

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/122
(VOL. III)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/122
(VOL. III)

SACHED'S CONFERENCES, PAPERS
MAY - JULY 1945

300

Spence

283-299 for info sheet.

Intercom. S. 25/7.

7/5/54

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1322

250

Acting Executive Commission

You should see 248 which
is an important paper in
history of command in the
Atlantic See 5/7

5/7 mod. 7

251

See Com.

You should see 248.

See 12/7 8/13/7

263

C-50

noted

5/2 noted. 7

251

Excluded

In 24 miles low Sec 248.

12/17 8W/13/17

263

CSE

On 258 & 259 you will see proposed
handover dates of ports by naval
authorities to Lt adm. Ports still ATG
of particular interest.

Seen

19/7/45

1321

277

Excluded PI note 276

One month too late! 12W/24/17

Trustworthy to be personally

204

-172/1710

(To be sent to the Secretary General on Reception Room) 15/24/70

205

Read Quantum 15/5

226

Note: State to chief clerk G-5 at 1815 hrs

6 Jan 45 and arranged for copy of SPs Study
P/246 (Final), referred to in file 244, to be
forwarded.

6 Jan 45

Whitfield

MS/9/6.

227

G-5 AT-HQ (Brit Hen) has promised to

send text of agreement and the map showing

the new boundaries

MS/9/6.

enter of

Note: Spoke to chief clerk G-5 at 1215 hrs
6 June 45 and arranged for copy of SPs Study
P/246 (Final), referred to in false 374, to be
forwarded.

6 June 45
Whitcomb

7/5/46

227.

G-5 AFHQ (Brittman) has promised to

send text of agreement and the map showing

the new boundaries.

7/5/46

Received 11.6.45, filed in 523/EC. 1/2/46.

233.

Executive Commissioner.

and 237

To see 232 for information.

20 June 45.

7/5/46

S.H.
C.S.O.

15389

SECRET 2/8

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

29 July 1945

SUBJECT: Supreme Allied Commander's Conference

TO : Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission

The attached copy of the minutes of SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting is forwarded as requested in your letter No. 218/EC dated 27 July 1945.

Robert T. Hanley
Major, GSC
for J.E. BASTION, Jr.,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

Copy No 43 enclosed (with para 12, page 8 amended) — passed to Political Advisors.

cc. 20/7
1319

SECRET

PA
2/8
11/1

SECRET

218/9

304

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AFS61

SAC (45) 7
27th July 1945

SECRET

COPY NO 32

JUL 28 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FUTURE POLICY TOWARD ITALY

Note by Secretary

(276)

217/247/65-

1. With reference to the decision at SAC (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 7, the Memorandum by Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, (which was circulated as Paper No. SAC (45) 5), was dispatched to the Combined and British Chiefs of Staff under cover of the letter at Appendix 'A'.
2. This letter is therefore circulated for information.

28 JUL 1945

14/10/45
J. G. SHEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Note by Secretary

(276)

217/247/EC

1. With reference to the decision at SAC (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 7, the Memorandum by Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, (which was circulated as Paper No. SAC (45) 3), was dispatched to the Combined and British Chiefs of Staff under cover of the letter at Appendix 'A'.
2. This letter is therefore circulated for information.

28 JUL 1943

Ly. Sullivan
J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

NORMAL

E.E. DIST - 28 JULY 45

31 CHIEF COMMR

32 LEX COMMR

33 FOR ADVS.

Copy in file 60/EC 13

SECRET

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Supreme Allied Commander

APPENDIX A

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

27 July 1945

SUBJECT: Memorandum Entitled "Future Policy Toward Italy"

TO : The Secretaries,
Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee,
1901 Constitution Avenue,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1. I forward herewith 5 copies of a memorandum written by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission on "Future Policy Toward Italy".
2. The main purpose of this memorandum is to seek a more definite expression of Allied policy toward Italy. This is a purpose which I unreservedly support. In PAF 487 I am instructed that the policy of the Allied Governments is to "relax control.....thus developing in the Italian authorities a greater sense of responsibility". While this definition of policy gives guidance on certain practical matters, such as the functioning of the Allied Commission, it does not make clear the fundamental principles behind our intentions. Briefly, is it the Allied intention to "assist Italy towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically", accepting the cost of doing this; or, is it held that Allied interest in Italy is small and that the amount of assistance to be given to her should be restricted accordingly?
3. This is a matter of high policy. Admiral Stone argues strongly in favour of the policy of active interest. While personally I favour the same policy, I feel that it is a question which is beyond my province. I do not propose, therefore, to comment on it, except to say that a clear statement, in one sense or the other would remove many of the inconsistencies which I feel exist at present in our actions towards Italy.
4. Finally, I wish to say that I consider this memorandum to be a most valuable contribution towards the solution of the Italian problem. While I do not wish, in this letter, to be taken as endorsing every proposal made in it, I do urge that it should be studied with great care, and I will send my detailed comments on the naval, military and air aspects raised by the Chief Commissioner at a later date.

2. The main purpose of this memorandum is to seek a more definite expression of Allied policy toward Italy. This is a purpose which I have personally supported. In Feb 1947 I am instructed that the policy of the Allied Governments is to "re-examine control....thus developing in the Italian authorities a greater sense of responsibility". While this distinction of policy gives guidance on certain practical matters, such as the functioning of the Allied Commission, it does not make clear the fundamental principle behind our intentions. Briefly, is it the Allied intention to "assist Italy towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically", accepting the cost of doing this; or, is it held that Allied interest in Italy is small and that the amount of assistance to be given to her should be restricted accordingly?

3. This is a matter of high policy. Admiral Stone argues strongly in favour of the policy of active interest. While personally I favour the same policy, I feel that it is a question which is beyond my province. I do not propose, therefore, to comment on it, except to say that a clear statement, in one sense or the other would remove many of the inconsistencies which I feel exist at present in our actions towards Italy.

4. Finally, I wish to say that I consider this memorandum to be a most valuable contribution towards the solution of the Italian problem. While I do not wish, in this letter, to be taken as endorsing every proposal made in it, I do urge that it should be studied with great care, and I will send my detailed comments on the naval, military and air aspects raised by the Chief Commissioner at a later date.

JOSEPH T. McGRATH
General, U.S.A.
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Mediterranean Theater

Copies to: Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff,
Cabinet Offices,
Great George Street,
LONDON, S.W. 1

1317

SECRET

Ref: 218/BC.

27 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Supreme Allied Commander's
Conferences.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Supreme Allied Com-
mander's Secretariat.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your letter dated 23 July 1945 and enclosures. Receipt form is returned herewith.

2. It is pointed out, however, that in para 4 of our letter 218/BC of 21 July a request was made for one further copy of the Minutes of Conference, SAC (P)(45)16th Meeting dated 20 July 1945. This was not forwarded by you. May this further copy be supplied please, together with a copy of the amendment thereto dated 22 July 1945.

For the Chief Commissioner.

(Sgd) E.T. L.Cd.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

/JG.

See 3rd

1000

9

218

30

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

23 July 1945

JUL 26 1945

SUBJECT: Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences

TO : Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission

265

1. Reference is made to your letter #218/EC dated 21 July 1945.

2. It is regretted that through an error the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, was shown as receiving only two copies of minutes and papers of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences. Necessary instructions have been given to forward three copies in future and an extra copy of all papers issued since 20 July are accordingly enclosed so that your files may be completed.

J. E. BASTION, Jr.,
Colonel, G.S.C.

Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

3 Incls:

1. Cpy #43 of SAC (45)1 dated 20 July 1945.
2. Cpy #42 of SAC (45)2 dated 22 July 1945.
3. Cpy #43 of SAC (45)3 dated 22 July 1945.

264

262

276

1345

(SSM PICKER)

9670

SECRET

2189

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF351

14 JUL 1945

Confidential

SAC (45) 6
24th July 1945

COPY NO 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - SPEECH BY
SIGNOR MENNI

Note by Chief of Staff

1. It is reported by Associated Press that Signor Menni, the Italian Vice Premier and the Minister responsible for preparing the Constituent Assembly and for anti-fascist sections, in an address to a large political meeting in Milan on 22nd July 1945, campaigned vigorously for a republican. Such action contravenes the undertaking, not to raise the institutional question, signed by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Italian government as a whole and the oath which was taken by Signor Menni on assuming office.
2. If the report by Associated Press is confirmed, the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, should be instructed to protest strongly, on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, to the Italian Prime Minister. He should emphasize that Signor Menni has violated his oath and that any repetition of such action would be viewed with the utmost gravity by the Allied Governments.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested:

- (a) To approve the course of action recommended in paragraph 2 above.
- (b) To authorize the dispatch of the signal in Appendix 'A' reporting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the incident and the action taken in regard to it.

298

(Initial) J.D.M.

E.C.DIST - 25 JUL 45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1. It is reported by Associated Press that Signor Nenni, the Italian Vice Premier and the Minister responsible for preparing the Constituent Assembly and for anti-fascist elections, in an address to a large political meeting in Milan on 22nd July 1945, campaigned vigorously for a republic. Such action contravenes the undertaking, not to raise the institutional question, signed by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Italian Government as a whole and the oath which was taken by Signor Nenni on assuming office.

2. If the report by Associated Press is confirmed, the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, should be instructed to protest strongly, on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, to the Italian Prime Minister. He should emphasize that Signor Nenni has violated his oath and that any repetition of such action would be viewed with the utmost gravity by the Allied Governments.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested:

- (a) To approve the course of action recommended in paragraph 2 above.
- (b) To authorize the signature of the signal on Appendix 'A' reporting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the incident and the action taken in regard to it.

298

(init) N.S.M.

DISTRIBUTION:

Normal

Conclusions in this paper
at this date. The officer.

E.C. DIST — 25 JUL 45 —

31 Chief Counsel

32 Exec Counsel

33 For AGUS

Copy to: 30/EC

6520/EC

1311

SECRET

SECRET

~~Confidential~~
298

TO: CIB for Combined Chiefs of Staff
JCSO for British Chiefs of Staff

This is RIF-----

1. Pursuant to policy permitting political meetings in AMT territory, MIMI, Italian Vice Premier and Minister responsible for preparation of the Constituent assembly, was allowed to address large meeting in MILAN 22 July purpose of which was avowed as treasury bond campaign and wheat marketing. In fact MIMI campaigned vigorously for a republic.

2. Such action contravenes the undertaking not to raise institutional question signed on behalf of Italian government as whole and the oath taken by MIMI on taking office.

3. I have instructed Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to protest strongly to the Italian Prime Minister, emphasising that Signor MIMI has violated his oath and that any repetition would be viewed with the utmost gravity by the Allied Governments.

4. Above reported for your information.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

...and, Italian Vice Premier and Minister responsible for preparation of the Constituent Assembly, was allowed to address large meeting in MILAN 22 July pursuant of which was announced an treasury bond campaign and what remains. In fact MAMMI campaigned vigorously for a republic.

2. Such action contravenes the undertaking not to raise institutional objection signed on behalf of Italian government as whole and the oath taken by MAMMI on leaving office.

3. I have instructed Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, to protest strongly to the Italian Prime Minister, emphasising that Signor MAMMI has violated his oath and that any repetition would be viewed with the utmost gravity by the Allied Governments.

4. Above reported for your information.

1313

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

217

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF 545

SAC (45) 5
24th July 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO 22

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S SECRETARIAT

RECOMMENDATION OF R.F. COMMAND IN ITALY

Note by Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

AF 545

1. Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Forces is now composed entirely of RAF and Dominion units and is no longer an Allied Air Force. The Allied title will, therefore, be dissolved on 1 August 1945 at the same time as the dissolution of Mediterranean Allied Air Force into its national elements.

2. It is, therefore, proposed on 1 August 1945 to rename Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Forces "Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy". This headquarters will command all ITALY based RAF aircraft, including the Desert Air Force when HQ RAF MEDAE withdraws to Cairo.

3. The forces to come under Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy, at present include one coastal squadron. This squadron will be withdrawn to Malta in due course. However, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy, will then still be responsible for arranging to provide, on application, such minespotting and other coastal sorties as the naval authorities in ITALY may require.

4. When Headquarters R.F. MEDAE withdraws to COMMO, Air Headquarters, RAF, Italy, will be responsible for the command of all RAF units and personnel remaining in the theatre of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

5. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to these arrangements is requested.

(initd) R.F.P.
for M.C.G.

DISTRIBUTION:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

the Mediterranean units are no longer an Allied Air Force. The Allied title will, therefore, be dissolved on 1 August 1945 at the same time as the dissolution of Mediterranean Allied Air Force into its national elements.

2. It is, therefore, proposed on 1 August 1945 to rename Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Forces Air Headquarters, R.A.F. Italy. This headquarters will control all Italy based R.A.F. aircraft, including the West Air Force when the R.A.F. MEDE withdraws to C.AIRO.
3. The forces to come under air headquarters, R.A.F. Italy, at present include one coastal squadron. This squadron will be withdrawn to M.I.I. in due course. However, air headquarters, R.A.F. Italy, will then still be responsible for arranging to provide, on application, such airsupporting and other coastal services as the naval authorities in Italy may require.
4. When Headquarters R.A.F. MEDE withdraws to C.AIRO, air headquarters, R.A.F. Italy, will be responsible for the command of all R.A.F. units and personnel remaining in the theatre of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.
5. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to these arrangements is requested.

(initd) R.E.P.

For A.C.G.

DISTRIBUTION:

Normal

Rec Hist - 25 July 45

31 Chief Commr

32 Exec Commr

33 Political Advisers

1312

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

218

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC(45) 4
24 July 1945

AP 541

JUL 23 1945

ITALIAN CLIPS HULLS TO ROYAL NAVAL HULLS

Note by Secretary

1. Item Number 5 of the 16th Meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to bring forward to the next meeting a letter, which had been sent by the Italian Foreign Minister to the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission expressing concern in regard to certain islands off the west coast of Istria and coastal villages on the mainland, the population of which was claimed to be Italian. A draft reply was also to be submitted.

2. The letter in question is reproduced at Appendix 1A.

3. It has been ascertained that apart from a formal acknowledgment no reply has been made by the Allied Commission to the above letter.

4. At the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, in conjunction with U.S. Political Advisor and British Resident Minister has prepared the draft reply to Simon de Gasperi, which is reproduced at Appendix 1B.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve the terms of this reply and instruct the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission to despatch it.

Enclosure - the paper
at 10.00 etc. file 27/22
copy - 522/22

11/10/45
C. G. STEVENSON
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

regard to certain islands off the west coast of Istria and coastal villages on the mainland, the population of which was claimed to be Italian. A final reply was also to be submitted.

295

2. The letter in question is reproduced at Appendix VI.
3. It has been ascertained that errors from a formal acknowledgment to reply had been made by the Allied Commission to the above letter.
4. At the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff G-5, in consultation with U.S. Political Advisor and British Resident Minister has prepared the draft reply to Signor de Gasperi, which is reproduced at Appendix VII.
5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve the terms of this reply and instruct the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission to dispatch it.

*Enclosures - the paper
at table etc. 4th 27/00
copy in 522/00*

W. J. ...
L. A. ...
LIEUTENANT COLONEL
GIGANTINI

DISTRIBUTION
NOTES

EE DAST - 25 JULY 45
31 CHIEF COMMR
32 EXEC COMMR
33 FOR ADVS

1311

SECRET

I therefore suppose that, besides the one marked on the map which you kindly forwarded to me, the Italian occupation line will also include a further line in Eastern Istria, as well as the islands which are mostly Italian.

On this subject, I strongly has the opportunity of expressing to the American and British Ambassadors the considerations which have a fundamental interest for us, i.e.:

1. Besides Pola, the encampments on the East coast include the following towns which are all Italian: Lussino, Capodistria, Parenza, Isola, Farsano, Brunico, Cittadella, Pordenone, Gorizia, Ravenna, and Imbriani. Besides, in the immediate hinterland of the Istria, there are Italian villages such as Sigmund, Suda, Gallensted, Villa, Sottos, Vignone. These cities and villages at least, which are all exclusively Italian, should be placed in the zone which is under Allied control. Out of them would be included in it by taking the national Trieste-Pola road, which goes up by Monte Joso, or even better, the Trieste-Pola railroad, as transportation line.

2. After examining the sensitive details, we think that some form of guarantee for the Italian beyond the demarcation line, and of Vienna principally, should be introduced, such as, at least, the organization of a commission of observers as it has been foreseen for the zone occupied by Jugoslavia.

I repeat to you what I wrote on this subject to the British and American Ambassadors: we are fully conscious of the dangers and risks that the question presented so far is still presenting for the Allies, and of the great and serious effort which has been put in necessity to overcome them. The full consciousness of these dangers and risks has certainly increased and deepened the sense of gratitude of the Italian people because of the solidarity shown to it by the Washington and London Governments in these difficult circumstances. I therefore beg you to keep in mind the friendly confidence and spirit of close collaboration which inspires our work, when you are taking these considerations; kindly consider them as the expression of our deep conviction that Europe can only be protected by fair and just solutions.

I shall be most grateful if you kindly draw the attention of the Supreme Allied Command on the above mentioned indications, so be taken in the nearest possible consideration when the occupation program already established or to be established will be carried out.

I remain, my dear General,

Yours very truly,

S. D. Despero

1310

SECRET

100-100000-56000
Chief of Staff,
United States Army

SECRET

TO: FIELD IN IT 111 FORTY-ONE
FROM: FIELD IN IT 111 FORTY-ONE

CONFIDENTIAL

294

SV

1. On 30th June I wrote to inform you of the action I had taken in regard to your letter of 21st June, in which you suggested that the existing agreement between the 5th Army Allied Commander and Marshal Tito, in respect of the area known as VALICIA GALLI, should be modified to provide special protection for the interests of Italians living beyond the demarcation line.

2. The contents of your letter have been considered by the Supreme Allied Commander, who has directed me to inform you as follows:-

(a) The areas coming under Allied control are defined in the Agreement of 9th June as the Territory of TUNISI, GIBLI, east of the line drawn on the map, of which you have a copy. These areas include TUNISI, the railways and roads from there to Austria via GIBLI, C. PIRELLA and T. PIRELLA, as well as Pils and Sackenberg on the west coast of ISRI. They do not include the islands and coastal towns to which you refer in your letter. There is no intention of extending the zone of occupation to include further territory in Western ISRI.

(b) As you are no doubt aware, it is specifically noted in the two agreements, signed at TUNISI on 9th June and at TUNISI on 20th June 1945, that the final disposition of the whole territory is not determined by the present areas of occupation. The view that the populations of certain towns, villages and islands are predominantly Italian should be submitted through diplomatic channels for consideration at the Peace Conference or

Allied Commander, who has directed me to inform you as follows:-

(a) The areas coming under Allied control are defined in the Agreement of 9th June as the Territory of VENEZIA GIULIA West of the line drawn on the map, of which you have a copy. These areas include TRIESTE, the railways and roads from there to Austria via MONFALCONE, CERVIGNANO and VERBICIA, as well as Pola and anchorage on the west coast of ISTRIA. These do not include the islands and coastal towns to which you refer in your letter. There is no intention of extending the zone of occupation to include further territory in Eastern ISTRIA.

(b) As you are no doubt aware, it is specifically noted in the two agreements, signed at MOSCOW on 8th June and at ~~PARIS~~ ^{BRUSSELS} on 26th June 1945, that the final disposition of the whole territory is not determined by the present areas of occupation. The claim that the populations of certain towns, villages and islands are predominantly Italian should be submitted through diplomatic channels for consideration at the Peace Conference or whenever the disposition of the disputed territories is finally decided.

(c) It is not the intention of the Supreme Allied Commander to such revision of his existing military agreement with the Yugoslav Army.

(d) The Italian Government are of course at liberty to raise the question at any time through diplomatic channels. In this connection it is noted that you have in fact already addressed communications on the subject to the British and American Ambassadors.

1309
SECRET

A 306 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Copy No. _____

JUL 23 1945

23 July 1945.

FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS ITALY

in accordance with terms of reference received from the Chief of Staff we have examined the paper prepared by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and the covering letter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff drafted by the CAS. We have redrafted the suggested covering letter and have deleted from it any comments on particular points raised in the paper. We consider that there are so many contentious points raised in the naval, military and air clauses which are already under detailed examination by us that it would be unwise to commit ourselves at such short notice on any of these points. Comment in the covering letter on any one particular point might be construed as tacit agreement on other points not commented on.

It is our view that it would be better to forward any detailed comments after the various MJPS papers at present in course of preparation have been considered and agreement reached on the issues raised in them.

Winston Churchill
 D. PEELE YATES
 Brigadier, G.S.
 G-3 Operations.

R B Parkinham
 A. B. PARKINHAM
 Group Captain
 MAAT Plans

Winston Churchill
 T. A. ADAIR
 Commander
 Staff Officer, Plans

DISTRIBUTION

List A plus

C-5

) Copy of paper by

) Chief Commissioner

in the covering letter on any of these points. Comment
tacit agreement on other points not commented on.

It is our view that it would be better to forward any detailed comments after
the various MPS papers at present in course of preparation have been consid-
ered and agreement reached on the issues raised in them.

See memo 20/6/66

James T. Hume
C.I.F.

D. PEEL TATES
Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Operations.

R.B. Pakenham

R. B. PAKENHAM
Group Captain
MAAF Plans

Wanso air

T. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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List A plus
G-5
US Polad
Br Res Min

) Copy of paper by
) Chief Commissioner
) already circulated
) under ref SAC(P)(45)3
or MPS/66 of 22 July.

E E Dist - 25 JUL 66

28 - Chief Comm

31 - Exec Comm

440 - 102 APR 65

copy - file 66/66

1308

(200)

18 (Final)

SECRET

TO: The Secretaries,
Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee,
1901 Constitution Avenue,
Washington, D.C.

COPY TO: Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff
Cabinet Offices,
Great George Street,
London, S.W.1.

1. I forward herewith 6 copies of a memorandum written by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission on "Future Policy Toward ITALY".

2. The main purpose of this memorandum is to seek a more definite expression of Allied policy toward ITALY. This is a purpose which I unreservedly support.

In FAW 487 I am instructed that the policy of the Allied Governments is to "relex control thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility". While this definition of policy gives guidance on certain practical matters, such as the functioning of the Allied Commission, it does not make clear the fundamental principle behind our intentions.

