

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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SACMED OPERATIONAL CONFERENCE, MINUTES
JUNE, JULY 1945

Executive Communication

Three minutes of Sacramento
operational conference of 12 July - at
folio 15. Only one copy has been received
, CC has not seen - but he must
be particular page 14 in SAC's letter
Visit.

18/7/45

8/1
C.S.C.

775/14/7

3

SO. to Chief Commissioner.

The Chief Commissioner should see Minutes of Sacramento's
Operational Conference of 12 July 45 at folio 15, of which this is the
only copy. In particular he should see folio 14 on SAC's visit to
London.

16 July 45.

To Executive Commissioner.

18/

Noted

18/

778/1417
2
SO. to Chief Commissioner.

The Chief Commissioner should see Minutes of Sacred's Operational Conference of 12 July 45 at folio 15, of which this is the only copy. In particular he should see folio 14 on SAC's visit to London.

16 July 45.

Si
To Executive Commissioner.

18/

Noted
Worth
cc

1433

18/7

21

2. *Sanctus* of 15-16 in 145

Alfred

7/81 13

24. vi

Chief Commissioner -

1405

3. withdrawn 4 to 5 lines
from story p 4 para 4

5/18/6

There is only one copy of
the memo. ∴ CC has
NOT seen.

5/18/6

1435

Chief Commissioner

! detect a wrong assumption in the
discussions on detection of troops in 9th.

My opinion is that troops are needed
not to primarily provide striking force which
can machine-gun, shell, or bomb rioters - but
to provide a stabilizing force also by their
very presence will prevent the outbreak of disorders
and who can act as ambassadors of democracy
I urge that this point be emphasized to AF, FBI,
NSA, etc. 5/18/6 M. S. L. 10

Noted by
CC. 5/18/6
21 June.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Confidential

MAP (5) (45) Joint Meeting
12 July 1945

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COPY NO

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (OPERATIONAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1100 HOURS ON THURSDAY 12TH JULY 1945

PRESENT:-

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R. L. S. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Major General Otto L. Nelson, representing
Commanding General, LXXXII

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF

Vice Admiral T. A. Glasford,
Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Brigadier General A. Thomas, representing
Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian K. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer AFHQ

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General T. S. Airey

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PRESENT:-

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R. L. S. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

Major General Otto L. Nelson, representing
Commanding General, LUSCAG

Admiral Sir John H. B. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Gurnard,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MEAP

Vice Admiral W. A. Glasford,
Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Brigadier General A. Thomas, representing
Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater 1434

Lieutenant General W. D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Lieutenant General Sir Brian H. Robertson,
Chief Administrative Officer AFHQ

Major General Lyman I. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General T. G. Airey,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Berle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Brigadier D. P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

Secretaries:-

Lt. Colonel J. G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hensley

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5. REHABILITATION OF ITALY

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that in recent conversations which he had had in LONDON it had been quite clear that the authorities there were well aware of the importance of rehabilitating ITALY, of the possibility of internal disorders in that country, and of the desirability of maintaining friendly relations between ITALY and the United States and United Kingdom. However, the Italian situation was somewhat overshadowed by the grave position in GERMANY where anxiety was being caused by the prospect of severe shortages of coal and food during the coming winter. He understood that the matter of the speed of redeployment of British and US forces out of EUROPE would be re-examined at the forthcoming Big Three conference, in view of the possibility of unrest all over EUROPE during the winter and the consequent necessity to retain greater forces to deal with this situation.

THE COMMANDER :

Took note of the above information.

6. COMBINED ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE AND FUTURE OF AFHQ

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that in discussions in LONDON he had put the view that, as long as the United States and British governments had joint responsibilities in ITALY, there would be need for an integrated Headquarters and that as long as an integrated Headquarters was retained it would be desirable to retain a Supreme Allied Commander. He had stated that an extensive examination had been carried out at AFHQ of other possible methods of command. However, the result had only been to show that nothing could be devised which was as good as the existing organization, which had grown up as a result of experience during the last three years. It had been agreed in LONDON, therefore, that the existing organization would remain for three or four months during which time appreciable US forces would in any event remain in the theatre. The matter would then be reconsidered in the light of such developments in the situation as might have occurred.

*Detached as F-21310 to GRIKMIT (AC OUT 3201 of 12 July)
and MAP 1037 to Combined Chiefs of Staff

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However, while retaining the present basic organization, it remained necessary to cut down the size of staffs wherever possible.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed :
should

(a) That planning/proceed on the basis that the present command arrangements at AFHQ would continue for three to four months.

