

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

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(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

SACMED CONFERENCES, MINUTES OF MEETINGS
SEPT. 1944 - JAN. 1945

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L. I)

27-
Chief Staff Officer.

Copy of Para 8 on Page 22 to GOC. Land Forces Sub-Commission.

13 Oct 44.

M. S. LUSH

37
Chief Commissioner.

Para 4 on Page 36. Have we received the report from R.A.A.C. Has C.G., R.A.A.C. ever discussed it with any of us?

M. S. LUSH

27.Oct.44.

(See File 3620/COS).

93

COS

Agenda for tomorrow SACHED

Conference is opposite.

Meeting Cancelled. 15/11 1944
PR

Edwin 17/11/44
15/11

File CLOSED - All PAPERS ISSUED FOR 1945 MILES on 20 Nov 44 1/2

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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RESTRICTEDCOPY NO. 1SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL) JAN 15 1945

The meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) originally scheduled for 1030 hours on Tuesday 16th January 1945, will NOT be held. The date of the next meeting will be announced later.

W A Bannister May FA
for J.H. LACCHIELLO,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, H. 18AF
Commander, 1st Force, AFHQ
Secretary, General Staff
Inter-Services and Political Secretariat
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief Liaison Section

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SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting
16th January 1945

W A Bannister May FA
per M. S. LARVELL,
COLONEL,
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Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, W MAF
Commander, 1st Force, AFM
Secretary, General Staff
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SAC (E) (45) 1st Meeting.
15 January 1945.

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COPY NO.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JAN 15 1945

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE 0-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY, 16 JANUARY 1945.

A G E N D A

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, G-3, G-2 and Air
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.)
2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting - already circulated) — 90
3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 1 - already circulated)
4. ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 2 - already circulated on limited distribution)

TO THAT NOTE:

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
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Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff

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(Civil Statements by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, G-3, G-2 and Air
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING — 90
(SAC (P)) (L) 27th Meeting - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE:

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. S.C (P) (45) 1 - already circulated)

4. ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS ITALY
(Paper No. S.C (P) (45) 2 - already circulated on limited distribution)

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
Commander, U.S. Force, AFHQ
Secretary, General Staff
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat
Secretary, Commander-in-Chief Committee, GHQ, MFP
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PCE
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (25) 1st Meeting
9th January 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

There will be NO meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) on Tuesday, 9 January, 1945. The date of the next political meeting will be notified later.

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, FTB
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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G-1 (b)

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J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
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Supreme Allied Commander
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Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
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British Resident Minister
Director, PWB
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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Chief Comm
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SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting
30th December 1944.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL) HELD IN THE 1-3 WAR ROOM AT 1330 HOURS ON SATURDAY 30
DECEMBER 1944.

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal The Hon Sir Harold R.G.L. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNamara,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Lieutenant General Ivo C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
Honourable Alexander G. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser
Mr. Honourable R. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister
Major General Lowell H. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

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Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNerney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira G. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rocks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General D. Nece,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

*Quoted by A.C.C.
Consolidated and Dec
Private Subject*

*C. of S. Hist.
J.G.C.
Chief Commr. (31)
C. of S. (11)
Pol. Sec. (33)*

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Brigadier General C.F. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, Hq. USAF

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
G-3 (Plans), AFHQ

Mr. C. G. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. S. Breed,
Office of British Resident Minister

Colonel J.C.M. Hobson, representing
Calief, INC

(For Items 4 and 5)

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major W.A. Hendister

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting) *7*

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 19th December 1944.

2. SAILING OF GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP "GEMDISCA"

(Previous reference SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting - Conclusions 2(a) and 2(b)) *77*

AMERICAL COMBATANTS reported that the GEMDISCA would be brought in the first instance to ALBANIA after interception, where 400 beds were available. The numbers of wounded on board would probably exceed 400, however, and it depended on instructions sought from the War Office as to the classes of patients to be disembarked whether it would be necessary to bring the vessel into the head ports or ALBANS. He hoped to avoid this if possible.

THE CURRENT ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Page No. SAC (P) (44) 161 and Annexure) -- R. 54 & 55, File 219/503.

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Maccelles
Major Bonister

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting) *7*

THE CONFERENCE APPROVED THE MINUTES OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 19th DECEMBER 1944.

2. RAILING OF GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP "GULDISOL"

(Previous reference SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting - Conclusions 2(a) and 2(b))

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the GULDISOL would be brought in the first instance to ALGERIA, after interception, where 400 beds were available. The numbers of wounded on board would probably exceed 400, however, and it depended on instructions sought from the Air Office as to the classes of patients to be disembarked whether it would be necessary to bring the vessel into the hotel ports or ALGERIA. He hoped to avoid this if possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 and Annexure) -- R. 52 + 56, File 218/505.

THE CONFERENCE had before them the text of an agreement signed between the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CINAI) defining their mutual relations, which had received the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that the Italian Government would shortly announce the fact of the agreement and at the same time issue a retraction of the statement formerly made concerning the recognition of the CINAI by the Allied Military Command.

THE CONFERENCE :

Took note of the terms of the agreement between the Italian Government and the CINAI, as set forth in Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161.

F 52, File 218/505

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4. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 157) - For file copies.

THE COMMISSIONER had before them a paper by the Chief of Staff reporting the conclusions of the Sub-Committee on News Agencies appointed under conclusion 5 of SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting and recommending that private news agencies be permitted to operate in Rome and that a technical sub-committee be appointed to study the further extension of their operation in liberated Italy.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING stated that at the meeting of the Sub-Committee there had been some disagreement between the viewpoints of the Allied Commission and the Psychological Warfare Branch and the admission of private news agencies to Rome had been agreed as a compromise. He felt that, although this might involve some security risk, it should be accepted. Further extension of the activities of the news agencies would be studied by the technical sub-committee, which he recommended should be under the chairmanship of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who should report its recommendations, with his views, to AFHQ.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of Rome on and after 15 January 1945, and that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, so inform the private news agencies.

(b) Appointed a technical sub-committee consisting of,

- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission - Chairman
- Director, PWB
- Chief, INC
- Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ

or their representatives, to investigate at what pressure and by what means the distribution of news to newspapers and radio stations by private news agencies, both foreign and Italian, should be extended throughout the remainder of liberated Italy, and to report their recommendations to AFHQ.

(c) Directed that the technical sub-committee appointed under (b) above, in carrying out their investigation, have particular regard to the safeguards required to prevent the establishment of a monopolistic indigenous news agency in Italy.

(d) Directed that no measures other than normal censorship be adopted to prevent the publication of material liable to cause disorder or unrest, unless in the opinion of the competent military authorities the precipitation of a situation prejudicial to military security

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recommendations, with his views, to AFHQ.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of Rome on and after 15 January 1945, and that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, so inform the private news agencies.

(b) Appointed a technical sub-committee consisting of,

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission - Chairman
Director, PMS
Chief, IMC
Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ

or their representatives, to investigate at what juncture and by what means the distribution of news to newspapers and radio stations by private news agencies, both foreign and Italian, should be extended throughout the remainder of liberated Italy, and to report their recommendations to AFHQ.

(c) Directed that the technical sub-committee appointed under (b) above, in carrying out their investigation, have particular regard to the safeguards required to prevent the establishment of a non-patriotic indigenous news agency in Italy.

(d) Directed that no measures other than normal censorship be adopted to prevent the publication of material liable to cause disorder or unrest, unless in the opinion of the competent military authorities the precipitation of a situation prejudicial to military security should be imminent.

5. RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 158) — So. File 26/cos.

THIS CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Chief, IMC, recommending that the Italian Government be invited to create a Board of Governors to act as advisers to the management of Eiar, as a first step in freeing Italian radio from Allied control.

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MR. BARNES said that he would prefer to see more competition in the radio field. He felt also that the Italian radio should buy its news from the private news agencies, as had been approved in principle in the case of the Italian press. He advocated the earliest possible removal of all control over news issuing both through the press and through the radio, since it would be impracticable to maintain for long the distinction between news published in radio and news published elsewhere in Italy. It must be understood, however, that the removal of control would mean that PAB would no longer be able to carry out its directives received from LONDON and WASHINGTON. PAB's function would then pass into the purely informational stage, and could more appropriately be undertaken by the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Ministry of Information (MI) on behalf of the respective governments. He suggested that he submit a paper setting forth these considerations.

MR. McCULLICH agreed that some adjustment of the functions of PAB would certainly follow from the freeing of the Italian press and radio and added that he believed this to be in accordance with the wishes of LONDON and WASHINGTON. He felt that the maximum liberty consistent with military security should now be accorded to the Italian press and radio, and drew a parallel between the organization proposed for PAB and the ABC. Proposals for relaxing existing controls were already under discussion in WASHINGTON.

MR. KING, approving in general the proposals under discussion, added that the PAB organization would continue to have a valuable advisory function and expressed the hope that it would be retained in this capacity.

THE SURGEON GENERAL confirmed that his policy was to create a free Italian press and radio as early as feasible and to allow news to be published without restriction where this was possible.

THE SURGEON GENERAL ORDER :

-P. 6. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

(a) Approved the recommendations of Chief, INC, embodied in Part III, paragraph 1, of paper No. 8.0 (P) (44) 130 and directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in conjunction as necessary with the appropriate authorities, take suitable action to implement them.

(b) Directed that Director, PAB, submit through the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee his recommendations regarding the organization and functions of PAB when the Italian press and radio had been freed and what transitional measures he advised.

6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOGICAL RESOURCES BOARDS

(Paper No. 8.0 (P) (44) 130) - P. 6. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

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P. 6.

...we believe that the U.S. Government should be aware of the situation in Italy. The policy that the maximum liberty consistent with military security should now be accorded to the Italian press and radio, and draw a parallel between the organization proposed for EIC and the EIC. Proposals for relaxing existing controls were already under discussion in Washington.

MR. KING, agreeing in general the proposals under discussion, added that the EIC organization would continue to have a valuable advisory function and expressed the hope that it would be retained in this capacity.

THE CHIEF, ALLIED COMMANDER, confirmed that his policy was to create a free Italian press and radio as early as feasible and to allow news to be published without restraint where this was possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- 280, five copies.

(a) Approved the recommendations of Chief, IAC, included in Part III, paragraph 1, of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 198 and directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in conjunction as necessary with the appropriate authorities, take suitable action to implement them.

(b) Directed that Director, VIB, submit through the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee his recommendations regarding the organization and functions of PIR when the Italian press and radio have been freed and what transitional measures be advised.

6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 197) - 280, five copies.

THE COMMISSION had before them a paper requesting that the Supreme Allied Commander approve participation by representatives of the Italian Government in the Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board and its dependent committee.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL FOWLER regarded it as unwise to appoint representatives of the Italian Government on Allied standing boards and committees, since points would inevitably arise the discussion of which in the presence of Italian representatives would be undesirable and embarrassing and therefore result. He thought it preferable to accept Italian representatives for these meetings and subjects where their presence would be helpful.

ADMIRAL CARRINGTON strongly supported the viewpoint of the Chief Administrative Officer. He recommended that there would be frequent occasions on which the presence of Italian representatives would be advantageous, particularly in the case of the Industrial Coordination Committee, he considered

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that they should be invited to attend on these specific occasions only.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL AMBURNY agreed with Admiral Dunnington and related that the rights of access to files, which would accompany permanent Italian membership of the board or standing committees, would be undesirable.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE asserted that the proposal before the Conference was in line with what he understood to be the intention of the President and Sir Winston Churchill and that any regular membership was consistent with the position of the Italians as belligerents. He felt that regular membership of the board and committees was the best means of creating in the Italian Government a better understanding of the economic problems which the Allies were facing in Italy, and that it would dispel much of the feeling on the part of the Italians that the Allies were deliberately impeding the economic rehabilitation of Italy. Security requirements would be met by the screening of the individuals who were to become members of the committees and of the board.

MR. W. GILLIES said that since the board made the policy decisions, leaving details to the committees, it would be wise not to have Italian representatives on the board. He advocated that authority be given to the chairman of each committee to invite Italian representatives to be present at appropriate committee meetings, and recommended that discussion of subjects should be so arranged that when an Italian representative was invited to attend a meeting his presence should be at that particular meeting, for all items, would be appropriate items suitable for discussion in the presence of the Italian representative could be discussed at a separate meeting which he would not be invited to attend.

MR. KIM queried whether security considerations applied in respect of all committees and suggested that Italian representatives should be appointed permanently to committees in respect of which no security factors arose.

THE SURVIVANT ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, jointly authorize the Allied Local Resources (Italian) Board to invite suitable representatives of the Italian Government to attend meetings of the Board, or of its dependent committees, upon occasions when their presence would be advantageous and would not be prejudicial to military security.

7. RELIEF AND MASS EVACUATION OF CITIZEN POPULATION IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED ISLANDS

(Major No. 540 (S) (44) 203) — P.53, P.54 and 20/45.

THE CONFERENCE has before them a paper requesting a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy as to whether relief supplies should be des-

on the basis. In addition, it would be wise not to have Italian representatives on the board. In addition, it is suggested that authority be given to the chairman of each committee to invite Italian representatives to be present at appropriate committee meetings, and recommend that discussion of subjects should be as appropriate as possible. When an Italian representative was invited to attend a meeting, his presence throughout the particular meeting, for all items, would be appropriate. It is suggested for discussion in the presence of the Italian representative could be discussed at a separate meeting which he would not be invited to attend.

Mr. KIM queried whether security considerations applied in respect of all committees and suggested that Italian representatives might be appointed particularly to committees in respect of which no security criteria arose.

THE SWEDISH ALLIED COMMANDER :

Director that the Chief Administrative Officer and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, jointly authorize the Allied Local Resources (Italian) to invite suitable representatives of the Italian Government to attend meetings of the Board, or of its dependent committees, upon occasions when their presence would be advantageous and would not be prejudicial to military security.

7. RELIEF AND EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED ISLANDS

(Paper No. SAC (F) (44) 160) — P. 53. File 20/65.

THE CONFERENCE has before them a paper reporting a statement of the Swedish Allied Commander's policy as to whether relief supplies should be dispatched under either International Red Cross or Allied auspices to the civilian populations of enemy-occupied islands in the Atlantic, and as to whether means of evacuation of civilians from such islands should be permitted.

ALLIED COMMISSIONER explained that in his view a stage had now been reached at which clarification of the Swedish Allied Commander's policy in this matter was needed. Swedish and International Red Cross relief supplies had already been authorized for admission into enemy-occupied GIBRALTAR, and relief was being sent under Allied arrangements to the neighbouring part of GIBRALTAR occupied by the enemy. A delegation had come out of GIBRALTAR asking for relief supplies and for the mass evacuation of the civilian population of that island. He pointed out that the relief or evacuation of civilians in the GIBRALTAR-occupied islands would alleviate the position of the enemy garrisons and would immensely increase Allied difficulties in the eastern Mediterranean.

THE SWEDISH ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he had already requested from the staff a paper regarding details of the location and strength of German garrisons,

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The numbers and nationality of the civilian populations of the islands, and other pertinent facts. He pointed out that there were the following alternatives: to not let the German garrisons on the islands, for which sufficient resources could not be made available; evacuation of civilians, which also was not feasible; allowing the civilian populations to starve, which was undesirable; and making it possible for shipments of food to reach them, which probably would be the desirable alternative, and which, if done, should probably be under Swedish and International Red Cross auspices.

MAJOR GENERAL ALDER said that the object of the enemy in leaving garrisons on some of the ABERDEEN Islands was to cause as much embarrassment to the Allies as possible. The cessation of relief to the islands would further this object. The enemy were responsible under International law for the civil populations of the islands which they held.

MR. GARDINER pointed out that if the relief came from Red Cross sources it would be served in ships not in the Allied shipping pool.

ADMIRAL GUTHRIE stated that indirectly Allied shipping would be affected by such shipments, since the ships used were vessels which the Allies call home owned, but did not have, under their right of supply.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOLLING said that it would be desirable to have a statement from the Navy as to the extent to which International Red Cross relief shipments to the ABERDEEN Islands would affect Allied shipping.

THE ABERDEEN ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-3, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, Commander-in-Chief, Headquarters, and G-2, review the situation in respect of civilian populations in the enemy-occupied area of GIBRALTAR and in enemy-occupied BOLDHEADS and ABERDEEN Islands and recommend what policy should be adopted in each case in regard to their relief and/or evacuation, taking into account particularly the following factors :-

- (a) the location, strength and supply position of the enemy garrisons;
- (b) the numbers and nationalities of the civilian populations and their capacity to support themselves;
- (c) the effect of admitting relief supplies under Swedish or International Red Cross auspices on -

(i) the capacity of the enemy garrisons to hold out,

(ii) the Allied shipping situation in the Eastern

ALLIED COMMANDERS stated that indirectly Allied shipping would be affected by such shipments, since the ships used were vessels which the Allies could have seized, but did not seize, under their right of enemy.

ADJUTANT GENERAL HARRIS said that it would be desirable to have a statement from the Navy as to the extent to which International Red Cross relief shipments to the AEGEAN Islands would affect Allied shipping.

THE SUPPOSED ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that 2-3, in conjunction with the Joint Administrative Officer, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and 3-2, review the situation in respect of civilian populations in the enemy-occupied area of CRETE and in enemy-occupied DODECANES and AEGEAN Islands and recommend what policy should be adopted in each case in regard to their relief and/or evacuation, taking into account particularly the following factors :-

- (a) the location, strength and supply position of the enemy civilians;
- (b) the numbers and nationalities of the civilian populations and their capacity to support themselves;
- (c) the effect of shipping relief supplies under Swedish or International Red Cross auspices on -
 - (1) the capacity of the enemy garrisons to hold out,
 - (2) the Allied shipping position in the Eastern Mediterranean;
- (d) the availability of Swedish or International Red Cross relief supplies in the Eastern Mediterranean;
- (e) the administrative implications of the evacuation of the civilian populations, in whole or in part, from enemy-held areas;
- (f) the naval facilities of the relief and/or evacuation of these civilian populations.

303

EGED HATVORING IN ITALY

THE CONFERENCE :

File 407, Page 17

Task Force of Telegram No. 83 of 21 December 1944 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting a statement of policy on the provision of bread for the populations of ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA, and the

Send a
file 407
copy to
E. L. L.
and 1/2.
J. E.

- 6 - /allocation of SECRET

SECRET

Confidential 84

(see also, para 10)

1. BBA

allocation of shipping to implement that policy; and of telegram No. 140918 of 22 December 1944, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, furnishing an estimate of the stocks and monthly outlays necessary to provide a 300 or more basic bread ration for ITALY and SICILY and SARDINIA.

9. RELIEF TO ALBANIA

(Paper No. SAC (P) (14) 196) - P. 40, File 24/203.

THE CONFERENCE had before them, for information, a paper by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, describing the status of Albanian relief arrangements, on stating in particular that the ship to carry engineer stores for repair of the port of DURRES was not being called forward pending the outcome of negotiations with Colonel-General Hoxha.

ANIMAL ORIGINISM stressed the need for a careful survey of the requirements necessary for opening up the port of DURRES, including the minesweeping commitment involved, since these requirements could only be met at the expense of other commitments. He understood that AL HIGHWIN were revising their requirements, particularly in respect of landing craft.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON remarked that no actual relief could proceed to ALBANIA before February 1945.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

P. 40, File 24/203.

Took note of Paper No. SAC (P) (14) 196 and of the above discussion.

10. MILITARY MISSIONS TO ALBANIA

THE CONFERENCE :

Took note of telegram No. 7-79253 of 19 December 1944, and telegram No. 140999 of 29 December 1944, from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US War Department respectively, stating that the United States did not contemplate sending a military mission to ALBANIA, but that it contemplated sending a State Department political representative and, possibly, military observers.

11. SPANISH AIR LINK TO THE BALEARIC ISLANDS

AIR MARSHAL GLENOR reported that advice had been received through the United States Political Adviser that the Spanish Government wished to operate a civil air line from the Spanish mainland to the BALEARIC Islands. The Staff Department were under the impression that M.F. had previously agreed to the operation of this line. While this was not the case, and some confusion with

conditions involved, since those requirements could only be met at the expense of other commitments. He understood that MLALHILA were revising their requirements, particularly in respect of landing craft.

LEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON remarked that no actual relief could proceed to ALGERIA before February 1945.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL ALLIED COMMANDER :

.P. 26 File 29/200

Task note of Paper No. 500 (P) (44) 136 and of the above discussion.

10. MILITARY MISSIONS TO ALGERIA

THE CONFERENCE :

Task note of Telegram No. 3-79253 of 19 December 1944, and Telegram No. 3-80509 of 29 December 1944, from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US War Department respectively, stating that the United States did not contemplate sending a military mission to ALGERIA, but that it contemplated sending a State Department political representative and, possibly, military observers.

11. SPANISH AIR LINE TO THE BALEARIC ISLANDS

AIR MARSHAL BLESSOR reported that advice had been received through the United States Political Adviser that the Spanish Government wished to operate a civil air line from the Spanish mainland to the BALEARIC ISLANDS. The State Department were under the impression that MLAF had previously agreed to the operation of this line. While this was not the case, and some confusion with the projected line to the Canaries had arisen, MLAF in fact had no objection, and he understood that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement. It was merely a question of issuing the necessary warnings. The Spanish Government should be advised that the air line should comply with the existing Allied instructions regarding aircraft flying in the vicinity of Allied shipping, and should be warned that the use of 39528 would increase the risk of incidents.

X

AIRMARSHAL CUNNINGHAM said that no complications vis-à-vis Allied shipping were likely to arise at present, but they might arise in the future if the GIBRALTAR-BALEARIC route were shortened.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Revised the U.S. Political Adviser to inform the U.S. State Department that he had no objection to the line operated by the Spanish Government of the proposed airline from BALEARIC to ALGERIA, subject to the existing instructions raised by the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean at ALGERIA above.

(b) SECRET

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43

(b) Directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, convey to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, for communication through the State Department to the Spanish Government, the details of the procedures and instructions which the proposed airline should observe to avoid incidents with Allied shipping.

12. EVACUATION OF GREEKS AND IONIAN ISLANDS

ARMYAL COUNCILING referred to the evacuation of GREEKS now proceeding and pointed out that Zervas was asking for the evacuation of 500 of his troops and of approximately 5,500 civilians from the island of ITHAKA. There appeared to be a possibility that a request would also be made for the evacuation of civilians from ZAKYTH and KEFALONIA. He observed that the evacuation of Greek civilians from these localities was not a commitment which he could accept. He added that he had understood the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to give no support either to ELAS or to EDES in this area except by way of evacuating EDES forces, but a telegram had now been received from 3 Corps indicating that a naval patrol of the straits inside GUFU would be arranged in order to prevent landings or GUFU by ELAS or the Albanians before the island was in a position to defend itself.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed the view that the 500 EDES troops should be evacuated from ITHAKA but not the 5,500 civilians. His intention was to reduce the military commitment in GUFU to the minimum as soon as possible. Evacuation of Allied troops from ZAKYTH and ITHAKA would be effected in accordance with this policy when conditions permitted. While the evacuation of EDES forces was desirable for humanitarian reasons, actual support of Zervas would have increased the military commitment in GUFU and could not therefore be entertained.

MR. MONTGOMERY added that the principle followed was not to support or make use of Greek partisan forces but only of such Greek forces as were called upon legally under the auspices of the Greek Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, discuss with him further the question of evacuation of Greeks from the IONIAN Islands.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Mr. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, British Fleet, HSC

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J. A. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed the view that the 500 ZDES troops should be evacuated from LEVLOS but not the 5,500 civilians. His intention was to reduce the military commitment in GREECE to the minimum as soon as possible. Evacuation of Allied troops from SALONIKA and FALKE would be effected in accordance with this policy when conditions permitted. While the evacuation of ZDES forces was desirable for humanitarian reasons actual support of ZARVAS would have increased the military commitment in GREECE and could not therefore be entertained.

Mr. MacGillivray added that the principle followed was not to support or to make use of Greek partisan forces but only of such Greek forces as were called up legally under the auspices of the Greek Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, discuss with him further the question of evacuation of Greeks from the IONIAN Islands.