Briefly, is it the Allied intention to "assist ITALY towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically", accepting the cost of doing this; or, is it held that Allied interest in ITALY is small and that the amount of assistance to be given to her should be restricted accordingly?

3. This is a matter of high policy. Admiral Stone argues strongly in favour of the policy of active interest. While personally I may favour the same policy, I feel that it is a question which is beyond my province. I do not propose, therefore, to comment on it, except to say that a clear statement, in one sense or the other would remove many of the inconsistencies which I feel exist at present in our actions towards ITALY.

allied policy toward ITALY. This is a purpose which I unreservedly support. In FAM 487 I am instructed that the policy of the Allied Governments is to "relax control thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility". While this definition of policy gives guidance on certain practical matters, such as the functioning of the Allied Commission, it does not make clear the fundamental principle behind our intentions.

Briefly, is it the Allied intention to "assist ITALY towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically", accepting the cost of doing this; or, is it held that Allied interest in ITALY is small and that the amount of assistance to be given to her should be restricted accordingly?

2. This is a matter of high policy. Admiral Stone argues strongly in favour of the policy of active interest. While personally I may favour the same policy, I feel that it is a question which is beyond my province. I do not propose, therefore, to comment on it, except to say that a clear statement, in one sense or the other would remove many of the inconsistencies which I feel exist at present in our actions towards ITALY.

3. I wish, however, to mention one matter to which specific reference is not made by Admiral Stone. There is, I believe, a proposal under consideration, that the responsibility for civil supply in ITALY, now vested in the Allied Commission and this headquarters, should be taken over by UNRRA. I feel very strongly that such a step would not be compatible with the policy of active interest. I am sure, and Governor Lehman with whom the matter has been discussed agrees, that UNRRA are incapable of shouldering this responsibility. This, however, concerns questions of supply and economic rehabilitation with which I will deal in a later communication.

SECRET

808 (Final)

5. Finally, I wish to say that I consider this contribution towards the solution of the Italian problem to be a most valuable wish. In this letter, to be taken as endorsing every proposal made in it, I do urge that it should be studied with great care, and I will send my detailed comments on the naval, military and air aspects raised by the Chief Commissioner at a later date.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1366

SECRET

6/30/7 (Final)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Copy No. —

JUL 25 1945

23 July 1945.

REVIEW OF AMPHIBIOUS LIFT IN THIS THEATRE

SUBJECT.

1. To examine the future requirements for amphibious lift in this theatre and to prepare a draft signal in the MEDCOS series as a follow up to MEDCOS 259 & 261.

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT.

2. The amphibious lift now available is considered to be adequate to meet all likely requirements. It consists of 3 LST (including 3 Greek and "Thruster") 1 flotilla of LCI(L), and 2 flotillas of LCI(3). The future of the Greek LST is not yet known. However, under present plans, the balance of this force will be withdrawn progressively. By the end of 1945 all will have been withdrawn for refit and service in the FAR EAST, or withdrawn and laid up in order to release the crews. Any decision to request their retention in this theatre must be made in the near future. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean suggests that it is necessary to retain a small amphibious lift comprising 7 of the above mentioned LST plus eight of the LCI(L). ("Thruster" is not included in the LST to be retained as her draft makes her unsuitable for employment in any of the Mediterranean harbours.) This would provide an amphibious lift capable of transporting approximately 4000 personnel and 400 vehicles at a time, which represents the approximate strength of one Brigade/Regiment with supporting arms. (At Appendix A is an appreciation on the subject by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean).

FACTORS INVOLVED.

3. In considering the requirement for amphibious lift in this theatre the following factors are pertinent:

- a. The political situation.
 - b. Purposes for which lift might be required.
 - c. Troops available.
 - d. Other shipping available.
 - e. Air lift available.
4. Political Situation.

will be withdrawn progressively. By the end of 1945 all will have been withdrawn for refit and service in the FAR EAST, or withdrawn and laid up in order to release the crews. Any decision to request their retention in this theatre must be made in the near future. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean suggests that it is necessary to retain a small amphibious lift comprising 7 of the above mentioned LST plus eight of the LCI(L). ("Thruster" is not included in the LST to be retained as her draft makes her unsuitable for employment in many of the Mediterranean harbours.) This would provide an amphibious lift capable of transporting approximately 4000 personnel and 420 vehicles at a time, which represents the approximate strength of one Brigade/Regiment with supporting arms. (An Appendix A is an appreciation on the subject by Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean).

FACTS INVOLVED.

3. In considering the requirement for amphibious lift in this theatre the following factors are pertinent:

- a. The political situation.
- b. Purposes for which lift might be required.
- c. Troops available.
- d. Other shipping available.
- e. Air lift available.

Political Situation.

a. It appears likely that the Allied authorities in the Mediterranean area will be faced with a continuing threat of potential security problems in widely scattered areas throughout the theatre such as VETIZIA GIULIA, NE ITALY, the Greek frontiers and the LEVANT.

b. It is not unlikely that attempts may be made by Jugo-Slav, Albanian or Bulgarian elements to create frontier incidents with a view to future annexation of Greek territory adjacent to their common frontiers. Although it is desirable that Greek forces should be entirely responsible for guarding their own frontiers it is nevertheless considered that we should adopt a strong line as in VETIZIA GIULIA and that we should continue to support the Greek Government in the event of such violations of Greek frontiers by concentrating the maximum force possible in the affected area. In this connection GREEKIN have been instructed along these lines and the Combine Chiefs of Staff have been requested to approve such a policy.

EC Doc 28 June 45

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31 Chief Commr

32 Exec Commr

35 Political Adviser

2/207 (Final)

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c. Recurrence of the recent disorders in SYRIA and the LEBANON, as well as related or unrelated disturbances in PALESTINE must be considered a strong possibility at least until major decisions have been reached regarding the political status of those countries.

e. Paradees for Which Lift Must Be Required.

a. Of the areas mentioned in the above, the first two are not likely to involve the use of amphibious lift. A possible exception to this would be a requirement to reinforce or evacuate an Allied force in the POLA area. This is considered unlikely and not sufficient reason to retain an amphibious lift in the theatre. Again if the political situation in ITALY deteriorates, it may be necessary to move some of the forces, when released from GREECE, back to ITALY as quickly as possible.

b. As mentioned in para c of the policy with respect to British forces in GREECE is now before the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval. It is considered that unless JUGOSLAVIA declares war on GREECE, the present British troops in GREECE will be able to cope with any emergency that may arise, without substantial reinforcements. Should trouble arise however, it may be that owing to the poor state of road communications and the likelihood of those communications being disrupted by wintry weather, troops will have to be moved rapidly by sea from one part of GREECE to another. An amphibious lift would be necessary for this, especially if the area threatened was NW GREECE since this area is devoid of suitable harbours. Present plans call for the retention of British forces at least until the end of 1945. In event of frontier violations after their withdrawal it might be necessary to reintroduce Allied forces into GREECE from this theatre or from MIDEAST.

c. C-in-C Mediterranean is responsible for the LEVANT as well as those parts of the Mediterranean Theatre which are under command of SACEM. Similarly the control of merchant shipping for the whole of the Mediterranean is exercised by this HQ. Requirements for movement of personnel and vehicles for which the employment of LST and LCI(L) would be of value must be considered on a wider basis than the requirement of this theatre alone. It may be necessary to reinforce the LEVANT or MIDEAST rapidly from this theatre or elsewhere in the Mediterranean and C-in-C Med would be responsible for the provision of naval craft.

d. It may be that, wherever disturbances occur, those responsible will indulge in large scale bridge blowing activities. It will therefore be desirable to be in a position to land Allied troops as near as possible to the disturbed areas. If a force cannot be landed in the desired place it will probably have to carry with it so much bridging material as to detract considerably from its use as a fighting force.

e. Apart from the operational requirement for amphibious lifts there are

that unless JUSCOBIA declares war on GREECE, the present British troops in GREECE will be able to cope with any emergency that may arise, without substantial reinforcements. Should trouble arise however, it may be that owing to the poor state of road communications and the likelihood of those communications being disrupted by wintry weather, troops will have to be moved rapidly by sea from one part of GREECE to another. An amphibious lift would be necessary for this, especially if the area threatened was NW GREECE since this area is devoid of suitable harbours. Present plans call for the retention of British forces at least until the end of 1945. In event of frontier violations after their withdrawal it might be necessary to reintroduce Allied forces into GREECE from this theatre or from MID-EAST.

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d. It may be that, wherever disturbances occur, those responsible will indulge in large scale bridge blowing activities. It will therefore be desirable to be in a position to land Allied troops as near as possible to the disturbed areas. If a force cannot be landed in the desired place it will probably have to carry with it so much bridging material as to detract considerably from its use as a fighting force.

e. Apart from the operational requirement for amphibious lifts there are certain other requirements which must be met. There is a requirement now to move some 1300 vehicles to GREECE in order to equip the Greek Army. The more rapidly this is done, the sooner the hand of the Greek Government will be strengthened and British troops can be withdrawn. There are also, from our experience in the Mediterranean, always many requirements for the movement of small parties of personnel and vehicles by LST and LCI(L). It is therefore desirable that sufficient flexibility for quick movement by sea be retained to enable such forces to be carried in landing craft.

6. Availability of Forces.

a. According to information now available there will be located in MID-EAST after completion of the main redeployment plans the following troops:

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1 Inf Div (US)
1 Inf Div (Br)
1 Arm Bde (Br)
1 Arm Cav Regt
8 Arty Regts

These will later be reduced to:

1 Inf Div (US)
1 Inf Div (Br)
1 Arty Regt (Br)

This does not take into consideration Italian troops nor the possibility that all or part of the Polish Corps might remain in the theatre. Furthermore in WAF 1030 the SAC recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that a portion of the mobile reserve be located in ITALY. Should this recommendation be approved the forces listed above might be increased by one division and one armoured regiment.

b. In addition to the troops in ITALY there will be aarrison in MIDEAST of at least one Infantry Division and one armoured division. By May 1948 the British Central European Reserve will be established there also, and a portion of this force might be available for dispatch to GREECE.

c. In the event of frontier incidents in GREECE after the departure of British troops, it is extremely likely that such incidents would have a strong Jugo-Slav flavor, with a consequent deterioration of stability in VENETIA GIULIA. Under such circumstances, it would more than likely be impossible to detach a force of any effective striking power from the occupational forces in VENETIA GIULIA. Thus, at best, a token force, at the maximum a Brigade Group/BCT, could be dispatched to GREECE from ITALY. However should the CCS agree to a mobile reserve being located in ITALY or should troops be made available from AUSTRIA, the size of the force might be substantially increased.

d. There is a possibility that political objections to the employment of the Polish Corps in GREECE might be overcome or they might be transferred to MIDEAST at short notice in order to relieve forces required to deal with trouble in the LEVANT. LST and LCI(L) would be necessary if such movements were to be accomplished rapidly.

e. In any case, provided the emergency justified it, forces would certainly be made available either from this theatre, EUROPE or MIDEAST to meet the situation especially if the threatened area was GREECE.

7. Other Shipping Available.

a. There will be available in the Mediterranean at any one time relatively

b. In addition to the troops in Italy there will be a garrison in KILIZIST of at least one infantry division and one armored division. By May 1945 the British Central European Reserve will be established there also, and a portion of this force might be available for dispatch to GREECE.

c. In the event of frontier incidents in GREECE after the departure of British troops, it is extremely likely that such incidents would have a strong Yugoslav flavor, with a consequent deterioration of stability in YUGOSLAVIA. Under such circumstances, it would more than likely be impossible to detach a force of any effective striking power from the occupational forces in YUGOSLAVIA. Thus, at best, a token force, at the maximum a Brigade Group/ECZ, could be dispatched to GREECE from ITALY. However should the CCS agree to a mobile reserve being located in ITALY or should troops be made available from AUSRIA, the size of the force might be substantially increased.

d. There is a possibility that political objections to the employment of the Polish Corps in GREECE might be overcome or they might be transferred to KILIZIST at short notice in order to relieve forces required to deal with trouble in the LEVANT. LST and LCI(L) would be necessary if such movement were to be accomplished rapidly.

e. In any case, provided the emergency justified it, forces would certainly be made available either from this theatre, EUROPE or KILIZIST to meet the situation especially if the threatened area was GREECE.

7. Other Shipping Available.

a. There will be available in the Mediterranean at any one time relatively few merchant ships which could at short notice be used to meet any emergency requirement for movement of vehicles or stores. Any large scale diversion of this shipping would be likely to interfere with carriage of supplies to the FAR EAST. In any event the use of merchant shipping is inevitably a slow method of movement as these ships take time to position and load. Also there are many ports in the Mediterranean, particularly in GREECE, which are not suitable, by reason of their draught, for the discharge of MT ships. The only feasible manner in which these areas could be reinforced would be by the use of shallow draught LST.

b. Transport of forces by warship, while a possibility, has the great disadvantage that no heavy weapons or vehicles can be carried and any force so transported is relatively immobile upon arrival.

2/307 (ZL-1)

6. Air Lift Available.

There is at present available in the MEDITERRANEAN-MIDEAST area the following air lift:

- a. 3 transport squadrons of the RAF.
- b. Parts of 10 heavy bomber squadrons of 305 Group RAF.
- c. Fifth Wing (3 bomber groups) of USAF - under operational command of USAF.

All or the greater part of the above air lift will be available during the first six months of 1948 and from these resources an ample air lift could be provided to move the equivalent of a Brigade Group/200 on short notice. There are adequate airfields within reasonable distance of the Greek frontiers. Any force so transported however would be comparatively immobile upon arrival and would lack heavy weapons.

9. Naval Manpower Shortage.

If it is agreed that an amphibious lift can be retained, it is not planned to keep the 4 British LST and British LCI(L) in full commission owing to the shortage of British Naval manpower. They would be kept in care and maintenance reserve manned by skeleton crews at 8 days notice for movement. If they were required for an emergency, military assistance could be made available towards completing the crews. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has already proposed to the Admiralty that 4 of the LCI(L) be transferred to the Royal Hellenic Navy.

CONCLUSIONS.

10. It is concluded that:

- a. The most likely areas in the Mediterranean for which an amphibious lift for a combat force is likely to be required are GREECE and MIDEAST.
- b. If trouble arose forces of a sufficient size would indubitably be made available either from this theatre or elsewhere and these forces would require to be transported by sea at short notice.
- c. There would be considerable danger that road and rail communications would be disrupted by insurgents blowing up bridges and forces being delayed unless they could be landed as close as possible to the required area.
- d. There would be relatively few merchant ships available in the Mediterranean for lifting this force and in addition many Mediterranean harbours, particularly in GREECE, are not suitable for the discharge of MT ships. It is therefore most desirable to retain an amphibious lift for this purpose.

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9. Naval Airpower Shortage.

If it is agreed that an amphibious lift can be retained, it is not planned to keep the 4 British LST and British LCI(L) in full commission owing to the shortage of British Naval transport. They would be kept in care and maintenance reserve manned by skeleton crews at 8 days notice for movement. If they were required for an emergency, military assistance could be made available towards completing the crews. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has already proposed to the Admiralty that 4 of the LCI(L) be transferred to the Royal Hellenic Navy.

CONCLUSIONS.

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 - a. The most likely areas in the Mediterranean for which an amphibious lift for a combat force is likely to be required are GREECE and MIDDLEAST.
 - b. If trouble arose forces of a sufficient size would indubitably be made available either from this theatre or elsewhere and these forces would require to be transported by sea at short notice.
 - c. There would be considerable danger that road and rail communications would be disrupted by insurgents blowing up bridges and forces being delayed unless they could be landed as close as possible to the required area.
 - d. There would be relatively few merchant ships available in the Mediterranean for lifting this force and in addition many Mediterranean harbours, particularly in GREECE, are not suitable for the discharge of MT ships. It is therefore most desirable to retain an amphibious lift for this purpose.
 - e. Personnel could be transported by air, warships or personnel ships all of which are available in the Mediterranean areas. A force so transported would be relatively immobile, be lacking in heavy weapons and hence be capable of limited employment only.
 - f. It is most desirable that sufficient LST and LCI(L) be retained in this theatre to permit continued flexibility in sea movements for such unforeseen commitments as are certain to arise. In particular it is desirable that the Greek LST be retained to transport vehicles and equipment for the Greek Army.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

11. It is recommended that:

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- a. 4 British LST, 3 Greek LST and 8 LCI(L) to be retained in the Mediterranean to provide a lift for forces required urgently to meet any emergency.

(Note: If the proposal of the C-in-C Med is approved by the Admiralty 4 of the LCI(L) will be Greek.)

- b. The draft MEMCOS at Appendix B to be approved for dispatch, including a copy to WHEMIST.

James F. Pennington Jr.
Br E. PEARL YARDS - C. S.
Brigadier, G. S.
G-3 Operations.

W. B. Fackelman

W. B. FACKELMAN
Group Captain
MAAF Plans

Wassdair

W. A. ADAMS
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S SECRETARIAT.

APPENDIX A

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean Station,
Allied Force Headquarters.
13th July, 1945.

MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - RETENTION OF
AMPHIBIOUS LIFT - NOTE BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN

The antagonisms aroused by the European War are such that it appears likely that the Military Authorities will be faced with a considerable security problem in the MEDITERRANEAN area for some time to come, with the possibility of disturbances serious enough to require the presence of troops or reinforcements occurring in such diverse areas as GREECE, CYPRUS, ITALY, or EGYPT.

2. It is understood that of the remaining amphibious lift - (6 L.S.T. including 3 Grecks and "THRUSTER", 1 Flotilla L.C.I. (1), 2 Flotillas L.C.T. (3)) - the L.S.T. will be withdrawn by the end of the year for refit and service in the FAR EAST, and the L.C.I. (1) and L.C.T. either withdrawn or laid up in order to release the crews. Furthermore, as the size of the armed forces in the theatre is reduced by redeployment the amount of shipping employed on internal Mediterranean sailings, and hence available in emergency for use as M.T. shipping, will correspondingly be reduced. The bulk of the shipping in the MEDITERRANEAN will eventually be transit shipping already loaded for the FAR EAST. In addition, alongside berths suitable for unloading M.T. shipping are not available in all MEDITERRANEAN harbours. It is evident therefore, that we are in danger of losing our flexibility in the transport of reinforcements in emergency and that we may reach a stage in which we cannot make effective use of our Military reserves.

3. It is considered necessary, therefore, to retain a small amphibious lift in the MEDITERRANEAN, until at least after the Peace Conference, to ensure the Army the necessary mobility. This lift should be in L.S.T. only, as the inferior sea-keeping qualities of L.C.T. make them unsuitable for this requirement, since they might be required to operate at any time of the year, and they represent a heavy maintenance and manning commitment out of proportion to their value. It is considered, however, that a small force of L.C.I. (1) should also be retained for use in a case where a small lift of personnel only is required.

4. In view of the known heavy requirements for this type of craft in the FAR EAST it is unlikely any L.S.T. could be made available from outside the Station. Furthermore, of the 8 L.S.T. now operational on the Station, "THRUSTER's" draught renders her unsuitable for the purpose under consideration. 2500 personnel

2. It is understood that of the remaining amphibious lift - (8 L.S.T., including 3 Greeks and "THUNDER", 1 Flotilla L.C.I. (L), 2 Flotillas L.C.I. (3)) - the L.S.T. will be withdrawn by the end of the year for refit and service in the FAR EAST, and the L.C.I. (L) and L.C.I. either withdrawn or laid up in order to release the crews. Furthermore, as the size of the armed forces in the theatre is reduced by redeployment the amount of shipping employed on internal Mediterranean sailings, and hence available in emergency for use as L.F. shipping, will correspondingly be reduced. The bulk of the shipping in the MEDITERRANEAN will eventually be transit shipping already loaded for the FAR EAST. In addition, alongside berths suitable for unloading M.T. shipping are not available in all MEDITERRANEAN harbours. It is evident therefore, that we are in danger of losing our flexibility in the transport of reinforcements in emergency and that we may reach a stage in which we cannot make effective use of our military reserves.

3. It is considered necessary, therefore, to retain a small amphibious lift in the MEDITERRANEAN, until at least after the Peace Conference, to ensure the Army the necessary mobility. This lift should be in L.S.T. only, as the inferior sea-keeping qualities of L.C.I. make them unsuitable for this requirement, since they might be required to operate at any time of the year, and they represent a heavy maintenance and manning commitment out of proportion to their value. It is considered, however, that a small force of L.C.I. (L) should also be retained for use in a case where a small lift of personnel only is required.

4. In view of the known heavy requirements for this type of craft in the FAR EAST it is unlikely any L.S.T. could be made available from outside the Station. Furthermore, of the 8 L.S.T. now operational on the Station, "THUNDER" draught renders her unsuitable for the purpose under consideration. The remaining 7 L.S.T. (2) would provide a lift of approximately 2500 personnel and 420 vehicles, which would approximate to a lift of one Brigade Group/R.C.T. However, it must be borne in mind that of these 7 L.S.T. (2), three are Greek, and although at present they are under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, MEDITERRANEAN, a situation might arise where it would be politically undesirable to employ them. They might, in fact, already be in use by the Greeks for military purposes.

5. It would not be possible to keep the 4 British L.S.T. in a fully manned state. It would be planned to maintain permanent skeleton crews aboard, the crews being completed in emergency, within 8 days, from Station shore-based personnel and crews of ships refitting. Reserves of 4 Naval manpower in the MEDITERRANEAN until the end of the Japanese War will be very small, and it might be necessary to call upon the Army authorities to assist with men to carry out some of the less skilled duties on the upper deck, and to act as gun's crews.

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APPENDIX A

Page 2 of the Commander-in-Chief, MEDITERRANEAN's letter No. Med.00605/3 dated 13th July, 1945.

6. The complement of an L.S.T.(2) is 4 Officers and 58 men. The size of the skeleton crew it would be necessary to maintain in each of the 4 British L.S.T. would be 2 Officers and 22 men.

7. The foregoing appreciation is drawn to the attention of the Supreme Allied Commander in order that he may consider requesting the retention of the 7 remaining L.S.T.(2), when reviewing his requirements for amphibious forces in July in accordance with MEDCOS 259, should he so desire.

