

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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(VOL. III)

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Vol. III)

SACMED'S CONFERENCES, MINUTES OF MEETINGS
MAY - AUG. 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No. 785017

Ex Comm

295-7 (initials)

Julio 29 ✓ for info

(initials) 22/8

22/8 noted 7.

305

Ex Comm

For info - please see files 296 thru 300

(initials) 22/8

22/28/8

821

(initials)

270

Executive Committee

back to 262

For 209, 1 - information

271
272

276

C. S. D.

Presume that P.R.O. is informal R.C.s of

the retention of press control office, then

press status, responsibilities & functions. If not

then should be done.

272 (30/10/45)

(Re-installed in file 9267/50)

280

Executive Committee

Folio 284 - Minutes of Secret's

Conference on 2nd Aug. for information - this

is - discussion of Peace Treaty is interesting -

the retention of press control officers, their
press status, responsibilities & functions. If not
this should be done. MS (30/8/48)

(Re-invested in file 9267/ee)

Executive Committee

File 284 - Minutes of Secretariat
Conference. on 2nd Aug. for information - this
- discussion of Peace Treaty is interesting -
See also file attached - prior to

You must read

8/8/48 File 218 list of the 20

MS (3/8) 294

Secret 293 for information
2/11/48

MS (4/8)

258

CSO

See minutes of SACMEDS Political Conf 19 July

folios 249 - 257. Passages marked.

On file 218/EC, Ex Com? saw a paper
on reduction of Port Parties & estimated hand-
over dates of ports. Note approval on folio 250.

23/7/45

ELH

259.

Executive Commission

To see passages marked in folios
249. 257. also minute 258 above.

23/7/45.

Mr (24/7)

CSO

262

23/7/45

259.

Executive Commission

To see passages wanted in photo
249. 257. also minute 258 above.

23/7/45. Mr/247

SP
C.S.O.

262

Executive Commission

To see photo 261 for info. 819

@ for C.S.O.

25/7.

203.

Executive Commissioner.

Sir,

To note the Agenda for SACRED's Political Conference, which I understand from Major Quayle has now been put off until Friday, 18th May.

R 16/5

16. May. 45

212

Ex Com

SAC's Conference of 18/5

*- I have mentioned V. G.
a French Provisional*

H 22/5

M 23/5 TTS 19/6

238

Executive Commission

To see folios 237 & 234.

JACS Conference of 1973

- 2 items marked V.6
+ French Frontier

Spec. 1

MS 234 MS 236

238

Executive Commission

To see folios 237 & 234

20 June 45

↓
C.S.O. 17
seen by EC. 16.2.

817

Executive Commission.

245.

To see folio 245 for information.

20 June 45.

MS 234

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217

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Confidential

B-1654

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COPY NUMBER

SAC (45) 4th Meeting
24 August 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

AUG 21, 1945

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 23RD AUGUST 1945

PRESENT:

General Joseph T. McNarney,

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral W. Glassford,

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,

Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDME

Brigadier General C. T. Myers,

Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,

Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,

Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel C. G. Blakeney, representing

Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,

Deputy British Resident Minister

Mr. C. Offie,

Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,

Chief, Commission Allied Commission

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General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral K. Glassford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MED

Brigadier General C. T. Myers,
Commanding General U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Colonel C. G. Blakeney, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Mr. C. C. C. C.
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel C. R. Tuff, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Zerbe,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

EC DIST - 27 AUG 45

31 Chief Command

32 Exec Command

33 102 ADS

202

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(Case Approved)

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General A. D. Ward,
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)

Major General M. G. White,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, MFOUSA

Major General R. W. M. Macleod,
Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br)

Colonel P. McC. Smith, representing
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARY:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 3rd Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 9 August 1945.

2. RETURN OF COMMUNICATIONS TO CIVILIAN USE IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL DUNNITH reported that the Chief Signal Officer was pursuing this matter with the Allied Commission. It appeared that it might be possible to use certain land lines jointly for both civilian and military traffic. A measure of approval for such a procedure had been received from the United States War Department and similar approval was being sought from the British War Office. It had not yet been possible, however, to settle details of the financial arrangements which joint use would involve. Meanwhile, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had authorized a relaxation of the previous security regulations, so as to allow ship owners in ITALY and RUSSIA to forward messages regarding shipping movements through normal commercial channels.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Representative of the above report

SECRETARY:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

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MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS reported that the Chief Signal Officer was pursuing this matter with the Allied Commission. It appeared that it might be possible to use certain land lines jointly for both civilian and military traffic. A measure of approval for such a procedure had been received from the United States War Department and similar approval was being sought from the British War Office. It had not yet been possible, however, to settle details of the financial arrangements which joint use would involve. Meanwhile, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had authorized a relaxation of the previous security regulations, so as to allow ship owners in ITALY and GREECE to forward messages regarding shipping movements through normal commercial channels.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

3. INTERIM POLICY FOR ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 4)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS reported that in order to provide the basis for the ten internal security brigades, the formation of which was to be the first step in the reorganization of the Italian Army, six Italian Guard Battalions would be turned over to Italian Government control by 25 August. By 20 September this number would be increased to eleven battalions. It was considered that no further release of Guard battalions would then be possible unless they were replaced by Allied troops or unless guard commitments were reduced. This aspect was under further examination.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Took note of the above report.

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2. 93

Copy in file 8956/2 & 6
Communications 2/1/46

Grand n 827/2

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4. YUGOSLAV WAR BOOTY IN VENETIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL KENNEDY reported that as a result of the discussion at the previous meeting the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, had held at AFHQ a conference attended by representatives of the Allied Commission. In consequence, it had been decided to amend the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 6 in two respects. The first was to lay down as an AFHQ directive that salt and tobacco were to be considered disease and unrest items and so were not to be released to the Yugoslavs. It had previously been intended to leave the decision on this matter to 13 Corps. In the second place the directive now stipulated specifically that items of Italian government ownership might only be released to the Yugoslavs if there was evidence that effective control of such items had been assumed by the Germans or by the Fascist Republican authorities. As so amended the directive had now been despatched to 13 Corps.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HARMLEN said that on a recent visit to VENETIA GIULIA he had discovered that the war booty, claimed by the Yugoslavs, had in fact been in the possession of their civilian agents throughout the negotiations. Now that it had been decided that certain of these items could not be released to YUGOSLAVIA, 13 Corps might require some further direction as to the use of force in order to seize these items.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in noting the above reports, directed:

that the measures necessary to appropriate to Allied Military **600** Warrent uses items such as salt and tobacco, which were held within the Allied occupied areas and were not now to be released to YUGOSLAVIA, could properly be left to Commander, 13 Corps.

5. FORMATION OF MEDITEMER NEAL ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

(Paper No. SAC (45) 13) — Page 26/EC

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending that since Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, had been dissolved, it was necessary to have an arrangement whereby Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEXB, and the Commanding General, AAF/VTC, should act together, in committee, on air matters of common Allied interest, and attaching a draft charter for such a committee.

AIR MARSHAL GATTOB said that the object of the proposed committee was to bind the Commanding General, A.F./ATO and himself together so that they could offer joint advice to the Supreme Allied Commander on Allied air matters and also to provide one authority with which the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission, could deal. In reply to a query by the Deputy Supreme Allied Com-

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he had discovered that the war booty, claimed by the Jugoslavs, had in fact been in the possession of their civilian agents throughout the negotiations. Now that it had been decided that certain of these items could not be released to JUGOSLAVIA, 13 Corps might require some further direction as to the use of force in order to seize these items.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in noting the above reports, directed:

that the measures necessary to appropriate to Allied Military Government uses items such as salt and tobacco, which were held within the Allied occupied area and were not now to be released to JUGOSLAVIA, could properly be left to Commander, 13 Corps.

5. REGULATION OF MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

(Paper No. SAC (45) 13) — *File 266C*

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending that since Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, had been dissolved, it was necessary to have an arrangement whereby Commander-in-Chief, RAF MESE, and the Commanding General, AAF/ATO, should act together, in committee, on air matters of common Allied interest, and attaching a draft charter for such a committee.

AIR MARSHAL BURROE said that the object of the proposed committee was to bind the Commanding General, AAF/ATO and himself together so that they could offer joint advice to the Supreme Allied Commander on Allied air matters and also to provide one authority with which the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission, could deal. In reply to a query by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, he said that the Allied Liaison Section, which the paper proposed should act as Secretariat to the Committee, was an RAF staff section under his command.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, with the agreement of the Deputy U.S. Political Adviser, suggested that it would be advisable for the Committee to have an Allied Secretariat and asked whether the secretariat facilities could not be provided by the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

COLONEL BASTON said that the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat could assume certain duties for routing papers to and from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee but could not provide complete secretariat facilities for that Committee, as these would be of a somewhat technical nature and would, therefore, require the attention of Air Force officers.

SAC 386.3/223 CES-0 dated 19 August 1945

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the draft charter for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, circulated under paper No. SAC (L5) 13, subject to the amendment in order to :-

- (a) provide that Committee with an Allied Secretariat;
- (b) set out the relationship between that Secretariat and the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

6. DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION

(Paper No. SAC (L5) 17)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a revised draft directive for the Air Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD said that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission had previously been responsible in certain respects to the Mediterranean Allied Air Commander-in-Chief and now that this appointment was terminated it was proposed that the Sub-Commission should be responsible to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

MAJOR GENERAL DWIGHTER disagreed with the statement contained in the draft that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission was the representative of the British and US Air Forces on the Allied Commission. The position was that the whole of the Allied Commission had the task of representing the Supreme Allied Commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the position of the Heads of the three service sub-commissions of the Allied Commission was analogous to that of the Head of a technical service, such as the Signal Corps, with an Army. The sub-commissions were responsible for advising him but also dealt with their own technical superiors.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER disagreed with certain portions of the draft directive, which he considered to imply that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee was empowered to make major Allied policy decisions affecting the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Such policies would inevitably be promulgated through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander. The latter had, however, delegated to the Air Commander-in-Chief in the past, and would delegate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the future, the task of the technical supervision of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. General McNarney also considered that the statement, that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee could authorize use of Italian Air Force units as they thought fit, required redrafting, as the Committee could only perform this function within

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MAJOR GENERAL LUBITZER disagreed with the statement contained in the draft that the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission was the representative of the British and US Air Forces on the Allied Commission. The position was that the whole of the Allied Commission had the task of representing the Supreme Allied Commander.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE pointed out that the position of the Heads of the three service sub-commissions of the Allied Commission was analogous to that of the Head of a technical service, such as the Signal Corps, with an Army. The sub-commissions were responsible for advising him but also dealt with their own technical superiors.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER disagreed with certain portions of the draft directive, which he considered to imply that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee was empowered to make major Allied policy decisions affecting the Air Forces Sub-Commission. Such policies would inevitably be promulgated through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander. The latter had, however, delegated to the Air Commander-in-Chief in the past, and would delegate to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the future, the task of the technical supervision of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. General McWarney also considered that the statement, that the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee could authorize use of Italian Air Force units as they thought fit, required redrafting, as the Committee could only perform this function within the general policy determined by the Supreme Allied Commander. He also questioned the implication in the proposed draft directive that the Italian Air Force would remain indefinitely under Allied control. The policy of turning over the Italian Army to the Italian government had already been recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General McWarney considered that a start in the same direction might shortly be necessary in regard to the Italian Air Force.

AIR MARSHAL CLARKE, referring to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander's last remark, said the difficulty was that nobody knew what size or type of air force would be permitted to Italy by the Peace Treaty. There were indications that the present Italian Air Force was larger than the limit which was likely to be finally imposed. Consequently, the handover of the Italian Air Force to the Italian government might give rise to difficulties at a later stage. However, the Italian Air Ministry was assuming increasing administrative control. Referring to the portions of the draft directive dealing with

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the channels of responsibility of the Head of the Air Forces Sub-Commission, he said it ought to be made clearer that, while on service matters the sub-commission would deal with Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, on other broader matters it was responsible to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSION:

Instructed the Secretary to redraft, in the light of the above discussion, the directive circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 14 and, after obtaining the necessary Air Force concurrence, to submit the revised draft to him for his approval.

(20/3/46) SWS

7. POLICY FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION

(Paper No. SAC (45) 15)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper concluding that a policy for Italian civil aviation could not be laid down until further guidance was received, and attaching a draft signal designed to obtain such guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR MARSHALL GARDNER said that, as the matter was so tied up with the terms of the prospective Italian Peace Treaty, it was not possible to go further without reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He agreed with the questions proposed by the draft signal but thought it desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should make recommendations in regard to them. He considered these recommendations should be, firstly, that Italian civil aviation should be permitted but should not be allowed to operate in VENETIA, GIBULLA or other disputed territories, secondly, that the Italian government should be allowed to own and control the Italian civil air lines, and thirdly, that the Italian aviation industry should not be revived. He explained that the small Italian Air Force, which the Peace Treaty was likely to permit, and the requirements of Italian civil aviation were most unlikely to be large enough to give a sufficient market for an Italian aircraft industry to be an economic proposition. Consequently, if such an industry were revived, there would always be a danger of the Italians in order to gain further markets, seeking either to obviate the military terms of the Peace Treaty or to spread their civil aviation further afield. However, he agreed that for economic reasons the rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry, on anything other than a very small scale, was not a practical proposition for some years.

MR. GUTHIE considered, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed, that it would be unwise for the Supreme Allied Commander at the present stage to make a definite recommendation that an Italian aviation industry should not be allowed. He thought, however, that the general subject

the COMINT had before them a paper concluding that a policy for Italian civil aviation could not be laid down until further guidance was received, and attaching a draft signal designed to obtain such guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. MARSHALL said that, as the matter was so tied up with the terms of the prospective Italian Peace Treaty, it was not possible to go further without reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He agreed with the question proposed by the draft signal but thought it desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should make recommendations in regard to them. He considered these recommendations should be, firstly, that Italian civil aviation should be permitted but should not be allowed to operate in VENEZIA, GIBUL, or other disputed territories, secondly, that the Italian government should be allowed to own and control the Italian civil air lines, and thirdly, that the Italian aviation industry should not be revived. He explained that the small Italian Air Force, which the Peace Treaty was likely to permit, and the requirements of Italian civil aviation were most unlikely to be large enough to give a sufficient market for an Italian aircraft industry to be an economic proposition. Consequently, if such an industry were revived, there would always be a danger of the Italians in order to gain further markets, seeking either to violate the military terms of the Peace Treaty or to spread their civil aviation further afield. However, he agreed that for economic reasons the rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry, on anything other than a very small scale, was not a practical proposition for some years.

Mr. CURRIE considered, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed, that it would be unwise for the Supreme Allied Commander at the present stage to make a definite recommendation that an Italian aviation industry should not be allowed. He thought, however, that the general subject of civil aviation should be raised as it was possible that the British and United States governments would shortly wish to discuss with the Italian government problems affecting British and United States civil aviation.

Mr. L. CURRIE pointed out that if development of civil aviation was allowed it did provide a nucleus for war expansion. GERMANY had already taught us that lesson once. He therefore considered that it should be stipulated that no Italian aircraft industry would be permitted for the present. This provision could, if necessary, be relaxed later. However, if the stipulation were not made now, it would be difficult to impose it later.

Mr. CURRIE considered that the statement that the present directive to the Allied Commission prohibited discussion of civil aviation with the Italians should be deleted from the draft signal. He had been unable to trace any such direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and he believed that this decision was taken by the Supreme Allied Commander and could be reversed by him if he so wished.

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Exhibit - All 8506/EC AF 5/2 already have copy

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with Air Marshal Garrow that it was desirable to comment, in so far as military implications were concerned, on the questions being put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. From the military point of view, he considered that State ownership of Italian civil aviation would simplify Allied control. He also thought that, in regard to the possibility of permitting the rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry, the question should be posed as to whether that industry should be State owned and controlled, or privately owned as at present.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the statement in the draft signal that if an Italian civil aviation industry were permitted it would be difficult to exercise technical control of design, observed that this appeared contradictory to the recommendation that no attempt should be made to impose an Allied control on Italian research. This recommendation had been agreed at a previous meeting and the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the British draft of the Italian Peace Treaty had been forwarded on that basis.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, R.F. WHEAT, and the Commanding General, J.F./MCO, to redraft in the light of the above discussion, the signal circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 15, and subsequently to despatch it.

8. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (45) 11)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper, circulating the comments which the Supreme Allied Commander had made on the draft Peace Treaty with ITALY, as prepared by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reported that when in LONDON he had obtained some information from the Foreign Office with regard to the status of the Italian Peace Treaty. The Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been set up by the POSH.M Conference, had placed the question of the Italian Peace Treaty at the top of its agenda. The Foreign Office understood that the Treaty would include a settlement of both the Northeast and Northwest Italian frontier questions, would cover the future of the former Italian colonies and would impose appropriate limitations on the Italian armed forces. The Foreign Office were anxious to have the Supreme Allied Commander's views, especially with regard to a permanent settlement in the Northeast, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, was already examining this matter. It was hoped that the Council of Foreign Ministers would produce an agreed draft Treaty comparatively quickly. The other interested parties such as ITALY and JMGSLVIA would then be given an opportunity to comment on this draft. The Foreign Office were optimistic

Instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, A.F. MEYER, and the Commanding General, A.F. WFO, to redraft in the light of the above discussion, the signal circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 15, and subsequently to despatch it.

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BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMLEN reported that he had received a personal signal from Brigadier General Spofford asking for certain information about Italian industry and indicating that the United States War Department were now actively interested in the question of the Peace Treaty.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

9. REPARATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

(Paper No. SAC (45) 12) — 21/11/45

THE CONFERENCE had before them a record of a meeting held between the

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Supreme Allied Commander and Major General Basilov, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Delegate in regard to repatriation.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that certain persons, whom the Russians claimed to be Soviet citizens, were accommodated in displaced persons camps under Allied Commission control and also in camps operated by USSR. He had received directions in regard to the disposal of some of these persons to British prisoner of war camps. As AC was an integrated Anglo-American undertaking, his problem was an Allied one and these persons must be considered under Allied rather than British or American control. The divergence between the British and United States positions was therefore giving him some embarrassment. Further, in view of the Yalta Agreement, he questioned the desirability of sending displaced persons to prisoner of war camps.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMILTON explained that the prisoner of war camps to which these displaced persons had been sent, were camps for liberated Allied prisoners of war and not camps for captured enemy prisoners of war. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, need not therefore be disturbed by the thought that these Soviet citizens were being treated as enemy prisoners of war.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HAMILTON said that the terms of the agreements signed at Yalta stipulated that civilian Soviet citizens would be treated in precisely the same way as Soviet military personnel, who had been made prisoners by the enemy and liberated by the United States or British forces.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that there was now no divergence of opinion between the British and United States governments in regard to the interpretation of the Yalta agreements except in so far as the use of force, to effect the repatriation of unwilling persons, was concerned. In this respect, Field Marshal Alexander's position was that he could not forcibly return to Russia or elsewhere people who did not wish to go.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSIONER observed that the major difficulty in regard to the Yalta Agreement was the determination of what constituted a Soviet citizen. In regard to the use of force to effect repatriation, while he personally had a directive from the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to personnel in purely United States custody (and which directive differed from that issued to Field Marshal Alexander in his British capacity), he considered it most desirable that, as certain persons were held as an Allied responsibility the question should be posed on an Allied basis to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSIONER:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br), in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (MOR.), and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, JHQ, to examine the Allied commitments in the Theatre for prisoners of war and displaced persons, with particular regard to the

that these Soviet citizens were being treated as enemy prisoners of war.

GENERAL L. H. HARRIS said that the terms of the agreements signed at Yalta stipulated that civilian Soviet citizens would be treated in precisely the same way as Soviet military personnel, and had been made prisoners by the enemy and liberated by the United States or British forces.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, G-1 (Br), in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (AFMOS.), and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFM, to examine the Allied commitments in the theatre for prisoners of war and displaced persons, with particular regard to the desirability of the use of force to effect repatriation, and as a result of this examination to draft for his approval:

- (a) a signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting that an Allied policy directive be given to the Supreme Allied Commander on this matter.
- (b) Instructions to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and any other agencies concerned, as to how persons considered to be an Allied commitment should be handled pending receipt of the instructions to be requested from the Combined Chiefs of Staff under (a) above.

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10. USE OF NORTHWEST ITALIAN PORTS FOR TRAFFIC TO SWITZERLAND

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that the Admiralty had requested his views in regard to the use of the ports of GENOA and SAVONA by Spanish ships engaged in the transportation of goods to SWITZERLAND. SAVONA was already under Italian control and GENOA would be on 1 September. While the capacity of these ports was considerable the ability of the inland communications (especially the railways) to clear them was limited. In consequence, the situation might arise later in which the Italians would complain that supplies for Northwestern Italy were being interfered with by the transit of this traffic to SWITZERLAND. He had replied to the Admiralty that from a naval point of view he had no objection provided Spanish ships concerned would accept his routing instructions.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to investigate this matter further.

11. GREEK REQUIREMENTS FOR OLIVE OIL

MR. BIGGAD said he was informed that the Greek Government, considering that they were about to have serious economic difficulties in regard to the supply of olive oil and fats, had requested assistance from the British and United States Ambassadors, who in turn had referred this request to their governments. The Deputy Resident Minister had further had a signal from the British Ambassador to ATHENS enquiring whether, pending such assistance on governmental level, ATHENS could make a loan to GREECE of 2,000 tons of olive oil from ITALY.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HADFIELD said that he had received a copy of some of the signals to which the Deputy Resident Minister had referred and a preliminary examination had been made. This indicated that any major assistance from ITALY was out of the question. It was believed that this year only some 52,000 tons of olive oil had been amassed in the whole of ITALY as against 45,000 tons last year in that part of the country which was then under Allied control. Furthermore, he had information which indicated that the Greeks had not amassed some of 1st year's crop of olive oil in the Aegean Islands and that vigorous measures in these areas would produce results. A similar request for loans had been received in respect of both the US and British zones in AUSTRIA. He felt that the Greek government had not realized that there was a world-wide shortage of olive oil and fats. He had also noted the Supreme Allied Commander's signal sent from CHIEF indicating that failing ITALY an attempt should be made to get supplies from NORTH AFRICA or MIDDLE EAST. He was not hopeful of this but he wished to explore certain aspects of the matter further.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

11. GREEK REQUIREMENTS FOR OLIVE OIL

MR. BROADBENT said he was informed that the Greek Government, considering that they were about to have serious economic difficulties in regard to the supply of oil and fats, had requested assistance from the British and United States Governments, who in turn had referred this request to their respective governments. The Deputy Resident Minister had further had a signal from the British Ambassador to CHICAGO inquiring whether, pending such assistance on governmental level, AEFHQ could make a loan to GR. EEC of 2,000 tons of olive oil from ITALY.

