

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/123
(VOL. IV)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

109/123
IV)

SACHED CONFERENCES, PAPERS
AUG. 1945 - OCT. 1946

esc

424

Minute 2 on p 420 with refer of telegram
to go to AFSC & Navy Sub Com.

Done - 1 hour Sec $\frac{27}{3}$

MS (26/3)

426

Ex Comm.

425 for info.

H.S. 15710

MC 1572

386-390

Ex. Com. / P. 381-385 for inf.

T-111
20/10

OCT 22 1960
0930

387-391

Chief Commissioner

387-391

Approved
Attached is submitted for your signature
information

Mr. [unclear]

See by CC
retained

388-392

Ex. Com. / P. 380-384 for inf.

Dispers should be

Mr. [unclear]
23/10

T-111
22/10

389

393

Dispers

See P. 380-384

Attached is submitted for your signature information

Mr. 25/1x See by O.C. 2
retained.

342

Ex. Com. ³⁴² P. 340 - 344 for inf.
Dispers should be see.
Mr. 23/1x 1-11/10 22/10.

346

343

Dispers. ³⁴⁶⁻³⁴⁹ to me P. 340-344
1-11/10 25/10.

Ex. Com

342

P. 340-344 noted

11/10 27/10

1418

423

Ex. Com. P. 408 - 422 for inf.
1-11/10 21/2
See by Ex. Com. Mr. 25/1x

348
 from 7 have gone to Miller's
 Rd. (Any Aug 20/65)

349
 H. Hopkinson Por. ad (B) any 25.

MS 28/8

to 355

Examine

for info foli 354 Belier Linton Dr

would be interested in this as request for travel by
 persons can take them.

He came road R

MS 28/8

MS 28/8

358

1/9/45: Seen and noted.

NB Walker Capt
 LAYSON DIV.

364.

Examine

1. Pl See 368. Sunday H. Hopkinson
 born 1890-1891 N. Broudy F.O.

Exclusions

Also info from 354. Please review this
 to be interested in this as request for trust by
 Records from them.

He came back

775 268 358
 358

1/9/45: Seen and noted.

NB Building back
 LARSON DIV.

369.

Exclusions

1. Pl See 368. Sunday 11: Hopkins
 have captured N' Broudy. F.O.
 view at 5c?

2. You will have it: prepared
 to keep 446 in. Video
 until further notice and
 not Dec 1. 1417

6/9

340

seen by L.N.C.

[Signature]

333

Ex Com

332
8/11 10/11/18

8/11/18

11/14/8

Ex Com

335

Please see folio 334 for info.

8/17/15

19/8 Noted 2

346

Ex Com

For info please see folios 336 then 345. Inasmuch as Polado have always been on distribution list but available copies were such as to cause them to be omitted because it was felt copies should be sent to Air Force SFC - could you please pass on file to Polado when you have finished, for their info. Thank you.

347

8/18

1416

Polad 12

Polad 13.

22/8

See information.

2

318

Executive Commission

Ref minute 9. (folio 280 in attendance
file) please see revised study on Peace
Treaty with Italy at folio 317 & back.

8/8. 773/878.

CDO.

322

Spec. Com.

321 /- information.

Encl.

323

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your signature/information/approval.

Do you know the terms of the proposal
see below

12/3
1961

322

Ex Com

322 for information

Ex n/c.

323

Aug 1 1968

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your signature/information/approval.

Do you know the terms of the proposal

NS/118

324

Ex Com

The CC has no information other than is contained in draft signal at 320.

14th Aug.

NS/118

W. Stewart
SO to CC

RG 331

ACC Italy

Box 197

Folder 10000/109/123

1? document/2 10 pages

"1401-1410"

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File Designation

10000/109/123

Date

10/20/92

From

AR403

To

AC

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

103 per file

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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File Designation

1000 104/123

Date

10/20/64

From

AFM3

To

AC

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1000 104/123
Authority

10/20/64
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FPMR 7117 (2-72)

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From _____
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Authority _____

Date _____

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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File Designation 1000 pages

Date 1976

From SAC (46) 6

To (46) 1

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RG 331
ACC Italy
Box 197
Folder 10000/107/123
1 document for pages
1411-1415

See page 46 9/18/76 Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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File Designation 100-10423
Date 1944
From SAC (40) 2
To (40) 1

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☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

100-10423
Authority

7/24/44
Date

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

CSA FORM 7117 (2-72)

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Date _____

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (7-72)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

SAC (45) 24
19th November 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

A3-804

Confidential

SECRET

COPY NO. 7

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

DIRECTIVE TO COMMANDER, MILITARY MISSION TO
THE ITALIAN ARMY

Note by Secretary 297-400

1. The attached draft Directive to Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army, has been prepared as a result of consultations by interested Staff Sections of AFHQ.
2. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited to approve the Directive for issue.

J. G. Sweetman
J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

NORMAN

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Chief of Staff
Divided Command
NOV 21 1945 401

Note by Secretary 197-400

1. The attached draft Directive to Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army, has been prepared as a result of consultations by interested Staff Sections of AFHQ.

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited to approve the Directive for issue.

19 Jan 45
J. B. SWETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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EC DIST - 21 Nov.

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27 - EX COMM.

29 - LAND FORCES

Copy in 8257/EC

197-400
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFC 512

1200
Confidential

DRAFT

FILE 9-5 AFHQ/126

SECRET

SUBJECT: Directive to the Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army.
TO : Commander, Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission (MALIA).

INTRODUCTION

1. It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the Italian Army, of such a size as can reasonably be maintained in a charge against the Italian Government shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency. The task which will be required of the Italian Army is to maintain the authority of the Italian Government, to be available to go to the assistance of the civil authority for the maintenance of law and order and to act as a deterrent to foreign aggression across the frontiers of ITALY. With this end in view, an Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army (MALIA) will be maintained. In order to economize in manpower, the functions of this Military Mission will be exercised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, acting in a dual capacity.

2. This directive deals solely with your functions as Commander MALIA, which will be confined to matters in connection with the formation, organization, training and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceiling. In other respects, including any alterations to the approved ceiling, you will function as Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

This Headquarters letter is 091.112/079 901-0 of 25 October 1944 revised, and

Italian Army, or such as also as circumstances be maintained as a check against the Italian Government shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency. The task which will be required of the Italian Army is to maintain the authority of the Italian Government, to be available to go to the assistance of the civil authority for the maintenance of law and order and to act as a deterrent to foreign aggression across the frontiers of Italy. With this end in view, an Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army (AMMIA) will be maintained. In order to economize in manpower, the functions of this Military Mission will be exercised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, acting in a dual capacity.

2. This directive deals solely with your functions as Commander AMMIA, which will be confined to matters in connection with the formation, organization, training and administration of the Italian Army within the approved ceilings. In other respects, including any alterations to the approved ceiling, you will function as Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. This Headquarters letter AG 091.112/079 GGT-O of 25 October 1944 refers, and this directive is intended only to amplify the provisions regarding AMMIA in the light of the reorganization of the Italian Army as set out in this Headquarters letter AG 091.711 GSE-O of 2 November 1945.

3. The term "Italian Army" includes the Carabinieri, except where the operational functions and instructions in purely civil police duties ¹⁴²³ Carabinieri are concerned. Such matters are the responsibility of the Italian Ministry of the Interior and of the Public Safety Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission.

SECRET

SECRET

OBJECTS

4. The objects of your Mission will be:

a. To advise and assist the Italian Ministry of War and subordinate Italian Headquarters in the formation, organization, training, and administration of the Italian Army within the approved colling. Your responsibilities in these respects will be limited to advice and assistance only: all necessary executive work must remain the responsibility of Italian authorities concerned. The Italian Government normally will be expected to accept your advice. If it should feel unable to do so you will refer the matter to AFHQ.

b. To advise AFHQ on such Italian Army matters as come within the scope of Subpara 2. above, and, should the occasion arise, on the employment of any Italian units or formations under Allied Command.

COMMA

5. As far as the terms of this directive are concerned you will be directly subordinate to AFHQ. In all other respects, as Land Forces Sub-Commission of Allied Commission, you will be directly subordinate to the Allied Commission.

ORGANIZATION OF AFHQ

6. To enable you to carry out the objects of your Mission you will be provided with a suitable staff of British and U.S. officers, other ranks and enlisted men. These will be organized into:

a. Military Mission to the Italian Army (also functioning as Land

399
Confidential

matter to AFHQ.

- b. To advise AFHQ on such Italian Army matters as come within the scope of Subpara 2, above, and, should the occasion arise, on the employment of any Italian units or formations under Allied Command.

COMMA

5. As far as the terms of this directive are concerned you will be directly subordinate to AFHQ. In all other respects, as Land Forces Sub-Commission of Allied Commission, you will be directly subordinate to the Allied Commission.

ORGANIZATION OF AFHQ

6. To enable you to carry out the objects of your Mission you will be provided with a suitable staff of British and U.S. officers, other ranks and enlisted men. These will be organized into:

- a. Military Mission to the Italian Army (also functioning as Land Forces Sub-Commission.)
b. British liaison units for attachment to Italian Army formations and training establishments.

7. At the present time no termination can be foreseen to the period during which the services of your Mission will be required by the Italian Government. You will, however, keep constantly under review the numbers of British and U.S. officers, other ranks and enlisted men required to carry out your objects efficiently and make such recommendations for progressive decrease as may be possible.

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8. British Liaison units are placed under your command and you are authorized to exercise the disciplinary, financial and administrative powers of a General Officer Commanding a District in respect of the personnel and stores of these units. For this purpose the Military Mission to the Italian Army will be your Headquarters.

9. You will make it clear to all personnel under your command that they are to take no part in Italian political activities of any kind. Lack of impartiality may gravely impair Allied-Italian understanding, and will, in any case, render the individual or individual concerned incapable of carrying out properly the duties entrusted to them.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

10. As far as possible the Italian Army will be organized, equipped, commanded and administered on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army. This policy is subject to such modification as may be dictated by:

- a. Nature of the tasks which the Italian Army are intended to carry out.
- b. Nature and amount of the equipment which the British and U.S. Governments have undertaken to provide.
- c. National characteristics of the Italian Military system.

With reference to "c." above, it is not the intention to interfere with or modify the Italian system in regard to honors and awards and the "et cetera" of military personnel except in-so-far as it is necessary to bring them in line with other changes in the organization. It may, however,

out properly the duties entrusted to them.

ARMY REINVESTMENT AND REORGANIZATION

10. As far as possible the Italian Army will be organized, equipped, committed and administered on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army. This policy is subject to such modification as may be dictated by:

a. Nature of the tasks which the Italian Army are intended to carry out.

b. Nature and amount of the equipment which the British and U.S. Governments have undertaken to provide.

c. National characteristics of the Italian Military system.

With reference to "c." above, it is not the intention to interfere with or modify the Italian system in regard to honors and awards and the "status civil" of military personnel except insofar as it is necessary to bring them in line with other changes in the organization. It may, however, be necessary to advise the Italian Government to modify the present system of promotion, selection of officers, pay and allowances, financial responsibility, discipline and military law, so that these shall not hamper the efficient reorganization of the Italian Army.

11. The colling of the Italian Army will be decided from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the advice of AFHQ based on the recommendations of the Allied Commission. The detailed order of battle of the Italian Army within this ceiling will be decided from time to time by AFHQ based on your recommendations.

SECRET

SECRET

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Confidential

TRAINING

12. The training policy for the Italian Army will be laid down by the Italian Ministry of War, but will be carried out under your advice and supervision. You should ensure that it conforms generally with British training policy and that British methods and standards are adopted as far as is practicable. The principal British staff officer for training at AFHQ will keep you informed of current British training policy and methods.

ADMINISTRATION

13. The approved policy regarding the administration, including maintenance and supply, of the Italian Army, is shown in this Headquarters letter AS 091.711 GSD-C of 2 November 1945, paragraphs 10 to 13 inclusive. Any alteration to these arrangements will be notified to you from time to time.

14. You will be responsible for screening the demands of the Italian Ministry of War for such equipment and supplies as continue to be found from Allied Military sources. You also will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

15. You will ensure that copies of all establishments and equipment tables drawn up by the Italian Ministry of War on your advice, are forwarded to AFHQ for information, and you will assist the Italian Ministry of War to introduce into the Italian Army a system of unit accounting and individual responsibility for stores, similar to that in the British Army.

16. You will be advised of the financial arrangements under which the provision of any equipment or supplies is undertaken by the British and U.S. Governments.

the approved policy regarding the requisitioning, including notes--

transmission and supply, of the Italian Army, is shown in this Headquarters letter AS 0541.711 GSD-0 of 2 November 1945, paragraphs 10 to 13 inclusive. Any alteration in these arrangements will be notified to you from time to time.

14. You will be responsible for assessing the demands of the Italian Ministry of War for such equipment and supplies as continue to be found from Allied Military sources. You also will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

15. You will ensure that copies of all establishments and equipment tables drawn up by the Italian Ministry of War on your advice, are forwarded to AFHQ for information, and you will assist the Italian Ministry of War to introduce into the Italian Army a system of unit accounting and individual responsibility for stores, similar to that in the British Army.

16. You will be advised of the financial arrangements under which the provision of any equipment or supplies is undertaken by the British and U.S. Governments.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

C. W. CHRISTENSEN,
Colonel, ASD,
Adjutant General.

1400

SECRET

218 ~~48~~ *Ex Com.*

(396)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AT 755

SAC (45) 21 Amendment
10th November 1945

RESTRICTED
REF ID: A6750
NOV 16 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FROM DISTANCE IN ITALY

NOTE BY SECRETARY

394

Reference para 2 b. SAC (45) 21 of 9 November 1945.
For "Allied Intelligence Services"
Read "Allied Information Service"

Letter for 1st of May
For S. J. SECTION,
CENTRAL COMMAND,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

FOR: 11/11

Reference page 2 b. 540 (25) of 3 November 1945.

For "United Intelligence Service"

and "United Information Service"

William M. Haas May

*for J. G. SPENCER,
CHIEF OF BUREAU,
SECURITY*

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17/11

EC DIST - 16 Nov

*Copy #27 - CC
" 28 - EC
" 29 - POLAD.*

1399

19/11

(250)

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF 792

SAC (45) 22
9th November 1945

RESTRICTED
COPY NO. 28

SUPREME ALLIED COM. AMER'S CONFERENCE
FILM DISTRIBUTION IN ITALY

NOV 16 1945

Note by Secretary

SAC (P) (45) 22 of 21 June 1945 refers.

1. The entrance of foreign film representatives and the release of PWB from responsibility for film distribution to ITALY were discussed at several meetings of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference, ending with SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting Minute 7. PWB was accordingly authorized to withdraw from this activity as soon as foreign film representatives were in a position to assume the responsibility.

2. The Director, PWB, now advising that arrangements have been initiated for the handover of film distribution in ITALY to representatives of American and British commercial interests and to the Italian Ministry of Information.

a. The responsibility of PWB for distribution of films in ITALY with the exception of VHSZ14 GHIULIA area will therefore cease at 2359 hours on 25 November 1945.

b. Arrangements are being made to insure the continuance of a satisfactory supply of British and American films for distribution by Allied ^{Italian} Service in VHSZ14 GHIULIA.

3. The above is circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference.

16 Nov 45

SAC (2) (44) 32 of 21 June 1945 refers.

