

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

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SACMED'S CONFERENCES, PAPERS  
JAN.-MAY 1945

1/3/60

Examination

14/4 noted. 2

14/4

185

Examine

185 & 187 in 1. Gaiter. SAC  
will be asked to give decision  
on item. Item at 185  
Lancaster Conference.

190

SEEN BY EXCOM 1/2

1/25/4

WMS

2188

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188-187 in 1 quarter SAC  
will be asked to see document  
in the book at tomorrow  
Parents Conference

198-  
SEEN BY EICM *[initials]*  
11/20/74

*[signature]*

1218

145

D/Kremer

1. The pen to which referred at the morning meeting is pen. 0149
2. Lym invited to see the White Sea

27 23/3

148

D/Kremer

Since writing the above memo  
the paper 196-147 has been  
is among the ~~document~~ papers

168 at 150

27/3 vol 2

177

Ex. Com.

To see files 174-176. See 9 Apr.

1317

7/23/8

168

A/Volume

See writing the above book  
148 pages 106-147 later can  
be amended the ~~document~~ paper

168 at 150

8/24/8

27/3 vol 2

177

Ex. Com.

To see plus 174-176. for 9 Apr.

1217

5/4 noted. 2.

185

A/Selms

To see 175 re Venezuela further.  
Sentences underlined in red can  
be bearing in for spotted. Letter in  
a separate PMA for V.G.

8/14/4

17/4 noted. 7

Ex Case

113

1. ~~12~~ <sup>12</sup> for information.
2. SAC's Conference every Tuesday but not necessarily a Political Conference.
3. Papers for discussion must reach Secretaries by 1000 hrs Tuesdays

8/14/3

7/16/3

~~12~~ ~~13~~ 132

01 Ex Case

~~12~~ - ~~13~~ <sup>131</sup> Road for information.

It is entirely operational and I suggest it need not be seen by

P.P.S.

8/20/3

1948

read section by

1000 hrs Tuesdays

5/14/3

7/16/3

44 ~~131~~  
132

DJ Ex Lane

~~131~~ - 131 read for information.

It is entirely operational and I  
suppose it need not be seen by

J.P.S.

5/20/3

1216

Also see 137-144 re Gyrostat

describers. I don't think para 3  
on p 138 is right. Surely it should  
not be AC who will require the  
particulars from the Commission. The  
AC is to assist the Gyrostat in the  
approximation of descriptors & we must see  
they get the particulars as in para 3.

Adding last sentence of para 4 p 137.  
That is the channel, I have - ~~last~~ ~~last~~

5/21/3

2/3  
noted.  
2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017P. 102 See NY 13109Explain

103 accounts for your

information

1215

(See Ex. Comm's Comments)  
on 2214/EC

9/2

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SIG (P) (43) 24  
15 May 1945

CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 36

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

CONFERENCE WITH JUGOSLAVS

Note by Secretary

Records of the meetings held recently in BELGRADE between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito are circulated herewith for information.

*14 June 1945*  
J. S. STEEDMAN,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF  
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest  
Africa Waters  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF  
Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer

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10-12 35 Chief Clerk

*Lt Col Dist*  
*15 May 45*

Records of the meetings held recently in ELISABETH between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito are circulated herewith for information.

*13 June 1945*  
J. G. SPENCER,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF  
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest  
Africa  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF  
Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4  
Assistant Chief of Staff (R-)  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ HQAF  
U.S. Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Director, FBI  
Chief Communications, Allied Commission  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat  
Spares

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*Lic List*

*15 MAY 45*

*35 Chief Comm*

*36 Exec Comm*  
*(Copy in file)*

*37 R. A. A. A.*

*Shel's*  
*82/5*  
*12/5*  
*12/5*  
*12/5*

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K165

ANNEXURE I

RECORD OF THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN AND MARSHAL TITO  
IN BELGRADE AT 1700 HOURS ON THURSDAY 8TH MAY 1945

Confidential

PRESENT:-

JUGOSLAVIA

Marshal of Yugoslavia,  
Josip Broz Tito

Lieut-General Arso Jovanovic,  
Chief of Staff

Lieut-General Arsic,  
Chief Administrative Officer

Major General Mucic,  
Chief of Naval Staff

Major General Djuric,  
Chief of Military Cabinet

Captain Petricic,  
Liaison Staff

Captain Brdic,  
Liaison Staff

U.K.F.H.C.

Lieut-General W.T. Morgan,  
Chief of Staff to Supreme  
Allied Commander

Brigadier General A.L. Hasblen,  
Assistant Chief Administra-  
tive Officer

Air Vice Marshal A. Lee,  
Commander, 37 Military  
Mission

Lieut-Colonel P. Lindsay,  
Commander, US Military  
Mission in Belgrade

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN introduced himself and conveyed greetings to Marshal Tito on behalf of Field Marshal Alexander. He then handed Marshal Tito a draft agreement containing Field Marshal Alexander's proposals in regard to arrangements in VENETIA GIULIA as attached at Appendix 'A'.

MARSHAL TITO after examining this document said that an understanding could not be reached on the basis suggested. That solution might have been applicable previously, but recent events had changed the position. As the war was over the problem was now a political and not a military one. Jugoslavs had a right to those sections of their country which were formerly under Italian rule and which they had freed. These territories were Yugoslav and he believed that they would be obtained by JUGOSLAVIA at the Peace Conference. Under Field Marshal Alexander's proposal, he would be required to

Lieut-General Arsic,  
Chief Administrative Officer

Major General Anola,  
Chief of Naval Staff

Major General Duric,  
Chief of Military Cabinet

Captain Potniski,  
Liaison Staff

Captain Brkic,  
Liaison Staff

Air Vice Marshal ... Inda,  
Commander, 37 Military  
Division

Lieut-Colonel F... Lindsay,  
Commander, US Military  
Mission in Belgrade

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORAN introduced himself and conveyed greetings to Marshal Tito on behalf of Field Marshal Alexander. He then handed Marshal Tito a draft agreement containing Field Marshal Alexander's proposals in regard to arrangements in VENETIA GIULIA as attached at Appendix VI.

MARSHAL TITO after examining this document said that an understanding could not be reached on the basis suggested. That solution might have been applicable previously, but recent events had changed the position. As the war was over the problem was now a political and not a military one. Jugoslavs had a right to those sections of their country which were formerly under Italian rule and which they had freed. These territories were Yugoslav and he believed that they would be obtained by JUGOSLAVIA at the Peace Conference. Under Field Marshal Alexander's proposal, he would be required to withdraw his troops. He believed that it would be possible to find a better solution for these matters. Ethnologically and geographically the territories belonged to JUGOSLAVIA. He had no controversy with the Allies, but he did have with ITALY. He considered the whole matter was not a military but a political one. He agreed that the Allies should use the part of TRIESTE and the communications. A joint commission would be set up to coordinate matters on the ground.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORAN said that he could not discuss the matter from a political standpoint. From a military aspect, however, the British and American forces had found from experience that as long as one commander did not have full control in an area, it was not possible to operate efficiently. For example, in FRANCE certain cities were directly under British and others under American control. Similarly in ITALY, MACCHI was under British control and other ports under American control. A similar position existed even in ENGLAND where certain areas were under complete American control. For correct/ pending

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military reasons, the Supreme Allied Commander asked to be the controlling authority in the area of his communications in VENETIA, ITALY. The final status of the whole province would, undoubtedly, be decided by the Peace Treaty.

MARSHAL TITO repeated that he could not approve the agreement in the form proposed. He could not see why the Allies would not agree to the idea of a joint command. This had worked very well on VHS. The Yugoslav authorities would give full assistance to the Allies and he guaranteed that everything would be in order in the presence of the Yugoslav troops.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that neither he nor Field Marshal Alexander were authorized to do anything other than claim the area stated. The Allies required complete control of TRIESTE.

MARSHAL TITO was willing to offer complete control of the communications and the Port, but that was the most that he could concede. He was sorry to see a disagreement arising between Field Marshal Alexander and himself, but just as Field Marshal Alexander was not in a position to go any further, so he (Marshal Tito) had a duty to the interests of his country. He indicated that a line, considerably to the west of that proposed by Field Marshal Alexander, would be recognized at the Peace Conference as the boundary of SLOVENIA. Ethnologically all this territory belonged to SLOVENIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN stated that he was restricted to considering the matter from a military standpoint. He asked if Marshal Tito realized the privileges which JUGOSLAVIA would obtain if the port of TRIESTE was opened by the Allies. They could not, however, open the port until they had full control. He also asked Marshal Tito to explain more fully what he had in mind in saying that the Allies could have full use of the port of TRIESTE.

MARSHAL TITO said that he meant use of the coast, the port itself, ships, the warehouses at the port, and all that is necessary for war materials for supplying the army and all defences of the port or harbor. The harbor included the city, buildings in the city and other things. A Yugoslav command would also be operative in the area and a joint command could be set up, under which the Yugoslav civil authority would produce the necessary civil labour to assist the Allies in handling large tonnages through the port.

The essence of the arrangement which he suggested was that the territory would be occupied by Yugoslav troops. The Yugoslav government had sent a note a month ago to the USSR, American and English governments asking that a part of AUSTRIA be turned over for occupation by Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav government stated that it was not clear that the

Morgan was willing to offer complete control of the communications and the Port, but that was the most that he could concede. He was sorry to see a disagreement arising between Field Marshal Alexander and himself, but just as Field Marshal Alexander was not in a position to go any further, so he (Marshal Tito) had a duty to the interests of his country. He indicated that a line, considerably to the west of that proposed by Field Marshal Alexander, would be recognized at the Peace Conference as the boundary of SLOVENIA. Chronologically all this territory belonged to SLOVENIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN stated that he was restricted to considering the matter from a military standpoint. He asked if Marshal Tito realized the privileges which JUGOSLAVIA would obtain if the port of TRISTE was opened by the Allies. They could not, however, open the port until they had full control. He also asked Marshal Tito to explain more fully what he had in mind in saying that the Allies could have full use of the port of TRISTE.

MARSHAL TITO said that he must use of the coast, the port itself, ships, the warehouses at the port, and all that is necessary for war materials for supplying the army and all defenses of the port or harbor. The harbor included the city, buildings in the city and other things. A Yugoslav command would also be operative in the area and a joint command would be set up, under which the Yugoslav civil authority would provide the necessary civil labour to assist the Allies in handling large cargoes through the port.

The essence of the arrangement which he suggested was that the territory would be occupied by Yugoslav troops. The Yugoslav government had sent a note a month ago to the USSR, American and English governments asking that a part of TRISTE be turned over for occupation by Jugoslavs. No answer had as yet been received from ENGLAND and AMERICA though the consent of the U.S.S.R. had been obtained. In regard to TRISTE, CIVILIA the Jugoslavs themselves had liberated this area and accordingly under military law they could rightfully occupy it, even if it had not yet been legally given to them by the Peace Conference. The area had been conquered by force of arms.

In reply to questions by Lieutenant General Morgan, he said that he would be agreeable to Allied troops being stationed at any important points necessary to safeguard their communications. The Allies were also at liberty to bring in service troops. However, the Jugoslavs would require freedom of movement, and the Allied troops could not be strict this. All matters of controversy between the two forces would be settled by the Joint Coordinating Commission. For the present, Italian metropolitan law would be the currency in the area. The civil administration would be through National Liberation Committees and

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THOMAS would be an autonomous city within Federal Slovenia. Allied soldiers would, however, be subject to their own military courts.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he must submit his report in their meeting to Field Marshal Alexander, who would in turn have to consult with the United States and British governments. Field Marshal Alexander would be disappointed because he had expected that matters would proceed differently, as the Allies had reduced their demands to the minimum.

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APPENDIX A

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DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN ON BEHALF OF  
FIELD MARSHAL ALFREDER TO VISUAL TWO  
DURING CEASE AT 1800 HOURS, TUESDAY, 2TH  
JULY 1945.

1. As it is agreed, Field Marshal ALFREDER requires the port of TRIESTE and the railways and roads from there to ANSTRIA via GORIZIA and TREVISO to maintain his forces in NE ITALY and in ANSTRIA, the portion of the compartment VENEZIA, GIULIA, West of the line on the attached map will be under his command.
2. All Naval, Military and Air force West of the line on the attached map will be placed under his command from the moment at which this comes into force.
3. Field Marshal ALFREDER will govern this area using an Allied Military Government. Use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and working satisfactorily.
4. To facilitate and simplify the working of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, Marshal TITO will withdraw the Yugoslav regular forces now in the portion of VENEZIA, GIULIA by a double line on the attached map 12 May 1945.
5. Any irregular forces in this area will either hand in their arms to the Allied military authorities and disarm, or will be withdrawn from the area.
6. In order establish safe shipping lanes in the North Adriatic and particularly the approaches to TRIESTE, the port of POLA and the anchorages on the West Coast of ISTRIA between POLA and TRIESTE will be open to unrestricted use by Allied Naval forces.
7. This agreement is purely military, and in NO way prejudices or affects long term policy regarding the ultimate disposal of the compartment VENEZIA, GIULIA.

all naval, military and air force west of the line on the attached map will be placed under his Command from the moment at which this comes into force.

3. Field Marshal JEFKINER will govern this area using an Allied Military Government. Use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and working satisfactorily.

4. To facilitate and simplify the working of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, Marshal TITO will withdraw the Yugoslav regular forces now in the portion of VENEZIA GIULIA by a double line on the attached map 11 May 1945.

5. Any irregular forces in this area will either hand in their arms to the Allied military authorities and disarm, or will be withdrawn from the area.

6. In order to establish safe shipping lanes in the North ADRIATIC and particularly the approaches to TRIESTE, the port of POLA and the anchorages on the West Coast of ISTRIA between POLA and TRIESTE will be open to unrestricted use by Allied Naval forces.

7. This agreement is purely military, and in NO way prejudices or affects long term policy regarding the ultimate disposal of the compartment VENEZIA GIULIA.

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ANNEXURE II

RECORD OF THE SECOND MEETING BETWEEN  
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN AND MARSHAL TITO  
IN BELGRADE AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 29TH JULY 1945

PRESIDENT :-

YUGOSLAVIA

Marshal of Yugoslavia  
Josip Broz Tito

Lieut-General Arso Jovanovic,  
Chief of Staff

Lieut-General Arsic,  
Chief Administrative Officer

Major General Manola,  
Chief of Naval Staff

Major General Djuric,  
Chief of Military Cabinet

Captain Petnicki,  
Mission Staff

Captain Bracic,  
Mission Staff

A.F.H.Q.

Lieut-General W.D. Morgan,  
Chief of Staff to Supreme  
Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,  
DPMG, B-4 (British)

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,  
Assistant Chief Administrative  
Officer

Captain V.B. Laing,  
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff

Colonel D.S. Jackling,  
G-5 Section

Lieut-Colonel L.M. Cooper,  
AFMG Nov & Th (Br)

Air Vice Marshal A. Lee,  
Commander, 37 Military Mission

Lieut-Colonel F.A. Lindsay,  
Head of U.S. Military Mission  
in Belgrade

A draft summary of the proposals put forward by Marshal Tito at the first meeting had been prepared by the AFMG delegation and translated into Croat. This paper was handed to Marshal Tito.

MARSHAL TITO asked whether the minutes of the previous meeting which had been prepared by his staff, and which contained all his views, had yet been read by General Morgan.

DDMC, 7-4 (British)

Lieut-General Arsic,  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Major General Banola,  
Chief of Naval Staff  
Major General Djuric,  
Chief of Military Cabinet  
Captain Petnicki,  
Engineer Staff  
Captain Bralic,  
Mission Staff

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,  
Assistant Chief Administrative  
Officer

Captain W.H. Leinig,  
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff

Colonel D.S. Jackling,  
C-5 Section

Lieut-Colonel L.H. Cooper,  
ACMS Nov & Tr (Br)

Air Vice Marshal A. Lee,  
Commander, 37 Military Mission

Lieut-Colonel F.A. Lindsey,  
Head of U.S. Military Mission  
in Belgrade

A draft summary of the proposals put forward by Marshal Tito at the first meeting had been prepared by the ACMS delegation and translated into Croat. This paper was handed to Marshal Tito.

MARSHAL TITO asked whether the minutes of the previous meeting which had been prepared by his staff, and which contained all his views, had yet been read by General Morgan.

LIEUTENANT GEN. J. MORAN pointed out that these minutes had not yet been translated into English. He asked Marshal Tito to say where he disagreed with the draft paper so that it could be altered to represent an accurate statement of his proposals.

MARSHAL TITO said that the territory was Slovene and his forces had liberated it. On account of their services and sacrifices in the Allied cause, he considered that his forces had a right as an Allied Army to occupy this territory. He therefore requested that the draft be amended accordingly. He also considered the Commission referred to should be called a Joint Military Commission as it would coordinate with the Yugoslav military as well as civil authorities. He had no other comments to make.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORAN asked exactly what was meant by "full and unrestricted" use of the port of TRISTE.

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LIEUTENANT TITO replied that the Allies could operate the port as they chose. He would agree to it being placed under control of an Allied Naval officer who would be responsible to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who would be assisted by a port committee in which there would be Yugoslav representation. He also agreed that use of the harbor at POLJ and the anchorage between POLJ and TRINJE could be granted to the Allies. He further stated the Allies could have full use of the railways between TRINJE and CORIZI. The right to operate, maintain and repair the underground cable from ROME to VIENNA would also be granted.

Replying to a question about the use of airfields, he said there was no airfield at TRINJE but there was one at CORIZI. This should be used jointly by Yugoslav and Allied air forces and should be under their joint control.

LIEUTENANT TITO then said that he was now clear as to the Marshal's views and all that remained for him was to return and report accordingly to the Supreme Allied Commander.

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...and all that remained for him was to return and report accordingly to  
the Supreme Allied Commander.

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N165

ANNEXURE III

RECORD OF THE THIRD MEETING BETWEEN

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN AND MARSHAL TITO

IN BELGRADE AT 2300 HOURS ON TUESDAY 9th MAY 1945

Confidential

PRESENT:-

YUGOSLAVIA

Marshal of Yugoslavia,  
Josip Broz Tito

Major-General Djuric,  
Chief of Military Cabinet

A.F.H.Q.

Lieut-General W.D. Morgan,  
Chief of Staff to  
Supreme Allied Commander

Brig-General A.L. Hamblen,  
Assistant Chief Administrative  
Officer

The Paper setting out the draft proposals made by Marshal TITO, which had been handed to him at the 2nd Meeting, had been revised in the light of his remarks at that meeting and had been re-submitted to him at 2030 hours. As a result, Marshal TITO had requested this third and final meeting with Lieutenant General MORGAN.

MARSHAL TITO requested that the word "unrestricted", which appeared in the draft in relation to the use of the ports of TRISTE and FOLA, should be deleted and the word "full" inserted. He said that his reason was that "unrestricted" had a more far-reaching meaning in the Yugoslav language. In all other respects, he accepted the draft as fairly representing his views.

This summary of Marshal Tito's views, as so accepted by him, is attached as Appendix (A) to these Minutes.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he wished to make it clear to Marshal Tito that his failure to accept the proposals, presented to him on the previous day on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, was a great disappointment to the latter. As a result, the matter was now out of the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander who would have to refer it to the authorities in WASHINGTON and LONDON.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reminded Marshal Tito that the Supreme Allied Commander had always been a good friend of his, as the Marshal must

Major-General Dvorlo,  
Chief of Military Cabinet

Brig-General A.D. Hrablen,  
Assistant Chief Administrative  
Officer

The Paper setting out the draft proposals made by Marshal TITO, which had been handed to him at the 2nd Meeting, had been revised in the light of his remarks at that meeting and had been re-submitted to him at 20X hours. As a result, Marshal TITO had requested this third and final meeting with Lieutenant General MORAN.

MARSHAL TITO requested that the word "unrestricted", which appeared in the draft in relation to the use of the parts of THIRTE and POLA, should be deleted and the word "fully" inserted. He said that his reason was that "unrestricted" had a more far-reaching meaning in the Yugoslav language. In all other respects, he accepted the draft as fairly representing his views.

This summary of Marshal Tito's views, as so accepted by him, is attached as Appendix 'A' to these Minutes.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORAN said that he wished to make it clear to Marshal Tito that his failure to accept the proposals, presented to him on the previous day on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, was a great disappointment to the latter. As a result, the matter was now out of the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander who would have to refer it to the authorities in WASHINGTON and LONDON.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORAN reminded Marshal Tito that the Supreme Allied Commander had always been a good friend of his, as the Marshal must have realized from the amount of material and military aid which he had received. This had only been achieved by the close personal contact which the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito had had in the past. As Marshal Tito would not deal with the Supreme Allied Commander along the lines of the agreement which the Chief of Staff had presented on his behalf, Field Marshal Alexander would not be able to go further in the matter and in the future it would be necessary for Marshal Tito to deal with the British and American Governments.

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APPENDIX I  
to  
ANNEXURE III

Confidential

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS WHICH MARSHAL ALEXANDER  
MADE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE DRAFT  
SUBMITTED BY LIEUT-GENERAL MORICONE ON BEHALF  
OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER

1. Marshal LITO said he was sorry he could not accept Field Marshal ALEXANDER's proposal. His reason for this was that as his troops had liberated territory which is Slovene, he considered that they had a right to occupy it as an Allied Army on account of their services and sacrifices in the Allied cause. He further mentioned that at the Peace Conference he would claim territory to the West of the ISONZO.

In view of this he pointed out that the matter had taken on a pre-dominantly political significance.

2. He offered to Field Marshal ALEXANDER full use of the Port of TRIESTE and the communications he required, and he considered that this should meet all reasonable military requirements.

3. He suggested that there should be a joint commission in TRIESTE which would coordinate with the Yugoslav civil and military authorities all military matters in TRIESTE and throughout the lines of communication. This joint commission would have overriding powers over the civil and military authorities in matters pertaining to military interest.

4. Civil government would be carried out by National Liberation organizations which had been set up previously and were now functioning.

5. Allied personnel would have extra territorial rights under their own commanders.

6. Italian metropolitan law would be the currency for the time being.

7. Allied personnel would have full liberty to operate TRIESTE as a base, including shore facilities and railways as they deemed necessary. Local labour and employees would be provided as required.

8. An Allied naval officer, responsible to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would be in charge of the Port of TRIESTE. He would be assisted by a Port Committee, in which there would be Yugoslav representatives. Naval forces under Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would have full use of the harbour at POLA and anchorages between POLA and TRIESTE.

in view of this he pointed out that the matter had taken on a predominantly political significance.

2. He offered to Field Marshal ALEXANDER full use of the Port of TRIESTE and the communications he required, and he considered that this should meet all reasonable military requirements.

3. He suggested that there should be a joint commission in TRIESTE which would coordinate with the Yugoslav civil and military authorities all military matters in TRIESTE and throughout the lines of communication. This joint commission would have overriding powers over the civil and military authorities in matters pertaining to military interest.

4. Civil government would be carried out by National Liberation organizations which had been set up previously and were now functioning.

5. Allied personnel would have extra territorial rights under their own command.

6. Italian metropolitan lire would be the currency for the time being.

7. Allied personnel would have full liberty to operate TRIESTE as a base, including shore facilities and railways as they deemed necessary. Local labour and supplies would be provided as required.

8. An Allied naval officer, responsible to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would be in charge of the Port of TRIESTE. He would be assisted by a Port Committee, on which there would be Yugoslav representatives. Naval forces under Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would have full use of the harbour at PULA and anchorages between PULA and TRIESTE.

9. The Allies would be at liberty to operate any airfield at TRIESTE or along the lines of communication. Such airfields would be under joint control.

10. Allied forces necessary for service and garrison purposes would be stationed in TRIESTE and on the lines of communication.

Lieut-General MORGAN pointed out that these proposals differed fundamentally from the draft agreement put forward by Field Marshal ALEXANDER. He would refer the matter to Field Marshal ALEXANDER, who would almost certainly have, in turn, to refer it to the United States and British Governments.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 24  
24th April 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

APR 25 RECD

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENEZIA GHULIA

Note by Deputy Chief of Staff

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have still not defined their policy in regard to the occupation of VENEZIA GHULIA. However, events have now moved to such an extent that it is imperative to make detailed plans and preparations. A draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which is self-explanatory, is therefore attached at Appendix 'A'.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested :-

(a) To approve as his policy for the occupation of VENEZIA GHULIA the proposals outlined in Appendix 'A'.

(b) To authorise the despatch of this signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the action which he intends to take.

*Conclusion in this Paper  
at Paris on 27/EC.*

(intd) I.L.L.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
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Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, HAF  
Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest  
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Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer

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plans and preparations. A draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which is self-explanatory, is therefore attached as Appendix 'A'.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested :-

- (a) To approve as his policy for the occupation of YUGOSLAVIA the proposals outlined in Appendix 'A'.
- (b) To authorize the despatch of this signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the action which he intends to take.

*Conclusions in this Paper  
at Force HQ, Five 27/EC.*

(intd) L.I.L.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
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APPENDIX 'A'

DRAFT SIGNAL

TO: AGMR for Combined Chiefs of Staff  
AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff

RPTD: SHAIF Main

Confidential

This is NAF \_\_\_\_\_

Subject is occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. reference signals ending with

NAF 872.

1. Events are moving rapidly in this theatre and I am likely to be faced in the near future with the necessity for action in respect of allied occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. I must now make the necessary plans and preparations and unless you instruct me to the contrary, these will be as follows.
2. An Anglo-American task force will be set up to occupy the entire compartment of VENEZIA GIULIA under the direction of 15 Army Group. Allied Military Government will be set up in the wake of the occupational forces in the usual way. This will be a joint Anglo-American undertaking provided as far as possible equally from US and British resources. It will work through such local authorities as may be found functioning in VENEZIA GIULIA regardless of nationality.
3. Before the task force enters VENEZIA GIULIA I will inform Marshal TITO of my intentions and will request his cooperation in withdrawing all Yugoslav forces from the entire compartment. If necessary I will explain to him that it is my further intention to disarm all forces remaining, regardless of nationality, and to carry out any other measures required to ensure the orderly govern-

in the near future with the necessity for action in respect of allied occupation of VENEZUELA. I must now make the necessary plans and preparations and unless you instruct me to the contrary, these will be as follows.

2. An Anglo-American task force will be set up to occupy the entire compartment of VENEZUELA under the direction of 15 Army Group. Allied Military Government will be set up in the wake of the occupational forces in the usual way. This will be a joint Anglo-American undertaking provided as far as possible equally from US and British resources. It will work through such local authorities as may be found functioning in VENEZUELA regardless of nationality.

3. Before the task force enters VENEZUELA GHILLI I will inform Marshal TITO of my intentions and will request his cooperation in withdrawing all Yugoslav forces from the entire compartment. If necessary I will explain to him that it is my further intention to disarm all forces remaining, regardless of nationality, and to carry out any other measures required to ensure the orderly government and pacification of the compartment. I shall explain that my action is dictated by the agreed policy of the United Nations to reserve all questions of territorial revision until the peace conference, and by the paramount operational need for ensuring a peaceful and secure I. of C for the Allied forces carrying out the occupation of AUSTRIA. It will in no way prejudice a decision on any territorial claims which he (Marshal TITO) may make at the final peace settlement

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 22  
10 April 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

FREEDOM OF AIR PASSAGE IN AUSTRIA  
AND GERMANY DURING ALLIED OCCUPATION.

APR 11 1945

Note by the Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF.

1. The question of the movement of Allied aircraft between the zones of occupation in GERMANY is under consideration at SHAER. This question also affects AFHQ in that VIENNA lies within the Russian zone of occupation.
2. Up to the present as far as the Russians are concerned, all movement of aircraft in and out of Russian-occupied areas has had to be cleared through MOSCOW. This system prevails in the BALKANS at the moment, and an extension of it to cover the Russian zone in AUSTRIA would raise countless difficulties for the other occupying powers with zones in VIENNA.
3. British and U. S. aircraft based in AUSTRIA will require to fly North to BERLIN, and DENMARK, and NORWAY, and West to Western GERMANY, FRANCE, the Low Countries, and U. K. This will involve British and U. S. aircraft crossing territory occupied by the U. S. and British components of SHAER, and the Russian occupational zone.
4. To ensure free air movement between BERLIN and VIENNA, and between the various national zones, the following mutual facilities are necessary:

- (a) Free passage across zone boundaries subject only to flying control limitations;
- (b) landing and refuelling, both at terminals and at intermediary points en route as required;
- (c) the use of navigational aids and repair facilities, as available, to the extent necessary for the continuation of a flight.

the question of the movement of Allied aircraft between the zones of occupation in GERMANY is under consideration at SHAFF. This question also affects AFHQ in that VIENNA lies within the Russian zone of occupation.

2. Up to the present as far as the Russians are concerned, all movement of aircraft in and out of Russian-occupied areas has had to be cleared through MOSCOW. This system prevails in the BALKANS at the present, and an extension of it to cover the Russian zone in AUSTRIA would raise countless difficulties for the other occupying powers with zones in VIENNA.

3. British and U. S. aircraft based in AUSTRIA will require to fly North to GERMANY, and DENMARK, and NORTHAY, and West to Western GERMANY, FRANCE, the Low Countries, and U. K. This will involve British and U. S. aircraft crossing territory occupied by the U. S. and British components of SHAFF, and the Russian occupational zone.

4. To ensure free air movement between BERLIN and VIENNA, and between the various national zones, the following mutual facilities are necessary:

- (a) Free passage across zone boundaries subject only to flying control limitations;
- (b) landing and refuelling, both at terminals and at intermediary points en route as required;
- (c) the use of navigational aids and repair facilities, as available, to the extent necessary for the continuation of a flight.

5. This agreement should cover not only the period of military government, but in addition, the whole period of Allied military occupation.

6. I recommend, therefore, that a signal be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting urgent action to effect agreement between the American, British, Russian and French governments ensuring:

- (a) Freedom of passage throughout GERMANY and AUSTRIA for all aircraft under the control of the U. S., British, Russian and French Air Forces, subject to the operational control of the formations to which they belong;

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- (b) landing and refueling rights for transit aircraft at any U.S., British, Russian and/or French occupied airfield in GERMANY and AUSTRIA;
- (c) the use of navigational aids and repair facilities as available to the extent necessary for the continuation of the flight.

7. A draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff is attached.

/s/ J. K. G.

DISTRIBUTION

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Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
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Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
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*Enclosures on this Paper at  
folio 156, file 217/EC.*

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TO: COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

1. During the period of occupation of GERMANY and AUSTRIA considerable freedom of air travel will be necessary between and through various international areas if adequate communications are to be maintained. Thus, British and U. S. aircraft based in AUSTRIA will require to fly North to BERLIN and West to Western GERMANY, FRANCE, the Low Countries, and U. K. This will involve U. S. and British aircraft crossing the Russian occupational zone. Under the system at present in force in the Russian occupied area in the BALKANS, all movements of Allied aircraft in and out of those occupied areas have to be specially cleared, entailing continuous delays. Any extension of this system to cover the Russian zones in AUSTRIA and GERMANY would raise countless difficulties for the other occupying powers.

2. It is therefore recommended that immediate action be taken to effect agreement between the American, British, Russian and French governments to ensure:

- (a) Freedom of passage through GERMANY and AUSTRIA for all aircraft under the control of the U. S., British, Russian and French air forces, subject to the operational control of the formations to which they

and U. S. This will involve U. S. and British aircraft crossing the Russian occupational zone. Under the system at present in force in the Russian occupied area in the BALKANS, all movements of Allied aircraft in and out of these occupied areas have to be specially cleared, entailing continuous delays. Any extension of this system to cover the Russian zones in AUSTRIA and GERMANY would raise countinous difficulties for the other occupying powers.