CHICAGO AIRLIE WALKER said that he had received a copy of some of the signals to which the Deputy Resident Minister had referred and a preliminary examination had been made. This indicated that any major assistance from ITALY was out of the question. It was believed that this year only some 52,000 tons of olive oil had been amassed in the whole of ITALY as against 45,000 tons last year in that part of the country which was then under Allied control. Furthermore, he had information which indicated that the Greeks had not amassed some of last year's crop of olive oil in the Aegean Islands and that vigorous measures in these areas would produce results. A similar request for loans had been received in respect of both the US and British zones in AUSTRIA. He felt that the Greek Government had not realized that there was a world-wide shortage of oils and fats. He had also noted the Supreme Allied Command's signal sent from CHICAGO indicating that failing ITALY an attempt should be made to get supplies from NORTH AFRICA or MIDDLE EAST. He was not hopeful of this but he wished to explore certain aspects of the matter further.

THE DEPUTY SUPPLEMENTAL ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, to investigate the matter further and, in due course, to submit appropriate recommendations in regard to the Greek Government's request.

W. J. Sullivan
W. J. SULLIVAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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EXTRACTS

Commander, Land Forces, GREECE
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AT 662

SAC (45) 4th Meeting
21st August 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

AUG 22 1945

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 23RD AUGUST 1945

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 3rd Meeting - already circulated)
2. FORMATION OF MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE
(Paper No. SAC (45) 13 - to be circulated)
3. DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION
(Paper No. SAC (45) 14 - to be circulated)
4. POLICY FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION
(Paper No. SAC (45) 15 - to be circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

5. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (45) 11 - already circulated)
6. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
(Paper No. SAC (45) 12 - already circulated)

J. G. Sweetman

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 3rd Meeting - already circulated)
 2. FORMATION OF MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE
(Paper No. SAC (45) 13 - to be circulated)
 3. DIRECTIVE FOR A.F. FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION
(Paper No. SAC (45) 14 - to be circulated)
 4. POLICY FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION
(Paper No. SAC (45) 15 - to be circulated)
- TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-
5. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (45) 11 - already circulated)
 6. REPATRIATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
(Paper No. SAC (45) 12 - already circulated)

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 2nd Meeting
9th August 1945

Confidential

REF NUMBER

21 AUG 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 9TH AUGUST 1945

PRESENT :

Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
Rear Admiral H. A. Parker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
Air Vice Marshal S. B. M. Baker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, R.A.F. Middle East
Brigadier General J. M. Hollison,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theater
Major General Lyman L. Lammeter,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander
Major General W. G. Duff
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ
Mr. C. G. Duff,
Deputy U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip E. Smith, representing

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785017

Supreme Allied Command, Mediterranean Theater

General Joseph F. McCarty,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
Near Admiral H. S. Tucker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral W. Glassford,
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, North-east African Waters
Air Vice Marshal J. R. Baker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, R.F. Middle

Brigadier General J. M. Mallison,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theater

Major General Lyman L. Lutzner,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General J. C. Duff
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. G. G. G.
Deputy U. S. Political Advisor

Mr. Phillip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Near Admiral Ellery A. Stone,
Chief of Communications, Allied Commission

Brigadier General S. C. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Sperry,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General J. L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING ARE ALSO PRESENT :-

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Brigadier T. P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES :-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Swenson
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (45) 7th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE APPROVED THE MINUTES OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 4 AUGUST 1945.

2. RETURN OF COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER FACILITIES TO CIVILIAN USE IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL LUTHER reported that, in accordance with the direction given him by SAC (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 3, enclosures and how much into the possibility of reducing or removing present censorship restrictions on civil communications. However, as these restrictions had been prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was necessary to obtain their approval to any alterations. A signal had therefore been despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting authority for ship-owners and agents in Italy and GERMANY to forward messages through normal commercial telegraphic channels. With regard to the release for civilian use of certain communication lines now reserved for military traffic, he stated that this question was most complex but that investigations were progressing. Only 65 per cent of the pre-war communications facilities of Italy were now in operating condition and only 15 per cent of these were available for civilian use. Military requirements had not decreased since the cessation of hostilities, due to the widespread deployment of our forces throughout the country. The release of further circuits could therefore only be effected if power facilities for military communications were accepted. He considered that the Italian Government after examining the matter should put in a demand for the additional circuits required for the shipping commitment. The Chief Signal Officer was already making the matter up on these lines with the Allied Commission and he would report, through the Chief of Staff in due course.

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(SAC (45) (ad meeting))

THE CONFERENCE APPROVED THE SIGNATURE OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 4 AUGUST 1945.

2. RETURN OF COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER FACILITIES TO CIVILIAN USE IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL LINDSEY reported that, in accordance with the direction given him at SAC (45) and others, Minute 3, facilities had been made into the possibility of releasing or resuming present censorship restrictions on civil communications. However, as these restrictions had been prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was necessary to obtain their approval to any alterations. A signal had therefore been despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting authority for only-owned and agents in Italy and abroad to forward messages through normal commercial telegraphic channels. With regard to the release for civilian use of certain communication lines now reserved for military traffic, he stated that this question was most complex but that investigations were progressing. Only 65 per cent of the pre-war communications facilities of Italy were now in operating condition and only 15 per cent of these were available for civilian use. Military requirements had not decreased since the cessation of hostilities, due to the widespread deployment of our forces throughout the country. The release of further circuits could therefore only be effected if poorer facilities for military communications were accepted. He considered that the Italian Government after examining the matter should put in a demand for the additional circuits required for the shipping examination. The Chief Signal Officer was already dealing the matter up on these lines with the Allied Commission and he would report, through the Chief of Staff in due course.

MAJOR GENERAL STONE said that as a result of the termination of hostilities the secrecy of the military traffic was not as important as previously. It might therefore be possible for the military to share certain circuits with civilian users.

MAJOR GENERAL LINDSEY added that the Commanding General, 15th Army, had directed all United States units to examine urgently the feasibility of releasing to the Italians accommodation and material now requisitioned for military use.

MAJOR GENERAL TUFF reported that a similar directive to British forces had been drafted and would be issued in the near future.

* M.T. 271 (MC OUT 2010) read 7 August 1945.

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Exhibit in 8726/EC - copy to General S/Gen.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER:

Reiterated his policy that accommodation, land lines and similar facilities in ITALY should be released to civil purposes as soon as military requirements permitted.

3. REORGANIZATION OF THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY WITH THE PARTISAN NAVY

(Previous reference SAC (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 6)

REAR ADMIRAL PLOMET reported that further examination had shown that 60 per cent of the officers and 50 per cent of the ratings of the Royal Yugoslav Navy complement at TIRANO had now elected not to return to JUGOSLAVIA. Similarly, 70 per cent of the officers and 60 per cent of the ratings at MONTENAP had likewise declined to return; no figures were available for the personnel stationed at ALBANIA. All members of the Royal Yugoslav Navy who elected not to return to JUGOSLAVIA would eventually become displaced persons under Allied control. However it had been agreed that at the end of a few weeks these persons would again be given an opportunity to elect to return to their country.

Mr. CEVIE reported that a communication had been received through French diplomatic channels enquiring as to how many Yugoslav displaced persons now in ITALY might be available for employment in agricultural and other work in FRANCE.

VICE ADMIRAL CLASPOND reported that arrangements had progressed favourably for turning over to the Yugoslav Navy the eight American-built boats supplied on Lend-Lease arrangements. These craft would remain under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER:

Took note of the above reports.

4. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous reference SAC (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL LAMBINEN reported that instructions had been sent to COMZ directing them to proceed with the reorganization of the Italian Armed Forces within the present ceilings, pending final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of the policy recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER:

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...personally selected displaced persons under Allied control. However it had been agreed that at the end of a few weeks these persons would again be given an opportunity to elect to return to their country.

Sir, CFEI reported that a communication had been received through French diplomatic channels enquiring as to how many Yugoslav displaced persons now in Italy might be available for employment in agricultural and other work in France.

VIC. ALIEN GLASSFORD reported that arrangements had progressed favourably for turning over to the Yugoslav Navy the eight American-built boats supplied on Lend-Lease arrangements. These craft would remain under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above reports.

4. WARREN POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

(Previous references S.C. (45) and Meeting, Minutes 8)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZ reported that instructions had been sent to IAL, directing them to proceed with the reorganisation of the Italian Armed Forces within the present ceiling, pending final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of the policy recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

5. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

(Paper No. S.C. (45) 9)

THE COMPTON had before them a revised draft letter to the British Chiefs of Staff setting forth the comments of Field Marshal Alexander in regard to the paper by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which attached draft Naval, Military and Air clauses of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he had examined the draft letter in detail, and he was in general agreement with it. Some minor revisions would be necessitated by the recent Russian declaration of war on J.P.M. In reply to a report by the Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, concerning the necessity of increasing the Italian Armed Forces should Italy be allowed to retain control of any of her overseas territories, he observed that the

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Comments were based on the assumption that all overseas possessions would be taken from Italy as indicated in the paper by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff. He did not feel called upon to express any opinion as to whether these overseas territories should be removed or not.

17. BROAD and MR. CAPPIS expressed agreement with the draft reply.

MR. J. MURIEL STONE stated that he was generally in agreement with the draft letter, but suggested certain minor amendments.

GENERAL HENNING considered that the paragraph in the draft Treaty prepared by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, which referred to Italian provision of supplies for Allied armies in GERMANY and GERMANY should be deleted. In its present form, this paragraph would permit the Russians to requisition quantities of supplies from Italy for the provision of their forces in GERMANY and GERMANY. Since ITALY was not self sufficient for supplies and a large part of her needs were being supplied by American imports, he could not agree to any clause which would place the misuse of these materials of American origin.

MR. J. MURIEL STONE after making a number of minor comments stated that his Commander-in-Chief could not agree with the Naval clause of the Treaty as drafted by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff. It was stated that the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Navy would remain until 1950 or for a longer period. In the view of Commander-in-Chief, nevertheless, this period was too short.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER repeated his opinion, as stated at the previous conference, that no specific time limit should be stated. He considered the lifting of these restrictions should be dependent on a change of circumstances rather than mere passage of time.

GENERAL HENNING believed that the inclusion of a stated time-limit would make the Peace Treaty more acceptable to the Italian Government. He considered, moreover, that it would prevent continuous overtures in an endeavour to bring about cancellation or reduction of the severity of the clause from time to time.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed the Deputy Chief of Staff:

To revise, in the light of the above discussions, the draft letter and attached appendix circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 9, and to submit the amended draft for his approval.

6. SUCCESSOR WAR BOOTS IN GERMANY
(Paper No. SAC (45) 8)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending the despatch of an amended draft directive to Headquarters, III Corps authorising the release to the Jugoslavs, under the terms of the YUGOSLAV-JUGOSLAVIC Agreement, of certain items of war booty which were captured by their forces and which were the property of governments (including ITALY) at war with JAPANESE.

Generalissimo BUCHER after making a number of minor corrections stated that his Conference-in-Chief could not agree with the Naval clause of the Treaty as drafted by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff. It was stated that the limitations to be imposed on the Italian Navy would remain until 1950 or for a longer period. In the view of Conference-in-Chief, BUCHER, this period was too short.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED CONFERENCE repeated his opinion, as stated at the previous conference, that no specific time limit should be stated. He considered the lifting of these restrictions should be dependent on a change of circumstances rather than mere passage of time.

GENERAL BUCHER believed that the inclusion of a stated time-limit would make the Peace Treaty more acceptable to the Italian Government. He considered, however, that it would prevent continuous overtures in an endeavour to bring about reconciliation or reduction of the severity of the clauses from time to time.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED CONFERENCE directed the Deputy Chief of Staff:

To revise, in the light of the above discussion, the draft letter and attached appendix circulated under paper No. SAC (45) 9, and to submit the amended draft for his approval.

6. YUGOSLAV WAR BOOTY IN VENETIAN GULF
(Paper No. SAC (45) 8)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending the despatch of an attached draft directive to Headquarters, III Corps authorising the release to the Yugoslavs, under the terms of the MOSCOW-LENINGRAD Agreement, of certain items of war booty which were captured by their forces and which were the property of Governments (including Italy) at war with YUGOSLAVIA.

GENERAL BUCHER stated that, in accordance with the terms of the MOSCOW-LENINGRAD Agreement, the Yugoslavs were entitled to remove certain items of war booty from the Anglo-American occupied area of VENETIAN GULF, subject to the provisions of International Law. Accordingly, recommendations as to what items should be released had been made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. BUCHER had approved the majority of the proposals, but had queried whether we were entitled to forbid the release of items essential to the maintenance of law and order, items which would necessitate replacement in kind by the Allies, and enemy-owned live armaments. A decision on these items was awaited.

GENERAL BUCHER considered that the reference to commercial ships in the draft directive to III Corps should be deleted. The Yugoslavs had not as yet demanded the return of any commercial shipping, and it was undesirable to make any reference which might suggest that they had a right to do so. In reply to a remark by Brigadier General (Hobbs), he stated that various harbour and small craft were being released to them, but no large sized ships had so far been released.

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REDACTED - STAFF agreed that the proposed directive was sound on the basis of the instructions received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, he expressed the view that various items which it was proposed to release to the Yugoslavs, such as salt and tobacco, should be considered as items essential to the prevention of disease and unrest. In addition, he stated that until recently he had not been informed of the text of the recommendations made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He then he, nor his political advisers, were in agreement with its proposals. It was his contention, in which he was supported by his legal advisor, that property of the Italian Government could not be properly considered as Yugoslav War booty, so since the date of 1943, JUGOSLAVIA had not been at war with Italy. Accordingly, he had written a letter to the Chief of Staff, setting out the reasons for his disagreement, and he was of the opinion that in the light of that letter, the Supreme Allied Commander might consider the alteration of certain of his recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. OFFICE stated that he had previously expressed his concurrence to the AFHQ proposals for the disposition of War Booty. It was his opinion that a more complete statement should be dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff when he did not believe had been fully aware of the political implications of their decision. He considered that, in the meanwhile, the release of items to the Yugoslavs should not proceed.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HADLON, referring to the disagreement expressed by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and the United States Army Political Advisor, stated that those views had been fully expressed at AFHQ before recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been despatched. These views, and the reasons for which they had been over-ruled, were summarized in the paper by the Secretary which was before the Conference. In the absence of the Supreme Allied Commander the subject had been discussed at great length between the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Administrative Officer. He (Brigadier General Hadlon) was of the opinion, that even though the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission had not been present for those discussions, the view held by him had been put forward fully before the decision was taken. In fact the advice of the legal advisors at AFHQ was contrary to that of the legal advisor to the Allied Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

That action in regard to the release of War Booty to the Yugoslavs be suspended until he had given the matter further consideration.

See 3a.

7. PARAGRAPH NO. 12 - YUGOSLAV ASSOCIATION
(Paper No. 317 (45) 10)

THE COMMISSIONER had before them a paper recommending the dispatch of an attached draft signal to British and United States Headquarters in AFHQ by setting forth the views of the Yugoslav Government and its subordinate

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political implications of their decision. He considered that, in the meantime, the release of items to the Department should not proceed.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HUGHES, referring to the disagreement expressed by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and the United States Army Political Advisor, stated that those views had been fully expressed at AFHQ before recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been despatched. These views, and the reasons for which they had been over-ruled, were summarized in the paper by the Secretary which was before the Conference. In the absence of the Supreme Allied Commander the subject had been discussed at great length between the Chief of Staff and the Chief Administrative Officer. He (Brigadier General Hughes) was of the opinion, that even though the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission had not been present for those discussions, the view held by him had been put forward fully before the decision was taken. In fact the advice of the legal advisers at AFHQ was contrary to that of the legal adviser to the Allied Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER DIRECTED:

That action in regard to the release of War Envoys to the Department be suspended until he had given the matter further consideration.

See 107.

7. PROPOSED POLY-SIGNATURE ASSOCIATION (Paper No. 327 (45) IC)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending the dispatch of an attached draft signal to British and United States Headquarters in Germany setting forth the views of this Headquarters and its subordinate commands in regard to the establishment of an Anglo-American association which had been proposed by SHARP.

MAJOR GENERAL L. DUNSTON stated that a conference had recently been held at Headquarters, Fifth Army, at which representatives of all three services and the principal subordinate commands of the Theatre had been invited to express their views in regard to the organization of the proposed association. He was in general agreement with the proposals, although he considered that the association should provide for an exchange of scholarships between the United States and Great Britain similar to the Rhodes Scholarships. At the present stage however, the number of scholarships could not be determined, since this would depend largely on the funds available in future. Referring to paragraph 3b of the draft signal, he stated that if such an association were to confer its future membership to the personnel of the Third Forces, it might be accused of having political intentions.

GENERAL DUNSTON agreed with the Deputy Chief of Staff.

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THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDERS, noting the general approval of the meeting in regard to relationships, expressed the view that the necessary money might be obtained from wealthy philanthropists of Great Britain and the United States.

Colonel THOMAS DUFF stated that, although he had not been present at the conference at Headquarters, Fifth Army, he had been informed that the provision of exchange of relationships between the two countries had been suggested at that meeting. He therefore requested an opportunity to investigate the reasons for failing to include the suggestion in the draft signal.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer:

- (a) to investigate the reasons for omitting from the draft signal, the suggestion made by the Deputy Chief of Staff at (a) above, and
- (b) to revise the draft signal in the light of the above discussion and of his findings at (a) above, and submit the revised draft to him for approval.

A. G. Smith

J. G. SMITH,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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To, Chief Signal Officer

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(c) to investigate the reasons for omitting from the draft signal, the suggestion made to the Deputy Chief of Staff at 12:00 a.m., and

(d) to review the draft signal in the light of the above discussion and of his findings at (a) above, and submit the revised draft to him for approval.

J. G. STEPHENSON

J. G. STEPHENSON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SIGNAL CORPS.

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To Chief Signal Officer

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Staff

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10 August 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters, Allied Commission,
APO 394

11 AUG 1945

Subject: Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences

1. Reference is made to your letter No. 217/285/EC dated 7 August 1945. Attached is an additional copy of the Minutes of SAC (45) 2nd Meeting as requested.

2. Distribution of papers of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference is usually made by the Mail and Distribution Section of the Adjutant General's office, and the latter were directed by this office on 23 July 1945, to forward three copies of all papers to you.

3. It is regretted that the instruction was not complied with. However, steps have been taken in an effort to prevent any recurrence of this error.

J. E. Bastion, Jr.
J. E. BASTION, Jr.,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

Encl:
Copy No. 42 of
SAC (45) 2nd Meeting
dtd 4 August 1945

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 3rd Meeting
7th August 1945

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COPY NO. 2

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE THIRD MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 9TH AUGUST
1945

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)
2. PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY
(a) British Chiefs of Staff Paper No. PWP (45) 2 (Final) - already
circulated on limited distribution as Appendix B to JPS Study
No. 7/309 (Final);
(b) Paper No. SAC (45) 9 - already circulated — 208/1/4 1945
3. JUGOSLAV WAR ROOM IN VENETIAN GULLIA
(Paper No. SAC (45) 8 - already circulated) — 208/1/4 1945
4. PROPOSED ANGLO-AMERICAN ASOCIATION
(a) USNET Signal S-57287 (MC IN 8628 of 13 July 1945);
(b) Paper No. SAC (45) 10 - to be circulated

1945
J.C. SWENTON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 2nd meeting - already circulated)
2. PEACE TALKS WITH ITALY
(a) British Chiefs of Staff Paper No. PWP (45) 2 (Final) - already circulated on limited distribution as Appendix B to JPS Study No. P/304 (Final);
(b) Paper No. SAC (45) 9 - already circulated — 20/5/45/20/10/45
3. URGENTLY W.R. SOCIETY IN VENEZIA GULLA
(Paper No. SAC (45) 8 - already circulated) — 20/5/45/20/10/45
4. PROPOSED ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
(a) URGENT Signal S-97287 (MC IN 8628 of 12 July 1945);
(b) Paper No. SAC (45) 10 - to be circulated

14 June 1945
J.G. SMITHSON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref: 217/285/80.

7 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
Attn: Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

1. Reference is made to your letter dated 23 July 1945 in which you agree to forward three copies of all minutes and papers of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences.

2. Only two copies of SAC (45) 2nd Meeting 4 August 1945 have been received. May a further copy be forwarded please.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

see 258

B/V
751
Noted

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EXEC. COMM.

AUG 6 1945

RECD

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) and Meeting
14th August 1945

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COPY NO. 1

7 AUG 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 2ND AUGUST 1945

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph P. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral L. Glasford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDEVAC

Major General J.M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

The Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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General Joseph F. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral J. Glascock,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Day Gurnod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEXEM

Major General J.M. Devane,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Force, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General Lynn L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

The Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G.S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.L. Duerle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblin,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General L. Browning,
Director, Military Mission Italian Army

Brigadier General J.A. Mollison,
Commanding General Designate, U.S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theatre

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Brigadier M.S. Lish,
Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel J.B. Bastin, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC 45 1st Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE reviewed the minutes of their meeting held on 26th July 1945.

2. COMMAND AGREEMENTS IN MEDITERRANEAN AND FUTURE OF JFHQ

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWINTER reported that the Chief of Staff had taken with him to ENGLAND, for the consideration of the War Office, a proposal for the War Establishment of a British Headquarters parallel to HQUS..

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. REDUCTION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 5)

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS reported that a second meeting had been held between representatives of the Naval and Army Staffs and the Merchant Shipping authorities for the purpose of further examining the provision of civil signal facilities after the withdrawal of the Naval Port Parties. There were two main difficulties which must be overcome in order to achieve the transfer of responsibilities. Firstly, the existing censorship restrictions must be

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC 45 1st Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 26th July 1965.

2. COMBINED REQUIREMENTS IN MEDITERRANEAN AND FUTURE OF JPMQ

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 2)

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS reported that the Chief of Staff had taken with him to ZENITH, for the consideration of the War Office, a proposal for the War Establishment of a British Headquarters parallel to MOCUS.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. REDUCTION OF BRITISH M.V.L. PORT PARTIES IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 5)

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS reported that a second meeting had been held between representatives of the Naval and Army Staffs and the Merchant Shipping authorities for the purpose of further examining the provision of civil signal facilities after the withdrawal of the Naval Port Parties. There were two main difficulties which must be overcome in order to achieve the transfer of responsibilities. Firstly, the existing censorship restrictions must be reduced so as to permit the use of civil facilities in regard to the movement of shipping. Secondly, civil land lines in Italy and GREECE were below the pre-war standard and he understood that 90% of available civil communication facilities were now requisitioned for military purposes.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to examine:

- (a) the possibility of reducing or removing present censorship restrictions on the use of civil land lines.
- (b) the possibility of releasing for civilian use, certain lines now reserved for military traffic and to report accordingly.