1. The entrance of foreign film representatives and the release of film from responsibility for film distribution in Italy were discussed at several meetings of the Supreme Allied Commanders' Conference, ending with SAC (P) (45) 16th Meeting Minute 7. It was accordingly authorized to withdraw from this activity as soon as foreign film representatives were in a position to assume the responsibility.

2. The Director, DIA, has advised that arrangements have been initiated for the handover of film distribution in Italy to representatives of American and British commercial interests and to the Italian Ministry of Information.

3. The responsibility of DIA for distribution of films in Italy with the exception of VENEZIA GIULIA area will therefore cease at 2359 hours on 25 November 1945.

4. Arrangements are being made to insure the continuance of a satisfactory supply of British and American films for distribution by Allied Intelligence Services in VENEZIA GIULIA.

5. The above is circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference.

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NOV 21 1945

J. G. SWETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

EC DIST. 16 NOV 1945

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17/11/45

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217

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389
(3)(28-30)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Command's Secretariat

2172

445 (45) 22
15th October 1945

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO 28

REGISTRATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN
WEST-BERLIN

REPORT OF A MEETING HELD IN THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S
OFFICE AT 1100 HOURS, 11 OCTOBER 1945

PRESENT:-

Major General V.D. Basilev,
Soviet Plenipotentiary Delegate
for Repatriation

Colonel P.G. Jankovlev,
Permanent Soviet Repatriation
Representative in ITALY

Colonel Brihtanov,
Staff Officer to Major General
Basilev

Major General L. L. Lemnitzer,
Chief of Staff to Acting Supreme
Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Staff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AF

Major General M.H.H. Macleod,
Deputy Adjutant General, HQ AF

Major General M.H. White,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1,
AFHQ.

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5,
AFHQ.

INTERPRETERS:-

Captain Saunders (British)
Captain Bekranova (Russian)

SECRETARY:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.T. Sweetman

CC DIST 22 OCT
CC COMD AF
28- POWS
29- CC FILES
30 - 22-304

PRESENT:-

Major General V.D. Basilov,
Soviet Plenipotentiary, Disarmament
for Repatriation

Colonel V.G. Jakovlev,
Permanent Soviet Repatriation
Representative in Italy

Colonel Brubnerov,
Staff Officer to Major General
Basilov

Major General L. L. Lemnitzer,
Chief of Staff to Acting Supreme
Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Major General H.M. Macleod,
Deputy Assistant General, AFHQ

Major General H.G. Wille,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1,
AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5,
AFHQ

INTERPRETERS:-

Captain Saunders (British),
Captain Bekrenevo (Germanian)

SECRETARY:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Sweetman

G C DIST 22 OCT

28- EX. COMMAND

29- RECORDS

30- CC FILES

31- 342-1344

1. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR SOVIET OFFICERS IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV handed over a nominal roll of Russian officers working in the group of Colonel Jakovlev, Permanent Soviet Repatriation Representative in Italy. He (Major General Basilov) had applied on 17th September, through Allied Commission, for movement orders to permit these officers to move freely throughout Italy and had indicated the places to which they would go. He requested that these movement orders should be issued immediately.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that it was not at present possible to give a blanket permit to any Russian officer to allow permanently free movement throughout Italy. Separate movement orders were necessary for each specific journey. This was also the regulation for all allied officers, including British and American. He understood that the letter to which Major General Basilov referred had been received at AFHQ considerably after that date, and he thought that, in some respects, a reply had already been given. He believed that

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certain of the requests made could not be granted, as they were contrary to the already stated policy of the Supreme Allied Commander. He understood that a full reply to Major General Basilev's letter would be furnished to him as a matter of urgency.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILEV stated that American and British officers were permitted complete freedom of movement in BRIGADIA, ROMANIA, and HUNGARY, without the necessity of obtaining movement orders. He wished to refute a statement made in a letter dated 9th October addressed to him by General Lammizer that Russian officers were making journeys without authorization. It was his interpretation that Article 2 of the Yalta Agreement undertook to allow Russian officers to move freely. Further undertakings in this sense had been given by the British Ambassador in BRIGADIA. The Russian officers in Italy had considered that these statements provided adequate authorization for their movement and had proceeded accordingly to their duties at the Russian-organized collecting points for Soviet citizens in Italy. They only moved away from these points when they received news of Russian citizens located in certain districts and requiring to be repatriated. They then went to see that these persons came to the collecting points.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that the Yalta Agreement provided only a general authority for freedom of movement. In accordance with its provisions movement orders would be issued allowing Russians to move on all reasonable occasions. However, such local movement orders for specific journeys remained required in accordance with theatre regulations. If Russian officers were proceeding with such authority they would be offered all facilities made available to any other Allied officer.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, GSG GAF, in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, AFMGS, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFMGS, to draft for his approval as a matter of urgency a complete reply to Major General Basilev's request for permission for Russian officers to move in Italy.

2. RUSSIAN COLLECTING POINTS IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL BASILEV named several places throughout Italy where collecting points for Russian citizens had formerly been set up by Russian officers. These officers had recently been ordered to return to ROMANIA as not being in possession of authorization to remain. They had been located at some of these collecting points since May. He wished these collecting points to continue in existence and requested that the officers, mentioned on the nominal roll which he had handed over, should be authorized to remain in the towns in question.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILEV and Brigadier General

that they received news of Russian citizens located in certain districts and requiring to be repatriated. They then went to see that these persons came to the collecting points.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that the Zalta agreement provided only a general authority for freedom of movement. In accordance with its provisions, movement orders would be issued allowing Russians to move on all reasonable occasions. However, such local movement orders for specific journeys remained required in accordance with the state Russian law. In Russian officers were proceeding with such authority they would be offered all facilities made available to any other allied officer.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Deputy Adjutant General, G-1, G-2, in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, G-2, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, G-4, to draft for his approval some matter of urgency a complete reply to Major General Basilev's request for permission for Russian officers to move in Italy.

2. RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP POINTS IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL BASILEV named several places throughout Italy where collecting points for Russian citizens had formerly been set up by Russian officers. These officers had recently been ordered to return to Rome as not being in possession of authorization to remain. They had been located at some of these collecting points since May. He wished these collecting points to continue in existence and requested that the officers, mentioned on the nominal roll which he had handed over, should be authorized to remain in the towns in question.

MAJOR GENERAL LAMBERT said, and Major General HITE and Brigadier General MATHIAS agreed, that it appeared that this Russian organization of collecting points had been set up without the knowledge or the overall authority of the allied authorities. They were in no way official allied collecting points for Russian citizens and were not recognized as having any official status. Moreover he could not agree that they were Russian citizens, according to the British and United States interpretations, located at the various points throughout Italy to which Major General BASILEV had referred.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILEV explained that the network was not a permanent organization. It was organized by Colonel Jakovlev. The Russians put out advertisements both in the press and on the Russian radio that Russian officers were located in these places and then Russian citizens wanting to be repatriated were collected at these points and passed on. The collecting points often consisted simply of a flat in which these Russian citizens gathered. The Russian officers were in the habit of reporting to the local allied command all about these people and regions for the Russian personnel concerned and been obtained from the local allied authorities.

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THE CHIEF OF STAFF said it was now becoming clear why the misunderstanding about unauthorized Russian movement had arisen. The allied authorities at ILLI had known nothing about this system of Russian collecting points, whereas the Russian officers had believed they were authorized to move about ILLI in order that this organization might function. He asked Major General RASHLEY to submit in writing complete details of his plan for collecting points in ILLI, together with an estimate of the numbers to be handled at each place, so that proper arrangements for accommodation could be made. This plan should be based on handling only persons recognized as Soviet citizens by the United States and British Governments. It would then be thoroughly examined by the staff and a decision would be given as to whether the organization was to be allowed to continue. Such a decision could not, however, be given until a full study could be made of the implications. He also asked Major General RASHLEY to arrange for one of his officers to go with a staff officer from AFHQ in one or more of these collecting points, so that the allied authorities might have a clear idea of the way the organization worked.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Invited Major General RASHLEY to submit in writing full details of his plan for Russian collecting points for Soviet citizens in ILLI.

3. SPECIAL HOSPITAL FACILITIES FOR RUSSIANS

MAJOR GENERAL RASHLEY asked if one hospital, or if that was not possible one department or ward of a hospital, could be set aside for Russian citizens. He said that Russian sick and wounded were at present located in various hospitals over ILLI and it would be better if they could be put in one place. He pointed out that in GROSS special American and British hospitals had been set up.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF said that he would have this proposal examined by the staff. He understood that in certain areas it was already in force. However, the provision of facilities in any particular area would necessarily depend on the number of Soviet citizens requiring treatment, as it was essential that hospitalization facilities should be economically arranged.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to examine the feasibility of the provision of special hospitalization facilities for Russian citizens in ILLI and to inform the Russian Representative Mission accordingly in due course.

4. SOVIET CITIZENS IN POLISH CAMPS

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Invited Major General Bastlow to submit in writing full details of his plan for Russian collecting points for Soviet citizens in ITLL.

3. SPECIAL HOSPITAL FACILITIES FOR RUSSIANS

CHIEF OF STAFF said that he would have this proposal examined by the War Department or ward of a hospital, could be set aside for Russian citizens. He said that Russian sick and wounded were at present located in various hospitals over ITLL and it would be better if they could be put in one place. He pointed out that in USSR special American and British hospitals had been set up.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF said that he would have this proposal examined by the staff. He understood that in certain areas it was already in force. However, the provision of facilities in any particular area would necessarily depend on the number of Soviet citizens requiring treatment, as it was essential that hospitalization facilities should be economically arranged.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to examine the feasibility of the provision of special hospitalization facilities for Russian citizens in ITLL and to inform the Russian Representative Mission accordingly in due course.

4. SOVIET CITIZENS IN POLISH CARS

MAJOR GENERAL BASTLOW said there were some 300 Soviet citizens, according to the United States and British definition, held in the camp around GRYBOW. Most were personnel of the Polish Corps who had elected to return to POLAND were at present concentrated. These 300 personnel wished to return to USSR and he asked that their return should be arranged, in accordance with the instructions which Field Marshal Alexander had given that all personnel, who were Soviet citizens or the United States and British definition and who wished to return to USSR, should be so returned.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that this had been a general directive of Field Marshal Alexander's. Particular arrangements for personnel of the Polish Corps were governed by further specific instructions from the British Government as this corps was a British contingent.

MAJOR GENERAL BASTLOW said that all personnel who had been in the Polish Corps had been enlisted into that formation as Poles. Some 14,000 had volunteered to

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return to POLAND and had been withdrawn from the Polish Corps for that purpose. The British Government had undertaken to return these individuals to POLAND and it was his responsibility to see that this decision was carried out. If the 300 personnel he knew Major General Basilov referred wanted to go to RUSSIA when they got back to POLAND, that was a matter for negotiation between the Soviet and Polish governments. The instructions of the British Government, as confirmed by the Supreme Allied Commander, were completely clear that all of these 14,000 personnel were to be returned to POLAND.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he was only asking that agreed Soviet citizens who wanted to go to RUSSIA should be handed over to the agencies for repatriation.

MAJOR GENERAL DEFF reported that his instructions were that all 14,000 personnel should be returned to POLAND. Any variation of these instructions must be arranged between the Russian and British governments. However, he was most anxious that the whole 14,000 should get back to POLAND as quickly as possible. He was finding great difficulty in making the train arrangements for this move and he asked Major General Basilov if he could obtain any assistance from his government in regard to the journey from VIENNA onwards.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV asked if he himself or one of his officers could go into the camps around GERMANY to identify Russian citizens.

MAJOR GENERAL DEFF replied that, as all the men in these camps were being sent back to POLAND, visit to them by Russian officers would serve no useful purpose.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to write to the Soviet Repatriation Commission in ITALY, requesting the British position and requesting Major General Basilov's requests in regard to this matter.

5. PERMISSION FOR SOVIET OFFICERS TO VISIT PRISONS IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that in his letter of 29th September he had given details of Soviet citizens detained in prisons in ITALY. He asked if Soviet officers could visit such prisons.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that in order to visit civilian prisons in areas which had been turned back to the Italian Government the Russian mission would approach that Government. Permission would certainly be given for Russian officers to visit any British or United States military

over, he was most anxious that the whole 14,000 should get back to POLAND as quickly as possible. He was finding great difficulty in making the train arrangements for this move and he asked Major General Basilev if he could obtain any assistance from his government in regard to the journey from VIENNA onwards.

MAJOR GENERAL BASILEV asked if he himself or one of his officers could go into the camp round CARPIVIA to identify Russian citizens.

MAJOR GENERAL STAFF replied that, as all the men in those camps were being sent back to POLAND, visit to them by Russian officers would serve no useful purpose.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to write to the Soviet Representation in ITALY, requesting the British Legation and requesting Major General Basilev's requests in regard to this matter.

5. PERMISSION FOR SOVIET OFFICERS TO VISIT PRISONS IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL BASILEV said that in his letter of 29th September he had given details of Soviet citizens detained in prisons in ITALY. He asked if Soviet officers could visit such prisons.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF pointed out that in order to visit civilian prisons in areas which had been turned back to the Italian government the Russian Mission would approach that government. Permission would certainly be given for Russian officers to visit any British or United States military prisons in which Russian citizens (on the British and United States Inter-pretation) were detained. An investigation would also be made by the Allied authorities in regard to the Russian citizens stated to be confined in military prisons under command of Polish Corps.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Interviewed the Deputy Adjutant General, 14th CAV, in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 14th CAV, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 14th CAV, to investigate the report contained in Major General Basilev's letter of 29th September, that Russian citizens were confined in camps in prisons in ITALY, and if those proved to be military prisons to take appropriate action.

6. RUSSIAN CITIZENS ON SOVIET DEPRIVATION REGISTRY IN ITALY

MAJOR GENERAL BASILEV asked what was the intention in regard to the disposal of personnel, at present held in camps in ITALY, who were not Soviet citizens according to the British and American definition and therefore not at present eligible for repatriation.

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THE CHIEF OF STAFF replied that the problem had been put up to the British and United States governments but no answer had as yet been received. In the meantime these personnel would be properly taken care of in Allied camps pending a decision as to their disposition.

7. PLANNING FOR DEPARTURE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATION MISSION

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV suggested that Colonel Jakovlev, the Chief of the normal Russian Representation Mission in Italy, should come to AFHQ each week for consultation with a suitable British or American Staff officer who dealt with representation matters.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF said he would be exceedingly glad for such interviews to take place, as any visits could be settled on staff level which were not suitable for discussion at a meeting such as the present one. Colonel Jakovlev would be received at AFHQ at any time on giving reasonable notice.

MAJOR GENERAL M. CLEGG said that the officer with whom Colonel Jakovlev could probably best deal was the Head of the M2 Section of his staff. He understood that Colonel Jakovlev had in the past visited this staff section and knew how to find it. He would also be glad to have Colonel Jakovlev visit Headquarters, 218 Special Area who were responsible for the running of the Russian camp in the RHINE area.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Invited Major General Basilev to arrange for Colonel Jakovlev to contact an appropriate staff officer at AFHQ and Commander, 218 Special Area, as suggested above.