2. It is therefore recommended that immediate action be taken to effect agreement between the American, British, Russian and French Governments to ensure:

- (a) Freedom of passage through GERMANY and AUSTRIA for all aircraft under the control of the U. S., British, Russian and French air forces, subject to the operational control of the formations to which they belong.
- (b) Landing and refuelling rights for transit aircraft at any U. S., British, Russian and French occupied airfields in GERMANY and AUSTRIA.
- (c) That such navigational aids and repair facilities as are available in each zone can be used by transit aircraft as necessary during their flight.

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SAC (E) (45) 22  
9th APRIL 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

APR 12 1945

TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES - ANNOUNCEMENTS AND  
CELEBRATIONS

Note by Secretary

1. It has been suggested that an order should be issued, laying down a policy applicable to all troops in the theatre in regard to announcements of the cessation of hostilities in EUROPE, and appropriate celebrations and speeches which will result therefrom.
2. Attached as Appendix 'A' is an instruction issued on behalf of Field Marshal ALFRED in his capacity as commander of the British land forces. It will be observed that this order is based on the policy that victory in EUROPE should not be marked by extravagant celebrations or by a general relaxation of discipline, but should be welcomed in a spirit of sober satisfaction and gratitude. It also envisages the publication of a Special Order of the Day to all members of the Allied forces in the theatre.
3. The United States forces propose that, following the announcement of termination of hostilities, there should be broadcast a number of special radio programmes and announcements, including recorded speeches by the Supreme Allied Commander, and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.
4. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to direct that the policy outlined at paragraph 2 above shall be adopted by all forces under his command and that all concerned in the arrangements for celebrations and the preparation of announcements and radio programmes should proceed in accordance with it.

Enclosures on this Paper at  
Paris 1st Lt 27/4.

1/1  
J.S. GUSTIN,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

- Supreme Allied Commander
- Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- Air Commander-in-Chief, IAF
- Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA

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2. Attached as Appendix 'A' is an instruction issued on behalf of Field Marshal ALLENBY in his capacity as Commander of the British Land Forces. It will be observed that this order is based on the policy that victory in Europe should not be marked by extravagant celebrations or by a general relaxation of discipline, but should be welcomed in a spirit of sober satisfaction and gratitude. It also envisages the publication of a Special Order of the Day to all members of the Allied forces in the theatre.

3. The United States Forces propose that, following the announcement of termination of hostilities, there should be broadcast a number of special radio programmes and announcements, including recorded speeches by the Supreme Allied Commander, and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly invited to direct that the policy outlined at paragraph 2 above shall be adopted by all forces under his command and that all concerned in the arrangements for celebrations and the preparation of announcements and radio programmes should proceed in accordance with it.

*Endorsements in this Paper at  
Paris 1st Lt 27/4.*

*19*  
J.C. SUTHERLAND,  
LEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF  
Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, AF MAF  
U.S. Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Director, FCB  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
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APPENDIX A

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GMO OFFICE

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TO: See below

SUBJECT: Armistice Celebrations.

Various inquiries have been received at this HQ regarding plans for celebrating the armistice or cessation of hostilities against GERMANY.

When this event takes place the Supreme Allied Commander will probably issue a Special Order of the Day to all troops under his command. Meanwhile, I am instructed to inform Commanders of British troops as to the policy which the SAC will wish them to adopt.

The SAC considers that the achievement of final victory over GERMANY should be welcomed in a spirit of sober satisfaction and heartfelt gratitude, but that it is not a fitting occasion for extravagant celebrations. Requests for the issue of additional rations or MAPI supplies will not be approved. Discipline will not be relaxed.

The war with JAPAN will still remain to be won, and many other important and hard tasks will lie ahead. It will be very necessary to keep these matters in the minds of the troops and to discourage any feeling that no further efforts will be required from them.

31 March 45.

DISTRIBUTION: CG 15 Army Group  
CG Fifth Army  
Main Eighth Army

B.H. WHERSTON,  
Lieutenant General,  
Chief Administrative Officer.

while, I am instructed to inform Commanders of British troops as to the policy which the S.C. will wish them to adopt.

The S.C. considers that the achievement of final victory over GERMANY should be welcomed in a spirit of sober satisfaction and heartfelt gratitude, but that it is not a fitting occasion for extravagant celebrations. Requests for the issue of additional rations or M.A.F.I. supplies will not be approved. Discipline will not be relaxed.

The war with JAPAN will still remain to be won, and many other important and hard tasks will lie ahead. It will be very necessary to keep these matters in the minds of the troops and to discourage any feeling that no further efforts will be required from them.

21 March 45.

DISTRIBUTION: CC 15 Army Group  
CC Fifth Army  
Main Eighth Army  
HQ No. 1 District  
HQ No. 2 District  
HQ No. 3 District  
HQ 1st, CENTRAL  
HQ 1st, ADRIATIC

C-in-C Mediterranean  
CC MAF  
D/SAC  
C-in-C R.P.  
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CEFI

For  
Information

R.H. ROBERTSON,  
Lieutenant General,  
Chief Administrative Officer.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (P) (45) 21  
7th April 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

APR 11 1945

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION  
OF VENETIA GULF

Note by Secretary

1. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENETIA GULF has been requested in NAF 872 to which a reply is awaited.
2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.
3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC (P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an I of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in Italy, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.
4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters :-

- (a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.
- (b) The handing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited.  
(Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).

Conclusions  
in this paper  
at Folkestone  
14th April

Government of VENETIA CHILIA has been requested in NAF 872 to which a reply is awaited.

2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.

3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC (P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to ANSTH, Allied carrier troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters :-

(a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.

(b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited. (Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).

(c) Whether personnel of Number One Italian Cooperator Company would be permitted to enter TRIESTE for work with Officer-in-charge, Works. (Note: These would be in substitution for the Royal Marine Engineer Company recently withdrawn from the theatre, and failure to use these would prejudice the work of the port.)

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to :-

(a) Reaffirm that the general policy outlined at paragraph 34 135 above is, in the absence of further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to form the basis of plans for the occupation of VENETIA CHILIA.

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(b) Authorize, as exceptions to the above policy, the use of THIRTE by Italian naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port as suggested by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at paragraphs 4 (a), (b) and (c) above.

*by direction*

J. G. SWEETMAN,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF  
Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, Hq USAF  
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British Resident Liaison  
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Supreme Allied Commander  
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
 Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF  
 Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
 Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF  
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ALLIED FORM NO. 100-10  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 20  
3 April 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

APR 4 1945

YUGOSLAV ORGANIZATIONS AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 3, the Supreme Allied Commander:

(a) Invited the British Resident Minister and the U. S. Political Advisor to obtain the formal approval of the Yugoslav Government to the closure of the Royalist Yugoslav Missions in Rome, Naples and Bari, and to the disposition of the Yugoslav personnel of those missions in a manner agreeable to the Allies.

(b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to make representations to the Yugoslav military authorities, through 37 Military Mission, to the effect that the Yugoslav Army Military Mission in Rome should be closed and the similar delegation at Bari reduced in size.

2. The British Resident Minister subsequently reported at SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 2, that although he had made arrangements for the matter of the closure of the Royalist missions to be taken up with the Yugoslav Government, he did not consider it was yet opportune to raise the question of the disposal of the Yugoslav personnel concerned. The Supreme Allied Commander, therefore, directed that the latter question should not be raised until the United States Ambassador had arrived in Belgrade, when joint representations on the subject would be possible.

3. The British ambassador in Belgrade has now reported that both he and Air Vice Marshal Lee consider that a request for the closure of the Yugoslav military mission in Rome should not be pressed, as it might react most unfavorably on the position of the Allied Sub-Commissions in JUGOSLAVIA. Mr. Stevenson states, for instance, that if questioned by the Yugoslavs, we might find it difficult to justify on military grounds the retention of certain of our intelligence officers in the field and at key points such as SARAJEVO.

4. The British ambassador further understands that so far as the military mission at Bari is concerned, the Yugoslavs themselves are only too anxious to cut down their establishment. He therefore considers that it is unnecessary for this subject to be raised at the moment.

the closure of the Royalist Yugoslav missions in Rome, Naples and Bari, and to the disposition of the Yugoslav personnel of these missions in a manner agreeable to the Allies.

- (b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to make representations to the Yugoslav military authorities, through 37 Military Mission, to the effect that the Yugoslav Army Military Mission in Rome should be closed and the similar delegation at Bari reduced in size.
2. The British Resident Minister subsequently reported at SAC (P) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 2, that although he had made arrangements for the matter of the closure of the Royalist missions to be taken up with the Yugoslav Government, he did not consider it was yet opportune to raise the question of the disposal of the Yugoslav personnel concerned. The Supreme Allied Commander, therefore, directed that the latter question should not be raised until the United States Ambassador had arrived in Belgrade, when joint representations on the subject would be possible.
3. The British ambassador in Belgrade has now reported that both he and Air Vice Marshal Lee consider that a request for the closure of the Yugoslav military mission in Rome should not be pressed, as it might react most unfavorably on the position of the Allied Sub-Commissions in JUGOSLAVIA. Mr. Stevenson states, for instance, that if questioned by the Yugoslavs, we might find it difficult to justify on military grounds the retention of certain of our intelligence officers in the field and at key points such as SKOPJE.
4. The British ambassador further understands that so far as the military mission at Bari is concerned, the Yugoslavs themselves are only too anxious to cut down their establishment. He therefore considers that it is unnecessary for this subject to be raised at the moment.
5. The U. S. Political Advisor has received reports in similar terms from the head of the independent United States Military Mission in Belgrade.
6. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly requested:
  - (a) To direct that in regard to the Royalist Yugoslav Missions his existing policy should not be changed, and that
  - (i) The formal approval of the Yugoslav Government to the closure of these missions should be obtained as soon as possible.
  - (ii) Joint representations should be made by the British and United States ambassadors, on the subject of the disposal of the Yugoslav personnel of these missions, as soon as the United States ambassador is established in Belgrade.

*Endorsement - the Paper at - 1 -  
This is a, Lile 217/22.*

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*see P 117*

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(b) To revise his previous policy in regard to the Jugoslav Army Military Missions, and to direct that

(1) No action should be taken to request the closure of the mission in Rome or the reduction of that at Bari.

(11) The direction at SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting, Minute 3 (b), should be regarded as cancelled.

*J. G. Sweeney*  
J. G. SWEENEY,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 19  
3rd April 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY - DIRECTIVE REGARDING  
SPECIAL OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

Note by Secretary

1. The initial orders, to be issued on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, to enemy forces in ITALY in the event of their surrender, contain certain instructions regarding the treatment of Allied liaison officers and Italian Government forces in German-occupied ITALY. Paragraphs 18-20 of Appendix 'A' to paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15 (Revised), which has now been issued as AG Instruction No. AG 287/247 SACS-O of 31 March, refer.
2. The Joint Planning Staff in their Study No. P/270 (Final) drew attention to their belief that separate instructions were required for issue to Allied liaison officers and CIVIL in the field. It was also considered desirable that a small mission composed of a representative of G-5, SOE and OSS should upon surrender immediately be sent to the German Commander-in-Chief South-west for the purpose of coordinating all questions concerning partisans.
3. A detailed examination is being made separately of the complete machinery required, in respect of attachment of Allied officers to enemy headquarters and vice versa, to ensure that orders, issued on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander to enemy forces, are implemented.
4. Meanwhile, A.C. of S, G-3, with the concurrence of A.C. of S, G-5, U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister, recommend that the draft directive at Appendix 'A', amplifying the special operational aspects of enemy surrender, should be despatched to 15th Army Group.
5. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to the issue of this directive is therefore requested.

Endorsements on this Paper  
at 11.15.45

Certain instructions regarding the treatment of their surrender, contain and Italian Government forces in German-occupied Italy. Paragraphs 18-20 of Appendix 'A' to paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15 (Revised), which has now been issued as AG instruction No. AG 387/247 SACCS-O of 31 March, refer.

2. The Joint Planning Staff in their Study No. P/270 (Final) drew attention to their belief that separate instructions were required for issue to Allied liaison officers and CINAI in the field. It was also considered desirable that a small mission composed of a representative of G-5, SOE and OSS should upon surrender immediately be sent to the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest for the purpose of coordinating all questions concerning partisans.

3. A detailed examination is being made separately of the complete machinery required, in respect of attachment of Allied officers to enemy Headquarters and vice versa, to ensure that orders, issued on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander to enemy forces, are implemented.

4. Meanwhile, A.C. of S, G-3, with the concurrence of A.C. of S, G-5, U.S. Political Adviser and British Resident Minister, recommend that the draft directive at Appendix 'A', amplifying the special operational aspects of enemy surrender, should be despatched to 15th Army Group.

5. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to the issue of this directive is therefore requested.

*Endorsement - this paper at Loh 150, Loh 24/EC.*

*J. B. Sweetman*

J. B. SWEETMAN,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

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II

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SUBJECT: Local German Surrender in North ITALY

TO: 15th Army Group

1. This instruction is designed to enlarge on special operative aspects detailed in paras 18-20 of Appendix 'A' to AG 387/24.7 SACS-O dated 31 March subject as above.

2. It is not unlikely that as soon as the terms of surrender are made known, fighting will break out:

(a) Between the Republican forces and forces of the C.N.R.I.

(b) Between Italians and French in the North West.

(c) Between Italians and Slovenes in the North East.

It is most desirable to avoid such happenings particularly in the North East - the area covering our approach to AUSTRIA and the eventual L of C.

3. Allied Liaison Officers in conjunction with C.N.R.I. will play an important part in the early stages of surrender in facilitating the pacific occupation by Allied forces.

4. You will therefore issue to all Allied Liaison Officers in the field such instructions as you consider necessary in amplification of orders contained in paras 18-19-20 of Appendix 'A' to above cited memorandum.

5. You will prepare in conjunction with TMB and AG the necessary proclamations in the name of the S.C. for dropping into North ITALY and issuing through

- (a) Between the Republican forces and forces of the ITMLI.
- (b) Between Italians and French in the North West.
- (c) Between Italians and Slovenes in the North East.

It is most desirable to avoid such happenings particularly in the North East - the area covering our approach to AUSTRIA and the eventual E of C.

2. Allied Liaison Officers in conjunction with CLMFI will play an important part in the early stages of surrender in facilitating the pacific occupation by Allied forces.

4. You will therefore issue to all Allied Liaison Officers in the field such instructions as you consider necessary in amplification of orders contained in paras 12-19-20 of Appendix 'A' to above cited memorandum.

5. You will prepare in conjunction with PEB and JC the necessary proclamations in the name of the SAC for dropping into North Italy and issuing through the Italian Combatto Programme, the BBC, etc. These should be submitted to this HQ for approval.

6. In order to control relations of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and his subordinate commanders with members of the Italian Resistance in North Italy prior to the arrival of Allied forces, it is intended that senior officers from OSS, SOI and JC return with the enemy delegation to the Headquarters of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest. It is desired that you, in conjunction with the other agencies concerned, take action to ensure that such officers are detailed and suitably briefed at the appropriate time to carry out this task effectively.

III

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (3) (45) 18  
25th March 1945

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COPY NO. 76

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES  
IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At SAC (3) (44) 39th Meeting, Director PMB was instructed to submit recommendations regarding the future functions of PMB in liberated ITALY.
2. Discussions have therefore taken place between PMB and Allied Commission, United States and British Embassies, British Ministry of War Information and United States Office of War Information, and agreement has been reached in regard to certain proposals for reorganisation. These are summarised in Appendix 'A' in a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, when it is considered should be informed accordingly.
3. In order to implement this policy Director, PMB, recommends, with the concurrence of the agencies mentioned in paragraph 2 above, that he should be given the detailed directions set out in Appendix 'B'.
4. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to approve:-

- (a) The despatch of the draft cable in Appendix 'A' to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- (b) The issue to Director, PMB, of the detailed directions in Appendix 'B'.

*Enclosure - this Paper is  
Table 120, Ltr 27/50. p. 2*

*14 June 45*  
J. G. SWERTMAN,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

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2. Discussions have therefore taken place between FMS and Allied Com-

mission, United States and British Embassies, British Ministry of War Information and United States Office of War Information, and agreement has been reached in regard to certain proposals for reorganization. These are summarized in Appendix 'A' in a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, whom it is considered should be informed accordingly.

3. In order to implement this policy Director, FMS, recommends, with the concurrence of the agencies mentioned in paragraph 2 above, that he should be given the detailed directions set out in Appendix 'B'.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to approve:-  
(a) The designation of the draft cable as Appendix 'A' to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) The issue to Director, FMS, of the detailed directions set out in Appendix 'B'.

*Endorsement - this Paper at  
JCS 140, Ltr 27/EC, 1944*

*16 June 1944*  
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APR. DIX 'A'

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2 R A F T

TO: AGHAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: STAFF MAIN

This is NAF\_\_\_\_\_. Subject is Psychological Warfare activities in ITALY.

1. During initial stages of occupation PWB, in addition to conducting combat propaganda, was responsible for distribution and control of all news, newspapers, moving pictures, books and other publications except for military censorship. PWB published newspapers in certain Italian cities and operated all Italian civilian radio stations. It also monitored enemy radio stations and collected and distributed intelligence required for its activities.

2. Recently PWB has been divided into :

- (a) PWB 15 Army Group, responsible for operational propaganda in direct support of the armies and directed towards areas of ITALY north of the rear Army control line.
- (b) PWB Liberated ITALY, responsible for activities in areas south of the control line and in regard to which it is not yet possible to relinquish allied control.

3. In liberated areas, to foster in the Italians a greater sense of responsibility as directed by FAN 487, PWB has now :

- (a) handed over the distribution of news to private news

news, newspapers, moving pictures, books and other publications except for military censorship. PWB published newspapers in certain Italian cities and operated all Italian civilian radio stations. It also monitored enemy radio stations and collected and distributed intelligence required for its activities.

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(a) PWB 15 Army Group, responsible for operational propaganda in direct support of the armies and directed towards areas of ITALY north of the rear Army control line.

(b) PWB Liberated ITALY, responsible for activities in areas south of the control line and in regard to which it is not yet possible to relinquish allied control.

3. In liberated areas, to foster in the Italians a greater sense of responsibility as directed by PAN 427, PWB has now :

- (a) Handed over the distribution of news to private news agencies, Italian and foreign.
- (b) Relinquished control of newspapers which are now published under Italian editorial arrangements.
- (c) Relinquished control of Italian radio network which is now operated by Italian Radio Agency.
- (d) Handed over as appropriate informational activities in connection with Books, Plays, Copyrights, News features and photographic services to Allied Commission, C.I., M.O.I and British and United States Embassies.

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Similar action will be taken in respect of areas further north as soon as convenient after their liberation.

4. To conduct operational propaganda, it remains necessary to retain control of the following services in the liberated area : Central News Services, time on Italian radio transmitters, and facilities for leaflet printing, radio monitoring and collection of intelligence. Distribution of American and British films and preparation of documentary films required by Allied organisations must also remain Allied functions at present.

5. Your covering approval to these arrangements is requested.

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at present.  
5. Your covering approval to these arrangements is requested.

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APPENDIX 'B'

DETAILED DIRECTIONS TO FWB

1. That responsibility for the introduction of news features and similar background material be transferred immediately to American and British Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.
2. That responsibility for the introduction and distribution of American and British news photos be transferred to the respective Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information, as soon as convenient.
3. That responsibility for the introduction and distribution of American and British publications and all responsibilities concerning copyright be transferred immediately to the respective Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.
4. That radio monitoring, other than that required for the servicing of ARIQ, and other Allied military organizations, be liquidated or that the facilities be passed to the Italian Press Secretariat as soon as convenient.
5. That FWB retain the technical facilities and accommodation required for the central servicing of the news operation towards North ITALY, AUSTRIA and the BALKANS. These facilities consist of five requisitioned Morse transmitters together with the necessary accommodation and the personnel required for their use.
6. That FWB retain on the Italian transmitters, ROME short wave and BARI I respectively three hours and forty-five minutes and four hours of transmitting time.
7. That FWB retain such requisitioned printing facilities as may be required for the preparation of operational leaflets.
8. That FWB retain responsibility for the distribution of films on existing lines, until such time as private distributors can take over.
9. That FWB retain responsibility for the preparation of news reels and other films required by other Allied organizations until such time as these can be handed over to private manufacturers, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

and British publications and all responsibilities concerning copyright be transferred immediately to the respective Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

4. That radio monitoring, other than that required for the servicing of AFHQ, and other Allied military organizations, be liquidated or that the facilities be passed to the Italian Press Secretariat as soon as convenient.
5. That FIB retain the technical facilities and accommodation required for the central servicing of the news operation towards North Italy, Austria and the Balkans. These facilities consist of five requisitioned Morse transmitters together with the necessary accommodation and the personnel required for their use.
6. That FIB retain on the Italian transmitters, ROME short wave and BARR 1 respectively three hours and forty-five minutes and four hours of transmitting time.
7. That FIB retain such requisitioned printing facilities as may be required for the preparation of operational leaflets.
8. That FIB retain responsibility for the distribution of films on existing lines, until such time as private distributors can take over.
9. That FIB retain responsibility for the preparation of news reels and other films required by other Allied organizations until such time as these can be handed over to private manufacturers, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (F) (45) 15 (Revised)  
25th March 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. As directed at SAC (F) (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 3, the directive, draft instrument of surrender, and initial orders to enemy land, naval and air forces, circulated under paper No. SAC (F) (45) 15, have been redrafted.

2. The revised drafts are circulated for the further consideration of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political)

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J. G. SWERTMAN,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

forces, circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15, have been redrafted.

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2. The revised drafts are circulated for the further consideration of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political)

*J. G. Sweetman*  
J. G. SWEETMAN,  
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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SUBJECT: Local German Surrender in ITALY.

TO: Commanding General, 15 Army Group  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean ) For appropriate Naval  
and Air Commanders.

PROBABLE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER.

1. When the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest surrenders, the end of all organized German resistance is likely to be imminent, and it is probable therefore that FREEDOM conditions (Case B) will shortly arise. It is possible, however, that some German formations will refuse to obey the orders of their higher command to surrender and will attempt either to continue or to resume hostilities after a general "stay-out" order has been issued, or to withdraw out of ITALY.

2. In any event, the period immediately following a German surrender is likely to be one of great general confusion and disorganization throughout German occupied ITALY. It will be important to take advantage of this period and by rapid action before German forces and Italian and Slovene Partisans can react, to seize such areas as will be essential to our future operations. TRIESTE and the BRESCIA Route are the two most important of such areas.

3. Arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest and for the signature of the instrument will be made by AFHQ.

A copy of the draft instrument (FREEDOM Memorandum No. 1) is attached as Annexure 1. This may be modified before signature according to circumstances. A copy of the instrument and appendices as finally signed will be

possible, however, that some German formations will refuse to obey the orders of their higher command to surrender and will attempt either to continue or to resume hostilities after a general "stay-put" order has been issued, or to withdraw out of Italy.

2. In any event, the period immediately following a German surrender is likely to be one of great general confusion and disorganization throughout German occupied Italy. It will be important to take advantage of this period and by rapid action before German forces and Italian and Slovene Partisans can react, to seize such areas as will be essential to our future operations. TRIESTE and the BRENNER Route are the two most important of such areas.

3. Arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest and for the signature of the instrument will be made by AFHQ.

A copy of the draft instrument (PRECEDENT Memorandum No. 1) is attached as Annexure 1. This may be modified before signature according to circumstances. A copy of the instrument and appendices as finally signed will be forwarded as soon after signature as possible.

#### TASKS OF LAND AND AIR FORCES IN ITALY.

4. The primary task of our land and air forces will be to enforce the orders to the German land and air forces as set out in Appendices A and C to the Instrument of Surrender. To this end, Commanding General, 15 Army Group and the Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF will issue and enforce such further orders as they may consider necessary. The first essentials will be to prevent any resumption of resistance by the enemy, to deal with any enemy forces that may continue to resist, and to prevent the withdrawal of any enemy forces from Italy. With these objects in view, and in order to facilitate future

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operations:

2. Commanding General 15 Army Group will in the first instance

immediately position such forces as he considers necessary astride

the enemy's lines of communication in the general area VERONA -

PADUA - MANTUA. He will also seize TRIESTE and secure as much of

the BRESCIA Route as possible.

3. The Air Commander-in-Chief will be prepared to interdict all movement on routes leading out of ITALY.

The primary disarmament of enemy main bodies south of the PC will be carried out simultaneously with the above.

5. The secondary task of 15 Army Group in conjunction with MAF will be to carry out the occupation of AUSTRIA as rapidly as circumstances permit and in accordance with plans for PRUEFERN.

6. The occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be carried out concurrently with the above tasks as rapidly as the resources of 15 Army Group will permit. In allotting resources, the initial policy will be to give such priority to the requirements of 15 Army Group as will ensure the rapid occupation of AUSTRIA, while at the same time allowing for the minimum essential needs of the civilian population in ITALY and providing for the establishment of effective control over the L of C areas behind Fifth and Eighth Armies. In extending such control subsequently as further resources can be made available, the occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be completed in accordance with separate instructions already issued for these two operations.

7. Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

the secondary task of 15 Army Group in conjunction with MAAF will be to carry out the occupation of AUSTRIA as rapidly as circumstances permit and in accordance with plans for PHOTOPAN.

6. The occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be carried out concurrently with the above tasks as rapidly as the resources of 15 Army Group will permit. In allotting resources, the initial policy will be to give such priority to the requirements of 15 Army Group as will ensure the rapid occupation of AUSTRIA, while at the same time allowing for the minimum essential needs of the civilian population in ITALY and providing for the establishment of effective control over the L of C areas behind Fifth and Eighth Armies. In extending such control subsequently as further resources can be made available, the occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be completed in accordance with separate instructions already issued for these two operations.

7. Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

#### TASKS OF NAVAL FORCES.

8. The tasks of naval forces will be, in cooperation with the appropriate military and air commanders,

- a. To enforce the orders set out in Appendix B to the Instrument of Surrender.

- b. To support the advance of 15 Army Group in AUSTRIA.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER.

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ANNEXURE I

FIELDWORK MEMORANDUM NUMBER 1

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT INSTRUMENT OF LOCAL SURRENDER  
OF GERMAN AND OTHER FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OR  
CONTROL OF THE GERMAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SOUTHWEST

1. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest hereby surrenders unconditionally all the forces under his command or control on land, at sea and in the air and places himself and these forces unconditionally at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.
2. All armed forces under the command or control of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest will cease all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air at .....hours (Greenwich mean time).....(date). The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to arrange accordingly.
3. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to carry out the orders set out in Appendices A, B and C and any further orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. Disobedience of such orders or failure to comply with them will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war.
4. This instrument will enter into force immediately on signature, and the orders in Appendices A, B and C will become effective on the date and at the time specified in para 2 above.
5. This instrument and accompanying orders are drawn up in the English and German languages. The English version is the authentic text. If any doubt as to meaning or interpretation arises, the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander is final.

Chief Southwest will cease all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air at .....hours (Greenwich mean time).....(date).

The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to arrange accordingly.

3. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to carry out the orders set out in Appendices A, B and C and any further orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. Disobedience of such orders or failure to comply with them will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war.

4. This instrument will enter into force immediately on signature, and the orders in Appendices A, B and C will become effective on the date and at the time specified in para 2 above.

5. This instrument and accompanying orders are drawn up in the English and German languages. The English version is the authentic text. If any doubt as to meaning or interpretation arises, the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander is final.

6. This instrument is independent of, without prejudice to, and shall be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to GERMANY and the German armed forces as a whole.

.....

.....  
German Commander-in-Chief Southwest  
Supreme Allied Commander,  
Mediterranean Theatre of Operations

Place .....  
Date .....  
Hour .....  
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A-125 APPENDIX 'A'

Confidential

ORDERS FOR GERMAN LAND FORCES

1. The term "German Land Forces" wherever used in these orders shall be deemed to include all German and Italian Republican military or para military formations or organizations, under the command or control of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, who is hereafter referred to as "the German Authority."
2. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" will be deemed to include all subordinate Allied Commanders.
3. The German Authority will send to HQ 15 Army Group, as soon as possible after the signing of the instrument of surrender, senior representatives with full executive powers to carry out the following orders and such further orders as the Commanding General 15 Army Group may issue for compliance by the German Land Forces.

"STALIN-HIT" ORDER

4. All formations, units and sub-units of the German Land Forces, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions and in their existing formations pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander. Only such local movement is permitted as is essential for the transmission of orders, the supply of food, water, forage and petrol and the treatment of sick and wounded. (See also paragraph 7.)
5. In particular, all road and rail movement (including that of ambulances, trains and motor ambulances) between ITALY and any point outside ITALY is absolutely prohibited. Any movement east or north of the line FRIEDL - VILLACH - Southernmost end of Lake GARDA - BRESCIA will be liable to air attack without warning.

after the signing of the instrument of surrender, senior representatives with full executive powers to carry out the following orders and such further orders as the Commanding General 15 Army Group may issue for compliance by the German Land Forces.

"STAY-HUT" ORDER

4. All formations, units and sub-units of the German Land Forces, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions and in their existing formations pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander. Only such local movement is permitted as is essential for the transmission of orders, the supply of food, water, forage and petrol and the treatment of sick and wounded. (See also paragraph 7.)
5. In particular, all road and rail movement (including that of ambulance trains and motor ambulances) between ITALY and any point outside ITALY is absolutely prohibited. Any movement east or north of the line FUSSE - VILLAGE - Southernmost end of Lake GARDA - BRENO will be liable to air attack without warning.

DISARMAMENT OF GERMAN LAND FORCES

6. All German Land Forces will be completely disarmed. They will hand over their arms, ammunition, equipment and all war-like stores at places and times and in a manner to be further ordered by the Commanding General, 15 Army Group, or any of his subordinate Commanders.

MAINTENANCE OF GERMAN LAND FORCES

7. The German authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

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STATUS OF SURRENDERED PERSONNEL

8. All personnel of the German Armed Forces shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the Supreme Allied Commander. At the Supreme Allied Commander's discretion, some or all of such personnel may be declared to be prisoners of war.

PROHIBITION OF DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE

9. The German Authority will prevent the removal, destruction of or damage to, and will safeguard in good condition at the disposal of the Supreme Allied

Commander:

- a. All arms, ammunition, explosives and warlike stores, equipment, vehicles, material of all kinds, fuel and oil stocks, and any items of supply used by or for members of the German land forces.
- b. All military installations and establishments, including permanent and temporary land fortifications, fortresses and fortified areas together with all plans and drawings of the same.
- c. All transportation and communications facilities and equipment, including all ports and port facilities and equipment, roads, railways, waterways, bridges, tunnels and telecommunications systems.
- d. All civil and industrial factories, installations and plant, workshops, laboratories, experimental stations, stores, equipment, supplies, raw materials and finished products, buildings and civil property.
- e. All cryptographic methods and equipment, cyphers, codes and call-sign systems, whether military, diplomatic or civilian.

- a. All arms, munition, explosives and verlike stores, equipment, vehicles, material of all kinds, fuel and oil stocks, and any items of supply used by or for members of the German Land Forces.
- b. All military installations and establishments, including permanent and temporary land fortifications, fortresses and fortified areas together with all plans and drawings of the same.
- c. All transportation and communications facilities and equipment, including all ports and port facilities and equipment, roads, railways, airways, bridges, tunnels and telecommunications systems.
- d. All civil and industrial factories, installations and plant, workshops, laboratories, experimental stations, stores, equipment, supplies, raw materials and finished products, buildings and civil property.
- e. All cryptographic methods and equipment, cyphers, codes and call-sign systems, whether military, diplomatic or civilian.
- f. All military, para military and civil documents, records and archives.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND FACILITIES

10. The German Authority will forthwith furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander:

- a. Complete information regarding the German Land Forces and in particular even details as the Supreme Allied Commander may require concerning the numbers, locations, dispositions, stores and equipment of the German Land Forces wherever located.
- b. Complete information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

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c. Such military, para military and civil  
as the Supreme Allied Commander may require.