4. ABANDONMENT OF THE REGAL JAGSLEY NAVY WITH THE FUTURE NAVY

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 6)

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS reported that slightly more than 50% of the

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seniorized personnel of the Royal Yugoslav Navy had elected to return to JUBAULVIA and to become members of the amalgamated Yugoslav Navy. He had no report of the number of officers who had so elected. Generally speaking, the arrangements for the amalgamation were proceeding satisfactorily.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

5. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - SPEECH BY SIGNOR MENNI

(Previous reference S.C. 45 1st Meeting, Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL LUSITZER reported that, in accordance with the directions given at the last conference, he had called on the Italian Prime Minister, and informed him that Signor Menni's recent speech in MILAN was a violation of his oath as an Italian Minister, and such conduct was not likely to induce confidence in the Italian Government on the part of the United States and British Governments. The Prime Minister had readily agreed and had undertaken to express this view to Signor Menni. The Chief Commissioner added that he had taken the opportunity at the same time of expressing similar concern regarding an unconfirmed report of a speech along the same lines made by Signor Togliatti, the Minister of Justice.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

6. ITALIAN CLAIMS IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference S.C. 45 1st Meeting, Minute 9)

MAJOR GENERAL LUSITZER reported that the approved reply to the letter from the Italian Foreign Minister, in which the latter had made certain claims regarding the Italian population of coastal areas of ISTRIA, had recently been despatched by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

MAJOR GENERAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander stated that the welfare of the Italian population of the Yugoslav occupied area of VENEZIA GIULIA was causing anxiety to the Italian Government. Signor Parri had informed him that it was the Italian intention to request that the International Red Cross be allowed to investigate reports of atrocities committed in the area. It was Admiral Stone's view that the Allied Military authorities should endorse such a request if it were formally made.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

of the United States Government. The Prime Minister had readily agreed and had undertaken to express this view to Signor Ferri. The Chief Commissioner added that he had taken the opportunity at the same time of expressing similar concerns regarding an unconfirmed report of a speech along the same lines made by Signor Foglietti, the Minister of Justice.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

6. ITALIAN CLAIMS IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference S.O. 45 1st Meeting, Minute 9)

MAJOR GENERAL LAMITZKE reported that the approved reply to the letter from the Italian Foreign Minister, in which the latter had made certain claims regarding the Italian population of coastal areas of ISTRIA, had recently been despatched by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

MAJOR GENERAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander stated that the welfare of the Italian population of the Yugoslav occupied area of VENEZIA GIULIA was causing anxiety to the Italian Government. Signor Ferri had informed him that it was the Italian Government's request that the International Red Cross be allowed to investigate reports of atrocities committed in the area. It was General Stone's view that the Allied military authorities should endorse such a request if it were formally made.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) stated that it was his policy that military negotiations with the Yugoslavs in regard to VENEZIA GIULIA should not be reopened and that any queries in regard to the situation in the Yugoslav occupied area should be raised through diplomatic channels.

(b) directed that the Italian request for facilities to be allowed to the International Red Cross should, if formally, be endorsed on his behalf.

7. HEADQUARTERS TOWN OF R.F. COMMAND IN ITALY

(Previous reference S.O. 45 1st Meeting, Minute 11)

MAJOR GENERAL GARRID reported that he had agreed with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, that the Headquarters for Army known as the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force should be called Mediterranean Coastal Air Force for the present. The name of the Air Headquarters remaining in ITALY would be

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remained at the time came for Headquarters of MAF to move to Cairo.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the above arrangements.

8. ITALIAN POLICY FOR FINING OF ITALIAN ALLIED FORCES
(JCS Study No. 7/508 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the requirements for Italian armed forces in the interim period until the peace conference, and recommending that the Italian Army should be organized as a force of 140,000 men plus 65,000 Carabinieri, that the present arrangements in respect of the Italian Navy should not be changed and that a separate investigation should be carried out in regard to the Italian Air Force. The paper further attached a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting approval of this policy.

MR. KILN expressed the view that everything possible should be done to develop the Italian Army, as the future preservation of law and order would depend largely on the development of that force. In relation to this, the development of the Carabinieri was less important, as the Italian people had greater respect for the Army than the Carabinieri.

MR. ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the current policy that the province of Bolzano should remain under Allied Military Government indefinitely, stated that after careful consideration, he had now recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be requested to approve the return of this province to the Italian Government on September 30th. He requested therefore that the draft signal now under discussion should be worded so as to avoid prejudicing this decision. He also thought that the statement in the draft signal, to the effect that the Carabinieri were corrupt and inefficient, was too strong. With regard to the size of the Italian Army, Admiral Stone had informed him that it was the intention of the Italian Government to request an increase of 20,000, making a total of 160,000. He had suggested to the Italian Prime Minister that he discuss this matter with the Ministry of War, after which, if it were still believed desirable the Government could make a definite recommendation to the Allied authorities.

GENERAL LACH PARRY said that he agreed with the military recommendations of the proposed signal but he considered that the last paragraph of the signal should be revised so as to recapitulate the points on which the Supreme Allied Commander was requesting decisions.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed himself as being in agreement with the paragraph of the draft signal referring to the size and employment of the Italian Navy. He believed, however, that the signal should include a recommendation regarding the need for a strong Allied Military Mission in the Italian Navy.

...the Italian Army, as the future preservation of law and order would depend largely on the development of that force. In relation to this, the development of the Carabinieri was less important, as the Italian people had greater respect for the army than the Carabinieri.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the current policy that the provinces of Bolzano should remain under Allied Military Government indefinitely, stated that after careful consideration, he did not recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be requested to approve the return of this province to the Italian Government. He requested that the draft signal should be worded so as to avoid prejudicing this decision. He also thought that the statement in the draft signal, to the effect that the Carabinieri were corrupt and inefficient, was too strong. With regard to the size of the Italian Army, General Fawcett had informed him that it was the intention of the Italian Government to request an increase of 25,000, making a total of 160,000. He had suggested to the Italian Prime Minister that he discuss this matter with the Ministry of War, after which, if it were still believed desirable, the Government could make a definite recommendation to the Allied authorities.

GENERAL McHUGHY said that he agreed with the military recommendations of the proposed signal but he considered that the last paragraph of the signal should be revised so as to recapitulate the points on which the Supreme Allied Commander was requesting decisions.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed himself as being in agreement with the paragraph of the draft signal referring to the size and employment of the Italian Navy. He believed, however, that the signal should include a recommendation regarding the need for a strong Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed concern regarding the maintenance of supply for the civil population of Italy. The future arrangements for the provision of such supplies had not yet been agreed and any examination would add most gravely to the difficulty of maintaining law and order. He agreed with Admiral STONE's remarks concerning the Carabinieri. He also agreed with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in regard to the importance of the task of the Carabinieri. The main difficulty with the Italian Army was not its rank and file, but the quality of its officers. This could only be improved by the organization of good officer schools, efficient training, and the elimination of unsatisfactory officers. He considered that the JPS proposals for the size and organization of the Italian Army were sound. It was important to restrict the force to a size which could be made efficient. Any suggestion by the Italian Government for an increase in the size of the Army was therefore unlikely to meet with his approval.

REAR ADMIRAL GARDNER considered that the paragraphs of the signal pertaining to the size and composition of the Italian Army should be revised to state that the existing ceiling of 140,000 was not to be exceeded.

Excerpt - 5257/42

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In reply to a query by the Supreme Allied G-6 Commander he stated that the Italian Air Force was at present providing useful internal air communications and also providing a power for service duties.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF reported that a separate meeting was being held that afternoon to determine administrative responsibilities in regard to the Italian Army and that separate recommendations would be submitted on this matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COM-MUNDA :

(a) Instructed the Deputy Chief of Staff to review the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated under JPS Study No. P/306 (Final) in accordance with the above discussion, and to submit the revised draft to him for his approval.

(b) USF stated that Commanding General, AF/MTO and WOC-in-C, Bar Macchio should :

(1) Cause a further investigation to be made regarding the strength, within the agreed ceiling, at which it was desirable to retain the Italian Air Force until the Peace Treaty

(2) In conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, examine what responsibilities in regard to the administration of the Italian Air Force can legitimately be transferred to the Italian Government. *See 2A*

and report accordingly.

9. ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

(JPS Study P/309 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which attached draft Naval, Military and Air clauses of the Peace Treaty with Italy (on which Field Marshal Alexander had been requested to comment in his capacity as British Commander-in-Chief) together with a study by the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff putting forward recommendations in regard to these comments.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER pointed out that while the Supreme Allied Commander had been asked to comment on the whole report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, only the draft clauses of the actual Peace Treaty which had been forwarded for detailed comment were the Naval, Military and Air clauses. These could only be read in the light of the political background set out in the report of the Post-Hostilities Planning

WAR should :

- (1) Cause a further investigation to be made regarding the strength, within the agreed ceiling, at which it was desirable to obtain the Italian Air Force until the Peace Treaty.
- (2) In conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, examine what responsibilities in regard to the administration of the Italian Air Force can legitimately be transferred to the Italian Government. *See 29/*

and report accordingly.

7. ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

(JPS Study P/309 (Final))

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MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS pointed out that while the Supreme Allied Commander had been asked to comment on the whole report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, only the draft clauses of the actual Peace Treaty which had been forwarded for detailed comment were the Naval, Military and Air clauses. These could only be read in the light of the political background set out in the report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, but the draft political clauses of the Peace Treaty had not been forwarded for comment.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS considered that the political and military clauses were inter-linked. Comment on the latter could only be made on the assumption that the political clauses would include the removal of all Italian overseas possessions as indicated in the political background given in the report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff. Any retention of such overseas territories would have a major effect on the Italian requirements for Naval, Military and Air Forces. He did not agree with the contention of the Joint Planning Staff that there was difficulty in reconciling the objective of establishing ITALY as a useful and prosperous European state not under Soviet influence with the objective of compelling ITALY to give up all pretence to be a great power and proving to her that aggression did not pay.

ADMIRAL GARRICE suggested that the Supreme Allied Commander's

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reply should be clear that his detailed comments were entirely based on the material in part 2 of the Post-Hospital Planning Staff paper.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER, while agreeing that detailed comments must be based on this political background, said that he would like to make certain political comments in general terms. He considered that the size of the Italian armed forces should be governed by three major considerations: the first was that, for Italy's own sake, they must be limited to a size which the country could maintain in an efficient state. They must, therefore, in any event be small. Secondly, they must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend the country against her neighbors, particularly GERMANY. Thirdly, they must not be strong enough to offer Italy any prospect of attacking those neighbors or threatening the interests of the principal allied powers.

GENERAL COMMANER considered that the wording of the clauses which give rights equal to the principal allied powers (U. K., U.S., U.S.S.R., FRANCE) was most unfortunate as at present drafted. The Americans had already showed a habit of interpreting treaties to suit their own ends, and the present draft could be used to allow them to station troops in Italy and to demand all types of military facilities there, subject in certain respects to a nominal declaration of war against GERMANY. This was a most dangerous situation wholly at variance with the political object of preventing Italy falling under Soviet influence.

GENERAL COMMANER said that he completely disagreed with the recommendation of the Joint Planning Staff that the limitations of military installations in Sicily and Sicily should be reviewed in 1950. The implication of such a clause would be that they would be removed after that date. Installations in these islands would always threaten British imperial communications at a vital point, and he felt strongly that the LONDON draft, whereby these limitations would be permanent, should not be altered. In regard to the Italian Navy, he pointed out that it was the only one of the three Italian armed services which had maintained a good spirit-de-corps. It was therefore important that, while the Navy must be reduced, this should not be done in such a way as to injure Italian prestige unnecessarily. Any transfer of battleships to the U.S. would, for example, have a most unfortunate effect. He believed, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed that thinking people in Italy realized that the financial strain involved would in any case prevent them from keeping battleships in commission. Finally, he thought that the timing of the signature of the proposed treaty required careful consideration. It would appear such haste meant to the Italians if the terms became known after the considerably more severe terms, which were expected to be imposed on GERMANY, had been published.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean that if it was necessary to have places such as SICILY and SARDINIA demilitarized, then permanent demilitarization must be effected. However, he agreed with the Joint Planning Staff that there was a danger that if the terms imposed were too harsh, Italy would become a 'Balkanist' rather than a Western European country. He considered that in the long

...all types of military facilities there, subject to certain re-
 spect to a possible declaration of war against U.S.A. This was almost
 dangerous situation which at variance with the political object of pre-
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Admiral COMINGHAM said that he completely disagreed with the recom-
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 Liddell Hart draft, whereby these limitations would be permanent, should not
 be altered. In regard to the Italian Navy, he pointed out that it was
 the only one of the three Italian armed services which had maintained
 a good esprit-de-corps. It was therefore important that, while the Navy
 was to be reduced, this should not be done in such a way as to injure Ital-
 ian prestige unnecessarily. Any transfer of battleships to the S.M.A. would,
 for example, have a most unfortunate effect. He believed, and the Chief
 Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed that thinking people in Italy
 realized that the financial strain involved would in any case prevent them
 from keeping battleships in commission. Finally, he thought that the timing
 of the signature of the proposed treaty required careful consideration. It
 would appear much less harsh to the Italians if the terms became known
 after the considerably more severe terms, which were expected to be imposed
 on Germany, had been published.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSIONER agreed with the Commander-in-Chief,
 Mediterranean that if it was necessary to make places such as SICILY and
 Sardinia demilitarized, then permanent demilitarization must be effected.
 However, he agreed with the Joint Planning Staff that there was a danger
 that if the terms imposed were too harsh, Italy would become a "Balkanized"
 rather than a unitary European country. He considered that in the long
 run this would be a greater disaster to British interests than the danger
 of Italy being slightly too strong and be able to threaten communications
 through the Mediterranean.

MR. KINK thought that the draft clauses were unfortunate in that they
 seemed to put into a permanent Peace Treaty with Italy, arrangements
 which were only required for the interim period while Allied forces were
 stationed in the country and up to the conclusion of the Japanese war.
 He doubted whether any final Peace Treaty with Italy was in fact, ur-
 gently required. What was necessary was a gradual relaxation of Allied
 control and for that purpose an interim "modus vivendi" was urgently
 needed.

MR. BRAD, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander as
 to from what source was pressure being applied to conclude a Peace Treaty
 with Italy in the near future, said that he had noted that it was the
 desire of the UNITED STATES State Department that such a treaty should
 be concluded at an early date. He believed the British Foreign Office

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were also coming round to this view. He remarked however, that decisions taken at PCSD-1 would probably affect the latter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMISSION:

Deferred action in regard to commenting on the British Chiefs of Staff's proposal for the Peace Treaty with Italy until no. 24, considered the latter further.

10. AFRICAN POLICY TO PDS ITALY
(Previous reference Paper No. SAC (45) 7)

THE CONFERENCE took note of a letter, which had been dispatched over the signature of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, to the Combined and British Chiefs of Staff, forwarding to them copies of a memorandum by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission in regard to future policy towards ITALY.

DISTRIBUTION

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EXTRACT:

Chief Signals Officer - Minute 3 - 1 Copy.

J. G. Sherman
J. G. SHERMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U.S.
SECRETARY.

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Comrade H. H.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 2nd Meeting
31 July 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

THE SECOND MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 2 AUGUST 1945

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (45) 1st Meeting - already circulated) — 269
2. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES
(JPS Study No. P/306 (Final) - to be circulated) — *Cancel*
3. PLACE ITALY WITH ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/307 (Final) - to be circulated) — *N/R*
4. FUTURE POLICY TOWARD ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (45) 7 - already circulated) — 218/24

TO PLACE NOTE ONLY:

L. G. Smith
J. G. SMITH,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(S.E.C. (45) 1st Meeting - already circulated) — 269
2. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ILLINOIS-BASED FORCES
(JPS Study No. P/306 (Final) - to be circulated) — Chief Clerk
3. PAGE TWENTY WITH IV...IX
(JPS Study No. P/307 (Final) - to be circulated) — N/R

TO L.A.B. NOTE ONLY:

4. FUTURE POLICY BOARD I...IX
(Paper No. S.E.C. (45) 7 - already circulated) — 218/EC

C. G. Shannon
J. G. SHANNON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SECRETARY.

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- EC Dist - 31 Aug 45
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 - 32 Exec Comm
 - 33 Political Advisors

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF560

SAC (45) 1st Meeting
26th July 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

JUL 20 1945

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE, HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 26TH JULY 1945

24

PRESENT:-

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Captain A.V.S. Fickhardt, representing
Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Admiral Vice Marshal G.B.A. Baker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MIDE

Major General J. M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General C. B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

The Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Captain A.V.S. Pickhardt, representing
Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Air Vice Marshal G.B.A. Baker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MIDE

Major General J. M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General C. B. Magruder,
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

The Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G. S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier T. R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General A. C. Duff,
MC, JWC.

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31 CHIEF COMMR

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Brigadier D. P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U. S. Political Adviser

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:-

Lt. Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETINGS

(SAC (O) (45) 14th Meeting) (45)
(SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the Minutes of their meetings held on 12 July, 1945, and 20 July, 1945.

2. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND FUTURES OF AFHQ

(Previous reference SAC (O) (45) 14th Meeting - Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that planning was continuing in regard to the reorganization of Allied Force Headquarters and that a proposal for the establishment of a British Headquarters similar to MTOUSA was under consideration.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ZADAR AND VIS

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting - Minute 4)

BRIGADIER GENERAL EBERLZ reported that the withdrawal of stores and personnel from ZADAR had been completed and that a total of 548 tons of stores had been loaded at VIS. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, had arranged for five LCIs to arrive at VIS on 24th July to withdraw personnel and vehicles and this would conclude the operation.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(SAC (G) (45) 14th Meeting
SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the Minutes of their meetings held on 12 July, 1945, and 20 July, 1945.

2. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND FUTURE OF AFHQ

(Previous reference SAC (G) (45) 14th Meeting - Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that planning was continuing in regard to the reorganization of Allied Force Headquarters and that a proposal for the establishment of a British Headquarters similar to MTONSA was under consideration.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ZADAR AND VIS

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting - Minute 4)

BRIGADIER GENERAL REEPLER reported that the withdrawal of stores and personnel from ZADAR had been completed and that a total of 543 tons of stores had been loaded at VIS. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, had arranged for five LCs to arrive at VIS on 24th July to withdraw personnel and vehicles and this would conclude the operation.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

4. TRANSFER OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PRESS AND RADIO NEWS FROM FME IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting - Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER reported that the withdrawal of FME from the distribution from press and radio news throughout ITALY except in the VENEZIA GIULIA area, had been virtually completed. It had been decided, however, to leave one press control officer on the staff of each Regional Commissioner until such time as the Region had been turned back to the control of the Italian Government.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

5. REDUCTION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting - Minute 12)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that, in accordance with the directions given at the last conference, a meeting had been attended by representatives of the Naval and Army Staffs and the Merchant Shipping Authorities. Full agreement had been reached on all major problems in regard to the operation of the ports and the provision of signals facilities after the withdrawal of the naval port parties. Referring to his statement at the previous conference, he reported that he had received a communication from the local representative of the Ministry of War Transport stating that in this Theatre the War Shipping Administration and the Ministry of War Transport operated as an integrated agency and in complete cooperation.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

6. AMALGAMATION OF THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY WITH THE PARTISAN NAVY

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that final arrangements for the amalgamation of the Royal Yugoslav Navy with the Partisan Navy had been agreed in discussions between his representatives and those of the Yugoslav Naval Staff and Royal Yugoslav Navy at Allied Force Headquarters on 20 and 21 July. It had been agreed that vessels of the Royal Yugoslav Navy would proceed to SIBENIK and on arrival would become part of the amalgamated Yugoslav Navy, remaining, however, under the general operational control of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The amalgamated Navy would fly the Yugoslav Navy flag with the red star. Royal Yugoslav Naval officers and men would have the free choice of returning to Yugoslavia or remaining outside. Unfortunately those who took the latter course would eventually become stateless refugees. Those personnel joining the amalgamated Navy would wear their present uniforms until replacements become available, and would retain their ranks, but their titles would change to conform to Yugoslav custom. They would have the same rights, pay, and duties as Yugoslav personnel. Arrangements were also made in regard to minesweeping and supplies.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

operated as an integrated agency and in complete cooperation.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

6. AMALGAMATION OF THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY WITH THE PARTISAN NAVY

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

7. FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS ITALY

(Paper No. SAC (45) 3 — File 218, Sub 176
JPS Study No. E/308 (Final)) — File 218, Sub 283.

THE CONFERENCE had before them a letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, advocating the adoption by the Allies of a policy of active interest in regard to the future of Italy, together with a draft letter for signature by the Supreme Allied Commander, forwarding the Chief Commissioner's letter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and making certain comments.

MAJOR GENERAL LEONUTZER said that the Chief Commissioner's letter had already been given a wide distribution both in LONDON and in WASHINGTON. It was, therefore, extremely desirable that copies should be forwarded officially to the Chiefs of Staff. However, referring to paragraph 4 of the JPS Study, he questioned whether it was desirable to raise the issue of the ability of UNRRA to assume responsibility for civil supplies in ITALY.

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MAJOR GENERAL MACDONALD, referring to the Deputy Chief of Staff's last point, said that an inquiry, in regard to the arrangements required on the termination of military responsibility for civil supplies, had been received from the Supreme Allied Commander in BERLIN. The question arose because, on the U.S. side, the decision had been taken to terminate the military responsibility for civil supplies in Italy at an early date. At that time the Foreign Economic Administration would take over the United States financial responsibilities which were involved. No parallel decision had been taken on the British side to cover the interim period until UNRRA would assume responsibility in October. It had been suggested that during this interim period UNRRA should take over financial responsibility, while the physical handling of the supplies should continue to be a matter for the military authorities in conjunction with the Allied Commission. This proposal that UNRRA should assume financial responsibility had been agreed by AFHQ. There remained, however, the greatest objection to UNRRA assuming physical responsibility for handling the supplies as it was not considered that this organization was yet capable of doing so. There was, therefore, no conflict between the signal which had been sent to the Supreme Allied Commander and the view put forward in the JPS paper, that the physical responsibility should not be handed over to UNRRA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that as the Chief Commissioner's letter had already been circulated both in LONDON and in WASHINGTON, the purposes of the Supreme Allied Commander's letter was merely to forward copies so as to regularize the existing position. It was not, therefore, desirable to use that forwarding letter to raise this separate and complicated question.

MR. KIRK suggested that the Chief Commissioner's letter might be forwarded without comment.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM, disagreeing with the United States Political Adviser, thought that the Supreme Allied Commander must comment on the military matters raised in the basic letter. He thought, therefore, that it should be made clear that the Supreme Allied Commander did not necessarily support these views. This was particularly applicable to the naval recommendations with certain of which he (Admiral Cunningham) was in complete disagreement. He wished, therefore, to see the final paragraph of the Supreme Allied Commander's draft letter strengthened so as to state this disagreement.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that it would be wise in forwarding the paper to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to notify them that the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the military aspects of the paper would follow.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN thought that it would be unwise to express

Extract in file 600/EC

responsibility should not be handed over to UNRRA.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that as the Chief Commissioner's letter had already been circulated both in LONDON and in WASHINGTON, the purpose of the Supreme Allied Commander's letter was merely to forward copies so as to regularize the existing position. It was not, therefore, desirable to use that forwarding letter to raise this separate and complicated question.