8. DEPARTURE OF MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV AND PARTY FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he wished to return to VISCONTI by road via VIENNA, starting on 14th October. He gave details of the composition of his party. He requested that he be given a route and travel orders and that arrangements for his passage be made.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF observed that it would be necessary to obtain the permission of Commander-in-Chief, British Troops in AUSTRIA, but that this would be done as a matter of urgency.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructed the Secretary to take immediate steps to arrange, subject to the agreement of Commander-in-Chief, British Troops in Austria, for Major General Basilev's movement to VIENNA in

MAJOR GENERAL PLUMED said that the officer with whom Colonel Jakovlev could probably best deal was the head of the 12 Section of his staff. He understood that Colonel Jakovlev had in the past visited this staff section and knew how to find it. He would also be glad to have Colonel Jakovlev visit Headquarters, 218 Special Area who was responsible for the running of the Russian camp in the HUNGARIAN area.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Invited Major General Basilov to arrange for Colonel Jakovlev to contact an appropriate staff officer at AFHQ and Commander, 218 Special Area, as suggested above.

B. DEPARTURE OF MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV AND PARTY FROM THE HUNGARIAN AREA:

MAJOR GENERAL BASILOV said that he wished to return to MOSCOW by road via VIENNA, starting on 14th October. He gave details of the composition of his party. He requested that he be given a route and travel orders and that arrangements for his passage be made.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF observed that it would be necessary to obtain the permission of Commander-in-Chief, British Troops in AUSTRIA, but that this would be done as a matter of urgency.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Instructioned the Secretary to take immediate steps to contact subject to the agreement of Commander-in-Chief, British Troops in AUSTRIA, for Major General Basilov's movement to VIENNA in accordance with his request.

(NOTE:

The following matters were touched on during the conference, but as they were left for detailed discussion between Colonel Jakovlev and the appropriate Allied staffs, they are not recorded:

- (1) Alleged objection of a Russian officer from his hotel in the LITOMER-PRISL area.
- (2) Appointment of a Russian officer to work with the British authorities at Camp 50 near HUNGARI.
- (3) Anti-Soviet articles by Polish newspapers.

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J. G. STEPHAN,
LEUTENANT COLONEL.

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ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
INTER OFFICE MEMO

From:

SUBJECT

FILE No.

TO:

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CONFERENCES, ALLIED COMMUNITIES CONFERENCE

ERROR ON PAGE 20: 2ND LINE

Date by class of Survey

1. On 1 December 1946, will be a comparatively small headquarters, and will be mainly British. It will continue to decrease slightly in size, but it is likely to continue in some form at least until the summer of 1946.
2. Many of its important duties would be considerably lightened by having in close contact with the British and U.S. Ambassadors, the Allied Commission and M.H.I.A. In fact, in every respect it would be able to carry out its duties more economically and efficiently if located in Rome rather than in Caserta.
3. The morale factor must also be considered. Winter recreation and facilities for recreation in Caserta are very poor. It is important now that the war is over to house and entertain all ranks as well as can be economically arranged.
4. It is, therefore, recommended that the move to Rome should be agreed and the telegram at Appendix 'A' notified. All concerned should be prepared for despatch.

BY EMMETT C. HARRIS

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Chapman

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4. It is, therefore, recommended that the move to Rome should be agreed and the telegram at Appendix 'A' notified all concerned should be approved for despatch.

(Sintd) T.D.A.

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TO: AG AR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHIEF OF STAFF
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDERS IN CHIEF
USCIB MAIN
TSSTT MAIN
AICOM

This is MAP.

1. In view of PAM 601 and PAM 608, it is thought desirable to report the present status of plans for the future of AFHQ and its associated Headquarters.

2. GIC, CEF, is being activated effective 1 October 1945 to conduct purely British Army matters in this Theatre. United States matters will continue to be handled by HQ MTOUSA. AFHQ as such will then become a comparatively small integrated Headquarters whose activities will be restricted to essentially Allied matters.

3. Subject to any directions that you or the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff may give, as a result of the review of the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander forermentioned in PAM 608, it is intended that Headquarters MTOUSA should be dissolved about 1 December 1945. It is understood that a detachment of United States personnel under the administrative control of USCIB will then be provided to play their part in the remaining Allied activities of AFHQ.

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2. GHQ, DIP, is being activated effective 1 October 1945 to conduct purely British Army matters in this Theater. United States matters will continue to be handled by HQ MTOUSA. AFHQ as such will then become a comparatively small integrated Headquarters whose activities will be restricted to essentially Allied matters.

3. Subject to any directions that you or the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff may give, as a result of the review of the appointment of Supreme Allied Commander forthcoming in JAX 608, it is intended the Headquarters MTOUSA should be dissolved about 1 December 1945. It is understood that a detachment of United States personnel under the administrative control of USMST will then be provided to play their part in the remaining Allied activities of AFHQ.

4. Meanwhile the British Naval Headquarters of CINCPAC is already in the process of moving to MAJLH and Headquarters RAF MEDWILL have completed its move to WIDELST by the end of October, leaving a smaller subordinate Air Headquarters in IFLLY. GHQ, CEF, will also decrease in size as British commitments in ITALY are reduced.

5. It has always been true that the location in Rome of the Military Headquarters responsible for ITALY would have considerable advantages, particularly by facilitating closer contact with the Allied Commission

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and its Sub-Commission and with the British and United States Ambassadors. We will now, however, the practical difficulties of moving and accommodating a Headquarters as large as AFHQ have prevented such a step. After the dissolution of UNCS, the Headquarters will be sufficiently reduced for these difficulties no longer to be prohibitive. It is intended, therefore, that at this stage, AFHQ and the Headquarters remaining associated with it should move to ROME.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AP 718

SAC (45) 21
20th September 1945

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SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDERS CONFERENCE SEP 24 1945

DIRECTIVE TO AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, AIR, ITALY

NOTE BY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, IAF, AND

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The Supreme Allied Commander's conference is requested to take note of the attached directive which has been issued to the Air Officer Commanding, IAF, Italy.

(Snd) H.B.P.
for A.C.N.

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EE DIST-24 SEP 45

37 CONFIDENTIAL

30 EX CONFIDENTIAL

The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is requested to
take note of the attached directive which has been issued to the
Air Officer Commanding, RAF, Italy.

(Intd) R.I.P.
for W.D.C.

21/10/44

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37 Carrier Command

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33 Air Force

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AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCT 10 1945

TO: Air Vice Marshal J. WHITFIELD, C.B., C.B.E.,
Air Headquarters, Royal Air Force, ITALY

With effect from 1st October, 1945, you are appointed Air
Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, ITALY.

2. With effect from the date when the Commander-in-Chief, Royal
Air Force, Mediterranean and Middle East transfers his headquarters to
Cyprus, you will be his deputy with the supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre, with Allied Force Headquarters and with General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, The British Army in the Central Mediter-
ranean. You will keep the C-in-C, M.E.S., DP/2 fully informed of
any proposed changes of policy or action taken.

3. With effect from 1st October 1945 you will have operational
control over all formations and units operating from bases in the
mainland of Italy and in Sicily with the exception of 205 Group, 214
Group and 216 Group. Desert Air Force and Royal Air Force, GUMUCCI
will be under your command. You will be responsible for certain ad-
ministrative services for 214 Group, as already laid down, and for the
local administration of 216 Group units; and, when Headquarters 205
Group moves to the AL-OL, 205, of No. 205 Group units left in ITALY.

4. You will be responsible for making all necessary preparations
for action against external aggressors of AUSTRIA, ITALY and GERMANY.

5. According to the prevailing circumstances, you will render
every assistance you can, to A.O.C., R.A.F., AUSTRIA in the maintenance
of internal security in AUSTRIA.

6. With regard to AUSTRIA, except for R.A.F. units located there,
your responsibilities are limited to those administrative services
deriving from A.F.M.C. Directives to A.O.C., R.A.F. and A.O.C., R.A.F.

With effect from 1st October, 1943, you are appointed Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force, Italy.

With effect from the date upon the Commander-in-Chief, Royal Air Force, Mediterranean and Middle East transfers his headquarters to Cairo, you will be his deputy with the supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, with Allied Force Headquarters and with General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, The British Army in the Central Mediterranean. You will keep the C-in-C, A.S.F., 23/23 fully informed of any proposed changes of policy or action taken.

3. With effect from 1st October 1943 you will have operational control over all formations and units operating from bases in the Mediterranean of Italy and in Greece with the exception of 205 Group, 214 Group and 216 Group. Desert Air Force and Royal Air Force, Greece will be under your command. You will be responsible for certain administrative services for all Groups, an already laid down, and for the local administration of 216 Group units; and, with Headquarters 205 Group serves to the Allied Force, of 205 Group units left in Italy.

4. You will be responsible for making all necessary preparations for action against external aggressors of AUSTRIA, ITALY and GREECE.

5. According to the prevailing circumstances, you will render every assistance you can, to A.S.F., A.S.F., AUSTRIA in the maintenance of internal security in AUSTRIA.

6. With regard to AUSTRIA, except for D.A.F. units located there, your responsibilities are limited to those administrative services deriving from A.S.F.C. Directives to A.S.F., I.A.F. and A.S.F., AUSTRIA, copies of which are attached, give details of their responsibilities.

7. You will establish your headquarters in close proximity to Allied Force Headquarters or any Allied Land Force Headquarters that may succeed it.

(sig) J.B. MOUNTAIN 1943 1353

W/air

For Air Marshal,
Commander-in-Chief,
Royal Air Force,
Mediterranean and Middle East.

22nd September, 1943.

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Supreme Allied Co. Andor's Sovereigns

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EDUCATION AND TRAINING: CONGRUENCE

PHOTOGRAPHIC SECTOR IN THE EALMANS

Florida by Secretary

1. MR. RAY/MILLER has received a request from the Director of Survey, ARA, to complete the photographic survey of TUNIS. To do this successfully, it would be necessary for aircraft to cross the frontiers of neighboring States.

2. In view of the political factors involved, CINC PAC/TIME has prepared this paper at APPENDIX 1A and requests that it be considered by the Board in order to be approved by the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference. In order to have no adverse effect to the recommendations of this paper, if approved, a draft telegram has been prepared by the Secretariat and is at APPENDIX 1B.

3. It is understood that on the American side, the U.S. Air Force's European Theatre have been charged with the responsibility of photographing the Balkans and GE, SAIR/ETO, was approached in regard to the survey of ALBANIA. It is, however, the present U.S. policy not to make reconnaissance flights over that country without obtaining prior clearance from the Albanian authorities.

The suggested priority is justified:

2. To approve the recommendations of CHIC RAC/AUTOP as contained in this paper at APPENDIX 1, 2 and 3. 00.

D. To authorize the dispatch of the signal is $APPROVAL = 1$.

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Note by Secretary

1. CINC RAR/ALUE has received a request from the Director of Survey, AFM, to complete the photographic survey of ALUE. To do this successfully, it would be necessary for aircraft to cross the frontiers of neighboring States.

2. In view of the political factors involved, CINC RAR/ALUE has prepared the paper at APPENDIX 1A and requests that it be considered by the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference. In order to give effect to the recommendations of this paper, if approved, a draft telegram has been prepared by this Secretariat and is at APPENDIX 1B.

3. It is understood that on the American side, the U.S. Air Forces Europe Theatre have been charged with the responsibility of photographing the Balkans and CE, and AFM, was approached in regard to the survey of ALUE. It is, however, the present U.S. policy not to make reconnaissance flights over that country without obtaining prior clearance from the Albanian authorities.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is invited:

- a. To approve the recommendations of CINC RAR/ALUE contained in the paper at APPENDIX 1A and 1B.
- b. To authorize the dispatch of the signal at APPENDIX 1B.

J. J. GREGG
J. J. GREGG,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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APPENDIX 1A

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POST WAR PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY IN THE BALKANS

Note by Commander-in-Chief, RAF/AZD

INTRODUCTION

1. To complete the photographic survey of GREECE will involve crossing the border into all the Balkan countries bounding on GREECE, i.e., ALBANIA, JUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA and TURKEY, as it is not possible to photograph up to the border without flying over it. It is stated that the actual areas to be covered are small and although it is not possible to state the exact number of sorties required, it is anticipated that twelve successful missions would probably be sufficient. There is, in addition, a small commitment to complete the survey within ALBANIA itself, which will involve crossing the JUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN border.
2. The Director of Survey stresses the importance to all branches of the Allied Forces of having accurate maps. He points out that most of the current maps are of very poor quality indeed, and the only way in which they can be quickly improved is by air photography.

DISCUSSION

3. At the moment flying over JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA and all RUSSIAN occupied territory is specifically forbidden on orders of GCMHQ; these restrictions were imposed as the result of complaints by the JUGOSLAVS, the ALBANIANS and the RUSSIANS in BULGARIA. While air Ministry are anxious for these surveys to be completed they are prepared to leave the decision regarding flying over these territories to HEMU.
4. The objections to Allied aircraft flying over JUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA were directed against normal transport aircraft that were either landing in those two countries or else overflying them to other countries. Flights were for the most part made at a low altitude and were not detected by radar.
5. During the first week in July, however, the RUSSIAN section of the ACC in BULGARIA transmitted a written complaint to the British Delegation to the effect that British aircraft had violated RUSSIAN controlled territory on 27 June. This was followed by a complaint of a previous violation on 22nd June. The accurate information given by the RUSSIANS regarding the P.R. flights which they had detected at an altitude of

ated that twelve successful missions would probably be sufficient. There is, in addition, a small commitment to complete the survey within Albania itself, which will involve crossing the JUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN border.

2. The Director of Survey stresses the importance to all branches of the Allied Forces of having accurate maps. He points out that most of the current maps are of very poor quality indeed, and the only way in which they can be quickly improved is by air photography.

DISCUSSION

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4. The objections to Allied aircraft flying over JUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA were directed against normal transport aircraft that were either landing in these two countries or else overflying them to other countries. Flights were for the most part made at a low altitude and were not detected by Radar.

5. During the first week in July, however, the RUSSIAN section of the AOC in BULGARIA transmitted a written complaint to the British Ambassador to the effect that British aircraft had violated RUSSIAN controlled territory on 27 June. This was followed by a complaint of a previous violation on 22nd June. The accurate information given by the RUSSIANS regarding the P.R. flights which they had detected at an altitude of 20,000 feet, indicated conclusively that there is in existence good Radar or aircraft reporting cover of the area.

6. As stated in para 1 above the nature of the frontier on the Northern Borders of GREECE makes it virtually impossible to complete a survey of that country without violation of the boundaries of adjacent states. It is clear, therefore, that if the survey is completed without the concurrence of the adjacent states, detection of P.R. flights over the GREEK-BULGARIAN border is almost certain, but unlikely in the case of ALBANIA, JUGOSLAVIA and TURKEY.

7. As far as the survey on the ALBANIAN, JUGOSLAV and TURKISH borders is concerned, it is considered safe to proceed, but the risk of detection on the Bulgarian border necessitates an examination of the courses open to us to complete the survey in this sector.

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CHANGES OF ACTION IN REGARD TO THE BULGARIAN FRONTIER

6. Ask permission from the RUSSIANS. If permission were granted, the problem would be solved. There are, however, no grounds for anticipating their concurrence in our request, and the very fact of consulting them direct would have the effect of putting them on the alert, especially in view of the present concentrations of RUSSIAN Air Force and ground units in S. BULGARIA.

