

should be stated in this case, was to secure such parts of VHSZEL GMLH as would be required to ensure the military lines of communication.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft telegram circulated under paper No. SAC (S) (L5) 21 in accordance with the above discussion and to transmit the revised draft, for their approval.

11. FINANCES FOR THE CHAI

MR. WATKINS said that until recently the CHAI had, under agreement, been provided with 100,000,000 lire monthly. Signor Longhi had recently, for various reasons, asked for this amount to be increased to 300,000,000. This had been agreed and the Allied Commission had been instructed to approach the Italian government accordingly. Meanwhile, however, the rapid advance of the armies had already involved the liberation of substantial areas of the north of Italy and it therefore appeared inappropriate to increase the sum paid to the CHAI at this time. It appeared more proper to consider whether the amounts paid could not now be reduced. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, had therefore refrained from requesting the Italian government to increase the payments, pending further direction from the Supreme Allied Commander.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief of Staff to examine the matter of CHAI finances, so as to determine whether, in view of the liberation of substantial areas of northern Italy, the amount paid should not be substantially reduced instead of increased, as had been previously proposed.

*Subsequently despatched as SAC 132.

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J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 8th Meeting
24 April 1945

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SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

APR 25 RECD

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 26TH APRIL 1945

(12) (P) (45) (NR) (NR)

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 7th Meeting - already circulated)
2. ANNOUNCEMENT FOR AGENDANCE & SUMMIT OF GEN. A. COM. SUPR-IR-
CHIEF SECRETARY
(JPS Study No. P/278 (Final) - already circulated) (NR)
3. ANNOUNCEMENT FOR SUMMIT OF GEN. A. SUMMIT IN ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/275 (Revised) - already circulated) (NR)
4. RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS IN GERMANY
(JPS Study No. P/279 (Final) - already circulated) (NR)
5. FUTURE OF LAND FORCES AERIAL TROOPS
(JPS Study No. P/280 (Final) - to be circulated) (NR)
6. N.V.L. SUPPORT FOR JUGOSLAVIAN ORGANIZATION IN THE FUTURE
(JPS Study No. P/281 (Final) - to be circulated) (NR) (28/EC)
7. ALLIED ALLIANCE CONTROL IN VERMONT, GERMANY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 24 - to be circulated)

ATTENDANCE: Director and Deputy Director, SAC, are invited to attend
for Item 4.

Minutes at Folio 172

W. G. S. Smith
W. G. S. SMITH
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

COPY NO

MINUTES OF MEETINGS

(SAC (P) (45) 7th meeting - already circulated)

2. ANALYSIS TO THE ACQUISITION OF SUBSTANCES OF GENERAL COMMERCE-IR-CHIEF EQUIPMENT
(JPS Study No. P/276 (Final) - already circulated)
3. REQUIREMENT FOR EQUIPMENT OF THE SUBSTANCES IN ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/275 (Revised) - already circulated)
4. REQUIREMENT FOR EQUIPMENT IN ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/279 (Final) - already circulated)
5. PURCHASE OF LAD LORRIES, ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/273 (Final) - to be circulated)
6. REQUIREMENT FOR EQUIPMENT OF THE SUBSTANCES IN ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/275 (Final) - to be circulated)
7. REQUIREMENT FOR EQUIPMENT OF THE SUBSTANCES IN ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/275 (Final) - to be circulated)

ATTENDANCE: Director and Deputy Director, JPS, are invited to attend for Item 4.

Minutes at Folio 172

J. G. S. S. S.
J. G. S. S. S.,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

17 APRIL 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

1. There will be NO FORMAL MEETING of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, either Political or Operational, ON THURSDAY, 19 APRIL 1945.
2. A BRIEF INFORMAL CONFERENCE, will, however, be held by the Supreme Allied Commander with the Commanders-in-Chief IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS on that day. Attendance will be as set out at SAC (P) (45) 12 Addendum, para 1 (f).

J. G. Swenson
J. G. SWENSON,
Lt. Colonel, G.S.,
Secretary.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, MACF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MACF
Commanding General 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MACF
U.S. Political Adviser
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ROOMS on that day. Attendance will be as set out at 340 (P) (45) 12 Addendum, para 1 (c).

H. G. SWEETMAN
Lt. Colonel, G.S.,
Secretary.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
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Deputy Chief of Staff
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Assistant Chief of Staff G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5
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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (F) (45) 7th Meeting
12th April 1945

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COPY NO 3

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

APR 14 1945

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 12TH APRIL 1945

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Major General John K. Cannon,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

Vice Admiral W.A. Glassford,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AEW

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Bead, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

*All necessary reports
made
Documented p. 7/2.*

Field Marshal Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Major General John W. Cannon,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Force

Vice Admiral W.A. Glassford,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Gerrard,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General D. Mace,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

*All necessary to add
made
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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

K 147

Brigadier J.G. Nicholson, representing
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Brigadier General C.P. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF

Mr. C. Offis,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES :-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(S.C (P) (45) 6th Meeting) (151)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 5th April 1945.

2. DEEP SEA FISHING FACILITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(Previous reference S.C (P) (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 6) (147)

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS reported that a detailed examination of the feasibility of increasing present facilities for deep sea fishing was now being made. However, a final report had not yet been received.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that this examination would not cover the question of deep sea fishing in the Adriatic near the Eighth Army area. This was being examined separately. It applied mainly to food for hospitals.

MAJOR GENERAL CANNON observed that certain areas in the Adriatic used as bombing ranges would still, of necessity, be closed to fishermen.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

See E.O.

1734

Lieutenant Colonel J.O. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(S.S. (P) (45) 6th Meeting) (151)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 5th April 1945.

2. DEEP SEA FISHING FACILITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(Previous reference S.C. (P) (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 6) (147)

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

| See F. 71.

Took note of the above reports.

3. LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

(Previous reference S.C. (P) (45) 6th Meeting - Minute 3) (150)

MAJOR GENERAL LEONITZER, referring to his statement at the last meeting concerning the attachment of OSS/SOE officers to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest for the purpose of controlling actions of enemy forces and advising in respect of action by Partisans, stated that his remarks, as reported, required enlargement. Control of Partisans would, as at present, continue to be exercised directly by Headquarters 15th Army Group. The OSS/ SOE officers referred to above would exercise control, on behalf of 15th Army Group, the actions of enemy forces in regard to Partisans.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, referring to the statement in the general directive regarding local enemy surrender in Italy that the Air Commander-in-

Letter, AFHQ, IG 387/147 S.O.S.-O, dated 31 March 1945.

File 514/EC.

Exhibit A. All notes on copy to Exec Sec

Exhibit A. All notes on copy to Exec Sec

TOP SECRET

K 147

Chief will be prepared to interview all movement routes leading out of Italy, express the view that action so taken should be carefully coordinated with the administrative staff, as the railway would be essential to our own forces when they occupied Northern Italy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

4. EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 21) — File 2452. Fow 79.

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper noting previous discussions at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting - Minute 10 and SAC (P) (44) 33rd Meeting - Minute 7, where it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian forces for policing VENEZIA GIULIA, and requesting exceptions to this policy in regards to the use of TRIESTE by Italian Naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that there were a number of Naval problems in regard to the opening of the port of TRIESTE which must be settled before military needs were met. Since any electric power provided in the port must come from a vessel equipped for the purpose, the use of an Italian ship was militarily desirable, as also was the employment of an Italian Cooperator Engineer Company. In response to a question by Mr. Orris, he stated that the use of an Italian corvette would obviate the necessity for use of a French vessel.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that while Marshal Tito's forces might be in possession of a large part of VENEZIA GIULIA at the time of our occupation of TRIESTE, he nevertheless believed that there was little likelihood of Yugoslav objection to the use of Italians in the port of TRIESTE, since these Italian forces would be under the Allied Military command. In any case he would not allow any political considerations to interfere with the development of the port of TRIESTE, which would be his main military base, in any manner he thought fit. Similar considerations would apply in the immediate area of the military L of C from TRIESTE into AUSTRIA. However, no Italian personnel should be introduced into those parts of VENEZIA GIULIA, outside the L of C area which it might be necessary to occupy for political reasons. It would also be unwise to introduce Carabinieri from other parts of ITALY into any part of VENEZIA GIULIA. He added that he had recently sent a communication to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff expressing his concern over the delay in deciding the policy to be adopted in regard to the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA.

MR. KIRK agreed with the view expressed by Admiral Cunningham that military necessity in the use of Italian forces would overrule political desirability.

Admiral Cunningham stated that there were a number of Naval problems in regard to the opening of the port of TRIESTE which must be settled before military needs were met. Since any electric power provided in the port must come from a vessel equipped for the purpose, the use of an Italian ship was militarily desirable, as also was the employment of an Italian Cooperator Engineer Company. In response to a question by Mr. Olffe, he stated that the use of an Italian corvette would obviate the necessity for use of a French vessel.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER stated that while Marshal Tito's forces might be in possession of a large part of VENETIA GIULIA at the time of our occupation of TRIESTE, he nevertheless believed that there was little likelihood of Yugoslav objections to the use of Italians in the port of TRIESTE, since these Italian forces would be under the Allied Military command. In any case he would not allow any political considerations to interfere with the development of the port of TRIESTE, which would be his main military base, in any manner he thought fit. Similar considerations would apply in the immediate area of the military I of C from TRIESTE into AUSTRIA. However, no Italian personnel should be introduced into those parts of VENETIA GIULIA outside the I of C area which it might be necessary to occupy for political reasons. It would also be unwise to introduce Carabinieri from other parts of ITALY into any part of VENETIA GIULIA. He added that he had recently sent a communication to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff expressing his concern over the delay in deciding the policy to be adopted in regard to the occupation of VENETIA GIULIA.

MR. KIRK agreed with the view expressed by Admiral Cunningham that military necessity in the use of Italian forces would overrule political desirability.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNSTON was of the opinion that the introduction of any Italian troops into VENETIA GIULIA was undesirable, even though these might be attached to British or American Army units. There were, for example, a number of Italian personnel attached to Headquarters Eighth Army as cooks, mess orderlies, and batmen. It was his view that in the occupation of VENETIA GIULIA these troops should not accompany tank headquarters, especially as it would at a later date move into AUSTRIA.

MAJOR GENERAL AIREY considered that any introduction of Italian personnel would be undesirable from the counter-intelligence viewpoint.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER considered that it would be detrimental to Allied prestige if we were to remove Italian personnel, normally employed by any headquarters, simply because that headquarters was moving into VENETIA GIULIA. Such personnel would not, however, be employed in AUSTRIA and could therefore be removed from headquarters destined for that country. In reply to a question by the U.S. Political Adviser as to whether this view applied to the use of cooperator companies, he stated that even though it might be necessary to use them in TRIESTE, they should not be moved to AUSTRIA.

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GENERAL MACNEE stated that the employment of Italians in TRIESTE was analogous to the use of Italians in FRANCE, and also we had found it necessary to use them in the latter country, the precedent so established could be applied to the area of our communications in VENEZIA GIULIA if necessary. He added that he had recently been pressed by the United States Chiefs of Staff to consider redeployment of certain American service troops to the F.I.R. EAST. Lack of sufficient American service units might therefore require the employment of Italians in the occupation of the U.S. zone of AUSTRIA and the development of the I of C into it.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Reaffirmed the general policy that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian forces in the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA, and,
- (b) Authorized as exceptions to the above policy:
 - (i) The use of TRIESTE by Italian Naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.
 - (ii) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied I of C into AUSTRIA as might, for military reasons, be unavoidable.
- (c) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to arrange for British Units, to which Italian personnel were attached, to shed such personnel at a suitable time before entry into AUSTRIA.

5. MACHINERY FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ENEMY SURRENDER IN ITALY

(JPS Study No. P/4/15 (Final)) — RUC 54/1cc

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper setting out the machinery which would be required, in the event of enemy surrender in ITALY, to insure the implementation of orders issued to enemy forces by or on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander.

BRIGADIER NICHOLSON stated that the establishment of the machinery for enforcement of surrender of German Ground Forces was already partially covered in Appendix 'A' to the Instrument of Surrender. It was now, however, for consideration whether Appendices 'B' and 'C', which applied to Naval and Air arms, respectively, should be amended to include similar provisions. Direction was also required as to whether the paper should be forwarded to 15th Army Group and M.T.F. for their information.

AIRLIE CUNNINGHAM stated that it would be necessary for a high ranking German Naval officer to be attached to his Headquarters at CASERTA rather than to Headquarters 15th Army Group, as naval surrender would introduce many

the employment of Italian personnel at that point.

- (14) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied L of C into AUSTRIA as might, for military reasons, be unavoidable.

- (c) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to arrange for British Units, to which Italian personnel were attached, to spend such personnel at a suitable time before entry into AUSTRIA.

5. MACHINERY FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ENEMY SURRENDER IN ITALY

(JPS Study No. P/275 (Final)) ----- File 54/EC

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper setting out the machinery which would be required, in the event of enemy surrender in ITALY, to insure the implementation of orders issued to enemy forces by or on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander.

BRIGADIER NICHOLSON stated that the establishment of the machinery for enforcement of surrender of German Ground Forces was already partially covered in Appendix 'A' to the Instrument of Surrender. It was now, however, for consideration whether Appendices 'B' and 'C', which applied to Naval and Air arms, respectively, should be amended to include similar provisions. Direction was also required as to whether the paper should be forwarded to 15th Army Group and MCTF for their information.

ADMIRAL GUNNINGHAM stated that it would be necessary for a high ranking German Naval officer to be attached to his Headquarters at CASERTA rather than to Headquarters 15th Army Group, as naval surrender would introduce many questions affecting parts of the Mediterranean outside the Italian Theatre. Such matters could not be entrusted to a local Fleet Officer. Paragraphs 4 c and 10 of the JPS paper should therefore be amended to state specifically that German Naval representatives should be sent to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, as soon as possible after the signing of the instrument. Referring to the Allied Naval Liaison Officers who, as stated at paragraph 4 a of the paper would be sent to German Naval Commands after the surrender, he said it would be necessary to send appropriate small staffs of naval experts with these officers. The reference in the paper might therefore be amended to read "Allied Liaison Parties."

ADMIRAL GUNNINGHAM said that, as on the air side surrender would also raise problems outside the jurisdiction of the tactical air forces in ITALY, he would also require a high ranking enemy air force officer to come to his headquarters. The air paragraphs of the paper should therefore be revised in a manner similar to the naval amendments suggested by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Final - File 54/EC

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ALLIED COMMANDER:

X 127

(a) Instructed the Chief of Staff:

(1) To review the paper circulated as JPS Study No. F/275 (Final), in accordance with the above discussion, and subsequently to dispatch it for information to Commanding General 15th Army Group and, through Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF, to Commanding General, MATF.

(12) To amend accordingly the Naval and Air Orders to Entry Forces, attached as Appendices B and C to the Instrument of local surrender.

(b) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to take action to implement Paragraph 11 of JPS Study No. F/275 (Final).

6. ALLIED MISSION TO THE RUSSIAN ARMIES IN AUSTRIA

(JPS Study No. F/276 (Final) — *MR (Copy sent CC)*

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper setting out the composition of the mission required to establish contact and liaison with the Russians (with a view to facilitating both the deployment and the setting up of initial machinery of joint tripartite control over AUSTRIA), and attaching a draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of these proposals and requesting them to make the necessary approach to the Russians to secure their agreement.

MR. BRONN observed that the Joint Planning Staff proposals were for a large mission of some 300 to 400 personnel. It would be necessary to approach the Russians at governmental level in order to obtain their agreement to the entry of such a mission; such a process would at best be slow and in fact it was likely that the Russians would delay approval indefinitely. He felt the only way of obtaining any representation in AUSTRIA within a reasonable period of time was for a direct approach to be made by the Supreme Allied Commander to Marshal Tolbukhin, requesting his approval to the attachment of a very small mission (say some six officers) to his Headquarters.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he had no doubt that, if he were to approach Marshal Tolbukhin directly requesting the attachment to him of any mission, no matter how small, the latter would at once refer the request to MOSCOW. He thought that great care was needed with regard to direct communications with Marshal Tolbukhin as the only effect might be to cause the Russian authorities at MOSCOW to object to the proposal more than ever.

MR. BRIGGIER NICHOLSON said that the reason why the Joint Planning Staff had recommended a large mission was in order to introduce elements of the future Tripartite Central Council into AUSTRIA as soon as possible. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had stated that it was the desire of the United States

THE COMPREHENSIVE had before them a paper setting out the composition of the mission required to establish contact and liaison with the Russians (with a view to facilitating both the deployment and the setting up of initial machinery of joint tripartite control over AUSTRIA), and attaching a draft signed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of these proposals and requesting them to make the necessary approach to the Russians to secure their agreement.

MR. BEOLIN observed that the Joint Planning Staff proposals were for a large mission of some 300 to 400 personnel. It would be necessary to approach the Russians at governmental level in order to obtain their agreement to the entry of such a mission; such a process would at best be slow and in fact it was likely that the Russians would delay approval indefinitely. He felt the only way of obtaining any representation in AUSTRIA within a reasonable period of time was for a direct approach to be made by the Supreme Allied Commander to Marshal Tolbukhin, requesting his approval to the attachment of a very small mission (say some six officers) to his Headquarters.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that he had no doubt that, if he were to approach Marshal Tolbukhin directly requesting the attachment to him of any mission, no matter how small, the latter would at once refer the request to MOSCOW. He thought that great care was needed with regard to direct communications with Marshal Tolbukhin as the only effect might be to cause the Russian authorities at MOSCOW to object to the proposal more than ever.

BREITENBERG NICHOLSON said that the reason why the Joint Planning Staff had recommended a large mission was in order to introduce elements of the future Tripartite Control Council into AUSTRIA as soon as possible. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had stated that it was the desire of the United States and British Governments that as soon as VIENNA had been occupied by any Allied forces, the Tripartite Control Council should immediately be established.

GENERAL MCGARRY was strongly of opinion that no attempt should be made to set up the Control Council until Anglo-American occupational troops were installed in AUSTRIA. Otherwise a situation, in which the British and United States representatives were subject to indignities and were in fact powerless, would arise in AUSTRIA as it had in ROMANIA, BULGARIA and HUNGARY. Such a situation would be most undesirable. He therefore considered that a signal should be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, disagreeing with the proposal to set up the Control Council soon after the occupation of VIENNA by the Russians and recommending that no attempt should be made to establish the Council until our occupational forces were installed in AUSTRIA. In the meantime, however, he considered a very small liaison mission might be of some use for purposes of my contact, radio registration and other purposes.