Mr. KLEN suggested that the Chief Commissioner's letter might be forwarded without comment.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM, disagreeing with the United States Political Adviser, thought that the Supreme Allied Commander must comment on the military matters raised in the basic letter. He thought, therefore, that it should be made clear that the Supreme Allied Commander did not necessarily support these views. This was particularly applicable to the naval recommendations with certain of which he (Admiral Cunningham) was in complete disagreement. He wished, therefore, to see the final paragraph of the Supreme Allied Commander's draft letter strengthened so as to state this disagreement.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that it would be wise in forwarding the paper to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to notify them that the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the military aspects of the paper would follow.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM thought that it would be unwise to express any strong views in the present letter. The time for doing this would be when the Supreme Allied Commander forwarded his detailed military comments.

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Secretary to prepare for his signature the letter circulated under JPS Paper No. 8/508 (Final), deleting the paragraph referring to UNRRA responsibilities, and subsequently to despatch it to the Combined and British Chiefs of Staff, together with copies of the letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

8. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - SPEECH BY SIGMUND MARSH

(Paper No. SAC (U.S) 6) — File 218/299/EC.

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper, recommending that the Chief

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Commissioner, Allied Commission, should be instructed to protest strongly to the Italian Prime Minister in regard to a speech by Signor Menzi in which he campaigned for a republic, and attaching a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting the incident and the action taken.

MEMORANDUM GENERAL MORRIS said that it appeared from the press reports of Signor Menzi's speech that the undertaking not to raise the institutional question had been violated. It seemed desirable, therefore, that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, should approach the Italian Prime Minister and register a strong protest, especially as Signor Menzi was the Italian Minister charged with the responsibility for preparing impartially the Constituent Assembly which was to decide between a republic and a monarchy.

MR. CHAIRMAN STONE said that he had now been able to obtain confirmation of the exact words used by Signor Menzi, which he read to the Conference. While these words were undoubtedly most improper the Associated Press report had clearly exaggerated his actual statement. It was incorrect to state that Signor Menzi had campaigned vigorously for a Republic, and he (Rear Admiral Stone) did not consider this statement could be construed as a violation of the undertaking of the Italian Government. It was, however, a violation of his oath by an individual minister. He doubted whether, under the current directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allied Commission had a right to caution the Government in the manner indicated in the paper. Moreover, the legal situation was complicated by the fact that the speech had taken place in AD territory. He suggested, therefore, that his representations to the Italian Prime Minister should take the line of suggesting that such violations of his oath by an Italian minister were not likely to induce confidence in the Italian Government on the part of the United States and British Governments.

MR. KIRK agreed that this speech by one minister did not constitute a violation of its undertaking by the entire Italian Government. He did not consider it advisable to stress the fact that the speech took place in AD territory, as this would only invite the making of similar speeches in territory which had been handed back to the Italian Government.

MR. BHOJ, agreeing with the remarks of the United States Political Adviser, considered that the form of protest suggested by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, would be preferable.

THE DEPUTY SURFICIAL ALLIED COMMISSIONER:

(a) Directed that a protest should be made to the Italian Prime Minister by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on the lines of his remarks at 'IX' above.

(b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to review the draft telegram to the Italian Government (U.S.) and conform with it.

While these words were undoubtedly most improper the associated Press report had clearly exaggerated his actual statement. It was incorrect to state that Signor Nenni had complained vigorously for a Republic, and he (Rear Admiral Stone) did not consider this statement could be construed as a violation of the undertaking of the Italian Government. It was, however, a violation of his oath by an individual minister. He doubted whether, under the current directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allied Commission had a right to caution the government in the manner indicated in the paper. Moreover, the legal situation was complicated by the fact that the speech had taken place in MIG territory. He suggested, therefore, that his representations to the Italian Prime Minister should take the line of suggesting that such violations of his oath by an Italian minister were not likely to induce confidence in the Italian Government on the part of the United States and British Governments.

MR. NIKK agreed that this speech by one minister did not constitute a violation of its undertaking by the entire Italian Government. He did not consider it advisable to stress the fact that the speech took place in MIG territory, as this would only invite the making of similar speeches in territory which had been handed back to the Italian Government.

MR. BROD, agreeing with the remarks of the United States Political Adviser, considered that the form of protest suggested by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, would be preferable.

THE DEPUTY SURNAME ALLIED COMMISSIONER:

- (a) Directed that a protest should be made to the Italian Prime Minister by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, on the lines of his remarks at 'X' above.
- (b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft telegram circulated under Paper No. 3AC (45) 6 to conform with his direction at (a) above and subsequently to despatch ~~it~~ ^{it}.

9. ITALIAN CLAIMS IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

(Paper No. 3AC (45) 4) — 28/296/EC.

THE CONFERENCE had before them a letter from the Italian Foreign Minister in which certain claims were made regarding the Italian population of coastal areas of ISTRIA and a draft reply for despatch by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

MAJOR GENERAL LEMMITER said that only a formal acknowledgement had so far been sent to the Italian Foreign Minister. It was desirable that a fuller

* - Despatched as HAF 1048 of 26 July 1945.

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reply should be furnished him. The suggested letter pointed out that the areas in question were not under Allied administration.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE suggested that in the reply it would be unwise to refer to the military agreement signed in VENIZIA GRILLIA as it had been considered undesirable to furnish a copy of this document to the Italian Government.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that the reference to the anchorages off the west coast of ISRAEL required redrafting. Although the BELGRADE agreement gave the Supreme Allied Commander certain rights in regard to these anchorages, in point of fact, in accordance with the terms of the subsequent military agreement, no control was being exercised over them.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to redraft in the light of the above discussion the proposed reply to the Italian Minister circulated under Paper No. SAC (45) 4 and to forward it in its revised form to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, for despatch.*

10. RETENTION OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT IN THE THEATRE

(JPS Study No. P/307 (Final)) — 20/29/50

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the anticipated future requirements for amphibious lift in the Mediterranean Theatre and attaching a draft signal in the MEDCOS series recommending the retention of certain British landing craft and the release of others.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that the basic recommendation was to retain amphibious lift for about a brigade in the theatre. The absence of such lift might lead to dangerous lack of flexibility in the movement of Army reserves.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that, while he had no objection to the despatch of this signal, he thought the United States naval department would not react favourably to the immobilization of craft in this theatre while the shortage of such craft in the Pacific continued.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

approved the draft signal circulated as appendix 'A' of JPS Study No. P/307 (Final) and instructed the Chief of Staff to despatch it.

11. REORGANIZATION OF R.F. COMMAND IN ITALY

10. RETENTION OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT IN THE THEATRE(JPS Study No. P/307 (Final)) — *28/29/45*

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that, while he had no objection to the despatch of this signal, he thought the United States naval department would not react favourably to the immobilization of craft in this theatre while the shortage of such craft in the Pacific continued.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Approved the draft signal circulated as appendix 'B' of JPS Study No. P/307 (Final) and instructed the Chief of Staff to despatch it.

11. REORGANIZATION OF R.A.F. COMMAND IN ITALY(Paper No. S.A.C. (45) 5) — *28/29/45*

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper pointing out that, as there was no longer any U.S. component in Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force, that Headquarters should lose its Allied title, and be renamed "Air Headquarters, R.A.F. Italy". It was intended that the new Headquarters should command all Italy-based R.A.F. aircraft. It would also arrange to provide such coastal sorties as the naval authorities in Italy might require.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that while he had no objection to the proposed title, he thought that a Mediterranean Coastal Air Force Headquarters should

* - Despatched as MEDCOS 263 of 26 July 1945.

* - Forwarded to Allied Commission by memorandum dated 26 July 1945.

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remain and work in close touch with the Headquarters of the naval Commander-in-Chief. After all the experience which had been laboriously acquired during the war it would be a pity to drop the title of a coastal air force completely.

AIR VICE MARSHAL BAKER said that the present Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force controlled only one coastal squadron and that this would in due course be withdrawn to A.M.I.A. The title of a coastal air force was, therefore, inappropriate for that Headquarters. He believed that retention of the title of a coastal air force in the theatre was a separate problem and that in any case it would probably be desirable for such a headquarters to be based on A.M.I.A.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed:

- for*
- (a) That the Allied title of Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force should be dissolved.
 - (b) That Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and Commander-in-Chief, R.F. MEDAF, should endeavour to reach agreement both as to the future title of the R.F. Headquarters in Italy and as to the retention of a coastal air force headquarters.
 - (c) That, in the event of failure to reach agreement in accordance with (b) above, a decision on this matter should await the return of the Supreme Allied Commander.

12. COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(Paper No. SAC (45) 2) — *28/29/EC*

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of a letter which had been despatched to the British Chiefs of Staff, commenting, on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, on the note by Commander-in-Chief, MIDDLE EAST, regarding future command arrangements in the Mediterranean Theatre.

for
J. G. SEXTON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

(b) That Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and Commander-in-Chief, S.F. AFCEC, should endeavour to reach Agreement both as to the future title of the S.F. Headquarters in ILLY and as to the retention of a coastal air force headquarters.

(c) That, in the event of failure to reach agreement in accordance with (b) above, a decision on this matter should await the return of the Supreme Allied Commander.

12. COMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(Paper No. SAC (45) 2) — 28/24/EC

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of a letter which had been despatched to the British Chiefs of Staff, commenting, on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, on the note by Commanders-in-Chief, MIDDLE EAST, regarding future command arrangements in the Mediterranean Theatre.

J. G. STEWART,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Commander, Land Forces, GREECE.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AP 516

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S.O. (45) 248
24th July 1945

THE FIRST PART OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE ALLIED FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO. 1090
DATE OF THE SUPREMACY 26th JULY 1945

1. STATUS OF THE SUPREMACY
(S.O. (45) 248) - already circulated
(S.O. (45) 248) - already circulated
File 218, Folio 276
2. THE ALLIED FORCES SUPREMACY
(S.O. (45) 248) - already circulated
(S.O. (45) 248) - already circulated
File 218, Folio 293
3. THE ALLIED FORCES SUPREMACY - SECTION OF SUPREMACY
(S.O. (45) 248) - to be circulated
File 218, Folio 297
4. THE ALLIED FORCES SUPREMACY - SECTION OF SUPREMACY
(S.O. (45) 248) - to be circulated
File 218, Folio 296
5. SECTION OF SUPREMACY LIST IN THE SUPREMACY
(S.O. (45) 248) - already circulated
File 218, F 290
6. SECTION OF SUPREMACY LIST IN THE SUPREMACY
(S.O. (45) 248) - to be circulated
File 218, F 297
7. SECTION OF SUPREMACY LIST IN THE SUPREMACY
(S.O. (45) 248) - already circulated
File 218, F 292

TO BE NOTED :-

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2. WORLDWIDE TRENDS IN THE
(Page No. 50 (45) 1 - already circulated)
JPS Study No. 5/308 (Final) - already circulated
File 218, Folio 276
3. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM - STUDY BY JIMON LAMINI
(Page No. 50 (45) 1 - to be circulated)
File 218, Folio 299
4. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM - STUDY BY JIMON LAMINI
(Page No. 50 (45) 1 - to be circulated)
File 218, Folio 296
5. EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN LIT IN THE 19th C.
(JPS Study No. 5/309 (Final) - already circulated)
File 218, F 290
6. AMERICAN LIT. OF THE 19th C. IN THE 19th C.
(Page No. 50 (45) 1 - already circulated)
File 218, F 297
7. COMPARISON OF THE AMERICAN LIT IN THE 19th C.
(Page No. 50 (45) 1 - already circulated)
File 218, F 293

TO THE "WORLD" UNIT:

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DISSEMINATION:

Report, 1st Dec 1971, Commission in Chief Committee, Middle East

Ec 1157 - 25 July 45

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32 EXEC COMAK

33 POLITICAL ADVISERS

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (F) (45) 16th Meeting (Amendment)
22nd July 1945

COPY NO. 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JUL 23 1945

The following amendment should be made to SAC (F) (45) 16th Meeting, Minute

12. On page 8, delete 2nd paragraph and substitute the following:

Para deleted 22/7/45.

"ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said he could not agree to this proposal of the Chief Administrative Officer. As long as a Naval Officer-in-Charge remained at a port he should remain Chairman of the Port Executive Committee. Moreover when the Naval Officer-in-Charge left, the Chairman must be a merchant shipping representative of either the Ministry of War Transport or the War Shipping Administration. This principle had been thrashed out in regard to ALEXANDRIA and established after reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, in many ports the Army convoys handled were small in proportion to UNRRA and commercial supplies."

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J. S. STEWART,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Chief Signals Officer
Ministry of War Transport, Mediterranean

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"ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said he could not agree to this proposal of the Chief Administrative Officer. As long as a Naval Officer-in-Charge remained at a port he should remain Chairman of the Port Executive Committee. Moreover when the Naval Officer-in-Charge left, the Chairman must be a merchant shipping representative of either the Ministry of War Transport or the War Shipping Administration. This principle had been thrashed out in regard to ALGERIA and established after reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, in many ports the Army cargoes handled were small in proportion to UNRRA and commercial supplies."

J. G. GERRARD,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Chief Signal Officer
Ministry of War Transport, Mediterranean
Representative
War Shipping Administration, Mediterranean
Representative

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SAC (F) (45) 1644 Meeting
20th July 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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COPY NO

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 19TH JULY 1945

PRESENT:-

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF

Vice Admiral W.A. Glassford,
Commander United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Major General J.M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Force, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General L.L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

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PRESENT:-

General Joseph T. McNerney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Gattard,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAFC

Vice Admiral R.A. Glasford,
Commander United States Naval Forces Northwest African Theatre

Major General J.W. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General L.L. Lennitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G.S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.I. Beale,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

See 258/

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32 Exec Comm

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Brigadier D. P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch, AFHQ

Colonel J. K. Ketherall,
Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Branch, AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel J. F. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 18 June 1945.

2. ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minutes 2)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON received a signal and then received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff approving in principle the establishment of Italian Production Advisory Boards, and stating that the matter is properly for the decision of the Italian Government and that no proposals should be presented which might appear dictatorial.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. PAYMENTS TO CIVILIANS

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 3)

MAJOR GENERAL STONE reported that the final payment of 180 million lire to

SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert F. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 18 June 1945.

2. ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 3)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON reported that a telegram had been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff approving in principle the establishment of Italian Production Advisory Boards, and stating that the matter is properly for the decision of the Italian Government and that no proposals should be presented which might appear dictatorial.

THE DEPUTY SUPRIME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. PAYMENTS TO CINA

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 3)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that the final payment of 160 million lire to the CINA to discharge existing obligations had been made and the matter was therefore closed.

THE DEPUTY SUPRIME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

4. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ZADAR AND VISE

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 4)

BRIGADIER GENERAL LEBER stated that the withdrawal of stores from ZADAR had been completed and the landing party had withdrawn. It would, however, be a matter of one week before the Allied parties withdrew from VISE. *See 15*

ITEM 614, (IC IN 20672 of 30 June 1945)

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MAJOR GENERAL LEWITTZER reported that little stores of petrol, which had been found at Zadar and were in a fit state to remove, had been handed over to the Yugoslavs.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

5. POLICE IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITTZER stated that a letter had been sent by the Italian Foreign Minister to the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, expressing concern in regard to certain islands off the west coast of ISTRIA and coastal villages on the mainland, the population of which was claimed to be Italian. A draft reply was in preparation and this, together with the basic letter, would be circulated for consideration at the next meeting.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to bring this matter forward at the next meeting.

6. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 7)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITTZER reported that in accordance with the agreement signed at Allied Force Headquarters on 11th June 1945, all French forces had been withdrawn to the east side of the 1939 FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier by midnight 10 July. The French had continued to press in various ways, for an assurance that Italian carabinieri would not be brought into the ITALIA area. They had been informed, however, that the Supreme Allied Commander was not willing to accept any restrictions on the powers which he reserved in the agreement which had been signed by Gen. Canclavier and that the maintenance of law and order would have to be left to the common sense of AMG.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

7. ENTRY OF FILIPIN REPRESENTATIVES INTO ITALIA

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITTZER reported that a signal had recently been despatched to the Allied Commission requesting them to inform representatives

that reply was in preparation and this, together with the basic letter, would be circulated for consideration at the next meeting.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to bring this matter forward at the next meeting.

SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 7)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMMERTZ reported that in accordance with the agreement signed at Allied Force Headquarters on 11th June 1945, all French forces had been withdrawn to the east side of the 1939 FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier by midnight 13 July. The French had continued to spread in various ways, for an assurance that Italian carabinieri would not be brought into the TRINIA area. They had been informed, however, that the Supreme Allied Commander was not willing to accept any restrictions on the powers which he reserved in the agreement which had been signed by Gen. Carpenter and that the maintenance of law and order would have to be left to the common sense of A.M.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

ENTRY OF FILM REPRESENTATIVES INTO ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 8)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMMERTZ reported that a signal had recently been despatched to the Allied Commission requesting them to inform representatives of foreign film agencies that their entry into ITALY was now approved in principle, and that applications for entry should be made individually to this Headquarters.

MAJOR GENERAL STONE pointed out that the minute of the previous conference, to the effect that responsibility for distribution of films could pass to Foreign Film Representatives on 1 August, was inaccurate. The film representatives could enter ITALY by that date but it would be some considerable time thereafter before they could assume responsibility for the distribution at present made by F.F. In reply to a question by Mr. M. J. D. stated that the legislation, abrogating Fascist laws regarding the prohibition of business transactions by foreign film representatives in ITALY was expected to be passed within the next few weeks.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

* P-24539 (MC OUT 5057 of 18 July 1945)

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8. TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS AND RADIO NEWS FROM THE IN ITALY.
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 13)

MR. BARNES stated that in accordance with the decision taken at the last meeting, PIS had commenced, as of 15 July 1945, to withdraw from the distribution of press and radio news throughout ITALY, except in the VENETIA GIULIA area. It was expected that the turnover would be completed very shortly.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed concern regarding a story which had recently appeared in the 'Union Jack' and 'Stars and Stripes' concerning Italian submarines operating against the Japanese. The story was a complete fabrication and he considered that it was of such a nature as to cause protest by the Italian Government as ITALY had only declared war on JAPAN in the course of the last few days.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to make representations to the Italian Government on behalf of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to the effect that this story was a complete fabrication.

9. REORGANISATION OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 11)

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that while it had been decided that there would be no fundamental change in the organization of Allied Force Headquarters for the present, the view had been expressed by the War Department that further recommendations in this regard should be submitted in September of this year.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of the above.

10. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 35)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper stating that, when the Italian institutional question was reopened, it was desirable that the choice between the monarchy and republic should be made by a referendum rather than by a decision of a Constituent Assembly, and attaching a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting this view, suggesting certain action which might be taken to produce a referendum, and requesting guidance.

MR. ARTHUR STONE said that the paper erred in stating that voters' lists would not be completed till next Spring. These lists would in fact be completed by the end of the year.

Directed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to make representations to the Italian Government on behalf of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to the effect that this story was a complete fabrication.

9. PREPARATION OF ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 11)

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that while it had been decided that there would be no fundamental change in the organization of Allied Force Headquarters for the present, the view had been expressed by the War Department that further recommendations in this regard should be submitted in September of this year.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of the above.

10. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION.
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 25)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper stating that, when the Italian institutional question was reopened, it was desirable that the choice between the monarchy and republic should be made by a referendum rather than by a decision of a Constituent Assembly, and attaching a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff reporting this view, suggesting certain action which might be taken to produce a referendum, and requesting guidance.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE said that the paper erred in stating that voters' lists would not be completed till next Spring. Those lists would in fact be completed by mid-November. However, for a number of reasons it was unlikely to be possible to hold a plebiscite before the Spring. He considered that there was no doubt that the solution of the problem by referendum would ensure a more democratic result, as in the present state of Italy it was certain that undemocratic influences would be brought to bear on the members of a Constituent Assembly. If the matter were to be settled by a Constituent Assembly their decision would probably be in favour of a republic. It was, however, quite impossible to predict what the result would be if the matter were settled by plebiscite, as there had been no free expression of opinion in Italy for such a long period.

MR. LUK agreed with the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and considered that a freely held referendum or plebiscite was the only way by which the United States and British governments could carry out the undertakings they had given to the Italian people.

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MR. BROAD also agreed that a referendum was a more desirable method of solution.

MR. ADAM STONE, referring to the draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, said that the reasons for preferring a referendum had not been expressed in sufficient length. With regard to the proposal that the Allies might advise the Italian government to revise the existing decree (which stated that the decision would be made by a Constituent Assembly), he observed that the political liaison officers attached to his headquarters in Rome had advised him that it might be impolitic to ask the Italian government to modify this decree. He had further been advised that the Foreign Office and State Department would not view the rejection of the existing decree with favour as they considered it went some way towards meeting what was required. He therefore tabled an amendment to the proposed telegram to the effect that the decision should be made by a Constituent Assembly but that the decision of that Assembly should be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection by means of a national referendum, and that this procedure should be laid down in a supplementary decree which would in any case be necessary to set up the machinery for the Constituent Assembly.

MR. LEEK observed that this would involve an additional process in deciding the question. Moreover the fact that a proposal had already been agreed by the Constituent Assembly would be likely to affect the free choice of the people at the referendum. He did not believe the State Department's views had yet been clearly determined in the direction suggested by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission. Mr. Kirk thought, therefore, there could be no objection to putting up the original proposal if it were considered desirable.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that, as the object of the cable was to ask for guidance, the two possible methods of solution which had been suggested should be put forward as alternatives.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, agreeing with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, thought that a third possible method of solution should be mentioned. This would be that the Italian government would be required in the peace treaty, or in the negotiations preliminary to the peace treaty, to undertake to settle the matter by referendum.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Deputy Chief of Staff to redraft for his approval, in the light of the above discussion, the cable circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 35, and subsequently to despatch it as amended.

should be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection by means of a national referendum, and that this procedure should be laid down in a supplementary decree which would in any case be necessary to set up the machinery for the Constituent Assembly.

MR. KIRK observed that this would involve an additional process in deciding the question. Moreover the fact that a proposal had already been agreed by the Constituent Assembly would be likely to affect the free choice of the people at the referendum. He did not believe the State Department's views had yet been clearly determined in the direction suggested by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission. Mr. Kirk thought, therefore, there could be no objection to putting up the original proposal if it were considered desirable.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS suggested that, as the object of the cable was to ask for guidance, the two possible methods of solution which had been suggested should be put forward as alternatives.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, agreeing with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, thought that a third possible method of solution should be mentioned. This would be that the Italian government would be required in the peace treaty, or in the negotiations preliminary to the peace treaty, to undertake to settle the matter by referendum.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Deputy Chief of Staff to redraft for his approval, in the light of the above discussion, the cable circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 35, and subsequently to despatch it as amended*.

11. ORDER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. (JPS Study No. P/305 (Final) and Addendum)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a copy of the comments of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, on the paper* which had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff in regard to command in the Mediterranean, together with a draft letter to the British Chiefs of Staff expressing the Supreme Allied Commander's views on the comments raised by Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.