(Signed) J. H. D. CUNNINGHAM,
ADMIRAL

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(Signed) J. H. D. CUNNINGHAM,
ADMIRAL

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1/307 (Final)

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APPENDIX 2983

TO : JMSO for British Chiefs of Staff.

REFD: BRITISH WASHINGTON for US Joint Chiefs of Staff
WIDEAST

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This is JEDCOOS _____ further to JEDCOOS 259 and 261.

1. Following British landing craft remain in this theatre:

- 8 LST (including 3 Greek and "Thruster")
- 1 Flotilla LCI(L)
- 2 Flotillas LCT(3)

2. The antagonisms aroused by the European war are such that it appears likely that a considerable security problem in the Mediterranean area, especially in GREECE and the LEVANT, must be faced for some time to come. If the emergency it is justifies it, /felt that forces will be made available, either from within the theatre or elsewhere, requiring transportation by sea.

3. As the size of the armed forces in this theatre is reduced by redeployment, the amount of merchant shipping here, available in an emergency for use as MT shipping, will be correspondingly reduced. In addition alongside berths suitable for unloading MT shipping do not exist in all Mediterranean harbours.

Further owing to likelihood of damage to road and rail bridges by insurgents it is /highly desirable to be able to land forces where required. It is evident therefore that there is grave danger of losing flexibility in transport of reinforcements in an emergency and a stage may be reached when effective use cannot be made of military reserves unless amphibious lift available.

4. C-in-C Med has already proposed to the Admiralty that 4 of the LCI(L) remaining in this theatre be transferred to the Royal Hellenic Navy.

5. 3 Greek LST are required to meet shipping demands for rapid movement of

GREECE and the LEVANT, must be faced for some time to come. If the emergency it is justified it, felt that forces will be made available, either from within the theatre or elsewhere, requiring transportation by sea.

3. As the size of the armed forces in this theatre is reduced by redeployment, the amount of merchant shipping here, available in an emergency for use as MT shipping, will be correspondingly reduced. In addition alongside berths suitable for unloading MT shipping do not exist in all Mediterranean harbours. Further owing to likelihood of damage to road and rail bridges by insurgents it is highly desirable to be able to land forces where required. It is evident therefore that there is grave danger of losing flexibility in transport of reinforcements in an emergency and a stage may be reached when effective use cannot be made of military reserves unless amphibious lift available.
4. C-in-C Med has already proposed to the Admiralty that 4 of the LCI(L) remaining in this theatre be transferred to the Royal Hellenic Navy.
5. 3 Greek LST are required to meet shipping demands for rapid movement of vehicles and equipment from ITALY to GREECE to reequip Greek Army.

6. Recommend therefore to meet needs set out in paras 2, 3, 4 and 5 that 4 British LST, 3 Greek LST and 8 LCI(L) be retained in this theatre. If abroad skeleton crews only would be maintained on board British vessels owing to manpower shortage. If required in an emergency crews would be provided with assistance from military resources.

7. It would thus be possible to release forthwith

LST "Thruster"
The remaining 5 LCI(L)
Two Flotillas LCI

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 2
22nd July 1945

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COPY NO 32

JUL 24 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Note by Secretary

1. As a result of the discussion and direction at SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting, Minute 11, the attached letter has been signed by the Chief of Staff and dispatched to the Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff, with copies to the Secretary of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, MIDDLE EAST.

2. The papers are therefore circulated for information.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

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CC DIST - 24 JUL 45

(28)
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2. The papers are therefore circulated for information.

J. G. SHEPHERD,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ATTACHED FORMS HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Command in the Mediterranean

TO : The Secretary to the British Chiefs of Staff,
Office of the War Cabinet
Great George Street
S. W. 1, London, England

21 July 1945

Further to this HQ letter of 1 June in reply to your memorandum of 1 June enclosing COM(45)362(6), I have been instructed to submit the following comments on the note from the Commanders-in-Chief ALLIES dated 27 June, Ref. II/15/1. Reference herein are to paragraphs of that note.

Para 1.

The proposal that F&C ALLIES Staff should be covered all intra-Allied matters relating to military purposes is not agreed. The proposal makes no account of the fact that much of the intra-Allied staff work is executed by F&C and as a pool to meet Anglo-American needs.

These Anglo-American needs will continue for some months to come and the allocation of staff, in to meet them must therefore be controlled by an Allied Headquarters, advised and assisted by the senior representatives of the shipping authorities. Now these authorities are Principal and Joint Transport Officer (JTO) is the most essential from the military point of view.

Para 2.

A reply to the letter attached as Annexure to II/15/1 has already been sent to the ALLIES with a copy to the JTO under reference COM(45)362(6) dated 6 July. A copy of this reply is attached for easy reference and from this it will be seen that the requests made by ALLIES have been substantially met.

Further to this letter of 20 June in reply to your memorandum of 1 June enclosing JO(45)308(1), I have been instructed to submit the following comments on the note from the Quartermaster-in-Chief dated 27 June, and 21/12/1. References to the note are to paragraph 1 of that note.

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Para 1. The proposal that P&Y should have control of all intra-Atlantic shipping allocated for military purposes is not agreed. The proposal takes no account of the fact that each of the intra-Atlantic shipping is operated by F&O and as a pool to meet Anglo-American needs.

These Anglo-American needs will continue for some months to come and the allocation of shipping to meet them must therefore be controlled by an Allied Headquarters, advised and assisted by the senior representatives of the shipping authorities. Since these authorities are Principal Sea Transport Officer (and) is the most essential from the military point of view.

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Para 2. A reply to the letter attached as Annexure to 21/12/1 has already been sent to the Admiralty with a copy to the C. C. Office under reference HQ/XX/M/1. A copy dated 9 July. A copy of this reply is attached for easy reference and from this it will be seen that the requests made by the Admiralty have been substantially met.

Para 3. There will always be possibility of incidents on the Greek frontier with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The political problems of all Balkan countries are increasingly mixed and the Balkans has a dominating influence over the whole area. The Balkans should therefore be

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dealt with as a whole by one file. For this purpose the following are considered as Balkan countries: GREECE, ALBANIA, JUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA and ROMANIA. Whichever Headquarters is responsible for the Balkans should therefore be responsible for the collection and collation of intelligence appertaining thereto. As stated in this Headquarters letter dated 25 June, it is recommended that this responsibility should remain with AFHQ. However, it is agreed that ALIAS EAST should continue to be responsible for the collection of intelligence in TURKEY. ALIAS EAST has also in practice been responsible for the DOMINION and this should continue.

Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9. Agreed.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre:

W. B. R. 100-100
L. B. R. 100-100
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

Copies to:

Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee,
AFHQ, etc.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

See this should contain.

Para 6, 7, 8 and 9. added.

For the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre;

W. B. H. H. H.
W. B. H. H. H.
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

Copies to:

Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee,
AFHQ, AFHQ

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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F 1001

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Q (MAINT) BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

AFHQ/700/5/Q(Maint)

6 Jul 45

Subject: Commitments in Middle
East for C.M.E.

To: GHQ, M.E.F.

Copy to: War Office

Reference your 92255/Q/2) of 20 Jun 45.

1. Your difficulties in relation to shortage of shipping and manpower are fully appreciated since they apply equally to this theatre. Every effort has however been made to reduce your commitments on our behalf but these have been governed by War Office policies. As you are aware these have now been reviewed and a reduction is possible.

SUPPLIES

2. You will now have received a copy of War Office Urgent Memorandum Gen/26/(Ops) dated 26 Jun 45. This proposes the cutting down of AFHQ reserves in Middle East by calling forward of certain commodities to make good the backlog from U.S.A. This HQ is in agreement with the proposals which will be implemented departmentally.

R.E.M.E.

3. The position for period Jul - Sep 45 was discussed with D.M.E., AFHQ at a meeting held in the office of Brigadier Q(AE), GHQ, MEF on 12 Jun:-

(a) Overhaul of tank engines was reduced from a monthly task of 422 to 253. It is necessary to maintain this figure in order that the commitment of repaired tanks for DMO may be met.

Copy to: War Office

Reference your 92555/15) of 20 Jun 45.

1. Your difficulties in relation to shortage of shipping and manpower are fully appreciated since they apply equally to this theatre. Every effort has however been made to reduce your commitments on our behalf but these have been governed by War Office policies, as you are aware these have now been reviewed and a reduction is possible.

SUPPLIES

2. You will now have received a copy of War Office Urgent Memorandum Gen/28/4(Ops) dated 26 Jun 45. This proposes the cutting down of AFHQ reserves in Middle East by calling forward of certain commodities to make good the backlog from U.S.A. This HQ is in agreement with the proposal which will be implemented departmentally.

R.E.M.E.

3. The position for period Jul - Sep 45 was discussed with D.M.E., AFHQ at a meeting held in the office of Brigadier C(AE), GHQ, MEV on 12 Jun:-

- (a) Overhaul of tank engines was reduced from a monthly task of 422 to 253. It is necessary to maintain this figure in order that the commitment of repaired tanks for INDIA may be met.
- (b) The reorganisation of armoured formations in this theatre from Tanks to Armoured Cars for occupational duties will entail the continuation of the present output of repaired engines for these vehicles.
- (c) 'B' vehicles were reviewed and a cut in the monthly output from 752 to 403 was agreed. This figure is necessary in order to maintain the forces left in MEV.
4. It is hoped that before Sep 45 the position will have clarified and that further reductions will then be possible.

page 2/ page 5

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ADMINISTRATION

5. Reserve levels for occupational forces have been received from War Office which are covered by present holdings in Italy. All comments for AFHQ reserve are cancelled by War Office cables 99248 WS 2 of 5 Jun, and 54072 WS 2 of 22 Jun. It is presumed that you will obtain the necessary disposal instructions from the War Office.

A.O. DUFF, Major General,
For Field Marshal,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

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G-4 (Per)
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DGS
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War Diary.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Distribution

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Q (AS)

DST

DOS

DLS

War Diary.

A.C. DUFF, Major General,
for Field Marshall,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

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AP 533

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Ex. C.

SAC (45) 3
22 July 1945

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COPY TO 22

SUPPLEMENT ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FUTURE POLICY TOWARD ITALY

JUL 23 1945

Note by Secretary

275

Confidential

1. The attached letter from the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, is circulated for information.

2. It is proposed that copies of this letter, together with the Supreme Allied Commander's comments, should be forwarded officially to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to the British Chiefs of Staff.

3. A draft covering letter is, therefore, in preparation and will be circulated shortly for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander.

267.
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SAC

27/EC
J. C. DUSTAN,
DISTANCE COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

21

DISTRIBUTION

FORWARDED

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3. A draft covering letter is, therefore, in preparation and will be circulated shortly for the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander.

See memo 267
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[Signature]
 J. G. STANTON
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL
 55/10/1945

[Handwritten mark]

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10/11/45

EC Dist - 23 July 45

31 CHIEF COMMR

32 EXEC COMMR

43 POL ADVISERS (Dist 26/45)

Copy to 26 600/EC

1291

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 294

CC 1001

Confidential 275
June 1945

SUBJECT: Future Policy toward Italy.

TO : Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

1. Italy is at the parting of the ways. Defeated in 1943, she has been fought over and occupied by Allies or Germans for two years; she has suffered civil war in the North where partisans have fought Fascists, and Republican troops have been in battle against the new Italian Army. She is split into eight conflicting political parties with membership of less than 10 per cent of the population and no outstanding leader has come to the fore; she has had five Governments since September 1943; a million of her men have been in exile either as slave labor or as prisoners of war; more than half a million of her people have suffered dislocation of home; her financial position is precarious; her economy has been totally disrupted; she has no merchant fleet and few foreign markets; without coal and raw materials she faces unemployment amounting to several millions; the country is full of arms illegally held. Like other European countries devastated by the war, the ground in Italy is fertile for the rapid growth of the seeds of an anarchical movement fostered by Moscow to bring Italy within the sphere of Russian influence. Already there are signs that, if present conditions long continue, Communism will triumph -- possibly by force.

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2. Communistic growth cannot be checked by restrictive or repressive measures. Since the conditions which engender it are both material and moral, the only hope of restraining it in Italy is to ameliorate these conditions -- to assist Italy economically, and to lift her morale by admitting her to a position of respectability in the family of nations.

3. It can be argued that the expiration of Italy's crime of 1943 must rightly be prolonged: indeed, her defeat and the course of events since 1943 have tended to ensure that. Circumstances, it

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

~~Confidential~~

not the will of the United Nations, will see that she will not revert again to the artificial position of a great power which Mussolini's regime achieved. But already her people have shown, by their profusion and acts of co-belligerency with the Allies, not only in the armed forces of the post-Armistice Italian Government, but among the Partisans in the North, that they are willing to abandon totalitarianism and work for the same freedoms as the Allies was liberated them. The great majority of Italians desire to see a democratic Italy. They will only permit Communism to take hold because of fear -- since that party is the best organized and best armed in the country -- or because of apathy arising from a generation of non-participation in democratic political life, the shame of defeat, and the results of privation. Their efforts to attain democracy may be ineffective compared with others; they may appear self centered, and, like many liberated peoples, show scant gratitude to their liberators. But unless they receive help and guidance from the democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, they will inevitably turn to the USSR and join the group of "police" states, united by Communism, which is extending westward from Russia.

4. It is in the material interests of the United States and Great Britain to prevent this. Nor can the historical and moral issues be disregarded. American and British influence, military,

a democratic Italy. They will only permit Communism to take hold because of fear -- since that party is the best organized and best armed in the country -- or because of apathy arising from a generation of non-participation in democratic political life, the shame of defeat, and the results of privation. Their efforts to attain democracy may be ineffective compared with others; they may appear self centered, and, like many liberated peoples, show scant gratitude to their liberators. But unless they receive help and guidance from the democracies, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, they will inevitably turn to the USSR and join the group of ~~police~~ states, united by Communism, which is extending westward from Russia.

4. It is in the material interests of the United States and Great Britain to prevent this. Nor can the historical and moral issues be thereby avoided. American and British influence, military, political and economic, have been predominant in Italy for nearly two years. They have brought freedom from the common enemy; they have ensured freedom from hunger; they have not yet provided freedom from fear. Posterity would judge harshly if the endeavors of two great democratic states were to result in the institution of a second dictatorship in the first European country to be liberated from Fascism and Nazism.

5. An expression of positive policy towards Italy by the US and UK Governments is necessary. The policy should be one which,

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

Confidential

23 June 1945.

by restoring confidence in herself and in the Allies, will assist Italy towards recovery as a healthy nation politically and economically. Moreover, it is in the interests of the Allies to make use of Italy. She is geographically important in any strategic plans for regional security in the Mediterranean. She owned a naval fleet (which still exists) which, if properly employed, would be an important addition to regional security. She has a small army which, reorganized under Allied guidance, has won merit and would improve greatly under further Allied help. The industries in Northern Italy lack only raw materials and coal to be employed immediately for Allied war production and to supplement in the Mediterranean the commodities necessary for the clothing and rehabilitation of Europe.

6. But a change in relationship between the three nations must be effected. Having "worked her passage", Italy must be allowed to emerge from defeat through co-belligerency to the position of an active partner, however lowly, in the maintenance of post-war security. If she is to serve as a bastion of democracy in Southern Europe, such a recovery is essential and must be encouraged.

7. The implementation of this policy would require certain positive steps, assurances, and conditions. These might be included in the agreement between the Allies and Italy which would formally terminate the state of hostilities and replace the Terms of Surrender.

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7. The implementation of this policy would require certain
positive steps, assurances, and conditions. These might be included
in the agreement between the Allies and Italy which would formally
terminate the state of hostilities and replace the Terms of Surren-
der as a prelude to her joining the United Nations now or in the
very near future. The agreement might include, among others, the
following provisions:

(a) Italy to regain control of her naval fleet for employment
under any regional security scheme which might be evolved
for the Mediterranean.

The fleet consists of 5 battleships, 9 cruisers, 11
fleet destroyers, 40 small craft and 28 submarines.

Two of the battleships are now in the Bitter Lakes.

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

23 June 1945.

three in Taranto. It is estimated that it would cost five hundred million lire each to make them fit for service. 13 Submarines are in Allied operations overseas. It would require a Navy of 50,000 to maintain the fleet without the battleships, and of 75,000 with them. Even having regard to the comparative ineffectiveness of the fleet, its physical presence would be an assurance towards regional security. But its retention would be a major contribution to Italian morale.

(b) The Italian Army to be maintained at a reasonable strength (say 200,000 or 250,000 men).

In my memorandum 8251/180/EC of 7 June 1945 I have suggested the maintenance of the Italian Army at an interior strength of 140,000 men consisting of five combat groups and one reserve regiment (50,000), three internal security divisions for Sicily and Sardinia, and one internal security brigade for each of ten military regions (40,000), with the remainder to be control and administrative units. In addition, the present strength of 65,000 men of the Royal Carabinieri should be maintained. Such a strength would suffice so long as Allied troops, mentioned in subpara (f) below, remained, but should be increased as these are

tion would be a major contribution to Italian morale.

(b) The Italian Army to be maintained at a reasonable strength

(say 200,000 or 250,000 men).

In my memorandum 0251/130/EC of 7 June 1945 I have suggested the maintenance of the Italian Army at an interim strength of 140,000 men consisting of five combat groups and one reserve regiment (50,000), three internal security divisions for Sicily and Sardinia, and one internal security brigade for each of ten military regions (40,000), with the remainder to be control and administrative units. In addition, the present strength of 65,000 men of the Royal Carabinieri should be maintained. Such a strength would suffice so long as Allied troops, mentioned in subpara (f) below, remained, but should be increased as these are withdrawn.

(c) The Italian Air Force to be maintained at a token strength, or at present strength.

It is presumed that an military air force will be maintained but it is suggested that sufficient aircraft be allocated to the Navy and Army for reconnaissance and spotting purposes. If, however, it were considered possible to permit an air force, then it is recommended that it be maintained at its present strength. Restor-

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

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23 June 1945. 271

action of civil air transport domestically and in the

Mediterranean should be encouraged.

- (d) To enable her to fill her role as a "junior partner" in the maintenance of Mediterranean security, the Allies would agree to furnish a military mission to assist in the training and organization of the Italian land, sea, and air forces, similar to the pre-war military and naval missions provided by the United States for certain South American republics.

- (e) Similarly, an Allied Police Mission to assist the Italian Government in the reorganization and training of the Police Forces of Italy could be offered.

The introduction of an Allied Police Mission of high quality is essential. Although in two years of occupation the Allies have been compelled to employ the existing Italian Police Forces, they still lack the confidence of themselves, the public, or the Allies. With the difficulties of military occupation it may not have been possible to achieve this. It is essential, however, that immediate steps be taken to overhaul and possibly reconstitute the whole of the public security agencies in Italy, based on democratic

republics.

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(f) The retention in Italy of an Allied Military Force of five Divisions (excluding Allied Forces in VENEZIA GIULIA) until such time as revitalized Italian civil and military services were in a position to ensure democratic security in Italy.

The role of the Allied troops at all times would be as representatives of the democracies and it would be necessary to arrange for special instruction and even training to this end. Intervention in Italian affairs

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

Confidential

23 June 1945

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except in the gravest emergency would be avoided and the greatest care would be taken in the handling of such administrative problems as accommodation and requisitioning. The troops would be not so much forces of occupation in a defeated country but forces of assistance provided by the Allies in order to give confidence to the population and the Government: to strengthen merely by their presence the authority of the Italian machinery of law and order (but only in exceptional cases to supplant it) and to be used in a last resort to prevent the imposition of undemocratic methods by force.

(g) The establishment of an Allied economic organization (joint or separate) to assist Italy in correcting the basic defects of her former economy, in the procurement of raw materials and the rehabilitation of her commerce and industry; and

(h) The provision of an annual quota of coal sufficient to enable Italian industry to function.

A prerequisite for a healthy Italy is the immediate provision of sufficient coal and raw materials to maintain a modicum of the industries of Italy at work and to prevent unemployment on such a vast scale that

the Italian machinery of law and order (but only in exceptional cases to supplant it) and to be used in a last resort to prevent the imposition of undemocratic methods by force.

(g) The establishment of an Allied economic organization (joint or separate) to assist Italy in correcting the basic defects of her former economy, in the procurement of raw materials and the rehabilitation of her commerce and industry; and

(h) The provision of an annual quota of coal sufficient to enable Italian industry to function.

A prerequisite for a healthy Italy is the immediate provision of sufficient coal and raw materials to maintain a medium of the industries of Italy at work and to prevent unemployment on such a vast scale that it must lead to disorder. Provision of raw materials and coal must be assured and equally the retention of an Allied economic organization (or separate U.S. and British missions) to ensure procurement and to advise the Italian Government on the proper use and distribution of such imports is essential. It would contain, of course, a financial section. Some such body as NAUEN or MEAC is envisaged with strong Italian representation dependent from the Allied Commission, or

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

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23 June 1945

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its successor. Alternatively, separate U.S. and U.K. economic missions depending from the Embassies or the Governments could be provided. The economic problems of post-war Italy are immense and unless Allied assistance by means of imports and guidance is provided, all other measures to preserve the country may be discounted.

- (i) The reassurance of credits in the U.S. and an increase in credits in the U.K. The latter might well take the form of financial assistance with regard to the import of coal.
- (j) The replacement of the Allied Commission by a small Allied Mission to coordinate (d) to (h) above and to function as advisers to the Italian Government.
- (k) Arrangements with respect to the Italian colonies to be considered with due regard to the interests of the inhabitants and to the assistance given by Italy as a co-belligerent and in no punitive sense.

Little perhaps can be said for the return of any of her colonies to Italy. But if she were to achieve the position of an active partner in regional security in the Mediterranean then it might be possible to allow her, under the same regional agreement, to administer the colony of Tripolitania. She might also be per-

credits in the U.S. The latter might take the form of financial assistance with regard to the import of coal.

(j) The replacement of the Allied Commission by a small Allied Mission to coordinate (d) to (k) above and to function as advisors to the Italian Government.

(k) Arrangements with respect to the Italian colonies to be considered with due regard to the interests of the inhabitants and to the assistance given by Italy as a co-belligerent and in no punitive sense.