(b) That all concerned should continuously reduce the size of their staffs whenever possible.

7. SAILING OF ALLIED AND GRANT VESSELS TO JUGOSLAV PORTS

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 34.)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper stating that the Yugoslavs had recently been uncooperative in regard to shipping matters and that in consequence it might, at some future date, become necessary to suspend sailings of Allied merchant vessels to Yugoslav ports.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS said that the British Naval representatives in BELGRADE had received a request from the Yugoslav authorities that the British naval liaison officers at SPLIT should be withdrawn. He (Admiral CUMMINGS) had ordered this withdrawal to take place at once, but had instructed his representative in BELGRADE to inform the Yugoslav authorities that, as a result, the continuance of sailings to Yugoslav ports by Allied shipping would be dependent on efficient arrangements for its handling being made by the Yugoslav authorities. In fact there had already been occasion, prior to the withdrawal of the Allied liaison officers, where the Yugoslav authorities had enforced the discharge of a ship in an unsuitable manner and contrary to the previous instruction of the British naval liaison officer. As the officer responsible for the safety of Allied merchant shipping in the Mediterranean, Admiral CUMMINGS could not accept the risk involved by Allied ocean-going shipping using Yugoslav ports if such unsatisfactory action by the Yugoslavs continued. Were it necessary to suspend such sailings the only effect would be to disturb UNRA supplies to JUGOSLAVIA. Moreover, it might still be possible for the Yugoslavs to bring in these supplies by schooners and coastal shipping under their own control.

He had also received a telegram from the British Ambassador in BELGRADE forwarding a Yugoslav request that the approaches to FIUM and R.A.A.R Bay be swept clear of mines, so that UNRA supplies could be brought in to these ports. He considered that, as the approaches to FIUM were heavily mined and it would be a long term commitment (up to 18 months) before this port could be used by ocean-going shipping, this was a matter for the International Mine-sweeping Authority. He would, however, be able to effect limited sweep-

...even uncooperative in regard to shipping matters and that in consequence it might, at some future date, become necessary to suspend sailing of Allied merchant vessels to Yugoslav ports.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that the British Naval representatives in BELGRADE had received a request from the Yugoslav authorities that the British naval liaison officers at SPALIT should be withdrawn. He (Admiral CUNNINGHAM) had ordered their withdrawal to take place at once, but had instructed his representative in BELGRADE to inform the Yugoslav authorities that, as a result, the continuance of sailings to Yugoslav ports by Allied shipping would be dependent on efficient arrangements for its handling being made by the Yugoslav authorities. In fact there had already been occasion, prior to the withdrawal of the Allied liaison officers, where the Yugoslav authorities had enforced the discharge of a ship in a unsuitable manner and contrary to the previous instruction of the British naval liaison officer. As the officer responsible for the safety of Allied merchant shipping in the Mediterranean, ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM could not accept the risk involved by Allied ocean-going shipping using Yugoslav ports if such unsatisfactory action by the Yugoslavs continued. Were it necessary to unseal such sailings the only effect would be to distort UNRRA supplies to JUGOSLAVIA. However, it might still be possible for the Yugoslavs to bring in these supplies by schooners and coastal shipping under their own control.

He had also received a telegram from the British Ambassador in BELGRADE concerning a Yugoslav request that the approaches to FIUMI and RAKAR Bay be swept clear of mines, so that UNRRA supplies could be brought in to those ports. He considered that, as the approaches to FIUMI were heavily mined and it would be a long term commitment (up to 18 months) before this port could be used by ocean-going shipping, this was a matter for the International Mine-sweeping Authority. He would, however, be able to effect limited sweeping into RAKAR Bay at the beginning of August. He felt, however, that the Yugoslavs were using the matter of UNRRA supplies merely to gain their own ends at a time when other Allied nations were still pooling their resources. In these circumstances he considered it most unwise to accept any undue risk to Allied personnel in opening these ports to ocean-going shipping.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER said that he fully agreed with Admiral CUNNINGHAM's last statement above.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that Governor Lehman, the head of UNRRA, was visiting AFHQ on 12 July and that the effect of the Yugoslav attitude on UNRRA supplies to JUGOSLAVIA should be discussed with him. Special reference should be made to the appropriation of these supplies by the Yugoslavs so as to build up their armed forces rather than distribute them among the needy population for whom they were intended. In reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander, he said there was ample evidence to satisfy ourselves that

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(12)

the Yugoslavs were in fact taking this course, though sufficient evidence might not yet exist to warrant bringing the matter before an international tribunal. The position was complicated by the fact that the Head of UNRA in JAGOSLAVIA was a Russian, although the Soviet Government only contributed a small amount towards the overall UNRA expenses.

