

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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AGRICULTURE, ENFORCEMENT OF GRAIN COLLECTION
JULY - OCT. 1944

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4

V.P.'s meeting

W/28/2

✓

CAS.

S.

Returned and noted.

For Shipp 15/11


Col.

28.10.44

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MINISTERO DELLE CORPORAZIONI

DIREZIONE GENERALE DELL'INDUSTRIA
UFFICIO SPECIALE ECONOMIA E SOSTITUZIONE METALLI

WHITE SHEET

To Public Safety.

①

See S.A. ~~Down~~ I should like your
the question in
opinion on ¶ para 8 as to whether it is proposed to send
additional police forces to cope with the grain situation.

Quite apart from our commitments elsewhere
I should have thought that additional police would not
be necessary. The views of Col Yang who was in Sicily
for some weeks in connection with this problem would
be particularly helpful.

24 Oct.

G.P.M.

-2-

To V.P. C.A.

There is of course no hope of any additional police being sent
to Sicily for grain collection enforcement. On the contrary, ^{new}
future commitments in the north will undoubtedly necessitate a
dilution of the present police strength in the island.

I am confident that sufficient police are already available in Sicily
for a law enforcement drive if this develops and that what is particularly

for some weeks in connection with this problem would
be particularly helpful.

24 Oct.

SPRM

-2-

To V.P. C.A.

There is of course no hope of any additional police being sent
as likely for grain collection enforcement. On the contrary, we
future commitments in the north will undoubtedly necessitate a
dilution of the present police strength in the island.

I am confident the supplied police are already overworked in being
for a law enforcement drive of this character and that what is particularly
required is supplied infantry from the Government and High Commission.

The C.C.R.R. have already been particularly active and their
connecting officer - General Brown - is deserving of high praise.
They need however a more enthusiastic support from the Police ~~Force~~
and from the High Commission.

It is sure to be a hard and difficult task which will last for
several months but I am sure that if properly handled it can
make a substantial addition to the forces in being.

23 OCT. 1944

To C.O.S.

22 Oct '44. To see minute 2 for info

23/10/44

Albany.

D.O.P.S.

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ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

~~SECRET~~ 951
CA SEC.

FILE:RC/433

17 Oct 1944

SUBJECT: Grain amassment - SICILIA Region

TO : H.Q. A.C.C. ROME
Chief of Staff

COPY TO: Vice President Economic Section
Vice President Administrative Section
Agriculture sub-commission

1. In continuation of my letters RC/433 of 2 OCT and of 28 SEP I have further investigated the grain situation and now report as follows. This letter omits reference to many difficulties which have beset the amassment of grain in the region and which are known to your Headquarters.

2. In the opinion of this Headquarters this Island produced sufficient wheat this year to feed the population possibly till the next harvest but at least to within a month or two of it. Very few civilians, if any, would agree with this opinion and the High Commissioner is not in agreement. To have obtained this sufficiency for the purpose of producing bread for the population would, however, have required a thoroughly efficient amassing organization, 100% cooperation on the part of the producers, and a proper withdrawal of all bread ration cards from producers. None of these essentials have been present.

3. As your Headquarters has been informed, the target figure set by this Headquarters for the Granai del Popolo was 3,100,000 quintals which, it was estimated, was approximately the quantity required to feed the population till the next harvest. The targets allotted to each province and the amounts amassed on October 13th may be found in Appendix A to this letter. There has been constant criticism of these figures on the grounds that they are exaggerated and not in accordance with ground cultivated or production yields. It is also stated that between provinces the burden of amassment was inequitably distributed and not in accordance with previous harvests.

In this connection, I observe that the target figure included in documents emanating from your Headquarters is 2,000,000 quintals as compared with 3,100,000 quintals set by this Headquarters.

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4. I have endeavoured to calculate what is the true position but have found this impossible because of the absence of any reliable statistics from U.P.S.E.A. or of any frank information or of agreement on the part of provincial officials. The following are given as instances.

(a) In the Province of PALERMO endeavour was made to obtain figures as regards one hundred of the biggest producers in the province. After a lapse of about one month, the names of 44 large producers were forthcoming about 25 SEP. Of only 16 of these were figures available as to the amounts which had been amassed to date. In these 16 cases alone a total of approximately 2,200 quintals of grain or 220 tons was shown as still due to the Granai del Popolo.

