

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/172

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

10000/109/172

CRITICISM OF ITALIAN SERVICES
JAN., FEB. 1945

P.A.

1. Similar Press attacks have been made on Admiral de Courtenay. Please extract urgently facts from Naval Sub-Com.

2. This is tied up with epuration of Remondino. B.F. at COS Meeting.

26. Jan. 45

M S LUSH

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Ref. para 1 of Minute 15, COS saw Commodore Warren. Matter discussed at COS meeting 26. Jan. 45.

(Sgd) P. RUSSELL.

26.

Chief Commissioner.

1. I submit an aide memoire for the Prime Minister containing representation on the attacks against the Admirals and REMONDINO. I have included all the points raised in the Acting President's message with the exception of the last paragraph in which you are asked to say you are not concerned with the actual merits of the case against REMONDINO, but would point out that his selection was made by the Air Ministry and approved by ourselves. This may be a bit awkward because I am recommending that you should at the same time hand a letter to the Prime Minister asking that Colonel REMONDINO should not stand his trial before the Epuration Tribunal.

2. I have compared REMONDINO's case with the PELLEGRIINI imbroglio and find that there is no parallel.

MSL/32.
27. Jan. 45

MSL
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

26.

Chief Commissioner.

1. I submit an aide memoire for the Prime Minister containing representation on the attacks against the Admirals and REMONDINO. I have included all the points raised in the Acting President's message with the exception of the last paragraph in which you are asked to say you are not concerned with the actual merits of the case against REMONDINO, but would point out that his selection was made by the Air Ministry and approved by ourselves. This may be a bit awkward because I am recommending that you should at the same time hand a letter to the Prime Minister asking that Colonel REMONDINO should not stand his trial before the Epuration Tribunal.

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MSU/SL.
27. Jan. 45

MSL

Brigadier
Chief of Staff.

27.

41/20

C.O.S.

Aide memoire will be delivered by C.C. to Sir. Baines

at 1730 hrs this evening. January 27.

Copy to both Service

Sub Coms. DML/27/1

DONE, SEE 29. Jan. 45.

132

Copy to Sir. Baines. which contains a letter from Sir. Baines

41/2

TA Quayle
Comd.

37

Discussed on 10/2 with P.R.O. AFHQ & AC, 9/18
Letter to INC to issue - SEE (38) 10/12

41

Excluded Noted
To be 39-40. I stopped we
Shaw got 38 a chance so
his action is necessary.

11/12/2

43

P.R.D. for information 10/12/2

44

Noted
gob. (PRO) 11/12/2

Should give 38 a chance to
be active if necessary.

17/2

43

P.R.D. for information DS (22/2)

44

noted
QB. (PRO)

17/2

4087

C.O.S.

At 31 is a memo from Air Vice-Marshal BOWEN-SMITH which includes translation of a letter from GASPARDIO to the AVM.

In para. 3 of GASPARDIO's letter he draws what appears to be a complete red herring across the matter. I have talked with PRO who says that the only censorship is the AVM's censorship. There is no censorship of newspaper articles examined by us, and in any case the article in the "Yoon Republicans" was a political article which is free of censorship even at AVM. I will speak if you wish.

1 February 45.

33

CC 281
FEB 2

W.F.H.O.

C.C.

I think that the Memo for Air has made a good point. The only censorship is that carried out by Italian Officers under P.R.O. A.F.H.Q. (CA (Haley) (in A.C.)) if we wish these attaches to stop then we can help by instructing P.R.O. A.F.H.Q. that attaches on Service Officers in the Italian Armed Forces are to be treated as militarily excommunicable - they are not so at present.

A /

W.F.H.O. 1/2/45

Director - Communications S/C
He'll see me

3/2

END

I think that the reference for this has made a

Good point. The only censorship is that carried out by Italian Officers under PRO AFHQ / CO (Italy) (not AFHQ). If we wish these attaches to stop then we can help by instructing PRO AFHQ that attacks on Service Officers in the Italian Armed Forces are to be treated as militarily countervailing. - They are not so at present.

PRO/1/2/40

Director - Communications S/C

Also see me.

JWD
cc

4058

3/2

35

605

I completely agree with your Minute 33. Giapadotto I feel sure made an honest error. It is not guilty of drawing a "red hearing".