7. Attempt completion of the survey without permission. This could be easily attempted, but the following factors should be taken into consideration.

a. It is anticipated that twelve successful missions will be required. In practice this may mean flying considerably more than twelve sorties with a corresponding increase in the likelihood of detection.

b. Past experience shows that there is an adequate aircraft reporting system or Radar cover along the BULGARIAN frontier. This makes detection almost certain, unless the Radar screen is not operating, and this is unlikely for the whole period during which the operation is taking place. With the detection of only one flight, the RUSSIANS would have grounds for further complaints.

On balance it is considered that to attempt to complete the survey without RUSSIAN approval is bound to occasion further protest.

10. Abandon the completion of the survey project for the present. This could, of course, be done, but in the absence of reliable intelligence it would be difficult to decide when it would be safe to complete the work. Detection at a later date may cause even more embarrassment and render impossible the completion of the task in a reasonable time, if at all.

11. Leave the survey incomplete (i.e., unfinished at the border). This alternative has the advantage of being 'trouble free'. It means, however, that the inter-state boundaries will not be accurately covered. Present long term military considerations or even future boundary delimitations may well make this undesirable.

12. Clear project with the appropriate authorities in LONDON. This would ensure that the importance of the survey would be balanced against the political implications. If it was decided that the survey is to proceed, then the Foreign Office would be prepared for any complaints that were received.

RECOMMENDATIONS

D. Past experience shows that there is an adequate aircraft reporting system or Radar cover along the GREEK-TURK border. This makes detection almost certain, unless the radar system is not operating, and this is unlikely for the whole period during which the operation is taking place. With the detection of only one flight, the GREEKS would have grounds for further complaints.

On balance it is considered that to attempt to complete the survey without GREEK approval is bound to excite further protest.

10. Abandon the completion of the survey project for the present. This could, of course, be done, but in the absence of reliable intelligence it would be difficult to decide when it would be safe to complete the work. Detection at a later date may cause even more embarrassment and render impossible the completion of the task in a reasonable time, if at all.

11. Leave the survey incomplete (i.e., unfinished at the border). This alternative has the advantage of being flexible. It means, however, that the inter-state boundaries will not be accurately covered. Present and term military considerations or even future boundary delimitations may well make this undesirable.

12. Clear project with the appropriate authorities in GREECE. This would ensure that the importance of the survey would be balanced against the political implications. If it was decided that the survey is to proceed, then the Foreign Office would be prepared for any complaints that were received.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. A. Proceed with the survey on the ALBANIAN, GREEK and TURKISH borders.

B. Obtain the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, before proceeding with the survey on the GREEK-TURK border.

(Initial) G. B. F.

For A. G. C.

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DRAFT

B. 1060

APPENDIX B

TOP SECRET

TO FOR ACTION: ALSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO FOR INFO: BRITISH AMBASSADOR FOR U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINIST FOR COMMANERS-IN-CHIEF

This is MINCOM _____.

1. As current maps of GREECE are of very poor quality, it is desired to complete the photographic survey of that country.

The photo-reconnaissance flights necessary for this purpose can be provided from the resources of KING AIR LIAISON, through whom I understand that the Air Ministry are anxious for the survey to be completed.

2. The nature of the Northern Greek frontier, however, makes it virtually impossible to complete the survey without violation of the boundaries of adjacent States. My previous policy has been to forbid flights (other than standard courier flights and special missions for which clearance is obtained) over JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, and all Russian occupied territory. This policy was adopted as a result of complaints by the Yugoslavs and Albanians and by the Russians in regard to BULGARIA.

3. Detection of photo-reconnaissance flights in the areas of the ALBANIAN, JUGOSLAV and TURKISH frontiers of GREECE is unlikely

is desired to complete the photographic survey of that country. The photo-reconnaissance flights necessary for this purpose can be provided from the resources of CINC PAF BFMZ, through whom I understand that the Air Ministry are anxious for the survey to be completed.

2. The nature of the Northern Dvick frontier, however, makes it virtually impossible to complete the survey without violation of the boundaries of adjacent States. My previous policy has been to forbid flights (other than standard courier flights and special missions for which clearance is obtained) over JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, and all Russian occupied territory. This policy was adopted as a result of complaints by the Yugoslavs and Albanians and by the Russians in regard to BULGARIA.

3. Detection of photo-reconnaissance flights in the areas of the ALBANIA, JUGOSLAV and RUSSIAN frontiers of GREECE is unlikely and I have, therefore, ordered the survey of these areas to be completed.

4. It is my information, however, that the Russians have in existence a good radar or aircraft reporting cover of the BULGARIAN border area and that photo-reconnaissance flights on this frontier, if made without prior Russian permission, are likely to be detected. On the other hand, the Russians, if approached, may refuse the necessary permission.

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5. I request, therefore, that, if you consider it desirable, you should obtain Russian clearance for the completion of the survey on the GRACE-SUNGLASS Frontier. Meanwhile, I am instructing CINC RAIL WHEEL for photographic flights are not to be undertaken on this frontier until I receive your further guidance.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

CONFIDENTIAL

SAC (45) 12
422 September 1945

SEP 5 1945

COPY NO 31

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
PROVINCES OF
HANOVER OF PROVINCES IN BOLZANO
AND UDINE TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

Note by Chief of Staff

1. By MAP 1029, the Supreme Allied Commander recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that Northern ITALY, with the exception of the provinces of BOLZANO and UDINE and the Allied occupied portion of VENEZIA GIULIA, should be handed back to Italian Government control on 30 September or 21 days after receipt of orders to do so from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
2. The handback of the remaining areas, when raised in a Staff Study by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, disclosed a considerable divergence of view and it has, therefore, appeared that the subject should be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference.
3. The current directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (FAN 536) is that, when the remainder of Italian Metropolitan territory is returned to Italian administration, VENEZIA GIULIA, BOLZANO, and the area around TREVISO (which before 1919 formed part of the Austrian province of CARINTHIA and now is part of the Italian province of UDINE) should be retained under Allied Military Government.
4. The retention of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is not at issue.
5. In regard to the province of BOLZANO:
 - a. There appears to be no adequate military reason why BOLZANO province should be retained under Allied Military Government.
 - b. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and the U.S. Political Adviser recommend that this province should be

1. By NAF 1669, the Supreme Allied Commander recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that Northern ITALY, with the exception of the provinces of BOLZANO and UDINE and the Allied occupied portion of VENEZIA GIULIA, should be handed back to Italian Government control on 30 September or 21 days after receipt of orders to do so from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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4. The retention of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is not at issue.

5. In regard to the province of BOLZANO:

a. There appears to be no adequate military reason why BOLZANO province should be retained under Allied Military Government.

b. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and the U.S. Political Adviser recommend that this province should be returned to Italian Government control.

2. The British Resident Minister, however, states that the Foreign Office are inclined to favor the retention of Allied Military Government in this province, but would be reluctant to press this point of view if it were found difficult to meet the military commitment involved.

6. In regard to the province of UDINE:

a. It appears militarily essential to retain AMG in the whole province for the present.

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31 - Ex Comm

32 - Chief Comm

33 - 1st A.D.C.

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Dist - 11 Sep 45

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b. To maintain quiet conditions in Northeast ITALY, direct frontier contact between the Italian and Yugoslav Governments should be avoided. It is, therefore, at present undesirable to hand back the area round TRIESTE to the Italian Government. However, it is not administratively advisable to separate this area from the rest of the province of UDINE. The whole province should, therefore, be retained under Allied Military Government until the Italic-Yugoslav situation is more settled.

2. It is necessary to safeguard the lines of communications from TRIESTE and VENICE into the British zone of AUSTRIA. Both run through UDINE. The security of this base area is, therefore, important under existing conditions and would be even more so in the event of further trouble with the Yugoslavs.

4. Your approval is, therefore, requested for:

a. The handback of BOLZANO province with the remainder of Northern ITALY (except UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA) on the date proposed in NAF 1069.

b. The retention of AMG in the whole province of UDINE until further notice.

TRIESTE and VENICE into the British zone of AUSTRIA. Both run through UDINE. The security of this base area is, therefore, important under existing conditions and would be even more so in the event of further trouble with the Jugoslavs.

4. Your approval is, therefore, requested for:

- a. The handback of BOLZANO province with the remainder of Northern ITALY (except UDINE and VENEZIA GIULIA) on the date proposed in MAP 1069.
- b. The retention of AMG in the whole province of UDINE until further notice.

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TO : ADMIRAL FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
AMEMB FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO : ALGOL

This is MAP _____

1. Subject is handback of BOLZANO and UDINE provinces to Italian Government jurisdiction. FAN 536 laid down that the whole province of BOLZANO, and TARVIS and the surrounding area in the province of UDINE, were to remain indefinitely under Allied Military Government.

2. I now consider that BOLZANO could with advantage be handed back to Italian jurisdiction at same time as other Northern Italian territories, the handback of which was proposed in MAP 1069. Reasons are:

a. The frontier marches with Allied occupied AUSTRIA and SWITZERLAND, and there is, therefore, little likelihood of aggressive movement from outside by force of arms or propaganda. Position is thus different from that in other disputed territories.

b. It is not considered that any internal separatist movement is likely to arise with which the Italian Government should not be able to deal.

c. Risk of appearing to prejudice outcome of Peace Conference is not considered sufficiently serious to justify maintaining Allied Military Government for that reason alone.

d. Handover of this territory will be in accordance with the spirit

UDINE and the surrounding area in the province of UDINE, were to remain indefinitely under Allied Military Government.

2. I now consider that BOLZANO could with advantage be handed back to Italian jurisdiction at some time as other Northern Italian territories, the handback of which was proposed in MAP 1069. Reasons are:

a. The frontier marches with Allied occupied AUSTRIA and SWITZERLAND, and there is, therefore, little likelihood of aggressive movement from outside by force of arms or propaganda. Position is thus different from that in other disputed territories.

b. It is not considered that any internal separatist movement is likely to arise with which the Italian Government should not be able to deal.

c. Risk of appearing to prejudice outcome of Peace Conference is not considered sufficiently serious to justify maintaining Allied Military Government for that reason alone.

d. Handover of this territory will be in accordance with the spirit of para 1 of VAN 536.

3. For following reasons, however, I do not consider handback of UDINE province is at present feasible:

a. Owing to delicate situation in VENEZIA GIULIA, it remains necessary for the Allied corps in that area, with its supporting air forces, to be disposed semi-operationally and to be capable of operational deployment at short notice. As the portion of VENEZIA GIULIA under Allied Military Government does not allow sufficient depth for this purpose, the retention of full military control in the adjoining territory of UDINE is essential.

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1. U. S. Political Adviser and the British Resident Minister are however, most anxious for political reasons, that the province should be returned to the Italian Government at the same time as the rest of Northern Italy. They realize, however, that this turnover may be prohibited by over-riding military necessity.
2. The Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, while agreeing to the retention of AMG in UDINE for the present, has recommended that such Government should be terminated on 1 December 1945. It is considered, however, that the Supreme Allied Commander should not, at present, commit himself to any particular date.
7. The Supreme Allied Commander is accordingly requested to approve the dispatch of the draft signal at Appendix 'A' recommending:
 - a. The handback of BOLZANO province.
 - b. The retention of AMG in UDINE.

(Info) (D.L.)

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2. The handback of BOLZANO province.
3. The retention of AMG in UDINE.

(Ined) (D.D.)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC(45) 16
27th August 1945

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AUG 30 1945

SUPREMAC ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

CHARTER FOR MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COM MITTEE

Note by Secretary

1. As a result of the direction at SAC (45) 4th Meeting, Minute 5, the Charter for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee was re-drafted and has finally been approved in the form attached.
2. This Charter is, therefore, circulated for information.

J. G. Sweetman
J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Thurs 30 Aug 45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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2. This Charter is, therefore, circulated for information.

Sp.

14 Sept 45
J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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32 CHIEF COMINT

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31 AIR FORCE SEC
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

CONFIDENTIAL

27 August 1945

SUBJECT: Charter for Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

TO : The Secretaries,
The Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

1. The Commanding General, AAF/ATO and Commander-in-Chief, AAF/MEDEA, in Committee, are hereby designated as the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

2. On matters of a common Allied air interest the Committee will act as Air Advisors to the Supreme Allied Commander and will be responsible for the coordination of all action to be taken thereon.

3. The staff of Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will consist of the existing staffs of AAF/ATO and AAF/MEDEA who will present coordinated papers to the Committee through its Secretariat.

4. The Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will consist of two officers, one being designated by the Commanding General, AAF/ATO, and the other by Commander-in-Chief, AAF/MEDEA.

5. Papers on matters of common Allied air interest will be forwarded by the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat. The latter secretariat will forward papers approved for further transmission by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee to the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat who will be responsible for their appropriate disposition.

6. It will be the responsibility of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat to distribute copies of correspondence to the appropriate staff sections of AAF/ATO and AAF/MEDEA. This Secretariat will receive papers that have been coordinated between the appropriate staff sections of AAF/ATO and AAF/MEDEA and will be responsible for their presentation to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

of the Mediterranean, are hereby designated as the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

2. On matters of a common Allied air interest the Committee will act as Air Advisers to the Supreme Allied Commander and will be responsible for the coordination of all action to be taken thereon.
3. The staff of Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will consist of the existing staffs of AAF/ATO and RAF/ADMED who will present coordinated papers to the Committee through its Secretariat.
4. The Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will consist of two officers, one being designated by the Commanding General, AAF/ATO, and the other by Commander-in-Chief, RAF/ADMED.
5. Papers on matters of common Allied air interest will be forwarded by the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat. The latter secretariat will forward papers approved for further transmission by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee to the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat who will be responsible for their appropriate disposition.
6. It will be the responsibility of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat to distribute copies of correspondence to the appropriate staff sections of AAF/ATO and RAF/ADMED. This Secretariat will receive papers that have been coordinated between the appropriate staff sections of AAF/ATO and RAF/ADMED and will be responsible for their presentation to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.
7. The establishment of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and its secretariat is not intended to alter the normal procedure for staff consultation between Naval, Army and Air Force staff officers.

1304

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

W. D. MORRIS,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

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ALLIED FORCE HQ D/WARTS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

B 1050

SAC (45) 15
21st August 1945

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AUG 22 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

POLICY FOR ITALIAN CIVIL AVIATION

Note by Commander-in-Chief, R.F. MEDRES
and Commanding General, A.F./MGO

Introduction

1. The problem has been examined by Staffs of A.F./MGO and R.A.F. MEDRES in consultation with the British Resident Minister, POL.D and G-5, A.F.H.Q. It has also been co-ordinated with A.C. Air Forces Sub-Commission and with the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission. It will be clear from the following paragraphs that the whole question of Civil Aviation in Italy can only be dealt with in relation to certain matters of policy about which further discussion is required.

2. The Chief Commissioner's letter to the Supreme Allied Commander dated 25th July, 1945 requests consideration be given to the amendment of the current Directive given in your FA 25270 dated 13th February, 1945. This Directive forbids the discussion of Civil Aviation with the Italians. The Chief Commissioner suggests that the Directive be amended to enable the Italian Government to make plans for Civil Aviation. He states that the end of the war in EUROPE has made it possible for groups of individuals and firms, at least one of which operated pre-war air transport, to become extremely interested in making plans for Italy's future aviation industry provided a policy is laid down by the Allies.