*Signal WA 30812 of 2 February 1945

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MR. KIRK agreed that, while it was desirable that the Tripartite Control Council should be set up as early as possible, the Council should not be established until it could function properly. He thought, therefore, that an examination should be made to determine the full requirements of British and United States personnel and equipment which would be necessary to enable their delegations to the Tripartite Control Council to function efficiently. Agreement with the Russians should then be sought on a governmental level for the entry of such delegations into VIENNA at an appropriate time and their freedom to operate in AUSTRIA thereafter. He believed that in view of the privileges given to the Russian representatives on the Allied Commission in ITALY we had a right to ask for such treatment in AUSTRIA. The entry of the British and United States delegations on this scale and the establishment of the Control Council might therefore be possible before Allied occupational troops had reached AUSTRIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed that the Control Council should in no circumstances be established until it would be able to function properly. The question was how soon this would be possible. He thought that further consideration was required as to whether it would be necessary to wait until occupational forces were installed, or whether a Control Council including British and United States elements on a scale which would permit them to function, could be established earlier by means of diplomatic agreement as suggested by Mr. Kirk.

MR. OPPIE observed that it was clear from the information available to him that the Russians had their own intentions regarding AUSTRIA and that they were proceeding with these plans without any reference to what had been agreed in the European Advisory Commission.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM remarked that the only argument in favour of getting a small mission into AUSTRIA early was to find out the nature of these independent Russian plans and report accordingly, so that the British and United States Commissions might endeavour to avoid being faced with a fait accompli.

VICE ADMIRAL GLASSFORD considered that it would be opportune to point out in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, that the situation in regard to the establishment of the Control Commission in AUSTRIA differed from that in respect of the similar commission for GERMANY. In the latter case, U.S. and British troops were already in occupation of a large part of the country and, in consequence, the Control Commission could commence to function considerably earlier than would be possible in AUSTRIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONTGOMERY said that it was not technically possible for the Control Council to exercise effective control until the occupational forces were disposed in accordance with the finally agreed layout of the national zones. Moreover, he thought, as a result of conferences which had been held in LONDON, that the time was opportune to make a recommendation to this effect as had been suggested by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. However, quite apart from the question of the establishment of the Tripartite Control Council,

occupational forces were installed, or whether a Control Council including British and United States elements on a scale which would permit them to function, could be established earlier by means of diplomatic agreement as suggested by Mr. Kirk.

MR. COWEN observed that it was clear from the information available to him that the Russians had their own intentions regarding AUSTRIA and that they were proceeding with these plans without any reference to what had been agreed in the European Advisory Commission.

ADMIRAL CHAMBERLAIN remarked that the only argument in favour of getting a small mission into AUSTRIA early was to find out the nature of these independent Russian plans and report accordingly, so that the British and United States Commissioners might endeavour to avoid being faced with a fait accompli.

VICE ADMIRAL GLASSFORD considered that it would be opportune to point out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, that the situation in regard to the establishment of the Control Commission in AUSTRIA differed from that in respect of the similar commission for GERMANY. In the latter case, U.S. and British troops were already in occupation of a large part of the country and, in consequence, the Control Commission could commence to function considerably earlier than would be possible in AUSTRIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONTGOMERY said that it was not technically possible for the Control Council to exercise effective control until the occupational forces were disposed in accordance with the finally agreed layout of the national zones. Moreover, he thought, as a result of conferences which had been held in LONDON, that the time was opportune to make a recommendation to this effect as had been suggested by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. However, quite apart from the question of the establishment of the Tripartite Control Council, he considered there was a strong case for despatch of a small mission to try and contact liberated Allied prisoners of war. The Russian treatment of our prisoners of war who had so far been liberated was nothing short of scandalous. As it was not considered desirable to make a direct approach to Marshal Tolbukhin, the question of the despatch of such a small mission should therefore be taken up with the Combined Chiefs of Staff without delay.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff:

- (a) To despatch a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting them to endeavour urgently to obtain Russian agreement to the despatch of a small mission designed to effect liaison with the Russian armies in AUSTRIA, in regard to the evacuation and repatriation of liberated Anglo-American prisoners of war.

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- (4) To arrange for a further examination to be made in regard to the steps, at which it was desirable to set up the Control Council in AUSTRIA, and the re-examination which should accordingly be made on this matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. FREEDOM OF AIR PASSAGE IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY DURING ALLIED OCCUPATION

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 23) — File 296c, Folio 163

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting that action be taken to effect agreement between the American, British, Russian and French Governments to ensure freedom of passage throughout the national occupational zones of GERMANY and AUSTRIA for all Allied aircraft.

MAJOR GENERAL GANNON stated that past experience has shown that permission for the passage of U.S. and British planes into or over Russian occupied territory could be approved only in MOSCOW. Agreement to free passage of Allied planes in AUSTRIA and GERMANY should therefore be sought immediately on the governmental level. In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he stated that it would, in fact, be necessary for all planes leaving the VIENNA airport to fly over the Russian Zone. In addition to the free use of airfields, it would be necessary to agree to an exchange of servicing facilities and the use of navigational aids. Referring to Para 2 (a) of the draft cable, he said that the words "subject to the occupational control of the formalities to which they belong" should be omitted as this was an automatic procedure in any case.

X

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS stated that while this Headquarters had not been officially informed of any action taken to secure transit rights, he understood the matter had been raised in WASHINGTON. He therefore considered that the telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be opportune. He remarked that after the CHIEFS Conference, when it had been decided that the French would share in the occupation of AUSTRIA, it was stated that the U.S. Forces would require certain transit rights through the proposed French Zone.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Chief of Staff to revise the cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with the Air Commander-in-Chief's remarks at 'X' above and subsequently to dispatch it.*

8. TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES - ANNOUNCEMENTS AND CELEBRATIONS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 22) — File 296c, Folio 161

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper suggesting that an order should be issued laying down a policy applicable to all troops in the Theater in regard to announcements of the cessation of hostilities in EUROPE and appropri-

governmental level. In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he stated that it would, in fact, be necessary for all planes leaving the VIMARK airport to fly over the Russian Zone. In addition to the free use of airfields, it would be necessary to agree to an exchange of servicing facilities and the use of navigational aids. Referring to Para 2 (a) of the draft cable, he said that the words "subject to the occupational control of the formations to which they belong" should be omitted as this was an automatic procedure in any case.

MAJOR GENERAL LUTHER stated that while his Headquarters had not been officially informed of any action taken to secure transit rights, he understood the matter had been raised in WASHINGTON. He therefore considered that the reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be opportune. He remarked that after the CHIEF Conference, when it had been decided that the French would share in the occupation of AUSTRIA, it was stated that the U.S. forces would require certain transit rights through the proposed French Zone.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Chief of Staff to revise the cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with the Air Commander-in-Chief's remarks at 'X' above and subsequently to despatch it.*

8. TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES - ANNOUNCEMENTS AND CELEBRATIONS

(Paper No. 3.2 (1) (45) 22) — File 3.9.2c, FOWO 81.

THE CONFERENCE and before then a paper suggesting that an order should be issued laying down a policy applicable to all troops in the Theater in regard to announcements of the cessation of hostilities in EUROPE and appropriate celebrations and speeches which would result therefrom.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER felt that any celebrations should not be of an extravagant nature or occasion of hostilities in EUROPE would not mean that the war was over. The war in the PACIFIC would not have been completed and large numbers of troops now in this Theater would be dispatched to the FAR EAST. Moreover, it had been a very bitter war. It was, therefore, his opinion that victory in EUROPE should be celebrated in a level-headed manner, in a spirit of thanksgiving and much in the same way as Christmas. It was not his intention to condone any general relaxation of discipline.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUNNINGHAM remarked that the British Government had already announced that in the UNITED KINGDOM a general holiday would be declared. He was in agreement with the general policy which the Supreme Allied Commander had

*Despatched as MAY 917 of 12 April.

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suggested and, in regard to Naval personnel under his command, he intended there would be a Sunday dinner, which would not involve the issue of extra rations but rather the saving of rations during the week in order to provide this meal. It was also his intention to hold church services and allow all personnel a half holiday. He added that it must be realized that the younger element in the services would be more exuberant in their demonstrations but he considered that the policy should be directed towards keeping all celebrations as dignified as possible.

MR. KIRK, referring to the Supreme Allied Commander's remarks, considered that the matter of celebrations was largely a question of the interpretation of the word extravagant. It was his view that there should be festivities although these should be well-organized and conducted in a tasteful, dignified manner.

MAJOR GENERAL GUNSON, expressing agreement with Admiral Cunningham's remarks, stated that he was declaring a similar policy for Air Force personnel. However, while the day allotted for celebrating the cessation of hostilities would be observed as a holiday, the next day would be one of normal activity.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON was of the opinion that any instructions issued by the Supreme Allied Commander should be general in nature, and that detailed instructions should be issued by the services themselves in accordance with this policy. He considered that extra food available to troops should be a saving item for weekly rations rather than an additional issue. He agreed with a suggestion by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, that the firing of arms and pyrotechnics should be prohibited.

AIR MARSHAL GUNSON expressed agreement with the above and suggested that there should be a Committee appointed to organize celebrations locally so that all three services should receive similar treatment.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in reply to a query by Rear Admiral Stone, said that instructions covering the Italian Forces would be issued through Military Channels. In answer to a suggestion by Admiral Cunningham, he agreed that it would be desirable to ascertain the policy which SHAEF proposed to adopt in regard to celebrations and announcements.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER instructed the Chief Administrative Officer:

- (a) In conjunction with representatives of the Commanding General AFUSA and the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief, to draft for his approval a general directive governing celebrations and announcements upon cessation of hostilities.
- (b) To dispatch a cable to SHAEF incorporating his views as outlined above and requesting information on the

LEUTENANT GENERAL MORETSON was of the opinion that any instructions issued by the Supreme Allied Commander should be general in nature, and that detailed instructions should be issued by the services themselves in accordance with this policy. He considered that extra food available to troops should be a service from the weekly rations rather than an additional issue. He agreed with a suggestion by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, that the firing of arms and pyrotechnics should be prohibited.

AIR MARSHAL GILSON expressed agreement with the above and suggested that there should be a Committee appointed to organize celebrations locally so that all three services should receive similar treatment.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in reply to a query by Rear Admiral Stone, said that instructions covering the Italian Forces would be issued through Military Channels. In answer to a suggestion by Admiral Cunningham, he agreed that it would be desirable to ascertain the policy which STAFF proposed to adopt in regard to celebrations and announcements.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER instructed the Chief Administrative Officer:

- (a) In conjunction with representatives of the Commanding General MFCUSA and the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief, to draft for his approval a general directive governing celebrations and announcements upon cessation of hostilities.
- (b) To dispatch a cable to STAFF incorporating his views as outlined above and requesting information on the policy to be adopted by STAFF.

A. G. Sweeney

A. G. SWEENEY,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF
Commander, British Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF
Commanding General 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, MAF
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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EXTRACT

Commander SCATO, c/o SOA Liaison

Item 3

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Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
 Chief, Liaison Section
 Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF
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Commander SOUTH, c/o SCW Liaison

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

R-142

SAC (P) (45) 7th Meeting
10 April 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 12TH APRIL 1945

AGENDA

APR 11 1945

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 6th Meeting - already circulated) 179 fl 215/EC
2. EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN COORDINATION WITH THE ALLIED
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 21 - already circulated)
3. MACHINERY FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ENEMY SURRENDER IN ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/275 (Final) - already circulated) NK
4. ALLIED MISSION TO THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN AUSTRIA
(JPS Study No. P/276 (Final) - to be circulated)
5. FREEDOM OF AIR PASSAGE IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY DURING ALLIED
OCCUPATION
(SAC (P) (45) 23 - to be circulated) 182 fl 214/EC
6. TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES - ANNOUNCEMENTS AND CELEBRATIONS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 22 - already circulated) NK

minutes of this conference
at 162.

J.G. STEPHENSON
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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EC 151

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 6th Meeting - already circulated) *179 p. 218/EC*
2. EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 21 - already circulated)
3. MECHANISM FOR ENFORCEMENT OF MINE SURVEILLANCE IN ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/275 (Final) - already circulated) *NE*
4. ALLIED MISSION TO THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN AUSTRIA
(JPS Study No. P/276 (Final) - to be circulated)
5. PRELIMINARY AIR PASSAGE IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY DURING ALLIED OCCUPATION
(SAC (P) (45) 23 - to be circulated) *182 p. 218/EC*
6. TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES - ANNOUNCEMENTS AND CELEBRATIONS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 22 - already circulated) *NE*

*minutes of the conference
at 162.*

14 December
J.A. STEPHENSON
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander
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Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commanding General 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
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ARMED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (R) (45) 6th Meeting
5th April 1945

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COPY NO 35

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

APR - 6 1945

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 5TH APRIL 1945

PRESENT :-

General Joseph T. McNamara,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Major General John K. Cannon,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Air Vice Marshal F.J. Fowarty, representing
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces
Lieutenant General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser
Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister
Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

General Joseph T. McNamara,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Major General John K. Gavron,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Vice Marshal F.J. Fowley, representing
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

Lieutenant General H.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honorable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemaitre,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel G.S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General D. Wood,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General E.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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Chief Commissioner (24)

Exec (35)

Pol. Officers (24)

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see p 152

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Vice Admiral W.A. Glassford, USN,
Commander Designate, Eighth Fleet, USN

Brigadier General G.L. Morley,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Brigadier General G.P. Cabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF

Colonel J.E. Bastien, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Mr. C. Office,
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Colonel G.L. King,
G-3 Special Operations, AFHQ

(for Item 3)

SECRETARIES :-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (F) (45) 5th Meeting) — 143.

THE COMMANDEER approved the minutes of their meeting held on 29th March 1945.

2. STRIKE OF ITALIAN ARTISANS

(Previous reference SAC (F) (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 5) — 138

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON reported that the strike of Italian artisans in the NILES area was virtually over. Discussions would take place shortly with a view to setting up better machinery for the settlement of wage disputes in future. The Italian government, who had been approached through the Allied Commission, had been particularly cooperative in effecting prompt termination of this strike.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

Trans - All order copy
5 Feb 1946
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Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Colonel G.I. King,
G-3 Special Operations, AFHQ
(for item 3)

SECRETARIES :-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Swainson
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 5th Meeting) — 143.

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 29th March 1945.

2. STRIKE OF ITALIAN ARTISANS

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 5th Meeting - Minute 5) — 138

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON reported that the strike of Italian artisans in the M.ELIN area was virtually over. Discussions would take place shortly with a view to setting up better machinery for the settlement of wage disputes in future. The Italian government, who had been approached through the Allied Commission, had been particularly cooperative in effecting prompt termination of this strike.

THE DEUTY SUGGESTED ALIEN DOCUMENT :

Back note with approval of the above report.

3. LEGAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN JULY - DIRECTIVE REGARDING SPECIAL OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 19) — Para 17, File 20/EC.

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to 15th Army Group amplifying the special operational aspects of the action to be taken in event of enemy surrender in Northern Italy.

MR. MACMILLAN, referring to paragraph 2 b and c of the proposed directive, stated that the term "Italians" should be amplified. It was not meant to imply that Italian forces would fight the French and the Slovenes but Partisans or civilians might be so involved. He was of the opinion therefore that the directive should read "Italians other than regular forces".

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With regard to paragraph 6 of the draft directive he considered that a phrase should be added to make clear that the Allied officers would proceed in the enemy Headquarters, immediately after the signature of the Instrument of Surrender.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, referring to paragraph 3 of the cover note of the paper, considered that the directive should also point out to 15th Army Group, that the officers, mentioned in paragraph 6 of the draft, were only a part of a larger mission in regard to which further directions would be issued. Moreover, he thought this paragraph was not clear, both in regard to the number of officers to be sent - he thought the number should be small - and in regard to their precise tasks. He queried whether it was intended that these officers should control the Allied liaison officers in the field and issue orders directly to them and to the representatives of the GHQ.

MAJOR GENERAL MOSE said that, as the liaison officers and partisan forces in the field were already under command of 15th Army Group, the choice of OSS and SOE officers to be sent was properly a matter for General Clark's decision.

COUNTESS KING, agreeing with Major General Mose, considered that the best selection would be the senior OSS and SOE officers now employed at Headquarters, 15th Army Group.

MR. KING suggested that as the Italian government would eventually have to assume responsibility for law and order in the areas in question, representatives of that government should be included in this mission.

MR. MACMILLAN pointed out that the representatives mentioned in the directive were solely the OSS/SOE portion of a general military mission, which was to be sent considerably prior to the arrival of Allied troops. It would be too early to include political representation at this stage.

ADMIRAL GOMMINGHAM, agreeing with a remark by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander that the mission should be confined to military representatives, observed that it had been decided at the previous meeting that such personnel would be required to supervise the steps taken by the enemy to implement the Supreme Allied Commander's orders. He understood this matter was now under examination by the Joint Planning Staff. The mission so sent to the enemy Headquarters should be on a purely military basis. Any political problems, arising at that stage, would be decided at JPMHQ and if necessary the mission, whose function was merely to transmit the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander and ensure compliance with them, would be instructed accordingly.

MR. GOMMINGHAM pointed out that the task of the OSS/SOE officers

Excluded - Not for EC

forces in the field were already under command of 15th Army Group, the choice of GCS and SCS officers to be sent was properly a matter for General Clark's decision.

GENERAL KING, agreeing with Major General Wood, considered that the best selection would be the senior GCS and SCS officers now employed at Headquarters, 15th Army Group.

MR. KING suggested that as the Italian Government would eventually have to assume responsibility for law and order in the areas in question, representatives of that government should be included in this mission.

MR. WACHSCHILD pointed out that the representatives mentioned in the directive were merely the GCS/SCS portion of a general military mission, which was to be sent considerably prior to the arrival of Allied troops. It would be too early to include political representation at this stage.

ADMIRAL DUMFRIES, agreeing with a remark by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander that the mission should be confined to military representatives, observed that it had been decided at the previous meeting that such personnel would be required to supervise the steps taken by the enemy to implement the Supreme Allied Commander's orders. He understood this matter was now under examination by the Joint Planning Staff. The mission so sent to the enemy headquarters should be on a purely military basis. Any political problems, arising at that stage, would be decided at JPHQ and if necessary the mission, whose function was merely to transmit the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander and ensure compliance with them, would be instructed accordingly.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS pointed out that the lack of the GCS/SCS officers would be to control, in the light of their intimate knowledge of the resistance movement, the actions taken by the enemy forces under Commander-in-Chief Southwest in regard to the Italian Partisans, and thereby to assist in the maintenance of law and order.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS then considered that, during the period immediately following enemy surrender, it would be wrong to change the existing chain of command for Allied liaison officers and the lines of communication with them and the Partisans. As the present method was to control the resistance movement from 15th Army Group, that system should remain. The GCS/SCS officers despatched to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest should, therefore, have authority to control the actions of the enemy forces, but should only have an advisory task in respect of action by Partisans, which would still be controlled, as at present, by Headquarters, 15th Army Group.

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THE DEPT. SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft directive circulated under paper No. SAC (I) (45) 19, to include,

(a) the amendments suggested by the British Resident (indicated at 'X' above);

(b) a paragraph on the lines of paragraph 3 of the cover note to the paper, making clear that the OSS and SOE representatives to be sent to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest were only a portion of a general mission, in regard to which Commanding General, 15th Army Group, would receive further directions;

(c) a more precise definition of the tasks of the OSS/SOE officers to be despatched from 15th Army Group,

See also
ib.

and subsequently to despatch the directive as amended.

