCHICALLY Important

AUTHENTICATED

Internal : MA to OOC

(G/TRE)

A.

C

Org B.

File : 9D/26/2

04/10/50

65A
30/10/50

1011A
- 5 APR 1950

WHOM WE HAVE STATED THAT INDIVIDUALS WERE WISHING TO JOIN THE ARMY WILL TO
WE CERTAIN PREFERENCES TO DO SO (.) IN THIS CONNECTION THERE ARE AT THIS
THE 10000 AVERAGE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE INDIVIDUAL WHO ARE SUBJECT OF CURRENT
SIGNAL.

Internal : MA to GOC

G/REG

A

Q

ORG B.

FILE : SE/23/2

eng

RECEIVED Important

AUTHENTICATED

W. T. [unclear]
10/12

04/10/58

6-41-3

504

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

6/23/04 ✓
RESTRICTEDFI 70207
MAY 032125B7/1/75
MAY 040810E
ROUTINEAFHQ SIGNED SACKED CITE PHOCT
CG 15 ARMY GROUP INFO ALCON, BOMTO**RESTRICTED**Request you pass following message personal from Field
Marshal ALEXANDER to Chairman CLEAI.

"Now that the campaign in Northern ITALY has ended victoriously, I would be pleased if you would convey to General CADORNA and all subordinate Patriot commanders and units my admiration and gratitude for the successful part which they have played both in the destruction of the enemy and the preservation of installations and plants vital to the future life of ITALY.

I have noted also with particular pleasure the efficiency and speed with which the CLEAI has been able to turn from these military achievements to the equally important task of restoring, in conjunction with my AMG officers, civil administration in Liberated ITALY."

Dist

Info-Action - Patriots Div
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
CA Sec
File ?
Float

6413

RESTRICTED

4930

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 73506

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION

26 APR 1945

Ref : 95/1/PAT

26th April, 1945.

To: Patriots Branch

Subject: Hospitalisation for Patriots
(Record of Telephone Conversation)

Lt. Col. Jackson, G.5 AFHQ calling Colonel Gripps.

1. Lt. Col. Jackson stated that the proposals of G5 Section with regard to the hospitalisation of Patriots were as follows:

- (1) That previous instructions regarding Patriot hospitalisation will be cancelled.
- (2) That fresh instructions on the undermentioned lines will be given:
 - (a) Patriots will receive emergency treatment in any available organisation to include Allied and Italian Military Units.
 - (b) Patriots after emergency treatment will be sent to civilian hospitals specially organised by A.M.
 - (c) Such hospitals to be either complete hospitals or wards in existing Italian civilian hospitals. Rations will be drawn from Military sources. Details will be contained in the instructions to be issued.
 - (d) Medical supplies and equipment will be found from the following sources in order of priority set out:

C.C.M.D.
Italian Military Sources
Allied Military Sources.

2. It was agreed by Col. Gripps that some centralisation of Patriot casualties was necessary, and that the above proposals were practicable provided it was understood that complete centralisation was impossible and that, if a ward or wing of a hospital, was set aside for Patriots, control of the ration problem would be possible. It was further pointed out that to concentrate all patriots in one or two large hospitals would not be practicable owing to the anticipated transportation problem.

R.R. Gripps
R. R. GRIPPS, Colonel,
Director,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUB COMMISSION.

6412

Copy to C.M.S. for info
13/5/45

P38

JB
13/5/45

90 APR 1945

6/12/49

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
TO JPL
LZGAB 7000 0000 800 0000 1000
PUBLISHED BRANCH

SECRET

18 April 1945.

Ref: 624/15/PAT.

FINANCES - R.F. ITALY - FINANCE

Look

1. With reference to the Request for Funds in R.F. Italy, ref 94/PAT dated 7 April 1945, the following should be taken as an amplification of para. 10 to appendix "A" dealing with Finance.

(a) Funds for British General will be provided by the British in accordance with the instructions as laid down in appendix "A". Para. 10 of appendix "A" shall not be taken to mean that RAF funds will be advanced by Regional or Divisional Finance Officers except in the case of expenditure in Italy where the Provincial Administration in Italy 1. every occupied territory.

(b) In such cases it may be necessary for Provincial Finance Officers to advance RAF funds to British General until such time as a Provincial Administration becomes operative. Where there is necessary the funds advanced will be considered as an advance on behalf of the Italian Government and recovery, or repayment of para 2/42, will be obtained at Italian Headquarters.

(c) RAF funds advanced to the Italian Military Headquarters will be advanced against a receipt on form 2/3. The Italian Military Headquarters will be

629

- (b) In such cases it may be necessary for Provisional Finance Officers to advance US funds to the Italian Government which are in the Provisional Administration account. Where this is necessary the funds advanced will be considered as an advance on behalf of the Italian Government and recovery, or payment on Form 3/12, will be obtained at this Headquarters.
- (c) US funds advanced to the Italian Military District Government will be advanced against a receipt on Form 3/3. The Italian Military District Representative will account to his own Government for the expenditure of these funds and not to US. The Italian District Officer will, however, be responsible for authorizing the manner in which these funds are disbursed.
- (d) The Chief Accountant will, through the District Branch, periodically report to the Italian Government the total of such funds issued to the Italian Military District Representative and will also obtain reimbursement of these receipts on Form 3/12.

64111

9/12/52

- 2 -

2. With regard to para. 9 of Appendix "A" all Allied Patriot Officers will ensure that when rations or other supplies from army sources are requisitioned, it is clearly shown on the requisition that the rations or supplies are required for Italian Patriots. They should also ensure that the signature of the Italian Military Patriot Representative is obtained on the Army issue voucher or shipping ticket.

000000

[Signature]
P. GRILL,
Lt. Colonel,
Deputy Director,
Local Govt. S/C.

DISTRIBUTION.

Regions	LIGURIA	2
	LAZIO	2
	PIEMONTE	2
	EMILIA	2
	TOSCANA	2
	VENETIA	3
5th Army		2
8th Army		2
IV Corps		4
C. Section		1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

DISTRIBUTION.

REGIONE LIGURIA
LOMBARDIA
PIEMONTE
EMILIA
TOSCANA
VENETIE
5th Army
6th Army
IV Corps
C... Section
Finance Sub-Com.

2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 1 2

P. CRAIG,
Lt. Colonel,
Deputy Director,
Local Cont. S/C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

6/12B/CA ✓

SECRET

61A

Subject: Issues to Partisans.

12 APR 1945

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(M. M. I. A.) ROME
Q/68

12 April 1945

To: Civil Affairs Section, A.C.

Reference AFHQ Signal F57900 of 11 Apr. Para 4 would seem to disapprove the existing plan by which certain issues are made to Partisans at present. No action is being taken by MMTA to alter present arrangements but it is suggested you may wish to clarify with AFHQ.

FJH/le

1 J. Noakes.
P. J. NOAKES, Col.
for Major General,
M. M. I. A.

Copy to: Patriots Branch, A.C.

*Re assumed that the para, consequences together
with the rest of the signal, refers to future only
Authority - VP after used to AFHQ*

15/4

NFA.

A. B. Humphreys

6410

3819

REPUBLICAN ARMY COMMISSION

PO 294

CIVIL AFFAIRS SERVICE

LOCAL BOARD OF COMMISSION

SECRET

11 APR 1945

Ref: 94/Est

7 April, 1945.

PLAN FOR PATRIOTS IN N.W. ITALY.

INFORMATION

1. In the event of a sudden withdrawal by the enemy from the Regions LIGURIA, EMILIA, LOMBARDIA and N.W. ITALIA it is known that we shall have to deal with large numbers of armed and organized Patriot Bands.

INTENTION

2. The intention is to contact the Patriots, disarm and disband them, enlist, within the limits allowed, into the Italian Armed Forces, find employment for as many as require it as require it and return the remainder to their homes as quickly as possible.

METHOD

3. a). Administration of Patriots used operationally will be, as at present, the responsibility of the Allied Unit which uses them or retains them for future operations.
- b). For the remainder there will be two Phases:
Phase I. The treatment of these remaining Patriots will be the responsibility of Hq. IV Corps or 5 Army.
Phase II. As soon as control of any part of N.W. Italy is assumed by No. 2 District the responsibility for administration and rehabilitation of the Patriots in that part is longer under IV Corps control will pass to Regional Commissioners in conjunction

and intention is to convert the Patriots, disarm and disband them, enlist, within the limits allowed, into the Italian armed forces, find employment for as many as require it as required and return the remainder to their homes as quickly as possible.

METHOD.

3. a). Administration of Patriots used operationally will be, at present, the responsibility of the Allied Units which uses them or retains them for future operations.
- b). For the remainder there will be two Phases: Phase 1. The treatment of these remaining Patriots will be the responsibility of H. IV Corps or V Army. Phase 2. As soon as control of any part of N.W. Italy is assumed by No. 2 District the responsibility for administration and rehabilitation of the Patriots in that part no longer under IV Corps control will pass to Regional Commissioners in conjunction with No. 2 District or E.3.3.

- c). For the purposes of Phase 1, the Staffs of the Regional Commissioners attached to H. IV Corps will include an Regional Patriot Officer and one Italian Military Patriot Representative for each Region, and as many Italian Army Officers as may be considered necessary to deal with the immediate Patriot problem in each Province.

Italian Army Officers will be nominated by the Ministry of Occupied Italy and approved by Patriots Branch. (See Appendix 2 for list of officers allocated to each Region and Province).

Such Personnel will now forward with IV Corps or V Army and undertake Patriot work as instructed by IV Corps or V Army in their future Regions and Provinces; they will remain behind in these Regions and Provinces continuing their work under Regional and Provincial Commissioners when IV Corps or V Army moves on.

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- D). The Regional Patriot Officer will be responsible, through intelligence channels at 15 Army Group and Patriots Branch for ascertaining as far as possible the location and strength of Patriot bands in the Regions about to be occupied.
This information will be used (a) for assessing the number of Patriot Officers required and (b) for gaining a general background of their future work.
- E). As Army moves forward No. 1 Special Force will drop Allied Officers behind the enemy lines to contact Allied Liaison Officers already working there, and also Patriot Leaders. These Officers will prepare the way for the first meeting between Patriot Officers and Patriots, arranging meetings, instructing Patriots when and where to assemble and, if necessary, reconnoitering quarters suitable for Patriot Centres.
The Regional Patriot Officer and Patriot personnel will move forward with Corps as soon as possible to make these contacts.
- F). Patriot Centres will be established near concentrations of Patriots.
The Provincial Commissioner will, for this purpose take as a permanent staff of Patriots to prepare the Centre for occupation and to maintain it efficiently. His Italian Military Representative should be made responsible for the proper running and interior economy of the Centre. The pay of the Patriots taken on his permanent staff will be met by funds drawn from the local Prefecture. (Authority HQ/AF Finance Sub-Commission letter 13196/P dated 6 April 1945. See Appendix A).
- G). Functions of the Patriot Officer (Phase 1) Working under IV Corps or 5 Army he will:
(1) take such steps as are necessary to induce Patriot bands to come to Centres. The provision of transport for the collection of suitable groups or bands of Patriots will be a IV Corps or 5 Army responsibility.
- (11) Indent for action (Italian Military scale - See Appendix "G", from DIO or OM Stores.

The Provincial Commissioner will, for this purpose take in a permanent staff of patriots to prepare the Centre for occupation and to maintain it efficiently. His Italian Military Representative should be made responsible for the proper running and interior economy of the centre. The pay of the patriots taken on his permanent staff will be set by funds drawn from the local Prefettura. (Authority: Italian Minister Sub-Commission letter 13195/3 dated 6 April 1945. See Appendix B).

g).

Functions of the Patriot Officer (Phase I)

Working under IV Corps or 5 Army he will:

- (i) make such arrangements as are necessary to insure Patriot funds to come to Centre. The provision of transport for the collection of suitable groups or bands of Patriots will be a IV Corps or 5 Army responsibility.

- (ii) Indent for rations (Italian Military scale - See Appendix C) from DID or (M) Stores. Arrange for certain elements (i.e. fruit, fresh vegetables and wine) to be drawn from local Italian Army stores or purchased locally by the IGPO with funds drawn through the P.F.O.

- (iii) Make immediate arrangements, working through Patriot leaders, for the disarming of Patriots if they have not already been disarmed by the Army (See Appendix E.)

- (iv) With the help of Allied and Patriot Leaders decide which of the claimants are bona fide patriots.

- (v) Report to the nearest Military HQ details of POW brought in by Patriots and ask for disposal instructions. (See Appendix B).

- (vi) Arrange, if possible, to engage the services of an Italian doctor at the Centre to deal with minor cases, and, if necessary, give preliminary treatment.

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treatment to various cases. Send national patriots to Italian military or civilian hospitals according to the availability of accommodation. Allied Forces will assist the Italian army who will be responsible for hospitalization. Evacuation will be a IV Corps or V Army responsibility.

(vii) Issue any clothing that is available. Distribution from rear stockpiles will be a IV Corps or V Army responsibility.

(viii) With the help of allied and Patriot leaders, arrange to issue to some able Patriots a certificate signed by the CO master-in-charge. In suitable cases this could be arranged as part of the disarming ceremony.

(ix) Make arrangements for the absorption of patriots into employment through Labour Organizations of the Army and any civilian Labour Organization that may be available. No. 2 District will give priority of employment to all genuine Patriots.

(x) Wherever possible evacuate Patriots to their homes using refugee channels (if no other means are available) but their homes are a long distance away.

(xi) The regulations outlined above may be given to a maximum of 90 days from the time of reception and disbursement by the Patriot Officers. All Patriots should have been found employment or dispersed to their homes within a much shorter period, normally within 14 to 21 days.

11. Phase II.

(a) Regional Patriot Officers will come under direct control of their Regional Commissioners and will continue the work begun in Phase I.

(b) Equipment already at command will be left by IV Corps

(x) Whenever possible arrange to provide in their homes using refugee channels (if no other means are available) when their homes are a long distance away.

(xi) The assistance outlined above may be given to a maximum of 30 days from the time of reception and placement by the Patriot Officers. All patriots should have been found unemployed or disappeared in their homes within a short period, normally within 12 to 15 days.

ii. Phase II.

(a) Regional Patriot Officers will come under direct control of their Regional Commissioners and will continue the work begun in Phase I.

(b) Equipment already at Camps will be left by IV Corps or 5 Army.

(c) Transport will be provided by Regions or local arrangements made.

iii. Phase III.

4. Payment to patriots. The Italian Government proposes to reward patriots for their services with grants of money on the following scale:

Pocket money to Patriots	1000 lire
50% disabled Patriots	5000 "
For family of patriot killed in action	10000 "

These payments will be the responsibility of the Italian Military Representative with each team who will obtain funds as laid down in Appendix A para. 16 (d). The distribution of funds will be the responsibility of the Italian Patriots Representative.

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and will be supervised by the Allied Patriot Officer. Receipts will be obtained for payment and control will be forwarded to the Italian organization making the payment.

5. Collection of arms. Lists will be made of all arms and ammunition collected from Patriots; receipts will be given to each individual. The Commander of the nearest Allied Military Unit will be responsible for the collection and safe custody of arms when surrendered. Copy of lists of arms will be forwarded to Patriots Branch.

6. Relieving. Patriot Officers will forward to their HQs, reports to HQs or 5 Army and Patriots Branch HQs, a weekly report of their activities compiled under the following headings:

1. Arms surrendered (quantity and type)
2. Number of Patriots received at Centre or Office.
3. Number of Patriots sent to hospital
4. Number of Patriots enlisted into the Italian Army
5. Number of Patriots re-employed.
6. Number of Patriots returned to their homes.
7. Number of Patriots not yet disposed.
8. Commander-in-Chief's Certification
 - (a) Number issued with command roll.
 - (b) Number of certificates in stock.

INTERCOMMUNICATION.

5. HQ may correspond direct only on routine and technical matters with Patriots Branch HQ, HQ.

R. S. CHIFFS,
Colonel,
Director,
Local Govt. S/C.

DISTRICT VON

5. 120 any correspondence direct only on routine and technical matters which interests Branch Hq. and.

INTERCOMUNICATION.

R. P. Griffin
 R. P. GRIFFIN,
 Colonel,
 Director,
 Local Govt. S/O.

DISTRIBUTION

- Regions LEONIA 10
- COAHUILA 10
- PUEBLA 10
- QUERETARO 10
- TOLUCA 10
- VERACRUZ 10
- AMIG. (G-5) 10
- 15 Army Group 20
- 5th Army 20
- Sub Army 160
- IV Corps 2
- S.O. (A) Liaison Staff Room 3
- Ex. Commissioner 2
- Personnel Section 10
- Finance Sub-Dir. 10
- Public Health S/O. 1
- Land Forces Sub-Dir. 2
- File 10

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SECRET.

Appendix A to 94/PAS
dated 7 April 1945.

ADMINISTRATION OF PATRIOT CENTERS.

1. LOCATION. Centers will be established by the HQ, when necessary near concentrations of patriots. It will be a IV Corps or 5 Army responsibility to establish equip and maintain these centers. This responsibility will be discharged through Provincial Patriot Officers.
2. COMING. The Patriot Officer, assisted by the Italian Military Patriot Representative, will control and supervise the administration of the Center.
3. STAFF. Staff for the Center will be enlisted from Patriots. A Camp Commandant (Battalion Commander), a Doctor, a hairdresser, cooks, cleaners and guards will be required. Payments on scale approved by the MOOI (Minister of Occupied Italy) will be made by the Military Patriot Representative.
4. PRISON. Patriots may remain in Centers for a maximum period of 90 days. Within that time is the duty of the Patriot Officer to ensure that they are either enlisted into the Italian Army, found civil work or returned to their homes. Those who should formally be adequate, and patriots should be kept for longer periods only in exceptional circumstances.
5. SCREENING. The Patriot Officer with the Italian (if available) and leader of each Patriot Band that arrives, will form a screening committee and ensure that as far as possible only genuine patriots are admitted.
6. HYGIENE. Particular attention will be paid to hygiene. Disinfectants will be obtained and all clothing will be disinfected. Bathing and washing arrangements must be adequate for maximum number expected.
7. CLOTHING. Essential clothing will be issued, as necessary, and if available.
8. ACCOMMODATION CENTERS. Accommodation stores will be obtained as far as possible from local sources. Beds should be obtained

4. POLICY. Patriots may remain in Centres for a maximum period of 90 days. Within that time it is the duty of the Patriot Officer to ensure that they are either enlisted into the Italian Army, Fascist civil work or returned to their homes. Those who should normally be exempted, and Patriots should be kept for longer periods only in exceptional circumstances.
5. SUPERVISION. The Patriot Officer with the Allies (if available) and leader of each Patriot Band that arrives, will form a screening committee and ensure that as far as possible only genuine Patriots are admitted.
6. HYGIENE. Particular attention will be paid to hygiene. Disinfectants will be obtained and all clothing will be disinfected. Latrines and washing arrangements must be adequate for maximum number expected.
7. CLOTHING. Essential clothing will be issued, as necessary, and if available.
8. ACCOMMODATION SITES. Accommodation sites will be obtained as far as possible from local sources. Beds should be obtainable from the Italian Army.
9. RATIONS. Rations will be drawn on the Italian Army scale from DIME and all stores. The heavy elements of the Italian Army Division Scale for local purchase of vegetables, fruits, and meat, will be drawn from the local prefect by the Italian Patriot Representative, who will be responsible for buying this part of the ration and accounting for the funds.
10. FUNDS. The following funds will be made available by the Finance Officers in each Patriot Centre through the I.C.O. Such funds will be drawn and accounted for by the I.C.O. Funds can only be drawn on the authority and with the approval of the Allied Patriot Officer:

- (a) For the payment of Italian wages;
- (b) For Patriot Centre staff wages. (These will be arranged by the I.C.O. when staff is engaged and confirmed by I.C.O.)

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- (c) A floor of 100,000 lire, to be adjusted monthly, for incidental expenses at Geneva, and payment for the purchased part of the Italian military ration.
- (d) A fund for the payment of 10,000, 50,000 and 10,000 lire grants to Patriots and their dependants.

11. COLLECTION OF PATRIOTS. It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to furnish transportation as required to transport to Geneva Patriots from the fields where suitable bands or groups exist.

12. DISPATCH. The HQ will arrange transport to take away recruits to Assistant Centre and volunteers for labour Corps to the scope of their own work. Patriots whose homes are at a distance will be evacuated through Refugee Channels if no other means are available.

13. REGISTRATION. A Register will be kept of all Patriots entering the Centre, containing the following information:
(a) Date of arrival at Centre. (b) Surveys. (c) Christian name. (d) Sex. (e) Nationality. (f) Date and Place of Birth. (g) Home address. (h) Occupation. (i) Date of departure. (j) Immediate destination. This information will be sent in duplicate with Patriots evacuated through Refugee Channels.

SECRET.

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
7 April, 1945.

ITALIAN ARMY RECRUITING AGENCIES.

1. RECRUITING.

As mentioned, demands a recruiting agency, consisting of 4 Italian Officers and 6 Cms, will be attached to Regional HQ. Joint Forces Sub-Commission, at the request of Pacifica Branch will send these recruiting agencies into the field.

2. CONTROL.

The HQ has full control over the recruiting agency while it remains attached to him. He can divide it, at his discretion into four or less sub-agencies which may be sent to work independently in any part of his Region.

3. FUNCTIONS.

In army areas or Military Government Territory recruiting agencies are entitled to RUC and items from Italian Military Sources.

as division remains a recruiting agency, consisting of 4 Italian Officers and 6 O.N., will be attached to Regional HQ. Land Forces Sub-Division, at the request of Portuguese Branch will send these recruiting agencies into the field.

2. NO. 73016

The HQ has full control over the recruiting agency while it remains attached to HQ. He can divide it, at his discretion into four or less detachments which may be sent to work independently in any part of his Region.

3. NO. 73016

In army areas or Military Government Territory Recruiting agencies are entitled to HQ and officers from Italian Military Bureau.

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APPENDIX "C"
To 94/PAT Issued 7 April 1946.

ITALIAN MILITARY PATRIOT REFUGEE ACTIVITIES.

1. ENLISTMENT

Recruitments of all Italian Military Patriot Ref-
ugees must be confirmed by the Italian Government.

2. DISCIPLINE

- (a) Any IPR found to be in possession of rifle or party
to, or acting as an agent for, the carrying of rifle, will be
subject to immediate dismissal and severe disciplinary measures.
- (b) Any IPR engaging in political activities will be dis-
missed immediately.

3. RATIONS, BILLETTS AND P.O.L.

IPRs will receive free petrol, free billetes and a
free issue of rations in any area. (All 675/5/91 or 26
Oct. 44). They will not be allowed to/CRs for needs of their
own, nor will they draw supplies from IPRs or Post Exchange
Services. "Free billetes" will not be converted to include
furniture or bedding. IPRs, if admitted to Allied Officers'
messes, will be required to pay the local messing fee.

4. FIN.

The Italian Government provides funds through the
local Prefect for payment of each IPR at the rate of one
million (100) lire a day from the time he is released, and

of, or conduct as an agent for, the carrying of mail, will be subject to breache of discipline and severe disciplinary measures.

(4) Any LRP engaging in political activities will be dismissed immediately.

2. RELIGIOUS, ETHNIC AND P.O.L.

LRPs will receive free petrol, free fillots and a free issue of rations in any area. (All 1075/5/01 or 02 Oct. 44). They will not be allowed 2/00 for issues of their gun, nor will they draw supplies from M201 or Post Exchange services. "Free Religion" will not be construed to include furniture or bedding. EFES, if added to Allied troops' Messes, will be required to pay the local messing fee.

4. PAY.

The Italian Government provides funds through the local effect for payment of each LRP at the rate of one hundred (100) lire a day from the time he is called up, and two hundred (200) lire a day from the time when he receives his appointment. Payments are for a seven day week. Regional Commissioners are responsible for seeing that they are paid on 15th and last day of each month.

5. TRANSPORT

P.O.s are required that LRPs require transportation which may be provided by other Italian Officials.

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APPENDIX IV
INSTRUCTIONS DATED 1 APRIL 1945.

PRINCIPLES ON WAR.

Instructions to Allied Patriot Officers.

1. It is possible that Patriot bands may arrive either:

- I (a) deserting enemy prisoners of war, or
- (b) with enemy troops in their ranks who have joined the patriots to fight the main German forces for political or other reasons.

2. Instructions will be issued by 15 Army Group as to the treatment of such enemy troops and, in the meantime, the following principles will be observed:

(a) Allied Patriot Officers' action will be governed by the knowledge that any negotiations can take place with the enemy except on the basis of unconditional surrender.

(b) It must be clearly understood that Allied Patriot Officers are not in position to guarantee treatment as prisoners of war to those who have surrendered to patriots, before the prisoners are received into Allied custody.

(c) Allied Patriot Officers should at once transmit to the nearest Military Authority, officers by means of detachments of unconditional surrender to the Allies. The Military Authority should be informed of the full circumstances and they will decide whether such surrender can be accepted.

(d) Until surrender is accepted by Allied Command, prisoners of patriots' hands are patriots and not as Allied responsibility.

(a) Allied Prisoners of War' actions will be governed by the knowledge that no negotiations are being planned with the enemy except on the basis of unconditional surrender.

(b) It must be clearly understood that Allied Prisoners of War are in a position to guarantee treatment as Prisoners of War to those who have surrendered to Patriots, before the prisoners are received into Allied custody.

(c) Allied Prisoners of War should at once transmit to the nearest military officer, officers by army detachments of unconditional surrender to the Allies. The military authorities should be informed of the full circumstances and they will decide whether such surrender can be accepted.

(d) Until surrender is accepted by Allied Command, prisoners in Patriots' hands are a Patriot and not an Allied responsibility.

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APPENDIX "B"

to be used until 7 April

From: Finance Sub-Committee
To: All Regional Fin. Officers and Senior Finance Officers.

No. 13196/C
Date 6 April, 1945.

Subject: FINANCING OF PATRIOT CENTRES IN THE TERRITORY.

1. In addition military Government territory the expenditures of Patriot Centres and payments to patriots will be controlled through the Prefecture budget.

2. For the first three months budget there will be no reliable guide to the extent of expenditures that is likely to be incurred, but in order to avoid supplementary requests for funds the initial credit should be a sum fully sufficient for the estimated requirement. Any unexpended balance can be taken into account in the succeeding quarterly budget, according to the established procedure.

3. The Prefect of each province should be instructed to submit (S.P.) budget estimates and request for funds forthwith, specifying the capital of expenditures in accordance with III 1 March 1945 n. 66. It will be the responsibility of the Prefecture to keep on hand Patriot Centre supplies and funds for all administrative and other expenditures, and for the payment of indemnities and compensation to patriots and patriots. Patriot Centres will maintain continuity of all disbursements and apply to the Prefecture monthly to advance for funds to meet the estimated disbursements for the succeeding month.

By command of Rear Admiral CANE.

Signed

Joint Director,
Finance Sub-Committee

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APPENDIX III
To Part II of 7 April 1945.

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APPENDIX "C"
to 94/245, dated
9 April 1945.

RATIONS FOR ITALIAN PRISONER CAPTIVES.
1. Items of the Italian Military Ration furnished from Allied Sources.

Flour	15 oz.
Dried vegetables	2 oz.
Meat, canned, or fish, preserved	3 oz.
Cheese	1 oz.
Sugar	1 oz.
Macaroni	3 oz.
Rice	1 oz.
Vegetables, dehydrated	1 oz.
Catsup, or tomato paste	1 oz.
Coffee	2 oz.
Pepper	1/260 oz.

2. Items of the Italian Military Ration furnished by the Italian Government.

Fruit, fresh	4 oz.
Vegetables, fresh	3 oz.
Olive oil	1 1/2 oz.
Nuts, shelled, or	1 oz.
Nuts, unshelled	2 oz.
Salt	1 oz.
Wine	1 litre
Matches, per 7 rations	1 box or 2 books

3. Sops and Cigarettes.

When military rations are correctly issued to Prisoner Camps etc. on Form 92/2 and are correctly accountable through M.I.A., the following ration of 5.2 and cigarettes may also be drawn (authority - Italian Prisoner Sub Commission letter 9/58 dated 9 April 1945).

(a) Sops.

with all troops forward

Government.

Fruit, fresh	oz.
Vegetables, fresh	oz.
Olive oil	oz.
Butter, shelled, or	oz.
Butter, unshelled	oz.
Salt	oz.
Vinegar	litre
Butter, per 7 rations	box or
	boxes

3. Soap and Cigarettes.

When military rations are correctly issued to Patriot Camps etc. on forms ST/5 and are correctly accountable through H.M.S.A., the following ration of soap and cigarettes may also be issued (Authority - Lt. Col. Vernon Sub Commission Letter Q/63 dated 9 April 1945).

(a) Soap.

- (i) 300 grammes per man per month for all troops forward of 5th and 8th Army Rear Boundaries.
- (ii) 250 grammes per man per month for all troops behind 5th and 8th Army Rear Boundaries.

(b) Cigarettes.

- (i) Five issues, 5 cigarettes per man per day.
- (ii) Additional free issue. Authority has been given for an additional free issue of 5 cigarettes certain per day (Note: It is not anticipated that supplies will be available for issue under this heading until 7 May 1945).

6/128/CA

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION.

LOCAL GOV. SEC

11 APR 1945

Ext. 620

10th April, 1945.

To: Patriots Branch.

CAS

Telephone message to Chief Staff Officer Civil Affairs
Section; Colonel Gripps speaking: Number of vehicles required
for Regional and Provincial Patriot Officers in Northern Italy
is as follows:

(1) <u>North West Italy</u>					
Piedmont		7	Provincial Patriot Officers		
Liguria		4	"	"	"
Lombardia		9	"	"	"
Emilia		2	"	"	"
One for Regional		<u>22</u>			
Patriot Officers :					
Piedmont					
Lombardia		5			
Liguria		<u>5</u>			
<u>North East Italy</u>					
Venezia		10			
Emilia		<u>4</u>			
One for each		<u>14</u>			
Regional Patriot					
Officer		2			
		<u>16</u>			

Capitaine

Director.

6403

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Ext : 525

Ref 6/12M/CA

11 April 45

SUBJECT : Transportation for Patriot Officers
TO : Acting Executive Commissioner

- 1 Will you kindly give instructions for the T.E. of Regions to be increased by the numbers given below in order to provide for Patriot Officers.

Liguria	5
Piemonte	8
Lombardia	10
Venezia	11
Emilia	7
	<u>41</u>

- 2 This request is in accordance with your remarks on the subject at to-day's meeting of Regional Commissioners.

GB
G.R. UFFONI Brig,
VP CA Section

AA/ex

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

PO 394

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND MISSION

SECRET

Ref: 94/Pat

7 April, 1945.

PLAN FOR PATRIOTS IN N.W. ITALY.

INFORMATION

1. In the event of a sudden withdrawal by the enemy from the Regions LIGURIA, PIEMONTE, LANGHARDA and N.W. EMILIA it is known that we shall have to deal with large numbers of armed and organised Patriot Bands.

INTENTION

2. The intention is to contact the Patriots, disarm and disband them, enlist within the limits allowed, into the Italian Armed Forces, find employment for as many as require it and return the remainder to their homes as quickly as possible.

AGREED.

3. A). Administration of Patriots used operationally will be, as at present, the responsibility of the Allied Unit which uses them or retains them for future operations.
B). For the remainder there will be two Phases:
Phase I. The treatment of these remaining Patriots will be the responsibility of H. IV Corps or 5 Army.
Phase II. As soon as control of any part of N.W. Italy is assumed by No. 2 District the responsibility for administration and rehabilitation of the Patriots in that part no longer under IV Corps control will pass to Regional Commissioners in conjunction with No. 2 District or P.R.S.

For the purposes of Phase I the Staffs of the

The intention is to contact the Patriots, disarm and disband them, enlist within the limits allowed, into the Italian Armed Forces, find employment for as many as require it and return the remainder to their homes as quickly as possible.

METHOD.

3. a). Administration of Patriots used operationally will be, as at present, the responsibility of the Allied Unit which uses them or retains them for future operations.

b). For the remainder there will be two Phases: Phase I. The treatment of those remaining Patriots will be the responsibility of H. IV Corps or 5 Army. Phase II. As soon as control of any part of H.V. Italy is assumed by Hc. 2 District the responsibility for administration and rehabilitation of the Patriots in that part no longer under IV Corps control will pass to Regional Commissioners in conjunction with Hc. 2 District or E.S.S.

c). For the purposes of Phase I, the Staffs of the Regional Commissioners attached to Hc. IV Corps will include one Regional Patriot Officer and one Italian Military Patriot Representative for each Region, and as many Italian Army Officers as may be considered necessary to deal with the immediate Patriot problem in each Province.

Italian Army Officers will be nominated by the Ministry of Occupied Italy and approved by Patriots Branch. (See Appendix 2 for list of officers allocated to each Region and Province).

Such Personnel will move forward with IV Corps or 5 Army and undertake Patriot work as instructed by IV Corps or 5 Army in their future Regions and Provinces; they will remain behind in those Regions and Provinces continuing their work under Regional and Provincial Commissioners when IV Corps or 5 Army moves up.

(2).

6402

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 75016

D). The Regional Patriot Officer will be responsible, through intelligence channels at 15 Army Group and Patriots Branch for ascertaining as far as possible the location and strength of Patriot Bands in the Regions about to be occupied.

This information will be used (a) for assessing the number of Patriot Officers required and (b) for gaining a general background of their future work.

E). As Army moves forward No. 1 Special Force will drop Allied Officers behind the enemy lines to contact Allied Liaison Officers already working there, and also Patriot Leaders. These Officers will prepare the way for the first meeting between Patriot Officers and Patriots, arranging rendezvous, instructing Patriots when and where to assemble and, if necessary, reconcentrating quarters suitable for Patriot Centres.

The Regional Patriot Officer and Patriot personnel will move forward with Corps as soon as possible to make these contacts.

F). Patriot Centres will be established near concentrations of Patriots.

The Provincial Commissioner will, for this purpose take on a permanent staff of Patriots to prepare the Centre for occupation and to maintain it efficiently. His Italian Military Representative should be made responsible for the proper running and interior economy of the centre. The pay of the Patriots taken on his permanent staff will be met by funds drawn from the local Prefecture. (Authority HQAF Finance Sub-Commission letter 15195/P dated 6 April 1945. See Appendix 2).

G). Functions of the Patriot Officer (Phase I) working under IV Corps or 5 Army he will:

(i) take such steps as are necessary to induce Patriot bands to come to Centres. The provision of transport for the collection of suitable groups or bands of Patriots will be a IV Corps or 5 Army responsibility.

(ii) Indent for rations (Italian Military scale - See Appendix 3) from BID or AF Stores. Arrange for certain elements (i.e. fruit, fresh vegetables and wine) to be drawn from local Italian Army stores or purchased locally by the

of patriots.

The Provincial Commissioner will, for this purpose take on a permanent staff of patriots to prepare the Centre for occupation and to maintain it efficiently. His Italian Military Representative should be made responsible for the proper running and interior security of the centre. The pay of the patriots taken on his permanent staff will be met by funds drawn from the local Prefettura. (Authority 1942 Finance Sub-Commissioner letter 13196/2 dated 6 April 1945. See Appendix E).

G). Functions of the Patriot Officer (Phase 1)
Working under IV Corps or 5 Army he will:

(i) take such steps as are necessary to induce Patriot Bands to come to Centres. The provision of transport for the collection of suitable groups or bands of patriots will be a IV Corps or 5 Army responsibility.

(ii) Indent for rations (Italian Military scale - See Appendix G) from DID or OM Storero.

Arrange for certain elements (i.e. fruit, fresh vegetables and wine) to be drawn from local Italian Army stores or purchased locally by the LAGO with funds drawn through the P.R.O.

(iii) Make immediate arrangements, working through Patriot Leaders, for the disarming of patriots if they have not already been disarmed by the Army (See Appendix F.)

(iv) With the help of Allied and Patriot Leaders, decide which of the claimants are bona fide patriots.

(v) Report to the nearest Military HQ details of patriots brought in by patriots and ask for disposal instructions. (See Appendix "D").

(vi) Arrange, if possible, to engage the services of an Italian doctor at the Centre to deal with minor cases, and, if necessary, give preliminary treatment

treatment to serious cases. Send wounded patriots to Italian Military or civilian hospitals according to the availability of accommodations. Allied Forces will assist the Italian Army who will be responsible for hospitalization. Evacuation will be a IV Corps or 5 Army responsibility.

(vii) Issue any clothing that is available. Distribution from war stockpiles will be a IV Corps or 5 Army responsibility.

(viii) With the help of Allied and Patriot Leaders, arrange to issue to each file Patriots a certificate signed by the Commander-in-Chief. In suitable cases this could be arranged as part of the disarming ceremony.

(ix) Make arrangements for the absorption of patriots into employment through Labour Organizations of the Army and any civilian Labour Organization that may be available. No. 2 District will give priority of employment to all genuine Patriots.

(x) Wherever possible evacuate Patriots to their homes using refugee channels (if no other means are available) when their homes are a long distance away.

(xi) The assistance outlined above may be given to a maximum of 90 days from the time of reception and disarmament by the Patriot Officers. All Patriots should have been found employment or dispersed to their homes within a much shorter period, normally within 14 to 21 days.

H. Phase II.

(a) Regional Patriot Officers will come under direct control of their Regional Commissioners and will continue the work begun in Phase I.

(b) Equipment already at Centres will be left by IV Corps or 5 Army.

6.1.1.1

(x) Whenever possible evacuate Patriots to their homes using refugee channels (if no other means are available) when their homes are a long distance away.

(xi) The assistance outlined above may be given to a maximum of 90 days from the time of reception and disengagement by the Patriot Officers. All Patriots should have been found employment or dispersed to their homes within a much shorter period, normally within 14 to 21 days.

4. Phase II.

(a) Regional Patriot Officers will come under direct control of their Regional Commissioners and will continue the work begun in Phase I.

(b) Enlistment already at Centres will be left by IG Corps or 5 Army.

(c) Transport will be provided by telephone or local arrangements.

ADMINISTRATION.

A. Payment to Patriots. The Italian Government proposes to reward Patriots for their services with grants of money on the following scale:

Pocket money to Patriots	1000	lire
for disabled Patriots	5000	"
for family of patriot killed in action	10000	"

These payments will be the responsibility of the Italian Military Representative with each team who will obtain funds as laid down in Appendix A para. 16 (d). The distribution of funds will be the responsibility of the Italian Patriotic Representative.

/ and

and will be supervised by the Allied Patriot Officer. Receipts will be obtained for payment and nominal roll will be forwarded to the Italian organization making the payment.

B. Collection of arms. Lists will be made of all arms and ammunition collected from Patriots; receipts will be given to each individual. The Commander of the nearest Allied Military Unit will be responsible for the collection and safe custody of arms when surrendered. Copy of lists of arms will be forwarded to Patriots Branch.

C. Returns. Patriot Officers will forward to their RAs, copies to IV Corps or 5 Army and Patriots Branch HQ., a weekly report of their activities compiled under the following headings:

1. Arms surrendered (quantity and type)
2. Number of Patriots received at Centro or Office.
3. Number of Patriots sent to hospital
4. Number of Patriots enlisted into the Italian Army
5. Number of Patriots re-employed.
6. Number of Patriots returned to their homes.
7. Number of Patriots not yet dispersed.
8. Commander-in-Chief's Certificates
(a) Number issued with nominal roll.
(b) Number of certificates in stock.

INTERCOMMUNICATION.

5. HQ may correspond direct only on routine and technical matters with Patriots Branch HQ., AG.

DISTRIBUTION

Regione Liguria 10
Liguria 10

R. R. Griffiths
R. R. GRIFFITHS,
Colonel,
Director,
Local Govt. S/O.

7. Number of Patriots not yet dispersed.
8. Commander-in-Chief's Certificates
 - (a) Number issued with nominal roll.
 - (b) Number of certificates in stock.

INTERCOMMUNICATION

5. RPO may correspond direct only on routine and technical matters with Patriots Branch HQ, AF.

R. R. GRIFFS
 R. R. GRIFFS,
 Colonel,
 Director,
 Local Govt. S/O.

DISTRIBUTION

Regions LIGURIA	10
LOMBARDIA	10
PIEMONTE	10
EMILIA	10
TOSCANA	10
VENEZIA	2
APHQ. (C-5)	1
15 Army Group	10
5th Army	20
8th Army	20
IV Corps	160
S.O. (M) Liaison Staff Para 3	
Ex. Commissioner	2
Economic Section	10
Adm. Section	10
Finance Sub-Com.	2
Public Health S/O.	1
Land Forces Sub-Com.	2
File	10

SECRET.