(b) I made a personal investigation into the situation in TRAPANI, which is the province with the worst record so far. The Region I target figure of 300,000 quintals for this province was arrived at about May 15th 1944 as follows:-

Hectares cultivated	65,000	Total yield	645,000 qtls
Yield per hectare	9.9 qtls		
Retention for seed for 65,000 Hectares	85,000		
Retention for food for 80,500 Producers	161,000		
	<u>246,000</u>		<u>246,000</u> "
Amassable			399,000 "
To allow a margin the figure was fixed at			300,000 "

At the time the above calculations were made the provincial authorities wished to estimate on a yield of 8 quintals per hectare but this was considered too low by the Regional Agricultural officer and the Ispettore Agrario.

On my visit early this month the provincial authorities agreed that 65,000 hectares had been cultivated but produced communal calculations to show that the yield per hectare averaged only 6 quintals. It was agreed, however, that 7 quintals per hectare might be equitable.

This meant that the total provincial production was 455,000 quintals. 360,000 quintals were claimed for retention allowance and seed, leaving a balance of 95,000 quintals, or only 21% of total production to be amassed. When this very high figure for retention and seed was disputed, statistics were produced to show that covering the years 1936-43 the average amount amassed was only 27% of total production and the provincial officials considered that not more than 21% could be expected under existing conditions.

To date only 58,000 quintals of this provincial estimate 4989 95,000 quintals have been amassed.

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(c) There appear to be very many cases throughout the Island where even now denunce asienali are still outstanding. (5A)

(d) There is invariably a wide difference between the estimates made by the Alimentation authorities (who are concerned with bread ration cards for non-producers) and those made by the Agricultural authorities of the quantity of grain required for retention allowances for producers.

5. The present situation is as follows:-

(a) Grain collection is now practically at a standstill and is averaging about 1,000 quintals per day or under.

(b) A special enforcement party has been at work in PALERMO Province since August 20th. Their operations have not produced any extensive results though it is true that the PALERMO figures have improved considerably and what little grain is now coming in comes from PALERMO Province.

(c) The High Commissioner, in conjunction with the Commander of the XII Italian Army Corps, is, it is understood, forming from the slender resources available a special unit of carabinieri for grain enforcement with the most modern armament and equipment available in the Island and with as much motor transport as can be spared. The High Commissioner considers that this unit, which will number about 500, cannot cover more than one Province. This would mean that considerable time must elapse before all main grain producing provinces here are dealt with and, in the meantime, more grain will go into hiding or be irregularly disposed of.

(d) A new issue of bread ration cards, effective 1 NOV, is now in process of being made. The High Commissioner has been urged to take every possible step to ensure that bread ration cards are issued only to those entitled to them and he has again been informed that the percentage of holders should not exceed 66.9% of the population which was the figure agreed by my predecessor with your Headquarters (and presumably the late High Commissioner for SICILY). Claims are now being made by the Italian authorities that the correct percentage is approximately 76%. Ration cards are not being released by the central authorities for issue until precise details have been received from the Province (or Comune) and checked by the appropriate Italian authorities.

6. I do not consider that it would be safe, under existing circumstances, to count on more than a maximum of 1,500,000 quintals of grain being amassed which is 75% of the target figure set by your Headquarters or 50% (fifty) of that laid down by this Headquarters. At the present rate grain is coming in it does not appear that even this figure will be reached by the end of the year. The extent to which this figure might be increased by the dispatch of additional forces to the Island would depend

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largely on the way they were used. The manner of administration here inspires one with little or no confidence when it comes to a task requiring careful planning, energy, and fearless and impartial action. There is much talk but little or no concrete action and too much time is spent in playing politics. It would appear to be very difficult to obtain from U.P.S.R.A. particulars as to where the grain should be. The necessary information, however, is probably common knowledge in the communes, but the officials will not or are afraid to take action particularly in the case of large producers. 5H

7. If the present bread ration scale remains in force, this island will require imported flour with effect from approximately the beginning of January 1945. The High Commissioner has, I understand, already written to his government to this effect and has suggested that importation should begin about the middle of November in order to obviate grain being moved from one part of the Island to another, thus effecting transportation economy. I have warned the High Commissioner that I have no information as regards any grain being available for importation.

8. I am anxious to know at a very early date what is the situation as regards the prospects of importation of grain into SICILY and whether it is proposed to send any additional police or other forces to this Island so as to give the Italian authorities no excuse for not applying as drastic measures as possible in order to unass increased quantities of grain and so reduce to a minimum the need for importation. I presume that general directions in this matter will be given in the reply to my RC/433 of 28 SEP 44.