Information

3. At the present moment, the Italian Air Force is operating a Courier service throughout Italy, SICILY and SARDINIA under the direction of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. This service functions for the purpose of transporting Allied Commission, Allied and Italian Government personnel on official business.
4. A number of aircraft factories and considerable material are available in NORTHERN ITALY at the present time. An attempt is being made to keep these factories busy by authorising completion of those unfinished aircraft to Peace Courier Ser-

Introduction

1. The problem has been examined by Staff of A.F./ATO and R...F., MEMBER in consultation with the British Resident Minister, P.O.D and G-5. A.F. R.S. It has also been co-ordinated with ...C. Air Forces Sub-Commission and with the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission. It will be clear from the following paragraphs that the whole question of Civil Aviation in Italy can only be dealt with in relation to certain matters of policy about which further direction is required.

2. The Chief Commissioner's letter to the Supreme Allied Commander dated 26th July, 1945 requests consideration be given to the amendment of the current Directive given in your PX 29270 dated 13th February, 1945. This Directive forbids the discussion of Civil Aviation with the Italians. The Chief Commissioner suggests that the Directive be amended to enable the Italian Government to make plans for Civil Aviation. He states that the end of the war in EUROPE has made it possible for groups of individuals and firms, at least one of which operated pre-war air transport, to become extremely interested in making plans for Italy's future aviation industry provided a policy is laid down by the Allies.

Information

3. At the present moment, the Italian Air Force is operating a Courier service throughout Italy, SICILY and SARDINIA, under the direction of the Air Forces Sub-Commission. This service functions for the purpose of transporting Allied Commission, Allied and Italian Government personnel on official business.

4. A number of aircraft factories and considerable material are available in Northern Italy at the present time. An attempt is being made to keep these factories busy by authorizing completion of those unfinished aircraft which, when modified, are suitable for the Italian Air Force Courier Service. Facilities remain for considerable increases in the output of these factories. This work is being done largely from the factories' local resources in spares although a certain amount of raw material has, on occasion, to be used for making up necessary equipment.

5. The aircraft industry in Northern Italy, particularly the S. 1331 factory and the Fiat factory, are turning over the bulk of their floor space to civilian industry. Evidence of this was noted by the A.O.C., Air Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission on recent visits. The Directors of the factories have, however, been told unofficially that it may be as well for them to reserve a little floor space for overhaul of Italian Air Force aircraft and possibly for civil air industry if and when it is allowed. All aircraft factory employees are being kept in employment through

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the medium of a Government subsidy system whereby the Government assists the factory by providing a portion of the employees pay.

6. The interim policy for the Italian Armed Forces, recommended by the Supreme Allied Commander to the British Chiefs of Staff, indicated liberal consideration being given to rehabilitation of a prosperous and self-supporting Italian nation. The future policy of Civil Aviation in ITALY has not been received by this Headquarters either from the U. S. or British Governments and consequently it is clear that any alteration to the current Directive which may be made without consultation with the Government concerned may prejudice their intended future policy.

Possible Courses of Action

7. It would appear that the following interim courses of action are open to us: -

- (1) To forbid all Civil Aviation.
- (11) To permit controlled self-supporting Italian Civil Aviation.
- (111) To allow no Italian Aircraft Industry but to permit the operation of Italian Civil Air lines operated under Allied Control but under day to day management of the Italians, all equipment to be from non-Italian sources.

Political Factors

8. The following points require clarification at government level:-

- (1) Is it intended to allow Civil Air routes to other than those parts of ITALY and any Colonies, which are directly under control of the Italian Government? In this connection it is considered undesirable to allow civil air lines to operate in Italian disputed territories.
- (11) Will the Italian Government own and control the Italian Civil Air Lines? Government control and ownership of Civil Air Lines might enable the Italian Government to keep aircrews and ground personnel in training while under the guise of civil status. This was one of the methods by which GERMANY built up the Luftwaffe after the last war. In the opinion of the A.O.C., Air Forces Sub-Commission, this is not likely to occur in ITALY as he considers it unlikely that the Italians possess the necessary initiative. However, in order to maintain the requisite control over Civil Aviation it is considered desirable to have it state-owned or state-controlled as the Italian Government can be compelled to back up requests from the Inspectorate and this would be more difficult if Civil Aviation were privately owned. Italian Civil Air Lines if allowed, would have to be "lined up" with us to avoid duplication of services and waste of effort.

(14) To permit controlled self-supporting Italian Civil Aviation.

(141) To allow no Italian Aircraft Industry but to permit the operation of Italian Civil Air Lines operated under Allied Control but under day to day management of the Italians, all equipment to be from non-Italian sources.

Political Factors

8. The following points require clarification at government level:-

(i) Is it intended to allow Civil Air routes to other than those parts of ITALY and any Colonies, which are directly under control of the Italian Government? In this connection it is considered undesirable to allow civil air lines to operate in Italian disputed territories.

(ii) Will the Italian Government own and control the Italian Civil Air Lines? Government control and ownership of Civil Air Lines might enable the Italian Government to keep aircrews and ground personnel in training while under the guise of civil status. This was one of the methods by which GERMANY built up the Luftwaffe after the last war. In the opinion of the A.C.C., Air Forces Sub-Commission, this is not likely to occur in ITALY as to consider it unlikely that the Italians possess the necessary initiative. However, in order to maintain the requisite control over Civil Aviation it is considered desirable to have it state-owned or state-controlled as the Italian Government can be compelled to back up requests from the Inspectorate and this would be more difficult if Civil Aviation were privately owned. Italian Civil Air Lines if allowed, would have to be "wined up" with us to avoid duplication of services and waste of effort. In this connection over-riding control of Italian Civil Air Lines by the UNITED NATIONS is favoured during the armistice regime but in view of the paucity of personnel available it is considered that the day to day control of Italian Civil Airways could be carried out by the Italians themselves subject always to their having received specialized training from UNITED NATIONS Agencies.

(iii) Is it the intention to allow the Italian aircraft industry to be rehabilitated with a view to providing aircraft for the post-war Italian Air Force and also for Civil Air Lines? It is considered unlikely that the number of aircraft to be engaged on civil aviation and for that matter also the number of aircraft required for the post-war Italian Air Force, would be sufficient to keep an Italian aircraft industry working on an economic basis. At the present time ITALY is a bankrupt, and in part occupied, country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. It is considered however that the Italians will wish to build their aircraft if they are allowed to. Prior to the war they did a great deal of their engine building under

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licence. The very fact of their building UNITED NATIONS types under licence would enable us to reinforce them with additional aircraft should such a course of action at any time appear necessary. If the Italians are allowed (for the time being) to continue completion of aircraft for which they have orders, the new modern machines so acquired might be of some value to UNITED NATIONS. Any reduction in unemployment produced as a result of this would also be of assistance to us as it would contribute towards improved internal security conditions. It was suggested by A.O.C., Air Forces Sub-Commission that it might favour of International sharp practice to forbid the Italians to manufacture any aircraft and then allow them to operate internal services with foreign-manufactured aircraft. Against this it can be argued that two of the most successful air lines in the world, i.e. the Dutch K.L.M. and Swiss Air Lines were operated entirely on foreign made aircraft. However, the very fact of giving permission for an Italian Civil Aviation Industry would make it very difficult to control the design staffs on all technical matters appertaining to aviation. This would offer an opportunity for technicians to work on experiments for future aerial weapons. This may or may not be considered dangerous.

Recommendation:

9. When the policies indicated in the above paragraph have been clarified it will be possible to decide on a course of action and it is therefore recommended, that before issuing any interim policy to the Italian Government on Civil Aviation, the Supreme Allied Commander seek the guidance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff by means of the draft signal at Appendix "A".

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air weapons. This may or may not be considered dangerous.

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DRAFT SIGNAL

TO: ADMIRAL FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
AMCSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

THIS IS NAF _____.

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1. The Italian Government is pressing for an interim policy on Italian Civil Aviation in order that plans can be made for the future. The present Directive to the Allied Commission prohibits discussion of Civil Aviation with the Italians.
2. Due to the far-reaching implications involved I request guidance on the following factors which have a direct bearing upon the terms of the peace treaty and should therefore be taken into consideration when determining any interim policy.

a. Is it the intention to allow Italy to develop her own civil air routes to other than those parts of Italy, and any colonies, which are directly under the control of the Italian Government? In this connection it is considered undesirable to allow civil air lines to operate in Italian disputed territories.

b. Will the Italian Government own and control the Italian Civil Air Lines? While Italian Government control and ownership of civilian air lines may enable the Italian Government to keep aircrew and ground personnel in military training under the guise of civil status, nevertheless they afford certain advantages for purposes of allied control.

Is it the intention to allow the Italian aircraft industry to be

aviation with the Italians.

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b. Will the Italian Government own and control the Italian Civil Air Lines? While Italian Government control and ownership of civilian air lines may enable the Italian Government to keep aircrew and ground personnel in military training under the guise of civil status, nevertheless they afford certain advantages for purposes of allied control.

c. Is it the intention to allow the Italian aircraft industry to be rehabilitated with a view to providing aircraft for the post-war Italian Air Force and also for Civil Air Lines? The Air Force to be built and the number of aircraft to be engaged on Civil aviation would probably ^{1,354} be insufficient to keep an Italian aircraft industry as an economic proposition. If civilian aviation industry is permitted it will be difficult to control the design staff on all matters pertaining to aviation which would offer an opportunity for such technicians to work on experiments for future

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• Aerial weapons.

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In view of economic conditions of Italy and presently slight potential, rehabilitation of the Italian aircraft industry on other than a very small scale is most unlikely.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SEC (45) 14
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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE AUG 22 1945

DIRECTIVE FOR AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COM-
MISSION

Note by Secretary

1. On the dissolution of Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces into its two national components, it has become necessary to revise the existing directive for the Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission.
2. The draft directive at Appendix 'A' has therefore been prepared by Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEHE in conjunction with Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and has received the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve this directive for despatch.

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W. G. S. Smith
W. G. S. SMITH,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

to the National Commission. It was deemed necessary to revise the existing directive for the Air Forces Sub Division, Allied Commission.

2. The draft directive at Appendix 'A' has therefore been prepared by Commander-in-Chief, RAF with in consultation with Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, and has received the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

3. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve this directive for despatch.

A. G. L. Smith
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APPENDIX A

SECRET

SUBJECT: Directive for Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission

TO : Air Vice Marshal I.E. Brodie, CBE,
Air Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission

THRU : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

1. The following instructions supersede and cancel the directive which was issued from this Headquarters on 6th March 1945, under reference AG 354/111 15873-0.

2. a. As representative of the British and U.S. Air Forces you will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEWS, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations in Committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

b. Your duty is to represent the U.S. and British Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

3. a. The Italian Air Force has been permitted to remain at a ceiling laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until a final policy regarding the future of the Italian Air Force is decided either by a revision of the Armistice Terms or a Peace Treaty with Italy.

b. Your primary function, in general, is to assist the Italian Air Ministry, Chief of Staff and Italian Air Force authorities generally to run the Italian Air Force as efficiently as possible within the limits of their authorized resources, and of such resources as the Allies may make available to them in accordance with the policy laid down by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. You should be quite clear, and should make clear to the above mentioned Italian authorities, that the efficiency of the Italian Air Force is their responsibility. Your responsibility is, first, to transmit to the Italian Air Ministry the policy instructions of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee, and secondly, to assist the Italian Air Ministry with advice and with such material resources as may be made available by the Allies. If, in your view, the Italian Air Force authorities are failing in their duty, you will make such representations as you may think fit to the Italian Air Ministry.

2. a. As representative of the British and U.S. Air Forces you will be responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, RAF JMWL, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations in Committee, hereinafter called the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

b. Your duty is to represent the U.S. and British Air Forces on the Allied Commission and to advise the Chief Commissioner on matters affecting the Italian Air Force.

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4. a. Your function is thus a professional and not a political one. In the event of a change of Government in Italy you will be responsible for advising the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee in the light of your knowledge and official contacts as a member of the Allied Commission, as to the qualifications from the Air Force point of view of any potential Secretary or Under-Secretary of State. You will reserve the right to approve or reject on the grounds of suitability, the appointment of Commanding Officers and Senior Staff Officers in the Italian Air Force. In doing so, however, you should, as far as possible, ensure that there is nothing in the Officer's previous record under the Fascist Government that makes him unsuitable for his appointment. You should discourage any political activities on the part of

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Italian Air Force personnel that may come to your notice. Apart from this it is not your function to concern yourself with the political views of any Italian Air Force personnel unless they intrude themselves by affecting the efficiency of the Italian Air Force. Neither is it your duty to discover any political activities in which Italian Air Force personnel may be engaged (that is a matter for the Italian Air Force authorities themselves.)

2. Thus you and your staff have no political responsibilities but should keep in close touch with, and consult as necessary, any authorities under Allied Force Headquarters whose duty it is to concern themselves with the past and present political activities of any Italian Service personnel.

5. You and your staff, through the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will call on the staff branches of RHP/EDP and AAF/STO for advice, assistance and authority where applicable on matters concerning organization, maintenance, supply, training and equipment.

6. Units of the Italian Air Force are equipped with Allied or Italian types of aircraft. The decision on the number, strength and composition of units to be maintained is for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Maintenance of these units will be regulated by instructions from the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

7. You will be responsible for ensuring that the Italian Air Force does not maintain any units in excess of those authorized. All the Italian Air Force units will be unreservedly at the disposal of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee who will authorize them to be used as they consider fit.

8. You will submit routine reports on matters affecting the organization, administration and maintenance of the Italian Air Force to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Special reports by you may be necessary from time to time, such as on matters of organization, administration and maintenance of Italian Air Force units which are affecting their efficiency. No reports are to be made direct to any higher authority other than to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee and the Chief Commissioner. For information and on matters which are his direct concern. The Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will be responsible for determining any other distribution which may be necessary. Copies of reports should be rendered in sufficient quantity to ensure adequate distribution to RHP/EDP and AAF/STO.

9. Over and above the requirements of the authorized flying and auxiliary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force personnel within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organizing such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air

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9. Over and above the requirements of the authorized flying and auxiliary units there may be a surplus of trained Italian Air Force manpower within the approved ceiling. You will be responsible for organizing such surplus manpower for the use of the British and American Air Forces in this Theatre. The decision as to the proportion to be employed by the Italian Air Force and in the British and American Air Forces respectively rests with the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.

10. You should ensure that the Intelligence Staff of the Italian Air Ministry make available to you for the information of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee any information that they may obtain and which would be of any value to the Intelligence Staffs of BAR/AFMIS and IAF/STC.

By command of Field Marshal ALLEXANDER:

L. W. CHRISTENSEN,
Colonel, AFC,
Adjutant General.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

21st August 1945

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AUG 22 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FORMATION OF MEDITERRANEAN
ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

Note by Commander-in-Chief, RAF MEDAE
and Commanding General, AAF/MTO

1. The dissolution of Mediterranean Allied Air Forces into its United States and British national components (A2F/MTO and RAF/MEDAE) renders necessary the formation of an Allied Committee to advise the Supreme Allied Commander on all air matters of common interest to the two air forces. To this end it is recommended that the Commanding General, AAF/MTO and the Commander-in-Chief, RAF/MEDAE, in Committee, shall form the "Mediterranean Allied Air Committee".