* Despatched as MAP 1043 of 20 July 1945.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, referring to the remark in the JPS paper that the control of shipping in the Mediterranean was now being examined separately, said that this examination by the shipping authorities had now been completed. He therefore read to the conference a revised paragraph in regard to this matter which had been agreed by the shipping authorities.

AIRLIEAL GUNNINGHAM said that he agreed to the paper in general and also to the revised remarks on shipping which had been put forward by the Chief Administrative Officer.

AIR MARSHAL GARRON, referring to the remarks in regard to Balkan countries, thought it should be made clearer that the recommendation was that responsibility for these countries, except Turkey, should remain with AFHQ. Referring to the original British Chiefs of Staff paper, he considered that the Air Headquarters remaining in BALK should be under AEC-in-C, RAP HADGE, when this officer established his Headquarters in BALK.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that as long as there was a Supreme Allied Commander at this Headquarters, all naval and air forces within his theatre would clearly come under his command.

AIRLIEAL GUNNINGHAM, agreeing with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, observed that the whole of this matter had been covered by the Supreme Allied Commander's previous recommendation to the British Chiefs of Staff. Both the naval and Air British Commanders-in-Chief exercised their command over areas larger than the theatre of the Supreme Allied Commander, but that did not affect the paramount authority of the Supreme Allied Commander within that theatre.

BRIGADIER KATZ, referring to Air Marshal Garrod's first point, said that the previous communication to the British Chiefs of Staff had clearly stated the recommendation that GARRON should remain under AFHQ for the present.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the letter circulated under JPS Study No. P/305 (Final), as follows:

- (a) to take account of the amendment proposed by the Chief Administrative Officer at (X) above;
- (b) to emphasize the point made by Air Marshal Garrod at (Y) above in regard to command in

[illegible]

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ALLIED COMMANDER commented that as long as there was a Guyanese Allied Commander at this Headquarters, all travel was to Cordea within his theatre would necessarily come under his command.

ALLIED COMMANDER, agreeing with the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, observed that the whole of this matter had been covered by the Supreme Allied Commander's previous recommendation to the British Chiefs of Staff. Both the naval and air British Commanders-in-Chief exercised their command over areas larger than the theatre of the Supreme Allied Commander, but that did not affect the paramount authority of the Supreme Allied Commander within that theatre.

ASSIGNED TATES, referring to Mr. Norman Garrod's first point, said that the previous communication to the British Chiefs of Staff had clearly stated the recommendation that GALLIE should remain under AFHQ for the present.

Abstract

Instructed the Chief of Staff to review the letter circulated under 325 Study No. P/305 (Final), 30 03,

- (a) to take account of the amendment proposed by the Chief Administrative Officer at 111 above;
- (b) to emphasize the point made by Air Marshal Gaird at 111 above in regard to command in the Balkans.

and subsequently to deposit it.

12. REDUCTION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIAL IN ITALY.
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 36)

The CONFERENCE had before them a paper stating that owing to shortage of personnel, great pressure was being exerted by the Admiralty to reduce naval shore-based commitments in the Mediterranean, and as a result, attaching a programme, to which the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander was requested, for the withdrawal of British Naval Port Parties from ports in Italy.

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ADMIRAL CUMMINGS said that since this paper was written he had become aware that the functions of the United Maritime Authority would be considerably less than had been envisaged. This had a considerable bearing on the transfer to commercial agencies of certain merchant shipping responsibilities. The steps required to put this transfer into effect, with particular reference to the opening of civil communications, were under discussion separately with the shipping interests concerned. However, this only affected the ability of local Italian Port Authorities to take over the running of the port from the Naval authorities to the extent that it would be necessary to look further into the provision of communication facilities. The principal considerations on which the programme of withdrawal of Naval Port Parties had been based remained unchanged, and he therefore requested the approval of this programme by the Supreme Allied Commander.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said there was no military objection to the withdrawal of the Port Parties, provided the programme could be codified if necessary from time to time as circumstances changed. One of the most important functions of Naval Port Parties was however to give sailing instructions to vessels. The shipping authorities requested some clear statement of how these instructions would be given when the Port Parties were withdrawn. The commercial shipping agencies would not be able to function for some time.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS agreed with the Chief Administrative Officer that the commercial agencies were not yet in a position to operate. However, steps must be taken to get back towards that position, as this matter was not a normal Naval responsibility in peacetime. He proposed, therefore, to form a committee to examine this matter with the merchant shipping authorities. The committee would include his Fleet Communications Officer, as the signals aspect appeared of great importance, and he hoped that the Army Chief Signal Officer would be able to give some assistance in regard to the use of Army signal facilities.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON requested that the American and British elements of the Army Movements and Transportation staff should both be represented on this committee.

VICE ADMIRAL GLASSFORD observed that it was proposed, on withdrawal of the Naval Port Parties, that the local representative of the British Ministry of War Transport would become Chairman of the Port Executive Committee, except at LONDON, where it was proposed that this post would be occupied by the representative of the War Shipping Administration. He felt that this arrangement should be extended to HALIFAX and any other ports at which American interests in regard to shipping predominated. He understood that the War Shipping Administration had not been

modified if necessary from time to time as circumstances changed. One of the most important functions of Naval Port Parties was however to give sailing instructions to vessels. The shipping authorities requested some clear statement of how these instructions would be given when the Port Parties were withdrawn. The commercial shipping agencies would not be able to function for some time.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM agreed with the Chief Administrative Officer that the commercial agencies were not yet in a position to operate. However, steps must be taken to get back towards that position, as this matter was not a normal Naval responsibility in peacetime. He proposed, therefore, to form a committee to examine this matter with the merchant shipping authorities. The committee would include his Fleet Communications Officer, as the signals aspect appeared of great importance, and he hoped that the Army Chief Signal Officer would be able to give some assistance in regard to the use of Army signal facilities.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON requested that the American and British elements of the Army Movements and Transportation staff should both be represented on this committee.

VICE ADMIRAL GLASSFORD observed that it was proposed, on withdrawal of the Naval Port Parties, that the local representative of the British Ministry of War Transport would become Chairman of the Port Executive Committee, except at LONDON, where it was proposed that this post would be occupied by the representative of the War Shipping Administration. He felt that this arrangement should be extended to HALIFAX and any other ports at which American interests in regard to shipping predominated. Moreover, he understood that the War Shipping Administration had not been consulted in regard to the arrangements set out in the Paper for the suspension of commercial control of shipping. In this regard they had an interest equal to that of the Ministry of War Transport.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that as the liaison between the Ministry of War Transport and War Shipping Administration representatives had always seemed so close he had regarded them almost as one body, and in consequence the term "Ministry of War Transport" had been used rather loosely in the Paper. However, he would need to look into this matter further, as he was not certain that the powers of the two representatives in the theatre were in fact parallel. In regard to HALIFAX, he pointed out that it was proposed to retain the Naval Port Party there until March 1946, so that the problem of the control of the port after the withdrawal of that Party was not an urgent one.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that the principle whereby Naval officers in charge of ports were automatically Chairman of the Port Executive Committee had been established some two years ago as a war measure, because of the paramount Naval interest in insuring the safety of ships from attack. With the termination of hostilities, this consideration was no longer valid and he considered that it would now be preferable for the local Army Port Commandant to be Chairman of the Port Executive Committee, as 90 percent of the business of these Committees was concerned with discharge of ships and similar matters which were an Army responsibility. It was the opinion of both British and American Army staffs that business of this nature could be more efficiently carried out under control of an Army officer.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said he could not agree to this proposal of the Chief Administrative Officer. As long as a Naval Officer-in-Charge remained at a port he should remain Chairman of the Port Executive Committee. This principle had been thrashed out in regard to ASFERS and established after reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, in many ports the Army cargoes handled were small in proportion to UNRRA and commercial supplies.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that, in general, ports at which the Army cargoes were small were scheduled for handing back in time to Italian authorities. At these ports, therefore, the Port Executive Committee would be abolished and the question of Chairmanship of it would not arise. He maintained his view that an Army Chairman was desirable at other ports, but in view of the opposition of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to this proposal, he had no option but to drop it.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- a. Approved in principle the programme of withdrawal of Naval Port Parties from the Italian ports circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 36, subject to such minor modifications as might from time to time become necessary.
- b. Directed that the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, investigate further, in conjunction with the merchant shipping authorities, the methods by which communication facilities necessary for the routing of ships could be provided when the Naval Port Parties withdraw, and invited him to include both British and American officers of the Army Movements staff and a representative of the Army Chief Signal Officer on any committee which he might form for this purpose.

and established after reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, in many ports the Army cargoes handled were small in proportion to UNRRA and commercial supplies.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that, in general, ports at which the Army cargoes were small were scheduled for heading back in time to Italian authorities. At these ports, however, the Port Executive Committee would be abolished and the question of Chairmanship of it would not arise. He maintained his view that an Army Chairman was desirable at other ports, but in view of the opposition of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to this proposal, he had no option but to drop it.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- a. Approved in principle the programme of withdrawal of Naval Port Parties from the Italian ports circulated under Paper No. SAC (F) (45) 34, subject to such minor modifications as might from time to time become necessary.
- b. Directed that the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, investigate further, in conjunction with the merchant shipping authorities, the methods by which communication facilities necessary for the routing of ships could be provided when the Naval Port Parties withdraw, and invited him to include both British and American officers of the Army Movements staff and a representative of the Army Chief Signal Officer on any committee which he might form for this purpose.
- c. Invited the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in conjunction with Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters, to investigate further the functions which should be exercised respectively by the representatives of the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration when the Port Parties had withdrawn, having regard to the remarks of Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters at (2) above.

13. APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL CONFERENCES.

MAJOR GENERAL LEUNITZER stated that, in view of the cessation of hostilities, and the consequent reduction in the number of matters which required consideration by the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Operational), he recommended that the distinction between the Operational and Political conferences should be discontinued and that

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Future attendance at all meetings should be substantially as at the present meeting.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Secretary to arrange for the termination of the distinction between Operational and Political conferences.

12. ASSOCIATION FOR CONTINUANCE OF AMILO-AMERICAN COOPERATION.
(Previous reference SAC (G) (45) 11th Meeting, Minute 9)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON stated that he had despatched signals to General Clark, Lieutenant General McGrouy, Lieutenant General Truscott and Lieutenant General Harding, requesting their views on the formation of an association to perpetuate the spirit and principle of Allied cooperation developed in the Combined Commands, as had been suggested by SCHAF. It was his intention to call a meeting of representatives of these Commanders at Headquarters, 5th Army, on or about 30th July for the purpose of discussing SCHAF's proposals, and he accordingly invited the commands of the British and American Naval and Air Force Commanders-in-Chief in this connection.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of the above.

J. G. S. ELLMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
COMNAVWIL
Commander-in-Chief, RAP MARE
Commanding General, J.F.P./ATO
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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Commanders at Headquarters, 5th Army, on or about 30th July for the purpose of discussing SCHAF's proposals, and he accordingly invited the members of the British and American Naval and Air Force Commanders-in-Chief in this connection.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of the above.

J. G. S. BETHAM,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- COMNAVSTA
- Commander-in-Chief, RAF MIDE
- Commanding General, LAF/MTO
- Chief of Staff
- Chief Administrative Officer
- Deputy Chief of Staff
- Deputy Chief Administrative Officer
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
- Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
- Assistant Chief of Staff, British
- Chief of Staff, MTOUSA
- U. S. Political Adviser
- British Resident Minister
- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
- Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
- Chief, Liaison Section
- Director, PEB
- Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee, GHO, MDE
- Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
- Sparks

EXTRACTS

- Chief Signals Officer
- Ministry of War Transport, Mediterranean Representative
- War Shipping Administration, Mediterranean Representative

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting
17 July 1945

~~Confidential~~
COPY NO. 35

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JUL 18 1945

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 19TH JULY 1945

SECRET

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting) - already circulated
2. THE ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 35 - already circulated) - 256 pth 218/46
3. COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
(JFS Study No. P/305 (Final) and P/305 (Addendum) - already circulated on limited distribution) - MX
4. REDUCTION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 36 - circulated herewith) - 162 pth 218/46

cc II 155 - 18 July 45

34 Chief Commr

35 Exec Commr

36 Political Advisers

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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2. THE ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
(Paper No. SAC (I) (45) 35 - already circulated)

3. COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
(JPS Study No. P/305 (Final) and 2/305 (Addendum) - already circulated on limited distribution)

4. REMUNERATION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 36 - circulated herewith)

EC 11-18 July 45

34 Comm Comm
35 Exec Comm
36 Parliamentary Advisers

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAP
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)

Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAP
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PWs
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

X 202

27 June 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL) and (POLITICAL)

JUN 29 1945

There will be no formal meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) or (Operational) on Thursday 28th June 1945.

Kyle T. Henderson
for Colonel, G.S.C., Secretary

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
U. S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister

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DISCUSSION

Commanding General, 1st Army Group

Chief of Staff

Chief Administrative Officer at

Deputy Chief of Staff

ASSEMBLY

1000

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Assistant Chief of Staff (AS)

Gilder, Liaison Section

Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ 101st Airborne Division

J. C. TOWELL

[illegible]

1000

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Secretary, Founders-In-Chief Committee, CHLMP

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34 Chief Cook

36 EXEC CommX

34 Personal Accounts

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (L5) 15th Meeting
18th June 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JUN 21 1945

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1430 HOURS ON MONDAY, 18TH JUNE 1945.

PRESENT:-

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF

Vice Admiral W. A. Glasford,
Commander United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Major General J. M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General L. L. Lechnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Office, representing
U. S. Political Adviser

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph I. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAP

Vice Admiral W. A. Glassford,
Commander United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Major General J. V. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General L. L. Lennitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Giffie, representing
U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellory W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Major General T. S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Horle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Colonel J. S. Jackling, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Major General Otto L. Nelson,
Deputy Theatre Commander, MOCUSA

Brigadier Nicholson,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

Lt. Colonel H. E. Ehrlich, representing
Chief, INC Section, AFHQ (for item 10)

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Secretary:-

Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting) (34)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 7 June 1945.

2. ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 2) (30)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON reported that no reply had been received to the signal inferring the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the proposal to establish Italian Production Advisory Boards.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

REMARKS TO CHIEF

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 3) (35)

Extract in 501/c

Secretary:-

Major Robert T. Hanley

MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting) (23)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 7 June 1945.

ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 2) (18)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON reported that no reply had been received to the signal informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the proposal to establish Italian Production Advisory Boards.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

PAYMENTS TO GIMAI

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 3) (23)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander stated that all arrangements for final payment of 160,000,000 lire to the GIMAI to discharge existing obligations had been completed. It was expected that this sum would be turned over shortly.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM S.D.R. AND VIS

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 4) (23) (145)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that in reply to a signal informing Marshal Tito of his (Supreme Allied Commander's) intention to evacuate the remainder of the supplies from S.D.R. and VIS, Marshal Tito had requested that certain stores, including petrol, should be left for the Jugoslavs.

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MAJOR GENERAL LEWITZER reported that a signal had recently been dispatched to Marshal Tito informing him that the matter of stores which would be left for his use was under consideration. It further stated that detachments would arrive at Z.D.M. and VIS on 27 June for the purpose of effecting the evacuation.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITZER expressed the opinion that it would be unwise to delay the withdrawal later than 27 June inasmuch as landing craft might not be available for that purpose after that date.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

a. Directed the Chief of Staff to hold in abeyance decision as to what stores would be left on Z.D.M. and VIS for the use of the Yugoslavs, pending outcome of conferences now taking place between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and the Chief of Staff to Marshal Tito.

b. Directed the Chief Administrative Officer to order that the withdrawal of stores from Z.D.M. and VIS commence on 27 June 1945.

5. OCCUPATION OF POL.

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITZER reported that in accordance with the agreement signed by Marshal Tito in BELGRADE on 9 June 1945, occupational forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander had arrived in POL. on Saturday, 16 June. These forces had traveled to POL. by overland route.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITZER expressed concern over the approved final boundary of the POL. enclave inasmuch as the only suitable beach which was immediately useable for landing craft to insure delivery of supplies by sea without interference had been excluded from POL. territory.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

6. POLICY IN REGARD TO VEREEL GIBLL.

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITZER outlined the developments which had taken place during the past week. He stated that information had just been received in-

of Staff to Marshal Tito.

- b. Directed the Chief Administrative Officer to order that the withdrawal of stores from ZILIR and VIG commence on 27 June 1945.

5. OCCUPATION OF POLA

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL LAMBERTER reported that in accordance with the agreement signed by Marshal Tito in BELGRADE on 9 June 1945, occupational forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander had arrived in POLA on Saturday, 16 June. These forces had traveled to POLA by overland route.

MAJOR GENERAL LAMBERTER expressed concern over the approved final boundary of the POLA enclave inasmuch as the only suitable beach which was immediately usable for landing craft to insure delivery of supplies by sea without interference had been excluded from the territory.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

6. POLA IN REGARD TO VENETIAN GROUND

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, Minute 6)

MAJOR GENERAL LAMBERTER outlined the developments which had taken place during the past week. He stated that information had just been received indicating that negotiations for the signing of an agreement between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and the Chief of Staff to Marshal Tito had recently broken down owing to differences in regard to civil administration. It was indicated, however, that negotiations would reopen within a day or two. In accordance with the Belgrade agreement almost all Yugoslav forces with the exception of a few detachments had moved to the East side of the HUNGARIAN LINE.

MAJOR GENERAL STONE reported that a serious labor situation had recently developed in TRIESTE as a result of Yugoslav failure to pay liborers an agreed wage of 400 lire per day. It was likely that a politically-inspired strike would take place in TRIESTE in the near future. He considered that the fuel was too high and would require revision by U.S. authorities. He stated he had sent representatives to TRIESTE to look into the situation.

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Excerpt in 522/22

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

7. SITUATION OF FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th meeting, minute 7) (24)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWINTER reported that under the terms of an agreement signed at Allied Force Headquarters on 11 June, all French forces in Northwest Italy would be withdrawn to the east side of the 1939 Franco-Italian frontier by 10 July. Information had been received that withdrawal had already commenced in the VAL D'AOSTA area.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

8. ENTRY OF FILM REPRESENTATIVES INTO ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th meeting, minute 8) (24)

MR. DANIEL STONE reported that the question of entry of film representatives into Italy had been fully examined and had been forwarded with the recommendation that PAB turn over responsibility for distribution of films to private agencies effective 1 August 1945.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Secretary to bring forward the report by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, for consideration at the next meeting.

See 248

9. PUBLICITY IN REGARD TO ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT AREA IN ITALY AND GERMANY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th meeting, minute 9) (24)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWINTER reported that a representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, had recently returned from STYRIA and CARINTHIA after conducting an examination into the conditions in those provinces. The report had been most favorable and had accordingly been referred to the Director, PAB, and Chief, IAC, for counter-propaganda purposes and for information of correspondents. However, since Yugoslav and Russian propaganda had ceased it was recommended that counter-propaganda measures be deferred for the present.

MR. BLANCH stated that since Russian and Yugoslav propaganda in regard to this territory had ceased he recommended that publication of information

8. ENTRY OF FILM REPRESENTATIVES INTO ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th meeting, Minute 8)

MR. ADAM STONE reported that the question of entry of film representatives into ITALY had been fully examined and had been forwarded with the recommendation that PIA turn over responsibility for distribution of films to private agencies effective 1 August 1945.

THE CHIEF, ALLIED COMMISSIONER:

See 105

Instructed the Secretary to bring forward the report by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, for consideration at the next meeting.

9. PUBLICITY IN REGARD TO ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT AREA IN SYRIA

MR. GARNETT

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 14th meeting, Minute 9)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS reported that a representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, had recently returned from SYRIA and GARNETT after conducting an examination into AMG conditions in those provinces. The report had been most favorable and had accordingly been referred to the Director, PIA, and Chief, INC, for counter-propaganda purposes and for information of correspondents. However, since Yugoslav and Russian propaganda had ceased it was recommended that counter-propaganda measures be deferred for the present.

MR. BATES stated that since Russian and Yugoslav propaganda in regard to this territory had ceased he recommended that publication of information contained in the report be held up inasmuch as he considered that its release at this time would be liable to prejudice negotiations now being conducted with the Yugoslavs at Headquarters, XIII Corps, but he believed that correspondents should be allowed to see the conditions in those provinces and to write such stories as they desired.

THE CHIEF, ALLIED COMMISSIONER:

a. Approved the action by Director, PIA, in regard to withholding counter-propaganda and publication of the information contained in the report on SYRIA and GARNETT.

b. Approved action by Chief, INC, in permitting correspondents to write such stories on AMG activities in those provinces as they desired.

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- c. Confirmed the decision taken at SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting, minute 9, in that a factual report of JAG in STRIKE and C.R.I.T.I.C. should be issued to the press at such time as Russian and Yugoslav propaganda in regard to the area might recede.

10. TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PRESS AND RADIO NEWS FROM PAB TO ITALY

(Previous reference Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 32) — Four 407 14 3 516 24/52

THE COMMISSION had before them a paper recommending that transfer of responsibility for the distribution of press and radio news from PAB to private news agencies should take place on 1 July 1945.

MR. JAMES L. SPENCER stated that the Technical Sub-Committee appointed by him to investigate a date for the cessation of PAB had recommended 1 July provided that three radio frequencies now being used by PAB should be made available to Ital-Cable for their use in Northern Italy. Recently, however, he had been informed that private news agencies had been unable to complete negotiation of contracts as soon as anticipated and a new target date of 15 July was therefore more desirable.

MR. BARNES stated that he could see no reason why these frequencies could not be made available to the Italian agencies inasmuch as PAB had offered its transmitters in RAB to the Italians on a loan basis.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL CONSIDER:

- a. Directed the Chief of Staff to investigate the allotment of the three frequencies now held by PAB to Ital-Cable and to submit to him a report of his investigation.
- b. Directed the Chief of Staff to give appropriate orders for the hand-over of responsibility for distribution of press and radio news from PAB to private news agencies effective 15 July 1945.

11. REORGANIZATION OF PAB

(JRS Study No. P/298 (Final))
(JRS Study No. P/301 (Final))

THE COMMISSION had before them a paper examining the current arrangements which would be required in future in the Mediterranean Theater and recommending the adjustments which would be necessary in the organization of Allied Forces Headquarters and its relationship with other Naval, Army and Air Force Headquarters.

Exempt a 026/50. Copy to R. B. and
to Bureau S/C of June 1945. Jk

to be used for their use in northern Italy. Recently, however, he had been informed that private news agencies had been unable to complete negotiation of contracts as soon as anticipated and a new target date of 15 July was therefore more desirable.

MR. BARNES stated that he could see no reason why these frequencies could not be made available to the Italian agencies inasmuch as FCB had offered its transmitters in ROZ to the Italians on a loan basis.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

a. Directed the Chief of Staff to investigate the allotment of the three frequencies now held by FCB to Ital-Cable and to submit to him a report of his investigation.

b. Directed the Chief of Staff to give appropriate orders for the hand-over of responsibility for distribution of press and radio news from FCB to private news agencies effective 15 July 1945.