M Carr Brigadier

M. CARR
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

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APPENDIX A

RC/433 of 17 OCT

October 13th

PROVINCES	Estimated yield Au- tumn sown	Per Ha. spring sown	Target qtl	wheat amount amassed qtl	Barley amount amassed qtl	wheat & Barley target
AGRIGENTO	9	7	500.000	165.182.49	15.294.35	36
GALLARUSSETTA	12	11	600.000	282.719.00	29.768.00	52
CATANIA	11	9	400.000	175.277.00	17.887.00	48
ENNA	10	8	300.000	182.895.30	7.420.00	63
MESSINA	8	7	50.000	15.412.21	373.12	32
PALERMO	9	6	600.000	166.085.83	2.726.24	28
RAGUSA	8	7	90.000	67.145.00	13.840.00	90
SIRACUSA	8.5	8	260.000	83.431.00	11.501.00	38
TRAPANI	10	9	300.000	54.700.16	3.123.53	19
	9.5	7.2	3.100.000	1.192.847.99	101.933.24	47
Total wheat and barley amassed by 13 OCT				1,294,781 qtls		

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RC/433 of 17 OCT 44

October 13th

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Per Ha. spring sown	Target qtl	Wheat amount amassed qtl	Barley amount amassed qtl	Wheat & Barley target %
7	500.000	165.182.49	15.294.35	36.0 %
11	600.000	232.719.00	29.766.00	52.2 %
9	400.000	175.277.00	17.887.00	48.2 %
8	300.000	182.895.30	7.420.00	63.3 %
7	50.000	15.412.21	373.12	32.0 %
6	600.000	166.085.83	2.726.24	28.1 %
7	90.000	67.145.00	13.840.00	90.0 %
8	260.000	83.431.00	11.501.00	36.5 %
9	300.000	54.700.16	3.123.53	19.3 %
7.2	3.100.000	1.192.847.99	101.933.24	41.7 %

amassed by 13 OCT 1,294,781 qtls

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HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

4A

Ref: 4206/21/008.

19th October 1944.

SUBJECT: Grain Collection - SICILY.

TO : Regional Commissioner, SICILIA Region.

1. Colonel Jordan has given me an appreciation of the grain situation in SICILY and an estimate of the feeding of the population.
2. The Acting Chief Commissioner fully appreciates the efforts that you and your staff have made in helping the High Commissioner and the local governments to collect sufficient grain to maintain the urban population until the coming harvest. It is, however, perfectly clear to him, as it is to me, that the grain exists in the Island and that the producers are not bringing it forward.
3. You should make clear to the High Commissioner the contents of the Acting Chief Commissioner's letter to the Prime Minister. You should tell him that immediate action is necessary, first of all to intensify the collection of the grain, and secondly, to take every step possible to see that the minimum number of the urban population, are made entitled to ration cards. The Acting Chief Commissioner is not satisfied that a sufficient reduction in those alleged to be entitled to ration cards has been made.
4. The Acting Chief Commissioner is pressing AAF to substitute two battalions recently removed from Sicily by two battalions of the Calabria Division now in Sardinia: at the same time, for reasons of security in the North he will not be able to stop the reduction of the Carabinieri, for trained men are needed for NW Italy. At the same time, the Civil Affairs Section hopes to replace any Carabinieri removed from the Island by an equivalent number of Italian troops who will be allocated by AAF and AAFIA but who, of course, will not be trained in police duties.

M. S. LUSH

MSL/JG.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff 4985

Copy to: DCOS, Econ Sec
DCOS, CA Sec

2856

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 725016

4B

Ref: 4206/20/CPL

19th October 1944

My dear Prime Minister:

The collection of grain in Sicily has, as you and I will know, produced a serious problem, a problem which has been tackled with energy by the High Commissioner with the advice of the AGO Regional Commissioner and his staff of AGO officers in the island. In this connection you will be aware that I have reinforced the staff of the Regional Commissioner with a number of officers in order to help the local provincial government in the collection of grain.

In spite of this the collection has fallen far short of the target, and my present advice is that it is doubtful even whether that target can be reached.

My Regional Commissioner informs me that an approximate estimate of the grain harvested in Sicily amounts to no less than 7 million quintals. The amount of grain to be issued monthly on the present ration basis of 300 grams per day totals 220,000 quintals monthly. You will realize that in order to feed the whole of the population, that is to say those entitled to grain, until the next harvest in 6 months time, will require 1,760,000 quintals. You will appreciate that this is far less than the total amount of grain harvested in the island and therefore in the hands of the people.

Although there is in the collection depots sufficient grain to feed those on ration scales until the end of this year, the Regional Commissioner sees little prospect of collecting more than an additional month's supply for these people.