Memorandum "..." to SAC/PAZ
dated 7 April 1945.

ADMINISTRATION OF PATRIOT CENTERS.

1. LOCATION. Centers will be established by the HQ, when necessary, near concentrations of patriots. It will be a IV Corps or 5 Army responsibility to establish equip and maintain these centers. This responsibility will be discharged through Provincial Patriot Officers.
2. COMMAND. The Patriot Officer, assisted by the Italian Military Patriot Representative, will control and supervise the administration of the Centre.
3. STAFF. Staff for the Centre will be enlisted from Patriots. A Camp Commandant (Battal Commander), a Doctor, a hairdresser, cooks, cleaners and guards will be required. Payment on scale approved by the MGI (Minister of Occupied Italy) will be made by the Military Patriot Representative.
4. POLICY. Patriots may remain in Centre for a maximum period of 90 days. Within that time it is the duty of the Patriot Officer to ensure that they are either enlisted into the Italian Army, found civil work or returned to their homes. Those who should normally be admitted, and Patriots should be kept for longer periods only in exceptional circumstances.
5. SECURITY. The Patriot Officer with the Allies (if available) and leader of each Patriot Band that arrives, will form a screening committee and ensure that so far as possible only genuine patriots are admitted.
6. HYGIENE. Particular attention will be paid to hygiene. Disinfectants will be obtained and all clothing will be disinfected. Latrine and washing arrangements must be adequate for maximum number expected.
7. CLOTHING. Essential clothing will be issued, as necessary, and if available.
8. ACCOMMODATION CENTRES. Accommodation where will be obtained as far as possible from local sources. Beds should be obtainable from the Italian Army.

63395

by the Military Patriot Representative.

4. POLICY. Patriots may remain in Centres for a maximum period of 90 days. Within that time it is the duty of the Patriot Officer to ensure that they are either enlisted into the Italian Army, found civil work or returned to their homes. Three weeks should normally be adequate, and Patriots should be kept for longer periods only in exceptional circumstances.
5. SCREENING. The Patriot Officer with the Allies (if available) and leader of each Patriot Band that arrives, will form a screening committee and ensure that so far as possible only genuine patriots are admitted.
6. HYGIENE. Particular attention will be paid to hygiene. Disinfectants will be obtained and all clothing will be disinfected. Laundry and washing arrangements must be adequate for maximum number expected.
7. CLOTHING. Essential clothing will be issued, as necessary, and if available.
8. ACCOMMODATION SERVICES. Accommodation stored will be obtained as far as possible from local sources. Beds should be obtainable from the Italian Army.
9. RATIONS. Rations will be drawn on the Italian Army scale from Lido and QM Stores. The money element of the Italian Army Ration Scale for local purchase of vegetables, fruit, and wine, will be drawn from the local Prefect by the Italian Patriot Representative, who will be responsible for buying this part of the ration and accounting for the funds.
10. FINANCE. The following funds will be made available by the Finance Officer to each Patriot Centre through the P.F.O. Such funds will be drawn and accounted for by the IPR. Cash can only be drawn on the authority and with the approval of the Allied Patriot Officers:
 - (a) for the payment of IPRs wages;
 - (b) for Patriot Centre staff wages. (These will be arranged by the IPR when staff is engaged and confirmed by MOI)

(/e)

2.

- (c) A Fleet of 10,000 lire, to be adjusted monthly, for incidental expenses at Genoa, and payment for the purchased part of the Italian military ration.
- (d) A fund for the payment of 1000, 5000 and 10,000 lire grants to Patriots and their dependents.

11. COLLECTION OF PATRIOTS. It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to furnish transportation as required to transport to Central Patriots from localities where suitable bands or groups exist.

12. DISPATCH. The HQ will arrange transport to take army recruits to Enlistment Centers and volunteers for Labor Corps to the scene of their new work. Patriots whose names are at a distance will be evacuated through Refugee Channels if no other means are available.

13. DOCUMENTATION. A Register will be kept of all Patriots entering the Corps, containing the following information:
(a) Date of arrival at Centre (b) Birth. (c) Christian name. (d) Sex (e) Nationality (f) Date and Place of Birth. (g) Home Address (h) Occupation (i) Date of Departure. (j) Immediate destination. This information will be sent in duplicate with patriots evacuated through Refugee Channels.

SECRET.

APPENDIX "B"
TO 94/F.P.T. dated 7 April, 1945.

ITALIAN ARMY RECRUITING AGENCIES.

1. ESTABLISHMENT.

As occasion demands a Recruiting Agency, consisting of 4 Italian Officers and 6 ORs, will be attached to Regional HQ. Land Forces Sub-Commission, at the request of Patriots Branch will send these Recruiting Agencies into the field.

2. ORGANON.

The RHC has full control over the Recruiting Agency while it remains attached to him. He can divide it, at his discretion into four or less detachments which may be sent to work independently in any part of his Region.

3. FUNCTIONS.

In Army areas or Military Government Territory Recruiting Agencies are entitled to sell and store from Italian Military Sources.

6392

...ing officers and ... will be attached to Regional ...
 ... Lord ... Sub-Commission, at the request of Patriots ...
 Branch will send these Recruiting Agencies into the field.

2. CONTROL.

The ... has full control over the recruiting agency while it remains attached to him. He can divide it, at his discretion into four or less detachments which may be sent to work independently in any part of his Region.

3. RATIONS.

In army areas or Military Government Territory Recruiting agencies are entitled to ... and stores from Italian Military Sources.

SECRET

APPENDIX "C"
To 9L/FAT dated 7 April 1945.

ITALIAN MILITARY PAROLION REFUGEE STATUTES.

1. ENLISTMENT

Nominations of all Italian Military Patriot Representatives must be confirmed by the Italian Government.

2. DISCIPLINE

(a) Any IAPR found to be in possession of mail, or party to, or acting as an agent for, the carrying of mail, will be subject to immediate dismissal and severe disciplinary measures.

(b) Any IAPR engaging in political activities will be dismissed immediately.

3. RATIONS, BILLOTS AND P.O.L.

IAPRs will receive free petrol, free billets and a free issue of rations in Army areas. (Ad 1075/5/41 or 26 Oct. 44). They will not be allowed M/ORs for messes of their own, nor will they draw supplies from MAFI or Post Exchange Services. "Free Billets" will not be construed to include furniture or bedding. IAPRs, if admitted to Allied Officers' Messes, will be required to pay the local messing fee.

4. PAY.

The Italian Government provides funds through the IAPR for payment of each IAPR at the rate of one hundred (100) lire a day from the time he is called up, and two hundred (200) lire a day from the time when he receives his appointment. Payments are for a seven day week. Regional Commissioners are responsible for seeing that they

(b) Any DIRM engaging in political activities will be dismissed immediately.

3. RATIONS, BILLETTS AND P.O.L.

IDPRs will receive free petrol, free billets and a free issue of rations in any area. (At 1075/5/91 or 26 Oct. 44). They will not be allowed RA/CHA for horses of their own, nor will they draw supplies from MAFI or Post Exchange Services. "Free Billets" will not be construed to include furniture or bedding. IDPRs, if admitted to Allied Officers' Messes, will be required to pay the local messing fee.

4. PAY.

The Italian Government provides funds through the local Prefect for payment of each IDPR at the rate of one hundred (100) lire a day from the time he is called up, and two hundred (200) lire a day from the time when he receives his appointment. Payments are for a seven day week. Regional Commissioners are responsible for seeing that they are paid on 15th and last day of each month.

5. TRANSPORT

P.Cs. are reminded that IDPRs require transportation which may be provided as for other Italian Officials.

SECRET.

APPENDIX "C"

To 94/P.2 Dated 7 April 1945.

PRISONERS OF WAR.

Instructions to Allied Patriot Officers.

1. It is possible that Patriot Bands may arrive either:
 - 1 (a) Rescuing enemy Prisoners of War, or
 - (b) With enemy troops in their ranks who have joined the patriots to fight the main German forces for political or other reasons.
2. Instructions will be issued by 15 Army Group as to the treatment of such enemy troops and, in the meantime, the following principles will be observed:
 - (a) Allied Patriot Officers' action will be governed by the knowledge that no negotiations can take place with the enemy except on the basis of unconditional surrender.
 - (b) It must be clearly understood that Allied Patriot Officers are not in a position to guarantee treatment as Prisoners of War to those who have surrendered to Patriots, before the prisoners are received into Allied custody.
 - (c) Allied Patriot Officers should at once transmit to the nearest Military Centre, officers by enemy detachments of unconditional surrender to the Allies. The Military Authorities should be informed of the full circumstances and they will decide whether such surrender can be accepted.
 - (d) Until surrender is accepted by Allied Command, prisoners in Patriots' hands are a Patriot and not an Allied responsibility.

2. Instructions will be issued by 15 Army Group as to the treatment of prisoners of war. In the interim, the following principles will be observed:

(a) Allied Prisoners' actions will be governed by the knowledge that no negotiations can take place with the enemy except on the basis of unconditional surrender.

(b) It must be clearly understood that Allied Prisoners are not in a position to guarantee treatment as Prisoners of War to those who have surrendered to Patriots, before the prisoners are received into Allied custody.

(c) Allied Prisoners should not be transferred to the nearest Military Centre, offers by enemy detachments of individual prisoners to the Allies. The Military authorities should be informed of the full circumstances and they will decide whether such surrender can be accepted.

(d) Until surrender is accepted by Allied Command, prisoners of Patriots' hands are a Patriot and not an Allied responsibility.

1809

SECRET

APPENDIX "M"

To 94/247 dated 7 April

From: Finance Sub-Commission
To: All Regional Patriotic Officers and Senior Finance Officers.

No. 13195/P
Date 6 April, 1945.

Subject: FINANCING OF PATRIOT CENTRES IN THE TERRITORY.

1. In Allied Military Government territory the expenditures of Patriotic Centres and payments to partisans will be controlled through the Prefecture budget.

2. For the first three monthly budget there will be no reliable guide as to the amount of expenditures that is likely to be incurred; but in order to avoid supplementary requests for funds the initial credit should be a sum amply sufficient for the estimated requirements. Any unexpended balances can be taken into account on the succeeding quarterly budget, according to the established procedure.

3. The Prefect of each Province should be instructed to submit (S.P.) budget estimates and a request for funds forthwith, specifying the capital of expenditure in accordance with D.L. 1 March 1945 n. 68. It will be the responsibility of the Prefecture to keep each Patriotic Centre supplied with funds for all administration and other expenditures, and for the payment of indemnities and compensation to patriots and partisans. Patriotic centres will maintain accounts of all disbursements and apply to the Prefecture monthly in advance for funds to meet the estimated disbursements for the succeeding month.

of Patriot Centres and payments to partisans will be controlled through the Prefecture budget.

2. For the first three monthly budget there will be no reliable guide as to the amount of expenditure that is likely to be incurred; but in order to avoid supplementary requests for funds the initial credit should be a sum amply sufficient for the estimated requirements. Any unexpended balances can be taken into account on the succeeding quarterly budget, according to the established procedure.

3. The Prefect of each Province should be instructed to submit (S.B.) budget estimates and a request for funds forthwith, specifying the capital of expenditure in accordance with the 1 March 1945 n. 63. It will be the responsibility of the Prefecture to keep each Patriot Centre supplied with funds for all administration and other expenditures, and for the payment of indemnities and compensation to patriots and partisans. Patriot centres will maintain accounts of all disbursements and apply to the Prefecture monthly in advance for funds to meet the estimated requirements for the succeeding month.

By command of Rear Admiral ROME.

Signed

Joint Director,
Finance Sub-Commission

SECRET.

APPENDIX "B"
to 74/847 of 7 April 1945.

LOMBARDIA REGION - PARLIAMENT REPRESENTATIVES.

HR	COL.	BRIGANTI, Giuseppe
HR	MAJ.	BERGAMINI, Mario
MILANO	COL.	BUONAI, Spartaco
MILANO CITY	MAJ.	DALL'ACQUA, Luigi
VARESE	T.COL.	BONCHI, Marco
PAVIA	MAJ.	VIVIANI, Augusto
MONZA	S.TEN.	RUSSI, Aldo
BESENCO	CAP.	COMENZI-CONTRASTI, M. S.
CREMA	CAP.	LENTINI, Rocco
COMO	MAJ.	QUARTO, Giovanni
SONDRIO	MAJ.	D'AMICO, Giulio
BERGAMO	T.COL.	ROBOLIO, Pampalo

PUGLIA REGION:

HR.	T.COL.	FRULLI, Vincenzo
TORINO	CAP.	RAUDDI, Remo
TORINO, City	T.COL.	MATA, Camillo
ALBA	CAP.	CINQUE, Giuseppe
ALBA	S.TEN.	MARIN, Alfredo
CUNEO	S.TEN.	TOCI, Ardeco
ASTI	CAP.	FRULLI, Mario
NOVARA	TEN.	CINQUE, Manfredo
VERCELLI	CAP.	FRULLI, Bruno

LIGURIA REGION.

HR.	CAP.VAS.	CARNO, Silvio
GENOVA	T.COL.	LESAI, Luigi
LA SPEZIA	CAP.	SANTINI, Gino
LA SPEZIA	CAP.	MILITELLI, Luigi

Cap. LEONINI, Romeo
Maj. DELATO, Giovanni
Maj. D'ANGELO, Giulio
T.Col. BOSCHIO, Pasquale

PIEMONTE REGION

T.Col. FANELI, Vincenzo
Cap. FADDINELLI, Rene
T.Col. RITA, Camillo
Cap. CIMBUCHI, Giuseppe
S.Maj. MORETIL, Alfredo
S.Maj. ROCI, Amedeo
Cap. FABRI, Mario
Ten. CAMERIO, Manfred
Cap. ZENODI, Bruno

LIGURIA REGION

Cap. Vaso, GABRI, Silvio
T.Col. LESSANI, Luigi
Cap. SARTINI, Gino
Cap. MULLASCHI, Luigi
Cap. SALVI, Edo.

IV CORPS

Cap. JACCHIONE, Filippo

6390

COMO
SONDRIO
BERGAMO

RA.
TORINO
NORINO, City
ALESSANDRIA
AOSTA
CUNEO
ASTI
NOVARA
VERCELLI

RA.
GENOVA
LA SPEZIA
LA VOGA
IMPERIA

SECRET

APPENDIX "G"
to 94/PAT. dated
9 April 1945.

RATIONS FOR ITALIAN PATRIOT GUERRILLAS.

1. Items of the Italian Military Ration furnished from Allied Sources.

Flour	15 oz.
Dried vegetables	2 oz.
Meat, canned, or fish, preserved	3 oz.
Cheese	1 oz.
Sugar	1 oz.
Macaroni	3 oz.
Rice	1 oz.
Vegetables, dehydrated	1 oz.
Catsup, or tomato paste	2 oz.
Coffee	1 oz.
Pepper	1/250 oz.

2. Items of the Italian Military Ration furnished by the Italian Government.

Fruit, fresh	4 oz.
Vegetables, fresh	8 oz.
Olive oil	1 1/2 oz.
Nuts, shelled, or	1 oz.
Nuts, unshelled	2 oz.
Salt	1/2 oz.
Wine	1 litre
Matches, per 7 rations	1 box or
	2 books

3. Soap and Cigarettes.

When military rations are correctly issued to Patriot Camps etc. on Forms 92/3 and are correctly accountable through R.M.I.A., the following ration of soap and cigarettes may also be drawn (authority - L.M.A. Forces Sub Commission letter 9/68 dated 9 April 1945).

(a) Soap.

Coffee
Pepper

oz.
oz.
1/200 oz.

2. Items of the Italian Military Ration furnished by the Italian Government.

Fruit, fresh	4 oz.
Vegetables, fresh	8 oz.
Olive oil	1 1/2 oz.
Nuts, shelled, or	1 oz.
Nuts, unshelled	2 oz.
Salt	oz.
Wine,	1 litre
Matches, per 7 rations	1 box or
	2 books

3. Soap and Cigarettes.

When military rations are correctly issued to Patriot Camps etc. on Form 32/5 and are correctly accountable through R.M.I.A., the following ration of soap and cigarettes may also be drawn (authority - Land Forces Sub Commission Letter 3/63 dated 9 April 1945).

(a) Soap.

- (i) 300 grams per man per month for all troops forward of 5th and 8th Army Rear Boundaries.
- (ii) 250 grams per man per month for all troops behind 5th and 8th Army Rear Boundaries.

(b) Cigarettes.

- (i) Free issue: 5 cigarettes per man per day.
- (ii) Additional free issue. Authority has been given for an additional free issue of 5 cigarettes per man per day (Note: It is not anticipated that supplies will be available for issue under this heading until 7 May 1945).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH

6RS
N.A. Lib RMC
579
3 APR 1945

Ref : 153/PAT.

2 April 1945.

Subject: Report on Northern Italy.

To : C.A. Section.

1. Ref No. II Int. report for Liberated Italy North of the Army Control line, dated 23 March 1945.
2. Herewith comments by the Liaison Officer attached to this Branch on appendices I and II. I endorse his views.

Craig

F. CRAIG,
Lt. Colonel,
Director,
Patriots Branch.

V.P. See attached

6390

/srg.

*Do you wish to advise P.W.B. of R. comments
it would be then good.*

3 Apr 45

R.R. Gage

2374

8

APPENDICES I and II Int. Report for Liberated Italy
North of the Army Control Line, dated 23 March 1945

Comments by Italian Liaison Officer attached
Patriots Branch.

These two appendices seem to be the work of a busybody official of M.O.C.I. who is not aware of what his ministry is doing for the Patriots. Most of the remarks might have been appropriate 4 or 6 months ago but are utter nonsense now. Most of the suggestions, and especially the sensible ones, have already been acted upon by Patriots Branch and M.O.C.I.

The M.O.C.I. official who supplied the information on which the appendices are based must be someone who is in close touch with Dr. Perini as the suggestions and remarks contained therein are very much the same as those brought up by him.

APPENDIX I.

1. Para. 1, 2, 3. M.O.C.I. and High Commissariat for Veterans, (S.E. Garofalo) are responsible for Patriots in AMV. areas and in the territory that has already been returned to Italian Government.
2. Para. 4. The question of assistance is well catered for by the above Government Departments. With the exception of A.M.P.I., all other bodies who undertake assistance work, do it on their own initiative and must be regarded as private organizations not recognized by the Italian Government.
3. Para. 6. Prior to the institution of Patriots Centres at Florence and Pesole, the 240th Division did give what little assistance it could to Patriots, but it no longer has any responsibilities in connection with them.
4. Para. 9. This occurred during the days immediately following the liberation of Florence, but it is no longer the case.
5. Para. 12. All these partisan aid groups are unofficial. The only recognized one is the "Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d'Italia" which is subsidized by the Government.

Furthermore in all Cases, where Patriots' Representatives have completed their work, Patriot Council Committees have been instituted.

Para. 1. 2. 3. M.O.C.I. and "High Commissariat for Veterans. (S.E. Casparotto) are responsible for Patriots in A.C. areas and in the territory that has already been returned to Italian Government.

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5. Para. 12. All these partisan aid groups are unofficial. The only recognized one is the "Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d'Italia" which is subsidised by the Government.

Furthermore in all Communes, where Patriots' Representatives have completed their work, Patriot Communal Committees have been instituted.

6. Para. 13. Grossly inaccurate.

7. Para. 14. Notes suggestions which have been rendered out of date by subsequent action and organization.

8. Para. 15. The duties of Patriot representatives are identical with those suggested for provincial Commissions.

Patriots' Representatives in Regions and Provinces will be as under:

1 Military Representative appointed by M.O.C.I. and approved by A.C. Patriots Branch;

1 Representative recommended by the local C.I.A.S.;

1 Representative recommended by the Prefect.

9. Para. 16. Directives for Patriot Representatives are now being prepared by this Office, based on old directives and containing also data concerning the Ministry of Occupied Italy, and additional information required by the Patriots Representatives.

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- 2 -

10. Paras. 17 and 18. Liaison Centres - The duties of the Liaison Centres are identical with those of the Patriots Representatives.

11. Para. 21. Identity books are already in use, and being issued by the Florence Patriot Centre.

APPENDIX II

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12. Attilio FIGUIONI is entirely unknown to this Office.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 75016

CA Section

Below on Port 2000

Revised by the interest

at Sept 2

Major E. Tabor

to GATS

See p. 1 of 2

CA SECTION

20. 17. 45

CONFIDENTIAL

Psychological Warfare Branch
Headquarters P.W.B. 15th Army Group
P.W.B. Unit No 14, APO 512 U.S. Army

"D" Section

23rd March, 1945.

No 11 INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR LIBERATED ITALY NORTH OF THE
ARMY CONTROL LINE

No 11.

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VII

N.B. passages marked with a line at the side are for information only.

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Nº 11.

Psychological Warfare Branch
Headquarters P.W.B. 15th Army Group
P.W.B. Unit Nº 14, APO 512 U.S. Army

"D" Section

23rd March, 1945.

Nº 11 INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR LIBERATED ITALY NORTH OF THE
ARMY CONTROL LINE

SUMMARY

As in other cities liberated by the Allies, after an interval which enables other parties to take the lead in organizing their cadres, some of the monarchists in Florence have formed themselves into a group to promote, or at least to preserve, the institution of the monarchy. So far the group does not show the coherence or the organization which characterizes a political party but it is carrying out a poll of public opinion to ascertain what portion of it is in favour of monarchy. This activity may have interesting consequences. It is worth noting also that the Fronte Monarchico aims at uniting within its ranks all adherents to the monarchy who may be members of the political parties, but that in the first test case - that of a Christian Democrat who was a founder of the Fronte Monarchico - the political party has called upon its member to sever his connection with the monarchist group and that he will conform to the party directive, while, of course, not sacrificing his convictions as a king's man.

The Congress of the Federation of the Communist Party for Florence province held in Florence on 10, 11 and 12 March reports from reports in the local press to have been a successful gathering. In a report on this Congress by the Communist

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The Congress of the Federation of the Communist Party for Florence province held in Florence on 10, 11 and 12 March appears from reports in the local press to have been a successful gathering. In a report on this Congress by the Communist Erriero published in the special edition of the Restione del Popolo of 18th March, the figure of 36,000 is mentioned as being the number of party members in the province. It may be recalled that the figure quoted in No 2 of these reports of 18th January 1945 which was an approximate estimate obtained from non-Communist sources of the number of Communists in the city of Florence was 4,000.

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An interesting report from an Italian government official about the organizing of assistance to partisans points out that amongst Italians there is a lack of co-ordination and prevalence of personal interests in these efforts. A serious attempt is now being made, however, by representatives of the Ministry for Occupied Italy to put an end to this somewhat chaotic state of affairs.

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No II

Psychological Warfare Branch
Headquarters P.M.B. 15th Army Group
P.M.B. Unit No 14, APO 512 U.S. Army

"D" Section

20th March 1945

NO 11 INTELLIGENCE REPORT FOR LIBERATED ITALY NORTH OF THE
APR CONTROL LINE

POLITICAL

1. The Fronte Monarchico.

According to one of its founders, Dr. Fabrizio Boggiano-Pico, the Monarchist Front was started in Florence in early February by himself and a few of his friends. A Provincial Central Committee has been established consisting of:

- General Camillo d'Affrillo
- Dr. Carlo Roselli
- Berardo Geddes - who acts as secretary to the Committee
- Lt. Col. Paolo Salvadori - orderly officer to Prince Umberto
- Dr. Fabrizio Boggiano-Pico
- Marchesa Anna Astinori - to represent women monarchists.

So far only this provisional Committee has been chosen and it acts for the whole of the Florence Province. It is hoped to establish a representation of all the Communes as the movement develops. At present the activities of the Monarchist Front are discreet. They have issued and distributed by hand a stencilled manifesto of their programme. This has also been issued more recently in the form of a handbill (See below). Permission has also been asked for the publication of a booklet with some such title as "Linee programmatiche del Fronte Monarchico". A few members hold meetings in private houses. Perhaps the most fruitful activity in the collection of names of adherents to the movement. The names are collected by circulating copies of the programme and asking people who agree to it to sign a receipt form. Stating that they agree with the programme of the movement. In this way, says Boggiano-Pico, it will be possible to hold a kind of

On 10/10/50, the following consisting of:

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Eoggiano-Pico said that adherents to the movement come from all classes and he mentioned barbers, carpenters and shop-keepers as being members. In his view the upper classes would be found to be almost wholly in favour of the monarchy and the middle-classes element was producing a pretty increasing number of adherents. He said it would be necessary to carry on active propaganda in favour of the Monarchy among the parties. This could be particularly fruitful among the liberals and the Christian Democrats. As to funds, Eoggiano Pico complained that the Monarchist Front was very short of money.

Dr. Fabrizio Eoggiano-Pico is a young and energetic man in his late twenties. During the period of the German occupation he was

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a member of a Christian Democrat band and is said to have been both active and fearless. He comes from an old Genovese family and has connections in industrial circles. His position in the Monarchist Front has been made very difficult by the announcement made in the NAZIONE DEL POPOLO of March 12th (see Report No 10 para. 4) that the Provincial Executive Giunta of the Christian Democrat Party has decided that a person cannot be a member of the party while adhering to the Monarchist Front. Eoggiano-Pao told a P.W.E. officer that he had decided in loyalty to his party to resign from the Monarchist Front, but that this could not alter his sympathies as a monarchist.

The handbill circulated by the Monarchist Front is as follows:

Monarchist Front.
(Central Committee)
PROGRAMME.

The Monarchist Front proposes:

- 1) To unite in a single front all those who see in a constitutional monarchy freely chosen by the Italian people according to its traditions the only institution fitted to carry out the new democratic resurrection of the country and worthy of the trust and material collaboration of all civilized nations.
- 2) To carry out the honest and elevated propagation of its own ideas, to strengthen the conviction of the majority that if Italy should change her highest institutions, she would be led fatally towards a new dictatorship.
- 3) To act within the law opposing itself, however, decisively to any act of dishonesty or violence, which might be effected to the detriment of individual liberty and of the state.
- 4) To co-ordinate and nourish in that part of Italy still occupied by the Germans the struggle which all the Monarchist forces of the North have been carrying on since 5th September 1943 against the infamous fascist republic.
- 5) To try to merge all monarchist currents in a single Italian Monarchist Front which by its programme and choice of leaders will give secure guarantees of success.

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- 4) To co-ordinate and nourish in that part of Italy still occupied by the Germans the struggle which all the monarchist forces of the North have been carrying on since 8th September 1943 against the infamous fascist republic.
- 5) To try to merge all monarchist currents in a single Italian Monarchist Front which by its programme and choice of leaders will give secure guarantees of success.
- 6) To receive into its ranks all citizens with a right to vote whether or not they belong to the various political parties and independently of any political prejudice.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

24.9.42. Christian Democrat Ban on members of the Monarchist Front.

A warning by the Provincial Executive Giunta of the Christian Democrat Party drawing the attention of members of the Party to the deliberation of the National Council of the Party which forbade them to adhere to other movements, was published in paragraph 4 of the last of these Reports (No 10).

A leading Christian Democrat of Florence, Avv. Piccioni, who has recently been elected to the Central Executive Giunta of the party, explained to a P.M.B. officer the scope of the above-mentioned warning. It was occasioned by the participation in a prominent rôle of a Christian Democrat, Dr. Fabrizio Roggiano-Pico, in the newly formed Monarchist Front. Although, said Avv. Piccioni, the warning appeared to discriminate against monarchists,

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the decision of the National Council, of which the voting was a secret, was a general prohibition to members of the Christian Democrat Party against taking part in other political movements whether republican or monarchist. In fact the Christian Democrat Party had already, some time ago, refused a proposal to take part in a republican concentration or coalition of various republican parties.

3. The Third Provincial Congress of Communist Federation of Florence.

The Congress took place on 10th, 11th, and 12th of March in the Pergola Theatre in Florence. There were present 256 delegates from the city and province representing 17 sections and 36,000 members of the party according to the report from LA NATIONALE DIL. POPULO by the Communist Oreste Barberi, a member of the Federal Committee. On the stage were seen the entire Federal Committee, three members of the Directorate of the Communist Party of Italy, (Pellegrini, Silvati and Berlinguer) and the secretaries of the other Tuscan Federations. A delegation of the Socialist Party was also present.

The Congress opened with the reading of a letter from Togliatti who was unable to attend the Congress. This letter has several interesting passages. In one of them is the suggestion that only the advanced parties in the Government have the confidence of the people and explains the position of the party in the Government following the scandalous flight of the war criminal Roatta as being due to a desire to prevent any breach of unity in the country at war for its own freedom. Togliatti made plain, however, that the Communist Party had requested and obtained from the Government the adoption of energetic measures to extirpate fascism and its residues from the body politic and that they made their participation in the Government conditional on the fulfillment of these measures. He asked, in his letter, that the party organizations should watch vigilantly to prevent "torrid elements" from taking advantage of popular discontent to produce situations which would be detrimental to the democratic and anti-fascist forces in Italy.

He recommended a tightening of the bonds which united Communist and Socialist parties and in a passage of special importance and interest asked party members "to maintain in your province relations of sound collaboration with the Christian Democrat Party."

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He recommended a tightening of the bonds which united Communist and Socialist parties and in a passage of special importance and interest asked party members "to maintain in your province relations of sound collaboration with the Christian Democrat Party, not only in the syndical but in the political field". He told them to strengthen the unity of all anti-fascist parties in the C.L.N. which "remains for us the axis of the political life of the country". It is interesting to note that in the political resolution passed at the conclusion of the Congress meetings, most of the above suggestions were approved.

After Togliatti's letter Giuseppe Rossi made a report on the political activity of the youth movements and the women's organizations by Tito Mazzoni. Aldo Preibanti and Teresa matter. These reports were followed by discussion among the members. These discussions were lively. 35 members intervened in the political debate and as in most of the organization of the party. After the reports came the election of the new Federal Committee which was increased from 13 to 21 members. The proceedings of the party, Silvati and Pellegrini and the Socialist Chair addressed the Congress saying: "The seriousness and realism with which you have raised and discussed important problems show that you have in fact created a new type of party."

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Amongst other resolutions approved by the Congress there were two of special importance, the first a political one, the second on the party organization.

a) The Political Resolution.

The resolution affirmed that the political conduct of the party had been such as to meet the national exigencies and those of the party itself; that the policy of national unity followed by the Communist Party had been realised through its being in the vanguard of all the sound forces in the fight for national liberation and the extirpation of fascism. The Florentine Federation expressed its will to reinforce the policy of the party which aimed at greater participation in the war, the solutions of the problems of the labouring masses through a policy of national solidarity, epuration of the organisms of national life and their effective transformation to democratic forms. The resolution approved the political attitude of the party directorate following the Roatta incident, confirmed the necessity of an ever increasing collaboration with the Socialists and expressed a wish to maintain and consolidate good relations with the Christian Democrat Party not only in the syndical but also in the political field. Then follows an interesting passage in the resolution which calls for a greater strengthening of the party and a rapid remedy of the deficiencies and lacunae which the Congress has revealed. It calls for great vigilance on the part of the party members in watching the manoeuvres of reactionaries and concludes with sending messages of good will to the army, the partisans and the population of the north, the directorate of the party and comrade Togliatti.

b) The Organizational Resolution.

The fundamental basis of the Party remains the cell. In order to assure syndical uniformity among the cells in the same place of work a co-ordinating committee acting under the Section Committee should be formed. Sex segregation should continue to be the rule where street cells are concerned. In view of the scarcity of cadres, the responsible organs of the party are invited to select suitable persons for appointment to posts of responsibility. It is suggested that a Cadres Section should be set up in each Section. While experience does not show

the political attitude of the party directorate following the Roatta incident, confirmed the necessity of an ever increasing collaboration with the Socialists and expressed a wish to maintain and consolidate good relations with the Christian Democrat Party not only in the syndical but also in the political field. Then follows an interesting passage in the resolution which calls for a greater strengthening of the party and a rapid remedy of the deficiencies and lacunae which the Congress has revealed. It calls for great vigilance on the part of the party members in watching the manoeuvres of reactionaries and concludes with sending messages of good will to the army, the partisans and the population of the north, the directorate of the party and comrade Togliatti.

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4. Action Party Elections.

The Florence Section of the Action Party has just finished holding its elections. As a result, the following members chosen from among industrial workers, farmers, artisans, clerks and intellectuals, now constitute the Direzione Politica of the Party:-

Agnoletti Enriquer Enzo, Calamandrei Piero, Campolmi Carlo, Codignola Tristano, Fallaci Edeardo, Fasolo Rita, Furno Carlo, Barbacci Corrado, Bertolino Alberto, Boniforti Luiga, Barile Paolo, Botticelli Bruno, Felli Giuliano, Levi Carlo, Passagli Aldo, Pieraccini Piero, Raghianti Carlo Ludovico, Riccioli Ernesto, Turziani Noretta. The first nine of the above mentioned form the Executive Committee, the others the Consultative Committee. Codignola is the Section Secretary and Raghianti and Barile are President and Vice-President respectively.

FROM MEC

5. I.R.I.S.A. (Cement Factory) at Incisa (Firenze).

(Interview with Ing. Cesare PELLERI (President),
temporary Manager and one of the Company's three owners.)

Construction of the plant was started in 1938. It was intended to manufacture high-resistance "artificial" cement that a cement made under continual scientific control of the ingredients in order to ensure uniformity and high quality. The war interfered with the completion of the installation of the necessary special machinery, though the lime furnace and the equipment for making ordinary cement were completed. However, as for competitive reasons the company failed to become a member of the Trade Association of the Cement Industry (C.I.I.T.) - Consorzio Italiano Leganti Idraulici, it was never given the necessary supply of coal to produce any cement.

The equipment aside from the incomplete installation, today consists of one furnace for making "normal cement", a large Hoffmann type furnace for making hydraulic lime and bricks. The Germans destroyed practically nothing nor did they take anything away. All removable machinery was hidden behind a wall in the air-raid shelter. The building containing the new cement making equipment was completely closed in by filling doors and windows with brick work. The shed containing a large gringer for making ordinary cement was partly walled in and the equipment deeply covered with soil. The company's old but useful truck was saved by leaving it without wheels upside down in a far corner of the yard, making it look like a wreck.

Production of hydraulic lime, bricks and tiles was begun in September 1944. Until the end of Feb. 1945, 6,000 qls

the equipment for making ordinary cement were completed. However, for competitive reasons the company failed to become a member of the Trade Association of the Cement Industry (C.I.I. - Concorso Italiano Leganti Idraulici), it was never given the necessary supply of coal to produce any cement and the equipment made from the incomplete installation.

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Production of hydraulic lime, bricks and tiles was begun in September 1944. Until the end of Feb. 1945, 6,000 qts of lime were produced; 45,000 bricks and several thousand tiles were made by hand. This work was done without the help of electricity. It meant that in the absence of ventilation twice the normal amount of lignite had to be burned to make the lime. It meant that 2 men had to be kept at work all day long, pulling lignite up a steep incline to feed the furnace. As no coal was available, no cement could be made.

ALG Industry Section became interested in the plant **6388** because of its potential productive efficiency. Through the good offices two tons of iron were supplied to repair mine bomb and artillery damage to the buildings. 72 sq. metres of glass and 40 metres of leather belting were also supplied. ALG also assigned the plant 50 tons of coal. And since Feb. 22nd 1945 kw of electricity have been supplied to be soon increased to 170 kw.

With a consumption of 1 - 5 tons of coal, 18 tons of lignite and 170 kw of power, the plant now produces daily:

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300 qls. of cement
300 " of hydraulic lime
4,500 bricks.

At present the plant employs 90 workers soon to be increased to 115. Wages average 185 lire a day with an upper limit of 220 lire. Through AMG supplementary food rations are furnished the workers (130 grs. of flour, 21 grs. of dry soup a day).

With the exception of a part of the hydraulic lime all production is for the account of AMG. The necessary cash is supplied by banks at 8% interest.

6. New Bread Price.

The substitution of an "economic" price for the hitherto prevailing "political" price of bread, entailing an increase from 5 to 16 lire a kilo, has not, as far as can be ascertained, given rise to excessive comment. It may be that the population of Florence counts the increase as part of the cost of liberation, and in any case the extra charge is absorbed by the indemnity of 95 lire a month decreed in favour of all workers and each member of their families. Moreover, the rise did not come as a surprise and anyhow people were used to paying fancy prices for the extra bread needed to supplement the official ration. Thinking people were also beginning to appreciate that where-as a rise in price would not weigh unduly on the family budget, the continuation of the bread subsidy would do so on the State budget.

7. Conversion from Petrol to Methane.

A new order regarding the change-over from petrol to natural gas (methane) as a medium of propulsion for motor vehicles in the Province of Florence has been issued by AMG.

The substitution of an "economic" price for the hitherto prevailing "political" price of bread, entailing an increase from 5 to 16 lire a kilo, has not, as far as can be ascertained, given rise to excessive comment. It may be that the population of Florence counts the increase as part of the cost of liberation, and in any case the extra charge is absorbed by the indemnity of 95 lire a month decreed in favour of all workers and each member of their families. Moreover, the rise did not come as a surprise and anyhow people were used to paying fancy prices for the extra bread needed to supplement the official ration. Thinking people were also beginning to appreciate that whereas a rise in price would not weigh unduly on the family budget, the continuation of the bread subsidy would do so on the State budget.

7. Conversion from Petrol to Methane.

A new order regarding the change-over from petrol to natural gas (methane) as a medium of propulsion for motor vehicles in the Province of Florence has been issued by AMG. Previously it was ordered that all vehicles up to 10 quintals had to be converted at the rate of fifty a month, but difficulties in the supply of apparatus necessary to run them on gas having arisen, it has now been provided that AMG will from time to time order a certain number of vehicles to be so converted. The owners of the vehicles included in any particular batch will be notified personally to change over to gas within a specified period.

Meanwhile anybody in possession, or who was in possession before the arrival of the Allied Forces, of apparatus for enabling motor vehicles to run on gas is required to report such possession, or alternatively to show to what use the apparatus has been put, to the Comune of Florence or to C.C.R.R. stations in country districts.

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PUBLIC OPINION

8. Alexander's Address to Italian Soldiers.

Italian officers interviewed by a P.W.S. official concur in the view that Field Marshal Alexander's words to the Italian troops have given considerable satisfaction in military circles. They are taken as an appreciation of the Italian war effort by a fighter whom Italians greatly admire. His praise of the Italian troops even when fighting on the other side, is regarded as very timely owing to the Italian soldiers' uncertainty as to whether he was doing right in taking pride in past achievements and sacrifices.

The persons interviewed did not omit to seize the opportunity of pointing out that relations between Allied and Italian Forces would be vastly improved if Italy were granted the status of an ally. Until this happened, there would still remain a doubt in the mind of the Italian soldier whether the new effort he was called upon to make was worth while. "What are we fighting for, if our sacrifice is not to improve the position of our country in the international field?", or words to that effect, is a thought often expressed by serving soldiers. There is also the much debated question of Italian P/Ws. Practically one out of every five soldiers has a relation in an Allied concentration camp and the knowledge aggravates the feeling of inferiority born of defeat in the field.

9. Mussolini's Radio Speech of 16th March.

Although the recent speech of Mussolini is regarded as the "spirologuo" of a madman who refuses to face facts, his allusion to German secret weapons has produced a certain impression bordering on apprehension. The two dictators have been harping on this string for some time now and their utterances are considered as being the prelude to the initiation of gas and

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10. Press Meeting.

One of the questions asked of A.M.G. officials at this week's Press Meeting in Florence was whether there would be a special issue of foodstuffs for Easter. The reply was in the negative although it was added that the distribution of paste would be ante-dated so that the population could receive it before Easter.

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In reply to complaints that sugar was being used by cafes and confectioners which might have gone to increase the allowance for children it was stated that the sugar in question must have been bought prior to the liberation of Florence as no supplies has been issued by A.M.G. to such users.

Among the many questions put to A.M.G. officials, that relating to the prices of cloth probably ranked first in importance, as with 2,500 to 6,000 lire a metre being asked for suit and dress lengths the matter is one in which most ordinary citizens have a direct interest. The reply was to the effect that the remedy lay in the hands of the consumers themselves as all they had to do was to report cases of overcharging to the authorities. The prices of cloth, it was explained, were controlled by the Consiglio Provinciale dell'Economia and shopkeepers were required to indicate the prices of the various materials exposed for sale. These prices were from 700 to 900 lire a metre and were applicable not only to new production - a million metres of cloth are lying at Prato ready for distribution - but also to existing stocks.

