

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

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(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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(VOL. I)

SACMED'S CONFERENCES, PAPERS
OCT. - DEC. 1945

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SAC (P) (44) 163. Annexure
29th December 1944.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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COPI NO 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

107, 514, 107/514

1. It is notified for information that the Supreme Allied Commander has already approved paragraph (1) and (2) of the agreement set out in para 1 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 (see telegram 5741113 of 25 December from FREEDOM to Allied Commission). By implication he has also approved para (3) of the agreement in question (see telegram quoted above and telegram No. S-403 of 23 December to FREEDOM from the Allied Commission).

2. Para 3 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 is therefore cancelled. Instead the Conference is requested to take note of the terms of the agreement reached between the Italian Government and the CLMVI as set forth in paragraph 1 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161.

See also P 87, 44 21/22.

del. Lascell...
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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- British Agent in Italy
- Director, J.E.
- Secretary, General Staff
- Secretary, J.E.
- Chief, Liaison Section

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2. Para 3 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161 is therefore cancelled. Instead the Conference is requested to take note of the terms of the agreement reached between the Italian Government and the British as set forth in paragraph 1 of paper No. SAC (P) (44) 161.

See also P. 29, the 2nd/25.

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27th December 1944

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28 DEC 1944

SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (FOUO)

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

1. On the basis of an exchange of telegrams with HQ Allied Commander, this H has been informed that the following agreement was signed on 26th December by the Italian Government, represented by BONOMI, and the CLNAI, represented by NARZI :-

"(1) The Italian Government recognises the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ of the Anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.

(2) The Italian Government delegates the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy to represent it in the struggle that the Patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and the Germans in the part of ITALY NOT yet liberated.

(3) The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy agrees to act towards this and as delegate of the Italian Government which is recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Government which signed the Armistice Conditions and is the only legitimate authority in such part of ITALY as has already been or will later on be returned to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government."

2. The foregoing agreement was concluded after the parties were brought together pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, who further directed that their agreement should be subject to his approval (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting, minute 4). *Page 20*

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to approve the agreement quoted in paragraph 1 *at CLNAI, under the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to notify the Italian Government and the CLNAI of such approval.*

Form 55 also upon.

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See Form 55, para 2 *at CLNAI*
J.H. LASCHLES,
CHIEF,
SECRETARY.

Copy 3 at CLNAI

Copy 1 at CLNAI

(2) The Italian Government delegates the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy to represent it in the struggle that the patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and the Germans in the part of ITALY NOT yet liberated.

(3) The Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy agrees to act towards this and as delegate of the Italian Government which is recognized by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Government which signed the Armistice Conditions and is the only legitimate authority in such part of ITALY as has already been or will later on be returned to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

2. The foregoing agreement was concluded after the parties were brought together pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, who further directed that their agreement should be subject to his approval (SAC (S) (44)) 36th Meeting, minute 4). *Page 20*

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to approve the agreement entered in paragraph 1. *See Vol 85, para 2.* *10/1/45* *J.H. LASHLIES, CHIEF, SECRETARY.*

For 55 also refer.

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Capt. D. T. ...
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SAC (P) (14) 180
27th December 1944.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

28 DEC 1944

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REF ID: A66212

SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RELIEF AND MASS EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN
POPULATION FROM ENEMY OCCUPIED ISLANDS

Note by Secretary

1. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, wishes to raise the question of the despatch of relief to enemy occupied islands in the Aegean and the mass evacuation of civilian population from these islands.
2. He has recently been informed by POLSK that a delegation left RHODES on 5th December chartered by the German administration and the Greek community with organising civilian relief supplies for RHODES. The delegation had been told by the German commander in RHODES that he was concerned over the shortage of food for the civilian population and that even British relief ships would be allowed. The delegation reported that the Germans were prepared to evacuate 10,000 civilians from RHODES and that the population of the island were seeking opportunities to leave. POLSK pointed out that, unless the Turks could be persuaded to accept the responsibility for refugees from RHODES, they would become an unwelcome British commitment. He suggested that it would be more economical to introduce relief through the medium of the International Red Cross and that, if the International Red Cross were unwilling to participate, the despatch of a British ship should be considered, subject to satisfactory safeguards. He drew a parallel between the case of RHODES and the case of the Channel Islands.

3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, accordingly requests a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy:-

- (a) As to whether relief supplies should be despatched under either International Red Cross or Allied supplies to the civilian population of enemy occupied islands in the Aegean.
- (b) As to whether mass evacuation of civilians from enemy occupied islands in the Aegean should be permitted.

He points out that it would clearly assist the enemy war effort to allow either (a) or (b).

2. He has recently been informed by POLIZ that a delegation left RHODES on 5th December chaired by the German administration, and the Greek community with organizing civilian relief supplies for RHODES. The delegation had been told by the German commander in RHODES that he was concerned over the shortage of food for the civilian population and that even British relief ships would be allowed. The delegation reported that the Germans were proposing to evacuate 10,000 civilians from RHODES and that the population of the island were seeking opportunities to leave. POLIZ pointed out that, unless the Turks could be persuaded to accept the responsibility for refugees from RHODES, they would become an unwelcome British constituent. He suggested that it would be more economical to introduce relief through the medium of the International Red Cross and that, if the International Red Cross were unwilling to participate, the despatch of a British ship should be considered, subject to satisfactory safeguards. He drew a parallel between the case of RHODES and the case of the CHANNEL ISLANDS.

3. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, accordingly requested a statement of the Supreme Allied Commander's policy :-

(a) as to whether relief supplies should be despatched under either International Red Cross or Allied auspices to the civilian population of enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN.

(b) as to whether mass evacuation of civilians from enemy occupied islands in the AEGEAN should be permitted.

He points out that it would clearly assist the enemy war effort to allow either (a) or (b).

J.H. Laschilles
J.H. LASCHILLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

See P. 16, File 27/005

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Secretary, General Staff
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Chief, Liaison Section
Chief, Communications, Allied Commission

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SMU (P) (44) 259
25th December 1944

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SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

28 DEC 1944

PARTICIPATION BY ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ALLIED
LOCAL RESOURCES BOARD.

Note by the Secretary

1. On 2 December 1944 the Allied Commission submitted to the first meeting of the Industrial Coordination Committee, Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board, a proposal that a representative of the Italian Government (Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labour) be admitted to membership of the Industrial Coordination Committee.

2. The Allied Commission offered the following grounds for this proposal:

"The Allied Commission believes that participation by the Ministry in the work of the Committee would be helpful to all parties concerned. As is now attempting, insofar as possible to have all operational functions in the field of industrial production performed by the Italians themselves. If the Italian Government is to assume an increasing measure of responsibility for the Italian economy, it is essential for its representatives to have a participation in the discussion as to the use of that economy in furthering the war effort and in decreasing the extent to which Italy needs to call on the United States for essential civilian supplies. Moreover, it would help the Italian Government and people to understand the necessary limitations of supply and transport, and spur them to put forth their best efforts in the development of local resources, if they participated in the deliberations on the allocation of the relatively scarce resources that are available."

3. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, also presided at the meeting mentioned. He requested that the proposal be considered by the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, and has suggested that there be considered also the question of a hierarchy of representatives of the Italian Government on the Board itself.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to approve in principle participation by the Italian Government in the Allied Force Local Resources (Italian) Board and its Departmental Committees and to authorize the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to proceed accordingly.

2. The Allied Commission offered the following reasons for this proposal:

"7. The Allied Commission believes that participation by the industry in the work of the Committee will be helpful to all parties concerned. As is now attempting, insofar as possible to have all operational functions in the field of industrial production performed by the Italians themselves. If the Italian Government is to assume an increasing measure of responsibility for the Italian economy, it is essential for its representatives to begin to participate in the decision-making as to the use of that economy in furthering the war effort and in developing the extent to which Italy needs to call on the United Nations for essential Italian supplies. Moreover, it would help the Italian Government and people to understand the necessary limitations of supply and transport, and enable them to put forth their best efforts in the development of local resources, if they participated in the determinations on the allocation of the relatively scarce resources that are available."

3. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, also provided at the meeting mentioned, and requested that the proposal be considered by the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, and has suggested that there be considered also the question of membership of representatives of the Italian Government on the Board itself.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference in response to a move in principle participation by the Italian Government in the Italian Force Level Resources (Italian) Board and its dependent Committee and to authorize the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission to proceed accordingly.

for [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
J. [unclear]
CHIEF, ALLIED COMMISSION.

Su P. 97, 21/05/45

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (44) 158

27th December, 1944.

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

RADIO PLAN FOR LIBERATED ITALY

Note by Chief, INC

I. Objectives with reference to radio in ITALY

1. The ultimate objective of Allied effort in the field of radio is to promote a free radio which will not be the instrument for any Government, political party or group of private interests.

2. To this end Italian radio should be adjusted to the conditions of the free ITALY of tomorrow. This does not mean that Italian radio should necessarily be re-modelled along British or American lines. Rather it must be based upon Italian character, temperament, traditions and economic possibilities. It must be politically free but not beyond the reach of criticism.

II. Present FMB Policy

1. Conforming to overall directives, which call for the swiftest possible transfer to Italian hands of all domestic services, FMB transferred on 1 October 1, 1944, to EIAZ, the existing Italian radio organization, the responsibility for, and the actual organization and production of, all musical programmes in AS territory, both "live" and recorded, representing approximately 50 per cent of the total radio output. FMB continues to assist EIAZ in the production of musical programmes especially as regards supply of recorded programmes.

2. FMB retains the right to intervene and to request modifications in EIAZ's musical programmes:-

- (a) If it becomes apparent that these programmes pursue political aims at variance with those of the United Nations.
- (b) If the quality, artistically or technically, of the programmes on broadcast is not of sufficiently high standard.
3. FMB retains the responsibility for and the actual organization and production of the "spoken" programmes, v.g. news and political commentary, and other spoken features, dramatizations and prose readings.

2. To this end Italian radio should be adjusted to the conditions of the free Italy of tomorrow. This does not mean that Italian radio should necessarily be re-modelled along British or American lines. Rather it must be based upon Italian character, temperament, traditions and economic possibilities. It must be politically free but not beyond the reach of criticism.

ii. Present PWE Policy

1. Conforming to overall directives, which call for the swiftest possible transfer to Italian hands of all domestic services, PWE transferred on 1 October 1944, to EIAZ, the existing Italian radio organisation, the responsibility for, and the actual organisation and production of, all musical programmes in 43 territories, both alive and recorded, representing approximately 80 per cent of the total radio output. PWE continues to assist EIAZ in the production of musical programmes especially as regards supply of recorded programmes.

2. PWE retains the right to intervene and to request modifications in EIAZ's musical programme:-

- (a) If it becomes apparent that these programmes pursue political aims at variance with those of the United Nations.
- (b) If the quality, artistically or technically, of the programmes as broadcast is not of sufficiently high standard.