11. The German authority will:

- a. Maintain in operation all public utility and essential civilian services.
- b. Clearly mark and maintain safety lanes through all minefields and other obstacles to movement.
- c. Remove or render safe all demolition charges and all booby-traps.
- d. Make available for the Supreme Allied Commander such military personnel with the necessary equipment, as he may require, for the clearance of mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement; and such labor as he may require for any purpose.

DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY

12. The German authority will release in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander all prisoners of war (naval, military or air) at present in their power and will furnish forthwith complete lists of these persons with the places of their detention. Pending release of such prisoners of war, the German authority will continue to protect them in their persons and property, and accord them such treatment and facilities as are prescribed under the Geneva Convention.

13. The provisions of paragraph 12 preceding will be applied by the German Authority equally to all other persons who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as the result of any action, law or regulation originating from discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, color, creed or political belief. Such persons as are not en-

clearance of mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement;

and such labor as he may require for any purpose.

#### DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY

12. The German Authority will release in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander all prisoners of war (naval, military or air) at present in their power and will furnish forthwith complete lists of these persons with the places of their detention. Pending release of such prisoners of war, the German Authority will continue to protect them in their persons and property, and accord them such treatment and facilities as are prescribed under the Geneva Convention.

13. The provisions of paragraph 12 preceding will be applied by the German Authority equally to all other persons who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as the result of any action, law or regulation originating from discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, color, creed or political belief. Such persons as are not entitled to treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention will be afforded comparable rights and amenities in accordance with their rank or official position.

14. Without prejudice to any other provisions in these orders, the German Authority will hand over to the Supreme Allied Commander the control of all places of detention.

#### RADIO AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

15. Pending the institution of control by the Supreme Allied Commander, all German controlled military, para military and civilian wirelans

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transmitters will cease transmission. They will be rendered inoperative

without damage and safeguarded.

16. The use of military and civil land line communication systems is permitted

with the provisos that:

a. All messages and signals will be made in clear.

b. All forms of scrambling and secrecy equipment will be disconnected

and safeguarded intact.

#### MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE

17. The German Authority will remain responsible for the maintenance of discipline throughout the German Land Forces as defined in para 1 above.

#### TREATMENT OF ALLIED LIAISON OFFICERS AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES

##### IN GERMANY-OCCUPIED ITALY

18. Italian Government forces in Northern Italy comprise all partisan formations and organizations owing allegiance to the CIGAI, which is the recognized delegate in German-occupied Italy of the Italian Government.

Immediate control of these groups is exercised through Allied and Co-

Beliguerent officers operating in conjunction with these forces in the

field. Such officers are being instructed immediately to get in touch

with local German commanders.

19. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and all German subordinate coman-

dars will receive and afford all facilities to those Allied or Co-

Beliguerent officers together with representatives of the CIGAI for the

purpose of establishing and maintaining pending arrival of Allied forces,

in line with the following objects:

a. The general maintenance of law and order.

the German and forces as defined in para 1 above.

TREATMENT OF ALLIED MILITARY OFFICERS AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES  
IN GERMANY-OCCUPIED ITALY

18. Italian Government Forces in Northern Italy comprise all partisan formations and organizations owing allegiance to the CUMAI, which is the recognized delegate in German-occupied Italy of the Italian Government. Immediate control of these groups is exercised through Allied and Co-Belligerent officers operating in conjunction with these forces in the field. Such officers are being instructed immediately to get in touch with local German commanders.
19. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and all German subordinate commanders will resolve and afford all facilities to those Allied or Co-Belligerent officers together with representatives of the CUMAI for the purpose of establishing and maintaining pending arrival of Allied forces, liaison with the following objects:
  - a. The general maintenance of law and order.
  - b. The maintenance of all essential civilian services.
  - c. The provision of communications and transport which may be necessary for the adequate distribution of supplies and the continuance of local administration.
20. For the execution of the above functions all Allied Italian officers will be considered as the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commander. They will be afforded complete freedom of communication by any means.

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D R A F T

ORDERS FOR GERMAN AND GERMAN CONTROLLED NAVAL FORCES AND  
MERCHANT SHIPPING

1. a. The term "German Naval Forces" wherever used in these orders will be deemed to include all German and Italian Republican naval or para-naval forces or organizations under the command or control of the German Naval Commander South or the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest.
- b. The term "German Authority" wherever used in these orders will mean the German Naval Commander South and the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, both severally and jointly.
2. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" will be deemed to include all his subordinate commanders.
3. The German Authority will cause:
  - a. All such surface warships, auxiliaries and merchant vessels as are under his command or control, at sea at the time and date of surrender, wherever they may be, to return to their normal port of origin. Armaments of these ships are to be trained fore and aft.
  - b. All ocean going U-boats at sea to surface and fly a black flag or black pendant by day and to remain unmarked by night and show navigation lights. All ocean going U-boats at sea to be ordered to proceed to GIBRALTAR, reporting on 500 kilocycles to the nearest Allied Wireless Station their estimated time of arrival at GIBRALTAR point.

the German Naval Commander South and the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, both severally and jointly.

2. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" will be deemed to include all his subordinate commanders.
3. The German authority will cause:
  - a. All such surface warships, auxiliaries and merchant vessels as are under his command or control, at sea at the time and date of surrender, wherever they may be, to return to their normal port or base. Armaments of these ships are to be trained fore and aft.
  - b. All ocean going U-boats at sea to surface and fly a black flag or black pennant by day and to remain undarkened by night and show navigation lights. All ocean going U-boats at sea to be ordered to proceed to GIBRALTAR, reporting on 500 kilocycles to the nearest Allied Wireless Station their estimated time of arrival at EUROPA point. Small enemy submarines at sea in the ATLANTIC or MEDITERRANEAN Seas are to be ordered to return to POLA or GENOA respectively.
  - c. All such warships, including submarines of all types, auxiliaries, and merchant vessels as are under his command or control, which are in harbour, to remain there.
  - d. All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not they have been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of or under German control at the time of surrender, to proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

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4. The German Authority will at once cause all such warships, submarines, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft in harbour, as are under his command or control, to comply with the following orders:

a. No ship, vessel or craft of any description, including harbour craft, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building, is to be damaged or scuttled, nor is any damage to be done to its hull, machinery or equipment.

b. Ammunition is to be retained on board until further orders.

c. Armaments are to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential portions of the firing mechanisms, but such mechanisms, and the armament in general are not to be damaged or destroyed. Fire control equipment is to be maintained on board fully efficient. All weapons are to be trained fore and aft.

d. All small arms are to be landed, and safeguarded.

e. Ships are to remain undarkened by night.

f. Colours are to be struck and not rehoisted.

g. With the exception of minesweepers and harbour tugs and vessels, all warships, surface and submarine, and auxiliaries, are to be reduced to 20% of their complement of officers and men, except such ships or craft as are required to remain in operation to comply with the instructions in para 6 h (1). The officers and men removed are to be placed in shore barracks where they are to remain under naval discipline. The crews of merchant vessels are to remain on board their ships.

h. Minesweepers are to be subjected to the degree of disarmament pre-

armament in general are not to be damaged or destroyed. Fire control equipment is to be maintained on board fully efficient. All weapons are to be trained fore and aft.

- d. All small arms are to be landed, and safeguarded.
- e. Ships are to remain undarkened by night.
- f. Colours are to be struck and not rehoisted.
- g. With the exception of minesweepers and harbour tugs and vessels, all warships, surface and submarine, and auxiliaries, are to be reduced to 20% of their complement of officers and men, except such ships or craft as are required to remain in operation to comply with the instructions in para 6 h (1). The officers and men removed are to be placed in shore barracks where they are to remain under naval discipline. The crews of merchant vessels are to remain on board their ships.

h. Minesweepers are to be subjected to the degree of disarmament prescribed in sub para g above, but are to be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives, and are to be complete with fuel.

- i. Wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus is to be damaged or destroyed.

j. All call sign, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, files and cryptographic machinery, are to be removed from ships and placed under guard ashore. International code and call signs are to be retained on board.

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5. The German Authority will cause all such warships, surface or submarine, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft at sea as are under his command or control to be instructed to comply with the orders in para 3 above immediately on return to harbour.
6. The German Authority will immediately ensure that German naval aircraft under his command or control:
  - a. Do not leave the ground or base or ship until further orders are received from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.
  - b. Already in the air, land or alight forthwith.
7. The German Authority will immediately take action to ensure compliance with the following orders:
  - a. No demolitions are to be carried out to harbour or port facilities of whatever nature; to naval establishments ashore; to scientific or experimental centres or laboratories; to telecommunication and radar stations; to power and water installations; to stores and industrial equipment; to documents records and archives of naval interest; which are to be preserved and kept free from damage or destruction pending receipt of further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives. All necessary steps are to be taken, and orders issued, to prohibit any act of sabotage, scuttling or contamination of fuels.
  - b. All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and kept open at all times. Where possible, they are to be removed.
  - c. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbours are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.

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The German Authority will immediately take action to ensure compliance with the following orders:

- a. No demolitions are to be carried out to harbour or port facilities of whatever nature; to naval establishments ashore; to scientific or experimental centres or laboratories; to telecommunication and radar stations; to power and water installations; to stores and industrial equipment; to documents records and archives of naval interest; which are to be preserved and kept free from damage or destruction pending receipt of further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives. All necessary steps are to be taken, and orders issued, to prohibit any act of sabotage, scuttling or contamination of fuels.
- b. All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and kept open at all times. Where possible, they are to be removed.
- c. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbours are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.
- d. All demolition charges in all ports and harbour works are to be removed or rendered ineffective, and their presence indicated by appropriate signs.
- e. The existing wartime system of navigational lighting is to be maintained except that all dimmed lights are to be shown at full brilli-<sup>107</sup>ancy, and lights shown only by special arrangement are to be exhibited continuously. Navigational lights which have been extinguished are to be exhibited as soon as possible with their former characteristics if practicable.

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f. All pilotage services are to continue to operate and all pilots are to be held at their normal stations ready for service and equipped with

charts.

g. All small arms, explosives, and warlike stores, in naval barracks and shore establishments, are to be placed in magazines, under guard.

h. (1) German naval and other personnel concerned in the operation of ports and administrative services in ports are to remain at their stations and to continue to carry out their routine duties.

(2) German and German controlled naval personnel employed on seaward defense are to comply with the instructions given by the Supreme Allied Commander.

(3) A general order is to be given to all German and German controlled naval and para-naval personnel that they are to carry out all orders and instructions given them by the Supreme Allied Commander. All personnel are to be unarmed at all times.

i. A certificate that the action required under sub paras g, d and e above has been carried out, is to be rendered by the German Authority to the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

8. The German Authority will forthwith furnish the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief with the following in respect of the whole of the Mediterranean and the Straits of GIBRALTAR:

a. Positions of all minefields, both moored and ground mines, independent and controlled, laid by the Italians or Germans, by all types of

- (2) German and German controlled naval personnel employed on seaward defense are to comply with the instructions given by the Supreme Allied Commander.
- (3) A general order is to be given to all German and German controlled naval and para-naval personnel that they are to carry out all orders and instructions given them by the Supreme Allied Commander. All personnel are to be unarmed at all times.
1. A certificate that the action required under sub paras c, d and e above has been carried out, is to be rendered by the German Authority to the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.
2. The German Authority will forthwith furnish the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief with the following in respect of the whole of the Mediterranean and the Straits of GIBRALTAR:
2. Positions of all minefields, both moored and ground mines, independent and controlled, laid by the Italians or Germans, by all types of minelaying craft including aircraft. Details of each mine or group of mines laid is to include:
- (1) Type of mine.
  - (2) Number of mines laid.
  - (3) Spaces between mines.
  - (4) Depth setting.
  - (5) Date laid.
  - (6) Number and type of anti-sweeping devices laid.
  - (7) Types of anti-sweeping devices, if any, fitted to the mines themselves.

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- (8) If snag lines have been fitted to mines.
- (9) Polarity, delay, and number of actuations set on all ground mines.
- (10) Details of the mines themselves, including drawings and photographs of all types of mines and minefittings.
- b. Details of convey routes, searched channels and approach channels.
- c. Details of,
  - (1) Navigational lights which have been destroyed.
  - (2) Navigational lights which are in operation, giving details of operation, and by whom controlled.
  - (3) Navigational lights which can be put into operation at short notice and their characteristics.
- d. Details of buoys, indicating:
  - (1) Buoys remaining in place. If light buoys whether light is working and its characteristics.
  - (2) Additional buoys laid, with reason for laying and details, including lights, if any.
  - (3) Buoys removed.
- e. Details of beacons and obstructions, including wrecks dangerous to navigation.
- f. Details of all radio and radar navigational aids including all shore radar stations which could be used for this purpose.
- g. A complete and up-to-date set of charts corrected to the latest information available, and showing all minefields, convey routes, searched channels, approach channels, buoys, lights, navigational

(3) Navigational lights which can be put into operation at short notice and their characteristics.

d. Details of buoys, indicating:

(1) Buoys remaining in place. If light buoys whether light is working and its characteristics.

(2) Additional buoys laid, with reason for laying and details, including lights, if any.

(3) Buoys removed.

e. Details of booms and obstructions, including wrecks dangerous to navigation.

f. Details of all radio and radar navigational aids including all shore radar stations which could be used for this purpose.

g. A complete and up-to-date set of charts corrected to the latest information available, and showing all minefields, convoy routes, searched channels, approach channels, buoys, lights, navigational aids, booms, wrecks, obstructions and radar stations.

h. A complete and up-to-date set of navigational publications corrected to the latest information available.

9. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the information set out in para 7 concerning the undermentioned two special areas is in any case required to be supplied by the German Authority at the date and time at which surrender becomes effective, to be delivered to the Allied Naval Authorities at a place and by means which will be decided at the meeting held prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender.

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The two special areas concerned are:-

- a. LIGURIAN SEA - Area bounded on the west by meridian of 8°W. South by parallel of 43° 30' N. East and north by the coast of ITALY.
- b. ADRIATIC SEA - Area bounded on the north, east and west by the coasts of ITALY, ISTRIA and JUGOSLAVIA. On the south by parallel of 44°N.

10. The German Authority is to furnish forthwith, exact information with regard to the disposition of German and German controlled naval formations and units under his command. Such information is to include the following:

- a. Present locations of all Naval Staffs and Headquarters.
- b. Full details of organization of German Naval Command in the Mediterranean.
- c. Disposition, state of readiness, and crew lists of all warships, auxiliaries and merchant shipping.
- d. Details of defense plans, including plans and drawings of all naval fortifications, installations and establishments.
- e. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace, diesel, petrol and coal.

11. The German Authority will cause all Naval Shore Wireless Stations under his command to comply with the following orders:-

- a. All wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus or shore station equipment is to be damaged or destroyed.

- a. Present locations of all Naval Staffs and Headquarters.
- b. Full details of organization of German Naval Command in the Mediterranean.
- c. Disposition, state of readiness, and crew lists of all warships, auxiliaries and merchant shipping.
- d. Details of defense plans, including plans and drawings of all naval fortifications, installations and establishments.
- e. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace, diesel, petrol and coal.

11. The German Authority will cause all Naval Shore Wireless Stations under his command to comply with the following orders:-

- a. All wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus or shore station equipment is to be damaged or destroyed.
- b. All call signs, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, files and cryptographic machinery, are to be safely stored and guarded.

12. Detailed directions as to how and where the information required by the foregoing paras 8 and 9 is to be delivered to the Allied Naval Authorities will be notified separately to the German Authority at the meeting prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender. The details of the methods which will be used by the German Authority to pass the necessary orders to ships at sea, are to be signalled to the Allied Naval

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Authorities in plain language, prior to the time and after this instrument takes effect.

13. The German Authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain his own forces from his own resources.

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D R A F T

ORDERS FOR THE GERMAN AND GERMAN CONTROLLED  
AIR FORCES

1. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, hereinafter referred to as the "German Authority", is hereby held responsible for the execution of the following orders.
2. All aircraft of any kind or nationality, including gliders and balloons, under the control of the German Authority, whether military, naval or civil, will remain on the ground, on the water, or aboard ships pending further instructions.
3. The German Authority will forthwith cause all German or German controlled aircraft in the air over territories or water occupied or controlled by it to land at once and remain on the ground. All German or German controlled aircraft in the air will be treated as hostile.
4. The German Authority will prevent sabotage or destruction of any Luftwaffe equipment or installations, and will maintain all airfields in readiness for instant use by the Allied Air Forces.
5. All aircraft will be cleared off runways and parked in recognized dispersal areas.
6. All aircraft will be dismantled and all wireless equipment rendered inoperative without damage. The guns, bombs, pyrotechnics, ammunition and wireless equipment will be stored under guard in the appropriate storerooms or hangars.
7. All aircraft will be immobilized by removing the elevators, disconnecting

Further instructions.

3. The German Authority will forthwith cause all German or German controlled aircraft in the air over territories or water occupied or controlled by it to land at once and remain on the ground. All German or German controlled aircraft in the air will be treated as hostile.
4. The German Authority will prevent sabotage or destruction of any Luftwaffe equipment or installations, and will maintain all airplanes in readiness for instant use by the Allied Air Forces.
5. All aircraft will be cleared off runways and parked in recognized dispersed areas.
6. All aircraft will be disarmed and all wireless equipment rendered inoperative without damage. The guns, bombs, pyrotechnics, ammunition and wireless equipment will be stored under guard in the appropriate storehouses or hangars.
7. All aircraft will be immobilized by removing the elevators, disconnecting the fuel and oil supply (to each engine, in the case of twin or multi-engine aircraft) and draining all fuel and oil tanks into suitable containers.
8. All aircraft together with the removed elevators, fuel and oil, spare parts, hangars, storehouses, airfield administrative and living accommodations, general airfield equipment, including lighting installations will be safeguarded intact.

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9. The German Authority will forthwith furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander complete information regarding German and German Controlled Air Forces and in particular such details as the Supreme Allied Commander may require concerning the numbers, units, locations, dispositions, stores and equipment of the German and German Controlled Air Forces wherever located.

10. Balloons.

All balloons will be hauled down, deflated, packed and safeguarded intact.

Pool pumps and carburetors will be removed from all winch motors and safeguarded.

11. Explosives.

Informant on concerning all booty-traps, mines and other explosive devices on and in the vicinity of the airfields will be furnished immediately on demand to the responsible local Allied authorities. All explosives, including bombs, will be rendered safe by the removal of fuses and detonators.

12. All self-destructing devices, whether in aircraft, signals equipment or in any Luftwaffe equipment or installation will be removed.

13. Personnel.

All Luftwaffe personnel will be disarmed and will remain in their camps or at assigned sites until directed otherwise by the representatives of the local Allied Commander. The orders or instructions

Fuel pump and carburetors will be removed from all winch motors and safeguarded.

11. Explosives.

Information concerning all booby-traps, mines and other explosive devices on and in the vicinity of the airfield will be furnished immediately on demand to the responsible local Allied authorities. All explosives, including bombs, will be rendered safe by the removal of fuses and detonators.

12. All self-destructing devices, whether in aircraft, signals equipment or in any Luftwaffe equipment or installation will be removed.

13. Personnel.

All Luftwaffe personnel will be disarmed and will remain in their camps or at assigned sites until directed otherwise by the representatives of the local Allied Commander. The orders or instructions of any representative of the local Allied Commander will be obeyed.

14. Motor Transport.

All transport tracked or wheeled will be collected together and maintained in good condition in recognized AF parking areas under guard.

15. Fuel and Oil.

Fuel and oil supplies in installations of all types will be safe-1101 guarded and handed over to the local Allied authorities without contamination.

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16. Anti-aircraft.

All anti-aircraft guns, heavy and light, under control of the Luftwaffe will be rendered inoperative by the removal of an essential part of the firing mechanism. The whole equipment will be safeguarded intact.

17. All parts removed from AA under para 16 above, will be properly prepared for storage, labelled with the number of the appropriate gun, segregated from guns, and safeguarded intact.

Any spare parts for AA guns held at Luftwaffe units will be segregated from guns and safeguarded intact.

18. Fire Control Equipment.

Instruments, directors and computers including Radar and all fire control equipment will be concentrated and stored intact.

19. Searchlights.

All carbon rods will be removed from the projectors. The fuel pumps will be removed from the generators. The carbons and fuel pumps together with all carbon and fuel pump spares will be stored and safeguarded intact.

20. Shell Area.

All shell areas will be collected and safeguarded intact.

21. Gas Bomba and Equipment.

Normal precautions will be taken against leakage of gas from any gas bombs.

All gas equipment and decontamination material will be preserved and handed over to the Allied Representatives on demand.

18. Fire Control Equipment.

Instruments, directors and computers including Radar and all fire control equipment will be concentrated and stored intact.

19. Searchlights.

All carbon rods will be removed from the projectors. The fuel pumps will be removed from the generators. The carbons and fuel pumps together with all carbon and fuel pump spares will be stored and safeguarded intact.

20. Small Arms.

All small arms will be collected and safeguarded intact.

21. Gas Bombs and Equipment.

Normal precautions will be taken against leakage of gas from any gas bombs.

All gas equipment and decontamination material will be preserved and handed over to the Allied representatives on demand.

Gas spray containers will be collected and guarded, and where such containers are filled with gas, the normal precautions will be taken against leakage.

22. Flying Bombs.

All stocks of flying bombs will be immobilized by the removal of fuzes, detonators, and fuel pumps. The items so removed will be segregated from flying bombs, concentrated and safeguarded intact, and all flying bombs and their equipment, spares and launching sites and facilities will be safeguarded intact.

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23. Rocket-Propelled Weapons.

All weapons and projectiles propelled by rockets or similar devices will be immobilized by the removal and sequestration of essential parts of the mechanism. The parts so removed will be segregated from such weapons and projectiles, concentrated, and guarded, and the weapons and projectiles, their equipment, spares, launching sites and facilities will be safeguarded intact.

24. Signals Equipment.

- a. In addition to the requirements of paragraph 6 above, all communication equipment used for code, voice, teletype or other electrical transmission will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.
- b. All ground and airborne electronic transmitters and receivers of whatever nature or design, whether used for air warning, tracking, identification or flying control will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

25. Call and Code Signs.

All call and code sign systems used by GEMINI and/or her allies in operating Luftwaffe telecommunication systems will be withdrawn from use, and all documents and/or associated coding devices will be stored and safeguarded intact.

26. Code and Ciphers.

2. In addition to the requirements of paragraph 6 above, all communication equipment used for code, voice, teletype or other electrical transmission will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.
25. Call and Code Signs.  
All call and code sign systems used by GERMANY and/or her allies in operating Luftwaffe telecommunication systems will be withdrawn from use, and all documents and/or associated coding devices will be stored and safeguarded intact.
26. Code and Cyphers.  
All code and cyphers systems, including books, documents and cypher machinery, employed by the Luftwaffe will be withdrawn from use, stored and safeguarded intact.
27. Secrecy Equipment.  
All forms of scribbling and secrecy equipment in use on any Luftwaffe telecommunication system will be disconnected and safeguarded intact.
28. All other Luftwaffe equipment, including that in experimental stations, and laboratories, military or civilian, photographic equipment, furniture, will be preserved intact and maintained in good condition. Special care will be taken to ensure the preservation of all documents, including technical manuals, files, lists, maps, card indices

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identity elements.

29. Maintenance of Luftwaffe.

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The German Authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

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XI

TOP SECRET

EXEC. COM. R.

MAR 24 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Command

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SAC (P) (45) 15 Addendum  
21st March 1945

TOP SECRET

OTEN NO 33

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

THIS PAPER WILL BE DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH ITEM 2 OF THE AGENDA  
OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) ON MONDAY  
22ND MARCH 1945

1. The draft papers on Local German surrender in Italy, circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 15, were produced in some haste. There has now been time to consider the matter further and the following suggestions for improvement and correction of errors are therefore notified.

2. In regard to the directive, it is suggested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, that :-

(a) The first sentence of paragraph 1 should be reworded as follows :-

"If the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest surrenders before sustaining a further major defeat at the hands of 15 Army Group, and while his forces still hold substantially their present line, it is probable that the end of all organised German resistance in EUROPE will soon follow, and therefore that FRENCH operations (Case B) will shortly arise".

(b) A new paragraph 2 should be added as under :-

"2. In any event, the period immediately following a German surrender is likely to be one of great general confusion and disorganisation throughout German-occupied Italy. It will be important to take advantage of this period and, by rapid action, before German forces and Italian and Slavene Partisans can react, to seize such areas as will be essential to our future operations. TRIESTE and the ADRIATIC Route are the two most important of such areas".

(c) The present paragraph 3 should be reworded as follows :-

"3. The primary task of our land and air forces will be to enforce the orders to the German land and air forces as set out in Appendices

paper No. 22 (2) (5) 15, were produced in some haste. There has been some time to consider the matter further and the following suggestions for improvement and correction of errors are therefore notified.

2. In regard to the directive, it is suggested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, that :-

(a) The first sentence of paragraph 1 should be reworded as follows :-

"If the German Commander-in-Chief Suedenst surrenders before sustaining a further major defeat at the hands of 15 Army Group, and while his forces still hold substantially their present line, it is probable that the end of all organized German resistance in Europe will soon follow, and therefore that FULBROOK conditions (Case 3) will shortly arise".

(b) A new paragraph 2 should be added as under :-

"2. In any event, the period immediately following a German surrender is likely to be one of great general confusion and disorder throughout German-occupied lands. It will be important to take advantage of this period and, by rapid action before German forces and Italian and German Partisans can react, to seize such areas as will be essential to our future operations. These areas and the ALGERIA House are the two most important of such areas".

(c) The present paragraph 3 should be reworded as follows :-

"3. The primary task of our land and air forces will be to enforce the orders to the German land and air forces to act out in accordance with the Instrument of Surrender. To this end, Commanding General, 15 Army Group, and the Air Commander-in-Chief, will issue and enforce such further orders as they may consider necessary. The first essentials will be to prevent any resumption of resistance by the enemy, to deal with any enemy forces that may attempt to resist, and to prevent the withdrawal of any enemy forces from Italy. With these objects in view, and in order to facilitate future operations :-

- a. Commanding General, 15 Army Group, will in the first instance immediately position such forces as he considers necessary astride the enemy's lines of communication in the general area VERONA - PAVIA - MILAN. He will also seize TRIESTE and secure an area of the BRESCIA route as possible.

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3. The Air Commander-in-Chief will be prepared to intercept all movement on routes leading out of Italy.

The primary disbursement of enemy units being south of the PO will be carried out simultaneously with the above.

- (d) At paragraph 7 the one word "orders" should be substituted for the words "naval terms of surrender".

3. In regard to the draft Instrument of local surrender (Annexure I) it is recommended by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, that:-

- (a) The title of the instrument should be amended to read:

"INSTRUMENT OF LOCAL SURRENDER OF GERMAN AND OTHER FORCES UNDER THE CONTROL OR CONTROL OF THE GERMAN COMBINED-IN-NINE SURRENDER"

- (b) Paragraph 6 of this instrument should be amended to read:

"This instrument is independent of, without prejudice to, and shall be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to Germany and the German armed forces as a whole".

4. There are two typographical errors in the orders for German and German-controlled naval forces (Annexure B), in that the word "files" at paragraph 3, line 1, and paragraph 10, line 2, should read "files" in each case.

J.S. SWETMAN,  
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4. There are two typographical errors in the orders for German and German-controlled naval forces (Appendix B), in that the word "files" at paragraph 3 b, line 2, and paragraph 10 b, line 2, should read "filos" in each case.

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 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
 Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
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 Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF  
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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (F) (45) 9 Addendum  
20 March 1945

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COPI NO. 25

MAR 21 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

CURRENCY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

Note by Secretary

1. At SAC (F) (45), 2nd Meeting, Minute 5, it was directed that the subject of the currency responsibility of the Italian Government, as set out in paper number 880 (F) (45) 1, should be raised again when further details were available regarding the precise statement made by the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury and the reactions of the Italian Government and the Italian public.

2. It is now clear that the statement by the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury constitutes an unequivocal assertion that the U. S. Government is not in any way responsible for the Allied Military lire, which is considered to be the currency of the Italian Government. The statement of the Secretary of the Treasury further points out that the Italian Government publicly accepted this responsibility in late 1943.

3. It is recognized that in view of Allied statements such as the above, Italians now publicly recognize that they are responsible for the Allied Military Currency, but that they have for some time needed financial support. Since this aspect of the matter is one of high policy, on which decisions must be taken at an inter-governmental level, it appears to be desirable that, pending such decision, the Supreme Allied Commander should refrain from further comment.

4. C-5 (with the concurrence of the Allied Commission, the British Resident Minister, the U. S. Political Adviser, the Deputy Paymaster-in-Chief, and the Fiscal Director, AFM34) therefore submit for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander the draft reply to the Combined Chiefs of Staff attached at Appendix "A".

Endings on this Paper

J. C. STEWART

subject of the currency was confidential, it was pointed out that the  
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 were available regarding the currency was confidential, it was pointed out that the  
 of the Treasury and the reactions of the Italian Government and the Italian  
 public.

2. It is now clear that the statement by the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury  
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 Since this aspect of the matter is one of high policy, a final decision  
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 Fiscal Director, WUSA) therefore submit for the approval of the Supreme  
 Allied Commander the draft reply to the Combined Chiefs of Staff attached  
 at A. perfix "A".

Conclusions in this Paper

at Loto 129 File 2765.12

*W. G. Stevens*  
 W. G. STEVENS,  
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
 SECRETARY.

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Chief, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3  
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Figure 1

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proposed to transfer emergency responsibility to Italian Government in subject.

RESEARCHER DR. J. S. GAVE TWO GLOVES OF THIS HEADQUARTER AND L.C.

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44 enough two. At the time of the signing of 1945, I found it difficult to give any clear reply on the broad political effect of entering upon the negotiations projected in paragraph 15 of T.M. 443. Some of my advisers felt that since the question of the ultimate disposition of A.S. lines was obscure in Italian minds, there was a good deal to be said for not disturbing their situation which to some extent was contributed to internal stability. Since then, however, the technical condition with regard to A.S. lines has become quite clear, and Italians generally must be coming to recognize the necessity for absorbing the currency with their own.

Paragraph Three. At the same time, the Italians no doubt hope for some financial support from the Allied Governments. This is a matter of which financial policy upon which decision must clearly be taken at an intergovernmental level, more especially as the Italian Government have now formally raised the issue in their memorandum of January 5 (refer MAT 566 of 2 March). Your reply to this memorandum may effectively dispose of the question of closing/storing reimbursement and open the way to

...to give any clear reply on the broad political effect of  
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intergovernmental level, and especially so the Italian Government have  
now formally raised the issue in their memorandum of January 9 (refer MIT  
369 of 2 March). Your reply to this memorandum may officially dispose of  
the question of either/stalling settlement and open the way to  
negotiations on currency convertibility and issue. In the meantime,  
therefore, I do not feel that any further comment of mine is necessary.

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SAC (2) (48) 17  
20th March 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

YUGOSLAV NATIONALS IN ITALY

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. The SAC at his conference (Political) of 15 March 1945 directed that a report be prepared together with a draft communication for transmission by the Allied Commission to the Yugoslav Delegation, incorporating the points set out in paper No. SAC (2) (48) 13, together with a statement of Allied policy drafted in the light of the discussion at the conference.

2. In November 1944 the Yugoslav Delegation in Rome notified its desire to obtain custody of certain Yugoslav nationals residing in Rome on the grounds that they were deserters from the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation. It was then decided that the policy of this HQ should be:

- a. that deserters from the Yugoslav armed forces should be apprehended and returned to Yugoslav military jurisdiction,
- b. that the liberty of other persons whose custody might be sought by the Yugoslav authorities for political or other reasons should be protected.

3. After the formation of the joint provisional government for YUGOSLAVIA a letter was sent by this HQ to the Allied Commission instructing them to inform the Yugoslav Delegation that this HQ would assist in the apprehension of deserters from the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation but would require certain particulars to establish the identity of each deserter.