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Took note of the points raised in Paper No. S.A.C (P) (45) 34. —
- (b) Deferred further action until the matter had been discussed with Governor Lehman.

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1. Swelton
M. G. SWELTON
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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* SHAF S-9501 (AD IN 4530 of 7 July 1945)

1430

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DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF
Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Northeast African Waters
Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theater

Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff (RR)
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF
Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee, GHQ MAF
British Resident Minister
U. S. Political Adviser
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Spare

EXTRACTS

Commander, Land Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Chief Commissioner Allied Commission
Item 4
Items 5 and 7
Items 5, 6 and 7
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1 Copy
1 Copy

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Secretary of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAF
Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee, CMC MFP
British Resident Minister
U. S. Political Advisor
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Spares

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Commander, Land Forces	Item 4	1 Copy
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	Items 5 and 7	1 Copy
Chief, Commander Allied Commission	Items 5, 6 and 7	1 Copy

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1945

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COPY NO. 76

JUN 21 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL/POLITICAL)

There will be no formal meeting of the Supreme Allied Commander's
Conference (Political) or (Operational) on Thursday 21st June 1945.

for T. H. Anderson
J. E. B. STICK, M.A.,
COLONEL, S.E.C. May
SECRETARY

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theater
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, H. MAF
U.S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister

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Handwritten:
J. E. B. STICK, JR.,
Colonel, U.S.O. way
SECRETARY

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, USAF
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Force, Mediterranean Theater
Commanding General, 15th Army Group
Chief of Staff
Chief Administrative Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)
Chief, Liaison Section
Director of Operations and Intelligence, H. H. H.
U. S. Political Advisor
British Resident Minister
Director, ME
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat
Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee, GHQ MEF
Spare

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (G) (45) 1344 meeting
14 June 1945

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Keco 18 June 45

SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (OPERATIONAL) HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT
1030 HOURS ON THURSDAY 14th JUNE 1945

PRESENT :

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. G. G. G. G.
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MEAF

Vice Admiral W. A. G. G. G.
Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Major General J. H. Bevens,
Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General Lyman I. Lounitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A. C. Duff, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

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PRESENT : -

Field Marshal the Hon. Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H. D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Air Marshal Sir A. G. Gurney,
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF

Vice Admiral W. A. Gurney,
Commander, United States Naval Forces Northwest African Waters

Major General J. W. Devane,
Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A. C. Duff, representing
Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel G. S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Colonel D. S. Jacklin, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

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THE FOLLOWING ARE ALSO PRESENT:

Brigadier J. G. Nicholson,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Colonel J. E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to the Supreme Allied Commander

Secretary:-

Major Robert T. Harley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC (C) (45) 12th Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE APPROVED THE MINUTES OF THEIR MEETING HELD ON 24 MAY 1945.

2. TRANSFER OF BRITISH COMMAND IN NORTH AFRICA TO NIDELST

(Previous reference: SAC (C) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 2)

BRIGADIER GENERAL EMERLE REPORTED THAT A SIGNAL HAD RECENTLY BEEN DESPATCHED TO NIDELST REQUESTING AN EARLY REPLY TO OUR LETTER ASKING THEIR VIEWS REGARDING THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF THE BRITISH ARMY COMMAND IN NORTH AFRICA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Took note of the above report.

3. PLAN FOR DISSOLUTION OF ALLIED AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(Previous reference: SAC (C) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 3)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMBITZER REPORTED THAT A SIGNAL HAD BEEN DESPATCHED TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF REQUESTING THEIR APPROVAL TO THE EVENTUAL DISSOLUTION OF HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES AND MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCES, AND TO THE IMMEDIATE DISSOLUTION OF HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED STRATEGICAL AIR FORCES AND MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED COASTAL AIR FORCES. AN INFORMATION SIGNAL HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF STATING THAT THEY WERE IN AGREEMENT WITH THESE PROPOSALS, PROVIDED THAT HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES AND HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCES WERE NOT DISSOLVED BEFORE ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS AND 15th ARMY GROUP, RESPECTIVELY.

AIR MARSHAL GARRAD REPORTED THAT THE DISSOLUTION OF MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED STRATEGICAL AIR FORCES AND MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED COASTAL AIR FORCES HAD, IN EFFECT, ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

2. TRANSFER OF BRITISH COMMAND IN NORTH AFRICA TO MIDEAST

(Previous reference S.C. (C) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 2)

GENERAL GIBBS reported that a signal had recently been despatched to MIDEAST requesting an early reply to our letter asking their views regarding the proposed transfer of the British Army Command in NORTH AFRICA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND:-

Took note of the above report.