I feel you should understand and should inform the High Commissioner for Sicily that it is the definite intention of the Supreme Allied Commander not to import additional grain for Sicily and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which are known to be available. No grain will therefore be imported to Sicily between this date and the coming harvest.

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4C

The High Commissioner, therefore, on present figures is faced with the problem of feeding the nation population of Sicily from January until mid-July on the grain which exists in the island and which, as I am advised at present, will not be assessed.

I recommend that you take the earliest opportunity of making this clear, not only to the High Commissioner but to the people of Sicily, so that there can be no doubt in their minds, as in the minds of others, that the grain exists in the island and that it is for the island to show sufficient public spirit to provide sufficient grain, and it is only a small proportion of the harvest, to feed those in the urban areas who depend upon the producer for their daily bread.

I must repeat that no further grain can be imported into Sicily and I must ask you to make this perfectly clear to all concerned.

MILBY W. STONE
Commander, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

4985

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref 2206/14/008.

5th October, 1944

6 OCT. 1944

SUBJECT: Granai del Popolo, Sicily.

TO : Economic Section.

1. I refer to Sicily Region Headquarters' letter No. RC/433 of the 28th of September.

2. With regard to proposals made by Brigadier Carr in para 12 of his letter the points with regard to Italian Army dispositions have been taken up with AFHQ in two recent letters in which it was asked that any proposed alterations in the military garrison of Sicily should be referred to this Headquarters before implementation and that the military garrison in Sicily should not be reduced below two Italian internal security battalions.

3. Would you please in consultation with the Civil Affairs Section produce a letter to the Prime Minister setting out the main facts of the case as reported by Brigadier Carr, the weaknesses as they appear to this Commission and any remedies which you recommend to be taken.

W. S. L.
Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

4982

Copy to:
Civil Affairs Section. ✓

2/24

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
SICILY REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS
20 SEP

Set.
Admin 6507

FILE:AC/405

20 Sept 1944

(JA)

HEADQUARTERS

29 SET. 1944

A. C. C.

SUBJECT: General del Popolo

TO : H.C.C.C. Rome
R.C.C. C.C.C. Section

COPY TO: Vice President Economic Section
Vice President Administrative Section
Agriculture Sub-Commission

1. This letter contains a report on the situation as regards the General del Popolo in SICILY as I found it on taking over control of Region I and on the most recent developments in the collection of grain.

2. I have been in SICILY, since taking over Region I and since my return from the Regional Commissioners Conference at our Headquarters, about one month. During this period, the High Commissioner has been away from SICILY on two visits to Rome and from Palermo from time to time touring the Island. I have necessarily carried out some tours to gain first hand knowledge of the situation. My only agricultural officer was away from duty on account of sickness for one week. Grain collecting officers have been changed twice during the period and at the moment only one is at work on the Island, though another three have been asked for.

The above factors, together with the negligible number of Provincial Officers now in the Region and the recent reductions in staff, have made the task of obtaining full information in the matter and of coordination and continuity of advice difficult and have been responsible for some delay in making this report. I have, however, had frequent discussions with the High Commissioner and other Italian officials concerned on this most important matter.

3. I find, unfortunately, that the more important recommendations made in the memorandum under your COS/25/CA of 1944 have not been implemented. I refer in particular to

2. I have been in Sicily, since taking over when I and since my return from the National Conference Conference at Palermo, about one month. During this period, the High Commissioner has been away from Sicily on the visits to Rome and other parts of the country in the island. I have necessarily carried out some tasks to gain first hand knowledge of the situation. My only agricultural officer was away from duty on account of sickness for one week. Grain collecting officers have been engaged twice during the period and at the moment only one is at work on the island, though another three have been asked for.

The above factors, together with the negligible number of provincial officers now in the region and the recent reductions in staff, have made the task of obtaining full information in the matter and of coordination and continuity of advice difficult and have been responsible for some delay in making this report. I have, however, had frequent discussions with the High Commissioner and other Italian officials concerned on this most important matter.

3. I find, unfortunately, that the more important recommendations made in the memorandum under your 200/25/CA of 3 JUL have not been implemented. I refer in particular to those relating to the forces available or required for the enforcement of grain collection, the provision of tyres for vehicles, and the removal from the island of certain individuals whose presence was considered undesirable.

4. At the time my predecessor handed over to me it was decided that the time had come for the application of compulsion and forcible measures, particularly in the provinces most in arrears. I later advised the High Commissioner, 4981 owing to the alleged small numbers of police and military available for this purpose, concentration of the forces of compulsion appeared necessary and that these should be used in the main grain producing provinces. Now, if any steps were taken in this respect during the period to date owing to the following circumstances.