4. Before the substance of this letter had been communicated to the Yugoslav Delegation further letter dated 4 March 1945 was received by the Allied Commission from the Deputy Delegate of Yugoslavia to the Advisory Council. This letter stated that the instructions of the Yugoslav government were to the following effect:

- a. That all males born between 1895 and 1927 are to report personally to the Yugoslav army for military duty.
- b. That all other Yugoslav subjects are to report to the reception centre of the Yugoslav army in Bari for return to Yugoslavia.

2. In November 1944 the Yugoslav Delegation in Rome notified its desire to obtain custody of certain Yugoslav nationals residing in Rome on the grounds that they were deserters from the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation. It was then decided that the policy of this HQ should be:

- that deserters from the Yugoslav armed forces should be apprehended and returned to Yugoslav military jurisdiction,
- that the liberty of other persons whose custody might be sought by the Yugoslav authorities for political or other reasons should be protected.
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4. Before the substance of this letter had been communicated to the Yugoslav Delegation further letter dated 4 March 1945 was received by the Allied Commission from the Deputy Delegates of Yugoslav in the Advisory Council. This letter stated that the instructions of the Yugoslav Government were to the following effect:

- That all males born between 1895 and 1927 are to report personally to the Yugoslav army for military duty.
- That all other Yugoslav subjects are to report to the reception centre of the Yugoslav army in Bari for return to YUGOSLAVIA.

The letter further laid down the following policies of the Yugoslav Government:

- That all Yugoslav subjects unwilling to return to YUGOSLAVIA are not entitled to obtain resistance or police in Italy from any source.
- That those Yugoslavs who collaborated with the enemy or "acted in any other way against the national liberation struggle of YUGOSLAVIA" or who have refused the call up should be interned and treated as enemies of the United Nations.

5. The Allied authorities are requested to support the Yugoslav authorities in carrying out these instructions.

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6. A copy of this letter is attached at Annex I.

7. It is apparent that the instructions as to deserters from the Yugoslav Government to considerably beyond the requests which have heretofore been made and run counter to the policy referred to in paragraph 2 b. It would also seem clear that the instructions requiring the Allied agencies, including non-military relief agencies, to withhold relief as a measure to assist enforcement of the Yugoslav call up and repatriation orders are not acceptable, nor should the Supreme Allied Commander apply principles as to internment in the case of Yugoslavs other than those which are applicable generally.

8. It is believed that the reply to the Deputy Delegate should be framed as a statement of the following policies:

a. Deserters from the Yugoslav Army. Assistance will be given in the apprehension of deserters from the Yugoslav army. The Yugoslavs must, however, conform substantially to the procedure for notification of deserters required of other armed forces in WWII. The Allied Forces will, in principle, return deserters to the unit or formation from which they deserted.

b. Those failing to report for military service. These will not be treated as deserters nor interned except in accordance with the existing policies of this HQ regarding internment. Any further action required by the Yugoslav Government in respect of such persons should be made through diplomatic channels. The call up regulations are understood to be inapplicable to Yugoslav nationals serving in or with the Allied Forces.

c. Assistance to the Axis. Relief will be furnished in accordance with need and without discrimination by reason of race, creed or political belief.

9. A draft letter to the Deputy Delegate of Jugoslavie is attached as Annex II. It is recommended that the Supreme Allied Commander approve the letter for despatch.

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Chief of Staff

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- b. Assistance to the destitute. Relief will be furnished in accordance with need and without discrimination by reason of race, creed or political belief.

3. A draft letter to the Deputy Delegates of Jerseyville is attached as Annex II. It is recommended that the Supreme Allied Commander approve the latter for despatch.

(Info) C.M.S.

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COPY

YUGOSLAV NATIONALS IN ITALY  
**Confidential**

Pr. Nr. 218/46

The Deputy Delegate of Yugoslavia to the Advisory Council in Italy presents his compliments to the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, and has the honour to inform him of the following instruction received from the Yugoslav Government referring to Yugoslav subjects in Italy:

1. All males born between 1895 and 1927 have forthwith to report personally to the Representatives of the Yugoslav Army for the purpose of resuming their military duty.
2. All other Yugoslav subjects have forthwith to report personally to the Reception Centre of Base 13 of the Yugoslav Army (Prihvatanje Starijih Stara Baza Jugoslovenske Armije), in Bari, which will care for their return to Yugoslavia.
3. Since there are a number of Yugoslav subjects in Italy not willing to return to Yugoslavia, any in their respect the following policy of the Yugoslav Government please be noted:

Yugoslav subjects who are not willing to return to Yugoslavia are not entitled to obtain any assistance whatsoever (food, location, clothing, necessary means, etc) which refugees in Italy may get through the United Nations (i.e. Displaced Persons and Repatriation S/C of A.C. UNRRA, 1943, and any other similar institution). The Yugoslav Government insist on their objection to any kind of assistance to such persons. The Yugoslav Government will moreover recognize no expenses for such subjects.

The Yugoslav Government differentiate among these persons three groups

- (a) who collaborated with the enemy or have acted in any other way against the national-liberation struggle of Yugoslavia;
- (b) who have refused the Government's call-up and are accordingly to be considered deserters;
- (c) who, not belonging to either of the above two groups, do not want for any reason to return to Yugoslavia, but wish to stay in Italy.

The Yugoslav Government request that persons belonging to groups under (a) and (b) be interned in camps and treated as enemies of the United Nations; those ones who are responsible for having committed war crimes should in due time be put on trial in Yugoslavia.

Subjects belonging to group under (c) who have to fear nothing if returned to Yugoslavia and yet refuse to do so, do not deserve any assistance

Government please be noted:

Jugoslav subjects who are not willing to return to Yugoslavia are not entitled to obtain any assistance whatsoever (food, location, clothing, monetary means, etc) which refugees in Italy may get through the United Nations (i.e. Displaced Persons and Repatriation S/C of AG, UNRCA, IRO, and any other similar institution). The Yugoslav government insists on their objection to any kind of assistance to such persons. The Yugoslav government will moreover recognize no expenses for such subjects.

The Yugoslav government differentiates among three persons groups

(a) who collaborated with the enemy or have acted in any other way against the national-liberation struggle of Yugoslavia;

(b) who have refused the government's call-up and are accordingly to be considered deserters;

(c) who, not belonging to either of the above two groups, do not want for any reason to return to Yugoslavia, but wish to stay in Italy.

The Yugoslav government requests that persons belonging to groups under (a) and (b) be interned in camps and treated as enemies of the United Nations; those ones who are responsible for having committed war crimes should in any case be put on trial in Yugoslavia.

Subjects belonging to group under (c) who have to fear nothing if returned to Yugoslavia and yet refuse to do so, do not deserve any assistance.

It is requested that all competent Allied authorities support the Yugoslav authorities in carrying out these instructions for the sake of the common war effort of the United Nations.

4. This Delegation is only authorized to grant exceptionally subsidies or any other assistance to Yugoslav subjects in Italy who have duly reported to the Delegation. If latter finds that the person in question for medical reasons is unable to travel. This applies however only to those who are definitely in need, and is limited to an amount sufficient to meet minimum expenses for life.

5. Would you please inform of above all Allied institutions concerned.

Rome, March 4th 1945

To: The Chief Commissioner,  
Allied Commission

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ALLIED LIAISON TO ITALY  
COMMISSION

March 1945

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Nationals in Italy.

TO: Headquarters, Allied Commission.

1. On 12 March 1945 a letter was forwarded to this Headquarters in which the Deputy Delegate of Yugoslavians to the Advisory Council in Italy set forth certain policies of the Yugoslav government with respect to Yugoslav nationals in Italy. Therefore, under date of 30 November 1944 a letter from Major Keljenski of the Yugoslav Delegation in Rome, on the subject of Yugoslav deserters, was referred to this Headquarters.
2. You should advise the Deputy Delegate of Yugoslavians to the Advisory Council in Italy that it will be your policy to assist the Yugoslav government in every way in the apprehension of deserters from the Yugoslav armed forces. It will be necessary for Yugoslav military authorities to conform to a procedure similar to that now in use in the Allied forces, in order to establish the identity of each deserter. It is the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to return deserters who have been apprehended to the formation from which they have deserted, whether military, naval or air force.
3. Prior to taking any action towards the apprehension of a deserter you will require, in writing, the following particulars from the Commanding Officer of the area in which the deserter is sought:
  - a. Name and rank of deserter.
  - b. Military unit from which deserted and location thereof.
  - c. Date of enlistment or induction.
  - d. Date and circumstances of desertion.

Refugee of the Yugoslav Detention in Rome, on the subject of Yugoslav deserters, was referred to this Headquarters.

2. You should advise the Deputy Det. to of Yugoslav to the Advisory Council in Italy that it will be your policy to assist the Yugoslav government in every way in the apprehension of deserters from the Yugoslav armed forces. It will be necessary for Yugoslav military authorities to conform to a procedure similar to that now in use in the Allied forces, in order to establish the identity of each deserter. It is the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to return deserters who have been recommended to the formation from which they have deserted, whether military, naval or air force.

3. Prior to taking any action towards the apprehension of a deserter you will require, in writing, the following particulars from the Commanding Officer of the area who is sought:

- a. Name and rank of deserter.
- b. Military unit from which deserted and location thereof.
- c. Date of enlistment or induction.
- d. Date and circumstances of desertion.
- e. Full description of deserter.
- f. Probable whereabouts.

Such affidavit will be required to be submitted within 90 days from the date of desertion.

4. The letter of the Deputy Detention of Yugoslav also deals with the status of Yugoslav nationals in Italy who are not on active military service but who have failed to report for military service in accordance with existing Yugoslav military regulations, and those who have failed to report to appropriate Yugoslav authorities in accordance with Yugoslav regulations generally requiring the return of Yugoslav subjects to Yugoslav. The letter of

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the Deputy Delegate also requests that all persons who have failed to report in accordance with the Yugoslav military service requirements or who have collaborated with the enemy or who have otherwise acted against the national liberation struggle of Yugoslavia be interned. You are requested to advise the Deputy Delegate that it is and will continue to be the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to detain, pending further investigation, any person suspected of committing or intending to commit any act hostile to the Allied Forces or engaging in any political or other activity in the interest of the enemy or hostile to the Allied Forces. You are further requested to advise the Deputy Delegate that with respect to the internment of any other persons the Yugoslav Government may take appropriate steps through diplomatic channels.

5. The letter of the Deputy Delegate further requests that no aid of any kind be furnished to any Yugoslav national who refuses to return to Yugoslavia as such refusal constitutes a violation of existing Yugoslav law. The policy of the Supreme Allied Commander is that relief will be furnished in accordance with need and without discrimination by reason of race, creed or political belief. You are requested to advise the Deputy Delegate of this policy.

6. In communicating your reply to the Deputy Delegate you are requested to advise him further that it is the understanding of the Supreme Allied Commander that the Yugoslav nationals now serving in or with the Allied Forces are not subject to the call-up referred to in paragraph 2 of his letter. If it is desired to know the identity of Yugoslav subjects in this class, this may be arranged through appropriate military channels.

the Deputy Delegate that with respect to the internment of any other persons the Japanese government may take appropriate steps through diplomatic channels.

5. The letter of the Deputy Delegate further requests that no aid of any kind be furnished to any Japanese national who refuses to return to Japan as such refusal constitutes a violation of existing Japanese law. The policy of the Supreme Allied Commander is that relief will be furnished in accordance with need and without discrimination by reason of race, creed or political belief. You are requested to advise the Deputy Delegate of this policy.

6. In commenting your reply to the Deputy Delegate you are requested to advise him further that it is the understanding of the Supreme Allied Commander that the Japanese nationals now serving in or with the Allied Forces are not subject to the call-up referred to in paragraph 2 of his letter. If it is desired to know the identity of Japanese subjects in this class, this may be arranged through appropriate military channels.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Ex. Commr

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SAC (P) (45) 15  
19 March 1945

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MAR 21 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES  
DEDICATED TO AID THE BALKANS

Note by Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee

1. In accordance with instructions received from the former Chief of Staff, the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee has considered the question of the separation, along national lines, of Psychological Warfare activities directed to the Balkans, and reports as follows.
2. In October 1943 PWB founded an integrated U.S./British organization at BARI, mainly for the purpose of carrying out activities directed towards Balkan countries. As a result of the liberation of certain of these countries and the position taken by the United States State Department (with the concurrence of the U.S. Office of War Information) that the combined PWB operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of PWB activities along national lines has already occurred.
3. It is considered that to meet this situation three distinct organizations are required:-
  - a. An integrated U.S./British organization under PWB to carry on Psychological Warfare against areas where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.
  - b. A purely United States organization ) for propaganda in liberated areas.
  - c. A purely British organization )
4. The necessary United States organization is already being provided by OSI and is operating entirely independent of PWB under an office which has been established in ROMA. The British organization is at present being provided by PWB, personally responsible to the Deputy Director, PWB, in his British capacity; it is, however, envisaged that these British activities will shortly be turned over to the Ministry of Information and when this has occurred the British and United States organizations will be entirely parallel.

of the separation, along national lines, of psychological warfare activities directed to the Balkans, and reports as follows.

2. In October 1943 PR founded an integrated U.S./British organization at RAB, mainly for the purpose of carrying out activities directed towards Balkan countries. As a result of the liberation of certain of these countries and the position taken by the United States State Department (with the concurrence of the U.S. Office of War Information) that the combined PR operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of PR activities along national lines has already occurred.

3. It is considered that to meet this situation three distinct organizations are required:-

a. An integrated U.S./British organization under PR to carry on psychological warfare against areas where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.

b. A purely United States organization } For propaganda in liberated areas.  
c. A purely British organization }

4. The necessary United States organization is already being provided by OWI and is operating entirely independent of PR under an office which has been established in ROME. The British organization is at present being provided by PR, personally responsible to the Deputy Director, PR, in his British capacity; it is, however, envisaged that these British activities will shortly be turned over to the Ministry of Information and when this has occurred the British and United States organizations will be entirely parallel.

5. Some military control over the independent British and United States propaganda organizations will however remain necessary as long as the Mediterranean continues to be a theater of war. It is felt that this control will best be effected if the respective British and United States governmental propaganda agencies, while carrying on the separate activities in the theater under the general guidance of their respective governments, are subject to the overriding authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

6. The Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee accordingly requests the Supreme Allied Commander:-

a. To direct that PR, as an integrated organization, cease to participate in non-operational propaganda into ALBANIA, ROMANIA, HUNGARY, ITALY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GREECE and the liberated portions of JUGOSLAVIA, except in so far as may necessarily result as an incident of operational propaganda directed to enemy occupied regions and enemy troops, and except in support of allied relief operations.

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be dispatched of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, inform them of the organization outlined above and requesting that the necessary representations be made to the British and United States governments in order that the foregoing arrangements may be carried into effect.

(Intd) ...J. McC.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USF  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commanding General 15th Army Group  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3  
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF  
U.S. Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Director, FBI  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat  
Chief, JMC  
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K.C. List

21 MAR 45

Chief Comm

Chief Administrative Officer  
 Deputy Chief of Staff  
 Assistant Chief of Staff G-2  
 Assistant Chief of Staff G-3  
 Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
 Assistant Chief of Staff D-5  
 Chief, Liaison Section  
 Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF  
 U.S. Political Advisor  
 British Resident Minister  
 Director, PRB  
 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
 Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat  
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K.C. List  
 21 MAR 45  
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Continuing in the Paper at Table B, File 37/20

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This is K.E. \_\_\_\_\_.

1. I have recently reviewed the organization required for Psychological warfare activities in this Theater. Present cable deals with activities directed to liberated areas in Balkan and Central European countries. P.W. activities in Italy will be subject of a separate signal.
2. As a result of the liberation of Balkan and Central European countries and the position taken by the United States State Department that combined Psychological warfare operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of Psychological warfare activities along national lines has already occurred.
3. Consequently, three distinct organizations are required:
  - a. An integrated U.S./British organization to carry on psychological warfare against areas where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.
  - b. A purely United States organization for propaganda in liberated areas.
  - c. A purely British organization for the same purpose.
4. The necessary independent United States organization is already being provided by G.I. The separate British activities are at present being undertaken by P.I. though it is envisaged that this will shortly be turned over to the British Ministry of Information.
5. Some military control over the independent British and United States propaganda organizations will, however, remain necessary as

that combined Psychological warfare operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of Psychological warfare activities along national lines has already occurred.

3. Consequently, three distinct organizations are required:

a. an integrated U.S./British organization to carry on psychological warfare against those where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.

b. a purely United States organization for propaganda in liberated areas.

c. a purely British organization for the same purpose.

4. The necessary independent United States organization is already being provided by C.I. The separate British activities are at present being undertaken by P.I. though it is envisaged that this will shortly be turned over to the British Ministry of Information.

5. Some military control over the independent British and United States propaganda organizations will, however, remain necessary as long as this continues to be a theater of war. This control will best be effected if these organizations, while carrying on separate activities under the general guidance of their respective governments, are subject to my overriding authority should it be necessary, for military reasons, to exert it.

6. I have, therefore, directed that the integrated Psychological warfare organization under my command shall come to participate in non-operational propaganda directed into J.E.N., B.H.F., B.H.G., B.H.V., G.Z.C., G.L.V., G.L., G.R.T.C. and the liberated portions of J.W.S.L.V., except in so far as operational propaganda directed to

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( ) any of the occupied regions and enemy troops is concerned, and except in support of allied relief operations.

7. Your approval of these arrangements, and your intervention, by means of such representations to the British and United States Government as may be necessary to ensure that the separate national propaganda agencies conform to the above policy, is requested.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

015 (1) (45) 35  
19th March 1945

~~Confidential~~  
REF NO 34

Supreme Allied Commander's Conference  
POLITICAL

MAR 20 1945

LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. The papers on the subject of local German surrender in Italy, which were distributed under Study No. 1/2/0 (Final), have been revised on the instructions of the Chief of Staff and are circulated herewith.
2. The Joint Planning Staff also drew attention to their opinion that separate instructions should be issued to Allied Liaison Officers and the CIVIL in the field. In addition they considered it desirable that a small mission, composed of representatives of G-5, SCS and GSS, should upon surrender immediately be sent to the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest for the purpose of co-ordinating all questions concerning prisoners.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve,
  - (a) the draft papers attached hereto;
  - (b) the recommendation of the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff as para 2 above.

See also Encls (127)

Enclosed - this Paper is  
also 131. See notes

*18 March*  
J.O. SWETMAN,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff

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*18 March*  
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...their own free attention to their opinion that appropriate instructions should be issued to Allied Liaison Officers and the GINLI in the field. In addition they considered it desirable that a small mission, composed of representatives of G-5, G-6, G-7 and G-8, should upon surrender immediately be sent to the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest for the purpose of coordinating all questions concerning prisoners.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve,

(a) the draft papers attached hereto;

(b) the recommendation of the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff at para 2 above.

See also Folio (157)

Enclosed in this paper is

John 131. 144 207/10

*19 Dec 1945*

J.G. SWEETMAN,  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

#### DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAP  
U.S. Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Director, FIB  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat  
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*19 Dec 1945*

*20 Mar 45*

*Chief Comm.*

*Exec Comm.*

*Political Affairs*

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DRAFT

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

Confidential

SUBJECT: Local German Surrender in Italy

TO: Commanding General, 15 Army Group  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean } For appropriate Naval  
and Air Commands.

UNRELIABLE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER

1. When the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest surrenders, the end of all organized German resistance is likely to be imminent, and it is probable therefore that FRIEDRICH conditions (Case E) will shortly arise. It is possible, however, that some German formations will refuse to obey the orders of their higher command to surrender and will attempt either to continue or to resume hostilities after a general "stay-put" order has been issued, or to withdraw out of Italy.
2. Arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Commander-in-Chief Southwest and for the signature of the instrument will be made by AFHQ.

A copy of the draft instrument (AFHQ Form Memorandum No. 1) is attached as Annexure 1. This may be modified before signature according to circumstances. A copy of the instrument and appendices as finally signed will be forwarded as soon after signature as possible.

TASKS OF LAND AND AIR FORCES IN ITALY

3. The primary task of our Land and Air Forces will be to enforce the orders to the German land and air forces as set out in Appendices A and C to the instrument of surrender. To this end Commanding General, 15 Army Group, and the Air Commander-in-Chief AFHQ will issue and enforce such further orders as they may consider necessary. The first essentials will be to prevent any resumption of

that some German formations will refuse to obey the orders of their higher command to surrender and will attempt either to continue or to resume hostilities after a general "stay-put" order has been issued, or to withdraw out of ITALY.

## 2. Arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Commander-in-Chief

Scut/ment and for the signature of the instrument will be made by AFM.

A copy of the draft instrument (FUTURUM Memorandum No. 1) is attached as Appendix I. This may be modified before signature according to circumstances. A copy of the instrument and appendices as finally signed will be forwarded as soon after signature as possible.

## TASKS OF LAND AND AIR FORCES IN ITALY

3. The primary task of our Land and Air Forces will be to enforce the orders to the German land and air forces as set out in Appendices A and C to the instrument of surrender. To this end Commanding General, 15 Army Group, and the Air Commander-in-Chief USAF will issue and enforce such further orders as they may consider necessary. The first objective will be to prevent any resumption of resistance by the enemy, to deal with any enemy forces that may continue to resist, and to prevent the withdrawal of any enemy forces from ITALY. With these objects in view, Commanding General, 15 Army Group, will in the first place immediately position such forces as he considers necessary astride the enemy's lines of communication in the general area VERONA - PADOVA - MANTUA. The Air Commander-in-Chief will be prepared to interdict all movement on routes leading out of ITALY. The primary disarmament of enemy main bodies south of the PO will be carried out simultaneously with the above.

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5. The secondary task of 15 Army Group in conjunction with ILLM will be to carry out the occupation of AUSTRIA, as rapidly as circumstances permit and in accordance with plans for PHENOMEN.

5. The occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be carried out concurrently with the above tasks as rapidly as the resources of 15 Army Group will permit. In addition, the initial policy will be to give such priority to the requirements of 15 Army Group as will ensure the rapid occupation of AUSTRIA, while at the same time allowing for the minimum essential needs of the civilian population in ITALY and providing for the establishment of effective control over the L of C areas behind Fifth and Eighth Armies.

In extending such control subsequently as further resources can be made available, the occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITALY will be completed in accordance with separate instructions already issued for these two operations.

6. Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

#### TASKS OF NAVAL FORCES

7. The tasks of naval forces will be, in co-operation with the appropriate military and air commanders,

- a. To enforce the general terms of surrender set out in Appendix B to the Instrument of surrender.
- b. To support the advance of 15 Army Group into AUSTRIA.

By command of FIELD MARSHAL ALPHEAN.

in extending such effort subsequently as further resources can be made available, the occupation of Northeast and Northwest ITAM will be completed in accordance with separate instructions already issued for these two areas.

c. Administrative instructions will be issued separately.

#### TASKS OF NAVAL FORCES

7. The tasks of naval forces will be, in co-operation with the appropriate military and air commanders,

a. To enforce the agreed terms of surrender set out in Appendix B to the instrument of surrender.

b. To support the advance of 15 Army Group into AUSTRIA.

By command of FIELD MARSHAL ALFRED MONTGOMERY.

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ANNEXURE 1

FINAL INSTRUMENT OF LOCAL SURRENDER

RAFT INSTRUMENT OF LOCAL SURRENDER

1. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest hereby surrenders unconditionally all the forces under his command or control on land, at sea and in the air and places himself and these forces unconditionally at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.
2. All armed forces under the command or control of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest will cease all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air at .....hours (Greenwich mean time).....(date). The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to arrange accordingly forthwith.
3. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to carry out the orders set out in Appendices A, B and C and any further orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. Disobedience of such orders or failure to comply with them will be punished in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war.
4. This instrument will enter into force immediately on signature, and the orders in Appendices A, B and C will become effective on the date and at the time specified in part 2 above.
5. This instrument and accompanying orders are drawn up in the English and German languages. The English version is the authentic text. If any doubt as to meaning or interpretation arises, the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief Southwest shall prevail.

at ..... hours (Greenwich mean time).....(date).  
The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to arrange accordingly  
forthwith.

3. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest undertakes to carry out the orders  
set out in Appendices A, B and C and any further orders of the Supreme  
Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations. Disobedience of  
such orders or failure to comply with them will be punished in accordance  
with the accepted laws and usages of war.

4. This instrument will enter into force immediately on signature, and the or-  
ders in Appendices A, B and C will become effective on the date and at the  
time specified in part 2 above.

5. This instrument and accompanying orders are drawn up in the English and  
German languages. The English version is the authentic text. If any  
doubt as to meaning or interpretation arises, the decision of the Supreme  
Allied Commander is final.

6. This instrument is independent of and without prejudice to any general instru-  
ment of surrender made by or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable  
to GERMANY and the German armed forces as a whole.

.....  
German Commander-in-Chief Southwest  
Place .....  
Date .....  
Hour .....

.....  
Supreme Allied Commander,  
Mediterranean Theatre of Operations

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ORDERS FOR GERMAN LAND FORCES

1. The term "German Land Forces" wherever used in these orders shall be deemed to include all German and Italian Republican military or para military forces or organizations, under the command or control of the German Commander-in-Chief Southwest, who is hereafter referred to as "the German Authority".
2. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" will be deemed to include all subordinate Allied Commanders.
3. The German Authority will send to HQ 15 Army Group, as soon as possible after the signing of the instrument of surrender, senior representatives with full executive powers to carry out the following orders and such further orders as the Commanding General 15 Army Group may issue for compliance by the German Land Forces.

"STAY-PUT" ORDERS

4. All formations, units and sub-units of the German Land Forces, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions and in their existing formations pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander. Only such local movement is permitted as is essential for the transmission of orders, the supply of food, water, forage and petrol and the treatment of sick and wounded. (See also paragraph 7).

5. In particular, all road and rail movement (including that of ambulances and motor ambulances) between Italy and any point outside Italy is absolutely prohibited. Any movement east or north of the LINO Fiume -

VILLACH - Southernmost end of Lake CHIESA - and so on will be liable to air

3. The German Authority will send to HQ 15 Army Group, as soon as possible after the signing of the instrument of surrender, senior representatives with full executive powers to carry out the following orders and such further orders as the Commanding General 15 Army Group may issue for compliance by the German Land Forces.

STAY-IN ORDER

4. All formations, units and sub-units of the German Land Forces, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions and in their existing formations pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander. Only such local movement is permitted as is essential for the transportation of orders, the supply of food, water, forage and petrol and the treatment of sick and wounded. (See also paragraph 7).

5. In particular, all road and rail movement (including that of ambulances, trains and motor ambulances) between ITALY and any point outside ITALY is absolutely prohibited. Any movement east or north of the line FURNE - VILLACH - Southermost end of Lake CARL - LISANO will be liable to air attack without warning.

DISARMMENT OF GERMAN LAND FORCES

6. All German Land Forces will be completely disarmed. They will hand over their arms, ammunition, equipment and all war-like stores at places and times and in a manner to be further ordered by the Commanding General, 15 Army Group, or any of his subordinate Commanders.

MAINTENANCE OF GERMAN LAND FORCES

7. The German authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

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STATUS OF SURVIVENT PERSONNEL

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3. All personnel of the German Armed Forces shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the Supreme Allied Commander. At the Supreme Allied Commander's discretion, some or all of such personnel may be declared to be prisoners of war.

PROHIBITION OF DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE

9. The German authority will prevent the removal, destruction of or damage to., and will safeguard in good condition at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander:

- a. All arms, ammunition, explosives and warlike stores, equipment, vehicles, material of all kinds, fuel and oil stocks, and any items of supply used by or for members of the German land forces.
- b. All military installations and establishments, including permanent and temporary land fortifications, fortresses and fortified areas together with all plans and drawings of the same.
- c. All transportation and communications facilities and equipment, including all ports and port facilities and equipment, roads, railways, motorways, bridges, tunnels and telecommunications systems.
- d. All civil and industrial factories, installations and plant, workshops, laboratories experimental stations, stores, equipment, supplies, raw materials and finished products.
- e. All cryptographic methods and equipment, cyphers, codes and call-sign systems, whether military, diplomatic or civilian.
- f. All military, para military and civil documents, records and archives.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND FACILITIES

vehicles, material of all kinds, fuel and oil stocks, and any items of supply used by or for members of the German land forces.

- D. All military installations and establishments, including permanent and temporary land fortifications, fortresses and fortified areas together with all plans and drawings of the same.
- E. All transportation and communications facilities and equipment, including all ports and port facilities and equipment, roads, railways, motorways, bridges, tunnels and telecommunications systems.
- F. All civil and industrial factories, installations and plant, works, shops, laboratories experimental stations, stores, equipment, supplies, raw materials and finished products.
- G. All cryptographic methods and equipment, cyphers, codes and call-sign systems, whether military, diplomatic or civilian.
- H. All military, para military and civil documents, records and archives.

PROVISIONS OF INFORMATION AND FACILITIES

10. The German authorities will forthwith furnish to the Supreme Allied

Commander:

- A. Complete information regarding the German Land Forces and in particular such details as the Supreme Allied Commander may require concerning the numbers, locations, dispositions, stores and equipment of the German Land Forces wherever located.
- B. Complete information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement and the safety lanes in connection therewith.
- C. Such military, para military and civil documents, records and archives as the Supreme Allied Commander may require.

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The German authorities will:

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- a. Maintain in operation all public utility and essential civilian services.
- b. Clearly mark and maintain safety lanes through all minefields and other obstacles to movement.
- c. Remove or render safe all demolition charges and all booby-traps.
- d. Make available for the Supreme Allied Commander such military personnel with the necessary equipment, as he may require, for the clearance of mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement; and such labor as he may require for any purpose.

## DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY.

12. The German authorities will release in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander all prisoners of war (naval, military or air) at present in their power and will furnish forthwith complete lists of these persons with the places of their detention. Pending release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities will continue to protect them in their persons and property, and accord them such treatment and facilities as are prescribed under the Geneva Convention.
13. The provisions of paragraph 12 proceeding will be applied by the German authority equally to all other persons who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as the result of any action, law or regulation originating from discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, color, creed or political belief. Such persons as are not entitled to treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention will be afforded comparable rights and amenities in accordance with their rank or official position.

12. The German Authority will release in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Allied Commander all prisoners of war (naval, military or air) at present in their power and will furnish forthwith complete lists of those persons with the places of their detention. Pending release of such prisoners of war, the German Authority will continue to protect them in their persons and property, and accord them such treatment and facilities as are prescribed under the Geneva Convention.

13. The provisions of paragraph 12 preceding will be applied by the German Authority equally to all other persons who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as the result of any action, law or regulation originating from discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, color, creed or political belief. Such persons are not entitled to treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention will be afforded comparable rights and attention in accordance with their rank or official position.

14. Without prejudice to any other provisions in these orders, the German Authority will hand over to the Supreme Allied Commander the control of all places of detention.

RADIO AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

15. Pending the institution of control by the Supreme Allied Commander, all German controlled military, para-military and civilian wireless transmitters will cease transmission. They will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

16. The use of military and civil land line communication systems is permitted with the provisos that:

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- a. All messages and signals will be made in clear.
- b. All forms of scrambling and secrecy equipment will be disconnected and safeguarded intact.

MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE.

17. The German Authority will remain responsible for the maintenance of discipline throughout the Corps under its command.

TRAINING OF ALLIED LIAISON OFFICERS AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES IN

GERMAN OCCUPIED ITALY.

18. Italian Government Forces in Northern ITALY comprise all partisan formations and organizations owing allegiance to the CIGLI, which is the recognized delegate in German-occupied ITALY of the Italian Government. Immediate control of these groups is exercised through Allied and Co-Belligerent officers operating in conjunction with these forces in the field. Such officers will immediately get in touch with local German commanders.

19. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and all German subordinate commanders will receive and afford all facilities to those Allied or Co-Belligerent officers together with representatives of the CIGLI for the purpose of establishing and maintaining pending arrival of Allied forces, liaison with the following objects:

- a. The general maintenance of law and order.
- b. The maintenance of all essential civilian services.
- c. The provision of communications and transport which may be necessary for the adequate distribution of supplies and the continuance of local administration.

organizations owing allegiance to the CIN. I., which is the recognized delegate in German-occupied Italy of the Italian Government. Immediate control of these groups is exercised through Allied and Co-Belligerent officers operating in conjunction with these forces in the field. Such officers will immediately get in touch with local German commanders.

19. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest and all German subordinate commanders will receive and afford all facilities to those Allied or Co-Belligerent officers together with representatives of the CIN. I. for the purpose of establishing and maintaining pending arrival of Allied forces, liaison with the following subjects:

- a. The general maintenance of law and order.
- b. The maintenance of all essential civilian services.
- c. The provision of communications and transport which may be necessary for the adequate distribution of supplies and the continuance of local administration.

20. For the execution of the above functions all Allied Liaison officers will be considered as the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commander. They will be afforded equal freedom of communication by any means.

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ANNEX 15

DEFINITION

DEFINITION OF "GERMAN" AND "GERMAN CONTROLLED" ALL PRICES AND  
TRADE SHIPING

1. a. The "German Commander-in-Chief Southwest" is hereinafter referred to as the "German Authority".  
b. The "German Naval Commander South" is hereinafter referred to as the "German Naval Command".
2. The German Authority and Naval Command will cause:
  - a. All such surface warships, auxiliaries and merchant vessels as are under their command or control, at sea at the time and date of surrender, wherever they may be, to return to their normal port or base. Arguments of these ships are to be treated for and left.
  - b. All such going U-boats at sea to surface and fly a black flag or black pendant by day and to remain unlighted by night and show navigation lights. All such going U-boats at sea to be ordered to proceed to SINGAPORE, reporting in 500 kilometers to the nearest Allied Wireless Station their estimated time of arrival at SINGAPORE.
  - c. All such submarines at sea in the ATLANTIC or PACIFIC Seas are to be ordered to return to U.S. or U.S.S.R. respectively.
  - d. All such warships, including auxiliaries of all types, auxiliaries, and merchant vessels as are under their command or control, which are in harbor, to remain there.
  - e. All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has

1. All such surface warships, auxiliaries and merchant vessels as are under their command or control, at once at the time and date of surrender, wherever they may be, to return to their normal port or base. Arguments of these ships are to be trained fore and aft.
2. All ocean going U-boats at sea to surface and fly a black flag or black pendant by day and to remain unlighted by night and show navigational lights. All ocean going U-boats at sea to be ordered to proceed to GUNSLITER, reporting on 500 kilocycles to the nearest Allied Wireless Station their estimated time of arrival at GUNSLITER point. Small enemy submarines at sea in the ATLANTIC or IBERIAN Seas are to be ordered to return to POLA or GUNSLITER respectively.
3. All such warships, including submarines of all types, auxiliaries, and merchant vessels as are under their command or control, which are in harbour, to remain there.
4. All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of or under German control at the time of surrender, to proceed at the date and to the ports or bases specified by the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.
5. The German Authority and Naval Command will at once cruise all such warships, surface or submarine, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft in harbour, as are under their command or control, to comply with the following orders:  
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1. No ship, vessel or craft of any description, including harbour craft, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building, is to be damaged or mutilated, nor is any damage to be done to its hull, machinery or equipment.
2. Ammunition is to be retained as long as possible until further orders.
3. Ammunitions are to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential portions of the firing mechanisms, but such mechanisms, and the armament in general are not to be damaged or destroyed. Fire control equipment is to be maintained on board fully efficient. All weapons are to be trained fore and aft.
4. All small arms are to be loaded, and safeguarded.
5. Ships are to remain underpowered by night.
6. Colours are to be struck and not to be exhibited.
7. With the exception of minesweepers and harbour tugs and vessels, all warships, surface and submarine, and auxiliaries, are to be reduced to 20% of their complement of officers and men, except such ships or craft as are required to remain in operation to comply with the instructions in para 8.2 (1). The officers and men retained are to be placed in shore barracks where they are to remain under naval discipline. The crews of merchant vessels are to remain on board their ships.
8. Minesweepers are to be subjected to the degree of disarmament prescribed in sub para 2 above, but are to be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives, and are to comply with fuel.

and aft.

1. All small arms are to be landed, and safeguarded.
2. Ships are to remain unarmored by night.
3. Soldiers are to be straddled and not to be remounted.
4. With the exception of minesweepers and harbor tugs and vessels, all warships, surface and submarine, and auxiliaries, are to be reduced to 25% of their complement of officers and men, except such ships or craft as are required to remain in operation to comply with the instructions in para 6 h (2). These officers and men remaind are to be placed in shore barracks where they are to remain under naval discipline. The crews of merchant vessels are to remain on board their ships.
5. Minesweepers are to be subjected to the degree of disarmament prescribed in sub para 2 above, but are to be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives, and are to comply with fuel.
6. Wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus is to be damaged or destroyed.
7. All collign, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, films <sup>by</sup> ~~and~~ and cryptographic machinery, are to be removed from ships and placed under guard ashore. International code and call signs are to ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~board~~ <sup>board</sup>.

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surface or submarine, auxiliary, merchant ships and other craft at sea are under their command or control to be instructed to comply with the orders in para 3 above immediately on return to harbour.

4. The German Authority and Naval Command will immediately ensure that German naval aircraft under their command or control:

1. Do not leave the ground or base or ship until further orders are received from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

2. Already in the air, land or afloat forthwith.

5. The German Authority and Naval Command will immediately take action to ensure compliance with the following orders:

1. No demolitions are to be carried out in harbour or port facilities of whatever nature; to naval establishments ashore; to scientific or experimental centres or laboratories; to telecommunication and radar stations; to power and water installations; to stores and industrial equipment; to documents records and archives of naval interest; which are to be preserved and kept free from damage or destruction pending receipt of further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives. All necessary steps are to be taken, and orders issued, to prohibit any act of sabotage, scuttling or contamination of ships.

2. All boom defenses at all ports and harbours are to be opened and kept open at all times. Where possible, they are to be removed.

3. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbours are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.

4. All demolition charges in all ports and harbour works are to be

compliance with the following orders:

- a. No demolitions are to be carried out in harbour or port facilities of shipyard interest; no naval establishments ashore; no scientific or experimental centres or laboratories; no telecommunications and radar stations; no power and water installations; no stores and industrial equipment; no documents records and archives of naval interest; which are to be preserved and kept free from damage or destruction pending receipt of further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander's representative. All necessary steps are to be taken, and orders issued, to prohibit any act of sabotage, scuttling or contamination of fuels.
- b. All boats belonging to all ports and harbours are to be opened and kept open at all times. Where possible, they are to be removed.
- c. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbours are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.
- d. All demolition charges in all ports and harbour works are to be removed or rendered ineffective, and their presence indicated by appropriate signs.
- e. The existing warning system of navigational lighting is to be maintained except that all dimmed lights are to be shown at full brilliancy, and lights shown only by special arrangement are to be exhibited continuously. Navigational lights which have been extinguished are to be exhibited as soon as possible with their former characteristics if practicable.

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1. All pilot services are to continue to operate and all pilots are

to hold at their normal stations ready for service and equipped with charts.

2. All small arms, explosives, and rocket stores, in naval barracks and shore establishments, are to be placed in magazines, under guard.

3. (1) German naval and other personnel concerned in the operation of ports and administrative services in ports are to remain at their stations and to continue to carry out their routine duties.

(2) German and German controlled naval personnel employed on coastal defense are to comply with the instructions given by the local

Allied Commanders.

(3) A general order is to be given to all German and German controlled naval and para-naval personnel that they are to carry out all orders and instructions given them by the local Allied Commanders. All personnel are to be unarmed at all times.

4. It is certified that the action required under sub items c, d and e above has been carried out, is to be rendered by the German Naval Command to the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

5. The German Authority and Naval Command will forthwith furnish the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief with the following information in respect of the whole of the Mediterranean and the Straits of GIBRALTAR:  
a. Positions of all minefields, both moored and ground mines, laid by the Italians or Germans, by all types of minelaying craft, including aircraft  
Details of each mine or group of mines laid is to include:

(1) Type of mine.

(3) ... and order is to be given to all German and Italian controlled naval and para-naval personnel that they are to carry out all orders and instructions given them by the local Allied Commanders. All personnel are to be warned at all times.

2. ... certificate that the action required under sub paras a, d and e above has been carried out, is to be rendered by the German Naval Command to the Supreme Allied Commander's representatives.

7. The German authority and Naval Command will forthwith furnish the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief with the following information in respect of the ships of the Mediterranean and the British of GERMANY: (a) Positions of all mineships, both moored and ground mines, laid by the Italians or Germans, by all types of minelaying craft including aircraft Details of each mine or group of mines laid is to include:

- (1) Type of mine.
- (2) Number of mines laid.
- (3) Spacing between mines.
- (4) Depth setting.
- (5) Date laid.
- (6) Number and type of anti-sweeping devices laid.
- (7) Types of anti-sweeping devices, if any, fitted to the mines themselves.
- (8) If any mines have been fitted to mines.
- (9) Polarity, delay, and number of actuations set on all ground mines.

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(10) Details of the mines themselves, including drawings and photographs

of all types of mines and minefittings.

1. Details of convoy routes, searched channels and approach channels to ports in the two areas specified in para 5, with charts showing these,

namely:

- (1) Minearea charts.
- (2) Coastal channel charts.
- (3) Approach route charts.
- (4) New navigational charts issued as a result of recent surveys.

2. Details of,

- (1) Navigational lights which have been destroyed.
- (2) Navigational lights which are in operation, giving details of operation, and by whom controlled.
- (3) Navigational lights which can be put into operation at short notice and their characteristics.

3. Details of buoys, indicating:

- (1) Buoys remaining in place. If light buoy whether light is working and its characteristics.
- (2) Additional buoys laid, with reason for laying and details, including lights, if any.
- (3) Buoys removed.

4. Details of beacons and obstructions, including wrecks dangerous to navigation.

5. Appropriate navigational publications.

6. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the information set out in para 7 concerning

- (1) Navigational lights which have been destroyed.
- (2) Navigational lights which are in operation, giving details of operation, and by whom controlled.
- (3) Navigational lights which can be put into operation at short notice and their characteristics.

4. Details of buoys, indicating:

- (1) Buoys remaining in place. If light buoys whether light is working and its characteristics.
- (2) Additional buoy laid, with reason for laying and details, including lights, if any.
- (3) Buoys removed.

5. Details of beacons and obstructions, including wrecks dangerous to navigation.

6. Appropriate navigational publications.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the information set out in para 7 concerning the unburied wrecks is in any case required to be supplied by the German Naval Command at the date and time at which surrender becomes effective, to be delivered to the Allied Naval Authorities at a place and by means which will be decided at the meeting held prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender.

The two special areas concerned are:-

- a. LIBURNIA SF. - Area bounded on the west by meridian of 14° W. South by parallel of 43° 30' N. East and north by the coast of Italy.

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b. BRITISH - Area bounded on the north, east and west by the coast of ENGLAND, IRELAND, and JUSCULVIA. On the south by parallel of 42°N.

9. The German Naval Command is to furnish forthwith, exact information with regard to the disposition of German and German controlled naval formations and units under its command. Such information is to include the following:

a. Present locations of all Naval Staffs and Headquarters.

b. Full details of organization of German Naval Commands in the Mediterranean.

c. Disposition, state of readiness, and crew lists of all warships, auxiliaries and merchant shipping.

d. Details of defense plans, including plans and drawings of all naval fortifications, installations and establishments.

e. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including bunker, diesel, petrol and coal.

f. The German Naval Command will cause all Naval Staff Wireless Stations under its command to comply with the following orders:-

a. All wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus or shore station equipment is to be damaged or destroyed.

b. All cipher, code and cypher systems, including books, documents, files and cryptographic machinery, are to be safely stored and guarded.

c. Detailed directions as to how and where the information required by the

2. Disposition, status of resources, and other lists of all warships, submarines and merchant shipping.
3. Details of warfare plans, including plans and drawings of all naval fortifications, installations and establishments.
4. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including German, diesel, petrol and coal.
10. The German Naval Command will ensure all Naval Staff, including Stations under its command to comply with the following orders:-
  - a. All wireless transmitting apparatus is to be rendered inoperative by removal of essential parts, but no wireless apparatus or shore station equipment is to be damaged or destroyed.
  - b. All call signs, code and cipher systems, including books, documents, ~~in the~~ files and cryptographic machinery, are to be safely stored and secured.
11. Detailed drawings as to how and where the information required by the foregoing paragraph 9 is to be delivered to the Allied Naval Authority will be notified separately to the German Naval Command at the meeting prior to the signing of the Instrument of Surrender. The details of the methods which will be used by the German Naval Command to pass any ~~128~~ necessary orders to ships at sea, are to be signalled to the Allied Naval Authorities in plain language, prior to the time and date at which this instrument takes effect.
12. The German Naval Command will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

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APPENDIX 'C'

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ORDERS FOR THE GERMAN AIR FORCES

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1. The German Commander-in-Chief Southwest is hereinafter referred to as the "German Authority".
2. All aircraft of any kind or nationality, including gliders and balloons, under the control of the German Authority, whether military, naval or civil, will remain on the ground, on the water, or aboard ships pending further instructions.
3. The German Authority will forthwith cause all German or German controlled aircraft in the air over territories or water occupied or controlled by it to land at once and remain on the ground. All German or German controlled aircraft in the air will be treated as hostile.
4. The German Authority will prevent sabotage or destruction of any Luftwaffe equipment or installations, and will maintain all airfields in readiness for instant use by the Allied Air Forces.
5. All aircraft will be cleared off runways and parked in recognized disposal areas.
6. All aircraft will be disarmed and all wireless equipment rendered inoperative without damage. The guns, bombs, pyrotechnics, ammunition and wireless equipment will be stored under guard in the appropriate storehouses or hangars.
7. All aircraft will be immobilized by removing the elevators, disconnecting the fuel and oil supply (to each engine, in the case of twin or multi-engine aircraft) and draining all fuel and oil tanks into suitable containers.
8. All aircraft together with the removed elevators, fuel and oil, spare parts, hangars, storehouses, airfield administrative and living accommo-

controlled aircraft in the air will be treated as hostile.

4. The German authority will prevent sabotage or destruction of any Luftwaffe equipment or installations, and will maintain all airfields in readiness for instant use by the Allied Air Forces.

5. All aircraft will be cleared off runways and parked in recognized dispersal areas.

6. All aircraft will be dismantled and all wireless equipment rendered inoperative without damage. The guns, bombs, pyrotechnics, ammunition and wireless equipment will be stored under guard in the appropriate storehouses or hangars.

7. All aircraft will be immobilized by removing the clowators, disconnecting the fuel and oil supply (on each engine, in the case of twin or multi-engine aircraft) and draining all fuel and oil tanks into suitable containers.

8. All aircraft together with the removed clowators, fuel and oil, spare parts, hangars, storehouses, airfield administration and living accommodation, general airfield equipment, including lighting installations will be safeguarded intact.

9. Balloons.

All balloons will be hauled down, deflated, packed and safeguarded intact.

Fuel pumps and carburetors will be removed from all winch motors and safeguarded.

10. Explosives.

Information concerning all booby-traps, mines and other explosive devices on land in the vicinity of the airfields will be furnished.

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demanded to the responsible local Allied authority. All explosives, including bombs, will be rendered safe by the removal of fuses and detonators.

11. All self-destroying devices, whether in aircraft, signals equipment or in any Luftwaffe equipment or installation will be removed.

12. Personnel.

All Luftwaffe personnel will be disarmed and will remain in their camps or at assigned sites until directed otherwise by the representative of the local Allied Commander. The orders or instructions of any representative of the local Allied Commander will be obeyed.

13. Motor Transport.

All transport tracked or wheeled will be collected together and maintained in good condition in recognized AF parking areas under guard.

14. Fuel and Oil.

Fuel and oil supplies and installations of all types will be safeguarded and handed over to the local Allied authorities without contamination.

15. Anti-aircraft.

All anti-aircraft guns, heavy and light, under control of the Luftwaffe will be rendered inoperative by the removal of an essential part of the firing mechanism. The whole equipment will be safeguarded intact.

16. All parts removed from A. under para 15 above, will be properly prepared for storage, labelled with the number of the appropriate gun, segregated from guns, and safeguarded intact.

Any spare parts for A. guns held at Luftwaffe units will be segregated from guns and safeguarded intact.

13. Motor Transport.

All transport tracked or wheeled will be collected together and maintained in good condition in recognized air parking areas under guard.

14. Fuel and Oil.

Fuel and oil supplies and installations of all types will be safeguarded and handed over to the local Allied authorities without contamination.

15. Anti-aircraft.

All anti-aircraft guns, heavy and light, under control of the Luftwaffe will be rendered inoperative by the removal of an essential part of the firing mechanism. The whole equipment will be safeguarded intact.

16. All parts removed from A.C. under para 15 above, will be properly prepared for storage, labelled with the number of the appropriate gun, segregated from guns, and safeguarded intact.

Any spare parts for A.C. guns held at Luftwaffe units will be segregated from guns and safeguarded intact.

17. Fire Control Equipment.

Instruments, directors and computers including Radar and all fire control equipment will be concentrated and stored intact.

18. Searchlights.

All carbon rods will be removed from the projectors. The fuel pumps will be removed from the generators. The carbons and fuel pumps together with all carbon and fuel pump spares will be stored and safeguarded intact.

19. Small Arms.

All small arms will be collected and safeguarded intact.

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Normal precautions will be taken against leakage of gas from any gas bombs.

All gas equipment and decontamination material will be preserved and

handed over to the Allied representatives on demand.

Gas spray containers will be collected and guarded, and where such

containers are filled with gas, the normal precautions will be taken

against leakage.

#### 21. Flying Bombs.

All stocks of flying bombs will be immobilized by the removal of fuzes,

detonators, and fuel pumps. The items so removed will be segregated from

flying bombs, concentrated and safeguarded intact, and all flying bombs

and their equipment, spares and launching sites and facilities will be

safeguarded intact.

#### 22. Rocket-Propelled Weapons.

All weapons and projectiles propelled by rockets or similar devices will

be immobilized by the removal and segregation of essential parts of the

mechanism. The parts so removed will be segregated from such weapons and

projectiles, concentrated, and guarded, and the weapons and projectiles,

their equipments, spares, launching sites and facilities will be safeguarded

intact.

#### 23. Electronic Equipment.

a. In addition to the requirements of paragraph 6 above, all communication

equipment used for code, voice, radio, tele-type or other electrical transmission

will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

b. All ground and airborne electronic transmitters and receivers of what-

ever nature or design, whether used for air warning, tracking, identifi-

cation or direction finding, will be rendered inoperative without damage

and their equipment, spares and launching sites and facilities will be safeguarded intact.

22. Rocket-Propelled Weapons.

All weapons and projectiles propelled by rockets or similar devices will be immobilized by the removal and segregation of essential parts of the mechanism. The parts so removed will be segregated from such weapons and projectiles, concentrated, and guarded, and the weapons and projectiles, their equipment, spares, launching sites and facilities will be safeguarded intact.

23. Signal Equipment.

1. In addition to the requirements of paragraph 6 above, all communication equipment used for code, voice, radio type or other electrical transmission will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

2. All ground and airborne electronic transmitters and receivers of whatever nature or design, whether used for air warning, tracking, identification or flying control will be rendered inoperative without damage and safeguarded.

24. Call and Code Signs.

All call and code sign systems used by GROUND and/or Air will in operating Luftwaffe telecommunication systems will be withdrawn from use, and all documents and/or associated coding devices will be stored and safeguarded intact.

25. Code and Cyphers.

All code and cyphers systems, including books, documents and cypher machinery, employed by the Luftwaffe will be withdrawn from use, stored

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and Guard Contact.

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26. Security Equipment.

All forms of scrambling and security equipment in use on any Luftwaffe telecommunication system will be disconnected and safeguarded intact.

27. All other Luftwaffe equipment, including that in experimental stations and laboratories, military or civilian, photographic equipment, furniture, will be preserved intact and maintained in good condition. Special care will be taken to ensure the preservation of all documents, including technical manuals, files, plans, maps, card indices, identity documents.

28. Maintenance of Luftwaffe.

The German Authority will, pending further orders from the Supreme Allied Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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Commander, maintain its own forces from its own resources.

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- 4 -

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SAC (1) 135 32 Addendum  
13th March 1945

215/102/102

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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REF NO 33

APR 14 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

ORGANISATION FOR DEALING WITH INTER-SERVICE  
AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS AT AFHQ

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

1. The Supreme Allied Commander has given further consideration to the present method of holding his conferences and has decided as follows :-

(a) Conferences will be held regularly each Thursday. In the event that there are political matters to be discussed, the Political Conference will commence at 1030 hours and the Operational Conference will follow immediately afterwards. If there are no political items requiring discussion, the Political Conference will be held and the Operational Conference will commence at 1030 hours.

(b) Subjects for consideration at these conferences will be restricted to important matters of theatre policy.

(c) Regular attendance at Operational Conferences will be as follows :-

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commanding General, 15th Army Group (when necessary)  
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chairman, Joint Planning Staff  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, H.Q. AF

(d) Regular attendance at the Political Conference, in addition to the officers nominated in (c) above, will be as follows :-

U.S. Political Adviser

that there are political matters to be discussed, the Political Conference will commence at 1000 hours and the Operational Conference will follow immediately afterwards. If there are no political items requiring discussion, the Political Conference will be held and the Operational Conference will commence at 1000 hours.

(b) Subjects for consideration at these conferences will be restricted to important matters of theatre policy.

(c) Regular attendance at Operational Conferences will be as follows :-

Supreme Allied Commander  
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
 Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
 Commander, Eighth Fleet  
 Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
 Commanding General, 15th Army Group (when necessary)  
 Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander  
 Chief Administrative Officer  
 Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
 Chairman, Joint Planning Staff  
 Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ M. F

(d) Regular attendance at the Political Conference, in addition to the officers nominated in (c) above, will be as follows :-

U.S. Political Adviser  
 British Resident Minister  
 Chief Representative, Allied Commission  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

(e) Officers other than those listed above may be called in for the discussion on items in regard to which they are particularly concerned. The Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee and Director, PWG, will attend when Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee papers are under discussion; otherwise it will be the responsibility of the Service raising a subject for formal consideration to notify the Secretariat that the attendance of additional officers is desired during the discussion on that matter.

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Chief Comm

Chief Comm

Political Adviser

see p. 117

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(c) In the event that no subject for discussion at a Political or Operational Conference are previously placed on the agenda, the Supreme Allied Commander will hold a brief informal conference with the Commanders-in-Chief on Tuesdays at 1300 hours. Attendance at these conferences will be as follows :-

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander  
Ch. of Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

For these conferences no agenda will be prepared and no minutes issued except that when an important policy decision is taken at these conferences appropriate publication thereof will be made to all agencies concerned.

SECRETARIAL ARRANGEMENTS

2. In order to implement the foregoing decisions, the following secretarial arrangements will apply :-

(a) Papers for discussion at the conferences must reach the Secretariat by 1400 hours Tuesdays.

(b) Agenda will be published on Tuesdays.

(c) Papers and minutes will continue to be circulated on existing distributions.

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCES

3. With reference to the direction at Minute 4 of paper No. SAC (T) (45) 12, further discussion between the three Services has now taken place and as a result it has been decided that these meetings will not be held.

4. The AFM Staff Conferences, held under the chairmanship of the Chief of Staff at 1000 hours on Wednesdays and Saturdays, are not affected by this decision and will continue.

4/Dec/44

that when an important policy decision is taken at these conferences appropriate publication thereof will be made to all agencies concerned.

SECRETARIAL ARRANGEMENTS

2. In order to implement the foregoing decisions, the following secretarial arrangements will apply :-

(a) Minutes for discussion at the conferences must reach the Secretariat by 100 hours Tuesday.

(b) Agendas will be published on Tuesdays.

(c) Papers and minutes will continue to be circulated in existing distributions.

CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCES

3. With reference to the direction at Minute 4 of paper No. SAC (C) (45) 12, further discussion between the three Services has now taken place and as a result it has been decided that these meetings will not be held.

4. The AFHQ Staff Conferences, held under the chairmanship of the Chief of Staff at 1030 hours on Wednesdays and Saturdays, are not affected by this decision and will continue.

*Y. S. S. S. S.*  
J. S. S. S. S. S.  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
Chief, G-3 Plans Section  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, AF MAF  
U.S. Political Adviser  
British Resident Minister  
Director, IIR  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Secretary, General Staff  
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat  
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HF 11.13  
U.S. Liaison Advisor  
British Resident Liaison  
Director, FE  
Chief, Documentation, Allied Commission  
Secretary, General Staff  
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat  
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SEC. 62 (a) 14  
7th March 1945

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NOTE BY SECRETARY

NOTE BY SECRETARY

Note by Secretary

1. In early December a letter was received by MIL from the Italian Ministry of War, alleging that representations of the Yugoslav Government were inviting the desertion of Italian soldiers. At the same time other information suggested that the numbers and size of Yugoslav organizations and missions in Italy had become excessive and that certain of these missions were undertaking improper activities. As a result paper No. 10 (44) 150 was prepared and was considered at the Political Committee of the Supreme Allied Commander's conference on 9th December (SO (44) 35th Meeting, Minute 4). The Supreme Allied Commander directed that an interim reply be forwarded to the Italian Ministry of War and appointed a sub-committee composed of G-2, G-3, G-5, Italian Section and Military Mission to prepare a report on the numbers, locations and activities of unauthorized Yugoslav liaison officers and missions in Italy and as a result of their investigation to recommend what further action should be taken when the United Provisional Yugoslav government was established.

2. This sub-committee has now completed its investigations and finds that, with the exception of one mission at MILAN the abolition of which is recommended below, the Yugoslav liaison officers and missions at present established in Italy were originally duly authorized by the Allied authorities. A list of Yugoslav liaison officers and missions which have been located is attached as an annex to this paper.

3. The Sub-Committee makes the following recommendations as to action which may be taken to induce the Yugoslav government to reduce certain of its organizations in Italy :-

- (a) The so-called Royalist missions in Rome, Milan and Bari will, with the establishment of a United Provisional Yugoslav Government, become redundant. The Allied Commission might therefore be directed formally to request the closure of these missions. There is evidence, however, that although the head of the Yugoslav delegation to the Advisory Council for Italy, acting on instructions from Mr. Suberic, is already attempting to liquidate the Royal Yugoslav military mission in Rome he is encountering opposition from the Royalists. Should the latter continue to resist the disbandment



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- (c) There is no objection to the small liaison department of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation continuing to function at B.113. It is, however, suggested that the new Yugoslav government be requested to provide resources :-
- (i) That this representation will not be increased.
- (ii) That it is a regular detachment either of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation delegation at B.113 or of the Yugoslav delegation to the Allied Military Council for I.I.I.
- (e) No reductions are at present necessary in the 14th Yugoslav Overseas Brigade, since this organization is performing useful work on behalf of S.E.
- (f) There is not at present any evidence to justify a general recommendation for the removal of Yugoslav engineers from hospitals.
4. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve the foregoing recommendations and as a result :-
- (a) To instruct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to take action in accordance with paragraphs 3(-) and 3(e).
- (b) To instruct the Chief of Staff to take appropriate action in regard to the remaining recommendations.

*J. H. L. S. Williams*  
J. H. L. S. WILLIAMS,  
COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

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Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

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There is not to present any evidence to justify a general recommendation for the removal of Yugoslav commanders from hospitals.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve the foregoing recommendations and as a result:-

- (a) To direct the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to take action in accordance with paragraph 3(a) and 3(c).
- (b) To instruct the Chief of Staff to take appropriate action in regard to the remaining recommendations.

*J. H. L. Schellen*  
J. H. L. SCHELLEN,  
COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USAF  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
Chief, G-3 Plans Section  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, AFMRF  
U.S. Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Director, JWP  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Secretary, General Staff  
Inter-Services and Political Secretariat  
Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
Spartan

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ROYALIST COLLABORATION AND MISSIONS IN ITALY

1. Royal Yugoslav Military Mission in Bari

Strength : approximately 80.

Location : Corso Trieste 10, Bari.

Activities : This mission, under Lieutenant Colonel Vukobrat, was formed from the Royal Yugoslav Military Mission in R.H., permission for the establishment of which was given by Allied Force Headquarters early in 1947. Application for its dispatch was received at Allied Force Headquarters from the Royal Yugoslav authorities in Rome, who desired to have representation in Italy to superintend arrangements for the care of Yugoslav refugees arriving in Southern Italy from UNRRA VI. After its establishment in R.H. the mission recruited a larger staff and widened the scope of its activities. The mission is primarily concerned with looking after the interests of Yugoslavs of Royalist sympathies as opposed to the Partisan organizations in Italy which cater for Partisan adherents.

2. Royal Yugoslav Military Mission Liaison Centre Naples

Strength : 1 officer, 2 G.N.

Location : SA Piviera di Stabia, Naples.

Activities : It is assumed that this liaison centre grew out of the Royalist Yugoslav military mission which was established in Bari. It looks after the interests of Yugoslavs of Royalist sympathies.

3. Royal Yugoslav Military Mission at Bari

Strength : Approximately 20 officers, 5 G.N.

Location : Via Marchese di Montoro 47, Bari.

Activities : This mission is concerned with looking after the interests of Yugoslavs of Royalist sympathies. Sub-missions have been organized at LECOP and G. LINDI where the Internees and Displaced Persons Sub-Commission have permanent camps for refugees, and at TARANTO where the Sub-Commission operated a staging camp for refugees en route to the Middle East.

4. Yugoslav Army of National Liberation Detachment at Bari

Strength : Approximately 1100.



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6. Jugoslav Delegation to the Allied Advisory Council for Italy

Strength : Approximately 50.

Location : Via Quintino Sella 5, Rome.

Activities : The normal duties of a delegation to the Allied Advisory Council are performed by this organization.

7. Italian Department of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation at Milan

Strength : 3 officers, 12 O.B.s.

Location : Via Veronesi No. 1, Milan

Activities : This liaison department was established at Milan in the middle of December 1944. Its purpose is to look after refugees and reinforcements for the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation arriving in Italy from overseas.

8. Fourth Overseas Brigade

Strength : Approximately 1350.

Location : Headquarters LONDON.

Activities : This organization provides certain guards and also assistance in the packing of munition for infiltration into the Balkans for Headquarters Special Operations Headquarters. Detachments of this organization are believed to take part in recruiting for the Partisan forces.

9. Commissars in Hospitals

There are about seven hospitals in the Balkan area in which there are Yugoslav patients. Each of these has a Yugoslav Partisan commissar who is responsible for the discipline and welfare of the Partisan inmates of the hospital. Commissars are also responsible for the political instruction of the Yugoslav patients. Authority for the establishment of semi-medical camps for Yugoslav Partisans in Italy and for the acceptance of Partisans in British hospitals was given by Allied Force Headquarters.

...middle of December 1941. Its purpose is to look after refugees and send them on for the Yugoslav army of National Liberation arriving in 1942 from overseas.

8. Fourth Overseas Brigade

Strength : Approximately 1350.

Location : Headquarters MEMOROLZ.

Activities : This organization provides certain guards and also assists in the packing of supplies for infiltration into the BALKANS for Headquarters Special Operations Headquarters. Detachments of this organization are believed to take part in recruiting for the Partisan Forces.

9. Committee in Memorials

There are about seven hospitals in the BRF area in which there are Yugoslav patients. Each of these has a Yugoslav Partisan Committee who is responsible for the discipline and welfare of the Partisan inmates of the hospital. Committees are also responsible for the political instruction of the Yugoslav patients. Authority for the establishment of semi-medical camps for Yugoslav Partisans in Italy and for the acceptance of Partisans in British hospitals was given by Allied Force Headquarters.