Little perhaps can be said for the return of any of her colonies to Italy. But if she were to achieve the position of an active partner in regional security in the Mediterranean then it might be possible to allow her, under the same regional agreement, to administer the colony of Tripolitania. She might also be permitted to be represented on any international body set up to administer Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.

9. The first and last of these suggested conditions are of course the assurances that would create most satisfaction in Italy and restore the self respect of her people.

10. A further safeguard to preserve Italy among the free nations of democracy, and indeed a duty of the Allies, is the education of the minds of the Italians towards a democratic way of life. Not enough has been done in this direction. We have established freedom

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

23 June 1945.

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of speech and of the press -- but freedom without the self-imposed restraints of a democratically educated nation tends to become license. We have done much in the schools and universities. But the people, the Government, and the local authorities, after 20 years of Fascism, need advice on the interpretation of democracy. We cannot expect, nor should we try, to impose Anglo-American methods on a Latin country: but in the field of national and local government, of justice and police methods, of agriculture and labor, of electoral systems and social welfare, the Allies still have much to teach and the Italians much to learn. If the Italians are to become partners with the Allies they must be prepared to assimilate their national characteristics with the principles of democracy and take advice from the two democratic powers who are willing to help them materially.

11. Much can be done in this way by institutions such as the British Council, the interchange of American cultural representatives, and by sympathetic treatment of Italian problems in the Allied press. The Military Mission and the Police Mission would represent direct forms of advice. The Allied Mission referred to in subpara 7(j) should contain a very small number of highly qualified men who, without semblance of control, would be accepted by the Italian Government and act to them as advisers in their task of setting up a democratic form of administration. Such men might be

systems and social welfare, the Allies still have much to teach and the Italians much to learn. If the Italians are to become partners with the Allies they must be prepared to assimilate their national characteristics with the principles of democracy and take advice from the two democratic powers who are willing to help them enter-ally.

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12. The Allied Commission, therefore, should be succeeded by an Allied Mission for the following purposes: Except in VENEZIA GIULIA, and possibly in the Southern Tyrolean provinces, Allied Military Government should have disappeared by September 1945. In order to ensure free elections and a free referendum, it will be recommended that a number of Allied officers, under the direction of the Commission or its successor, remain in the provinces, and a considerable number may be required in connection with the rehabilitation of

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

Confidential 267

industry. But by the end of 1945 both the redeployment of Allied troops, except those recommended in para 7(f) above, and the removal of Allied Commission officers in the field, will probably have been completed. It is recommended that the Head of the Mission with access to the United States and British Governments should be charged with the following functions:

(a) As Chief Civil Affairs Officer, the administration of

VENEZIA GIULIA and any other areas under AMF.

(b) As Head of the Allied Mission:

(i) To coordinate the work of the military mission or missions.

(ii) To supervise the Allied Police Mission.

(iii) To supervise the Economic Board or to coordinate independent economic missions.

(iv) To coordinate the work of the Displaced Persons and Refugees Sub-Commission with UNRRA, the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees, and other organizations until such time as UNRRA took over all such functions.

(v) To supervise the work of the Enemy War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission.

(vi) To interpret to the Italian Government the conditions of any agreement made, vide para 7, and to safeguard

(b) as Head of the Allied Mission:

- (i) To coordinate the work of the military mission or missions.
- (ii) To supervise the Allied Police Mission.
- (iii) To supervise the Economic Board or to coordinate independent economic missions.
- (iv) To coordinate the work of the Displaced Persons and Refugee Sub-Commission with UNRRA, the Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees, and other organizations until such time as UNRRA took over all such functions.
- (v) To supervise the work of the Enemy War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission.
- (vi) To interpret to the Italian Government the conditions of any agreement made, vide para 7, and to safeguard Allied interests under such an agreement.
- (vii) To provide liaison between Allied Military Commander or Commanders and the Italian Government.

13. To sum up, in order to prevent Italy from leaning toward the USSR and succumbing to its influence, an expression of positive, non-vindictive policy by the US and UK Governments is necessary. 1282 This policy should make Italy a useful partner of the Allies in the Mediterranean and so create a healthy Italy. Important conditions are: the rebuilding of her morale by restoring to her the control

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Subject: Future Policy Toward Italy

Confidential

23 June 1945.

of her fleet and a non-punitive policy with regard to her colonies; the retention of 5 divisions of Allied troops and the establishment of Allied Military and Police Missions to enable her to regain internal security under a democracy; and practical economic assistance. More must be done to encourage the education of the Italians towards the democratic way of life: the Allied Commission should be replaced by an Allied Mission.

14. In short, neither a laissez-faire attitude toward Italy by the U.S. and the U.K. nor the imposition of a harsh peace is compatible with a policy of preserving Italy as a bastion of democracy in the Mediterranean area.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

U.S. Ambassador
British Ambassador
U.S. POLAD, AFHQ
British REPAIR, AFHQ

14. In short, neither a laissez-faire attitude toward Italy by the U.S. and the U.K. nor the imposition of a harsh peace is compatible with a policy of preserving Italy as a bastion of democracy in the Mediterranean area.

Copy to:

U.S. Ambassador
British Ambassador
U.S. POLAD, AFHQ
British RESMIL, AFHQ

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USMC
Chief Commissioner

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FILE

265

Tel: 478730

21 July 1945.

Ref: 218/EC.

SUBJECT: Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
Attn: SAC's Secretariat.

1. Reference para 3 of Paper SAC (45) 1 dated 20 July 1945.
2. It would be appreciated if three copies of Minutes, Agenda and Papers with reference to Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences could continue to be forwarded and not two copies as indicated in Paper under reference.
3. Distribution at this Headquarters is:

Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
Political Advisers
4. If agreed it is requested that one further copy of Paper SAC (45) 1 dated 20 July 45 and Minutes of Conference, SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting, dated 20 July 45, can be forwarded.

For the Chief Commissioner:

264

257 file 257


Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

X 210

SAC (45) 1
20th July 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

JUL 23 1945

Note by Secretary

1. In accordance with the decision taken at SAC (P) (45) 15th Meeting, Minute 13, the distinction between the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Operational) and (Political) will henceforth be discontinued, and there will accordingly be only one series of conferences, at which the following officers will normally attend or be represented :-

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Commander, US Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
Commander-in-Chief, AFMST
Commanding General MAF/ATO
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief Administrative Officer
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
British Resident Minister
U.S. Political Adviser
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

2. When the Agenda is such that the Chief of Staff considers that any of the above officers are not required or that any other officers should attend, the officers affected will be notified accordingly by the Secretariat.
3. The normal distribution of Conference papers and minutes will be the same as the distribution of this paper.
4. The provisions of SAC (P) (45) 12 (Addendum) are hereby cancelled.

Supreme Allied Commander
 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
 Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
 Commander, US Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
 Commander-in-Chief, US MACV
 Commanding General AF/ATO
 Chief of Staff
 Deputy Chief of Staff
 Chief Administrative Officer
 Deputy Chief Administrative Officer
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
 British Resident Minister
 U.S. Political Adviser
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4. The provisions of SAC (P) (45) 12 (Addendum) are hereby cancelled.

14 June 45
 J.S. STEEDMAN,
 LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
 SECRETARY.

14 June 45

31 Chief Comm
 32 Exec Comm
 43 POL ADVISERS (ind 26 July)

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(as noted)

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff, British
Chief of Staff, ATOUSA
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Chief, Liaison Section
Director, FWE
Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee, CMC/MCP
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Chief of Staff, HONSA
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British Resident Minister
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Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
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Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee, CHC JEF
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
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SAC (P) (45) 26
17 July 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JUL 18 1945

POST-NAR COMMITMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - REDUCTION
OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY

Note by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

1. The duties now being carried out by the Royal Naval Port Parties in Italian Ports have been under detailed examination, in order to determine to what extent the impending assumption of control by the UNITED NATIONS MARITIME SHIPPING AUTHORITY (U.N.A.) of merchant shipping will permit of the withdrawal of these parties.

Formation of the Parties.

2. Naval Port Parties were originally formed and equipped for the rapid opening and operation of newly-captured ports essential for the supply of the Army, in circumstances in which communications were likely to have been destroyed, and where no assistance from the local port personnel could be anticipated.

Responsibilities of the Naval Officer-in-Charge

3. Residce being responsible for the seaward defence of the port, the Naval Officer-in-Charge was the final authority empowered to issue orders for the berthing and movement of all shipping and craft within the port limits, the defence of the port and the safety of the shipping from all dangers being solely within his discretion. So far as attacks on harbours and shipping therein are concerned these special powers are no longer required.

4. Once the operation of the port became a matter of routine it became the custom to decentralise the orders for berthing, so as to suit the working of the port. The berthing of ships in safety from marine dangers is a normal function of the local Port Authorities and their pilots, and these have, in General, been doing this work at ports under the direction of the Naval Officer-in-Charge. With the cessation of hostilities a stage has now been reached when the direct assistance rendered by the Navy in support of the Army in the ports is comparatively small, and is moreover delaying assumption by the Commercial Authorities of the Ports of their normal functions.

control by the UNITED STATES
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Admiralty Release Plan

5. Continued pressure is being exerted on the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean by the Admiralty for the reduction of Naval Shore-based commitments in the Mediterranean, and it has recently been represented with increased urgency that the rate of release of personnel must be accelerated, or the working of the Naval release plan will be jeopardised with resulting injury to the Navy as a whole.

6. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has been instructed that, by March 1946, T.P.MTO is to be the only port in T.M. with Royal Naval representation; this port being retained as a major refitting port in support of the Fleet in the East. Compliance with this instruction will involve the Royal Navy withdrawing from the majority of the ports earlier than the dates on which current Army planning contemplates handing-over complete control to the local Italian authorities.

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7. The following ports are concerned:-

ANCONA
BARI
BRINDISI
GENOA
LEGHORN
NAPLES
PARMA
TARANTO
VENICE

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Considerations affecting the withdrawal of Naval Port Parties

8. There are two considerations which affect the reduction of British Naval Commitments in Italian ports.

- (a) the ability of the local Italian Port Authorities to take over the running of their port from the British Port Party.
- (b) the transfer to Commercial Agencies of certain merchant shipping responsibilities, which are now undertaken by Naval Authorities.

9. With regard to paragraph 8 (a) above it is understood that the Port Authorities at GENOA and VENICE are available as they were undisturbed by hostilities, and in the case of the Southern Italian Ports the pilots and Port Authorities have been assisting in conducting the business of the Port for some time. It will however be necessary to retain British Naval Control Service Officers to issue routes to Merchant ships until Italian Naval Officers can be trained to relieve them, and the call forward of merchant ships for discharge will be effected through these officers at request of the Port Executive Committee. The existing procedure for calling forward merchant ships would therefore be unaffected.

10. Withdrawal of the British Naval Port Party does not therefore affect the existing control of the port exercised by the Army, or the ability of the Army to ensure that the Italian Port Authorities do what they are told, since the local Ministry of War Transport Representative or, in his absence, the Army Port Commandant will assume Chairmanship of the Port Executive Committee, the Italians being granted increased representation on the Committee. This method has proved successful at ALGERIA. Reasonably efficient Italian Naval communications are already available at the majority of ports.

11. With regard to paragraph 8 (b) it now appears that U.M.A. will be operating on a commercial basis within the next six weeks, and that this will have a direct and important effect on the question of the reduction of British Naval Port Parties. Under U.M.A. Control the interposition of a Naval Officer-in-Charge and Naval channels of communication in commercial procedure would be a hindrance rather than a help; it is therefore desirable that the Navy should relinquish control of ports in order that the normal

responsibilities, which are now undertaken by Naval Authorities.

9. With regard to paragraph 3 (a) above it is understood that the Port Authorities at GENOA and VENEZIA are available as they were undisturbed by hostilities, and in the case of the Southern Italian Ports the pilots and Port Authorities have been assisting in conducting the business of the Port for some time. It will however be necessary to retain British Naval Control Service Officers to issue routes to Merchant ships until Italian Naval Officers can be trained to relieve them, and the call forward of merchant ships for discharge will be effected through these officers at request of the Port Executive Committee. The existing procedure for calling forward merchant ships would therefore be unaffected.

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Assumption of Control by U.M.A.

12. The following is the suggested division of responsibilities after the U.M.A. organisation is functioning:-

- (1) The working of the port is controlled by Ministry of War Transport Representative (or the Army Port Commandant) in his capacity as Chairman of the Port Executive Committee.

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(11) British Naval Control Service Officer remains responsible for the safe routing of all merchant ships and for the dispatching of VEECA telegrams reporting merchant ship movements until relieved by a trained Italian Officer. This would continue to be handled by Naval communication, either British or Italian.

(12) All signals ordering movements of merchant ships (i.e. those now originated by the Shipping Diversion Room in the name of Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean) would be exchanged between the U.M.... zone committee and their agents and brokers at ports, via commercial communication channels.

Censorship regulations will shortly be relaxed within Italy (except for the disputed VENEZIA GIULIA) and it is merely a matter of local arrangement to introduce a system whereby shipping agents can file their telegrams at Italian commercial telegraph offices. In the case of telegrams to addressees outside Italy, the question of censorship still exists. This could probably be overcome by acceding the agents adequate official status to permit them to file such messages in the clear.

Merchant Ship Repairs

13. Control and supervision of merchant ship repair facilities at ports vacated by the Navy will be turned over completely to Ministry of War Transport, Mediterranean, if this is requested. Otherwise these repair facilities will revert to a commercial basis.

14. Proposals for the commercial operation of fuelling installations are under discussion in Washington and London, nevertheless the assumption of responsibility for the supply of liquid fuels to merchant shipping by U.S.A. and U.K.F.S. in bases from which it is now proposed Royal Naval interests be withdrawn is earnestly desired as this results in a further reduction in naval personnel.

15. The Supreme Allied Commander in Conference is requested to approve the attached programme of withdrawal of British Naval Port Parties. Adjustment of the programme will be made should unforeseen difficulties delay the discharge of the Navy's accepted tasks at GRC. and VENICE.

(Intld) J.H.D.C.

Merchant Ship Repairs

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14. Proposals for the commercial operation of fuelling installations are under discussion in Washington and London, notwithstanding the assumption of responsibility for the supply of liquid fuels to merchant shipping by S.M.A. and M.V.T.R. in bases from which it is not proposed Royal Naval interests be withdrawn is earnestly desired as this results in a further reduction in naval personnel.
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(Intld) J.H.D.C.

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A	B	C	
No.	Port	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean's Intentions	
1	Ancona	Commence hand-over of the port to the local Italian port Authorities now. It is anticipated withdrawal of all Admiralty owned stores, machinery, and equipment will take up to 2 months. <u>Target date for completion 1st October, 1945.</u>	Alli reta H.W. for Chad
2	Bari	Commence hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities now. <u>Target date for completion 1st week in August.</u>	Rema
3	Brindisi	Commence hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities now. <u>Target date for completion 1st week in August.</u> A small Naval supervisory staff will remain for control of the local repair facilities, but these will have no connection with the discharge and loading activities of the port.	Rema
4	Genoa	Hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities as soon as minesweeping and salvage operations necessary to permit discharge of 8000 t.p.d. through the port, for which the Navy accepted responsibility, have been completed. <u>Target date for completion 1st September.</u>	Rema Targ mine rend
5	Leghorn	(a) Present NOIC and Port Party will remain while mine clearance forces are operating from the Port. (b) On completion of minesweeping operations hand-over port to the local Italian Port Authorities. The date of this hand-over will depend on the progress of minesweeping operations.	If G Army No. 1 that will Comm

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D-12

Remarks

Com-in-Chief Mediterranean's Intentions

of the port to the local Italian port Authorities
for withdrawal of all Admiralty owned stores,
which will take up to 2 months. Target date
October, 1945.

Allied control of port operations will be
retained by Port Executive Committee of which
M.W.T. Representative will take Chairman. Call
forward of shipping by M.C.S.O. at request of
Chairman Port Executive Committee.

Local Italian Port Authorities now.
Operation 1st week in August.

Remarks for No. 1 Col. D. apply.

Local Italian Port Authorities now.
Operation 1st week in August.
Navy staff will remain for control of the local
and these will have no connection with the
activities of the port.

Remarks for No. 1 Col. D. apply.

Italian Port Authorities as soon as minesweeping
is necessary to permit discharge of 5000 t.p.d.
which the Navy accepted responsibility, have
Target date for completion 1st September.

Remarks for No. 1 Col. D apply.
Target date will be readjusted if
minesweeping or salvage operations
render this necessary.

Port Party will remain while mine clearance
from the Port. (b) On completion of minesweeping
Port to the local Italian Port Authorities.
Power will depend on the progress of minesweeping

If Col. C (b) occurs before the U.S.
Army is ready to withdraw remarks in
No. 1 Col. D will apply, except
that it is presumed USA representative
will take chairman of Port Executive
Committee.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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A	B	C	
No.	Port	Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean's Intentions	
6	Naples	Reduce Naval Port Party progressively. <u>Target date for final hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities to be not later than March 1946.</u>	When h
7	Taranto	Situation at this port is complicated as some discharging and loading is done in the Arsenal. Extent to which commercial port can be handed over to the local Italian Port Authorities, and the future of the N.O.I.C. organisation, is under detailed examination.	
8	Venice	Hand-over to local Italian Port Authorities when minesweeping operations to open Porto Lido entrance, and Porto Marghera to Liberty Ships are complete. <u>Target date for completion mid-August.</u>	When h Target to pro
9	Trieste and Pola	For political reasons it will be necessary <u>to retain present NOIC's and port party organisation until future ownership of these ports is settled at the Peace Conference.</u>	In add adrese operat

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Chief Mediterranean's Intentions

Remarks

ty progressively. Target date for final hand-over
Authorities to be not later than March 1946.

When handed over remarks in No. 1 Col. D apply.

It is complicated as some discharging and loading is
Extent to which commercial port can be handed over
Port Authorities, and the future of the N.O.I.C.
or detailed examination.

lian Port Authorities when minesweeping operations
Grance, and Porto Marghera to Liberty Ships are
for completion mid-August.

When handed over remarks in No. 1 Col. D apply.
Target date may require adjustment according
to progress of minesweeping operations.

It will be necessary to retain present NOIC's
ation until future ownership of these ports
Conference.

In addition Trieste will become the main
minesweeping base for mine clearance
operations in the Northern Adriatic.

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff, (Br)
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34 Chief Comm

35 Exec Comm

36 Liaison Advisers

Chief of Staff, (Er)

- Chief, Liaison Section
- Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
- U.S. Political Adviser
- British Resident Minister
- Director, PWS
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- 35 Exec Comm
- 36 Political Advisers

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SMC (P) (45) 35
19 July 1945

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JUL 10 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

1. Now that the North of Italy has been liberated and the Parli Government, including representatives of the north, has been formed, the ultimate method of settlement of the Italian institutional question is clearly a matter which will come into rapidly increasing prominence both in Italy and abroad. In this connection the British and United States Governments have pledged themselves that the Italian people shall have "a free and untrammelled choice of the permanent form of their government" and have guaranteed that "in so far as possible, the will of the majority of the Italian People shall be carried out".

2. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, considers that, in order to allow the Italian people such a free choice, it will be best if the question is ultimately solved by a referendum or a plebiscite rather than by a vote passed by a Constituent Assembly. The following are extracts of the arguments which lead him to this conclusion :-

(a) "In countries such as Italy, with limited experience in recent years of democratic Government, and under the circumstances presently existing here, it is unrealistic to expect that an attempt will be made by domestic or external interests to secure the result desired by them. It will be clearly far more difficult to manipulate a referendum throughout the whole country than to lobby and cajole the members of a Constituent body".

(b) "Signor Borrelli expressed after the Yalta conference the hope that the Allied Governments would require in the peace treaty or otherwise that the Italian institutional question be determined by referendum rather than by constituent assembly in order to avoid the danger of having this question decided by less than a majority of the Italian people".

3. The settlement of the matter by a referendum is, however, complicated by the fact that in June 1944 the Italian Government decided to

2. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, considers that, in order to allow the Italian people such a free choice, it will be best if the question is ultimately solved by a referendum or a plebiscite rather than by a vote passed by a Constituent Assembly. The following are extracts of the arguments which lead him to this conclusion :-

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(b) "Signor Bonomi expressed after the Yalta conference the hope that the Allied Governments would require in the peace treaty or otherwise that the Italian institutional question be determined by referendum rather than by constituent assembly in order to avoid the danger of having this question decided by less than a majority of the Italian people."

3. The settlement of the matter by a referendum is, however, complicated by the fact that in June 1944 the Italian Government passed a decree the part of which was announced as follows :-

"This measure establishes, by legislative process, that after the liberation of the national territory the institutional question will be decided by the Italian people, who, for this purpose, will elect by universal, direct and secret ballot a Constituent Assembly to decide the new Constitution of the State."

4. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, considers that this decree precludes the Italian Government from taking action on its own initiative so as

5. - Aide Memoire of British Embassy in Washington to Department of State dated 12 May 1945 and Department of State's reply of May 25.

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to decide the institutional question by referendum. However, as is of the opinion that:

A. The decree could be advocated by another, arranging for a referendum, and that it would not be inappropriate for the allies to suggest to the Italian Government that the legislation should be revised in this manner in order to assist the allied Governments in carrying out their commitments regarding the free and untrammelled choice of the Italian people on their permanent form of Government.

B. The revised legislation might provide for the referendum to take place when the voters lists have been completed for the whole of Italy, less GUARDIA GIULIA. It is not, however, envisaged that these lists will be ready before the spring of next year.

5. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, the British Resident Minister and the United States Political Adviser, suggest that the arguments put forward by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, have considerable weight and recommend that the policy which he has suggested should be approved.

6. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly requested:-

- (a) To approve the despatch of the draft cable at Appendix B, reporting the matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for information and guidance.
- (b) To invite the United States Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister to report the matter in a similar sense through their diplomatic channels.

EC Dist - 18 July 45

34 CMC Cmrk

35 EXEC Cmrk

36 Political Advisers

J.C. SUTTON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer

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by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, have considerable weight and recommend that the policy which he has suggested should be approved.

6. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly requested:-

- (a) To approve the despatch of the draft cable at appendix (A) reporting the matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for information and guidance.
- (b) To invite the United States Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister to report the matter in a similar sense through their diplomatic channels.