3. PLAN FOR DISSOLUTION OF ALLIED AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(Previous reference S.C. (C) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 3)

MAJOR GENERAL LAMBITZER reported that a signal had been despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting their approval to the eventual dissolution of Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces and Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force, and to the immediate dissolution of Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force and Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force. An information signal had been received from the British Chiefs of Staff stating that they were in agreement with these proposals, provided that Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Force and Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force were not dissolved before Allied Force Headquarters and 15th Army Group, respectively.

AIR VISCOUNT GANDY reported that the dissolution of Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air Force and Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force had, in effect, already been accomplished.

GENERAL McILHENNEY stated that in regard to the dissolution of 15th Army Group, he had recently received a communication from the War Department regarding his views on the command of the UNITED STATES forces in MIDEAST. He had, after consultation with the Supreme Allied Commander, forwarded a reply to the War Department stating that he considered that 15th Army Group, from which the U.S. Headquarters in MIDEAST would be formed, could be dissolved with effect from about 1 July. In relation to this, he considered that Allied Force Headquarters should be dissolved on 1 August. After that date, Headquarters AFMCSA would continue along its present lines and he believed that there should be a similar British Headquarters. He saw no objection to the continued integration of certain sections of the United States and British Headquarters now to the establishment of a small Allied Command which would be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He suggested that Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force and Mediterranean Allied Air Force should be dissolved on 1 July at the same time as Headquarters 15th Army Group.

* 7-92979 (ME OUT 4476, 14 June 1945)
 ** ME 957 (ME OUT 9497, 28 May 1945)

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that the problem could best be met, not by planning the reduction of Allied Force Headquarters, but by substituting machinery to replace it.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE queried whether Allied Commission would report to the new Headquarters or directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out that the Italian Transition Terms provided that the Allied Authority in Italy was a Supreme Allied Commander and that it would therefore seem necessary to continue that office, though its command and functions might change.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS expressed the view that the office of the Supreme Allied Commander might be replaced by a Commanders-in-Chief Committee similar to that already established in HIDEOUT. Referring to the integration of the new Headquarters, he believed that certain staff sections dealing with common items such as shipping control, fuel, movements and transportation should continue to be combined.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

- A. Directed the Chief of Staff to conduct an examination into the dissolution of Allied Force Headquarters with effect from 1 August 1945, and to recommend to him the form which the new Mediterranean Headquarters, British and United States, should take.
- B. Directed the Secretary to bring forward the report on this above examination at the next Conference (Political).

4. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ITALY

(JPS Study No. P/299 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the effect of withdrawal of United States and British Forces from ITALY in the light of the commitment necessary for Allied occupational and security requirements, recommending that a signal be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff outlining the views of the Supreme Allied Commander in this regard.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER was of the opinion that the largest Allied commitment in ITALY between the present time and the signing of the Peace Treaty would be in the VENETIAN, GULIA region. This would require a force of a Corps Headquarters and two divisions, one of which would be British. Since the occupational commitment was an Allied one, he considered that the other Division should be American. In Northwest ITALY, it would be advisable to maintain there a force of one Division. For this, Polish troops would be available, but he questioned the political advisability of employing them in this region. However, it was possible that one of the two Divisions now in GERMANY could, if the situation required, be brought to ITALY and employed there after the 55th

- a. Directed the Chief of Staff to conduct an examination into the dissolution of Allied Force Headquarters with effect from 1 August 1945, and to recommend to him the form which the new Mediterranean Headquarters, British and United States, should take.
- b. Directed the Secretary to bring forward the report on the above examination at the next Conference (Political).

4. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ITALY

(JPS Study No. 2/299 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the effect of withdrawal of United States and British Forces from Italy in the light of the commitment necessary for Allied occupational and security requirements, recommending that a signal be dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff outlining the views of the Supreme Allied Commander in this regard.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER was of the opinion that the largest Allied commitment in Italy between the present time and the signing of the Peace Treaty would be in the VENETIA-GIULIA region. This would require a force of 4 Corps Headquarters and two divisions, one of which would be British. Since the occupational commitment was an Allied one, he considered that the other Division should be American. In Northwest Italy, it would be advisable to maintain that a force of one Division. For this, Polish troops would be available, but he questioned the political advisability of employing them in this region. However, it was possible that one of the two Divisions now in GREECE could, if the situation required, be brought to ITALY and employed there after the Greek election. He believed that the Italian Army could be invaluable in maintaining security elsewhere in Italy and therefore its training and re-arming should continue as rapidly as possible.