3. PWE retains the responsibility for and the actual organisation and production of the "spoken" programmes, e.g. news and political commentary, and other spoken features, dramatizations and prose readings.

iii. Recommendations

1. Upon the basis of proposals made to it by PWE the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee (PWSOC (44) 8th Meeting) recommends that the Italian Government be invited:-

- (a) To create a Board of Governors to act as advisers to the management of EIAZ with a term of two years composed of the following:

- 1. Chairman of the Minister of Education
- 1. University Professor
- 1. Industrialist
- 1. Member of EIAZ Employees' Association
- 1. Musician
- 1. Author
- 1. Journalist

See P.W.S. File 10/54

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Each, with the exception of the first, to be nominated by the appropriate body. e.g., the Association of University Professors, the Chamber of Commerce, the Federations of Stamps, etc; the terms to be staggered in order to preserve continuity of experience.

- (b) To call upon this Board of Governors to make recommendations concerning the future organization and operation of EIAZ consistent with the maintenance of a free radio in ITALY after the time of withdrawal of PWE from the Italian radio field.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to approve the foregoing recommendations and to authorize the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in conjunction as necessary with the appropriate authorities, to take action accordingly.

(Incd) A.C.V.H.
for A.I. No 5.

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(Info) A.C. V.H.
for A.C. Mc G.

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E. J. McCarroll
Chief Commissioner, Allied
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27th December 1944

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28 DEC 1944

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

PRIVATE PRESS AGENCIES IN ITALY

Note by the Chief of Staff

13, File 217/ces.

1. The Sub-Committee on News Agencies appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC (P) (44) 36th Meeting, minute 5) met on 26th December 1944 to consider the questions referred to it by the Supreme Allied Commander.
2. The Sub-Committee also had before it a proposal by the Chief, Commander, Allied Commission, to permit private news agencies to sell news to newspapers of the city of Rome, only.
3. The Sub-Committee recommends to the Supreme Allied Commander as follows:-

(a) Reference question (i), as to the juncture at which the P/B screen on news should be removed and the operation of private news agencies permitted:-

- (1) That private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of Rome on and after 15 January 1944.
- (2) That a technical sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Allied Commission, P/B, UK, and the Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ, be appointed to investigate the time and the methods by which the distribution of news to newspapers throughout the remainder of liberated Italy by private news agencies will be feasible.

(b) Reference question (ii), as to the safeguards which should be established to ensure against the development in Italy of a monopolistic indigenous news agency:

That for the time being no Italian news agency be permitted to distribute news in Italy outside Rome. That the time when RTI, or any other Italian news agency, is to be permitted to enter the field of news distribution be investigated by the technical sub-committee.

(c) Reference question (iii), as to what measures should be taken to avoid publication of material likely to lead to disorder and unrest:

That nothing other than normal censorship should be undertaken, unless a serious situation from the military point of view seems

See 460 ff
File 217/ces.

Sub-Committee recommends to the Supreme Allied Commander as follows:-

(a) Reference question (i), as to the juncture at which the FIP screen on news should be removed and the operation of private news agencies permitted:-

(1) That private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of ROME on and after 15 January 1944.

(2) That a technical sub-committee consisting of representatives of the Allied Commission, P.F., I.M., and the Chief Signale Officer, AFHQ, be appointed to investigate the time and the methods by which the distribution of news to newspapers throughout the remainder of liberated Italy by private news agencies will be feasible.

Sz. H. G. R.

File 21/10/43

(b) Reference question (ii), as to the safeguards which should be established to ensure against the development in Italy of a monopolistic indigenous news agency:

That for the time being no Italian news agency be permitted to distribute news in Italy outside ROME. That the time when AFHQ, or any other Italian news agency, is to be permitted to enter the field of news distribution be investigated by the technical sub-committee.

(c) Reference question (iii), as to what measures should be taken to avoid publication of material likely to lead to disorder and unrest:

That nothing other than normal censorship should be undertaken, unless a serious situation from the military point of view seems likely to arise. The security risk admittedly existing as a result of the admission of private news agencies to ROME is outweighed by the advantage in respect of freedom of the press, particularly in view of the power of the Supreme Allied Commander under the mission terms to impose necessary measures of censorship in most particular situations which may arise.

(initd) J.S.

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Sub (P) (u) 116
20th December 1944

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
K-507

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Confidential
28 DEC 1944
SUBJECT: ALLIED OPERATIONS' S. CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

REPORT TO ALBANIA

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

1. On 23 December G-5 submitted a staff study directing attention to the following:-

a. Military Liaison Hq (Albania) had been directed to introduce relief supplies into Kibari, and the troop concentration date set at 3 January 1945.

b. It is planned that the Durazzo Harbor will be swept on approximately 27 December 1944 and AL (A) troops will follow immediately.

c. Neither the U.S. nor B.R. Governments are recognized as Albanian Government, and are therefore not in session on the part of AL (A) should consent then to recognition of any particular group.

d. This Headquarters has advised that no negotiations should be carried out with Col. Ben. Mulla (Mulla), except that Lt. Col. Palmer has suggested to advise him of the future and scope of AL (A) organization, the fact that AL (A) charter was in no way subject to alteration, and to request him to instruct his Durazzo representatives to enter into the necessary local agreements with AL (A).

e. At this time it had been decided that one U.S. and one B.R. AL (A) representatives should be made available to clarify any technical points that might arise.

f. Lt. Col. Palmer on his return has reported that on 20 December 1944 he called on the AL (A) Hq, and Mulla reserved consideration on issuance of the requested instructions, because of the following factors:

- (1) Number of personnel involved.
- (2) Observance.

Col. Gen. Mulla indicated that the attendance of "his staff" officers at his Headquarters would not be required, and that his organization was ready to determine relief needs and to administer supply distribution.

g. In order to make a delivery 15/25 delivery of engineer stores to repair

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- (3) Following arrival of Engineer stores further supplies will be required to put the port in order to receive relief supplies.
 - (4) Any unnecessary delay should be avoided as tending to increase Albanian suspicion.
2. Under these circumstances, G-5 recommended that:
- a. The necessary stores be called forward as imminent immediately.
 - b. Lt. Col. Palmer be instructed to return to HDXHA's HQ on 27 December 1944.
 - (1) to obtain his reply to the request that he instruct his representatives at Durazzo to enter into the necessary local agreements and,
 - (2) to advise this HQ and ML (a) not later than 29 December 1944 of any further points requiring detailed clarification.
 - c. Should such clarification be necessary the Commander and Deputy Commander ML (a) should proceed to HDXHA, after briefing, to advise final terms.
 - d. If these terms were not accepted
 - (1) ML (a) officers should return,
 - (2) arrangements should be made immediately over PWs in Albanian and in English, of the terms of the offer and of HDXHA's refusal,
 - (3) the ship should be held or diverted and concentration of troops cancelled.
 - e. The British Resident Minister, U.S. Political Adviser, GSO and the Deputy SAC appeared in the recommendations of G-5 as yet forth have except that the Deputy SAC expressed the view that past experience gives little hope of any useful action prior to reaching agreement. In all the ship forward now would only result in lost shipping time. The Deputy SAC therefore recommended that an agreement be reached prior to sailing forward. Accordingly the ship was not held called forward, but Lt. Col. Palmer has been instructed to proceed as in para 2b.
 - f. The Supreme Allied G. Commander in Conference is requested to take note of the above developments.

(Intd) T.R.H.

- c. Such clarification be necessary the Commander and Deputy Commander AL (A) should proceed to HQMA, after briefing, to advise field teams.
- d. If these terms were not accepted
- (1) AL (A) officers should return,
 - (2) arrangements should be made immediately over PWs in Albanian and in English, of the terms of the offer and of HQMA's refusal,
 - (3) the ship should be sold or diverted and concentration of troops cancelled.
3. The British Resident Minister, U.S. Political Advisor, SAS and the Deputy SAS concurred in the recommendations of G-5 as set forth above except that the Deputy SAS expressed the view that past experience gave little hope of any useful action prior to reaching agreements. To call the ship forward now would only result in lost shipping time. The Deputy SAS therefore recommended that an agreement be reached prior to sailing forward. Accordingly the ship has not been called forward, but Lt. Col. Palmer has been instructed to proceed as in para 2b.
4. The Cyprus Allied C. Officer in Conference is requested to take note of the above developments.

(Intd) P.M.C.
for J.M.S.

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SAC (P) (44) 155
170 December 1944

ALLIED SUPREMACY HEADQUARTERS

CONFIDENTIAL

REF NO 32

SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. The Supreme Allied Commander has directed (Conclusion 3(c) of PG (44) 35th Meeting) that G-5 prepare for his approval a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the present position in regard to Sicilian wheat and the immediate action being taken and requesting guidance as to the course to be adopted in the event of continued Italian failure to secure adequate local amendment.
2. On 13th December the Chief Administrative Officer held a meeting, a record of which is contained in paper No. PG (44) 55. It will be observed that at Conclusion (a) of the record of this meeting G-5 were directed to prepare a telegram to the Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 grams ration throughout liberated Italy. A draft telegram has been prepared and coordinated with the appropriate authorities. A copy of this draft telegram is attached.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested :

- (a) To authorize the despatch of the attached draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- (b) To direct that in the event of an unfavourable reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff G-5, in conjunction with the appropriate authorities, prepare for his approval a further telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending,
 - (i) the introduction of a reduced uniform bread ration throughout Italy,
 - (ii) the terms of a statement for issue jointly by the United States and British Governments explaining the reasons which necessitated the introduction of the reduced uniform scale.

- (c) To endorse Conclusion (b) of the meeting held by the Chief Administrative Officer on 13th December to the effect that the Allied Com-

2. On 13th December the Chief Administrative Officer held a meeting, a record of which is contained in paper No. PC (Ad.) 162. It will be observed that at Conclusion (a) of the record of this meeting G-5 were directed to prepare a telegram to the Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 grams ration throughout liberated Italy. A draft telegram has been prepared and coordinated with the appropriate authorities. A copy of this draft telegram is attached.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested:

(a) To authorize the despatch of the attached draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) To direct that in the event of an unfavourable reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff G-5, in conjunction with the appropriate authorities, prepare for his approval a further telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending,

(i) the introduction of a reduced uniform bread ration throughout Italy;

(ii) the terms of a statement for issue jointly by the United States and British Governments explaining the reasons which necessitated the introduction of the reduced uniform scale.

(c) To endorse Conclusion (b) of the meeting held by the Chief Administrative Officer on 13th December to the effect that the Allied Commission be directed to draw up plans for further wheat shipments to Sicily after 10th January 1945, but to defer any action to implement such plans for the present.

See F.7, Page 20/20.

to General
J.H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Director, FBI
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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TO: CCS personnel from Field Marshal Sir H. Alexander (repeated to the President and the Prime Minister respectively through State Department and Foreign Office channels).