11. V.I.

It is rumoured in Florence that flying bombs launched from the far bank of the Po fell in the countryside round Pistoia on March 17th. The rumour, which has gained wide credence in all circles, has aroused considerable apprehension, as it is feared that these unwelcome attentions will not be confined to Pistoia and that the rest of Tuscany will eventually come in for its share.

12. Independence of Radio Florence.

The Commissione Interna ("shop committee") of Radio Florence has passed a resolution expressing its apprehension in regard to the wholesale dismissals of radio workers from South

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12. Independence of Radio Florence.

The Commissione Interna ("shop committee") of Radio Florence has passed a resolution expressing its apprehension in regard to the wholesale dismissals of radio workers from South Italian stations which have come under the jurisdiction of R.A.I. The resolution affirms that the Florence station is perfectly capable of operating as an independent unit and states that it must not be sacrificed on the altar of Roman centralisation.

0000 The desiderata of Radio Florence personnel are supported by the C.C.I.N. and the C.C.L.

GENERAL13. Maternity and Infant Welfare in Florence.

(An interview with the President of the O.N.M.I.I.)

Maternity and Infant Welfare in Italy was organized in 1936 under a National scheme known as "Opera Nazionale Maternità ed Infanzia", (O.N.M.I.I.) Its primary aim has been to give health and medical assistance to mothers and to children up to about the age of four, with additional material aid in case of need.

In Florence, a city which has always taken particular pride in its welfare organizations, the ONMI carried on under war conditions, and during the period of emergency was able to supply its centres with food from stores expressly built up and hidden from the Nazi-Fascists.

In an interview with a PWE collaborator, the President of the ONMI in Florence, gave the following facts about the work of the Centres:-

Welfare Centres

There are 18 Consulting Centres in Florence, of which 14 are for sick children and 4 for maternity care. Here, patients irrespective of social station, may receive expert advice and treatment free of charge. Food is also distributed at the Centres at a minimum charge for infants under one year, and consists chiefly of milk, cornflour, oatmeal etc. Vitamins were also distributed at one time, but these are at present unobtainable. Their lack is widely felt and requests for them come from doctors in every quarter.

There is also a Crèche for children whose mothers are at work. It is open from 8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and serves the children with breakfast, mid-day lunch and an afternoon snack.

Food Centres.

Food Centres for Mothers and Infants are run by the ONMI for expectant mothers, nursing mothers up to 7 months, and mothers with children in needy circumstances. They receive one large meal daily of extra bread, soup, meat and vegetables, jam and fruit, for which no coupons are required. If transport were available more fruit and vegetables could be fetched from the countryside which would help to replace some of the vitamins which are lacking.

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Food Cakes.

which are lacking.

Centre and Crèche.

charges.
Food Problem

Good Problem

of the Allied
authorities. It is
distributed:-

powdered milk
lins 8630

Vaporized
+ + +
+ + +
8956

over from the emergency period

owing to the control taken by AMG and SAHRA, which is

extremely valuable for expectant mothers.

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without interruption, and when it was impossible to serve cooked food, fortnightly parcels of food were distributed from the supplies which had been saved.

Mortality.

Immediately after the period of emergency, cases of infantile enterocolitis with symptoms of jaundice were reported. Fortunately the cases were not excessive in number and mortality was not heavy. The disease has now been completely overcome. Diphtheria which followed and was traced to the Refugee Centre where a few cases had broken out, reached its height in October with a total of 99 and 81 deaths respectively. This too has almost completely disappeared.

Numbers Benefitting.

Approximately 850 persons are examined weekly at the Consulting Centres, of which about 650 receive assistance.

In the Food Centres about 900 meals are provided daily.

14. Report from the Acting School Inspector of Florence.

The running of the schools during the German occupation was especially obstructed in the 1943-1944 scholastic year, on account of the many requisitions of school premises for military purposes - billets for the troops, as hospitals, etc. - and also as a result of air-raids. In point of fact, during that period, many schools in important local centres of the province, like Pontassieve, Borgo S. Lorenzo, Figline Valdarno and Certaldo were opened for only a few weeks and then definitely closed because of damage.

The teachers were the same as those now in service, except for those who have been suspended for reasons of epuration or who have fled to the North. Apart from those who are absent on military service or because they were former members of the G.I.L. or because they are on regular leave for private reasons, there are no absentees. Indeed, it is known that, especially in 1944 some teachers did all to avoid enlistment and when the emergency period drew near in the summer of the same year hid themselves to escape the Nazi-Fascist comb-outs. In the same year, a few cases of open revolt against Nazi-Fascism occurred, as at the Saffi school, which was picketed for a long time.

Much scientific and educational equipment was lost or destroyed but there was also a large quantity which was put in a safe place and hidden (to the great personal danger of many a head-

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Much scientific and educational equipment was lost or destroyed but there was also a large quantity which was put in a safe place and hidden (to the great personal danger of many a headmaster or teacher) in order to save it from German looting.

The alterations in the curriculum of the elementary and secondary schools are in accordance with the official programmes approved by the A.C. and already circulated to the schools.

The present condition of the schools can be considered satisfactory in Florence city, and good in the province, although there are many schools which are occupied for military purposes, as can be seen by the statistics attached. Nevertheless, it can be said that nearly all, with the exception of a very small minority, are functioning regularly either in their own premises or in temporary ones. The time-tables are curtailed when more than one school has to use the same school-rooms on the same day.

The following are some figures, which while not absolutely exact, give a good general picture:-

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Figures of the opening of State Schools in Florence and Province:-

	Kindergarten	Elementary	Occupational	Intermediate Schools	Ginnasi, Licei Institutes
Total Number of schools.	16.	597	21	7	18
Number of schools open.	10	466	15	7	18
Normal attendance.	827	58765	5275	3797	6080
Present Attendance.	406	44349	3571	3318	4343
Teachers on permanent Staff	26	2013	158	148	234
Teachers actually on duty.	26	1871	266	204	403

Condition of the school buildings:-

	Elementary Buildings	Occupational Buildings	Intermediate Buildings	Ginnasi, Licei Buildings
Normal Total number	587	1848	117	331
Total number open	465	151	7	18
Occupied by the Allies.	77	466	1	8
Occupied by the Carabinieri	1	1	=	=
Occupied by the Italian Army	4	27	=	=
Occupied by Evacuees	39	121	=	=
Occupied by Firms or Parties	2	4	1	1
Awaiting to be			25	20

Condition of the school buildings:-

	Elementary		Occupational		Intermediary		Ginnasi, Licei	
	Buil- ding	Rooms	Buil- ding	Rooms	Buil- ding	Rooms	Buil- ding	Rooms
Normal Total	597	1948	152	169	7	117	18	331
number								
Total number	465	1098	15	99	7	66	18	184
Open								
Occupied by the Allies.	77	466	4	22	1	12	8	=
Occupied by the Carabinieri	1	1	=	=	=	=	=	=
Occupied by the Italian Army	4	27	=	=	=	=	=	=
Occupied by Evacuees	39	31	3	=	=	=	=	=
Occupied by Firms or Parties	2	4	1	=	1	25	1	20
Awaiting to be disinfected	135	858	=	=	=	=	=	=
Awaiting minor repairs	159	341	5	43	4	24	11	126
Seriously damaged	60	231	3	32	=	=	=	=
Destroyed	28	129	3	32	=	=	=	6385
Not in use for other reasons	9	17	4	=	=	=	=	=
Conditions not known	29	43	=	=	=	=	=	=

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Figure on the opening of private and quasi-state schools in Florence and Province.

	Kindergarten	Elementary	Occupational	Intermediary	Ginnasi Licei
Total Number of Schools opened	169	103	6	43	=
Normal Attendance	138	103	6	38	=
Actual Attendance	10904	8867	431	6282	=
Teachers on permanent staff	8734	7423	436	5150	=
Teachers on duty	=	=	=	=	=
N.B.	241	237	54	518	=

These schools are privately run but on the State pattern.

Condition of the school buildings:-

	Elementary Build-Rooms ding	Occupational Build-Rooms ding	Intermediary Build-Rooms ding	Ginnasi, Licei Build-Rooms ding			
Normal Total number	140	=	6	27	43	562	=
Total number open	110	=	6	25	38	518	=
Occupied by the Allies	=	=	=	=	3	=	=
Occupied by the Italian Army	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
Occupied by the Carabinieri	=	=	=	=	=	=	=
Occupied by Evacuees	=	=	1	=	3	=	=

241 237 54 518 =
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Condition of the school buildings:-

	Elementary Build- Rooms ding	Occupational Build- Rooms ding	Intermediary Build- Rooms ding	Ginnasi, Licei Build- Rooms ding
Normal Total number	140	27	43	562
Total number open	110	25	38	518
Occupied by the Allies	=	=	3	=
Occupied by the Italian Army	=	=	=	=
Occupied by the Carabinieri	=	=	=	=
Occupied by Evacuees	=	1	3	=
Occupied by Firms or Parties	=	=	=	=
Awaiting disinfection	4	=	=	=
Awaiting minor repairs	6	1	12	=
Seriously damaged	1	1	2	=
Destroyed	=	=	=	=
Not in use for other reasons	=	=	=	=
Conditions not known	21	=	=	=

15. Aid for the Devastated Regions.

A vigorous drive is being made into Florence in aid of the people of the devastated regions. A Committee has been formed under the presidency of Avv. Passonbroni who defined the plan for the systematic collection of clothes, blankets and money throughout the city at a meeting at the Supercinema on March 8th.

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In his appeal the President stressed particularly the plight of the villages along the front and the distress in the nearby town of Fissa; Leghorn; Pontedera; Pontassieve and Poggibonsi.

Collections in the different zones of the city began on March 15th. Groups of volunteer workers with trucks and other vehicles are working in different quarters of the town daily; and results are exceeding all expectations. It is worthy of note that the response is more ready and generous from the poorer streets; the popular quarter of Santa Croce, for example, has given 150,000 lire and there have been many touching instances of sacrifice on the part of those who have very little to give. Men confined in the city gaol heard of the collection and spontaneously contributed 8000 lire.

In addition to house to house collections, subscriptions are open in banks and other public centres; special performances and entertainments are being organized; and owners of windows overlooking the Cathedral square have placed them at the disposal of the Committee to be let for the traditional Easter Eve ceremony of the "Scoppio del Carro."

Up to 21st March, contributions in money have reached 1,052,930 lire.

The press and the Allies are cooperating in the drive.

16. Fascists' answer.

The other day a P.W.B. Italian collaborator was stopped by two children who begged him with tears in their eyes to escort them out of reach of a lad who was throwing stones at them. Upon being asked the reason for this conduct, the stone-thrower, who could not have been more than 8 years old, answered that the other two children had called him a fascist. Laughingly the P.W.B. collaborator asked if this was so and received the following reply. "Why of course I am, and I'm not alone. There are many of us as you'll learn one of these days."

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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APPENDIX I.

THE PARTISAN QUESTION.

A Practical Survey and Plan for Organised Assistance by the Ministry of Occupied Italy.

The following survey was supplied by an Italian Government official in close touch with the Minister for Occupied Italy:

1. The question of the Partisans should be examined from three aspects:-

- a) Ex-Partisans resident in territory controlled by the Italian government.
- b) Partisans resident in German-Occupied territory.
- c) Partisans resident in territory which is liberated but still under Allied military control.

2. In the first instance, the transfer of powers from AG to the Italian government should have already resulted in the absorption of these Partisans into civilian or military life.

The second is a matter of politico-military regularisation which calls for careful examination and execution in accordance with the opinion of the government and the course of the war.

The third is of great importance for this report in that it should automatically solve the first problem and contribute largely towards solving the second.

3. It is reasonable therefore to conclude that a solution of the Partisan problem in territory still administered by the Allied military authorities could have a decisive influence on the conduct of the war as well as on Italian politics, both at home and abroad. For whether the Partisans, once in liberated territory, become an active orderly element or a passive disorderly one, will depend entirely on a good organisation to meet their needs.

This problem deserves the serious attention of the Allied

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4. Assistance given to the

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Everyone takes a certain amount of interest in the Partisans, but no one tackles the problem radically.

All cultural and political associations, most bodies in fact, include assistance to the Partisans among their activities. The result is a plethora of different aid groups competing and often conflicting with each other, none of which will ever succeed in improving the situation as a whole.

For example, assistance to the Partisans was first started by the C.I.D.A. and, directly or through the Tuscan Military Command, was very active. It has gradually declined and is now almost negligible.

Cardinal Elio Dalla Costa, Archbishop of Florence, personally or through his clergy, gave considerable assistance at first, but this too has become little more than occasional and sporadic.

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5 Every party of the Right, Centro or Left started to help the Partisans, but with the sole object of proselytizing. There are flagrant cases of aid given only to those inscribed in the parties, and shameful cases of exploitation of the dead and wounded for political ends.

6 The Italian military authorities have also attempted to head assistance groups, but have met with as little success as the attempts of the 210th Division and others.

7 The Patriot Department which was established at the Prefecture and emanated directly from the Government has barely kept its head above water and is now dying without honour or glory.

8 The Prefect himself, with the help of the city authorities has tried as far as possible to provide aid, and the Province has assigned various sums to the Partisans' Aid Fund.

9 The Commune, after a somewhat chaotic system of aid, has now taken the sensible line of considering the Partisans as refugees and evacuees and gives them a daily subsidy.

10 All these efforts however are inspired less by the groups themselves than by their needs who, through their efforts, hope to impress those likely to be prominent in the future political, economic and military life of the country. In the same category are men and women, particularly of the aristocracy, who have promoted assistance by individual effort.

11 The Unione delle Donne Italiane, though lacking coordination, has done good work, especially in organizing a centre for receiving and distributing clothes.

12 Side by side with these efforts, other so-called Partisan aid groups have sprung up, such as the Movimento Partigiano, headed by the Comando Superiore Partigiani - an importation from

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12 Side by side with these efforts, other so-called Partisan aid groups have sprung up, such as the Movimento Partigiani, headed by the Comando Superiore Partigiani - an importation from Rome and representing personal interests more than anything else; the Associazione Partigiani d'Italia, an honest attempt on the government's part to gather the Partisans into a single association which would defend their interests.

13 Broadly speaking, aid is limited to gifts of money, cigarettes, clothing and words of encouragement. The complete lack of organization and coordination, while benefiting the ne'er-do-wells who go the round of the aid centres getting money or clothes which they immediately sell, creates dissatisfaction and disillusionment among genuine and honest Partisans. The Allies are aware of this. The result is a general lack of confidence on their part in the Italian people's ability to recuperate, one proof of which is the diffidence with which they give their approval - approval so necessary at this time - to any kind of

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effort in connection with the Partisans. The Allies' confidence must be regained. They must see that there are signs of recovery. This is work for the Ministry of Occupied Italy. First and foremost a radical change of system with a centralization of pro-Patriot assistance is needed.

14.

To achieve this the following suggestions are submitted:--

- 1) A distinction to be made in territories under Allied Military Government between the question of a) Partisans in the front lines, b) Partisans in the rear and towns. The first is essentially a military problem and should be considered as such; the second, though not purely a military problem, should be examined and solved entirely with the unconditional aid of the Allied Military Government. Much will depend on results achieved in this field as to future possibilities of cooperation in the front lines.
- 2) The various aid centres to be given a sound financial basis: contributions to be fixed by the Ministry, funds, food, clothing, medical supplies to be centralized and every effort made to ensure distribution.
- 3) Men appointed to branch offices to be chosen for their capacity for honest loyal work and for gaining Allied sympathy.

The new organization must hinge on these three points: the result should be a strengthening of the powers of the Ministry of Occupied Italy and so, of Italy as a whole.

PLAN

MINISTRY OF OCCUPIED ITALY

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PLAN

MINISTRY OF OCCUPIED ITALY

provincial commissions

LIAISON CENTRE

COLLECTING CENTRE

5TH ALLIED ARMY

hospitals

convalescent homes

enrolment in army

transfer to work

return home

COLLECTING CENTRE

8TH ALLIED ARMY

hospitals

convalescent homes

enrolment in army

transfer to work

return home

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15. Explanatory notes.

PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONS

A Provincial Commission to be set up in every liberated province under A.M.G., consisting of:

President	-	An official of the Ministry of Occupied Italy
Members	-	3 representative of the Prefettura
	"	" A.M.G.
	"	" C.I.N.
	"	" Deputazione Provinciale
	"	" Ass. Naz. Partigiani
	"	" d'Italia
	"	" Unione delle Donne
	"	" Italiane

Duties

- 1) Set up immediately Ass. Naz. Partigiani d'Italia.
- 2) Centralize funds, clothes, medical supplies etc., in each province.
- 3) Promote aid of all kinds, and give emergency help to Partisans sent from Collecting Centres and in hospitals and convalescent homes in their own province.
- 4) Arrange with C.G.L., Ass. Industriali, Ass. Commercianti; Allied offices, state and commune offices etc., for the transfer to work of Partisans discharged from Collecting Centres.
- 5) Contact Liaison Centres for distribution of funds, clothing etc., according to needs.
- 6) Afford assistance to families of fallen Patriots in their own province, or temporarily resident there.

The above to be carried out during period of administration by A.M.G., at the end of which the Provincial Commission to form

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- 6) Afford assistance to families of fallen Patriots in their own province, or temporarily resident there.

The above to be carried out during period of administration by A.N.G., at the end of which the Provincial Commission to form part of the Commissariato Naz. Patrioti and Reduci di Guerra, and the President (Ministry official) to be assigned fresh duties by Liaison Centre.

LIAISON CENTRE (one Centre for the 5th and 8th Allied Armies)

To be set up where expedient and mobile with the front, consisting of: Head - official of the Ministry of Occupied Italy; and 42 members - officials available for Provincial Commissions and inspecting and administrative work for the Liaison Centre (subordinate personnel).

Duties.

Collect from Provincial Commissions all material needed for distribution to Collecting Centres; keep in touch with Allies, National Army, Ministry of Occupied Italy and Provincial Com-

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N° 11.

Missions: keep in communication and control of Collecting Centres; file personal particulars of Partisans; assist Partisans in zones under A.M.G., estimate family needs of fallen patriots; report on work accomplished to Ministry of Occupied Italy; prepare ground for organized assistance in zones to be liberated, reporting details to Ministry; inform Partisans fighting beyond the lines of what to do in liberated zone and provision made for them.

COLLECTING CENTRES - one for each Allied Army.

To be set up where expedient and mobile with front, consisting of: Commandant; Vice-Commandant (Allied officer); medical officer; employee for financial assistance; National Army officer for enrolment; official for transfer to civilian employment; employee for measures for return of Partisans to their homes.

The Collecting Centres to be as comfortable as possible - preferably in large requisitioned buildings - and provide food, lodging, clothing, medical aid, recreation. Patriots to remain 14 days. On arrival each to receive a sum to be fixed by Ministry of Occupied Italy; the sum to be provided free or at a minimum charge. The Centres to arrange to send Partisans to: hospitals, convalescent homes, National Army, civilian employment or their homes. Arrangements for mess and lodging to remain fixed, the rest of the organization to be mobile with the front.

Equipment: beds, 3 blankets per person; 2 sheets per person; 1 pillow and case per person; abundant clothing; mobile kitchen; wash-basins; bath, obligatory once a day; well-kept lavatories; mobile first-aid apparatus; motor-ambulances; cine-camera; folding theatrical stage; cars and lorries for commanding officer and officers.

Such material to be calculated according to receiving

Medical officer; employee for financial assistance; National Army officer for enrolment; official for transfer to civilian employment; employee for measures for return of Partisans to their homes.

The Collecting Centres to be as comfortable as possible - preferably in large requisitioned buildings - and provide food, lodging, clothing, medical aid, recreation. Patriots to remain 14 days. On arrival each to receive a sum to be fixed by Ministry of Occupied Italy; the mess to be provided free or at a minimum charge. The Centres to arrange to send Partisans to: hospitals, convalescent homes, National Army, civilian employment or their homes. Arrangements for mess and lodging to remain fixed, the rest of the organization to be mobile with the front.

Equipment: beds, 3 blankets per person; 2 sheets per person; 1 pillow and case per person; abundant clothing; mobile kitchen; wash-basins; bath, obligatory once a day; well-kept lavatories; mobile first-aid apparatus; motor-ambulance; cine-camera; folding theatrical stage; cars and lorries for commanding officer and officers.

Such material to be calculated according to receiving capacity of the Centres, and all equipment to be collected from Collecting Centres, Prov. Commissions, National Army, Allies, Italian Red Cross and American Red Cross.

IDENTITY BOOKS.

Each Partisan on crossing the lines to receive an identity book from an official of the Ministry stationed with **6888** the Allied units. The book to consist of: 1st page: surname and name; names of parents; date and place of birth; present address; profession or trade; conditions of family; group to which he belongs. 2nd page: dates of arrival at and departure from first line Allied Command; destination; provision given by Allied Command; 3rd and 4th pages: provision given by Ministry and its branches. The book only valid for: Collecting

CONFIDENTIAL

VI

No 11.

Centres, Prov. Commissions and groups depending from them, hospitals and convalescent homes, employers, C.G.I. and similar associations, Commissariato N.2. Patrioti and Reduci di Guerra, Allied Commands for travelling orders to return home. The book ceases to be valid on cessation of aid and return of Partisans to civilian or military life. Partisans not furnished with the book to be considered either as not authentic, or to have crossed the lines uncontrolled and are therefore to be sent back to the Allied authorities to apply for assistance and identification in the approved way.

22.

The foregoing scheme is drawn up with the sole object of facilitating the workings of the assistance groups of the Ministry, and contacts between the Centres and districts, particularly in view of the fact that shortly over 100,000 Partisans may be requiring care and guidance. On the eve of liberation the Ministry should be in a position to cope with the fluid situation and direct the work of coordination behind the front lines. The Livison Centre is directly responsible to Rome, its function being to form a centre of active assistance in Occupied Italy, and an organization ready to carry out the directives of the Under-Secretary of State when the time comes.

CONFIDENTIAL

VII

No. 11

APPENDIX II

FLORENTINE PERSONALITIES

The biographical details of one of the most important men among the Christian Democrats of Tuscany were not available when those for other members of this party were given in Report No. 8. His name is ATTILIO PICCIONI and the following is the information it has been possible to obtain on him:

PICCIONI was born at Rieti 14th June 1892, became a law graduate at the University of Turin in 1916; fought in the 1915-18 war as an officer of the bersaglieri and then as a pilot-officer in the air force. After the war he busied himself with politics in the Partito Popolare in Turin - which was the cradle of the movement headed by Piero Gobetti.

He was a member of the Consiglio Nazionale del Partito until it was dissolved, was communal assessor (assessore comunale), he wrote political articles in many papers and magazines. He was editor of the paper IL PENSIERO DEL POPOLO through which he fought against fascism until 1925, when press liberty was suppressed, and was a candidate for the Partito Popolare at the last elections.

Fascist persecution became too strong for him and he fled to Tuscany where he lived during the fascist regime, keeping up liaison with members of the Partito Popolare of Rome and the whole of Italy.

He took part in the clandestine movement of Christian Democracy even during the fascist regime; after the 25th July 1943, he became Political Secretary of the Christian Democrat party in Florence. After the 8th September, while hiding he contributed very actively to the clandestine movement, and dictated the political writings of the party.

After the liberation of Florence he became a member of the C.T.L.N. and still holds this position. He was named political Secretary of the Florentine Section, a member of the National

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the cradle of the movement headed by Piero Gobetti.

He was a member of the Consiglio Nazionale del Partito until it was dissolved, was communal assessor (assessore comunale), he wrote political articles in many papers and magazines. He was editor of the paper IL PENSIERO DEL POPOLO through which he fought against Fascism until 1925, when press liberty was suppressed, and was a candidate for the Partito Popolare at the last elections.

Fascist persecution became too strong for him and he fled to Tuscany where he lived during the fascist regime, keeping up liaison with members of the Partito Popolare of Rome and the whole of Italy.

He took part in the clandestine movement of Christian Democracy even during the fascist regime; after the 25th July 1943, he became Political Secretary of the Christian Democrat Party in Florence. After the 8th September, while hiding he contributed very actively to the clandestine movement, and dictated the political writings of the party.

After the liberation of Florence he became a member of the C.F.L.N. and still holds this position. He was named political Secretary of the Florentine Section, a member of the National Council of the Christian Democrats; now he is a member of the Central Direction of this party. He has published various political articles.

6380

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH

28 MAR 1945

File

Ref : 121/15/PAT.

27 March 1945.

Subject: Patriot Centres.

To : C.A. Section

Finance Sub Commission
(ref their 13156/T dated 11 March 1945.).

1. Copy of a translation of letter 4/G/D.5 dated 21 March 45, from the Ministry of Occupied Italy is forwarded herewith for your information and ~~action please~~
2. The above was received as a result of a Memorandum, dated 14 March from the Director to the Italian Liaison Officer of this Branch, of which a copy is forwarded also for information.

M. Proby for Paul

for

J. CRAIG,
Lt. Colonel,
Director,
Patriots Branch.

Col. Craig.

For your information. I spoke to Col Craig in the matter. The financial side is getting tied up.

W. H. Craig

28 Mar..

info.

W.H.C.

Thank you

What is the cost of the fund?

REL.

31st

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 73506

Translation.

FROM : Ministry of Occupied Italy.
TO : Lt.Col. CRAIG, Director Patriots Branch.
REF : 470/D.3
DATE : 24 Mar 45.

As requested by you, this Ministry has decided to make the following provisions to cover the points raised in your letter dated 15 March.

- a. Payment of Italian Patriots Representatives. As from 1 April the payment of daily indemnity of 200 lire (and in some cases of 100 lire-), will be made by the Italian Government direct.
- b) Payment of the staff of patriot Centres. As from 1 April the Ministry of Occupied Italy will be responsible for the payment of all Italian personnel at the Patriots Centres. With regard to the rates of pay it is not possible to fix them beforehand; they will have to be fixed for each centre at the time of its institution.
- c. Extraordinary expenses. For each centre the Ministry of Occupied Italy will settle a fund of 100,000 lire to be adjusted monthly.
- d. Supplementary rations. For the time being no definite figure can be agreed for this matter. However as it is not desirable that the patriots and the Allies should be kept waiting for the settlement of such fund, supplementary rations will be provided from the fund mentioned at para c.
- e. Compensation to the patriots. The Ministry has decided to grant the following compensation :
 - 1,000 lire as a demobilisation bonus;
 - 5,000 lire to wounded patriots,
 - 10,000 lire to dependents of dead.

These payments and all matters connected with them will be the responsibility of officers specially appointed in all provinces. They will be strictly supervised by the inspectors of the Ministry of Occupied Italy.

With regard to the request for the reimbursement of expenses which have been met to date in connection with the organisation and the operation of the patriots centres such reimbursement must be effected by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

This Ministry however will not fail to use all its influence for a speedy solution of the problem.

THE MINISTER 6360

(signed)

M. Soccimarro.

14 March 1945.

TO : Italian Liaison Officer ,
Patriots Branch.

FROM: Director Patriots Branch.

1. We should be grateful for your assistance in bringing to an early and final conclusion the various matters in connection with finance at Patriot Centres.
2. Our object should be to receive from the Ministry of Occupied Territories, on behalf of the Italian Government a letter agreeing formally to certain points, on some, which you have already approached the Ministry concerned (See your memo of 7 Mar 45).
3. The points to be embodied in this letter are as follows :

(a) Payment of Italian Patriot Representatives.

Agreement that, with effect from 1 April, the payment of the daily gratuity of 200 lire (or in some cases 100 lire) to Patriots Representatives and the hire of their motor cars will become the responsibility of the Prefects.

(b) Payment of Staffs at Patriot Centres.

Agreement that the Patriots Representatives at Patriots Centres will be responsible for payment of the Italian Staffs at Patriot Centres, and will have funds placed at their disposal for this purpose by the Ministry of Occupied Territories.

The scale of staff envisaged cannot be laid down precisely, but an indication can be obtained

3.

the points to be embodied in this letter are as follows :

(a) Payment of Italian Patriot Representatives.

Agreement was, with effect from 1 April, the payment of the daily gratuity of 200 lire (or in some cases 100 lire) to Patriots Representatives and the hire of their motor cars will become the responsibility of the Prefects.

(b) Payment of Staffs at Patriot Centres.

Agreement that the Patriots Representatives at Patriots Centres will be responsible for payment of the Italian Staffs at Patriot Centres, and will have funds placed at their disposal for this purpose by the Ministry of Occupied Territories.

The scale 66 staff envisaged cannot be laid down precisely, but an indication can be obtained from the experience of the Florence Centre, the figure of which are attached. The Patriot Representatives will obtain their moneys through the Prefect.

(c) Incidental expenses.

Agreement to the settlement of a fund, to be adjusted monthly, of 20,000 lire for each Patriots Centre for small upkeep expenditure; this fund to be administered by the Patriots Representative; expenditure to be endorsed by the Allied Officer attached to the Centre. The Patriots Representatives will obtain their moneys through the Prefect.

(d) Supplementary Rations.

Agreement to the settlement of a fund, to be adjusted weekly of sufficient size to allow the purchase of supplementary rations. The size of the fund will vary according to the average number of Patriots at a Centre. It will be for the Italian Government to fix the rate of expenditure per head. (Note : at 15 lire per head per day, a fund of approximately 50,000 lire would be required for a Centre of 500 persons). The

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6. It is essential to obtain agreement at the same time for the reimbursement by the Ministry of Occupied Territories of all expenditure under the above heads already incurred at Patriots Centre.

F. C.

F. CRAIG,
Lt. Colonel,
Director,
Patriots Branch.

/mf g.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

APPENDIX.Florence Centre, Staff (ref par. 3(b) above)

The following statement shows the paid staff employed at the Patriots Centre at Florence. It is estimated that this staff would be adequate for a Centre accommodating approximately 500 Patriots. A total figure cannot be fixed however, on a per capita basis, as some of the charges are not elastic.

1 Comandante	6.000	L. per month
1 Vice Comandante	3.600	" " "
1 Capo Guardia	2.100	" " "
12 Guards	1.800	" " "
4 Cooks	1.800	" " "
3 Storemen	2.500	" " "
2 Doctors	3.300	" " "
1 Barber	1.800	" " "
2 Interpreters	3.000	" " "
1 Clerk	3.200	" " "
4 Sanitary orderlies (cleaners)	1.800	" " "

6375

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET

54A

Tel: 735

Ref: 3201/228/EC

14 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Partisan Problems in N.W. ITALY.

14 MAR 1945

TO : Civil Affairs Section.

1. With reference to your 6/12B/CA of 12 Mar 45 addressed to HQ 15 Army Group, attached hereto is copy of letter from Land Forces Sub-Commission (LMIA) reference C/100 dated 12 Mar 45.
2. Will you please send to Land Forces Sub-Commission a copy of 15 Army Group letter AG-091.711 dated 2 Mar 45 and also a copy of your letter referred to above.

E. Horden
Chief Staff Officer
To Executive Commissioner

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Commission (LMIA)

Copy of above letter sent to Patriots

W. G. S. Holland, Major
C. A. Sec

6312

2532

C O P Y

SECRET

SUBJECT: Partisan Problems in NW ITALY

Land Forces Sub-Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
G/100
12 Mar 45.

TO: Executive Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

Ref 15 Army Gp letter, AG-091.711 of 2 Mar no copy to this HQ.

1. The proposed plan for dealing with Partisans in North ITALY is agreed except that it is considered para 4 b (5) of the Appx. should read as under;

" (5) Hospitalization

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to evacuate sick or wounded partisans to Italian Military Hospitals if available space therein is surplus to the needs of the Italian Army, otherwise to civilian hospitals established by the Allied Commission. Allied Commission is responsible for evacuation from Italian Army Hospitals to civilian hospitals as soon as possible, in order that the facilities of Italian Army Hospitals will be available to the Italian Army. In Italian Army Hospitals they will be accorded the same treatment as that given to Italian Military."

2. It is considered that the whole plan of hospitalization must depend on the buildings and equipment being made available vide AGIA letter Q/12 of 10 Mar to AFHQ copy att.

(Signed) L. BROWNING,
Major General
AMIA.

INTERNAL: MA to GOC
Q
LED

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.

SECRET

53a

6/12B/CA

12 March 1945

SUBJECT: Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.

TO: Adjutant General, Hq 15 Army, APO 777.

1. Reference 15 Army Group letter AG-091.711 dated 2 March 45 and Memorandum AG-091.711 dated 25 February 45 on the above subject.

2. In general the Allied Commission is in agreement with the proposals contained therein. The following comments and suggestions are, however, made:

3. Patriot Arms (see para (2) AG-091.711).

- a) Although a parade may be accepted as one method (and possibly the best) of ensuring that the maximum number of arms is handed in by Patriots, such a ceremony may not always be either possible or appropriate: it should therefore be considered as only one of the methods, and machinery should be set up in Patriot centres to collect those arms not previously handed in.
- b) It is suggested that it will always be advisable to review local circumstances, and particularly to take the advice of British Liaison Officers, or officers of other Allied Missions, who will have contacted Patriot bands before the arrival of the army and will have given special attention to this problem.
- c) In any case, it is felt that an interval of seven days between meeting the Allies and handing in weapons may be too long and will give time for the secreting of weapons. Arms should be handed in as quickly as possible.
- d) Inducement to Report to Centres or Parades.

The maximum inducement in the form of offers of clothing, food, hospitalization, gratuities and the presentation of the Alexander Certificate,

a) Although a parade may be accepted as one method (and possibly the best) of ensuring that the maximum number of arms is handed in by Patriots, such a ceremony may not always be either possible or appropriate: it should therefore be considered as only one of the methods, and machinery should be set up in Patriot centres to collect those arms not previously handed in.

b) It is suggested that it will always be advisable to review local circumstances, and particularly to take the advice of British Liaison Officers, or officers of other Allied Missions, who will have contacted Patriot bands before the arrival of the army and will have given special attention to this problem.

c) In any case, it is felt that an interval of seven days between meeting the Allies and handing in weapons may be too long and will give time for the smuggling of weapons. Arms should be handed in as quickly as possible.

4. Inducement to Report to Centres or Parades.

The maximum inducement in the form of offers of clothing, food, hospitalization, gratuities and the presentation of the Alexander Certificate, must be made to Patriots through Liaison Officers and Band Leaders to encourage them to report to Patriot Centres and to attend Parades (if held).

5. Action taken by Patriots before Allied Arrival. (see para (5) ~~AC-07-711~~).

a) Care must be taken to ensure that lack of action by the Allied authorities on their arrival in respect of cases which involved death, "beating up", or dismissal, cannot be construed as approval of the acts in question.

b) Internment is a matter to be decided by C.I.C./S.S. on security grounds.

c) All other Italian persons imprisoned by Patriots should be held pending investigation by the Italian authorities who are entirely responsible for expatriation, sanctions against Parades and punishment of Fascist crimes.

d) For information, it is pointed out that the Italian authorities have under consideration the setting up of courts which will deal more speedily than hitherto with Fascists.

/(e) Expatriation.....

- e) Expiration - i.e. dismissal from office - will rapidly be not in motion by Regional Commissioners under General Order 35.

6. Patriot Centres. (see para 4.b.(1) of AG-091.711).

- a) Equipment. It is presumed that the equipment provided by IV Corps for Patriot Centres will be left for future use at the Centres when IV Corps hands over control to No.2 District.

- b) Location. The exact location of centres is difficult to determine beforehand, as this must depend mainly upon the location of large concentrations of patriots. While the centres enumerated by you appear satisfactory on present information, their final location must be decided according to the circumstances prevailing at the time.

- c) Duration of Stay. The time spent by Patriots in Centres should be as short as possible. Three weeks should normally be the maximum time necessary and 90 days (the maximum) only used in exceptional circumstances.

- d) Pay. The Italian Government proposes to pay gratuities on the following scale:

1: To a Patriot on Demobilization	500 Lire
To a disabled Patriot	5,000 Lire
To the family of a Patriot killed in action	10,000 Lire

2: This is an interim payment of pocket money and the Italian Government have under consideration the payment of a supplementary gratuity later.

The responsibility for the distribution of gratuities lies not with IV Corps but with the Italian Government, and will be discharged through the Italian Patriot Representatives working under the general supervision of IV Corps.

- e) Screening. No mention is made of screening. It is suggested that a screening committee, consisting of the British Liaison Officer or equivalent officer of another mission, the Allied Patriot Officer, and the Patriot Band Leader, should screen all

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- :: To a Patriot on Demobilization 500 Lire
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The responsibility for the distribution of gratuities lies not with IV Corps but with the Italian Government, and will be discharged through the Italian Patriot Representatives working under the general supervision of IV Corps.

e) Screening. No mention is made of screening. It is suggested that a screening committee, consisting of the British Liaison Officer or equivalent officer of another mission, the Allied Patriot Officer, and the Patriot Band Leader, should screen all Patriots before any benefits are given.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER

6371

Copy

G. R. HUGHES, Brig.
Vice President
Civil Affairs Section
Allied Commission

Copies to: Executive Commissioner
Records Section
Patriots File Ref: 94/6.

SECRET

Copy No. 11.

HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

CA SEC. (3) 1-15
: : : : :
: SECRET :
: By Auth of :
: CG, Hq 15th AG :
: Init: H.L.O. :
: Date: 2 Mar 1945 :
: : : : :

AG-091.711

JHR/HLO/reh
2 March 1945

SUBJECT: Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.

TO: See Distribution.

1. Attached is a memorandum covering the problems connected with the Partisan movement in North West ITALY, together with the methods suggested for their solution when the area is occupied by the Allies.

2. Fifth Army, Eighth Army, Allied Commission and 2 District are requested to forward their views on the proposals. It is intended that this memorandum, as modified in accordance with the recommendations of the addressees hereof, will form the basis of an Operation Instruction establishing the policy of this Headquarters in the matter. This Operation Instruction will be prepared in final form on 15 March and comments to be considered must be received at this Headquarters prior to that date.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK:

H. L. Ostler
H. L. OSTLER,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl - Ltr Hq 15th Army Gp,
"Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG 091.711, dtd 2 March 45.

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	- 1 -

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SECRET

AC 3-15
CA SEC (3)
EX-100-155 6370
ECM SEC.

2155

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

AG-091.711

25 February 1945

PARTISAN PROBLEMS IN NW ITALY

1. Introduction - On 9 February 1945 a meeting was held at Headquarters 15th Army Group to discuss Partisan problems in NW ITALY and to make recommendations as to the best methods of dealing with them. G-2, G-3, and G-5 were represented at the meeting. The following paragraphs set out the conclusions which were reached.

2. Partisan Arms.

a. The Problem.

The first and chief problem is to determine whether, when, and how the Partisans should be required to hand in their arms, ammunition and explosives after the arrival of the Allies in N. ITALY.

b. Whether Partisans should be Disarmed.

It is considered that the continued possession of arms by large numbers of Partisans (perhaps as many as 100,000), most of whom have strong political allegiances and who have grown accustomed to violence and outlawry, would present a potential danger to Allied security, in that it might lead to or aggravate one or more of the following:

- (1) Armed clashes and disturbances between Italian elements politically opposed to one another.
- (2) Isolated sniping and ambushes against Allied individuals, vehicles etc.
- (3) Organized armed resistance against the Allied forces and Military Government.
- (4) Sabotage.

It is therefore recommended that the Partisans be required to hand in their arms, ammunition and explosives.

- 1 -
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG-091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

after the arrival of the Allied Forces.

c. When should Partisans be Disarmed?

It is thought that it would be tactless to include the immediate disarming of the Partisans among the very first acts of the Allied forces or AMG officials on their arrival in any given area, and that such action would probably cause resentment and provoke unfavorable reactions. On the other hand, it is equally undesirable to allow a long interval to elapse before they are disarmed, since experience has shown that the attitude of the Italians towards the Allies tends to deteriorate after the early days of liberation; their high and usually unreasonable hopes can never be satisfied by the Allies, and thus their initial welcome is liable to develop, through disillusionment, into apathy and then bitterness.

It is therefore recommended that the Partisans be required to hand in their arms approximately one week after the arrival of the Allies, or as soon after that as it can properly and appropriately be organized.

d. How should Partisans be Disarmed?

(1) According to normal AMG procedure, two orders or proclamations concerning arms etc. are posted up in every Comune immediately on the arrival of the first Civil Affairs Officer. One states that all arms etc. must be surrendered immediately to a certain official at a certain place; the other states that any person having in his possession any arms etc. without a permit after the date fixed by public notice will be liable to punishment by death or imprisonment.