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34 Chas Comk

35 Exec Comk

36 Political Advisers

J.G. SUTCLIFF,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Assistant Chief of Staff (BR)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, R. MAF
U.S. Political Adviser
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APPENDIX "A"

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TO : AGENTS FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
AGENTS FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : ALCOA

This is NAF _____.

Consideration of Italian institutional question.

1. Liberation of North and set up of Parri Government which includes representatives of North makes it obvious that question of ultimate settlement of Italian institutional question is one which will come rapidly into increasing prominence. Undertakings signed by Italian Government preclude question being re-opened without allied content "until such time as ITALY has been liberated and Italian people have the opportunity of themselves determining the form of government". It is probable, however, that Italian Government will shortly press question. Guidance as to line of action to be taken is therefore desirable.

2. I consider that institutional question, when allowed to be re-opened, could best be solved by referendum to Italian people rather than by vote of a Constituent Assembly. This advocated on grounds that first Constituent Assembly elected might not be truly representative of Italian people and that referendum would give best chance to all to state their desires.

3. Communiqué published 23 June 1944 by Italian Government referring

1. Liberation of North and set up of Parri Government which includes representatives of North makes it obvious that question of ultimate settlement of Italian institutional question is one which will come rapidly into increasing prominence. Undertakings signed by Italian Government preclude question being re-opened without allied consent "until such time as Italy has been liberated and Italian people have the opportunity of themselves determining the form of government". It is probable, however, that Italian Government will shortly press question. Guidance as to line of action to be taken is therefore desirable.

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2. Communiqué published 23 June 1944 by Italian Government referring to an Italian decree which was published on the institutional question

states:

"This measure establishes, by legislative process, that after the liberation of the national territory the institutional question will be decided by the Italian people, who, for this purpose, will elect by universal, direct and secret ballot a Constituent assembly

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to decide the new Constitution of the State."

4. While the decree of itself precludes settlement of institutional question by referendum we consider there is nothing to prohibit Italian Government passing new decrees to achieve settlement by referendum. The Italian Government might be appropriately advised that they should consider the revision of the present decree; and that such revision would be a sign of the Government's desire to assist the Allied Governments in discharging their declared commitments to enable the Italian people to choose freely their permanent form of government.
5. It is improbable that complete voters lists on which proper referendum could be founded could be ready before next Spring.
6. It is felt that Allied intervention, if considered desirable, might well be made through diplomatic channels but that this matter should be reported to you at this stage for information and guidance.
7. Directions are accordingly requested.

their declared commitments to enable the Italian people to choose freely their permanent form of government.

5. It is improbable that complete voters lists on which proper referendum could be founded could be ready before next Spring.

6. It is felt that Allied intervention, if considered desirable, might well be made through diplomatic channels but that this matter should be reported to you at this stage for information and guidance.

7. Directions are accordingly requested.

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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10 July 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(PRIORITY)

JUL 11 1945

SAILING OF MERCHANT VESSELS TO JUGOSLAVIA PORTS

Note by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

1. The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has received a request from the Yugoslav authorities in BELGRADE to withdraw the British Naval Liaison Officers at SPLIT. He has complied with this request.
2. Reports from various sources have revealed that the Yugoslavs on the coast have recently been very unco-operative and unhelpful and the withdrawal of the Liaison Officers, together with the Sea Transport and Movement's Officers, who have also received orders to return to ITALY, may make the position of masters of Allied merchant vessels in ports in JUGOSLAVIA untenable. It may, therefore, become necessary at some future date to suspend sailing to such ports until the Yugoslav attitude becomes more reasonable.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander, in conference, is requested to take note of the above.

(Initial) J. A. H.

For J. H. D. C.

DISTRIBUTION:

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, AAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theater

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Officers at SPLIT. He has complied with this request.

2. Reports from various sources have revealed that the Yugoslavs on the coast have recently been very unco-operative and uncivil and the withdrawal of the Liaison Officers, together with the Sea Transport and Movement Officers, who have also received orders to return to Italy, may make the position of eastern Allied merchant vessels in ports in JUGOSLAVIA untenable. It may, therefore, become necessary at some future date to suspend sailings to such ports until the Yugoslav attitude becomes more reasonable.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander, in conference, is requested to take note of the above.

(Initial) J. A. W.

for A. H. D. C.

DISTRIBUTION:

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theater

Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (AR)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, H. H. H.
U. S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, PAB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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EC II 137 - 11 July 45

(213/152)

24 Chief Clerk
35 Exec Clerk
36 Personnel Adviser

120/451

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SEC (E) (45) 33
3 July 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

(POLITICAL)

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

Note by Secretary

The attached letter is circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

Robert T. Anderson
Major General, G.S.C.
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

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The image is predominantly black with significant vertical banding and horizontal streaks, suggesting a poor quality scan or a very dark photograph. A bright, irregular white shape is visible along the bottom edge, possibly representing a page fold or a light source. Faint, illegible markings are scattered across the surface, but no text or identifiable figures can be discerned.

785017

The enclosed letter is circulated for the information of members of the General Allied Co., under's Conference (Political).

J. W. B. B. B.
J. W. B. B. B.
P.O. Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

DISCUSSION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Europe
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest Atlantic Waters
Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, and Airman
The other

Co-mending General, 15th Army Group

Chief of Staff

Chloroform

Deputy Chief of Staff

A. J. G. M. van der Wal, M.D., Ph.D.
Department of Pathology, University Hospital Groningen, P.O. Box 30.001,
9700 RB Groningen, The Netherlands
E-mail: a.j.g.m.vanderwal@azg.umcg.nl

www.elsevier.com/locate/jmb

Chadman, Leddy, and the Joint Planning Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Assistant
Director

Chief, Liaison Section

Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ 3002

U. S. Political Action

British Columbia Winter

Director, FBI

Chief Counsel

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretaries

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$

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Rec. 1151 - 4 July 48

3% Chief Clerk

36 Ewee. Cook

3rd Peasebrook House

Coke on the water

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ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

TO: Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Confidential

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

With reference to your memorandum of 1 June forwarding a report (COS(45)369(C) by the British Chiefs of Staff on the future organization of command in the Mediterranean, I have been instructed by Field Marshal Alexander to submit the attached paper giving his views on this subject. In addition Field Marshal Alexander offers the following comments on certain points dealt with in the British Chiefs of Staff Report.

a. GREECE and the DOBECANESI (Paras 2, 17 b, and 17(c)(iii) of the Report).

(1) GREECE

It is agreed that the commitment in GREECE is no valid reason for the continuation of AFHQ but there would be considerable administrative disadvantages in transfer of responsibility to MIDDLE EAST for some time yet. Moreover it is preferable for political reasons that GREECE should not pass to MIDDLE EAST at present.

(2) DOBECANESI

The general question of division of territorial responsibility between SACRED and MIDDLE EAST is dealt with in the attached paper, where it is argued that the DOBECANESI (in common with all other Italian territory in EUROPE) should continue to be the responsibility of SACRED. Although this is the logical solution, the fact that MIDDLE EAST has in practice handled the DOBECANESI situation, and is now responsible for administering Allied Military Government there, is good reason for recognising official the de facto position.

b. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (Paras 7 and 17(c)(ii) of the Report)

The French are already responsible for FRENCH NORTH AFRICA, except that we have retained certain rights in respect of ports and airfields and the stationing of the necessary garrisons to operate them.

The same remarks apply to COSICA.

c. NAVAL and AIR COMMAND (Paras 17(c)(vi)(vii) and (viii)).

(1) These proposals are generally agreed, but it is suggested that the possibility of giving the three C-15-C MIDDLE EAST the same territorial

(1) GREECE

It is agreed that the commitment to GREECE is no valid reason for the continuation of AFHQ but there would be considerable administrative disadvantages in transfer of responsibility to MIDDLE EAST for some time yet. Moreover it is preferable for political reasons that GREECE should not pass to MIDDLE EAST at present.

(2) DODECANESSE

The general question of division of territorial responsibility between SARDEN and MIDDLE EAST is dealt with in the attached paper, where it is agreed that the DODECANESSE (in common with all other Italian territory in EUROPE) should continue to be the responsibility of SACRED. Although this is the logical solution, the fact that MIDDLE EAST has in practice handled the DODECANESSE situation, and is now responsible for administering Allied Military Government there, is good reason for recognizing official the de facto position.

b. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (Paras 7 and 17(c)(14) of the Report)

The French are already responsible for FRENCH NORTH AFRICA, except that we have retained certain rights in respect of ports and airfields and the stationing of the necessary garrisons to operate them.

The same remarks apply to CORSICA.

c. NAVAL and AIR COMMAND (Paras 17(c)(vi)(vii) and (viii)).

(1) These proposals are generally agreed, but it is suggested that the possibility of giving the three C-in-C MIDDLE EAST the same territorial responsibility should be examined. The MEDITERRANEAN, SARDEN and MIDDLE EAST in fact constitute and form one interrel area on imperial communications to INDIA and the FAR EAST.

(2) As regards the position of C-in-C MED, it has been considered hitherto here that he is already the Naval member of the C-in-C Committee MIDDLE EAST, and that in his absence from meetings he has been represented by Flag Officer LEVANT and EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

JON/RE/Plans

W. D. MORGAN
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff

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COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

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PRESENT SYSTEM OF COMMAND

1. A note outlining the present system of command in this theatre is attached at Appendix 'A'. The main points which emerge from this note are:
 - a. SACMED's Command Group, which is the machinery through which he exercises inter-Allied inter-service command, is a very small organization. Its retention or abolition would have no effect on reduction in the size of AFHQ.
 - b. Matters of exclusively US Army concern are handled by the US Theatre Headquarters MTOUSA. On the British side there is no separate theatre command designated as such. The difference between the US and the British arrangements is not as great as would appear, but it has some effect on practical working particularly in regard to the distribution of correspondence and channels of general staff control.

FUTURE SYSTEM OF COMMAND

2. The choice of future system of command lies between the following broad alternatives:
 - A. The retention of SACMED and Allied inter-service command generally on present lines.
 - B. Command through an inter-Allied inter-service committee as shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'B'. The only material change from the present system is that the authority now vested in one man would be vested in a committee.
 - C. Command through an Allied Military Commander and Allied staff, coordinating with the two other services. This is shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'C'.
 - D. Command through national inter-service committees as shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'D'.
3. It will be observed that the main points to be decided in choosing between the above alternatives are whether the system is
 - a. To be Allied,
 - b. To be inter-service; and if so, whether command is to be vested in one supreme commander or in an inter-service committee.

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE CHOICE OF FUTURE SYSTEM OF COMMAND

FUTURE SYSTEM OF COMMAND

2. The choice of future system of command lies between the following broad alternatives:
 - a. The retention of SACRED and Allied inter-service command generally on present lines.
 - b. Command through an inter-Allied inter-service committee as shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'B'. The only material change from the present system is that the authority now vested in one man would be vested in a committee.
 - c. Command through an Allied military Commander and Allied staff, coordinating with the two other services. This is shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'C'.
 - d. Command through national inter-service committees as shown diagrammatically at Appendix 'D'.
3. It will be observed that the main points to be decided in choosing between the above alternatives are whether the system is
 - a. To be Allied,
 - b. To be inter-service; and if so, whether command is to be vested in one supreme commander or in an inter-service committee.

CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE CHOICE OF FUTURE SYSTEM OF COMMAND

4. The primary reason for which a Supreme Allied Commander was appointed in the Mediterranean Theatre was to exercise unified command over Allied sea, land and air forces in order to conduct a major campaign. Even though actual hostilities have now ceased, the whole of EUROPE is in a most unsettled state. This applies particularly to Southern EUROPE and the BALKANS where the ultimate ownership of territories on the frontiers of YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE, JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, ITALY and FRANCE is in dispute. The general situation will inevitably be uneasy until the final European peace settlement. The possibility of having to use force to impose the terms of that settlement, or to prevent unilateral military action by any of the interested nations in the meantime, cannot be ruled out.

Responsibility for controlling this situation is an Allied commitment. It involves the three fighting services and the coordination of Allied military action. The authority vested in and consequent prestige enjoyed by a Supreme

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Allied Commander together constitute a powerful Anglo-American policy and of importance that it is without delay and without resistance. The recent settlement of the dispute with the Japanese and French in NE and NE ITALY respectively are good examples. For these reasons alone there is evident advantage in retaining for the time being unified Allied command over the three fighting services as at present set up in this theatre.

5. The choice of the future system of command is also affected by the following:

a. Command of the Allied Operational Forces in ITALY

It has been proposed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in MAY 1943 that an Allied corps of two divisions should be retained in NE ITALY at least until the end of the year, and probably until the final peace settlement in EUROPE. Either Allied command in some form (alternatives A, B, or C) must be retained, or the corps commander must report back direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Control of the Allied Commission and Administration of AMG

Control of the Allied Commission can only be vested in an Allied representative or an Allied committee; executive responsibility for the operation of AMG can only be vested in an Allied commander. If, therefore, one of the alternatives B or C is adopted, it would be necessary to appoint an Allied Military Governor for ITALY reporting direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. Operation of the Anglo-French Naval Agreement

Under CCS 353 (revised) operational control of the French fleet is vested in the Allied Naval Area Commander who is subordinate of SACMEX. It would appear, therefore, that if either or both SACMEX and an Allied Naval Area Commander are abolished, a firm agreement would have to be made with the French Government. The French are unlikely to accept any change without protracted and difficult negotiations, which might have serious adverse naval repercussions.

d. Execution of Allied Administrative Responsibilities

Any system of command which does not provide for retention of an Allied commander in some form would make the execution of Allied administrative responsibilities so difficult as to be unworkable in practice. These responsibilities, such as repair and docking of war and merchant ships, civil affairs, communications, labour, solid and liquid fuel, local resources and financial matters, form the greater part of the day-to-day work in this theatre. If there is no form of Allied command, action could only be taken after coordination and agreement between the British and US

3. Control of the Allied Commission and Administration of AMG

Control of the Allied Commission can only be vested in an Allied representative of an Allied committee; executive responsibility for the operation of AMG can only be vested in an Allied commander. If, therefore, one of the alternatives 2 or 3 is adopted, it would be necessary to appoint an Allied Military Governor for Italy reporting direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Operation of the Anglo-French Naval Agreement

Under CCS 35a (revised) operational control of the French fleet is vested in the Allied Naval Area Commander who is a subordinate of SACMEX. It would appear, therefore, that if either of both SACMEX and an Allied Naval Area Commander are abolished, a French Government would have to be made with the French Government. The French are unlikely to accept any change without protracted and difficult negotiations, which might have serious adverse naval repercussions.

4. Execution of Allied Administrative Responsibilities

Any system of command which does not provide for retention of an Allied commander in some form would make the execution of Allied administrative responsibilities so difficult as to be unworkable in practice. These responsibilities, such as repair and docking of war and merchant ships, civil affairs, communications, labour, solid and liquid fuel, local resources and financial matters, form the greater part of the day-to-day work in this theatre. If there is no form of Allied command, action could only be taken after coordination and agreement between the British and US staffs concerned. This would probably become so cumbersome and slow a procedure as to make impossible the orderly execution of Allied administrative responsibilities. Alternative 3 is not therefore practicable.

PARTICULAR CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING BRITISH NAVAL, ARMY AND AIR COMMAND

5. British Naval and Air Command

While for the reasons given in paragraph 4 there is advantage in the retention of unified command over the three fighting services for the present, it will probably be desirable towards the end of the year for C-in-C Med and Air C-in-C RAF Med to establish their headquarters in MAFIA and the MIDDLE EAST respectively. There is no difficulty in the release of either the naval or air C-in-C from the control of SACMEX at any time that it is decided that this is the appropriate course. At the same time the physical move of their headquarters away from ITALY does not necessitate such release, provided arrangements are made.

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made for appropriate representation to remain at SACRED's headquarters. The time of release should be decided later in accordance with the Mediterranean situation developments, and with regard to the out in para 4. When release is effected, the system of command in Alternative B or C should be adopted.

7. British Army Command

Attention is drawn to paragraph 12 and Appendix A where it is explained that SACRED, in his purely British capacity, exercises his British command functions through an Allied headquarters. It is considered that the US system, whereby the US Theatre Commander exercises command through a US Theatre HQ within the general framework of AFHQ is preferable. It is accordingly considered that a British headquarters should be organized on similar lines to AFHQSA. This involves no increase in personnel. The main advantage is that it would produce a direct British command and staff channel for dealing with British theatre problems. This is of increasing importance in the post-hostilities and redeployment phase on which we have now entered.

TERRITORIAL EXTENT OF THEATRE COMMAND

6. The future territorial extent of the theatre command depends mainly on the system of command it is decided to adopt. If it is decided to terminate Supreme Allied Inter-service command, there would be good reason to reduce the Allied command in Italy to the smallest possible size, and to pass responsibility for the BALKANS to the US and the British MIDDLE EAST commands. If it is decided to retain Supreme Allied Inter-service command, it is evident that in the light of the considerations set out in paragraph 4, there is advantage in continuing SACRED's responsibilities for the whole of ITALY, all Mediterranean islands (excluding MALTA and CYPRUS), and all BALKAN countries. Both policies and from the intelligence aspect the BALKANS should be dealt with as a whole, one HQ. Yugoslav affairs and reactions will continue to affect ITALY and ALBANIA; and there is always the possibility of difficulties and incidents over JUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN-TURKISH-GREEK relations. Over the whole of the BALKANS there is the predominant influence of RUSSIA. In these circumstances it is suggested that the appropriate division between SACRED on the one hand and the US and British commands in the MIDDLE EAST on the other, is that the former should be responsible for EUROPE and European affairs, and the latter for territories in ASIA, AFRICA and the Arab and Moslem countries (including TURKISH). When Supreme Allied Inter-service command is terminated, the above division of responsibilities should be reexamined and adjustment made in the light of the situation obtaining at the time.

CONCLUSIONS

9. The discharge of Allied responsibilities in general needs advancement, and of administrative responsibilities in particular necessitates the retention of some form of Allied command in ITALY for a considerable period yet, and

TERRESTRIAL EXTENT OF THEATRE COMMAND

6. The future territorial extent of the theatre command depends mainly on the system of command it is decided to adopt. If it is decided to terminate Supreme Allied Inter-service Command, there would be good reason to reduce the Allied command in ITALY to the smallest possible size, and to pass responsibility for the BALKANS to the US and the British MEDITERRANEAN command. If it is decided to retain Supreme Allied Inter-service Command, it is evident that in the light of the considerations set out in paragraph 4, there is advantage in continuing SACMEX's responsibilities for the whole of ITALY, all Mediterranean islands (excluding MALTA and CYPRUS), and all BALKAN countries. Both political and from the intelligence aspect the BALKANS should be dealt with as a whole by one US. Superseding affairs and reactions will continue to affect ITALY and ALGERIA; and there is always the possibility of difficulties and incidents over YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN-TURKISH-GREEK relations. Over the whole of the BALKANS there is the predominating influence of RUSSIA. In these circumstances it is suggested that the appropriate division between SACMEX on the one hand and the US and British commands in the MEDITERRANEAN on the other, is that the former should be responsible for EUROPE and European countries, and the latter for territories in ASIA, AFRICA and the Arab and Moslem countries (including TURK). When Supreme Allied Inter-service Command is terminated, the above division of responsibilities should be reconsidered and adjustment made in the light of the situation obtaining at the time.

CONCLUSIONS

2. The discharge of Allied responsibilities in general makes advantageous, and of administrative responsibilities in particular necessitated, the retention of some form of Allied command in ITALY for a considerable period yet, and probably until the peace settlement in ITALY.

10. For so long as it remains advantageous to convert naval, military and air action through a supreme inter-service commander, the appointment of SACMEX should be retained and the system of command in the Mediterranean should continue as at present. When these considerations no longer apply, the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief should be released from subordination to SACMEX at this stage the system of command outlined in Appendix 'D' or 'C' should be set up.

11. A. For so long as Supreme Allied Inter-Service Command is retained, the territorial extent of the theatre command should be 1239
The whole of ITALY, all Mediterranean islands (excluding MALTA and CYPRUS) and all BALKAN countries (YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, GREECE, TURKEY and ROMANIA).

Responsibility for territories in ASIA, AFRICA and for the Arab and Moslem countries (including TURKEY) should be made that of MEDITERRANEAN.

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2. When supreme Allied inter-service command is terminated, the above division of responsibilities should be reconsidered and adjustment made in the light of the situation obtaining at the time.

12. A British theatre command and staff should be organized within the existing framework of AFHQ on similar lines to the US Theatre Headquarters, MTOUSA.

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NOTE ON PRESENT SYSTEM OF COMMAND IN MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

1. a. Allied Force HQ is an Allied Army HQ, headed by a small Command Group exercising operational command and coordination over the three services. This Command Group consists only of Supreme Allied Commander, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Chief of Staff, CAO and Deputy CAO, Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat, and the Joint Planning Staff. A great deal of the staff work of the Command Group is, however, done by AFHQ.
- b. The naval and air theatre HQs are self contained organizations, completely separate from and independent of AFHQ.
- c. Political guidance is given to the Supreme Allied Commander and the naval and air Commanders-in-Chief through the office of the US and British Political Advisers.
2. In its purely army aspect, AFHQ is the headquarters through which:
 - a. The Supreme Allied Commander exercises Allied command over the US and British land forces.
 - b. The Supreme Allied Commander, being the Commander of the British land force in this theatre, exercises command over such forces.

The US counterpart to b above is the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (who is also CG MCOUSA) working through MCOUSA. It should be noted here that US portions of certain integrated staff sections of AFHQ constitute the corresponding staff sections of MCOUSA. G-2 is an example.

3. Actual integration in AFHQ is of necessity confined to those general and special staff sections and to certain divisions of staff sections which deal with matters that are of common concern to both Allies. Intelligence, operations, movements and civil affairs are examples. Other matters, such as personnel questions, are handled by separate and parallel US and British general staff sections (e.g. G-1 American and G-1 British). In some cases, there are separate and parallel US and British divisions within an integrated general staff section (e.g. G-3 Org American and G-3 Org British).