1. This is a personal and urgent request to you for a firm and final statement of the policy of our two Governments on the provision of bread for the population of ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA, supported by a firm and final guarantee of the means to implement that policy month by month over minimum periods of not less than six months. This request has the complete support of my political and economic advisers.
2. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has always been to limit sufficient imports to provide a basic ration of 200 grams of flour or 250 grams of bread. From the earliest days of our responsibility in ITALY a ration of 300 grams of bread has been recognized as desirable if disease and unrest are to be avoided. Such a ration is far below the standard obtaining in FRANCE and GREECE; it is lower than that in N.A. Europe as a whole. The matter is, therefore, not one of preferential treatment for ITALY; it is the primary and fundamental means of preventing unrest and disease and so of providing the conditions in ITALY necessary for the continuance of military operations.
3. As you have been advised, it has been our constant endeavour to raise the target figure of 300 grams by making full use of the local resources of ITALY. We have proved that there is always a discrepancy between what it is theoretically possible to want for controlled distribution, and what is in fact, assessed and available for this purpose. This is no new problem and is always

2. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has always been to allot sufficient imports to provide a basic ration of 200 grams of flour or 250 grams of bread. From the earliest days of our responsibility in ITALY a ration of 300 grams of bread has been recognized as desirable. If disease and unrest are to be avoided. Such a ration is far below the standard obtaining in FRANCE and GREECE; it is lower than that in N.W. Europe as a whole. The matter is, therefore, not one of preferential treatment for ITALY; it is the primary and fundamental means of preventing unrest and disease and so of providing the conditions in ITALY necessary for the continuance of military operations.

3. As you have been advised, it has been our constant endeavour to raise the target figure of 300 grams by making full use of the local resources of ITALY. We have proved that there is always a discrepancy between what it is theoretically possible to achieve for controlled distribution, and what is in fact, unassessed and available for this purpose. This is no new problem and is always most acute in peasant-populated countries with weak local administration. We cannot hope within measurable time to correct it. It is therefore idle to discuss further the use of grain which for controlled distribution in support of a ration scale is non-existent. Nor is it more useful to place the responsibility to the Italian Government for a problem which they cannot solve.

4. Hitherto we have been able to establish a ration of 300 grams south of the Garigliano. It has not been possible to do so north of this line, where, 2,000 grams bread ration obtains. The disparity between the two zones is causing resentment and distress which have already led to disorders and this fact has again been brought to my notice by my Army Commanders. In the combat zone and in

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newly liberated areas the combination of undernourishment and the winter operational conditions is causing the greatest hardship; and the necessity for preventing militarily serious disorders in and near the combat zone is as imperative as the political and military necessity for preventing them in the south.

5. There is no doubt that the Italian people regard the statement made by the President and the Prime Minister as constituting a pledge which will not be broken; and in this connection I wish to quote the following statement on which they base their hopes.

a. "The first objective in improving the lot of the Italian people is to furnish relief from hunger and sickness and misery". (Joint statement by the President and Prime Minister, 26 September 1944).

b. "Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in ITALY where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency". (The President on 29 October 1944).

c. "Under any circumstances I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams throughout all of ITALY that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you could ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks, in whatever number is required, to provide a minimum transport system to get the food to the people". (The President's letter to the War Department dated 31 October 1944).

6. The amount of wheat being shipped to this country is not sufficient to feed our troops. Of late weeks the cuts which have been imposed ask

a. "The first objective in improving the lot of the Italian people is to furnish relief from hunger and sickness and famine". (Joint statement by the President and Prime Minister, 26 September 1944).

b. "Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in ITALY where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency". (The President on 29 October 1944).

c. "Under any circumstances I have determined to assume the responsibility for asking General Wilson to increase the ration to 300 grams turning out all of ITALY that our forces occupy. Furthermore, I wish that you would ask the War Shipping Administration to send additional trucks, in whatever number is required, to provide a minimum transport system to get the food to the people". (The President's letter to the War Department dated 31 October 1944).

d. The amount of wheat being shipped to this country is not sufficient to implement these promises. Of late weeks the cuts which have been imposed make it impossible for me to plan consistently for any uniform ration. It will be superfluous for me to emphasize the administrative and political objections to an unstable ration scale for such a basic foodstuff as bread. It has, for example, been brought to my notice that some fifty to sixty thousand tons only are expected to arrive in this country in January, as against previously planned and advised shipments of ninety thousand tons of wheat equivalent. It is impossible to plan the feeding of a population of 25 million people (and later 45 million) with a plan which, as past experience has shown, may be upset from week to week. Further, the shipping allotted to us for operational maintenance has already been so cut that it will not permit of any further ^{technological} ~~TOP SECRET~~

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operations are to continue as planned. I would also draw your attention to the fact that whatever difficulties confront us now they may be counted as small compared with those which we march to meet in the densely populated areas of Northern ITALY.

7. In order to provide for a uniform 300 gram bread ration throughout ITALY, SICILY and SARDINIA (including the provision for future commitments in North ITALY), I estimate that I shall require an average import of 185,000 tons monthly for the 5 months February to June. For each month during which the portion of ITALY north of our present line does NOT become a commitment, an average of 91,000 tons can be deducted, provided forward stockpiling is eliminated.

8. I am aware in general terms of the shipping situation, and alive to the effect of conflicting claims of many operations in many theatres of war. It is my duty, however, to point out to you in terms which allow of no misunderstanding that I cannot continue to administer those parts of ITALY under my control in accordance with the policies quoted above and which are known to the Italians, unless I am regularly and continuously provided with the means to do so. I believe that, both for our immediate war effort and for the final achievement of peace, an ITALY which does not cause the perpetual grievances of broken promises, hunger and apathy and a growing physical weakness of her people, will be the best testimony to the justice of Allied dealing. I do not think that firm and generous treatment will be without its effect as an example to other countries.

average of 94,000 tons can be deducted, provided forward stockpiling is eliminated.

8. I am aware in general terms of the shipping situation, and alive to the effect of conflicting claims of many operations in many theatres of war. It is my duty, however, to point out to you in terms which allow of no misunderstanding that I cannot continue to administer those parts of ITALY under my control in accordance with the policies quoted above and which are known to the Italians, unless I am regularly and continuously provided with the means to do so. I believe that, both for our immediate war effort and for the final achievement of peace, an ITALY which does not nurse the perpetual grievances of broken promises, hunger and apathy and a growing physical weakness of her people, will be the best testimony to the justice of allied dealing. I do not think that firm and generous treatment will be without its effect as an example to other countries.

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SAC(F)(44)154
16 December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

1. A draft for a tripartite agreement, between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CNLI), was circulated with paper No. PC(44)144. Owing to the delay in the formation of the new Italian Government, it later became necessary, as explained in paper No. PC(44)144 Annexure, to return the CNLI delegation without this agreement having been signed. Instead, the signatures of the delegation were obtained to a bipartite agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CNLI.

2. However, in accordance with the sense of the discussions at PC(44)34th Meeting Minute 3 and PC(44)35th Meeting Minute 8, Commander SOMO discussed the draft tripartite agreement with the CNLI delegates before their return to Northern Italy. It appeared that the delegation had certain objections to this draft, of which the more important were:-

- (a) In regard to Paragraph 1 of the draft agreement, the delegates considered it essential that the CNLI should be recognized as the agents of the Italian Government both by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander. They do not consider that there is any reason why they, who are seeking recognition from the Italian Government, should themselves recognize it; and they believe that by seeking recognition from it they are acknowledging its authority.
- (b) The delegates objected to the inclusion of the words "including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so" at the end of Paragraph 5 of the draft agreement. They consider that such wording:-
- (i) Implies distrust on the part of the other signatories.
 - (ii) Is unnecessary because it is implied in the preceding words "and will obey orders issued by him or by the Allied Military Government on his behalf."

(iii) Is undue in that it unnecessarily draws attention at

to the duty in the formation of the new Italian Government, it later became necessary, as explained in paper No. 40(44)P.L. Annexure, to return the CNLIA delegation without this agreement having been signed. Instead, the signatures of the delegation were obtained to a bipartite agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and the CNLIA.

2. Moreover, in accordance with the sense of the discussions at 40(44)34th Meeting Minute 3 and 40(44)35th Meeting Minute 3, Commander SOTTO discussed the draft tripartite agreement with the CNLIA delegates before their return to Northern Italy. It appeared that the delegation had certain objections to this draft, of which the more important were:-

(a) In regard to Paragraph 1 of the draft agreement, the delegates considered it essential that the CNLIA should be recognized as the agents of the Italian Government both by the Italian Government and by the Supreme Allied Commander. They do not consider that there is any reason why they, who are seeking recognition from the Italian Government, should themselves recognize it; and they believe that by seeking recognition from it they are acknowledging its authority.

(b) The delegates objected to the inclusion of the words "including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so" at the end of Paragraph 5 of the draft agreement. They consider that such wording:-

(i) Implies distrust on the part of the other signatories.

(ii) Is unnecessary because it is implicit in the preceding words "and will obey orders issued by him or by the Allied Military Government on his behalf."

(iii) Is unwise in that it unnecessarily draws attention at this stage to a situation which, because it has given rise to such problems in other liberated territories, is delicate in the extreme.

3. On the other hand, the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, has expressed the view that the Italian Government should not be requested to confer on the CNLIA any more definite recognition than is contained in Paragraph 1 of the existing draft.

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4. A further meeting is therefore being held in Rome on Sunday, 17th December, between the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and representatives of Commander SOMMO and G-5. As a result of this meeting, it is hoped to lay before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference a revised draft memorandum of agreement, which the Supreme Allied Commander will be invited to approve for transmission to the Italian Government.

J. H. LSCHELES

J. H. LSCHELES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

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Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission (c/o G-5)
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16 December 1944

ALLIED COMMERCE DEPARTMENT

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CONF NO 32

SUMMARY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

POLICY REGARDING PRIVATE NEWS AGENCIES IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

18 DEC 1944



1. In a previous paper (number RC(44)127) the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee recommended:

a. That private news agencies should not be allowed to start up in Italy as long as that country remained a theatre of operations.

b. That P.W.B. should endeavor to prepare the ground for the establishment of Italian co-operative and non-monopolistic news agency to be ready to function that privately owned agencies begin to operate. This co-operative agency could be owned and operated by member newspapers and be in competition with private agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press, etc.

2. This paper was discussed at RC(44)32nd Meeting when the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and the British Resident Minister both requested that the foregoing policy should be revised and that in order to give the Italians greater liberty, private agencies should now be permitted. In consequence, the Supreme Allied Commander directed that P.W.B., G-2, G-3 and the Allied Commission, should endeavor to agree on the action to be taken and report accordingly.

3. The Chairman of the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee thereupon held a meeting in Rome with the Allied Commission and G-5, at which it was agreed that P.W.B. would not interpose any objection to the entrance of private news agencies. It was, however, pointed out that their entrance might:

a. Retard the progress of a non-monopolistic private Italian agency.

b. Possibly impair the political situation through the admission of the news from outside sources which are, at the present time, screened by P.W.B.

4. It has been determined from consultations with the private news

b. That P.B. should endeavor to prepare the ground for the establishment of Italian co-operative and non-monopolistic news agency to be ready to function when privately owned agencies begin to operate. This co-operative agency could be owned and operated by member news-reports and be in competition with private agencies such as Reuters, Associated Press, etc.