See 200

11. EXERCISES OF FCB

{ JPS Study No. P/298 (Final) }
{ JPS Study No. P/301 (Final) }

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the command arrangements which would be required in future in the Mediterranean Theater and recommending the adjustments which would be necessary in the organization of Allied Force Headquarters and its relationship with other Naval, Army and Air Force Headquarters.

In addition, the Conference had before them a second paper examining the command requirements in the Mediterranean Theater based on the assumption that the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander would continue.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER considered that the question was one of principle and not of detail. He believed that for some time to come the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander must be continued inasmuch as it was not feasible to entirely divide British and United States responsibilities in this Theater. He believed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would desire continuation of the appointment in view of Allied commitments in Italy, but he believed that integration need only be continued in those staff sections dealing with common-user items; otherwise the present Allied Force Headquarters could be divided into separate British and American headquarters and effect a savings in personnel wherever possible.

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THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER stated that his views in regard to the future of Allied Force Headquarters differed considerably from those of the Supreme Allied Commander and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. He was in agreement with the recommendation that the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander should continue, but he considered that any fundamental changes in the present Allied Force Headquarters organization were inadvisable. He saw no merit to the suggestion that the Chief of Staff should become the Commander of British Forces. Assuming that the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander would continue to be held by a British officer, he believed it was consistent that he should also be the Commander of British Army Forces similar to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander who was the Commander of the United States Army Forces. He was not in sympathy with the suggestion that the appointment of Chief Administrative Officer should be discontinued and that administrative problems should be dealt with by a new Deputy Chief of Staff (Administrative). Such an appointment would have less authority than the present Chief Administrative Officer. With the result that upon detail concerning finance, UNRRA, coal, and Allied Commission would ultimately have to be referred to the Chief of Staff for decision, whereas the Chief Administrative Officer now relieves him of many of these details. Thirdly, he considered that the Deputy Chief of Staff (Administrative) should not be confined to dealing with army problems, since many of the matters requiring decision would necessarily be of an inter-service nature.

GENERAL McNAMARA expressed general agreement with the views of the Chief Administrative Officer, but he considered that an examination should be conducted into the current channels which would exist in the Theater at such time as the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander should be abolished. He had tentatively set 1 December as the date on which Headquarters AFHQ would be dissolved, at which time the European Theater of Operations would be in command of American forces in this Theater. He considered that any reduction of Allied Force Headquarters was impracticable and, therefore, a totally new machinery should be set up to replace it. He stated that SLAF was being dissolved in a few days' time as he could see no justification under those circumstances for the prolonged existence of Allied Force Headquarters. There were, however, two objections to the abolition of an Allied Command - firstly, the fact that the 10th U.S. Mountain Division would be under command of All British Corps and, secondly, the integrated nature of the Allied Commission.

GENERAL GUNNINGHAM considered that even though the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander might be abolished, some sort of Allied Command machinery would have to be substituted. This could take the form of a Commanders-in-Chief Committee similar to that adopted in Moscow. It would be necessary, for example, for the United States Headquarters European Theater of Operations to have a connection with the British Headquarters in Italy at such time as Headquarters AFHQ is dissolved.

of Staff for decision, whereas the Chief Administrative Officer now relieves him of many of these details. Thirdly, he considered that the Deputy Chief of Staff (Administrative) should not be confined to dealing with day problems, since many of the matters requiring decision would necessarily be of an inter-service nature.

GENERAL SMITH expressed general agreement with the views of the Chief Administrative Officer, but he considered that an examination should be conducted into the command channels which would exist in the Theater at such time as the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander should be abolished. He had tentatively set 1 December as the date on which Headquarters AFHQ would be dissolved, at which time the European Theater of Operations would be in command of American forces in this Theater. He considered that any reduction of Allied Force Headquarters was impracticable and, therefore, a totally new machinery should be set up to replace it. He stated that SHARP was being dissolved in a few days' time and he could see no justification under these circumstances for the prolonged existence of Allied Force Headquarters. There were, however, two objections to the abolition of an Allied Command - firstly, the fact that the 10th U.S. Mountain Division would be under command of Hill British Corps and, secondly, the integrated nature of the Allied Command.

ALLIED COMMAND considered that even though the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander might be abolished, some sort of Allied Command machinery would have to be substituted. This could take the form of a Commanders-in-Chief position similar to that adopted in HICOG. It would be necessary, for example, for the United States Headquarters European Theater of Operations to have a connection with the British Headquarters in Italy at such time as Headquarters AFHQ is dissolved.

ALLIED COMMAND considered that no alterations should take place in the fundamental organization of Allied Force Headquarters as long as there was a Supreme Allied Commander. He believed that savings in personnel could be effected on a gradual basis and suggested that plans should be made at this time for the form of command to be adopted when, and if, the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander is abolished.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

Directed the Chief of Staff to examine urgently all alternatives for command machinery which might be set up in the Mediterranean Theater on the assumption that the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander is abolished, and submit to 139 him a report of his examination.

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12.

ATTACHMENT OF MEMORANDUMS FROM HONORABLE MEMBERS

(Paper No. SLS (E) (45) 30) — 21/11/60

THE COMMISSIONER had before him the record of a meeting between the Chief of Staff and a representative of the Chief of the French General Staff of National Defense which resulted in the agreement that French forces would withdraw by 10 July to the west side of the 1959 Franco-Italian frontier.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Approved the decisions taken by the Chief of Staff in
Paper No. SLS (E) (45) 30.

Robert T. Haden
J. E. BASTION, J.E.D.
Colonel, G.S.C., Major
Secretary to S.C.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, M.E.P.
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces West Coast
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff

Chief Administrative Officer

Deputy Chief of Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)

Chief, Liaison Section

Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ M.E.P.

U.S. Political Adviser

British Resident Minister

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 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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 Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
 Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
 Commanding General, 15th Army Group
 Chief of Staff
 Chief Administrative Officer
 Deputy Chief of Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
 Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
 Chief, Liaison Section
 Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ JMW
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 British Resident Minister
 Director, PMF
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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting
15 June 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)
JUN 16 1945

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE 6-3 A.B.
ROOM AT 1430 HOURS ON MONDAY 18TH JUNE 1945

A L L I E D F O R C E S

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 14th Meeting - already circulated)
2. DISSOLUTION OF PAB IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 31 - to be circulated) 237 file 218
3. REORGANIZATION OF AFHQ
(JPS Study No. P/298 (Final) - already circulated)
4. NOTE ON REORGANIZATION OF AFHQ
(JPS Study No. P/301 (Final) - to be circulated)

TO T.A.L. NOTE ONLY:-

5. WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH FORCES FROM NORTHWEST ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 30 - already circulated) 232 file 218

NOTE:

Chief, IHC, is invited to attend for item 2.

737

Frank T. Stanley
J. E. HASTON, JR.,
COLONEL, C.S.C.

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) Lath Meeting - already circulated)
2. DISCUSSION OF PMS IN ITALY
(Paper No. 242 (P) (45) 31 - to be circulated)
3. REORGANIZATION OF JPHQ
(JPS Study No. P/208 (Final) - already circulated)
4. NOTE ON REORGANIZATION OF JPHQ
(JPS Study No. P/301 (Final) - to be circulated)
5. WITHDRAWAL OF FRENCH FORCES FROM NORTHWEST ITALY
(Paper No. 242 (P) (45) 30 - already circulated)

TO READ NOTE ONLY:-

NOTE:

Chief, INC, is invited to attend for Item 2.

737
Robert T. Heston, Jr.
 COLONEL, U.S.C.
 SECRETARY

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

12th June 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(ADDITIONAL)

There will be no formal meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) on Thursday 14th June 1945. A meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Operational) will be held, agenda for which is issued separately.

Robert T. Hanning
Major
J. E. BARTON, JR.,
Colonel, E.S.C.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

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Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	15-16
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Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Operational) will be held, agenda, for which is issued separately.

Robert T. Harbo
for J. E. RUSSELL, Jr., Major
Colonel, U.S.C.
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

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Assistant Chief of Staff (Ar)	20
Chief, Liaison Section	21
Director of Operations and Intelligence, S. MACV	22-26
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Director, JMA	34
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	35-37
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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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1000 (2) (4) 14th meeting
17th June 1945

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SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

1945

July

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3, AIR HQ, AT 1030
HOURS ON MONDAY 7TH JUNE 1945

PRESENT:-

General Joseph E. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Vice Marshal E. A. Baker, representing
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, AAF

Rear Admiral J. A. Lewis, representing
Commander United States Naval Forces & Western African Waters

Major General J. M. Evans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General A. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AAF

Mr. E. Office, representing
U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General James L. Lewis

EC 11117 - 9 June 45

35 Chief Clerk

36 Exec Clerk

37 Political Advisers

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THE FOLLOWING ARE ALSO PRESENT:-

Sir Desmond Morton,
Personal Assistant to Prime Minister

Brigadier J. G. Nicholson,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Air Commodore J. H. Edwards-Jones,
Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence, MAP

Brigadier General A. J. Lockhart,
Chief, INL Section, AFHQ

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

Brigadier W. M. Jeffries,
Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

Colonel G. L. Lang,
C-3 Special Operations Section

Colonel J. E. Bastian, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

(See Item 3)

Secretariat:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Swettenham
Major Robert F. Hailey

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting)

THE COMMANDER APPROVED THE MINUTES OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 31 MAY 1945.

2. ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 6)

THE ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD, in accordance with instructions given him at the last meeting, he has redrafted the telegram informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the proposal to establish Italian Production Advisory Boards. After the necessary consultations had been obtained the telegram had been dispatched.

3. THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

4. REPORTS TO CHIEF

Colonel J. W. Hession, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Secretariat:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Swanton
and/or Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (43) 13th Meeting)

THE COMBATANT APPROVED THE MINUTES OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 31 MAY 1945.

2. ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD
(Previous reference SAC (P) (43) 13th Meeting, Minute 5)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SWANTON reported that in accordance with instructions given him at the last meeting, he had redrafted the telegram informing the Chief of Staff of the proposals to establish Italian Production Advisory Boards. After the necessary consultations had been obtained the telegram had been dispatched.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

MINUTE 20 CIVIL
(Previous reference SAC (P) (43) 13th Meeting, Minute 2)

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER reported that an examination of the statement submitted by Signor Longhi, revealed that one further payment of 160,000,000 lire should be made to the Civil. Signor Longhi accepted that this payment would cover all outstanding obligations. Rear Admiral Stenhouse accordingly attached the Italian Prime Minister to request that these funds be made available and the latter had agreed.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

a. He stated that one final payment of 160,000,000 lire should be made from Allied funds to the Civil to discharge existing obligations.

MIN 707 of 5 June 1945.

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- b. Instructed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to ensure the reimbursement of the allies, to this amount, by the Italian Government.

4. ATTACHMENT 12 OF ALLIED FORCES HQ, LONDON AND VRS
(JPS Study No. 17/297 (Final))

THE COMMISSIONER had before them, in accordance with directions at S/C (2) (45) 13th Meeting, Minute 3 E., a draft telegram to Marshal Tito informing him of the Supreme Allied Commander's intentions in regard to the evacuation of LADAN and VRS.

THE DRAFT TELEGRAM ALLIED COMMISSION:

Approved the draft cable circulated under JPS Study No. 17/297 (Final) and instructed the Chief of Staff to dispatch it.

5. CONSIDERATION OF PCL
(JPS Study No. 17/295 (Final))

THE COMMISSIONER had before them a paper making recommendations as to the forces and area which would be required in the vicinity of PCL in order to establish Allied Military Government in that territory.

MR. TAILOR, COMMISSIONER, referring to the recommendation that maintenance of the occupational forces in PCL should be by sea, stated that in view of obligations elsewhere and the shortage of ships, he considered in operating PCL, as an isolated port was an unlikely one. He considered moreover that by the time PCL was required, there would be no landing craft available in the theater, although it would be possible to dispatch ships by lighter. He considered therefore that unless relieved should not be based on maintenance of our forces in PCL by sea and that maintenance by land should be secured as an alternative.

MR. TAILOR, COMMISSIONER, stated that from an administrative point of view a land L of C would be more economical, provided operational considerations permitted maintenance by land.

MR. TAILOR, COMMISSIONER, expressed the view that while initially the forces might be maintained by road, the L of C should be opened and supply should eventually be maintained by sea, in as much as this would obviate the possibility of air attacks which would be likely on land routes passing through territory not under L of C.

MR. TAILOR, COMMISSIONER, stated that the occupational force should be British or American, but not mixed as recommended in the JPS study. He believed, moreover, that a force in the order of two Brigades Groups was unnecessary.

Classified in 5/22/82

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-1
(JCS Study No. 1/295 (Final))

THE COMBATANT had before him a paper asking recommendations as to the forces and area which would be required in the vicinity of KML in order to establish a fixed military base in that territory.

AD JCS, WASHINGTON, referring to the recommendation that maintenance of the occupational forces in KML should be by sea, stated that in view of obligations elsewhere and the shortage of personnel, he considered it inoperable to maintain a fixed base in KML. He considered, however, that the maintenance of a fixed base in KML was required, there would be no landing craft available in the vicinity, and it would be possible to disembark troops by lighter. He concluded that before an undue reliance should not be placed on the assistance of the forces in KML, by sea and that the point of entry by land should be secured as an alternative.

AD JCS, WASHINGTON, stated that he was from an administrative point of view a land force would be most convenient, provided operational considerations permitted maintenance of a fixed base in KML.

COMBATANT, in reply, expressed the view that while initially the forces might be maintained by land, this should be changed and supply should eventually be maintained by sea. In so doing as this would obviate the possibility of interference with the land route passing through territory not under control.

AD JCS, WASHINGTON, stated that the occupational force should be maintained by sea, but not maintained in the JCS study. He believed, however, that a force in KML of two brigades would be unnecessary. The cost of maintaining a force in KML would be to send a brigade of 15,000. In reply to a question of the JCS, AD JCS, WASHINGTON, stated that it might be advisable to maintain a force in KML, but he agreed that it was not necessary to maintain a force in KML, as had been done at KML, but this decision could be left to the discretion of local commanders.

GENERAL, in reply, expressed the view that in time and occupation of KML, the occupational force should be maintained by sea. He stated that the occupational force should be maintained by sea, but not maintained in the JCS study. He believed, however, that a force in KML of two brigades would be unnecessary. The cost of maintaining a force in KML would be to send a brigade of 15,000. In reply to a question of the JCS, AD JCS, WASHINGTON, stated that it might be advisable to maintain a force in KML, but he agreed that it was not necessary to maintain a force in KML, as had been done at KML, but this decision could be left to the discretion of local commanders.

Dispatched as RA-87762 of 5 June 1945. (SEC OUT 1153)

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THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

Directed that the Chief of Staff should instruct Commanding General, 15th Army Group to make preparation for the occupation of POFA by overland movement and the establishment of Allied Military Government in the area immediately around that port, and should at the same time suggest to 15th Army Group that it was considered at AFHQ that an occupational force of the order of a Brigade group should be adequate for this task. See para 223

6. POLICY IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

(JPS Study No. 7/296 (Final))

(Paper No. 346 P (45) 29)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper suggesting policies in regard to a number of points which had been raised by Eighth Army with regard to Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA, together with a second paper containing decisions reached in regard to these matters at a meeting which had been held by the Chief of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER referring to a recommendation that force could be used to prevent the Yugoslav Army from removing heavy plant, motor vehicles and other equipment at the time of its withdrawal from AMG territory, said that he thought this instruction was much too broadly worded. He considered that under no circumstances should Eighth Army make any general application of force without prior reference to this Headquarters. His present directive from the President of the United States made it quite clear that force could not be generally employed. An incident involving the use of force after signature of the agreement by Marshal TITO would, GENERAL McNAMARA considered, be most unfortunate.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON expressed the view that it was unlikely that the Yugoslavs would begin wholesale looting at the time of their withdrawal since they would not have the transport to undertake removal of goods and equipment on any scale.

SIR DENISON MORTON reported that he was authorized to say that the British Government did not view the use of force with alarm, although any unnecessary use of force would of course, be deplored.

ADMIRAL CONNORWAY stated that he was under instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander to prevent the unauthorized removal by the Yugoslavs of Naval supplies or equipment from the Port of TRIESTE by force if necessary. He had issued instructions to the Naval Commander in TRIESTE accordingly.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

A. Directed that:

1. The policy in regard to the use of force by 15 Army Group against Yugoslavs should be in accordance with the remarks at X above.

force could be used to prevent the Yugoslav Army from removing heavy plant, motor vehicles and other equipment at the time of its withdrawal from AMG territory, said that he thought this instruction was much too broadly worded. He considered that under no circumstances should Eighth Army make any general application of force without prior reference to their Headquarters. His present directive from the President of the United States made it quite clear that force could not be generally employed. A. Incident involving the use of force after signature of the agreement by Marshal TITO would, ESSENTIAL Navy/Army considered, be most unfortunate.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORTON expressed the view that it was unlikely that the Yugoslavs would begin wholesale looting at the time of their withdrawal since they would not have the transport to undertake removal of goods and equipment on any scale.

AIR DESPATCH MORTON reported that he was authorized to say that the British Government did not view the use of force with alarm, although any unnecessary use of force would of course, be deplored.

AMIRAL COMMINGHAM stated that he was under instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander to prevent the unauthorized removal by the Yugoslavs of Naval supplies or equipment from the Port of THURSO by force if necessary. He had issued instructions to the Naval Commander in THURSO accordingly.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

2. Directed that:

1. The policy in regard to the use of force by 15 Army Group against Yugoslavs should be in accordance with the remarks at X above.
2. The policy in this respect stated at para 2 b of Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 25 in reference to para 3 b of JPS Study No. P/196 (Final), should be regarded as cancelled.
- b. Instructed the Chief of Staff to issue orders to 15 Army Group accordingly.
- c. Confirmed that the existing instructions, issued to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, in regard to the use of force by naval forces to prevent the removal of essential port equipment from THURSO, remained unaltered.

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7. SITUATION ON FRANKO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
(Previous reference S.C. (F) (45) 13th Meeting, Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMBITZER reported that two recent communications received from GENERAL DOYEN indicated a complete change in French policy in regard to Northwest Italy. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had been informed, and since the 15th Army Group had been instructed to maintain their present position.

THE DEPUTY SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER stated that he had been informed that the UNITED STATES had sent a very strong note to the French Government indicating that the people of the UNITED STATES would be most shocked in the event that the French used American weapons, which they had been given by the American Government, against soldiers of the UNITED STATES. A personal message had also been sent from President TRUMAN to GENERAL DE GAULLE stating that unless French forces withdrew immediately from Northwest Italy all supplies to the French forces, with the exception of rations, would be stopped.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of the above reports.

8. ENTRY OF FILM REPRESENTATIVES INTO ITALY.

(Previous reference S.C. (F) (45) 8th Meeting - Minute 4)

MAJOR GENERAL STONE reported that he had examined the question of entry of film representatives into ITALY in accordance with directions at SIC (F) (45) 8th Meeting - Minute 4 b, and that a full report with recommendations has just been forwarded to the Secretary.

THE DEPUTY SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Secretary to bring forward the report from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, for consideration at the next meeting.

9. PUBLICITY IN REGARD TO MIGRANTS OF SERBS AND CROATIA

MAJOR GENERAL LEMBITZER stated that the Russian and Yugoslav press and radio had recently been directing a full scale propaganda campaign against Allied treatment of Slovanes in the Provinces of STYRIA and CARINTHIA. To date no official notice has been taken of this unfavorable attitude but he considered that the time had now come to combat propaganda through the press and PWS.

MAJ. BARNES outlined the course he considered should be adopted. He suggested an official and factual AFHQ report should be released through press and radio channels describing in detail the activities of MIG in that territory. He considered that this release should be given worldwide distribution.

Took note of the above reported.

8. ENTRY OF FILM REPRESENTATIVES INTO ITALY.

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 8th Meeting - Minute 4)

REAR LIAISON STAFF reported that he had examined the question of entry of film representatives into ITALY in accordance with directions at SAC (P) (45) 8th Meeting - Minute 4 B, and that a full report with recommendations has just been forwarded to the Secretary.

THE DEPUTY SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Secretary to bring forward the report from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, for consideration at the next meeting.

9. PUBLICITY IN REGARD TO THE AREAS OF STIRIA AND CARINTHIA

MAJOR CAROL LUMPTER stated that the Russian and Yugoslav press and radio had recently been directing a full scale propaganda campaign against Allied treatment of Slovenes in the Provinces of STIRIA and CARINTHIA. It was no official notice has been taken of this unfavorable attitude but he considered that the time had now come to combat propaganda through the press and PWB.

MR. BERNES outlined the course he considered should be adopted. He suggested an official and factual AFHQ report should be released through press and radio channels describing in detail the activities of IMV in that territory. He considered that this release should be given worldwide distribution and special local dissemination in STIRIA and CARINTHIA. He also believed that visits of war correspondents to those provinces should be arranged.

MR. OTTIE suggested that a statement by the SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER to the effect that he had personally visited the areas would be beneficial.

THE DEPUTY SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Chief of Staff to obtain a full report from GOC-in-C Eighth Army in regard Allied Military Government in STIRIA and CARINTHIA, and on that basis to prepare a factual report for issue as a press release and for dissemination by PWB methods.

J. G. SMITH,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MEAP
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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 13th Meeting
5 June 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 7TH JUNE 1945

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 13th Meeting - already circulated)
2. STATEMENTS TO CINAI
(Oral statement by Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission)
3. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM CADAR AND VIS
(AFS Study No. P/297 (Final) - already circulated)
4. OCCUPATION OF POLA
(AFS Study No. P/295 (Final) - already circulated)

BY THIS NOTE ONLY:-

5. POLICY IN REGARD TO VENETIA GIULIA
(AFS Study No. P/296 (Final) - already circulated
Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 29 - already circulated)
6. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
(AFS Study No. MAP 1002 (AC OUT 1277, 4 June)

J. G. S. S. S.
J. G. S. S. S.,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 13th Meeting - already circulated)
2. PRESENTS TO CHIEF
(Oral statement by Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission)
3. MEMORANDUM OF ALLIED FORCES FROM CADAR AND VIS
(JPS Study No. P/297 (Final) - already circulated)
4. CORRUPTION OF POLA
(JPS Study No. P/295 (Final) - already circulated)
5. POLICY IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA
(JPS Study No. P/296 (Final) - already circulated
Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 29 - already circulated)
6. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
(Telegram No. MAP 1002 (MC OUT 1277, 4 June)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:-

V. J. S. S. S. S.
J. J. S. S. S. S. S.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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(Mr. C. T. T. T.)

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Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff, (br)
Chief, Liaison Section
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Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF
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Director, FBI
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ALLIED FORCE HQ. MEMBERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Sup. (E) (45) 1314 Meeting
31st May 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JUN 1 1945

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDING
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 31ST MAY 1945

PRESENT:-

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Rear Admiral H. M. Tucker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. G. Gay, representing
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, M.E.F.