The High Commissioner, on return from his last visit to Rome, announced, as already reported to your headquarters, certain additional instructions towards the furtherance of the campaign. These were (a) the payment of L.100 per quintal towards cost of transport charges (b) a special retention allowance for farm workers and (c) a special retention

(7A)

allowed for sure things. The first of these measures was notified to prefects before I was made aware of it and the last two, which were announced, according to the High Commissioner, in error and contrary to his instructions, were later suspended on my advice and as a result of information that none of these measures had been agreed with your headquarters. These announcements followed by suspension proceedings had an adverse effect on grain collection. Further the High Commissioner filled the period of 3 up to 10 up as that during which all accounts could be rectified and must be completed. This naturally caused a very considerable falling off in grain transfers to the warehouses for the time being.

5. As regards denarius, the officials concerned estimate that, of those required at the beginning of the harvest, about 50 may be considered as still outstanding. I have grave doubts as to whether 97, have already been rendered and dealt with.

As regards the denario or acceptationi required in the second phase, very large numbers of these remain to be dealt with. At the rate at which they are being handled in many places, it would seem that many months must elapse before the work is completed. U.P. records generally appear to be in a state of chaos. This state of affairs is attributed by the responsible officials to shortage of staff.

The Head of the U.P. reports that two years ago the strength of staff was three times that at work today. To take the case of Palermo province, the strength allowed for this years assessing was 150. When 110 officials had become available, orders were received that the staff should not be further increased.

The Head of the U.P. reports, in addition to being in charge of Palermo province, is responsible for coordination throughout the Island, but he was unaware as to the U.P. personnel situation in the remainder of the Island. The U.P. in Palermo was only one out of the disposal of its staff (in which connection see the following paragraph). My first reaction was that the whole machinery had broken down but I am informed by those concerned, including the High Commissioner, that this is not the case and this may be so, judging by Italian standards.

6. I found that there was a lamentable lack of care available for U.P. officials throughout the Island. From the time I took over, I have been pressing for this

work is completed. U.P.S. records generally appear to be in a state of chaos. This state of affairs is attributed by the responsible officials to shortage of staff. The Head of the U.P.S. reports that two years ago the strength of staff was three times that of now. Today, to take the case of Palermo Province, the strength allowed for this years missing was 150. When 110 officials had become available, orders were received that the staff should not be further increased.

The Head of the U.P.S., in addition to being in charge of Palermo Province, is responsible for coordination throughout the Island, but he was unaware as to the U.P.S. personnel situation in the remainder of the Island. The U.P.S. in Palermo has only one car at the disposal of its staff (in which connection see the following paragraph). My first reaction was that the whole machinery had broken down but I am informed by those concerned, including the High Commissioner, that this is not the case and this may be so, judging by Italian standards.

6. I found that there was a lamentable lack of cars available for U.P.S. officials throughout the Island. From the time I took over, I have been pressing for this state of affairs to be remedied even though so late in the campaign. Results to date have been disappointing. I am convinced the vehicles could be obtained if energetic action were taken by those concerned, but they seem to be either afraid or incapable of taking action.

In the case of Palermo Province mentioned in para 5 above where at present the U.P.S. officials, including the Head responsible for coordination throughout the Island, have one car only, there are a considerable number of taxis plying or standing on tanks in the city of Palermo and only 50% can be in use at anyone time.

When the High Commissioner is pressed on this and similar matters, he explains that the Prefects have their instructions and complain bitterly of lack of cooperation on the part of the Prefecture and Justice.

As regards lack of tyres for vehicles, I am not clear whether the latter buses which were to be made available immediately under your Memo 203/28/CA of 6 JUL were for requisitioned

U.C.C. vehicles or for vehicles for officials. Tyres are required for both types. In any case, no inner tubes have been forthcoming.

In this connection, however, a complete lack of civilian transport discipline and control seems to prevail on the

498U

Ireland

7. I found that the pay of U.S.A. officials was three months in arrears. When this matter first came to my attention, it had apparently not been brought to the notice of the High Commissioner through the head of the U.S.A. or any other channel. The High Commissioner undertook to have the matter remedied at once but it seemed to me to reveal a serious state of affairs in circumstances where I have heard it said that the farmers are indifferent about landing in grain because they suspect some officials of passing the grain around the back of the warehouses" to the Black Market.