4. STATUS OF PERSONNEL OF ITALIAN FASCIST FORCES IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY

(JIS Study No. 1/273 (Final)) — File 5463/EC

THE COMPTONAGE had before them a draft paper, recommending that, in the event of enemy surrender, Italian Fascist forces should be treated on the same terms as German prisoners, until such time as the policy regarding the status and treatment of Italian prisoners of war is settled, and attaching a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting their approval.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MORRIS, in answer to a question by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, stated that the term "neo Fascist" applied to those Italian Fascists who fought for the Republican Italian government since the Italian Armistice. In MAP 876, it had been proposed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that those Italians falling within the general term "Italian neo Fascists" would not be turned over to the Italian government for custody in the same way as certain other categories of Italian prisoners of war and civilian internees. The proposal of the Joint Planning Staff was that the "neo Fascists", who were already prisoners of war, and those Italian Fascists captured as a result of German surrender, should be considered to be in the same group as far as concerned their handover to the custody of the Italian government. It might not be necessary for the Supreme Allied Commander to retain these personnel in Allied custody for as long as would be the case in regard to German prisoners of war and "surrendered Germans".

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON questioned the necessity of despatching the

and subsequently to despatch the directive as amended.

4. STATUS OF PERSONNEL OF ITALIAN FASCIST FORCES IN EVENT OF FURTHER

SURRENDER

(JRS Study No. P/273 (Final)) — File 565/60

THE COMMISSIONER had before them a draft paper, recommending that, in the event of enemy surrender, Italian Fascist forces should be treated on the same basis as disarmed Germans, until such time as the policy regarding the status and treatment of Italian prisoners of war is settled, and attaching a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting their approval.

BRIGADIER GENERAL RHODES, in answer to a question by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, stated that the term "neo-Fascists" applied to those Italian Fascists who fought for the Republican Italian government since the Italian Armistice. In H.P. 276, it had been proposed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that those Italians falling within the general term "Italian neo-Fascists" would not be turned over to the Italian government for custody in the same way as certain other categories of Italian prisoners of war and civilian internees. The proposal of the Joint Planning Staff was that the "neo-Fascists", who were already prisoners of war, and those Italian Fascists captured as a result of German surrender, should be considered to be in the same group as far as concerned their handover to the custody of the Italian government. It might not be necessary for the Supreme Allied Commander to retain these personnel in Allied custody for as long as would be the case in regard to German prisoners of war and "surrendered Germans".

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONTAGNY questioned the necessity of despatching the telegram which was now before the Conference. He was of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not be asked to consider at this time a question so involved, especially as they had already been informed that ~~these~~ Italians would initially be treated on the same basis as disarmed Germans.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

- (a) That the recommendation of the Joint Planning Staff, that personnel of the Italian Fascist forces should be treated on the same basis as disarmed Germans, until such time as the policy regarding the status and treatment of Italian prisoners of war in Allied hands is settled and the Italian government is deemed by the Supreme Allied Commander to be in a position to deal with them, should for the present be accepted as theatre policy.
- (b) That no further consideration should be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this subject pending a reply to H.P. 276 on receipt of which the subject should be reviewed.

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Final - 26/2/40

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5. JUGOSLAV ORIGINIS VIOLATIONS AND ACTIONS IN ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 20) — Page 76, File 24/60

THE OVERSIGHT had before them a paper recommending that diplomatic approaches should be made to the Yugoslav government to obtain their approval for the closure of the Yugoslav military missions in Italy and to the removal of personnel of the personnel concerned, and further recommending that no action should be taken to request the closure of the Yugoslav Army military mission in Italy or the reduction in size of the similar military mission at Rome.

MR. MCWILLIAMS pointed out that in fact the old Yugoslav missions in Rome and Naples, which had consisted of elements who refused to recognize the new government in Yugoslavia, had now been closed and the closure of the similar mission at Rome was in progress. The question of obtaining the formal approval of the Yugoslav government did not, therefore, arise. He did not consider it was desirable to make official representations on the question of the disposal of the personnel of these missions as the Yugoslav government would undoubtedly order them back to Yugoslavia. And, equally certainly, the people concerned would refuse to go. The Yugoslav personnel involved had certain funds in Italy on which they could continue to subsist, and individual cases of hardship could be dealt with in the normal way as displaced persons. The Yugoslav Army military missions, in respect of which the Supreme Allied Commander had previously decided to press for the closure of the one at Rome and the reduction of that at Bari, had however previously been partisan missions and were composed of personnel favourably disposed towards the new Yugoslav government. Mr. Macmillan now believed, in view of the advice he had received from the British Ambassador at Belgrade, that it would be unwise to apply such pressure. The decision, as to whether the advantages obtained from our present military missions in Yugoslavia outweighed the disadvantages involved by allowing the partisan missions in Italy to continue to function at their present scale, was, however, a military one.

THE DEPUTY SURVIVANT MILITARY COMMANDER felt that it would be unwise to press at present for the reduction of the Yugoslav military missions in Italy. He considered that no further action should be taken in this respect at least while the present Yugoslav offensive operations continued. The matter should, however, be brought up at once if any Yugoslav tendency to increase their activities in Italy was observed.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, referring to the discussion at SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 3, requested direction as to whether the procedure which Air Marshal Slesinger had provisionally agreed with Marshal Tito, in regard to personnel of the Royal Yugoslav Air Force, should be applied generally to all Yugoslav personnel throughout the theatre. There were at present being held in the head of Italy some 750 Yugoslavs who did not wish to return to Yugoslavia in or employment with the Allied

of the disposal of the personnel of these missions as the Yugoslav government would undoubtedly order them back to JUGOSLAVIA, and, equally certainly, the people concerned would refuse to go. The Yugoslav personnel involved had certain funds in Italy on which they could continue to subsist, and individual cases of hardship could be dealt with in the normal way as displaced persons. The Yugoslav Army military missions, in respect of which the Supreme Allied Commander had previously decided to press for the closure of the one at BARI and the reduction of that at BARI, had however previously been partisan missions and were composed of personnel favourably disposed towards the new Yugoslav government. Mr. Macmillan now believed, in view of the advice he had received from the British Ambassador at BELGRADE, that it would be unwise to apply such pressure. The decision, as to whether the advantages obtained from our present military missions in JUGOSLAVIA outweighed the disadvantages involved by allowing the partisan missions in ITALY to continue to function at their present scale, was, however, a military one.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR, MR. STANLEY felt that it would be unwise to press at present for the reduction of the Yugoslav military missions in ITALY. He considered that no further action should be taken in this respect at least while the present Yugoslav offensive operations continued. The matter should, however, be brought up at once if any Yugoslav tendency to increase their missions in ITALY was observed.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, referring to the discussion at SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 3, requested direction as to whether the procedure which Air Marshal Gossard had provisionally agreed with Marshal Tito, in regard to personnel of the Royal Yugoslav Air Force, should be applied generally to all Yugoslav personnel throughout the theatre. There were at present being held in the heel of ITALY some 750 Yugoslavs who did not wish to return to JUGOSLAVIA and were not required for enrolment in or employment with the Allied forces. He wished to treat these personnel as displaced persons.

THE DEPUTY SURVEYOR, ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) The notes of the report by the British Resident Minister regarding the closure of the Royalist Yugoslav missions in ITALY and Air stated that no approach should be made to the Yugoslav government either in respect of the closure of these missions or in regard to the disposition of the Yugoslav personnel thereof.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(b) Directed that no further action be taken to request the closure of the Yugoslav Army (formerly Partisan) military mission in HQM of the reduction of the similar mission at B.M.I., and instructed the Chief of Staff to inform 37 Military Mission accordingly.

(c) Directed that a procedure similar to that described by Air Marshal Blosser at SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 3, should be followed in respect of any Yugoslav personnel, in regard to whose disposition the Allied authorities in the Mediterranean Theatre were concerned.

6. DEEP SEA FISHING FACILITIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that he was very anxious to increase, if possible, the quantity of fish obtained for food in Italy, mainly in order to provide more fish for the civil population; he asked the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to examine the feasibility of further relaxing the naval regulations which restricted fishing.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM, while agreeing that a detailed examination should be made, thought that in fact it would be found that any increase in deep sea fishing, would be restricted by the existing enemy minefields which had not yet been cleared.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Invited the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, to arrange for a detailed examination of the feasibility of increasing the present facilities for deep sea fishing.

See 16. See 16.

1/1/45
J.G. SHERMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff

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CRITICAL CONVICTION, while agreeing that a detailed examination should be made, thought that in fact it would be found that any increase in deep sea fishing, would be restricted by the existing energy minefields which had not yet been cleared.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Invited the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, to arrange for a detailed examination of the feasibility of increasing the present facilities for deep sea fishing.

16/10/40

1/11/40
J.S. SHEPHERD,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, W. M. S.
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FBI
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 6th Meeting
3rd April 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

APR 4 1945

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 5TH APRIL 1945

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 5th Meeting - already circulated)
2. LOCAL GERMAN SUPREMACY IN ITALY - DIRECTIVE REGARDING SPECIAL
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 19 - to be circulated) - File 2/4/EC, Four 17b
3. STATUS OF PERSONNEL OF ITALIAN FASCIST FORCES IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY
SURRENDER
(JIS Study No. P/273 (Final) - already circulated) - File 2/4/EC
4. JUGOSLAV ORGANISATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 20 - to be circulated) - File 2/4/EC, Four 17b

ATTENDANCE: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A)) are invited to attend or
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (B)) be represented for Item 3.

Minutes of this meeting at 151.

H. J. Stewart
J.G. STEWART,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

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C. J. Stewart - (38)

(S) (U) (45) 500 Meeting - already circulated)

2. LOCAL AREA SUPERVISOR IN ITALY - DEFENSIVE REQUESTS FOR SUPPLY
OPERATIONAL REPORTS
(Paper No. 500 (U) (45) 19 - to be circulated) - File 2/5/EC, Four ~~19~~²⁰
3. STATUS OF FINISHED OF ITALIAN PRISONER REPORTS IN LIGHT OF ENEMY
INTERVIEW
(JIS Study No. 5/293 (Final) - already circulated) - File 2/2/EC.
4. REPORTS ON REINFORCEMENTS AND MISSING IN ITALY
(Paper No. 500 (U) (45) 20 - to be circulated) - File 2/5/EC, Four 17h.

ATTENDANCE:

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (4) } are invited to attend or
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (4) } be represented for Item 3.

minutes of the meeting at 15h 15h

14/10/45

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, MAF
Chief Documentation, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (4)
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (5)
Spokes

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Rev. Adv. - (36)

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MAC (P) (45) 5th Meeting
29th March 1945

COPY NO 35

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

APR 1 1945

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COM-
MANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3
WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 29TH MARCH 1945

PRESENT:-

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Lieutenant General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir B.H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Coffey, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Colonel G.S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General D. Woods,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.M. Spafford

LC DIST - 1 Apr 45

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McFarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry A. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Lieutenant General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir B.H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. C. Offie, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honorable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Colonel G.S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General D. Noce,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Brigadier General C.P. Cabel,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF

Brigadier General A.J. McChrystal,
Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee (For Item 4)

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CHIEF COM - No 34
EX COM - No 35
POL ADY - No 36

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THE FOLLOWING ARE ALSO PRESENT :-

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch (for item 4)

Colonel J.E. Bastien, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 22nd March 1945.

2. JUGOSLAV ORGANIZATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 2)

MR. OFFIE stated that he had received a message from Lieutenant Colonel Thayer, head of the Independent American Military Mission in BELGRADE, expressing the hope that representations to the Yugoslav government concerning the matter of closing or reducing the number of personnel in Partisan Missions in ITALY would not be unduly strong as Marshal Tito might consider this sufficient cause for requesting similar reductions in British and American missions in JUGOSLAVIA. In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he agreed that the Partisan missions in ITALY were unduly large.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that Marshal Tito should welcome the proposal to abolish the Yugoslav Royalist Missions in ITALY.

MR. MCGILLIEM stated that as Ambassador Patterson would not arrive in BELGRADE until 30th March, joint action as directed at SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 2, had not yet been possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that his previous decisions, in regard to this subject, remain unaltered.

3. LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

167 p. 20/EC

821

1945. THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 22nd March

2. JUGOSLAV ORIGINATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (N) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 2)

MR. WHITE stated that he had received a message from Lieutenant Colonel Thayer, head of the Independent American Military Mission in BELGRADE, expressing the hope that representations to the Yugoslav government concerning the matter of closing or reducing the number of personnel in Partisan Missions in Italy would not be unduly strong as Marshal Tito might consider that sufficient cause for requesting similar reductions in British and American missions in JUGOSLAVIA. In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he agreed that the Partisan missions in Italy were unduly large.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that Marshal Tito should welcome the proposal to abolish the Yugoslav Royalist Missions in ITALY.

MR. MACMILLAN stated that as Ambassador Patterson would not arrive in BELGRADE until 30th March, joint action as directed at SAC (N) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 2, had not yet been possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that his previous decision, in regard to this subject, remain unaltered.

3. LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (N) (45) 15 (Revised))

167 *ph 20/EC*

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THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive (revised in accordance with the discussion at the previous meeting) to Commanding General, 15th Army Group, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, giving the tasks of the land, sea and air forces in the event of local German surrender in Italy and attaching drafts of the instrument of local surrender and initial orders to be issued, in accordance with it, to enemy land, naval and air forces.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS, referring to Appendix 'B' of the draft paper, stated that it would be advisable for operational reasons to send Allied naval representations to TRIESTE, POLA and GENOA as soon as possible after surrender. Accordingly, he suggested the inclusion of a new paragraph 10 as follows :-

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

"10. Pilots equipped as in paragraph 7 (f) are to be stationed at suitable rendezvous, at the time and date at which surrender becomes effective, in readiness to meet and land-in Allied warships in the ports of THIERTE, FOLA and GIRON. These rendezvous are to be communicated to the Allied naval authorities at a place and by means which will be decided at the meeting held prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender".

AIR MARSHAL GARDIN, referring to Appendix 'C' of the draft, said that in order to cover enemy civil aircraft, paragraphs 2 and 3 should be rewritten as follows :-

"2. The German Authority will forthwith cause all aircraft of any kind or nationality whether military, naval or civil, under the control of the German Authority, or operating in or over the area he controls, to alight at once and remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ship pending further instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander. The term aircraft includes gliders and balloons.

3. All German or German controlled aircraft in the air will be treated as hostile".

Further, in order that personnel serving civilian aircraft should be brought into the terms of this revision, he suggested paragraph 13 should be rewritten to read :-

"All personnel of the Luftwaffe and associated air forces will be disarmed."

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENNINGSON stated that the German forces in Northern Italy were subsisting largely on the country and thereby were even now causing hardship to the local population. He considered that paragraph 7 of the orders for land forces should be amended to include the following sentence: "Provision of requisition from local Italian sources is forbidden". Replying to a question of the Supreme Allied Commander he stated that it was probable that Allied forces would find it necessary to feed, not only the Italian forces and civilians in Northern Italy, but also the surrendered German Army. The matter of a suitable ration scale was now under examination.

MR. MACMILLAN expressed the view that an examination should be made immediately to determine the machinery required to enforce the orders which the Allies would issue under the terms of surrender. He considered that the German Commander-in-Chief, Southwest, should remain at his Headquarters

the area in control, to alight at once and remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ship pending further instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander. The term aircraft includes gliders and balloons.

3. All German or German controlled aircraft in the air will be treated as hostile.

Further, in order that personnel serving civilian aircraft should be brought into the terms of this revision, he suggested paragraph 13 should be rewritten to read:-

"All personnel of the Luftwaffe and associated air forces will be disarmed."

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERTSON stated that the German forces in Northern Italy were subsisting largely on the country and thereby were even now causing hardship to the local population. He considered that paragraph 7 of the orders for land forces should be amended to include the following sentence: "Purchase or requisition from local Italian sources is forbidden". Replying to a question of the Supreme Allied Commander he stated that it was probable that Allied forces would find it necessary to feed, not only the Italian forces and civilians in Northern Italy, but also the surrendered German Army. The matter of a suitable ration scale was now under examination.

MR. MACMILLAN expressed the view that an examination should be made immediately to determine the machinery required to enforce the orders which the Allies would issue under the terms of surrender. He considered that the German Commander-in-Chief, Southwest, should remain at his Headquarters in Northern Italy after the surrender, although he should send representatives to the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander for purposes of liaison. He added that it would be necessary for Allied representatives to be stationed as soon as possible with all major German Headquarters to supervise the carrying out of Allied instructions.

AIR MARSHAL GUNDEL agreed with Mr. Macmillan and said that the examination, to determine the machinery required to enforce the terms of surrender, should be made on an inter-service basis.

BRIGADIER GENERAL EMBLE pointed out that paragraph 4 of the draft directive laid the responsibility for enforcing the initial orders to enemy land and air forces on Commanding General, 15th Army Group, and Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The manner in which these tasks were carried out was properly a matter for these officers to decide.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN, agreeing with Brigadier General Eberle, said that the contents of the paper before the conference were restricted to the initial orders to enemy forces which would be handed to the enemy Commander-in-Chief at the time when the surrender was signed. The machinery, to which Mr. Macmillan referred, would be required to operate at a subsequent stage.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, while agreeing with Lieutenant General Morgan's last remark, considered that an examination should be conducted to determine what arrangements were required subsequent to surrender for the attachment of Allied officers to German Headquarters, and vice versa, in order to ensure that the enemy forces complied with orders issued to them on his behalf. In the meanwhile, it was necessary to be clear as to the status to be accorded to Partisans, Fascist-Italians and Germans after surrender.

MR. CATT, referring to paragraph 8 of the order to German land forces (Appendix 'A'), stated that the Department of State had informed him that in their view the Supreme Allied Commander did not have the authority to withhold prisoner of war status from surrendering personnel.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that at the time of the surrender of the German garrison in MARSEILLE, the Allied Commander had made it a condition of surrender that the enemy personnel should clear the port of mines and demolition charges and had subsequently held the enemy to this contract, notwithstanding the terms of the Hague Convention.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the status of prisoners of war was a privilege and not a right and, therefore, the decision rested entirely with the Supreme Allied Commander.

MR. CATTE further stated that the communication from the Department of State had expressed the view that the status of Italian forces fighting on the side of the Germans should, after the surrender, be similar to that of the German forces.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that it was in accepted theatre policy that on German surrender he would reserve to himself the right to decide whether prisoner of war status should be accorded to surrendered enemy troops.

- (b) Instructed the Chief of Staff :

- (i) To revise the directive, draft instrument of surrender and initial orders to enemy land, naval and air forces, circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) (6) (Revised), in accordance with the above discussion.

their view the Supreme Allied Commander did not have the authority to withhold prisoner of war status from surrendering personnel.

General CUNNINGHAM stated that at the time of the surrender of the German garrison in MUESEBIL, the Allied Commander had made it a condition of surrender that the enemy personnel should clear the port of mines and demolition charges and had subsequently held the enemy to this contract, notwithstanding the terms of the Hague Convention.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the status of prisoners of war was a privilege and not a right and, therefore, the decision rested entirely with the Supreme Allied Commander.