2. The successful functioning of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force has forcibly demonstrated the paramount importance of the cooperation and coordination with the Allied services. It is therefore considered that as the two air forces are now split into their national components, the matter of coordination has become of even greater importance and it is felt that greater attention should be paid to this matter by the Staffs of the Committee. To this end it will be necessary for the respective Staffs of AAF/MTO and RAF/MEDAE to continue working in close cooperation on all air matters of common interest as heretofore and to present coordinated proposals to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee through its Secretariat.

3. Apart from routine matters of allied air interest which will continue to arise from time to time and which will be dealt with in the manner described in para 2 above, there is now in being the Air Forces Sub-committee of the Allied Commission for Italy which has been directed to address all reports and correspondence required under existing arrangements to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. In order that proper routing of correspondence may be insured, it is recommended that a Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat be formed and that all correspondence addressed to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee be routed through the Allied Liaison Section (RAF/MEDAE), inasmuch as the Allied Liaison Section is familiar with and has been dealing with all routine matters pertaining to the Air Forces Sub-committee of the Allied Commission for Italy. It is recommended that this Section be designated

United States and British national components (A.P./MCO and R.A.F./MCEMF) require necessary the formation of an Allied Committee to advise the Supreme Allied Commander on all air matters of common interest to the two air forces. To this end it is recommended that the Commanding General, A.P./MCO and the Commander-in-Chief, R.A.F./MCEMF, in Committee, shall form the "Mediterranean Allied Air Committee".

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4. It will be the responsibility of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat to distribute copies of correspondence to the appropriate Staff Sections of A.P./MCO and R.A.F./MCEMF. The Secretariat will receive papers that have been coordinated between the appropriate Staff Sections of A.P./MCO and R.A.F./MCEMF and will be responsible for their presentation to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Papers approved by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee for further transmission will be forwarded by the Secretariat.

5. A proposed charter for the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee is attached at appendix 'A'.

6. The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander to these arrangements is requested.

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APPENDIX 'A'

CHARTER FOR

MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR COMMITTEE

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1. The Commanding General, AAF/ATO and Commander-in-Chief, RAF/ACOMH, in Committee, are hereby designated as the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.
2. On matters of common Allied air interest the Committee will act as air advisors to the Supreme Allied Commander and will be responsible for the coordination of all action to be taken thereon.
3. The Staff of Mediterranean Allied Air Committee will consist of the existing Staffs of AAF/ATO and RAF/ACOMH who will present coordinated papers to the Committee through its Secretariat.
4. The Allied Liaison Section (RAF/ALIES) will act as the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat and will receive all correspondence addressed to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee.
5. It will be the responsibility of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretaries to distribute copies of correspondence to the appropriate Staff Sections of AAF/ATO and RAF/ACOMH. The Secretariat will receive papers that have been coordinated between the appropriate Staff Sections of AAF/ATO and RAF/ACOMH and will be responsible for their presentation to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Papers approved by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee for further transmission will be forwarded by the Secretariat.

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5. It will be the responsibility of the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee Secretariat to distribute copies of correspondence to the appropriate Staff Sections of AF/MTO and A.S./MALL. The Secretariat will receive papers that have been coordinated between the appropriate Staff Sections of AF/MTO and A.S./MALL and will be responsible for their presentation to the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee. Papers approved by the Mediterranean Allied Air Committee for further transmission will be forwarded by the Secretariat.

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Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

14th August 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

There will be no meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on Thursday, 16th August 1945.

It is at present intended that the next meeting will be held on Thursday, 23rd August 1945.

J. G. S. S. S.
J. G. S. S. S.,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Sy Whitman

C. B. CYLERTMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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SAC (US) II
11th August 1945

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. With reference to the discussion at SAC (US) 3rd Meeting, Minute 5, a copy of the Supreme Allied Commander's comments on the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff is attached. This letter, a draft of which was circulated as Paper No. SAC (US) 3, was despatched on 10 August 1945.
2. The documents are therefore circulated for information.

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J. G. Spittall

J. G. SPITTALL,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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2. The documents are therefore circulated for information.

L. J. Johnston

J. J. SUTHERLAND,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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10 August
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SUBJECT: Peace Treaty with ITALY.

TO : The Secretary,
The British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Reference your COS/997/5 of 10 July 1945.

1. I have had the paper, prepared by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff, studied on an Allied basis by my staff. Although the views which follow are my own, in formulating them, I have consulted Co-Mander-in-Chief Mediterranean, AOC-in-C RAF MED, and the Co-Manders-in-Chief of the US Forces in this Theatre. My American colleagues have however received no directions from their own government on the subject.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

2. From a study of the political background given in the Post Hostilities Planning Staff report, and on which the proposed military clauses are based, it appears that the treaty is to have the following objects:

- a. To establish ITALY as a useful and prosperous state.
- b. To encourage ITALY to be friendly towards us and to be a member of any Western European system which may emerge.
- c. To compel ITALY to give up all pretence to being a great power.
- d. To prove to ITALY and the world that aggression does not pay.

Of these objects a and b are not easy to reconcile completely with c and d. As a result it appears that a compromise between these aims is to be adopted. I feel therefore that we shall be running a considerable risk of achieving none of our aims if we attempt such a course of action.

3. ITALY is now a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. For nearly two years she has been ravaged by a land campaign and she can

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Of these objects a and b are not easy to reconcile completely with c and d. As a result it appears that a compromise between these aims is to be adopted. I feel therefore that we shall be running a considerable risk of achieving none of our aims if we attempt such a course of action.

3. ITALY is now a bankrupt and outcast country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. For nearly two years she has been ravaged by a land campaign and she has had few illusions left as to the wisdom of aggression. I believe, therefore, that objectives c and d have already been sufficiently achieved. However, if we are to attain objects a and b action is urgently required now by the US and UK Governments to avert the crisis in Italian affairs which will otherwise be inevitable in the course of the next few months. It will involve assisting ITALY as a matter of urgency to reactivate her essential industries before unrest gives way to anarchy.

4. ITALY has been led to believe that the terms to be imposed at the Peace Treaty would be dependant on the way in which she has worked her passage since the Armistice. She has done her best, and has in fact provided us with considerable material assistance in the war against GERMANY. She has declared war on JAPAN. She therefore has some right to expect leniency, and no moderate Italian Government could accept a harsh treaty.

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5. The imposition of unacceptable terms on ITALY besides nullifying our present efforts to rehabilitate her, would inevitably precipitate conditions of anarchy in the country which could in the end reduce ITALY to the level of a Balkan state largely under Russian influence. Taking a long view I consider that this would be a greater disaster to British interests than the risk of ITALY being in a condition where she might possibly, in the remote future, pose some armed threat.

6. In this connection, I might mention that I am perturbed by the apparent intention of the phrasing of the draft military clauses, to give to RUSSIA, in ITALY, equal rights with the United States and the United Kingdom. I presume that this can only have been contemplated in exchange for similar rights for the United States and United Kingdom in the Peace Treaties with the Eastern and Southeastern European States. The advisability of such a "quid pro quo" is not a matter for me to judge. I can only state that the effect in ITALY will be most unfortunate.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

7. In my opinion the size of the Italian armed forces to be permitted by the Peace Treaty must be governed by three conditions:

a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity, her armed forces will therefore be small.

b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to deter an attack upon her frontiers, particularly from YUGOSLAVIA. (It follows that, should ITALY be allowed to retain control of any of her overseas territories, her requirements for armed forces would be appropriately increased.)

c. They must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principle Allied powers.

8. In attempting to apply fully the consideration in paragraph 7 c. above, there is the danger, referred to above, that we might impose on ITALY an unduly harsh peace. This must be resisted and I am of the opinion that certain of the restrictions which it is suggested should be imposed on the Italian armed forces should therefore be modified so as to make them rather less harsh.

9. My detailed comments on the draft clauses prepared by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff are attached in the Appendix to this letter. I emphasize that they are based on the assumption that the draft military clauses are acceptable.

0307

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

MILITARY OPERATIVES.

7. In my opinion the size of the Italian armed forces to be permitted by the Peace Treaty must be governed by three conditions:
- a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, so much as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity, her armed forces will therefore be small.
 - b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to deter an attack upon her frontiers, particularly from JUGOSLAVIA. (It follows that, should ITALY be allowed to retain control of any of her overseas territories, her requirements for armed forces would be appropriately increased.)
 - c. They must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principal Allied powers.
 - d. In attempting to apply fully the consideration in paragraph 7 a above, there is the danger, referred to above, that we might impose on ITALY an undue harsh touch. This must be resisted and I am of the opinion that certain of the restrictions which it is suggested should be imposed on the Italian armed forces should therefore be modified so as to make them rather less harsh.
 - e. In detailed comments on the draft clauses prepared by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff are attached in the Appendix to this letter. I emphasize that they are based on the assumption that the draft political clauses of the treaty, on which I have not been asked to comment, will require ITALY to cede the territories listed in paragraph 4 of the report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff.

1343

H.R. Alexander
Field Marshal
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

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APPENDIX A

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Supreme Allied Commander

ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

Reference in the left hand margin are to Sections and parts of draft heads of naval, military and air clauses.

Section I

1 & 2.

The present draft Section I would permit US, UK, USSR and FRANCE to station troops in Italy and to demand full military facilities there. It is considered that the stationing of Russian or French troops in Italy would be a deplorable step and one which might precipitate a most dangerous situation. Further, in the case of the Russians, such a step would be wholly at variance with our object of preventing Italy falling under Soviet influence.

It is considered that no provision should be made for the stationing of Russian or French troops in Italy. It would be most difficult, and probably undesirable, to ward clauses which give USA and UK the right to station troops in Italy and denied this right to USSR and FRANCE. It is considered therefore that such arrangements as are required for the period while British and US forces remain in Italy, should be made the subject of a separate civil and military affairs agreement, between USA and UK on one hand and Italy on the other. The whole of Section I should therefore be deleted from the treaty and included in this alternative agreement.

The duration of Allied occupation of VENETIA, CUNEO and AUSTRIA is at present undetermined. If and when suggested civil and military affairs agreement with Italy is concluded it is suggested that we should not limit our right to station troops in Italy only up to 1950 but rather for as long as we consider necessary. Besides granting full facilities necessary to maintain such forces as we consider necessary in Italy, Italy should also grant full freedom of movement to these forces. It is important also that besides obtaining the use of all ports, airfields and other facilities in Italy, while we continue to station forces there, Italy should also grant us the control of these facilities.

Section II

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

It is considered that the stationing of Russian or French troops in Italy would be a deplorable step and one which might precipitate a most dangerous situation. Further, in the case of the Russians, such a step would be wholly at variance with our object of preventing Italy falling under Soviet influence.

It is considered that no provision should be made for the stationing of Russian or French troops in Italy. It would be most difficult, and probably undesirable, to work clauses which give USA and UK the right to station troops in Italy and denied this right to USSR and France. It is considered therefore that such arrangements as are required for the period while British and US forces remain in Italy, should be made the subject of a separate civil and military affairs agreement, between USA and UK on one hand and Italy on the other. The whole of Section I should therefore be deleted from the treaty and included in this alternative agreement.

The duration of Allied occupation of VIENNA, GYLLA, and AUSTRIA is at present undetermined. If and when suggested civil and military affairs agreement with Italy is concluded it is suggested that we should not limit our right to station troops in Italy only up to 1950 but rather for as long as we consider necessary. Besides granting full facilities necessary to maintain such forces as we consider necessary in Italy, Italy should also grant full freedom of movement to these forces. It is important also that British continuing the use of all port, airfield and other facilities in Italy, while we continue to station forces there, Italy should also grant us the control of these facilities.

Section II

3.

In view of the comments on Section I above and of the fact that Italy has declared war on Japan it is agreed that para 3 should be deleted from the military clauses and its provisions except para 3 a should be covered by mutual agreement with each of the Allies as set forth with J.P.M. If the provisions of Section I amended as suggested above are made the subject of a civil and military affairs agreement between USA, UK and Italy para 3 a would be adequately covered.

There are in Italy certain blue-prints and experimental models which could be of considerable value to the Allies in the war against Japan. It is suggested therefore that a new para 3 should be substituted as follows: "Italy to render to the principal Allied powers all information concerning military installations and technical information of value to the United Nations in the war against Japan, whether such information be publicly or privately owned."

4.

The Allies may wish to use Italian manpower in some of the Italian

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territory which is taken away from her by this treaty. On the other hand, the right to use Italian manpower for labour outside Italian territories, as at present worded, is too wide, as the Russians, having declared war against J.P.N., would be in a position to deport Italians for labour in SIBERIA. The right of USA and UK to use Italians in their own countries where they are at present employed should also be safeguarded. It is suggested therefore that the provisions of para 4 should also be omitted from these draft clauses and included in the military and civil affairs agreement.

5. It is not desirable to require ITALY to furnish supplies for 500 Russian and French forces in AUSTRIA and GERMANY. Moreover, ITALY is in any event incapable of producing such supplies in any quantity. It is, therefore, recommended that this paragraph be deleted.

6. No comment.

Section III

7. No comment.

8. No comment.

9. No comment.

10. It would be difficult to determine what weapons are of an "offensive" and what of a "defensive" nature. It is therefore suggested that the words "of an offensive nature" should be omitted.

- 11 & 12. The desirability of stating that the short term limitations will last "until 1950 or for such lesser period as the principal Allied Powers may decide" is open to question. The removal of these limitations should, as indicated at para 12, be dependent on a change of circumstances rather than on the mere passage of time. Such a change of circumstances may occur either before or after 1950. On the other hand, the stipulation of a definite date, although probably more acceptable to the Italian Government, will tend to prevent pressure being exercised towards effecting the removal of the limitations unduly early. On balance, it is considered that the following one paragraph should be substituted for the draft paragraphs 11 and 12.

"Additional Limitations"

"Until such time as the principal Allied Powers may decide otherwise, the Italian armed Forces will be subject to the

Section III

- 7. No comment.
- 8. No comment.
- 9. No comment.

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"Additional Limitations"

"Until such time as the principal allied Powers may decide otherwise, the Italian armed Forces will be subject to the limitations set out in Sections IV to VII below. Some or all of these limitations will be removed when the principal allied Powers are satisfied that circumstances obtaining do not require their retention and that Italy has complied with the Peace Treaty."

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Iterations in this sense should be made throughout the remaining sections of the draft treaty.

Section IV

13. The Italian Navy is the only one of the three Italian armed Services which has maintained a good esprit de corps. It is important therefore that, while the Italian Navy must be reduced this should not be done in such a way as to injure Italian morale unnecessarily. Any transfer of battleships, or other warships to USSR, would for example have a most unfortunate effect. It is believed that most thinking people in Italy realise that the financial strain involved

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will in any case prevent them from keeping battleships in commission. It may not be difficult therefore to persuade ITALY to do without battleships altogether and accept additional cruise ships instead. It is considered that ITALY should be allowed to break up a sink such capital ships as she is not allowed to retain.

14. The recommendation that the Italian Navy should be manned on a voluntary long term engagement is not concurred in, since the long-term volunteer is of greater efficiency than the short-term conscript. Long term engagements tend to create a highly-trained nucleus suitable to rapid expansion in time of war. Moreover, ITALY is unlikely to be able to support financially a long-term Navy, and it is considered that the system of training, should, therefore, remain unchanged, i.e. conscription.