Vice Admiral R. J. Glassford,
Commander United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Major General J. H. Reynolds,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFM

Honorable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

all necessary
for the
for the
for the

PRESENT:-

General Joseph T. McNamara,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Rear Admiral H. ... Pecker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir ... Guy Garrod,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, M.F.

Vice Admiral H. ... Glasford,
Commander United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Major General J. H. Bayard,
Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Lieutenant General H. T. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honorable ... C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Rear Admiral Henry H. Stone,
Chief Coordinator, Allied Commission

Colonel G. S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General L. L. Foster, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C. H. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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all necessary etc for

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25 Ensign Command
26 En Command
34 Dec 1944

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THE FOLLOWING ARE ALSO PRESENT:-

Brigadier General Thomas C. Grey,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, MAF

Air Commodore J. H. Dwyer-Jones,
Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence, MAF

Mr. C. O'Leary,
Deputy E. S. Political Advisor

Colonel J. D. Beckler, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF REVIEWS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE APPROVED THE MINUTES OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 24 MAY 1945.

2. REMARKS TO CLM-1

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJ ADAM STONE said that though he understood that Signor Longhi had submitted a statement to the representative of the Allied Commission in Milan listing all payments purporting to have been made by the CLM-1, this statement had not yet been received in RAE for investigation, although it was reported to have been dispatched from Milan.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to take steps to expedite his investigation and to submit a report of his findings.

3. MINUTES OF ALLIED FORCE 3 FROM 2/DAY AND VIS

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 3)

Lieutenant Colonel J. N. Sweetman,
Major Robert F. Huley

MINUTES OF A MEETING

(SAC) (P) (45) 12th Meeting

THE MEETING APPROVED THE MINUTES OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 24 JULY 1945.

MINUTES TO VISIT

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting, Memo 2)

2405 ADJUTANT STONE said that though he understood that Signor Longhi had submitted a statement to the representative of the Allied Commission in Milan, all payments pursuant to have been made by the Allied, this statement had not yet been received in RLEZ for investigation, although it was expected to have been dispatched from Milan.

THE DEPUTY SUPERVISOR ALLIED COMMISSION:

Directed the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to take steps to examine his investigation found to submit a report of his findings.

MINUTES OF ALLIED FORCE'S FROM 24 JULY 1945

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting, Memo 3)

2405 ADJUTANT STONE, referring to a report made at the last meeting to the effect that 500 tons of food had been left behind at SAN, stated that this was an error. However, as the petrol left there amounted to 1,000 tons, supply for the two Japanese squadrons remaining, he considered that every effort should be made to eliminate the bulk of these stores, leaving those squadrons with a reasonable level of supply. It would be advisable, he believed, to inform Admiral Peto of our intention of removing the stores and further that the fuel would be considered to be in his responsibility until such time as evacuation was undertaken. Admiral Peto could draw on these supplies for training purposes but it would be necessary for him to account strictly for whatever amounts were consumed. British Air Force had estimated that one lot and forty 3-ton lorries could complete the required evacuation of stores from SAN in 15 days.

In regard to VIS he stated that a number of aircraft and some 600 tons of stores remained. He considered that the aircraft were beyond repair and should be abandoned, but that the maintenance of the other stores should be undertaken as soon as possible. There was also a demand by the United States Air Force for the removal of the pierce steel lying from the airfield on this island.

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1. GENERAL LEMWITZER, referring to a statement by Rear Admiral Prater that a list could be made available for this purpose, stated that such type contact would be more suitable as lists were difficult to load. A number of operators could be made available in a fortnight's time without undue detriment to conditions elsewhere. He would also be able to provide the necessary labor and torpedoes at that time.

Z.D. DEPUTY SURVEY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer in conjunction with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and Chief of Staff, Chief,...

2. To arrange for the evacuation of the stores from Z.D.R. and VTS on two lines of his statement at "X" above, and at a time most suitable to our commitments elsewhere.
3. To investigate the practicability of receiving the pierced steel planking from the airfields on VTS.
4. To draft for his approval a telegram to Marshal Tito informing him of our intentions in regard to supplies left at Z.D.R. and VTS.

REMARKS: CH. JUGOSLAVIA

(Previous reference S.C. (P) (45) 12th Meeting, minute 6)

1.30 GENERAL LEMWITZER reported that the text of the note to be mailed to Marshal Tito by the British and American Ambassadors in BELGRADE regarding the occupation of VENEZIA-CIVIL had been agreed upon. Information had been received from the United States Political Adviser that the port of VOL was to be included in the demands and, accordingly, lifted days had been dispatched to the Ambassadors in BELGRADE regarding the area around that port which the Yugoslav Allied Commander would need to control in the event that Marshal Tito acceded to these demands.

Z.D. DEPUTY SURVEY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

SITUATION ON FIELD CO-OPERATION FRONTIER

(Previous reference S.C. (P) (45) 12th Meeting, minute 7)

1.30 GENERAL LEMWITZER reported that General Doyen had forwarded a note to General Priscott requesting that French chaperons from the Haute-Savoie district should be allowed to cross the frontier in order to cross their flocks on Italian soil. In consequence with a quota which it was allowed and long

4.

Exempt - the Survey 8/6

5.

6/1/52

5. To draft for his approval a telegram to Marshal Tito informing him of our intentions in regard to supplies left at KALAJ and VIS.

MEMORANDUM FOR JUDGE W.S.

(Previous reference S.O. (2) (45) 12th meeting, Annex 6)

4.10 GENERAL LEPTITZ reported that the text of the note to be handed to Marshal Tito by the British and American Ambassadors in BELGRADE regarding the issue of VERDELI-GIVULI had been agreed upon. Information had been received from the United States Political Adviser that the part of POL. line to be included in the document and, accordingly, JUDGE W.S. had been dispatched to the Ambassador in BELGRADE showing the area around that part which the Supreme Allied Commander would need to control in the event that Marshal Tito acceded to these demands.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED CO. ADJUTANT:

Take note of the above report.

SITUATION OF VERDELI-GIVULI FRONTIER

(Previous reference S.O. (1) (45) 12th meeting, Annex 7)

4.10 GENERAL LEPTITZ reported that General Doyen had forwarded a note to General Francott requesting that French troops from the Haute-Garonne district should be allowed to cross the frontier in order to probe their flanks on Italian soil. In accordance with a custom which it was alleged was long established, 15 Army Group had been instructed not to permit such action since it would be liable to prejudice any proposals for the adjustment of boundaries which might be put forward in the future. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had been informed of this decision.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED CO. ADJUTANT: - SEE 233.

Take note of the above report.

ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD

(Paper no. 230 (1) (45) 27) - File 218, Vol. 3, Annex 213.

2.1 CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending the eventual establishment, under Italian Government auspices, of a Production Advisory Board with Allied advisory representatives and recommending in the meantime the establishment of a Joint Industry Bureau in U.S. and Italian Government territory, and attaching a draft order to the Combined Chiefs of Staff outlining the above proposals and requesting their comments.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED CO. ADJUTANT invited attention to Memo. No. 233 which had been received since the circulation of the paper before the Conference, and which directed that, before recommendations were made to the Italian

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Government. Details of the proposed program would be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval. The proposed enable would require notification in the light of this directive, as it did not contain sufficient information to enable the Combined Chiefs of Staff to arrive at a decision. In addition, General Sherman asked for an explanation as to why it was considered necessary for the Allies to intervene in regard to Italian industry which appeared to be a matter for the Italian Government.

REAR Admiral STONE, in reply, said that the main problem was that of large scale unemployment in Northern Italy. The factories there were at present working, but their stocks of coal were very limited, and if proper control was not exercised, there was a likelihood of up to four or five million Italian workers becoming unemployed. While substantial Allied forces remained in Italy awaiting redeployment, it would not be possible to ignore the political unrest resulting from large scale unemployment. This might involve the maintenance of Allied forces in Italy for a longer period than would otherwise be necessary. He felt the problem could not be tackled piece-meal, and that an overall plan, coordinated with the Joint Program, was required. The control should also be directed so as to face the two economies of the North and South. The proposals for a production advisory Board had been considerably modified since they were first raised and he felt satisfied that, in their present form, they were in accord with the intentions of the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MAJOR GENERAL WHEATON agreed with the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and added that it was not entirely possible for the Italians to organize their industry on a sound basis without help from the Allied military authorities, as the latter controlled the supplies of coal and certain other essential raw materials. Under the organization now proposed the military authorities would be in an advisory position only and could step out without difficulty as soon as the Italians were in a position to carry on unaided. He felt sure that effective such organization, industries would be able to employ an average of 100,000 men. He had discussed the matter on a recent visit to LONDON where, although the initial or Office resolution had been that the Allies should not become involved in what appeared to be a matter for the Italian Government, the proposals had finally been viewed with sympathy.

REAR Admiral STONE observed that the shipbuilding industry was not covered by the proposed Industrial Boards. Any attempt by the Italian Government to expand this industry might have an adverse effect on Italian labor at present being employed in shipyards under Allied control. He asked how, in the event of the Italians proposing to take such action, it could be possible to stop them.

REAR Admiral STONE in reply, said that the Allies would retain the control of imported raw materials. In addition, in the event of the Italian Government failing to secure effective and equitable utilization of local resources in Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander retained the power to impose the necessary controls or take other appropriate measures. He did not, however, consider that the Allies could dictate the suggested composition of the Production Advisory Board to the Italian Government. It could only be put forward as a suggestion. In reply to a question from the Chief Commissioner, he stated that the Italian Government had

the production of victory bonds. Seen considerably clarified since they were first raised and no fully satisfied that, in their present form, they were in closer accord with the intentions of the directors of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL J. H. HARRISON agreed with the Chief of Staff, London, Allied Commission on the basis that it was not entirely possible for the Italians to organize their industry on a sound basis without help from the Allied military authorities, as the latter controlled the supplies of coal and certain other essential raw materials. Under the organization now proposed the military authorities would be in an advisory position only and could step out without difficulty as soon as the Italians were in a position to carry on unaided. He felt sure that without such organization, industry would be in a state of severe unemployment and could result. He had discussed the matter on a recent visit to LONDON where, although the initial or official position had been that the Allies should not become involved in what appeared to be a matter for the Italian Government, the proposals had finally been viewed with sympathy.

MAJOR A. D. L. MACKER observed that the shipbuilding industry was not covered by the proposed Industrial Boards. Any attempt by the Italian Government to expand this industry might have an adverse effect on Italian labor at present being employed in shipyards under Allied control. He asked how, in the event if the Italians were going to take such action, it could be possible to stop them.

MAJOR A. D. L. MACKER in reply, said that the Allies would retain the control of imported raw materials. In addition, in the event of the Italian Government failing to secure effective and equitable utilization of local resources in Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander retained the power to impose the necessary controls or take other appropriate measures. He did not, however, consider that the Allies could dictate the suggested composition of the Production Advisory Board to the Italian Government. It could only be put forward as a suggestion. In reply to a question by the Deputy Chief of Staff, he stated that the Italian Government had not been approached in regard to the present proposals, though it had previously indicated that it did not look upon them as the earlier proposal for a board under Allied control.

MAJOR A. D. L. MACKER agreed with the Chief of Staff, London, Allied Commission on the basis that it was not entirely possible for the Italians to organize their industry on a sound basis without help from the Allied military authorities, as the latter controlled the supplies of coal and certain other essential raw materials. Under the organization now proposed the military authorities would be in an advisory position only and could step out without difficulty as soon as the Italians were in a position to carry on unaided. He felt sure that without such organization, industry would be in a state of severe unemployment and could result. He had discussed the matter on a recent visit to LONDON where, although the initial or official position had been that the Allies should not become involved in what appeared to be a matter for the Italian Government, the proposals had finally been viewed with sympathy.

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entirely separate but that close coordination between the two areas should be maintained.

THE DEPUTY SUPER ALIED COLONEL: The Deputy Super Allied Colonel said that he recognizes the need for some type of control by the Italian Government over Italian industry. The question as to how far the British and American authorities should go in enforcing any particular type of control was however a matter which must be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPER ALIED COLONEL:

a. Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer, in conjunction with the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to prepare for his approval the telegrams to the Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated under Paper No. S.C. (P) (45) 27 so as:

- (1) to set out fuller details of the functions of the proposed bodies;
- (2) to make it clear that the proposed machinery should already be submitted to the Italian Government and not imposed on that Government against its will.

b. Directed that, pending the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, no further approach should be made to the Italian Government in regard to this matter.

DISCUSSION OF P.B. IN H.M.S.

(Paper No. S.C. (P) (45) 28) — File 28, Vol. 3 - Fow. 216.

THE COMMISSIONER had before him a paper by the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee recommending a procedure for the eventual inclusion of P.B. activities in I.A.B., together with a note stating that the Chief of Staff had directed that further detailed investigations and preparations should proceed in accordance with these recommendations, and that a suggestion, as to the final date for the transfer of responsibility from P.B. to I.A.B., should be made to the Supreme Allied Commander in conference in due course.

THE DEPUTY SUPER ALIED COLONEL:

a. Endorsed the directions of the Chief of Staff as contained in Paper No. S.C. (P) (45) 28.

b. Directed that, when it became possible to recommend a definite date for the transfer of responsibility from P.B. to I.A.B., the latter should again be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander for final decision.

(1) to set out fuller details of the functions of the proposed bodies;

(2) to make it clear that the proposed machinery would already be submitted to the Italian Government and not to be used in that Government against its will.

2. Directed that, pending the approval of the United Chiefs of Staff, no further approach should be made to the Italian Government in regard to this matter.

DISCUSSION FOR D. FOR IN 17.17

(20) or No. 212 (2) (45) 25) — File 218, Vol 3 - Fow 216

THE COMMISSIONER had before him a paper by the Departmental Officer Sub-Commission recommending a procedure for the eventual dissolution of the activities in Italy, together with a note stating that the Chief of Staff had directed that further detailed investigations and preparations should proceed in accordance with these recommendations, and that a suggestion, as to the final date for the transfer of responsibility from the I.M.B., should be made to the Supreme Allied Commander in conference in due course.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

2. Endorsed the directions of the Chief of Staff as contained in Paper No. 212 (P) (45) 25.

3. Directed that, when it became possible to recommend a definite date for the transfer of responsibility from the I.M.B., the matter should again be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander for final decision.

W. G. S. J. J.

W. G. S. J. J.
MAJOR GENERAL, COLONEL,
GENERAL STAFF.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, PAB
Chief of Commission, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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Item 7

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 Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ 4-12
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Chief, DPC

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 23th Meeting
29 May 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 17

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE C-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 31ST MAY 1945

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting - already circulated)
2. ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 27 - circulated herewith)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

3. DISSOLUTION OF FIB IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 28 - already circulated)

*Minutes of meeting
at 4010 226*

*S. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.*

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff

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*EC II 127
31 May 45*

AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting - already circulated) 219
2. ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 27 - circulated herewith) 218/213/EC
3. DISSOLUTION OF FIVE IN ITALY
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 28 - already circulated) 218/216/EC

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

*minutes of meeting
at Telco 226.*

Approved by
S. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, PWB
INC
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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ALLIED AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

MAC (P) (45) 12th Aodtina
24/1/45

TO: 53/521

DATE: 20/1/45

SUPREMACY ALLIED AIR FORCE
(POLITICAL)

ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE ALLIED AIR FORCE'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 AIR HQ AT 1050
HOURS ON 21/1/45 AT 145

PRESENT:-

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General John A. D. Cunningham,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General John A. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Air Force, Air Force

Lieutenant General John A. D. Cunningham,
Air Commander-in-Chief, Air Force, Air Force

Vice Admiral R.L.G. Alexander,
Commander United States Naval Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Carrol,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Air Force

Lieutenant General V. B. Hoggan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General U. B. Hoggan, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, Air Force

Honourable Alexander U. Kirk,
U. S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

EC DIST 26/1/45

55 ENCL COMME

36 EN CL COMME

77 POLITICAL AND

David Jacobson and Mrs. S. J. Jacobson;
 S. J. Jacobson and Mrs. S. J. Jacobson.

Colin J. Jones, D., is assistant professor.

Maria Sapienza alla direzione, editoriale, University

Alameda Street N. D. Cunningham,
Counselor-in-Chief, advice rendered

Investment General Corp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 8

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Governor, Western States, New York, 100 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.

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Laurent General W. D. Long,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Mr. General C. B. Ingman, representing
 United Industrial Oils Co., Inc.

U. J. Polyzou, *Editor*

Dr. Timothy S. McEllion,
British Resident Linnet

Major General Byron D. Jarrett,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Rec: Admiral Sirery R. Stone,
Natl. Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel G. S. Smith, representing
 Anderson - Chief of Staff, G-2, 1948

Brigadier General S. L. Earle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

ASSISTANT General C. A. Spafford,
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 1200

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THE FOLLOWING ARE ALSO PRESENT:-

Brigadier General Thomas C. Carey,
Director of Operations and Intelligence.

Brigadier J. C. Nicholson,
Chairman, Inter-Service Joint Planning Staff

Mr. G. G. G. G.,
Deputy E. S. Political Advisor

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(S.C. (P) (45) 11th meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 18 May 1945.

2. MINUTES TO COME
(Previous reference S.C. (P) (45) 11th meeting - minute 2)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the investigation being conducted by the Allied Commission to obtain proof whether a debt to the C.M.I.I. existed in respect of the month of November, said that he understood that Signor Longhi was submitting to the representative of the Allied Commission in Milan a statement of all payments purporting to have been made by the C.M.I.I. This statement would be forwarded to R.A.E. for investigation and a full report would be forthcoming at a later date.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

See 228

Took note of the above report.

3. MINUTES OF ALLIED FOR: S. FROM Z.A.D.E. AND VIS
(Previous reference S.C. (P) (45) 11th meeting - minute 3)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GIBSON reported that the evacuation of personnel and equipment from Z.A.D.E. and VIS had been virtually completed by 20 May. It had been necessary, however, to leave behind certain supplies. These left at Z.A.D.E. included 500 tons of food, 611,000 gallons of 100-octane and a certain amount of 80-octane petrol, and about 500 tons of bombs from which the fuzes had been removed. In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he stated he

Forward on File 330/EC a
to 04 Sec 1 File 330

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(S.E. (P) (45) 11th Meeting) 20

THE COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 15 May 1945.

2. REPORTS TO CEMET
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 11th Meeting - minute 2) 20

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the investigation being conducted by the Allied Commission to obtain proof whether a debt to the CEMET existed in respect of the month of November, said that he understood that Sigismund Longhi was submitting to the representative of the Allied Commission in CEMET a statement of all agents purporting to have been made by the CEMET. This statement would be forwarded to SAC for investigation and a full report would be forthcoming at a later date.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMISSION:

SAC

Took note of the above report.

3. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCE 3 FROM ZADAR AND VIS
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 11th Meeting - minute 5)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CANNON reported that the evacuation of personnel and equipment from ZADAR and VIS had been virtually completed by 20 May. It had been necessary, however, to leave behind certain supplies. These left at ZADAR included 500 tons of food, 621,000 gallons of 100-octane and a certain amount of 80-octane petrol, and about 500 tons of bombs from which the fuses had been removed. In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he stated he did not consider it practical to remove these stores to ITALY. He added that the Yugoslav Government was eager to remove them on a basis of reverse loans. All stocks of ammunition had been removed. Some aircraft, which were under repair at the time of the evacuation, had been left behind but were rendered inoperative. Certain AF personnel, engaged in training Yugoslav aircraft, remained at ZADAR. He remained responsible for their maintenance and also that of the Yugoslav squadrons until the latter were formally handed over.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CANNON stated that it would be possible for the Navy to withdraw the stores by ship or by craft, but that the main difficulty lay in evacuating them from the airfield to the port.

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GENERAL MONTGOMERY observed that it would be desirable to examine the reasons and conditions of these items were in short supply.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL G. ROD stated that even though supplies had been left behind, our attitude towards the Yugoslavs should be that the stores remained allied property. If Yugoslavs made use of them, they should be required to replace them at a later date.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL G. ROD, referring to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander as to whether the food could be turned over to UHRA, stated that he had been advised that there was a serious food shortage at ZAGREB and that since UHRA had transport facilities, it might be desirable for this organization to have the food supplied from ZAGREB to ZAGREB, in order to alleviate the suffering of the population in the latter area.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL G. ROD said that the head of UHRA for JUGOSLAVIA, who was a Russian, was coming to ZAGREB shortly, and this letter could be discussed with him.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that as the head of UHRA for JUGOSLAVIA was a Russian, the only people who would get credit from the Yugoslav for such a transfer of food would be Russians. This was not acceptable.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL G. ROD, referring to a suggestion by the British Resident Minister regarding the possibility of using the petrol for fueling aircraft to fly the food to ZAGREB, observed that it was undesirable to consider additional use of Allied aircraft in view of the recent severe restrictions to our operations imposed by the Yugoslav authorities at the airfield at BELGRADE. He felt that the western allies would not in any case be given any credit by the Yugoslavs for food so supplied.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed that Air Commander-in-Chief, M.F. should further investigate the possibility of removing or utilizing the stores left at ZAGREB and VIS and should report to him accordingly.

4. CIVILIAN FLIGHT IN NORTHERN ITALY
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 11th. Acting - Minute 4)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL G. ROD said that arrangements had been made with the allies to allow travel of certain numbers of civilians who could be provided with a Quota pass. These arrangements would be effective 29 May 1945. The economic boundary line between Northern and Southern ITALY was also being abolished on that date.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

THE SUPREMACY OF THE COLLECTIVE was considered that as the head of UN R. for JUGOSLAVIA was a Russian, the only people who would get credit from the Yugoslavs for such a transfer of food would be Russians. This was not acceptable.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LAMBERT, referring to a suggestion by the British Assistant Secretary regarding the possibility of using the patrol for fueling aircraft to fly the food to LAMBERT, observed that it was undesirable to consider additional use of Allied aircraft in JUGOSLAVIA in view of the recent severe restrictions to our movements imposed by the Yugoslav authorities at the airfield at HILVERDALE. He felt that the western allies would not in any case be given any credit by the Yugoslavs for food so supplied.

THE SUPREMACY OF THE COLLECTIVE:

Directed that Mr. Commander-in-Chief, UN R. should further investigate the feasibility of removing or utilising the stores left at LAMBERT and VIS and submit report to him accordingly.

4. CIVILIAN TRAVEL IN NORTHERN ITALY
(Previous reference S/C (P) (45) 11th meeting - Minute 4)

MR. LAMBERT STONE said that arrangements had been made with the allies to allow travel of certain numbers of civilians who would be provided with a Questrum pass. These arrangements would be effective 26 May 1945. The economic boundary line between Northern and Southern ITALY was also being abolished on that date.

THE SUPREMACY OF THE COLLECTIVE:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

5. TREATMENT OF DISABLED GERMAN WOMEN
(Previous reference S/C (P) (45) 11th meeting - Minute 5)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL LAMBERT reported that, as directed at the previous meeting, a telegram had been dispatched to 15th Army Group instructing them to proceed with the dissolution of the surrendered German forces in the Theater. In reply to this, a signal had been received from Eighth Army, requesting confirmation of these directions in view of the fact that it was proposed to hand over to SHAEF a large part of the surrendered German personnel now in AUSTRIA, and that this move could not be organized if German Headquarters were split up at this time. A reply to Eighth Army was in hand. Meanwhile the dissolution of the Germans in ITALY was proceeding according to plan.