JWD

2 cso. Draft as in A of 33 above. JWD/1/2 cc

A /

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

⁵⁰²
~~SECRET~~
Confidential

1st Ind.

Ref: 502/38/COS

TO: Hq. Allied Commission, APO 394, U. S. Army, 19 February 1945
FROM: Chief, INC Section, AFHQ, APO 512, U. S. Army. **FEB 20 1945**

1. Reference basic letter. I am informed by Colonel Robert V. Shinn, Deputy Chief, Press/Radio Censorship Branch, AFHQ, that the matter contained therein was taken up at a recent conference and has been satisfactorily adjusted.

2. In the event that other complications ensue, and to secure quickest action, I suggest that the matter be brought to the attention of my deputy, in Rome, Colonel A.C.W. Hobson.

A. J. McManis
A. J. McMANIS
Brigadier General, GSC
Chief, INC Section

Inclosures withdrawn.

424/2

SECRET

4005

785017

From : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, H.Q. ALLIED COMMISSION

To : S.O. TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C.

Date : 16th February 1945

Ref. : AFSC/INT/IAF/R

FEB 17 1945

Subject : Attacks by the Italian Press against Officers of the Italian Air Force.-

At the Vice Presidents' meeting which I attended yesterday morning deputising for Air Vice Marshal W.A.E. Bowen-Biscarlet who is absent visiting the operational units, I stated that there had been no recent attacks against Italian Air Force officers. I now have to rectify this statement as on perusing the evening edition of the "Voce Repubblicana" of the 15th February 1945 I find it contains a letter addressed to the "Voce Repubblicana" by a group of self-styled civil servants.

The letter is published under the caption "Manovre Monarchiche" (Monarchical Manoeuvres) and is of a defamatory nature. It first deals with personnel at the War Office and after a reference to two I.A.F. officers, namely Col. Gallo and Major Viola, it goes on to say :

"Remondino, the ace of double crossers, is still at his place."

It would therefore appear that there is no intention on the part of the press to discontinue the campaign against Italian officers.

P. de Haan
P. DE HAAN W/CDR INT
AIR VICE MARSHAL
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING

10/17/45

cc 456

FEB 16 RECD

Translation

FEB 17 1945

Excerpt from Voce Repubblicana article
dealing with Civil Aviation, dated Feb.
15th under heading "Monarchist Manoeuvres"

" On the same (Air Force) theme :
Remondino - the double game ace -
remains at his post.

Military shirkers in offices are given
war bonuses (what of the partisans ?)
and draw 2.5 kg of flour every 15 days,
450 gr. of sugar every 15 days etc. etc.
And the children of the people die of
tuberculosis !"

→
TO COS

4683

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Confidential

Ref: 502/38/008.

16 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Press Attacks on Italian Serving Officers.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: I.M.C.

1. We discussed this morning the necessity of applying censorship to attacks in the Italian Press on serving officers of the Italian armed forces.
2. I enclose relevant correspondence. - 15 and 31
3. I confirm my request that the press censors be instructed to prevent the publication of such articles as being contrary to the interests of military security.

M. S. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner,
for the Chief Commissioner.

WCL/JG.

Copy to: GOC, Land Forces SubCom (M&IA).
Director, Air Forces Sub-Com.
Director, Navy Sub-Com.
Public Relations Branch.

4082

20.

1) agree. Mr (42)

21.

Major Stearns:

I believe there was a meeting
today with Col Astley etc. It
didn't end result.

1/16/45

22.

PRO Mr Brown:

Re min 21 - What's the answer? 17th Feb.

(5) 23

Office of the Executive Commissioner:

Brigadier Lush, Col. Henderson and I met with Col. Hobson,
Deputy Chief of Information & Censorship, AFHQ, Col. Astley and
Lt. Col. Shinn (see 17) on Feb. 16 re possible censorship of attacks
on serving officers.

It was agreed that such attacks were harmful to military morale and
therefore censurable on the grounds of military security. Col.
Hobson and Col. Shinn said the necessary instructions to stop such
attacks would be given to the censors assigned to the Italian papers.

19 Feb 45

1/17/45

ALB
DPR

Spent about 1/2 hr
from 10:00 to 10:30

10

Cor

At 9 AM present estimate
from the man covering police
activities in the Air Force.