MR. GIFFE further stated that the communication from the Department of State had expressed the view that the status of Italian forces fighting on the side of the Germans should, after the surrender, be similar to that of the German forces.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Directed that it run in accepted theatre policy that on German surrender he would reserve to himself the right to decide whether prisoner of war status should be accorded to surrendered enemy troops.

(b) Instructed the Chief of Staff :

(1) To revise the directive, draft instrument of surrender and initial orders to enemy land, naval and air forces, circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15 (Revised) in accordance with the above discussion, and subsequently to issue these documents to all concerned.

(11) To examine what machinery was required, in respect of attachment of Allied officers to enemy Headquarters and vice-versa, to ensure that orders, issued on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander to enemy forces after their surrender, were implemented.

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES IN ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 10) — 171 ~~4~~ 218/EC

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper attaching a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting their covering approval to the reorganization which had taken place in psychological warfare activities in Italy, together with draft detailed instructions to the Director, Psychological Warfare Branch, on the future PWB organization in Italy.

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BRIGADIER GENERAL MCKENNETT stated that the changes outlined in the draft telegram and in the detailed instructions to WTB had in fact already taken place. The purpose of the cable was, therefore, to localize the position.

MR. MCKILLIN, while expressing general agreement with the draft cable, queried whether, as WTB activity was now limited to Northern Italy and Austria, it was necessary to retain in liberated Italy a news distribution service. He also asked whether WTB could release further printing facilities, as he had been approached informally by the Italian Prime Minister with a request that the Allies should release further printing presses in liberated territory.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MCKENNETT stated that the only news services, which it was proposed to retain, were those essential for operational propaganda in the forward area.

MR. BARNES said that Psychological Warfare Branch had only one press in operation at the present time and this was in RH. The press in BARI was under the control of the British Army. The problem for the Italians, however, was not so much the control of the presses as the supply of paper and ink.

LEUTENANT GENERAL MCKINTOSH said that the question of military requirements for printing facilities and paper was a complex one. He would however undertake an investigation to determine what further assistance could be given to the Italians in this respect.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MCKENNETT suggested that paragraph 4 of the draft telegram should be amended to read: "Collection of propaganda intelligence".

MR. MCKILLIN agreed. He considered, however, that WTB activities in connection with the collection of intelligence in liberated Italy, should cease as they were not proper functions for a military agency to perform, especially in view of the disavowal of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to withdraw military control from liberated Italy. If such intelligence was really required the Directorate should collect it.

MR. BARNES stated that the Office of War Information was not authorized to carry on intelligence work since its proper function is the dissemination of information. The requests received from LONDON and WASHINGTON for intelligence reports on conditions in Italy could, however, be carefully screened in future, with a view to eliminating this activity of WTB.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MCKENNETT considered that this activity could gradually be reduced but that the matter should be taken up with the Combined Chief of Staff in a separate signal.

MR. BARNES stated that the only additional activity which WTB would be

under the control of the British Army. The problem for the Italians, however, was not so much the control of the presses as the supply of paper and ink.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that the question of military requirements for printing facilities and paper was a complex one. He would have to undertake an investigation to determine what further assistance could be given to the Italians in this respect.

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERTSON suggested that paragraph 4 of the draft telegram should be amended to read: "Collection of propaganda intelligence".

MR. MCWHIRTER agreed. He considered, however, that any activities in connection with the collection of intelligence in liberated Italy, should cease as they were not proper functions for a military agency to perform, especially in view of the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to withdraw military control from liberated Italy. If such intelligence was really required the Subscribers should collect it.

MR. BARNES stated that the Office of War Information was not authorized to carry on intelligence work since its proper function is the dissemination of information. The requests received from LONDON and WASHINGTON for intelligence reports on conditions in Italy could, however, be carefully screened in future, with a view to eliminating this activity of I.W.O.

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERTSON considered that this activity could gradually be reduced but that the matter should be taken up with the Combined Chief of Staff in a separate signal.

MR. BARNES stated that the only additional activity which I.W.O. would retain in liberated territory was in connection with films. There were some 300 individuals now concerned in this work which included receiving the film from Great Britain and the United States, their booking and delivery in Italian cinemas and collection of fees. He did not consider that this activity could cease until such time as the Allied authorities gave permission for civilian representatives of British and United States film companies to operate in Italy.

BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERTSON stated that the question of entry of mechanical and businessmen, who were associated with business enterprises in Italy prior to hostilities, was already under examination and suggested that the entry of film representatives should be reviewed at the same time.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in reply to a question by Mr. Officer, said that his policy was gradually to withdraw military control from liberated Italy, so that the country should return to normal as soon as possible, consistent with the overriding requirements of our military operations.

Grant - All info/ke is correct
126. Re the (A) - (1)

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN, referring to paragraph 5 of the instructions to Director, HQ, considered that the reference to the BLIKAS was misleading, as the operations would only continue in respect of enemy occupied areas. It suggested, therefore, that the first sentence should be amended to read: "VIMESTILL and the areas of the BLIKAS now in German occupation".

THE CURRENT ALLIED COMMAND:

(a) Instructed the Chief of Staff:

- (i) To revise the draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with the amendments suggested at 'x' above, and subsequently to despatch it.
- (ii) To revise the instructions circulated under appendix 'B' in accordance with the amendment at 'y' above, and subsequently to issue them as amended.
- (iii) To investigate the possibility of reducing activities of Psychological Warfare Branch in regard to the collection of intelligence and to report to him accordingly.

(b) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer:

- (i) To examine, in connection with his current investigation of the feasibility of allowing entry of private business personnel into Italy, the possibility of permitting the entry of film representatives.
- (ii) To investigate what further assistance could be given to the Italian Government by releasing printing facilities and supplies of paper.

5. STRIKE OF ITALIAN ARTISANS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reported that he had just been informed that three thousand Italian artisans in MILAN were on strike for higher wages. Since the fixing of wage rates had been turned over to the Italian government, control had become somewhat lax and the artisans were in effect striking for black market wages. While he had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the Political Advisers and the Allied Commission, he took the view that unless immediate steps were taken by the Italian Government to require the men to return to work, pending settlement of the dispute, the strike might spread and have far reaching repercussions. In that event

(112) To investigate the possibility of reducing activities of Psychological Warfare Branch in regard to the collection of intelligence and to report to him accordingly.

(b) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer :

(1) To examine, in connection with his current investigation of the feasibility of allowing entry of private business personnel into Italy, the possibility of permitting the entry of film representatives.

(11) To investigate what further assistance could be given to the Italian Government by releasing printing facilities and supplies of paper.

5. STRIKE OF ITALIAN ARTISANS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONTGOMERY reported that he had just been informed that three thousand Italian artisans in MILAN were on strike for higher wages. Since the fixing of wage rates had been turned over to the Italian government, central had become somewhat lax and the artisans were in effect striking for black market wages. While he had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the Political Advisors and the Allied Commission, he took the view that unless immediate steps were taken by the Italian government to require the men to return to work, pending settlement of the dispute, the strike might spread and have far reaching repercussions. In that event it would be necessary for the Supreme Allied Commander to resume, in regard to these matters, the control which he had handed over to the Italian government. If, however, the men at once returned to work, better machinery could probably be devised for settling such wage disputes.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONTGOMERY, agreeing with a remark by Vice Admiral Hewitt concerning a similar outbreak which had affected United States naval installations at TRIESTE, said that such strikes, unless checked, could seriously affect the naval effort.

MR. MACMILLAN considered that if it were necessary to take stern measures with the Italian Government the threat to employ would be that the Supreme Allied Commander would reimpose military government on the areas in question. However, he was hopeful that the matter would be settled without recourse to such measures.

*Despatched as NAT 903, Ref No. DX-52038, 29 March 1945

See also this 150.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer :

- (a) To arrange for the Allied Commission to make representations to the Italian government to the effect that immediate steps must be taken to induce the strikers to return to work.
- (b) To report to him regarding the outcome of these representations.

f. has done
V.G. STEIN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECURITY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, AFM
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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EXCLUDED

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A) Items 1, 2 and 3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (S) Items 1, 2 and 3

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SECRETARY GENERAL

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
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Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, US MAF
US Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FBI
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Spores

EXTRACTS

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (A)
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (B)
Chief, IN2
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 5th Meeting
27th March 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

MAR 28 1945

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COM-
MANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD
IN THE G-3 MEET ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY
28TH MARCH 1945

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting - already circulated) 13.
2. LOCAL GERMAN SUBSIDER IN ITALY FILE 27/EC, Row 167
(SAC (P) (45) 15 (Revised) - already circulated)
3. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES IN ITALY
(SAC (P) (45) 19 - already circulated)

FILE 27/EC, Row 17

ATTENDANCE: Director, IWH and Chief IWH are invited to
attend or be represented for Item 3.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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13

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting - already circulated)
2. LOCAL GROUND SURRENDER IN ITALY
(SAC (P) (45) 15 (Revised) - already circulated) *File 28/EC, Page 167*
3. PSYCHOLOGICAL WFF/RE ACTIVITIES IN ITALY
(SAC (P) (45) 18 - already circulated) *File 28/EC, Page 171*

EC 11/55

27 MAR 45

Comdr Conner

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*J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.*

ATTENDANCE: Director, IWB and Chief IWC are invited to attend or be represented for Item 3.

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DISTRIBUTION

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
- Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commanding General, 15th Army Group
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
- U.S. Political Advisor
- British Resident Minister
- Director, FBI
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
- Chief, IWC
- Spares

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting
22nd March 1945

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CONF NO 3

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COM-
MANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3
WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 22ND MARCH 1945

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal The Hon. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNamara,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Vice Admiral L. Hamilton, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir G. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral S.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Carter,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir C. Clark,
Commanding General, 15th Army Group

Lieutenant General A.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier General C.R. Hoger, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander G. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

EC DKT - 34 MAR 45.

CHIEF COM - No. 34

EX COM - No. 35

*Extracts from
minutes sent to
all concerned*

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Lieutenant General Joseph F. Bickart,
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Headquarters in Dayton

Vice Chairman B. Hamilton, representing
County of Alameda, California, will represent

Lieutenant General Sir C. Baker,
Air Commandant, RAF, London.

Robert Michael S.B. Lewis, representing
Oxley, W. Leigh, Esq., USA

Addressed Sir A. Guy Cope, Deputy Air Controller-in-Chief, Wellington

Assistant General Manager, Clark,
Consulting General, 15th Army Group

Lieutenant General M.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier General (U.S. Inspector), representing
Chief Administrative Officer, FBI

Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor
ECDET - 24 MAR 45.

Mr. Kenneth H. Conell,
British Resident Minister
Chief Clerk - No. 34
Ex. Clerk - No. 34

Rev. Alfred Wilby W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
P.O. Box - No. 36
1919

Colonel G. S. Smith, representing Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and

Rear Admiral D. Mose,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C. H. Spafford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, ADHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Rear Admiral R.M. Pecker,
Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Major General A.M. Grantham,
Chief of Staff to Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Brigadier General G.H. Eberle,
Assistant, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Brigadier General C.E. Cahell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ 15th AG
Brigadier J.G. Nicholson,
Deputy Chief, G-3 Plans Section, JHQ
Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor
Colonel A.G.W. Hobson, representing
Chairman, Psychological Warfare Subcommittee (for Item 5)
Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch (for Item 5)
Brigadier W.F. Joffree,
Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Branch (for Item 5)
Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert F. Bailey

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 15th March 1945.

2. JUGOSLAV ORGANISATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, minute 5)

MR. HAMILTON, referring to the Supreme Allied Commander's invitation to

Colonel J.C. Hobbs, Representing
(Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee (for Item 5))

Mr. Russell Burton,
(Director, Psychological Warfare Branch (for Item 5))

Brigadier A.P. Jeffries,
(Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Branch (for Item 5))

Colonel J.E. Benton, Jr.,
(Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert E. Hanley

2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting) 123

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 15th March 1945.

2. JUGOSLAV ORGANIZATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, minute 3) 123

MR. LAMMIE, referring to the Supreme Allied Commander's invitation to the British Resident Minister and U.S. Political Adviser to obtain the formal approval of the new Yugoslav government to the closure of the Royalist Missions in Rome, Naples and Bari, reported that he had forwarded a communication on this matter to the British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government; no action had, however, been taken to raise with the Yugoslav Government the questions of the disposition of the Yugoslav personnel of these missions or the enlistment of Yugoslavs in Allied forces. He was of the opinion that this matter should be taken up jointly by the British and United States Ambassadors to YUGOSLAVIA after the latter had assumed office.

MR. GIFFE stated that no diplomatic action in regard to the closure of the missions had yet been taken by the United States. The latter would, however, be raised when the United States Ambassador had arrived in BELGRADE. He agreed with Mr. Macmillan's proposal in regard to the question of the disposition of Yugoslav personnel.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

R-185

- (a) Directed that the reference to the disposition of the Yugoslav personnel, contained in Minute 3(a) of SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, be regarded as cancelled.
- (b) Invited the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Advisor to arrange for joint representations to be made to the Yugoslav government, in accordance with Mr. Macmillan's proposal at NY above, when the United States Ambassador to JUGOSLAVIA had arrived in BELGRADE.

3. LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

File 26/42, Page 31.

File 28/42, Page 147

(Major No. SAC (P) (45) 15 and Addendum)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a revised draft directive to Commanding General, 15th Army Group, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, giving the tasks of the land, sea and air forces in the event of local German surrender in Italy and attaching drafts of the instrument of local German surrender and initial orders to be issued, in accordance with it, to army land, naval and air forces.

File 26, Page 13.

THE CONFERENCE, in discussion, agreed that detailed amendments as set forth in Appendix 'A' should be made to the draft documents circulated under Major No. SAC (P) (45) 15.

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VICE ADMIRAL HAMILTON requested that final approval to the Naval appendix should be deferred until it had been examined by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who was returning from LONDON on 22nd March.

RE. HAMILTON, referring to the Supreme Allied Commander's right under the draft instrument of surrender to refrain from according to disarmed German personnel the privilege of prisoner of war status, suggested that an examination should be made as to the status of Italian personnel of the Fascist divisions who may be expected to surrender at the same time. He believed there was in existence an instruction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that such personnel should be treated as prisoners of war.

ADMIRAL BULL STONE confirmed that it had been directed that captured personnel of Italian Fascist divisions should be treated as prisoners of war and considered that if any variations from this instruction were to be made, the matter should be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL BULL STONE believed that these Italian personnel should be treated in a manner precisely similar to Germans who surrendered at the same time.

See the Combined

in-shelf, Mediterranean, giving the tasks of the land, sea and air forces in the event of local German surrender in Italy and attending drafts of the instrument of local surrender and initial orders to be issued, in accordance with it, to army land, naval and air forces.

File 26, Page 13

THE COMMISSIONER, in discussion, agreed that detailed comments as set forth in Appendix 1A, should be made to the draft documents circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15.

VICE ADMIRAL HAMILTON requested that final approval to the Naval Appendix should be deferred until it had been examined by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who was returning from LONDON on 22nd March.

MR. MACMILLAN, referring to the Supreme Allied Commander's right under the draft instrument of surrender to refrain from according to disarmed German personnel the privilege of prisoner of war status, suggested that an examination should be made as to the status of Italian personnel of the Fascist divisions who may be expected to surrender at the same time. He believed there was in existence an instruction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that such personnel should be treated as prisoners of war.

MR. ADAMAL STONE confirmed that it had been directed that captured personnel of Italian Fascist Divisions should be treated as prisoners of war and considered that if any variations from this instruction were to be made, the matter should be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONTAGNY believed that these Italian personnel should be treated in a manner precisely similar to Germans who surrendered at the same time.

MR. ROBERT NICHOLSON considered that the instruction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff was only intended to cover Italian personnel captured during normal combat under present conditions. He presumed that in the event of local surrender there would not be any objection to treating such Italians similarly to surrendered Germans.

MR. COTTE said that the disposition of Fascist and Nazi surrendered personnel, (including prisoners of war) after the termination of hostilities, was now under discussion by the European Advisory Council in LONDON.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff :

(a) To redraft the directive, draft instrument of surrender, and initial orders to army land, naval and air forces, circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15 and to submit the revised drafts for his approval.

File 26/EC,
Page 47

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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(b) To give into a suitable committee, to examine the status, to be accorded in the event of local enemy surrenders in Italy, to personnel of the Italian Fascist divisions and to report to A.L. in regard to the policy which should be accepted and the communications, if any, which should be made on this subject to the Italian Government and to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. JUGOSLAV NATIONALS IN ITALY

(Paper No. S.A.C (F) (45) 17) File 25/45, 25-0 (45)

THE COMMISSIONER and before that, a revised paper setting out policy to be adopted in connection with Jugoslav claims to jurisdiction of their nationals in Italy, together with a draft letter to Headquarters, Allied Commission, giving functions in the communication to be addressed to the delegate to JUGOSLAVIA on the Advisory Council, concerning the status of such Jugoslav nationals in Italy.

MR. DICKER GENERAL STAFFS said that a previous letter, approved by the Supreme Allied Commander, had not been forwarded by the Allied Commission to the Jugoslav delegate, as it had been forestalled by a note from the latter setting out certain claims in regard to Jugoslav nationals. The latter circulated under paper No. S.A.C (F) (45) 17 was designed to cover the procedure to be followed in connection with the apprehension of deserters from Jugoslav units, and to set out the Allied policy in connection with the treatment of Jugoslav nationals. In regard to alleged deserters the procedure suggested followed that which was inferentially in operation as between Allied forces but added the safeguards, by requiring notification of the alleged deserter within ninety days and a statement of the date of enlistment of the person concerned. The object of these provisions was to protect Jugoslav nationals when the Jugoslav partisan elements might seek to have alleged deserters on political grounds.

MR. ALLIED STAFFS considered that paragraph 3 of the draft letter should be amended, as the Allied Commission could not, of itself, take the action suggested. He agreed with Mr. Macmillan that the wording "prior to initiating any action towards the apprehension of deserters you will require the competent Jugoslav authority to secure in writing the following particulars", would be suitable.

MR. DICKER GENERAL STAFFS, referring to his statement at the previous meeting concerning Jugoslav nationals now serving with the United States Army Air Forces, suggested that paragraph 6 should be re-worded to read, "that the Jugoslav nationals who are now serving in or with the Allied forces will not be classified as deserters and are not subject to call-up".

THE JUNIOR ALLIED COMMAND :

Forward to all units and copy to all files. 10/1

MEMO DIRM C223241 31038 022 said that a previous letter, approved by the Supreme Allied Commander, had not been forwarded by the Allied Commission to the Yugoslav Delegate, as it had been prevented by a note from the latter setting out certain claims in regard to Yugoslav nationals. The latter circulated under paper No. S.A.C. (P) (45) 17 was designed to cover the procedure to be followed in connection with the apprehension of deserters from Yugoslav units, and to set out the Allied policy in connection with the treatment of Yugoslav nationals. In regard to alleged deserters the procedure suggested followed that which was informally in operation as between Allied Forces but added two safeguards, by requiring notification of the alleged deserter within thirty days and a statement of the date of enlistment of the person concerned. The subject of these provisions was to protect Yugoslav nationals when the Yugoslav partisan elements might seek to have declared deserters on political grounds.