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

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ALLIED ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

MAR 7 1945

ALLIED JUGOSLAVIAN PARTISANS

Note by Secretary

1. In conclusion 4(a) of PC (44) 15th Meeting, dated 9th December 1944, the Supreme Allied Commander directed that action on paper No. 70 (44) 110 be deferred pending the results of Dr. Subasic's conversations then proceeding in LONDON, which have resulted in the establishment of a joint provisional government of YUGOSLAVIA in BELGRADE. This paper notified the demise of the Yugoslav delegation in LHM to obtain custody of certain Yugoslav nationals residing in LHM on the grounds that they were deserters from the Yugoslav National Army of liberation and suggested that a procedure be set up whereby the Yugoslav authorities would be required to set forth certain particulars in regard to each person. The paper further suggested that the Allied Commission should be instructed that policy should be :-

- (a) That proven deserters from the Yugoslav armed forces should be apprehended and returned to Yugoslav military jurisdiction.
- (b) That the liberty of other persons whose custody might be sought by the Yugoslav authorities for political or other reasons should be protected.

A draft letter to the Allied Commission stating the procedure to be adopted was laid before the meeting.

2. Having regard to the recent developments in connection with the formation of the joint provisional government of YUGOSLAVIA, the Chief of Staff has now approved and despatched the draft letter previously proposed and a copy of this letter is attached as an annex to this paper.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to take note of the contents of this letter.

Enclosure in this Paper at  
Letter 120, File 217/EC

See 141

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that a procedure be set up whereby the Yugoslav authorities would be required to set forth certain particulars in regard to each person. The paper further requested that the Allied Commission should be instructed that policy should be:

- (a) That proven deserters from the Yugoslav Armed Forces should be apprehended and returned to Yugoslav military jurisdiction.
- (b) That the liberty of other persons whose custody is sought by the Yugoslav authorities for political or other reasons should be protected.

A draft letter to the Allied Commission stating the procedure to be adopted was laid before the meeting.

2. Paying regard to the recent developments in connection with the formation of the joint provisional government of YUGOSLAVIA, the Chief of Staff has now approved and despatched the draft letter previously proposed and a copy of this letter is attached as an annex to this paper.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to take note of the despatch of this letter.

*handwritten in this paper at this no. 44 21/7/45*

*See 121*

# DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
 Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
 Commander, Eighth Fleet, USA  
 Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
 Chief of Staff  
 Chief Liaison Section Officer  
 Deputy Chief of Staff  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
 Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
 Chief G-3 Plans Section  
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
 Chief, Liaison Section  
 Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF  
 U.S. Political Advisor  
 British Resident Liaison  
 Director, FE  
 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
 Secretary, General Staff  
 Inter-Services and Political Secretariat  
 Commanding General, 15th Army Group  
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*delivered (see)*  
 J. H. LINDSAY,  
 COLONEL,  
 SECRETARY.

*REC 11/11/45*  
*7 MAR 45*  
*Chief Comm*  
*Exec Comm*  
*C. A. S. J. J. J.*

*Copy To:*  
*Political Advisors*  
*GDH: K.C.*  
*(8 MAR 45)*  
**SECRET**

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SUBJECT: Alleged Japanese Deserters

1: Headquarters, Allied Command, Pacific  
100 394.

1. Under date of 30 November 1944 (reference DOW/2/22/DP) a letter from Major ROBERTSON of the Japanese Detachment in ROK, on the subject of Japanese deserters, was referred to this Headquarters.

2. The above advice was WILSON that it will be your policy to assist him in every way in the apprehension of deserters from the Japanese Detachment, Army of Liberation, but that it will be necessary for him to conform with a procedure similar to that now in use in the Allied forces. Each individual case will require to be considered separately, with a view to safeguarding the rights of a person whose apprehension is sought.

3. It will therefore be necessary for the Japanese National Army of Liberation to establish the identity of each deserter, and to furnish full particulars respecting his desertion. Prior to taking any action towards the apprehension of a deserter it is suggested that you receive, in affidavit form, the following particulars :-

1. Name and rank of deserter.
2. Military unit from which deserted and location thereof.
3. Date of enlistment or induction.
4. Date and circumstances of desertion.
5. Probable whereabouts.

Such affidavits will be required to be submitted within 60 days from the date of desertion.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

JOHN HARRIS

to necessary for him to conform with a procedure similar to that now in use in the allied armies. Each individual case will be considered separately, with a view to safeguarding the rights of a person whose apprehension is sought.

3. It will therefore be necessary for the Japanese National Army of liberation to establish the identity of each deserter, and to furnish full particulars respecting his desertion. Prior to taking any action towards the apprehension of a deserter it is suggested that you require, in affidavit form, the following particulars:-

1. Name and rank of deserter.
2. Military unit from which deserted and location thereof.
3. Date of enlistment or induction.
4. Date and circumstances of desertion.
5. Probable whereabouts.

Such affidavits will be required to be submitted within 60 days from the date of desertion.

By command of Field Marshal ALYKINDEN:

JOHN HARDING  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Staff

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1st March 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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MAR 1 - 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

ORGANISATION FOR DEALING WITH INTER-SERVICE AND POLI-  
TICAL QUESTIONS AT AFHQ

Record of a meeting held at 1500 hours on  
Tuesday 28th February 1945 in the 7-3 War  
Room

PRESENT :-

Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNerney,  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,  
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian R. Robertson,  
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. O'Leary,  
Deputy U.S. Political Advisor

Mr. Philip Broad,  
Deputy British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,  
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARY

Major J.G. Sweetman

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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REC 11151  
3 MAR 45  
Chief Comm  
Exec Comm  
Political Sec

Lieutenant General Joseph E. McNamara,  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir John Slessor,  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Lieutenant General Sir John Harding,  
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,  
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Mr. C. Office,  
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Phillip Broad,  
Deputy British Resident Minister

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,  
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major J.G. Sweetman

*EC List*  
*3 APR 45*  
*Chief Clerk*  
*Exec Clerk*  
*Political Sec*

SECRETARY

The meeting had before it a paper by the Chief of Staff on the subject of the organization for dealing with inter-service and political questions at AFHQ.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that the paper raised at least two different points, which he proposed to treat separately.

1. REORGANIZATION OF INTER-SERVICE AND POLITICAL SECRETARIAT AND SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF

MR. OFFICE wished to see the present functions of Inter-Service and Political Secretariat adequately carried out. He did not, however, hold strong views on how the staff machinery required to do this should be organized provided it worked efficiently.

MR. BROAD agreed with Mr. Office and stated he was satisfied with the arrangements proposed.

*Staff*

/LIEUTENANT CONFIDENTIAL

See 117.

CONFIDENTIAL

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUNNINGHAM stressed that the proposed reorganisation was not a question of personalities. He merely intended to rationalise the existing system of two interlocking secretariats which produced duplication of work. The reorganisation would reduce staff overheads and result in a saving in personnel. The name "Secretary General Staff" should be changed on this amalgamation taking place and he suggested the title "Chief of Staff's Secretariat".

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUNNINGHAM explained that he had previously opposed the idea because he had been under the impression that it was proposed to terminate the system of S.C.I.D. Operational and Political conferences. He now realised that the holding of such meetings would not be affected by the proposed reorganisation. He professed, if the change took place, that the new secretariat should be termed "Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat". He thought, however, that it was a pity to change a system which was at present working efficiently, as, although there was a good deal to be said in logic for the amalgamation, he feared that the result of it would be a secretariat having too military a colour.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUNNINGHAM agreed with Admiral Cunningham and regretted that it was in fact true that naval and air officers could not be made available to work in the new secretariat. He felt, however, that the important point was that the new secretariat, no matter what it was called, should adequately perform functions of an inter-service, inter-allied and political nature.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with General Harding that the present system inevitably involved duplication as the two secretariats could not function efficiently unless there was very close co-ordination.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CUNNINGHAM, answering a point raised by Admiral Cunningham, stated that it would be quite in order for naval and air Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs to deal direct with the Lieutenant General whom it was proposed should, within the new secretariat, act as secretary of the Supreme Allied Commander's conferences. He accepted Admiral Cunningham's suggestion for a name of the new secretariat.

#### THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff to take the necessary steps for the reorganisation, on the lines set out in the paper before the meeting, of the Inter-Service and Political Secretariat and the office of the Secretary General Staff into a joint secretariat to be known as the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

#### 2. INTER-SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER drew attention to paragraph 4 of the paper before the meeting and invited comments.

AIR MARSHAL BLESSOR agreed with Admiral Cunningham and regretted that it was in fact true that naval and air officers could not be made available to work in the new secretariat. He felt, however, that the important point was that the new secretariat's, no matter what it was called, should adequately perform functions of an inter-service, inter-allied and political nature.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with General Harding that the present system inevitably involved duplication as the two secretariats could not function efficiently unless there was very close co-ordination.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARTING, answering a point raised by Admiral Cunningham, stated that it would be quite in order for naval and air Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs to deal direct with the Lieutenant Colonel whom it was proposed should, within the new secretariat, act as secretary of the Supreme Allied Commander's conferences. He accepted Admiral Cunningham's suggestion for a name of the new secretariat.

#### THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff to take the necessary steps for the re-organisation, on the lines set out in the paper before the meeting, of the Inter-Service and Political Secretariat and the office of the Secretary General Staff into a joint secretariat to be known as the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

#### 2. INTER-SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER drew attention to paragraph 4 of the paper before the meeting and invited comments.

AIR MARSHAL BLESSOR considered that the Chief Administrative Officer must have inter-service responsibility and must co-ordinate requirements of such matters as accommodation, movement and transportation as between the Army and Air Forces. The Chief Administrative Officer could not of course give an over-riding administrative decision on a matter of inter-service policy but he had two functions, one of which was purely an Army matter and the other was of an inter-service nature.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that the connection between the Navy and the Army regarding administrative matters was not as close as between the Army and the Air Force. He was not clear what powers the Chief Administrative Officer was recommending with regard to shipping, the control of which as a naval operational matter must remain his (Admiral Cunningham's) responsibility. He considered that paragraph 7(d) of the paper before the meeting would, as drafted, give too wide powers to the Chief Administrative Officer.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that he did not seek to carry out any inter-service functions other than those which he had in fact performed in

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/the past

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the past. He wished, however, to regularize the position and considered that he should be empowered to decide on staff level whether administrative plans of an inter-service nature were sound. In addition he wished to be authorized to brief the Joint Planning Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER took the view, which was generally agreed by the meeting, that senior officers of all services should refrain from any tendency to dictate to the Joint Planning Staff, whose papers should represent no more than the opinion of individual planners. He further pointed out that as Commanding General, ITUSL, he had certain purely US administrative functions, which he did not delegate. Inter-allied administrative problems were, however, properly a responsibility of the Chief Administrative Officer.

#### THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that the Chief Administrative Officer be given official responsibility for co-ordinating the administrative aspects of inter-Allied, inter-service and political matters within approved policy.

#### 3. INTERVIEWS AT SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. R. HODGINS said that 15th Army Group and Balkan Air Force had been represented at the SACLANT conferences held on 19th and 20th February and he had asked them also to be represented at the conferences to be held on 2nd March. Having been at JLI he felt that it would be of considerable assistance to Commanding General, 15th Army Group, to be regularly represented at SACLANT conferences.

ADMIRAL CUMBERBELL expressed concern at the continued increase in the numbers of those attending the Supreme Allied Commander's conferences and pointed out that large meetings prevented Commanders-in-Chief from speaking freely.

AIR MARSHAL GIBSON agreed with Admiral Cunningham and said he would prefer that the more junior of the officers, who at present attended regularly, should not do so but should be called in for specific items as required.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that under present conditions Commanding General, 15th Army Group, was in practice in much the same position as an adviser to SACLANT as were the naval and air Commanders-in-Chief, though he realised that constitutionally the position was different.

#### THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff,

- (a) To arrange for the regular attendance of a representative of Commanding General, 15th Army Group, for such matters as af-

### 3. ATTENDANCE AT SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRING said that 15th Army Group and Balkan Air Force had been represented at the SICED conferences held on 29th and 31st February and he had asked them also to be represented at the conferences to be held on 3rd March. Having been at it he felt that it would be of considerable assistance to Commanding General, 15th Army Group, to be regularly represented at SICED conferences.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed concern at the continued increase in the numbers of those attending the Supreme Allied Commander's conferences and pointed out that large meetings prevented Commanders-in-Chief from speaking freely.

MR MARSHALL GIBSON agreed with Admiral Cunningham and said he would prefer that the more junior of the officers, who at present attended regularly, should not do so but should be called in for specific items as required.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that under present conditions Commanding General, 15th Army Group, was in practice in much the same position as an advisor to SICED as were the naval and air Commanders-in-Chief, though he realized that constitutionally the position was different.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff,

(c) To arrange for the regular attendance of a representative of Commanding General, 15th Army Group, for such matters as affected him at SICED conferences.

(b) To investigate the feasibility of restricting the attendance at SICED conferences.

### 4. OPERATIONAL SUMMARIES AT SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCES

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRING raised the question of whether it was necessary to have operational summaries given at the commencement of Supreme Allied Commander's conferences. The abolition of these summaries would obviate the need for the presence at the meetings of certain of the officers who at present made these statements.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that these summaries had previously been necessary when the battle was more fluid and conferences were being held

/more frequently

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more frequently. Under present circumstances the summaries were interesting but possibly not sufficiently so to merit half an hour of the commander's time.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed that operational summaries should be omitted from Supreme Allied Commander's conferences for the present.

5. SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S DAILY MEETINGS AND CHIEF OF STAFF'S ST-EX-11  
CONFERENCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HURDIN said that the previous 9 a.m. Chiefs of Staff meetings had been useful to clear up certain day to day problems. He considered there was a requirement for regular meetings between the three senior Chiefs of Staff and the Chief Administrative Officer to settle matters which could be dealt with on staff level and need not be referred to the 34 some Allied Commander's conference.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HURDIN said that the present 9 a.m. meetings were intended to be merely a presentation to the Supreme Allied Commander of the existing military situation by all three services. The meetings being informative in nature it was not necessary for Chiefs of Staff of other services to attend and all that was required was the presence of officers who could explain the naval and air aspects of current operations. He would gladly agree to regular meetings with the naval and air Chiefs of Staff.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff to arrange for regular meetings with the Chiefs of Staff of other services and the Chief Administrative Officer to discuss matters which would be settled on their staff level and for the attendance at these meetings of representatives of the U.S. Political Advisor and the British Resident Minister, when necessary.

*Ly. Hurdin*  
J.G. WATKIN,  
MAJOR,  
SECRETARY.

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Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. BROWN said that the present 9 a.m. meetings were intended to be merely a presentation to the Supreme Allied Commander of the existing military situation by all three services. The meetings being informative in nature it was not necessary for Chiefs of Staff of other services to attend and all that was required was the presence of officers who could explain the naval and air aspects of current operations. He would gladly agree to regular meetings with the naval and air Chiefs of Staff.

#### THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Directed the Chief of Staff to arrange for regular meetings with the Chiefs of Staff of other services and the Chief Administrative Officer to discuss matters which could be settled on their staff level and for the attendance at these meetings of representatives of the U.S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister, when necessary.

*14 hours*  
J.G. SWINMAN,  
MAJOR,  
SECRETARY.

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

540 (E) (45) M  
28th February 1945

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QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE  
(POLITICAL)

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN YUGOSLAVIA

Note by Deputy Air Chief, Yot

FILE 50/26  
MAR 1 - 1945

I suggest that the following amendments should be made to the draft telegram circulated under JHS Paper No. 7/265 (Yinal) :-

1. Paragraph 4, line 1. Delete the words "be withdrawn in default of which it would be insisted that any such as remained". There is no need for seeking an assurance that Jugoslav troops should be withdrawn, because this certainly would not occur and it would merely precipitate a war.
2. Paragraph 5. Delete sub-paragraph (c) and add at the end of sub-paragraph (a) "No doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA in advance of a general peace settlement".
3. Paragraph 5(b), line 2. For "confidently expect" substitute "have been assured".
4. Paragraph 7. I suggest should be re-drafted as follows :-  
"7. It is accepted policy that ALL ITALY (including of course YUGOSLAVIA) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the considerations in 5(a) and (b) above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Jugoslav (Slovene) forces are already in occupation of large areas of YUGOSLAVIA, and Jugoslav civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Jugoslav forces will

Even our seeking an assurance that Yugoslav troops would be withdrawn, because Tito certainly would not agree and it would merely precipitate a war.

3. Paragraph 6. Delete sub-paragraph (c) and add at the end of sub-paragraph (a) "no doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia in advance of a general peace settlement".

3. Paragraph 6(b), line 1. For "confidently expect" substitute "have been secured".

4. Paragraph 7. I suggest should be re-drafted as follows :-

"It is accepted policy that all Italy (including of course Venezia Giulia) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the considerations in 6(a) and (b) above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Yugoslav (Slovene) forces are already in occupation of large areas of Venezia Giulia, and Yugoslav civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Yugoslav forces will probably be in a position to extend their hold over the whole country before other Allied forces can arrive, and there may well be some force in Tito's contention that, unless his civil authorities are allowed to continue to function, chaos will ensue.

In order, therefore, to meet the requirement in 6(c) as well as those in 6(a) and (b) above, it is suggested that we should make a virtue of a necessity and invite the Provisional

Yugoslav Government - as soon as it is formed - to participate,

Comments on This Paper  
AT EMB, File 27/EC

Copy in File 50/EC

/as an ally

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1/1/1945  
Chief Commr  
Exec Commr  
Pol. Sec.

HEADQUARTERS  
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an ally, in the Allied Military Government of such portions of Italy as are so governed, including VENEZIA GIULIA, with an accredited Yugoslav representative on the Allied Commission. It should be arranged that British or American forces should occupy the I of C area and perhaps also FIUME and POLJ; that the Yugoslav forces in other parts of VENEZIA GIULIA should come under the orders of the appropriate Allied Commander; and that all officers should be associated with such existing civil and military as may be found functioning in the territory when, if Yugoslav, Tito has already agreed should be responsible to

W.G.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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1945 February 1945

SECTION

33

CONF NO

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

DIRECTIVE TO HEAD OF NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION  
ALLIED COMMISSION

Note by Secretary

1-1-1945

1. Until recently the Flag Officer Taranto and Liscia (Italy) was  
military head of the Naval Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission and  
a deputy acted for him in this capacity in 1945. This arrangement  
was terminated with the appointment on 19th February 1945 of Rear Ad-  
miral Warren as Head of the Naval Sub-Commission.

2. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, feels that it is appropriate  
at this time to issue a new directive to the Head of the Naval Sub-  
Commission, and submits for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commis-  
sion the draft at appendix 1A. When the directive has been approved  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, proposes to promulgate the substance  
of it to the Mediterranean Station by Section Message.

3. Rear Admiral Warren will also be acting as the representative in  
place of Flag Officer Liscia (Italy) and as senior British naval officer,  
there. In these capacities he will have responsibilities to Commander-  
in-Chief, Mediterranean, through normal naval channels.

Comments on this page?

at First meeting 20/2/45

for J.C. LASCHELLS,  
GULFEL,  
SECRETARY.

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Vice Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander, Mediterranean

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1. Deputy acted for him in this capacity in HQAF. This arrangement was terminated with the appointment on 19th February 1945 of Rear Admiral Barron as Head of the Naval Sub-Commission.

2. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, feels that it is appropriate at this time to issue a new directive to the Head of the Naval Sub-Commission, and submits for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander the draft of a new directive. When the directive has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, proposals to promulgate the substance of it to the Mediterranean Station by Station Message.

3. Rear Admiral Barron will also be acting as the representative in HQAF of Flag Officer Liaison (Italy) and as senior British naval officer, Rome. In these capacities he will have responsibilities to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through normal naval channels.

Commented in my letter  
at this date 20/2/45

*for J.H. LACOMBE,  
CHIEF,  
SECRETARY.*

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Mr. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Mr. Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
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Deputy Chief of Staff  
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Assistant, Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
Chief, G-3 Plans Section  
Assistant, Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
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APPENDIX 'A'

N-80

February 1945

TO: Rear Admiral Guy Longton Warren

## Confidential

1. You have been appointed Head of the Allied Naval Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. *By your only will be done*
2. The duty of the Naval Sub-Commission is to represent the Allied Nations on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner on such matters affecting the Italian Navy as are dealt with by the Commission. The function is a professional one and not a political one.
3. The Naval Sub-Commission is responsible for all administrative and material questions affecting the Italian Navy. These include :-
  - Employment of Personnel
  - Supplies of food, clothing, transport and naval stores
  - Disposal of war material
  - Recruitment of Italian Naval property.
4. Effective this date all communications relating to matters of policy in connection with the Italian Navy under the Armistice Terms and the general administration of the Italian Navy, not directly affecting the operation of the Italian Fleet under the Cunningham-de Courten Agreement, will be referred directly to the Sub-Commission.
5. You are authorised to deal direct with the Ministry of Marine, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, Headquarters 15th Army Group and the various sub-commissions of the Allied Commission regarding all such administrative questions. Matters of policy or any question requiring decision by higher authority should be referred to the Supreme Allied Commander through the Chief Commissioner.

3. The Naval Sub-Commission is responsible for all administrative and material questions affecting the Italian Navy. These include :-

Employment of Personnel  
Supplies of food, clothing, transport and naval stores  
Disposal of war material  
Acquisition of Italian Naval property.

4. Effective this date all communications relating to matters of policy in connection with the Italian Navy under the Armistice Terms and the general administration of the Italian Navy, not directly affecting the operation of the Italian Fleet under the Cunningham-to-Courten Agreement, will be referred directly to the Sub-Commission.

5. You are authorised to deal direct with the Ministry of Marine, Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission, Headquarters 15th Army Group and the various sub-commissions of the Allied Commission regarding all such administrative questions. Matters of policy or any question requiring decision by higher authority should be referred to the Supreme Allied Commander through the Chief Commissioner.

6. For Naval Sub-Commission business, the channels of communication shall be as follows: <sup>15/1/42</sup>  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, should also be through the Chief Commissioner.

7. Commodore H. J. Zirilli, United States Navy, will be your Deputy and will act on your behalf in your absence. The remainder of your staff is to be organised as you think best for the efficient performance of the above duties.

By Command of FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER.

JOHN HARDING,  
Lieutenant-General,  
Chief of **SECRET**

Copies to :- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Commanding General, 15th Army Group

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

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COUNT NO. 33

## FIGURE 2. ALLELE FREQUENCIES OF *MDR1*

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

FEB 28 1945

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1. In T-45-1 February the Combined Chiefs of Staff made certain recommendations for the modification of the financial relations between the US/UK Governments and the Italian Government. Some of these proposals, relating to the Allied Financial Policy, the control of Italian foreign exchange, and other financial activities of the Allied Commission, were technical and non-political in character; and the comments of the Allied Commission and of British Headquarters were transmitted to the CCS in LHM 544 of 24 February.
2. Paragraph 13 of T-45-1, however, stated that negotiations should be undertaken with the Italian Government looking toward the centralization in the Government of the issuance of all lire currency issues, including the Allied Military lire. In view of the fact that the Government would provide lire currency required by the Allied Forces.
3. There is attached hereto as annex 1A a draft reply to T-45-1, paragraph 13 of T-45-1, paragraph 2, relating to the lire account. This draft was submitted from every technical point of view the Italian Government should be understood to assume the liability for all lire currency and for the revision of currency to the Allied Forces. However, the Government has already stated that it intends to issue for reimbursement in dollars and sterling of all lire currency for the Allied Forces in Italy, and may have created in the minds of the public the conviction that such reimbursement is essential to the stability of the lire. This being the case, the majority view in the Allied Commission and British Headquarters is that the political and financial aspects of this time to reimbursement are far within by the Government of the lire currency bill alone may cause a currency crisis and accelerate the devaluation of the lire, thus adversely affecting military operations.
4. This draft reply has been approved by the Allied Commission, the British Government, the U.S. Political Advisor (whose dissenting view is attached hereto), the U.S. Financial Director, and the U.S. Payment-in-Kind.
5. The Successor Allied Commander is requested to advise the despatch.

Consolidation and fines  $P_{avg}$

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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the experimental design. The subjects were divided into two groups: the control group and the experimental group. The control group was divided into two subgroups: the control group and the experimental group. The experimental group was divided into two subgroups: the control group and the experimental group. The control group was divided into two subgroups: the control group and the experimental group. The experimental group was divided into two subgroups: the control group and the experimental group.

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2. For each 10 of 100 445, re-use that negotiations should be undertaken with the Italian Government looking toward the centralization in the Government of the currency of all lire currency issues, including the Allied Military Lira. Thereafter the Government would provide lire currency required by the Allied Forces.

3. There is attached hereto an Annex 'A' draft reply to 100 445 of 100 445 dated 10 10 44, relating to the lire issue. This draft makes that from every technical point of view the Italian Government should be made to assume responsibility for all lire currency and for the revision of currency to the Allied Forces. However, the Government has publicly stated that it intends to pass for reimbursement in dollars and sterling of all lire issued by it for the Allied Forces in Italy, and may have created in the minds of the public the conviction that such reimbursement is essential to the stability of the lire. This being the case, the majority view in the Allied Commission on this Headquarters is that the official and public reaction at this time to imputation of responsibility by the Government of lire for currency bill issues may cause a Government crisis and accelerate the re-issuance of the lire, thus adversely affecting military operations.

4. This draft reply has been approved by the Allied Commission, the British Resident Minister, the U.S. Military Advisor (whose dissenting view is attached therein), the U.S. Fiscal Director, and the D/Commander-in-Chief.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to authenticate the draft.

Conclusions on 100 445  
100 445, 100 445/50  
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Commander, 1st Air Force, USA  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief of Staff

Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
Chief, G-3 Plans Section  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, H. H. H.  
U.S. Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Air Staff, USA

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Secretary, General Staff  
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat  
Spores

(Initial) T.R.H.

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Call on 100 445/50

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TO: JCS FOR US FOR COM.

FROM: JCS FOR COM.

Confidential

Subject: Transfer currency res. liability to Italian government is subject.

Para one. Ref 554. We view of this Headquarters and AG on 7.3.44 setting para 13 and 2 which are contained in herein.

Para two. It is the consensus of opinion in the Allied Commission and this Headquarters that: (a) at a date Italian government must assume official res liability for all lire currency. They have accepted this res liability only because the Allies invaded from Sicily and the South and had no access to the Italian facilities for almost a year and found them destroyed when they were reached. (b) It is not now to return officially to the Italian government the full res liability of its res liability for all lire currency.

Para three. In our view as raised in 2(1) by advisors, it is out that the Italian government has officially stated that it is seeking to be relieved of the financial liability under article 23 of the Armistice. On 9 January is known to the AG and to both Embassies - strong opinion on this subject which my Headquarters is studying. It is not to be given. It is not. Unless, as my advisors do not think likely, the two governments agree to accept the Italian demand for dollar/sterling reimbursement for all lire expended by or on behalf of the Allied force, the political responsibilities of

It is the consensus of opinion in the Allied Commission and this Headquarters that: (a) as the Italian Government must assume official responsibility for all lire currency. They have agreed that the liability only because the Allies insisted from SICILY and the South and no coins to date. (b) It is not a new currency officially to use the Italian Government to give public recognition of its responsibility for all lire currency.

There are three. In the first the view expressed in 2(a) by the Commission, but that the Italian Government has officially stated that it is seeking to be relieved of the financial obligations under article 23 of the Armistice. On 9 January it made a statement to the A.C. and to both Delegations. Other arrangements in this subject which the Commission is studying, but no further action is to be taken. Unless, as my colleagues are not thinking likely, the two Governments, regard to

accept the Italian demand for dollar/sterling reimbursement for all lire exchanged by or on behalf of the Allied forces, the Allied representatives of 100

insistence on the abolition of the government's currency obligation may be severe and may contribute to the downfall of the present Government and to some increased measures of inflation. The U.S. Political Adviser is of the view that in view of the public statements of the Italian Government the no inflation and will not be a matter of indifference to the Italian Government, but he considers that notwithstanding, within all factors and taking into consideration the long run situation, it is desirable to undertake the proposed

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Part 2 of the report of this time to have any more detail on the situation with the Indian Government which may increase, limited amount of financial assistance in 1954, to the fact of Indian military operations. It is not possible for my office to reach with experience the effect which the Indian Government will have, but a balance of power in the view that it would not be desirable at the present time, to force the issue, in the event of the fact of causing the fall of the present Government.

Part 3 of the report of this time to have any more detail on the situation with the Indian Government which may increase, limited amount of financial assistance in 1954, to the fact of Indian military operations. It is not possible for my office to reach with experience the effect which the Indian Government will have, but a balance of power in the view that it would not be desirable at the present time, to force the issue, in the event of the fact of causing the fall of the present Government.

If the area of order of the Indian Government is not in a reduced form.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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at the request of the

**Confidential**

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) B (Addendum)  
18th February, 1945

COPY NO. 14

SUPREME ALLIED COMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND ELAS

Note by Secretary

Since receipt of the Agreement and Resume of draft law of Amnesty circulated under Paper No. SAC (P) (45) B, three further papers have been received relating to this agreement. These are attached as follows for information:-

- (a) Annex I - An extract from the Greek Constitution of 1911 comprising those articles referred to in Article III of the present Agreement.
- (b) Annex II - A plan for the disarmament of ELAS forces and organizations which is believed to be included in the protocol referred to in articles 5 and 6 of the present agreement.  
(Note:- No copy of this protocol has yet been received)
- (c) Annex III - An agreement regarding demilitarization and re-registration of ELAS/ELAN shipping.

*J. H. Lascaris*  
J. H. LASCARIS  
COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

Distribution  
Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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(a) Annex I - An extract from the Greek Constitution of 1911 comprising those articles referred to in Article III of the present Agreement.

(b) Annex II - A plan for the disarmament of ELAS forces and organizations which is believed to be included in the protocol referred to in Articles 5 and 6 of the present Agreement.  
(Note: No copy of this protocol has yet been received)

(c) Annex III - An agreement regarding demilitarization and re-registration of ELAS/ELAN shipping.

*W. R. L. SCHLES*  
J. R. L. SCHLES  
COLONEL  
SECRETARY.

Distribution  
Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Sixth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
Chief, G-3 Plans Section  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF  
U.S. Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Director, FBI  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Secretary, General Staff  
Inter Service and Political Secretariat  
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## ANNEX I

EXTRACT FROM THE GREEK CONSTITUTION OF 1961

The following are the Articles of the Greek Constitution which the Greek Government has suspended for the time being. They are referred to in Article II of the Political Agreement.

Article 5

With the exception of persons taken in the act of committing an offence so one may be arrested or imprisoned without a warrant giving the reasons for the arrest, which must be presented at the moment of arrest or if imprisonment pending trial. A person arrested in the act or held in the virtue of a warrant must be brought before the competent examining magistrate without any delay, within 24 hours at the most after his arrest or, if the arrest has been made at a distance from the magistrate's official seat, within the time absolutely necessary for him to be brought there. The examining magistrate is obliged within three days at the most after his being brought before him either to release the arrested person or to issue an order for his imprisonment. If either of these time-limits expires, any order or other person charged with his custody, whether he be a civilian or a military official, must release the arrested person immediately. Violations of the above orders will be punished for ill-gal detention and obliged to repair all damage resulting to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the judge but can never be less than ten drachmas for each day.

Article 10

Greeks have the right to assemble quietly and unarmed; only at public gatherings can the police be present. Gatherings in the open air can be forbidden if danger to public security would result therefrom.

Article 12

Every citizen has the right of sanctuary in his own home. No house search is allowed except when and as the law ordains.