2. This paper was discussed at EC(44)32nd Meeting when the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission and the British Resident Minister both requested that the foregoing policy should be revised and that in order to give the Italians greater liberty, private agencies should now be permitted. In consequence, the Supreme Allied Commander directed that P.B., G-2, G-5 and the Allied Commission, should endeavor to agree on the action to be taken and report accordingly.

3. The Chairman of the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee therefor held a meeting in Rome with the Allied Commission and G-5, at which it was agreed that P.B. would not interpose any objection to the entrance of private news agencies. It was, however, pointed out that their entrance might:

a. Retard the progress of a non-monopolistic private Italian agency.

b. Possibly impair the political situation through the admission of the news from outside sources which are, at the present time, screened by PAB.

4. It has been determined from consultations with the private news agencies that they will be willing and able to take over as from 15 January.

5. G-2 point out that, although there does not appear to be any direct security risk from the entrance of these private agencies, there is, in view of the disturbed political situation in liberated territory, an indirect risk that unfiltered news might further impair the political situation to such an extent that it might become necessary to withdraw Allied troops from the front for internal security reasons.

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6. The ruling of the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is re-
quoted as to whether the political advantage to be obtained by allowing
the entrance of private agencies into E.M.I. justifies the increased mili-
tary risk involved.

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for J. H. L. LACELLE
COLONEL
SECRETARY

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Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
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Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
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British Resident Minister
Director, F.B.
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
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Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
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EC (44) 152
13th December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

FOOD RATIONING IN ITALY

Record of a meeting held in the Chief Administrative
Officer's Office at 1100 hours on Wednesday 13th
December 1944.

PRESIDENT :-

Lieutenant General J.G.W. Clark,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Colonel D.M. Libby, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (A)

Major General R.G. Lewis,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (B)

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied
Commission

Colonel J.E. Butterworth,
G-5 Section

Colonel J. Legg,
Allied Commission

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political
Adviser

SECRETARY :-

Major J.G. Sweetman

THE MEETING had before them the following documents from the Allied
Commission :-

- (a) A letter from the Chief Commissioner stating strongly the case for
implementing a 300 grams bread ration in ITALY, but recommending
that, in the event of shipping being inadequate to support such a
scale, ration parity should nevertheless be established throughout
the liberated area (including SICILY and SARDINIA).

(b) A draft statement to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, explaining the

Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Brigadier M.S. Lush, representing
Chief Commissioner, Allied
Commission

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Colonel J.B. Butterworth,
G-5 Section

Colonel D.M. Libby, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (A)

Colonel J. Legg,
Allied Commission

Major General R.G. Lewis,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (B)

Mr. C. O'Flaherty,
Deputy U.S. Political
Adviser

Colonel T.B. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

SECRETARY :-

Major J.G. Sweetman

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Commission :-

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implementing a 300 grams bread ration in ITALY, but recommending
that, in the event of snipping being inadequate to support such a
scale, ration parity should nevertheless be established throughout
the liberated area (including SICILY and SARDINIA).
- (b) A draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, explaining the
position in regard to food supplies in ITALY and recommending that,
if shipping to make a 300 grams ration possible cannot be guaran-
teed, the decision to reduce the ration in the southern area and at
the same time equalise it throughout the country should be communi-
cated to the Italian Government in a joint statement to be made by the
Allied Governments.
- (c) A draft joint statement by the Allied Governments in accordance with
(b) above.

COLONEL HENN stated that there were three problems which the meeting
should consider. The first was that of wheat supplies for SICILY. The
Supreme Allied Commander had reported on 24th September to the Combined Chiefs
of Staff that he did not propose to import wheat into that island as suffi-
cient local grain was available. Later, in view of the failure of the

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assessment of Sicilian wheat to reach early estimates, the Allied Commission had been directed to investigate the possibilities of emergency feeding in SICILY, but examination had shown that little could be expected in this respect. At PC (44) 25th Meeting, Minute 3(e), G-5 had been directed to prepare a cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff advising them of the position and the immediate action which had been directed, and requesting guidance as to the course to be adopted in the event of continued Italian failure to secure adequate local assessment. G-5's draft cable on this subject had not been completed by G-4 (A), who maintained that any further diversion of shipping from operational requirements was not acceptable and consequently a ration, which could not be covered by existing allocations, could not be recommended. The second problem before the meeting was the consideration of the Allied Commission's recommendation that it was necessary to establish parity in rationing, so as to provide to the best of our ability an equitable standard throughout the country. The Allies had a clear responsibility in this respect. Thirdly, the meeting should produce a draft statement for publication in the event of the equalisation of the ration, at a level below 300 grammes, being necessary.

BRIGADIER LUSH said the Chief Commissioner was strongly of opinion that equalisation of the ration was essential. The decision as to the scale at which parity should be effected must be made on the basis of a firm allocation of shipping for the importation of supplies. It was important that no promise should be made to maintain the ration on a level above what the shipping allocation would permit.

The Chief Commissioner further felt that any disparity in SICILY would create a most serious situation in that island. Brigadier Lush added that the fact must be faced that in SICILY further local supplies would not be produced for assessment on any appreciable scale no matter what action was taken. He further pointed out that the 300 gramme ration could not be implemented on the present shipping allocation without prejudicing the stock-pile which was earmarked to provide the minimum impact ration in northern ITALY.

MR. KIRK considered that the Chief Commissioner's letter made a very strong case for the establishment of a 300 gramme ration. In view of the present situation in ITALY and the statements which had been made by both the President and the Prime Minister (which had been interpreted in ITALY as a promise of a 300 gramme ration) he considered that SACMID ought to make the final request for an increased shipping allocation to allow of the establishment of a ration on this scale. The telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should therefore state fully the case for such a ration and point out the serious consequences to be expected from any reduction so that the President and the Prime Minister could assess the responsibility involved in a decision to withhold further shipping. He did not consider that the telegram should include any reference to the establishment of the ration on the scale of 250 grammes, nor was it necessary to raise the question of a joint statement at this stage. It should be emphasised that the establishment of a 300 gramme ration would not represent an especial favour to ITALY at the expense of other countries, but was merely the minimum essential to prevent disease and unrest and provide conditions in

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MAJOR GENERAL LEWIS agreed with Mr. Kirk that the telegram should be confined to presenting the case for a 300 gramme ration. He felt that experience in SYRIA had shown that there was no sovereign remedy for producing hoarded grain quickly. Several measures were necessary and these took a considerable time. On current decisions, supplies for SICILY were ensured until 10th January only, consequently sufficient time for effective action to bring out hoarded supplies was not available. Representations had been made in LONDON that the procedure for making the recent cuts in shipping had discriminated unfairly against this theatre and some additional allocation might be made available. He questioned whether it was right to divert in the next month some 14,000 tons of wheat to SICILY in view of Lieutenant General Clarke's opinion (expressed in a message CAO 346 of 12 December) that further supplies were urgently required in forward areas if militarily serious unrest was to be avoided.

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COLONEL LIBBY said that discussions now proceeding would not produce an increase in the theatre shipping allocation greater than three or four ships per month. He stressed that military maintenance could not be subject to any further cuts if operations were to continue. There could be no question of providing increased civilian shipments within the existing allocation. It was for that reason that while this allocation stood he could not agree to any policy involving an increase on the ration (of 200 grammes flour equivalent to 250 grammes bread) which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed in their reply to LAC VI of 28 December 1943.

COLONEL LEGG pointed out that the purpose of diverting 14,000 tons to SICILY was to avoid a reduction of the ration as the consequences of such a step were likely to be more serious than failure to raise the ration in the north. The Allied Commission desired to raise the ration in the forward area but did not consider that this should be done until a firm shipping allocation had been received and consequently a firm assessment had been made of the scale of ration which could be maintained.

COLONEL BUTTERWORTH, in reply to Major General Lewis, stated that the shipping required to implement a 300 gramme ration would be of the order of eight ships per month. He confirmed that the wheat was available and that shipping was the limiting factor. The advance of the armies had led to an increased civil commitment which it was not possible to meet within a static shipping allocation.

MR. HICAD agreed with Mr. Kirk that SACRED should recommend a 300 gramme ration in the strongest possible terms.

BRIGADIER LUSH enquired whether planning for the import of further wheat into SICILY after 10th January should proceed. In his view such shipments would be necessary, though the Italian Government should not be so informed at this stage.

THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER :

-
- (a) Directed that G-5 (in conjunction with G-4 (A), G-4 (B), British Resident Minister and U.S. Political Adviser) prepare for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff making a final request for the implementation of a 300 gramme ration throughout liberated ITALY in accordance with Mr. Kirk's remarks at IX' above.
 - (b) Directed that the Allied Commission draw up plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10th January 1945 but defer any action to implement such plans for the present.
 - (c) Approved in principle the proposal to establish parity in ration scales throughout liberated ITALY but ruled that no further action

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- (b) Directed that the Allied Commission draw up plans for further wheat shipments to SICILY after 10th January 1945 but defer any action to implement such plans for the present.
- (c) Approved in principle the proposal to establish parity in ration scales throughout liberated ITALY but ruled that no further action towards such parity, or in regard to the proposed joint statement by the Allied Governments, be taken until a reply had been obtained to the telegram to be despatched under (a) above.

See file 44, file 214/cos.

J. G. Sweetman
J.G. SWEETMAN,
MAJOR,
SECRETARY.

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN GREECE ON COMBINED
RELIEF OPERATIONS

DEC 1 1944

Note by Lt. Col. Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

1. Existing directives of the CCS for combined relief and rehabilitation operations in GREECE appear to contemplate the introduction of relief only into liberated areas in which reasonably settled conditions exist. A basic requirement is that distribution should be equitable without distinction of race, creed or politics. The Combined Chiefs have taken the position that where chaos and anarchy exist relief may be abrogated.
2. Recent developments in ATHENS include fighting between British forces and those of the Greek Government on the one side and EAM-ELAS forces on the other; declaration of military areas under full control of the British military; and domination of other areas by EAM-ELAS forces.
3. Under these circumstances ML GREENE is proceeding with combined relief operations pursuant to existing directives, insofar as conditions permit the import and distribution of supplies.
4. These conditions in GREECE however are such that the principles of equitable non-discriminatory distribution of relief supplies are extremely difficult to apply and enforce in any area or for the country as a whole. Those settled conditions (as distinguished from chaos and anarchy) on which combined relief operations are assumed to have been predicated do not and for some time may not exist. Relief operations if continued may well be discriminatory in effect if not by intention, according to the element in control of each area.
5. It is believed that continuance of combined relief operations in GREECE under existing conditions should be brought to the attention of the CCS for any comment which they may wish to make. Attached is a draft telegram designed to accomplish this purpose.
6. The Political Committee are invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to authorize the dispatch of this telegram.

(init) T. H. H.

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6. The Political Committee are invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to authorize the dispatch of this telegram.