It is considered that it would be inappropriate to regard the provisions of these particular proclamations as applicable to Partisan bands who have been largely armed by the Allies, and moreover it is thought that very little response would be forthcoming if reliance were placed on this method of disarming the Partisans.

* It is therefore recommended that in Northwestern Italy Partisan Leaders be informed that on a date to be announced all weapons will be turned in, and that the occasion will be one of ceremony and with full honors.

(2) In considering the question of method,

S E C R E T

Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG-091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

our main purpose must be to determine what procedure is best calculated to persuade the highest possible proportion of Partisans to hand in their arms etc. when instructed to do so. It is thought that this object can best be achieved by adopting a procedure which is based as far as circumstances permit on organized military lines, and by "sugaring the pill" with some compensating counter-attractions.

It is therefore recommended that the disarming of Partisans should be carried out in conjunction with ceremonial stand-down parades. Such parades will be organized by HQ IV Corps in all areas or centers where Partisan bands or units formerly operated. As early as possible after their arrival, HQ IV Corps should contact the local Partisan leaders and ask them to arrange for the members of their bands or group to parade at a suitable place (e.g. the Provincial Capital or nearest convenient large town), and on a suitable date (e.g. in approximately one week's time). It is preferable that the place and date should be coordinated as far as possible throughout a Province, or even a Region, should the speed of occupation permit, as this would assist the publicity angle and increase the ceremonious nature of the occasion. The Partisans should be instructed to parade with all their arms, and should be informed that arms are to be handed in at the end of the parade. They should also be instructed to collect and dump all their ammunition and explosives at convenient points for subsequent collection. The commander of the nearest Allied Military unit or formation will attend the parade and will be responsible for the collection of arms. The parade should be accompanied by as much ceremony as possible; there should be advanced publicity, flags, a band, speakers etc. At the end of the parade, the formation will be marched to a dump where arms will be deposited before it is dispersed. At that time certificates will be issued on the handing in of fire arms on the basis of exchange; one certificate to each Patriot turning in his individual firearm. The only exceptions to this restriction will be those certified by recognized leaders as wounded Patriots who have already turned in their weapons, those who served in an unarmed capacity, (staff, cooks, etc.) those who served unarmed as part of a heavy weapons crew, and those who were used exclusively in demolition activities. The commander of the nearest Allied Military unit will be responsible for the collection of arms immediately afterwards, as well as for collection of the ammunition and explosives above referred to. CC.RR will NOT take any part in such collection.

S E C R E T

Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG 091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

(3) It is further recommended that the local action described above should be accompanied by parallel action at the top; a representative of the Allied Commission or of an Allied Military higher headquarters should contact the CLNAI and the CVL and obtain their support and cooperation in the scheme. This Central Committee and Military Command should be asked to inform all local CGLN and Commanders that they desire the latter's fullest assistance in insuring the success of the parades, both as regards numerical attendance and arms collection. PWB should assist with radio propaganda and publicity.

(4) It is possible that the parades might be very poorly attended in certain areas, or that a large proportion of those attending might fail to bring their arms. In such cases it should be possible for the Allied Military Commander concerned to judge whether there is some innocent explanation or whether a deliberate attempt is being made by a high proportion (say over 20 per cent) of Partisans to evade the order to hand in their arms.

In the latter event, it is recommended that the parade should be held as arranged; but, before its dispersal, the Allied Military Commander should make it clear to those present that he is not satisfied with the response to the Allied order concerning the surrender of arms; he should inform them, and through them their absent comrades, that those who have failed to hand in their arms must do so at a given place before the end of the next day, and that thereafter any person found still to be in possession of arms etc. will be subject to serious penalties.

(5) It is anticipated that, during the first days of the Allied occupation, a number of armed Partisans will be admitted to the various Partisan Reception Camps which are to be established by AMG in appropriate localities.

It is recommended that the Allied officers in charge of these camps should arrange for any such arms to be turned in to the (nominal) custody of the Senior Partisan in the camp, pending their surrender to the Allied authorities at the time of the parade.

e. Enforcement.

It is recommended that, after such parades have been held, Partisans be regarded as ordinary civilians, who are subject to the provisions of AMG Procla-

S E C R E T

Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AG-091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

mations, and that any who are later found in possession of arms, ammunition or explosives without an AMG permit should be brought to trial before an Allied Military Court.

f. Conclusion.

It is believed that the procedure recommended above offers the best chance of collecting the maximum quantity of arms etc. from the Partisans.

We should not, however, be justified in anticipating that it will prove altogether successful, as it is felt that a certain proportion will insist on retaining and concealing the arms in their possession, whatever measures are taken by the Allied authorities.

It is felt that the only real and fundamental method of countering the potential dangers inherent in the Partisan situation would be to insure that, when the Allies occupy Northern ITALY, their treatment of the Partisans and of the Fascists, their handling of the food, housing and labor problems, and their efforts towards the general reconstruction of ITALY, were all such as to satisfy the hopes, expectations and impatience of the Partisans.

This, however, is an ideal which we cannot hope to attain, and it would therefore be useless to rely on this solution to the problem. Nevertheless, it is evident that the degree of speed and thoroughness with which the Allied authorities tackle the problem of relief, reconstruction and epuration, will directly influence, for better or for worse, the likelihood of trouble arising out of this Partisan problem.

3. Independent Action by Partisans.

a. The Problem.

The second problem is to determine what attitude is to be adopted by the Allied authorities towards independent action by Partisans in the sphere of epuration and reprisals etc. after the German withdrawal from N. ITALY.

b. Action taken by Partisans before Allied arrival.

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(1) It is anticipated that, during the

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AG-091.711, 25 Feb 45.

transition period between the German and Allied occupation, the Partisans will take violent and widespread action against Fascists and other such elements; these are likely to suffer death; "beating up", imprisonment, or dismissal from public appointments.

It is recommended that no action be taken by the Allied authorities on their arrival in respect of those cases which involved death, "beating up" or dismissal; with regard to those persons who were imprisoned by the Partisans, it should be the responsibility of AMG Public Safety Officers, assisted by the CIC/PSS, to examine all such cases as quickly as possible, and to decide on their disposal. Such persons would normally be disposed of in one of the following ways:

- (a) Interned.
- (b) Released.
- (c) Detained pending trial as War Criminals, or
- (d) Handed over to the Italian judicial authorities for trial on either criminal or epuration charges.

The examining officers should bear in mind that the release of such prisoners would tend to antagonize the Partisans, and, as a general rule, borderline cases should be disposed of by internment rather than by release.

c. After Allied Arrival.

Since it has been decided that Allied Military Government is to be established as soon as possible in Northern ITALY, it would be illogical, improper and undesirable for the Partisans (or any other such elements) to be authorized to continue taking independent action affecting the liberty of their fellow-countrymen, once the territory has been occupied by Allied forces and Military Government officials.

It is therefore recommended that, after the arrival of the Allies, no further such independent action by Partisans should be tolerated. This should be made clear to all Partisan leaders and CSIN as soon as possible, and thereafter any offenders should be punished.

d. Conclusion.

The foregoing recommendation, although it

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AG-091.711, dtd 25 Feb 45.

appears the only possible one, may well lead to discontent, demonstrations and anarchy, unless the Allied Military Government and Security authorities carry out the work of "defascistisation", including dismissals and internments, with the utmost speed and thoroughness. It is considered that, if the impatience of the Partisans is to be prevented from getting "out of hand", this factor should be regarded as of paramount importance, and that the need for rapid and comprehensive action in the sphere of "epuration" should be a dominating influence in the activities of AMG and C.I. agencies.

4. CARE OF PARTISANS.

a. The Problem.

The first problem is in connection with those Partisans who may continue to be used operationally.

Recommendations.

Administration of Partisans used operationally will be, as at present, the responsibility of the Allied unit which retains them operationally or for future operations.

b. The Problem.

The second and most important problem is to determine the treatment and responsibility for treatment of Partisans who cease to be used operationally.

Recommendations.

That, initially, the treatment of Partisans as regards their feeding, clothing, housing, hospitalization and rehabilitation in general be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps. As soon as control of any part of NW Italy is assumed by AFHQ the responsibility for administration and rehabilitation of Partisans in that part no longer under IV Corps control, will pass to No. 2 District in conjunction with HQ Allied Commission. The staffs of the Regional Commissioners attached to HQ IV Corps will include Patriot teams consisting of one Allied officer and one Italian Army officer for each Province.

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(1) Establishment of Partisan Centers.

It is the responsibility of HQ IV Corps

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to establish, equip and maintain "Centers" where Partisans will be housed, fed and generally administered. These Centers, subject to the development of the tactical situation, will be established at GENOA, LA SPEZIA, IMPERIA, TURIN, CUNEO, ALESSANDRIA, VARESE, MILAN AND PIACENZA.

(2) Food.

AFHQ is responsible for making available and stockpiling in forward areas rations for Partisans on a scale equivalent to that issued to the Italian Military forces. HQ IV Corps is responsible for transportation and distribution of this food to Partisan "Centers".

(3) Clothing.

AFHQ is responsible for making available and stockpiling in forward areas clothing on a minimum essential scale. HQ IV Corps is responsible for transportation and distribution of this clothing to Partisan "Centers".

(4) Pay.

Payment to Partisans is the responsibility of the Italian Government. It is the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission to co-ordinate gratuities contemplated by the Italian Government and insure that funds are made available for this purpose. Distribution of such funds will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps.

(5) Hospitalization.

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to evacuate sick or wounded Partisans to Italian Military Hospitals where they will be accorded the same treatment as that given to Italian Military.

(6) Rehabilitation.

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to insure that the necessary organization is provided to:

- (a) Encourage Patriots to enlist in the Italian Army.
- (b) Provide work through Allied Military Labor Organizations.
- (c) Return as many as possible to their homes.

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Ltr Hq 15th Army Group, "Partisan Problems in NW ITALY.",
AC 091.911, dtd 25 Feb 45.

(4) Supervise general care of Partisans
at Centers.

(7) Collection of Partisans.

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV
Corps to furnish transportation as required to gather up
and transport to "Centers" Partisans from localities where
sizable bands or groups exist.

(8) Assistance to be rendered by outside
Agencies.

At the time of writing there exist in
this area some fifteen (15) Allied Missions, British, U.S.
and Italian working in close liaison with the larger
Partisan bands. Upon the withdrawal of the enemy forces
and the arrival of the Allies these missions should be able
to provide considerable assistance to local AMG officers
and Military Commanders. The leaders of these missions
will be able to provide considerable information about local
conditions, numbers of Partisans, numbers of arms etc.
Their assistance in establishing relations with Partisans
should be sought by local commanders and AMG officers. In
the near future they will be instructed to reconnoiter for
suitable accommodations for the establishment of the local
Partisan centers. At the proper time they will be in-
structed to present themselves to Military Commanders upon
the arrival of the latter in their areas of activity. HQ
IV Corps will be informed of the locations of these
missions and names of leaders.

5. Action.

It is recommended that the substance of this
memorandum be included in the Operation Instruction which
is to be issued by this HQ concerning the occupation of NW
Italy, and that CG (IV) Corps be directed to include its
essence in instructions to his command. It is further
recommended that HQ Allied Commission, and HQ 2 District,
be requested to issue similar instructions to their person-
nel.

6365

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 725016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH

~~TOP SECRET~~

51a

1 March 1945

Ref : 94/6/PAT

Subject : Partisan Problems in N.W. Italy

To : Civil Affairs Section.

Draft memorandum from G-5 H.Q. 15
Army Group forwarded to this Branch by you
on 28 February, is returned herewith as
instructed.

F. Craig

F. CRAIG,
Lt; Colonel,
Director,
Patriots Branch.

6301

MP/mle.

3402
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 75016

Serial TS/CSC/10

TOP

File: 11A
SECRET

176
HEADQUARTERS 15TH ARMY GROUP
G-5 SECTION
APO 777

Ref: S-24/G-5

25 February 1945

SUBJECT: Partisan Treatment in NW Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
(Attn: V.P. Civil Affairs Section)

1. Attached herewith is a draft copy of a Memorandum treating with Partisan supervision and control.

2. As Colonel Monfort stated, this draft has not been approved, and there undoubtedly will be revisions before it reaches final form. As soon as the document is approved and issued in directive form, you will be furnished with a copy.

Robert A. Persell

ROBERT A. PERSELL
Lt Col, G.S.C.
For the DCCAO

6363

COPY

SUBJECT: Partisan Problems in NW ITALY

SECRET

Headquarters,
15 Army Group.

MEMO for Chief of Staff.

20 Feb 45

1. Introduction.

(a) Reference is made to the attached papers, and in particular to the basic memo, in which certain problems are set out concerning the policy to be adopted towards Partisans in Northern ITALY when the latter is occupied by the Allies.

(b) On 9 Feb '45 a meeting was held at this HQ to discuss these problems and to make recommendations as to the best methods of dealing with them. G-2, G-3 and G-5 were represented at the meeting. The following paragraphs set out the conclusions which were reached.

2. Partisan Arms

(a) The Problem.

The first and chief problem is to determine whether, when, and how the Partisans should be required to hand in their arms, amn and explosives after the arrival of the Allies in N.ITALY.

(b) Whether.

It is considered that the continued possession of arms by large numbers of Partisans (perhaps as many as 100,000), most of whom have strong political allegiances and who have grown accustomed to violence and outlawry, would present a potential danger to Allied security, in that it might lead to or aggravate one or more of the following:

- (i) Armed clashes and disturbances between Italian elements politically opposed to one another.
- (ii) Isolated sniping and ambushes against Allied individuals, vehicles etc.
- (iii) Organized armed resistance against the Allied forces and Military Government.
- (iv) Sabotage.

(a) The Problem.

The first and chief problem is to determine whether, when, and how the Partisans should be required to hand in their arms, amn and explosives after the arrival of the Allies in N. ITALY.

(b) Whether.

It is considered that the continued possession of arms by large numbers of Partisans (perhaps as many as 100,000), most of whom have strong political allegiances and who have grown accustomed to violence and outlawry, would present a potential danger to Allied security, in that it might lead to or aggravate one or more of the following:

- (i) Armed clashes and disturbances between Italian elements politically opposed to one another.
- (ii) Isolated sniping and ambushes against Allied individuals, vehicles etc.
- (iii) Organized armed resistance against the Allied forces and Military Government.
- (iv) Sabotage.

It is therefore recommended that the Partisans be required to hand in their arms, amn and explosives after the arrival of the Allied Forces.

(c) When.

It is thought that it would be tactless to include the immediate disarming of the Partisans among the very first acts of the Allied forces or AMG officials on their arrival in any given area, and that such action would probably cause resentment and provoke unfavourable reactions. On the other hand, it is equally undesirable to allow a long interval to elapse before they are disarmed, since experience has shown that the attitude of the Italians towards the Allies tends to deteriorate after the early days of liberation; their high and usually unreasonable hopes can never be satisfied by the Allies, and thus their initial welcome is liable to develop, through disillusionment, into apathy and then bitterness.

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It is therefore recommended that the Partisans be required to hand in their arms approx one week after the arrival of the Allies, or as soon after that as can be properly and appropriately organized.

(d) How.

(1) According to normal AGO procedure, two orders or proclamations concerning arms etc. are posted up in every Commune immediately on the arrival of the first Civil Affairs Officer. One states that all arms etc. must be surrendered immediately to a certain official at a certain place: the other states that any person having in his possession any arms etc. without a permit after the date fixed by public notice will be liable to punishment by death or imprisonment.

It is considered that it would be inappropriate to regard the provisions of these particular proclamations as applicable to Partisan bands who have been largely armed by the Allies, and moreover it is thought that very little response would be forthcoming if reliance were placed on this method of disarming the Partisans.

It is therefore recommended that, in Northern ITALY, a note or amendment be added to the first proclamation mentioned above, to the following effect: "This Order does NOT apply to bona fide members of organized Partisan bands or units to whom special instructions on this subject will be issued in due course".

(ii) In considering the question of method, our main purpose must be to determine what procedure is best calculated to persuade the highest possible proportion of Partisans to hand in their arms etc. when instructed to do so. It is thought that this object can best be achieved by adopting a procedure which is based as far as circumstances permit on organized military lines, and by "sugaring the pill" with some compensating counter-attraction.

It is therefore recommended that the disarming of Partisans should be carried out in conjunction with ceremonial stand-down parades. Such parades will be organized by HQ IV Corps in all areas or centres where Partisan bands or units formally operated. As early as possible after their arrival, HQ IV Corps should contact the local Partisan leaders and ask them to arrange for the members of their bands or group to parade at a suitable place (e.g. the Provincial Capital or nearest convenient large town), and on a suitable date (e.g. in approximately one week's time). It is preferable that the place and date should be coordinated as far as possible throughout a Province, or even a Region, should the speed of occupation permit, as this would assist the publicity angle and increase the ceremonial nature of the occasion. The Partisans should be instructed to parade with all their arms, and should be informed that arms are to be handed in at the end of the parade. They should also be instructed to collect and dump all their ammunition and explosives at convenient points for subsequent collection. The commander of the nearest Allied Military unit or formation will attend the parade and will be responsible for the collection of arms. The parade should be accompanied by as much ceremony as possible; there should be advanced publicity, flags, a band, and as much ceremony as possible; at the end of the parade, the

(ii) In considering the question of method, our main purpose must be to determine what procedure is best calculated to persuade the highest possible proportion of Partisans to hand in their arms etc. when instructed to do so. It is thought that this object can best be achieved by adopting a procedure which is based as far as circumstances permit on organised military lines, and by "sugaring the pill" with some compensating counter-attraction.

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(iii) It is further recommended that the local action described above should be accompanied by parallel action at the top: a representative of the Allied Commission or of an Allied Military higher HQ should contact the CLMFI and the CVL and obtain their support and cooperation in the scheme. This Central Committee and Military Command should be asked to inform all local GSN and Commanders that they desire the latter's fullest assistance in ensuring the success of the parades, both as regards numerical attendance and arms collection. PWS should assist with radio propaganda and publicity.

(iv) It is possible that the parades might be very poorly attended in certain areas, or that a large proportion of those attending might fail to bring their arms. In such cases it should be possible for the Allied Military Commander concerned to judge whether there is some innocent explanation or whether a deliberate attempt is being made by a high proportion (say over 20 per cent) of Partisans to evade the order to hand in their arms.

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In the latter event, it is recommended that the parade should be held as arranged; but, before its dispersal, the Allied Military Commander should make it clear to those present that he is not satisfied with the response to the Allied Order concerning the surrender of arms; he should inform them, and through them their absent comrades, that those who have failed to hand in their arms must do so at a given place before the end of the next day, and that thereafter any person found still to be in possession of arms etc. will be subject to serious penalties.

(v) It is anticipated that, during the first days of the Allied occupation, a number of armed Partisans will be admitted to the various Partisan Reception Camps which are to be established by AMG in appropriate localities.

It is recommended that the Allied officers in charge of these camps should arrange for any such arms to be turned in to the (nominal) custody of the Senior Partisan in the camp, pending their surrender to the Allied authorities at the time of the parade.

(e) Enforcement

It is recommended that, after such parades have been held, Partisans be regarded as ordinary civilians, who are subject to the provisions of AMG Proclamations, and that any who are later found in possession of arms, amn or explosives without an AMG permit should be brought to trial before an Allied Military Court.

(f) Conclusion

It is believed that the procedure recommended above offers the best chance of collecting the maximum quantity of arms etc. from the Partisans.

We should not, however, be justified in anticipating that it will prove altogether successful, as it is felt that a certain proportion will insist on retaining and concealing the arms in their possession, whatever measures are taken by the Allied authorities.

It is felt that the only real and fundamental method of countering the potential dangers inherent in the Partisan situation would be to ensure that, when the Allies occupy Northern Italy, their treatment of the Partisans and of the Fascists, their handling of the food, housing and labour problems, and their efforts towards the general reconstruction of Italy, were all such as to satisfy the hopes, expectations and impatience of the Partisans.

This, however, is an ideal which we cannot hope to attain, and it would therefore be useless to rely on this solution to the problem. Nevertheless, it is evident that the degree of speed and thoroughness with which the Allied

problems, and that any who are later found in possession of arms, amn or explosives without an AMG permit should be brought to trial before an Allied Military Court.

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This, however, is an ideal which we cannot hope to attain, and it would therefore be useless to rely on this solution to the problem. Nevertheless, it is evident that the degree of speed and thoroughness with which the Allied authorities tackle the problems of relief, reconstruction and epuration, will directly influence, for better or for worse, the likelihood of trouble arising out of this partisan problem.

3. Independent Action by Partisans.

(a) The Problem.

The second problem is to determine what attitude is to be adopted by the Allied authorities towards independent action by Partisans in the sphere of epuration and reprisals etc. after the German withdrawal from N. ITALY.

(b) Action taken by Partisans before Allied arrival

(i) It is anticipated that during the transition period between the German and Allied occupation, the Partisans will take violent and widespread action against Fascists and other such elements: these are likely to suffer death: "beating up", imprisonment, or dismissal from public appointments.

/.....4.....

It is recommended that no action be taken by the Allied authorities on their arrival in respect of these cases which involved death, "beating up" or dismissal: with regard to those persons who were imprisoned by the Partisans, it should be the responsibility of AMG Public Safety Officers, assisted by the CIC/PSS, to examine all such cases as quickly as possible, and to decide on their disposal. Such persons would normally be disposed of in one of the following ways:

- (i) Interned
- (ii) Released
- (iii) Detained pending trial as War Criminals, or
- (iv) Handed over to the Italian judicial authorities for trial on either criminal or epuration charges.

The examining officers should bear in mind that the release of such prisoners would tend to antagonize the Partisans, and, as a general rule, border-line cases should be disposed of by internment rather than by release.

(c) After Allied Arrival

Since it has been decided that Allied Military Government is to be established as soon as possible in Northern ITALY, it would be illogical, improper and undesirable for the Partisans (or any other such elements) to be authorized to continue taking independent action affecting the liberty of their fellow-countrymen, once the territory has been occupied by Allied forces and Military Government officials.

It is therefore recommended that, after the arrival of the Allies, no further such independent action by Partisans should be tolerated. This should be made clear to all Partisan leaders and OSLN as soon as possible, and thereafter any offenders should be punished.

(d) Conclusion

The foregoing recommendation, although it appears the only possible one, may well lead to discontent, demonstrations and anarchy, unless the Allied Military Government and Security authorities carry out the work of "defascistization" including dismissals and internments, with the utmost speed and thoroughness. It is considered that, if the impatience of the Partisans is to be prevented from getting "out of hand", this factor should be regarded as of paramount importance, and that the need for rapid and comprehensive action in the sphere of "epuration" should be a dominating influence in the activities of AMG and C.I. agencies.

4. CARE OF PARTISANS

(a) The Problem.

The first problem is in connection with those Partisans who may continue to be used operationally.

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fellow-countrymen, once the territory has been occupied by Allied forces and
Military Government officials.

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no further such independent action by Partisans should be tolerated. This should
be made clear to all Partisan leaders and CAIN as soon as possible, and thereafter
any offenders should be punished.

(c) Conclusion

The foregoing recommendation, although it appears the only possible
one, may well lead to discontent, demonstrations and anarchy, unless the Allied
Military Government and Security authorities carry out the work of "defascistisation",
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4. CARE OF PARTISANS

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6355

Recommendations.

Administration of Partisans used operationally will be, as at
present, the responsibility of the Allied unit which retains them operationally or
for future operations.

(b) The Problem.

The second and most important problem is to determine the treatment
and responsibility for treatment of Partisans who cease to be used operationally.

Recommendations

That, initially, the treatment of Partisans as regards their feeding,
clothing, housing, hospitalization and rehabilitation in general be the responsibility
of HQ IV Corps. As soon as control of any part of NW Italy is assumed by AFHQ
the responsibility for administration and rehabilitation of Partisans in that part
no longer under IV Corps control, will pass to No. 2 District in conjunction with
HQ Allied Commission. The staffs of the Regional Commissioners attached to HQ IV
Corps

/.....5.....

will include Patriot teams consisting of one Allied officer and one Italian Army officer for each Province.

(1) Establishment of Partisan Centres.

It is the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to establish, equip and maintain 'Centres' where Partisans will be housed, fed and generally administered. These Centres, subject to the development of the tactical situation, will be established at GENOVA, LA SPEZIA, IMPERIA, TUNIS, GENOVA ALESSANDRIA, VARESE, MILAN and FIADENZA.

(2) Food.

AHQ is responsible for making available and stockpiling in forward areas rations for Partisans on a scale equivalent to that issued to the Italian Military forces. HQ IV Corps is responsible for transportation and distribution of this food to Partisan 'Centres'.

(3) Clothing.

AHQ is responsible for making available and stockpiling in forward areas clothing on a minimum essential scale. HQ IV Corps is responsible for transportation and distribution of this clothing to Partisan 'Centres'.

(4) Pay.

Payment to Partisans is the responsibility of the Italian Government. It is the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission to co-ordinate gratuities contemplated by the Italian Government and insure that funds are made available for this purpose. Distribution of such funds will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps.

(5) Hospitalization.

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to evacuate sick or wounded Partisans to Italian Military Hospitals where they will be accorded the same treatment as that given to Italian Military.

(6) Rehabilitation.

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to insure that the necessary organisation is provided to :

- (a) Encourage Patriots to enlist in the Italian Army.
- (b) Provide work through Allied Military Labor organisations.
- (c) Return as many as possible to their homes.
- (d) Supervise general care of Partisans at Centres.

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- (c) Return as many as possible to their homes.
- (d) Supervise general care of Partisans at Centres.

(7) Collection of Partisans

It will be the responsibility of HQ IV Corps to furnish transport ⁶³⁰³ as required to gather up and transport to 'Centres' Partisans from localities where sizable bands or groups exist.

5. Action

It is recommended that the substance of this memorandum be included in the Operation Instruction which is to be issued by this HQ concerning the occupation of NW ITALY, and that detailed instructions on this subject be issued by the Allied Commission to all AMG officers concerned.

DONALD W. BRANN,
Brig. Gen., G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-3.

C.E.R. HIRSCH,
Brigadier,
A.C. of S., G-2.

NELSON W. MONFORT,
Colonel,
A.C. of S., G-5

DRAFT

NOTES OF A MEETING

ON
HOSPITALISATION OF PETRIOTS

Held at J.C.H. on
27 Feb 45

SECRET

Present were:

D.J.M.S., 2 District
V. C. Section AC.
Director, Public Health Sub-Commission, AC.
Chief Public Health Branch, P.H. Sub-Comm.
Director, Patriots Branch, AC.
Land Forces Sub-Commission.

- Brig. CAMERON
- Brig. HAYDEN
- Brig. PASTINSON
- Lt. Col. BRIDGES
- Lt. Col. CRAIG
- Maj. HODGKIN

The conference was called to discuss the problem of hospitalisation of patriots in N.W. Italy in the light of AFHQ directives AC 400/033/280-30 dated 13 Jan 45 and GS 370.64/3 dated 12 Feb 45.

Maj. HODGKIN drew attention to the differentiation between 'patriots' and 'partisans' given in 8 Army Administration Instruction 37 but Brig. HAYDEN pointed out there was no real distinction. The problem was to consider the hospitalisation of genuine fighting patriots (whether they had fought as auxiliary troops by the side of the Allied Armies or on the other side of the line) who would normally be members of bands and vouched for by their responsible leaders and frequently also by the S.L.O. Others claiming to be patriots would be a civilian responsibility.

After some discussion the following points were agreed in principle:

1. The identification of genuine fighting patriots entitled to treatment could be undertaken by AC Patriot Officers and the Italian military representatives.
2. Patriots would obviously in the first place be treated in whatever first aid C.C.S. or other medical station, whether military or civilian, was available.
3. M.I.A. were then primarily responsible for hospitalisation up to 60 days but Allied hospitals would resist so far as capacity permitted.
4. It was unlikely that, in the initial stages, any Allied military hospital would be available and M.I.A. would use every means by using existing staffs in military hospitals in the North to demand for hospitalisation.
5. 2 District would in principle, not requisition any military hospitals.

given in Army Administration Instruction 37 but Brig. Wagon pointed out there was no real distinction. The problem was to consider the hospitalization of genuine fighting patriots (whether they had fought as auxiliary troops by the side of the Allied Armies or on the other side of the line) who would normally be members of bands and watched over by their responsible leaders and frequently also by the R.L.C. Others claiming to be patriots could be a civilian responsibility.

After some discussion the following points were agreed in principle:

- 1 The identification of genuine fighting patriots entitled to treatment could be undertaken by AC Patriot Officers and the Italian military representatives.
- 2 Patriots would obviously in the first place be treated in whatever first aid C.C.C. or other medical station, whether military or civilian, was available.
- 3 M.I.V. were then primarily responsible for hospitalization up to 60 days but Allied hospitals would assist so far as capacity permitted.
- 4 It was unlikely that, in the initial stages, any Allied military hospital would be available and M.I.V. would use every endeavor by using existing efforts in military hospitals in the North to ~~bring~~ ^{bring} the demand for hospitalization.
- 5 2 District would in principle, not requisition any military hospitals. In any event their demand was only for a total of 4,000 beds and subject to demolitions, existing military hospital accommodation in E.A. Italy was 50,000 beds.
- 6 It was felt that in all probability existing accommodation would be ample and the problem would be staffing and medical supplies and retentions. This was primarily an M.I.V. responsibility but 2 District would help out with supplies and retentions.
- 7 Lt. Col. CRAIG said he had NO repeat NO transport to deal with evacuation of patriots and Brig. CANTON agreed to see if M.I.V. would let him have more transport to come. At present he had asked for no R.L.C. (93 cars).

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

6/25/02
RESTRICTED

762
FRB 13/1900A

CAS
FOR INFORMATION ONLY

49a

3/1307
FRB 14/0700
IN STANT

14 FEB 1945

MAIN ARM 8TH ARMY
HQ ALCON FOR PATRIOT BRANCH, INFO: 5TH ARMY FOR ANG. 8TH
ARMY REAR FOR AREA.

RESTRICTED.

Understand recruiting parades being organized on the 18 February
under instructions of Italian Government. Has this been approved for
Army Area II so by whom. No known organization available here to deal
with large numbers of recruits. Parades in Army area undesirable.

DIST
Action: PATRIOTS BR
Info: A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
CA SEC
L FORCES
FLOAT
FILE 2 6356

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
14 FEB 1945

123

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 725016

Patriot Recruiting.

Patriots Branch.

31 Jan

5

Reference report by Land Forces Sub-Commission 5/1/102/2
dated 25 Jan 45 on Patriots.

- 1 It is stated in para v (d) that the screening and recruiting agencies are controlled by Patriots Branch. Surely this is not so; are not MOIA responsible for the recruiting agencies?

Tel. Ext. 525.

G.R. UPTON, Brig.,
VP CA Section,
DOCS AC.

6355

0 4 1 7

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

76-1-143

SECRET

47A

7th January 1946.

Chief Commissioner.

I submit a first draft of your letter on the enrolment of patriots into the Italian Army. I discussed it at length with General Browning last night who made several useful additions himself and entirely agrees with the contents thereof. If you agree I suggest a discussion with Political Section and Brigadier Upjohn at a very early date.

77.5C

Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Col Sec
DCCS, CA Sec

Done by VP 6354

7076

DRAFT.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner
+++++

SECRET
PERSONAL & URGENT

46a

7 January 1945.

Ref:

SUBJECT: Enrolment of Patriots in Italian Army.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander,
Allied Force Headquarters.

1. The disposal of patriots immediately on liberation has been a matter of constant consideration, and indeed anxiety, on the part of myself and my advisers for some months. Arrangements made to meet this extremely difficult problem, which were agreed upon last July by all parties concerned including members of Special Forces and of the patriots themselves, have been partly successful and we are constantly learning by experience that a new approach must be made towards the subject.
2. Hitherto our aim has been to make of the patriots, after liberation, good civilians: to rehabilitate them in their normal vocations: to give them preferential treatment in the matter of employment: to clothe them and to feed them insofar as supplies make it possible: to recruit them as individuals into the Italian Army: and to repatriate

problem, which were agreed upon last July by all parties concerned including members of special forces and of the patriots themselves, have been partly successful and we are constantly learning by experience that a new approach must be made towards the subject.

2. Hitherto our aim has been to make of the patriots, after liberation, good civilians: to rehabilitate them in their normal vocations: to give them preferential treatment in the matter of employment: to clothe them and to feed them insofar as supplies make it possible: to recruit them as individuals into the Italian Army: and to repatriate them to their homes if they are not found to be locals. Finally, our policy has been to disarm them.

3. Our reports from Allied Military ~~Command~~ ^{Officer} have shown that patriots expect better and different treatment. They are disillusioned at their reception. Those that have really fought in bands and companies have expressed the desire to continue the fight in the same formations. ~~Whether this is to be the case or not we~~ ^{cannot give them the opportunity to do so.} The negro supplies of food and clothing that we have been able to give do not in ^{their} opinion fulfill the promises made to them by the Allied missions with whom they have been

operating. The order to disarm is the final straw, they resent it and the majority of them disobey it. Granted hitherto we have had no serious trouble but, in my opinion, a fundamentally different situation will arise when we get to the North with its more virile population and (estimated) 100,000 patriots in well organized bands.

4. The experiences of the Allied Nations in Belgium, France and Greece have exposed the vital danger which threatens any government, be it military or indigenous, which has to face, in the initial stages of liberation, the presence of armed bands of men accustomed to living by force of arms alone, who are readily affected and enrolled into political organizations whose object is to usurp the power of the legitimate government and set up a government which is little short of tyranny.

5. We must in this country endeavour to avoid the misuse of these gallant bands of partisans who, armed with Allied rifles and equipment, provided with Allied food and money, encouraged by equally gallant Allied officers, have aided the Allied war effort. Disrupted from their normal life with little chance of an easy return to civilian employment, in this country perhaps the only virile members of a defeated population, they find it easier and more attractive to retain the role of fighters and become an easy prey to forces and

legitimate government and set up a government which is little short of tyranny.

5. We want in this country endeavour to avoid the misuse of those gallant bands of partisans who, armed with Allied rifles and equipment, provided with Allied food and money, encouraged by equally gallant Allied officers, have aided the Allied war effort. Disrupted from their normal life with little chance of an easy return to civilian employment, in this country perhaps the only virile members of a defeated population, they find it easier and more attractive to retain the role of fighters and become an easy prey to forces and anarchy.

6. I believe that with patience we can overcome many of the material causes of disillusionment but ⁶³²attempts at dis-
armament will ever be a source of resentment and of resistance for a portion of these persons.

7. The offer to enlist individuals into the Italian Army under the normal conditions of recruitment for that Army, intended to meet the desires of those who wish to carry on the fight, have met with little success. From many Italian sources, from the patriots themselves and from members of the Italian Government, have come requests that

they should be recruited into the fighting element of the Army in their patriot bands under their patriot officers so that the comradeship and loyalty displayed behind the lines

may not be lost after liberation. Whether in fact they will join the Army in these circumstances or not, we must give them the opportunity to do so.

8. The technical objections to this course are well

understood. In the very difficult task of reorganizing the

Italian Army the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission naturally

dislikes the idea of forming special nuclei within that Army

which might become political formations and which would be of doubtful value militarily. We must object to accepting men

into the Italian Army on their own terms; he must resist the

breeding up of existing official Army units in order to fit in

special bands. General Browning's objections are well

expressed in the enclosed proposed draft reply to the Italian

Chief of Staff's letter attached, which he has submitted to us for concurrence.

9. But it seems to me that we must consider accepting the

principle of taking into the Italian Army patriot bands as

units, in numbers not exceeding say that of a company, under

their own existing officers. In my opinion the political,

and indeed administrative advantages, must outweigh the military

objections, for by doing so we shall be going a long way to

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10. The members of the Italian Army within the present ceiling are fully committed to combat groups, ~~regimental~~ battalions and service units working for the Allies. The patriots are unwilling to serve even in their own companies in the latter two groups. I submit, therefore, for your earnest and urgent consideration, that the ceiling of the Italian Army should be raised in order that the patriots may be attracted in collective bodies to form part of either the existing or new combat groups organised to take part in operations with Allied forces, ~~voluntarily~~ ~~possibly~~, ~~in the event~~, which would to a great extent overcome the problem of provision of technical equipment. The maximum

additional ceiling would be 100,000 and it is doubtful whether this full number would be required. Alternatively, there is the possibility of earmarking, say, some 40,000 within the existing ceiling for the absorption of patriot bands by the formation of 8 additional I.S. Divisions, even at the expense of the provision of service units for the Allies.

11. If this were accepted and political considerations were held to outweigh the military ones, General Browning is perfectly prepared to work out a plan whereby the practical difficulties could be overcome in order to absorb patriot bands into composite units of the Italian Army, provided always that the requisite equipment, clothing, etc., was forthcoming. As a military proposition he considers this unworkable (see para 8) but he fully realises the political implications and is, of course, fully prepared to implement any decision you give after weighing the political and military factors in this complicated problem.

12. Our present policy towards the patriots is being attacked both in this country and in the Allied countries, particularly in the United States. We should not reject any opportunity to create, particularly in Northern Italy, an atmosphere of content as against resentment towards the Allies. We must support the legitimate Italian Government. We know that there are many forces willing and prepared to upset this Government.

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The concession to the patriots outlined above would be a tremendous effect, in my opinion, on the patriots now in German occupied Italy. It would make them after liberation part of the armed forces of the country whose duty it would be to preserve rather than disrupt order. It would give them scope to use their loyalty and patriotism, it would direct their hatred of Fascism into the right channels and it would draw the heat from this potential political bonfire.

13. Whatever, therefore, the technical difficulties of or adjusting the distribution of raising/the ceiling may be: whatever the extra financial commitments (and we must remember that many millions of lira

5-
and many tons of supplies are being poured into the patriot stores in the North), these should and must be overcome in order to give to the patriots what they think is their due reward and make them part of a responsible government rather than potential disillusioned tools of disorder. This is a matter with an international, even a world-wide aspect and should NOT be judged, in my opinion, on the basis of local and parochial considerations of purely military exigencies in this theatre of operations.

ELBERT W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

(COPY)

FLORENCE AND THE PARTISANS

Florence -- all florentines should know it and may be proud of it -- is the only town or community of liberated Italy in which the humane and political problems of the hour can acquire national and international dignity owing to the plane on which they are set.

All of us for the last four months have been witnessing the dignified and serene way in which in public reunion and in the press this city is trying to establish the reasons of life and each one of us has heard both from Italians and from foreigners that on arriving here one has the impression of stepping on to a firm ground. This being the case, it is only natural to call this community to consider some events which are a substantial part of its existence.

With time the situation of partisans has become unpleasant. In saying this we do not fear to play into the hands of the enemy propaganda; the enemy fears nothing as much as plain talking.

All florentines know exactly who the partisans are; we all remember that morning of August 11th when after the vague and far away sound of bells we saw some ten or twelve men in the street, which until then had been the reign of terror and death; these men were not foreigners, they were plain Italians. Where were they coming from? From the other side. And only then, together with tears of emotion, our souls and our body were given back to us.

How we envied those men and how we understood them! They had conquered their liberty through months in the woods, in loneliness in fighting, in disobeying enemy orders; they were telling us that Italy still belongs to Italians, and they were the only ones to tell us this....Four months have passed since and out of the wreckage and the graveyards full of these soldiers new life is sprouting. But for these men life is gloomier every day....After the last shot has been fired they are obliged to live amongst us and suffer through the misunderstanding that arises out of their double quality of soldiers and civilians....We would like to know what the address is to which these men must apply in that precise moment which occurs between their taking leave of death and finding again the way home.

For this is the case. They can enlist in hundreds of thousands for death -- the woods will accept them and the impossibility to come to an agreement with the enemy; but then, when their trial is ended, if they need a toothpick, the question arises as to who will supply them with it.

Many of them are waiting to go home; but the home is in the hands of the enemy. Others are waiting to enlist in the army. Others are waiting to get better in hospitals. Others are looking for work, others are simply in need of advice. We are ashamed to write that the best title with which these men are credited is that of refugees of honour. And this leads them straight to charity. They do not want charity, they are our pride, they are the genuine memorial which Italy will be able to write for herself and for others the day when peace will come.