Violators of these orders will be punished for abuse of power and shall be liable to full restitution of damages to the

any, within 24 hours of the competent examining magistrate without any arrest has been made at a distance from the magistrate's official seat, within the time absolutely necessary for him to be brought there. The examining magistrate is obliged within three days at the most after his being brought before him either to release the arrested person or to issue an order for his imprisonment. If either of these limitations expires, any further or other person charged with his custody, whether he be a civilian or a military official, must release the arrested person immediately. Violators of the above orders will be punished for illegal detention and obliged to repair all damage resulting to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the judge but can never be less than ten drachmes for each day.

#### Article 10

Greece has the right to assemble quietly and unarmed; only at public gatherings can the police be present. Gatherings in the open air can be forbidden if danger to public security would result therefrom.

#### Article 12

Every citizen has the right of sanctuary in his own home. No house search is allowed except when and on the law orders.

Violators of these orders will be punished for abuse of authority and obliged to make full restitution of damages to the offended person and also to satisfy him by the payment of a sum of money which will be decided on by the court but can never be less than ten hundred drachme.

#### Article 20

The secrecy of private correspondence is absolutely inviolable.

#### Article 95

Political offences are tried by jury, as also offences of the Press & however they do not regard private life.

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ANNEX II

PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY L.A.S. OFFICE OF VANDERBILT  
(IN PARS) (P.A.M.) AND P.A.M. OFFICE OF THE MILITARY  
L.A.S. OFFICE OF THE MILITARY  
L.A.S. OFFICE OF THE MILITARY

CONFERENCE OF THE MILITARY COMMAND

The following quantity of weapons are expected to be handed in by  
"L.A.S." which includes all subsidiary organizations such as POLICE, MILITARY,  
etc., in accordance with the provisions below.

|                      |   |        |
|----------------------|---|--------|
| Rifles               | - | 41,500 |
| Sub machine guns     | - | 650    |
| Light machine guns   | - | 1,050  |
| Heavy machine guns   | - | 315    |
| Mortars, heavy       | - | 55     |
| Mortars, light       | - | 10     |
| Artillery, all types | - | 32     |
| Wireless sets        | - | 15     |

The plan will consist of two phases:

PHASE I.

1. "L.A.S." will be the day on which the agreement concluding the conference is signed.
2. On return to "L.A.S." Headquarters, the "L.A.S." delegation will be accompanied by a British Liaison Mission with communications established to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison. At the same time "L.A.S." will appoint a senior Liaison Officer to be attached to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece.
3. A general order will be issued by "L.A.S." in effect immediately on return to "L.A.S." Headquarters forbidding the use of weapons over the "L.A.S." communication system. Orders for mobilization of "L.A.S." will be issued by "L.A.S." immediately thereafter.
4. "L.A.S." will inform a British Officer appointed for the task of

|                      |   |        |
|----------------------|---|--------|
| Infantry             | - | 41,500 |
| 500 machine guns     | - | 540    |
| Light and line guns  | - | 1,000  |
| Heavy machine guns   | - | 315    |
| Mortars, heavy       | - | 55     |
| Mortars, light       | - | 10     |
| Artillery, all types | - | 32     |
| Engineers            | - | 15     |

The plan will consist of two phases:

#### Phase 1.

1. "The day" will be the day on which the agreement concerning the conference is signed.
2. On return to L.S. Headquarters, the "L.S. Delegation" will be accompanied by a British Liaison Mission with communications established to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece. At the same time "L.S." will appoint a senior liaison officer to be attached to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece.
3. A general order will be issued by "L.S. via clear" immediately on return to L.S. Headquarters forbidding the use of diggers near the L.S. communication system. Orders for mobilization of "L.S." will be issued by "L.S." immediately thereafter.
4. "L.S." will inform a British Officer appointed for the task of the state of the civil communication system, so that plans for rehabilitation and for linking up to the seat of Government may be undertaken without delay. Any communication equipment, military or civil, will be maintained in situ, and handed over to the Greek Government civil authorities on their arrival. This will include P.C.T. tools and equipment; these will not be regarded as air war stores, although previously used by "L.S." as such.
5. All road blocks, demolitions, mines and booby traps will be removed and rendered safe by "L.S. by D plus 14. L.P.S., "L.S." will instruct an officer in each "L.S. Divisional Area" to meet the British forces as they move in to take over the area and report that this has been completed.
6. "L.S." will disclose to a British officer appointed for the purpose all roads obstructed by broken bridges, etc., so that plans can be made for their repair and in order that British

.../transport

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transport can move freely along all roads normally suitable for 3-ton transport and required to implement this plan.

Part from the material excepted in paragraph all rifles, revolvers, sub machine guns, light machine guns, heavy machine guns, mortars, artillery pieces, wireline sets, all unboxed ammunition and grenades, military vehicles and covered military equipment, food stocks, animals (accompanied by appropriate unarm'd personnel for their maintenance), and all material in general of whatever nature, under the control of TUS will be handed in to TUS for the safe custody of such arms, equipment, etc., at the following centres for TUS headquarters and formations:-

|                   |          |
|-------------------|----------|
| 5th               | THINKING |
| 6th Division      | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| 9th Division      | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| Independent Regt. | THINKING |
| 10th Division     | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| 11th Division     | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| 12th Division     | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| 13th Division     | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| 14th Division     | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| 15th Division     | THINKING |
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| 16th Division     | THINKING |
| Outstation        | THINKING |
| 17th Division     | THINKING |
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| 18th Division     | THINKING |
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| 19th Division     | THINKING |
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| 21st Division     | THINKING |
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| 22nd Division     | THINKING |
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| 23rd Division     | THINKING |
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| 24th Division     | THINKING |
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| 100th Division    | THINKING |
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at any place. The task of these guard companies will be to maintain law and order in support of the civil power until such time as they are relieved by the National Guard, at which time they will be notified by the British authorities. On relief, they will hand in their arms to an ILS guard referred to in paragraph 7, and will then disappear to their homes.

On D plus 14, the officers in charge of the guards referred to in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will render a certificate, in duplicate, to ILS General Headquarters ascertaining the number of weapons, ammunition and equipment shown in their charge as custodians for the Greek Government, also a notional roll in duplicate of those soldiers who have failed to have in their arms, together with full military particulars, so that the quantity of material under guard, with the addition of the numbers not handed in equals the total specified in the opening clause hereof. From these certificates a total of the ILS arms, ammunition and equipment will be ascertained. A certificate will then be rendered to General SCORPI by D plus 18 signed by M. GILBERTS and General SM-PIS, indicating that ILS has dismantled, and that the arms, ammunition and equipment are held by the officer rendering the original certificate in safe custody for the Greek Government at the places indicated.

Provided that the terms of this certificate agree, within reasonable limits, with the figures given in the opening clause hereof, it will be publicly announced that ILS has dismantled. From 1 will then have been completed.

By D plus 21 ILS General Headquarters will render to Headquarters, Land Forces and Military Liaison, Greece, detailed lists of arms, ammunition and equipment, by types, to enable disposal arrangements to be made. Wireless equipment will be maintained in serviceable order by ILS until final disposal instructions are given. A copy of these lists will be retained by the ILS Divisional Commander to be handed over to the British authorities when required.

PR-51 2.

9. The Greek Government will re-assume control in Greece, arms by arm, as follows either simultaneously or stage by stage:-
- (a) Southern PLEKOMENOS and ATTOLIS-KLAKHNI.

.../(h)

(46)

- (b) That part of the Province of EPIRUS-LUKAS that lies beyond the ethnic boundary, and the provinces of LUKAS and TRIKALA.
- (c) The Province of HELIKONIKI, EPIRUS-LUKAS, EPIRUS and TRIKALA.
- (d) The Province of SULLI, EPIRUS, EPIRUS, EPIRUS and TRIKALA.
- (e) The Province of EPIRUS, EPIRUS and TRIKALA.
- (f) The Governor-General of EPIRUS.
- (g) EPIRUS ISLANDS.
- (h) EPIRUS ISLANDS.

10. On a date or dates on or after 1 plus 18 to be decided mutually between the British authorities and the Greek Government and previously notified to U.S., British authorities will move into such areas accompanied by units of the National Guard.

11. Arms, ammunition and equipment collected will then be handed over by the U.S. guards at the collecting center to the British authorities as agents for the Greek Government, in accordance with the certificate furnished by the officers in charge of such guards referred to in paragraph 8(a).

12. The National Guard units will proceed to the points at which U.S. guards have been maintained, and will relieve those guards of their responsibilities. U.S. guards will then hand in their weapons, as indicated by the British authorities, and return to their homes. On the date appointed for the transfer of responsibility in each area, the Greek Government will assume responsibility for civil administration.

13. In view of the presence of German troops in GREECE, U.S. troops will not be disbanded in accordance with this plan. The National Guard are already being called up in GREECE, and includes certain U.S. groups of all U.S. troops now fighting the Germans. On formation of the National Guard all U.S. troops outside the two groups called up, will be disbanded on a date to be agreed between the Greek Government

10. On a date or dates on or after D plus 15 to be decided mutually between the British authorities and the Greek Government and previously notified to U.S. British authorities will move into such areas recommended by units of the National Guard.
11. U.S. ammunition and equipment collected will then be handed over by the U.S. guards at the collecting centres to the British authorities as agents for the Greek Government, in accordance with the certificate furnished by the officers in charge of such guards referred to in paragraph 8(a).
12. The National Guard units will proceed to the points at which U.S. guards have been maintained, and will relieve them of their responsibilities. U.S. guards will then hand in their weapons, as indicated by the British authorities, and return to their homes. On the date appointed for the transfer of responsibility in each area, the Greek Government will assume responsibility for civil administration.
13. In view of the presence of German troops in CRET, U.S. forces will not be dispersed in accordance with this plan. The National Guard are already being called up in CRET, and including certain age groups of all U.S. are now fighting the Germans. On formation of the National Guard all U.S. outside the age groups called up, will be disbanded on a date to be agreed between the Greek Government and the British Government.

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ANNEX III

SURRENDER OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

BY

ELAS/ELAN SHIPS AND VESSELS

AND

RE-REGISTRATION OF ELAS/ELAN SHIPPING

1. SURRENDER OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

i. As from the date of the signature of the agreement between the Greek Government and the CAC Central Committee, all ELAS/ELAN controlled ships and vessels are to surrender all arms and munitions at one of the following ports:-

GORFU PATRAS KALAMATA MITRAS  
VOLOS SALONIKA NAVARINA MYTHRAS.

ii. Twenty days grace will be allowed for the completion of the surrender of arms and munitions.

iii. After the said twenty days grace have expired, it will be an offence for any Greek vessel to carry any arms or munitions unless duly commissioned and authorized by the Greek Government.

iv. In the event of any vessel being unable to proceed with its arms and munitions to the ports mentioned in paragraph i(i), through stress of weather, damage or breakdown, the nearest Royal Hellenic Naval Authority are to be informed. Such vessels are on no account to proceed to sea with their arms or munitions after the expiry of the twenty days grace without the specific authority of the Royal Hellenic Navy.

2. RE-REGISTRATION

i. All ELAS/ELAN controlled ships and vessels, whether engaged in the surrender of arms as in Section 1 or not, are to proceed at the earliest opportunity to the ports mentioned in paragraph i(i) for re-registration.

ii. Re-registration will be carried out by the Greek Harbour Master Service.

GOMEN PATRAS SALAMATA PIRAEUS  
VILLOS SALONIKA SAVALLA MYTILENE.

- ii. Twenty days grace will be allowed for the completion of the surrender of arms and munitions.
- iii. After the said twenty days grace have expired, it will be an offence for any Greek vessel to carry any arms or munitions whilst duly commissioned and authorized by the Greek Government.
- iv. In the event of any vessel being unable to proceed with its arms and munitions to the ports mentioned in paragraph 1(i) through stress of weather, damage or breakdown, the nearest Royal Hellenic Naval Authorities are to be informed. Such vessels are on no account to proceed to sea with their arms or munitions after the expiry of the twenty days grace without the specific authority of the Royal Hellenic Navy.

#### 2. RE-REGISTRATION

- i. All ELAS/ELAM controlled ships and vessels, whether engaged in the surrender of arms as in Section 1 or not, are to proceed to the earliest opportunity to the ports mentioned in paragraph 1(i) for re-registration.
- ii. Re-registration will be carried out by the Greek Harbour Master Service.
- iii. No re-registration certificate will be issued until the local ownership of the ship or vessel has been fully established.
- iv. Vessels captured from the enemy, German, Bulgarian, Italian, will be held in prize, and, subject to the decision of the Prize Court, become the property of the Greek Government.

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K 71

RECEIVEDCOPY NO. 33SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND EAMNote by Secretary

As a result of discussions which have taken place recently in Athens between the Greek Government and EAM an agreement between the two parties has been concluded. Copy of this agreement is attached herewith for information.

See Also Two 91.

*J.H. LASCARIS*  
J.H. LASCARIS,  
COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
Chief, G-3 Plans Section  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, Hq. MAF  
US Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Director, FBI  
Chief Coordinator, Allied Commission

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SEC (P) (45) A  
18th February 1945

See Also Feb 91

*Admiral*  
J.H. HANCOCK,  
COLONEL,  
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Ninth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
Chief, G-3 Plans Section  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, Hq AFM  
U.S. Political Advisor  
British Resident Minister  
Director, FBI  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Secretary, General Staff  
Inter-Service and Political Secretariat  
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EC List - 19 FEB 45

*Chief Commr*

*Ex Commr*

*Pol Sec*

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT  
AND TAIWAN

R 71

ARTICLE I

Liberty

The Government will secure in accordance with the Constitution and the Democratic Principles everywhere recognized, the free exercise of the civil and political rights of the citizens, respecting any existing liberal law. It will also secure the unhindered functioning of individual liberties such as those of assembly, association and expression of views in the press. More especially the Government will fully restore Trade Union liberties.

ARTICLE II

Restoration of Martial Law

Martial Law will be revised immediately after the signature of the present agreement. Simultaneously with this action there will be brought into force a Constitutional Act similar in all respects to Constitutional Act No. 24, whereby the suspension of those articles of the Constitution to which reference is made in Act 24 shall be abolished.

Articles 5, 10, 12, 20 and 95 of the Constitution shall be suspended throughout the country. This suspension shall continue until the completion of disarmament, and the establishment of administrative, judicial and military authorities throughout the country. As regards Article 5 in particular, this suspension shall not take effect in the cities of Athens and Piraeus and their suburbs. Especially, however, as regards persons arrested up to the present day it is agreed that Article 5 of the Constitution is not in force, and that they will be liberated within the shortest possible period of time, the necessary orders to this effect being given to the competent authorities.

Followers of KMT who may be held in captivity by other organizations shall be set free as soon as possible.

ARTICLE III

Amnesty

There shall be an amnesty for political crimes committed between the 3rd December 1944, and the publication of the law establishing the amnesty. From this amnesty shall be excluded common law crimes, instant life and property crimes which were not absolutely necessary to the achievement of the political crimes concerned. The necessary law will be published immediately after the signing.

which will be revised immediately after the signature of the present agreement. Similarly with their action, there will be no draft but forced a Constitutional act similar in all respects to Constitutional act No. 24, whereby the members of these organs of the Constitution to which reference is made in act 24, shall be permitted.

Articles 5, 10, 12, 20 and 95 of the Constitution shall be suspended forthwith throughout the country. This suspension shall continue until the conclusion of disarmament, and the establishment of administrative, judicial and military authorities throughout the country. As regards articles 5 in relation, this suspension shall not take effect in the cities of Athens and Piraeus and their suburbs. Respectfully, however, as regards persons arrested in the present day it is agreed that article 5 of the Constitution is not in force, and that they will be liberated within the shortest possible period of time, the necessary orders to this effect being given to the competent authorities.

Followers of E.L.S. who are held in captivity by their organizations shall be set free as soon as possible.

#### ARTICLE III

##### Amnesty

There shall be an amnesty for political crimes committed between the 3rd December 1944, and the abolition of the law establishing the amnesty. From this amnesty shall be excluded certain law criminals - that is, and party which were not absolutely necessary to the achievement of the political crime concerned. The necessary law will be published immediately after the nature of the present agreement. From this amnesty shall be excluded any persons who, being under obligation to surrender their arms, as being members of the organizations of E.L.S., the National Civil Guard or E.L.S., shall not have handed them over by the 15th March 1945. This last provision concerns only the exclusion from the amnesty shall be excluded after verification of the fact that the disarmament of E.L.S. has been effected, since there will then be no further cause and justification for it. Guarantees and details of the amnesty to be provided are contained in the draft law attached to the present agreement.

#### ARTICLE IV

##### Hostages

All civilians who have been arrested by E.L.S. or by the National Civil Guard (E.P.), irrespective of the date on which they were arrested, shall be set at liberty immediately. Any who may be held on the charge of collusion with the enemy or of commission of any crime shall be handed over to the justice of the State for trial by the competent courts according to law (the draft law of amnesty attached).

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ARTICLE V

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National Army

The National Army, apart from the professional officers and N.C.O.s, shall consist of the soldiers of the classes which shall from time to time be called up. Reserve officers, N.C.O.s and other ranks, who have been specially trained in modern war, shall remain in service as long as there is a formation requiring them. The Greek Government shall remain as responsible, since it is under the immediate orders of the Allied High Command, and shall therefore be served in the United National Army in accordance with the above principle. The effort will be made to extend regular communication to the whole of Greece in accordance with the technical facilities existing and the necessities which may arise. After the demobilization of E.L.A.S. there shall be no return to classes which are to be called up in accordance with the attached protocol. It shall be left for enrolment in the units already existing. All men who have been enrolled in the units now existing, without belonging to the classes being called up, shall be discharged. All members of the permanent cadres of the National Army shall be considered by the Councils for which provision is made in Constitutional Act No. VII. The political and social views of citizens serving in the Army shall be respected.

ARTICLE VI

Demobilization

Immediately on the abolition of the present agreement the armed forces of resistance shall be demobilized and in particular the E.L.A.S., both Regular and Reserve, the E.L.A.S. and the National Civil Guard. The demobilization and surrender of arms shall take place according to the detailed provisions of the protocol drawn up by the Committee of Experts, which duly initiated, is attached hereto.

The State will settle all questions arising out of requisitioning carried out by E.L.A.S. The goods requisitioned by E.L.A.S., including boats, motor vehicles, etc., which will be handed over to the State according to the detailed provisions of the protocol which has been drawn up and is attached hereto, will be returned thereafter as having been requisitioned by the Greek State.

ARTICLE VII

Peace of Civil Service

The Government will proceed, by means of Committees of Councils, to be established by a special law to the purpose of the personnel of the public administration, Government officials, and

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## APPENDIX VI

**Decomposition**

alone. Actually, on the objection of the President's Cabinet, the model for a resistance shall be demolished and in violation of the H.M.S., both He and General Romer, the H.M.S. and the National Civil Guard. The demolition of the surrender of arms shall take place according to the stipulated provisions of the Convention of 1945, by the Committee of Experts, which duly initiated, in its conclusion.

The State will petition all questions arising out of requisitioning carried out by RMB. The funds requisitioned by RMB, including benefits, other value-added, etc, which will be handed over to the State according to the detailed provisions of the Contract which has been drawn up and is attached hereto, will be remitted themselves as having been requisitioned by the Bank State.

## APPENDIX

TABLE OF CIVIL SERVICE

The Government will proceed, by means of Commissions of Councils, to be established by a special law to the purpose of the personnel of the public services, officials of public companies, local Government officials, and those of other services dependent on the State or, only by it. The criteria of which the law will take account will be either professional competence, or character and personality, or collaboration with the army or the utilization of the official as an instrument of the dictatorship. Officials of the above services, who, during the occupation, joined the forces of resistance will return to their positions and will be considered in the same manner as other officials. The above-mentioned councils will also consider the cases of officials who have taken part or collaborated in the manifestations which have taken place between the 3rd December 1944 and the date of signature of the present agreement. Those of them who are found to have been concerned may be placed at the disposal of the State as provided by law. The final disposal of such officials will be decided by the Government which shall result from the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Officials who have already been placed in responsibility decisions of Ministers will be submitted to the decision of the Council above-mentioned. No official will be dismissed solely on account of his political opinion.

**\*BOSTON - AUGUST 10**

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ARTICLE VIII

Purge of Security Services

The purge of the Security Services, the Tashkumaria and City Police will be carried out as soon as possible by special purge commissions on the basis of the purge of the Civil Service. All officers and other ranks of the above Corps will fall under the provisions of the Amnesty Law, and, during the period of the amnesty, joined the ranks of KLAS, KLAS or the National Civil Guard, will return to their positions and will be considered by the purge commissions in the same manner as the rest of their colleagues. All the officers and other ranks of the above Corps who left their positions between the 3rd December 1944 and the date of signature of the present document shall be placed on (amnesty); their final discharge being left for the Committee of Councils to be constituted by the Government arising from the elections.

ARTICLE IX

Platiscio and elections

At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its solemnity a platiscio, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the results of the expression of the popular will the present Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.

Of this recent agreement two similar copies have been made, one of which has been received by the Government Delegation and the other by the Delegation of KAS.

In Athens, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

14th February 1945.

At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in C. M. late freedom and with every care for its genuineness a plebiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers.

Of this recent agreement the similar ones have been made, whereof the one has been received by the Government Delegation and the other by the delegation of E.M.

In Athens, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

12th February 1945.

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Regime of draft law of amnesty referred to  
in Article 4 of the Act of Amendment

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Article 1.

Para 1. An amnesty is granted to the political offences committed between the 3rd December 1944 and the date of publication of the present law. Common offences against life and property connected with the political offences but not absolutely necessary for its accomplishment are excepted from the amnesty.

Para 2. Are excepted from this amnesty all those belonging to ELAS, EAM and the Civil Guard who, though obliged to keep in their arms, have not done so before the 15th March 1945.

Article 2.

The Court of Appeal will settle any doubts as to the interpretation of Article 1.

Article 3.

Those who do not receive the amnesty cannot be prosecuted for the accepted offences after six months in the Athens area and after the end of 1945 in the rest of Greece.

Article 4.

Those same persons who do not receive the amnesty cannot be held in custody pending trial for more than six months. After that they must be released.

Articles 5 and 6 settle some minor technical details of procedure.

Article 2.

The Court of Appeal will settle any doubts as to the interpretation of Article 1.

Article 3.

Those who do not receive the amnesty cannot be prosecuted for the executed offences after six months in the Athens area and after the end of 1945 in the rest of Greece.

Article 4.

Those same persons who do not receive the amnesty cannot be held in custody pending trial for more than six months. After that they must be released.

Articles 5 and 6 settle some minor technical details of procedure.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 7 (Revised)  
28th February, 1945

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COPY NO.

FEB 27 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS  
IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

— E 97, File 24/52.

In accordance with conclusion 11 of JAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting, paragraph 7 has now been revised to take account of the propaganda facilities afforded by PTF to the Russians.

Copies of the revised paper have been forwarded to the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser for despatch to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to Allied Missions elsewhere.

This paper supersedes Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7, which should — Be  
now be destroyed.

*Approved by*  
J. E. LASCELLES  
COLONEL  
SECRETARY.

Distribution

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
Chief, G-3 Plans Section

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HEADQUARTERS  
27 FEB 1945

Paragraph 7 has now been revised to take account of the propaganda facilities afforded by PWs to the Russians.

Copies of the revised paper have been forwarded to the British Resident Minister and the U.S. Political Adviser for despatch to LONDON and WASHINGTON and to Allied Missions elsewhere.

This paper superseded Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 7, which should — be destroyed.

*By Harrison* *hys* *1/27*

*for* C. H. LASCHLES  
COLONEL  
SECRETARY.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
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Chief, G-3 Plans Section  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAJ  
U.S. Political Adviser  
British Resident Minister  
Director, PWs  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Secretary, General Staff  
Secretary, Inter Service and Political Secretariat  
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HEADQUARTERS  
27 FEB 1945

*File 115-24 Feb 45*

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*Exec. Comm*

*Political Sec*

*Copy To: FAE S/W/EC.*

*CIA Sec*

*Ext. Sec*

*See 115*

*at/oc. 24*

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PRIVILEGES AND FACILITIES ACCORDED  
THE SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN ITALY

For reference in connection with determining what privileges and facilities should be expected for British and US personnel accredited to the Allied Control Commissions in ROMANIA and BULGARIA, there is presented herewith a summary of information concerning the privileges and facilities accorded to the various Russian delegations in ITALY. The information given applies to the Russian Embassy only to the extent so stated.

1. PERSONNEL

Soviet personnel (not including wives or children) are assigned or attached to the respective delegations in ITALY as follows:-

- (a) Allied Commission:
  - 1 Representative, 5 Officer Assistants,
  - 1 Other Rank - Total 7 persons.
- (b) Advisory Council:
  - 1 Representative (temporarily the same as for the AC), 1 Officer Assistant,
  - 6 Civilian Assistants, 10 Other Ranks
  - Total- 20 persons.
- (c) Military Mission:
  - (to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission of AC)
  - 1 Representative, 17 Officer Assistants (3 more about to be accredited) 4 Civilians, 15 Other Ranks - Total 39 Persons.
- (d) Embassy:
  - 15 Civilians

2. FUNCTIONS

(a) Under directive of the S.A.C. dated 25 January 1944, the Soviet Representative to the Allied Commission is limited to consultative functions, with access to information on all reports of the Commission's work and with the right to make suggestions to the Deputy President (Chief Commissioner). Under directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 23 September 1944, the staff officers attached to the Soviet representation to the AC are limited to observing the work of the various Sub-Commissions.

(b) In addition to their observational functions, the personnel of the Military Mission to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission screen Soviet refugees and ex-prisoners of war, visit camps

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- (a) Allied Commission:
  - 1 Representative, 5 Officer Assistants,  
1 Other Rank - Total 7 persons.
- (b) Advisory Council:
  - 1 Representative (temporarily the same  
as for the AC), 1 Officer Assistant,  
8 Civilian Assistants, 10 Other Ranks  
Total- 20 persons.
- (c) Military Mission:
  - (to the Displaced  
Persons and  
Repatriation Sub-  
Commission of AD)
  - 1 Representative, 17 Officer Assistants  
(2 more about to be accredited) 4  
Civilians, 15 Other Ranks - Total 39  
Persons.
- (d) Embassy:
  - 13 Civilians

2. FUNCTIONS

- (a) Under directive of the S.A.C. dated 25 January 1944, the Soviet Representative to the Allied Commission is limited to consultative functions, with access to information on all aspects of the Commission's work and with the right to make suggestions to the Deputy President (Chief Commissioner). Under directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 23 September 1944, the staff officers attached to the Soviet representation to the AC are limited to observing the work of the various Sub-Commissions.
- (b) In addition to their observational functions, the personnel of the Military Mission to the Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission screen Soviet refugees and ex-prisoners of war, visit camps and arrange for repatriation of Soviet nationals.
- (c) The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council participates on an equal basis with other representatives in presiding at meetings and in the recommendations formulated by the Council.
- (d) It follows from the fact that the function of the Soviet Representative on the Allied Commission is merely consultative, that no procedure is provided to ensure that he will have an opportunity to consult with his Government prior to the taking of decisions by the Commission, or even to ensure that he or his staff may know of contemplated decisions before they are taken, except insofar as this occurs through attendance at meetings.

3. ACCESS TO INFORMATION

- (a) Meetings.
- /The....

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The Soviet representative on the Allied Commission's meetings (attended by heads of state or government) which are presided over by the Deputy President. For those he is permitted to be accompanied by an ADC and an interpreter. No agendas are circulated for these meetings. Members of the Military Mission attend meetings of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission when invited to do so in connection with matters affecting Soviet interests. The Staff Officers assigned to the other Sub-Commissions have the privilege of attending Sub-Commission meetings but do not frequently do so. Prior to each meeting of the Advisory Council, an agenda is circulated, but it is not the practice to circulate prior to the meeting papers for consideration.

(b) Documents

All documentary information relative to the work of the Commission is made available on the initiative of the Commission to the Soviet Representative. He and his staff do not see:-

- (2)
- (3)

Unrephrased copies of cipher messages, and Matter which is likely to prejudice relations with the Soviet Government. Top Secret matter which it would be inadvisable to show to junior officers is shown only to the Soviet Representative. Soviet officers assigned to Sub-Commissions are not permitted to observe the work of Sub-Commissions other than those to which they are assigned. They are, upon request, shown documents at the discretion of the head of their Sub-Commission, but do not frequently avail themselves of this privilege.

All information affecting the Advisory Council that the Delegation to it requires is made available to it on request.

(c) Information from Italian Sources

The extent to which the Soviet members of the various delegations interview personnel of the Italian Government and private Italian citizens is not known. No restrictions are placed upon such interviews.

4. MOVEMENT

(a) Freedom of Movement

(1) South of the line ANCONA-SIENNA-PISERNO, members of all Russian delegations have complete freedom of movement within ITALY. Travel orders, whether or not travel is to be by US or British facilities, are obtained through the appropriate US or British Liaison officer at RMCE, and issued by Headquarters, Allied Commission.

(2) To the north of this line, consent of 15th Army Group

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

which is likely to prejudice relations with the Soviet Government. Top Secret matter which it would be inadvisable to show to junior officers is shown only to the Soviet Representative. Soviet officers assigned to Sub-Commissions are not permitted to observe the work of Sub-Commissions other than those to which they are assigned. They are, upon request, shown documents at the discretion of the head of their Sub-Commission, but do not frequently avail themselves of this privilege.

All information affecting the Advisory Council that the delegation is it required is made available to it on request.

#### (c) Information from Italian Sources

The extent to which the Soviet members of the various delegations interview personnel of the Italian Government and private Italian citizens is not known. No restrictions are placed upon such interviews.

#### 4. MOVEMENT

##### (a) Freedom of Movement

(1) South of the line MONZA-SIRMIONE-RICCIONE, members of all Russian delegations have complete freedom of movement within ITALY. Travel orders, whether or not travel is to be by US or British facilities, are obtained through the appropriate US or British Liaison officer at ROME, and issued by Headquarters, Allied Commission.

(2) For travel north of this line, consent of 15th Army Group Administrative Memorandum No. 56, AFHQ, 3 December 1944 now requires concurrence of AFHQ (also) is obtained for Soviet personnel, likewise through the appropriate Liaison officer. Two such visits have been made north of the line by members of Soviet delegations at ROME during the last six weeks. The Military Mission has on at least one occasion sent officers into the forward areas without US or British authority.

(3) For inter-theatre travel, including that of Soviet diplomatic couriers, authority to travel is obtained by the appropriate British or US Liaison officer at ROME from AFHQ, and travel orders are issued by HQ Allied Commission. Authority has in every case been obtained, though there have been some delays due to the making of applications at the last minute. Such authority consists of travel orders for use within the theatre, or when US or British facilities are used. No authorization for the exit itself is required for Allied service personnel on duty, or for accredited diplomats and consular officials. (Letter, AFHQ AG 371.2/015 530-0, 7 November 1944)

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As to travel to ITALY from the Soviet Union, an Allied Force Permit for the trip, which may be issued by SO Military Mission or the US Military Mission in MOSCOW without AFHQ concurrence, is now theoretically required, except as to diplomatic and consular officials (Letter AFHQ, AF 271.2/CIA 631-0.5 January - August 1945) but this requirement has not yet actually been enforced.

(4) Entry of Soviet planes into the theatre requires clearance by HQ MAW, which, however, is immediately given as a matter of routine.

(3) Transportation

(1) Vehicles permanently assigned to the Soviet delegations by U.S. and British authorities are only two in number - one for the delegation to the AS and one for the Military Mission.

(2) The following Russian-owned vehicles are maintained:-

|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Military Mission               | 4 |
| Delegation to Advisory Council | 6 |
| Embassy                        | 1 |

(3) All of the above vehicles except the Embassy vehicle receive maintenance, motor fuel and lubricants from AS.