(init)

T. R. H.

for

C. M. S.

NOTE: This paper will be taken as Item 5a. at the 35th Meeting of the Political Committee to be held at 1130 hours, Saturday, 19 December 1944.

1124

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TO : AGRAR FOR DCS

INFO: Central District UK Base Section (London) for British Chiefs of Staff, UK Command Main (ETOUKA)

signed Wilson cite PHED.

This is MAT _____

Effect of political and military developments on combined relief operations in GREECE is subject.

1. You are undoubtedly fully informed on subject of current political and military developments in GREECE. These include (a) fighting in ATHENS between forces of British and Greek Governments on the one side and EAM and ELAS on the other, (b) fighting between ELAS and other Greek elements in a few localities, and (c) co-operation for the introduction of relief between British and ELAS forces in still other localities dominated by EAM.

2. Under these circumstances ML GREECE is proceeding with combined relief operations insofar as circumstances permit and insofar as the import and distribution of supplies is possible, but there may well be some discrimination according to the elements in control at the different ports of entry.

3. In short present conditions in GREECE are such that the principles of equitable non-discriminatory distribution of relief supplies are extremely difficult to apply and enforce in any area or for the country as a whole. Those settled conditions mentioned in TAL 250 upon which combined relief operations were predicated do not and for some time may not exist.

between forces of British and Greek Governments on the one side and EAM and ELAS on the other, (b) fighting between ELAS and other Greek elements in a few localities, and (c) co-operation for the introduction of relief between British and ELAS forces in still other localities dominated by EAM.

2. Under these circumstances MI GREECE is proceeding with combined relief operations insofar as circumstances permit and insofar as the import and distribution of supplies is possible, but there may well be some discrimination according to the elements in control at the different ports of entry.

3. In short present conditions in GREECE are such that the principles of equitable non-discriminatory distribution of relief supplies are extremely difficult to apply and enforce in any area or for the country as a whole. Those settled conditions mentioned in TAA 250 upon which combined relief operations were predicated do not and for some time may not exist.

4. The foregoing is reported for your information and any comment which you may wish to make for the guidance of this Headquarters. Meanwhile we propose to continue the import and distribution of relief supplies to the extent permitted by prevailing conditions.

Distribution:

G-5	SO3
CAC	AD Records
G-3	C/S MTO
G-4 (B)	US POLAD
ISAPS	Brit. Res. Min.
G-4	

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DEC 1 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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TO (am) 120
1st December, 1944

K 510

CONF. M.

11 DEC 1944

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

SUBVERSION OF ITALIAN TROOPS INTO
THE YUGOSLAV ARMY OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION

Note by Secretary

1. A letter has been received by MOA from the Italian Minister of War, charging that representatives of the Yugoslav Partisans are inviting desertion of Italian soldiers. It is alleged that trucks were sent from the headquarters of the Partisan Committee in ROMA to SIENA to collect Italian soldiers who were to desert from Army units in order to enlist in Yugoslav formations. It is stated that the trucks actually returned with some seven Italian soldiers.

2. Liaison Section states that a report by the Intelligence officer of the United States Army Air Force Support Command, WFO, shows the following facts:-

- (a) There have recently been 462 desertions of men of Yugoslav origin, out of a total of 1600 such troops in the Italian division in the Command. There is no direct evidence that these desertions were provoked by Yugoslavs but the Commanding General of the division, his Chief of Staff, and several subordinate commanders were found to be of that opinion.
- (b) The Italian officers suspect the Yugoslav Headquarters in NAPLES to be the source of this proselytising. All the desertions of soldiers of Yugoslav origin have so far been from those units of the division which are located in the close neighbourhood of NAPLES. The units further away have not so far suffered from desertion.
- (c) These Italian officers state that the propaganda carried

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1. A letter has been received by MILA from the Italian Minister of War, charging that representatives of the Yugoslav Partisans are inviting desertion of Italian soldiers. It is alleged that trucks were sent from the headquarters of the Partisan Committee in ROMS to SIENA to collect Italian soldiers who were to desert from army units in order to enlist in Yugoslav formations. It is stated that the trucks actually returned with some seven Italian soldiers.

2. Liaison Section states that a report by the intelligence officer of the United States Army Air Force Support Command, WFO, shows the following facts:-

- (a) There have recently been 462 desertions of men of Yugoslav origin, out of a total of 2650 such troops in the Italian division in the Command. There is no direct evidence that these desertions were provoked by Yugoslavs but the Commanding General of the division, his Chief of Staff, and several subordinate commanders were found to be of that opinion.
 - (b) The Italian officers suspect the Yugoslav Headquarters in NAPLES to be the source of this proselytizing. All the desertions of soldiers of Yugoslav origin have so far been from those units of the division which are located in the close neighbourhood of NAPLES. The units further away have not so far suffered from desertion.
 - (c) These Italian officers state that the propaganda carried out by the Yugoslavs stresses the point that, unless Yugoslavs now join with Tito, it will be another five years or more before they see their families across the Adriatic, during the imminent Third War, which it is implied is sure to come between Russia and the remainder of the present Allies and co-belligerents.
 - (d) These desertions are markedly impairing the morale of native Italian troops.
- There are known to be a minimum of 13 Yugoslav Partisan officers in ROMS, 3 in NAPLES and 1 in TARANTO, apart from the NLA authorities in the BARI area. It is believed that a close investigation would reveal the existence of many more and their location in areas of ITALY in which the Yugoslavs can have no legitimate interest. There are, in addition, the Royal Yugoslav Delegates in ROMS and AIGERS.

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4. It is expected that a united provisional Yugoslav Government founded on the Subasic-Tito agreement will soon be established. When this takes place, it will be possible to call upon this Government to reduce its military representation in Italy to conform with its legitimate needs, which, apart from NLA Headquarters in Bari, would appear to be best related to a military component for any diplomatic mission it may wish to maintain in Rome.

5. In the interim, Liaison Section (with the concurrence of G-2, G-3, the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser) recommends:-

(a) That G-5 be directed to request the Allied Commission to address an interim reply to the Italian Minister of War stating that the Supreme Allied Commander shares the Minister's apprehension as to the effect of acts of this kind ~~and~~ has ordered a complete investigation into the activities of Yugoslav Partisan officers in Italy.

(b) That G-2, G-3, G-5, Liaison Section and 34 Military Mission be instructed to collect all information available as to the numbers, locations and activities of unauthorized Yugoslav Liaison officers and missions in Italy, and to render a report to the Political Committee in due course.

(c) That a further communication be made to the Italian Minister of War as soon as this report has been considered.

(d) That, as soon as it is established, the united provisional Yugoslav Government be asked to eliminate superfluous Liaison officers and missions, reducing its military representation to conform to its proper needs in Italy.

6. G-5 have pointed out that representations to the Yugoslavs to require the return of the alleged deserters to Italian military jurisdiction cannot at present be made, as the communication from the Italian Minister of War fails to identify the persons who are stated to have deserted.

7. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to authorize action in accordance with paragraph 5 above.

Minister's apprehension as to the effect of acts of this kind and has ordered a complete investigation into the activities of Yugoslav Partisan officers in Italy.

- (b) That G-2, G-3, G-5, Liaison Section and 34 Military Liaison be instructed to collect all information available as to the numbers, locations and activities of unauthorized Yugoslav Liaison officers and missions in Italy, and to render a report to the Political Committee in due course.
- (c) That a further communication be made to the Italian Minister of War as soon as this report has been considered.
- (d) That, as soon as it is established, the United Provisional Yugoslav Government be asked to eliminate superfluous liaison officers and missions, reducing its military representation to conform to its proper needs in Italy.
6. G-5 have pointed out that representations to the Yugoslavs to require the return of the alleged deserters to Italian military jurisdiction cannot at present be made, as the communication from the Italian Minister of War fails to identify the persons who are stated to have deserted.
7. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to authorize action in accordance with paragraph 5 above.

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
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PC (44) 149
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K 505

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DEC 8 - 1944

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELATIONS WITH THE YUGOSLAVS

Note by Secretary

Attached for information at Appendix "A" is a copy of the draft agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito which Brigadier Maclean has taken into Yugoslavia with him.

At Appendix "B" is a further draft agreement taken into Yugoslavia by Brigadier Maclean concerning purely naval matters.

to be enclosed
J. H. LASPES
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which Brigadier Maclean has taken into Yugoslavia with him.

At Appendix "B" is a further draft document taken into Yugoslavia by Brigadier Maclean concerning purely naval matters.

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Commander, ML HQ YUGOSLAVIA
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Appendix "B"

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PENDIX "A"

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K 505

DRAFT AGREEMENT BETWEEN SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE AND MARSHAL TITO

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1. It is agreed that for the purpose of supporting the JNL in their fight against the Germans in northern JUGOSL.VL., British forces should now be introduced into the Z.D.B. area. It is further agreed that these forces are being introduced into JUGOSL.VL. for the sole purpose of destroying the German armies and that they will be withdrawn when their presence is no longer required for this purpose.
2. The primary object of these forces will be to establish and maintain a base from which to extend and intensify air action against the enemy. To this end it is further agreed that the air forces in the Z.D.B. area shall be:-

6 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons (including the two JNL Squadrons) with the possible addition at a later date of another Fighter/Bomber Squadron and one Night Fighter Squadron.

.. Balkan Air Force Command Post

Ancillary Units including R.D.B. Units

The total air forces will be approximately 4,000 officers and men.

This force will be under the operational command of a Royal Air Force Officer, who in turn will be under the general direction of MARSHAL TITO for operations in JUGOSL.VL..

3. It is also agreed that British Land Forces should be sent to the

2. The primary object of these forces will be to establish and maintain a base from which to extend and intensify air action against the enemy. To this end it is further agreed that the air forces in the M.D.R area shall be:-

6 Fighter/Bomber Squadrons (including two J.M.L Squadrons) with the possible addition at a later date of another Fighter/Bomber Squadron and one Night Fighter Squadron.

a. Balkan Air Force Command Post

Ancillary Units including P.M.D.R Units

The total air forces will be approximately 4,000 officers and men.

This force will be under the operational command of a Royal Air Force Officer, who in turn will be under the general direction of M.A.S.H.L.T.T.O for operations in JUMOSL.VII.

3. It is also agreed that British Land Forces should be sent to the M.D.R area. The role of these forces will be to carry out the extensive technical work required to establish and maintain the port and base and in conjunction with the J.M.L to carry out the defence of the base as far forward as possible. They will also be available to carry out offensive operations in conjunction with the J.M.L forces if required. These forces shall act without the conclusion of a further agreement, exceed 20,000, of which not more than 50% will be fighting troops. They will include infantry, artillery, engineers, a small amount of light armour and the necessary technical signal and administrative units for the maintenance of the forces.

TOP SECRET

K 505

It is agreed that the operation of these forces will be carried out in consultation with and in support of the appropriate J.M.L. Commanders.