I remain in the Air Force
at least last meeting you
would take up the matter
of clearing up the matter
with Col Astley & P.R.O.

3/2

11

P.R.O.

Have you discussed with Col Astley.

12/4/2

Had please do so.

12

C.S.O. copy of 14 to Air Force S.C. sent 1/4/2

12/4/2

18

would take up the matter
of the situation in South America
with Mr. Astley & P.R.O.

8/3/2

11

P.R.O.

Have you discussed with Mr. Astley.

12/4/2

And please do so.

12

C.S.O. copy of 14 to the Foreign Sec. sent *[initials]*

12/4/2

18

COS

I have spoken to Philip Astley but
he appears with me, as I had no doubt he
would, like if you fight for a free press
and freedom of the press, you have a
free press. Lady has been a growing
and would not dangerous freedom.
in AC to stop down or press freedom.
of AC does not. It just people to show
what is the other part. Astley is quite
prepared to come over & talk to you and
bring in chief censor, if you like. But
then is real way with say. See the case of
the Republican's opponents and particularly
Colonel Shinn's para 2.

L. Fielder.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information and Censorship Section
Press and Radio Censorship Branch
Detachment "A"
APO 794

PREC/2

3rd February 1945.

SUBJECT: La Voce Repubblicana.

TO : Major L. Fielden,
PRO A.C.

1. Reference the attached translation of article from "La Voce Repubblicana", and covering letter from Major Colville.
2. Such articles, as in this case, will be referred to the Allied Commission and/or the Embassies. From the censorship angle they can only be cut in as far as they violate military security.
3. Further control might possibly be effected by arranging for periodical informative guidances to be given directly by Allied Commission to the heads of the Italian press, such guidances to be designed to correct false impressions.

Since Love Major
for R.V. SMITH
Lieutenant Colonel, GSC.,
Deputy Chief, Press & Radio Censorship Branch.

cc : Major J.W. Colville,
Mr. G. Adams - PWB.

4679

PA

[Signature]
1/2

COPY

0
PRESS AND RADIO CENSORSHIP BRANCH
(I.N.C. - A.F.H.Q.)
C/O PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH, UNIT 12
APO 512

#6

29 January 1945

TO : Lt. Col. J.L. Hayden

SUBJECT : La Voce Republican

1. Attached is a translation of the leading article in La Voce Republican of 28 Jan. 45.

2. Under the heading of "Another cry of alarm in America", this article purports to summarise an article by Gene Rea in The American Mercury.

3. Mr. Rea attributes the whole blame to the Allies for the tragic conditions he describes. The Allied Commission is unjustly condemned, criticized and ridiculed.

4. It is assumed that all this was originally passed by Pd. Press Censorship. Is it however, desirable that such unilateral criticisms of Allied policy and practice by an Allied Correspondent be publicized in the Roman Press?

J.W. OLIVILLE
Major, G.S.

1078

*Excerpt from Voice of Repatriation
12/28/45*

15

In December the Allies were still studying the proposal submitted long ago by the Italian Govt. for raising salaries to meet the cost of living.

The Italian Govt. had a plan for mobilising 15 Divisions. This was disapproved.

The economic conditions of the Italian population are intolerable. According to the American author a person needs from 2500 to 3000 calories a day. The food Allied soldiers receive is equivalent to 4000 calories. The Italians, if they are lucky, have daily rations which amount to 1000 calories.

Italian girls working for the Allies earn about 80 lire a day - men from 80 to 150.

A family of 3 or 4 people cannot spend less than 350 lire a day on food. Where are they to find the money? Italy has no industries, she has no trade. Thousands of families have already sold everything they possess - gold, jewelry, objects of art, furniture, linen.

A pair of shoes costs 4000 lire - stockings 600 lire. Olive oil costs 570 lire a litre, etc. etc. The situation is most desperate for the children. - Childrens' clothing does not exist. Milk is unobtainable.

At Naples 40% of the infants under a year old have died of undernourishment.

Conditions in the hospitals are pitiable. A few moments after a patient has died, another is placed in the same bed. There are no disinfectants. The sheets are not changed.

In Rome 200 thousand people line up for the soup kitchens. The Vatican distributes tens of thousands of plates of soup every day.