- 2 -

.....The Committee of Liberation and the political parties cannot provide the assistance which could be only given by a central organization. With every day the situation becomes more grave, because new partisans arrive. How can we tell them that there is no place where they can be protected from the rain, dry their clothes at a fire, dress their wounds and rest near to the arms which they have just laid down?We know that the Government tries and does not try to solve the problem...But besides the government and the political parties there are the communities of citizens. What would each of us do for the man who has defended his home? We would help him in every way, it would be our duty. This is what we should do for the partisans. They need a home, let's give them a room in ours, let's find a convalescent home and each florentine will bring a pin, a piece of soap, a lamp, a chair, a towel, a cup. All that which these men need in their new venture between the front lines and the civil life, must be given to them. Only by acting thus we can deny the charge that weighs on us that the Italian people have accepted fascism, and repel the accusation that we have worked with the aggressors of European liberty.

.....We must remember that it is to our homes that the Northern Italians are looking who wish to see in them, as incentive and benediction, that liberty and the freedom to live and express themselves, for which they are now ready to die.

FROM: La Nazione del Popolo (Florence)
15 December 1944

6344

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 725016

4/22/54

Free.

MEETING ON SUBJECT OF PATRIOTS
held in C.A. Section 21 Nov 44

Those present were :

- | | |
|--------------|---------|
| 1. Brigadier | UPJOHN |
| 2. Gr. Capt. | BENSON |
| 3. Colonel | SPICER |
| 4. Colonel | CRIPPS |
| 5. Colonel | MAYNE |
| 6. Colonel | MONFORT |
| 7. Major | DRAGE |
| 8. Major | MAGNUS |
| 9. Major | DOLLARD |

The meeting was presided over by Brig Upjohn who in discussion with Group Captain Benson, Col Spicer and Col Mayne announced the general policy of paras 1-3 :

1. Only certificates signed by Gen. Alexander may be given in AMG territory .
2. Compensation, however, may be given by Italians even in AMG territory .
3. It is possible that Patriots may be given status as part of Italian Army for food, clothing, hospitalisation.
4. As Director of Patriots Branch Col Spicer declared that :
 - a) The sole purpose of dealing with Patriots coming through the line is for welfare, employment or dispersal ;
 - b) Advance Intelligence work is not a function of Patriots Branch ;
 - c) Included in Welfare (to which Col Mayne agreed) are :
 - i) Proper reception, hot baths, decent food, clothing, hospitalisation, small Red Cross Centres ;
 - ii) Centres with " pep " talks at Lucca , Pistoia, Rimini ;
 - iii) From those points absorption and dispersal

45A

1944

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should take place, i.e. all concomitant detail at one centre (to which Col Monfort agreed) .

- d) Col Monfort suggested Local Patriot representatives nominated on the spot instead of persons from Rome, with representatives for corps and Regions .
- 5. Group Captain Benson remarked that schemes on paper do not always work out practically :
 - a) Who will provide Camps ?
 - b) In 5 Army there are big towns .
 - c) 8 Army has had to dispossess civilians .
 - d) All Camps must be on L.of C's not 3 miles off where trucks will not go .
 - e) That we meet many who wear bands and claim to be Patriots and that :
 - i) The Armies enroll some Patriots ;
 - ii) Rest complain that they get no work, food etc .
- 6. After further discussion, it was agreed that :
 - a) There must be Camps ;
 - b) In 8 Army area these camps would be tented ;
 - c) Authority to put wounded Patriots in Italian and/or Allied Military Hospitals was needed .
(We are waiting for the answer of A.A.I. to our request for this .)
 - d) Camps must be ready to follow the Armies forward ;
 - e) Camps must be supervised by
 - i) 1 " overall " officer ;
 - ii) 1 Camp commandant ;
 - iii) 1 EM/OR per Camp.
 - f) Col Spicer will ask Italian Patriot Authorities to investigate possibility of :
 - i) Screening Patriots ;
 - ii) Having only Military Italian Patriot Re-

6340

3

representatives .

7. A few general problems were discussed :
- a) Group Captain Benson pointed out the political problems arising when Communist Patriot Representatives went forward with large funds to spend and others had little or no funds .
 - b) Transportation of Italian Patriot Representatives should be their own concern . They should hire their own cars in Rome .
 - c) The Radio programs directed to Patriots by P.W.B., which have sometimes given Patriots undue hopes, have been toned down in accordance with a directive .
 - d) The problem of the surrender of arms by Patriots was represented as a major one by Col Spicer . Group Captain Benson said that he thought we should get some of their arms but never all. Col Mayne believed that no general plan could be made for securing arms, but that the problem must be treated ad hoc in each area .

That concluded the meeting .

W. A. S. Dollard
WILLIAM A.S. DOLLARD
Major

63-12

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held in C.A. SECTION 21 Nov 44

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2

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

3

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RECEIVED AIRMAIL OCTOBER 25

P O 394

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

25 NOV 1944

WD. 44A

Ref: 51/242.

25 November 1944.

Subject: Intelligence Activities.

TO : See distribution.

Ref. 51/242. Dated 20 August 44.

It is notified that the distribution of intelligence reports by the Army, Section Patriot, March, 1944, is being discontinued forthwith. It is considered that the material is already sufficiently covered by the intelligence which is available in the War Department and by No. 1 Special Force.

R. B. SPENCER,
Colonel,
Director,
Patriot March.

Discontinued

6330

A dark, rectangular object, possibly a book cover or a folder, with a lighter-colored, textured border. The object is centered against a dark background.

63:U

U.S. Gov.
Aug 5th 1947
100 8th St
Detroit, Mich.
O.D. 10.2 District
100 10th St
Detroit

Regional Coordinators:
 Dayton, P. J. Booth, 11111,
 Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana,
 47406.

Political Section
City of Los Angeles
R.M. Branch
Adv. Sec. P. E. Branch.

1856

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25 NOV 1944

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AAI, INFO: ALLIED COMMISSION

AFHQ SIGNED SACHED

FX 57627

URGENT

CITE: PHOCT

MOD ALL

25 NOV 1944
A. C.

SECRET.

SACHED desires that qualified representative of AAI be present at 1500 hrs 25th repeat 25th November at HQ ALLIED COMMISSION ROME to discuss in conference terms of recognition of Italian committee of national liberation in northern ITALY by SAC and the Italian Government also to consider improvement of methods and means for disposal of liberated Italian patriots.

DISTRIBUTION: 6339

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DISTRIBUTION: 6339

Encl. - C.O.S. (2)

info - Chief-Comm. Sec.

PA Sec

Pol. Sec.

Patriots Bu.

File

1887

22 October 1944.

HANDING OVER NOTES ON THE PATRIOT BRANCH

1. Italian National Patriot Committee.

General ALBAUGH told me personally to get the Italians to do as much as possible for themselves so that, firstly, the Italians should have practice in handling their own affairs, and, secondly, the number of Allied personnel employed on this work should be reduced to a minimum.

The I.N.P.C. was recently formed under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, to take over and deal with as many of the patriot problems behind the line as A.C.C. wish to pass over to them.

I consider that the main political object of the Committee is to make it clear to the Italian people that the Italian Government is actually capable of giving practical assistance to patriots behind the line.

In the beginning I personally found it extremely difficult to make this Committee function in any way whatsoever, but after the composition of the Committee had finally been settled and Major General OGDON had taken over the job of Secretary of the Committee things slowly started to happen. Last week the Committee had a meeting which lasted for over three days and which decided, frankly to my astonishment, a considerable number of important points. Consequently I feel that unless a new Government, if it materialises, is allowed to hinder further progress this Committee should now be able to be of real use in solving patriot problems.

2. Italian Patriot Representatives.

In order to help Regional Commissioners, Provincial Commissioners and Civil Affairs Officers in forward areas to handle patriots, it has been agreed that pairs of patriot representatives, one military and one civil, should be sent to help these officers not only to meet patriots and disarm them but also to rehabilitate them. The patriot representative is not allowed to indulge in political propaganda.

A new directive, agreed in principle with the Patriot Committee and the Finance Sub Commission is now up for final approval before the following:

- (a) V.P., C.A.S.
- (b) Finance Sub Commission
- (c) I.N.P.C.

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- (a) V.P., C.A.S.
- (b) Pimrose Sub Commission
- (c) I.N.P.C.
- (d) H.Q., A.A.I.
- (e) V Army A.M.G.

When this directive is issued my suggestion is that it should be sent out in English and Italian to all concerned, and a copy should be given to every patriot representative so that he knows to what exactly he is entitled.

3. Developments in North Italy.

I have asked Major TULLOCH of No.1 Special Force, who has gone to a meeting in South Italy, to find out from Comdr. HALLSWORTH if he thinks that the patriot organisation should now be 100% on its toes waiting for a quick forward movement. If the answer is in the affirmative, then two things will have to be done in order to be able to complete arrangements which have already been started. Firstly, the forward Intelligence Teams at FLORENCE will have

to be brought up to full strength; secondly, arrangements will have to be made at once to send forward to Regional H.Q.s. all the patriot representatives for whom the Regions have asked. Most of the patriot representatives are already in place, and I do not think it will be wise to allow any of them to come back to ROME since the problem of collecting them and moving them forward again will be very difficult to overcome. The I.N.P.C. have agreed that they are prepared to give them their full pay of 200 lire per day while waiting for North Italy to be liberated.

4. Fortnightly Reports.

In order to show the current position, the following reports are prepared at the beginning and middle of every month.

- (a) Staff in ROME and FLORENCE
- (b) Motor Cars
- (c) Members of Patriot Representatives with Arms and Regions
- (d) Members of Certificates and Posters issued.

H.A.C.

Col. FAVA keeps a current list of the names and stations of all patriot representatives.

5. Future of the Patriots Branch.

In August I recommended that at some future date - after the I.N.P.C. had started to function - the affairs of the patriots south of the Gothic Line should be dealt with by one staff officer in ROME, who should be attached to Civil Affairs Branch of R.C. & H.G. Section. In order to deal with patriot problems inside the Army areas and further north, I recommended that a strong representation of the Patriots Branch should move forward so that they will be in close touch with realities. My idea was that if a Forward Echelon of A.C.C. should come into being then these patriot officers should work under the senior officer of the A.C.C. Forward Echelon.

Also it was agreed at a meeting held in mid-September by Brigadier HAINSWORTH when Comdr. HOLDSWORTH, Mr. RAINOR and myself were present that Special Forces, P.F.B. and the Forward Patriots Branch should work as a team and move forward with "G" Branch of H.Q., A.A.I., so that the Forward team would always be in close contact with Col. HILLS of G(B), who is the officer of H.Q., A.A.I. who gives instructions to patriots north of the line.

I still feel that this policy is broadly the right one. I was wrong

(b) No for Cars

(c) Numbers of Patriot Representatives with Armies and Regions

(d) Numbers of Certificates and Posters issued.

N. A. C.

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I still feel that this policy is broadly the right one. I was wrong in thinking that the I.N.P.C. could be made to function by the end of September, but since it now appears to be making decisions I feel that within a very short period it should be possible to leave this Committee to carry out very many useful duties, which would otherwise have had to be done by the Patriots Branch in RMA.

6. Region IV and Region V.

We have written to Regions IV and V that we expect them to have finished their patriot business almost immediately. In this connection I have asked the V.P. to send a letter to Regions IV and V calling for a report on the rehabilitation of patriots inside their respective regions, but excluding RMA.

6337

3.

7. Outstanding Problems.

I have three problems which I consider need special watching in the immediate future.

(a) Rome Patriot Committees.

The three Rome Patriot Committees have been very slow in getting off the mark and need prodding.

9th public lib. exp. 1/1/50

(b) Employment Agencies.

Employment agencies must be found for Regions in the north. These employment agencies must not only find out from local industries what jobs are available, but must examine the list of patriot bands and fit suitable patriots into the right jobs. Each Provincial Commissioner should, I feel, have an agency attached to him. I have asked the I.M.P.C. to put up a proposal on these lines.

(c) Welfare Organisation.

A welfare organization must be started by the I.M.P.C. There are, of course, innumerable things that such a welfare organization can do. It can help to look after wounded patriots in hospital, provide comfortable and pleasant billets in Italian houses for patriots to sleep in, also comforts such as socks, sweaters, shoes, cigarettes for those patriots who are in need of this kind of assistance in the early days when they are overrun by the advancing armies. I feel that women can play as large a part in this as men, and General CAHILL knows that we expect him to get this organized as fast as he possibly can.

8. No.1 Special Force Liaison Officer.

At present Major TULLYAN sits in an office in our corridor and produces interim reports and other very valuable information which is definitely secret in character, and I have sometimes wondered whether this information should not rather be produced from their head house in Rome. It is, of course, very

9th public lib. exp. 1/1/50

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6. Major Special Force Liaison Officer.

At present Major TULLOCH sits in an office in our corridor and produces MISERIA reports and other very valuable information which is definitely secret in character, and I have sometimes wondered whether this information should not rather be produced from their head house in ROMA. It is, of course, very convenient both for Major TULLOCH and for our Branch to be sitting next to each other since it means, for instance, that he can read without much inconvenience all the reports of patriot representatives as they pass through our office to the I.N.P.C.

John for Mr. S. Army for collection for 6 months ending 1945

Wm. Carthy R
C.O. ~~63336~~
Colonel,
Patriots Branch.

Distribution: Brigadier UNWIN (2) —
Colonel HUGHES
Major MUMFORD
Major BRUCE
File

14/4/10A

Brig. Vignier

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1. Authority ...

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- 1. Attached hereto is a copy of the report, dated 10/10/50, titled "The Status of the Communist Party in the United States" and dated 10/10/50.
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- 6335

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

• **1997** – 1998

15 November 1944

SUBJECT : Memorandum.

P A T R I O T S

From day to day the political situation with regard to the Patriots grows worse. Despite all the efforts of AIG Officers concerned the Partisans are so ill provided for that they arrive in Florence and other towns dispirited, ill fed, ill clothed and demoralized.

It is only natural that the genuine Patriot who has fought and suffered for many months at the instigation of Allied Propaganda should expect material support and encouragement when he comes through the lines. As it is, most of the men refuse to work not so much because they are not prepared to do so as because they feel that their dignity as fighters for their country is being impaired. Also they refuse to join the Italian Army because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that the Senior Officers are imbued with Fascist principles and they have no confidence in their military capacities. The present situation is grave and most competent observers agree that unless radical measures are taken there is the greatest danger of anarchy in this country.

It would seem most urgent therefore to establish a well coordinated organization for the rehabilitation and welfare of the Patriots. It should be possible to form teams of competent Officers to receive them when they pass through the lines, to look after their immediate well being and to draft them into civilian work before they become demoralized.

It is clear that to clothe and feed these Partisans will be a great problem and it is also obvious that if these men are still a greater problem.

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It is clear that to clothe and feed these Partisans will be a great problem and it is also obvious that if these men are not clothed and fed they may present a still greater problem, both now and for years to come.

Their services, if used, could prove of the greatest value in such military necessities as the reconstruction of roads and railways and the clearing of mines. If the rebuilding of roads is considered, the potential requirement of labour is infinitely greater than can be supplied from this source alone. 6334

Now these Patriots will, if handled properly, work and work willingly. The problem is a psychological one - they will work if they are allowed to remain under their own leaders and in their own formations but they must be made to feel that the reconstruction of their country is a Patriotic action and that they are still as it were, front line soldiers contributing to the war effort.

With regard to feeding and clothing these volunteers if it is to be done it should be done well. If these contingents are fed and clothed properly much material will be involved but still far less than would have to be supplied to labour units of the Allied Forces.

Some observe maintain that if these Patriot formations remain intact they may eventually be used for subversive or political action. The answer, I think, is that if you give an Italian work, food and a few cigarettes he is easily contented; and in any case after a few weeks of employment the militant ardour of these Patriots will tend to disappear.

With regard to Patriots that wish to go home it is essential that they should be repatriated quickly before they have time to cause trouble and so that they may help in the reestablishment of the normal life in their country.

Lately the Patriots who arrive in Unoccupied Italy have had no organized and effective welcome from their fellow-Italians. It should be possible to establish canteens and welcome centres where they may be made to feel that their past efforts have been appreciated; already in Florence a committee of Italians has been formed to collect clothes and money for the Patriots. Given the right stimulus and support such committees could be formed elsewhere.

To sum up the present situation once more, the Patriots feel that they are uncared for, unaccommodated and that they have been made the tools of Allied propaganda. Already there are many hundreds of them wandering about unemployed in the cities of the war zone. Whether they are to be blamed or not for refusing to work under present circumstances is irrelevant. If present conditions are allowed to continue they will prove a formidable obstacle not only to the resettlement of Italy but to the resettlement of Europe as a whole and will form an easy prey to almost any kind of subversive activity.

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For the Patriot problem is one that has to be solved in every country which has fought against Germany.

Philip Taylor 6333

T. Br. 16. WPJH

Subject:- Disarmament 13/16 Nov. 1953 11th Army
3000 IV Centre and Patriotic Reg (Adv).

Civil Affairs Section,
The Allied Forces in Italy
The Planning of

HOA

20/10/53.2
15 Nov 53

To:- DTMO

1. After our visit to the 11th Army (Adv), Col. Mayo, in the midst of the riots, it was definitely anticipated that these riots would be an early indication for important work and that even more important, perhaps, in the future, their cooperation was planned. A great deal more work has been done in the past. Col. Mayo considers that the situation at the moment is not really with an adequate solution and the situation is still largely the same.

2. The situation of matters for which they are treated as

3. General and administrative administration at those times.

4. In connection with 1, this office from the present point of view 13 Nov situation in the midst of the riots, which represents (Advances) in Florence. There, except for a full of the 11th Army, there is Col. Mayo, 3000 PLANNING UNIT, is described that sort of the situation of that which seems to be involved with the situation of "disarmament" or to condition in many cases. The situation is very serious, it is a very serious situation of work of the 11th. The information received by 11th (Adv) is the actual information, which was previously and that is not represented by Patriotic, in such information, for civilian matters. (11th (Adv) note daily reports by representative established full representation for our thing.) This work should be carried forth, to allow the representative and his staff to deal with what appears to be a very serious, the actual dealing with the physical bodies of the Patriotic after they come through the lines and come to be of direct value operationally.

5. At 11th 11th Army the situation of Patriotic is described at some length with major lines, the representative of the 11th at that time. It was mentioned that the 11th Army is not completely with the 11th Army up to 3,000 within this area and does not impact any great 11th (Adv) unless the situation is not good. (11th (Adv) (5) (30,000) actually appears. He agreed in that case that the following would be of great value.

6. General and administrative matters, particularly with of the 11th, solely for Patriotic.

7. An anticipated increase in riotous to provide Patriotic with an entirely the same quantity and quality of food as is now being given (German).

They must rely on Displaced Persons Sub-Committee representations to keep the trustees "different" than that given the people usually handled by that group.

6. Col. WALSH agreed that poor transportation would be a real problem, and in this connection the terms (green) of pink, yellow and blue would be considered as possible sites.

7. Col. WALSH ended another section saying, that if further Patriot moved, at the present the Patriots wanted in this area are to be taken found at two hospitals (Admission) suggested up to a week, then they are sent to civilian hospitals. There, the discharges in treatment and in civilian hospitals attempts to supply those patients with a little more in the way of food, water, and medication. When treatment will be complete, if they are willing to be sent to a civilian hospital, they are sent to a "well" in a camp and a reference made by our trusted Patriots no needed. Col. WALSH would like to see this altered.

8. At 11:00 AM the day after the "Patriot" meeting, the "Patriot" meeting was held to be continued to have nothing to do with the treatment of hospitals. "Patriot" Patriots apparently have no standing relationship with those of the north and it was suggested that all representatives who to any further facilities for Patriots be made solely on the recommendation of "Patriot" board (also) through the area.

9. The question of food again came up. Col. WALSH discussed the hope that written requests and actual supplies to show to some of the hospitals as a ration at least equivalent to the ration. In addition, to the further work Patriots are actually fed very ration but this is not understood and to long as it is being done, and as long as we have these people operationally something should be done to legalize the procedure and of ordering it.

10. It was also pointed out that the previous mentioned area for the most part in dire need of clothing and shoes. Col. WALSH stated that about piles at such centres as might be set up, would be of the greatest value to the raising of funds.

11. Chairman of the nation of military discipline, in the part of our "publicity" was not. Col. WALSH said that discipline was in order for things they have been provided and he has never been informed that as to what is being mentioned. He suggested that all concerned be given copies of the program and either by pamphlet or by word of mouth as they are at least conversation in advance as to why anything may not be available.

12. In conclusion, it seems fairly evident to be that the Patriot board should actually 99% of the time in a position to deal with the situation in 10, 11, and the Andromeda board along the following pattern:

13. Rehabilitation and expansion the movement of strategically located Patriot Centers where Patriots may be located and fed for periods up to 30 days.

13. It was also pointed out that the functions mentioned are "for the most part in dire need of clothing and shoes. Col. Winters stated that about 5000 at such centers as might be set up, would be of the greatest value to the training of cadres.

14. Criticism of the method of raising business practices in the past of our "politicized" was not. Col. Winters said that it is difficult to do in a way that they have been provided and he has never been informed of any such as being realized. He suggested that all concerned be given copies of any previous and either by page, lot or treatment so they can at least know where in advance as to why anything may not be available.

15. In conclusion it seems fairly evident to us that the Patriot Branch should actually get involved in a program which will be the basis of it, and the American should study the following points:

a. Substantiate and reorganize the operation of strategically located Patriot Centers where activities may be located and for the purpose of to 30 days.

b. That Patriot Superintendents (actual co-fighters) be established at such centers to administer the Centers (with Patriot assistance and the representatives of the centers) and to

6331

1. Arrange for the armed forces in Italy

11. Rehabilitate the guests

14. Organize "work" groups

17. Arrange "training" to conduct displaced persons camps of those who after 30 days will continue work locally or fight.

2. Establish a nation scale for these centers to compare favorably with that set to KGB's.

3. Arrange for wounded Patriots to be treated at military hospitals until they do not require further hospitalization.

4. Establish stockpiles of clothing and shoes at these centers (through Red Cross, private charity and more importantly through USSR).

5. Patriots Branch should be furnished a clear directive giving them power to originate and operate these centers.

6. It is suggested that Major Winters, the Adv Rep of the Patriot Branch be appointed to deal with the actual establishment and operations involved, subject to

supervision by Civil Affairs Section in AAF. This officer at the present known of no officer who has equivalent experience in establishing working installations, and his previous MAO experience plus his present situation make him a logical appointee. For liaison work with the Armed Forces it is suggested that an officer of test and delivery be appointed as Co-Director if this term may be used.

2. It is further recommended that all Patriot Representatives be selected first by representatives of the Armed, and that those be approved by Patriots Branch and the AAF, and that any Central Agency operating under the control of AG be made up of "known" Patriots and not political resistance leaders.

3. Finally it is recommended that all emphasis on publicity to those in the Armed be turned to the theme that the Patriots are fighting for liberty and not solely for the ALGER.

Robert A. Fennell

ROBERT A. FENNEL,
Lt. Colonel, INF.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Subject: Patriot ~~certificated~~

20 NOV 1944

C. A. Sec. 3598

Civil Affairs Section,
HQ Allied Forces in Italy
FM: STAVT 132

Col:

V.P. Civil Affairs Section,
HQ Allied Commission

XXIII/12/14
18 Nov 44

394

1. Reference your Ltr 7.1/OL dated 10 Nov 44.
2. I am pleased to enclose a copy of a letter received from the
CAG, H. HQ (ref CGA/42 of 17 Nov 44). 458.

Phineas James

Lt. Col.,
Chief Staff Officer
For DOLAG

6329

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

GAFFY

CCA/NA

Advanced Headquarters,
Allied Action in Italy
17th November 1944

393

To:- Chief staff officer,
Civil Affairs Section.

From:- C.C.A.
H.Q. A.A.I.

Patriot Certificates

1. I have considered the facts set out in H.Q. Allied Commission letters 12/PAT dated 8 Nov and 1/7.1/CA dated 10 Nov.
2. I am in agreement with the recommendation of Brigadier Upjohn expressed in para 5 of the latter letter. There is no necessity for any Certificates other than those issued by General Alexander. You will therefore prohibit the issue of any "Supplementary Certificates" and the formation of any further Provincial Patriots' Committees in Allied Military Government territory.

Sgt John Harding
Lieut-General,
C.C.A.

6328

1555

147A/CA ✓

COPY

MEMORANDUM

38a
File =

To: Patriots Branch.

5 November 1944.

- 38b
1. Ref. attached draft, this confirms verbal directions given by the Deputy Chief of Staff Civil Affairs Section at the interview with Major Magnus on 4 November 44.
 2. Major Magnus to draft a letter for submission to AFHQ on para.2.
 3. Major Magnus to clarify the position with regard to Patriot provincial committees and to inform INFC that the only committees that could be formed in AMG territory would be those appointed by Provincial Commissioners.
 4. Major Magnus to submit a further memo on his proposal to retain Patriot bands as organised bands.

(Signed) CRIPPS,

for G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.
V.F. C.A. Sec.
D.C.O.S.

6327

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APC 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
Ext. 374

Ref: 89/PAT

3 November 1944.

To: Civil Affairs Section.

From: Major Sir Philip MAGNUS.

Four months have passed since the A.C. first faced up to the problem of the Italian patriots. During these four months conditions have altered in two important respects. On the one hand, a considerable volume of experience has now been garnered which was not previously available. On the other hand, the climate of opinion which determines the broad outline policy towards Italy, so far as this can be discerned, has grown unmistakably more mellow. The present time, therefore, seems favourable for reviewing briefly the manner of handling the patriot problem.

The present policy in dealing with the patriots is to disarm them and disperse them into civil life. This policy has met only with very partial success, and there is no doubt that in the breasts of the patriots a sense of bitterness and frustration is being aroused, which is potentially dangerous. The roots of the trouble, so far as it is possible to disentangle them, are these:

1. The patriots responded well to Allied appeals to resist and harass the enemy. There is no doubt that the life of the German invader has been made difficult and dangerous over a wide area by the activities of about a quarter of a million patriots. Now, when the Allies advance and the patriots with all their emotions quickened as a result of many months of privation expect to be received as brothers in arms by General ALEXANDER's soldiers, they experience a reception which chills their blood. They are disarmed by the Army, by A.M.G. or by the Carabinieri. They are often more or less willing to accept nominal disarmament at the hands of the Allies - although in an increasing number of cases they conceal a large majority of the arms which they possess - but psychologically it is very foolish to allow the Carabinieri to disarm patriots. Patriots are bound at first to regard the

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2. Wounded patriots receive first-aid at Army dressing stations and are then sent down the line. No proper organisation exists for looking after patriots when they have left the advance dressing stations. The ball is passed from hand to hand, from Allied military hospitals to civilian hospitals, from civilian to Italian military hospitals and so on to the C.L.N. authorities and possible back to hospital again.

Whether wounded or unwounded, the present arrangements or the lack of them tend to make the patriots feel that they belong to a species of pariah dog. Very seldom do they experience even such elementary comforts as hot meals or a change of clothes. Their morale drops and they are fair game for any agitator who is at hand to exploit their mood of dejection.

3. The question of rations and clothing for patriots when they are first received in our lines is absolutely fundamental. The present policy - it would be more true to call it "absence of policy" - is responsible for much the larger part of the discontent which is being engendered. It is, of course, an affair of policy which can only be decided on a high level, since it involves questions of the supply of foodstuffs and clothing which are exceedingly difficult. I do, however, submit that this is a matter to which close and sympathetic attention should be given at this time as a matter of urgency.
4. The delay in issuing patriot Certificates depreciates their value in the eyes of the patriots. There is reason to fear that Certificates have been changing hands on a cash basis for something in the neighbourhood of 15,000 lire a time. The Italian National Patriot Committee has recently decided to draw up its own roll of patriots. It is not prepared to accept the award of a Certificate signed by General ALEXANDER as affording final proof that its holder is a certificated patriot.
5. The organisation of a welfare department of the I.N.P.C. is making little progress, and the prospects for the future are less bright than I had hoped. The I.N.P.C. argues that before a really effective welfare organisation can be established some of its powers must be delegated to offshoots of itself in the Provinces and Army areas. The intention is that welfare committees should work in association with these delegated offshoots, but the truth is that every one of the six parties is anxious to run a welfare "racket" to serve its own ends. General ODONE, the excellent secretary of the I.N.P.C., is wrestling with this situation.
6. The work of putting patriots back into civil life is proceeding only slowly. The I.N.P.C. has issued an order that patriots should be reinstated in Government employment if they enjoyed such employment before. In the case of private organisations, however, the I.N.P.C. has merely issued an instruction to prefects that employers should be invited when possible to re-employ patriots who were in their employment before. General ODONE is pressing for the appointment in every Region and in every Province of an honest and authoritative

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Other matters could be enumerated were it necessary or helpful, but enough has, I think, been said to make it reasonable for me to submit a proposal which would, I believe, obviate at one stroke a large part of our troubles.

3.

I feel that the time has come when the patriots should be recognised - as they are recognised in France and in Russia - as a part of the regular fighting forces of the Italian Army acting under the orders of the Allied C. in C. I know that the ceiling imposed under the Armistice Agreement makes it technically impossible for this policy to be adopted immediately, but there are a great many respects in which the Armistice Agreement of 1943 is already becoming an anachronism. I think that a way should be found to overcome this difficulty. Even if the patriots were only regarded as an auxiliary military force, temporarily attached to the Italian Army, it would be possible for them to be subjected to discipline - which they badly need - and military law, and the situation would be susceptible of vast improvement. It would be possible then to supply them, without recourse to subterfuge, with such rations and clothing as can be made available. The patriots would then have an ordered place in the world and would no longer feel themselves slighted, unregarded and unrewarded.

The patriots' main desire is to continue to serve under their own officers. They will not - in the great majority of cases - consent willingly to their bands being broken up, and this is the reason why they are unwilling to take advantage of the opportunity which is provided for them to volunteer for service in the Italian Army. They will not agree to be sent as isolated fragments of humanity to serve in some unit or other which is new and strange. If the patriots could be afforded the chance to continue to serve in their own bands and under their own officers, the esprit de corps which has been generated amongst them might become a stabilizing factor of immense value to the future not only of Italy but of Europe as well. In present circumstances the patriots remain united in sentiment if not in fact, and there is a danger that some day when the times are ripe they may conclude that a march on Rome in red shirts might have as good a chance of succeeding as a certain march a quarter of a century ago when the fashionable colour was black.

It may be argued, of course, that after a Region has been liberated the continued existence of patriot bands is useless to the Allied war effort; that the patriots must settle down in civilian life some time and that the sooner they start the better. There is a twofold answer to this argument.

1. If the transition to civilian life is to be made successfully, the time and conditions must be favourable. They are not favourable now.
2. Military considerations are not in all circumstances and at all times the most important. Two examples only need be given. First, in 1941, political considerations were rightly held to overrule military ones when a British Army was sent to help the Greeks. And, second, after the invasion threat was virtually at an end in England, and the Germans were hopelessly involved in Russia, the Home Guard was maintained at a high level of

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2. Military considerations are not in all circumstances and at all times the most important. Two examples only need be given. First, in 1941, political considerations were rightly held to overrule military ones when a British Army was sent to help the Greeks. And, second, after the invasion threat was virtually at an end in England, and the Germans were hopelessly involved in Russia, the Home Guard was maintained at a high level of efficiency. Time and money were lavished upon it, and it is obvious that the justification for all this was far less military than moral. The Home Guard justified itself because it helped to maintain the morale of the nation. In Italy today, ~~after the transition~~ from the present period of difficulty and confusion needs to be accomplished successfully, the morale of the nation needs to be preserved. If the morale of the Italian people is to be preserved, it is essential that the patriot problem should be handled with wisdom and imagination. No one doubts that the patriots ultimately must be disarmed and dispersed into civil life. The question is one of means, not of ends, and I submit that the best method of achieving our ends is to keep these patriots who desire it under arms and under military discipline until the times are ripe for them to be disbanded.

H. Magnus
for Sir Philip MAGNUS,
Acting Director.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section

APC 394 C.E. UJOHN. Brig.
VP CA Sec.
D.C.O.S.

Ref:- 1/7.1/CA

10 Nov '44

SUBJECT:- Patriot Certificates.

TO:- D.C.O.A.O. (Col. Montford).

1. I attach a memorandum from the Acting Director, Patriots Branch, on the above subject matter which I think fully explains the position.
2. I think that the issue of General Alexander's certificates as soon as possible after liberation of territory and disbandment of Patriot bands has a definite advantage, and I should be very sorry if General Alexander desired to discontinue issue of such certificates.
3. I recommend that we prohibit the issue of any certificates other than those of General Alexander's in Allied Military Government territory, and also the formation of any further provincial committees in such territory.
4. Will you please take this matter up with Chief of Staff, AAI, and let me know his views as soon as possible.

[Signature]
C.E. UJOHN. Brig.
VP CA Sec.
D.C.O.S.

6323

6323

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
Patriots Branch
APO 394

Ref:- 42/PAT

8 Nov '44.

SUBJECT:- Patriot Certificates

Ext. 321

TO:- Civil Affairs Section

FROM:- Major Sir Philip Magnus.

Gen. Odone, Secretary of the Italian National Patriot Committee, came to see me this morning. I told him that I wished to clarify the situation with regard to the Patriot Provincial Committees which the I.N.P.C. were designating for the purpose of awarding Certificates supplementary to those already issued bearing the signature of General Alexander.

Gen. Odone explained that the Patriot Provincial Committees are to be composed of local personalities, such as leaders of Patriot bands, distinguished civilians, and officers. I explained that in A.M.C. territory no committees could be formed except those appointed by Provincial Commissioners. I said I would confirm this statement in a letter. Gen. Odone said that the Communal Committees had sometimes been too lenient and sometimes too severe in awarding certificates. I accordingly asked how these Provincial Committees which are intended to supplement the work of the Communal Committees, hoped to achieve a more uniform basis for the awarding of the Certificates. The General said that there would certainly be difficulty in inducing the Provincial Committees to achieve a uniform basis of award; he said they would have to proceed on a basis of compromise i.e. in one Province the Communists might predominate, in another the Socialists, and so on. The General said that the difficulties were always the same where the I.N.P.C. was concerned. This was a party organisation, and it was impossible to achieve unity. Each party sought to use the Patriots to further its own ends.

Gen. Odone said that the intention was to inform the Allied Commission of any cases in which the Provincial Committees did not recommend awarding an I.N.P.C. Certificate to Patriots already in possession of a Gen. Alexander certificate. This would give the Allied Commission an

Gen. Odono explained that the Patriot Provincial Committees are to be composed of local personalities, such as leaders of Patriot bands, distinguished civilians, and officers. I explained that in A.M.G. territory no committees could be formed except those appointed by Provincial Commissioners. I said I would confirm this statement in a letter. Gen. Odono said that the Communal Committees had sometimes been too lenient and sometimes too severe in awarding certificates. I accordingly asked how these Provincial Committees which are intended to supplement the work of the Communal Committees, hoped to achieve a more uniform basis for the awarding of the Certificates. The General said that there would certainly be difficulty in inducing the Provincial Committees to achieve a uniform basis of award; he said they would have to proceed on a basis of compromise i.e. in one Province the Communists might predominate, in another the Socialists, and so on. The General said that the difficulties were always the same where the I.N.P.C. was concerned. This was a party organization, and it was impossible to achieve unity. Each party sought to use the Patriots to further its own ends.

Gen. Odono said that the intention was to inform the Allied Commission of any cases in which the Provincial Committees did not recommend awarding an I.N.P.C. Certificate to Patriots already in possession of a Gen. Alexander certificate. This would give the Allied Commission an opportunity, if it wished, to withdraw the Alexander Certificate. I said nothing in reply to this.

As far as Rome Area is concerned, three committees composed of equal numbers of soldiers and civilians have been appointed but have not yet started work because Signor BONOMI has not yet ordered Marshal MESSI, the Italian C. in C., to hand over to the Committees all documents concerned with the patriot underground movement in Italy.

When the formation of these Committees was approved by the A.C., it was intended that they should award Gen. Alexander certificates. Gen. Odono said that the new intention was that they should award both classes of certificate at the same time.

I told Gen. Odono that I thought it necessary for this HQ to inform Gen. Alexander of the proposal of the I.N.P.C. and I asked him to wait until he had heard from this HQ before any further action could be taken. The General said that he thought in any case it would be some time before the Provincial Committees actually started to function.

For information, it is intended to divide the I.N.P.C. Certificate into three classes:-

Class ONE - Fighters, saboteurs, and carriers of information of first-class importance.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

To 1.2 for information.

4/48/CA ✓

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

file
Lester Harvey 36a
John E. Smith

Ref: 36/PAT

21 October 1964.

Subject: Employment and Payment of Patriot
Representatives, and Hiring of
Motor Vehicles.

To: Vice President
Col. ORRIS
Col. GRANTON-SMITH
Capt. DE ROSSIGNOL (for General Stone)

1. The attached draft instructions are now being examined by
AAI HQ and V Army, who have already approved the main points in
principle.

2. It is proposed that a translation should be made of these
instructions into Italian and that every Regional Commissioner,
Provincial Commissioner, S.C.A.C. of Armies and Individual Patriot
Representatives should have a copy.

3. If you have any comments or amendments to make please let
me have them.

John E. Smith Col.

C.D. McGARRY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch.

6321

2909

DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 384

Ref: 36/PAT

20 October 1944.

Subject: Employment and Payment of Patriot
Representatives, and Hiring of
Motor Vehicles.

PART 1. - Employment of Patriot Representatives

1. If and when asked for by AMG or Regional Commissioners, Patriot Representatives will be provided to assist in the handling of Patriot problems.
2. Nominations of all Patriot Representatives must be confirmed by the Italian National Patriot Committee who are providing pay for each Representative at the rate of one hundred (100) lira per day from the time they are called up, and two hundred (200) lira per day from the time they receive their appointment.
3. Patriot Representatives who are selected by AMG Armies will not be permitted to receive pay until their appointments have been confirmed by the Italian National Patriot Committee who reserve the right to withhold payment if they wish.
4. Patriot Representatives who engage in political activities will be immediately dismissed.
5. Serving regular army officers on full pay cannot be employed, and any now serving in this capacity must be released by mid-November. Regular officers on minimum pay can be employed until called back by the Ministry of War.

Part I. Employment of Patriot Representatives

1. If and when asked for by the or Regional Commissioners, Patriot Representatives will be provided to assist in the handling of Patriot problems.
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3. Patriot Representatives who are selected by the Allies will not be permitted to receive pay until 2.11.45. Representatives have been confirmed by the Italian National Patriot Committee who reserve the right to withhold payment if they wish.
4. Patriot Representatives who engage in political activities will be immediately dismissed.
5. Serving regular army officers on full pay cannot be employed, and any now serving in this capacity must be released by mid-November. Regular officers on minimum pay can be employed until called back by the Ministry of War.
6. Patriot Representatives will be organized in pairs, one being civilian and the other military. Normally one pair of Patriot Representatives will be engaged for each Regional and Provincial Headquarters provided Regional Commissioners ask for them. Upon completion of their tour of duty, which should vary between one and two months, they should be returned to the Italian National Patriot Committee by Regional Commissioners who must not retain their services for longer than is necessary.
7. Headquarters will have agreed that Patriot Representatives shall receive free petrol, free billets and a free issue of uniforms. They will not be allowed M/Us. For reason of their own, nor will they draw supplies from NAACP or Post Exchange Services. "Free billets" is not to be construed as including furniture or bedding. Patriot Representatives, if admitted to Allied officers' messes, will be required to pay the local messings fee.
8. Any Patriot Representatives found to be in possession of mail, or acting as an agent for, the carrying of mail will be subject to immediate dismissal and severe punishment.

9. *Working hours*

9009

9. Lists of Patriot Representatives will be sent fortnightly to Regional Commissioners who are responsible for ensuring that all Representatives in their area are duly and punctually paid, as laid down in Part II.

PART II. - Payment of Patriot Representatives

1. Regional Commissioners will notify the Regional Finance Officers of the names and location of all Patriot Representatives in the Region. Any change in the personnel of the Patriot Representatives or in their location will at once be reported to the Regional Finance Officer by the Regional Commissioner.

2. On the basis of the information received from the Regional Commissioner, the Regional Finance Officer will make arrangements to pay, through his Provincial Finance Officers or other sub-accountants, the Patriot Representatives who will be distributed throughout the Region.

3. Patriot Representatives will immediately be paid by ACC as from the date of their appointment or as from the 1st of September if their appointment was prior to that date, up to the 15th of October 1944. Thereafter they will be paid on the last and the 15th day of each month.

4. The rate will be two hundred (200) lire per day for a 7-day week. The rate will be the same for civilians and for officer personnel, irrespective of rank.