4. Apart from facilitating the coordinated discharge of Allied functions, integration results in a considerable economy in both British and US staffs which would otherwise be duplicated.

a. The Supreme Allied Commander exercises Allied command over the US and British land forces.

b. The Supreme Allied Commander, being the Commander of the British land force in this theatre, exercises command over such forces.

The US counterpart to b above is the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (who is also CG MTOUSA) working through MTOUSA. It should be noted here that US portions of certain integrated staff sections of AFHQ constitute the corresponding staff sections of MTOUSA. G-3 is an example.

3. Actual integration in AFHQ is of necessity confined to those general and special staff sections and to certain divisions of staff sections which deal with matters that are of common concern to both Allies. Intelligence, operations, movements and civil affairs are examples. Other matters, such as personnel questions, are handled by separate and parallel US and British general staff sections (e.g. G-1 American and G-1 British). In some cases, there are separate and parallel US and British divisions within an integrated general staff section (e.g. G-3 Org American and G-3 Org British).

4. Apart from facilitating the coordinated discharge of Allied functions, integration results in a considerable economy in both British and US staffs which would otherwise be duplicated.

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APPENDIX B

CONCORD THROUGH AN INTER-ALLIED
AND INTER-SERVICE COMMITTEE

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

US Patent & Trademark Office

Allied Naval C-in-C
 Allied Army C-in-C
 Allied Air C-in-C
 Deputies to CS-in-C
 Chief of Staff (a)
 C/Chief of Staff (a)
 C-2 (b)
 D/C-2 (b)
 Secretariat

In Conclusion

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WHEELING, W. VA.

US and British
Narcotics in Italy

07-06-2008
09:00 AM

Center of Child Development

Robins: (a) One British, one Indian


(a) $\mathbb{P}$

(a) Explain integration to be performed

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Key: Chain of Allied Command

Notes: (a) One British, one American

(b) do

(c) Existing integration to be retained

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COMMAND THROUGH AN ALLIED MILITARY COMMANDER AND
ALLIED STAFF, CO-ORDINATING WITH THE OTHER TWO SERVICES.


COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ALLIED MILITARY HQ ALLIED NAVAL C-in-C MED . . .

US POLAD)
BR RES MIN)

Advice →

Allied Military Comd (a)
D/Allied Military Comd (a)
Chief of Staff (b)
Deputy Chief of Staff (b)
CAG (c)
Deputy CAG (c)
Secretariat



Note: (a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

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REFERENCES

MINISTRY

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WFOUZA (A) CENTRAL
 MED
 BRIGADE Allied
 Commission

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LAND FORCES
GREET

Chain of inter-service coordination


Note: (a) One US, one British

(b) one US, one British

(c) One US, one British.

(d) existing information to be retained.

OPERANT THROUGH NATIONAL INTER-SERVICE COMMITTEES



Note (x). Found from MTOUSA and DR MED COMD

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
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APPENDIX

COMMANDE THROUGH NATIONAL INTER-SERVICE COMMITTEES



Note (a). Found from MTCUSA and BR RPS MD

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (US) 32
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(POLITICAL)

FILM DISTRIBUTION IN ITALY

Note by Secretariat

22 JUN 1945

1. Arrangements have already been made to hand over to the Italians and other agencies concerned all functions now performed by PAB in ITALY (outside VENEZIA GIULIA) with the simple exception of film distribution.
2. Up to the present time Army transport and other facilities have been used to effect distribution. Film rentals have been collected by PAB and placed to the credit of the private companies supplying the films, after PAB distribution expenses have been deducted.
3. The Temporary Film Board, consisting of representatives of Allied Commission, PAB, and the Italian government, has submitted to the Italian government draft legislation abolishing former Fascist film laws, and formulating plans for the distribution of commercial films, domestic and foreign, by private agencies. The current government crisis is likely to retard this legislation, which if passed, would permit foreign film representatives to enter ITALY.
4. PAB recommend (with the concurrence of Allied Commission and the British and US Embassies in ROME) that they be authorised to withdraw from the distribution of motion picture films in ITALY on 1 August, or as soon thereafter as foreign film representatives may be in a position to assume that responsibility.
5. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited to approve the recommendation of PAB in paragraph 4 above.

22 JUN 1945

J.S. SMITH,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

1. The Temporary Film Board, consisting of representatives of Allied Governments, FFI, and the Italian government, has submitted to the Italian Government draft legislation abrogating former Fascist film laws, and formulating plans for the distribution of expropriated films, dramatic and foreign, by private agencies. The current government crisis is likely to retard this legislation, which if passed, would permit foreign film representatives to enter Italy.

2. Up to the present time very transport and other facilities have been used to effect distribution. Film rentals have been collected by FFI and placed to the credit of the private companies supplying the films, after FFI distribution expenses have been deducted.

3. The Temporary Film Board, consisting of representatives of Allied Governments, FFI, and the Italian government, has submitted to the Italian Government draft legislation abrogating former Fascist film laws, and formulating plans for the distribution of expropriated films, dramatic and foreign, by private agencies. The current government crisis is likely to retard this legislation, which if passed, would permit foreign film representatives to enter Italy.

4. FFI recommend (with the concurrence of Allied Command and the British and US Embassies in Rome) that they be authorized to withdraw from the distribution of motion picture films in Italy on 1 August, or as soon thereafter as foreign film representatives may be in a position to assume that responsibility.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited to approve the recommendation of FFI in paragraph 4 above.

22 JUN 1945

J. C. SPEDMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
GURKHA.

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EC List - 22 June 45

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36 Exec Comm

37 R. R. B.

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Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, PAB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Chief, INR
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Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ II AF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, TME
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Chief, TME
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (P)(45) 31
16 June 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

JUN 17 1945

TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISTRIBUTION OF
PRESS AND RADIO NEWS FROM PAB IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

217/220/EC

1. At SAC (P)(45) 13th Meeting, Minute 7 b, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander directed that, when it became possible to recommend a definite date for the transfer of responsibility for the distribution of press and radio news from PAB to private news agencies, the matter should again be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander for final decision.
2. The Technical Sub-Committee set up by Allied Commission to examine the problems involved in the admission of private news agencies to North ITALY in all but the VENETIA GULF region, has completed its investigations and finds that sufficient communications facilities will be available to permit adequate coverage of North ITALY by private news agencies beginning 1 July 1945. A detailed scheme for the control of Italian press and radio in North ITALY after the cessation of PAB activities is attached as annexure 1.
3. The recommendations of the Technical Sub-Committee apply only to press and radio. The question of distribution of films will be examined separately.
4. The Supreme Allied Commander, in conference, is requested to approve the hand-over of responsibility from PAB to private news agencies with effect from 1 July 1945.

Robert T. Hanning
J. S. BASTION, JR.
COLONEL, U.S.C.
SECRETARY.

At one (P)(45) 13th Meeting, Minute 7 b, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander directed that, when it became possible to recommend a definite date for the transfer of responsibility for the distribution of press and radio news from PAB to private news agencies, the latter should again be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander for final decision.

2. The Technical Sub-Committee set up by Allied Commission to examine the problems involved in the admission of private news agencies to North ITALY in full but the VENEZIA GIULIA region, has completed its investigations and finds that sufficient communications facilities will be available to permit adequate coverage of North ITALY by private news agencies beginning 1 July 1945. A detailed scheme for the control of Italian press and radio in North ITALY after the cessation of PAB activities is attached as Annexure 1. (35)
3. The recommendations of the Technical Sub-Committee apply only to press and radio. The question of distribution of films will be examined separately.
4. The Supreme Allied Commander, in conference, is requested to approve the hand-over of responsibility from PAB to private news agencies with effect from 1 July 1945.

Robert T. Handerley
J. B. BASTON, JR.
COLONEL, U.S.A.
SECRETARY.

Inclosures to this paper

File 20/82

P.R.B.R.

Comp on 9267/EC 1231
see p 233

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean
Theater
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (HR)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
U.S. Political Adviser
British Resident Minister
Director, RAB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief, IWC
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
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Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, H. H. H. F.
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, PAB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Chief, INC
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Spares

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ATTACHED 1

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PROPOSAL FOR THE DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF
ITALIAN PRESS AND RADIO ON CESSATION OF
FIRE ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN ITALY

1. Italian Press and Radio in North Italy will be free to use any news and information available from official sources and private agencies subject to the requirements of military censorship.
2. The elimination of material likely to inflame public opinion and the objective presentation of contentious issues to the Italian population resident in areas under Allied Military Government will be secured through Allied Press Officers whose functions and status are defined below:
3. Allied Publications Board, which will continue to meet at Rome, will appoint from among the civilian and military personnel at present employed by PWB, Allied Press Officers. These will be stationed in areas in which there is a Regional Commissioner, with whom they will act in close cooperation.
4. The Press Officers will act in accordance with directives prepared by Allied Publications Board concurred by AC/AF and approved by the Chief of Staff, AFM. In case of emergency when public safety is endangered the Press Officer will act on the instructions of the Regional Commissioner; in the event of these instructions being at variance with the directives of Allied Publications Board, the matter will be referred back to higher authority for decision.
5. The Press Officers will be under the command of the Chief Press Officer, who is directly responsible to the Chairman of Allied Publications Board. The Chief Press Officer will be a member of Allied Publications Board and will act as Deputy to the Chairman as required.
6. The direction and control of the Italian Press and Radio, vested in Allied Publications Board, will be additional to that exercised by military censorship; it will normally be carried out by means of post publication scrutiny. In cases likely to inflame public opinion, and in controversial issues, which will be the subject of directives from AFM, Press Officers will have the right to demand from the non-political information newspapers, which will be authorized in each region, the pre-publication submission of editorial articles and comment and will be entitled to delete from such articles matter liable to inflame public opinion. Press Officers will also be entitled to require these non-political information papers to publish, in full or in part, official

4. The Press Officers will act in accordance with directives prepared by Allied Publications Board concurring by AG/1.0 and approved by the Chief of Staff, AFM, in case of emergency when public safety is endangered the Press Officer will act on the instructions of the Regional Commissioner; in the event of these instructions being at variance with the directives of Allied Publications Board, the matter will be referred back to higher authority for decision.
5. The Press Officers will be under the command of the Chief Press Officer, who is directly responsible to the Chairman of Allied Publications Board. The Chief Press Officer will be a member of Allied Publications Board and will act as Deputy to the Chairman as required.
6. The direction and control of the Italian Press and Radio, vested in Allied Publications Board, will be additional to that exercised by military censorship; it will generally be carried out by means of post publication scrutiny. In cases likely to influence public opinion, and in controversial issues, which will be the subject of directives from AFM, Press Officers will have the right to demand from the non-political information newspapers, which will be authorized in each region, the pre-publication submission of editorial articles and comment and will be entitled to delete from such articles matter liable to inflame public opinion. Press Officers will also be entitled to require these non-political information papers to publish, in full or in part, official allied statements and orders.
7. The Press Officer will have the power to exercise similar control over public scripts in any circumstances when he may consider this necessary.
8. Licensing of the press, including weekly and monthly magazines, and the allotment of circulation to newspapers and posters, will be the responsibility of Regional Allied Publications Board, whose decisions will be subject to confirmation by the Central Allied Publications Board.
9. Regional Allied Publications Boards will include the following:-

Press Officer	Chairman
Asst. Press Officer	Secretary
Representative of Regional Commissioner	
Representative of Military Censorship	

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The Chairman, Allied Publications Board, will be ex officio a member of all regional boards and may delegate the Chief Press Officer to attend

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as his representative.

10. The Control of Paper Supplies and Production will be the responsibility of C/AG.

11. The Press Officers will, if desired, act as the agents for GAI and MOI for the distribution of American and British publications within their areas, GAI and MOI providing the Italian staff necessary for this purpose.

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JUN 18 1945

PROCEED UP TO WAITING BEHIND LITURNEY, 1202 MAIN, 10 30 AM
AND ALSO GENERAL CLEANUP IN THE 0-3 IN ROOM
AT 1600 HOURS, SUNDAY 11TH JUNE 1966

100

Major General Carpenter, representing
Chief of the General Staff
of National Defense

Brigadier General Lord-st,
Chief of Staff to
General Dwyer

Colonel Pedron, representing
Chief of General Staff
of National Defense

Colonel Arthur L. Parks,
Chief of Police, Military
Mission to Iran

Brigadier General Edwin B. Howari,
Director of State

Enclosure is this
Paper at Costa 349
\$10 27/00.

Colonel F. O. Paxson,

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No

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W.P.H.C.

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme
Allied Commander

RELINQUE

Major General Chippert, representing
Chief of the General Staff
of National Defense

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Brigadier General Lambert,
Chief of Staff to
General Dwyer

Major General L. L. Lounitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander

Colonel Pedron, representing
Chief of General Staff
of National Defense

Colonel D.W.S. Hunt, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Colonel Arnold Lefebvre,
Chief of French Military
Mission to AFHQ

Brigadier General Edwin B. Howard,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Fifth Army

*handwritten - this
paper is taken up*

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Colonel H. C. Paxson,
G-3 Section, 15th Army Group

file 29/12

Colonel T. J. Conway,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Fifth Army

Colonel L. K. LeDue,
Chief of Staff, IV Corps

E. & DIST - 16 June 45

Major General C. B. Magruder,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (..), AFHQ

35 - Chief of Staff

Colonel J. L. Mitchell, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

36 - Ex Command

Brigadier General Edgar E. Hunt,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, Fifth Army

37 - 1st Advisor

Ch. on 12-17

see M 233

HEAD - 16 June 45

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A.P.H.O.

Lieutenant Colonel W. B. Jackson,
C-1 Section, AFHQ

Brigadier J. C. Macdonald,
Chief, Allied American Joint Planning Staff

Colonel E. C. Clark, representing
Chief, IHD

Colonel J. Z. Easton, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Major J. B. Bulmer,
Liaison Section, AFHQ

Captain J. C. McIntosh,
French Army

Interviewers

Secretaries

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major R. T. Henley

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN opened the conference by giving the background to the present differences which had arisen between the French and the Anglo-American Governments in regard to Allied military Government in Northeast ITALY. During the past month, negotiations had been conducted on a Governmental level, and the previous day a message had been received stating that General de Gaulle had agreed to withdraw French forces to the west side of the 1945 Franco-Italian frontier.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN then indicated the disposition of French and Anglo-American troops in the North, Center, and South in areas of the disputed territory.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that the French Government were entirely agreeable to the withdrawal of their forces behind the 1945 frontier. He had come to Allied Force Headquarters solely for the purpose of discussing details of procedure, and the plans of withdrawing those forces. He stated that orders for the withdrawal would be given immediately. However, due to difficulties in lines of communication, the evacuation of certain areas could not be completed for some time. He undertook to guarantee that all French troops would be withdrawn from the disputed areas by 10th July 1945. Withdrawal by sectors would be completed as follows:

Captain J. A. ...
French ...

Secretaries

Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Swetten
Major R. T. Hanley

DEUTERON'S OFFICIAL ... opened the conference by giving the background to the present differences which had arisen between the French and the Anglo-American Governments in regard to Allied Military Government in Northwest INDIA. During the past month, negotiations had been conducted on a Governmental level, and the previous day a message had been received stating that General de Gaulle had agreed to withdraw French forces to the west side of the 1944 Franco-Italian frontier.

DEUTERON'S OFFICIAL ... then indicated the disposition of French and Anglo-American troops in the North, Center, and Southern areas of the disputed territory.

ALICE GENERAL ... said that the French Government was entirely agreeable to the withdrawal of their forces behind the 1944 frontier. He had come to Allied Forces Headquarters solely for the purpose of discussing details of procedure, and the means of withdrawing those forces. He stated that orders for the withdrawal would be given immediately. However, due to difficulties in lines of communication, the evacuation of certain areas would not be completed for some time. He undertook to guarantee that all French troops would be withdrawn from the disputed areas by 10th July 1945. Withdrawal by sectors would be completed as follows:

STUR. DE BEL OME VALLEY	- 20th June
V.L. D'ALCER	- 25th June
SUS.-OULZ-CHEN	- 1st July
CHEN.-VINTALICIA	- 10th July

DEUTERON'S OFFICIAL ... replied that this proposal was acceptable.

ALICE GENERAL ... then spoke of the introduction of Allied Military Government. He considered that this would present no problem in the Northern and Central sectors. However, there was a large proportion of the population in the SUD. and he had indicated their desire that the territory should be annexed to INDIA. In order that there should be no repercussions on the SUD of, or against, these citizens, he proposed that the handover to INDIA should take place while French forces were still in the area. In this way, French officials could be relieved one by one by INDIA officials at such a rate

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as the Anglo-American commander considered off. British forces could then arrive, and French forces would be relieved, according to arrangements which would be made on the spot between local commanders.

MAJOR GENERAL MORGAN stated that this was satisfactory inasmuch as all officials were already in the area. Although they were not functioning at the present time, their relations with French officials were friendly, and they could begin operating immediately, if required.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORRIS, referring to the unpopulated campaign now being conducted by the French in Northwest Italy, stated that this must cease forthwith.

MAJOR GENERAL MORGAN replied that orders had already been given in Paris to that effect. Referring to the occupational forces, he stated that, other than instructed by General Juin to request an undertaking from the Chief of Staff that no Italian troops would be stationed within a certain distance of the frontier. In particular, he requested that the Italian Port at G. should be occupied by Anglo-American forces, and that the Italian flag should not be displayed there.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORRIS stated that as long as Allied troops were available, no regular forces of the Italian Army would be stationed within 15 miles of the frontier. Italian Carabinieri and Customs Officials would, however, be employed in the usual manner. Referring to the Port at G. MORRIS, he stated that no guarantee could be given on that point.

MAJOR GENERAL MORGAN then stated that there were three or four additional points which he wished to discuss. Firstly, he had been instructed to request that the French Transit Camp for Prisoners of War at Displaced Persons at SUS, on Italian territory, should be maintained as long as the requirement for such an establishment should continue to exist. Secondly, he desired that freedom of Frontalier Movement across the Franco-Italian frontier should be included in the agreement. He stated that this movement had been normal in pre-war years prior to the development of tension between FRANCE and ITALY. Thirdly, referring to the electrical power station at SUS, he asked that this should continue to furnish power to the SUS-PORTON area. These communities had formerly been supplied by a station on French soil, but this had been destroyed by the Germans, and until such time as the French plant could be restored, SUS-PORTON was the only available source of supply.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORRIS stated that the first two points, namely, the continuance of the Transit Camp at SUS, and freedom of Frontalier Movement, were agreed. In regard to the third point, power from the SUS-PORTON station to the SUS-PORTON area, he could not undertake that the same amount of power would be supplied in future as at the present time. He was in agreement with the suggestion made by Lieutenant General Robertson that an investigation should be made by the British and French Governments to determine the amount of power to be supplied.

In particular, he requested that the Italian Port at Chambery should be occupied by Anglo-American forces, and that the Italian flag should not be displayed there.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN stated that as long as allied troops were available, no regular forces of the Italian Army would be stationed within 15 miles of the frontier. Italian Carabinieri and Guardia Civile would, however, be employed in the rural sector. Referring to the Port of Chambery, he stated that no guarantee could be given on that point.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN then stated that there were three or four additional points which he wished to discuss. Firstly, he had been instructed to request that the French Transit Camp for Prisoners of War in Displaced Persons at SUS, on Italian territory, should be maintained as long as the requirement for such an establishment should continue to exist. Secondly, he desired that freedom of frontiers movement across the Franco-Italian frontier should be included in the agreement. He stated that this movement had been normal in pre-war years prior to the development of tension between France and Italy. Thirdly, referring to the electrical power station at SUSSE ROFF, he asked that this should continue to furnish power to the NICE-ANTON area. These communities had formerly been supplied by a station on French soil, but this had been destroyed by the Germans, and until such time as the French plant could be restored, SUSSE ROFF was the only available source of supply.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN stated that the first two points, namely, the continuance of the Transit Camp at SUS, and freedom of frontiers movement, were agreed. In regard to the third point, power from the SUSSE ROFF station to the NICE-ANTON area, he could not undertake that the same amount of power would be supplied in future as at the present time. He was in agreement with the suggestion made by Lieutenant General Robertson that an investigation should be made of the requirements of the area, and that power could continue to be allotted to the French in relation to other demands for it in Italy.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN asked that no bulletin or communication should be issued to the Press or Radio regarding the present agreement. An announcement would, he considered, give undue importance to the views of the French forces, which was being regarded by his Government solely as a matter of belief rather than withdrawal.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN expressed the opinion that an agreement such as this, resulting in considerable movement of troops, would not be concealed from the Press. He stated that they no longer controlled Italian press and unless the French took the initiative and released an announcement favorable to them, they must expect articles to appear in Italian and World Press which might be most provocative and injurious. He believed that speculation on part of correspondents could be avoided if the French and Anglo-American authorities were to issue a joint release or, if the French desired, to make the release themselves.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL CARPENTIER stated that all possible steps would be taken by the Supreme Allied Commander to prevent mention of the present agreement by the Press or Radio of this Theatre. He would likewise suggest to the British and American Governments that they issue no public statement. He added that there was no objection, however, to the French Government issuing a reference. He then suggested that the meeting should adjourn till a draft agreement was prepared. This could later be signed at an informal conference in his office.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:-

Directed, that in the light of the agreement set out above:-

- a. The Secretary should draft for his approval an agreement for his signature and that of Major General Carpenter.
- b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, should cause a study to be made of the question of electrical supply from the power house at B.333 POW. and to submit to him recommendations for its use.
- c. The Chief, IMC, to issue guidance and instructions to all concerned that the loss of French troops to the west of the 1952 Franco-Italian frontier should be treated as a normal routine relief, without special publicity.
- d. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, to issue necessary instructions for the implementation of all terms of the agreement not covered by sub-paragraphs b and c above.

NOTE: The agreement was agreed by Lieutenant General Carpentier at 2200 H 11 June and by Major General Carpenter at 2200 H, 11 June, 1945.

Robert T. Hagan (leg)
J. E. B. STICK, JR.,
Colonel, C.S.C.,
Lieutenant General, Allied Commander.

- b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, should cause a study to be made of the question of electrical supply from the power house at B-238 10K, and to submit to him recommendations for its use.
- c. The Chief, ISU, to issue guidance on instructions to all concerned that the move of French troops to the west of the 1559 Franco-Italian frontier should be treated as a normal routine relief, without special publicity.
- d. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to issue necessary instructions for the implementation of all terms of the agreement not covered by sub-paragraphs b and c above.