*for under A.M. MASCHALLS,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.*

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
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British Resident Minister
Director, P.E.
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IC & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief, Commissioner, Allied Commission
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Chief, INW
Chief Signals Officer

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (C) (44) 123rd Meeting
SAC (P) (44) 57th Meeting
27th December 1944

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29 DEC 1944

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL)

1. The 123rd Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Operational) and the 57th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) will NOT be held on Friday, 29 December, 1944 as previously advised, but on SUNDAY, 30 DECEMBER INSTEAD.

2. Time and location of the meetings and the agenda for them will be as previously notified. The meetings are merely postponed 24 hours.

J. H. MacNeill
J. H. MACNEILL,
COLONEL.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff

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Chief, Plans Officer

U.S. Political Adviser

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Previously notified. The meetings are merely postponed 24 hours.

Johnston
J.A. LASCELLES,
COLONEL.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
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G-4 (B)
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G-4 (Log Plans)
Chief, Liaison Section
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Secretary, IS & PS
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Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting
25th December, 1944.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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28 DEC 1944

SUPREMACY ALLIED INFORMATION'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREMACY ALLIED INFORMATION'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON FRIDAY 29TH DECEMBER, 1944.

A G 2 L R A

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, G-3 and Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)
2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting - already circulated)
3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. 310 (P) (44) 150 - to be circulated) P. 52, five copies.
4. PRIVATE PRESS APPEARS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 157 - to be circulated) P. 52, five copies.
5. RADIO FILM FOR INDETERMINED ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 158 - to be circulated) P. 52, five copies.
6. PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED LOCAL RESOURCES BOARDS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 159 - to be circulated) P. 52, five copies.
7. BELIEFS AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN ENEMY OCCUPIED ISLANDS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 160 - to be circulated) P. 52, five copies.
8. TO MAKE NOTE:-
- five copies.
9. FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY
(Telegram No. 445 830 and 445 911 - 21 and 22 December to Commanders in Chief of Forces - HQ 007 7699 and 7699)
10. RELIEF TO ALGERIA
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 155 - to be circulated) P. 52, five copies.

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Total available by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, 8-3 and Air Commander-in-Chief I, Mediterranean)
2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (44) 307-10000 - already circulated) P-16. Five copies
3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. 312 (P) (44) 157-10000 - to be circulated)
4. PRIVATE PAPER ISSUES IN ITALY
(Paper No. 312 (P) (44) 157-10000 - to be circulated) P-14. Five copies
5. RAID PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY
(Paper No. 312 (P) (44) 157-10000 - to be circulated) P-16. Five copies
6. PARTICIPATION OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED ITALIAN RESISTANCE MOVES
(Paper No. 312 (P) (44) 157-10000 - to be circulated) P-13. Five copies
7. RELATIONS AND MASS PROSECUTION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION IN ITALY
(Paper No. 312 (P) (44) 160-10000 - to be circulated) P-13. Five copies
8. IN THE LINE
(Paper No. 312 (P) (44) 160-10000 - to be circulated) P-13. Five copies
9. THE ITALIAN SITUATION IN ITALY
(Paper No. 312 (P) (44) 160-10000 - to be circulated) P-13. Five copies
10. RELATIONS TO ALGERIA
(Paper No. 312 (P) (44) 160-10000 - to be circulated) P-13. Five copies
11. MILITARY MISSIONS TO ALGERIA
(Paper No. 312 (P) (44) 160-10000 - to be circulated) P-13. Five copies

NOTE: - Chief, IAD is invited to attend or to not attend for IAD's aid 5.

Minutes of this meeting at 90.

John A. ...
J. A. ...
SECRETARY

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
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British Resident Minister
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SUPREMAC ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

24 DEC 1944

Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences during week ending 30th December, 1944, will be arranged as follows:-

1. There will be NO meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's (Political) Conference on Tuesday 26th December, 1944.

2. The 37th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's (Political) Conference is provisionally scheduled to take place at 1030 hours on Friday 29th December. This meeting will be followed immediately by the Supreme Allied Commander's (Operational) Conference.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander's 9 o'clock meeting will NOT be held on Christmas Day.

24 DEC 1944

C.

Handwritten signature
J. H. M. SCHMIDT
COLONEL
SECRETARY AF.

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff

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The Supreme Allied Commander's 5 o'clock meeting will
 not be held on Christmas Day.

HEADQUARTERS

24 DEC 1944

C.

John H. L. Schell
 J. H. L. SCHILLER
 COLONEL
 SECRETARY.

see by 11/1
by 11/1

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Command R. Eighth Fleet, USA
 Chief of Staff
 Chief Administrative Officer
 Deputy Chief of Staff
 G-1 (A)
 G-1 (E)
 G-2
 G-3
 G-4 (A)
 G-4 (E)
 G-4 (Nav & En)
 G-4 (Log Plans)
 Chief Liaison Section
 Chief Signals Officer
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 British Resident Minister
 Secretary, General Staff
 Secretary, IS & PS
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24th December, 1944.

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SAC (E) (44) 36th Meeting
19th December 1944

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A.F.H.Q.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON TUESDAY 19TH DECEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal The Hon Sir Harold R.G.L. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNamara,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Comodore H.A. Packer, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Hon. Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Phillip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell M. Hicks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

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Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNamara,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Colonel H.A. Packer, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Iva C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Sinner,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Hon. Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Phillip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell A. Weeks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.R. Horn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery A. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Colonel W.B. Hitchens, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General I.L. Foster, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Major General W.A. Stowell,
Commander, 55th

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General F.C. Beaumont Nashitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, GPHQ

Mr. C. Offle,
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major J.C. Swettenham

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(22 (14) 35th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of the meeting of the Political Committee held on 9th December 1944.

2. SAILING OF GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP "GEMDISCA"

RECORDED FACTS said that it was reported that the German hospital ship GEMDISCA would sail shortly from TRINITE in order to take off hospital cases from their garrison in CHATE. He drew attention to the instructions as a result of which this vessel has been intercepted in the course of her previous sailing from this ADON and enquired whether a similar procedure was to be adopted on this occasion. He did not consider there would be any advantage in intercepting the vessel during her outward sailing from TRINITE to CHATE.

MR. KIFF said that the Department of State still maintained the view, which they had expressed on the previous occasion, that interception of the German hospital ship was not advisable. However, he fully realised that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had endorsed the action which the British Admiralty had on that occasion ordered.

THE SUITABLE ALLIED CASE UNDER :

(See also p. 14)

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean :

(a) Arrange for the interception of the GEMDISCA on her return journey from CHATE and for the bringing of this vessel into a suitable Allied port so that German wounded, other than serious cases, could be disembarked and taken into custody.

(b) Determine, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, to what port it would be most suitable to bring this ship in the light of availability of hospital accommodation.

Committee held on 9th December 1944.

2. SAILING OF GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP "GEMDISEN"

COMMODORE GORDON said that it was reported that the German hospital ship GEMDISEN would sail shortly from TRINITE in order to take off hospital cases from their prison in there. He drew attention to the instructions as a result of which this vessel has been intercepted in the course of her previous sailing from the LORRAINE and enquired whether a similar procedure was to be adopted on this occasion. He did not consider there would be any advantage in intercepting this vessel during her outward sailing from TRINITE to GEMDISEN.

MR. KIRK said that the Department of State still maintained the view, which they had expressed on the previous occasion, that interception of the German hospital ship was not advisable. However, he fully realized that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had ordered the action which the British Admiralty had on that occasion ordered.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER :

Directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean :

(See also p. 2)

(a) arrange for the interception of the GEMDISEN on her return journey from GEMDISEN and for the bringing of this vessel into a suitable Allied port so that German wounded, other than serious cases, could be disembarked and taken into custody.

(b) Determine, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, to what port it would be most suitable to bring this ship in the light of availability of hospital accommodation.

3. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

(Papers Nos. 80 (44) 152 and SAC (F) (44) 155) — P. 34, File 218. — P. 31, File 218/10.

THE COMMISSIONER had before him the papers, the first being a record of a meeting held by the Chief Administrative Officer on the subject of food rationing in ITALY at which it had been decided to prepare for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting the establishment of a 300 calorie ration throughout the liberated area of Italy, and the second attaching a draft of such a telegram and recommending that in the event of an unfavourable reply, a further telegram proposing a reduced uniform ration should be despatched.

/LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ROBERTSON

SECRET

Extract on
File 4672
Cdr to
Econ Sec
a 600 24.

J. D.

SECRET

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that previous discussions at the Political Committee in regard to food rationing had been confined to the situation in SICILY, which was somewhat different from the rest of the country in that there was at least a strong suspicion that a considerable quantity of local wheat existed in the island, though it could not be brought forward for amendment. The presentation of a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as directed at Conclusion 3(c) of WC (44) 35th Meeting had commenced but before agreement could be reached two occurrences caused the whole situation to be reviewed. The first event was the receipt of a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, urging the establishment, by importation of the necessary wheat of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated Italy, or, alternatively, if that could not be done, the establishment of a parity ration throughout the area on a reduced scale. The second factor was a telegram from Commanding General, Fifth Army, expressing the view that, unless further supplies were made available in forward areas, militarily serious unrest was likely to result. The former Chief Administrative Officer had, therefore, held a meeting and as a result had directed that a telegram should be drawn up, putting a strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their decision. A draft of this telegram was read before the meeting. Meanwhile, the Allied Commission had that morning reported (cable No. S 395 - WC IN 14636 of 18 December) that notices and posters demanding more food had appeared in FLORENCE. This was a further indication of the seriousness of the situation.

MR. KERR thought it very necessary to lay a final statement before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and especially before the Prime Minister and the President, so that they could realize the consequences of a failure to provide this food. He considered that the phraseology of the draft telegram was impressive.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, confirmed that the necessary food to implement the ration did not exist in the country, except possibly in SICILY. There the government had reached 66 per cent and it was his opinion and that of his advisers that the present government would not be any more successful than its predecessor in obtaining any appreciable increase.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McMAHERY considered that portions of the telegram as at present drafted were most ill advised. Paragraph 1 in effect asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a blank cheque against future operations. The Chiefs of Staff would require an estimate of the impact on future operations of shipping the tonnage of wheat required. He was doubtful of the truth of the statement at paragraph 6

available in forward areas, militarily serious unrest was likely to result. The former Chief Administrative Officer had, therefore, held a meeting and as a result had directed that a telegram should be drawn up, putting a strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their decision. A draft of this telegram was then before the meeting. Meanwhile, the Allied Commission had that morning reported (cable No. S 395 - MC IS 14636 of 18 December) that notices and posters demanding more food had appeared in FLORENCE. This was a further indication of the seriousness of the situation.

MR. KIE thought it very necessary to lay a final statement before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and especially before the Prime Minister and the President, so that they could realize the consequences of a failure to provide this food. He considered that the phraseology of the draft telegram was impressive.

MR. LAMONT BROWN, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, confirmed that the necessary food to implement the ration did not exist in the country, except possibly in Sicily. There the government had reached 66 per cent and it was his opinion and that of his advisers that the present government would not be any more successful than its predecessor in obtaining any appreciable increase.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McLAUREY considered that portions of the telegram as at present drafted were most ill advised. Paragraph 1 in effect asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a blank cheque against future operations. The Chiefs of Staff would require an estimate of the impact on future operations of shipping the tonnage of wheat required. He was doubtful of the truth of the statement at paragraph 6 of the draft that the shipping allotted to the theatre for operational maintenance would not permit any further reduction and urged that an immediate examination should be made to determine what additional shipments were required to meet the 300 gramme ration and what proportion of these could be met from allocations already made to the theatre. The telegram should be redrafted to include this information and the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be asked to provide the balance of the shipping necessary. A contribution by the theatre from normal sailings would assist in securing a favourable reply.

THE SUPREMACY LIEUT COMANDER accepted General McLAUREY's views as to how the case should be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was disturbed by the lack of food which he considered would sooner or later lead to unrest and disorders to the detriment of operations. He considered that definite promises to the Italians had been made and felt that action must be taken to implement them.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL
ROBERTSON

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MEMORANDUM OF MR. ROBERTSON, in reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that owing to the machinery by which previous cuts in the theatre allocation of shipping had been effected these reductions had been made mainly at the expense of UK military maintenance.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer establish:-

(i) That monthly sailings of fleet, additional to those at present programmed, would be required to ensure the maintenance of a 300 grume ration throughout Italy during the period until the next harvest became available for consumption.

(ii) What contribution, if any, in terms of sailings per month, could be made by the Mediterranean Theatre from the existing operational shipping programme without serious prejudice to military operations in the theatre.

(b) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in consultation with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, re-arrange those portions of the draft telegram circulated under paper No. S.A.C. (P) (44) 155 to which the latter had taken exception, in such a way as to put the matter in the best possible light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, adding a statement of the results of the examination carried out under (a) above.

(c) Directed that for the present no action be taken on recommendation 3(b) of paper No. S.A.C. (P) (44) 155 pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 300 grume ration.

(d) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer arrange for the drawing up of plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10 January 1945 but that action to implement such plans be deferred pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 300 grume ration.

(e) Directed that Conclusion 3(b) of PC (44) 35th Meeting be regarded as cancelled.

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and 145 are Paper No. S.A.C. (P) (44) 154.)

In addition to papers which had been considered at their previous meeting, the COMRAH had before them a paper pointing out that the

(b) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in consultation with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, redraft those portions of the draft telegram circulated under paper No. S.C. (P) (44) 135 to which the latter had taken exception, in such a way as to put the matter in the best possible light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, adding a statement of the results of the examination carried out under (a) above.

(c) Directed that for the present no action be taken on recommendation 3(b) of paper No. S.C. (P) (44) 135 pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 360 grenade ration.

(d) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer arrange for the drawing up of plans for further chest shipments to SICILY after 10 January 1945 but that action to implement such plans be deferred pending a reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in respect of the 360 grenade ration.

(e) Directed that Conclusion 3(b) of PC (44) 35th Meeting be regarded as cancelled.

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and S.C. (P) (44) 134) *Page 7*
 144013, 16, File 215/205.

In addition to papers which had been considered at their previous meeting, the CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that the delegation of the C.I.A.I. had certain objections to the draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy.

MR. KIRK said he was in favour of any agreement which the Italian Government were prepared, of their own volition, to enter into with the C.I.A.I. On the other hand, there should not be any Allied attempt to dictate to, or to exert pressure on, either party since such action, apart from being an undesirable intervention in Italian internal affairs, might result in the establishment in Northern Italy of an authority which might later oppose the HOME Government.

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MR. ADAMS pointed out that the first paragraph of the draft agreement circulated with PC (44) 144 had been drawn so as to provide for the participation of the Italian Government in the military agreement, between the Supreme Allied Commander and the C.I.A.I., which had already been signed. The Italian Prime Minister had stated to him that he was prepared to recognize the C.I.A.I. in these terms, or

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alternatively in the terms which had been suggested in August, but he was not willing to designate them as the agents of his Government in Northern Italy. On the other hand, he understood that the C.M.I. were not willing to recognize the Italian Government in the terms proposed.

Major General STELL said that, according to the views which the delegation had expressed to him, the C.M.I. were now prepared to recognize the Italian Government. He was of opinion that their recognition by the Italian Government as the latter's agents would produce much improved resistance activities in northern Italy and would also decrease the problems to be met when that area was occupied. He explained that the Allied authorities had up till now been acting as intermediaries in regard to discussions between the Italian Government and the C.M.I. and he urged that the time had now come for the remaining C.M.I. delegate, who possessed plenary powers, to negotiate directly with the Italian Government a form of agreement for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Committee would not sign the agreement in the form proposed at present.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that an agreement between the Italian Government and the C.M.I. would be advantageous. He would not, however, consider any modification of his existing agreement with the C.M.I.; nor was he willing to enter into a tripartite agreement with that body and the Italian Government, since this would embroil him in any future differences between the C.M.I. and the ROYAL Government. He agreed that representatives of the C.M.I. and the Italian Government should be brought together and allowed to work out an agreement between themselves but as military considerations were involved such an agreement must be subject to his approval.

Major General B.L. BROOKS considered that such an agreement would have two advantages. It would strengthen the hand of the Italian Government after the occupation of northern Italy and meanwhile it would strengthen the partisans and enable them to carry out increased activities. He observed that payments were at present being provided from British sources to the C.M.I. and reported that it had been suggested that if the Italian Government did not agree to take over responsibility for these payments they should become a Joint British and US account. Whatever the financial procedure adopted, however, the commitment would eventually be shouldered by the Italian Government under the existing general financial arrangement.

MR. BROOKS said that the Foreign Office regarded the conclusion of a tripartite agreement as essential, but had not given their reasons for this view. They felt it important that the Supreme Allied Commander should have the power to terminate the agreement when required.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COM. UNDER considered that an agreement between the Italian Government and the C.I.M.I. would be advantageous. He would not, however, consider any definite plan if his existing agreement with the C.I.M.I. was to be willing to enter into a tripartite agreement with that body and the Italian Government, since this would embroil him in any future differences between the C.I.M.I. and the ROME Government. He agreed that representatives of the C.I.M.I. and the Italian Government should be brought together and allowed to work out an agreement between themselves but as military considerations were involved such an agreement must be subject to his approval.

MAJOR GEN. M.L. ROCKS considered that such an agreement would have two advantages. It would strengthen the hand of the Italian Government after the occupation of northern Italy and meanwhile it would strengthen the partisans and enable them to carry out increased activities. He observed that payments were at present being provided from British sources to the C.I.M.I. and reported that it had been suggested that if the Italian Government did not agree to take over responsibility for these payments they should become a joint British and US account. Whatever the financial procedure adopted, however, the commitment would eventually be shouldered by the Italian Government under the existing general financial arrangement.

MR. HADJI said that the Foreign Office regarded the conclusion of a tripartite agreement as essential, but had not given their reasons for this view. They felt it important that the Supreme Allied Commander should have the power to terminate the agreement when required.

MR. ALBERT L. SLESSOR and MAJ. GEN. J. STONE supported the Supreme Allied Commander's view that a bilateral agreement, subject to his approval, should be concluded between the Italian Government and the C.I.M.I. if this could be done without Allied pressure.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COM. UNDER :

(a) Directed that no further action be taken towards concluding a tripartite agreement between himself, the Italian Government and the C.I.M.I.

(b) Directed that the Allied Commission arrange to put the remaining delegate of the C.I.M.I. in touch with the Italian Government with a view to the conclusion between these two authorities, subject to his approval, of a voluntary bilateral agreement to govern their mutual relations.

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(a) Directed that his existing military agreement with the CIA remain unchanged.

5. PRIVATE PRESS OPERATIONS IN ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 193)

THE COMMISSIONER had before them a paper pointing out that it was desirable, in order to give the Italians greater liberty, that private press censorship should soon be permitted to operate in Italy, but arguing that such action would give rise to certain difficulties if the change were made at the present time.

MR. KIRK said that the aim should be that when the Allies left Italy they should leave behind them a healthy, free press. However, unless the Italians were given a measure of freedom now, they would not develop the ability to manage their own affairs. He fully realized that there were certain complications in practice in connection with the proposed changes but he thought that the principle was sufficiently important for these difficulties to be accepted. The position of the military in this matter was, he felt, adequately covered by the requirements of military censorship.

MR. BARNES said that P.B. was perfectly willing to hand over to the Italians the press facilities which they at present controlled in Italy. However, he pointed out that this might give rise to three difficulties. In the first place, as all the existing press was now screened by P.B., it might be necessary for military reasons to impose a political censorship by M.H.Q. the repercussions of which might on occasion be severe. In the second place it was difficult to see how private agencies could be provided with the means of communication necessary to distribute their news throughout the country unless some assistance could be provided by army signals. In this connection, he pointed out, in reply to a remark by Major Admiral Stone, that it would not meet the case if the existing P.B. communications were handed over to an Italian agency, as such action would automatically place that agency in a position of monopoly. The third difficulty which he foresaw was that the opening up of Italy to foreign news agencies would lead to a demand by other private business organizations to commence working in the country. He thought it likely that the Motion Picture companies in particular would make such an application.

MR. A. DUFFELL STONE did not consider that increasing news handled by private agencies would need to be subject to political censorship. He thought that the Italian people should not be permitted to read accounts of current affairs as published in other countries. He pointed out that a procedure had already been set up to deal with the demands of the motion picture companies and he did not foresee any complications

important for these difficulties to be accepted. The position of the military in this category was, he felt, adequately covered by the requirements of military censorship.

MR. BARNES said that PEB was perfectly willing to hand over to the Italians the press facilities which they at present controlled in Italy. However, he pointed out that this might also give rise to three difficulties. In the first place, as all incoming news was now screened by PEB, it might be necessary for military reasons to impose a political censorship by DIA, the repercussions of which might on occasion be severe. In the second place it was difficult to see how private agencies could be provided with the means of communication necessary to distribute their news throughout the country unless some assistance could be provided by army signals. In this connection, he pointed out, in reply to a remark by Rear Admiral Stone, that it would not meet the case if the existing PEB communications were handed over to an Italian agency, as such action would automatically place that agency in a position of monopoly. The third difficulty which he foresaw was that the opening up of Italy to foreign news agencies would lead to a demand by other private business organizations to organize working in the country. He thought it likely that the Motion Picture companies in particular would make such an application.

MR. ADMIRAL STONE did not consider that incoming news handled by private agencies would need to be subject to political censorship. He thought that the Italian people should now be permitted to read accounts of current affairs as published in other countries. He pointed out that a procedure had already been set up to deal with the demands of the motion picture companies and he did not foresee any complications in this respect. He remarked that, even after the proposed admission of private agencies, there would remain a need for PEB facilities in the territory. He agreed with Mr. Barnes that it was not undesirable for the handover to be effected in any way which would tend to produce a monopoly of news in the country.

THE SUPREMACY LIAISON COMMISSIONER considered that, as the Allies had now been in Italy for more than a year, he should be prepared to sacrifice certain advantages in order to give the Italians greater liberty in the management of their internal affairs, provided always that no serious interference with military operations resulted.

MR. BARNES confirmed that this was the aim towards which PEB had been working. The only question for decision was in regard to the timing of the proposed transfer of responsibility. PEB had been organizing

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to build up an Italian non-antipolitic private news agency. However, he did not yet consider that this agency was sufficiently developed to stand on its own feet.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, disagreeing with Mr. Barnes, observed that the Italians themselves thought they were ready to stand on their own feet and appeal to us from external private news agencies indicated that they were of this opinion also.

MEMORANDUM GENERAL McHUGH observed that, if the proposed Italian agency were weak, the external private agency would break it. He considered that the purpose for which these agencies were now trying to secure entry into the country, was to establish their post-war position.

COLONEL HITCHENS said that on grounds of military security a change would not be propitious at the present moment.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) agreed in principle that private news agencies should be allowed to operate freely in Italy at the earliest moment consistent with the military security.
- (b) appointed the following sub-committee :-

Chairman - Chief of Staff

Representatives of - Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Chief Administrative Officer
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Chief Signals Officer
Director, F B
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief, IAC.

Secretary - Major W. L. Barnister

to examine and report to him :-

- (i) at that juncture the removal of the PIB screen on news issued to the Italian press should be effected, and the operation of private news agencies in Italy permitted.

(a) agreed in principle that private news agencies should be allowed to operate freely in Italy at the earliest moment consistent with the military security.

(b) appointed the following sub-committee:-

Chairman - Chief of Staff

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 Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 U.S. Political Advisor
 British Resident Minister
 Chief Administrative Officer
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Chief Signals Officer
 Director, P B
 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
 Chief, INC.

Secretary - Major W. A. Bannister

to examine and report to him:-

(i) As that juncture the removal of the P.B. screen on news issued to the Italian press should be effected, and the operation of private news agencies in Italy permitted.

(ii) That safeguards should be established to ensure that there should be no development in Italy of a monopolistic indigenous news agency.

(iii) That measures should be taken in regard to the dissemination of news in Italy to avoid the publication of material likely to lead to disorder and unrest to the prejudice of military operations.

and that the Sub-Committee confine their recommendations to that part of Italy, responsibility for the administration of which had been returned to the Italian Government.