5. The pay of Patriot Representatives will eventually be recovered by ACC from the Italian National Patriot Committee. It will therefore be necessary for all Patriot Representatives to be paid on a separate payroll, the original copy of which, signed by each Patriot Representative drawing pay, will be forwarded with the Monthly Report of Receipts and Disbursements to the Chief Accountant, ACC. He will take the necessary steps to obtain reimbursements from the Italian National Patriot Committee and from the Government.

6. Attached is a schedule with the names of existing Patriot Representatives. This schedule should be used as a basis for making the original payment. Thereafter, the schedules will be sent periodically to the Regions; so, however, the National Administration may change the personnel or location of the Patriot Representatives in his Region, these changes must subsequently reflect the actual situation. For this reason

the date of their appointment or as from the 1st of September if their appointment was prior to that date, up to the 15th of October 1944. Thereafter they will be paid on the 1st and the 15th day of each month.

4. The rate will be two hundred (200) lire per day for a 7-day week. The rate will be the same for civilians and for officer personnel, irrespective of rank.

5. The pay of Patriot Representatives will eventually be recovered by AOC from the Italian National Patriot Committee. It will therefore be necessary for all Patriot Representatives to be paid on a separate payroll, the original copy of which, signed by each Patriot Representative drawing pay, will be forwarded with the Monthly Report of Receipts and Disbursements to the Chief accountant, AOC. He will take the necessary steps to obtain reimbursements from the Italian National Patriot Committee each month.

6. Attached is a schedule with the names of existing Patriot Representatives. This schedule should be used as a basis for making the original payment. Thereafter, the schedules will be sent periodically to the Region; as, however, the Regional Committee may change the personnel or location of the Patriot Representatives in his Region, these lists may not subsequently reflect the actual situation. For this reason they will only act as the authority for payment up to the end of September, and subsequent payment will be made on the authority of the Regional Commissioner.

6319

PART III. - Hire of Motor Vehicles.

1. Motor vehicles may be hired on behalf of the Patriot Representatives on the specific authority of the Patriots Branch, Headquarters AOC, who will issue instructions through the Regional Commissioners. In all such cases the prior agreement of the Italian National Patriot Committee will be obtained.

2. The sub-accountant making the payment will state clearly in his Monthly Report of Receipts and Disbursements that the payments in question are in respect of hire of motor vehicles for Patriot Representatives. Such expenditures will subsequently be recovered from the Italian National Patriot Committee by AOC in the same way as the pay of the Patriot Representatives.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMAND
APO 594
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

File
377
352
4-1-A

MEMORANDUM

Ref : 1477/14
SUBJECT : Patriots.

4 Nov 44

TO : Regional Commissioners Biguria, Picomate, Lombardia, Venezuela, Emilia,
BAG : V & VILL ARMY.

1 The functions of the Patriots Branch of this HQ are now under review and this memorandum is addressed to you with a view to discussion at the Staff Conference on the 8th November.

2 The disarming and dispersal of Patriots is essentially a matter for Regional Commissioners and their provincial commissioners this Headquarters assists by providing:-
a) information
b) Patriot representatives.

3 As to information; at the present time, the Permanent staff officer of the Patriots Branch of Picomate compiled information collected from various military sources on the distribution and activities of Patriots, the names of their leaders, etc.

4 The views of Regional Commissioners will be requested on:-
a) whether they desire the information to continue to be supplied on the present lines, or
b) whether they would be interested to receive reports in greater detail comprising a larger variety of subjects such as economic conditions, the destruction of factories, bridges and the like which may be of economic importance. Such technical information could without difficulty be added to the reports, or
c) whether the reports are found to be of doubtful utility in view of the fact that many changes are likely to happen before Regional Commissioners enter their Regions, and the information will be out of date. In this connection it should be noted that infor-

2 The following are dispersed of patriots in essentially a matter for regional commissions and their provincial organizations this morning are sent by providing:-
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b) patriot representatives.

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c) whether the reports are found to be of technical utility in view of the fact that many changes are likely to happen before Regional Commissioners enter their Regions, and the information will be out of date. In this connection it should be noted that information about patriots will in future be readily available at HQ V Army, and I think also at the VIII Army, as well as in L. 6310

5 Patriot representatives have been supplied to Provincial Commissioners from the Indian National Patriot Committee, and it is known that Provincial Commissioners have found these useful in dealing with problems of finding employment for patriots and so forth. It has been suggested, however, that in future Patriot representatives could more usefully be found through Patriot leaders who may be met with in Northern Regions or who can be suggested from more Northern towns such as Florence.

A further question arises as to whether in view of the existing situation Patriot representatives should be withdrawn to some and sent up later if required, or against this it must be remembered that there is bound to be some delay in getting patriots transported up to the front at the time when they are most required if they are now withdrawn.

RECEIVED OF THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Copy to : Messrs
(Attention for Amalini)

G.B. VISWANATHAN,
V.P. Section,
Deputy Secy.

3722

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
4/4A/CA✓ APO 512
CA Sec
RJ3/1220

G-5: 313.3

25 October 1944

34a

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Reports.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control
Commission, A.P.O. 394.

35a

Forwarded herewith two copies each of
the Internal Organization of the Partisan
Movement in Italy and extracts from a
general report on Area Piedmont covered by
FIAP Mission for your information.

For Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

F. J. BLANKETER,
Captain, A.G.D.

Incls: as above.

Ref 5 Distribution
copy CA Sec

3346

THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTISAN
MOVEMENT IN ITALY.

SECRET

33A

1. From information received in the last few days it is possible to give a somewhat clearer picture of the internal organization of the partisan movement in Italy.
2. The "GUF" of the movement, as has of course long been known, is in MILAN. This is the logical result of three main causes:-

(a) MILAN is the natural centre of German occupied Italy.

(b) As Italy's principal industrial town it has a large working population which has, in the past, proved a fertile field for anti-Fascist organization.

(c) As a result of (b) the Committee of National Liberation in MILAN had a firm foundation of well organized underground activity which parties of the left had established and maintained throughout the Fascist regime. The CLN was thus able to begin the evolution of an active central organization at a time when partisan activity in the rest of Italy was sporadic and entirely un-coordinated. The Committee has gradually increased the extent of its influence until at present it is believed that it is recognized by the great majority of the partisans.

3. In essence the CLN aims to co-ordinate the activities of all resistance elements which are prepared to act against Germans and Fascists, and to eliminate friction arising both from the wide variety of causes which have induced Italians to join resistance groups, and from the tendency of a large number of political parties to attempt to capitalise on the resistance movement.

4. (a) The sources from which the partisan movement derives almost all its motive strength are five-fold:-

(1) Members of the Italian Army before the Armistice, who for various reasons later refused to throw in their lot with the Germans and Fascists. Their political views appear to be predominantly monarchist and it is probable that the majority of these bands which remained independent of the CLN derived from these sources.

(2) Communists.

(3) Action Party Members.

(4) Christian Democrats.

(5) Socialists.

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(2) Communists.

(3) Action Party Members.

(4) Christian Democrats.

(5) Socialists.

(b) The rigidity of this classification should however be qualified. Operating with Partisans is a large and heterogeneous body of Italians of no, or only the loosest, political allegiance, together with an unknown number of Russian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, and even German deserters from the Wehrmacht, Slovenes, and a considerable number of Allied ex-pats.

5. When it became clear that the CLN in Milan had achieved a real authority over this complex movement, and had in fact been recognized by the Italian Government, it was decided to send a distinguished Italian officer, and with an unexceptionable democratic background, as a representative of A.A.I. to the CLN. He will be referred to as Colonel X. What follows is based in the main on reports from this officer.

6. (a) The General Command of the Milan CLN consists of five members, one from each of the five principal resistance elements, and a military adviser.

(b) The Operations section of the Command virtually rules the CLN and consists of the Communist and Action Party representatives and the Military adviser.

SECRET

338

(a) Colonel X was welcomed by all parties and was nominated President of the Committee. This however raised a difficulty in that the three parties of the left could not agree as to the allocation of the secondary posts. He therefore refused the presidency and has taken up the appointment of Military Adviser with its ex officio seat in the operations section, a task for which his capabilities make him eminently suitable.

7. The Committee has achieved a creditable degree of cooperation between all the political parties, but it is certain that the Communists are by far the most influential single element. They provide most of the Committee's administrative and liaison personnel, and in passing it is pointed out that where communications consist chiefly of couriers on foot, bicycle, or occasionally motor car, liaison duties assume a very great significance.

8. The lack of communications and the clandestine nature of the organization have made close control of military operations particularly in the case of distant bands, out of the question. The Committee therefore contains itself with broad operational policy and concentrates mainly on organization. AAI therefore maintain their direct operational control of the bands by means of an increasing network of British, American and Italian liaison officers, and a considerable wireless organization.

9. The CLW has under its direct command the MILAN city command, under General BILLOCHIO, and has divided the remainder of enemy occupied Italy into five regional commands. Each of these regional commands has a number of zones, that of WINDMONT having the TURIN town command in addition. The bands acknowledging the CLW come directly under the respective zones. The following table shows the position in graphic form.

C.L.W. MILAN				
-----MILAN City Commander (Gen. BILLOCHIO)-----				
EMILIA Regional Command	LIQUORIA Regional Command	PIEMONTE Regional Command (incl TURIN town command) (Gen. TURBINO)	LOMBARDY Regional Command	VENETO Regional Command
1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1
5 Zones	2 Zones	5 Zones	4 Zones	5 Zones

3313

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 725016

0 0
DOOAG/12/15A 1st Ind.
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION, HQ AAI, APO 777. 27 Oct 44
TO: VP, Dep Col, Civil Affairs Section, HQ AAG

There are no objections to this Section taking over control and supervising the activities of Maj. Drage. However, it is considered practicable at all times to keep him as far forward as possible, as it is in the forward area that his work can be most effectively conducted.

W. H. Montgomery
WILLIAM H. MONTGOMERY,
Colonel, A. U. S.
DOOAG

6315

3337

62

COPIES

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

Ref:- 4/7A/CA

24 Oct 44

To:- D.S.C.A.S. Forward.
(Col. H. W. Manfort).

SUBJECT:- Patriots Branch.

1. The Patriots Branch have a forward staff officer (Major Drage) who at present works in the P.W.B. Advance HQ at Florence. If at any time A.A.I. moves to a town where there is more accommodation than at their present HQ, he will of course be with that HQ.

2. Major Drage's functions are to secure information from S.O.S. O.S.S. and P.W.B. with regard to the activities of patriots north of the line, and he compiles reports which are distributed to Army, AFM, and Northern Regions so that they may be fully advised of the patriot position in their respective regions.

3. I am anxious that Major Drage and his staff of Italian clerks should come under your general authority and control at AAI, and the CCS has approved of this idea if you see no objection. Will you please let me know as soon as possible if you have any objection to this proposal.

/s/ L. B. Upjohn
/c/ C. E. USCHER, Brig.
VP CA Sec.
Dep. C.A.S.

Copy to Patriots Branch.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INTER OFFICE MEMO

29

Recd

From: C O S

Ext. 388

SUBJECT: Patriots Branch

FILE No. 7007/27/COS

24 Oct 1944

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff,
Civil Affairs Section.

Reference your 17/4/CA of the 23rd of October I approve of the appointment of Col. R.C.P. Spicer, C.M.G. as Chief of the Patriots Branch in addition to his present duties as Director of Local Government Sub Commission.

I agree with you that the Patriots Branch should be kept an individual branch on paper.

Spicer
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

63164

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

Ref: 16/PAT

22 October 1944.

Subject: Staff.

Dear Roy

With regard to staff I would just like to record the following.

JOHN RAYNER would definitely like to have Major DRAGE for P.M.B., and DRAGE has asked me if he can join them.

If this happens it would create a vacancy which could best be filled by a Captain or Major from No. 1 Special Force. Really to run that job we need in a critical period, such as you may be going into, a first-class Intelligence Officer with practical experience of Patriots.

I believe we may be able to get an officer of this calibre from Comdr. HOLDSWORTH since, as a result of our recent successes in the South of France, Yugoslavia and Greece, several important officers who were working as B.L.O's. in these countries are on the market.

merer.

Tom McCarthy

G.D. MCCARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch.

To: Col. SPICER
Copy to: Brig. UPJER.

See by VP.
24 Oct 44
RR
6312
3023

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 73504

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
AFO 394

Ref:- I/4/CA

23 Oct '44

TO:- C.O.S.

SUBJECT:- Patriots Branch.

1. Consequent on the departure of Col. C.D. McCarthy, Chief of Patriots Branch to take up an appointment in Mid East, I recommend that Col. R.G.P. Spicer, C.M.G. be appointed Chief of the Patriots Branch in addition to his present duties as Director of Local Government sub-commission.
2. If the above recommendation is sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner there will be a de facto merger of the Patriots Branch into the Local Government sub-commission and this I am sure is the proper course to adopt.
3. I do not, however, recommend that there be any merger on paper of the Patriots Branch for the reason that the recently formed Italian National Patriots Committee, of which the Prime Minister is Chairman, are delighted to think that they have a special Branch of this Commission dealing with their affairs, and they would feel some slight if the Branch were merged into some other sub-commission. This retention of a separate Branch on paper will not involve any additional personnel whatsoever.
4. May I please be informed as soon as possible if the above is approved as Col. McCarthy desires to introduce Col. Spicer to a number of officers and Italians who deal with Patriot matters before he leaves.

G.R. UPJOHN. Brig.
VP CA Sec.
Dep. C.O.S.

6311

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

4/7/1/CA
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

26
22 October 1944.

Subject: Propaganda on Patriots.

To: Brigadier UPJCHN (2) —
File copy for Col. SPICER only.

As you know, I have never been an active supporter of the proposal to reduce the propaganda on Patriots.

Firstly, I feel that it is not fair, and I have always believed that when one adopts an unjust policy one always pays for it in the long run.

Secondly, I feel that it will not work because, say what we will, the activities of the Patriots are the only activities in which the Italian people can have any pride at this period and therefore all Italians will in fact boost Patriots.

Thirdly, let us consider the long term political outlook. Harold Gaccia will tell you that H.M.G. want an Independent Italy not too strong and not too weak: i.e. not strong enough to be a menace to us and not weak enough to be an easy prize to others who could from Italy dominate the Mediterranean in another war. I can see no fault in this policy, except that I doubt from what I have seen of the Italians that they can ever be too strong for a very long period. From this it follows that I must think that we should from now onwards boost Italy and help Italy to the maximum. Let us give Italy the best peace terms we can and let us not mind if they do in fact tell us that the Patriots have won the war.

Col. C. D. McCarthy 6310

C.D. MCCARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch.

22 October 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDS

3m 25

1. Italian National Patriot Committee.

General ALLENBY told me personally to get the Italians to do as much as possible for themselves so that, firstly, the Italians should have practice in handling their own affairs, and, secondly, the number of Allied personnel employed on this work should be reduced to a minimum.

The I.N.P.C. was recently formed under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, to take over and deal with as many of the patriot problems behind the line as I.N.C. wish to pass over to them.

I consider that the main political object of the Committee is to make it clear to the Italian people that the Italian Government is actually capable of giving practical assistance to patriots behind the line.

In the beginning I personally found it extremely difficult to make this Committee function in any way whatever, but after the composition of the Committee had finally been settled and Major General CHAMBERLAIN taken over the job of Secretary of the Committee things slowly started to happen. Last week the Committee had a meeting which lasted for over three days and which decided, frankly to my astonishment, a considerable number of important points. Consequently I feel that unless a new Government, if it materializes, is allowed to hinder further progress this Committee should now be able to be of real use in solving patriot problems.

2. Italian Patriot Representative.

In order to help Regional Commissioners, Provincial Commissioners and Civil Affairs Officers in forward areas to handle patriots, it has been agreed that pairs of patriot representatives, one military and one civil, should be sent to help these officers not only to meet patriots and discuss them but also to rehabilitate them. The patriot representative is not allowed to indulge in political propaganda.

A new directive, known as Directive 4, has been issued and the Finance Sub-Commission is now up for final approval before the following:

- (a) W.F., C.A.S.
- (b) Finance Sub-Commission
- (c) I.N.P.C.

In the beginning I personally tried to make it to make this Committee function in any way whatsoever, but after the composition of the Committee had finally been settled and Major General CUNNINGHAM taken over the job of Secretary of the Committee things slowly started to happen. Last week the Committee had a meeting which lasted for over three days and which decided, frankly to my astonishment, a considerable number of important points. Consequently I feel that unless a new Government, if it is established, is allowed to hinder further progress this Committee should now be able to be of real use in solving patriot problems.

2. Italian Patriot Representative.

In order to help Regional Commissioners, Provincial Commissioners and Civil Affairs Officers in forward areas to handle patriots, it has been agreed that pairs of patriot representatives, one military and one civil, should be sent to help these officers not only to meet patriots and listen to them but also to rehabilitate them. The military representative is not allowed to indulge in political propaganda.

A new directive, agreed in principle with the Patriot Committee and the Finance Sub Commission is now up for final approval before the following:

- (a) V.P., C.A.S.
- (b) Finance Sub Commission
- (c) I.V.P.C.
- (d) U.S., A.A.I.
- (e) V Army A.D.C.

When this directive is issued my suggestion is that it should be sent out in English and Italian to all concerned, and a copy should be given to every patriot representative so that he knows to what exactly he is entitled.

3. Developments in North Italy.

I have asked Major WILLIAMS of No. 1 Special Force, 6309, gone to a meeting in South Italy, to find out from Gen. HULLYARD what he thinks that the patriot organization should now be 100% on its toes waiting for a solid forward movement. If the answer is in the affirmative, then two things will have to be done in order to be able to complete arrangements which have already been started. Firstly, the forward Intelligence Teams at PULIGNO will have

to be brought up to full strength; secondly, an agreement will have to be made as once to send forward to Regional I. F. S. all the patriot representatives for whom the Regions have asked. Most of the patriot representatives are already in place, and I do not think it will be wise to allow any of them to come back to Paris since the problem of collecting them and moving them forward again will be very difficult to overcome. The I. F. S. have agreed that they are prepared to give them their full pay of 200 lire per day while waiting for North Italy to be liberated.

447 Commodity Reports

In order to show the current position, the following reports are prepared at the beginning of every month.

- (a) Staff in Hall and Halls;
 (b) Motion Cart
 (c) Numbers of Patriot Representatives with Armies and Regions
 (d) Numbers of Organizations and Students Located.

Col. JAW keeps a current list of the names on the station at all parties represented.

5. Autism of the Patoleta Branch.

In August I recommended that at some future date - after the L.A.C. had started to function - the affairs of the patriots south of the Rio Grande should be dealt with by one senior officer in RUSA, who should be attached to Civil Affairs Branch of L.A.C. & N.G. Section. In order to deal with patriotic problems inside the LRG area and further north, I recommended that a strong representation of the Patriots Branch should also forward so that they will be in close touch with realities. My idea was that if a forward section of L.A.C. should come into being then these patriotic officers should work under the senior officer of the L.A.C. Forward Section.

also it was agreed at a meeting held in Chicago, Ill., between representatives from Canada, Wisconsin, Mr. HUNTER and myself, who present that Special Forces, U.S.A. and the Forward Elements Branch should work as a team and move forward with "A" Branch of V.C. 6000, so that the Forward Team would always be in close contact with Col. KING or G(S), who is the officer of V.C. 6000. We give instructions to soldiers north of the line.

I still feel that this policy is broadly the right one. I was wrong in thinking that the I.M.P.C. could be made to function by the end of September, but within a very short

(by numbers of Confidential and Restricted Lists)

Col. PVA keeps a current list of the names and stations of all patriot representatives.

5. Picture of the Patriots Branch.

In August I recommended that at some future date - after the I.N.P.C. had started to function - the affairs of the patriots south of the border should be dealt with by the staff officer in PVA, who should be attached to Civil Affairs Branch of I.N.P.C. Section. In order to deal with patriot problems inside the army areas and further north, I recommended that a strong representation of the Patriots Branch should move forward so that they will be in close touch with realities. My idea was that if a forward skeleton of I.N.P.C. should come into being, then these patriot officers should work under the senior officer of the I.N.P.C. Forward Detachment.

Also it was agreed at a meeting held in mid-September by Brigadier SAWHAY, then Comdr. HINDUJI, Mr. PAVAN and myself were present that Special Forces, I.N.P.C. and the Forward Patriots Branch should work as a team and move forward with the Branch of I.N.P.C. I.N.P.C., so that the Forward team would always be in close contact with Col. BIRSA of G(R), who is the officer of H.A., I.N.P.C. who gives instructions to patriots north of the line.

I still feel that this policy is broadly the right one. I was wrong in thinking that the I.N.P.C. could be made to function by the end of September, but since it now appears to be making decisions I feel that within a very short period it should be possible to leave this Committee to carry out very many useful duties, which would otherwise have had to be done by the Patriots Branch in PVA.

6. Region IV and Region V.

We have written to Regions IV and V that we expect them to have finished their patriot brigades almost immediately. In this decision I have asked the V.B. to send a letter to Regions IV and V asking them to report on the rehabilitation of patriots inside their respective regions, but excluding PVA.

6308

3.

7. Outstanding Problems.

I have three problems which I consider need special watching in the immediate future.

(a) Some Patriotic Organizations.

The three Grand Patriotic Committees have been very slow in getting off the mark and need prodding.

(b) Employment Agencies.

Employment agencies must be found for Regions in the north. These employment agencies must not only find out from local industries what jobs are available, but must examine the list of patriotic bands and fit suitable patriots into the right jobs. Such Provincial Commissioner should, I feel, have an agency attached to him. I have asked the I.M.P.C. to put up a proposal on these lines.

(c) Welfare Organization.

A welfare organization must be started by the I.M.P.C. There are, of course, innumerable things that such a welfare organization can do. It can help to look after wounded patriots in hospital, provide comfortable and pleasant billets in Italian houses for patriots to sleep in, also comforts such as socks, sweaters, shoes, cigarettes for these patriots who are in need of this kind of assistance in the early days when they are overcome by the advancing armies. I feel that women can play a large part in this as well, and General GORDON knows that we expect him to get this organized as fast as he possibly can.

8. No. 1 Special Force Liaison Officer.

At present Major TULLOCH sits in an office in our corridor and produces reports and other very valuable information which is definitely secret in character, and I have sometimes wondered whether this information should not rather be produced from their head house in Rome. It is, of course, very convenient both for Major TULLOCH and for our Branch to be sitting next to each other along it now, for instance, that he can read without much inconvenience

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Wm. Carthy R.

C.D. McCORMY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch.

6301

Distribution: Brigadier WILLIAMS (1) -
Colonel WILLIAMS
Major WILLIAMS
Major WILLIAMS
Major WILLIAMS

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH.
APO 394

Ref: 64/Pat

23 Sept. 144

SUBJECT: Treatment of Patriots in Italy
Final stage.

To: Brigadier M. Lush,
Brigadier Unjohn,
Mr. Harold Gaccia.

Copies for information to:
Brigadier Munnings,
Commander Keldsworth
AMC Fifth Army
AMC Eighth Army

1. Undoubtedly the handling of patriots in the North of Italy will be on a much larger scale than in central Italy; the patriots in the North are reputed to be tougher than those in central Italy; also they are well organised vide Appendix attached.

2. It seems clear that it is necessary to endeavor to harness and control the energies of the patriots in the North from now until such time as they are finally dissipated into the civilian population. Otherwise there is almost certain to be trouble wherever they are left uncontrolled especially if they are not put into proper civil or military employment after peace has been established in their areas.

3. HQ AAI are eager that patriots in the north should now be satisfied about their future so that they may give of their best over the next few weeks. A letter is probably being sent to us from G Ops to this effect.

4. At present, the fact that many patriots, e.g. in Florence, have not been finally rehabilitated has presented a serious public safety problem because, first, there are not enough of them and second, we have strong military forces everywhere in the vicinity.

5. What the patriots want is to know that they will be properly employed either in the Army or in civil life after the fighting is over. This means

on a much larger scale than in central Italy; the patriots in the North are reputed to be braver than those in central Italy; also they are well organized with a more active attitude.

2. It seems clear that it is necessary to endeavor to harness and control the energies of the patriots in the North from now until such time as they are finally designated into the civilian population. Otherwise there is almost certain to be trouble wherever they are left uncontrolled especially if they are not put into proper civil or military employment after peace has been established in their areas.

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5. What the patriots want is to know that they will be properly employed either in the Army or in civil life after the fighting is over. This means that if we wish to satisfy the patriots we must present to them terms for military and civil employment which they will accept.

6. The present military terms are unacceptable because the patriots wish to continue fighting with their own officers and they refuse to join up if they are to be split into different units in the army.

7. I have discussed the problem of recruitment briefly with General Browning and he has asked us to call attention to this after his return from Saragossa about the fourth of October. Whether or not on all grounds it is desirable that the patriots should join the army has also to be considered; and an answer must be given in the near future as the patriots told what that answer is.

8. With regard to civil employment, I find that many patriots refuse to accept the terms which the army can offer them because the pay is too low and the work unattractive. This has not been a serious problem in Florence but in the North it may be serious and it is suggested that the Italian Patriot Committee could produce one or two civilians for each Region who would carry leading industrial firms and find jobs for patriots according to their qualifications and experience. If the Italian Patriot Committee can take on this work it would be of great assistance.

1425

9. Both the army authorities and any civilian employment bureau that is formed by Italians must be able to make early contact with patriots, if possible before they are finally disbanded so that a clear scheme for reemployment will be known to us hands in good time.

10. The difficulty in doing this is to get the armies and corps to agree to let the patriots be contacted in the post-foreign areas. I think, however, that Alf feels sufficiently strongly about the necessity of outliving the guilms of patriots on this head, to insist that patriots should be contacted at a very early stage.

11. Col. Mayo. Feels strongly that the publicity given to patriots on the radio and in the press is exaggerated and that we are making too much publicity of their rehabilitation, and that the directives to this end given in our orders of 18 July and 24 July are not 'realistic'. He thinks all this will end only in causing trouble for Italy.

12. The Daily Corbetti programme, sponsored by Brig. Mainwaring, is probably the strongest single authority responsible for encouraging and sustaining the importance of the patriots.

13. There is, undoubtedly, much in what Col. Mayo says but it is difficult to reconcile these views with the practical necessity for encouraging the Italian patriots at this juncture. A little later on perhaps one could ask PWS to include their arrests on patriots amongst their articles on the courage and endurance of the whole civil population. At some stage it may be wise to eliminate from the news papers practically all reference to patriots but this presumably would be when Italy was almost entirely liberated.

14. In the mean time the present policy is to endeavour to look after the patriots when they are disbanded and I should like to have a directive if I can to proceed on the lines mentioned above, and take particular trouble to put patriots into the army and civil employment. Also is it desirable to cut down our propaganda?

Col. Mayo
Colonel,
Patriots Branch.

SECRET

THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PARTISAN
MOVEMENT IN ITALY.

1. From information received in the last few days it is possible to give a somewhat clearer picture of the internal organization of the Partisan movement in Italy.
2. The "center" of the movement, as has of course long been known, is in MILAN. This is the logical result of three main causes:
 - (a) MILAN is the natural centre of German occupied Italy.
 - (b) As Italy's principal industrial town it has a large working population which has, in the past, proved a fertile field for anti-Fascist organization.
 - (c) As a result of (b) the Committee of National Liberation in MILAN had a firm foundation of well organized underground activity which parties of the left had established and maintained throughout the Fascist regime. The CIL was thus able to begin the evolution of an active central organization at a time when Partisan activity in the rest of Italy was sporadic and entirely uncoordinated. The Committee has gradually increased the extent of its influence until at present it is believed that it is recognized by the great majority of the Partisans.
3. In essence the CIL aims to coordinate the activities of all resistance elements which are prepared to act against Germans and Fascists, and to eliminate friction arising both from the wide variety of causes which have induced Italians to join resistance groups, and from the tendency of a large number of political parties to attempt to capitalize on the resistance movement.

(c) As a result of (b) the Committee of National Liberation in Milan had a firm foundation of well organized underground activity which parties of the left had established and maintained throughout the Fascist regime. The CLN was thus able to begin the evolution of an active central organization at a time when Partisan activity in the rest of Italy was sporadic and entirely uncoordinated. The Committee has gradually increased the extent of its influence until at present it is believed that it is recognized by the great majority of the Partisans.

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4. (a) The sources from which the Partisan movement derives almost all its active strength are five-fold: -

- (i) Members of the Italian Army before the Armistice, who for various reasons later refused to throw in their lot with the Germans and Fascists. The political views appear to be predominantly monarchist and it is probable that the majority of these men which remained independent of the CLN derived from these sources.

- (ii) Communists.
- (iii) Action Party members.
- (iv) Socialists.
- (v) Christian Democrats.

6305

1945

- (b) The rigidity of this classification should however be qualified. Operating with Fortresses in a large and heterogeneous body of Italians of no, or only the loosest, political allegiance, together with an unknown number of Russians, Polish, Czech, Slovak, and even German deserters from the Wehrmacht, Slovaks, and a considerable number of Allied ex-Ps.

5. When it became clear that the CIM in MILAN had achieved a real authority over this complex movement, and had in fact been recognized by the Italian Government, it was decided to send a distinguished Italian officer, with an unexceptionable democratic background, as a representative of A.A.I. to the CIM. He will be referred to as "Colonel X". What follows is based in the main on reports from this officer.

6. (a) The General Command of the MILAN CIM consists of five members, one from each of the five principal resistance elements, and a military adviser.

(b) The Operations section of the Command virtually rules the CIM and consists of the Communist and Action Party representatives and the Military Adviser.

(c) Colonel X was welcomed by all parties and was nominated President of the Committee. This however raised a difficulty in that the three parties of the left could not agree as to the allocation of the secondary posts. He therefore refused the Presidency and has taken up the appointment of Military Adviser with its *ex officio* seat in the Operations section, a task for which his capabilities make him eminently suitable.

7. The Committee has achieved a creditable degree of cooperation between all the political parties, but it is certain that the Communists are by far the most influential single element. They provide most of the Committee's administrative and liaison personnel, and in passing it is pointed out that where communica-

6. (a) The General Command of the MILAN CLM consists of five members, one from each of the five principal resistance elements, and a military adviser.
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7. The Committee has achieved a creditable degree of cooperation between all the political parties, but it is certain that the Communists are by far the most influential single element. They provide most of the Committee's administrative and liaison personnel, and in view of this it is pointed out that where communications consist chiefly of couriers on foot, bicycle, or occasionally motor car, liaison during action is of very great significance.
8. The lack of communications and the clandestine nature of the organization have made close control of military operations particularly in the case of distant bands, out of the question. The Committee therefore contains itself with issued operational policy and concentrates mainly on organization. A.A.I. therefore maintain their direct operational control of the bands by means of an increasing network of British, American and Italian liaison officers, and a considerable wireless organization.
9. The CLM has under its direct command the MILAN city command and has divided the remainder of enemy occupied Italy into five regional commands. Each of these regional commands has a number of men, that of PLACENTIA having the MILAN town command in addition. The bands acknowledged the CLM come directly under the respective region. The following table shows the position in graphic form :-

6304

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INTELLIGENCE SUB COMMISSION
APO 394

95/Pat

16.9.44.

SUBJECT: Formation of Italian Patriot Committee

TO: Distribution below.

The Italian Government have set up an Italian Patriot Committee under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister with the following terms of reference:-

1. The Commission will be called "Commissione per i Patrioti."
2. It will be presided over by the Prime Minister and, in his absence, the Under Secretary of State to the Presidency.
3. The members will be:-

M. E. Mario P. LEBRO, Under Secretary of State for War.

M. E. Giuseppe S. LEBRO, Under Secretary of State for Press and Information.

Dr. E. LEBRO or other representatives of the C. L. N.

General OLIVONE (Military)

4. The directives of the Commission will be carried out by a corresponding "Ufficio Patriote". The work will be undertaken by military and civilian personnel.

5. The head of this, Lt. Col. B. LEBRO, will also be Secretary of the "Commissione".

In their relations with the Allied Control Commission and the Regions, this Committee will deal with the Patriot Branch of the RC and MG Section. Officers of this Commission will reciprocally deal with this Italian Patriot Committee through the Patriot Branch and not direct.

3. The members will be:-

H.E. Mario PASTO, Under Secretary of State for War,

H.E. Giuseppe SPALDO, Under Secretary of State for
Press and Information.

Dr. E. LUZZI or other representatives of the C.L.N.

General ORMONZ (Military)

4. The directives of the Commission will be carried out by a
corresponding "Ufficio Patriote". The work will be under-
taken by military and civilian personnel.

5. The head of this, Lt. Col. BATTALBO, will also be Secretary
of the "Commissione".

In their relations with the Allied Control Commission and the
Regions, this Committee will deal with the Patriot Branch of the
PC and MC Section. Officers of this Commission will reciprocally deal
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direct.

MSL

(M.S. LUZZI) Brigadier, Executive
Commissioner.

Distribution:

C (Group 1)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

Ref/64/LI/PAT.

24 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Patriots.

TO : Distribution as Below.

1. I enclose for your general information, copies as listed under distribution, of the following papers which may be of interest to your staff and I shall be particularly grateful if you will arrange that your Patriot Representatives are able to see these papers:

The Patriot Movement in Italy. This paper will be of considerable interest to many. The main object of its production is to enable everyone to realise what the Patriot Movement has achieved so far. It does also explain exactly how patriot units and gaps are organised which is so important when disarming has to be considered.

Speech of 22 August 1944. This will be of interest to those who want to know of the constitutions and scope of the Patriots Branch. The speech was delivered at the Acting Chief Commissioner's meeting in Rome on 22 August 1944.

Current Problems. I am circulating this note so that you may see what we are working on at present. If you have any comments I shall be grateful if you will let me have them.

2. Target Points in German Occupied Territory.

Notes on particular places e.g. power stations, the PO River, and notes on the composition of bands in German occupied territory are being distributed to those concerned. I mention this here so that if anyone should for any particular reason require such information, it may be possible to find it with A.M.G. of Ardes. If you do not find it there please ask this Branch and if it can be obtained it will be sent to you.

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CIM/PRS.

COPIES TO:

Brigadier Inch
Brigadier Munnings
Admin Section
Economic Section
Political Section
P.W.B.
P.R.O.
Information Div
M.M.I.A.
Air Forces S/C
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C.D. & C. H. H.
C.D. MC CARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

6303

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 394

PATRIOT BANDS IN CENTRAL ITALY

(This report concerns only the liberated areas of Regions 4, 5 and 6.)

1. ORIGIN OF THE BANDS.

The Patriot Movement does not represent something completely new in Italian life; it can be considered a new and wider development of the struggle carried out during the last twenty years by several underground organizations against the Fascist regime. The activities of these underground organizations had a direct influence in creating the conditions which made possible the coup-d'etat of July 25, 1943.

After the coup-d'etat, leaders and members of the underground organizations came out into the open. With the re-establishment of the Fascist regime (25 Sept. 1943), it became imperative for anti-fascists in enemy occupied territory, to go into hiding. The same was done by many other people who had not taken part in the anti-fascist activities before July 25th; and who after that date had shown sympathy for the new regime and for the Allied cause.

As a result of the armistice, most of the Italian Army disbanded. Officers and soldiers went home or tried to reach home, hoping that the Allies would soon arrive. When the new Fascist Government was re-established and it became evident that the enemy was going to occupy parts of the country for a certain while, officers and soldiers who did not want to join the new Fascist Army or were afraid of being sent to Germany to work, went into hiding.

Among the hundreds of thousands who went into hiding during the months of September and October 1943, there was a minority willing to engage in anti-fascist and all anti-German activities. In the towns the old anti-fascist organizations absorbed many of the people willing to act against the enemy. New groups were formed mainly by former officers in the Italian Armed Forces. In the rural districts a separation was soon established between members of bands and those who were simply waiting for the arrival of the Allies. Also in the rural districts, members of the former anti-fascist organizations succeeded in establishing some kind of authority over the bands, except for those bands which

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2. DEVELOPMENT OF BANDS.

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Fairly large bands were already in existence at the end of September. They could be found chiefly in the mountainous regions. There were bands in the Maiella and the Gran Sasso. A cluster of bands could be found all along the VIA Salaria from Rieti to ASSOLI and for a depth of about 30 to 40 miles north of this road. Other bands were formed in the Upper Tiber Valley and surrounding districts. Bands could be found in the sparsely inhabited area of MARELLA, from CERVIA to CIVITA VESCOVA. Large concentrations of bands were formed in the mountains north and east of the Arno Valley. Small groups which in some cases developed into large bands existed in the mountains between Lazio and Abruzzi, and in the hilly districts of southern Lazio (Castelli Romani, Monti Lepini). It is possible that the average strength of genuine bands in rural areas of Regions 4, 5 and 6 has varied from 6,000 to 12,000 true patriots.

It soon became customary for the bands in the rural districts to have some kind of military organisation, and they called themselves Battalions or Brigades. Battalions were bands with a strength of around 100 men. Brigades were usually bands or groups of bands with a strength which varied from about 250 men to a maximum of 800 men. Most Brigades had around 350 men.

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In the towns, the leaders of the anti-fascist organizations who had some experience of underground work, organized Gruppi d'Azione Patriottica (G.A.P.), small squads usually containing from five to twelve men. In the city of Rome there were both bands which usually had been organized by officers of the Italian Army and "gangs". It is possible that in the city of Rome there have been as many as 7,000 to 8,000 true patriots.

3. CENTRAL CONTROL.

While bands and gangs were being organized spontaneously in every section of Central Italy, efforts were being made to coordinate their activities and to bring them under some kind of unified control.

Before the coup-d'etat of 25 July 1943 an agreement had been reached between the six main anti-fascist political parties, and in most provincial capitals clandestine committees were formed by representatives of the six parties. After a while all the clandestine committees adopted the name of Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (C.L.N.).

In Central Italy the Rome C.L.N. soon acquired special importance. It established a Giunta Militare, also composed of representatives of the six parties. After the armistice, the Rome Giunta Militare tried to establish contact with the provincial C.L.N.'s in Central Italy and with the bands, but on the whole the real influence of the Rome Giunta Militare on the bands outside the cities' area was negligible. The fact remained however, that most bands considered themselves subordinated to the provincial C.L.N.'s, and through them to the Giunta Militare.

Soon after the armistice, anti-German officers of the Italian Army organized in Rome, the Military Clandestine Front. An offshoot of this organization was the Comando Bande, divided into two sections: Bande Interne and Bande Esterne. The C.B.I. was supposed to control bands inside Rome and to it were connected several military bands formed by loyal officers and men of disbanded units of the Italian Army. The C.B.E. was supposed to contact the Patriot Bands outside Rome. Only at a late stage was the C.B.E. able to establish contact with a certain number of bands in Central Italy, but, as in the case of the G.M., contact did not mean control.

Disident political groups tried to establish their own unified Patriot Command. Their efforts had negligible results.

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A number of bands had been organized spontaneously chiefly in the mountainous areas of Central Italy. Not less than two important central organizations and several smaller ones had been established in Rome, but there was little relationship between the former and the latter.

More successful were local attempts at creating cooperation between different bands. In several instances small bands got together and formed Brigades. In this way came into existence the Spartaco Brigades in Macerata Province and in Siena Province, the Garibaldi Brigades of Foligno, of the Pratomeno, of Fiume Province, of Ancona Province, the Arno Brigade in the Valdarno, the Gramsci Brigade near Spoleto, etc.

Brigades also tried to get together. There was a time for instance when several Brigades in the provinces of Macerata and Perugia were working together. Later on various Brigades in the Marche Region established cooperation and formed a Garibaldi Division. Another Division came into existence in the Arno valley. In the provinces of Siena and Grosseto, officers of the Italian armed forces brought together several bands and formed a Raggruppamento which was in contact with the C.B.E. Other Raggruppamenti were formed in northern Lazio, southern Lazio and in the area east of Lazio.

4. ARMAMENT - FOOD AND CLOTHING - POLITICS.

The majority of the Patriots who went to the hills or the mountains of Central Italy in September and October 1943, had little or no arms. A band of more than 200 patriots on the Gran Sasso had more than 40% casualties when attacked by the Germans because of a deficiency in weapons and ammunition. The situation improved before the end of Autumn 1943, thanks to the attacks made against barracks of the Fascist Militia and the Carabinieri and thanks also to the raids on camps of either the Italian or the German armies. In certain districts arms were supplied by the Allies.

The food situation for the patriots in Central Italy was altogether satisfactory. Germans gave generously. More food was obtained by the patriots by raiding the depots organised either by Italian or German authorities. Even in the city of Rome food was obtainable for the patriots. A large organisation sprang into being for the transport of foodstuffs from the countryside to the city.