MEMO ALLIED STAFF considered that paragraph 3 of the draft letter should be omitted, as the Allied Commission could not, of itself, take the action suggested. It agreed with Mr. McMillan that the wording "prior to initiating any action towards the apprehension of deserters you will require the competent Yugoslav authority to secure in writing the following particulars", would be suitable.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BAKER, referring to his statement at the previous meeting concerning Yugoslav nationals now serving with the United States Army Air Forces, suggested that paragraph 6 should be reworded to read, "that the Yugoslav nationals who are now serving in or with the Allied forces will not be classified as deserters and are not subject to a 'li-up'".

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSION :

Directed the Chief of Staff to revise the letter circulated under paper No. S.A.C. (P) (45) 17, in accordance with the above discussion and subsequently to transmit it as varied.

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5. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES DESERTER BOARDERS THE BALKANS

(paper No. S.A.C. (P) (45) 16) — File 24/14, Fawcett 126.

THE COMMISSIONER and before then a paper setting out the need for the re-organization of psychological warfare activities directed towards the BALKANS and requesting the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to the arrangements which had been made and to the dispatch of a cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, informing them of the reorganization and requesting that they should take such representations to the British and United States governments as might be necessary to ensure that this policy could be carried out.

IV

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13. KIRK said that the cable should be reworded so as to describe the functions of the separate British and United States organizations as being the provision of information rather than the dissemination of intelligence.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff to review the cable circulated under paper No. SAC (1) (45) 16, in accordance with Mr. Kirk's remarks and subsequently to dispatch it.

6. CHIEF RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Paper No. SAC (1) (45) 9 ~~has 2/1/45, 6/1/45, 9/1/45~~ file 2/1/45, 6/1/45, 9/1/45)

THE GOVERNMENT had before them a paper suggesting that though the Italians now recognized their responsibilities for Allied military currency, the latter was one which must be discussed at a governmental level and the Supreme Allied Commander should refrain from further comment. The paper attached a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff giving effect to these recommendations.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the draft cable circulated under SAC (1) (45) 9 and instructed the Chief of Staff to dispatch it.

1/1 hand on
J.G. SUTHERLAND,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SEVENTH ARMY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

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able to the Combined Chiefs of Staff giving effect to these recommendations.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSION :

Approved the draft cable circulated under SAC (P) (45) 9 Memorandum and instructed the Chief of Staff to despatch it.

19 hand no.

J.G. S. JENKIN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
RETIRED.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, MAF
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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EXTRACT

Chief, ENO

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+ Despatched as MAF 895 of 23 March 1945

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APPENDIX "A" TO
SAS (P) (45) 4th
Meeting, Item 3.

FINAL ORDER SURRENDER IN ITALY

The Conference, in discussion, agreed that the following detailed amendments should be made to the draft documents circulated under paper No. SAS (P) (45) 15 :-

1. Draft Directive

a. The first paragraph to remain as drafted in paper number SAS (P) (45) 15.

b. The other amendments suggested in paper number SAS (P) (45) 15 Addendum to be accepted.

2. Draft Instrument of Local Surrender (Annexure I)

a. The amendments suggested in paper number SAS (P) (45) Addendum were accepted.

b. The word "forthwith" to be deleted at the end of paragraph 2 of the instrument.

c. In paragraph 3, substitute "dealt with" for "perished".

3. Orders for German Land Forces (Appendix "A")

a. The provisions of this document to the effect that the Supreme Allied Commander need not declare surrendered personnel to have prisoner of war status unless he so desired were, after discussion, accepted.

b. Paragraph 9.1 add "buildings and civil property".

c. Last end of paragraph 17 to read "throughout the German Land Forces as defined in paragraph 1 above".

d. Paragraph 18 last sentence amended to read as follows: "Such officers will be instructed immediately to get in touch".

4. Orders for Army Naval Forces (Appendix "B")

a. The orders to be re-drafted to obviate any differentiation between the German Naval Command and the German Authority. In consequence the opening paragraphs to be limited on similar lines to the opening paragraphs of the Orders for German Land Forces (Appendix "A"). The words "German Authority" and "German Authority" throughout the document.

2. Draft Instrument of Local Surrender (Attachment I)

- a. The amendments suggested in paper number SAC (P) (45) Attachment were accepted.
- b. The word "fortified" to be deleted at the end of paragraph 2 of the instrument.
- c. In paragraph 3, substitute "guilt with" for "punished".
3. Orders for German Land Forces (Appendix "A")
 - a. The provisions of this document to the effect that the Supreme Allied Commander need not declare surrendered personnel to have prisoner of war status unless he so desired were, after discussion, accepted.
 - b. Paragraph 9 and "buildings and civil property".
 - c. Second end of paragraph 17 to read "throughout the German Land Forces as defined in paragraph 1 above".
 - d. Paragraph 18 last sentence amend to read as follows: "Such officers will be instructed immediately to get in touch".
4. Orders for Army Naval Forces (Appendix "B")
 - a. The orders to be re-drafted to obviate any differentiation between the German Naval Command and the German Authority. In consequence the opening paragraphs to be drafted on similar lines to the opening paragraphs of the Orders for German Land Forces (Appendix "A"). The words "German Authority" and "German Naval Command" to be amended accordingly throughout the appendix.
 - b. Paragraph 7 a to read, "positions of all minefields, both mined and ground mines, independent and controlled, laid by the Italians or Germans."
 - c. Paragraph 7 k delete all after "approach channels".
 - d. Delete sub para f, as drafted and substitute, "Details of all radio and radar navigational aids, including all shore radar stations, which could be used for this purpose".
 - e. Add new sub para g, as follows: "A complete and up-to-date set of charts connected to the latest information available, and showing all minefields, convoy routes, searched channels, approach channels, buoys, lights, navigational aids, boats, wrecks, obstructions and radar stations".
 - f. Add new sub para h, as follows: "A complete and up-to-date set of navigational publications connected to the latest information available".

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3. Orders for German Air Forces (Appendix "C")

K-152

a. The orders to be re-drafted so as to impose on the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest the responsibility for effecting the surrender, as far as possible, of Air Forces situated in his area though not under his command. The opening paragraphs of the appendix to be drafted, therefore, on lines similar to the opening paragraphs of appendix "A".

b. The appendix to include a paragraph demanding an Order of Battle of army forces, similar to paragraph 10 a of the Orders for German Land Forces.

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VII

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 45th Meeting
20th March 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE 9-0 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 22ND MARCH 1945

AGENDA

123

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting - already circulated)

2. LOCAL GERMAN RESISTANCE IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 16 - already circulated)

3. JUGOSLAV NATIONALS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 13 - already circulated)
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 17 - to be circulated)

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE BALKANS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 18 - already circulated)

5. CURRENCY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 9 - already circulated)
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 9 Addendum - to be circulated)

ATTENDANCE: Director, FMS } are invited to attend or
Chief, IAC } be represented for item 4.

minutes of this meeting at Lohs 133

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Command-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Command-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer

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J. G. SWETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

- (SAC (P) (45) and meeting - already circulated) ✓ 131 Feb 218/EC
2. LOCAL ALLIED COMMANDER IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15 - already circulated) ✓ 104 Feb 218/EC
3. SUSPECT NATIONALS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 17 - already circulated) ✓ 141
4. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE BALKANS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 18 - already circulated) 136 - 218/EC
5. CURRENCY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 9 - already circulated) 94 - 218/EC
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 9 Addendum - to be circulated) 144 - 218/EC

ATTENDANCE: Director, FWS } are invited to attend or
Chief, INC } be represented for item 4.

minutes of this meeting at Lolo 133.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, 20 MAF
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, FWS
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief, INC
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Sparks

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BY AUTHORITY OF SAC: 6

144-218/EC
J. J. STEINMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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ALC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting (Addendum)
20th March 1945

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COPY NO. 1

MAR 21 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

123

1. The Deputy U.S. Political Adviser has requested that the following amendments be made to the minutes of the 3rd Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) circulated on 18th March 1945 :-

Page 3, line 2. Delete the words "in LONDON".

Page 4, Item 5, 3rd paragraph. Delete the words "in FRANCE" and substitute the word "hereinafter".

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies accordingly.

Amendment made in file 201/12

notified to all concerned

24/3

Amended 21/3

14 March

J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAG
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister

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Substitute the word "hereafter".

2. Copy holders are requested to amend their copies accordingly.

Amendment made in file under

notified to all concerned

for 2/13

14 Dec 45

J.O. SWEDMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Sixth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAC
U.S. Political Adviser
Belt and Road Minister
Director, PWE
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Staff

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POLITICAL ADVISERS

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SAC (1) (45) 2nd Meeting
19th March 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MAR 14 1945

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE 5-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 15TH MARCH 1945

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (1) (45) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)
2. JERSEY DISSENTS AND VISIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (1) (45) 14 - already circulated)
3. SCUMMATION OF NORTH EASTERN ITALY
(JCS Study No. 7/267 (Final) - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

4. ALLIED JERSEY DISSENTS
(Paper No. SAC (1) (45) 13 - already circulated)

ATTENDANCE

Chief, Liaison Section, is invited to attend for Issues 2 and 3.

Minutes of this meeting at 123.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

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J.B. SWIFTMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

15.2.45
Chapman
Easton
Political Officer

- 1. JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (7) (45) 14 - already circulated)
- 2. COMMISSION OF NORTH EASTERN ITALY
(SOS Study No. P/267 (Final) - already circulated)
- 3. TO DATE NOV. 1945
- 4. ALLIED JOURNAL OF MISSIONS
(Paper No. SAC (7) (45) 13 - already circulated)

ATTACHMENT

Chief, Liaison Section, is invited to attend for Items 2 and 3.

minutes of this meeting at 123

By: [Signature]
U.S. SECRETARY,
LIAISON SECTION,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Mr. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commander, Fifth Fleet, USN
- Deputy Mr. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Chief, G-3 Operations Section
- Chief, G-3 Plans Section
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Director of Operations and Intelligence, H. H. H. F.
- U.S. Political Advisor
- British Resident Minister
- Director, H. H.
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Secretary, General Staff
- Inter-Services and Political Secretariat
- Commanding General, 7th Army Group
- Staff

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[Signature]

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May 11 1961

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMUNITARIAN CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE BALL ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 13TH MARCH 1965

Field Marshal The Hon. Sir Harold R. G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph F. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Vice Admiral L. Hamilton, representing Commander-in-Chief, Indian Ocean

Lieutenant General Eva C. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Mr. Harrell: Sir John Stenson,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Adjutant General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier General C.B. Magruder, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, 1950

Ms. C. 676, representing
U.S. Political Activity

Mr. Philip Brond, representing
British Resident Minister

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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10-11-68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Ex. 3(1) and E.O. 11652, Ex. 3(2)

Lieutenant General Joseph E. McNamara,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Vice Admiral L. Hamilton, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ira G. Baker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General M.F. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier General C.B. Haydn, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Coffin, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Colonel G.S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Major General D. Mose,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C.N. Spafford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral H.A. Packer,
Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

- 1 -

all enclosed for limits sent to

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THE FOLLOWING MEMO, 11/10/1945, PRESENTS :-

Major General H.G. Beaumont-Nesbitt,
Chief, Liaison Section, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.F. Sabell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.L. Charles,
Chief, 3-3 Plans Section, AFHQ

Brigadier J.O. Winkelman,
Deputy Chief, 3-3 Plans Section, AFHQ

EXHIBITS

Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Sweetman,
Major Robert S. Hawley

1. MINUTES OF MEETINGS HELD

(SAC (F) (45) 2nd Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 2nd March 1945.

2. SUMMARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Previous reference SAC (F) (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 6.)

BRITAIN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS reported that no further details were available regarding the precise statement made by the United States Secretary to the Treasury regarding the redemption of the so-called "invasion currency" in ITALY.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

3. JUGOSLAV ORGANISATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (F) (45) 12) — File 216/EC, Vol. 2, File 109

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper surveying Yugoslav organizations and missions in ITALY and recommending that the so-called Royalist missions (i.e. RMT, MRLTS and RMT) were redundant, that the delegations of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation in RMT should be closed and the similar delegation at RMT reduced in size.

Forward - JLE memo/EC
and copy to
JLE memo/EC

K 111

1. MINUTES OF MEETINGS DURING

(SAC (1) (45) and Meeting)

1945. The Committee approved the minutes of their meeting held on 22 March.

2. COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Previous reference SAC (3) (45) and Meeting, Minute 6.)

BRIGADIER GENERAL MURPHY reported that no further details were available regarding the precise statement made by the United States Secretary to the Treasury regarding the redemption of the so-called "invaded currency" in Italy.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above.

3. JUGOSLAV ORGANIZATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

(Taper No. SAC (1) (45) 147 — File 28/82 V.2. Rome 109)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a paper surveying Yugoslav organizations and missions in Italy and recommending that the so-called Royalist missions in Italy, MILITIA and RMT were redundant, that the delegations of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation in Italy should be closed and the similar delegation at Bari reduced in size.

MR. BOARD stated that about a month ago a communication had been received from Dr. Subasic ordering the disbandment of the Royal Yugoslav Mission in Italy, and asking the Allied authorities to pass this instruction to the Milan. The latter, however, had refused to acknowledge the order, stating that as their oath of Allegiance was to the Royal Yugoslav Government, and they were accredited to the Displaced Persons Sub-Committee of the Allied Commission, the order could not be accepted unless it was delivered in the form of a command from the Supreme Allied Commander. In answer to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he observed that the communication from the Yugoslav Government did not apply to the Royal Yugoslav Missions in Italy and MILITIA. However, he could state to the Yugoslavs that it was presumed they would wish the Supreme Allied Commander to take similar action in respect of these missions to that which they had requested in regard to RMT.

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MR. COTTON observed that it would be desirable to have their order from the Yugoslav government ~~in the form of a request in writing, after which, if the mission in RNE still persisted in its refusal, their relations, fact and utilities could be withheld.~~

MR. MARSHALL STANSON stated that the entire matter of allegiance of Yugoslavs was a complicated one as it applied also to members of the Royal Yugoslav Air Force. He had reached a provisional agreement with Marshal Tito that such personnel would be divided into three categories :-

1. Those who were willing to return to JUGOSLAVIA.
2. Those who were unwilling to return but could usefully be enlisted in, or employed by the RAF.
3. Those who were unwilling to return, but were not of use to the Allied forces. Such Yugoslavs would be sent to a displaced persons camp.

He said, however, experienced difficulties with the Yugoslav representative at B.31, who was endeavouring to order otherwise.

VICE ADMIRAL M. HIRN observed that a similar difficulty presented itself in regard to the Royal Yugoslav Navy, since those personnel who refused to serve in the ALBANIA under the new arrangements, would have to be shipped to a displaced persons camp in HUNGARY. It was not proposed, however, to enlist any Yugoslav personnel into the RAF.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL (COTTON) said that he did not believe this presented a serious problem, as it was his opinion that members of the Royal Yugoslav Navy and the Partisan Navy would eventually unite without undue difficulty.

MR. MARSHALL STANSON remarked that it was expected a decree declaring the United Yugoslav Navy would be issued in the near future.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL TAYLOR stated that there were at the present time twelve Yugoslav airmen serving with the United States Air Force, but under War Department regulations these men could not be properly enlisted in the United States Army without the approval of the Yugoslav Government. He suggested that the United States Ambassador to JUGOSLAVIA should take this matter up on a diplomatic level, and in the event of a negative reply, these twelve men might be enlisted in the RAF.

MR. MARSHALL STANSON stated that as the policy of the Royal Air Force had been to accept such enlistments in the past without seeking the concurrence of the Yugoslav Government, the question of the enlistment of these personnel in the United States Air Force should be raised in such a way as not to prejudice previous Yugoslav enlistments in the RAF.

he had, however, experienced difficulties with the Yugoslav representative at BZL, who was endeavoring to order otherwise.

VICE ADMIRAL H. HAY observed that a similar difficulty presented itself in regard to the Royal Yugoslav Navy, since those personnel who refused to serve in the Balkans under the new arrangements, would have to be shipped to a displaced persons camp in Germany. It was not proposed, however, to ship any Yugoslav personnel into the DRP.

THE SURVEY ALLEN CRITCHFIELD said that he did not believe this presented a serious problem, as it was his opinion that members of the Royal Yugoslav Navy and the Serbian Navy would eventually unite without undue difficulty.

REAR ADMIRAL JACKER remarked that it was expected a decree declaring the United Yugoslav Navy would be issued in the near future.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TARKER stated that there were at the present time twelve Yugoslav citizens serving with the United States Air Force, but under War Department regulations these men could not be properly enlisted in the United States Army without the approval of the Yugoslav government. He suggested that the United States Ambassador to Belgrade should take this matter up on a diplomatic level, and in the event of a tentative reply, those twelve men might be enlisted in the DRP.

AIR MARSHAL STANLEY stated that as the policy of the Royal Air Force had been to accept such enlistments in the past without seeking the concurrence of the Yugoslav government, the question of the enlistment of these personnel in the United States Air Force should be raised in such a way as not to prejudice previous Yugoslav enlistments in the DRP.

THE SURVEY ALLEN CRITCHFIELD :

- (a) Invited the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser to obtain the formal approval of the new Yugoslav Government to the closure of the Royalist missions in RHM, Italy and BZL, and to the disposition of the Yugoslav personnel concerned in a manner similar to that suggested by Air Marshal Stanger at (X) above, and report to him the result of their representations.
- (b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to make recommendations to the Yugoslav military authorities, through 37 Military Mission, in accordance with the conclusions in paragraphs 3(b) and 3(c) of Paper No. SAC (i) (45) 11. 2/6/54
- (c) Approved the conclusions of paragraphs 3(d), (e) and (f) of Paper No. SAC (i) (45) 11.

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K 111

- (d) Instruct the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander to take up with the Yugoslav government, through diplomatic channels, the question of the enlistment of Yugoslavs into the U.S. Air Forces, as raised by Lieutenant General Baker at 171 above.

4. COMMISSION OF NORTH AUSTRIAN ITALY

(JTS Study No. 1/267 (Final)) File Sec/EC

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, on the occupation of Northern Italy in the event of the withdrawal of the enemy to some General Alpine Line.

MR. OFFICE said that he had been advised by the State Department that the whole matter of the occupation of Northern Italy was being taken up actively on governmental level.

INTERIMMENT GENERAL McNAMARA, referring to paragraph 7 of the JTS Study, the communications over the RHENUS route should be raised together with those leading to TRENTO and INTRA, since the RHENUS would be of vital importance in the line of communications for the United States forces deployed in AUSTRIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft directive circulated under JTS Study No. 1/267 (Final) in accordance with General McNamara's remarks at 171 above and issue it to all concerned.