Venereal disease is reaching record figures in Naples and Palermo. The danger of typhus has become acute.

In liberated Italy about a million people are homeless. In the Abruzzo, only, there are about 100 thousand refugees. The refugees live, if such an existence can be called living, in wretched conditions. About 1000 refugees are in the premises of the Cine-Citta. Many of these have nothing but the clothes they wear. Many have no shoes. They eat once a day in empty rooms without beds or chairs.

4677

1438

The only flourishing industries are prostitution and the black market. Rome was once proud of the virtue of its women. Today girls are ~~being~~ ~~found~~ offering themselves for 1500 lire the night. Many of these girls are homeless and sometimes orphans. Some of them are widows. The majority are not "professionals". It is not a matter of vice but of hunger. Families would perish if help were not forthcoming.

Gene Rea concludes his article as follows:
"All liberated Italy, with the exception of a small group of aristocratic landlords, rich industrialists and political intriguers, is today suffering from hunger.

Only that little group can afford the luxury of good living. Some members of that little group dedicate themselves to charitable welfare work but the majority cling to the Allies in the hope of gaining favours.

Such is the picture of Italy today. Not a brilliant one to be sure. If one examines it without prejudice the symptoms of revolt are apparent. Not a revolution organised by Communists or anarchists, however many elements there may be composed of turncoats who are now ready to lead a revolt, but a popular revolution.

In these conditions, the people cannot continue. They are threatened with malaria, tuberculosis, with typhus. They want to see the earth fruitful, tractors in the field, and machines in the workshops.

To recognize their government is not enough. If the English and Americans do not understand that Italy is on the verge of revolution and do not hasten seriously to avoid it, we shall pass a sad and sanguinary winter in Italy".

We have summarised without comment.

TRANSLATION

Another cry of alarm in America

Under the title "Italy menaced with revolution", a long and instructive article on the Italian situation, by the American journalist Gene Rea, is published in the important review "The American Mercury".

The Allies have won a military victory in Italy but "are losing if they have not already lost the peace" says the American writer who maintains that, after twelve months of occupation, the Italian people are in a revolutionary state of mind.

Naturally certain classes of the Italian population are completely satisfied. These are "the feudal landlords, mediaeval aristocrats, rich businessmen and industrialists". The "Allied liberation protects their fortunes". But the great majority of Italians, peasants and artisans, white-collar workers or not, openly express their discontent.

The American writer declares that, among the Allies, only England is pursuing a clean-cut policy and the future will prove whether it is the most suitable and best chosen. It is a policy of supporting the monarchy. The American and Russian policies are less clear.

The Allied Commission which is not unaware of Italian dissensions, replies that its function in Italy is "to ensure the execution of the Armistice terms" - terms still enveloped in mystery although it is easy, watching the application of the Armistice, to imagine what it is all about.

Theoretically, the Italian Govt. has jurisdiction over some provinces. In practice the usual answer any Italian receives who wishes to do anything at all is: "Have you a permit from the Allied Authorities?" To every request the Allied Commission replies, "nothing must be allowed to embarrass the military situation. We must, first and foremost, win the war".

A few examples: "the Italian Govt asked for 500 trucks for carrying food. A negative reply. The Italian Govt asked for some workshops to be reactivated only to be told that the same workshops had been requisitioned for war purposes. A minister asked for a little extra petrol that he might visit the southern provinces. He had to buy it in the black market". Trucks were refused for transporting refugees.

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

TO: REAR ADMIRAL ELLERY W. STONE. (THROUGH CHIEF OF STAFF)
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

DATE: 3RD. FEBRUARY 1945.

REF: AFSC/R/10/SPEC.INT.

CONFIDENTIAL.

FEB 3 1945

25

With reference to your Aide Memoire to H.E. Bonomi of 27th. January 1945, on the subject of attacks in the Italian Press on serving officers in the Italian Navy and Italian Air Force.

While it is realised that it may take a few days for your instructions to take effect, I feel that you may be interested in some further attacks which have taken place recently, and I attach translations of these herewith.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscalet.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

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785017

TRANSLATION FROM "LA RIVOLUZIONE E ALISTA"
29TH JANUARY - 5TH FEBRUARY 1945.

THE "ROYAL" AIR FORCE.