The ceiling of 12,000 will probably be sufficient for manning the sea-going ships which it is proposed that ITALY should be allowed to keep. In view however of the commitments recently assumed ashore by the Italian Navy some small increase may be needed, and should be authorized if so recommended by the Allied Inspectorate.

It is therefore recommended that para 14 should be redrafted as follows :-

"Personnel to be limited to a figure of approximately 12,000 or as recommended by the Allied Inspectorate, on a conscription basis as at present."

15. In the past the Italians have shown considerable aptitude for individual novel assault operations. It is suggested therefore that the 1st sentence should be deleted and the following substituted :- "The aircraft carriers, submarines, or submersible or surface craft intended for use on operations of a purely offensive nature carried out by Italian 'special assault craft' to be retained or constructed".

16. No comment.

17. No comment.

18. No comment.

Section 7

19. No comment.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

to keep. In view however of the commitments recently assumed before by the Italian Navy some small increases may be needed, and should be authorized if so recommended by the Allied Inspectorate.

It is therefore recommended that para 14. should be reworded as follows : -

"Personnel to be limited to a figure of approximately 15,000 or as recommended by the Allied Inspectorate, on a contribution basis as at present."

15. In the past the Italians have shown considerable aptitude for individual naval assault operations. It is suggested therefore that the last sentence should be deleted and the following substituted : - "No aircraft carriers, submarines, or submersible or surface craft intended for use on operations of a nature heretofore carried out by Italian 'special assault craft' to be retained or constructed".

16. No comment.

17. No comment.

18. No comment.

Section V

19. No comment.

20. No comment.

21. No comment.

22. No comment.

23. It would be difficult to determine what weapons were of an "offensive" and what of a "defensive" nature and it is therefore suggested that the words "of an offensive nature" should be omitted. 1310

Section VI

24. It is considered that provision should be made for an air-sea rescue squadron and for training aircraft. It is therefore suggested that new sub-para as under should be added : -

"2. One air-sea rescue squadron".

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"d. A training school of such capacity as the Allied Inspector will consider necessary together with sufficient training aircraft to maintain the above squadrons."

Provision should also be made for reserve aircraft for each squadron and the following addition is suggested to the last sentence of para 24:-

"together with a reserve of aircraft which will not exceed 20% of the types in the squadrons."

25. In view of the suggested addition of an air-sea rescue squadron and training school a ceiling of "approximately 10,000" should become a maximum of 12,000."

26. No comment.

27. No comment.

28. No comment.

29. No comment.

Section VII

30. Paras 11 and 12 imply that the provisions of Sections IV and VII contain only short-term limitations. Further it is considered that the provisions of para 30 are adequately covered in para 10. It is suggested that para 30 should be deleted altogether.

31. It is possible that an attempt might be made to evade certain of the limitations by claiming that war material was privately owned. The words "either publicly or privately" should, therefore, be inserted between "own" and "any" in para 31 a.

Section VIII

32. German war material should be expressly stated to include blue-prints and experimental models. It is suggested therefore that para 32 should read: -

"All German war material, including blue-prints, prototypes, experimental models and plans, unless expressly excluded by the Allied Inspectorate to be placed at the disposal of the principal Allied Powers."

33. See comment in para 13 above regarding the disposal of surplus

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

28. No comment.

29. No comment.

Section VII

30. Paras 11 and 12 imply that the provisions of Sections IV and VII contain only short-term limitations. Further it is considered that the provisions of para 30 are adequately covered in para 30. It is suggested that para 30 should be deleted altogether.

31. It is possible that an attempt might be made to evade certain of the limitations by claiming that war material was privately owned. The words "either publicly or privately" should, therefore, be inserted between "own" and "any" in para 31 2.

Section VIII

32. German war material should be expressly stated to include blue-prints and experimental models. It is suggested therefore that para 32 should read: -

"All German war material, including blue-prints, prototypes, experimental models and plans, unless expressly excluded by the Allied Inspectors to be placed at the disposal of the principal Allied Powers."

33. See comment in para 13 above regarding the disposal of surplus capital ships.

Section IX

34. It should be noted that if BOLZANO is retained in Italy under the Peace Treaty a large number of people who have been German nationals will become Italian nationals. Under the provisions of this clause such individuals will be precluded from employment or training as technicians.

1209

Section X

35. No comment.

36. No comment.

Section XI

37. No comment.

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38. No comment.

Part XIV

39. No comment.

40. No comment.

41. No comment.

CENTRAL

There are certain points which may already be included in the Peace Treaty or which might more conveniently be included in separate agreements, such as the proposed civil and military affairs agreement, which may be concluded with Italy. In order that they shall not be overlooked these points are set out below: -

a. Allied Inspectorate

The Allied Inspectorate should be afforded full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities. The question of payment and status including the granting of diplomatic immunity should also be included.

b. Taxes

All Allied Forces stationed in Italy should be expressly exempt from Italian taxes.

c. Local Proceedings

All Allied Forces stationed in Italy should be expressly exempt from liability to Italian local proceedings.

Enforcement of Orders

d. Provision should be made for a method of dealing with Italian nationals who violate any orders or regulations issued by the Allied Inspectorate.

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Below: -

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d. Enforcement of Orders

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (45) 10
8th August 1945

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AUG 11 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

PROPOSED ANGLO-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

Note by Secretary

1. The latest views of United States and British Commands in Northwest Europe, in regard to the scope and organization of the proposed Anglo-American Association of members of Allied Commands, are contained in USFT signal C-77287 of 13 July.
2. In order to concert views of this subject, a conference was held at Headquarters, Fifth Army, at which all three services and the principal subordinate commands in this theatre were represented.
3. As a result of this meeting the Chief Administrative Officer recommends that the Supreme Allied Commander should approve the dispatch of the draft signal at Annexure 1.

14. 1. 1945
J. G. SWETMAN,
INFANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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NOTES

See v. 322-124

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16/7/44
J. G. SUTHERLAND,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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ADDITIONAL 1

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

Further to our C 7/21 of 16 Jul, not to all, and your S 97287 of 13 Jul.

1. Commanders wholly in accord with proposed Association and this then are will provide whole-hearted cooperation. Following comment offered on proposals your S 97287.

2. Object of Association. Prefer wording to permit wider membership than Europe and Mediterranean theatres. Suggest "to preserve and perpetuate the spirit of cooperation and unity which has existed between these personnel of the United States and the British Empire who have served together during the present war."

3. Membership:

- a. Initial Charter Membership to be open to all personnel of Armed Forces of United States and British Empire who have served in present war and to those civilians of either nationality who have served in a recognized capacity under control of Allied ground, naval or air commander.
- b. Future expansion of membership to be decided by Association after forming, but recommend policy be adopted of admitting all future members of armed forces of United States and British Empire.

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b. Future expansion of membership to be decided by Association after forming, but recommend policy be adopted of admitting all future members of armed forces of United States and British Empire.

4. Functions of Association:

a. While agreeing your third para, suggest that initial organization and functions are not on too ambitious scale.

Early activities might include:-

(1) Maintenance of staff secretariats in NEW YORK and LONDON, with duties to compile and publish information on the addresses of members and to assist visiting members whenever possible.

(2) Preparation by these Secretariats of regular periodical giving information on members and their movements.

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- (3) Provision for members of a distinguishing badge.
 - (4) Organisation of a Central Reunion, if found possible, to be left to decision of members.
 - b. Subsequent development to be left to decision of members, but the avenue apparent:-
 - (1) Encourage mutual exchange of students from Navy, Army and Air Force Colleges.
 - (2) Encourage similar exchange, in temporary attachment, of personnel serving in Armed Forces of two nations.Such exchanges to be organized by two governments.
 - 5. Organisation. Your sixth para agreed. Minority suggestion put forward by General Mark Clark urges further organisation into 'chapters', each 'chapter' on basis of army or equivalent formation.
 - 6. Subscription. Consider flat rate on joining most feasible.
 - 7. Immediate development.
 - a. Present command responsibility to continue until production of Charter of Association.
 - b. Initiative to start Association to be taken by USFET/C.I.L. and AFHQ. To this end grateful any further information you now have and your views on meeting suggested in our C 7421

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Confidential

SAC (45) 9
7th August 1945

COPY NO 32

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

PEACE TREATY WITH ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. In view of the discussion at SAC (45) 2nd Meeting, Minute 9, the Joint Planning Staff were instructed to revise their study No. P/309 (Final).
2. An examination of their revised study has also been made and as a result it is recommended that the attached reply be despatched to the Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee.
3. The Supreme Allied Commander in conference is requested to approve the despatch of this letter.

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J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

See Mb 318

0324

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J. G. Sweetman
J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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To: Secretary, British Chiefs of Staff Committee.

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Reference your COS/332/5 of 10 July 45.

1. I have had the paper, prepared by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff, studied on an Allied basis by my staff. Although the views which follow are my own, in formulating them, I have consulted Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, ACC-in-C RAF MEME and the Commanders-in-Chief of the US forces in this Theatre. My American colleagues have however received no directions from their own government on the subject.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES.

2. From a study of the political background given in the Post Hostilities Planning Staff report, and on which the proposed military clauses are based, it appears that the treaty is to have the following objects:

- a. To establish ITALY as a useful and prosperous state.
- b. To encourage ITALY to be friendly towards us and to be a member of any Western European system which may emerge.
- c. To compel ITALY to give up all pretence to being a great power.
- d. To prove to ITALY and the world that aggression does not pay.

Of these objects a and b are not easy to reconcile completely with c and d. As a result it appears that a compromise between these aims is to be adopted. I feel therefore that we shall be running a considerable risk of achieving none of our aims if we attempt such a course of action.

3. ITALY is now a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. For nearly two years she has been ravaged by a land campaign and she can have few illusions left as to the wisdom of

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3. ITALY is now a bankrupt and occupied country. Her economy is practically destitute with very little armament potential. For nearly two years she has been ravaged by a land campaign and she can have few illusions left as to the wisdom of aggression. I believe therefore that objectives c and d have already been sufficiently achieved. However, if we are to attain objects a and b action is urgently required now by the US and UK Governments to avert the crisis in Italian affairs which will otherwise be inevitable in the course of the next few months. This will involve assisting ITALY on a matter of urgency to rehabilitate her essential industries before unrest gives way to anarchy.

4. ITALY has been led to believe that the terms to be imposed at the Peace Treaty would be dependent on the way in which she has worked her passage since the Armistice. She has done her best, and has in fact provided us with considerable material assistance in the war against GERMANY. She therefore has some right to expect leniency, and no moderate Italian Government could

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5. The imposition of unacceptable terms on ITALY besides nullifying our present efforts to rehabilitate her, would inevitably precipitate socialist conditions in the country which would in the end reduce ITALY to the level of a Balkan state largely under Russian influence. Taking a long view I consider that this would be a greater disaster to British interests than the risk of ITALY being left in a condition where she might possibly, in the remote future, exercise some armed threat.

6. In this connection, I might mention that I am perturbed by the apparent intention of the phrasing of the draft military clauses, to give to RUSSIA, in ITALY, equal rights with the United States and the United Kingdom. I presume that this can only have been contemplated in exchange for similar rights for the United States and United Kingdom in the Peace Treaties with the Eastern and Southern European States. The advisability of such a "quid pro quo" is not a matter for me to judge. I can only state that the effect in ITALY will be most unfortunate.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

7. In my opinion the size of the Italian armed forces to be permitted by the Peace Treaty must be governed by three conditions:

- a. They must be restricted in size, for ITALY's own sake, to such as she can maintain in an efficient state. In view of Italian economic capacity, her armed forces will therefore be small.
- b. They must be large enough to maintain internal security and to deter an attack upon her frontiers, particularly from JUGOSLAVIA.
- c. They must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threatening the interests of the principal Allied powers.
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9. My detailed comments on the draft clauses prepared by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff are attached in the appendix to this letter. I emphasize that they are based on the assumption that the draft political clauses of the treaty, on which I have not been asked to comment, will require ITALY to cede the territories listed in paragraph 4 of the report by the Post Hostilities Planning Staff. Should ITALY be allowed to retain control of any of her overseas territories, her requirements for armed forces would be appropriately increased.

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APPENDIX

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Supreme Allied Commander
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ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

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Section I

- 1 & 2. The present draft Section I would permit US, UK, USSR and FRANCE to station troops in ITALY and to demand full military facilities there. It is considered that the stationing of Russian or French troops in ITALY would be a deplorable step and one which might precipitate a most dangerous situation. Further, in the case of the Russians, such a step would be wholly at variance with our object of preventing ITALY falling under Soviet influence.

It is considered that a provision should be made for the stationing of Russian or French troops in ITALY. It would be most difficult, and probably undesirable, to word clauses which gave USA and UK the right to station troops in ITALY and denied this right to USSR and FRANCE. It is considered therefore that such arrangements as are required for the period while British and US forces remain in ITALY, should be made the subject of a separate civil and military affairs agreement, between USA and UK on one hand and ITALY on the other. The whole of Section I should therefore be deleted from the treaty and included in this alternative agreement.

The duration of Allied occupation of VENETIA GIULIA and AUSTRIA is at present undetermined. If and when the suggested civil and military affairs agreement with ITALY is concluded it is suggested that we should not limit our right to station troops in ITALY only up to 1950 but rather for as long as we consider necessary. Besides granting full facilities necessary to maintain such forces as we consider necessary in ITALY, ITALY should also grant full freedom of movement to these forces. It is important also that besides obtaining the use of all port, airfield and other facilities in ITALY, while we continue to station forces there, ITALY should also grant us the control of these facilities.

Section II

3. In view of the comments on Section I above and of the fact that ITALY has declared war on JAPAN it is agreed that para 3 should be deleted from the military clauses and its provisions except para 3 a should be covered by mutual agreement with such of the Allies as are at war with JAPAN. If the provisions of Section I amended as suggested above are made the subject of a civil and military affairs agreement between

It is considered that a provision should be made for the stationing of Russian or French troops in Italy. It would be most difficult, and probably undesirable, to word clauses which gave USA and UK the right to station troops in Italy and denied this right to USSR and FRANCE. It is considered therefore that such arrangements as are required for the period while British and US forces remain in Italy, should be made the subject of a separate civil and military affairs agreement, between USA and UK on the one hand and ITALY on the other. The whole of Section I should therefore be deleted from the treaty and included in this alternative agreement.

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In view of the comments on Section I above and of the fact that ITALY has declared war on JAPAN it is asserted that para 3 should be deleted from the military clauses and its provisions except para 3 a should be covered by mutual agreement with such of the Allies as are at war with JAPAN. If the provisions of Section I amended as suggested above are made the subject of a civil and military affairs agreement between USA, UK and ITALY para 3 a would be adequately covered.

There are in ITALY certain blue-prints and experimental models which could be of considerable value to the Allies in the war against JAPAN. It is suggested therefore that a new para 3 should be substituted as follows: "ITALY to render to the principal Allied Powers all information concerning military installations and technical information of value to the United Nations in the war against JAPAN."