→ EXTRACT MADE FOR FILE 926/208.

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/s. RALPH

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6. RELIEF IN YUGOSLAVIA

K 552

(Previous reference PG (22) 35th Meeting - Minute 9)

THE CONFERENCE had before them telegram No. PX 69206 to Brigadier Maclean, directing him to endeavour to reach agreement with Marshal Tito on the subject of relief, and telegram No. N.F 829 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the contents of a telegram received from Brigadier Maclean showing the urgent need of relief in D.M.F.L. and of the contents of the Supreme Allied Commander's reply.

MAJOR GENERAL ROCKS pointed out that the reason for the breakdown of negotiations with Tito had been his failure to allow adequate supervision of relief distribution in accordance with the requirements of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL McLENNAN observed that there would be little prospect of obtaining any relaxation of these requirements from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. OTTE stated that an unconfirmed report had that morning reached him that Marshal Tito had agreed to the principle of unrestricted observation and to the entry initially of 100 observers.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COM-MANDER :

Took note of the above discussion.

7. STATUS OF UNRRA - GREECE

THE CONFERENCE :-

Took note of telegram No. LI 183 from III Corps, reporting that UNRRA was withdrawing its personnel from integration with ML GRUCE in the ATHENS-PIRAEUS area, and of telegrams Nos. PX 69914 and N.F 162 to UNRRA, LONDON and C.A.G respectively requesting them to instruct Chief, UNRRA, GREECE Commission, that in any area of withdrawal due to hostilities re-integration should be effected immediately upon cessation of such hostilities.

J. H. Maclean
J. H. MACLEAN,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

MR. OTTIE stated that an unconfirmed report had that morning reached him that Marshal Tito had agreed to the principle of unrestricted observation and to the entry initially of 100 observers.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COM. AREA :

Took note of the above discussion.

7. STATUS OF UNHCR - GROUND

THE COMMISSION :

Took note of telegram No. MI 189 from III Corps, reporting that UNHCR was withdrawing its personnel from integration with MI GRINCH in the THENS-PIRANUS area, and of telegrams Nos. FH 64912 and M.T. 462 to UNHCR. LONDON and COM. C. respectively requesting them to instruct G.H.I.F., UNHCR, CRATE Commission, that in any area of withdrawal due to hostilities re-integration should be effected immediately upon cessation of such hostilities.

J. H. L. SCILLERS
J. H. L. SCILLERS,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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British Honorary Minister
Director, FBI
Secretary General Staff
Secretary, JB & ES
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (a)
G-1 (E)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (a)
G-4 (E)
G-5
Commander, Balkan Air Force
Spain

Chief, JMC Section
Chief Signals Officer
G-4 (M-V & T)
Commander, SOUTO (c/o SOWLO)

Item 5
Item 5
Items 2 & 3
Item 4

EXTRACTS

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Chief, Liaison Section
Chief, Communications, Allied Commission
G-1 (A)
G-1 (P)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (P)
G-5
Commander, Balkan Air Force
Staff

EXTRACTS

Chief, IHC Section
Chief, Signals Officer
G-4 (W & T)
Commander, SMC (c/o HMC)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

20 December 1944

G-5: 337-12

SUBJECT: SACMED Conference 17 Dec 44.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

reference your 217/10/COS dated 19 Dec 1944.

1. Copy No 33 of Secret document K-541, (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting) dated 17 Dec 44 is enclosed for your records. It's earlier omission is regretted.

H. G. Ware
H. G. WARE
Major, RA
Executive Officer

Encl:
as above

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COPY NO. 40

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

1. The Supreme Allied Commander's Conference Room is being converted to a G-2 War Room and its use for Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences and other meetings, except those called by G-2, will be discontinued forthwith.
2. The Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences, both Operational and Political, will be held in future in the G-3 War Room (entrance through room No. 2016).
3. The Supreme Allied Commander's 9 o'clock meetings will continue to be held in the G-3 War Room.
4. The 16th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's (Political) Conference, scheduled for Tuesday 19th December at 1030 hours, will be held in the G-3 War Room and NOT in the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference Room as previously notified.

J.H. Lascelles
J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff

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The 16th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's (Political) Conference, scheduled for Tuesday 10th December at 1030 hours, will be held in the G-3 War Room and NOT in the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference Room as previously notified.

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John H. Lascelles

J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-4 (Mov & Tr)
G-4 (Log Plans)
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief, Signals Officer
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, PW
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Commander, SOWTO, c/o SOWTO
Chief, INW
Spares

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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Tel: 478730

19 December 1944.

Ref: 217/18/005

SUBJECT: SACRED Conference 19 Dec 44.

TO: : AMHQ, G-5 Section.

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1. Reference SECRET document K-541, (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting) dated 17 Dec 44 being agenda for Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) to be held 19 Dec 44.

2. It is noted from the Distribution List, copies No. 31 to 33 should have been received but only copies No. 31 and 32 were received.

For the Chief Commissioner.

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Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-511

SAC (P) (av) 16th Meeting
17th December, 1944

COPY NO. 32

19 DEC 1944

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM ON TUESDAY 19TH DECEMBER, 1944

A G E N D A

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by G-3, G-2, G-in-C Med, Air C-in-C Med)
2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 35th Meeting - already circulated) 60
3. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY
(a) Paper No. PC (44) 152 - already circulated)
(b) Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 155 - to be circulated)
4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(a) Paper No. PC (44) - 144 and Annexure - already circulated)
(b) Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 154 - already circulated)
5. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY
(P for No. SAC (P) (44) 153 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:-

6. RELIEF IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Telegrams No. FX 69206 - MC OUT 5383 and No. NAF 829 - MC OUT 5584 to Brigadier Maclean and Combined Chiefs of Staff respectively, dated 15th December, 1944)

STATUS OF ISHRA - CHECK

7. ((a) Telegram No. LI 189 - MC IN 11433 of 12 December from III Corps.)
((b) Telegrams No. FX 69914 - MC OUT 6036 and No. MAF 462 - MC OUT 6044 to UNTHA LONDON and CCAC

Good Statements by G-1, G-2, G-3-in-C Med, Air C-in-C Med)

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 15th Meeting - already circulated)
3. FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY
(a) Paper No. PC (44) 152 - already circulated)
(b) Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 155 - to be circulated)
4. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(a) Paper No. PC (44) -154 and Annexure - already circulated)
(b) Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 154 - already circulated)
5. PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (44) 153 - already circulated)
- TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-
6. RELIEF IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Telegrams No. EX 69206 - MC OUT 5583 and No. MAP 829 - MC OUT 5534 to Brigadier Macleod and Combined Chiefs of Staff respectively, dated 15th December, 1944)
7. STATUS OF UNRRA - GREECE
(a) Telegram No. LI 189 - MC IN 11433 of 12 December from III Corps.)
(b) Telegrams No. EX 69214 - MC OUT 6036 and No. MAP 462 - MC OUT 6034 to UNRRA LONDON and CCAC respectively, dated 16th December, 1944)

Minutes of this meeting at 6.78

NOTE:-

Commander, GORTO is invited to attend for Item 4
Chief, INC is invited to attend or be represented
for Item 5.

Telegrams (537)
J. H. MASCELLER
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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Deputy Chief of Staff
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British Resident Minister
Director, PWS
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (A)
G-1 (R)
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G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
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Commander, SOWTC, c/a SOWLO
Chief, INW
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G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Commander, COMUSC, c/o SMOLO
Chief, INC
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting
17th December 1944

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

19 DEC 1944

Please note that the time at which the next meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference will be held is 1030 hrs on Tuesday 19th December.

de la...
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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G-3 Special Operations

G-4 (A)

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to Bureau Gen.
J.H. LASCELLES,
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Director, FMB
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
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G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Commander, SCATO, c/o SCALO
Chief, INC
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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

51

AND

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

18 DEC 1944

At the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the following arrangements will come into effect as from Sunday 17th December, 1944:-

1. The Political Committee will cease to exist.
2. A Supreme Allied Commander's Conference will be held at 1010 hours on TUESDAYS to discuss political matters. Normal attendance at these meetings will be as at List "A" attached.
3. A Supreme Allied Commander's Conference will be held at 1010 hours on FRIDAYS to discuss operational matters. Normal attendance at these meetings will be as at List "B" attached.
4. Items and papers for the Agendas will NOT be accepted unless they reach the Inter Service and Political Secretariat before the following times:-

Political matters	1800 hours on Saturdays
Operational matters	1800 hours on Tuesdays

Matters which are of urgent operational importance may, however, be accepted for inclusion in the Agendas later than these times. Such matters should be notified as early as possible to the Inter Service and Political Secretariat.

5. Items put forward for the Agendas will be confined to matters involving important policy decisions.
6. If important matters involving inter-service or political considerations and requiring urgent decisions arise between meetings, the Inter Service and Political Secretariat should be informed of them at once.

7. The Supreme Allied Commander will hold an Operations and Intelligence Conference daily (including SUNDAYS) at 0900 hours in the G-3 War Room. Attendance at this Conference (which supersedes the Chief of Staff's

3. A Supreme Allied Commander's Conference will be held at 1030 hours on FRIDAYS to discuss operational matters. Normal attendance at these meetings will be as at List "B" attached.

4. Items and papers for the Agendas will NOT be accepted unless they reach the Inter Service and Political Secretariat before the following times:-

Political matters	1800 hours on Saturdays
Operational matters	1800 hours on Tuesdays

Matters which are of urgent operational importance may, however, be accepted for inclusion in the Agendas later than these times. Such matters should be notified as early as possible to the Inter Service and Political Secretariat.

5. Items put forward for the Agendas will be confined to matters involving important policy decisions.

6. If important matters involving inter-service or political considerations and requiring urgent decisions arise between meetings, the Inter Service and Political Secretariat should be informed of them at once.

7. The Supreme Allied Commander will hold an Operations and Intelligence Conference daily (including SUNDAYS) at 0900 hours in the G-3 War Room. Attendance at this Conference (which supersedes the Chief of Staff's Morning Meeting) will be as at List "C" attached. Those on both lists "B" and "C" (other than speakers at the 9 o'clock meeting) will NOT be expected to attend the 9 o'clock meeting on Fridays.

John Harding 533

JOHN HARDING
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff

Attached.

15th December, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

LIST "A"

1. Supreme Allied Commander
2. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
4. Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
5. Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
6. Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
7. Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
8. Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
9. United States Political Adviser
10. British Resident Minister
11. Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
12. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ
13. Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission for Italy.
14. Director, Psychological Warfare Branch, AFHQ

TUESDAYS
1030 hrs.

with. in attendance

15. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ
16. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ
17. Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ
18. Deputy United States Political Adviser

LIST "B"

1. Supreme Allied Commander
2. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
4. Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
5. Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
6. Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
7. Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
8. Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
9. Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
10. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ
11. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

with. in attendance

12. Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ
13. Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ
14. Chief, G-3 Operations Section, AFHQ
15. Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF

LIST "C"

1. Supreme Allied Commander
2. Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

17. Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ
 18. Deputy United States Political Adviser

LIST "B"

1. Supreme Allied Commander
2. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
4. Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
5. Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
6. Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
7. Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
8. Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
9. Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
10. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ
11. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

with. in attendance

12. Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ
13. Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ
14. Chief, G-3 Operations Section, AFHQ
15. Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF

LIST "C"

1. Supreme Allied Commander
2. Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
3. Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
4. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ
5. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ
6. Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
7. Chief of Staff to Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
8. Chief Intelligence Officer, HQ MAAF
9. Deputy Director of Operations, HQ MAAF
10. Chief, G-3 Operations Section, AFHQ
11. Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ
12. Deputy Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ
13. Commander "A" Force

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-4 (Mov & In)
G-4 (Log Plans)
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Signals Officer
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Director, PWF
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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Lt. Col. Crichton, c/o IS & PS
Chief, INC
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Signal Officer
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Director, PWD
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
SOM IG
Lt. Col. Orlinton, c/o IS & PS
Chief, INC
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

EC (11) 35th Meeting (Corrigendum)
13th December 1944

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

1. As the request of Mr. Broad the following amendment is issued to the Minutes of the 35th Meeting of the Political Committee :-

Item 11. Add after Brigadier Lush's statement the following :-

"MR. BROAD said that H.M. Government considered that it was necessary to adhere to the existing agreement under which proposed appointments must all be submitted to the Allied Commission for approval".

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies accordingly.



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Director, PAF
Secretary, General Staff
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Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (a)

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J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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HEADQUARTERS

18 JUL 1945

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J.H. LASCHELLE,
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British Resident Minister
Director, PCE
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & P
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
G-1 (A)
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Commander, Balkan Air Forces
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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
ROOM AT 1130 HOURS ON SATURDAY 9 DECEMBER, 1944.

PRESENT:-

- General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNerney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
- Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Lieutenant General Ian C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA
- Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gervail,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.F. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honorable Alexander G. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. P. Brand, representing
British Resident Minister.

Major General Lovell W. Hooker,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.H. Hunt, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Brigadier M.S. Rush, representing

Lieutenant General Ian C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Harry E. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gurnell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.D.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. P. Buxton, representing
British Resident Minister.

Major General Lovell W. Brooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel T.S. Hunt, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Brigadier W.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Psychological Warfare Branch.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General T.S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General T.G. Bennett-Moylett,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Mr. C. Coffie,
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor

SECRETARIES:

Colonel J.H. Lascollon
Major J.V. Sebastian

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1. MINUTES OF THE ONE MEETING.

2 521

(PC (44) 34th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their Meeting held on 30th November, 1944.

2. RELIEF FOR SICILY.

(Previous reference PC (44) 34th Meeting - Minute 5.)

COLONEL NENE reported that arrangements were in hand to commence distribution of relief in AGRIGENTO on 1 January 1945. A mission was being dispatched to the country in the near future to make the necessary contacts.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER took note with approval of the above.

3. RELIEF FOR SICILY.

(Previous reference - PC (44) 34th Meeting - Minute 7.)

BRIGADIER HUGH stated that the position regarding the arrangement of Sicilian grain had further deteriorated and present supplies would run out in the major towns on 15 December. A shipment of 9,000 tons was due to arrive on 20 December and it was proposed to cover the intervening period by sending 5,000 tons of grain to SICILY by rail. The shipment of 9,000 tons would then suffice until 10 January. Thereafter imports would be reduced until the next harvest in July. The present shortage was due to the failure of the Italian Administration to secure delivery from the local farmers of an adequate supply of grain, an amount of which had failed by some 70,000 tons to meet even the reduced estimate. However, it had always been realized that local supplies would not suffice for the needs of the island until the next harvest and the import of some 121,000 tons, in March and subsequent months, had been envisaged in order to support the 500,000 ration. He suggested that these shipments might now be spread over the months January - June, either the amount of the ration or the number of ration holders being proportionately reduced. The reduction of the ration to 200 rations could allow a reduction to some 70/80,000 tons in imports. In reply to a question by Mr. Kirk, he stated that the Italian Administration had, in certain cases, used both troops and carabinieri to seize hoarded grain from the farmers, but this action had not in the main been directed against the larger land-owners, who were considered to be the principal offenders. The High Commissioner in SICILY had now ordered farmers to produce 25 kg. each of wheat immediately. The local administration were taking steps to enforce the collection of this amount.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROMANEY believed that there were considerable supplies of local wheat hoarded in SICILY. The Allies should not employ operational

BRIGADIER USK stated that the position regarding the movement of Sicilian grain had further deteriorated and present supplies could run out in the near future on 15 December. A shipment of 3,000 tons was due to arrive on 20 December and it was proposed to cover the intervening period by sending 5,000 tons of grain to SICILY by rail. The shipment of 9,000 tons would then suffice until 10 January. Thereafter imports would be required until the next harvest in July. The present shortage was due to the failure of the Italian Administration to secure delivery from the local farmers of an adequate supply of grain, amounting of which had failed by some 70,000 tons to meet even the estimated estimate. However, it had always been realized that local supplies would not suffice for the needs of the island until the next harvest and the import of some 121,000 tons in March and subsequent months had been envisaged in order to support the 200 ration. He suggested that these shipments might now be spread over the months January - June, either the amount of the ration or the number of ration holders being proportionately reduced. The reduction of the ration to 200 ounces would allow a reduction to some 70/80,000 tons in imports. In reply to a question by Mr. Kirk, he stated that the Italian Administration had, in certain cases, used both troops and carabinieri to seize hoarded grain from the farmers, but this action had not in the main been directed against the larger land-owners, who were considered to be the principal offenders. The High Commissioner in Sicily had not ordered farmers to produce 25 kg. each of wheat immediately. The local administration were taking steps to enforce the collection of this amount.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONTAGNEY believed that there were considerable supplies of local wheat hoarded in SICILY. The Allies should not employ operational shipping to import grain into areas in which local supplies existed. It should be made plain to the Italian Government that by 10 January 1945 they must have made adequate arrangements to provide grain for the Sicilian towns from local resources, if necessary by forceful requisition. In his opinion, the only way to force the administration to requisition local wheat was to suspend shipments, as in present circumstances these only served to feed the black-market. Suspension of shipments might be coupled with Government-controlled relief.

BRIGADIER USK in reply pointed out that, as the shortage was confined to the towns, withholding of shipments might cause riots in PALERMO and CATANIA. He did not consider that the provision of relief, by means of emergency soup kitchens or such like arrangements, under Italian Government control was practicable in view of the weakness of the administration.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONTAGNEY observed that the Sicilian ports were of considerable Naval importance and riots in these towns would have an adverse effect on Naval operations in the Theater.

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MR. BURNS AG. Fifth Lieutenant General HARRIS, while maintaining their view in the hope of obtaining higher prices on the black market. He considered, however, that no manipulation of prices paid by the Government would induce the farmers to bring forward more grain. If riots occurred, he thought that they would be directed against the larger landowners and not initially be anti-allied in nature.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL FLARE reported that the maintenance of the 300 grange ration in SICILY would involve a commitment for 42 Liberty shipwrecks month, which would only be met if the volume of operational requirements. He thought, and Lieutenant General GERRARD agreed, that the two Italian Divisions in SICILY should be used to extract the hoarded grain by force.

THE ALLIED COMMISSION was not prepared to accept the idea of rationing from operational requirements. He considered that the Sicilian action should be reduced to 200 tonnes at once.

MR. BURNS felt that it was necessary to galvanize the Italian Government into action to force the local farmers to hand over their wheat. He thought that the best means of doing this was to withhold further shipments and enforce the immediate reduction of the ration.

MR. BURNS, while agreeing with Mr. BARK, commented that this action would need to be taken in conjunction with a carefully planned propaganda campaign.

THE ALLIED COMMISSION DIRECTOR:

(a) That the Allied Commission take action to move 5,000 tons of wheat to SICILY by rail, in order, in conjunction with the shipment of 9,000 tons by sea on 20 December, to provide adequate grain for the Sicilian towns until 10 January.

(b) That the Allied Commission instruct the Italian Government:

(1) That in view of the failure to secure adequate assessment of local wheat in SICILY, the ration in that island should be reduced to 200 tonnes *per annum* 13 (c) *per annum*.

(2) That the Italian Government to requisition adequate local supplies *Volio 45* requirements of the Sicilian towns from 10 January 1945 until the next harvest must be taken at once.

(3) That further shipments would not be if following.

Staff Officer, that of the Italian Government in Sicilian *Volio 75, para 3(c)* that *Cancelled* *Volio 75, para 3(c)* as to the course to be adopted in the event of continued Italian failure to supply

SECRET

MR. BROAD, while agreeing with Mr. Wick, commented that this action would need to be taken in conjunction with a carefully planned propaganda campaign.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMISSIONER (FRODO)

(a) That the Allied Commission take action to move 5,000 tons of wheat to SICILY by rail, in order, in conjunction with the shipment of 9,000 tons and on 20 December, to provide adequate grain for the Sicilian towns until 10 January.

(b) That the Allied Commission instruct the Italian Government:

(i) That in view of the failure to secure adequate movement of local wheat in SICILY, the ration in that island should be cancelled - see *enclosure 3 (c)*, *ibid.*

(ii) That the Italian Government to requisition adequate local supplies to meet the requirements of the Sicilian towns from 10 January 1945 until the next harvest must be taken at once.

(iii) That further shipments would not be forthcoming.

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[Cancelled - see *folio 75, para 3(c)*]
(c) That if proper for his approval, a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the situation in Sicily, that the Italian Government has cancelled the rationing of wheat in Sicily, as a result of the failure to secure adequate local movement.

6. ALLIED YUGOSLAV ASSOCIATION.

(Page No. PG (44) 143)

SUBMISSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS INTO YUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION.

(Page No. PG (44) 150)

THE COMMITTEE had before them two reports, the first recommending a procedure for screening Yugoslav requests to have deserters from the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation apprehended and returned to Yugoslav jurisdiction and the second dealing with the subject of subversion of Italian troops of Yugoslav origin and their illegal recruitment into the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, recommending an interim reply to the Italian Minister of War on the subject pending a full investigation of Yugoslav activities in Italy.

See *folio 75, para 3(c)*

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ALLIED COMMANDERS considered that it should be made clear that only personnel from the Fortress Land Forces would be returned to their jurisdiction. The position had become obscure owing to Kikine's broadcast from LONDON directing all Yugoslavs to declare for Marshal Tito's forces, but he understood that this did not apply to the Royal Yugoslav Navy and Air Force for which separate arrangements were in force. Despatchers from the Royal Yugoslav Navy or Air Force should be handed back to these organizations.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ELLER wished it to be made clear that some 18 men of the Royal Yugoslav Air Force, now serving with USAAF, should not be released, against their will, to return to Yugoslavia, where they felt reprisals would be taken against them.

MR. ELLER considered that final action on these matters should not be taken until the results of Dr. Subasic's conversations in LONDON, regarding the formation of a United Provisional Yugoslav Government, were known.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Deferred action on Paper No. 50 (44) was instructed the Secretary to bring this paper forward for further consideration by the Political Committee when the results of Dr. Subasic's conversations in LONDON were known.

(b) Directed that G-3 address an interim report to the Allied Commission in accordance with Conclusion 5 g of Paper No. 50 (44) 150.

(c) Directed that G-2 (in conjunction with G-3, G-5, Liaison Section and 34 Military Mission) prepare for the Political Committee a report as to the numbers, location and activities of members of Yugoslav Military Officers and Missions in ITALY, and as a result of their investigation:

(1) Draft for his approval a further communication to be made to the Allied Commission for transmission to the Italian Minister of War.

(2) Recommend, as soon as the United Provisional Yugoslav Government was established, what action should be taken to induce this Government to eliminate its numerous Liaison Officers and Missions, reducing its military representations to conformity with the proper needs in ITALY.

5. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL.

(Paper No. 50 (44) 147)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper describing how certain anti-Tito Yugoslav Officers had requested the Allied Commission to allow them to recruit anti-Tito Yugoslav personnel into combatant units, and recommending that action should be taken by the Allies with a view to such a development.

Secretary to bring this paper forward for further consideration by the Political Committee that the results of Dr. Subasic's conversations in LONDON were known.

(5) Directed that 5-5 address an interim reply to the Allied Commission in accordance with Conclusion 5 of Paper No. PC (44) 139.

(6) Directed that 5-7 (in conjunction with 5-3, 5-4, Liaison Section and 3a Military Mission) prepare for the Political Committee a report on the numbers, location and activities of unauthorized Yugoslav Liaison Officers and Missions in Italy, and as a result of their investigation:

(1) Draft for his approval a further communication to be made to the Allied Commission for transmission to the Italian Minister of War.

(11) Recommend, as soon as the United Provisional Yugoslav Government has established, what action should be taken to induce this Government to eliminate its superfluous Liaison Officers and Missions, reducing its Military Representatives to conform with its proper needs in Italy.

5. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL.

(Paper No. PC (44) 147)

THE COMMITTEE met before then a paper describing the certain anti-Tito Yugoslav Officers had requested the Allied Commission to allow them to recruit anti-Tito Yugoslav personnel into combatant units, and recommending that no action should be taken by the Allies with a view to such a development.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

323

Approved the conclusion set forth at paragraph 4 of Paper No. PC (44) 147 and directed that the Allied Commission take action accordingly.