BRIGADIER GENERAL LAMBERT said that the instructions, contained in the telegram to 15th Army Group, had not been intended to apply to AUSTRIA.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to study the existing directions to 15th Army in accordance with the remarks of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 at 'X' above.

6. DEVELOPMENTS AT JUGOSLAVIA
(Previous reference SAC (2) (46) 11th Meeting - Minute 5)

MAJOR GEN. J. L. FLETCHER outlined developments in the Yugoslav situation in VERDELL-GRIFFIN and Southern USTRI, which had taken place since the last meeting. The Yugoslav Foreign Office had forwarded a note on 21 May to the British and American Ambassadors in BELGRADE stating that the Yugoslav Government would accept in principle the establishment of Allied Military Government under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, on the basis of the communication line proposed in VERDELL-GRIFFIN by the Chief of Staff, subject to certain minor qualifications and to certain conditions. A message had been forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting out certain details of the Supreme Allied Commander's military requirements in VERDELL-GRIFFIN, which it seemed desirable to emphasize in light of recent developments. Meanwhile the forces under Eighth Army had been strengthened, and S. 15P were reinforcing by taking over part of Eighth Army's area of VERDELL-GRIFFIN. He observed that as the latter was not on a Governmental level no further action could be taken by this Headquarters pending receipt of instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MAJOR GEN. J. L. FLETCHER:

Took note of the above report.

7. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
(Previous reference SAC (3) (25) 11th Meeting - Minute 7)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that the matter of the occupation of certain portions of Northwest ITALY by French forces was being taken up at governmental level. General Clark had recommended that an attempt should be made to have these French forces put under his control. Field Marshal Alexander had not approved this recommendation as he thought that such action would produce the impression that French occupation of Northwest ITALY was condoned by the United States and British Governments. He considered that if these French forces were ever placed under his command, it would become much more difficult to insist on their withdrawal.

MAJOR GEN. J. L. FLETCHER reported that the local situation had not improved during the past few days in spite of the presence of sizeable American forces in the area. Conditions were such that an incident between local partisans and French forces might occur at any moment.

MAJOR GEN. J. L. FLETCHER, referring to a question by the United States Political

Chief of Staff acting out certain details of the Supreme Allied Commander's military requirements in WEST-GHILL, which it seems desirable to phrase in light of recent developments. Meanwhile the forces under British command have been strengthened, and S. 1111 are operating by taking over part of British Army's area of control. It is observed that as the British are not on a governmental level no further action could be taken by this Headquarters pending receipt of instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

See also 1111

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Topic: Date of the above report.

7. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
(Previous reference SAC (P) (25) 11th Meeting - Minute 7)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that the matter of the occupation of certain portions of Northwest Italy by French forces was being taken up at governmental level. General Clark had recommended that an attempt should be made to have these French forces put under his control. Field Marshal Alexander had not approved this recommendation as he thought that such action would produce the impression that French occupation of Northwest Italy was condoned by the United States and British Governments. He considered that if these French forces were once placed under his command, it would become much more difficult to insist on their withdrawal.

MAJOR GENERAL LAMBERT reported that the local situation had not improved during the past few days in spite of the presence of sizeable American forces in the area. Conditions were such that an incident between local partisans and French forces might occur at any moment.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to a question by the United States Political Adviser regarding the authenticity of a newspaper report that the Anzio Valley had declared itself independent, stated that an inquiry was in progress. It appeared that the CILAI had issued a decree ratifying a declaration by the local ACSTA GEN. The CILAI had no authority to issue such decrees now that Northwest Italy had been brought under Allied Military Government.

GENERAL MENDHAM, replying to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander as to whether he considered that negotiations with the French were liable to be protracted, reported that discussions had already taken place with Monsieur Bidault and the French Ambassador. He considered, however, a comprehensive report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be advisable.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to obtain from 15 Army Group a comprehensive report on the situation in Northwest Italy and on this basis to prepare for his approval a telegram forwarding this information to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

See P. 1111

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8. ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD

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REAR ADMIRAL STONE, replying to a question by the British Resident Minister, stated that no information had been forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding the formation of the Italian Production Advisory Board, which he had recommended. The formation of this board had been discussed at the last meeting of the Economic Sub-Committee. The scheme now proposed differed considerably from that which had at first been suggested.

GENERAL McLAUGHLIN considered that a paper dealing with the whole matter should be put before the Conference at the next meeting. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should then be informed of the proposals.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMANDERS:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to submit for his approval at the next meeting of his Political Conference, a paper dealing with the organization and functions of the proposed Italian Production Advisory Board, together with a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting their approval of the project.

By the Secretary

J. G. SWENTHALER,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Ar)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF

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ceasing with the organization and functions of the proposed Italian
Production Advisory Board, together with a draft cable to the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff requesting their approval of the project.

by the Italian
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Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (St)
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Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
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SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting
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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-2 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 24TH MAY 1945

A 2 2 E 2 A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (P) (45) 11th Meeting - already circulated)

2. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS

(Oral statement by Deputy Chief of Staff)

3. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER

Telegram No.:

SGS 422, from 15 Army Group (MC IN 14294, 20 May)
FTD 22095, from SHAEP (MC IN 15493, 22 May)
FX 10526, to 15 Army Group (MC OUT 7731, 23 May)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

4. TREATMENT OF DISARMED GERMAN FORCES

Telegram No. FX-60140 to 15 Army Group (MC OUT 7477, 23 May)

H. Sweetman

J.H. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

A E E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 11th Meeting - already circulated)
2. RELATIONS WITH JUBAHLANS
(Oral statement by Deputy Chief of Staff)
3. SITUATION ON FRAMO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
Telegram No. 1:
SSS 422, from 15 Army Group (MC IN 14294, 20 May)
FTD 22095, from SHAFF (MC IN 15493, 22 May)
FX 80526, to 15 Army Group (MC OUT 7793, 23 May)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

4. TREATMENT OF DISARMED GERMAN FORCES
Telegram No. FX-50140 to 15 Army Group (MC OUT 7477, 22 May)

H. Steinman
H. STEINMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (British)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, FMB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (British)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MACF
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, FVE
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (2) (25) 11th Meeting
18th May 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON FRIDAY 18TH MAY 1945

PRESENT:-

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Rear Admiral R. A. Facker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General John K. Cannon,
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF

Vice Admiral F. A. Glassford,
Commander United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Air Vice Marshal G.B.A. Baker, representing
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF

General Mark F. Clark,
Commanding General, 15th Army Group

Lieutenant General H. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian K. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, JHQ

Mr. C. Offie, representing
U. S. Political Adviser

Rt. Honourable H. Macmillan

36 Chief Commr

34 Exec Commr

38 Pol Advisers

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Major General the Hon. Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Rear Admiral H. A. Facker, representing
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General John E. Cannon,
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF

Vice Admiral W. A. Glasford,
Commander United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Air Vice Marshal G.B.A. Baker, representing
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF

General Mark W. Clark,
Commanding General, 15th Army Group

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Offie, representing
U. S. Political Advisor

Rt. Honourable R. Macmillan,
British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Rear Admiral Ellery F. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Major General T. S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General I. L. Foster, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General C. M. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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BY AUTHORITY OF SAC :
- 1 -

EC List - 21 May 45

36 Chief Comm

34 Exec Comm

38 Pol Advisors

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THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

Brigadier General Thomas C. Darcy,
Director of Operations and Intelligence, MAAP

Brigadier General Ralph H. Tate,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, 15th Army Group

Brigadier General A. J. McChrystal,
Chief, INC Section, AFHQ

Brigadier J. G. Nicholson,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Brigadier D. P. Yates,
G-3 Operations, AFHQ

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Colonel Edward J. O'Neill,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Fifth Army

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel K. W. Clark,
Chief, Public Relations Branch, INC Section, AFHQ

SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting)

The Conference approved the minutes of their meeting held on 10 May 1945.

2. PAYMENTS TO CINAI

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, Psychological Warfare Branch

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Colonel Edward J. O'Neill,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Fifth Army

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel K. W. Clark,
Chief, Public Relations Branch, INC Section, AFHQ

SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting)

The Conference approved the minutes of their meeting held on 10 May 1945.

2. PAYMENTS TO CLNAI

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting - Minute 2) — wlv (VCL2)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to an investigation being conducted by Allied Commission in an effort to obtain proof whether a genuine debt of 160 million lire existed in respect of the month of November to the CLNAI and whether the payment made on 2 May could be considered to cover such a debt, reported that a finance officer of the Allied Commission was now in MILAN where he was holding conferences with Signor Longhi but no definite results could yet be reported. He stated that a full report would be forthcoming at a later date.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

SAC (P) 208

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3. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ZADAR
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting - Minute 4) — 43

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITTEN reported that Allied Forces had been ordered to evacuate ZADAR and the Island of VIS, and that present indications were that all forces would be withdrawn by 20 May.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that owing to the difficulty in loading ships, there was a likelihood that certain supplies including air force petrol could not be evacuated.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CANNON reported that there were in all 600,000 gallons of gasoline and 500 tons of rations, part of which might have to be abandoned when our forces withdrew.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

that

Directed/the Air Commander-in-Chief, RAF / should ensure that no supplies which could be used against our forces in the event of hostilities with the Yugoslavs were left behind at either ZADAR or VIS.

4. CIVILIAN TRAVEL IN NORTHERN ITALY
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting - Minute 6) — 191

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that the feasibility of allowing increased civilian travel into Northern ITALY was at the present time complicated by the existence of the economic boundary line between North and South. He would report again in due course.

See 4th 2/3

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

5. RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVS
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 3) — 196

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITTEN outlined developments in the Yugoslav situation in VENEZIA GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA which had taken place since the last meeting.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that he had been advised that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had received Marshal Tito's reply to the note presented to him by the British Ambassador to BELGRADE. This reply merely re-stated the counter-proposals which Marshal Tito had given to the Chief of Staff at the recent BELGRADE conferences.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that, since the whole matter was

Directed to the Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF / ensure that no supplies which could be used against our forces in the event of hostilities with the Jugoslavs were left behind at either Zadar or Vis.

4. CIVILIAN TRAVEL IN NORTHERN ITALY
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting - Minute 6) (M1)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that the feasibility of allowing increased civilian travel into Northern Italy was at the present time complicated by the existence of the economic boundary line between North and South. He would report again in his course.

See 4th 201

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

5. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting, Minute 3) (M6)

MAJOR GENERAL LEWITTEN outlined developments in the Yugoslav situation in Venezia Giulia and Southern AUSTRIA which had taken place since the last meeting.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that he had been advised that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had received Marshal Tito's reply to the note presented to him by the British Ambassador to BELGRADE. This reply merely re-stated the counter-proposals which Marshal Tito had given to the Chief of Staff at the recent BELGRADE conference.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that since the whole matter was now being handled on a governmental level, no further action, other than to prepare for hostilities, could be taken pending the receipt of instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He reiterated, however, that Marshal Tito's counter-proposals were quite unacceptable to him.

MR. OFFIE reported that he had received information that the State Department had also received Marshal Tito's reply. (M1)

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

See (24)

Took note of the above reports.

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6. PRESS AND PROPAGANDA POLICY IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 26)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper outlining a proposed press and propaganda policy designed to acquaint our forces and the general public with the situation in regard to the Yugoslavs in VENETIA GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA and further directed to influencing the Yugoslavs towards accepting our demands.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that when the possibility of hostilities with the Yugoslavs had first arisen, he had decided that it was most desirable, before hostilities should begin, to tell our forces why it might become necessary for them to fight. He was most anxious to avoid a repetition of events in GREECE last December, when hostilities had commenced without either the troops or the people at home having been informed of the true situation. This had been an unfortunate experience, as in the beginning neither the Press nor the public had supported the operations and in consequence the morale of the troops had been affected. It was essential that a similar situation did not arise in regard to JUGOSLAVIA. However, as our troops in VENETIA GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA had been forced to stand by and watch Yugoslav forces carrying out all sorts of maltreatment, there were already indications that, during the past ten days, the opinion of the troops had become more and more hostile toward the Yugoslavs. Nevertheless he thought it wise to issue a special message to all United States and British forces in the Theatre informing them of the situation. He had, therefore, prepared a brief message which he placed before the Conference.

GENERAL McNAMNEY agreed in principle to the issue of such a message. However he considered that certain detailed amendments were required. He also questioned the wisdom of issuing it until a formal reply had been received by the Governments from Marshal Tito.

GENERAL CLARK expressed the view that the message should be issued as soon as possible in order that the troops could be kept abreast of the situation. He considered that if it were delayed until a reply were received from Marshal Tito, it might then be too late properly to orient our soldiers. The message would, moreover, tend to allay the many rumours which were now prevalent in forward areas.

MR. OFFICE pointed out, and Mr. Macmillan agreed, that as Marshal Tito had already replied to the United States and British notes, the issue of the Supreme Allied Commander's message in the immediate future would not be inopportune.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, referring to the paper on press and propaganda policy, considered that the entire matter should be handled with extreme care, so that any statements issued should not appear to be part of an organized propaganda campaign.

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...troops had been affected. It was essential that a similar situation did not arise in regard to JUGOSLAVIA. However, as our troops in VENETIA GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA had been forced to stand by and watch Yugoslav forces carrying out all sorts of maltreatment, there were already indications that, during the past ten days, the opinion of the troops had become more and more hostile toward the Yugoslavs. Nevertheless he thought it wise to issue a special message to all United States and British forces in the Theatre informing them of the situation. He had, therefore, prepared a draft message which he placed before the Conference.

GENERAL McNAMARA agreed in principle to the issue of such a message. However he considered that certain detailed amendments were required. He also questioned the wisdom of issuing it until a formal reply had been received by the Government of Marshal Tito.

GENERAL CLARK expressed the view that the message should be issued as soon as possible in order that the troops could be kept abreast of the situation. He considered that if it were delayed until a reply were received from Marshal Tito, it might then be too late properly to orient our soldiers. The message would, moreover, tend to allay the many rumors which were now prevalent in forward areas.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, referring to the paper on press and propaganda policy, considered that the entire matter should be handled with extreme care, so that any statements issued should not appear to be part of an organized propaganda campaign.

MR. BARNES was of the opinion that it would be advantageous to give publicity by press and radio to suitable statements by responsible citizens in the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN, who were respected by the Yugoslavs. It would be unwise to institute a radio propaganda campaign locally, since only traitors in Italian soil would be available and this would have an unfortunate effect on the Yugoslavs. Replying to a question by the British Resident Minister, he said that the statements, to which he had referred, could be obtained by requesting OIT and MOI to secure them.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MCHUGHSTAL considered that some misunderstanding existed and the separate functions of press publicity and propaganda activities were not wholly understood. The press campaign would be entirely factual but must begin from AFHQ by a message to the troops and a press release by the Supreme Allied Commander. The latter was necessary so that War Correspondents in ITALY could be told something of the facts of the case, so that they could help by intelligent reporting.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed that a Committee consisting of the Chief of Staff (Chairman), the Deputy Chief of Staff, Chief INO and Director PAB, with representatives of the British Resident Minister and U.S. Political Adviser should:

- (a) Redraft for his approval his proposed message to troops
- (b) Establish a press and propaganda policy in respect of relations with the Yugoslavs.

7. SITUATION ON FRANCE-ITALIAN FRONTIER

BRIGADIER TAYLOR reported that a cable had been sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 13 May requesting that governmental action be taken to seek the withdrawal of French forces from Northwest Italy. SHAFF reported that up to 15th May they had received no reply to their letter to the French military authorities on the same subject and that they, therefore, fully supported our recommendation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A report just received from 15 Army Group stated that there has been no change in the situation in Northwest Italy during the past few days. General Doyen had visited General Truscott and certain temporary local arrangements had been agreed upon, but the two commanders had agreed that no further steps could be taken regarding the French withdrawal pending instructions from their higher headquarters.

MR. OFFIE reported that General Juin was in WASHINGTON at the present time. The American Ambassador had, however, delivered a strong note to the French Government, requesting immediate withdrawal of these forces. The French Foreign Office in reply had insisted that it was not French policy to attempt to annex territory in Northwest Italy.

GENERAL CLARK, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, stated that while the French were importing certain supplies to Northwest Italy, they were also requisitioning large amounts locally. He expressed the view that the French occupation was not necessarily a decision of the French Government, but that it might be at the instigation of some local commander. He considered that the situation was not serious at the moment, inasmuch as cordial relations existed between the French and American forces in the area.

MR. MACMILLAN said that the British Ambassador in PARIS had also presented a note to the French Government. He thought it would be unwise for the Supreme Allied Commander to take any further action while the matter was being pursued at Governmental level. He agreed with Commanding General 15 Army Group that the continued presence of the French forces was likely to be due to a local decision rather than one of the French Government.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed:

- (a) That, while representations at Governmental level continued, no further action should be taken by this headquarters to expedite withdrawal of French forces from Northwest ITALY.
- (b) That the occupation of the area up to the frontier, by forces of 15 Army Group should continue under existing instructions.

See above 24

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9. TREATMENT OF DISARMED GERMAN FORCES
(JPS Study No. P/293 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper recommending that more drastic measures should be taken to break up the surrendered German forces in the Theatre, and attaching a draft cable instructing 16th Army Group to take action accordingly.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHMOND, agreeing in principle with the Study, considered that no drastic action should be taken to disperse German administrative headquarters before such units and all forces under them were transferred to the final concentration area. Removal of all higher headquarters before this time would embarrass 15 Army Group, who were already in a difficult position, owing to the number of prisoners of war and displaced persons in their hands.

GENERAL MONTGOMERY stated that he did not intend to order the dissolution of any German administrative service troops under U.S. control until an examination had been made into the disposition of similar Italian units.

MAJOR GENERAL AVERY said that SS and other security organizations should be brought under full control immediately. There were also very strong intelligence reasons for breaking up the other German forces as soon as possible.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COM MANDER:

He instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer and the Chief of Staff, MTOUSA, to amend the draft cable to 15 Army Group, circulated under JPS Study No. P/293 (Final), to the extent that might be necessary for essential administrative reasons, and subsequently dispatch it.

9. SURRENDERED PERSONNEL AND PW SITUATION
(Telegram No. NAF 9/4 of 17 April)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a telegram setting out the situation caused by the large numbers of surrendered enemy forces and refugees in the Eighth Army area of AUSTRIA and requesting assistance from SHARP in dealing with this problem.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of this signal.

10. CONFERENCE WITH JUDICIALS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (4.5) 25)

THE CONFERENCE had before them records of the meetings held between

information has been made into the disposition of similar Italian units.

MAJOR GENERAL ALLEY said that SS and other security organizations should be brought under full control immediately. There were also very strong intelligence reasons for breaking up the other German forces as soon as possible.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMAND:

Instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer and the Chief of Staff, MTUSA, to amend the draft cable to 15 Army Group, circulated under JPS Study No. 7/293 (Final), to the extent that might be necessary for essential administrative reasons, and subsequently dispatch it.

9. SUPPLEMENTED FINANCIAL AND PW SITUATION
(Telegram No. May 974 of 17 April)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a telegram setting out the situation caused by the large numbers of surrendered enemy forces and refugees in the Ninth Army area of AUSTRIA and requesting assistance from SHAF in dealing with this problem.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of this signal.

10. CONFERENCE WITH JUDICIALS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (LS) 25)

THE CONFERENCE had before them records of the meetings held between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito in BELGRADE on the 8th and 9th of May 1945.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of the above.

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16 June 1945
V. G. SWETININ,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (British)
Chief, Liaison Section
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U.S. Political Adviser
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Assistant: Chief of Staff (British)

Chief, Liaison Section

Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAP

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Supreme Allied Commander's Office

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SAC (P) (45) 11th Meeting
17th May 1945

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COPY NO. 37

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

MAY 15 RECD

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S OFFICE
PERIAGE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1030 HOURS ON FRIDAY 18TH MAY 1945

REVISED AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting - already circulated) — 197, Vol 2.
2. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Oral statement of latest politico-military developments by
Deputy Chief of Staff).
3. PRESS AND PROPAGANDA POLICY IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 26 - already circulated) — 26/203/EC.
4. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
(Oral statement by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3)
5. TREATMENT OF DISARMED GERMAN FORCES
(JPS Study No. F/493 (Final) - already circulated) — n/r.

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

6. SURRENDER PERSONNEL AND PW SITUATION
(Telegram No. NIS 974 of 17 April) — n/r.
7. CONFERENCES WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 25 - already circulated) — 25/197/EC.

ATTENDANCE:

MINUTES AT FOWO 211

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REVISED AGENDA

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting - already circulated) — 194, Vol 2.
2. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Oral statement of latest politico-military developments by Deputy Chief of Staff).
3. PRESS AND PROPAGANDA POLICY IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 26 - already circulated) — 28/203/EC.
4. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
(Oral statement by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3)
5. TREATMENT OF DISARMED GERMAN FORCES
(JPS Study No. F/293 (Final) - already circulated) — N/R.

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

6. SURRENDER PERSONNEL AND PW SITUATION
(Telegram No. NAF 974 of 17 April) — N/R.
7. CONFERENCES WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 25 - already circulated) — 28/203/EC.

ATTENDANCE:

Chief, INC) are invited to attend
Director, FMB) for Items 2 and 3.
Deputy Director, FMB)

Minutes at Fowd 211.

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J. G. SWEETMAN

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.Exec Hist - 18 May 45

36 - Chief Commr

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Joint Planning Staff
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 Assistant Chief of Staff (British)
 Chief, Liaison Section
 Director of Operations and Intelligence, 17th MAIF
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 Chief, IAC
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (P) (45) 11th Meeting
17th May 1945

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COPY NO. 37

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR
ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 17 MAY 1945

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting)
2. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Oral statement of latest politico-military developments by Deputy
Chief of Staff).
3. PRESS AND PROPAGANDA POLICY IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 26 to be circulated) — 26/203/EC.
4. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
(Oral statement by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3)

FO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

5. CONFERENCES WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 25) — Follow 100, File 25/EC.

ATTENDANCE: Chief, INC) are invited to attend
Director, FWH) for Items 2 and 3.
Deputy Director, FWH)

mining at 1030 204.
Cancelled See

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting)
2. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Oral statement of latest politico-military developments by Deputy Chief of Staff)
3. PRESS AND PROPAGANDA POLICY IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 26 to be circulated) — 26/203/EC
4. SITUATION ON FRANCO-ITALIAN FRONTIER
(Oral statement by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

5. CONFERENCES WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 25) — Form 100, File 214/EC

ATTENDANCE: Chief, IMC } are invited to attend
Director, FMB } for items 2 and 3.
Deputy Director, FMB }

min- up at 10:00 - folio 204
Cancelled

EC Dist - 16 MAY 45

36 Chief ConnK

37 Exec ConnK

38 Pol Advisers

100
J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
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