The Allies may wish to use Italian manpower in some of the Italian territory which is taken away from her by this treaty. On the other hand, the right to use Italian manpower for labour outside Italian territories, as at present worded, is too wide, i.e. in the event of the Russians declaring war against JAPAN they would be in a position to deport Italians for labour in SIBERIA. The right of USA and UK to use Italians in their own countries where they are at present employed should also be safeguarded. It is suggested therefore that the provisions of para 4 should also be omitted from these draft clauses and included in the military and civil affairs agreement.

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5. No comment.

6. No comment.

Section III

7. No comment.

8. No comment.

9. No comment.

10. It would be difficult to determine what weapons are of an "offensive" and what of a "defensive" nature. It is therefore suggested that the words "of an offensive nature" should be deleted.

11. No comment.

12. No comment.

Section IV

13.

The Italian Navy is the only one of the three Italian armed services which has maintained a good esprit de corps. It is important therefore that, while the Italian Navy must be reduced this should not be done in such a way as to injure Italian prestige unnecessarily. Any transfer of battleships, or other warships to RUSSIA would for example have a most unfortunate effect. It is believed that most thinking people in ITALY realize that the financial strain involved will in any case prevent them from keeping battleships in commission. It may not be difficult therefore to persuade ITALY to do without battleships altogether and accept additional cruisers instead. It is considered that ITALY should be allowed to break up or sink such capital ships as she is not allowed to retain.

14.

The recommendation that the Italian Navy should be manned on a voluntary long term engagement is not concurred in, since the long-term volunteer is of greater efficiency than the short-term conscript. Long term engagements tend to create a highly-trained nucleus suitable to rapid expansion in time of war. Moreover, ITALY is unlikely to be able to support financially a long-term Navy, and it is considered that the system of manning, should, therefore, remain unchanged, i.e. conscription.

The ceiling of 18,000 will probably be sufficient for manning the sea-going ships which it is proposed that ITALY should be allowed to keep. In view however of the commitments recently assumed ashore by the Italian Navy some small increase may be needed, and should be authorized if so recommended by the Allied Inspectorate.

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12. No comment.

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It is therefore recommended that para 14 should be redrafted as follows:-

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"Personnel to be limited to a figure of approximately 18,000 or as recommended by the Allied Inspectorate, on a conscription basis as at present."

15.

In the past the Italians have shown considerable aptitude for individual naval assault operations. It is suggested therefore that the last sentence should be deleted and the following substituted:- "No aircraft carriers, submarines, or submarines or surface craft intended for use on operations of a nature heretofore carried out by Italian 'special assault craft' to be retained or constructed".

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16. No comment.

17. No comment.

18. No comment.

Section V

19. No comment.

20. No comment.

21. No comment.

22. No comment.

23.

It would be difficult to determine what weapons were of an "offensive" and what of a "defensive" nature and it is therefore suggested that the words "of an offensive nature" should be omitted.

Section VI

24.

It is considered that provision should be made for an air-sea rescue squadron and for training aircraft. It is therefore suggested that new sub-paragraphs as under should be added:-

"c. One air-sea rescue squadron."

"d. A training school of such capacity as the Allied Inspectorate considers necessary together with sufficient training aircraft to maintain the above squadrons."

Provision should also be made for reserve aircraft for each squadron and the following addition is suggested to the last sentence of para 24:-

"together with a reserve of aircraft which will not exceed 20% of the types in the squadrons."

In view of the suggested addition of an air-sea rescue squadron and training school a ceiling of "approximately 10,000" should become "a maximum of 12,000."

25.

26. No comment.

27. No comment.

28. No comment.

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In view of the suggested addition of an air-sea rescue squadron and training school a ceiling of "approximately 10,000" should become "a maximum of 12,000."

26. No comment.

27. No comment.

28. No comment.

29. No comment.

Section VII
30.

Para 11 and 12 imply that the provisions of Sections IV and VII contain only short-term limitations. Further it is considered that the provisions of para 30 are adequately covered in para 10. It is suggested that para 30 should be deleted altogether.

31. No comment.

Section VIII
32.

German war material should be expressly stated to include blue-prints and experimental models. It is suggested therefore that para 32 should read:-

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"All German war material, including blue-prints, prototypes, experimental models and plans, unless expressly excluded by the Allied Inspectorate to be placed at the disposal of the principal Allied Powers."

33. See comment in para 13 above regarding the disposal of surplus capital ships.

Section IX

34. It should be noted that if BOLANO is returned to ITALY under the Peace Treaty a large number of people who have been German nationals will become Italian nationals. Under the provisions of this clause such individuals will be precluded from employment or training as technicians.

Section X

35. No comment.

36. No comment.

Section XI

37. No comment.

38. No comment.

Part XIV

39. No comment.

40. No comment.

41. No comment.

GENERAL

There are certain points which may already be included in the Peace Treaty or which might more conveniently be included in separate agreements, such as the proposed civil and military affairs agreement, which may be concluded with ITALY. In order that they shall not be overlooked these points are set out below:-

A. Allied Inspectorate

The Allied Inspectorate should be afforded full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities. The question of payment and status including the granting of diplomatic immunity should also be included.

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35. No comment.

36. No comment.

Section XI

37. No comment.

38. No comment.

Part XIV

39. No comment.

40. No comment.

41. No comment.

GENERAL

There are certain points which may already be included in the Peace Treaty or which might more conveniently be included in separate agreements, such as the proposed civil and military affairs agreement, which may be concluded with ITALY. In order that they shall not be overlooked these points are set out below:-

a. Allied Inspectorate

The Allied Inspectorate should be afforded full freedom of movement and all necessary facilities. The question of payment and status including the granting of diplomatic immunity should also be included.

b. Taxes

All Allied Forces stationed in ITALY should be expressly exempt from Italian taxes. 1328

c. Legal proceedings

All Allied Forces stationed in ITALY should be expressly exempt from liability to Italian legal proceedings.

Enforcement of Orders.

d. Provision should be made for a method of dealing with Italian nationals who violate any orders or regulations issued by the Allied Inspectorate.

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JAMES H. HARRIS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

AF 606

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SEC (45) 3

7th August 1945

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COPYING

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

JUGOSLAV M.B. MOVI IN VIEW OF GRILL

Note by Secretary

1. At paragraph 1 in Appendix 'B' of the Morgan-Jovanovic Agreement which, subject to the provisions of international law, gave the Yugoslavs certain rights in connection with war booty in the form of VARIOUS GRILL coming under Anglo-American occupation.
2. There was initially some disagreement within this Headquarters as to whether goods, which were seized by the Yugoslavs upon their occupation of the area and which prior to such occupation were considered to be the property of the pro-Fascist Italian government in Northern Italy, should be regarded as Yugoslav war booty.
 - (a) On the one hand it was argued that these goods were the de jure property of the Italian Government in Rome and as this Government was not at war with Yugoslavia, such goods could not be classified as war booty.
 - (b) However, as it was considered that the Italian government in Rome could not exercise of property over which neither it nor the Allies had secured physical control, and also in view of the fact that the admission in principle of the Yugoslav claim to such property was a basic contention of the Morgan-Jovanovic Agreement, the point of view at (a) above was over-ruled.
3. Accordingly recommendations were made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in ACP 1626, relevant paragraphs of which are:
 - "4. It is proposed to release, with exceptions in para 5, property of governments or governmental agencies of nations at war with Yugoslavia, including Italy.

1. At Annexure 1 is Appendix 'A' of the Morgan-Jovanovic Agreement which, subject to the provisions of international law, gave the Yugoslavs certain rights in connection with war booty in the area of VIMIZ, GRILL, coming under Anglo-American occupation.
2. There was initially some disagreement within this Headquarters as to whether goods, which were seized by the Yugoslavs upon their occupation of the area and which prior to such occupation were considered to be the property of the neo-Fascist Italian government in Northern Italy, should be regarded as Yugoslav war booty.
 - (a) On the one hand it was argued that these goods were the de jure property of the Italian government in Rome and as this government was not at war with Yugoslavia, such goods could not be classified as war booty.
 - (b) However, as it was considered that the Italian government in Rome could not dispose of property over which it had the right to exercise physical control, and also in view of the fact that the admission in principle of the Yugoslav claim to such property was a basic conception of the Morgan-Jovanovic Agreement, the point of view at (a) above was overruled.
3. Accordingly recommendations were made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in R.P. 1026, relevant paragraphs of which are:
 - "4. It is proposed to release, with exceptions in para 5, property of governments or governmental agencies of nations at war with Yugoslavia, including Italy.
 - "5. Items essential to maintenance of law and order, to protection of health and disease, to maintenance of public utility would not be released. Not released also would be such items as would necessitate reinforcement in kind by Allied forces. These items would be blocked for ultimate disposition on a Governmental basis."
4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, by R.M. 590, approved the proposals of R.P. 1026, except paragraph 5, in regard to which clarification was requested as to the relationship between these provisions and those of paragraph 1 of Annexure 1. This clarification has since been given by R.P. 1053 and the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to paragraph 5 of R.P. 1026 is amended.
5. Meanwhile direction on shipping aspects of the war booty problem has been requested from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in R.P. 1047.

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6. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, with the concurrence of G-4(B), propose that the draft directive at Annexure 2 should be issued to 13 Corps. This directive orders the release to the Yugoslav of items which were captured by their forces and which were the property of governments (including Italy) at war with Yugoslavia. It places a temporary restriction on the return of any shipping items or items covered by Paragraph 5 of MAP 1026, in regard to which the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is awaited.

7. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested to approve the despatch of the directive at Annexure 2.

H. J. S. M.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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APPENDIX 'F' TO LONDON-JUGOSLAVIAN AGREEMENT

WAR BOOTY

1. It is agreed that enemy war material, captured by the Yugoslav forces in the area now coming under Allied military control, may be considered Yugoslav war booty, in accordance with the normal provisions of international law.
2. It is agreed that appropriate machinery must be set up to determine at the earliest possible moment Yugoslav claims respecting war booty. In view of the apparently complicated nature of the cases presented, the nature, constitution and powers of any commission or other tribunal which may be established to consider these matters will be reserved for later agreement upon fuller examination of the types of cases involved.
3. Meanwhile, officers representing Allied and Yugoslav Military Commands will dispose of as many cases as possible by mutual agreement locally. Names of Officers designated to conduct these negotiations will be exchanged within one week of the signing of this agreement.
4. The Allied commanders will have the right to forbid the removal of equipment claimed to be war booty until agreement has been reached under paragraph 3, or a decision rendered in accordance with paragraph 2. The Allied forces agree not to evacuate any war material or equipment which is claimed by the Yugoslav Army as war booty, until such an agreement or decision has been reached.

.....

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ANNEXURE II

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
APO 512
Confidential

7 August 1945

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Claims for War Booty in Allied Occupied
YUGOSLAVIA.

TO : Headquarters XIII Corps.

1. There is attached hereto the initial list (Appendix *) of items claimed by the Yugoslavs as war booty under the provisions of Appendix 'I' (Appendix *) of the MCAGAN-JOVANOVIC Agreement. You already have been provided with a copy of that Agreement.

2. It is desired that you open negotiations and effect releases as indicated herein below with the proper Yugoslav agency through the Yugoslav Mission at Headquarters XIII Corps for the return of such items as are authorized herein below.

3. In connection with paragraph 2 of Appendix 'I' of the Agreement it is desired that the "appropriate machinery" set up by you to deal with war booty shall include the Naval Officer in Charge, TRIESTE. Whether this machinery shall be one of the committees set up by Appendix 'I' of the Agreement or another organized solely in connection with war booty questions is a matter for your determination.

4. Early representations should be made to the Yugoslav authorities that any additional lists which they desire to submit must be submitted at an early and definite date to be determined by you. A period of two weeks after you have established your working organization is considered reasonable.

5. The following class of items will not for the present be released; those required to maintain law and order; to prevent disease and unrest; those required to maintain public utilities; and those which, if removed, would have to be replaced in kind for these aforementioned uses. Enemy owned lire and lire accounts will not be released but blocked for ultimate disposition on a governmental basis. For the present no ships whether war or commercial or port-operating equipment will be released. The matter of releases of the lire and shipping mentioned above in this paragraph is being given further consideration and you may expect authority to release certain ships and port equipment in the near future.

2. It is desired that you open negotiations and effect releases as indicated herein below with the proper Yugoslav agency through the Yugoslav Mission at Headquarters XIII Corps for the return of such items as are authorized herein below.

3. In connection with paragraph 2 of Appendix 'I' of the Agreement it is desired that the "appropriate machinery" set up by you to deal with war booty shall include the Naval Officer in Charge, TALLINN. Whether this machinery shall be one of the committees set up by Appendix 'I' of the Agreement or another organized solely in connection with war booty questions is a matter for your determination.

4. Early representations should be made to the Yugoslav authorities that any additional lists which they desire to submit must be submitted at an early and definite date to be determined by you. A period of two weeks after you have established your working organization is considered reasonable.

5. The following class of items will not for the present be released; those required to maintain law and order; to prevent disease and unrest; those required to maintain public utilities; and those which, if removed, would have to be replaced in kind for these aforementioned uses. Enemy owned lire and lire accounts will not be released but blocked for ultimate disposition on a governmental basis. For the present no ships whether war or commercial or port-operating equipment will be released. The matter of release of the lire and shipping mentioned above in this paragraph is being given further consideration and you may expect authority to release certain ships and port equipment in the near future.

6. Except for the lire and lire accounts and the shipping, the restrictions on release have little effect on the present claims as none of the items appearing on the present Yugoslav list seem to be within the categories to be withheld.

7. The Yugoslavs must of necessity show that the items claimed as war booty were the property of governments or governmental agencies at war with YUGOSLAVIA. The fact in itself that an item was of Italian governmental or governmental agency ownership is no bar to release to the Yugoslavs.

8. Full records will be kept at Headquarters XIII Corps of all items released to the Yugoslavs. All captured enemy material surplus after the demands of Marshal TITO have been considered will be disposed of in accordance with this Headquarters directive 386.3/163 LOC-O of 22 June 1945. "Disposition of Captured Enemy Material in Italy," with amendments to date.

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9. In case the Justices raise the issue as to the failure to release all items listed in their original demand, they should be informed that items withheld, if any, under the restrictions of law and order, disease and unrest, and maintenance of public utilities are withheld in accordance with International Law, that the International Law in connection with the release of lire and lire accounts and shipping is so unclear that advice is being urgently sought.

10. For your information only, there is attached the recommendations (appendix •) of C-in-C Med on shipping matters. These recommendations have been agreed and forwarded to the CCS for action.

11. Also for your information only is the fact that the CCS has questioned the compatibility of our proposed restrictions on release of items and para 1 of appendix 1 of the WORMAN-YOVANOVIC Agreement. A paraphrase of N.F 1026 (appendix •) to CCS and of PAF 599 (appendix •) from CCS are enclosed herewith.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

C. W. CHRISTENBERY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

Incls:
as above.

Copies to: C-in-C MED
C/S, AGD
GAD
G-5
ALCOM

*-NOTE: appendices referred to are not attached to this draft.

0348

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... a paragraph of N.F. 1025 (Appendix *) to CGS and of
Fall 599 (Appendix *) from CGS are enclosed herewith.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

G. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

Incls:
as above.

Copies to: C-in-C MED
C/S, AFM
CAO
G-5
ALCOM

*-NOTE: Appendices referred to are not attached to this draft.

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