NOTE: The agreement was signed by Lieutenant General Morgan at 2020 H 11 June and by Major General Carpenter at 2220 H, 11 June, 1945.

Clifford T. Hanley
J. E. BUSHN, JR.
Colonel, G.S.C.
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces West Coast, African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ USAF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, P/B
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commanding General, Fifth Army
Commanding General, IV Corps
Chief, IMC
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Others

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Chairman, Joint-Interagency Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MACV
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, JEB
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commanding General, Fifth Army
Commanding General, IV Corps
Chief, JMC
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Spoken

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P)(44) 29
4th June 1945.

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COPY NO. 26

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

POLICY IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF
IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 11.15 HOURS ON MONDAY,
4th JUNE 1945.

PRESENT:-

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Rear Admiral R. J. Packer,
Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Major General L. L. Leardtzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Major General T. S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Colonel J. J. Denabue, representing

EC Illustration 6 June 45

25 - C. J. C. Conn

26 - E. J. C. Conn

27 - File 522/EC

PRESENT:-

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Rear Admiral H. A. Packer,
Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Major General L. L. Lenthizer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U. S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad,
Deputy British Resident Minister

Major General T. S. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, D-3, AFHQ

Colonel J. J. Donahue, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 (.), AFHQ

Colonel D. S. Jackling, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Brigadier General L. L. Hadden,
Assistant Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Brigadier J. P. Nicholson,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Air Commodore J. M. Edwards-Jones,
Deputy Director of Operations and Intelligence, ME F

Major J. C. White,
G-4 (.) Plans Section, AFHQ.

EC List - 6 June 45

15 - Guide Comm

16 - Exec Comm

17 - FILE 522/EC

Findings in this
Paper at File 231.
FILE 279/EC.

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SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 224
Major Robert T. Harlow

1. THE CONFERENCE had before them paper P/296 (Final) setting out the recommendations of the Joint Planning Staff concerning a number of points, which had been raised by Eighth Army, with regard to the occupation of the area of VENEZIA, GIBLI, to be brought under AMG in the event of agreement being reached with the Yugoslavs.

2. In discussion the following points of policy were agreed (references are to JPS Study P/296 (Final)) :-

a. Cover Note

Para 2 (a) - Recommendation agreed.

Para 2 (b) - The Chief of Staff announced that this had been done.

Para 2 (c) - It was agreed that every assistance, including the provision of transport should be offered to the Yugoslavs in their withdrawal. It was considered that details could be left to the discretion of local Allied Commanders.

b. Memorandum on VENEZIA, GIBLI (Appendix "A")

Para 1 - It was agreed that the demarkation of the boundary should be settled on the ground. It was emphasised however, that the boundary is an administrative line and not a tactical one. The recommendation that posts and road blocks should be 1 km apart was NOT agreed. It was considered that U.S. or British posts should be established on the boundary line and that the Yugoslavs should be invited to take action so that there became joint posts.

Para 2 - It was considered that Yugoslav troops should be withdrawn east of the agreed demarkation line as soon as possible after the signing of the agreement and in all cases within seventy-two hours. There should be no stated interval between the evacuation of the Yugoslavs and the follow-up by Allied troops. Local Allied Commanders should, at their discretion, follow up as rapidly as possible.

Para 3 (a) - It was agreed that this was covered by para 6 of the proposed agreement.

Para 3 (b) - It was considered that Eighth Army should be instructed that in the event of the Yugoslavs attempting a withdrawal breach of the agreement on these lines, all measures,

Para 2 (c) - It was agreed that every assistance, including the provision of transport should be offered to the Yugoslavs in their withdrawal. It was considered that details could be left to the discretion of local Allied Commanders.

5. Memorandum on VENETIAN GIULIA (Appendix "A") (29)

Para 1 - It was agreed that the demarkation of the boundary should be settled on the ground. It was emphasized however, that the boundary is an administrative line and not a tactical one. The recommendation that posts and road blocks should be 1 km apart was NOT agreed. It was considered that U.S. or British posts should be established on the boundary line and that the Yugoslavs should be invited to take action so that there became joint posts.

Para 2 - It was considered that Yugoslav troops should be withdrawn east of the agreed demarkation line as soon as possible after the signing of the agreement and in all cases within seventy-two hours. There should be no stated interval between the evacuation of the Yugoslavs and the follow-up by Allied troops. Local Allied Commanders should, at their discretion, follow up as rapidly as possible.

Para 3 (a) - It was agreed that this was covered by para 6 of the proposed agreement.

Para 3 (b) - It was considered that Eighth Army should be instructed that in the event of the Yugoslavs attempting a wholesale breach of the agreement on these lines, all measures, including force, could be used to prevent such action.

Para 3 (c) - Recommendation agreed.

Para 4 - Recommendation agreed.

Para 5 - Recommendation agreed. It was considered that Eighth Army should be requested to forward a copy of their plan to AFM.

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Para 6 - Recommendation agreed. In explanation it

was considered that the Yugoslavs should be informed that normal trade and movement across the boundary would be permitted, but AMG authorities reserved the right to stop unprovoked or abnormal movements. Military Security checks would be imposed but frontier control, in the accepted sense, would not be established.

Para 7 - Recommendation was agreed but it was emphasized that the period, for which telephone and telegraph facilities were suspended, should be restricted to the minimum and should not be more than a matter of hours.

Para 8 - Recommendation agreed.

Para 9 - Recommendation agreed.

Para 10 - Recommendation agreed. In addition it was noted that under the draft agreement a Yugoslav Liaison Mission would be attached to Headquarters, Eighth Army.

Para 11 - Agreed.

Para 12 - Recommendation agreed, except that the reference to Commanding General 15 Army Group should be amended to read "Commander Eighth Army". It was agreed that Carabinieri should only be employed in predominantly Italian areas, but it was considered that elsewhere, in addition to Allied troops, local Slovene police could be used if they were found to be working satisfactorily.

3. Certain additional points were then raised:

a. In regard to the flying of flags in the Allied area of VIMIZIA, after the Yugoslavs have withdrawn and AMG has been established, the following policy was agreed:

(1) On official buildings which are in any way a part of the AMG machine, the only display permitted will be that of U.S. and British flags jointly. This applies to police stations whether manned by local Slovene or Italian police or by Carabinieri.

(2) Concentration of troops in barracks or camps may fly their own national flags in those areas. Thus, the Yugoslav detachment of 2,000 may fly the Yugoslav flag and the Italian flag may be flown over Carabinieri barracks (as opposed to police stations).

Para 10 - Recommendation agreed. In addition it was noted that under the draft agreement a Yugoslav Liaison Mission would be attached to Headquarters, Eighth Army.

Para 11 - Agreed.

Para 12 - Recommendation agreed, except that the reference to Commanding General 15 Army Group should be amended to read "Commander Eighth Army". It was agreed that Carabinieri should only be employed in predominantly Italian areas, but it was considered that elsewhere, in addition to Allied troops, local Slovene police could be used if they were found to be working satisfactorily.

3. Certain additional points were then raised:

a. In regard to the flying of flags in the Allied area of VENEZIA, after the Jugoslavs have withdrawn and AGF has been established, the following policy was agreed:

(1) On official buildings which are in any way a part of the AGF machine, the only display permitted will be that of U.S. and British flags jointly. This applies to police stations whether manned by local Slovene or Italian police or by Carabinieri.

(2) Concentration of troops in barracks or camps may fly their own national flags in those areas. Thus, the Yugoslav detachment of 2,000 may fly the Yugoslav flag and the Italian flag may be flown over Carabinieri barracks (as opposed to police stations).

(3) No restrictions will be imposed on the display of flags on private residences and buildings.

b. It was considered that Eighth Army should be instructed to select an area for occupation by the detachment of 2,000 Yugoslav troops who were to be stationed west of the boundary. This area should be in a Slovene district but should not be adjacent to any large town or in a position to interfere with important Allied communications.

4. THE CHIEF OF STAFF directed that, in the light of the policies set out above:-

a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 should draft for his approval an instruction to Commander Eighth Army in reply to his memorandum.

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- E. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, should immediately notify all concerned of the policy in regard to Plans as set out at para 3 (a) above.
- F. The Secretary should prepare for his approval an agenda and brief for the conference which, if the suggestions accepted the United States and British proposals, he would have with the Jernsley Chief of Staff.

16. 1. 1945

V. C. SHUTTLIN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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1239

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It is noted that para 1 of the proposed agreement between Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean and Marshal Tito used the term ".... POLA and anchorages on the west coast of ISKLA". Whereas para 3 of the same agreement stated "....will govern areas west of the line on the attached map, POLA and such other areas on the west coast of ISKLA as he may deem necessary". He considered that it is both unnecessary and undesirable to establish Allied Military Government on the coast opposite such anchorages.

We consider that a copy of the proposed agreement, mentioned above, should be dispatched to Eighth Army. If this has not already been done, together with the answers to their memorandum.

We recommend that we should offer to the Yugoslav army assistance in carrying out their withdrawal to the east of the agreed line, including the use of Allied transport, in so far as this can be done without detriment to our own requirements. This is a matter which might suitably be discussed at the meeting between the Allied and Yugoslav Chiefs of Staff.

(Sgd) J. G. JUNGLOSON,
Brigadier, G.S.,
G-3 Plans

(Sgd) S. R. PARKER,
Group Captain,
HQAF Plans.

~~Major~~ W. A. ADAMS,
Commander,
Staff Officer, Plans. } Naval member
present at
meeting but
not available
to sign.

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See Form 22d

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APPENDIX A.

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ALLIED JUNE INDICATORS
Mediteranean Joint Planning Staff

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MEMORANDUM ON YUGOSLAV AREA

This paper sets out a number of points raised by Eighth Army with the views of the JWPJ added below each point.

1. The demarcation of the tactical boundary appears to be a problem which had best be settled between Commanders convenient with the ground. It is suggested that to avoid any arguments between our troops and the Jugoslavs, it would be advisable for posts and road blocks to be not less than 1 km apart.

We agree that the demarcation of the boundary should be settled on the ground, as has in fact been recommended in AFHQ signal FM 5622. It is pointed out, however, that the boundary is an administrative line based on certain military considerations, and not a "tactical boundary" as stated.

We also agree that posts and road blocks should not be less than 1 km apart. If this is accepted, arrangements may have to be made to cover residents within the 1 km belt. This point should be investigated on the ground, and is one which might suitably be discussed between the Allied and Yugoslav Chiefs of Staff at their meeting.

2. It is known that the Yugoslav system of disseminating orders is slow and uncertain. It is considered, therefore, that sufficient time should be given between the signing of the agreement and the time when Yugoslav troops must be sent of the agreed boundary. To avoid any incident during the withdrawal, it would be wise to fix an interval of 24 hours between the Yugoslav evacuation and the forward movement of Allied troops.

We consider that 72 hours might be taken as a suitable period between the signing of the agreement and the time by which Yugoslav troops must be withdrawn east of the agreed demarcation line. The exact period should be settled between the Allied and Yugoslav Chiefs of Staff at their meeting, and may vary in different areas. It is desirable that it should be as short as possible (i.e. it may be less than 72 hours in some areas) in order to ensure that the Jugoslavs have the minimum time for removing property (para 3 refers), and that AMG and food supplies are introduced as early as possible.

We consider that there should be no stated interval between the evacuation of the Jugoslavs and the follow-up by Allied troops.

line based on certain military considerations, and not a "national boundary" as stated.

We also agree that posts and road blocks should not be less than 1 km apart. If this is accepted, arrangements may have to be made to cover residents within the 1 km belt. This point should be investigated on the ground, and in one which might suitably be discussed between the Allied and Yugoslav Chiefs of Staff at their meeting.

2. It is known that the Yugoslav system of disseminating orders is slow and uncertain. It is considered, therefore, that sufficient time should be given between the signing of the agreement and the time when Yugoslav troops must be part of the agreed boundary. To avoid any incident during the withdrawal, it would be wise to fix an interval of 24 hours between the Yugoslav evacuation and the forward movement of Allied troops.

We consider that 72 hours might be taken as a suitable period between the signing of the agreement and the time by which Yugoslav troops must be withdrawn east of the agreed demarcation line. The exact period should be settled between the Allied and Yugoslav Chiefs of Staff at their meeting, and may vary in different areas. It is desirable that it should be as short as possible (i.e. it may be less than 72 hours in some areas) in order to ensure that the Yugoslavs have the minimum time for removing property (para 3 refers), and that this and food supplies are introduced as early as possible.

We consider that there should be no stated interval between the evacuation of the Yugoslavs and the follow-up by Allied troops. It should be left to the discretion of the local Allied Commander to follow up the withdrawal as quickly as possible while avoiding any incidents.

3. a. It is thought that once the Yugoslav Army knows that it is to withdraw, it will take the opportunity of taking with it motor vehicles, rolling stock, and such heavy plant as they can find the means to move. To keep this movement within bounds, a definite agreement is required with the Yugoslavs on this matter.

This is covered by para 5 of the proposed agreement.

- b. In addition a clear directive should be issued to British Army setting out what preventative measures the Army should take to prevent ~~escalated~~ clearance.

We consider that a directive should be issued to provide that where Allied troops are already in occupation of areas from which Yugoslav forces are to withdraw, all steps including the use of force if necessary will be taken to prevent obvious breaches of the agreement.

-2-

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2. It is recommended that the agreement should stipulate that AM should be established 24 hours after the signing of the agreement, i.e., before the Yugoslav withdrawal is complete.

We do not agree with this recommendation since AM can only be established in the wake of occupational forces. It cannot proceed then.

4. Fixed coastal defense round, and about, which are now in serviceable condition should be handed over intact with their stores.

We consider that all fixed coastal defenses, irrespective of their state, should be handed over intact with their stores.

5. An urgent matter will be disarmament of all Partisans west of the agreed boundary. A scheme is being worked out by Headquarters Eighth Army to deal with this problem.

It is assumed that by "partisans" non-regular Yugoslav forces are meant. On this assumption, this point is already covered by PZ 26910 and AG 323/064 SACS-G of 16 March.

It should be confirmed that the scheme being worked out by Headquarters Eighth Army is in accordance with the policy indicated in the above mentioned AFHQ directives.

6. The governing factor in the AM problem is whether the military boundary is to be a closed frontier or not. If it is to be closed, then it is for consideration as to what facilities shall be afforded an onward movement of goods and vehicles across the demarcation line, also whether train services and mail facilities are to be permitted. It is possible that the Yugoslavs may require to use the port of ZIMBABWE as a means of bringing in supplies for the hinterland. A closed boundary might seriously affect the economic life of the Yugoslav portion of VERMILIA AREA. On the other hand, if it is not to be closed there are obvious disadvantages such as ability to bring in and disseminate all forms of propaganda.

We consider that the boundary should not be a closed frontier. Trade and all movement across the demarcation line, both by road and rail, including the movement of supplies through VERMILIA, should be subject to our control. This applies equally to movement in both directions. Mail facilities should be permitted as soon as circumstances allow.

The disadvantages inherent in this policy are recognized but we consider that they should be accepted.

7. A problem to be considered is the amount of facilities which can be given for telephoning and telegraphing between the two occupied areas. It is recommended that no facilities should be given for civilians telephoning and that the exchanges should be under military control.

AD 323/061 EACS-0 of 13 March.

It should be confirmed that the scheme being worked out by Headquarters Eighth Army is in accordance with the policy indicated in the above mentioned AFHQ directives.

6. The governing factor in the AMB problem is whether the military boundary is to be a closed frontier or not. If it is to be closed, then it is for consideration as to what facilities shall be afforded as regards movement of goods and vehicles across the demarcation line, also whether train services and mail facilities are to be permitted. It is possible that the Yugoslavs may require to use the port of TRIGLAV as a means of bringing in supplies for the hinterland. A closed boundary might seriously affect the economic life of the Yugoslav portion of VENEZIA MILIA. On the other hand, if it is not to be closed there are obvious disadvantages such as ability to bring in and disseminate all forms of propaganda.

We consider that the boundary should not be a closed frontier. Trade and all movement across the demarcation line, both by road and rail, including the movement of supplies through TRIGLAV, should be subject to our control. This applies equally to movement in both directions. Mail facilities should be permitted as soon as circumstances allow.

The disadvantages inherent in this policy are recognized but we consider that they should be accepted.

7. A problem to be considered is the amount of facilities which can be given for telephoning and telegraphing between the two occupied areas. It is recommended that no facilities should be given for civilians telephoning and that the exchanges should be under military control.

We consider that initially all "through" telephone and telegraph facilities should be suspended. These should be reintroduced as soon as possible subject to Allied military control. When this has been established, civilians should be allowed the use of these facilities.

8. It is likely that a considerable number of political refugees will be coming out of the Yugoslav occupied area and it is considered that all such refugees will have to be accepted and steps taken to evacuate them into Italian territory. There may be a certain flow of Slovenes wishing to go into the Yugoslav occupied area and it is considered that such a flow should not be impeded.

We consider that political refugees now west of the demarcation line should be allowed to remain, and that those wishing to move in from Yugoslav occupied areas should be allowed to do so.

Any persons who wish to cross into the Yugoslav occupied area should also be permitted to do so.

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At the present moment only Metropolitan lire are being used in this area. It is considered that All Lire should be made legal tender in addition. Yugoslav money should not be accepted or exchanged.

We consider that All and Metropolitan lire should both be declared legal tender. Other currencies should be allowed to remain in circulation but should not be recognized. In particular no exchange rate should be quoted for any currencies other than All and Metropolitan lire. Allied troops should be warned accordingly.

We understand that it is proposed to advance All lire to local paymasters for payment of the detachment of regular Yugoslav troops who will be permitted to remain west of the demarcation line in accordance with para 4 of the agreement.

10. It is clear that if negotiations are to work efficiently and smoothly, there must be a Yugoslav Headquarters both military and civil with whom these Headquarters can discuss the many matters that must arise after the agreement has been signed. It is obvious that a number of points will demand quick decision and it is thought that if all messages and discussions have to be referred to H.Q. All, too great a delay may arise. It is recommended, therefore, that the Yugoslav Government should nominate a Headquarters, such as Headquarters Slovenia or Headquarters Italy, competent to deal with all these matters.

We agree that this proposal is most desirable but we consider that it is hardly possible to attempt to enforce it. It is a matter which should be dealt with by the Chief of Staff at his meeting with the Yugoslav Chief of Staff.

11. It is possible that certain key officials of railways, banks, police services, docks, may have been removed prior to the agreement being settled. It is considered that all such people should be returned under the agreement. It is also considered that political prisoners, of whatever nationality, whose homes are in our occupied area, should not be removed by the Yugoslavs when the agreement is signed.

This is already covered by para 6 of the proposed agreement.

12. The Carabinieri are part of the Italian Army and owe allegiance to the Italian Government. It is considered that steps should be taken to divorce the existing Carabinieri in our occupied area from the Ministry of War, and that they should swear allegiance to Military Government and be put under command British Army and carry the British Army Flag.

We do not agree with the proposal that steps should be taken to alter the status and allegiance of the Carabinieri in the area west of the demarcation line, since we consider that this is impracticable.

We understand that it has already been agreed that no further Carabinieri should be invested with the Italian flag.

decision and it is thought that all managers and discussions have to be referred to BELMONT, too great a delay may arise. It is recommended, therefore, that the Yugoslav Government should nominate a headquarters, such as headquarters Slovaca or Headquarters Army, competent to deal with all these matters.

We agree that this proposal is most desirable but we consider that it is hardly possible to attempt to enforce it. It is a matter which should be dealt with by the Chief of Staff at his meeting with the Yugoslav Chief of Staff.

11. It is possible that certain key officials of railways, banks, police services, etc., may have been removed prior to the agreement being settled. It is considered that all such people should be returned under the agreement. It is also considered that political prisoners, of whatever nationality, whose names are in our occupied area, should not be removed by the Yugoslavs when the agreement is signed.

This is already covered by para 6 of the proposed agreement.

12. The Carabinieri are part of the Italian Army and owe allegiance to the Italian Sovereign. It is considered that steps should be taken to divorce the existing Carabinieri in our occupied areas from the Ministry of War, and that they should swear allegiance to Military Government and be put under command British Army and carry the British Army Flag.

We do not agree with the proposal that steps should be taken to alter the status and allegiance of the Carabinieri in the area west of the demarcation line, since we consider that this is impracticable.

We understand that it has already been agreed that no further Carabinieri should be imported into the area west of the demarcation line, and we consider that such Carabinieri as are already there should be allowed to continue to function at the discretion of CG 15 Army Group. For his guidance it is suggested that Carabinieri should only be employed in areas predominantly Italian. Elsewhere Allied troops should be used.

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S.C. (P)(45)28
29th May 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

N. 183

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

DISCUSSION OF P.B. IN ITALY

Notes by Secretary

NA
31 MAY 1945

1. Annexure 1 in a paper which, after discussion at the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee was submitted to the Chief of Staff by the Chairman of that Sub-Committee.
2. The Chief of Staff has approved the recommendations of this paper and accordingly directs that the Chief Counsellor, Allied Commission, and Director P.B. should take action to implement them.
3. On receipt of the report of the Technical Sub-Committee to be set up in accordance with Recommendation 1 of the paper, the subject will be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) for final approval of the transfer of responsibility from P.B.
4. Meanwhile, the attached paper and the above note of decisions taken in regard to its recommendations are circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

*Inclosure in this Paper
at Solio 222, Lile 27/EC.*

J. G. S. HETMAN
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
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2. The Chief of Staff has approved the recommendations of this paper and accordingly directs that the Chief of Staff, Allied Commission, and Director P.B. should take action to implement them.

3. On receipt of the report of the Technical Sub-Committee to be set up in accordance with recommendation 1 of the paper, the subject will be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) for final approval of the transfer of responsibility from P.B.

4. Meanwhile, the attached paper and the above notes of decisions taken in regard to its recommendations are circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

Endeavour in this Paper

at Lolio 222, File 27/EC.

11/1/45

J.G. SUTHERLAND
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
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(Mr. C. Taylor)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

ANNEXURE 1

W 103

26 May 1945

SUBJECT: PWB Functions in North Italy.