5. ALLIED YUGOSLAV REUNITING

(Paper No. 100 67) (45) 13) File 201c V2, Para 104

THE CONFERENCE had before them a letter which had been despatched to Headquarters, Allied Commission, for delivery to the Yugoslav delegation in AEF, outlining the procedure to be adopted and the particulars which the Allied Commission should demand from the Yugoslavs in connection with the apprehension of alleged deserters from the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation.

BRIGADIER GENERAL STORTON then referred to a letter forwarded by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, from the Deputy Delegate of JUGOSLAVIA to the Advisory Council in ITALY, which he had mentioned in connection with Minute 2. This letter had been received by the Allied Commission previous to the command action which the Conference now had before them and, as a result, the contents of this letter had not been passed to the Yugoslav delegation. The note just received required all Yugoslav males, born between 1895 and 1927, to report immediately and required all other Yugoslav subjects to report personally to the Reception Centre in AEF. The Yugoslav delegate requested the Chief Commissioner to notify all military agencies that Yugoslavs who failed to report at once were to be considered deserters.

MR. OFFICE, in answer to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that this policy had not been followed.

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft Directive circulated under JCS Study No. 7/467 (Final) in accordance with General McFarney's remarks at 120 above and issue it to all concerned.

(Water No. 500 (7) (2.5) 13) — Feb 24th 4.2 Fawo 104

BRITISH TITLED IS OPPOSED them, referred to a letter forwarded by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, from the Deputy Delegates of JUGOSLAVIA to the Advisory Council in Italy, which he had mentioned in connection with Affirmate 3. This letter had been received by the Allied Commission previous to the communication which the Conference now had before them and, as a result, the contents of this letter had not been passed to the Jugoslav delegation. The note just received required all Jugoslav males, born between 1895 and 1927, to report immediately and required all other Jugoslav subjects to report personally to the Reception Centre in Bari. The Jugoslav delegate requested the Chief Commissioner to notify all military agencies that Jugoslavs who failed to report at once were to be considered as enemy.

INVESTMENT CAPITAL FUND, referring to his statement in Minutes 3 concerning the twelve airplanes coming with the Army Air Force, thus observed that if the terms of this directive were implemented, the twelve airplanes could be caused of desertion by the United States Government. A provision was required that no Army Air Force service in or employed by United States would be considered a deserter.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to prepare, for his consideration at the next Political Conference, a report, together with a draft communication for transmission by the Allied Committee to the Jugo-Slavs, incorporating the points set out in paper No. S.O. (P) (45) 13, together with a statement of Allied policy drafted in the light of the above discussion.

A 112

16 June 1945

J. S. SWETSON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ NAF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, IAF
Chief Coordinator, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commanding General, 10th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, IAF
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretary
Spores

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SAC (S) (65) 2nd Meeting
2nd March 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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COPY NO 93

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(CONFIDENTIAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COM-
MANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3
WAR ROOM AT 1000 HOURS ON FRIDAY 2ND MARCH 1945

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Brigadier General D.V. Brann, representing
Commanding General, 15th Army Group

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier General C.B. Hayder, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Giffis, representing
U.S. Political Advisor

Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

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Chief Clerk
Exec. Clerk
Office, AFHQ

Lieutenant General Joseph I. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, representing
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral Henry H. Hewitt,
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Brigadier General D.W. Brown, representing
Commanding General, 15th Army Group

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier General G.D. Hargrader, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Office, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Hon. Harold Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Lieutenant General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff designate to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

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BY AUTHORITY OF SAC

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Chief of Staff
AFHQ
Office, AFHQ

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AFHQ
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Chief of Staff
AFHQ
Office, AFHQ

TOP SECRET

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General D. Mace,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.P. Gubell,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, IX AF

Brigadier General G.L. Berle,
Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Colonel J.R. Easton, Jr.,
Secretary, General Staff

SUMMARY :-

Major J.G. Sweetman

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (2) (45) 1st Meeting)

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 20th February 1945.

2. THE ACTIVITIES IN LIBERATED ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (2) (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 2)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURNES reported that FIM had been authorized to hand over the distribution of news within liberated Italy to private press agencies as from 4 March. A draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting out previous FIM responsibilities in liberated Italy, envisaging these activities which had already been handed back to the Italians and stating plans for the future turnover of other functions, would be circulated for consideration at a future meeting.

MR. BURNES reported that a measure of agreement had been reached between AC, the US and British Embassies and FIM in respect of which further functions should be returned to Italian control and that the details of this agreement would be submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander for approval, through the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee.

THE SUPPLY ALLIED COMMANDER :

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SUMMARY :-

Major F.H. Cunningham

1. MINUTES OF COUNCIL'S MEETING

(5.15 P) (45) 1st Meeting

THE COUNCIL HAS APPROVED THE MINUTES OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 20th FEBRUARY 1945.

2. THE JACINTELLI II LAMBERT ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (1) (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 2)

MR. JACINTELLI REPORTED THAT HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO HAND OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS WITHIN LIBERATED ITALY TO PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES AS FROM 1st March. A draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting out previous and responsibilities in liberated ITALY, enumerating those activities which had already been handed back to the Italians and stating plans for the future takeover of other functions, would be circulated for consideration at a future meeting.

MR. BURNS REPORTED THAT A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN US, THE US AND BRITISH EMBASSIES AND PPS IN RESPECT OF WHICH FURTHER FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE RETURNED TO ITALIAN CONTROL AND THAT THE DETAILS OF THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER FOR APPROVAL, THROUGH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above reports.

3. RELIEF TO ALBANIA

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 3)

MAJOR CUNNINGHAM STATED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY FURNISHED TO THE JUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES, AT THEIR REQUEST, DETAILS OF THE CHANNELS INTO DURAZZO WHICH HAD BEEN KEPT CLEAR OF MINES, AS THE JUGOSLAVS PROPOSED TO OPEN COMMERCE WITH ALBANIA THROUGH THIS PORT. HE ADDED THAT AS FAMINE CONDITIONS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REPORTED IN DUKLA, AS A RESULT OF WHICH AL SUPPLIES WERE NOW BEING PUT INTO SPLIT, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO WATCH THE JUGOSLAV TRAFFIC WITH ALBANIA CLOSELY TO ENSURE THAT ALLIED RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR JUGOSLAVIA WERE NOT IMPROPERLY DIVERTED.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of this report.

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TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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4. VISIT OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TO MARSHAL TITO AND MARSHAL TOLBUKHIN

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that with the exception of matters concerning VRSZL TITIA, details of all subject discussed with the Jugoslavs were contained in the minutes of the various meetings which had now been circulated. In his conversations with Marshal Tolbukhin the latter had stated that he was now on the defensive and implied that considerable forces had been withdrawn from him for employment further north.

THE DISCUSSION:

Took note of the above.

5. ALLIED ALLY FORCE CONTROL IN VRSZLA GULLA

(JCS Study No. 7/246 (Final) → Collet on File
Paper No. SLF (7) (45) 11) ————— Two q8, five >15/2c
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THE COMPTON and before then a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggesting the lines on which agreement should be sought for Allied military control in VRSZLA GULLA, together with certain amendments to this telegram proposed by Air Marshal Gleser.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that in his conversations with Marshal Tito he had approached this subject by stating that when Allied troops were operating in or on the borders of VRSZLA, he (Field Marshal Alexander) would require the use of his own troops of TUSZLA and road and rail communications leading from it into VRSZLA. He must be fully responsible for his own communications and consequently responsible for any loss of his own troops and install his own military government. He had suggested that the best solution appeared to be to install military government over the whole area of VRSZLA GULLA up to the 1939 boundary and leave all questions of frontiers to be settled after the war. In reply Marshal Tito had agreed to these suggestions as far as areas containing essential communications were concerned, but had made the point that, as his troops were already in those areas and he had set up his civil administration, that organization could not be withdrawn without chaos resulting, and he had further implied that he wished eventually, when U.S. and British forces had departed, to take over all northwestern Italy east of the ISENZO. In areas containing communications vital to Allied troops, Marshal Tito was willing to put his troops under the Supreme Allied Commander's command and his civil administration under the Allied military government which the Supreme Allied Commander would impose. Marshal Tito had, however, asked why it was necessary to impose military government in the whole of VRSZLA as control of the entire area was not essential for military communications. Marshal Tito has further offered to make the Jugoslav communications through LUPULJKA available to the Allies.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggesting the lines on which agreement should be sought for Allied military control in Yugoslavia. GHILL, together with certain amendments to this telegram proposed by Mr. Marshal Glinzor.

THE SUPREMACY CHIEFS OF STAFF said that in his conversations with Marshal Tito he had approached this subject by stating that when Allied troops were operating in or on the borders of Yugoslavia, he (Field Marshal Alexander) would receive the aid of the port of TRIZNJE and road and rail communications leading from it into BELGRADE. It must be fully responsible for his own communications and consequently carry on the same. His own troops and install his own military equipment. It had suggested that the best solution appeared to be to install military equipment over the whole area of YUGOSLAVIA GHILL up to the 1939 boundary and leave all questions of frontiers to be settled after the war. In reply Marshal Tito had agreed to these suggestions as far as areas containing essential communications were concerned, but had made the point that, as his troops were already in those areas and he had set up his civil administration, this organization could not be withdrawn without chaos resulting, and he had further implied that he wished eventually, when U.S. and British forces had departed, to take over all northeastern Italy east of the ISONZO. In areas containing communications vital to Allied troops, Marshal Tito was willing to put his troops under the Supreme Allied Commander's command and his civil administration under the Allied military government which the Supreme Allied Commander would impose. Marshal Tito had, however, asked why it was necessary to impose military government in the whole of YUGOSLAVIA as control of the entire area was not essential for military communications. Marshal Tito had further offered to make the Supreme communications through IJUMILJAN available to the U.S.

It had become clear from these conversations that the key to obtaining Marshal Tito's agreement for any proposed arrangement in YUGOSLAVIA GHILL was to procure Russian approval for such an arrangement before it was presented to the Jugoslavs. It considered that the draft telegram circulated under JCS Study No. P/266 (Pinal) should be redrafted to take account of these considerations and to explain that it was as a result of them that proposals were now being made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by Mr. Glinzor, the Supreme Allied Commander said he felt sure that, without Russian agreement, Marshal Tito would not agree to placing under Allied control his troops and his civil administration in those parts of eastern YUGOSLAVIA GHILL which did not contain communications of military importance.

Circulated as paper No. 5.2 (5) (45) 13

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MR. MARSHAL
TOP SECRET

(b)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. I HEREBY considered that Japanese representation on the Allied Commanders staff would make Marshal Tito one of the co-governors of Yugoslavia. He did not think it right to offer participation in the government of Yugoslavia to Marshal Tito, whom he considered in fact precluded to seize certain portions of Italian territory. Such an arrangement would have serious repercussions on Italy and might lead to the fall of the Italian government. On this matter, however, military considerations he could not agree to such action while hostilities against Germany continued.

11. CERV thought Marshal Tito might have to accept the Supreme Allied Commander's full control of the whole of VALLBY's civil. He failed to see why special facilities should be offered to Marshal Tito in the control of Allied military government. The prestige he would acquire from cooperating in such military government would be considerable. The United States government was in the process of communicating with the British and Russian governments on the subject but was unwilling to agree the declaration line proposed at the previous meeting. In addition his government thought we should take every step to prevent Marshal Tito's civil administration from dominating areas of which the population were mostly Italians. He was not satisfied that Marshal Tito's partisans in 1945 possessed the strength in northeast Italy which they claimed.

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...that in addition this government might be offered representation in the Allied Commission itself and the Yugoslav officer nominated to this post would then be charged with the planning of military government for VIMZIL. This is in conjunction with the plan. He considered that having Tito would obtain appreciable advantages from being associated with Allied military government, particularly in regard to civil supplies for his supporters in VIMZIL. This is a substantial consideration in that area.

17. CITE thought Marshal Tito might agree to accepting the Supreme Allied Command's full control of the whole of VIMZIL. CITE. He failed to see any special facilities should be offered to Marshal Tito in the control of Allied military government. The prestige he would acquire from cooperating in such military government would be considerable. The United States government was in the process of communicating with the British and Russian governments on the subject but was unwilling to agree to the humanitarian line proposed at the previous meeting. In addition his government thought he should take every step to prevent Marshal Tito's civil administration from dominating areas of which the population were mainly Italian. He was not satisfied that Marshal Tito's personnel in fact possessed the strength in northeast Italy which they claimed.

18. CITE thought Marshal Tito might agree to accepting the Supreme Allied Command's full control of the whole of VIMZIL. CITE. He failed to see any special facilities should be offered to Marshal Tito in the control of Allied military government. The prestige he would acquire from cooperating in such military government would be considerable. The United States government was in the process of communicating with the British and Russian governments on the subject but was unwilling to agree to the humanitarian line proposed at the previous meeting. In addition his government thought he should take every step to prevent Marshal Tito's civil administration from dominating areas of which the population were mainly Italian. He was not satisfied that Marshal Tito's personnel in fact possessed the strength in northeast Italy which they claimed.

19. CITE thought Marshal Tito might agree to accepting the Supreme Allied Command's full control of the whole of VIMZIL. CITE. He failed to see any special facilities should be offered to Marshal Tito in the control of Allied military government. The prestige he would acquire from cooperating in such military government would be considerable. The United States government was in the process of communicating with the British and Russian governments on the subject but was unwilling to agree to the humanitarian line proposed at the previous meeting. In addition his government thought he should take every step to prevent Marshal Tito's civil administration from dominating areas of which the population were mainly Italian. He was not satisfied that Marshal Tito's personnel in fact possessed the strength in northeast Italy which they claimed.

20. CITE thought Marshal Tito might agree to accepting the Supreme Allied Command's full control of the whole of VIMZIL. CITE. He failed to see any special facilities should be offered to Marshal Tito in the control of Allied military government. The prestige he would acquire from cooperating in such military government would be considerable. The United States government was in the process of communicating with the British and Russian governments on the subject but was unwilling to agree to the humanitarian line proposed at the previous meeting. In addition his government thought he should take every step to prevent Marshal Tito's civil administration from dominating areas of which the population were mainly Italian. He was not satisfied that Marshal Tito's personnel in fact possessed the strength in northeast Italy which they claimed.

21. CITE thought Marshal Tito might agree to accepting the Supreme Allied Command's full control of the whole of VIMZIL. CITE. He failed to see any special facilities should be offered to Marshal Tito in the control of Allied military government. The prestige he would acquire from cooperating in such military government would be considerable. The United States government was in the process of communicating with the British and Russian governments on the subject but was unwilling to agree to the humanitarian line proposed at the previous meeting. In addition his government thought he should take every step to prevent Marshal Tito's civil administration from dominating areas of which the population were mainly Italian. He was not satisfied that Marshal Tito's personnel in fact possessed the strength in northeast Italy which they claimed.

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LIGHTENING CENTER, L. H. BATES, referring to paragraph 3 of the telegram circulated under JIS Study No. 1/66 (Final), observed that the requirement was not strictly for the maintenance of law and order in the area of the vital communications leading from T-10000 into ISTHL, but also for full control of those transportation facilities.

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension on the transformation efficiency of *Agrobacterium* strains. The concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension was 10⁶ cells/ml (A), 10⁷ cells/ml (B), 10⁸ cells/ml (C), and 10⁹ cells/ml (D). The concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension was 10⁶ cells/ml (A), 10⁷ cells/ml (B), 10⁸ cells/ml (C), and 10⁹ cells/ml (D). The concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension was 10⁶ cells/ml (A), 10⁷ cells/ml (B), 10⁸ cells/ml (C), and 10⁹ cells/ml (D).

Directed the chief of staff to redraft the telegram circulated under his study no. 2766 (Final), taking into account the above discussion and the substance of the amendments proposed by Air Marshal Slater and, after obtaining the necessary naval, air force and political concurrence, to submit the revised draft for his approval.

STUDY RESOURCES OF THE FILM GOVERNMENT

(Reaper No. S.S. (7) (S.S. 9) ————— Favo and face 2/1000

THE COMMISSIONER had before them a direct telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending that the Italian government should not be officially recognized at the moment to give public recognition to the responsibility for all lira currency.

MR. DEAN GORDON said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had forwarded for the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander certain proposals in regard to United States and United Kingdom financial relations with the Italian government. Concerning each of the proposals he was merely technical in nature, he already had notified. The question of whether the Italian government should be pressed to acknowledge its financial obligations in respect of all lire currency, including the so-called "investment currency" issued by the Allied and British, had, however, political implications and not comment on this matter had yet been forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Italian government had recently stated publicly that it was seeking to be relieved of these financial obligations which it had accepted under article 23 of the armistice. In view of this statement it had been considered inadvisable to press the Italian government officially at this time to accept full currency responsibility, as it was feared that such action might lead to the fall of the government. The draft telegram circulated under paper No. SAC (7) (45) 9 had been prepared on this basis.

In the meantime a statement was reported to have been made by the US Secretary to the Treasury to the effect that the United States had not assumed and did not intend to assume any liability for the redemption of the so-called "international currency" used by American armies in liberated European countries. With particular reference to IT 12, the press statement indicated that the Secretary disclosed that the Italian government had accepted responsibility

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The Committee had before them a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending that the Italian government should not be officially invited at the moment to give public participation to its responsibilities for all lire currency.

Major General J. H. D. Orr said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had forwarded for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander certain proposals in regard to United States and United Kingdom financial relations with the Italian government. Comments on each of the proposals as were merely technical in nature. It has been notified. The question of whether the Italian government should be pressed to acknowledge its financial obligations in respect of all lire currency, including the so-called "invested currency" issued by the Allied and British, had, however, political implications and no comment on this matter had yet been forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Italian government had recently stated publicly that it was seeking to be relieved of these financial obligations which it had accepted under Article 23 of the armistice. In view of this statement it had been considered inadvisable to press the Italian government officially at this time to accept full currency responsibility, as it was feared that such action might lead to the fall of the government. The draft telegram circulated under paper No. S.C. (7) (45) 9 had been prepared on this basis.

In the meantime a statement was reported to have been made by the US Secretary to the Treasury to the effect that the United States had not assumed and did not intend to assume any liability for the redemption of the so-called "invested currency" used by American troops in liberated European countries. With particular reference to Italy, the press statement indicated that the Secretary disclosed that the Italian government had accepted responsibility for the redemption of Italian lire currency under the terms of the armistice agreement. This statement, if correctly reported, would have a material bearing on the draft cable circulated under S.C. (7) (45) 9 and accordingly suggested that no further action should be taken until a verified summary of the remarks made by the Secretary to the Treasury had been obtained, and also the reaction of the Italian public to these remarks had become clearer.

Mr. McJILLIH said that the danger of pressing the Italian government to accept these currency responsibilities was not so much that such action would precipitate the fall of the government, but that, if that government openly accepted these obligations, the Italian public might realize that the Italian financial structure was bankrupt. The public had not realized the true position up to the present and the result of their doing so would be a cessation of normal banking activities and a runaway inflation such as had been seen in Greece. This would be a military embarrassment. He considered that the Supreme Allied Commander's reply on this subject might confine itself to

Subsequently despatched as MAP 872

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stating that he did not feel obliged to comment on the economic details of the matter, which must be settled by the governments, and pointing out that no steps should be taken which would make for confusion in Italy. He agreed that the reply should be postponed for the present.