6. ITALIAN SCHOONER REUTINGS.

(Paper No. PC (44) 145)

THE COMMITTEE had before then a paper stating that it was desirable, for Naval reasons, for Italian schooners proceeding to the Northern Adriatic to use routes through Yugoslav territorial waters, but pointing out the political difficulties which such a course involved.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed that Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean:

(a) Request Marshal Tito through Brigadier Liaison to authorize the passage through Yugoslav territorial waters of schooners proceeding under the Italian flag on missions in direct support of Allied Military operations, and to issue the necessary instructions to local Yugoslav Commanders.

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785017

SACMED Decides to enter
a Bilateral agreement
(Minutes of Meeting
of SACMED's Political
Committee, 9 Dec 74)

Under 5:

By The Committee

✓

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(u) Consider whether any identifiable marks already carried by such vessels, should be adopted to facilitate their identification by the Yugoslavs as employed in Allied service.

7. EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN GROUND ON COMBINED ARMY OPERATIONS.

(Paper No. PC (44) 151)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper, showing that present conditions in GROUND rendered any equitable distribution of relief extremely difficult, and recommending that a draft cable be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in- forming them of the position and requesting guidance.

MAJOR GENERAL ROUS stated that recent developments in GROUND raised two points in regard to relief supplies. In the first place, it was for consideration whether a further air drop should be issued to Lieutenant General Seabie. Secondly, he thought it would be appropriate to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the action being taken in respect of HQ GERM.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Director that no further instructions be sent to Lieutenant General Seabie in respect of relief matters at present.

(b) Approved the draft telegram annexed to Paper No. PC (44) 151 and directed that G-5 inspect it.

8. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a record of a meeting held by the Chief of Staff at which there had been drawn up a draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI). The agreement had been so drafted that, by the omission of certain passages, it could be converted into a bilateral agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLNAI. The annexure to this paper described how, in view of the delay it would be necessary before the Italian Government could sign the agreement and the urgent need of the CLNAI delegates to return to Northern Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander had decided to proceed immediately with the bilateral agreement and to return the Italian. It was reported to the Committee that this agreement had subsequently been signed and that it was hoped that the agreement of the Italian Government to convert it into a tripartite agreement would be secured at a later date.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

EXCERPT MADE FOR FILE *by*

9. RELIEF MATTERS IN YUGOSLAVIA.

(a) Directed that no further instructions be sent to Lieutenant General Seabie in respect of relief matters at present.

(b) Approved the draft telegram annexed to Paper No. 10 (44) 151 and directed that it be dispatched.

9. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS.

(Paper No. 10 (44) 144 and Annexure.)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a record of a meeting held by the Chief of Staff at which there had been discussion of a draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI). The agreement had been so drafted that, by the inclusion of certain paragraphs, it could be converted into a bilateral agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CLNAI. The annexure to this paper described how, in view of the delay that would be necessary before the Italian Government could sign the agreement and the urgent need of the CLNAI delegates to return to Northern Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander had decided to proceed immediately with the bilateral agreement and to return the document. It was reported to the Committee that this agreement had subsequently been signed and that it was hoped that the agreement of the Italian Government to convert it into a tripartite agreement would be secured at a later date.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above. *Yes*
 EXCISE MEMO FOR FILE 304/10

10. RELATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAVS.

(Paper No. 10 (44) 140)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper pointing out that it had been intended to send two relief ships to SPLIT and DUBROVNIK under certain conditions, less restrictively than those necessary for the fulfilment of the full plan, but that Marshal Tito had been unwilling to accept even these reduced conditions. In consequence these ships had not been sent, but on humanitarian grounds a consignment of supplies had been sent by technicians to SPLIT. Marshal Tito had been informed of this in telegram No. FY 62867 dated 4 December 1944.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

10. RELATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAVS.

(Paper No. 10 (44) 149)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper regarding copies of draft agreements between the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito, in regard to the introduction of forces into the Ljubljana area and the use of Yugoslav ports.

Subsequently dispatched as MAT 442 of 9 December.

SECRET

SECRET

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by Allied Naval Force. These draft arrangements had been taken into consideration by the British War Cabinet for nomination with Marshal Tito.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

11. FORMATION OF NEW ALLIED GOVERNMENT.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMISSIONER requested that the position regarding the submission of the names of the new Italian Government for approval by the Allied authorities, with particular reference to the precedent set at the time of the last change of government.

MR. KIRK recalled that the situation at the last change of government was a special one and that the British Government, on being informed of the composition of the new government, asked that an extraordinary meeting of the Advisory Council should be held to express its opinion on Sir Peter BEMONT and the government which had not taken office until that opinion had been expressed. Mr. Kirk observed that the United States Government also took the position that the composition of the Italian Government was entirely a matter for the Italians themselves, although any new government must subscribe to the new constitution towards the Allies as had been undertaken by the previous government, and the Supreme Allied Commander might, if necessary, for military reasons, veto the appointment of the heads of service ministries.

MR. KIRK stated that the composition of the new government would be notified to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in the course of the day and that the Chief Commissioner would inform the United States and British representatives in Rome who would report the matter to JPMG. It did not seem stimulated that the composition of the government required approval by JPMG.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

DISTRIBUTION

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Chief Commander-in-Chief, Western Front
- Commander, 11th Army, USF
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- U.S. Political Advisor
- British Resident Minister
- Director, HQ
- Secretary General Staff

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Handwritten signature
J. H. L. GIBBONS,
Colonel,
Staff.

the same committee towards the Allies as had been undertaken by the previous government, and the Supreme Allied Commander might, if necessary for military reasons, veto the appointment of the heads of service ministries.

SAULNIER UGH said that the composition of the new government could be notified to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in the course of the day and that the Chief Commissioner would inform the United States and British representatives in Rome and would report the names to AFHQ. It had not been stipulated that the composition of the government required approval by AFHQ.

Will see you too.

THE COMMITTEE took note of the above.

Handwritten signature
J. H. L. GORDON,
Colonel,
Staff Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Military
Air Commander-in-Chief, Military
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, HQ
Secretary General Staff
Secretary, IS & IS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief, Communications, Allied Commission

G-1 (a)
G-1 (3)

G-2

G-3

G-3 Special Operations

G-4 (a)

G-4 (3)

G-5

SP-1

Commander, Balkan Air Force

EXTRACTS

1. Col. J. A. Evans, HQ III Corps
2. Lt. (General) C/O G-5
Commander SOUTO C/O SOUTO

Minute 7
Minutes 2, 7 and 9
Minute 8

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PC (44) 35th Meeting
8th December, 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

12 DEC 1944

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1130 HOURS ON SATURDAY
9TH DECEMBER, 1944.

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 34th Meeting - already circulated)
2. ALLEGED YUGOSLAV DESEETERS
(Paper No. PC (44) 142 - already circulated)
3. SUBVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS IN TO YUGOSLAV
ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
(Paper No. PC (44) 150 - already circulated)
4. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Paper No. PC (44) 147 - to be circulated)
5. ITALIAN SCHOOVER ROUTINGS
(Paper No. PC (44) 145 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE:-

6. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure - already circulated)
7. RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 146 - already circulated)
(Telegram No. FY 62267 to Maclean Mission - MC CUT 1313 - 4 Dec)
8. RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. PC (44) 149 - already circulated)

Notes:- Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 is requested to
attend for Items 2 and 3.

Minutes of this

to be cancelled

L. H. 14302115

- 3. (Paper No. PC (44) 148 - already circulated)
SUBVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS IN TO YUGOSLAV
ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION
(Paper No. PC (44) 150 - already circulated)
- 4. ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Paper No. PC (44) 147 - to be circulated)
- 5. ITALIAN SCHOONER ROUTINES
(Paper No. PC (44) 145 - already circulated)
- 6. TO TAKE NOTE:-
RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 144 and Annexure - already circulated)
- 7. RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 146 - already circulated)
(Telegram No. FX 62857 to Maclean Mission - MC OUT 1312 - 4 Dec)
- 8. RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. PC (44) 149 - already circulated)

Note:- Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 is requested to attend for Items 2 and 3.

to be cancelled
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
Secretary.

Minutes of this meeting at 2 to

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Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-12	G-3	38-39	
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	13-14	G-3 Sp.Ops.	40-41	
Chief of Staff	15	G-4 (A)	41	
Chief Administrative Officer	16	G-4 (B)	42	
Deputy Chief of Staff	17	G-5	43-45	
U.S. Political Adviser	18-20	Commander, JCM	46	
British Resident Minister	21-24	Spores	47-51	
Director, PNE	25			
Secretary, General Staff	26			
Secretary, IS & PS	27-29			
Chief, Liaison Section	30			
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	31-33			

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32

EC (44) 35th MeetingALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEERESTRICTED**-8 DEC 1944**

The 35th Meeting of the Political Committee will take place on WEDNESDAY 9TH DECEMBER at a time to be advertised later and NOT on WEDNESDAY 6th December as previously notified. Revised agenda will be circulated in due course.

See 54

J. H. LASHLINGS
 J. H. LASHLINGS
 COLONEL
 SECRETARY

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Supreme Allied Commander
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 U.S. Political Advisor
 British Resident Minister
 Director, F7B
 Secretary, General Staff
 Secretary, IS & PS
 Chief, Liaison Section
 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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G-3 Special Operations

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J. H. HANCOCK
COLONEL
SECRETARY

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FWD
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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5th December, 1944.

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PC (44) 5th Meeting
5th December, 1944

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

7 DEC 1944

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
WILL BE HELD AT 1100 HOURS IN THE SEPTIMS
ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM ON
THURSDAY 6TH DECEMBER, 1944

SECRET

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 5th Meeting - already circulated)
2. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Paper No. PC (44) 144 - already circulated)
(Paper No. PC (44) 144 Summary - to be circulated)
3. ITALIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
(Paper No. PC (44) 145 - already circulated)
4. ITALIAN RESISTANCE IN YUGOSLAVIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 146 - to be circulated)
5. ANTI-FASCIST YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL
(Paper No. PC (44) 147 - to be circulated)

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff

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PC (44) 34th Meeting
1st December, 1944.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
ROOM AT 1800 HOURS ON THURSDAY 30TH NOVEMBER, 1944

cc 1031

DET 2 REPS

5 DEC 1944

PRESENT:-

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John E.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Glessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James H.M. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.D.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer

Mr. F.G. Reinhardt, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Dron, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General D. Kose,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spafford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Dornell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer

Mr. F.G. Reinhardt, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spafford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Brigadier M.S. Lusk, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier C.F. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAG

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
G-3 Plans, AFHQ

Colonel T.B. Henn,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

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/Secretaries....

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 33rd Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 22nd November, as subsequently amended.

2. PARTISAN MISDEMEANORS IN PARI
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 3)

MAJOR GENERAL NOCE reported that the Partisan Commander in BARI had now received instructions from Marshal Tito that JANI personnel in Italy were to conform with the orders in force for all Allied troops. While he had undertaken, therefore, that arms would not be carried off duty, personnel on guards or pickets would be armed.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK stated that officers commanding hospitals had complained that Partisan Commanders were discharging JANI patients without reference to the RAMC staff. He had accordingly requested Brigadier Maclean to ask Marshal Tito to issue orders designed to discontinue this practice.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note with approval of the above statements by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and the Chief Administrative Officer.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GIMMELL stated that the Allied Commission believed that the question of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy had been one of the factors contributing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. Alternative tripartite and bilateral memoranda of agreement had now been drafted but no further action would be taken until the new Italian Cabinet had been formed and the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission had reported as to the possibility of obtaining the Italian Government's adherence to the proposed agreement. The military advantages of their participation were considerable but might have to be over-ridden by political considerations, in which case the bilateral form of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy could be used. He added that on the recommendation of Commander, SCN it was proposed to increase the monthly contribution to the Committee from 100 million lire to 160 million lire.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note with approval of the above statements by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and the Chief Administrative Officer.

3. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAMBELL stated that the Allied Commission believed that the question of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy had been one of the factors contributing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. Alternative tripartite and bilateral memoranda of agreement had now been drafted but no further action would be taken until the new Italian Cabinet had been formed and the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission had reported as to the possibility of obtaining the Italian Government's adherence to the proposed agreement. The military advantages of their participation were considerable but might have to be over-ruled by political considerations, in which case the bilateral form of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy would be used. He added that on the recommendation of Commander, SOI it was proposed to increase the monthly contribution to the Committee from 100 million lire to 160 million lire.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note with approval of the above
Excluded from G-3 1301/44

4. FOOD MEASURES IN ROMANIA
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 6)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that the Officer Commanding DEIR had reported from SPLIT that food was so scarce that he had supplied a certain quantity including flour to the local population. In exchange for it he had been receiving vegetables. Admiral Cunningham felt that it was improper for H.M. ships to engage in barter, but had queried whether it could not be possible to allow naval craft proceeding to ROMANIA to carry up to 10 tons of supplies drawn from military stocks, as had been done at the time of the German withdrawal from GREECE.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK reported that the previous day he had reported to the Chief of Staff for Yugoslavia had not been received for some 10 days as it was felt that if the same procedure was followed to Yugoslavia in accordance with Conclusion 3(c) of PC(44) 33rd Meeting, Partisan local commanders might have refused to allow them to unload, pending receipt of TITO's orders. Brigadier Maclean was now on his way to BELGRADE with instructions to obtain TITO's agreement to the unloading of these ships and other emergency measures of relief without prejudice to the BARI discussions. He appreciated, however, that it might be some time before TITO's instructions were received at the ports.

MR. BUCK pointed out that a telegram had already been despatched to BELGRADE embodying the instructions given to Brigadier Maclean.

MR. VASSAL STUBBS thought that ad hoc relief should be introduced forthwith on the lines suggested by Admiral Cunningham.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

(a) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for the immediate sailing for destinations previously planned of the two relief ships now held at TARIKHO, and for their retention offshore from their destination if Marshal Tito's agreement to their discharge had not been received by the time they arrived.

(b) Authorised the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to arrange further that there is proceeding to Yugoslav ports should each carry up to 10 tons of relief supplies drawn from military stocks if, in the opinion of these two officers, the supplies provided under (a) above proved insufficient to relieve destitution in the vicinity of the ports.

5. RELIEF INTO ALBANIA (Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 10)

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPENCER reported that contrary to Conclusion 10(a) of PC (44) 33rd Meeting, G-5 with the concurrence of the Chief of Staff, the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister had deemed it advisable to inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that steps were being taken to initiate relief operations in Albania. Before this decision could be implemented, it would be necessary to allot the service units required by ME (ALBANIA). This question was now under review but it would probably be some weeks before relief supplies began to reach ALBANIA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (a) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for the immediate sailing for destinations previously planned of the two relief ships now held at T. M. A. T. C. and for their retention offshore from their destinations if Marshal Tito's agreement to their discharge had not been received by the time they arrived.
- (b) Authorized the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to arrange further that vessels proceeding to Yugoslav ports should each carry up to 10 tons of relief supplies drawn from military stocks if, in the opinion of these two officers, the supplies provided under (a) above proved insufficient to relieve destitution in the vicinity of the ports.

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(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 10)

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above.

6. ALLIED AIR MINISTRY
(Previous reference PC (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 12)

MINISTER GENERAL GAMBELL observed that, in advancing Allied Governments' desiderata in connection with the new Italian Government, the Allied Commission had asked that General Piacentini, the Italian Chief of Air Staff, be relieved of the additional role of Secretary of Staff for Air and that a non-service Secretary of State be appointed.

BRIGADIER CUNNINGHAM reported that the Allied Commission had asked his request also asked for the retention of Admiral de Courten as Minister of Marine.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above statement.

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7.

FOR SECURITY

(Previous reference 22 (44) 147)

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THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper:-

- (a) Revealing that the movement of Sicilian grain had fallen short of previous estimates, and that it would be necessary to import 160,000 tons of wheat between January and June 1945 if the bread ration of 300 grams were to be maintained.
- (b) Explaining, five courses open to the Supreme Allied Commander, and requesting attention as to which of them should be adopted.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPURDIN pointed out that, in addition to the five courses suggested, it might be possible to institute emergency soup kitchens or such-like arrangements.

BRIGADIER WISH stated that:-

- (i) Even if movement had come up to expectations, the Sicilian crop would not have been sufficient for the maintenance of the bread ration at 300 grams.
- (ii) The local administration though it had improved on last year's record had clearly failed to organize effective management of the crop but it was felt that this could not be done without imposing repressive measures which would undoubtedly lead to disorders.
- (iii) Prior to the war the consumption of bread had been well in excess of 300 grams per head, and the island had relied to a great extent on imports.
- (iv) Signor ROMONI, in reply to a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had stated that sufficient wheat or other food would not be found on the island, even if existing resources were tightened up. He presented most strongly for imports in order to permit the maintenance of the 300 grams ration. The Allied Commission had accordingly undertaken to find a shipment of wheat in December, and had told the Italian Government that further consideration would be given to this problem, but that no further assistance could be expected before 15 January, 1945.
- (v) Sicilians were counting on recent public statements to the effect that the 300 grams ration would be maintained, and its reduction would almost certainly have adverse political repercussions.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

- (1) By 11 if ~~amount~~ had come up to expectations, the Sicilian crop would not have been sufficient for the maintenance of the bread ration at 300 grams.
- (11) The local administration thought it had improved on last year's record but clearly failed to organize effective assessment of the crop but it was felt that this could not be done without imposing repressive measures which would undoubtedly lead to disorders.
- (111) Prior to the war the consumption of bread had been well in excess of 300 grams per head, and the island had relied to a great extent on imports.
- (iv) Senator MANONI, in reply to a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had stated that sufficient wheat or other food would not be found on the island, even if existing measures were tightened up. He pressed most strongly for imports. In order to permit the maintenance of the 300 gram ration. The Allied Commission had accordingly undertaken to send a shipload of wheat in December, and had told the Italian Government that further consideration would be given to this problem, but that no further assistance could be expected before 15 January, 1945.
- (v) Sicilians were counting on recent public statements to the effect that the 300 grams ration would be maintained, and its reduction would almost certainly have adverse political repercussions.

MR. BARNES thought that this problem, if not resolved, would give the Sicilians a grudge which would be hard to beat the ROMAN government. He also reported that small farmers were unwilling to surrender their grain, arguing that the large holders were retaining theirs for sale on the black market.

REPRESENTATIVE CLARK agreed that much grain was being held by the farmers. He felt that the Sicilians would always ask for more, and he urged that the Italian Government be told that they must find a solution for this problem themselves.

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MR. C. D. observed that the situation in Sicily was likely to be difficult for some time. He felt that if nothing were done to help it over this problem its instability would be increased. He suggested that a compromise should be adopted. Imported supplies should continue to be provided, but on an "ad hoc" basis, depending on the situation from month to month. At the same time the Italian Government should not be informed of this policy, but pressure on them to extract further grain in SYRILY should be increased.

MR. BIRKHEAD doubted whether indirect pressure on the Italian Government was likely to produce the desired results.

MR. BIRKHEAD, MR. C. D. and MR. BIRKHEAD LUSH, replying to a question by the DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, agreed that, again, the price paid to farmers would not bring about an improvement in the situation. Contrary to the allegations of certain farmers, it was considered that the price of 1,000 lire per quintal was a fair one and covered costs of production.

MR. BIRKHEAD LUSH pointed out that the Sicilian separatist movement was strong, and that it was believed in certain quarters to have the support of the Allied Government. He agreed, therefore, that the political implications of the problem were considerable.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER did not believe that this was a suitable case for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would accept neither the diversion of shipping from operational commitments in order to bring in imports, nor the use of force to increase movement. He felt, therefore, that the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S ruling of 22 September should be maintained, namely that no further imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available. He was of the opinion that no indication should be given to the Italians that they might receive supplies after the December ship-load. He agreed that the Sicilian population should not be allowed to die of starvation, but felt that if the Italian administration was incapable of feeding it adequately, soup kitchens or similar measures under Allied control should be instituted.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (a) Directed that the policy set forth in the Supreme Allied Commander's letter of 22 September 1944 (see X above) be maintained without modification.
- (b) Directed that the Allied Commission inform the Italian Government that no imports of wheat to Sicily could be maintained without modification.

7. LARSEN SUGGESTION pointed out that the Sicilian sentiment movement was strong, and that it was believed in certain quarters to have the support of the Allied Governments. He agreed, therefore, that the political implications of the problem were considerable.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER did not believe that this was a suitable time for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would accept neither the diversion of shipping from operational commitments in order to bring in imports, nor the use of force to increase movement. He felt, therefore, that the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S ruling of 24 September should be maintained, namely not to withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available. He was of the opinion that no indication should be given to the Italians that they might receive supplies after the December ship-load. He agreed that the Sicilian population should not be allowed to die of starvation, but felt that if the Italian administration was incapable of feeding it adequately, soup kitchens or similar measures under Allied control should be instituted.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (a) Directed that the policy set forth in the Supreme Allied Commander's letter of 24 September 1944 (see 2 above) be maintained without modification.
- (b) Directed that the Allied Commission inform the Italian Government that no imports of wheat to Sicily could be expected by them after the December ship-load already promised.
- (c) Directed that G-5 study and report to an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of organizing emergency distribution of food in SICILY under Allied control.
- (d) Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer expedite and report to an early meeting of the Political Committee as to the repercussions on operational shipping commitments if the imports required to maintain the bread ration in SICILY at 300 grams were sanctioned.

8. BRITISH MILITARY MIS-ION TO ALBANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 143) — P. 7, See 26/ces.

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper and draft telegram to the War Office recommending the formation of a British Military Mission to be despatched to ALBANIA at an early date and outlining its main functions.

SECRET
/MR. BROAD...

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MR. BROOKS explained that neither the British nor the U.S. Governments were at present willing to recognize the P.R.G. who were actually the "de facto" government in ALBANIA. Consequently it was not proposed to send diplomatic representatives to that country. It was necessary to maintain contact but it was thought to be undesirable to keep the existing SOE missions in the country in view of the nature of their past activity. It was therefore suggested that the most practical "stop-gap" would be a military mission.

MR. BENTHAM reported that an OCS party was in ITALY in readiness to go into ALBANIA. The State Department had been informed of the British intentions outlined in the paper under discussion.

MR. BENTHAM thought it was illogical to withdraw the SOE missions and introduce an OCS party simultaneously.

MAJOR GENERAL ROOPE replied that the C.I. party in question was only a small one headed by an Army Captain. He also pointed out that, unlike SOE, OCS did not engage in covert activity only. He was of the opinion nevertheless that a U.S. Military Mission, similar in character and composition to the British Mission suggested should also be sent into ALBANIA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to despatch to the War Office the draft telegram as amended in discussion.
- (b) Directed that 7-5 seek authority from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for the formation of a U.S. Military Mission to ALBANIA, similar in character and composition to the British Mission under discussion.

9. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AT BARI

AIR MARSHAL GLESSOR understood that the U.S. Political Advisor and British Resident Minister were contemplating closing their offices in BARI. Both these offices had been of great assistance to Commanders Balkan Air Force and Land Forces Adriatic, and he thought it highly desirable to maintain US and British Political advisors in BARI, even after representation had been set up in BRINDISI and TIRANA.

MR. BROOKS explained that the office of the British Resident Minister in BARI, of which he was himself normally in charge, covered YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and GREECE, the first two countries named being their principal interest. These missions were properly established in YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA there would no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the British Resident Minister's office at BARI. Nevertheless, he proposed to suggest to the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Advisor that they should attach representatives

He was of the opinion notwithstanding that a U.S. Military Mission, similar in character and composition to the British Mission suggested above, should be sent into BAHAI.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to instruct to the War Office the draft telegram is amended in discussion.
- (b) Directed that it be sent authority from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for the formation of a U.S. Military Mission to BAHAI, similar in character and composition to the British Mission under discussion.

9. POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF BAHAI

MR. BARRELL, SLEZOGA understood that the U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister were contemplating closing their offices in BAHAI. Both these offices had been of great assistance to Commander Balkan Air Force and Land Forces activities, and he thought it highly desirable to maintain US and British political advisers in BAHAI, even after representation had been set up in MOSCOW and TIRAN.