8. As regards forces available for compulsory measures one Infantry BN of the Italian Army had recently left the Island shortly before I took over. It was agreed between my predecessor, myself, the High Commissioner and the Italian Corps Commander that at least another three battalions were essential. I took this matter up during the last Regional Commissioners' Conference without result. I also understand that the Italian Army authorities here applied for such reinforcement without success. When I discussed this matter unofficially with M.A.I., I respectfully suggest that the position was not then fully appreciated. Mention was made that a very much smaller number of Allied troops could carry out a much greater task. Such argument overlooks the fact that here it is the civilians who have the modern armament and that to comb a considerable area of country in a reasonable space of time, to control movement, to enforce the law, and to unearth hidden supplies require numbers as well as adequate armament. The situation has recently been most seriously jeopardised further by the withdrawal on 25 May of another Italian Infantry BN and, during the last few days, of some 500 Carabinieri of which another 1000 are alerted to follow shortly. These facts have already been reported to your Headquarters but, had I been kept informed of these moves in the proposed stage, I should have protested much earlier. The maintenance of law and order generally is also affected by the available police and other armed forces and this is very close, inter-related here with the collection of grain.

The existing position is that present forces available permit of one grain enforcement squad being at work in each province and I understand from the Italian Corps Commander that he may find it possible to reinforce the CC.B. so as to permit also of an enforcement squad for the province of

CHICAGO

upgraded. Mention was made that a very much smaller number of allied troops could carry out a much greater task. Such argument overlooks the fact that here it is the civilians who have the modern armament and that to come a considerable area of country in a reasonable space of time, to control movement, to enforce the law, and to unearth hidden supplies require numbers as well as adequate armament.

The situation has recently been most seriously jeopardized further by the withdrawal on 30 and of another Italian Infantry in and, during the last few days, of some 500 carabinieri of which another 1000 are alerted to follow shortly. These facts have already been reported to your headquarters but, had I been kept informed of these moves in the proposal stage, I should have protested much earlier. The maintenance of law and order generally is also affected by the available police and other armed forces and this is very closely inter-related here with the collection of grain.

The existing position is that present forces available permit of one train enforcement squad being at work in F.L.M.R.O. Province and I understand from the Italian Corps Commander that he may find it possible to reinforce one CO. Lt. so as to permit also of an enforcement squad for the Province of Reggio Emilia.

Although somewhat outside my purview, I have discussed the whole situation with the Italian Corps Commander and he considers that, from the point of view of internal security and of train collection enforcement, another three full-strength battalions are required or, alternatively, that uniforms and equipment should be made available immediately and authority granted to enable him to call up 2000 men locally but, naturally, he would prefer not to have Sicilian troops.

I find it difficult to determine whether even this reinforcement would have the desired effect. A large quantity of grain has presumably been taken or otherwise disposed of and, as a practical matter, cannot probably be recovered at this late date. Nevertheless, with sufficient display of force substantial quantities of grain might still be seized. I tend to the opinion that that is really the need is the presence of allied troops. I appreciate, however, the complications which such a measure might cause, that special plans would be necessary for their employment, and that it could only be considered if it was essential to the interests of the war effort and if troops required rest and reorganization were available for the required length of time.

9. Grain collection has fallen far below the extent during recent days. The time allowance up to the 15th of September granted by the High Commissioner in respect of certain returns naturally, held up collection but it is now some days past that date and collection shows no sign of revival. Collection for the past seven days has averaged only 5000 quintals per day. As regards future food prospects, if at least 3,000,000 quintals are required to feed this island for the twelve months to the next famine, with the 1,500,000 quintals already collected there is in sight, at the rate grain is coming in at the moment, only flour approximately, sufficient to feed this island up to the end of December, having regard to the fact that the island came on to local supplies of grain in July.

10. The High Commissioner is, I feel, untiring in his efforts to achieve a successful campaign, but he cannot obtain co-operation and is severely handicapped by lack of drive and a spirit of laissez-faire (coupled with the normal official working hours) from all subordinate officers, and passive resistance on the part of the farmers, including the big landowners. All the matters referred to in this letter (except that referring to the employment of Allied troops) have been brought in writing or verbally to the attention of the High Commissioner.

11. Presumably, it might become necessary in the not too distant future, in view of the grave bread problem with which the island may be faced, to take some stern and comprehensive measures, such as the requisitioning of all grain on the island and of all mills. Such measures could only be taken if backed by sufficient force.

12. In view of the foregoing I therefore request that:-

- a. Further withdrawals of armed forces (including CC.M.) from Italy shall be suspended forthwith.
- b. Arrangements be made for the early despatch to the island of such Italian armed forces as are considered necessary. It is estimated at the moment that at least 3 battalions of Italian Infantry appropriately equipped are required.