4. In order to facilitate naval operations further north in the J.M.L. IC it is agreed that operations may be carried out against those islands by those forces based on Z.D.R. or from advanced bases occupied by the Navy.
5. It is agreed that in order to prepare the way for the early arrival of these forces British reconnaissance parties shall be allowed to proceed forthwith and that full facilities and liberty of movement shall be granted by the J.M.L. Commanders and authorities to these parties.
6. It is understood that the British Authorities will be entirely responsible for the supply of the British forces introduced by them. The J.M.L. Authorities will, however, afford all reasonable help to the British forces in respect of local facilities in the area of operations. It is further understood that while entirely responsible for their own administration the British forces will in no way interfere with the local civil administration.
7. It is agreed that the implementation of this agreement shall be entrusted to the British Air and Land Force Commanders in close collaboration with the appropriate J.M.L. Commanders and that the latter will be nominated and given in writing full authority to treat with them.

arrival of these forces British reconnaissance parties shall be allowed to proceed forthwith and that full facilities and liberty of movement shall be granted by the J.N.L. Commanders and authorities to these parties.

6. It is understood that the British Authorities will be entirely responsible for the supply of the British forces introduced by them. The J.N.L. Authorities will, however, afford all reasonable help to the British forces in respect of local facilities in the area of operations.

It is further understood that while entirely responsible for their own administration the British forces will in no way interfere with the local civil administration.

7. It is agreed that the implementation of this agreement shall be entrusted to the British Air and Land Force Commanders in close collaboration with the appropriate J.N.L. Commanders and that the latter will be nominated and given in writing full authority to treat with them.

8. Arrangements for naval co-operation will be the subject of a separate agreement.

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APPENDIX "B"

K 505

~~Confidential~~

DRAFT NAVAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED
COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE AND MARSHAL TWO

1. The Allied Navies in furtherance of their operations in the ATLANTIC against the common enemy will require the temporary use of any ATLANTIC ports and anchorages which the operational situation may demand.
2. It will be necessary to install a British Naval Officer and Staff together with the necessary Naval personnel and equipment afloat or ashore at these ports in order to co-ordinate and organise the operational and administrative matters of the Allied Naval Forces and shipping.
3. The command of the ports will remain in JUGOSLAV hands, but it is agreed that:-
 - (a) The Allied Navies may conduct operations from and in the ports as they require.
 - (b) The Allied Navies may take their own Naval and anti-air defence measures.
 - (c) The JUGOSLAV Authorities will give every assistance to the British senior Naval officer and keep him informed of all matters which may affect Allied naval operations.
 - (d) The Allied Naval forces concerned will be withdrawn as

or ashore at these ports in order to co-ordinate and organise the operational and administrative matters of the Allied Naval Forces and shipping.

3. The command of the ports will remain in JUGOSLAV hands, but it is agreed that:-

- (a) The Allied Navies may conduct operations from and in the ports as they require.
- (b) The Allied Navies may take their own Naval and anti-air defence measures.
- (c) The JUGOSLAV authorities will give every assistance to the British senior Naval officer and keep him informed of all matters which may affect Allied naval operations.
- (d) The Allied Naval forces concerned will be withdrawn as soon as their presence is no longer required.

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6 December 1944

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K 506

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Confidential
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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

- 8 DEC 1944

ALLIED YUGOSLAV DESERTERS

Note by Secretary

1. The Yugoslav Delegation in EOMF has expressed to the Allied Commission their desire to obtain custody of certain Yugoslav Nationals residing in EOMF, on the grounds that they are deserters from the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation. Some of the persons sought are believed to be in Allied custody in a refugee camp.

2. G-5, with the concurrence of the British Resident Minister, the United States Political Advisor, and G-1 (2), have suggested that the Allied Commission's policy should be:

a. That proven deserters from the Yugoslav Armed Forces should be apprehended and returned to Yugoslavian military jurisdiction.

b. That the liberty of other persons, whose custody might be sought by the Yugoslav authorities for political or other reasons, should be protected.

3. It is considered, therefore, that a procedure should be set up whereby the Yugoslav authorities would be required to set forth certain particulars in regard to each person. This will permit the Allied authorities to screen requests without entering into political issues. It is also thought that the Allied Commission should require notification of a desertion within 60 days of its occurrence.

4. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to endorse the above proposals and to authorize the dispatch of the attached draft letter to the Allied Commission.

to General
J. H. LSCHELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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the Allied Commission's policy should be:

- a. That proven deserters from the Yugoslav Armed Forces should be apprehended and returned to Yugoslavian military jurisdiction.
 - b. That the liberty of other persons, whose custody might be sought by the Yugoslav authorities for political or other reasons, should be protected.
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to General
J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U. S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PEB
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters, Allied Commission,
..FC 304.

Subject: Alleged Yugoslav Deserters.

1. Under date of 30 November 44 (reference Dpr/2/G2/DP) a letter from Major KOLJENSIC of the Yugoslav Delegation in Rome, on the subject of Yugoslav deserters, was referred to this Headquarters.

2. You should advise Major KOLJENSIC that it will be your policy to assist him in every way in the apprehension of deserters from the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation, but that it will be necessary for him to conform with a procedure similar to that now in use in the Allied Armies. Each individual case will require to be considered separately, with a view to safeguarding the rights of a person whose apprehension is sought.

3. It will therefore be necessary for the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation to establish the identity of each deserter, and, prior to taking any action towards apprehension, you should require that particulars be furnished. This right be set forth in affidavit form as follows:

- (1) Name of deserter.
- (2) Rank.
- (3) Military Unit.
- (4) Date of enlistment or induction.
- (5) Date and circumstances of desertion.
- (6) Probable whereabouts.

You should also require notification of any desertion within 60 days thereof.

Yugoslav National Army of Liberation, but that it will be necessary for

him to conform with a procedure similar to that now in use in the Allied
Armies. Each individual case will require to be considered separately,
with a view to safeguarding the rights of a person whose apprehension is
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- (5) Date and circumstances of desertion.
- (6) Probable whereabouts.

You should also require notification of any desertion within 60
days thereof.

By Command of General ELISON:

J. A. H. GANELL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

IN (14) 147
5th December 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

COM NO. 33

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

ANTI-TITO YUGOSLAV MILITARY PERSONNEL

Note by Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. Four YUGOSLAV officers, General LUDJIN PAVLOVITCH, General MARNO MIBALOVITCH, General GEORGE GLITCHICH and General ALEXANDER BARKOVITCH, called at the Allied Commission with a view to seeking a channel to the appropriate authorities at this Headquarters in order to discuss their future plans.
2. These officers desire permission to form YUGOSLAVS who are not followers of TITO into combatant units to fight on any Allied front except against YUGOSLAVS. It is said that there are 250 officers and 1780 NCOs and GRs in SWITZERLAND who have signed a declaration indicating their willingness to fight on any Allied front but not under TITO. There are said to be 60 or 70 officers and 150 NCOs and GRs in ITALY, and a greater number in GERMANY and FRANCE who could be recruited for this purpose. The Generals also have information regarding anti-TITO factions in YUGOSLAVIA.

3. The position of anti-TITO personnel at this time is anomalous. These persons, if they do not enter the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation, may be treated as deserters if they should return to Yugoslav jurisdiction. It is their claim that there is a state of civil war in YUGOSLAVIA.

4. Entirely apart from technical legal considerations, it appears that to permit the recruitment of Yugoslavs hostile to TITO, outside of YUGOSLAVIA into combatant units would be inconsistent with our friendly relations with Marshal TITO. It is recommended that no action be taken with a view to any such development. It is believed in this case that no useful purpose can be served by an interview between the Yugoslav officers and officers of this Headquarters, and that such action would create a most dangerous precedent. It is recommended that the Allied Commission be instructed to advise the Yugoslav officers to this effect.

(initd) T.R.H.

for C.M.S.

except against YUGOSLAVS. It is said that there are 250 officers and 1780 NCOs and ORs in SWITZ-BLND who have signed a declaration indicating their willingness to fight on any Allied front but not under TITO. There are said to be 60 or 70 officers and 150 NCOs and ORs in ITALY, and a greater number in GRYFT and FRANCE who could be recruited for this purpose. The Generals also have information regarding anti-TITO factions in YUGOSLAVIA.

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(intd) T.R.H.

for C.M.S.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
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British Resident Minister
Director, PS
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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Chief of Mission Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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EC(44)1146

2 December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELIEF MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA

DEC 6 1944

Note by Asst. Asst't. Chief of Staff, G-5

1. At the time of the last Political Committee meeting the intention was to send the two ships, previously held loaded in the HELL, one each to the ports of SPLIT and DUBROVNIK. These ships were being sent in under certain conditions, less than those necessary for the implementation of the full ML plan, but such as had already been agreed during the discussions at BARI.

2. Subsequent to that meeting, and on the evening of the same day, a signal was received saying that TITO was unwilling to accept even these reduced conditions. He wished to have nothing to do with ML or UNRRA, and to sign for the supplies with an AFHQ nominee in BARI or BELGRADE; but he professed to accept the strict basic principles already laid down. He requested that all the supplies should be sent to SPLIT, and not part to SPLIT and part to DUBROVNIK as had been intended.

3. Telegram No FX-62867 was dispatched to the Maclean Mission on 4 December 1944 and should be read in conjunction with this paper.

(Inlt) L. B. H.

for C. M. S.

DISTRIBUTION:

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PWB

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2. Subsequent to that meeting, and on the evening of the same day, a signal was received saying that TITO was unwilling to accept even these reduced conditions. He wished to have nothing to do with ME or UNRRA, and to sign for the supplies with an ARHQ nominee in Bari or BELGRADE; but he professed to accept the strict basic principles already laid down. He requested that all the supplies should be sent to SPLIT, and not part to SPLIT and part to DUBROVNIK as had been intended.

3. Telegram No 87-62867 was dispatched to the Maclean Mission on 4 December 1944 and should be read in conjunction with this paper.

(init) T. R. R.

For C. M. S.

DISTRIBUTION:

Supreme Allied Commander
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
 Chief of Staff
 Chief Administrative Officer
 Deputy Chief of Staff
 U.S. Political Adviser
 British Resident Minister
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 Secretary, General Staff
 Secretary, IS & PS
 Chief, Liaison Section
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PO (44) 143

4th December, 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

ITALIAN SCHOONER ROUTINES

Note by Secretary

1. With the coming of winter months, and the consequent bad weather, the operation of schooners off the Adriatic Coast northwards from BRINDISI will present considerable difficulties.
2. It is considered essential that all schooners take shelter when the "Bora" blows (mid-November to end of February).
3. It is understood that some schooners are now being routed via the TREMITI islands, and between these islands and ANCONA (3 days sailing), there is no shelter available for vessels drawing more than 7-8 feet of water.
4. Before the war, it is understood that all but the smallest schooners proceeding to the Northern ports during the winter months, crossed over to either VIS or LIGOSTA, and then proceeded up the Yugoslav coast, using shelter as necessary amongst the islands there, and returning to the mainland of Italy on reaching DUEI Island.
5. From the navigational and sea-sickness aspects it is desirable to use this route again. Moreover, if it is impossible to do so, schooner traffic carrying essential supplies to forward areas will be almost brought to a standstill during the winter months. It is thought, however, that there may be considerable political objection to the routing of vessels flying the Italian ensign through Yugoslav territorial waters.
6. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander whether the political objection must override the naval advantages.