MR. BARRELL explained that the office of the British Resident Minister in BAHAI, of which he was himself normally in charge, covered YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and ROMANIA. The first two countries named being of their principal interest. These missions were properly established in MOSCOW and TIRAN, there would no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the British Resident Minister's office at BAHAI. Nevertheless, he proposed to suggest to the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser that they should attach representatives to the ACC Balkan Air Force when they closed their offices in BAHAI.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Indorsed MR. BARRELL's suggestion recorded above and invited him to take action accordingly.

J.H. Lechley
 J.H. LECHLEY
 COLONEL
 SECRETARY.

Despatched as FX 61059 dated 1st December, 1944.

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Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
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Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, R3
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
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G-1 (B)
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G-3
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Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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PC (44) 311 Meeting
SAC (44) 117th Meeting
29th November, 1944.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

AND

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

1 DEC 1944

A COMBINED MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
AND THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1500 HOURS ON THURSDAY
30TH NOVEMBER, 1944

A G E N D A

A. POLITICAL COMMITTEE

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 23rd Meeting - already circulated)

2. MEET FOR SICILY

(Paper No. PC (44) 142 - to be circulated)

3. MILITARY MISSION TO ALBANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 143 - to be circulated)
(Telegram No. EAF 473 from Balkan Air Force
dated 23rd November, 1944)

B. SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION

(Oral statements by G-3, G-2, C-in-C Med, Air C-in-C Med)

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (44) 116th Meeting - already circulated)

3. EMERGENCY RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA

(Oral statement by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

4. OPERATIONAL POLICY IN RESPECT OF CRETE

(Oral statement by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

307

1.

MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 33rd Meeting - already circulated)

2.

MEET FOR SICILY

(Paper No. PC (44) 142 - to be circulated)

3.

MILITARY MISSION TO ALBANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 143 - to be circulated)
(Telegram No. BAF 473 from Balkan Air Force dated 23rd November, 1944)

1.

THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION

(Oral statements by G-3, G-2, G-in-C Med, Air G-in-C Med)

2.

MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (44) 115th Meeting - already circulated)

3.

EMERGENCY RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA

(Oral statement by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

4.

OPERATIONAL POLICY IN RESPECT OF CRETE

(Oral statement by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

minutes of this meeting at P. 57

to General

J. H. LASCELLES

COLONEL

SECRETARY.

Hand 50

-1-

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NOTE:-

Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 is invited to attend for item A 3

Assistant Chief of Staff G-5 is invited to attend for items B 3 and 4.

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British Resident Minister
Director, PME
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
G-4 (A)
G-4 (E)
G-4 (Mov & In)
G-4 (Log Plans)
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Assistant Chief of Staff, 2-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, 2-5

G-4 (A)
G-4 (E)
G-4 (Mov & Trn)
G-4 (Log Plans)
G-1 (A)
G-1 (E)

G-3 Special Operations
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief, Signals Officer
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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
AND
POLITICAL COMMITTEE

1 DEC 1944

1. There will be NO meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference or Political Committee on WEDNESDAY 28th November, 1944.

2. A combined meeting will be held at 1500 hours on THURSDAY 30th November, 1944. Agenda and papers will be circulated in due course.

3. The Chief of Staff's morning conference will be held as usual at 0900 hours on Wednesday 29th November, 1944.

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS

G-4 (A)

G-4 (E)

G-4 (Mov & Tr)

G-4 (Log Plans)

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3. The Chief of Staff's morning conference will be held as usual at 0900 hours on Wednesday 29th November, 1944.

John MacLean
J.E. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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British Resident Minister	20-22
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	23
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	24-31
Secretary, General Staff	32
Secretary, IS & PS	33-36
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G-4 (Log Plans)	39
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PC (44) 33rd Meeting (Corrigendum)
20th November, 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

At the request of the U.S. Political Adviser the following amendment to the minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the Political Committee is notified.

MINUTE 2: after Brigadier Hodgson's statement insert the following:-

"MR. KIRK stated that since 3-3's recommendation had been made without consultation with his office, and since he understood that Colonel McDowell had appreciated that the situation as set forth in Mihajlovic's message under reference was a fairly accurate presentation of the facts, he felt that further consideration should be given to this matter. He observed that in America there was considerable feeling with regard to Mihajlovic's position and there was in the United States a large Yugoslav colony which was deeply interested in the matter."

Amend the opening sentence of Colonel Sloane's statement to read :-

"COLONEL SLOANE replied that "

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies in accordance with the above.

John A. ...
J. A. ...
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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" MR. KIRK stated that since G-3's recommendation had been made without consultation with his office, and since he understood that Colonel McDowell had appreciated that the situation as set forth in Mihajlovic's message under reference was a fairly accurate presentation of the facts, he felt that further consideration should be given to this matter. He observed that in America there was considerable feeling with regard to Mihajlovic's position and there was in the United States a large Yugoslav colony which was deeply interested in the matter."

Amend the opening sentence of Colonel Sloan's statement to read :-

" COLONEL SLOAN replied that "

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies in accordance with the above.

Colonel
J. R. DISCHER
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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British Resident Minister
Director, F&Z
Secretary, General Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
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G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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44. Mr. Macmillan

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PC (44) 33rd Meeting (Corrigendum)
24th November 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

27 NOV Read

1. The following amendment is issued to the Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the Political Committee :-

Page 33. --- Minute 2. Delete conclusion and last sentence of Mr. Macmillan's statement and substitute the following :-

"The report should also state that, in view of the urgent need, limited relief supplies (i.e. those at present loaded and awaiting despatch at Bari) were being despatched to YUGOSLAVIA under the best arrangements possible for observation in the circumstances and regardless of the outcome of the negotiations.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) approved the immediate despatch of limited tonnages of relief supplies to YUGOSLAVIA, on the understanding that the best arrangements possible in the circumstances were made for observation of distribution by ML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA), and directed that the Chief Administrative Officer take action accordingly.

(b) Directed that G-5, in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, draft for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting the present status of negotiations regarding relief for YUGOSLAVIA and the action being taken under (a) above, and requesting guidance as to the line to be taken if the Yugoslavs maintained their refusal to accept travelling observers".

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies accordingly.

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Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Approved the immediate despatch of limited tonnages of relief supplies to YUGOSLAVIA, on the understanding that the best arrangements possible in the circumstances were made for observation of distribution by A. H. (YUGOSLAVIA), and directed that the Chief Administrative Officer take action accordingly.
- (b) Directed that G-5, in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, draft for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting the present status of negotiations regarding relief for YUGOSLAVIA and the action being taken under (a) above, and requesting guidance as to the line to be taken if the Yugoslavs maintained their refusal to accept travelling observers".

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies accordingly.

J. H. Laschilles
J. H. LASCHILLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet
Chief of Staff
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Deputy Chief of Staff
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British Resident Minister
Director, PMU
Secretary, General Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Secretary, IS & IS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commander, Balkan Air Force
M. H. (Belkane),
Spares

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Add:
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1C (44) 33rd Meeting
22nd November 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER'S CONFERENCE
ROOM AT 1530 HOURS ON TUESDAY 21ST NOVEMBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Captain W.B. Leine, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gansmull,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander G. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell H. Rocks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier D.E.P. Hodgson, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.H. Spafford,
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, AFHQ

Commander Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slenser, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Darnall,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Rt. Honourable W. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lowell W. Rocks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier D.E.P. Hodgson, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.H. Spafford,
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, AFHQ

Commodore Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Colonel C.C. Slone, Jr., representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Major General W.H. MacLeod,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (B)

Lieutenant Colonel H. Davis, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A)

(for item 5)

(for item 5)

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Major General H.A.M. Stewell,
Commander, Special Operations, Mediterranean

Mr. P. Broad,
Office of the Budget, Resident Minister

Mr. C. Orrin,
Office of the U.S. Pollution Advisor

QUESTIONS

Colonel V.K. Lascelles
Major T.E. Rose

1. LIMITS OF PREVIOUS TESTING

$(12, 44, 32)$ (Hagena)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 15th November 1944.

2. MESSAGE FROM CENTRAL LEADERSHIP

(Previous reference: PC (44) 32nd Meeting - X(ante 2)

BRIGADIER HODGSON reported that Colonel Macdonell's committee on General Mihajlovic's last message had now been received and that G-3 recommended that no further action be taken. — See New York Folio (100)

COLONEL GLAVNE, replying to a question by Mr. Kink, stated that Lieutenant Colonel Macfarwell had undoubtedly been restricted in his comments while with Mihajlovic and information had certainly been "planted" on him. Information from independent and reliable sources left no doubts as to Mihajlovic's collaboration with the enemy.

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Tack note of the above and directed that in view of the evidence of Mike Jolevic's collaboration with the enemy available to G-2 no reply be sent to his last message or any further action taken in the matter.

3. PARTIAL DISSECTIONS IN WPT

(Previous references PC (44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 3)

WITNESSES: General Clark stated that he had now received a report from [redacted] that [redacted] had improved.

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MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 32nd Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 15th November 1944.

2. MESSAGE FROM GENERAL MIKHAILOV

(Previous reference PC (44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 2)

BRIGADIER HOBSON reported that Colonel Macdowell's comments on General Mihajlovic's last message had now been received and that G-3 recommended that no further action be taken. - See New para Folio (249)

COLONEL MACDOWELL, replying to a question by Mr. Kirby, stated that Lieutenant Colonel Macdowell had undoubtedly been restricted in his movements while with Mihajlovic and information had certainly been "planted" on him. Intelligence from independent and reliable sources left no doubts as to Mihajlovic's collaboration with the enemy.

THE JAPANESE ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above and directed that in view of the evidence of Mihajlovic's collaboration with the enemy available to G-2 no reply be sent to his last message or any further action taken in the matter.

3. PARTISAN DISSEMINATORS IN RUPI

(Previous reference PC (44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 3)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK stated that he had now received a report from Commander, 3 District, stating that while Partisan behaviour had improved slightly no concrete results were likely until orders had been received from Marshal Tito. 2,000 Partisans were now being evacuated weekly and it might be possible to increase this figure to 2,500. On the basis of a weekly evacuation of 2,000 it was estimated that there would result in Italy on 1 January 1945 4,000 JANI personnel, 3,000 non-Ital, 1,000 and 500 displaced persons.

MR. BACOD reported that Russian personnel in the RUPI area were also carrying arms and agreed that there had been a slight improvement in Partisan behaviour.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that it was unsatisfactory that the Russians and the Partisans should not conform to the orders in force for other Allied personnel and should continue to carry arms.

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THE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT :

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Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer prepare a brief on this matter for discussion with Brigadier McLean during his forthcoming visit to RHM, with a view to representing strongly to him the need for him to issue specific orders designed to improve this situation.

6. SECURITY SITUATION IN RHMS

(Paper No. FC (44) 136)

THE COMINTRE had before them a paper indicating that the security situation in RHMS was serious enough to warrant consideration of precautionary measures and recommending :

- (a) That the Chief Administrative Officer investigate the underlying causes for this situation.
- (b) That G-3 examine the present internal security scheme for the area and recommend any additional measures necessary.

COLONEL SLINGS explained that the paper had been compiled on information received from Commander, RHMS.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT stated that in the absence of the Commander, RHMS, he had discussed the situation with his deputy during his recent visit to RHMS and he believed that the main cause of unrest was the food shortage and the consequent constant rise in prices. He himself had come to the conclusion that this situation was to some extent due to the presence in RHMS of large numbers of Allied personnel and he felt that certain sections were there because of the amenities offered by the city, whereas they could equally well be accommodated and carry out their duties in other parts of Italy. Thus he was somewhat concerned at the proposal to start a U.S. replacement camp in the area for some 5,000 to 7,000. While it was desirable to restrict the numbers of Allied personnel in the RHMS area, he particularly wished not to cut down the numbers on leave in view of the educational benefits derived from such visits.

MAJOR GENERAL HOMS pointed out that no suitable alternative accommodation for a replacement camp of the size required could be found in Italy and, in view of the serious replacement situation in Fifth Army, it seemed necessary to proceed with the scheme.

MAJ. KITE observed that if the U.S. replacements could be used if necessary to assist in the maintenance of internal security their presence would be beneficial. This consideration would to some extent offset the Supreme Allied Commander's objections. He wondered, however, whether Italian troops were not better suited for such duties.

(b) That G-3 examine the present internal security scheme for the area and recommend any additional measures necessary.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIDNEY explained that the paper had been compiled on information received from Commander, Pao. 5.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF, COLONEL STONE, stated that in the absence of the Commander, Pao. 5, he had discussed the situation with his deputy during his recent visit to Pao. 5 and he believed that the main cause of unrest was the food shortage and the consequent constant rise in prices. He himself had come to the conclusion that this situation was to some extent due to the presence in Pao. 5 of large numbers of allied personnel and he felt that certain sections were there because of the ammunition offered by the city, whereas they could equally well be accommodated and carry out their duties in other parts of Italy. Thus he was somewhat concerned at the proposal to start a U.S. replacement camp in the area for some 5,000 to 7,000. While it was desirable to restrict the numbers of allied personnel in the Pao. 5 area, he particularly wished not to cut down the numbers on leave in view of the educational benefits derived from such visits.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROCKS pointed out that a suitable alternative accommodation for a replacement camp of the size required could be found in Italy and, in view of the serious replacement situation in Fifth Army, it seemed necessary to proceed with the scheme.

MR. WICK observed that if the U.S. replacements could be used if necessary to assist in the maintenance of internal security their presence would be beneficial. This consideration would to some extent offset the Supreme Allied Commander's objections. He wondered, however, whether Italian troops were not better suited for such use.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GARNETT enquired whether more use could not be made of the Carabinieri. Sir Noel Charles felt that their lot was not a happy one and had suggested that something might be done to improve it.

COLONEL STONE, replying to a question by Mr. Wick, stated that the Italian Government had not asked for an increase in the number of Italian troops in the Pao. 5 area or anywhere else on the mainland. While he believed that increased numbers of Carabinieri could most usefully be employed and he agreed with Lieutenant General Garnett's suggestion that it might therefore be desirable to increase their pay and retentions, this would give them better treatment than the Italian army, including those units fighting with A.I. This policy was therefore questionable. He considered that press attacks on the Italian forces, which were increasing, could be dealt with by censorship since it could be argued that they were military rather than political in character.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF, COLONEL STONE :

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(a) Direct, that G-3 instruct Commander, 1st Airborne Division, to report on the internal security situation in the NCMS area and to recommend any additional precautionary measures considered necessary.

(b) Directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, examine and report at an early meeting of the Political Committee on the feasibility of increasing the strength and improving the conditions of service of the Carabinieri.

(c) Directed that G-2 report to him periodically on the internal security situation in the NCMS area.

5. STATUS OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN UNITED STATES CUSTODY AND OF ITALIAN CO-OPERATORS IN BRITISH CUSTODY SERVING IN ITALY

(Paper No. FC (44) 130)

THE COMMISSION had before them a paper arising out of FC (44) 31st Meeting, Conclusion B:

(a) Recommending that the status of prisoner-of-war status be removed provided present conditions of service remained unchanged.

(b) Submitting a draft letter directing the Allied Commission to invite the Italian Government to make proposals as to the manner in which prisoner-of-war status could be removed.

(c) Submitting a draft telegram for despatch to the Chiefs of Staff outlining the above recommendation and action.

MAJOR GENERAL MACLEOD reported that he had discussed this question during his recent visit to LONDON. The War Office were opposed to any change which might dislocate the present administrative arrangements which were working well. He felt, however, that if a change of name only were contemplated, such as the substitution of "Employment" for "prisoner of war" there could be no objection.

MR. KILN thought it was unnecessary to inform the Italian Government that this question was under discussion with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the draft letter to the Allied Commission be amended accordingly.

MAJOR GENERAL HARRIS suggested that a sentence might be added to paragraph 2 of the draft telegram intimating that Italian prisoners of war in British custody had also been moved to Italy.

BRIGADIER GENERAL STAPTON observed that Major General Macleod's suggestion was within the terms of the Directive regarding Italian prisoners of war received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in September.

Contributor :

- (a) Recommending that the status of prisoner-of-war status be removed provided present conditions of service remained unchanged.
- (b) Submitting a draft letter directing the Allied Commission to invite the Italian Government to make proposals as to the manner in which prisoner-of-war status could be removed.
- (c) Submitting a draft telegram for despatch to the Chiefs of Staff outlining the above recommendation and action.

MAJOR GENERAL L. MACLEOD reported that he had discussed this question during his recent visit to LONDON. The War Office were opposed to any change which might dislocate the present administrative arrangements which were working well. He felt, however, that if a change of name only were contemplated, such as the substitution of "employment" for "prisoner of war" there could be no objection.

MR. KIRK thought it was unnecessary to inform the Italian Government that this question was under discussion with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the draft letter to the Allied Commission be amended accordingly.

MAJOR GENERAL MOORS suggested that a sentence might be added to paragraph 2 of the draft telegram intimating that Italian prisoners of war in British custody had also been moved to ITALY.

MAJOR GENERAL GREGORY observed that Major General Macleod's suggestion was within the terms of the Directive regarding Italian prisoners of war received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in September.

THE SHIPPER ALLIED COMRADES :

- (a) Directed that G-5 despatch the telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the letter to the Allied Commission, amended in accordance with the above discussion.
- (b) Invited the United States Political Advisor to inform the State Department of the action being taken.

6. RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

(Paper No. PG (44) 127)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :-

Extracts made from the British

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(a) After giving the terms of a draft agreement, the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy was prepared to encourage the Italian Government to enter into with the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy.

(b) Suggesting a procedure for the disposal of Italian patriots liberated by the Allied armies.

MR. GENERAL STANLEY, replying to the report, stated that representatives of the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy were at present in Rome and had had preliminary discussions with the Italian Government and himself. They felt that recognition would give them a greater measure of control over the various sub-committees in the North and would increase their influence with industrialists which they deemed to be particularly desirable in view of the anti-secret policy now being pursued. They also believed that recognition would give them greater protection from reprisals from the Fascists, whom they feared more than the Germans.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that, although past experience in other countries had shown that the recognition of liberation movements entailed dangerous political consequences, the military advantage in this instance appeared to dictate it. It might be more logical for the proposed agreement to be entered into between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy but such a procedure would involve the practical difficulty of supplying 100 million metropolitan lire monthly, since the currency in use in liberated Italy was valueless on the enemy side of the line.

CARDON STONE reported that he had had a preliminary discussion with the Italian Prime Minister, who was agreed to the Committee's proposal that it should exercise control in liberated areas until the Italian Government was established. He added that the Committee's representative had indicated to the Italian Government that their proposals carried the agreement of Mr. Macmillan and himself which in fact was untrue. He had not yet discussed the question of funds with the Italian Government but he believed that they might find it possible to furnish the 100 million metropolitan lire monthly provided the equivalent were made available to them in liberated Italy in Allied military currency. This would remove the practical objection to the conclusion of an agreement between the Committee and the Supreme Allied Commander.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GARNELL observed that it might be more desirable to enter into a tri-partite agreement.

MR. KILK concurred in Lieutenant General Gammelle's suggestion but suggested that in compilation be used and that the Italian Government merely be invited to be a party to the agreement.

MR. MACMILLAN thought that some limit should be set to the military assistance given to the Committee of National Liberation and that this should be fixed

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...to dictate it. It might be more logical for the proposed agreement
...be entered into between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Committee of
...National Liberation in Northern Italy but such a procedure would involve the
...practical difficulty of supplying 100 million metropolitan lire monthly, since
...the currency in use in liberated Italy was valueless on the away side of the
...line.

CHANDLER STONE reported that he had had a preliminary discussion with
the Italian Prime Minister, who was opposed to the Committee's proposal that
it should exercise control in liberated areas until the Italian Government
was established. He added that the Committee's representative had indicated
to the Italian Government that their proposals carried the agreement of Mr.
Macmillan and himself which in fact was untrue. He had not yet discussed
the question of funds with the Italian Government but he believed that they
might find it feasible to furnish the 100 million metropolitan lire monthly
provided the equivalent was made available to them in liberated Italy in
Allied military currency. This would remove the practical objection to the
conclusion of an agreement between the Committee and the Supreme Allied Com-
mander.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GARNETT observed that it might be more desirable to
enter into a tri-partite agreement.

MR. KING concurred in Lieutenant General Garnett's suggestion but sug-
gested that a compromise be used and that the Italian Government merely be
invited to be a party to the agreement.

MR. MACMILLAN thought that some limit should be set to the monetary
assistance given to the Committee. He suggested that this should be based
on the basis of a given sum per month per head, the total sum not to exceed a
fixed amount. Subject to the addition of such a clause and to rewriting of
paragraphs 5 and 8 designed to secure a greater measure of Allied control he
thought that the agreement as submitted could serve as a basis for further
discussions between representatives of AFH, AI and the Allied Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that the Allied Commission invite the Italian Government
to furnish to the Allied Military authorities for payment of the
Committee of National Liberation in Northern Italy some 100 million
metropolitan lire a month in exchange for the equivalent in Allied
military currency and to join in a tri-partite agreement, reporting
to the next meeting of the Political Committee as to the Italian
Government's reactions.

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(b) Der. of test G-3, in conjunction with Officer, WAF, 441, SOW and the Chief

(2) There is a revised draft memorandum of discussion in the light of the above discussion.

(13) examine the proposed remedies for the disposal of liberated slaves, and recommend what action should be taken in this matter and by whom.

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THE OFFICERS had before them a paper covering a draft telegram for
forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff incorporating the modification
of the 1944 (77) CICA memorandum dated 10 March 1944 - Minute 10.

THE OTHERS WILL BE CALLED :

Directed that C-5 despatch the telegram to the Cabinet Office of Soviet A. The series is needed further: in discussion.

[illegible]

THIS CULTURE HAS LIVED THROUGH A REVOLUTION

(a) indicating that the above conversations on relief and rehabilitation had been suspended owing to the Yugoslav delegation's insistence on restricting Allied rights of aid facilities for observation.

(b) Recommending that no action be taken to in this matter and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be advised accordingly.

MR. BROWN explained that agreement had been reached on all aspects except the observers. The Yugoslav delegates had agreed to the presence of observers in Sofia and centers of distribution but not to travelling observers. The principal Yugoslav delegate had departed for BELGRADE to seek further instructions on this point. He added that there was an urgent need on the Dalmatian coast for the contents of two relief vessels which were at present loaded and awaiting despatch in BARI. In reply to an observation by Air Marshal Glessor that the missions were sending in large quantities of grain to YUGOSLAVIA he observed that these supplies could not reach these parts of the country which stood in need of them. He agreed, however, that it was urgently necessary for the allies to counter-balance Russian aid to YUGOSLAVIA.

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1. TREATMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE YUGOSLAV PARTISANS

(Telegram No. PzP 461 dated 13 November 1944 from H. Balkan Air Force)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a telegram from the Balkan Air Force reporting the shooting in DUBROVNIK of German prisoners of war and alleged Yugoslav collaborators.

MR. BEAUF said that strong representations should be made to Marshal Tito in this matter, particularly as British forces were now fighting alongside the KML in YUGOSLAVIA. He added that he was expecting an independent report on the subject and undertook to forward this to JFH when received.

THE CHIEF ALLIED COMANDANT remarked that the Russians and Partisans were reported to be shooting some of their German prisoners of war in the BELORUSS area. It would be difficult therefore to induce Partisans elsewhere to do otherwise. However the shooting of alleged Yugoslav collaborators was entirely the domestic concern of the Yugoslavs themselves.

THE CHIEF ALLIED COMANDANT :

Directed that G-3 prepare a brief on this matter for discussion with Brigadier Isachsen during his forthcoming visit to JFH and that the brief contain a draft statement for presentation to Marshal Tito reminding him of the undertaking given on his behalf by General Weighill regarding the treatment of German prisoners of war at the meeting held at JFH on 28th April 1944. (SAC (44) (Special) 1).