GENERAL McMAHER stated that if present redeployment plans were carried out, no United States Divisions would remain in the theater after November, but he was prepared to recommend that the 10th Mountain Division remain as the United States component of one division in Northwest Italy. He suggested that the matter of occupational forces should be re-examined in four or five months, at which time revised recommendations could be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that he had discussed the occupational forces required to maintain law and order with the United States and British Ambassadors to ITALY, who were of the opinion that the force should consist of five Divisions in addition to the present Italian Gruppi. It was their belief that this occupational force should be maintained for at least one year after all territory had been handed back to the Italian Government, or until approximately September 1946.

Extract in file copy.

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as long as large Allied forces were present in Italy, Communist elements could remain in the background, but could attempt to seize power as soon as Allied forces were withdrawn. He considered that a free election was imperative to the Italians and that this could never be held as long as conditions were unsettled.

ADMIRAL GUNNINGHAM expressed the opinion that ports should not be turned back to the Italian Government unless they had sufficient troops to deal with any strikes or outbreaks. He considered that sufficient United States and British forces should be retained on Italian territory so long as Italian forces remained unable to deal with any uprisings which might occur on the islands or mainland. Moreover, within a short time there would be no amphibious craft left in the theater to enable a rapid transfer of land forces to be effected to areas in which protection or support is required, and he believed that it was desirable to prevent outbreaks rather than to bring forces in afterwards for the purpose of quelling them, as had been necessary in GREECE. However, even a small occupational force could have a steady effect on the population if it were frequently moved about the country.

VICM ADMIRAL GIBBERD expressed the opinion that the occupational force should be kept to a minimum, but that there should be a central reserve in GERMANY or AUSTRIA which could be transported to ITALY on short notice.

AIR MARSHAL GUNNED believed that mobile forces from a central reserve could be moved without difficulty by the use of air transport. Referring to the requirements for occupational air forces, contained in the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he believed that five fighter squadrons and three light bomber squadrons, LAF, did not constitute an adequate air force. Combat aircraft would be required to operate primarily against pin-point targets in the event of disturbances and he therefore recommended that the number of fighter squadrons be increased to eight, and that the medium bombers be correspondingly reduced.

THE SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENT:-

Directed the Chief of Staff:

- a. To revise the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the light of the discussion above, and subsequently to dispatch it.
- b. To conduct an examination of the question of organizing a central mobile reserve in EUROPE which could be called upon by the several Allied Commands to assist in maintaining law and order when needed, and to submit a report to him of his findings.

VIC. ADRIAN GLASGOW expressed the opinion that the occupational force should be kept to a minimum, but that there should be a central reserve in GERMANY or AUSTRIA which could be transported to ITALY on short notice.

AIR COMMANDER BELIEVED that mobile forces from a central reserve could be moved without difficulty by the use of air transport. Referring to the requirements for occupational air forces, contained in the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he believed that five fighter squadrons and three light bomber squadrons, RAF, did not constitute an adequate air force. Combat aircraft would be required to operate primarily against pin-point targets in the event of disturbances and he therefore recommended that the number of fighter squadrons be increased to eight, and that the medium bombers be correspondingly reduced.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Directed the Chief of Staff:

- a. To revise the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the light of the discussion above, and subsequently to despatch it.
- b. To conduct an examination of the question of organizing a central mobile reserve in EUROPE which could be called upon by the several Allied Commands to assist in maintaining law and order when needed, and to submit a report to him of his findings.

5. NAVAL SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES IN THE TRIESTE AREA

(Paper No. SAC (C) (45) 23)

THE COMPTON had before them a paper submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, showing the naval support which could be given to ground forces in operations against the Yugoslavs in the TRIESTE area, and which had now been overtaken by events.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:-

Directed the Secretary to withdraw the paper by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

J. E. EASTON, Jr.
Colonel, G.S.C.
Secretary to SAC

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (O) (45) 13th Meeting
12th June 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(OPERATIONAL)

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (OPERATIONAL) WILL BE HELD IN THE G-3
WAR ROOM 1030 HOURS THURSDAY, 14TH JUNE 1945

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(SAC (O) (45) 12th Meeting - already circulated)
2. WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES FROM ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/299 (Final) - already circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

3. NAVAL SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES IN THE TRIESTE AREA
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TO TAKE NOTE ONLY :-

Robert T. Humber
for J.F. EASTON, JR., Major
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander.

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