THE SUBCOMMISSIONER OF THE

Director of the Chief Administrative Officer to have this matter raised at a future political conference when further details were available regarding the proposed statement made by the United States Secretary to the Treasury, and the positions of the Italian government and the Italian public.

7. REPORTING TO THE SUBCOMMISSIONER OF THE 11TH COMMISSION

(Copy No. SAC (1) (45) 10) Follow up, File 205/EC

THE COMMISSIONER had before him a draft directive to the Head of the Naval Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

Admiral CURTIS said that as a plan had been made by appointing Rear Admiral Martin as Head of the Naval Sub-Commission, he felt it was opportune to issue a new directive and redefine his functions. However, Admiral Howitt, who was concerned in the matter, and not yet had an opportunity of studying the proposed directive and he was also desirous to obtain the opinion of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, before the directive was issued.

THE SUBCOMMISSIONER OF THE

Directed the Chief of Staff to obtain the concurrence of Commander, British Fleet, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (1) (45) 10 and subsequently to issue it to all concerned.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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Re: about - All 205/EC - copy to
Navy Sub-Com 15/9

14 June 1945

A. J. SWIFT, JR.
11/10/45
STANDARD 102

1. The purpose of this directive is to provide for the coordination of the activities of the various agencies of the Department of Defense in the field of defense research and development.

2. The purpose of this directive is to provide for the coordination of the activities of the various agencies of the Department of Defense in the field of defense research and development.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS DIRECTIVE IS:

3. The purpose of this directive is to provide for the coordination of the activities of the various agencies of the Department of Defense in the field of defense research and development.

By Handwritten

J.S. SMITH,
Vice
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Air Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF
USAF Technical Advisor
Secretary Assistant Minister
Director, FBR
Chief of Commission, United Nations
Secretary, General Staff
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat
Commanding General, 10th Army Group
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 2nd meeting
28th February 1945

COPY NO

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1200 HOURS ON FRIDAY 2ND MARCH, 1945.

A G E N D A

106

MAR 1 - 1945

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 1st meeting - already circulated)

2. ORAL STATEMENT BY THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ON HIS VISITS TO LANCASHIRE, LIRCO AND NATIONAL TROUSERS

3. ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENUELA GUILLA

(a) (SAC Study No. P/266 (Final) - already circulated)
(b) (Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 11 - to be circulated)

4. TRANSFER OF CURRENCY RESPONSIBILITIES TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
(a) (Paper No. SAC(P) (45) 9 - already circulated)
(b) (Telegram No. T.M. 445 of 1 February from Combined Chiefs of Staff)
(c) (Telegram No. Mat 554 of 24 February to Combined Chiefs of Staff)

5. DIRECTIVE TO HEAD OF NAVAL SUB-MISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 10 - already circulated)

HEADQUARTERS

106A

for J.M. LASHLES,

COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

A. C. Hunter of this meeting at the

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- 3. ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENETIAN GIULIA
(a) (JFS Study No. P/266 (Final) - already circulated)
(b) (Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 11 - to be circulated)
- 4. TRANSFER OF CURRENT RESPONSIBILITIES TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
(a) (Paper No. SAC(P) (45) 9 - already circulated)
(b) (Telegram No. T.M. 445 of 1 February from Combined Chiefs of Staff)
(c) (Telegram No. M.J. 54 of 24 February to Combined Chiefs of Staff)
- 5. DIRECTIVE TO HEAD OF NAVAL SUB-MISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 10 - already circulated)

19 Jan 46
J.G. S. LEBLANC
Major.

HEADQUARTERS
1444
for J.H. LEBLANC,
CHIEF,
SECRETARY.

A. Counter of that
meeting at (14)

DISTRIBUTION

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA
- Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
- Chief, G-3 Operations Section
- Chief, G-3 Plans Section
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
- U.S. Political Advisor
- British Resident Minister
- Director F&E
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Secretary, General Staff
- Secretary, Inter-Service and Political Secretariat
- Spares

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SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting
20th February, 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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SUPREME ALLIED COM JAMES'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COM JAMES'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY 20TH FEBRUARY, 1945

PRESENT:-

Field Marshal The Hon. Sir Harold R.G.L. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNamara,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Ivo U. Zaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Rear Admiral E.S. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Lieutenant General Sir C. Zaker,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Rear Admiral S.B. Lewis, representing
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Air Marshal Sir John Slenser,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
Honourable Alexander G. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor
Sir, Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister
Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Brigadier General C.M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ
Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General T.S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ
Major General D. Hogg,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ
Brigadier General G.L. Doolittle,
Chief, G-3 Plans Section, AFHQ

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BY AUTHORITY OF THE SAC *h*

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CHIEF COMM
EXEC. COMM
PLANS SEC

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Brigadier F.R. Maclean, (For Item 5)
37 Military Mission

Brigadier General J.B. Caboli,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ M2A7

Mr. G. O'Neil,
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. P. Broad,
Office of British Resident Minister

SECRETARIES:-

Colonel J.B. Innesell
Major J.B. Sweetman

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING 90, 100, 110
(SAC (2) (44) 37th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE APPROVED THE MINUTES OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 30TH
DECEMBER 1944.

2. FUTURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH 90, 100, 110
(Previous reference SAC (2) (44) 37th Meeting - Conclusion 5(b))

MAJOR GENERAL LINDSEY explained that, in accordance with conclusion
5(b) of SAC (2) (44) 37th Meeting, a directive describing the organization of
PWBR and laying down its functions for the future and the procedure by which
these would be controlled had been prepared and issued. A copy of this
directive, which was drawn in general terms, had been sent to WASHINGTON.

MR. MACLELLAN added that a detailed scheme for transferring PWBR func-
tions in liberated ITALY was being worked out.

MR. BARNES reported that private press agencies were now operating in
ROME.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that the Technical Sub-Committee previously
set up, of which he was Chairman, had now completed its work and it was pro-
posed to hand over to private agencies as from 1st March PWBR's responsibility
for the dissemination of news in liberated ITALY other than ROME.

See Ref. 113

Copy to 11 Ref. 113
- Facs 926/10 - 11 926/10 and

Colonel J.H. Esposito
Major J.D. Swettenham

MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING (SAC (P) (P) 37th Meeting)

90, Vol. 1

THE CONFERENCE reviewed the minutes of their meeting held on 30th December 1944.

2. FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH (Previous reference SAC (P) (P) 37th Meeting - Conclusion 5(b))

MAJOR GENERAL LAMBERTON explained that, in accordance with conclusion 5(b) of SAC (P) (P) 37th Meeting, a directive describing the organization of FCB and laying down its functions for the future and the procedure by which these would be controlled had been prepared and issued. A copy of this directive, which was drawn in general terms, had been sent to AMINTON.

MR. BACHILLAN added that a detailed scheme for transferring FCB functions in liberated Italy was being worked out.

MR. BARNES reported that private press agencies were now operating in Rome.

MR. AIRMAIL STONE reported that the Technical Sub-Committee previously set up, of which he was Chairman, had now completed its work and it was proposed to hand over to private agencies as from 1st March FCB's responsibility for the dissemination of news in liberated Italy other than Rome.

See 166, 163
505

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above reports.

3. RELATIONS WITH ALBANIA (Previous reference SAC (P) (P) 37th Meeting - Minutes 9 and 10)

90, Vol. 1

LIAISON GENERAL SCHMITZON reported that General Hoxha had been informed that the United States Government was not prepared to recognize his Government as the legitimate government of ALBANIA and it was understood that the British Government would take a similar course shortly. It was expected that, following the conclusion of an agreement on relief with Marshal Tito, General Hoxha would make some approach shortly to reopen the negotiation of an agreement in respect of ALBANIA, which he had previously declined. He had

Staff Memorandum No. 13 of 5th February 1945

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made an appeal to USSR for assistance but it had been agreed with USSR that it was impracticable for them to supply relief to ALBANIA at this stage. Meanwhile, a decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the extent to which it was permitted to deal with General Hoxha in this matter was awaited.

MR. MACMILLAN asked whether, if General Hoxha showed himself willing to accept a relief agreement, negotiations for such an agreement would take place regardless of the position in respect of his acceptance of the military mission, which he had so far refused.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :-

(a) Took note of the report by the Chief Administrative Officer, recorded above.

(b) Directed that negotiations for a relief agreement in respect of ALBANIA proceed when practicable, regardless of General Hoxha's attitude towards the offer of a military mission.

See
P 103

4. POTENTIALITY. GREECE IN THE BALKANS

MR. BARNES stated that hitherto PAB had been operating from its base station throughout the BALKANS, but at present the area in which military operations against the enemy were continuing was confined to northern GUC-SLAVIA. In view of the policy of the United States Government, previously expressed in respect of GUC-SLAVIA, that joint activities by PAB should cease once liberation of a territory had been effected, he had asked the State Department for instructions regarding PAB activities in liberated BALKAN territories. It is now decided to discontinue joint PAB activities in these territories, considerable reduction in personnel could be effected.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the statement by Director, PAB, recorded above, and directed that he submit to the Chief of Staff proposals for the discontinuance of PAB joint activities in the BALKANS, in order that representations on this matter might be made through the correct channels to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. BRIEF FOR VISIT OF SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER TO BELGRADE (Paper No. SAC (C) (43) 9 and Addendum)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft brief for the Supreme Allied Commander's expected visit to Marshal Tito at BELGRADE, together with the

FOYERBACH, GORDON IN THE BALCAN

MR. GORDON stated that Alexander Foy had been operating from the BALCAN station throughout the BALCAN, but as present the area in which military operations against the enemy were continuing was confined to northern DUKLA. In view of the policy of the United States Government, previously expressed in respect of GORDON, that joint activities by Foy should cease once liberation of a territory had been effected, he had asked the State Department for instructions regarding Foy's activities in liberated BALCAN territories. If it were desired to discontinue joint Foy activities in those territories, considerable reduction in personnel could be effected.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the statement by Director, PMS, recorded above, and discussed that he submit to the Chief of Staff proposals for the discontinuance of Foy's joint activities in the BALCAN, in order that representations on this matter might be made through the correct channels to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

BRIEF FOR VISIT OF SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER TO BELGRADE
(Paper No. SAC (C) (45) 9 and Addendum) W/R

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft brief for the Supreme Allied Commander's projected visit to Marshal Tito at BELGRADE, together with the text of a draft agreement regarding the establishment of Allied military control in YUGOSLAVIA. 304

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER explained that there had been much discussion regarding the form of government which should be set up in YUGOSLAVIA at the time when the port of TRISTE would be acquired as a base from which to maintain Allied sea, air and land forces in AUSTRIA. It was essential that any arrangement agreed should be acceptable to Marshal Tito, since there were Yugoslav Partisan forces in the area and it was known that Marshal Tito wished to incorporate the area in the new YUGOSLAVIA. During the recent conference he had spoken to the Foreign Secretary and others on this matter and it had been agreed that he should endeavour to make an arrangement with Marshal Tito on purely military grounds. He intended, therefore, to propose to Marshal Tito that a military boundary should be established which would run north and south over certain well-defined physical features at a distance of approximately ten miles east of the lines of communication required by the Allies. It would be stated that territory to

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the west of this boundary would be administered under Allied Military Government, but no reference would be made to the form of administration west of the boundary. An effort would be made to induce Marshal Tito to remove any Yugoslav troops west of the boundary, but if he insisted that they should remain west of the boundary, then he must agree that they should come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander. Similarly, it would be agreed that any Allied troops which it was found necessary to station east of the boundary would come under the command of Marshal Tito.

MR. ALLEN said that his instructions from the State Department indicated that the United States Government wished Allied Military Government to be extended to all disputed areas which in 1939 were part of Italy, including ZARA and two Italian islands in the ADRIATIC. No action should therefore be taken which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA. The President had given no indication during his recent discussions with him that he wished to revise his view in this respect. He feared that the intention announced by the Supreme Allied Commander would imply that the Allies were prepared to restore some of VENETIA CIVILIA to YUGOSLAVIA, and in any case the proposal involved a restriction in the exercise of Allied Military Government over the area. He felt that, if it were necessary to discuss this question with Marshal Tito, he should be told at first that it was the intention to establish Allied Military Government throughout VENETIA CIVILIA. Moreover, there was no indication as yet that the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the area would not be acceptable to the Russians. If it were acceptable to the Russians, it would also presumably be accepted by Marshal Tito.

MR. ARTHUR SMITH said that the Italian Government had been notified that all VENETIA CIVILIA would pass under Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans. This was in accordance with proposals which had been made by the previous Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that the proposal now put forward by the Supreme Allied Commander would have an unfortunate effect as regards the surrender instrument concluded with the Italian Government by his predecessor on behalf of the United Nations, since the implied invitation to Marshal Tito (who was not under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander) to occupy territory which was previously Italian could be considered as a breach of the spirit, if not of the terms, of the surrender instrument. He added that, however much it was desired to conduct discussions on a purely military basis, an agreement of the kind contemplated would of necessity have political implications.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that the establishment of a working military arrangement for the area was nevertheless essential and urgent.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that, from the practical viewpoint, an arrangement of the kind proposed would in fact benefit the Italians, since their retention of the area would be a disadvantage to them. However, that

proposed to restore some of VENEZIA GIULIA to JUGOSLAVIA, and in any case the proposal involved a restriction in the exercise of Allied Military Government over the area. He felt that, if it were necessary to discuss this question with Marshal Tito, he should be told at first that it was the intention to establish Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. Moreover, there was no indication as yet that the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the area would not be acceptable to the Russians. If it were acceptable to the Russians, it would also presumably be accepted by Marshal Tito.

MR. ADMIRAL STONE said that the Italian Government had been notified that all VENEZIA GIULIA would pass under Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans. This was in accordance with the policy which had been made by the previous Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that the proposal now put forward by the Supreme Allied Commander would have an unfortunate effect as regards the surrender instrument concluded with the Italian Government by his predecessor on behalf of the United Nations, since this implied invitation to Marshal Tito (who was not under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander) to occupy territory which was previously Italian could be considered as a breach of the spirit, if not of the terms, of the surrender instrument. He added that, however much it was desired to conduct discussions on a purely military basis, an agreement of the kind contemplated would of necessity have political implications.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER pointed out that the establishment of a working military arrangement for the area was nevertheless essential and urgent.

MR. HAMMILL observed that, from the practical viewpoint, an arrangement of the kind proposed would in fact benefit the Italians, since their retention of the port of TRIESTE would be immediately assured. He agreed, however, that theoretically such an arrangement might be held to imply the 'de facto' right of the Yugoslavs to occupy that part of VENEZIA GIULIA lying to the east of the proposed boundary. Mr. Eden had raised this question in a recent debate. Mr. Stettinius but unfortunately opportunity had not been found to discuss the matter at the recent conferences. He felt that there were three courses open:

- (a) The Supreme Allied Commander might carry out the intention he had expressed above. This course carried the risk that, since the Yugoslavs would certainly assume control of the territory to the east of the proposed boundary, the Supreme Allied Commander would be in the position of having taken the first step precipitating the assumption of Yugoslav control without authority from both governments. Moreover, the evulsion of Yugoslav forces by the United States and Britain after the collapse of GERMANY could not be envisaged.

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(b) The Supreme Allied Commander might refer his proposed draft agreement to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before discussion with Marshal Tito.

(c) The United States and British Governments might approach the Russians with the object of obtaining their agreement to the proposed line and asking for their co-operation in establishing it.

There was little doubt that the Russians would wish to transfer the whole of VENETIA GIULIA to JUGOSLAVIA, including especially the port of TRIESTE, since this would give them a Yugoslav controlled outlet to the Mediterranean. He considered that the best course was that indicated in (b). It should be pointed out to the Chiefs of Staff that, if they wished to occupy AUSTRIA from the south, it would be necessary that Marshal Tito should accept the 1939 frontier or the boundary now proposed, and that the alternative to his acceptance of at least the latter boundary was to fight the Yugoslav Army for possession of the disputed territory.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONAGHAN pointed out that an agreement with Marshal Tito had already been concluded in respect of Zadar, which in 1939 was Italian territory. This Italian possession was therefore already compromised. The Yugoslavs were already in possession of large parts of VENETIA GIULIA and it might be necessary to leave them AUSTRIA and to make use of the port of TRIESTE before the matter could be settled in accordance with courses (b) or (c) proposed by Mr. Monaghan. He regarded the early conclusion of some arrangement providing for the Supreme Allied Commander's control over the I of C from TRIESTE to AUSTRIA as a matter of urgent military necessity and considered that the views held by the State Department regarding this territory was not entirely realistic.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that, if it were decided to negotiate with Marshal Tito the agreement as proposed in GAC (C) (45) 9 (Addendum), a paragraph should be added to the effect that the naval control of the ports between Fiume and TRIESTE inclusive would be vested in Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, whose representatives would work in close co-operation with the Commanders of 15 Army Group or of the Yugoslav forces as appropriate. He pointed out that the existing Anglo-Yugoslav naval agreement covered Yugoslav ports only.

AIR MARSHAL CLEGG suggested that the most promising course appeared to be, once a joint provisional government had been established in JUGOSLAVIA, to point out to them that they now shared in the responsibility of the Allies for the Allied Military Government in those parts of ITALY (including VENETIA GIULIA) in which it was exercised

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...of the disputed territory.

...pointed out that an agreement with Marshal Tito had already been concluded in respect of ZADAR, which in 1949 was Italian territory. This Italian possession was therefore already compromised. The Yugoslav was already in possession of large parts of VENEZIA GIULIA and it might be necessary to move to AUSTRIA and to take one of the parts of TRIESTE before the matter could be settled in accordance with course (b) or (c) proposed by Mr. Macmillan. He regarded the early conclusion of some arrangement providing for the Supreme Allied Commander's control over the L of S from TRIESTE to AUSTRIA as a matter of great military necessity and considered that the view held by the State Department regarding this territory was not entirely realistic.

ADMIRAL GUTHRIE suggested that, if it were decided to negotiate with Marshal Tito the agreement proposed in SAC (O) (49) 9 (Attachment), a paragraph should be added to the effect that the naval control of the ports between FUME and TRIESTE inclusive would be vested in Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, whose representatives would work in close co-operation with the Commanders of 15 Army Group or of the Yugoslav forces as appropriate. He pointed out that the existing Anglo-Yugoslav naval agreement covered Yugoslav ports only.

AIR MARSHAL SHERRER suggested that the most promising course appeared to be, once a joint provisional government had been established in JUGOSLAVIA, to point out to them that they now shared in the responsibility of the Allies for Allied Military Government in those parts of ITALY (including VENEZIA GIULIA) in which it was exercised.