12. RELIEF INTO ALBANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 139)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper recommending :-

- (a) That AL (ALBANIA) be directed to initiate relief operations forthwith without prior negotiations with any Albanian authorities but subject to notification to them of intended entry.
- (b) That a revised Memorandum of Agreement for use between AL (ALBANIA) representatives and local Albanians, as now submitted, be approved.

MR. BEAUF reported that COL. Balkan Air Force, was informally discussing proposals similar to those embodied in the paper with the Albanian Committee in Bari. He asked, therefore, that a decision in this matter might be deferred until the outcome of these discussions was known.

THE CHIEF ALLIED COMANDANT :

- (a) Endorsed Mr. Broad's suggestion recorded above and invited him to inform

Directed that G-3 prepare a brief on this matter for discussion with Sir Miles Maclean during his forthcoming visit to AFH and that the brief contain a draft statement for presentation to Marshal Tito regarding his of the undertakings given on his behalf by General Velabje regarding the treatment of German prisoners of war at the meeting held at AFH on 20th April 1944. (SAC (44) (Special) 1).

10. REPLYING INFO. ALBANIA

(Paper No. PG (44) 139)

THE COMMISSION had before them a paper recommending :-

(a) That ML (ALBANIA) be directed to initiate relief operations forthwith without prior negotiations with any Albanian authorities but subject to notification to them of intended entry.

(b) That a revised Memorandum of agreement for use between ML (ALBANIA) representatives and local Albanians, as now submitted, be approved.

12. HOGD reported that AGC, Balkan Air Force, was informally discussing proposals similar to those embodied in the paper with the Albanian Committee in Balli. He asked, therefore, that a decision in this matter might be deferred until the outcome of those discussions was known.

THE SUMMER ALBANIAN AGREEMENT :

(a) Endorsed Mr. Dwyer's suggestion recorded above and invited him to inform G-3 of the outcome of those discussions in due course.

(b) Directed that G-3 refer this matter again to the Political Committee when they had examined Mr. Dwyer's report on the Balli discussions.

11. LEAFLETS TO GERMAN TROOPS IN GREECE

AIR MARSHAL GIBSON drew attention to telegram No. ON 735 dated 19 November from H. 3 Corps, suggesting that leaflets stating information that British forces could round up the German Garrison of CRETE when they thought it fit should be dropped on the Germans in the island. He was of opinion that this threat should be omitted from the proposed leaflet as it could not be implemented at present.

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Understood to clear the leaflet which was now in course of publication with the RAF.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the view of Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, recorded above and back note with an oval of the undertaking by Director, FAE.

12. ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY

MR. MARINO SLOUGH stated that General Piacentini, the Italian Chief of Air Staff, had for some months been fulfilling the additional role of Secretary of State for Air. Piacentini was a satisfactory Chief of Staff but he was inclined to dabble in politics as Secretary of State for Air and the efficiency of the Italian Air Force was being adversely affected in consequence. He thought that the appointment of a non-service Secretary of State was therefore desirable.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that the Communist Party was at present claiming all the service portfolios. If this issue were forced on the Italian Prime Minister the new Secretary of State might be found to be obstructive both to MacF and to the Italian Prime Minister. He thought, therefore, that Commodore Stone might merely request to Sir Horace Rumbold that, if any changes in his Government were contemplated, the relief of Piacentini at the Air Ministry by a civilian would be desirable.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the British Resident Minister's intervention recorded above and directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, take action accordingly.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister

to Casale
J.B. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Dist. No.

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under the new Secretary of State might be found to be obstructive both to LIAF and to the Italian Prime Minister. He thought, therefore, that Comodoro Stone might merely suggest to Signor Bonomi that, if any changes in his Government were contemplated, the relief of Piacentini at the Air Ministry by a civilian would be desirable.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSION:

Endorsed the British Resident Minister's suggestion recorded above and directed that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, take action accordingly.

to Comander
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
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G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (H)
G-5
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Secrecy

Commander, Balkan Air Force
Commander, SSM
N.H. (Balkans)

EXTRACTS

Items 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 (5 copies)
Item 6 (1 copy)
Items 7 and 10 (3 copies)

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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CC 1002-2

18 November 1944

18 NOV Recd

Subject: Distribution of Political Committee Papers

To: Inter-Service and Political Secretariat, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

Will you kindly add the following to distribution of all Political Committee Papers -- Agenda and Minutes -- which would normally be sent to this Commission:

- 1 - Acting President, Allied Commission
- 1 - Chief of Staff, Allied Commission

For the Chief Commissioner:

2A2

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

cc: CofS ✓
A File

431

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

29

POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS

NOV. 29, 30, 31, 32.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

MA to A/cc 30

13th October 1944

ConfidentialPOLITICAL COMMITTEECORRIGENDUM

11 OCT Recd

Please amend the Minutes of PC (44) 28th Meeting of 11th October as follows :-

On page 7 PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE RELIEF IN ALBANIA

to be numbered 11

" " 7 REQUEST FROM ALLIED (SOVIET) HIGH COMMAND, ROMANIA, FOR BRITISH FILMS

" " "

" " 8 FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

" " "

*Amended
15/10*

J.B. LINDSAY, COLONEL, SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
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British Resident Minister
Chief, PWs
Secretary, General Staff
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
G-2
G-3
G-3 Special Operations
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Secretary, IS & PS
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GNC, MEF
Liaison Section
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission
Spares

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EC (44) 20th Meeting
12th October 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEAD-QUARTERS

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 1

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON
TUESDAY 11TH OCTOBER 1944

14 OCT Recd

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Halsland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Commodore L.T. Penkhurst, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General R.G. Lewis, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General D. Nee,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Commodore Ellery G. Stone, USN,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General I.T.L. Hughes,
Commander, M.H. (Balkans)

Major General F.G. Bennett Nesbitt,

Air Commodore L.T. Penhurst, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir James A.H. Gemmell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General R.G. Lewis, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honorable Alexander G. Kirk,
U.S. Political adviser

Mt. Honorable R. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General D. Nee,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Commodore Ellery W. Stone, USN,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING ARE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General I.T.J. Hughes,
Commander, 1st H. (Belkoms)

Major General F.G. Beaumont Hobbs,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spafford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Brigadier General A.J. McChrystal,
Chief, INS

(for Item 6)

Mr. C.E. Steel,
Office of British Resident Minister

Mr. C. Coffin,
Office of U.S. Political adviser

Colonel E.S. Hyde,
G-1 (A) Section, AFHQ

(for Item 5)

/SECRETARIES

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Copy 48 to AFHQ
46 'SIPAR'

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SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lescolles
Major W.E. Rose

8 327

Confidential

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 27th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 4th October 1944.

2. USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

(Previous reference PC (44) 27th Meeting - Conclusion 4(a))

COMMOORE STONE reported that the Italian Prime Minister had agreed verbally to the proposed employment of 33,000 Italian prisoners of war in FRANCE.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

3. ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GERMAN AMISTICE

(Previous reference PC (44) 27th Meeting - Conclusion 4(b))

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the Foreign Office were of the opinion that ITALY should neither be represented at the amistice discussions with GERMANY nor participate in its enforcement. If soon in agreement were required to close the state of war existing between GERMANY and ITALY it could be negotiated by the Control Commission which would be set up in GERMANY and the Allied Control Commission in ITALY. He added that these comments had been transmitted to the U.S. State Department whose views on the subject were awaited.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

4. CIVIL RELIEF FOR GREECE

(Previous reference PC (44) 27th Meeting - Minute 8)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that Flag Officer, TIRANTO, had reported that there was a pitiable shortage of food and clothing in the IONIAN islands. It was now intended to ship up to ten tons of 'ad hoc' relief supplies drawn from military stocks in each operational vessel proceeding to the PELOPONNESE, the IONIAN islands and the West coast of GREECE until such time as the planned relief measures already authorised could be brought into operation in particularly short supply and he envisaged

Took note of the above.

3. ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GERMAN ARRESTS

(Previous reference FC (44) 27th Meeting - Conclusion 4(b))

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the Foreign Office were of the opinion that ITALY should neither be represented at the armistice discussions with GERMANY nor participate in its enforcement. If some arrangement were required to close the state of war existing between GERMANY and ITALY it could be negotiated by the Control Commission which would be set up in GERMANY and the Allied Control Commission in ITALY. He added that these comments had been transmitted to the U.S. State Department whose views on the subject were awaited.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

4. CIVIL RELIEF FOR GREECE

(Previous reference FC (44) 27th Meeting - Minute 8)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that Flag Officer, TANTO, had reported that there was a pitiable shortage of food and clothing in the IONIAN Islands. It was now intended to ship up to ten tons of 'ad hoc' relief supplies drawn from military stocks in each operational vessel proceeding to the PELOPONNESOS, the IONIAN Islands and the West coast of GREECE until such time as the planned relief measures already authorized could be brought into operation. Clothing, however, was in particularly short supply and he envisaged great difficulty in supplying adequate quantities.

ADMIRAL GUNTINGHAM stated that a relief ship was due to arrive at Kalamata shortly and that it was hoped that FLEVEZA could accept a small relief ship by 21 October.

MAJOR GENERAL MICHES observed that the situation in the IONIAN Islands was better than in the IONIAN Islands as relief supplies were being sent from stocks in TURKEY. On the assumption that large scale relief to YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA would not begin in the immediate future, it was estimated that existing stocks of food supplies in the Middle East would cover essential Greek requirements for 30 days. Should full scale relief for all these countries be required at an early date, however, there would be deficiencies in some items.

/MR. MACMILLAN

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MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that Air Vice Marshal Elliot was seeking authority to compromise on certain points in respect of the relief negotiations with the Yugoslav delegates at BPL. He felt that the conclusion of an agreement should not be pressed to the point of compromise. The resulting delay would make it possible to use temporarily for GREECE, against subsequent replacement, supplies earmarked for YUGOSLAVIA. He added that relief supplies due to arrive in the theatre in November had not sailed, and that non-availability of supplies had been given as the reason. A serious situation would develop if arrivals scheduled for subsequent months also failed to sail. He had accordingly reported the matter to Mr. Eden personally, urging that appropriate action be taken to forestall the development of critical conditions.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Endorsed Mr. Macmillan's views recorded at 'X' above and directed that G-5 convey them as his policy to Commander, Balkan Air Force.
- (b) Took note with approval of the action taken by Mr. Macmillan in connection with the cancellation of the sailings of November relief arrivals.

5. VISITS OF VATICAN AUTHORITIES TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEE CAMPS

(Paper No. PC (44) 117)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :

- (a) Indicating that the Pope had enquired of the Supreme Allied Commander during his audience on 24 August whether the Vatican authorities could be given facilities to visit German and other prisoners of war and civilian internees in allied custody in Italy.
- (b) Stating that visits to prisoners of war camps be permitted but that visits to civilian internment camps be either refused or be limited in frequency and subject to certain security measures.

MR. KIRBY said that he understood that the Vatican desired these facilities for the purpose of giving "normal religious assistance" to Roman Catholic prisoners of war and internees.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out the need to make it clear that these facilities were granted not to the Vatican State as such, but to the Church. If the visitors were held to represent the Vatican State, other neutral States might demand similar facilities. It should also be made clear to the Vatican that no discussions on grounds for internment and suchlike

- (b) Took note with approval of the action taken by Mr. Macmillan in connection with the cancellation of the sailings of November relief arrivals.

5. VISITS OF VATICAN AUTHORITIES TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEE CAMPS

(Paper No. PC (44) 117)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper :

- (a) Indicating that the Pope had enquired of the Supreme Allied Commander during his audience on 24 August whether the Vatican authorities could be given facilities to visit German and other prisoners of war and civilian internees in Allied custody in ITALY.
- (b) Suggesting that visits to prisoners of war camps be permitted but that visits to civilian internment camps be either refused or be limited in frequency and subject to certain security measures.

MR. KIRK said that he understood that the Vatican desired these facilities for the purpose of giving "normal religious assistance" to Roman Catholic prisoners of war and internees.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out the need to make it clear that these facilities were granted not to the Vatican State as such, but to the Church. If the visitors were held to represent the Vatican State, other neutral States might demand similar facilities. It should also be made clear to the Vatican that no discussions on grounds for internment and suchlike subjects would be entertained. If these visits were agreed to, he suggested that it should be brought home to the Vatican that they had not been permitted by the Germans.

COLONEL HIDE reported that the U.S. War Department had objected to such visits about a year ago. The matter had been put to them again and, subject to their approval, G-1(A) was agreeable to the proposed visits.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Invited the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, in conjunction with G-1(A), G-1(B) and G-2, to despatch letters to the U.S. and British representatives at the Holy See informing them that visits both to prisoners of war and internment camps would be permitted subject to restrictions to be specified in these letters on the basis of Paper No. PC (44) 117 and the above discussion.

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6. CONTROL UNITED NATIONS PROPAGANDA **Confidential**

(Paper No. PC (44) 116)

THE COM ITES had before them a note by Chief, Liaison Section, drawing attention to recent cases where propaganda disseminated by one nation had included material liable to discredit the good name of another nation and suggesting that representatives of the various United Nations on the Allied Advisory Council and of the Italian Government be requested to adhere to an undertaking to restrain such activities by their nationals.

MAJOR GENERAL BEAUCHAMP NEBBITT, amplifying the paper, stated that the proposal was designed to assist the Poles. Their Public Relations Branch, being a military organization, was subject to a censorship which could stop publication of any material liable to embarrass the Allied authorities, whereas the Russians were free to do as they pleased and were apparently using certain sections of the Italian Press and other organizations to reproduce Russian material, including anti-Polish propaganda. Replying to a question by Mr. Macmillan, he added that the Poles, if given a free hand, would almost certainly produce material which would provoke protests from the Russians.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that the various representatives of the Allied Advisory Council would probably be unwilling to sign the proposed self-censorship ordinance without consulting their respective Governments and that this would open up wider issues. He suggested therefore that the Council procedure proposed was impractical and that incidents should be dealt with individually as they arose through the Allied Control Commission.

MR. KIDD supported this view, adding that the Council procedure proposed by Chief, Liaison Section, amounted in effect to political censorship, and that in any case reference to the Advisory Council would probably reveal unwelcome differences of view between its members.

MR. BAILEY pointed out that FIB ran exhibitions depicting the war effort of the Principal United Nations. He suggested that the Poles be told that PAB could undertake any further exhibitions desired by them. It would also be possible to penalize offending newspapers by arranging for APB to cease supplies of newspaper.

CHANDLER STONE observed that there were limits to the extent to which certain papers could be penalized. Thus it would doubtless be undesirable to compel the leading Communist papers to cease publication by withholding supplies of newspaper. He felt that Signor Bonomi might well be required to instruct Signor Lombardi to dispose of editors who consistently ignored his orders in matters of this kind.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

the Russians.

MR. MACGILLIVRAY pointed out that the various representatives of the Allied Advisory Council would probably be unwilling to sign the proposed self-denying ordinance without committing their respective governments and that this would open up wider issues. He suggested therefore that the general procedure repeated was impractical and that incidents should be dealt with individually as they arose through the Allied Control Commission.

MR. KIRK supported this view, adding that the general procedure proposed by Chief, Liaison Section, amounted in effect to political censorship, and that in any case reference to the Advisory Council would probably reveal unwelcome differences of view between its members.

MR. BARNES pointed out that PIB ran exhibitions denying the war effort of the Principal United Nations. He suggested that the Polish be told that PGC could undertake any further exhibitions desired by them. It would also be possible to penalize offending newspapers by arranging for AFI to cease supplies of newspaper.

CONSTANCE STONE observed that there were limits to the extent to which certain papers could be penalized. Thus it would doubtless be undesirable to compel the leading Communist papers to cease publication by withholding supplies of newspaper. He felt that Signor Dezzani might well be required to instruct Signor Legiatti to dispose of editors who consistently ignored his orders in matters of this kind.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that no further action be taken regarding the self-denying ordinance proposed in Paper No. PC (44) 116, but that G-5 instruct Allied Control Commission to be prepared to take action to ensure any individuals responsible for instances of the kind indicated in the paper.

(b) Directed that Director, P&I, inform the Polish Public Relations Branch in LOM that P&I would be willing to undertake any other exhibitions of Polish art and culture to be held in the theatre, but that no compulsion be exercised in the matter.

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7. PAYMENT FOR GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALY TERRITORY

(Paper No. PC (44) 120)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper by G-4 :

- (a) Indicating that the Italian Prime Minister had informed the Acting Chief Commissioner of the ACC that the political effect of the proposed lire account would be "disastrous".
- (b) Suggesting that a draft telegram, as submitted, be despatched to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee after insertion of a statement on the Italian Prime Minister's reaction as recorded at (a) above.

CORRADORE STONE, amplifying the paper, stated that it was now estimated that the drawings against the proposed lire account would amount to not less than one billion lire monthly. In the opinion of the Italian Prime Minister the proposed measure would seriously affect the stability of the Italian stock market and of the lire. He added that Italian financial circles had been led to understand by an article alleged to have originated in Wall Street that some resumption of Italian obligations could be expected.

BIG DIER GENERAL SPURDIN observed that events might well prove Italian expectations to be pessimistic and pointed out that the German indemnity had been fixed at ten billion lire monthly of which some seven billion monthly had been paid. This was in excess of probable Italian indebtedness to the Allies.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-5 insert in the draft telegram circulated under Paper No. PC (44) 120 a statement (to be agreed with the U.S. Political Adviser, the British Resident Minister and the Allied Control Commission) embodying the reactions of the Italian Prime Minister, and that they then despatch the telegram in the 447 series.

8. PROPOSED APPRECIATIVE STATEMENTS IN THE ITALIAN FORCES

(Paper No. PC (44) 122) *Revised, File 2/5*

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the New York office of C-1 had requested Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through F-15, to make an appreciative statement on the Italian forces serving under him. Similar requests were also being made of the Supreme Allied Commander, Air C-in-C, C-in-C and Commanding General, Fifth Army.

*Extract to
Lead lines*

that the price of the stock market and of the lira. He added that Italian financial circles had been led to understand by an article alleged to have originated in Wall Street that some realization of Italian obligations could be expected.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPERFORD observed that events might well prove Italian expectations to be pessimistic and pointed out that the German indemnity had been fixed at ten billion lire monthly of which some seven billion monthly had been paid. This was in excess of probable Italian indebtedness to the allies.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that G-5 insert in the draft telegram circulated under Paper No. PC (44) 120 a statement (to be agreed with the U.S. Political Advisor, the British Resident Minister and the Allied General Commissioner) embodying the reactions of the Italian Prime Minister, and that they then dispatch the telegram in the next series.

2. PROPOSED REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF THE ITALIAN FORCES

(Paper No. PC (44) 122) *Four, Page 2/3*

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the New York office of OHI had requested Commander-in-Chief, Headquarters, through PHE, to make an appreciative statement on the Italian forces serving under him. Similar requests were also being made of the Supreme Allied Commander, Air C-in-C, C-in-C ALI and Commanding General, Fifth Army.

AD LIAI CONSIDERED the desirability of making any appreciation statement on the Italian forces remarking that it would be unduly received in ALI, FRANCE and elsewhere.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that Director PHE, inform OHI that publication of any appreciative statements on the Italian forces was considered undesirable so long as fighting continued on Italian soil.
- (b) Directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, Commander-in-Chief, ALI, and Commanding General, Fifth Army, act accordingly if approached and that G-3 telegraph Commander-in-Chief, ALI, and Commanding General, Fifth Army, in this sense.

*Extract to
hand lines
Sub-Comm
by long letter
2/12/44
for 4/*

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9. ESTABLISHMENTS IN ITALY FOR DISPLACED YUGOSLAVS

(Paper No. PC (44) 119)

THE COM. ITTEE had before them a paper :

- (a) Indicating that Marshal Tito had requested that no more Yugoslavs be sent to EGYPT or NORTH AFRICA, and that he would undertake that as far as possible would in future be evacuated from YUGOSLAVIA to ITALY.
- (b) Recommending that five camps and centres, which had hitherto been in use for Yugoslavs in transit to EGYPT and NORTH AFRICA, be renamed "Accommodation Centres for Displaced Yugoslavs" and that they be taken over by UNRRA.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOTFORD pointed out that under the proposed scheme the number of Yugoslavs in ITALY would not be increased and that their retention here would permit some economy in the use of shipping. The effect would be to render the existing transit camps of paramount importance.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GILL said that Marshal Tito should be told that if he was prepared to stop evacuation from YUGOSLAVIA, AFHQ would endeavour to conform with his wishes, but that in any case, and particularly if evacuation from YUGOSLAVIA continued, AFHQ must retain complete freedom of administrative action.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS agreed, and added that it was desirable to avoid setting aside a specific accommodation for specific nationalities. It should be needed and regarded as equally available for refugees of all kinds.

THE CHIEF OF ALLIED COMMISSION :

- (a) Directed that G-5 take action in coordination with the recommendations in Paper No. PC (44) 119 as notified by the suggestion at 'X' above, and that no firm undertaking be given to Marshal Tito in the matter.
- (b) Directed that accommodation in the theatre for refugees be regarded as equally available for refugees of all kinds.

10. EVACUATION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL FROM ROMANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 219)

THE COM. ITTEE had before them a paper by the U.S. Political Adviser recommending a procedure for the evacuation of various categories of personnel from ROMANIA with the co-operation and consent of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

tion here would permit some economy in the use of shipping. The effect would be to render the existing transit camps, enroute in character.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GAN ZHI is stated that Marshal Tito should be told that if he was prepared to stop evacuation from YUGOSLAVIA, AFN would endeavour to conform with his wishes, but that in any case, and particularly if evacuation from YUGOSLAVIA continued, AFN must retain complete freedom of administrative action.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS agreed, and added that it was desirable to avoid setting aside specific accommodation for specific nationalities. It should be needed and regarded as equally available for refugees of all kinds.

THE COMBINED ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that G-5 take action in accordance with the recommendations in Paper No. PC (44) 118 as modified by the suggestion at IX above, and that no firm undertaking be given to Marshal Tito in the matter.

(b) Directed that accommodation in the theatre for refugees be regarded as equally available for refugees of all kinds.

10. EVACUATION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL FROM ROMANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 119)

THE COMPTON had before them a paper by the U.S. Political adviser recommending a procedure for the evacuation of various categories of personnel from ROMANIA with the co-operation and consent of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

MAJOR GENERAL BELMONT HERBERT, referring to PC (44) 26th Septem, 1944, Conclusion 3(b), stated that General orders had now asked the Polish Government to approach the British and US Governments regarding the evacuation of certain Poles from ROMANIA.

MR. MACMILLAN, replying to a question from the Supreme Allied Commander, remarked that a similar procedure could be applied for evacuations from BELGARI, and other liberated areas. In cases where there was no Allied Central Commission, the nearest Allied Mission or authorities could clear the request for entry, if the necessary information was available to them.

MR. COMMOORE PAMPHILUS pointed out that para 4(11) in the paper under discussion charged IAF with the entire responsibility for moving personnel including their eventual disposal from airfields in Italy. He suggested that 15th Air Force liaison officers in BUCHAREST or elsewhere should not arrange transport until applications had been considered, approved and classified as to priority by AFHQ. IAF's responsibilities must be restricted to the pro-

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vision of air in port only. They could not undertake any administrative arrangements at either end in respect of these evacuees.

THE SHARPE ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the proposal submitted by the U.S. Political Advisor in Paper No. PC (44) 119, and directed that the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, take action accordingly and in the light of the above discussion.

11. PROPOSED ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE RELIEF IN ALBANIA

(Paper No. PC (44) 131)

THE SHARPE HAD BEFORE THEM A PAPER COVERING A PROPOSED 'AIR FERRY' Memorandum of Agreement for use by Allied Commanders with local leaders in ALBANIA if the opportunity arose.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES explained that, as there was no party of any prominence in ALBANIA, it was not proposed at present to draw up an agreement on the lines of that now under discussion with the Yugoslav delegates in Paris. In the memorandum under discussion H. H. (Balkans) had aimed at simplicity and brevity and they had avoided any reference to financial obligation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that KATIN 3 conditions might soon obtain in ALBANIA. He had been directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff not to send any forces of occupation to ALBANIA but he felt that it might be necessary to consider the despatch of elements of the British Air Force and Land Forces Adriatic in order to ensure equitable distribution of any relief supplies sent in. He expressed what the political implications of such a move might be.