General Pietro Piana, who was appointed some time ago Commissioner for Sardinia, is an old protégé of the late regime, and he showed his sympathy for fascism in various ways as, for instance, on the occasion of Hitler's visit to Rome, which was marked by an elaborate air-display.

The said Commissioner has perhaps forgotten that fascism has fallen, otherwise he would not have surrounded himself in his new job with Squadristi, holders of the Solenne Litterio decoration, and with other personalities too often beset with the twenty years fascist politics.

In fact working beside him now are Major Achenna Stefano, a fascist of long standing as well as a fervent Squadrist, and his son-in-law Captain Negro Fernando, in his time a participant on the march on Rome, who boldly continues to do the same as they did once before.

It is a case of: "Dirty linen is washed in the family!"

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
2nd February, 1945.

TRANSLATION FROM "LA RIVOLUZIONE SOCIALISTA"
29TH JANUARY - 5TH FEBRUARY 1945.

CHANGING OF THE GUARD.

The old fascist style of changing of the guard has come back once more to the Air Force amongst the high ranking officers. That is to say, to the benefit of those in charge.

For example, Lieutenant Colonel Ambrasio Cassinerio has been relieved of his command as head of the Air Ministry Cabinet, the reason for this having its origin in shady moves made by him. He is in fact implicated in the affairs of a doubtful organisation, established at one time in Bari, which operated for the Black Market in oil. The precious liquid was trailed in Air Force lorries being used for transporting it.

What amazes one is the fact that the illustrious Lt. Col. Cassinerio has been designated, having fallen from his previous position, to the command of the Recruiting Centre at Florence in place of colleague Lt. Col. Donatello Tani, who is accused of the grave charge of the appropriation of 600,000 liras at the expense of the state.

One should not overlook the hypothesis that the enquiries made about both cases will be paid for in the long run by the poor airmen, who some people would like to accuse of complicity in the above mentioned affairs. Such a hypothesis is based on the fact that the changing of the guard has been carried out according to the fascist ritual with co-participants in the shady affairs.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
2nd February, 1945.

TRANSLATION FROM "LA RIVOLUZIONE SOCIALE"
29TH JANUARY - 5TH FEBRUARY 1945.

The Services Directorate of the Air Ministry deals amongst other things with the salvaging of disused material. This work is entrusted to certain "Salvage Sections", the directors and followers of which show themselves to be as dishonest and inadapted to the work as ever, continually abusing and thieving at the expense of the State. The amazing thing is that, when tracing these really responsible for these shady moves, it is always the humble followers who pay the piper.

It is furthermore known, for example, that military transport is used for such illicit activity in open agreement with the civilian firms, already holders of monopolies in the black market, as happened in Southern Italy.

The poor airmen, who have to help this military traffic, have, for some time, grumbled in military circles, as usual, that: "The conductor has been changed (apparently,) but the music is still the same".

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
2nd February, 1945.

TRANSLATION FROM "LA RIVOLUZIONE S. ALISTA"
29TH JANUARY - 5TH FEBRUARY 1945.

BEHIND THE SCENES ON THE CLANDESTINE FRONT.

The Ross Aeronautical Clandestine Front was financed with money from Southern Italy and from private persons.

The sums distributed were limited to 500 liras per head (for N.C.O.'s of course.) The men often had to go from one side of the city to the other to get a few hundred liras, and were in constant danger of the German raking in. The heads of the organisation and the various high ranking officers were, on the other hand, paid regularly at their residences (read: "ALBA MACCHIA") or in the convents, with magnificent generosity.

One of these is the head of the N.I.A.F. Clandestine Front, Division General UMBERTO LONGO, who some days ago acquired a luxurious apartment for a million and a half liras.

We ask the present Ministry that a balance sheet be drawn up with regard to the comings and goings of payment for the Aeronautical Clandestine Front, and that enquiries be urgently made in order to ascertain which illicit gains have been made at the expense of the country.

Note: - Gen. Longo was retained "in
auxiliaria" on 29th January.

W.B.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
2nd February, 1945.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1005-502
C-5
3/17
Translati

The President of the Council of Ministers
n. 2641/10124.62

Rome, 2 February 1945

Dear Admiral,

Refer to your letter of January 27th
(DE/4/13.1/CA), about Colonel Aldo REMONDINO, Deputy
Chief of Staff of the R. Airforce.