TO : Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed in FAW 536 that informational activities in liberated Italy should be separated on national lines when integration ceases to serve in direct support of military operations and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

2. It is the opinion of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in Italy in which allied control of the informational services could largely be relaxed with a view to restoring progressively and as speedily as possible the freedom of press and freedom of expression to which the United Nations are pledged. The timing of this restoration is partly dependent on political developments and partly on the restoration of communications facilities. While the former factor cannot be exactly forecast, the latter is under our own control, and the restoration to civilian agencies must be largely dependent on this purely technical problem. On the political side, the immediate restoration to civilian agencies may be open to objection, but it would appear to PWB that a considerable relaxation of control is desirable as soon as the solution of the technical communications problems allow and that provision for consultation and coordination with the Italian Government and Italian agencies should be provided for from the outset.

3. Notes

The first step in the release of public informational facilities is the admission of the private news agencies. On a previous occasion, the agencies requested our month's notice of intention to transfer responsibility in a given area. It is thought that this would be sufficient. An equally essential pre-requisite to transfer is the restoration of civilian communications, a technical problem which can be most easily studied by a

Informational activities in liberated Italy should be separated on rational lines when integration comes to serve in direct support of military operations and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

2. It is the opinion of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in Italy in which Allied control of the informational services could largely be relaxed with a view to restoring progressively and as speedily as possible the freedom of press and freedom of expression to which the United Nations are pledged. The timing of this restoration in partly dependent on political developments and partly on the restoration of communications facilities. While the former factor cannot be exactly forecast, the latter is under our own control, and the restoration to civilian agencies must be largely dependent on this purely technical problem. On the political side, the immediate restoration to civilian agencies may be open to objection, but it would appear to PWB that a considerable relaxation of control is desirable as soon as the solution of the technical communications problems allow and that provision for consultation and coordination with the Italian Government and Italian agencies should be provided for from the outset.

3. News

The first step in the release of public informational facilities is the admission of the private news agencies. On a previous occasion, the agencies requested one month's notice of intention to transfer responsibility in a given area. It is thought that this would be sufficient. An equally essential pre-requisite to transfer is the restoration of civilian communications, a technical problem which can be most easily studied by a technical sub-committee similar to that appointed to arrange the detailed transfer of facilities in Rome and Southern Italy.

4. Radio and Press

a. In Southern Italy, the admission of the private news agencies was accompanied by the return of the radio network to Italian control, and the transfer of PWB controlled newspapers to private Italian companies. The return of the whole radio network would place in the hands of the R.A.I. and so indirectly of the Italian Government a powerful propaganda organ and the relinquishment of all Allied control over this organ and over the press might place Allied Military Government at a serious disadvantage should any tension develop. In such circumstances even the restoration of the pre-Fascist newspapers as non-political information papers would be insufficient to guarantee that the Allied point of view were properly presented to the North Italian public, and that inflammatory material were avoided.

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b. But to secure such control, as is required, a more flexible system than that hitherto employed by P.B. might well be set up, and discussions with the AC suggest that the most suitable organ for this purpose is Allied Publications Board. Working under an over-all directive drawn up by Allied Publications Board, on which AC, O.I., M.O.I. and P.B. are all represented, it would be possible to exercise control by means of regional press officers acting in close cooperation with the regional commissioners. Should events develop smoothly, the function of these officers would be to afford to the Italian press and radio advice and assistance, more particularly to furnish the Italian agencies with material from Allied sources which would not otherwise be at their disposal. But should the development of events render this desirable in the view of AC or of the Regional Commissioners, these officers would be able to exert considerable pressure on the Italian Press and radio in North Italy by means of licensing, allotments of paper and other forms of economic pressure.

5. Venezia Giulia, N.W. Italy, and Austria

a. Venezia Giulia is excluded from the scope of the present paper in view of the special circumstances prevailing in that region. The scheme proposed can also be postponed if the situation in N.W. Italy develops so as to make such delay essential.

b. P.B. commitments to Austria will also necessitate the retention of certain facilities in Italy and these are considered elsewhere.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That AC be instructed to set up a technical sub-committee to examine the problems involved in the admission of the private news agencies to North Italy, and to recommend a date as soon as possible after July 1st for the transfer of responsibility for the collection and dissemination of news from P.B. to the private news agencies, Allied and Italian.

2. That Allied Publications Board be instructed to prepare and recommend a detailed scheme for the control of the Italian press and radio in North Italy, and of such Italian-controlled stations as are audible in North Italy, (including Rome II) through press officers working in close cooperation with the Regional Commissioners, and that it prepare and recommend a directive to govern the work of these press officers.

3. That P.B. be instructed to provide the Allied Publications Board with all necessary facilities, including the provision of the necessary staff, to make the foregoing project effective.

4. That press officers, attached to Allied Publications Board act as agents for the distribution of O.I. and M.O.I. publications in North Italy.

4. Venezia Giulia is excluded from the scope of the present paper in view of the special circumstances prevailing in that region. The scheme proposed can also be postponed if the situation in Italy develops so as to make such delay essential.

5. F.B. commitments to Austria will also necessitate the retention of certain facilities in Italy and these are considered elsewhere.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That C be instructed to set up a technical sub-committee to examine the problems involved in the admission of the private news agencies to North Italy, and to recommend a date as soon as possible after July 1st for the transfer of responsibility for the collection and dissemination of news from F.B. to the private news agencies, Allied and Italian.

2. That Allied Publications Board be instructed to prepare and recommend a detailed scheme for the control of the Italian press and radio in North Italy, and of such Italian-controlled stations as are audible in North Italy, (including Rome II) through press officers working in close cooperation with the Regional Commissioners, and that it prepare and recommend a directive to govern the work of these press officers.

3. That F.B. be instructed to provide the Allied Publications Board with all necessary facilities, including the provision of the necessary staff, to make the foregoing project effective.

4. That press officers, attached to Allied Publications Board act as agents for the distribution of G.I. and M.O.I. publications in North Italy.

5. That, upon approval of the recommendations of the sub-committee to be set up under para 1 above, F.B. should, at a date so determined, cease all activities other than those required for VEHZI, GIULI, and .USTAL., except for film distribution and activities required by para 3 above.

(Intd) A. J. McC. 12/2/44
Chairman, Psychological Warfare sub-Committee.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 27
29 May 1945.

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COPY NO 36

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD

Note by Secretary

1. In accordance with the directions at SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, has submitted the detailed paper at Annexure "A." This paper shows that the proposals set out by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, in his letter at Annexure "B" were accepted by the Supreme Allied Commander's Economic Sub-Committee.

2. Attention is invited to the following points:-

a. Now that Northern ITALY has been liberated the need for centralized control over Italian industry is considered to be urgent.

b. An Allied controlled industrial board cannot be set up as it would be contrary to the current direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. An Italian government board, with allied representatives participating in an advisory capacity only, is therefore proposed.

c. As considerable time may elapse before the Italian government establishes such a board, it is proposed as an interim measure to set up separate boards for each important industry in SAC territory and to request the Italian government to create similar boards in its territory.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly requested:-

a. To approve the policy for Italian Production Advisory Boards as set out at Annexures "A." and "B" and authorized at paragraph 2 above.

b. To approve the dispatch of the cable at Annexure "C" informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the proposals and requesting their comments.

In accordance with the directions at SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 8, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, has submitted the detailed paper at Annexure "A." This paper shows that the proposals set out by the Chief of Commission, Allied Commission, in his letter at Annexure "B" were accepted by the Supreme Allied Commander's Economic Sub-Committee.

2. Attention is invited to the following points:-

a. Now that Northern ITALY has been liberated the need for centralized control over Italian industry is considered to be urgent.

b. An Allied controlled industrial board cannot be set up as it would be contrary to the current direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. An Italian government board, with Allied representatives participating in an advisory capacity only, is therefore proposed.

c. As considerable time may elapse before the Italian government establishes such a board, it is proposed as an interim measure to set up separate boards for each important industry in IIG territory and to request the Italian government to create similar boards in its territory.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly requested:-

a. To approve the policy for Italian Production Advisory Boards as set out at Annexures "A" and "B" and summarized at paragraph 2 above.

b. To approve the dispatch of the cable at Annexure "C" informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the proposals and requesting their comments.

*Enclosures in this Paper
at Folio 22, File 20/EC.*

J. G. S. S. S.

J. G. S. S. S.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECONDARY.

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(John T. ...)

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22 May 1945

ESTABLISHMENT OF ITALIAN PRODUCTION ADVISORY BOARD

Notes by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. At its seventh meeting, on 22 May 1945, the Supreme Allied Commander's Economic Sub-Committee considered proposals made by the Allied Commission, respecting the establishment of some form of centralized industrial control organization, to ensure that Italian industry is rehabilitated as promptly as possible and is employed on those forms of production best suited to the continuing war effort and to the reconstruction of Italy and other parts of Europe. The Economic Sub-Committee accepted the proposals as summarized in the Chief Commissioner's letter of 21 May (CC4045), attached as Annexure "B," and agreed that the matter should be raised at the next meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

2. At the Political Conference on 24 May, the Supreme Allied Commander directed that a paper be submitted at the next meeting of the Conference dealing with the organization and functions of the proposed Italian Production Advisory Board, together with a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting their approval of the project.

3. It has been realized for some time that relinquishment of control of Italian industrial facilities by the Allied military establishment should be carefully integrated with resumption of Italian control of industrial dislocation and unemployment are to be avoided. In addition, now that the major industrial area of Northern Italy is liberated, it has become essential and urgent that there be created some form of centralized control over Italian industry. This control is needed, from the viewpoint of Allied interest:

a. To assure the effective use of imported equipment and materials to reduce the need for critical imports as rapidly as possible; and

b. To determine suitable priorities in the reconstruction of Italian industry with a view to assuring maximum contribution to the further Allied war effort, the prompt rehabilitation of Italy, and maximum aid to other parts of Europe.

4. Were an Allied-controlled Industrial Board to be set up, it would be

to the continuing war effort and to the reconstruction of Italy and other parts of Europe. The Economic Sub-Committee accepted the proposals as summarized in the Chief Commissioner's letter of 21 May (CC4045), attached as Annexure "B," and agreed that the matter should be raised at the next meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

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a. To assure the effective use of imported equipment and materials to reduce the need for critical imports as rapidly as possible; and

b. To determine suitable priorities in the reconstruction of Italian industries with a view to assuring maximum contribution to the further Allied war effort, the prompt rehabilitation of Italy, and maximum aid to other parts of Europe.

4. Were an Allied-controlled Industrial Board to be set up, it would be in contradiction to the intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as expressed in S.M. 487 (see Annexure "B"). The Allied Commission therefore proposes to refer immediately to the Italian Government the formation of an Italian Production Advisory Board, to be set up by the Government, and with Allied representatives participating only in an advisory capacity. This board would be given such powers as the Italian Government determined necessary to carry Italian industry through reconversion from military control and to accomplish the necessary rehabilitation. The Allied members would represent the Allied policy with respect to production for civilian use within the limits of the Allied interests as set forth in paragraph three above. While the Allied members would have advisory functions only, they should be in a position to exercise influence sufficient to protect Allied interests through their control of imported rehabilitation supplies, raw materials and transportation. In cases where production for military purposes or other direct military interest was involved, the Allied members could also rely on the power reserved

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to the Supreme Allied Commander in FAN 427 to impose any necessary controls or take other appropriate measures such as requisitioning facilities for military purposes.

5. It is anticipated by the Allied Commission that considerable time may elapse before the Italian Government establishes the Production Advisory Board. In the meantime urgent matters must be handled relating to the allocation of raw materials and equipment and to the most effective utilization of Italian industrial facilities, as well as to the re-requisitioning of industrial facilities by the Allied Forces. It is therefore proposed, as a temporary and interim measure, to set up industry boards in IIG territory, and to request the Italian Government to create similar boards in Italian Government territory. These Boards would be established in the following industries (see Annexure "B"): textiles; chemical and fertilizers; steel and coke oven; cement, lime, and brick; food processing. They would be Italian in composition, and the Allied members would be in the minority and would act as non-voting advisers. In case of need, the sanctions at the disposition of the Allied advisers would be those mentioned in paragraph 4 above. These single-industry Boards would be designed primarily to allocate raw materials and equipment, and to determine priorities for industrial rehabilitation.

6. It is considered that the proposals outlined above conform to the policy of the U.K. and U.S. Governments as laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in FAN 427. There is attached as Annexure "C" a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff outlining the situation and the proposals and requesting comments.

7. It is recommended that the cable attached as Annexure "C" be approved.

(Inclt)

C.H.S.

non-voting advisors. In case of need, the sanctions at the disposition of the Allied advisors would be those mentioned in paragraph 4 above. These single-industry barriers would be designed primarily to allocate raw materials and equipment, and to determine priorities for industrial rehabilitation.

6. It is considered that the proposals outlined above conform to the policy of the U.N. and U.S. Governments as laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in F/M 487. There is attached as Annexure "G" a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff outlining the situation and the proposals and requesting comments.

7. It is recommended that the cable attached as Annexure "G" be approved.

(Initd)

C.J.S.

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ATTACHMENT "B"

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
..30 394

OC 4045

21 May 1945

SUBJECT: Formation of Industrial Advisory and Production Boards.

TO : Chief Administrative Officer, ..F.H.Q.

1. The survey which has been made in Northern Italy by members of the Economic Section of Allied Commission clearly indicates that the setting up of Industrial Boards as envisaged in the correspondence between us has now become a matter of considerable urgency. Nevertheless, there are still many difficulties in the way.

2. The main difficulties are:

(a) Agreement of the Italian Government is essential

(1) as to the composition of the Boards, and

(2) as to their powers and methods of working.

This will probably take some time to obtain on account of the political situation. The Boards will have to be largely Italian in complexion.

(b) The composition and powers of the Boards must be such that the scheme for their initiation will receive the support of the Allied Governments.

(c) If the Boards are largely Italian in complexion, they would probably be acceptable to the United States and British Governments as being in accord with F.N. 487. At the same time, if the Boards are Italian in nature, the U.S. and British Governments may fear that they may become instruments for the nationalization of industry, with possible injury to U.S. and British investments in Italy.

(d) Time is not now available for prolonged discussions with either the Italian Government or the Allied Governments.

We are therefore forced to compromise between the evils of the courses open to us.

3. The Allied Commission therefore proposes that the formation of an

- (a) Agreement of the Italian Government is essential
- (1) as to the composition of the Boards, and
 - (2) as to their powers and methods of working.

This will probably take some time to obtain on account of the political situation. The Boards will have to be largely Italian in complexion.

- (b) The composition and powers of the Boards must be such that the scheme for their initiation will receive the support of the Allied Governments.

- (c) If the Boards are largely Italian in complexion, they would probably be acceptable to the United States and British Governments as being in accord with F.N. 437. At the same time, if the Boards are Italian in nature, the U.S. and British Governments may fear that they may become instruments for the nationalization of industry, with possible injury to U.S. and British investments in Italy.

- (d) Time is not now available for prolonged discussions with either the Italian Government or the Allied Governments.

We are therefore forced to compromise between the evils of the courses open to us.

3. The Allied Commission therefore proposed that the formation of an Italian Production Advisory Board be referred immediately to the Italian Government. Since some time will elapse before its creation, it is recommended that Italian Boards be set up by the Italian Government and I.M.G. for the following vital industries:

Textile industry;
Chemical industry, including fertilizers;
Steel industry, including coke oven industry;
Cement, lime and brick industries; and
Food processing industry.

4. It is proposed that the composition of these Boards be Italian, with Allied minority non-voting members participating only as advisors. 225

5. Until the Italian Government has set up the Italian Production Advisory Board (vide paragraph 3), the Allied Commission, acting on behalf of the Italian Government, will control the allocation of imported raw materials in common use by all industries, such as coal, etc. The Allied

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Chief Commissioner

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APPENDIX "C"

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PRIORITY

TO : COMBAT FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
JCSO FOR ALLIED CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : SHARP FORWARDED
HQ JCSO

SIGNED: ALBERT J.

This is MAY _____.

Subject is organization and revival of Italian industrial production.

1. Under direction of Allied Forces some industrial capacity in Southern Italy was repaired and reintegrated for military purposes in course of military operations in Italy. Steel industry an example. Other industries unimportant for direct military use have been repaired only to extent made possible by limited amounts of imports and such local facilities as were surplus to war effort. Cessation of hostilities and the freeing of major Italian industries in North has made urgent the establishment of some form of Italian organization capable of assisting and directing the reactivation of industry on national basis with following objectives:

- a. To assure most effective use of imported equipment and materials to reduce need for further critical imports;
- b. To determine suitable priorities in reconstruction Italian industries in order to assure maximum contribution to Allied war effort, to rehabilitate

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a. To assure most effective use of imported equipment and materials to reduce need for further critical imports;

b. To determine suitable priorities in reconstruction Italian industries in order to assure maximum contribution to Allied war effort, to rehabilitate Italian economy, to contribute to fullest employment, and to render aid as practicable to other parts of Europe.

2. I am discussing with the Italian Government the creation of an Italian Production Advisory Board to allocate imported raw materials and guide rehabilitation of Italian industry. Consistent with conditions and intentions of FM 437 the Allied representatives participating in this Board would be advisory. 1223

3. As considerable time may elapse before above Board begins operating, it

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is planned immediately to establish boards (reporting to Italian Production Advisory Board upon its activation) for following vital industries: textiles; chemicals and fertilizer; steel including coke oven; cement, lime, and brick; food processing. These boards will be set up by Italian Government in its territory and by ANZ in North with Allied members in non-voting minority as advisors.

4. Allied members of boards would be in position to use control of imports and transportation if required to achieve objectives set forth in paragraph 1 above. Allied Military also have power to enter into industrial contracts and S.C. retains full powers under paragraph 4 of F.I.N. 487 as may be necessary to insure fulfillment of military commitment.

5. Your comments on above plans will be of assistance as discussions with Italian Government proceed.

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5. Your comments on above plans will be of assistance as discussions with Italian Government proceed.

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16 May 1945.

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

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PRESS AND PROPAGANDA POLICY IN RESPECT OF RELATIONS WITH
JUGOSLAVS

Note by Deputy Chief of Staff.

OBJECT

1. The objects of our publicity in regard to the Yugoslav situation would be:

- a. Press campaign/be directed to condition and prepare Allied troops in the theater and the public at home for the possible use of arms against Marshal TITO's forces in Northeast ITALY and Southern AUSTRIA.
- b. Propaganda campaign to be directed towards influencing Yugoslavs so as to reduce their capacity and will to resist.
- c. Both press and propaganda would be handled so that Yugoslavs are not put in a situation in which, for reasons of honor, they are bound to resist our forces, but rather so as to build up a psychological atmosphere in which the Allied demands may be agreed without it being necessary to employ force.

TREATMENT OF THE SUBJECT

2. The main arguments which would be adduced to justify the use of force if necessary are:

a. Marshal TITO has shown that he has no intention of permitting a peaceful solution of the territorial problems in Northeast ITALY and Southern AUSTRIA at the peace conference. He appears determined that his forces should remain, no matter what the legal position is, in areas occupied by them in the course of battle against the Germans. He is also taking every step to infiltrate his forces into areas already occupied by Anglo-American troops, evidently with a view of seizing these areas also.

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b. The arguments which Marshal TITO put forward to justify his seizing of the disputed areas are entirely similar to those given by JAPAN prior to the invasion of MANCHURIA, by MUSSOLINI before the invasion of AETHIOPIA, and by HITLER in regard to the SUDETEN LAND. TITO is therefore putting himself in the position of being the first post-war aggressor. The Allies are obliged to insist, even to the use of force if necessary, that territorial claims in the TITO area must be left till the peace conference, where they can be settled by regular procedure and not by unilateral action. The Allies therefore demand that, without prejudice to the final disposition of the territory, the Supreme Allied Commander must immediately have control of at least the area which is militarily vital.

c. Marshal TITO by his occupation of GORIZIA and TRIESTE and other areas has broken his word to the Supreme Allied Commander. At Lake BOLSTRA, last July, Marshal TITO agreed that when their two armies met on the head of the ADRIATIC, the territory west of a north-south line drawn through FIUM

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would come under Anglo-American control. When the two met again in BELGRADE in February, Marshal TITO offered that the Supreme Allied Commander should have full control of the part of TRISTE and the communications running from it into AUSTRIA and said that any Yugoslav forces remaining in this area would be placed under Field Marshal LITVINOV's command. In fact the two armies met in TRISTE and CORVIA, and the surrender of TRISTE was taken by Allied troops, but Marshal TITO has not kept his word and is not willing for the Supreme Allied Commander to control this area.

d. The Supreme Allied Commander has honored his undertakings to Marshal TITO to the full. He has provided enormous help for Yugoslav forces while they were operating against the Germans, not only in the provision of supplies but also by naval and air support.

METHODS OF PUBLICITY

3. Press publicity would be given as follows:

a. The campaign would be started off with a press release by the Supreme Allied Commander. This statement would be a factual review of the case against Marshal TITO as set out above.

b. President Truman and Prime Minister would be requested to issue statements backing up the Supreme Allied Commander.

c. The statements made in accordance with the above, subsequent more detailed statements from Allied Force Headquarters, and favorable material appearing in the press and radio in the UNITED KINGDOM and UNITED STATES, would be hammered home continuously by using every available medium of dissemination of information.

4. The method of providing propaganda support would be as follows:

a. FWB would provide normal support for 15th Army Group in the operational area.

b. FWB would submit draft directives covering its activities for approval by the various agencies at Allied Force Headquarters in the normal way.

c. FWB activities would be carried out with a view to retaining the local character of the conflict and avoidance of a general war with JUGOSLAVIA. Leaflet dropping to districts outside the combat areas would not be undertaken without special authorization from Allied Force Headquarters. Radio propaganda would, however, be directed to all points in JUGOSLAVIA.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested:

a. To approve the general lines of the press and propaganda campaign as set out above.

b. To lay down a time at which this campaign shall commence.

(init) L. L. L.

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African Waters
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Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
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Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)

Chief, Liaison Section

Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF

U.S. Political Adviser

British Resident Minister

Director, FWE

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Chief, INC

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EC List - 17 May 45

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36 - Exec Commr

37 - Political Advisers

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