- c. Consideration be given to the matter of sending Allied troops (with the necessary transport) to the island.

(2A)

that referring to the employment of allied troops) have been brought in writing or verbally to the attention of the High Commissioner.

11. Presumably, it might become necessary in the not too distant future, in view of the grave bread problem which which the island may be faced, to take some stern and comprehensive measures, such as the requisitioning of all grain on the island and of all mills. Such measures could only be taken if backed by sufficient force.

12. In view of the foregoing I therefore request that:-

- a. Further withdrawals of armed forces (including CC.M.) from Italy should be accelerated forthwith.
- b. Arrangements be made for the early despatch to the island of such Italian armed forces as are considered necessary. It is estimated at the present that at least 3 battalions of Italian Infantry appropriately equipped are required.
- c. Consideration be given to the matter of sending allied troops (with the necessary transport) to the island, part of which could be used for grain collection enforcement.
- d. I should be kept informed of all future movements of armed forces into or away from Sicily.
- e. No note should be taken of the various food distribution which will arise in the not too distant future should the existing state of affairs continue.
- f. The appropriate Italian Government department should be approached to ensure that in case there is any local difficulty in this matter, 4972 officials are paid up to date for the with and promptly in future.

W. Can Bigadier

M. C. C. R.
Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Info

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016*Re: meeting**1A*CSO for VP.
-7 JUL 1944HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394Regional Control and Military Government Section.
+++++Ref: 203/28/CA.6 July 1944

SUBJECT: Enforcement of Grain Collection in Sicily.

TO : Vice President,
Economic Section.
Administrative Section.
Army Sub-Commission.
Regional Commissioner, Region I.
Regional Commissioner, Region II.
Secretary General.
P.R.O.
P.W.B.

1. By direction of the Acting Chief Commissioner I enclose memorandum on the enforcement of grain collection in Sicily which was discussed at the Vice Presidents' Meeting on 5th July.
2. The Acting Chief Commissioner wishes action to be taken by the authority named in the left hand column and directs that co-ordination at ACC HQ shall be arranged by the R.C. & M.G. Section.

MSL

MSL/JG.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

4978

Appendix "A" to 203/28/CA
dated 6 July 1944

ENFORCEMENT OF GRAIN COLLECTION IN SICILY.

ACTION BY.

1. The terms of the decree ordering the collection of grain is to be enforced in Sicily with the greatest vigour. We must expect opposition and obstruction from the people and drastic measures will be necessary.

2. The following action by the Italian Government, ACC and other authorities is recommended:-

A. By the Italian Government.

(i) A firm statement should be made by the Prime Minister over the air and in the Press, to be repeated at frequent interval, making it clear:-

(a) that the price of L. 1000 per quintal will not be increased by war bonus or any other means;

(b) that the collection of grain will be enforced by every means at the disposal of the Government and that heavy penalties will be imposed on offenders;

(c) that it is the duty of all Sicilians to make themselves self-supporting as an Island by bringing in the grain for proper distribution.

(ii) This statement to be followed by continuous propaganda and to be backed up by personal tours of the Island by the Minister of Agriculture and if possible the Prime Minister himself (not by Under-Secretaries), directed towards the collection of grain and not towards political purposes. The High Commissioner and Signor Orlando should carry out similar tours.

(iii) Direction to be given to the High Commissioner and the Italian tribunals that penalties against the decree must be increased to the maximum and offenders brought immediately to trial.

Adm Sec
PRO
FWB

Econ Sec.
Adm Sec.

Adm Sec.

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Pro do not know will

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11/11/44

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(iii) Direction to be given to the High Commissioner and the Italian tribunals that penalties against the decree must be increased to the maximum and offenders brought immediately to trial.

(iv) Instructions to be issued by the Ministers of Interior and Agriculture to Prefects and Agriculture Inspectors insisting on drastic action being taken and a Special Order of the Day to be issued to the Carabinieri concerning their responsibilities in helping to collect the grain and to arrest speculators.

(v) Arrangements to be made (with MMIA) to place the maximum number of Armed Forces (including Carabinieri) at the disposal of the High Commissioner to enforce the decree.

(vi) The acceleration of the promulgation of the road haulage decree which enforces the formation of the Provincial Consorzi to utilise private trucks on call at fixed tariffs.

(vii) The removal from Sicily of the heads of the Separatist movement, especially FINOCCHIARO APRILE, AVVORATO DE MARTINO, BARON CESARI, BRUNO DI BELMONTI, and other members of the so-called National Committee for the Independence of Sicily.

Econ Sec.
Adm Sec.