MR. MACMILLAN supported Air Marshal Sherrer's suggestion, pointing out that the joint provisional Yugoslav government would be required to participate in the obligations of the United Nations once it was established and that these obligations included being parties to the Italian surrender instrument, which provided for the establishment of Allied Military Government over all VENEZIA GIULIA. There would be no difficulty in appointing to the Allied Commission an accredited Yugoslav representative parallel to the present Soviet representative. He suggested that he and Mr. Kirk should make no report to their respective departments until the return of the Supreme Allied Commander, when a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be drafted, and reports made to the State Department and Foreign Office, in the light of the views already expressed and of the Supreme Allied Commander's visit.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE also supported Air Marshal Sherrer's suggestion but pointed out that any Yugoslav occupying forces or semi-national administration established in VENEZIA GIULIA would have to come under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander through the Allied Commission.

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THE SUPREMACY AND CONSENSUS observed that Marshal Tito had already agreed in principle to Allied control of TRIESTE and the I of C to AUSTRIA. It would be possible to inform Marshal Tito that Allied military headquarters that the whole of VENETIA GIULIA be subjected to Allied Military Government and that Marshal Tito's forces in the area must come under Allied control. There were bound, however, to be complications in regard of any Yugoslav occupational forces. On balance it appeared that the best course during his visit to BELGRADE was to raise the question of VENETIA GIULIA only in the most general military terms, without making any form of commitment, and to endeavor to ascertain Marshal Tito's views on the question. The director of the Combined Chiefs of Staff could then be sought on his return.

Turning to paragraph 1 of his brief, he enquired whether it was considered undesirable that Marshal Tito should be informed that Allied action against IUGOSLAVIA was possible, since this was Italian territory. He pointed out that Marshal Tito's Partisans had operated in these islands and that considerable assistance might be expected from them.

AIR MARSHAL WESSON observed that, provided there was no implication that IUGOSLAVIA was regarded as at present, or likely in the future to be, Yugoslav territory, there should be no objection to informing him that such operations were a possibility. There was general agreement with this view.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Agreed that the question of VENETIA GIULIA should be raised only in the most general military terms during his forthcoming discussions with Marshal Tito and instructed the Chief of Staff, in consultation with other appropriate authorities, to prepare on his return a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff analyzing the difficulties of the situation existing in VENETIA GIULIA and putting forward the suggestion made by Air Marshal Slesinger at the above, with supporting arguments.

- (b) Accepted the brief circulated under paper No. SKU (G) (4.5) 2 subject to (a) above and to the considerations recorded in the above minute and in Minute 3 of SAC (G) (4.5) 3rd Meeting.

4. REVISED DIRECTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION (P. 107) W. S.C. (F) (4.5) 3) SAC to be 24 7 SAC 24/60

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, revised in accordance with the new policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions.

AIR MARSHAL SLESINGER explained that the Italian Air Force was undergoing re-organization and all elements were being eliminated which could not be used

General VINCIG was regarded as at present, or likely in the future to be, Italian territory, there should be no objection to informing him that such operations were a possibility. There was rational agreement with this view.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Agreed that the question of VINCIG should be raised only in the most general military terms during his forthcoming discussions with Marshal Tito and instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with other appropriate authorities, to prepare on his return direct talks with the Combined Chiefs of Staff analyzing the difficulties of the situation existing in VINCIG and putting forward the suggestion made by Air Marshal Smeaton at 'X' above, with supporting arguments.

(b) Accepted the brief circulated under paper No. SAC (G) (45) 9 subject to (a) above and to the considerations recorded in the above minute and in minute 3 of SAC (C) (45) 3rd Meeting.

1. REVISED DIRECTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION (Paper No. SAC (F) (45) 2) SAC to C. S. SAC 14/4/45

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, revised in accordance with the new policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions.

AIR MARSHAL SLEIGH explained that the Italian Air Force was undergoing reorganization and all elements were being eliminated which could not be used in the war against GERMANY. This would reduce the aim of the force and would free personnel for Allied maintenance establishments. The subject of the new directive was to lay the responsibility for running the Italian Air Force on the Italian Government's own shoulders. He felt that the risk should be accepted that the administration of the Italian Air Force might in this case break down through inefficiency. He added that the Sub-Commission and his staff examined the political tendency of officers when it was proposed to attempt to lay down conditions and required whether any alternative machinery for effecting this existed.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE replied that this function might appropriately be exercised by the Security Section of the Allied Commission. He suggested that a paragraph should be inserted stating that the Head of the Sub-Commission was responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on all matters not connected with the operation of the Italian Air Force, or with its administration.

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MR. MATHIAS stated that the third sentence of paragraph 4 of the draft directive should be modified to make it clear that "political reasons" rendering an officer unsuitable for an appointment referred only to his previous Fascist sympathies.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MATHIASON approved whether, since the revised directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission had been stated to be necessary on account of the new directive in respect of the functions of the Allied Commission, it was also implied that a fresh directive for the Land Forces Sub-Commission was desirable. He did not himself read into telegram No. P-45187 any implication that from previous discussions there in fact necessary.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MATHIASON expressed the view that any tendency to re-defining the functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, or otherwise to interfere with the organization of the Italian Land Forces at present, should be resisted.

ADMIRAL MONTAGNINI observed that the arguments in respect of the Naval Sub-Commission were somewhat different from those in respect of the Air Force Sub-Commission, but did not conflict with them.

MR. WICK enquired whether it was proposed to appoint a Deputy to Air Vice-Marshal Brown Duxbury as head of the Air Force Sub-Commission.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONTAGNINI added that he would not forward the name of an American officer for this appointment.

AIR MARCHAL GLESSOR replied that this appointment would be welcome and added that he had asked for certain other American officers to assist in the work of the Sub-Commission.

THE SUPPOSED ALLIED COMMISSION :

- (a) Approved the draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, as circulated under Paper No. 521 (P) (A5) 3, subject to the amendments to cover the suggestions at (b) and (c) above, and directed that Air Commodore-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for its issue as needed.
- (b) Directed that in accordance to make it, report to the directive of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.
- (c) Took note with approval that it was the intention to appoint an American Deputy to the Head of the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

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air Force Sub-Commission, but did not conflict with them.

MR. LEEK reviewed whether it was proposed to appoint a Deputy to Air Vice Marshal Owen Dunsire as Head of the Air Force Sub-Commission.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCHAMBER added that he would not forward the name of an American officer for this appointment.

AIR MARSHAL BLESSER replied that this appointment would be welcome and added that he had asked for certain other American officers to assist in the work of the Sub-Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSION:

(a) Approved the draft directive to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, as circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3, subject to the amendments to cover the suggestion of FYI and FYI above, and directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, arrange for its issue as amended.

(b) Directed that no amendments be made at present to the directive of the Land Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

(c) Took note with approval that it was the intention to appoint an American Deputy to the Head of the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

PARTISAN PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN ITALY

(Paper Study No. 1/44 (Final)) — c/r

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The Conference had before them an interim report, prepared by the Joint Planning Staff, on measures to deal with Partisan problems in Northern Italy.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HASTING enquired whether there was any objection to the suggestion that Northern Italy of one or more senior liaison officers to improve the Partisan organization and to act as a steady influence. The dispatch of one such officer to Northwest Italy and one to Northwest Italy was under consideration.

AIR MARSHAL BLESSER strongly supported the suggestion to improve liaison with the Italian Partisans in the manner suggested by the Chief of Staff, adding that such effort had been wasted owing to poor organization of air supply cooperation arrangements.

MR. LACHMILLAN

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MR. MACMILLAN expressed the view that there could be no harm in the statement of such officers if their sole purpose was to increase the efficiency of distribution of supplies. It was important, however, that they should not succumb to the inherent tendency to participate in political action. Officers who did this were on occasions a source of political danger. In that they tended to elevate and distort national, political views. He felt that, if high grade officers were sent in as proposed, they should be drawn from the ranks of the United States and British Services.

MR. WIFE supported the views of Mr. Macmillan and emphasized the importance of maintaining the activities of such officers to operational functions.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the arrangement for providing the Italian Partisans with funds required careful supervision to ensure that no wastage was built up for use against the Allies after liberation.

MR. ADAM SMITH replied that this matter was under discussion by the authorities concerned, and the arrangements proposed were likely in his opinion to afford satisfactory safeguards.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Took note with satisfaction of the measures taken or contemplated to deal with Partisan problems in Northern Italy, as described in JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).
- (b) Took note with satisfaction of Rear Admiral Store's statement at 'X' above.
- (c) Directed that the Chief of Staff arrange for the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 6 in all copies of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final) distributed outside AFHQ, in view of the discussion recorded under Minute 5 above.

9. TYPER AND EMPLOYMENT FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 6 and Addendum) — Para 7, Vol 2, File 274/60

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending that unoccupied cypher facilities should continue to be denied to the Italian Government and that, in principle, secret key facilities should be granted to the Italian Government for use in correspondence with their representatives abroad, together with the views of the British Resident Minister on this matter.

1. REAR ALLIED STAFF realized that this matter was under discussion by the authorities concerned, and the arrangements proposed were likely in his opinion to afford satisfactory security.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER :

- (a) Took note with satisfaction of the measures taken or contemplated to deal with Partisan problems in Northern Italy, as described in JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).
- (b) Took note with satisfaction of Rear Admiral Stone's statement at (Y) above.
- (c) Directed that the Chief of Staff arrange for the delivery of the last sentence of paragraph 6 in all copies of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final) distributed outside AFHQ, in view of the discussion reported under item 5 above.

2. OTHER AND MAG FACILITIES FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT (P/2, or No. 300 (F) (45) 5 and Addendum)

Page 72, 74, 75, File 265/80

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending that undisputed cypher facilities should continue to be denied to the Italian Government and staff, in principle, secret war facilities should be granted to the Italian Government for use in correspondence with their representatives abroad, together with the views of the British Resident Minister on this matter.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HADGINS explained that, on grounds of military security, it was strongly felt that cyphers should not be used by the Italians. There was, however, no military objection to the use of secret war facilities. In reply to a question by Rear Admiral Stone, he confirmed that Italian Government letters would be given the same facilities for transport in Allied communication aircraft as Allied letters.

MR. KITZ observed that the Italian Government held in general a high opinion of the security of their cyphers and that it was difficult to explain to them why agreement to their use of cyphers was refused on grounds of military security.

MAJOR GENERAL ALPHEI replied that, whatever the views of the Italian Government might be on this matter, it was the experience of the Allied forces (whose opinion the Italians had once been) that Italian cyphers were not in fact secure.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

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(a) Directed that unclassified bywar facilities should continue to be denied to the Italian Government, but that principle be secret by facilities should be granted to the Italian Government for use in connection with their representatives abroad, and that the Chief of Staff and Chief Administrative Officer take appropriate action in accordance with this policy.

(b) Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to inform the Italian Government of the policy laid down under (a) above.

9. NEW DIRECTIVE ON FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

(a) Refer to No. SAC (P) (45) 1. — Page 17, Vol. 2, SAC 2/Sec.

(b) Refer to No. SAC (P) (45) 1. — Page 17, Vol. 2, SAC 2/Sec.

THE CONFERENCE had before them a telegram from the Combined Chiefs of Staff containing a new directive in respect of the functions of the Allied Commission, together with an explanatory note.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that many adjustments would be necessary, particularly as between AFHQ and the Allied Commission, in consequence of the new directive and its implications were now under examination. He proposed to inform the Italian Prime Minister in general terms of the contents of the directive, and it had been arranged that Rear Admiral Stansfield inform the Advisory Council for Italy. It was not intended to issue a public statement on the matter, but he proposed to hold a press conference at which he would give a statement "on the record" and would answer "off the record" any questions that the press correspondents might have.

10. ITALIAN BUILD-UP

Task note of the new directive in respect of the functions of the Allied Commission, as set forth in telegram No. SAC 457 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and explained in Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 4, and approved the action proposed by the Acting President, Allied Commission, as recorded above.

11. ITALIAN BUILD-UP

(a) Refer to No. SAC (P) (45) 5. — Page 70, Vol. 2, SAC 2/Sec.

THE CONFERENCE had before them a statement summarizing the developments which had led to the authorization of the 300,000 men build-up in Italy.

THE CONFERENCE had before them a telegram from the Combined Chiefs of Staff containing a new directive in respect of the Functions of the Allied Commission, together with an explanatory note.

MR. MACPHERSON observed that many adjustments would be necessary, particularly as between AFHQ and the Allied Commission, in consequence of the new directive and its implications were now under examination. He proposed to inform the Italian Prime Minister in general terms of the contents of the directive, and it had been arranged that Rear Admiral Spence should inform the Advisory Council for Italy. It was not intended to issue a public statement in the interim, but he proposed to hold a press conference at which he would issue a statement "on the record" and would answer "off the record" any questions that the press correspondents might have.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the new directive in respect of the functions of the Allied Commission, as set forth in telegram No. 1411 sent from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and explained in Pt of N. 1, SAC (F) (45) 4, and approved the action proposed by the Acting President, Allied Commission, as recorded above.

10. ITALIAN PRESS SECTION

(Paper No. SAC (F) (45) 5) — Page 70, Vol 2, Sec 25/6c.

THE CONFERENCE had before them a statement summarizing the developments which had led to the authorization of the 300 word broad nation throughout liberated Italy.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORSEMAN explained that Lt. Haron had originally been requested as the date for a public announcement if no more than 300 words were necessary, but the Allied Commission had since stated that, owing to the difficulty of concealing administrative preparations it would be impossible to maintain complete security for so long. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had therefore been asked to authorize 21st February as the date for any press release. It was hoped, however, that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would agree that no press release was necessary.

MR. KIM observed that any formal announcement on this matter would over-emphasize the delay which had taken place in implementing the 300 word nation.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of Paper No. SAC (F) (45) 5 and of the above statements.

Exhibit - File 1001/AC
Exhibit - File 1001/AC

Exhibit - File 1001/AC
Exhibit - File 1001/AC

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11. PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED TO THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7) — from 79, 74, 5, SAC 2/52

THE COMPLAINTEES had to inform that a number of suggestions regarding the privileges and facilities accorded to the Soviet Delegation in Italy.

MR. MACFARLANE suggested that, in view of the fact that the Soviet Delegation should be sent to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to the American and British sections of the Allied Commissions in ROMANIA, BULGARIA, and HUNGARY.

MEMORANDUM GENERAL MONTAGNIER suggested that the proposed plan should be sent to the military missions in MOSCOW.

MR. BARNES, referring to paragraph 7 of the paper, said that certain facilities had in fact been given to the Russians in ITALY, notably the provision of a car for transport.

MR. MACFARLANE suggested that, in view of the fact that the Soviet Delegation should be sent to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to the American and British sections of the Allied Commissions in ROMANIA, BULGARIA, and HUNGARY, the proposed plan should be sent to the military missions in MOSCOW.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF suggested that, in view of the fact that the Soviet Delegation should be sent to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to the American and British sections of the Allied Commissions in ROMANIA, BULGARIA, and HUNGARY, the proposed plan should be sent to the military missions in MOSCOW.

THE SURVIVOR ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Instructed the Chief of Staff to arrange for the maintenance of paragraph 7 of Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7 to take account of the requirements for facilities accorded by the Russian Delegation in ITALY.

- (b) To inform the Chief of Staff to arrange for the maintenance of paragraph 7 of Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7 to take account of the requirements for facilities accorded by the Russian Delegation in ITALY.

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at. Hence, referring to paragraph 7 of the report, which states that certain facilities had in fact been given to the Russians in Italy, relating the provision of paper for leaflets.

AIR MAJORAL SLESSOR drew attention to paragraph 4(a), (4) of the report, indicating the case with which Soviet aircraft were able to enter the Mediterranean theatre, and compare this with the difficulties encountered by Allied aircraft endeavouring to enter Sicily and Italy. He had previously expressed any suggestion that the Russians in Italy should be regarded as having treated as they accorded the Allies in the Balkans, but if the present circumstances in the Balkans permitted he fully that consideration should be given to this course.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF REALIZED THAT, in relation to the treatment accorded to the Allies in the Balkans was, he did not consider real reason treatment of the Russians in the Mediterranean would help matters, since the Balkan situation was mainly due to the transient defects of the Russian administrative system, and in particular to its great rigidity.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Instructed the Chief of Staff to arrange for the amendment of paragraph 7 of Report No. SAC (1) (45) 7 to take account of the present facility accorded by the Russians to the Russians in Italy.

See

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(b) Took note of Report No. SAC (P) (45) 7 and instructed the Chief of Staff to arrange for the deletion of copies (forwarded in accordance with (a) above) to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to Allied military authorities, as suggested by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the British Resident Minister.

file 20/100 (277)
J.H. L. SCHLES,
CHIEF OF STAFF,
SACB T.M.Y.

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British Resident Mission

Director, FBI

Chief of Mission, Allied Commission

Secretary, General Staff

Inter-Service and Public Relations Department

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) is Meeting
17th February, 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD ON THE 4 - 3
WAS 2300H AT 1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY 20TH FEBRUARY, 1945

AGENDA

1. THE OPERATIONAL SITUATION
(Oral statements by C-15-C Med, C-5, D-3 and Air C-in-C Med)
2. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 37th Meeting - already circulated) - File 40, 1/11
3. REVISED DISSENTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 - already circulated) - File 40, 1/11
4. BRIEF FOR VISIT OF SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER TO BELGIUM
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 4 - already circulated on limited distribution)
5. PATRIOT PROBLEM IN FORMER ITALY
(JCS Study No. P/285 (Final) - to be circulated)
6. CYBER AND SAC FACILITIES FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 5 - to be circulated) - File 72, 1/11

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:-

7. NEW DISSENTIVE ON FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION
(a) Telegram No. 777 dated 31st December from Combined Chiefs of Staff
(b) Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 4 - to be circulated - File 40, 1/11
8. ITALIAN DEBIL RATION
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 5 - to be circulated) - File 72, 1/11
9. PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED TO THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7 - circulated herewith) - File 72, 1/11

REC'D - 17 FEB 45

CHIEF COMAND

EX COMAND

J. H. LACROIX
COLONEL
SECRETARY

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3. REVISED DIRECTIVE TO '15 FORST SUB-COMMISSION OF THE UNITED COMMISSION
(Paper No. S/C (P) (45) 3 - already circulated) - *File 10, Vol 2, File 2/2*
4. REPORT FOR VISIT OF SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMISSION TO ALGERIA
(Paper No. S/C (P) (45) 4 - already circulated on limited distribution)
5. PATRIOT PROBLEM IN NORTHWEST ITALY
(Paper No. P/265 (Final) - to be circulated)
6. OTHER AND BAP FACILITIES FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
(Paper No. S/C (P) (45) 5 - to be circulated) - *File 72, Vol 2, File 2/2*
7. NEW DIRECTIVE ON FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION
(Paper No. P/265 (Final) - to be circulated) - *File 10, Vol 2, File 2/2*
8. ITALIAN BAPTIST RATION
(Paper No. S/C (P) (45) 6 - to be circulated) - *File 10, Vol 2, File 2/2*
9. PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ASSIGNED TO THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. S/C (P) (45) 7 - circulated herewith) - *File 10, Vol 2, File 2/2*

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:-

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief, G-3 Operations Section
Chief, G-3 Plans Section
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ A-7
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FNE
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, Inter Service and Political Secretariat

C. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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