I am glad to be able to tell you that I have already
imparted the necessary instructions to the competent ju-
diciary and administrative authorities, immediately to
suspend the proceedings against the said officer, and to
see that the most complete silence is kept about such
elements as already came to light on this subject.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Truly yours,

B. I. Bonomi

Admiral Eliery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R o m e

e.c.

COS DIST - 3/2/45
ACTION: CA Section
INFO: CHIEF PCHMR
COS
(AIR FORCE S.C.
1009
in route 12)

Copy also on 1005

502
Transmission

The President of the Council of Ministers
R. 26/2/1945

Rome, 2 February 1945

FEB 3 1945

My Dear Admiral,

I have thoroughly examined the memorandum sent to me by the Allied Commission, about the frequent attacks made by the Italian press against the officers in service in the Navy and in the Air Force.

I fully agree with the Allied Military Commander about the obvious necessity to cut short these attacks by the newspapers, which depress the morale of the officers who are attacked, and therefore indirectly hamper the war effort against the common enemy.

On the other hand, I must point out that the preventive military censorship on periodical press, though being entrusted to a special Italian military office, whose seat is with P.M.A., is made in close liaison with Allied Press Quarters, and on the basis of the precise orders given by the Allied authorities. In the provinces, censorship is entrusted to the organs of the Prefecture which have to follow the instructions of the said central office, as well as those of the Allied officers, acting as Regional Censorship Inspectors.

Considering this, I suggest it would be advisable for the Allied authorities to issue the necessary regulations, so that the inconveniences which were so justly pointed out, shouldn't occur again in future.

As for what concerns the possible indiscretions through which the papers obtained their information, I can only express my regret for the hypothesis that the fact should have taken place. As such events cannot be allowed to occur again, I have drawn the particular attention of the military ministers and of the High Commissioner for sanctions against fascism on this delicate question, for the necessary action to be taken without delay.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Yours very truly,

B. I. Bonomi

Admiral Hilary E. Stone
Chief Commissioner
R. O. M. C.

e.c.

ACTION - COS
INFO - CHIEF COMINT
AIR FORCES SC
NAVY SC.

785017

N°26342/10124.63



SECRET

*Il Presidente
del Consiglio dei Ministri*

ROMA 24 FEBBRAIO 1945

Confidenziale

URGENT

Mio caro Ammiraglio.

Ho preso in attento esame il promemoria trasmessomi dalla Commissione Alleata, in merito ai frequenti attacchi rivolti dalla stampa italiana contro ufficiali in servizio nella marina e nell'aeronautica.

Condivido pienamente le considerazioni svolte dal Comandante Militare Alleato circa la evidente necessità di troncare tali deprecabili attacchi giornalistici che, deprimendo il morale degli ufficiali che da essi sono colpiti, riescono indirettamente pregiudizievoli allo sforzo bellico contro il comune nemico.

Dubbo, peraltro, farla rilevare che la censura militare preventiva sulla stampa periodica, pur essendo affidata ad un apposito ufficio militare italiano avente sede presso il P.M.E., si svolge in stretto collegamento con il Quartiere Generale Alleato e sulla base delle precise direttive che vengono impartite dalle Autorità Alleate. Nelle provincie, la censura è affidata

All'Ammiraglio Ellery W. STONE
Comissario Capo della Commissione Alleata

R O M A

SECRET

Translation folio 3

4667

0 8
agli organi della Prefettura, i quali sono tenuti ad osservare le istruzioni di detto ufficio centrale, nonché quelle degli Ufficiali Alleati, che fungono da ispettori regionali di censura.

Ciò premesso, sono indotto a prospettare la opportunità che le stesse Autorità Alleate impartiscano le occorrenti disposizioni, affinché gli inconvenienti, così giustamente rilevati, non abbiano più a ripetersi in avvenire.

Per quanto si riferisce alle eventuali indiscrezioni attraverso le quali i giornali abbiano attinto il loro materiale informativo, non posso non esprimere il mio più vivo rincrescimento per l'ipotesi che il fatto si sia effettivamente verificato. Ma poichè non sarebbe tollerabile che simili episodi dovessero nuovamente accadere, ho richiamato sulla delicata questione la particolare attenzione dei Ministri militari e dell'Alto Commissariato per le sanzioni contro il fascismo, affinché siano prontamente adottate le occorrenti misure.