MR. HAMMILL observed that ALBANIA was not an ally and that the United Nations were under no obligation to assist in her relief and rehabilitation.

MR. RAIL CONNELL stated that it was unlikely that any Albanian ports would have to be opened up for relief purposes. Any naval vessels that did put in to Albanian ports would, however, be carrying small quantities of relief supplies and in this connection the proposed memorandum of agreement would be of use to captains of these ships.

MR. HICK observed that the draft contained no mention of relief agencies and no indication as to the source from which relief would be derived or as to how it would be administered. Moreover, paragraphs 3(b) and (c) might be held to imply that any likely Albanian leader was entitled to impose taxes and generally take the law into his hands.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES replied that the proposed Memorandum was only intended for use in conjunction with 'ad hoc' relief. A proper agreement could be negotiated if at a later date some suitable party emerged.

the lines of that are under discussion with the Yugoslav delegates in Bari. In the memorandum under discussion M.H. (Belkane) had aimed at simplicity and brevity and they had avoided any reference to financial obligation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that ALBANIA's conditions might soon obtain in ALBANIA. He had been directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff not to send any forces of occupation to ALBANIA but he felt that it might be necessary to consider the despatch of elements of the Balkan Air Force and Land Forces Adriatic in order to ensure equitable distribution of any relief supplies sent in. He enquired what the political implications of such a move might be.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that ALBANIA was not an ally and that the United Nations were under no obligation to assist in her relief and rehabilitation.

MR. RUSSELL CUNNINGHAM stated that it was unlikely that any Albanian ports would have to be opened up for naval purposes. Any naval vessels that did put in to Albanian ports would, however, be carrying small quantities of relief supplies and in this connection the proposed memorandum of agreement would be of use to captains of these ships.

MR. RUSSELL observed that the draft contained no mention of relief agencies and no indication as to the source from which relief would be derived or as to how it would be administered. Moreover, paragraph 3(b) and (c) might be held to imply that any likely Albanian leader was entitled to impose taxes and generally take the law into his hands.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES replied that the proposed Memorandum was only intended for use in connection with 'ad hoc' relief. A proper agreement could be suggested if at a later date some suitable party emerged.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

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Approved the Memorandum of agreement as submitted and directed that M.H. (Belkane), in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean and Commander, Balkan Air Force, arrange for its issue to all forces proceeding to ALBANIA.

12. REQUEST FROM ALLIED (SOVIET) HIGH COMAND, ALBANIA, FOR BRITISH FILMS

MR. BARNES reported that the Russian High Command had requested the British Mission in BELGRADE to arrange for the despatch of British films to ALBANIA. Subject to the Supreme Allied Commander's approval, he was proposing to despatch films depicting the British war effort, such as "Descent Victory" and enquired whether warlike films should also be sent.

MR. OFFICE remarked that there was some restriction on the despatch of American films to certain foreign countries and suggested that the State Department be consulted.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that Chief, S.A.C., dematch suitable British films to Allied Central Commission, BELMONT.

(b) Informed the U.S. Political Advisor to obtain the U.S. State Department's approval to the despatch of American films by S.A.C. to BELMONT.

13. FOOD SITUATION IN ITALY

MEMORANDUM DOWNS drew attention to President Roosevelt's recent statement claiming that food and other relief supplies were being sent to ITALY on a sufficient scale to "maintain full health and efficiency". The increased bread ration south of the GARGILLO of 300 grams daily, to which the Supreme Allied Commander had agreed without the previous consent of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee with effect from 1 July, was in fact only a minimum subsistence ration. Indeed, unless the Combined Civil Affairs Committee could undertake that monthly shipments to ITALY from 1st November onwards would be at the rate of 155,000 tons (instead of 150,000 tons monthly as at present) it would be necessary to reduce the ration to 230 grams. This estimate presupposed the early occupation of Northern ITALY. He suggested that a telegram be sent to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee asking for a reply to a letter sent them on 24 September requesting their agreement to the 300 gram bread ration, and for a statement as to whether or not the additional wheat shipments which this would entail would be forthcoming.

MR. MATHILLAN observed that it would be possible to consume the present harvest at a higher rate in the coming months, if it were definitely known that adequate shipments would be arriving in subsequent months to make up the resulting deficiency.

MR. MATHILLAN SPOFFORD added that an important variable affecting the rate of consumption was the length of time that might elapse before it became necessary to feed the PO Valley.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that S-5 send a telegram to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in the M.F. series based on the above discussion and requesting an answer to the points raised by the Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Central Commission.

J.H. LASHLEY,
COLONEL,

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overseas would be at the rate of 165,000 tons (instead of 100,000 tons monthly as at present) it would be necessary to reduce the ration to 230 grams. This estimate presupposed the early occupation of Northern Italy. He suggested that a telegram be sent to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee asking for a reply to a letter sent them on 24 September requesting their agreement to the 300 gram bread ration, and for a statement as to whether or not the additional wheat shipments which this would entail would be forthcoming.

MR. LAMILLAN observed that it would be possible to consume the present harvest at a higher rate in the coming months, if it were definitely known that adequate shipments would be arriving in subsequent months to make up the resulting deficiency.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPENCER added that an important variable affecting the rate of consumption was the length of time that might elapse before it became necessary to feed the IC Valley.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that C-5 send a telegram to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in the MAT series based on the above discussion and requesting an answer to the points raised by the Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

J. H. L. Spencer
J. H. L. SPENCER,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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G-4 (B)
G-5
Secretary, IS & PS
Secretary, Middle East Defense Committee, GHQ MFP
Division Section
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Central Commission
Spares

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Commander, 3 Corps
Commander, M H. (Belgians)
Commander, M H. H. (Greece), CTF
Commander, M H. (Greece), JTF
R.M. Ambassador to Greece
Commander, M H. (Albania)
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G-3 Special Operations
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G-4 (B)
G-5

Secretary, IS & IS
Secretary, Middle East Defense Committee, CHIEF
Liaison Section
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Central Commission
Syria

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Commander, 8th AF (Belgium)
Commander, 1st AF (Greece), CH
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H.H. Ambassador to Greece
Commander, 1st AF (Albania)
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PC (44) 28th Meeting
10 October 1944

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

12 OCT Recd

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY
11TH OCTOBER, 1944

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 27th Meeting - already circulated)
2. VISITS OF VATICAN AUTHORITIES TO GERMAN AND OTHER PRISONERS
OF WAR AND TO CIVILIAN INTERNEES IN ITALY
(Paper No. PC (44) 117 - already circulated)
3. CONTROL OF UNITED NATIONS PROPAGANDA IN ROME
(Paper No. PC (44) 116 - already circulated)
4. EVACUATION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL FROM ROMANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 119 - already circulated)
5. PAYMENTS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY
(Paper No. PC (44) 120 - to be circulated)
6. PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE RELIEF IN ALBANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 121 - to be circulated)
7. PROPOSED APPRECIATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE ITALIAN FORCES
(Paper No. PC (44) 122 - to be circulated)
8. ESTABLISHMENTS IN ITALY FOR DISPLACED YUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. PC (44) 113 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE:-

9. BULGARIAN ARMISTICE TERMS
((a) Telegram No. COSMID 192, dated 4 Oct 44 from
British Chiefs of Staff.
(b) MEMCOS No. 199, dated 10 Oct 44 to
British Chiefs of Staff.)

NOTE:- The following are invited to attend or be represented.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) for Item 2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) for Item 3

HEADQUARTERS
12 OCT 1944
A C C.

3. PAPER No. PC (44) 117 - already circulated
4. CONTROL OF UNITED NATIONS PROPAGANDA IN POLAND
(Paper No. PC (44) 116 - already circulated)
5. EVACUATION OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL FROM ROMANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 119 - already circulated)
6. PAYMENTS FOR GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY
(Paper No. PC (44) 120 - to be circulated)
7. PROPOSED MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE RELIEF IN ALBANIA
(Paper No. PC (44) 121 - to be circulated)
8. PROPOSED APPRECIATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE ITALIAN FORCES
(Paper No. PC (44) 122 - to be circulated)
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TO TALK NOTE:-

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(a) Telegram No. COSMED 192, dated 4 Oct 44 from British Chiefs of Staff.
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NOTE:- The following are invited to attend or be represented.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) for Item 2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (B) for Item 2
Chief, Liaison Section for Items 3 and 4
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 for Items 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8
Chief, INC for Item 3

minutes of the meeting at F.26

William T. Ryan
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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G-4 (A)

G-4 (B)

G-5

Secretary, IS & IC

Secretary, Middle East Defense Committee, GRC MP

Liaison Section

Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Chief, INC

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PC (44) 27th
4th October 1944

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

M-302

15
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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON
WEDNESDAY 4TH OCTOBER 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Commodore I.T. Penkhurst, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General J.G.H. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Captain Ellery H. Stone, U.S.N.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General I.T.P. Hughes,
Commander, M HQ (Balkans)

Major General P.G. Hensmont Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.H. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Commander I.T. Penhuret, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

Major General D. Noco,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Captain Ellery H. Stone, U.S.N.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General I.T.P. Hughes,
Commander, M HQ (Balkans)

Major General F.G. Beaumont Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.H. Spafford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Governor R. Cochran,
UNRRA Representative to Supreme Allied Commander

Mr. C. Office,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel E.E. Hyde,
G-1 (A)

(For Item 4)

Lieutenant Colonel G.S. Davis,
G-2 (A)

(For Item 4)

Wing Commander N.E. Sharpe,
G-3 (Special Ops)

(For Item 6)

Major E.J. Feldman,
G-1 (A)

(For Item 4)

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Colonel J.E. Lascelles
Major W.E. Rose

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1.

MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(P.C. (44) 25th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 27th September 1944, subject to the following amendment:-

Page 3 - last sentence on the page - delete from "be induced" to end of sentence and substitute - "be approached in the first instance"

2.

DISPOSAL OF YUGOSLAV EX PRISONERS OF WAR
(Previous reference - P.C. (44) 26th Meeting, Conclusion 5)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK, replying to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, said that the move of these 2,000 Yugoslav ex prisoners of war would be delayed as they were low on the priority list. It was intended that the move should eventually take place by sea direct from MARSEILLES to WIDEAST.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above.

3.

VOLUNTARY RELIEF IN ITALY
(Previous reference- P.C. (44) 26th Meeting - Conclusion 10)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Directed that G-5 circulate as a Political Committee Paper the minutes of his meeting with Mr. Myron Taylor and others in Rome on 23rd September, 1944.

4.

USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN FRANCE
(Paper No. P.C. (44) 113)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the Italian Government had learned of the decision to employ 28,000 Italian prisoners of war in FRANCE as service troops, and raising the question of what communication, if any, should be made to the Italian Government on this matter.

MAJOR GENERAL MOSE pointed out that it was intended to use these Italian prisoners of war of all allied units had not merely in rear

the Supreme Allied Commander, said that the move of these 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war would be delayed as they were low on the priority list. It was intended that the move should eventually take place by air direct from KARSEHILLS to WIDEAST.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above.

3. VOLUNTARY RELIEF IN ITALY
(Previous reference- P.O. (44) 25th Meeting - Conclusion 10)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Directed that G-5 circulate as a Political Committee Paper the minutes of his meeting with Mr. Myron Taylor and others in Rome on 29th September, 1944.

4. USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN FRANCE
(Paper No. PC (44) 113)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper indicating that the Italian Government had learned of the decision to employ 28,000 Italian prisoners of war in FRANCE as service troops, and raising the question of worst communication. If any, should be made to the Italian Government on this matter.

MAJOR GENERAL HOCE pointed out that it was intended to use these Italians in rear of all allied units and not merely in rear of French units, as stated in the paper.

CAPTAIN STONE explained that to the Italian Government ⁴⁷³ enquiry on this subject he had replied that he was seeking information. When they were in possession of the facts it was possible that a protest would follow.

NOTE:- MR. KIRK desires it to be recorded that he notified his view that this amendment should be made in a note to the Secretary dated 1 October 1944. Since the amendment did not affect the action to be taken on the minute in question, no amendment was issued at that time and the normal procedure was adopted whereby amendments to the Minutes of a Committee meeting are proposed at the next meeting of the Committee

J.H.L.

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/MR. MACMILLAN

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MR. MACMILLAN observed that in view of Italian co-belligerency matter for discussion with the Italian Government and (Switzerland) had been suggested. He pointed out that this question had its root in the fruitless negotiations with the Italian Government which had taken place earlier in the year regarding the status of Italian prisoners of war, and which had broken down mainly through the reluctance of the United States and British Governments to introduce the necessary legislation to effect a change in status. The use to which these prisoners of war would be put involved a breach of the latter of the Geneva Convention, but was consistent with the understanding agreed with Marshal Badoglio regarding the employment of prisoners of war. If the Italian Government pressed the matter, he felt that they should be told that the Allies were ready to re-open negotiations if they so wished, but that it should be pointed out that the Italian Government had previously pressed over in silence more than one opportunity of doing so. He suggested that Captain Stone should advise the Italian Government verbally of the use to which the prisoners of war in question were being put, and should seek the Italian Government's informal acceptance of the position, in confirmation of the assurance previously given by Marshal Badoglio.

X

CAPTAIN STONE agreed that the approach suggested by Mr. Macmillan hold a fair prospect of success.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER reported that the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission had received a letter from the Italian Prime Minister requesting that ITALY be allowed to participate actively in the armistice to be imposed on GERMANY in the name of the United Nations. This question was then to that under discussion, as being further evidence that the Italian Government were feeling their way towards the status of an Ally.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that there might well not be a formal armistice with GERMANY. If there were, a clause would be required providing for the association with the United Nations of the co-belligerent nations, as such.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER:-

- (a) Approved the British Resident Minister's suggestion at "X" above and directed that the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission take action on this basis.
- (b) Invited the U.S. Political Advisor and the British Resident Minister, in conjunction with G-5, to submit at the next meeting recommendations as to the answer to be sent to the Italian Prime Minister's letter regarding Italian participation in the German armistice.

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CAPTAIN STONE agreed that the approach suggested by Mr. Macmillan held a fair prospect of success.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER reported that the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission had received a letter from the Italian Prime Minister requesting that ITALY be allowed to participate actively in the armistice to be imposed on GERMANY in the name of the United Nations. This question was akin to that under discussion, as being further evidence that the Italian Government were feeling their way towards the status of an Ally.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that there might well not be a formal armistice with GERMANY. If there were, a clause would be required providing for the association with the United Nations of the cobelligerent nations, as such.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER:-

- (a) Approved the British Resident Minister's suggestion at "X" above and directed that the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission take action on this basis.
- (3) Invited the U.S. Political Advisor and the British Resident Minister, in conjunction with C-5, to submit at the next meeting recommendations as to the answer to be sent to the Italian Prime Minister's letter regarding Italian participation in the German armistice.

5. PAYMENT FOR GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY (Paper No. 20 (24) 112)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper outlining the Allied Control Commission's objections to Administrative Memorandum No. 31 which required the Italian Government to set up:-

- (a) A procurement agency, to which the Allied forces would normally resort for goods, services and facilities, and which would pay for such procurements.
- (b) A lire account which the Allied forces would use to pay for all goods, services and facilities which the Italian procurement agency did not or could not produce.

CAPTAIN STONE, said that he had discussed the proposed procurement agency with the Italian Government. He saw no great obstacle to its establishment but pointed out that it would be unlikely to meet more than 10% of Allied demands. He had not yet discussed the Lire Account, which was a more complicated subject, and it was estimated that its enforcement would require the Italian Government to pay some five hundred million lire monthly. Applying to a question

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Supreme Allied Commander. He stated that the measures demanded of the Italians were in accordance with the terms of the armistice. The Italians would interpret their enforcement, however, as an indication that, despite Italian co-belligerency, the Allies were contemplating no remission of the Armistice terms. The Allied Control Commission were strongly of the opinion that their enforcement at this juncture was inopportune and might lead to political repercussions, including press attacks. He suggested that he be allowed to sound the Italian Prime Minister and Finance Minister informally on the whole subject, emphasizing to them that this was part of the assistance expected of Italy as a co-belligerent.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOTTWOOD pointed out that under the existing arrangements currency was provided by the Allies, flown into Italy, expended, and the sum charged to the Italian State suspense account, for ultimate reimbursement in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. While not suggesting that the proposed lire account should operate retroactively, he queried whether it was not time to put the procedure on the proper basis by obliging the Italian Government to pay currently for all goods, services and facilities required by the Allies in Italy. The largest item would probably be labour. He added that US War and Navy Department regulations required all American expenditures in Italy to pass through the US Army and Navy appropriations, where dollars were held against them. He agreed that this was an internal matter, but observed that the War Department were already questioning the propriety of spending dollars on goods and services in respect of which they did not consider themselves obligated. The proposed scheme would remove this problem.

ADMIRAL CURNINGHAM emphasized the need to ensure that the effectiveness of work was not impaired as a result of dilatory settlement of bills. The present situation required clarification since the Admiralty had advised him that there was no need to pay for floating docks, now under construction, or for other services. He explained that the British Army Pay Services acted as agents for the Royal Navy for such items as were paid for in Italy, charging the Admiralty in LONDON at the rate of 400 lire to the pound.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the rapidly mounting overdraft resulting from Allied expenditure in Italy was not shown in the Italian budget, and the future presentation of the final bill in a single statement to the Italian Government would cause a considerable shock. He agreed with the proposed scheme in principle, but nevertheless queried whether the time was psychologically opportune for enforcing it on the Italian Government and he favoured Captain Stone's suggestion that he discuss the matter informally with the Italian Prime Minister, and Finance Minister and propose to them the gradual assumption of responsibility for procurement and the

to put the procedure on the proper basis by obliging the Italian Government to pay currently for all roads, services and facilities required by the Allies in ITALY. The largest item would probably be labour. He added that US War and Navy Department regulations required all American expenditures in ITALY to pass through the US Army and Navy appropriations, where dollars were held against them. He agreed that this was an interred matter, but observed that the War Department were already questioning the priority of spending dollars on goods and services in respect of which they did not consider themselves obligated. The proposed scheme would remove this problem.

ADMIRAL CUPPINGHAM emphasised the need to ensure that the effectiveness of work was not impaired as a result of dilatory settlement of bills. The present situation required clarification since the Admiralty had advised him that there was no need to pay for floating docks, now under construction, or for other services. He explained that the British Army Pay Services acted as agents for the Royal Navy for such items as were paid for in ITALY, charging the Admiralty in LONDON at the rate of 400 lire to the pound.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the rapidly mounting overdraft resulting from Allied expenditure in ITALY was not shown in the Italian budget, and the future presentation of the final bill in a single statement to the Italian Government would cause a considerable shock. He agreed with the proposed scheme in principle, but nevertheless queried whether the time was psychologically opportune for enforcing it on the Italian Government and he favoured Captain Stone's suggestion that he discuss the matter informally with the Italian Prime Minister, and Finance Minister and propose to them the gradual assumption of responsibility for procurement and the establishment of the lire account at a specified future date.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK, replying to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, remarked that, apart from the US War Department's difficulties referred to by Brigadier General Spofford, the present procedure was working satisfactorily. If the proposed scheme were enforced in its entirety, there would ensue not only political troubles, but very probably a drying up of supplies and labour.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- (a) Directed that the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission approach the Italian Government with a view to:-

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- (1) their setting up a procuring agency to meet a portion of the requirements of the Allied Forces
- (b) Directed that G-5 in conjunction with the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister ascertain and report to him the views of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on the proposed life account.

6. WITHDRAWAL OF BULGARIAN FORCES FROM GREECE
(Paper No. P.O. (44) 115)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper embodying a report from Force 133 Mission in THRACE to the effect that ELAS, in conjunction with Bulgarian forces were attacking the Capetenes, who were also threatened by Bulgarian Partisans, and suggesting alternative courses of action for dealing with the situation.

WING COMMANDER SHARPE, amplifying the paper, said that the local Bulgarian partisan leader had denied the right of ELAs to intervene. It was not known what backing he or ELAS had from the Bulgarian or Russian authorities.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the British and U.S. Governments, at the request of the Soviet Government, had now agreed to waive their original prerequisite that Bulgarian forces be removed from GREECE before armistice negotiations began. He had also just heard from AMERZA that the Bulgarian Government's representative there had explained that the Bulgarian forces in THRACE were under the command of Marshal Tobulkin, who had doubtless ordered them to remain there in order to cover his left flank. It appeared:-

- (1) that armistice negotiations with BULGARIA were unlikely until the country was under complete Russian domination
- (2) that the removal of Bulgarian forces from THRACE was unlikely except in furtherance of Russian operations against the Germans.
- (3) that if Bulgarian forces in THRACE were withdrawn the operation would be so carried out as to enable ELAS/ELAS most easily to take over the territory at present under Bulgarian occupation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that from reports which had reached him it appeared that all the Russian field forces in BULGARIA were in the Northwest part of the country and that the attitude of the Russians in SOFIA to the Bulgarians was cold. He believed the Russians' present intention was to reach the BELGRADE-SALONICA railway at an early date and he did not consider it illogical that they should require the Bulgarians to remain in THRACE and thus protect their left

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was not known that taking up of ELAS had from the Bulgarian or Russian authorities.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the British and U.S. Governments, at the request of the Soviet Government, had now agreed to waive their original prerequisite that Bulgarian forces be removed from GREECE before armistice negotiations began. He had also just heard from AMARA that the Bulgarian Government's representative there had explained that the Bulgarian forces in THRACE were under the command of Marshal Toboukhin, who had doubtless ordered them to remain there in order to cover his left flank. It appeared:-

- X
- (1) that armistice negotiations with BULGARIA were unlikely until the country was under complete Russian domination
 - (2) that the removal of Bulgarian forces from THRACE was unlikely except in furtherance of Russian operations against the Germans.
 - (3) that if Bulgarian forces in THRACE were withdrawn the operation would be so carried out as to enable ELAS/ELAS most easily to take over the territory at present under Bulgarian occupation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that from reports which had reached him it appeared that all the Russian field forces in BULGARIA were in the Northwest part of the country and that the attitude of the Russians in SOFIA to the Bulgarians was cold. He believed the Russians' present intention was to reach the BELGRADE-SALONICA railway at an early date and he did not consider it illogical that they should require the Bulgarians to remain in THRACE and thus protect their left flank. He felt that Russian ignorance of Bulgarian activities in THRACE was not impossible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

(a) Directed that G-3:-

- (1) arrange that Force 140 order General Sarafis, on the basis of the recent agreement, to restrain ELAS forces in THRACE from any action against the Cypriotes or collaboration with the Bulgarians.
- (11) Arrange that ACC (Bulgaria) report on the situation in BULGARIA and THRACE, immediately after entry into BULGARIA, with particular reference to the military validity of the Bulgarian explanation recorded at "X" above.

(b) Agreed that no action in this matter could appropriately be taken at this stage with the Soviet or Bulgarian Governments.

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AGREEMENT ON RELIEF FOR GREECE
(Telecom No. MAY 792 and 794 to Combined Chiefs of Staff, and Nos. Z 33146, Z 33698 and Z 33789 to Balkan Air Force)

THE COMMITTEE had before them five telegrams arising out of Conclusion 4(b) of PC (44) 26th Meeting of 27th September 1944, and embodying:-

(a) Instructions to Commander, Balkan Air Force, to negotiate with the representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government and of the Yugoslav National Committee of Liberation, in view of the agreement proposed in Paper No. PC(44) 109, an informal memorandum of agreement on the basic principles of relief, namely:-

- (1) Equitable distribution without distinction of race, creed or political affiliations.
- (11) Allied Forces and/or agencies to observe and check on the distribution of supplies and to receive consequential facilities for their officers concerned
- (b) Instructions to Commander, Balkan Air Force, not to start these negotiations on a firm basis before 5th October least the Combined Chiefs of Staff should want any alterations made to the instructions at (a) above.
- (c) Notification of (a) and (B) above to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES explained that the decision to start the negotiations on 5th October had been taken after consultations with the U.S. Political Advisor, British Resident Minister and other parties interested in reports from BARI indicated that both sets of Yugoslav delegates were proving restless.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the representative of the Royal Yugoslav Government was in fact one of Tito's nominees in the Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above.