Adm Sec.

Adm Sec.
Econ Sec.

Sec Gen.
MMIA.

Econ Sec.

RG & MG Sec.

ACTION BY.
RC & MG Sec
Political Sec.

B. By the Vatican.

The intervention with special directions to Cardinal LAVETRANO for a special drive through the Churches.

RC & MG Sec
Adm Sec.

C. By A.C.C. Headquarters.

(i) The appointment of Colonel A. YOUNG, Assistant Director of Public Safety Sub-Commission, as officer in charge of enforcement of grain collection under the authority of Regional Commissioner, Region I.

MMA

(ii) Arrange for the employment in Sicily of 7000 parole POW about to be made returnable to the Italian Army or for the despatch of two battalions from elsewhere.

Econ Sec.

(iii) Arrange for the immediate despatch of inner tubes for motor tyres for requisitioned cars.

Adm Sec.

(iv) Consultation with the Ministry of Justice for the rapid trial of offenders against the decree.

Sec Gen.

(v) Immediate consultation with PWB and PRO with the object of getting out forceful propaganda appealing to the emotions of the people and despatching suitable officers for this purpose. The present staff is weak. Draft appeal by Colonel Zallars attached (Appendix "B"). The use of local journalists to be encouraged. Special reference to be made to the dangers of inflation in really forceful propaganda.

RC & MG Sec.

(vi) Another appeal to AAI to assist in every manner by provision of transport, military police.

Adm Sec.

(vii) Numbers of Carabinieri to be increased if possible.

Regional
Commissioner.

D. By A.C.C. Region I.

(i) Regional Commissioner will convoke the High Commissioner and his Giunta Consultiva on return to Palermo in order to intensify deliveries to the granaries and to warn them that no inducement will be forthcoming and that force has got to be used.

(ii) Similar action with the Committees of Liberation and with local governments in Provinces.

3. Most of the above also applies to Region II but the

rapid trial of offenders against the decree.

(v) Immediate consultation with PWB and PRO with the object of getting out forceful propaganda appealing to the emotions of the people and despatching suitable officers for this purpose. The present staff is weak. Draft appeal by Colonel Zallars attached (Appendix "B"). The use of local journalists to be encouraged. Special reference to be made to the dangers of inflation in really forceful propaganda.

Sec Gen.

RC & MG Sec.

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Adm Sec.

(vii) Numbers of Carabinieri to be increased if possible.

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Regional Commissioner.

(ii) Similar action with the Committees of Liberation and with local governments in Provinces.

3. Most of the above also applies to Region II but the following special action is necessary:-

A. By A.C.C. Headquarters.

(i) Arrange for permanent use of at least one platoon of 2½ - 3 ton trucks for Region II in addition to those already provided from British sources and operating on road haulage (approx. 110).

Econ Sec.

Adm Sec.

(ii) Increase Carabinieri by 200, if possible.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Ad. Export. Food

Appendix "B" to 203/22/CA
dated 6 July 1944

PUBLICITY - GRANAI DEL POPOLO.

1. 1944 is bringing to Italy good fortune in that she is at last being liberated from the yoke of dictator gangs, through Allied assistance.
2. Nature also is provident. Food, a sufficiency for all, is now at hand.
3. The most bountiful crop of grain in twenty years has been harvested without waste. Through this rich blessing Italy can feed herself well in a world in which many people are not so fortunate.
4. The threshing of this gigantic crop of grain is well under way. The collection and the distribution of the crop has begun.
5. The important phase of placing bread and pasta in the hands of all - each person in Italy is entitled to sufficient to sustain his life - has now arrived.
6. It is the sacred duty of all Italians to collect and properly distribute the grain - farmers, Prefects and their staff, Sindaci and their communal committees, the Consorzi, labourers, warehouse men, judges, priests, yea, all must do their part in this, the most important function in the restoration of Italy.
7. Wagons, motors, rail, must be used to move the grain from the overflowing threshing floors to the towns and cities for people to eat who otherwise would go hungry in a land of sufficiency.
8. The Allies guarantee that grain grown on Italian soil will be eaten by Italian people - no shipments will be made outside of Italy of grain grown in Italy.
9. Italians must do the job of collection and distribution. The Allies will support and assist. This collection and distribution of the grain is the first real test of character and fortitude facing Italy in her post War reconstruction.
10. This important and necessary operation is so humanitarian that it transcends political parties or selfish interests. Arise liberated Italy, unite in your efforts and make sure that people of Italy get the food grown on Italian soil.
11. Hard work, team work, and head work, backed up by a determined populace will assure this momentous job.

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