A severe winter helped in creating a serious situation as far as clothing was concerned. Shoes also were practically unobtainable.

Politics have been an important element in the life of the patriots in Central Italy. The rank and file can be considered anti-German and anti-Fascist. In each band have usually been present a few patriots with rather determined political views who tried to acquire a following in the bands.

Until the end of April a sharp distinction existed between "badogliani" and "anti-badogliani". The former were supporters of Marshall Badoglio and of the Crown. The latter were in favour of the overthrow of the Monarchy. In this second group the most active elements were the Democrats (Action Party) and the Communists. The solution of the political crisis of April 1944 improved the relations between "badogliani" and "anti-badogliani". On the other hand the cleavage between Democrats and Communists increased.

There is little doubt that the Communists have found a more favourable ground for their propaganda among patriots than either the Monarchists (mostly regular army officers) or the action party Democrats. On the other hand it appears that in most patriot bands the Communists were a minority and that their success in establishing their leadership was mostly due to better organization and greater spirit of initiative.

5. ALLIED SUPPORT.

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5. ALLIED SUPPORT.

It is known that soon after the armistice of September 8, 1943, contacts were established between the Allied Armies in Italy and several bands in Central Italy. The bands received arms, ammunition, and funds. Directives were given to them concerning operations to be carried out.

An important element in the relationships between the bands and the Allied was represented by the propaganda coming from Allied radio stations. The Patriots were encouraged to carry out acts of sabotage against the enemy. Certain broadcasts could be interpreted by the patriots in such a way that they expected their work to be recognized and rewarded when the areas in which they operated were liberated.

It was something of a shock for many patriots to find, on their first contacts with Allied troops or with A.M.G. representatives, that the Allied officers with whom they came in touch knew little or nothing of patriot activities and had little or no idea of what Allied propaganda had said and promised.

/s. ACTIVITIES

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6. ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE ENEMY.

In the appendix are listed a series of examples of what bands and "gangs" did in Central Italy during the period of enemy occupation. It is impossible yet to give a complete record of patriot activities in Central Italy and it will be some time before all facts are collected and verified. It is impossible yet to say how many Germans and Fascists have been killed by the patriots, or how many trucks or railway were destroyed. By summing up what the bands did in various areas, the total is far from negligible.

Patriot activities in Central Italy can be summarised as follows:

- (a) Killing of Fascists and of Germans.
- (b) Sabotage against means of communications.
- (c) Attacks in the outlying districts against small groups of Fascists, of Carabinieri and of Germans.
- (d) Raids on food and petrol dumps.
- (e) Supplying information valuable to the Allied war effort.

A German map shows the areas in which it was not advisable for Germans to travel unless they were in fairly large numbers. It is an indication of the seriousness of the problem created by the patriots to the enemy troops. It appears that the Germans usually believed the patriots to be more numerous, better organized and better armed than they really were.

Considerable hardships were endured by the patriots during the months of enemy occupation. Their losses at times have been fairly high. The number of people shot by the Germans in Rome alone is probably between 1000 and 1500. Everywhere in Central Italy bands suffered losses. One Garibaldi Brigade in Umbria is reported to have had about 60 patriots killed, out of a total strength of less than 500. A group of bands in the Province of Pesinone suffered the loss of 43 patriots killed. A Spartaco Brigade in Siena Province is reported to have suffered 75 casualties out of a strength of less than 600 men. An Army band lost in one engagement 16 killed at Cervinica. In another engagement at Colle Croce a C.L.N. band lost 25 patriots killed while 7 more were killed in minor skirmishes, the enemy suffering 22 casualties. In one day at Montanone the patriots lost 16 killed.

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APPENDIX

Patriot Activities in Central Italy.

There follow now a few examples of what the patriots did in Central Italy. The list is by no means comprehensive but from the few examples given an idea can be gained of the kind of acts the patriots were performing throughout the whole of Central Italy.

R O M E =

12th Sept. '43 - During the curfew hours, in the Prenestina zone isolated Germans were attacked by an Action Party Squad of Tor Sapienza armed with revolvers and 5 Germans were killed. In reprisal the Germans shot 10 Italians.

Sept. '43 - The leader of the "Filippo" band established in Rome a W/T clandestine information service in favour of the Allied Forces. On Sept. 15th 1943 a wireless transmitter was carried from the Contrada la Storta to Rome by Filippo and other helpers on a small cart laden with vegetables in order to elude the strict control of the Nazi-fascists on all road approaches to Rome.

Sept. 20-22nd '43 - Acts of sabotage were carried out by the "Garibaldi" Group at the Garage "Stella d'Italia", via Pompeo Magno which was being used as a repair shop. 30 Jeeps (North-African booty) were rendered unusable by breaking of axles and destroying of parts and tyres.

The electrical and telephone installations were damaged by the Patriots of the group "Garibaldi".

Early Sept. '43 - Two fascists were wounded in a skirmish against fascists at ARPINO. An attack was made against Germans and paratroopers in vicinity of MONTE MARIO. Two Germans and one paratrooper were killed. (Group "Garibaldi").

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Sept. '41 - The leader of the "Filippo" band established in Rome a W/T clandestine information service in favour of the Allied Forces. On Sept. 15th 1941 a wireless transmitter was carried from the Campida la Storta to Rome by FILIPPO and other helpers on a small cart laden with vegetables in order to elude the strict control of the Nazi-fascists on all road approaches to Rome.

Sept. 20-22nd '41 - Acts of sabotage were carried out by the "Garibaldino" Group at the Garage "Stella d'Italia", Via Ponso Magno which was being used as a repair shop. 30 Jeeps (North-African booty) were rendered undrivable by breaking of axles and destroying of parts and tyres.

The electrical and telephone installations were damaged by the Patriots of the group "Garibaldino". also

Early Sept. '42 - Two fascists were wounded in a skirmish against fascists at ANELLO. An attack was made against German and paratroopers in vicinity of MONTE MARIO. Two Germans and one paratrooper were killed. (Group "Garibaldino").

28th Oct. '42 - Squads of the Action Party attacked a militia garrison (Piazza Ungheria) at night and wounded some militia-men. 6300

5th Nov. '41 - At night at Via Regina Elena, a squad of the Action Party, with an explosive grenade, sabotaged a German garage. One person was killed. Three vehicles and a considerable amount of material were damaged.

12th Nov. '41 - A mixed group of Action Party and Communist Party men, at night, detached a wagon from a German train loaded with ammunition and incendiary bombs at the Prenestina Station. Part of the material was destroyed.

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27th Nov. '43 - A squad of the Action Party at the Procestine Station at night attacked a train loaded with ammunition and fuel. Five wagons with their loads were destroyed.

28th Nov. '43 - 8.4. P. of the Communist Party executed at 2030 hours in Via Magella a fascist consul called MUSEO (sic) killing him with revolver shots.

9th Dec. '43 - 8.4. P. of the Communist Party killed a German of the S.S. with revolver shots at Via Regina Elena, at 1750 hours.

19th Dec. '43 - 8.4. P. of the Communist Party attacked Hotel Flora, a German H.Q., with grenades. This occurred at 1805 hours. 14 Nazi-fascists were killed and 2 trucks were damaged.

16th Jan. '44 - 8.4. P. of the Communist Party sabotaged a German garage with a bomb at Via San Nicolò da Tolentino at 1750 hours. 5 German trucks were damaged.

January '44 - Sabotage squads were formed by the "Zilippo" band. They scattered thousands of nails on the Cassia and Emilia highways.

23rd Jan. '44 - 8.4. P. of the Communist Party attacked, with a bomb, German troops at the Railway Station in Piazza del Vin- quicento at 1800 hours. 4 Germans were killed and 15 wounded.

23rd March '44 - 8.4. P. of the Communist Party attacked a Ger- man Company with hand grenades at Via Rucella at 1500 hours. 32 Nazis were killed and 71 wounded.

June '44 - Members of the Pilsippo band, in a Company of 20 strong, occupied FORTE MONTE MAFIO, at the time of the Allied entry into Rome. They captured 25 German soldiers, a tank and various arms and ammunition. Another band occupied the Mili- tary Hospital Baldi and saved all medical equipment, uniforms and provisions left behind by the Germans.

Sept. '43 - June '44 - From the very first days of Nazi occupa- tion of Italy, the Action Party was very active in the produc-

January '44 - Saboteurs squads were formed by the "Filippo" band. They scattered thousands of nails on the Cassino and Salaria highways.

23rd Jan. '44 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party attacked, with a bomb, German troops at the Railway Station in Piazza del Cinquecento at 1800 hours. 4 Germans were killed and 19 wounded.

23rd March '44 - G.A.P. of the Communist Party attacked a German Company with hand grenades at Via Rasella at 1500 hours. 32 Nazis were killed and 71 wounded.

June '44 - Members of the Filippo band, in a Company of 80 strong, occupied PIAZZA MONTE MARIO, at the time of the Allied entry into Rome. They captured 25 German soldiers, a tank and various arms and ammunition. Another band occupied the Military Hospital Baldi and saved all medical equipment, uniforms and provisions left behind by the Germans.

Sept. '43 - June '44 - From the very first days of Nazi occupation of Italy, the Action Party was very active in the production of false identity documents and their distribution to Patriots in the whole of Italy. False documents in circulation included the following:

1. Papers stating unfitness for military service;
2. Papers stating membership of the Fascist Republican Forces;
3. Papers stating absence from labour service of the Istituto Nazionale Repubblicano;
4. Ausweises of the Todt organization;
5. By falsifying the orders of the German High Command and Embassy the Action Party was able to sequester vehicles and food supplies which, with false permits, were sent through German control points to Patriots in the hills.

C O N F I D E N T I A L - 3 -

12A Z I O (not including Rome).

On September 18, 1943 the Sardinian band (Italian Army) engaged the enemy near Capronica, inflicting about 50 casualties. Eighteen Patriots were killed.

In October 1943, Patriots of the bands near TURRITA TIBERINA made two successful attacks against trains carrying ammunition and petrol. Three attacks were made against the railway bridge on the GALLARINA river.

5th. Dec. '43 - A C.L.N. band using a machine gun, and sabotaging the road with a mine and nails killed 2 German officers, wounded another and destroyed a vehicle on the Via Appia.

20 Dec. '43 - Two actions were engaged in on the principal railway lines of Rome-Cassino and Rome-Terme by a C.L.N. band. Two trains were blown up - one carrying troops and one loaded with war material and fuel. On the Rome-Terme line there were 400 dead and many wounded. On the Rome-Cassino line the goods vans loaded with war material and fuel were completely destroyed together with 2 engines. The German personnel on the train were all killed.

At the end of January, the Patriot band at TURRITA TIBERINA, in order to help the Allied landing at Anzio, mined several roads near the Tiber river.

Also at the end of January, the bands of GENZANO attacked small units in the German rear in an effort to help the killed troops at Anzio. They met with strong resistance and suffered severe casualties.

In March '44 a Fascist who had denounced an escaped Allied P.O.W. was killed at Monte Celio by members of the Partisan Brigade. Members of the same Brigade sabotaged effectively German telephone lines at SETTECAMINI, MONTE CELIO, GALLARINA, ROYAL INCAND, MONTE LIPARTI.

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Several bands in GICCIARIA (Prov. of FROSINONE) were active in cutting wires and putting nails on roads during the period October 1943 - May 1944. In the period of the enemy withdrawal, they engaged effectively small German units, which lost 43 killed and 179 prisoners. The bands lost ten Patriots killed.

19th May '44 - At Rustica Vecchia a band connected with the C.B.E. threw hand grenades at a truck. 6 Germans were killed and truck immobilized.

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G.A.P. of ZUMMO in Sept. '43 obtained by force from the Fascists 25 rifles, 3 Breda machine guns, 2 cases of hand grenades and 13 cases of ammunition.

Oct. '43 - The C.I.N. group of MONTE NERO - CINGOLI fought a Nazi-fascist force. They killed 1 German, captured 3 and also a vehicle.

Nov. - Dec. '43 - The Niccolò di Monastero Group had a clash with Nazi-Fascists at S. GINESIO. Eight of the enemy were killed. The Patriots lost one killed.

March '44 - The a/m group began a cleaning up operation against the Nazi-fascists. In heavy fighting the enemy lost several killed and wounded. The Patriots had 2 killed and several wounded.

Nazi-fascist reaction to the activities of the C.I.N. bands in the province of ASCOLI during the early months of '44 was very strong. They employed strong forces against the Patriots and on the 18th March '44 16 Patriots were killed at MONTOMO-MACO in severe fighting.

In April '44 a C.I.N. band captured and shot near MONTEPOTRANO a German Captain of the Intelligence Service who had worked his way into the band as well as four other spies captured in the RIVITOLLO-MONTEMACO area.

May '44 - The AVENALE di CINGOLI group attacked a Fascist H.Q. at SARNANO. The town was finally captured by the Patriots. The Patriots had 2 men killed.

On May 18, 1944, a force of about 300 Italian S.S. attacked the Patriots in the area of MONASTERO. The enemy was reported to have left behind nearly 40 dead and wounded.

In June '44 C.I.N. bands attacked the enemy in retreat. There was fighting along the ASCOLI-MANFOLLA-MACERATA road - in the areas of MONTE SABBIO - ARSIZATA - ACQUASANTA - CASTIGNANO - ORTIDA. These attacks delayed the enemy's movements and allowed the Patriots to retrieve a large quantity of cattle.

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May '44 - The AVENALE di GUGLI group attacked a Fascist R.Q. at SARMANO. The town was finally captured by the Patriots. The Patriots had 2 men killed.

On May 18, 1944, a force of about 100 Italian S.S. attacked the Patriots in the area of MONASTERS. The enemy was reported to have left behind nearly 40 dead and wounded.

In June '44 C.I.N. bands attacked the enemy in retreat. There was fighting along the ASCOLI-MANICOLA-MACERATA road - in the areas at MONTE CALLO - ARQUATA - ACQUASANTA - CASTIGNANO - OFELDA. These attacks delayed the enemy's movements and allowed the patriots to retrieve a large quantity of cattle. In the hills the Germans were prevented from looting and requisitioning.

On June 11th '44 a G.A.P. attacked a group of Republican Guards who had halted in the middle of the square at FEMO. They killed one officer and wounded 3 others. The G.A.P. had 4 men wounded.

U M B R I A - S A B I N A -

In October 1943, the Giuseppe Garibaldi Brigade located near Foligno attacked enemy transport. Fifteen Germans and fascists were reported killed.

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In order to obtain arms, ammunition and food, the Garibaldi, Gramsci and Spartaco Lavagnini Brigades attacked barracks of the Fascist Militia and of the Carabinieri at Camerino, at Nocera Umbra (when two Carabinieri were killed), at Campello (where two agents of the Fascist Police were killed), at Matigge di Trevi.

Two Fascists were killed by members of the Spartaco Brigade on January 24.

In November 1943, members of the Spartaco Brigade took 800 quintals of wheat and distributed it to the population. In March, members of the Garibaldi Brigade took 200 quintals of wheat from the Germans.

Severe mopping-up operations were undertaken by the Germans at the end of November 1943 and in March 1944. In the course of an engagement at Collo Greco, 25 Patriots were killed, the enemy suffering eight casualties. In the course of another engagement at Bettonia six more Patriots were killed by the Germans.

A C.I.N. band at Monterotondo in Sabina, regularly, twice a week, from November 1943 to March 1944, put nails on the roads Salaria, Nomentana and Tiberina.

The same C.I.N. band at Monterotondo attacked enemy transport on Dec. 8th (when six Germans were killed), on Dec. 18th (when five Germans were killed), on Jan. 15th 1944 (when seven Germans were killed). When the enemy was withdrawing (June 1944), the band attacked two enemy armoured cars which were captured. The Patriots lost 10 killed and 16 wounded.

A B R U Z Z I

25th Sept. '43 - The band of Bosco Martese attacked a German mopping-up party consisting of 26 troop carrying vehicles

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at the end of November 1943 and in March 1944. In the course of an engagement at Colle Croce, 25 Patriots were killed, the enemy suffering eight casualties. In the course of another engagement at Bettolin six more Patriots were killed by the Germans.

A C.I.N. band at Monterotondo in Sabina, regularly, twice a week, from November 1943 to March 1944 put nails on the roads Salaria, Simentana and Tiburtina.

The same C.I.N. band at Monterotondo attacked enemy transport on Dec. 8th (when six Germans were killed), on Dec. 18th (when five Germans were killed), on Jan. 15th 1944 (when seven Germans were killed). When the enemy was withdrawing (June 1944), the band attacked two enemy armoured cars which were captured. The Patriots lost 10 killed and 16 wounded.

A B R U I S I

25th Sept. '43 - The band of Basso Martens attacked a German cleaning-up party consisting of 26 troop carrying vehicles loaded with troops and two 82mm artillery pieces. The Germans were forced to withdraw leaving 57 killed or wounded behind. A Fiat 1100, 2 trucks loaded with mines and several cases of hand grenades were also captured.

January 1st, 1944 - Members of the band located in Pescina destroyed or damaged with hand grenades 12 enemy vehicles near Torva Caruso. 6298

February 7th. - Members of the band located in Pescina killed an enemy D/R at Km. 140 on Via Tiburtina.

11th March '44 - 400 Germans attacked the patriots at UNIFO and in the surrounding hills. The battle lasted 3 hours. The patriots were obliged to retreat. 36 patriots were killed but the Germans had 23 casualties.

A small band in the Colliery area carried out cutting of telephone wires and sabotaging of patrol dumps during the winter and the spring.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 6 -

The Marzio Band in eight months of partisan struggle lost 15 dead and 12 wounded. They have to their credit: - 45 Germans and Fascists killed and wounded, 41 trucks destroyed or damaged, 40 railway wagons sabotaged, 3 armoured cars rendered unserviceable, 15 cases of ammunition and 79 weapons of various kinds captured.

U S C A N Y (Area liberated at 15th August).

During January and February 1944, members of the C.L.N. Brigade Spartaco Lavagnini engaged the enemy at MUR=LO and MONTE CUCIO. The Patriots had severe losses but they are reported to have killed or wounded 30 Fascists. The Roccheggiano mines were damaged in March.

During the winter and spring, G.A.P. of CHIUSI tried to halt trains at that important railway centre.

A Fascist leader was killed at ORTIGNANO on March 8th by members of a Garibaldi Battalion. A few days later the same battalion attacked the Carabinieri of Talla and obtained a considerable quantity of hand grenades. Another group of Carabinieri was attacked at CHIUSI DELLA VERDE. Another Fascist was killed at BERNINA. Four Germans were killed on March 23rd and six more on April 2nd. The same Battalion is reported to have engaged actively the enemy during their withdrawal (Part of the area where the Battalion operated had not been liberated by August 15th).

During night of April 15th, Patriots from SINIGU=GA cut enemy telephone wires. On May 25th other Patriots attacked an enemy vehicle and killed two Germans.

The Distaccamento Sign (G.B.E.) reports that in May they were able to halt, for several hours, 40 enemy vehicles near Cascina d'Orsola. A Fascist was shot by them at

During the winter and spring, G.A.P. of CHIUSI tried to halt trains at that important railway centre.

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During night of April 19th, Patriots from SINIGLIA cut enemy telephone wires. On May 25th other Patriots attacked an enemy vehicle and killed two Germans.

The Distaccamento Nino (G.A.P.) reports that in May they were able to halt, for several hours, 40 enemy vehicles near San Quirico d'Orcia. A Fascist was shot by them at Montalcino on June 3rd.

At end of June, 1954, Patriots demolished two road bridges near Castiglione.

The C.L.N. Brigade Spartaco Lavagnini, operating in Siena Province, reports to have had the following losses in engagements with the enemy: 42 Patriots killed, 33 wounded. The same Brigade also reports that on June 3rd it inflicted 42 casualties on the enemy and 43 casualties on June 9th.

The 3rd Garibaldi Brigade is reported to have collaborated wholeheartedly with the Allies. Patriots were sent through the lines to carry useful information on military activities of the enemy and location of mined areas. Losses of this formation were considerable, the total in dead, wounded and prisoners amounting to well over 150 men.

=====

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.V. Section
Patriots Branch
APO 394

Ref/16/14/PAT.

22 August 1944.

Speech made by Colonel C.D. MC CARTHY Patriots Branch

at Regional Commissioner's Conference 22 Aug. 1944.

1. Patriot bands many of which are large and highly organized bodies have been created in various centres of German occupied territory in Italy and have received considerable encouragement and active help and instructions from the Allied Command. It is therefore clearly one of our chief tasks to look after the individual members of these bands when their fighting is over and in this connection it has been laid down by A.A.I. that bands must not accompany the armies forward out of their own areas.

The Patriots Branch of A.E.C. was formed early in July as a result of an instruction from A.A.I. and is responsible for all dealings with Resistance Groups as soon as the territory in which they have been operating is liberated by our troops.

2. In all dealings care is taken to distinguish between bogus Patriots and genuine patriots who are defined as being those in the ranks of genuine fighting bands who have carried arms, engaged in sabotage or secured important military information to the benefit of the Allied War effort. It must be remembered that these genuine patriots have in very many cases lived extremely precarious lives, suffered considerable casualties and been a very great nuisance to the enemy. Let us not forget that they have been living under the black cloud of torture and death not only for themselves but also for their families. I will read you the text of a German Order signed for the Commander in Chief of the German Armed Forces and found in the SUDETEN area in mid-July:

ONE. Whoever is found in possession of arms or explosives and does not report them to the nearest German Headquarters WILL BE SHOT.

received considerable encouragement and active help and instructions from the Allied Command. It is therefore clearly one of our chief tasks to look after the individual members of these bands when their fighting is over and in this connection it has been laid down by A.A.I. that bands must not accompany the armies forward out of their own areas.

The Patriots Branch of A.B.C. was formed early in July as a result of an instruction from A.A.I. and is responsible for all dealings with Resistance Groups as soon as the territory in which they have been operating is liberated by our troops.

2. In all dealings care is taken to distinguish between bogus Patriots and genuine patriots who are defined as being those in the ranks of genuine fighting bands who have carried arms, engaged in sabotage or secured important military information to the benefit of the Allied War effort. It must be remembered that these genuine patriots have in very many cases lived extremely precarious lives, suffered considerable casualties and borne a very great hardship to the enemy. Let us not forget that they have been living under the black cloud of torture and death not only for themselves but also for their families. I will read you the text of a German Order signed for the Commander in Chief of the German Armed Forces and found in the SUZHANG area in mid-July:

ONE. Whoever is found in possession of arms or explosives and does not report them to the nearest German Headquarters WILL BE SHOT.

TWO. Whoever gives shelter to bandits, protects them or gives them clothing, food or arms..... WILL BE SHOT.

THREE. If it is found that anyone knows a group of rebels or even a single rebel without having reported them to the nearest Headquarters, he..... WILL BE SHOT.

FOUR. Whoever gives information to the enemy or to the bandits on the location of German Headquarters or Military Camps...WILL BE SHOT.

FIVE. Any village where it can be proved that there are bandits or where attacks against German or Italian soldiers have been made, or where acts of sabotage intended to damage or destroy warlike stores, have taken place.... WILL BE BURNED TO THE GROUND. However, the male inhabitants of the village over 18 years old... WILL BE SHOT. Women and girls will be interned in labour camps.

There is no doubt that many patriots have acted with extreme bravery and courage and a note of their activities has been prepared and is available to those who would like to read it.

/3. Mary

6297

3. Many questions have been asked of the political tendencies of patriot bands. After meeting to a large number of patriots in various corners of the country I personally feel that in the great majority of cases these men have been fighting first to defeat the Germans, second to destroy Fascism and third in the case of some of them, to build up a new Italy. Most of them have at this stage of the war very little idea of the aims and ambitions of the six political parties in Italy but they are keenly alive to the fact that something drastic must be done about politics in the very near future and being mostly young and active men they are keenly susceptible to influence and require a lead from the Italian Government. Some of them will undoubtedly be of importance in the new Italy and they are a great responsibility for us all.

4. Plans have been drawn up for dealing with patriots. A message in poster form signed by General Alexander has been distributed in forward areas, a form of certificate of merit has been approved and certificates have been sent to Regions and to the 5 and 8 Armies for distribution. Although many patriots are used for a short while by the Army in their own area as guides and patrols and for reconnaissance work, the intention generally is to direct nearly all of them into civil life. About 50% return to their own homes and occupation locally. Of the remainder some will be used for police duties or as drivers, others will be employed on engineering work, and on mine clearance; and arrangements have been made for recruiting and passing back volunteers for service in the Italian Army and Air Force. General committees are being set up to assist Provincial Commissioners in this work, and to help weed out bogus applicants among the genuine patriots. The problems of collecting and disposing of the patriots' arms is in hand. The arms will be used for future operations as directed by A.A.I.

5. Reports are being received from Patriot representatives and from the leaders of the Patriot bands. Information from these reports is extracted and passed on when relevant, for use by P.R.O., P.W.B. and by the press. Italian newspapers are closely scrutinized. Information is being collected about conditions in enemy occupied territory in order that suitable plans can be made for handling patriot problems in that territory when it has been liberated.

6. Liaison is maintained with the Italian Ministry of War through an Italian senior officer who is responsible for coordinating the work of the two groups which are recognized - the C.I.M. Group and the Military Centre Group.

as drivers, others will be employed on engineering work, and on mine clearance; and arrangements have been made for recruiting and passing back volunteers for service in the Italian Army and Air Force. Criminal commissions are being set up to assist Provincial Commissioners in this work, and to help weed out bogus applicants among the genuine patriots. The problems of collecting and disposing of the patriots' arms is in hand. The arms will be used for future operations as directed by A.A.I.

5. Reports are being received from Patriot Representatives and from the leaders of the Patriot bands. Information from these reports is extracted and passed on when relevant, for use by P.R.G., P.W.B. and by the press. Italian newspapers are closely scrutinized. Information is being collected about conditions in enemy occupied territory in order that suitable plans can be made for handling patriot problems in that territory when it has been liberated.

6. Liaison is maintained with the Italian Ministry of War through an Italian senior officer who is responsible for coordinating the work of the two groups which are recognized - the G.I.N. Group and the Military Centre Group.

7. Directives have been issued as required in agreement with A.A.I. and other authorities. It is fair to say that the task of ensuring that these directives are acted upon by Allied officers concerned and by the leaders of the patriot bands is well in hand. The broad political aspect of the patriot problem has been borne constantly in mind, and very close liaison is being maintained with those Allied officers who are concerned with the political future in Italy.

8. The patriot question is very much in the news at present and I am bombarded with questions about what we are likely to find on the other side of the line. We have a fairly good idea and I am endeavouring to furnish this information when it is essential to do so. At the same time I am endeavouring to see that those on the other side of the line are properly informed about what is going on this side of the line. I would like in conclusion to take this opportunity to thank the press, F.R.O. and P.W.P. for the active cooperation given in recent weeks and for the manner in which publicity has been treated. The power of the press is tremendous in this present era of the patriot movement; and we must remember that the Germans are spreading propaganda against us as energetically as they can so that it is necessary for us to encourage our patriots as much as we can. I am trying to help in this firstly by ensuring that the proper arrangements are made for their welcome on this side of the line and secondly by taking care that they should be informed immediately what that welcome will be.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH
APO 334

CURRENT PROBLEMS

(A) PROBLEMS FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

1. Institution of a Patriot Commission for Italy.
2. Patriot Committee for Rome.
3. Nomination of truly representative Patriot Representatives.
4. Keeping a check on names and performances of genuine Patriots and seeing that they have employment.
5. Providing Patriot Branch with information.
6. Collect money for Patriot needs, such as pay and salary for Patriot Representatives, compensations for Patriots and provision of food, clothing and cigarettes to fighting Patriots pending their employment.
7. Provide transport and drivers for Patriot Representatives.

(B) PROBLEMS FOR A.M.G. OF ARMIES.

The whole brunt of the patriot problem falls on the Armies. The following will be helpful for handling patriot problems behind the Army areas.

1. Collection of stories for propaganda purposes and we should like to send Press Representatives up to witness the distribution of certificates.
2. Collecting and forwarding of reports from Patriot Representatives and Band Leaders.
3. A short summarised weekly report of patriot activities.

6. Collect money for Patriot needs, such as pay and salary for Patriot Representatives, compensations for Patriots and provision of food, clothing and cigarettes to fighting Patriots pending their employment.

7. Provide transport and drivers for Patriot Representatives.

(B) PROBLEMS FOR A.M.C. OF ARMIES.

The whole brunt of the patriot problem falls on the Armies. The following will be helpful for handling patriot problems behind the Army areas.

1. Collection of stories for propaganda purposes and we should like to send Frosa Representatives up to witness the distribution of certificates.
2. Collecting and forwarding of reports from Patriot Representatives and Band Leaders.
3. A short summarised weekly report of patriot activities.

(C) PROBLEMS FOR REGIONS (in addition to some or all the A.M.C. problems).

These are connected with the final winding up of the patriots in each Region.

6296

1. Training of an Allied officer, whole or part time, to look after patriot problems in each Region.
2. Formation of an Italian Patriot Committee and prodding of it to see that it functions.

(D) PROBLEMS FOR INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF PATRIOTS BRANCH.

1. Information to AMC of Armies and Regions concerning composition of forward bands etc.
2. Information regarding Po flooding, sea flooding and pump station preservation.
3. Information regarding Profects and prominent men in present occupied area.

/s/ Statement

4. Statement on damage to be avoided - this may need a special committee of Italians.
5. Collect reports weekly from Patriot Representatives and Band leaders (through Armies and Regions) and examine and pass to Italian Government for their need.

(E) PROBLEMS FOR PROPAGANDA SECTION OF PATRIOTS BRANCH.

1. Collect news from all Regions all sources. Collect good stories and statistical data.
2. Produce anti-Boche and anti-Fascist propaganda.
3. Give news to patriots of what is happening through P.R.O., P.W.B., B.R.C. broadcasts to civilians, leaflets and press.

(F) PROBLEMS FOR H.Q. SECTION OF PATRIOTS BRANCH.

1. Look after problem of returning volunteers.
2. Investigate question of providing patriots with food, cigarettes, clothes and boots.
3. Keep up to date lists of Italian officers for special jobs.

22 August 1944.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 7506

N/00 327.5

24 August 1944

27 AUG 1944

SUBJECT: Organisation of Patriots.

TO : His Excellency, President of the Council of Ministers.

1. The memorandum on this subject from the Minister of War has been carefully considered. It is felt that a meeting should be held as soon as possible to discuss the following matters.

2. WORKING COMMISSION

Some form of commission should be set up immediately by the Italian Government to handle, with guidance from the Patriots Branch A.C.C., the problem of (a) appointing Patriot Representatives and providing them with transport, (b) the preparation of records of Patriot activities (c) the payment of compensation and rewards, and, (d) the regular supply of information to the Patriots Branch.

3. CONSTITUTION OF THE WORKING COMMISSION

It is considered that this might be formed under the Ministry of the Interior or the Presidency of the Cabinet and that it should contain some officials co-opted from the Ministries of War and Finance.

4. CONTROL OF PATRIOT ACTIVITIES

For all questions affecting Patriots North of the DEAR ARMY boundaries the working commission must clearly understand that it cannot have any authority whatsoever. All authority and contacts will be under the absolute control of General Alexander's H.Q. Any recommendations the committee may wish to make (e.g. ref Propaganda) should be addressed to the Patriots Branch A.C.C. For problems South of the Dear Army boundaries the active cooperation of the working commission will be welcomed, it being understood that nothing can be done without the full approval of A.C.C. Patriots Branch. Suggestions for activities in addition to those mentioned above can be discussed when the meeting takes place. It is suggested any time on Friday 25 August would be a suitable date if the Italian Government will be ready with its proposals by then.

6295

HARRY S. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

c.c. Minister of War.
Political Section.
✓ Admin. Section.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & N.G. Section
APO 394

Ref/30/9/PAT.

26 July 1944.

SUBJECT: Re-employment of Patriots.

TO : Distribution Below.

1. Further to para. 4 of this office directive under reference 30/5/PAT dated 24 July 1944.
2. The problem of feeding civilians is now detailed in HQ. AAI. Administrative Instruction No. 39 dated 5 July 1944 which cancels previous instructions.
3. One copy of AAI. Instruction No. 39 is attached for each of the first seven addressees on the distribution list below.

DCM/PSS.

DISTRIBUTION:
SCAC, AMG 5 ARMY.
SCAC, AMG 8 ARMY.
R.C. Region IV.
R.C. Region V.
R.C. Region VII.
R.C. Region IX.
R.C. Rome Region.
Secretary General.
Admin Section.
Economic Section.

C.D. Mc CARTHY.
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.C. & N.G. Section.

(25)
(43)
(42)
(52)
(43)
(20)
(10)
(1)
(5)
(2)

3. One copy of AAF. Instruction No. 39 is attached for each of the first seven addressees on the distribution list below.

DOL/TES.

DISTRIBUTION:

SMAC, Area 5 Army.
SCMG, Area 6 Army.
R.C. Region IV.
R.C. Region V.
R.C. Region VII.
R.C. Region IX.
R.C. Rome Region.
Secretary General.
Admin Section.
Economic Section.
Political Section.
Army Sub-Commission.
Navy Sub-Commission.
Air Force Sub-Commission.
Civil Affairs Branch.
Displaced Persons Sub-Comm.
Italian Refugees Branch.
Public Relations Branch.
DWP (Attn: Mr. Rayner).
Public Safety Sub-Commission.
Labour Sub-Commission.
No. 1 Special Force.
O.S.S.
Adv. AAI (HIS(ONS)).
Main AAI (H(3)).
Main AAI (COMO).
Main AAI (DPMG).
Main AAI (DAG).

W.C. Carter

C.D. Mc CARTER.
Colonel,
Patriotic Branch,
R.C. & H.G. Section.

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6293

W.C.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

SECRET

22.18.1944

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref/30/8/PAT.

24 July 1944.

SUBJECT: Re-employment of Patriots.

TO : Distribution Overleaf.

1. This directive is issued after agreement with H.Q., A.A.I. and is for the guidance of A.M.G. officers in connection with appendix "A" of the General Instruction for the Administration of Patriots in Military Government Territory reference 30/1/PAT dated 12 July 1944.

2. It should be used as a basis for discussion with Area Commanders, Town Majors, Engineer or other Military units and Labour Officers who, other things being equal, should be asked to give priority for employment to genuine Patriots with certificates. C.A.O's. should be instructed to get in touch with the nearest Labour Officers (D.A.B.M. or S.I.G.S.) as soon as possible and give them the names of suitable Patriots who can be used as civilian workers.

3. Some Patriots may be taken for special operations, some will be disposed of locally, some will move to or have to be transported to a distance for re-employment and some foreigners e.g. Russians will be despatched through the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission. There will, however, remain a hard core of say 30% over whom a good deal of trouble may have to be taken and the following suggestions for their re-employment are approved in principle by A.A.I. and the other authorities concerned.

(a) Some of them may be enlisted in the Regular Italian Army by the special Italian Officers being sent up by A.A.I.A. Full details of the new scheme are given in Army Sub-Commission letter 6/19 dated 23 July 1944 - copy attached.

(b) The reengagement of Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza as such should not be made, on account of administrative difficulties arising from the establishment of the strength ceiling for these agencies. Where possible they should be employed as special police, pending their return to Reception Centres established at Grosseto and Chieti.

62943

Engineer or other Military units and Labour Officers who, other things being equal, should be asked to give priority for employment to genuine Patriots with certification. C.A.O's, should be instructed to get in touch with the nearest Labour Officers (D.A.I.I. or S.L.C.O.) as soon as possible and give them the names of suitable Patriots who can be used as civilian workers.

3. Some Patriots may be taken for special operations, some will be disposed of locally, some will move to or have to be transported to a distance for re-employment and some foreigners e.g. Yugoslavs will be despatched through the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission. There will, however, remain a hard core of say 30% over whom a good deal of trouble may have to be taken and the following suggestions for their re-employment are approved in principle by A.A.I. and the other authorities concerned.

(a) Some of them may be enlisted in the Regular Italian Army by the special Italian Officers being sent up by M.H.I.A. Full details of the new scheme are given in Army Sub-Commission letter 6/19 dated 27 July 1944 - copy attached.

(b) The reengagement of Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza as such should not be made, on account of administrative difficulties arising from the establishment of the strength ceiling for these agencies. Where feasible they should be employed as special police, pending their return to Reception Centres established at Grosseto and Chieti.

(c) Employment by Engineer or other military units for urgent work on bridging, road repairing, dock clearance and military repair work as soon as an area has been liberated.

(d) Employment by AMG/ACC for duties similar to (c) as and when required.

(e) Employment by AMG/ACC for special police and motor car drivers.

(f) Employment by Area Commanders and Town Majors as watermen.

(g) Where it is clear to a C.A.O. that he will have an impossible task in absorbing locally his hard core of Patriots, he should be instructed to pass particulars quickly to his Provincial Commissioner who should arrange for work within the Province.

(h) The problem of training and providing de-mining squads in back areas is being considered.

4. The problem of paying and feeding Patriots who are employed in some of the manners suggested above should be studied. Full instructions for feeding

6290

civilians employed on military duties are given in "Instructions Regarding the Employment of Civilian Labor (Italy and Sicily)". For issue of U.S. instructions to civilians see WACOWEA circular No. 14 dated 4 February 1944.

WOMAN B. FISH.

colony.

Norman & Davis
Columbus

777 Bridgman,
Executive Compensation.

USL/FPS.

DISCUSSION

SCAO, AUG 5 Army.
SCAO, AUG 9 Army.
R.C., Region IV.
R.C., Region V.
R.C., Region VIII.
R.C., Region IX.
R.C., Rome Region.
Secretary General.
Admin Section.
Economic Section.
Political Section.
Army Sub-Commission.
Navy Sub-Commission.
Air Force Sub-Commission.
Civil Affairs Branch.
Displaced Persons Sub-Comm.
Italian Refugee Branch.
Public Relations Branch.
PWE (Attn: Mr. Payner).
Public Safety Sub-Comm.
Labour Sub-Commission.
No. 1 Special Force.
O.S.S.
Adv. A.A.I. (BOS(ops)).
Main A.A.I. (G(GB)).
Main AAI (D.C.A.O.).
Main AAI (D.O.M.G.).
Main AAI (D.N.G.).

$$\text{H}_2\text{N}-\text{CH}_2-\text{CH}_2-\text{NH}_2 + \text{HOOC}-\text{CH}_2-\text{CH}_2-\text{COOH} \rightarrow \text{H}_2\text{N}-\text{CH}_2-\text{CH}_2-\text{NH}-\text{CO}-\text{CH}_2-\text{CH}_2-\text{CO}-\text{NH}-\text{CH}_2-\text{CH}_2-\text{NH}_2 + 2\text{H}_2\text{O}$$

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

15.	Region VII.	43
16.	R.C., Region VIII.	20
17.	R.C., Region IX.	10
18.	R.C., Home Region.	5
19.	Secretary General.	2
20.	Admin Section.	1
21.	Economic Section.	3
22.	Political Section.	1
23.	Army Sub-Commission.	5
24.	Navy Sub-Commission.	1
25.	Air Force Sub-Commission.	1
26.	Civil Affairs Branch.	1
27.	Displaced Persons Sub-Comm.	1
28.	Italian Refugee Branch.	1
29.	Public Relations Branch.	1
30.	PWH (Attn: Mr. Rayner).	1
31.	Public Safety Sub-Comm.	1
32.	Labour Sub-Commission.	2
33.	No. 1 Special Force.	2
34.	O.S.S.	2
35.	Adv. A.A.I. (PGS(ops)).	2
36.	Main A.A.I. (G(S)).	2
37.	Main AAI (P.C.A.G.).	2
38.	Main AAI (D.Q.V.G.).	10
39.	Main AAI (S.A.G.).	2

20 FY

SUBJECT: Italian Military Personnel from Enemy Occupied ITALY.

Army Sub-Commission, A.C.C.
Main H.Q. MILA
H.Q.

27 JUL 1944

6/19
23 JUL 44.

Ministry of War

Copy to: HQ AME
CIGS

Army Sub-Comm LO Naples
" " " 5 Army
" " " 5 Army
A.C.C. Patriots Section.
Army Sub-Comm. ACC.
Air Force Sub-Comm. ACC.

HQ ACC
Army Sub-Comm LO.
1 District.
2 District.
3 District.
5 Corps HQ.

1. Certain arrangements have been made, in agreement with the Patriots Branch at ACC, with a view to enlisting into the Italian Army at the earliest possible moment, Patriots encountered in newly-liberated areas who volunteer for such enlistment.