(4) The Soviet Representative on the AS and the Soviet Military Mission also have the use of vehicles in the AS HQ Commandant's pool.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Radio

The Soviet authorities maintain a transmitter in RMK, with which they can communicate directly with MOSCOW. The Soviet delegations can send signals by US or British channels whenever they wish by submitting the subject matter to the Liaison Officer, AS, but have only rarely used this facility.

(b) Courier and Letter Delivery Services

U.S. and British services are made available through the AS, but the Soviet Delegations appear to have little official correspondence. They are also permitted to maintain their own courier service, for communications inside and outside the theatre.

(3) All of the above vehicles except the Embassy vehicle receive maintenance, motor fuel and lubricants from AS.

(4) The Soviet Representative on the AS and the Soviet Military Mission also have the use of vehicles in the AS HQ Commandant's pool.

## 5. COMMUNICATIONS

### (a) Radio

The Soviet authorities maintain a transmitter in ROOM 3, with which they can communicate directly with MOSCOW. The Soviet delegations can send signals by US or British channels whenever they wish by submitting the subject matter to the Division Officer, AS, but have only purely used this facility.

### (b) Courier and Letter Delivery Services

U.S. and British services are made available through the AS, but the Soviet Delegations appear to have little official correspondence. They are also permitted to maintain their own courier service, for communications inside and outside the theatre.

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(c) Supply for the respective delegations from non-Russian sources is as follows:-

- |                         |                                                                                         |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (1) Allied Commission : | US rations; NAATI facilities for all, PX facilities for 2.                              |
| (2) Advisory Council :  | 1/2 British and 1/2 US rations; NAATI facilities for 10, PX facilities for 3.           |
| (3) Military Mission :  | British rations; NAATI facilities                                                       |
| (4) Embassy :           | Civilian rations from the Italian Government at approximately twice the civilian scale. |

(5) The AS has not been requested to import supplies or equipment from the Soviet Union for the delegations. The Soviet Authorities have, however, made some importations by their own aircraft.

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2. PROPAGANDA

(a) Official Privileges Given

2.4.2. Includes Russia in its general propaganda program covering the United Nations. On occasions the Russians have asked PWs for their assistance and paper was given them for the publication of pamphlets celebrating the Defence of Stalingrad and Red Army Day. The Russians were also permitted to exhibit in Rome - Red Army Day documentary film. Extracts from the Press Agency news file were included by PWs in news releases to the Italian newspapers and radio when such releases were under PWs control. Since the admission of private news agencies to Rome, Italy has been permitted to supply its file to the Italian News Agency and paper. The Soviet Embassy is allowed to import films for private showings to Italians.

(b) Other Russian Activities

There is little doubt that the Russians have given support, behind the scenes, to the Communist newspaper, UPIKA. The Russians also distributed on one occasion moving pictures to the Italian public through a commercial agency, without previously obtaining permission from Allied authorities.

3. SOVIET INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE ROME

- (a) No aircraft or airforce personnel are now maintained in ITALY by the Soviet Union.
- (b) A part of the St. Andrews' Camp, TRIESTE, is under Soviet control, for repatriation of ex-PWs.
- (c) One officer is attached to the Allied Repatriation Unit, NAPLES.

4. ARMISTICE TERMS

The privileges and facilities enjoyed by the respective national components of the various Allied Commissions may depend to some extent upon the armistice provisions establishing each Commission. For comparison, these are briefly summarized:-

(a) The Italian armistice does not name the nations to be represented on the Commission, but simply provides for a Control Commission representative of the United Nations and placed the Commission under orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief

(b) The Roumanian armistice provides for an "Allied Control Commission" which will undertake until the conclusion of the peace the control over the execution of the armistice terms "under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied powers".

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also distributed on one occasion saving pictures to the Italian public through a commercial agency, without previously obtaining permission from Allied authorities.

## 8. SOVIET INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE HOME

- (a) No aircraft or airforce personnel are now maintained in ITALY by the Soviet Union.
- (b) A part of the St. Andrews' Group, TARANTO, is under Soviet control, for repatriation of ex-PWs.
- (c) One officer is attached to the Allied Repatriation Unit, NAPLES.

## 9. ARMISTICE TERMS

The privileges and facilities enjoyed by the respective national components of the various Allied Commissions may depend to some extent upon the armistice provisions entitling each Commission. For comparison, these are briefly summarized:-

- (a) The Italian armistice does not name the nations to be represented on the Commission, but simply provides for a General Commission "representative of the United Nations" and places the commission "under orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief"

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- (b) The Romanian armistice provides for an "Allied Control Commission" which will undertake until the conclusion of the peace the control over the execution of the armistice terms "under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting in behalf of the Allied powers". The nations to be represented on the Commission are not named, but the fact that the armistice is signed on behalf of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the US implies the representation of all three.

- (c) The Bulgarian armistice expressly provides for the participation of representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, and further provides that during the whole period of the armistice the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command shall be chairman, and that until the cessation of hostilities with GERMANY the Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

- (d) The Hungarian armistice contains the same provisions as those described in (c) above.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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SAC (P) (45) 6 (Addendum)  
18th February, 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)OFFER AND BAS FACILITIES FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENTNote by Secretary

Reference paragraph 3 of Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 6.  
Attached is a copy of Mr. Macmillan's reply dated 18th February, which was not received by G-5 in time for inclusion in the main paper. Attention is drawn in particular to paragraph 2 of this reply.

*J. H. Lascelles*  
J. H. LASCELLES  
COLONEL  
SECRETARY.

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| Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN                     | 6     |
| Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean     | 7     |
| Chief of Staff                                   | 8     |
| Chief Administrative Officer                     | 9-10  |
| Deputy Chief of Staff                            | 11    |
| Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2                    | 12    |
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C O P Y

TO: Chief of Staff, AFHQ

FROM: Mr. Macmillan

Your minute of the 14th February, CS/104.

I understand the position is as follows :-

(1) You will not permit cypher messages to be sent by the Italian Government to its representatives abroad.

(2) You are required to agree to use facilities both inwards and outwards. I am most grateful for this concession, which I think will have a very good effect, and I am glad that you are able to accept the limited risk involved.

3. There is one further point. At present the Italian Ambassador in London, who holds a cypher approved by us, takes his cyphered messages to the Foreign Office to be despatched. This naturally somewhat creeps his style on reporting interviews, etc. I am informed that AFHQ have no objection to his sending them direct to the Italian Foreign Office in Rome through the normal telegraphic channel. It has been the practice to give a copy of the cyphered telegram to the Allied Commission so that it may check incoming messages. I take it that you see no reason for insisting upon this on security grounds, and I propose to abandon it on political grounds. Outgoing telegrams will, however, be shown to the Allied Commission as before.

(Initial H.M.)

16th February 1945.

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12th February, 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

FEB 1 1945

CYPHER AND BAG FACILITIES FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 <sup>4001</sup>cos

1. In a cable dated 16 February Allied Commission suggested that the policy laid down in FAN 487 of permitting direct diplomatic relations between Italy and other Nations can only be implemented on the basis of far reaching relaxation of the restrictions on Italian diplomatic communications and the cable requested review of the position without delay. The restrictions referred to have in the past precluded the Italian Government from communicating in cypher undeposited with the Allied Authorities and have made them disclose the contents of their diplomatic bags to the Allied Authorities before despatch.

2. In fact the possibility of relaxing the above restrictions has very recently been the subject of detailed study at this HQ arising out of representations made by Mr. Macmillan. On the 14 February the Chief of Staff informed Mr. Macmillan by letter that for reasons of military security it was still not considered possible to recommend that the Italian Government should be allowed undeposited cypher facilities but that if considered politically desirable objection would not be taken to allowing the Italian Government secret bag facilities with their representatives abroad.

3. Mr. Macmillan's reply has not yet been received, but as it is known that he was in favour of relaxation of such restrictions as were possible, permission pending his reply has in fact been given for TARCHIANI, the Ambassador designate to the United States, to carry a sealed diplomatic pouch with him when he leaves Italy to take up his post.

4. It is recommended:-

(a) that cypher facilities continue to be denied to the Italian Government

(b) that in principle bag facilities be granted to the Italian Government in accordance with

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2. in fact the possibility of relaxing the above restrictions has very recently been the subject of detailed study at this HQ arising out of representations made by Mr. Macmillan. On the 14 February the Chief of Staff informed Mr. Macmillan by letter that for reasons of military security it was still not considered possible to recommend that the Italian Government should be allowed undeputed cypher facilities but that if considered politically desirable objection would not be taken to allowing the Italian Government secret bag facilities with their representatives abroad.

It is recommended:-

(a) that cyber facilities continue to be denied to the Italian Government

(b) that in principle bag facilities be granted to the Italian Government for use in correspondence with their representatives abroad.

Contained in this paper at  
bottom of Vol. 3. Date 20/10.

166. L<sub>165</sub> - 19 Feb 45

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

ITALIAN BREAD ACTION

Developments Leading to Authorization of the 300 Gram Ration

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. In May 1944 the Chief Commissioner of the Allied Commission recommended to the Supreme Allied Commander that the bread allowance be increased from 200 grams to 300 grams to provide an adequate bread ration for the people and to stimulate the assessment of the coming harvest. After studying the problem SAC advised the CCS on 8 June that he intended to authorize a bread ration of 300 grams, as a temporary measure only, the ration to apply during the winter 1944-45 to be the subject of a later recommendation.

2. Upon being informed of his action in proceeding with the authorization the CCS pointed out that this was a high policy matter, and should not have been undertaken without the approval of the Governments of UX/US. Therefore the authorized increase must come from local resources.

3. In September SAC submitted to the CCS his recommendation that the 300 gram bread ration should be authorized for all of Italy (with the exception of Sicily which at that time was thought to be self-sufficient) for the balance of the harvest year. Also in September, 1944, the Chief of the Food Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, presented in person to the CCS the food requirements for January/June 1945.

4. In October, referring to public announcements by the Prime Minister and the President that 300 grams was to be adopted as the ration for Italy, SAC asked for an early reply to his September message. In November, and three times in December, SAC called the attention of the CCS to the acuteness of the situation in Italy, and pressed for a favourable reply authorizing the 300 grams. On December 9th the CCS replied that the subject was under urgent consideration by His Majesty's Government and by the U.S. Government.

5. In F.M. 478 and W-22519 of 18 January 1945, the CCS authorized the establishment of the 300 gram bread ration for liberated Italy but placed on SAC the responsibility for deciding when it was practicable to do so in the light of "the currently approved Shipping Programme." SAC replied that February shipments made

2. "Upon being informed of his action in proceeding with the authorization the CCS pointed out that this was a high policy matter, and should not have been undertaken without the approval of the Governments of UK/US. Therefore the authorized increase must come from local resources."
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5. In E.O. 472 and W-22519 of 18 January 1945, the CCS authorized the establishment of the 300 gram bread ration for liberated Italy but placed on SAC the responsibility for deciding when it was practicable to do so in the light of "the currently approved Shipping Programs." SAC replied that his stock position and the advice for January and February shipments made it impracticable to increase the ration at an early date. He cited the serious condition due to the non-arrival of promised wheat shipments and stressed the absolute necessity for establishing the 300 gram ration immediately to avert unrest throughout the country. He emphasized the discrepancy between actual arrivals for the months of November, December and January and allocations, but stated that, provided the February programme were met in full, it would be possible to initiate the 300 gram ration in early March.

6. Arrivals of wheat scheduled for February totalled 136,000 tons. This provided a surplus for the month of 36,000 tons.

7. On 14 February the Chief Commissioner asked that the 300 gram ration be extended to all of occupied Italy, effective 1 March.

Enclosures - Also Paper at  
SAC 45, Vol 2, File 277/EC

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8. A summary of the stock position (attached as an annex) was prepared which indicated that the chest in the Theatre, together with that which could confidently be counted upon to arrive, provided a margin of safety that would permit the immediate authorization of the 300 gram ration.

9. As a result of this study SAC visited the Chief Commissioner, AC, on 16 February, giving authority for the extension of the 300 gram bread ration to all of occupied Italy effective 1 March 1945, stating that no announcement would be made until the wishes of the CCS regarding such public announcement were made known.

10. Simultaneously with this cable to the AC the SAC advised the CCS of his action and requested their instructions concerning the public announcement. As to the latter SAC advised that no major pronouncement be made on the subject at this time.

11. The Supreme Allied Commander's Conference is requested to take note of the above report.

(Incl) C.M.S.

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AMNEX

Recapitulation of Wheat Position - - - ITALY  
(Including North Italy when liberated - In Thousands of Tons)

| MONTH        | CONSUMPTION                              | UTILIZATION<br>OF AVAILABLE<br>STOCKS | SCHEDULED<br>IMPORTS | BALANCE<br>(A - B - C) |
|--------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| February     | 157                                      | 66                                    | 136*                 | 45                     |
| March        | 166                                      | 66                                    | 100**                | 0                      |
| April (Note) | 226                                      | 126(a)                                | 130**                | 0                      |
| May (Note)   | 231 (b)                                  | 66                                    | 165**                | 0                      |
|              | (a) Includes Northern<br>stockpile of 60 |                                       | • (in sight)         |                        |
|              | (b) Includes 65 for North.               |                                       | ** (Called forward)  |                        |

NOTE: Consumption figures for April and May have been increased by 60 and 65,000 tons respectively, reflecting the additional tonnages that might be made available in the North from (a) Northern Stockpiles and (b) imports called forward for May delivery. Actually distribution will be limited by transportation. Log Plans indicate maximum lift to railheads of 2,000 tpd or 30,000 tpm.

| STOCK<br>POSITION | SCHEDULED<br>REQUIRITS | CONSUMPTION<br>LIBERATED<br>ITALY | BALANCE |
|-------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------|
| February          | 136                    | 157                               | 23      |
| March             | 100                    | 166                               | 66      |
|                   | 100                    | 166                               | 66      |

|              |         |        |       |    |
|--------------|---------|--------|-------|----|
| February     | 297     | 66     | 126*  | 43 |
| March        | 166     | 66     | 100** | 0  |
| April (Note) | 226     | 126(a) | 100** | 0  |
| May (Note)   | 231 (b) | 66     | 165** | 0  |

(a) Includes Northern  
stockpile of 60

\* (in sight)

(b) Includes 66 for North.

\*\* (called forward)

NOTE:

Consumption figures for April and May have been increased by 60 and 65,000 tons respectively, reflecting the additional tonnage that might be made available in the North from (a) Northern Stockpile and (b) imports called forward for May delivery. Actually distribution will be limited by transportation. Log Plans indicate maximum lift to railheads of 1,000 tnd or 30,000 ton.

|          | STOCK<br>POSITION | SCHEDULED<br>REINFORCEMENTS | CONSUMPTION<br>LIMITED<br>ITALY | Balance |
|----------|-------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|
| February | 454*              | 136                         | 157                             | 435     |
| March    | 433               | 100                         | 166                             | 367     |
| April    | 367               | 100                         | 166                             | 301     |
| May      | 301               | 166                         | 166                             | 302     |

\* Includes 60 reserve

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SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

FEB 18 1945

NEW DIRECTIVE ON FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

IMPLICATIONS OF FAR 487

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

19 FEB 1945

1. The directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting forth the revised policy for Italy is based on the continuation in effect of the Armistice and Surrender Instrument. These instruments, therefore, are to continue to be the basis of the relationships between Italy and the United Nations. The new policy is stated, however, to be that the rights under the Armistice and Surrender Instrument will be held in reserve, subject to overriding military needs, and that the controls provided for will be relaxed in the interests of developing in the Italian authorities greater responsibility and a greater measure of self-sufficiency.

2. In the light of the foregoing, policy directives on political, administrative and economic matters are included. A directive on financial matters is still under consideration.

#### Political Matters.

3. The relative responsibilities of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the civilian agencies of the respective governments are generally delineated (paragraph 2 A). It being stated that the directive is not intended to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who will continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments in matters of major policy and on such other matters as are within the scope of the activities of the Allied Commission. The Ambassadors, in addition to dealing with the Italian Government on matters not falling within the foregoing categories, will serve as Political Advisors to the Allied Commission, the Political Section accordingly being eliminated.

4. As a step in removing the controls on the Italian Government's external relations, direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives is permitted (paragraph 2 B). Also, it is stated to be the Allied desire that cultural interchange between Italy and the United Nations be facilitated.

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4. As a step in removing the controls on the Italian Government's external relations, direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives is permitted (paragraph 2 B). Also, it is stated to be the Allied desire that cultural interchange between Italy and the United Nations be facilitated as far as exigencies of the military situation permit (paragraph 2 F).

5. In the direction of removing internal controls upon the Italian Government, the present practice of the Allied Commission of approving decrees and legislation and approving appointments in territory under Italian Government jurisdiction is to be abandoned, with certain saving clauses in each case. With the same object, it is laid down that all Allied Commission officers stationed in the field in Italian Government territory are to be withdrawn as soon as possible, reserving, however, the right of sending personnel into such territory when Allied interests so require.

6. The previous suggestion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that arrangements be entered into with the Italian Government looking to the modification of the status of Italian prisoners repatriated to Italy is reaffirmed, such status to be terminated only upon terms satisfactory to SAC (paragraph 2 H).

*Comments - this report at  
JCS 93, 14 Dec 1945*

*EC 1157 - 19 Dec 45*

*Chiefs Comm*

(32)

*- 1 - EC Comm 121 (33-134)*

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Administrative Matters.

7. While the directive recognizes that the internal organization of the Allied Commission is primarily the responsibility of SAC, guidance is given as to the reorganization of the Commission in certain respects. The policy appears to be to confine the activities of the Allied Commission with respect to the Italian Government territory to advice and consultation (paragraphs 2 A and B). This is to be exercised at high levels and in certain specified instances only when requested by the Italian Government. The Commission is to be "civilianized" to the extent practicable, except in the case of the Service Subcommittees and as to functions related to AMI. With respect to the latter, it is suggested that officers dealing with such functions should be physically separated from the AC Headquarters (paragraph 2 D).

Economic Matters.

8. The Economic Section of the directive stresses the necessity of maximum internal production. It reserves the right of the Allies to take the necessary steps if appropriate economic controls are not adopted and implemented by the Italian Government.

9. The economic directive also reaffirms that basic supplies (food, fuel, clothing, medicine, etc.) will continue as a military responsibility for the duration of combined operations. Also specifically made part of the military program are supplies (fertilizer, raw materials, etc.) which will reduce imports of basic supplies under the disease and unrest formula. It is made clear, however, that the effect of these supplies need not be felt during the period of combined military responsibility. There are also included as within the military responsibility supplies necessary for the restoration of such of the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against Germany and Japan.

10. The preparation of the non-military rehabilitation program, to be procured and financed by the two Governments through other than military channels, is to be the responsibility of the Italian Government and is to be transmitted to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee through CCAC with comments by the AC, but will not be subject to screening by this Headquarters.

11. The economic section of the directive also contains answers to two of the three questions raised in NAF 778. The responsibility for the control of inflation is, in line with the general purposes of the directive, made the primary responsibility of the Italian Government (paragraph 7 A). It is also provided (paragraph 7 B) that industrial rehabilitation should be carried out by the Italian Government in accordance with priorities determined by it (with restrictions as to the rehabilitation of munitions indus-

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12. A general saving clause appears (paragraph 8) with regard to shipping. The directive is not to be taken as a commitment in respect of shipping or as affecting the existing procedure for shipping allocations.

13. Detailed directives to the Allied Commission implementing PAN 487 are under consideration in this Headquarters.

(Intd) C.M.S.

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FEB 19 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

REVISED DIRECTIVE TO AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION  
OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION

Note by Deputy Air Commander - in - Chief

1. In accordance with what I understand to be the Supreme Allied Commander's policy of relaxing direct control over Italian Government institutions and giving the Italians themselves more responsibility, it has been thought necessary to revise the directive (Annex II) to the Air Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

2. The revised directive (Annex I) which is proposed to issue is attached hereto for the consideration of the Political Committee who, I suggest should be asked to advise the Supreme Allied Commander:-

- (a) Whether the underlying conception is in accordance with the general policy now being followed by the Allied Commission.
- (b) Whether this directive in any way conflicts with the policy under which the Italian Army and Navy are controlled.
- (c) Whether it provides for adequate safeguards against the efficiency of the Italian Air Force, such as it is, being ruined by political activities among Italian Air Force officers.

Conclusions in case of  
at Rome to 14.2.45 ac/ae

(Insd) J.C.S.

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Continued on the back

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CONFIDENTIAL

TO :

Air Vice-Marshal V.A.F. Bowen-Suocriet, C.B.E., D.F.C.,  
Air Forces Sub-Commission,  
Allied Commission.

FROM :

Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

61

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued to you from this Headquarters on 7th December 1944, under Reference No. JCS.1321.

2. Your duty is to represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

As representative of Air C-in-C on the Allied Commission your functions will be as follows :-

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of GERMANY.

Your primary function, in general is to assist the Italian Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run an efficient Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air C-in-C, within the limits of their authorized resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air C-in-C, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the I.A.F. authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air C-in-C and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Air C-in-C, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to advise or reject on grounds of professional

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as representative of Air C-in-C on the Allied Commission your functions will be as follows :-

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an Italian Air Force, with an authorized manpower ceiling of (at present) 31,000, shall be allowed to remain in being for the present, as a co-belligerent Service for the defeat of Nazism.

Your primary function, in general is to assist the Italian Air Minister, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally, to run as efficient an Air Force as possible for the above end, in accordance with the policy laid down by the Air C-in-C, within the limits of their authorized resources and of such resources as the Allies can make available to them. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is first to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Air C-in-C, and secondly to assist them with advice and with such material resources as can be made available by the Allies. If in your view the I.A.F. authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Air C-in-C and the Chief Commissioner including, if necessary, recommendations for the removal of any particular officer or officers.

4. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Air C-in-C, in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications, from the Air Force point of view, of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. And you will reserve the right to approve or reject on grounds of professional suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Officers in the I.A.F.; in doing so, however, you should as far as possible ensure that there is no political reason for the officer concerned being unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activity on the part of Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any I.A.F. personnel unless they obtrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the I.A.F.; nor is it your duty to discover any political activities in which I.A.F. personnel may be engaged - that is a matter for the I.A.F. authorities themselves.

Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities, but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under whom whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

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5. You and your staff will be in the same relation to the Staff branches of I.A.F. concerned with organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment, as a subordinate AGO and his staff. You should see, these branches fully informed and you are entitled to their assistance and advice as required.

6. Five squadrons of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied types. Anything above that must be maintained from existing Italian material resources. You should ensure that the I.A.F. authorities retain in the Service only such Italian-equipped units as can effectively contribute to the war against Germany. In which should be included such Communications units as may be essential for internal courier services; the decision on the number, strength and composition of units falling under this category is for the Air C-in-C acting on your advice. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Ministry do not maintain any units in excess of those authorized by the Air C-in-C.

7. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air C-in-C who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate I.A.F. subordinate Commander.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to HQ, I.A.F. All material reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the I.A.F. Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration, or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.

9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and auxiliary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained I.A.F. manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the decision on the portion to be employed in the I.A.F. and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air C-in-C.

10. The Italian Air Ministry should be encouraged, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganize and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is recovered, and that could be of service to the Italian

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of those authorized by the Air C-in-C.

7. All first line operational units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Air C-in-C who will place them under the operational control of the appropriate MAF subordinate Commander.
8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to HQ, MAF. All special reports concerning the operations of the Italian Air Force units will be rendered by the MAF Commander responsible for operational control. Special reports by you or the operational Commander concerned may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration or maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their operational efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority except the Chief Commissioner and this Headquarters; the latter will be responsible for determining any wider distribution which may be necessary.
9. Over and above the requirements of the operational units, and of such non-operational and auxiliary units as may be authorized, there is and will be a surplus of trained I.A.F manpower within the present ceiling of 31,000 referred to above. You will be responsible for organizing the provision of such surplus manpower - and any additional surplus that may become available - for the use of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force, the decision on the proportion to be employed in the I.A.F and in Allied Air Force establishments respectively resting with the Air C-in-C.
10. The Italian Air Ministry should be employed, and as far as possible assisted, to reorganize and rehabilitate such resources of the Italian aircraft industry as may now be available, or may become available as additional Italian territory is occupied, and that could be of service to the Italian or Allied Air Forces in the prosecution of the war against Germany.
11. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you, for the information of HQ, MAF, any information that they may obtain that may affect the operational situation or be in any way of value to the Intelligence Staff at HQ MAF.

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Air Marshal,  
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief.

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ANNEX II

TO: Air Vice Marshal W.A.B. Power-Eusebio, CEE, DFC.  
Air Force Sub-Commission,  
Allied Commission.

Confidential

From: Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Date: 7th December, 1944.

Ref: JCS.1821.

Your duties as senior officer of the Air Forces Sub-commission in Italy have recently been reviewed and it is agreed that they should henceforth be defined as follows:-

1. To represent the Allied Air Forces on the Allied Commission, and to advise the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in respect of matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

2. To supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.

4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.

5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.

6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 31,000, in so far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.

to supervise the organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force including operational squadrons which, for operational purposes will be placed unreservedly under the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The Italian Air Force is to consist primarily of Italian personnel and equipment, but certain squadrons are equipped for the time being with Allied types of aircraft, by agreement of the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

3. To advise and control the Italian Air Ministry so that the Italian Air Force may be administered in such a way as to ensure its efficiency.

4. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of the resources of the Italian Air Force and aircraft industry, both in equipment and manpower, which may become available, as additional Italian territory is occupied, for the use of the Italian or Allied Air Forces.

5. To reorganize and rehabilitate as far as possible the resources of the aircraft industry in Italy for the use of the Italian Air Force.

6. To organize the provision of Italian manpower in substitution for Allied personnel from the Italian Air Force within its present authorized ceiling of 31,000, in as far as such personnel are surplus to the requirements of the Italian Air Force. The decision as to the proportions of Italian Air Force personnel to be employed in the Italian Air Force and in Allied Air Force establishments will rest with the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

7. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean informed of any intelligence from Italian or Italian Air Force sources affecting the operational situation.

8. To keep the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of any political developments or information which may come to his notice affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force.

9. To maintain liaison with the Public Relations Branch of the Allied Commission in order to supply them with any information which would be of assistance to them.

(and) J.C. SIZSSOR,

Air Marshal

Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET (6)

Confidential (6)

11 February 1945.

Ref/218/164/COS.

SUBJECT: SACRED Conferences. (6)

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

Reference SAC(P) (45) 3 (Withdrawal) dated 6 Feb 45.

Three copies Nos 36, 37 and 38 of Paper No SAC(P) (45) 3, received by this Headquarters are returned herewith.

It is requested that three copies of Staff Memorandum No 13 of 5 February 45 be forwarded. No copies of the latter Memorandum appear to have been sent to this Headquarters.

Major E. Talbot

Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff.

1066 (6)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 3. (Withdrawal)  
6th February, 1945

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FEB 8 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

REDISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF PWB

Note by Secretary

1. In consequence of the issue of Staff Memorandum No. 13 on 5 February defining responsibilities for Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theatre, the Chief of Staff has directed that Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 be withdrawn.

2. Copy holders are accordingly requested to return their copies as soon as possible to this Secretariat.

3. Points of detail covered in Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 which are not explicitly dealt with in Staff Memorandum No. 13 will be handled through the usual channels in accordance with the procedures laid down in Staff Memorandum No. 13.

J. E. LASCELLES  
COLONEL  
SECRETARY.

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Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN  
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3  
Chief, G-3 Operations Section  
Chief, G-3 Plans Section

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 defining responsibilities for Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theatre. The Chief of Staff has directed that Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 be withdrawn.

2. Copy holders are accordingly requested to return their copies as soon as possible to this Secretariat.

3. Points of detail covered in Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 which are not explicitly dealt with in Staff Memorandum No. 13 will be handled through the usual channels in accordance with the procedures laid down in Staff Memorandum No. 13.

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| Director, FWE                                    | 31-35    |
| Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission            | 36-38    |
| Secretary, General Staff                         | 39       |

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

11th January 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE  
(POLITICAL)

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Recipients of paper No. SAC (P) (45) 162 (Relations with Italian Partisans) are requested to renumber their copies SAC (P) (45) 1.

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)RELATIONS WITH ITALIAN PARTISANSNote by the Secretary

Fewer, Feb 27/45.

1. It was stated by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission at S.A.C. (P) (44) 37th Meeting (Minute 3) that the Italian Government was about to issue a statement concerning the agreements executed between the Committee of National Liberation for NORTHERN ITALY, on the one hand, and the Allied Command and the Italian Government, respectively, on the other.
2. Attached at ANNEX "A" is a translation by the Allied Commission of the bulletin published by the Italian Government in the Italian newspapers on 31 December 1944 after the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 30 December, of which the Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to take note.

*J. H. Laschies*  
J. H. LASCHIES,  
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hand, and the Allied Command and the Italian Government, respectively, on the other.

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2. Attached at Annex "A" is a translation by the Allied Commission of the bulletin published by the Italian Government in the Italian newspapers on 31 December 1944 after the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 30 December, of which the Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to take note.

*J. H. Lascabes*  
J. H. LASCABES,  
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PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

PRESS OFFICE

The President of the Council informs to have received the following message from the Committee of National Liberation of Northern Italy:

"The Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy, confronted with the urgent task that the anti-Nazi liberation war imposes on the new Italian democracy, conscious of the responsibilities of all people anxious for a free man's peace in this moment in which war is nearing its ultimate phase;

"Re-affirms its unity in the struggle and in the work of reconstruction which are to give once more independence, civil dignity and freedom to Italy within the frame of the permanent, just collaboration among the nations;

"Takes in consideration the statements by the representatives of the Socialist and Action Parties in the CLN for Northern Italy, with which they affirm their solidarity with the action that the Government is carrying on in view of the war of liberation;

"Expresses the certainty that the creation of a Ministry for Occupied Italy will help towards increasing the aid given to the glorious soldiers of liberty and to all the fighting people of Northern Italy and pledges itself to give its active collaboration to this task;

"Addresses itself with gratitude to the fighters who on the mountains, in the valleys, in the towns of our invaded country are defending Italy, and with their sacrifice are laying down the basis of the democratic rebirth of the Italian people, and invites them to strengthen their unswerving struggle against the Nazi Fascist enemy in the spirit of national unity."

Following information received from Allied HQs, the President of the Council has stated, and the Council acknowledged, that the declaration dated December 21st according to which the Allied Command would have recognized the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ representing all anti-Fascist parties

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people anxious for a free men's peace in this moment in which war is entering its ultimate phase;

"We affirm its unity in the struggle and in the era of reconstruction which are to give once more independence, civil dignity and freedom to Italy within the frame of the permanent, just collaboration among the nations;

"Take in consideration the statements by the representatives of the Socialist and Action Parties in the CIL for Northern Italy, with which they affirm their solidarity with the action that the Government is carrying on in view of the war of liberation;

"Express the certainty that the creation of a Ministry for Occupied Italy will help towards increasing the aid given to the glorious soldiers of liberty and to all the fighting people of Northern Italy and pledges itself to give its active collaboration to this task;

"Address itself with gratitude to the fighters who on the mountains, in the valleys, in the towns of our invaded country are defending Italy, and who with their sacrifice are laying down the basis of the democratic rebirth of the Italian people, and invites them to strengthen their unswerving struggle against the Nazi Fascist enemy in the spirit of national unity."

Following information received from Allied HQs, the President of the Council has stated, and the Council acknowledged, that the declaration dated December 21st according to which the Allied Command would have recognized the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy as the organ representing all anti-Fascist parties in enemy occupied territory, is inaccurate. The Allied military authorities have not accorded any form of political recognition of the aforesaid Committee of Northern Italy, but they have agreed with it on military measures relating to the prosecution of the war behind the enemy lines. On the other hand the Italian Government, having a wider sphere of action, has recognized the CILAI as the organ of the anti-Fascist parties in the still occupied territories. As the consequence of this the Government have delegated the Committee of Liberation of Northern Italy to represent them in the struggle that the patriots are waging against the Fascists and the Germans in the not yet liberated territories.

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