J. H. LARSEN
COLONEL
SECRETARY

Distribution
Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander

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3. It is understood that some schooners are now being routed via the TENERIFE islands, and between these islands and ANCONA (3 days sailing), there is no shelter available for vessels drawing more than 7-8 feet of water.

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[Signature]
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FIB
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

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PC(44)1144 - Amendment.
5 December 1944.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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COPT NO. 32

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary.

18 DEC 1944

1. In accordance with Conclusion (b) of Paper No. PC(44)1144 dated 30th November, the delegation from the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) have been detained in Rome. It would now appear however, that there is likely to be some delay before a new Italian Government is formed, and further delay before the proposal for the recognition of the CLNAI can be submitted to the new government when formed.

2. G-2 in a recent appreciation gave the opinion that the enemy may evacuate Northwest Italy this month. It is apparent, therefore, that no time should be lost if plans for anti-search and other measures of resistance in North West Italy are to be effective.

3. The delegation feel that they should return, if not to Italy, at any rate to SWITZERLAND. They feel that their prolonged absence at this critical juncture may be misconstrued by their adherents in Northern Italy. Time is needed to distribute the funds authorized by the Supreme Allied Commander, and generally to make the money work. Also plans for anti-search are held up pending the return of Signor PASHI, the military member of the delegation.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander has accordingly directed that Commander, 5CM: -

(a) Bring the delegation to AFHQ, in order to sign on 6 December 1944 the bi-lateral form of agreement attached to Paper No. PC(44)1144 dated 30 November 1944.

(b) Subsequently arrange for the return of the delegation to Northern Italy at times and by means dictated by security. (The Chairman of the Committee is likely to have to remain in SWITZERLAND on his way to Northern Italy for some time, to complete financial arrangements.)

5. The delegation are very disappointed that the primary object

when formed.

2. G-2 in a recent appreciation gave the opinion that the enemy may evacuate Northwest Italy this month. It is apparent, therefore, that no time should be lost in plans for anti-scorch and other measures of resistance in North West Italy are to be effective.

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4. The Supreme Allied Commander has accordingly directed that Commander, SCMI: -

(a) Bring the delegation to AFHQ, in order to sign on 6 December 1944 the bi-lateral form of agreement attached to Paper No. PC(44)144, dated 30 November 1944.

(b) Subsequently arrange for the return of the delegation to Northern Italy at times and by means dictated by security. (The Chairman of the Committee is likely to have to remain in SWITZERLAND on his way to Northern Italy for some time, to complete financial arrangements.)

5. The delegation are very disappointed that the primary object of their visit, namely, recognition by the Italian Government, has not so far been achieved, but they hope that this may materialize in the near future. In any case, no announcement of such recognition could be made until they are safely back in North West Italy and under cover. All that would then be required would be a radio announcement by the Italian Government.

6. It is therefore recommended that: -

(a) Conclusion (a) of Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30 November 1944 should stand.

See Pgs. Five 217/COS.

Care to File 324/COS

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(b) Commander, SCW, should secure the signature of the delegation to a document undertaking to accept the Italian Government's participation in a tripartite agreement if this can be secured on the terms set out in the draft attached to Paper No. PC(44)144 dated 30 November 1944.

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES,
Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, PWB
Secretary, General Staff
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
(c/o G-5)

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Commander SCW c/o SCHILD
Deputy Paymaster in Chief
Colonel Riepe, LII

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Supreme Allied Commander
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
 Chief of Staff
 Chief Administrative Officer
 Deputy Chief of Staff
 U.S. Political Advisor
 British Resident Minister
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 Secretary, General Staff
 Secretary, IS & ES
 Chief, Liaison Section
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 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
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 Commander SCM c/o SOMLO
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PC (44) 144
30th November, 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANS

3 DEC 1944

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN THE
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S COM-
MUNDS ROOM AT 15.30 HOURS ON
MONDAY 29TH NOVEMBER, 1944

PRESENT:-

Lieutenant General Sir James A.M. Gurnell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander.

Mr. P. Broed, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General W.A.M. Stewell,
Commander, SCW TO

Brigadier General C. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5.

Colonel G.L. King,
G-3 Special Operations.

Colonel T.R. Mann,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5.

Colonel P.T. Hammond,
G-5.

Colonel J.R. Riepe,
AAI

Colonel Joseph Rodrigo,
OSS

Major W.E. Subling,
AAI

Lieutenant A.H. Bullock,
G-5.

SECRETARY:-

Major W.E. Rose.

THE MEETING had before them:-

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Lieutenant General Sir James A.M. Gurnell,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander.

Mr. P. Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Major General W.A.W. Stowell,
Commander, SCW TO

Brigadier General C. Spofford,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5.

Colonel G.L. King,
G-3 Special Operations.

Colonel T.R. Henn,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-5.

Colonel F.T. Hammond,
G-6.

Colonel J.R. Riley,
AAI

Colonel Joseph Rodrigo,
OSS

Major W.E. Schling,
AAI

Lieutenant A.W. Bullowa,
G-5.

SECRETARY:-

Major W.E. Rose.

THE MEETING had before them:-

- (a) A third draft memorandum of agreement between the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government and the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CLNAI) - not fully concurred in by the U.S. Political Adviser, G-5 and the Allied Commission - arising out of PC (AI) 33rd Meeting, conclusion 6.

- (b) A note by G-5 raising certain objections to the draft memorandum of agreement at (a) above.

BRIGADIER GENERAL SPOFFORD stated that Mr. Kirk and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, who both had strong views on the proposed agreement, had been unable to come down from Rome for the meeting owing to the Italian Cabinet crisis. They had both pointed out however that a definite agreement could not be reached until there was a new Italian Government with which to discuss it and had also reported that recognition of the Patriot movement had been one of the factors contributing to the cabinet crisis. He understood that the Allied Commission was of the opinion that the Italian Government should not be a party to this agreement but that it should be a military instrument between the SUPREME ALLIED

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL STAMMELL proposed that the meeting should agree on two alternative memoranda, covering tripartite and bilateral agreements respectively. He pointed out in this connection that no part of the armistice terms empowered the Allied Governments to demand either the Italian Government's adherence to such an agreement or their recognition of the Partisan movement.

MAJOR GENERAL STAMMELL observed that recognition of the movement by the Italian Government was most desirable since it was in a much stronger position than the Supreme Allied Commander to order industrialists and other waverers to cooperate. He estimated that the value of the agreement would be halved if the Italian Government were not a party to it. He urged that the monthly contributions be raised to a maximum of 150 million lire instead of the 100 million lire previously suggested, pointing out that even at the higher figure the cost of resistance would be cheaper than in other countries.

Replying to a question by Lieutenant General Gammell, he stated that the funds would be supplied in Allied Military lire by the Deputy Paymaster in Chief, AFHQ to the Allied Commission who would in turn pass them over to the Italian Government for transfer in metropolitan lire to Northern Italy through banks and other agencies. Any sums which might be sent direct to the field by SOE/CSS would be part of the maximum monthly figure of 150 million lire. He agreed therefore, with Lieutenant General Gammell that it should be stated in the proposed agreement that the funds were being made available "on the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER"

COLONEL RIZZI queried whether there might not be some difficulty over the proposed method of payment with the American Fiscal authorities.

MR. BROAD stated that the Foreign Office were in favour of the proposed agreement but wished a clause inserted so as to safeguard any risk of the CINAI coming under the control of a particular political party. He suggested therefore, that a paragraph 4, reading as follows, be inserted in the draft agreement:-

"The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the Military Command of CINAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AM, acting under the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER. The Political Head of the CINAI must be a person acceptable to the Italian Government"

MAJOR GENERAL STAMMELL reported that the CINAI delegates were

Replying to a question by Lieutenant General Gemmell, he stated that the funds would be supplied in Allied Military lire by the Deputy Paymaster in Chief, AMHQ to the Allied Commission who would in turn pass them over to the Italian Government for transfer in metropolitan lire to Northern Italy through banks and other agencies. Any sum which might be sent direct to the field by SOE/CSS would be part of the maximum monthly figure of 160 million lire. He agreed therefore, with Lieutenant General Gemmell that it should be stated in the proposed agreement that the funds were being made available "on the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER"

COLONEL RIEPE queried whether there might not be some difficulty over the proposed method of payment with the American financial authorities.

Mr. BROAD stated that the Foreign Office were in favour of the proposed agreement but wished a clause inserted so as to safeguard any risk of the CINAI coming under the control of a particular political party. He suggested therefore, that a paragraph 4, reading as follows, be inserted in the draft agreement:-

"The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the Military Command of CINAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AMI, acting under the authority of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER. The Political Head of the CINAI must be a person acceptable to the Italian Government"

MAJOR GENERAL STAWELL reported that the CINAI delegates were anxious to return to occupied Italy as early as possible. If it was now proposed to await the formation of a new Italian Government it would be necessary either to hold Signor Loughi, much against his will, or to let him go, in which case his signature to the agreement, which was most desirable, would not be obtained.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:-

(a) Instructed the Secretary:-

- (1) To bring the draft memorandum of agreement as amended in discussion (attached) before the first meeting of the Political Committee following the formation of a new Italian Government.

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- (11) To send the amended draft agreements to the U.S. Political Advisor and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission enquiring of them whether they wished to suggest any major modifications prior to their submission to the Political Committee.
- (111) To invite the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to report to the Political Committee at its first meeting following the formation of a new Italian Government, as to the feasibility of obtaining the latter's adherence to the form of tripartite agreement proposed bearing in mind Major General Stawell's statement at "X" above.
- (b) Directed that Commander, SOM ensure that Sinner Longhi and other delegates of the CINAI remain in liberated Italy until the signature of the proposed agreement and that he take all other steps to ensure that secrecy were observed regarding these negotiations.

Lu P 15, file 20/col

William B. Rose

W.B. ROSE
MAJOR

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
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Chief Administrative Officer
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Director PMS
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G-3 Special Operations
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See 2 ps, file 207/cos

W.E. Rose

W.E. ROSE
MAJOR

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
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U.S. Political Adviser
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Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commander SCW 30, c/o SCMLO
Deputy Paymaster in Chief
Colonel Slope, AA2
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DEATH
N 480
MOHANTUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SUPREME
ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS,
THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

Confidential

1. The Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (CINAI) is
recognized by the Italian Government as the established body representing
the anti-fascist parties in enemy occupied Italian territory. The CINAI
for its part accepts the Italian Government recognized by the Allied
Governments as the successor of the Italian Government, which signed the
armistice terms and as the sole legitimate authority in that part of
Italy which has now been and may hereafter be handed over to the
Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.
2. The Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government wish the
utmost military cooperation to be established and maintained among the
elements which are active in the resistance movement. The CINAI will
establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all
active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the
CINAI anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.
3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE
VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the CINAI) will,
on behalf of the CINAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-
Chief, AAF, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.
It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian
Government that particular care should be given to all measures which
will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching,
demolitions and like degradation by the enemy.

Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government wish the utmost military cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The CINAI will establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the CINAI anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organizations.

3. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the CINAI) will, on behalf of the CINAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER and the Italian Government that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against searching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.

4. The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the military command of the CINAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AAI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. The Political Head of the CINAI will be a person acceptable to the Italian Government. 999

5. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CINAI will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately

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the establishment of Allied Military Government, CINAI will recognise Allied Military Government and will

Confide

Government all authority and powers of local government and

administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all

components of the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY

in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-

in-Chief, AMI acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander,

and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government

on his behalf, including such orders to disband and surrender their

arms, when required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation of Northern Italy the

utmost resistance will be given to the CINAI in common with all other

anti-fascist organizations, to meet the needs of their members who are

engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; weekly contribution

not exceeding 150 million lire will be made on the authority of the

Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the CINAI and all other

anti-fascist organizations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AMI,

acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum

will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the

support of all anti-fascist organizations in those areas:-

LIIGRIA	20
PIEDMONT	50
LOMBARDIA	25
EMILIA	30
VENETO	35

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according

to the requirements of the military situation; the maximum sum will be

Anti-fascist organizations will be given to the CINAI in common with all other anti-fascist organizations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; monthly contribution not exceeding 160 million lire will be made on the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the CINAI and all other anti-fascist organizations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AMI, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organizations in those areas:-

LIGURIA	30
PIEMONTE	60
LOMBARDIA	25
EMILIA	20
VENETO	25

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation; the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

7. Allied Missions attached to the CINAI, to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or to any of their components, will be consulted by them in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-search and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, AMI, under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by CINAI, the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.....

FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.....

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL

LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY.....

NOTE

PASSAGES UNDERLINED WOULD BE OMITTED IF THE AGREEMENT
WERE MADE ONLY BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
AND THE CLMAY.

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NOTE PASSAGES UNDERLINED WOULD BE OMITTED IF THE AGREEMENT
 WERE MADE ONLY BETWEEN THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
 AND THE CIVIL.

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PC (44) 143

29th November, 1944.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

MILITARY MISSION TO ALBANIA

Note by Secretary

1 DEC 1944

1. As a result of the report and proposals set forth in telegram No. 347 473 dated 23rd November 1944 from Balkan Air Force, G-3 propose, with the concurrence of the United States Political Adviser, the British Resident Minister, G-3 and W HQ Balkans that the attached draft telegram should be sent to the War Office.

2. Attention is drawn to:-

(a) to the slight variation in the functions of the proposed Mission as set out in para 3 of the attached draft, compared with those suggested in 347 473.

(b) to the rank proposed in para 4 of the attached draft for the head of the Mission.

3. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to endorse the proposals set forth in the attached draft telegram and to authorize its despatch.

*Conclusions of Mtg at
P. 27, File 217/003.*

J. H. Lascelles
J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister

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(b) to the rank proposed in para 4 of the attached draft for the head of the Mission.

3. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander to endorse the proposals set forth in the attached draft telegram and to authorize its despatch.

*Enclosure of aty at
P. 47, File 219/CO3.*

J.R. Lascelles
J.R. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, FWD
Secretary, General Staff
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G-2
G-3
G-3 (Special Operations)
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
G-5
Secretary, IS & PS
Chief, Liaison Section
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commander, M HQ Balkans, (c/o 3-5)
Commander, Balkan Air Force
Commander, SOM 10
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/Draft Cable...

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TO: THOOPERS

INFO: III CORPS

DRAFT CABLE

6
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1. The question of the future British representation in Albania has been under consideration. While it seems clear that some representative mission must remain in the country we are strongly of the opinion that the SOE Missions should be withdrawn as soon as possible. The personnel who compose them were trained as Liaison Officers for guerrilla operations and the situation is altered by the virtual withdrawal of the Germans from the country.

2. It is proposed, therefore, subject to your approval, to evacuate the majority of these missions forthwith, and to concentrate the remainder under Lt. Col. Alan Palmer at AYLA GHQ for the time being. We recommend, however, that as soon as possible, in any case not later than 31 December 1944, Lt. Col. Palmer's present SOE Mission at FNC HQ should be replaced by an orthodox Military Mission. This would maintain relations with FNC pending decision as to recognition of any future government in Albania and report to SACVED and not direct to authorities in UX.

3. The functions of this mission would include:

- A. The providing of up to date information on political tendencies in Albania.
- B. Advising on probable Albanian reaction to any particular policy contemplated by HMG.
- C. Giving expert advice to AFHQ on the financial and economic situation including possibilities of trade.
- D. Advising interested parties concerning the use of Albanian

airfields or assets for civil or military purposes.

the majority of these missions forthwith, and to concentrate the remainder under Lt. Col. Alan Palmer at AYLA GHQ for the time being. We recommend, however, that as soon as possible, in any case not later than 31 December 1944, Lt. Col. Palmer's present SOE Mission at ENC HQ should be replaced by an orthodox Military Mission. This would maintain relations with ENC pending decision as to recognition of any future government in Albania and report to SACMED and not direct to authorities in UK.

3. The functions of this mission would include:

- A. The providing of up to date information on political tendencies in Albania.
- B. Advising on probable Albanian reaction to any particular policy contemplated by HMG.
- C. Giving expert advice to AEMQ on the financial and economic situation including possibilities of trade.
- D. Advising interested parties concerning the use of Albanian air fields or ports for civil or military purposes.
- E. Advising or assisting interested parties with the distribution of suitable propaganda.
- F. Providing such information as requested by MI Albania in the event of an MI organisation being set up in the country.

4. It is recommended that in order to give Mission sufficient status effectively to carry out above functions, it should have at its head an officer of the rank at least of Brigadier. His advisers might usefully be chosen from suitable officers now serving in, or with experience of Albania. In particular, we suggest that functions of political adviser might be fulfilled by Lt. Col. Palmer.

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5. In Albania, when established, will, of course, be distinct from the proposed British Military Mission, which should be instructed to co-operate with it.
6. It is understood that independent American representation is to be temporarily provided by a Military Mission under OSS auspices.
7. Further recommendations regarding personnel will be made when this proposal is approved in principle.
8. Representative of Resident Minister in telegraphing similar recommendations to the Foreign Office.

Coordinated with: POLAD

RESMIN

G-3

MRQ DALKANS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

217

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Coordinated with: POLAD

RESMIN

G-3

MR. DALENS.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

MC (44) 642

29th November 1944

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POLITICAL COMMITTEE

THREAT FOR SICILY

11 DEC 1944

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

BACKGROUND

1. In a letter dated 24 September 1944, the Supreme Allied Commander conveyed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff his views on the bread ration for ITALY as a whole. He stated that, in the case of SICILY,

- a. the current crop was sufficient to feed the island
- b. the assessment was not going well.

2. He proposed in consequence "to withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available".

CONSIDERATIONS

3. The original amassing estimate was 297,000 tons to June 30, 1945, a figure well within the amassing totals of the years 1937-40. Subsequently, this estimate was reduced to 221,000, and then to 200,000 tons; but present information shows that not more than 150,000 tons is likely to be obtained without repressive measures.

4. It is estimated that, if the bread ration for SICILY is to be maintained at 300 grammes, it will be necessary to import 160,000 tons between January and June 1945. Pending a decision on the matter, the Allied Commission proposes to bring into SICILY one shipload of wheat in December and to tell the Italian Government that with this help the island must support itself until 15 January.

5. The reasons for the failure of the assessment are in the main as follows:

- a. political activities, and in the particular the failure of a weak administration to control strong agrarian interests.
- b. resentment of the farmers at receiving only 1000 lire per quintal against an assessed cost of production of 1400 lire per quintal.

b. the assessment was not going well.

2. He proposed in consequence "to withhold imports of grain from SICILY, and to leave to the local administration the problem of forcing an equitable distribution of the resources which were known to be available".

CONSIDERATIONS.

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5. The reasons for the failure of the assessment are in the main as follows:

a. political activities, and in the particular the failure of a weak administration to control strong agrarian interests.

b. resentment of the farmers at receiving only 1000 lire per quintal against an alleged cost of production of 1400 lire per quintal.

c. the natural resistance of the peasant to amassment.

COURSES OPEN.

6. The following courses appear to be open to the Supreme Commander: 993

a. to reduce the bread ration to 200 grammes; which appears to be unacceptable politically.

b. to resort to force in an attempt to increase the amassment; which would be unacceptable militarily and politically, as well as of doubtful effectiveness.

c. to increase the price offered for wheat; a course whose success could not be guaranteed, and which might set an undesirable precedent for other parts of ITALY.

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d. to adhere to the action which is proposed (Para 2 above) and to place the onus of collection of resources on the local administration; thereby to accept the political and economic consequences which might arise from their failure to carry out their responsibilities.

e. to provide the estimated quantities of wheat to make up the deficiency, and to accept the conflict of the consequent shipping demands with other urgent operational commitments.

RECOMMENDATION.

7. No recommendation is made. It is considered, however, that this opportunity should be taken of presenting SICILY to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a test case. SICILY is not only a complete economic unit but policy towards it will constitute an important precedent in the rest of ITALY, and possibly in other territory as well. It is therefore desired to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Commander regarding the policy to be followed.

(init) T.R.H.

for C.M.S.

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(init) T.R.S.
for C.M.S.

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Conclusions of Mtg at P&E, file 217cos.

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HC (44) 122
10th October 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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12 OCT Recd

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

PROPOSED APPRECIATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE
ITALIAN FORCES

Note by Secretary

1. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has been requested by the New York Office of OVI, through PEB, to make an appreciative statement on the contribution of the Italian Fleet during the first year of liberated Italy's war against GERMANY, the anniversary of which will fall on 13 October.

2. It is understood that a similar request is being sent to :-

The Supreme Allied Commander
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander-in-Chief, All
Commanding General, Fifth Army

regarding the Italian forces which have served under them.

3. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander on the above.

See Folio 22 on File 207/ces.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
COMNAVFOR
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff

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ready for against Germany, the anniversary of which will fall on 13 October.

2. It is understood that a similar request is being sent to :-

The Supreme Allied Commander
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander-in-Chief, AFI
Commanding General, Fifth Army

regarding the Italian forces which have served under them.

3. The Political Committee is invited to advise the Supreme Allied Commander on the above.

See Folio 22 in File 207/cas.

William H. L.
J. H. LASCELLES,
COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
COMNAVSTA

Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Chief, P.E.
Secretary, General Staff

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Secretary, IS & PS

Liaison Section

Acting Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission

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AFHQ

PC(44) 120

10 Oct 44

SECRET K318

Copy No. 46

Political Committee

Payment for Goods and Services
in Italian Territory

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Above note filed in 4604/COS

"PAYMENTS IN ITALIAN TERRITORY"

13 Oct 44,

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cc.

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