2. These arrangements which are in effect an extension of the provision of MILA letter, 6/13 of 3 June (and are to be read as such) are as follows: -

- (a) The Ministry of War will at once send a Recruiting Agency (not exceeding 4 officers and 6 men) to join the local officer handling with the re-settlement of Patriots (at HQ of each 5th Army, 8th Army and Polish Corps).
- (b) The Recruiting Agencies will interview volunteers as required by the local officer. They will decide whether these can be accepted within the number that the Ministry of War considers can be absorbed from time to time without detriment to the cohesion and efficiency of the existing Army.
- (c) Those accepted will be given a pass authorizing them to be passed back (through refugee channels) to the nearest Italian enlistment centre for immediate enlistment.
- (d) The Agencies will travel and operate as required by the local officer concerned inside the Army areas concerned and within the terms given them by the Ministry of War.

2. Those arrangements which are in effect an extension of the provision of M.L. letter, 2/19 of 2 June (and are to be read as such) are as follows: -

- (a) The Ministry of War will at once send a recruiting agency (not exceeding 4 officers and 6 men) to join the 1st Airborne Division with the re-estimation of Paratroops at HQ of each 5th Army, 8th Army and Polish Corps.
- (b) The Recruiting agencies will interview volunteers as required by the 1st Airborne. They will decide whether these can be accepted within the number that the Ministry of War consider can be absorbed from time to time without detriment to the cohesion and efficiency of the existing Army.
- (c) Those accepted will be given a pass authorizing them to be re-estimated (through various channels) to the nearest Italian enlistment centre for immediate enlistment.
- (d) The agencies will travel and operate as required by the 1st Airborne concerned within the Army areas concerned and within the terms given them by the Ministry of War.
- (e) These agencies will have contact in accordance with the advance of the Italian operations.
- (f) In order to deal with Paratroops who are still waiting in areas behind Army rear boundaries, the Ministry of War will detail and hold in readiness at HQs those similar agencies which will be available to visit units and areas as required by the Ministry of War. These agencies will be dispersed as soon as the area has been "cleared" or the normal civilian agency is established by proclamation.

3. Categories of military age, including Paratroops and volunteers who have not been accepted for immediate enlistment, will remain as civilians until called upon to register (or re-register) for service in the ordinary way.

(and) L. 1300/1940.
Major General.
Army Sub-Comm. A.C.C.

6292

REDACTED
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394.

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 50/1/PAT.

18th July 1944.

SUBJECT: General Instructions on the Administration of Patriots in Military Government Territory.

TO : Distribution Below.

1. The handling of patriots is a difficult problem which will increase in complexity as the advance continues and the patriots increase in numbers and achieve more successes. Their rehabilitation in liberated territory is an added burden to GAC's in Areas and Provincial Staffs, but it is a duty which must be carried out with firmness and sympathy and with the knowledge that success or failure in this matter may have wide repercussions in this and other territories.

2. Patriots, although mostly Italians, may be of any nationality, and are defined as being those in the ranks of German fighting bands who have carried arms, engaged in sabotage or secured important military information to the benefit of the Allied war effort.

3. The following directions contain the main principles of the agreed policy with regard to patriots and all the procedure to put that policy into effect. Instructions for dealing with all those who have helped Allied Prisoners of War are being issued separately.

4. On liberation of territory patriots must revert from their quasi-military status and become good citizens. To this end a message is being sent by General Alexander has been prepared and will be widely published.

5. Patriots come under theegis of AEC officers whose duty it is to see that the metamorphosis from military to civilian status takes place with the minimum of disillusionment. To this end representatives of patriot organisations have been sent to Army AEC's and Italian committees with strong patriot representation will be set up in the local governments of liberated territory. It is extremely important that while order is to be maintained and time have to be remembered, patriots should be treated with great tact and sympathy in order to avoid bitterness and discontent which would be a

of patriots in this matter may have wide repercussions in their and other territories.

2. Patriots, although mostly Italians, may be of any nationality, and are defined as being those in the ranks of genuine fighting bands who have carried arms, engaged in sabotage or acquired important military information to the benefit of the Allied war effort.

3. The following directions contain the main principles of the agreed policy with regard to patriots and all the procedures to put that policy into effect. Instructions for dealing with all those who have helped Allied prisoners of war are being issued separately.

4. On liberation of territory patriots must revert from their quasi-military status and become good citizens. To this end a message in poster form signed by General Alexander has been prepared and will be widely published.

5. Patriots come under the realm of law officers whose duty it is to see that the individuals free military to civilian status taken place with the minimum of disillusionment. To this end representatives of patriot organizations have been sent to Army HQ's and Italian committees with strong patriot representation will be set up in the local governments of liberated territory. It is extremely important that while order is to be maintained and arms have to be surrendered, patriots should be treated with great tact and sympathy in order to avoid bitterness and discouragement which would become known and have an adverse effect upon patriots still operating against the enemy. Leaders of patriot groups should be thanked by law officers for the which they have rendered to the Allies and told to convey to their Allied appreciation of their efforts.

6. While the patriots are not a political organization and must be disarmed etc. setting up purely patriot local governments, it must be remembered that by virtue of their military role they have a right to strong representation in the local government. Italian local government officials must be made to realize and show appreciation of their value and their right to be represented in government.

7. Patriots will be unwilling to bend in arms but the preservation of law and order precludes the existence of irregular armed bands in liberated territory; the law demands their surrender and they must therefore be tactfully told to obey the law.

8. After months of guerrilla warfare it will be hard for patriots to settle down to normal life. To encourage rapid return to their ordinary vocations will be one of the most difficult duties of the local committees who, like law officers

and Italian officials, must deal with the patriots not as a nuisance but with sympathy and gratitude. It should at all times be remembered that an unemployed patriot is not only a danger to the community but a menace.

9. While it is desirable to leave the rehabilitation of patriots to the Italians themselves, in the form of local committees, CAO's and especially Provincial Officers in the later period of occupation, remembering that they have fought for the Allies, should ensure that they are given a square deal.

10. 20,000 post or have been sent to AMF 5 Army and 30,000 to AMF 3 Army. These should be displayed immediately after liberation of territory and the attention of all patriots drawn to them. The contents of the poster will also be broadcast locally by RWA and will be published in Italian newspapers.

11. In order to show appreciation of individual effort certificates of merit have been prepared for issue to every individual patriot rewarded for by the local patriot leaders. Certificates will be endorsed by the recognized patriot leader and by an Allied officer (e.g. the AMF). If for any reason the patriot leader wishes to remain anonymous his signature can be replaced by a lieutenant or signed by another patriot representative. Posthumous certificates may be awarded to next-of-kin. In special cases letters of thanks by Corps or other senior commanders may be sent to towns or villages who collectively and actively have aided the Allied cause.

12. The advice of patriot leaders should be sought before the issue of any certificate in order to avoid possession of them by bogus patriots.

13. Provincial Commanders will issue certificates, if properly vouchered for by patriot leaders, in areas where the AMF, Army AMF's, have not been able to do so, and in areas liberated within the last few months. Provincial Commanders should give this matter very early attention and will set up special committees in local governments to deal with outstanding cases, e.g., in the Rome Region.

14. Italian patriot representatives from the Military Control Italy Group controlled by 201. Base and from the Committee Liberatori Nazionale controlled by Mr. Brent, have been sent to each Corps in Army AMF's. CAO's must bear in mind that these patriot representatives may be mainly concerned to obtain recognition for patriots belonging to their own organization. If other interests present themselves they must be carefully considered and if found to be bona fide they should be given certificates and afforded equal treatment. CAO's must encourage the patriot representatives to take a broad view and not to look after the interests solely of members of their own organizations but also all genuine patriots.

15. Patriot representatives are in no way political. Their main duties

Other senior commanders may be sent to towns or villages who collectively and actively have aided the Allied cause.

12. The advice of patriot leaders should be sought before the issue of any certificate in order to avoid misstatement of them by bogus patriots.

13. Provincial Commissioners will issue certificates, if properly vouched for by patriot leaders, in areas where the GAOs, Army HQs, have not been able to go so, and in areas liberated within the last few months. Provincial Commissioners should give this matter very early attention and will set up special committees in local governments to deal with outstanding cases, e.g., in the Para Region.

14. Italian patriot representatives from the Military Control Italy Group controlled by Col. Berio and four the Committee for National Liberation controlled by Mr. Deane, have been sent to each Corps in Army HQ's. GAO's must bear in mind that these patriot representatives may be mainly concerned to obtain recognition for patriots belonging to their own organization. If other patriots present themselves they must be carefully scrutinized and if found to be bona fide they should be given certificates and afforded equal treatment. GAO's must encourage the patriot representatives to take a broad view and not to look after the interests solely of members of their own organizations but also all genuine patriots.

15. Patriot representatives are in no way political. Their main duties are:-

- (a) to help Army GAO's in the identification of leaders of patriot bands;
- (b) to help in the selection of suitable patriots out of those known to assist the GAO;
- (c) to assist him generally in dealing with all patriot problems.

16. These representatives draw pay from their own organizations. They should be housed and rationed and supplied with POL by AMG (DMS), all in conformity with instructions to series B to this effect.

17. Distribution of these representatives is as follows:-

- 4 to AMG 5 Army;
- 5 to AMG 8 Army. Of these 2 are for 501 Corps.

One may be requisitioned for them locally.

18. That these patriot representatives enter into areas with GAOs it is suggested that they should set up a special patriot office and produce for the GAO a complete list of patriots in the area in order that certificates may be issued and plans made for their re-employment.

19. These representatives should also be of assistance in setting up the more prominent communal committees whose duties will be to organize the re-employment and dispersal of patriots on the lines set out in the attached leaflets.

20. Patriot leaders should be encouraged to prepare lists of their groups and reports on their guerrilla provisions to illegal acquisition.

21. Patriots must hand in their arms (including hand grenades and bombs). No other weapons need be divulged except that the law requires the surrender of arms. At the same time temporary orders in the first instance should be avoided.

22. Arms should be handed over mainly to GAOs and allied officers and a receipt should be signed by these officers or patriot leaders. Captains or other patriots may be used to receive and guard surrendered arms and great care should be taken with receipt of stores, especially of food and provisions.

23. Surrendered arms will as far as possible be removed to central points where some of them will be taken over by U.S. Special Forces who need them for further operations. It is important that the Patriot Branch, AGO, should be notified of the location of arms as above, numbers of arms, and be given a general picture of the position including estimated number of arms still unsurrendered.

24. Guerrillas are urgently required for operations in their own country in special circumstances should be made to send them South as quickly as possible through the Displaced Persons Sub-Committee.

Herbert S. Jones
Colonel
Major, Brigadier,
Executive Classification.

DISTRIBUTION: 3140, 445 5 Army.
3340, 445 8 Army.
445, 845 17.
340, 845 17.
340, 845 17.

(29)
(40)
(42)
(50)

151/30.

Appendix "A" to JN/1/INT dated 18 July 1964.

SECRET

FORMATION OF COMMITTEE ON-EDUCATION
AND RE-EVALUATION OF PATRIOTS.

1. (a) The Committee will be formed and exist at Centre level only in the first instance.
- (b) Subject to local conditions a suggested form of committee is as follows:-

Minister (or Commissioner Prefectural) to provide;
four or more representatives chosen by and from the patriots;
two members of the Minister's personnel, if formed as such or otherwise
two well known and respected local residents.

(c) Consistency of policy, co-ordination of the efforts of the Provincial Committee and means of communication from JAG/AGC HQ should be effected at Provincial level by and through the Prefect acting on the advice and under the supervision of the Provincial Commissioner.

2. The function and purpose of the Committee are as follows. They will firstly determine whether persons calling themselves patriots are in fact patriots. After sifting for this purpose, the bogus patriots will be ignored. The genuine patriots will be classified and dealt with in the following manner:-

(a) Local absorption into their ordinary walks of life and means of livelihood and employment (particularly agricultural and hawking) which may still exist in the local area. They will be dealt with as any other residents of the locality who had remained there. This process will apply both to patriots whose home is in the particular area and to non-residents if the latter so wish. Preference may be given to patriots in providing employment.

(b) Non-residents who do not want to stay in the area. It is believed that this class will be very small in number. They will return to their homes. Their return will be arranged locally by the CAG to Provincial HQ thence by the Provincial Commissioner.

(c) Those who want to join the Army immediately (as opposed to waiting for "call up" if and when liable) will be conveyed to Provincial HQ and thence under provincial arrangements to such points as may be determined by the Allied/Italian military authorities. To enable this to be done the USAF will keep Regional Commissioners and SCAGs informed as to the places to

2. The function and purpose of the Committee shall be to select, by lot, persons who have been identified as patriots. They will first-ly determine whether persons called themselves patriots are in fact patriots. After sorting for this purpose, the names patriots will be ignored. The genuine patriots will be classified and dealt with in the following manner:-

- (a) Local absorption into their ordinary walks of life and means of livelihood and employment (particularly agricultural and horticultural) which may still exist in the local area. They will be dealt with as any other residents of the locality who had remained there. This process will apply both to patriots who have been in the particular area and to non-residents if the latter so wish. Preference may be given to patriots in providing employment.
- (b) Non-residents who do not want to stay in the area. It is understood that this class will be very small in number. They will return to their homes. Their return will be arranged locally by the CAC to Provincial HQ thence by the Provincial Commissioner.

(c) Those who want to join the Army immediately (as opposed to waiting for "call up" if and when liable) will be conveyed to Provincial HQ and thence under Provincial arrangements to such points as may be determined by the Allied/Italian Military authorities. To enable this to be done the staff will keep Regional Commissioners and SOAs informed as to the places to which such persons are to be conveyed and any other relevant information for the purpose.

(d) Those who wish to continue to serve as patriots. These will be selected, in small numbers, by the appropriate military agencies if needed.

6200

(e) Boys who have not already been fitted and dealt with under these instructions will be returned through Singapore to Burma for special employment in the Air Fighting Division.

3. The Director and/or his official will keep proper records of the Committee's proceedings including the names, certification (if any) and classification of all persons dealt with and the method and date of their disposal.

Lists prepared by patriot leaders together with any other relevant information which may be required will be made available to the Committee.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

R 5
Hdair Ed
652
AMG FIVE ARMY AND EIGHT ARMY INFO REGION FIVE AND REGION EIGHT

ADV AAI

ACC ADV

12.58.1944

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

Civil Affairs Branch.

ADY 296

7 1245

PROPOSE DESPATCH PATRIOT REPS OF MILITARY AND CIN REPEAT CIN PARTIES AS FOLLOWS
 PD FIRST IN EACH CAR THERE WILL BE ONE REP ALSO DRIVER ALSO THREE DAYS RATIONS
 ALSO TWO FIVE ZERO ZERO REPEAT TWO FIVE ZERO ZERO NOTICES ALSO TWO COPIES OF
 SIGNATURE AND TWO IDENTIFICATION PAPERS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL PD PAREN TO AMG
FIVE ARMY AND EIGHT ARMY INFORMATION AMG REGION FIVE AND REGION EIGHT ADV ALLIED
ARMIES IN ITALY FOR BRIGADIER MAINTAINED FROM ABLE CHARLIE ADVANCE FROM MC CARTHY
PAREN PD SECOND FOUR CARS DUE DEPART ROME MORNING EIGHT JULY REPORT AMG
 PROPECTERA AT PERUGIA WHERE WILL AWAIT FURTHER INFO INSTRUCTIONS FROM GROUP CAPT
 BENSON PD THIRD FOUR CARS UNDER ESCORT MAJOR TALBOT WILL DEPART ROME MORNING
 NINE JULY FOR AMG FIVE ARMY PD FOURTH TWO CARS WILL BE READY LEAVE ROME TENTH
 JULY FOR ADRIATIC COAST WILL GROUP CAPT BENSON PLEASE TELEGRAPH INSTRUCTIONS WHERE TO
 REPORT PD FIFTH IN ADDITION SENDING SEPARATELY ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO REPEAT
 ONE ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO NOTICES TO AMG FIVE ARMY AND ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO REPEAT
 ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO ZERO TO AMG EIGHT ARMY ALSO MINUTES OF THIRD JULY AND FURTHER
 RELEVANT INSTRUCTIONS PD IT IS HOPED SEND CERTIFICATES OF MERIT NUMBERED BY BLOCKS
 TO REACH YOU WITHIN A WEEK PD SIXTH GSI(b) ALLIED ARMIES ITALY STATE THAT PATRIOT
 REPS CAN OBTAIN BROWN SECURITY PERMITS AT CORPS HEADQUARTERS PLEASE ARRANGE

COPIES TO:- AAI
 ACC MAIN for Civil Affairs Branch
 ACC REAR for Admin Section
 PWB Rome
 Col Fiske
 Security
 Political
 P.R.O.

628

47A

12/1-✓
11/28
45

~~10/10/10~~
BT 20/10/10

6

② ~~The following~~ Action has been taken by the Executive Commission
to get the necessary troops & assist in the carrying of the operations.

③ Action is required by us to get instructions to Portman to
pick up & get to work with him & bring an answer.

④ The only way to get the across the stream is only the air or by average transport from air.

The first answer is that but with regard to the very carefully considered, and is a "Genuine" thing, J.B.

The brand is dangerous especially if it falls into enemy hands.

⑤ Remind that the S.O. be
completely satisfied upon the
Spenders expenditure to open it &
it is in full of it.

The first answer is that that will result in to being completely
banned, and is a "Genuine Minister's job."
The second is dangerous especially if it falls into enemy
hands.

⑤ Remained that the G. 17 be appointed to ^{to speak} appropriate
completely selected upon the to speak at the air field.
(~~Advising if he should speak at the air field.~~)

Report

G. R. Kipp 5281

13. Jan. 44.

To. VP.

① When in Rome I looked over a file of R. 997.8 in this
matter.

② G. 17.3 an appeal to a broadcast, but an sitting a note
to be posted in areas where posters are located.

G. R. Kipp 5281

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

13 GIU. 1944

13 JUN 1944

597

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 499/5/CA.

12th June 1944

SUBJECT: Italian Partisans.

TO : Headquarters,
Allied Forces in Italy,
C. H. R.

1. Attached is report from SCAG, AMG 8 Army.
2. I endorse the proposal made in paragraph 6 and would ask that a small force of Italian Officers, with troops, immediately available, should follow up possibly with AMG 8 Army to deal with these partisans.
3. I will take up the political side of the matter with the Italian Government and instruct AMG 8 Army.

KCH/JG.

M. S. Lusk
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner,
for Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: V.P. Adm Sec - Will you take up this matter with the Italian Government and arrange for notification to be made to the partisans that as soon as the battle passes on they become ordinary civilians and that Allied Military Government is effective.

Simply the
Political
matter -
or should it be
62806
Good to mention
the Commission

Will be forwarded to you
in due time

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 7206

Excerpt from Report by SOG, 3d Army, dated 10 June 44.

4. There has been considerable trouble with partisans. There would appear to be two lots of partisans, one lot (those whom we are meeting now) who have not been officially helped by the Allies in the form of dropping supplies and arms, and the others who have. These latter we have not yet come in contact with. The attitude of the partisans is that they are both military and political. We have met them particularly in FIORE, FIORE, and FIORE. However they have been met we have found that they have set up their own administration and claim that these have been elected by them as representing the people. They have no knowledge of A.I.A. and are usually disinclined to accept its authority. In many cases they have arrested a considerable number of people not always at great discrimination and in some cases these people have only been saved from summary shooting by the arrival of a U.S. In FIORE they claim that their administration is recognized by the fact that Indragio in his broadcast about the formation of a new Government asked all the existing administrations in occupied territory to carry on with their work pending formation of the new Govt. The position about these partisans is also suggested in that owing to the present rate of advance, towns are being left with no military or men at all, and as the partisans are armed it requires great tact on the part of A.I.A. to handle them. Instructions have been given from FIORE that all these partisans are to be disbanded.

This problem is a novel one and is bound to be met with in further intensity as we further north the advance goes. At the present time instructions have been given that these partisans are to be disbanded and to be told that the administration they set up is not valid and that A.I.A. is the ruling authority. They are being told that they have done very good work but that now that the Allies have occupied the country they must lay down their arms in conformity with the Convention to this effect, but that their arms will be kept separate away in case of need or should it be decided to employ them in the Italian Army. The question of disarming partisans is strictly speaking not an A.I.A. affair, but owing to lack of troops we have attempted to deal with it and up to date the situation is in hand. Help in this respect has been received from the Civil Liaison Officer at this HQ with whom we are co-operating, but it must be pointed out that his mission is more connected with the other type of partisan mentioned above, than with the ones which we are dealing with now.

5. It is essential in my opinion that some directive be given on the whole question of political activities of the partisans, but it is more important that this directive be in some way given to them, so that in the future as and when they are met they will have some knowledge of the work that A.I.A. performs, and the fact that their political activities are not recognized and their nominees are not necessarily going to be accepted. It is suggested that if possible some broadcast could be made to this effect.

6. Another suggestion I would like to make is that A.I.A. should be asked to provide a body of responsible Italian officers who could be made immediately available to deal with the partisans as they are met, to look after the disarming and generally explain the position to them.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 73506

-2-

7. It must be borne in mind that with the rapid rate of advance it is impossible for AR Eight Army officers to be kept in these towns and with the small number of officers available to the provinces there is a very serious risk of trouble breaking out when the AR Eight Army GAs leave, owing to the inability of the provinces to put GAs in themselves. 1598

8. I consider that action must be taken to clear up the position of the paragon urgently, both in the interests of preventing trouble once the Army has passed through and also difficulties from the political aspect.

ADMINISTRATION OF PATRIOTS IN LIBERATED ITALY

AGENDA

1. Composition of Liaison parties with Army AMGAs.
2. Preliminary Action in occupation:
 - (a) Form and posting of General Alexander's notice.
 - (b) Return of Arms.
 - (c) Form and distribution certificate of merit.
 - (i) Individuals
 - (ii) Collective. *No*
3. Subsequent treatment of Patriots:
 - (a) Rehabilitation in Rural areas and small towns.
 - (b) Rehabilitation in Cities.
 - (c) Composition of committees in Provinces to deal with
 (a) and (b).
4. Certificate and assistance to those who have helped escape Allied P.O.Ws.

one This belongs to Patriot file
QRC

6

There lies in this proposal the danger of giving up a heavy, solid vote close with the majority of large & private

2) It has a activity code and - activity, an important
vector, specifically place, staying on the spot is preferable.

c. absolutely no. the former only fails in this.

628-

When will distribute a free sample, sufficient for
study & practice employment (employment is easily regained)

(a) It has to prove since it has been
seen we know they are not perfect, or the
positive factor is entirely.

D 1-2 The Helms C. O. C. must deal with the truth -
it should be free from the education.
If it fails it is its own fault. The best procedure is
to keep out of the way of the people (especially)
in their recent jobs.

ADVANCED HQ
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.C. Section
APO 394.

TOP SECRET.

3 July 1944.

AGENDA

for

Meeting at 1530 hrs on 3/7/44 to discuss the handling of Patriots in
occupied Italy including all Italians who have helped Allied P.W.

To be present

Brigadier M.E. Dush

Executive Commissioner

Colonel C.D. Mc Carthy

A.C.C. Representative

Summary of Agenda

- A Helpers of Escaped P.W.
- B Patriots in the Battle Zone Military Problems.
- C Patriots South of the Battle Zone Political Problems.
- D. Patriots in large cities such as Rome and Florence.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 73506

The attached proposals are made in order to secure decisions on certain specific points in connection with the handling, of Patriots (Partisans) inside occupied Italy. A recommendation is made concerning those who have helped Allied Prisoners of War. No specific reference is made to the kindred problems of Displaced persons and Italian Refugees.

During the last few days discussions have been held at A.A.I. at Hqs of 5 and 8 Armies, in Rome with representatives of O.S.S. Special Force, Italian Military and M.M.I.A., also inside the 8th Army area with various AMG officers and Italian Partisan Leaders between Spoleto and Perugia. Most of the proposals made have already been agreed by those chiefly concerned.

It must be appreciated that a great deal of the ground has already been covered by orders and directions from A.A.I. and A.C.C. but some of the proposals are new. No discussions have yet been held with those responsible for running large cities.

I. Patrioti

A. Helpers of Escaped Allied P.W.

1. This is to some extent separate to the Patriot problems proper but can be dealt with by AMG or ACC on rather parallel lines.
2. Financial compensation has in a few cases been paid but all cases should now be investigated and fully paid up. Payments can be made by AMG and ACC.
3. Special certificates of events to be issued to individuals and villages. Signed in facsimile by General Alexander and testified in ink by C.A.O.C.
4. Paras 2 and 3 to be broadcast quickly to Northern Italy.
5. The object of the above is to encourage Italians in North Italy to help P.W. and it is felt that encouragement quickly will make a lot of difference.

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B Patriots in the Battle Zone Military Problems.

1. Notice to Patriots signed by General Alexander.

This notice will be posted in forward areas in English and Italian and will be included in full in Italian newspapers and broadcast by P.R.B.

2. Patriot Liaison officers for A.G.

- (a) Three types required Allied Military, Italian Military and Italian Civil.
- (b) One of each type at Corps Hqs.
- (c) Everyone to be carefully selected and passed by Security.
- (d) Each to have requisitioned car and batman.
- (e) Permit from A.A.I. for (d) to draw petrol and rations.
- (f) Uniform not necessary but special identity cards.
- (g) Each P.L.O. to select suitable partisans in each area and coopt onto C.A.Os staff.

3. Returning of Arms.

Arms are being returned in some areas in appreciable numbers. It is generally recognised that the real reason for handing them in is that it is illegal to keep them. Any other reason sounds fictitious and slightly bogus to the men on the spot and complicates matters at once for the spearhead C.A.O. and will complicate matters later for others. We have said that we are sending arms back north but if we guarantee to do so in the case of each rifle and don't do it this will be used as a perfectly good reason for not handing in arms later elsewhere. Also makes good propaganda for the Germans.

It is recommended therefore that:-

- (a) Arms are handed in to Carabinieri against a straight receipt.
- (b) If and when an inter-regnum period is necessary - as now in Spoleto - before police arrive the C.A.O. can arrange for some

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735016

patriots to keep arms and hand in on agreed date.

- (c) Would it be possible for A.A.I. to allow C.A.Os to call on near by units for assistance in small doses - merely to impress Patriots with the fact that the law will be enforced?

4. Certificates of Merit.

Since the scheme must be capable of practical fulfillment, the following is recommended. It is clear that it will be quite impossible to give certificates to all who have "helped".

- (a) To be given to individuals and villages for helping escaped P.W.
- (b) To be given to individuals who have carried arms; signed by Patriot leaders and C.A.O.
- (c) To be given to villages and towns who have helped the Allied Armies particularly. To be signed by Corps Commanders.
- (d) No certificates to be given to individuals for "helping".
- (e) A.C.O. Regions to complete this work for back regions as early as possible. This will be difficult.

5. Link between C.A.Os and Special Ops A.A.I.

If the use of patriots develops, then the organisation envisaged in B(2) might well be of much more use than at present to Ops. The Amb Corps L.O. should be told to keep Corps HQ informed of special information e.g. One Patriot Leader (an ex regular officer in Bersaghees) told me that several of his men were wanting to go back at once either by land or by air to continue fighting.

C. Patriots South of the Battle Zone Political Problems.

1. I assume that Post War Italy takes over Patriot Boys as soon as they have handed over their arms. This is the moment when AMG ceases to have much interest - unless the Patriot Boys cause unrest in the army area when they will be put down - and it/also I suggest the moment when ACC become directly concerned as agents for the Italian Government, we must look after Post War Italy.

2. ACC must therefore insist that the Italian Government look after the minds and bodies of those Patriots. The minds by a manifesto on the future Government put new by the government under Bonhomie. The bodies by sending food money and in active employment plan to reach Patriots while they are disarming.

3. I want this manifesto and plan produced quickly not only so that AMG and ACC know what to tell Partisans but more important still so that future Ops in the north are not prejudiced by lack of action in this respect.

4. As a matter of interest I asked several times but received no evidence that any of the Partisans bands were primarily political. Some bands were fighting against the Germans, some were fighting only against the Fascists; some had members of all political parties in them and some were commanded by lags and so attracted primarily Italian communists.

D. Patriots in Large Cities such as Rome and Florence.

3

1. Some of the alleged troubles in Rome are as follows.
The patriots who defended the Tiber bridges were not welcomed by incoming troops - well known anti patriots are still at large in Rome and some have been engaged by the Allies - patriots in Rome are still without much food, without payment and without prospects - the tremendously difficult intelligence problem has not yet been properly tackled thereby making the patriots disheartened.
2. On the other hand it is quite certain that we can pander too much to the troubles of the Italians, one of our answers is to reiterate that the Italians helped to start this war.
3. At the same time it is probably wise to endeavour to iron out some of these troubles Before we enter Florence, Pisa and Milan.
4. It is felt that the right way to tackle say Florence is to make a special plan to be coordinated as between all the various branches of intelligence, the police, special forces and special subcommittees, reps of which should enter the city with the Area Commander's parties, in considerable numbers, and work in close cooperation with the Area Comd and AMG.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Vice President, Administrative Section
APO 394

a/cfe

27 June 1944

Sunday 25 June, Perugia.

Partisans' leader, Lieutenant Gordon Monti, a Montenegrin whose real name is Radulovich, works in association with G-1 and G-2 of the 8th Army from this side of the German lines. He communicates with partisan bands by means of relay messengers called "staffete". (see his own report appended.) The partisan groups have Italian Communists with large numbers of Russian, Yugoslav, and British prisoners escaped. They receive supplies of arms from the Allies. When the Allies enter a town, the task of Monti is to try to persuade the partisans to lay down their arms. A directive on this point has gone out from the 8th Army. It is explained that the arms are not being taken away, but are being put by for further use like any military stores. Monti is a British commissioned officer. Everything turns on the tact with which the partisans are approached. Monti thinks in some cases this is lacking in AMG. There are no representatives of the CNL (Comitato Nazionale di Liberazione) with the partisans. There are no politics in these particular bands, but they do include, as well as Communists, a number of monarchists.

Ferri, a young Italian, 25, father dead, home burned, brother tortured to make him disclose the names of other partisans, brother now a prisoner, is fairly blazing with emotion. He wants partisans organized as Arditi in a battalion or even as labor battalions. He particularly stressed the need for aid for families, pensions, etc. He considers the partisan movement non-political. He is in the Rome group, which with groups at Florence, Venice, Turin and Milan, are under the central committee.

A colonel, regular Italian Army, from the Florence group said that while the CNL at Florence represented all parties, the groups of partisans were homogeneous; some were Partito d'azione and others were Communist. There were no other bands.

We saw the working in Perugia, Polligao and Giano, a small mountain village. Perugia is of course a center of fascism. Simon, 8th Army AMG, had sacked everyone and there is at present no syndico and no giunta. Since it is a center of fascism, however, Fascists are popping up again now. Monti regards all these liberation committees as mere talk.

Assisi.

The second town we saw was Assisi where Lieutenant Carigas had

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appointed a syndico and giunta and after issuing the necessary notices in his own name, was encouraging the Italians to take over. Assisi is of course a special place and hoped at one time to be de-militarized. The Assisi bulletin was signed by the syndico.

Folligno.

The third town was Folligno, run by CAO Captain Bennet and a police officer, Captain Godbolt. The liberation committee had its own office and was working with AMG and the FSS. The organization was called Brigata Garibaldi. The young man in charge appeared to be satisfied to be under the control of AMG, but he complained that fascists were not being expelled from office. Before the arrival of the Allies the CNL had appointed the mayor; the CAO, Bennet, had installed the head of a printing works and nominated a giunta. Bennet said he would keep in touch with the local giunta but was anxious to make it plain that he, Bennet, was the boss. Godbolt referred to another village, which he said he had found being well run without interference. One partisan was on the giunta, which included a priest, etc.

Giano.

The fourth town was Giano, where we went with Bennet. He hurriedly summoned a meeting, but who exactly was present it was impossible to say. Bennet stood himself and kept everyone else standing and made these announcements: (1) that the partisans had no authority (2) that people of standing, the priest, etc., must submit to his names for a giunta, and he, Bennet, would decide. The CAO did all the talking and gave no invitation for the expression of a general view. There seemed to be only one representative of the CNL, a well-to-do shipping internee, who immediately said that he placed himself in the hands of Bennet. One citizen pushed in and said he wanted to express himself. He gave the clenched fist salute, for which the CAO (probably thinking it was the fascist salute) sternly rebuked him. The CAO then showed him how to salute and invited Captain Buckley also to give a demonstration. The latter pointed out that the man had no hat, was a civilian, and therefore should not salute at all. This view the CAO accepted.

* * * * *

General Considerations:

Then Group Captain Benson informed me that the 8th Army would be glad to have a representative of the Italian Government at these interviews with partisans. Would the partisans really rather deal with a representative of the Italians or with AMG. It would depend on what sort of officer the Italians sent. The problem seems to be to bring into contact the 8th Army, the Rome committee of the partisans, the Italian Government, and make AMG conform. It was noticeable how warmly the Italian bands praised the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs are in fact everywhere; clerks, secretaries, partisans, etc.

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There is some anxiety lest the partisan movement should develop into "left-wing civil war." Both the Italians and a good many British and Americans feel this. A Carabinieri told Captain Buckley that he was an ex-partisan, and in fact instead of handing in his arms had buried them. Many people think that the Allies should maintain forces in Italy after the war: (a) to steady the ship and prevent left-wing turmoil, and (b) to manipulate Italian trade to the profit of the Allies.

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REPORT ON PARTISANS

1. **NOTE.** Partisans are of three kinds.
 - (1) Foreign guerillas, i.e. British POW escaped, Jugo Slavs, Russians, who mix freely with Italians and usually lead.
 - (2) Italian Patriots who have lost homes or families or are prepared to sacrifice themselves mostly non-political.
 - (3) Mock patriots i.e. last minute converts, political turn-coats and job seekers. These are most numerous on our side of the line. Their worthlessness in no way minimises the fine work of the first two (see Appendix "A").
2. **THE PROBLEM** seems to resolve quite simply into
 - (1) The organisation of 1 and 2.
 - (2) The screening of 3 from the others.
3. **MATERIAL**, gathered between 22-26 June.
 - (1). Co. Capt. Benson, seen at his HQ on Friday, 23, show/a directive he had issued to his spearhead CAOs for treatment of Partisans and discussed the situation. He gave us names, and locations of various subordinates in the field whom we could contact.
 - (2) Lt. "Monti" (KRR) is in charge of TAC Partisans HQ., reporting direct for operations with G-1 8th Army and working closely with G-2. He organises the partisans behind the lines and utilises those in newly acquired territory. (enclosed his report, appendix "A"). He had plenty of material, including captured German Orders showing how important the partisans work had been in harrying the German War Effort. Even while I was talking to him in his HQ., two partisans brought in a pin pointed location of the enemy battery which was making itself a nuisance in the town) and within two hours it was silenced). As part of his job is to coordinate the work of partisans on both sides of the front, and bring about contacts, both for his "staffette" and organisers, it is highly important that visitors from unliberated Italy, should not obtain the impression that partisans are not justly treated once their work is finished. Lt. Monti had had to see Lt. Simpson (see par 7) about this very point and had arranged an "intimate tea" at which the CAOs, partisans from both sides of the line and local rich men could get an insight into the work. He wanted from the first their good will and patience, from the second their devotion and lives, and from the third, money. He insisted that the bulk of partisan activity had been done by Jugoslavs and Russians (many partisans we met agreed) and that for the most part the movement was military and not political. There were communists and groups of politicals, even monarchists, but they had combined for fighting.
 3. **PERI** a youthful leader of Rome Central Committee of liberation, was a partisan from hatred of Germans, who had killed and tortured various members of his family. He said there was no political activity only military they were organised in five big groups (Florence, Rome, etc.) without any central coordination. Their orders were received direct from Allied Command, through Monti, or his stafette.

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- He desired the organization of partisans into battalions for regular or irregular fighting (ARDITE) or as labor battalions.
4. Col. Guerriza, leader of Florence partisans was in Perugia to take orders from Monti. His groups contained political elements, and he was himself leader of the partito D'Azione, but the political outlook had been sacrificed to the military. He received arms and orders from Allied Commander but said there was no other central authority.
 5. A Group of Partisans interviewed in Foligno admitted,
 1. The Slavs had done wonderful work fighting.
 2. The partisans were non-political.
 3. They were glad to continue to help policing, laboring, clearing buildings of mines and booby traps etc. once they were left this side of the lines.
 4. One of them a Brig. of GCR, who had left his job to become a partisan was now reinstated, indicated that they still had a supply of arms.
 6. A large number of men in Orvieto and Perugia were sporting the patriot colors. One of them I questioned admitted he had become a member five days before the Allies arrived. His act of sacrifice consisted in wearing a ribbon after the Germans had gone. Such most partisans were probably in the majority and must be distinguished from the partisans who have been risking their lives for months. This task is not easy for a CAO in a hurry with many other problems to solve.
 7. Lt. Simpson, 8th Army CAO at Perugia thought the partisans nuisances. They interfered with his work (1) by not delivering arms (2) by disobeying other orders (3) by wishing to impose their own authority and nominees. He had formed the opinion that most of these so-called partisans were glib converts from fascism, when they are not actually communists. As he had to organize rapidly and see his orders carried out, he dealt summarily with any interference-in one case refusing to listen to an Italian ex-General who was recognized by the locals and G-1 as a most valuable partisan leader - leaving FSS and Monti to clean up after him. The patriots feel they deserve some recognition and Monti points out that summary treatment does not make for smooth working in his military machine or good propaganda on the other side of the lines. He had in fact, seen Simpson and asked him to be patient.
 8. In General, Major Steele, 6th Armored Div. AMB.
Capt. Palatte, 8th Army CAO.
Capt. Erskine, 8th Indian Div.
Lt. Garigue, 8th Army CAO.
Major Bullock, 8th Army HQ.
 agreed that whereas the partisans had done good work behind the line, they were now becoming a problem requiring a separate organization to deal with them. Notable in this connection, Group Capt. Benson was in favor of having some Italian Officers serving for this purpose. They could subliminate the energies of a few by appointing them as GCR and, when asked, provide labor gangs, clerks etc. But the greater number remained unabsorbed. They had the unconfirmed feeling that many were political opportunists, mostly communists, seizing this opportunity for power and authority.
 9. Capt. Bennett CAO Region IV had authoritarian views of his own. He forbade the partisans to exert power, where they had set up their own councils, but invited one nominee on his giunta. In his main town, Foligno, he was receiving the active assistance of the CNL, operating its own office. He has issued then a number

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- of passes and created GCRH from their strength (to patrol the streets with a German stick grenade thrust in their belt). While using them in this way and with labor and demolition gang, he allowed them no authority and sacked the mayor they had themselves elected in favor of the owner of a printing work. He himself nominated the giunta. (It must be pointed out that as the town was largely evacuated, the partisans made the bulk of the population) Speaking no Italian not listening to anything the locals have to say he will probably encounter or make trouble.
10. Capt. Godbold, CAPO Region IV Foligno had accepted ready made the giunta and Sindaco set up by the partisans in one of his towns but generally regarded them as people to be ignored if they could not be used. His chief concern was to get their arms from them.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1. The partisans are entitled to respect as liberating fighters and to substantial reward for their sacrifices.
2. As they have fought for liberty, they should not be asked to exchange one form of dictation for another and should certainly be given freedom of speech and not be treated summarily.
3. They must be disarmed.
4. They should exert authority, if any, in the interests of the whole country and not for one particular faction.
5. If not fairly and competently dealt with they might constitute a considerable menace to any form of government and necessitate a standing army ready to deal with them (c.f. Black and Tans in Ireland)

SUGGESTED ACTION

- A. A committee of Italians and Allies to coordinate policy.
 - B. To screen the true from the false partisans, the patriots from the political, the appointment of good Italian liaison officers to help CAOs and Lt. Monti, thereby freeing FSS for its other numerous tasks.
1. A general directive instructing CAOs on the correct attitude essentially tactful.
 2. Incorporation of ex-partisans into GCRH labor pioneer etc.
 3. Further use as partisans.
 4. Care in choosing mayor and giunta (will often have a partisan member) and instructions to mayor on treatment relief, jobs, etc.

5. Extended organisation of CNL to combine the political factions and give them a common aim, in some ways, and preserve a peaceful balance.
6. Formation of Arditi battallions to find a useful outlet for their energies and training of the more determined patriots.
7. Accelerate return to civil occupations and organise harvest.
8. Re-grouping of foreign ex-partisans, either through military authority or by DP Sub-Commission.

R.W. Buckley, Capt.

30 June 1944

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