8. CIVIL RELIEF FOR GREECE

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER explained that:-

- (a) The implementation of the authorised relief plan for GREECE was not feasible as long as operations were proceeding in ITALY and the ADRIATIC which rendered the provision of units

(b) Instructions to Commander, Balkan Air Force, not to start these negotiations on a firm basis before 5th October last the Combined Chiefs of Staff should want any alterations up to the instructions at (c) above.

(c) Notification of (a) and (b) above to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES explained that the decision to start the negotiations on 5th October had been taken after consultations with the U.S. Political Advisor, British Resident Minister and other parties interested as reports from EARI indicated that both sets of Yugoslav delegates were proving restless.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the representative of the Royal Yugoslav Government was in fact one of Tito's nominees in the Government.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above.

8. CIVIL RELIEF FOR GREECE

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER explained that:-

- (a) The implementation of the authorised relief plan for GREECE 409 was not feasible as long as operations were proceeding in ITALY and the ATLANTIC which rendered the provision of units required for the AI Force order of battle, and the provision of landing craft and mine-sweeping vessels, impracticable.
- (b) The original calculations had been upset by the need to introduce relief supplies to certain parts of Greece before the Piraeus and the other ports envisaged by the authorised plan could be put to use. As a result, the plan was now under examination and if necessary a tailored relief plan would be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting authority to implement it on the understanding that it would be carried out without prejudice to the relief plan already authorised, which would supersede it as and when conditions permitted.
- (c) It now seemed likely that the Russians would reach the BELGRADE-SALONIKA railway at an early date. With their main line of withdrawal cut the Germans might decide not to attempt to extricate their static forces but to leave them behind to hold key distribution points as fortresses. Such a course might well delay relief operations in GREECE further.

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MR. HIGG supported Mr. Macmillan and stressed the humanitarian aspect. He reported that the Swedish and Swiss Commissions in GREECE were concerned for the safety of their supplies if Allied troops did not follow in hard on the heels of the Germans.

GOVERNOR COCHRAN said that at present and for some time to come UNRRA would carry out the directives of the military to the maximum extent possible with their resources in personnel.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGHES remarked that the principal difficulty confronting M HQ (B-Dems) was the lack of suitable tonnage; there were not sufficient coliques, and the use of merchant ships to such ports as PATRAS would involve minesweeping, which Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, could not undertake in view of his commitments in the Western Mediterranean, the Adriatic and the Aegean. If RAMMUS E conditions were to persist indefinitely the existing plan could be adjusted to meet the new circumstances.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS said that it would probably be possible to send supplies in merchant ships to PEROS and MYTHRA for transshipment in coliques to the mainland, and that was under examination.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOTFORD remarked that the quantities of food earmarked for GREECE were relatively greater than those sent to ITALY and Southern FRANCE in the early days of Allied occupation. Shipment of items for rehabilitation, however, were likely to be deferred.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above discussion.

J.R. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander

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27-28
29-30

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OTHER MEMORANDUMS REPORTED THAT THE PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY confronting M HQ (Belgium) was the lack of suitable tonnage; there were not sufficient coliques, and the use of merchant ships to such ports as PATRAS would involve mine-sweeping, which Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, could not undertake in view of his commitments in the Western Mediterranean, the Adriatic and the Aegean. If BATHIN B conditions were to persist indefinitely the existing plan could be adjusted to meet the new circumstances.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS said that it would probably be possible to send supplies in merchant ships to PEROS and MYTHRA for transshipment in coliques to the mainland, and that was under examination.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOTTISWOOD remarked that the quantities of food earmarked for GREECE were relatively greater than those sent to ITALY and Southern FRANCE in the early days of Allied occupation. Shipment of items for rehabilitation, however, were likely to be deferred.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above discussion.

J.H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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Chief of Staff	14	G-5	34-35
Chief Administrative Officer	15	Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Deputy Chief of Staff	16	Secretary, M.E.S.O. G-2 REF	39-42
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19	Lincoln Section	43
British Resident Minister	20-22	Acting Chief Commissioner, AGO	44-47
Chief, F&D	23	Commander, Balkan Air Force	48-51
Secretary, General Staff	24	Commander, Force 140	52-53
G-1 (A)	25	Commander M HQ (Belgium)	54-55
G-1 (B)	26	Spares	56-60

EXTRACTS

Item 6-24 8 - 1 copy
Item 6-24 8 - 2 copies

H.M. Ambassador to Greece
Commander, M HQ (Greece)

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PC (44) 27th Meet.
3rd October, 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
WILL BE HELD IN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER'S
CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY
4TH OCTOBER, 1944

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PC (44) 26th Meeting - already circulated)
2. USE OF ITALIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHERN FRANCE
(Paper No. PC (44) 113 - already circulated)
3. PAYMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES IN ITALIAN TERRITORY
(Paper No. PC (44) 112 - already circulated)
4. WITHDRAWAL OF BULGARIAN FORCES FROM GREECE
(Paper No. PC (44) 115 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE :-

5. PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON RELIEF FOR YUGOSLAVIA
(a) Telegram No. MAF 792 of 30th September, 1944 to CCS
(b) Telegram No. S3146 of 2nd October 1944 to Belgian Air Force)
6. BULGARIAN AMNISTICE TERMS
(Paper No. PC (44) 114 - already circulated)

NOTE:- The following are invited to attend or be represented.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) for Item 2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 for Items 3 and 5
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 for Item 4
Brigadier Nicholson for Item 6.

Minutes of this
meeting at FHS

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
COMNAVSTA

SECRETARY.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL

Copy No.

1
2
3-1
5-11
12-13

OF COAST AND SEABORDS IN ITALIAN TERRITORY
(Paper No. PC (44) 112 - already circulated)

WITHDRAWAL OF BULGARIAN FORCES FROM GREECE
(Paper No. PC (44) 115 - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE :-

5. PROPOSED AGREEMENT OF RELIEF FOR YUGOSLAVIA
((a) Telegram No. WAF 792 of 30th September, 1944 to CCS)
((b) Telegram No. 33146 of 2nd October 1944 to Balkan Air Force)
5. BULGARIAN ARMISTICE TERMS
(Paper No. PC (44) 115 - already circulated)

NOTE:- The following are invited to attend or be represented.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) for Item 2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 for Items 3 and 5
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 for Item 4
Brigadier Nicholson for Item 6.

Minutes of this
meeting at FMS

J.E. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5-11
COMNAVSTA	12-13
Chief of Staff	14
Chief Administrative Officer	15
Deputy Chief of Staff	16
U.S. Political Adviser	17-19
British Resident Minister	20-22
Chief, PMB	23
Secretary, General Staff	24
G-1 (A)	25
G-1 (B)	26
G-2	27-28
G-3	29-30
G-3 Special Operations	31
G-4 (A)	32
G-4 (B)	33
G-5	34-35
Secretary, IS & PS	36-38
Secretary, Middle East Defence Committee, GEO MEF	39-42
Liaison Section	43
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission	44
Spares	45

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PC (44) 26th Meeting
27th September 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN THE SUPREME
ALLIED COMANDER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT
1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 27TH SEPTEMBER, 1944

PRESENT :-

General Sir Henry Meitland Wilson,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant-General Ira C. Eaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant-General Sir James H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant-General J.G.M. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major-General Lowell W. Hooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major-General I.T.P. Hughes, representing
Commander, Force 140

Major-General P.G. Esmonet-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

ACC DISTRICT TAV

A/ACC'S OFFICE

Atty - Capt. Stone
Asst - Capt. Smith
Secy - Capt. Jones

Lieutenant-General Ira C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant-General Sir James H. Gammell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant-General J.G.M. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major-General Lowell T. Rooks,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honorable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major-General I.F.P. Hughes, representing
Commander, Force 146

Major-General F.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Major-General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Captain Ellory H. Stone, U.S.M.,
Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

Colonel C.E. Lewin Harris,
G-5 Section, AFHQ

Mr. C. Coffin,
Office of U.S. Political Adviser

SECRETARIES

Colonel J.H. Lascelles
Major M.E. Hoge
Major C.H.P. Odgers

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K-273

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PC (44) 25th Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 20th September 1944.

2. CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN ROMANIA AND BULGARIA

(Previous Reference - PC (44) 25th Meeting, Conclusion 5)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GADWELL reported that subsequent to the last meeting of the Political Committee, the Supreme Allied Commander had agreed, after further consideration, that in spite of the conclusion then reached it would be preferable for control of Force 133 elements in ROMANIA and BULGARIA to be vested in AFHQ and action had been taken accordingly.

THE COMMITTEE :

Took note of the above.

3. EXTRACTION OF POLES FROM ROMANIA

(Previous Reference - PC (44) 25th Meeting, Conclusion 6)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BAKER and MAJOR-GENERAL ALFRED reported that arrangements for the evacuation of the Poles in question by air were possible, but pointed out that this involved a risk of difficulties with the Russians which might prejudice future Allied activities in ROMANIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that article 5 of the Armistice with ROMANIA provided for the handing over to the Soviet High Command by ROMANIA of all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war in their hands and that the action proposed in respect of Poles in ROMANIA was inconsistent with this article. He understood that no firm undertaking had been given to General Anders regarding their evacuation.

MAJOR-GENERAL BENJAMIN-NESBITT observed that General Anders would certainly wish the Allies to do their best for Poles in ROMANIA and also for those in YUGOSLAVIA and BULGARIA. He suggested that Poles in ROMANIA might be advised to report to the British Mission there and that authority should be sought for that mission to act on behalf of the Polish Government.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GADWELL considered that General Anders should be informed that the risk of evacuation in a clandestine manner was not acceptable but that the possibility of evacuating Poles in ROMANIA under the auspices of the British Mission was under examination.

Took note of the above.

3. EXTRACTION OF POLES FROM ROMANIA

(Previous Reference - PC (44) 25th Meeting, Conclusion 6)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EMER and MAJOR-GENERAL AHEW reported that arrangements for the evacuation of the Poles in question by air were possible, but pointed out that this involved a risk of difficulties with the Russians which might prejudice future Allied activities in ROMANIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that article 5 of the Armistice with ROMANIA provided for the handing over to the Soviet High Command by ROMANIA of all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war in their hands and that the action proposed in respect of Poles in ROMANIA was inconsistent with this article. He understood that no firm undertaking had been given to General Anders regarding their evacuation.

MAJOR-GENERAL BEMMONT-NESBITT observed that General Anders would certainly wish the Allies to do their best for Poles in ROMANIA, and also for those in YUGOSLAVIA and BULGARIA. He suggested that Poles in ROMANIA might be advised to report to the British Mission there and that authority should be sought for that mission to act on behalf of the Polish Government.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMMILL considered that General Anders should be informed that the risk of evacuation in a clandestine manner was not acceptable but that the possibility of evacuating Poles in ROMANIA under the auspices of the British Mission was under examination.

MR. MACMILLAN considered that the problem should be put before the State Department and the Foreign Office for guidance.

MR. ELL suggested that General Anders might also be advised to have the matter taken up by the Polish Government in LONDON and WASHINGTON. 400

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Invited the U.S. Political adviser and the British Resident Minister to inform the State Department and the Foreign Office respectively of the situation regarding Poles in ROMANIA, and other Balkan countries, in the light of the above discussion, and to request their guidance as to the policy to be adopted.

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(b) Dr. Macmillan said that the Chief, Liaison Section, inform General Anders that the risk attached to evacuation of Poles from ROMANIA in a clandestine manner was unacceptable but that instructions were being sought from LONDON and WASHINGTON in the matter; and advised him to request the Polish Government to take the matter up also with WASHINGTON and LONDON.

4. PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH THE ROYAL YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. 9C (44) 109)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft agreement for negotiation with the Royal Yugoslav Government to cover the activities in YUGOSLAVIA of M. HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) and the forces under its command.

MR. MACMILLAN said that at present certain delegates from Marshal Tito were about to arrive at BARI to discuss matters connected with relief supplies for YUGOSLAVIA and that Commander, Balkan Air Force, had urged that Dr. Subasic should send out to BARI representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government to join in these discussions. He understood that Dr. Subasic had ordered his representative in GAIK to attend. If representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government did arrive, he considered that they and Marshal Tito's delegates should be invited to agree on certain general principles on the basis of which relief in YUGOSLAVIA would be operated. The two basic principles were equitable distribution and the granting of facilities for inspection by the Allies, who were providing the relief supplies. If Marshal Tito declined to grant inspection facilities it might be necessary to refuse to supply relief. If, on the other hand, the basic principles were agreed then it would be possible to introduce clauses dealing with the status of Allied personnel working in YUGOSLAVIA in connection with relief, thus eventually building up to something like the agreement under discussion. It was clear that the Royal Yugoslav Government had in practice no power to carry out the agreement as at present drawn. Their representatives must first be asked to accept the principle of joint negotiation with Marshal Tito's delegates, and at the end of these negotiations it must be decided whether a formal agreement was required.

MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHES observed that the two basic principles referred to by Mr. Macmillan were the two main points for discussion in the forthcoming talks between Marshal Tito's delegates and Commander, M. HQ (YUGOSLAVIA). In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he said that relief matters had only been discussed in broad outline with Marshal Tito by Brigadier Maclean. He emphasised that Commander, M. HQ (YUGOSLAVIA), had no intention of referring in his discussions with Marshal Tito's delegates to the draft agreement at present under discussion.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER emphasised the necessity for insisting

Dr. Subasic had ordered him to join in these discussions. He understood that representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government did arrive. If they and Marshal Tito's delegates should be invited to agree on certain general principles on the basis of which relief in YUGOSLAVIA would be operated. The two basic principles were equitable distribution and the granting of facilities for inspection by the Allies, who were providing the relief supplies. If Marshal Tito declined to grant inspection facilities it might be necessary to refuse to supply relief. If, on the other hand, the basic principles were agreed then it would be possible to introduce clauses dealing with the status of Allied personnel working in YUGOSLAVIA in connection with relief, thus eventually building up to something like the agreement under discussion. It was clear that the Royal Yugoslav Government had in practice no power to carry out the agreement as at present drawn. Their representatives must first be asked to accept the principle of joint negotiation with Marshal Tito's delegates, and at the end of these negotiations it must be decided whether a formal agreement was required.

MAJOR-GENERAL HUGHES observed that the two basic principles referred to by Mr. Macmillan were the two main points for discussion in the forthcoming talks between Marshal Tito's delegates and Commander, MI HQ (YUGOSLAVIA). In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he said that relief matters had only been discussed in broad outline with Marshal Tito by Arpadier Maclean. He emphasized that Commander, MI HQ (YUGOSLAVIA), had no intention of referring in his discussions with Marshal Tito's delegates to the draft agreement at present under discussion.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER emphasized the necessity for insisting that Marshal Tito did not remove the Allied relief representatives once they were installed in YUGOSLAVIA. He added that, if the arrival of the delegates of the Royal Yugoslav Government were delayed, it would be possible to mark time with Marshal Tito's delegates by requesting them to produce details of their various relief requirements.

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MR. KIRK pointed out that the normal technical procedure would be the negotiation of an agreement with the Royal Yugoslav Government as originally suggested. He agreed, however, that Marshal Tito had de facto power in YUGOSLAVIA and pointed out the difficulty of combining the two elements. He added that embarrassment would result if Marshal Tito were consulted first in this matter, or if negotiations were conducted with anyone other than the Royal Yugoslav Government. He felt that the Royal Yugoslav Government should be induced themselves to initiate discussion with Marshal Tito's delegates.

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LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GAMBELL considered the views of the Foreign Office should be in the hands of the representatives of the Foreign Office and State Department with Commander, HL HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) acting as a technical adviser.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that further consideration of the draft agreement be postponed.
- (b) Endorsed the views of the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister recorded above and invited them, in conjunction with G-5 and Commander, HL HQ (BALKANS), to work out a plan of action based on the above discussion.

5. DISPOSAL OF YUGOSLAV EX-PRISONERS OF WAR

(Paper No. PC (44) 110)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a letter from the Allied PW Repatriation Unit, GEF, requesting instructions for the disposal of 2,000 Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war detained in SWITZERLAND, together with recommendations on this subject by the Chief, Liaison Section.

MAJOR-GENERAL BELMONT-MERBITT emphasised the importance of not moving these Yugoslavs until the conditions of service in the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation had been made known to them.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out the importance of concentrating Royalist and Partisan Yugoslavs in separate camps and suggested that the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslavs in question should be held at MARSEILLES until suitable arrangements for their accommodation had been made.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that G-4 (Mov & Trn) examine the possibility of moving the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war direct from MARSEILLES to the MIDDLE EAST.
- (b) Endorsed the recommendations of the Chief, Liaison Section, set forth in paragraph 3 of paper No. PC (44) 110 and directed that he inform HQ Allied PW Repatriation Unit accordingly.

6. AGREEMENT WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 101 (Revised))

THE COMMITTEE had before them a revised draft agreement with the Greek Government covering operation of a British force supported by an Allied Relief Organisation in GREECE, as amended by the Foreign Office.

tion Unit, GAF, requesting instructions for the disposal of 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war detained in SWITZERLAND, together with recommendations on this subject by the Chief, Liaison Section.

MAJOR-GENERAL BEAUMONT-NEWBITT emphasized the importance of not moving these Yugoslavs until the conditions of service in the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation had been made known to them.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out the importance of concentrating Royalist and Partisan Yugoslavs in separate camps and suggested that the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslavs in question should be held at HASSELTILLES until suitable arrangements for their accommodation had been made.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that G-4 (Mov & In) examine the possibility of moving the 2,000 Royalist Yugoslav ex-prisoners of war direct from HASSELTILLES to the MIDDLE EAST.
- (b) Endorsed the recommendations of the Chief, Liaison Section, set forth in paragraph 3 of Paper No. PC (44) 110 and directed that he inform HQ Allied PW Repatriation Unit accordingly.

6. AGREEMENT WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. PC (44) 101 (Revised))

THE COMMITTEE had before them a revised draft agreement with the Greek Government covering operation of a British force supported by an Allied Relief Organisation in GREECE, as amended by the Foreign Office.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that the State Department had agreed to the text of the Foreign Office draft subject to certain minor amendments* and had expressed their willingness that the agreement should now be negotiated with the Greek Government.

* These amendments are as follows :-

- (a) In line 2 of the preamble substitute "Greek units" for "other allied units". If units of other nationalities in addition to British and Greek are in fact to be employed the United States Government suggest "Greek units and other units".

- (b) Line 5 of the preamble should be amended to read "restoring stable conditions under which relief may be provided".

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ADJUTANT GENERAL pointed out that paragraph 10 of the agreement as at present drafted left the position regarding Merchant Seamen open. He agreed, however, that this was properly a matter for the Ministry of War Transport.

THE COMMITTEE :

Took note of the above.

7. TEXT OF ARMISTICE WITH ROMANIA

(Paper No. FC (44) 111)

THE COMMITTEE took note of the terms of the Armistice imposed on ROMANIA.

8. ARMISTICE WITH BULGARIA

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that the negotiation of the armistice with BULGARIA would now probably take place in MOSCOW and that there might be points arising in the course of the negotiations on which the views of the Mediterranean Theatre should be expressed.

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKS said that the terms of the armistice were under preparation by the European Advisory Council in LONDON. He suggested that consideration should be given to points which it was desired to include from the point of view of the Mediterranean Theatre, and that the Chiefs of Staff should be asked to put these before the European Advisory Council. He suggested that an inter-service committee should be established to investigate the matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to draft for his approval a telegram to the British Chiefs of Staff asking whether his views on points of particular concern to the Mediterranean Theatre which might arise in connection with the Bulgarian Armistice negotiations were required.
- (b) Instructed the Secretary to arrange for the establishment of a Committee, representative of the appropriate service and political authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre, to study the material available in ATHQ indicating the probable content of the Armistice terms to be imposed on BULGARIA and to report to him what, if any, recommendations should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for submission to the European Advisory Council to cover points of interest to the Allied service and political authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre.

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the views of the Mediterranean Theatre should be expressed.

MAJOR-GENERAL MOUS said that the terms of the armistice were under preparation by the European Advisory Council in LONDON. He suggested that consideration should be given to points which it was desired to include from the point of view of the Mediterranean Theatre, and that the Chiefs of Staff should be asked to put these before the European Advisory Council. He suggested that an inter-service committee should be established to investigate the matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Instructed the Secretary to draft for his approval a telegram to the British Chiefs of Staff asking whether his views on points of particular concern to the Mediterranean Theatre which might arise in connection with the Bulgarian Armistice negotiations were required.
- (b) Instructed the Secretary to arrange for the establishment of a Committee, representative of the appropriate service and political authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre, to study the material available in AFHQ indicating the probable content of the armistice terms to be imposed in BULGARIA and to report to him what, if any, recommendations should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for submission to the European Advisory Council to cover points of interest to the Allied service and political authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre.

9. OPERATIONS IN THE ARABIAN

(Telegram No. G075 of 26th September from Force HQ to BAF)

ADMIRAL GUNNINGHAM drew attention to a telegram in which Commander, Force HQ, requested Commander, Balkan Air Force, to hold 'B' Squadron of the Greek Sacred Regiment in KITHIRA. He pointed out that the retention of this squadron at KITHIRA would be valueless, since the advanced base for light naval craft was being moved to FOROS with 9 Commando. He considered that the Greek Sacred Squadron should also be moved to FOROS.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Endorsed the views of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, recorded above and instructed the Secretary to arrange that Commander, Force HQ, issue instructions for the earliest possible movement of 'B' Squadron of the Greek Sacred Regiment to FOROS.

TOP SECRET

VOLUNTARY RELIEF IN ITALY

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he would be discussing voluntary relief with Mr. Myron Taylor in WCE on 29th September and enquired what steps had been taken for its organisation.

CAPTAIN STONE replied that a Committee consisting of representatives of the Italian Government, Italian Red Cross and the Vatican had been set up to handle and distribute voluntary relief when supplies arrived. An Allied Control Commission Liaison Officer with the Committee had been appointed and co-ordination with UNRRA effected.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL Clark said that he envisaged difficulty in providing transport for voluntary relief. Moreover, it seemed uncertain whether or not voluntary relief supplies of the suggested categories would be additional to the minimum tonnages of each category supplied under the normal civil supply arrangements for Italy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that all voluntary relief must be co-ordinated under a single control. Additional relief organisations would undoubtedly wish to participate in voluntary relief in ITALY and the position in respect of GREECE had also to be considered. He referred to the offer by the New Zealand Government of approximately 700 tons of foodstuffs to the people of GREECE (TROOPERS telegram GEN 270 dated 25th September 1944).

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that the supplementing of relief tonnages authorised by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee with additional voluntary relief supplies in one country would lead to difficulties in other countries less favourably treated.

MR. McMILLAN observed that three factors conditioned the restriction of relief supplies provided under the authority of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee:-

- (a) Certain relief items might be in world short supply.
- (b) Insufficient shipping tonnage might be available to transport the full tonnage required even though the supplies might be available.
- (c) Expenditure might not be authorised in respect of certain commodities which were considered to be outside basic relief needs.

In his opinion it would be inappropriate that voluntary relief should be used to supplement tonnages officially restricted for the reasons in (a) or (b) but there would be no objection to supply by voluntary relief of commodities for which expenditure by the Allied Government was not authorised.

CAPTAIN STONE said that in the case of ITALY there were certain items of relief supplies, notably milk, in respect of which the official allowance was clearly inadequate and which could be readily supplemented by voluntary relief.

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CAPTAIN STONE said that in the case of ITALY there were certain items of relief supplies, notably milk, in respect of which the official allowance was clearly inadequate and which could be readily supplemented by voluntary relief. He could see no objection to voluntary relief in such circumstances.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above discussion.

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J. H. L. SELLER
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