Voglia accogliere, caro Ammiraglio, i sensi della mia profonda considerazione

Handwritten signature

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

502

EWS/3

CG 9251

1 February 1945.

FEB 2 1945

Dear Mr. Macmillan:

Replying to your message through the British Embassy with respect to the attack in "Voce Repubblicana" on Colonel Ascardino, I delivered both an Aide Memoire on the general subject of attacks on Italian military officers and a letter specifically relating to the proceedings against Colonel Ascardino, copies of which I am attaching.

I have asked the Prime Minister to advise me this week what steps he has taken to implement the position taken by us in both documents. So far, I have not received a reply but I shall be pressing him in a day or two.

Very truly yours,

Ernest W. Stone

ERNEST W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Mr. Harold Macmillan,
British Embassy,
Athens.

cc: COS
A File

4656

502

(3)

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF,
ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

FROM: AIR VICE-MARSHAL M.A.B. BOWEN-MICHAEL,
AIR FORCES INS-Commission,
ROME.

DATE: JANUARY 10th. 1945.
REF: AF 80/ R/21/SPED.INT.

JAN 30 1945

(29)

With reference to your letter to me 502/29/COS. of 28th. January 1945. forwarding a copy of an aide memoire headed by the Chief Commissioner to M.E. Bonomi on the subject of Press attacks on serving officers of the Italian Navy and Air Force.

Below is a translation of a letter I have just received from the Air Minister for any action you may think fit.

W. B. B. Bowen-Michael

M.A.B. BOWEN-MICHAEL,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL.

TRANSLATION.

REF. 2601.

20th. January 1945.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal,

With reference to the publication in the Press of information concerning facts and persons which are of interest to the military element.

I have specially consulted M.E. Bonomi on this subject and he has promised that he will make the necessary representations and issue warnings to members of the Press.

With regard to the censorship of facts and news of a military nature. This censorship is already in existence and is exercised by the Allied Commission through trustworthy Italian officers. It would, perhaps, be advisable if the Allied Commission were to renew their instructions to these officers so

that they are able to appear in 'La Voce Repub-

Below is a translation of a letter I have just received from the Air Minister for any action you may think fit.

William Barnard

V.A.B. BARNARD-BUSCAVILLI,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,

TRANSLATION.

REF. 2601.

10th. January 1945.

Dear Air Vice-Marshal,

With reference to the publication in the Press of information concerning facts and persons which are of interest to the military element.

I have specially consulted H.E. Bonomi on this subject and he has promised that he will take the necessary representations and issue warnings to members of the Press.

With regard to the censorship of facts and news of a military nature. This censorship is already in existence and is exercised by the Allied Commission through trustworthy Italian officers. It would, perhaps, be advisable if the Allied Commission were to renew their instructions to these officers so that they do not allow similar articles to appear in 'La Voce Repubblicana' in the future.

As far as I am concerned, I have advised the Director of the Press Bureau at the Presidency to communicate with the officers of the Censorship Bureau in order to render more efficacious any action which may be taken against further indiscretions and imprudences.

For as I am able.

I shall always be glad to meet your wishes as

Yours Sincerely,

L. CASTARDO.

cc: "A" file

785017

502
10.
COS

ALLIED ~~CONTROL~~ COMMISSION
INTER OFFICE MEMO

From: Office of the Chief Commissioner

SUBJECT: Distribution of Letter

FILE No.

JAN 29 1945

TO: CA Section

29 Jan 1945

The Chief Commissioner requests that a copy of your letter to Prime Minister Bennett, ref: 12/4/13.1/CA dated 27 Jan 45, be sent to:

Air Subcommission
Naval Subcommission

for their files.

cc: COS ✓

4084
H J. A. Quayle
J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CO

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET.

29

Ref: 502/29/1344.

29th January 1944.

SUBJECT: Press Attacks on Italian Serving Officers.

TO : Director, Air Force Sub-Com.
Director, Navy Sub-Com.

Herewith for your information copy of an aide memoire handed
by the Chief Commissioner to R.A. Bonomi yesterday on the subject of press
attacks on serving officers of the Italian Navy and Air Force.

Major E. Talbot

Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

EXL/31.

4063

28

DDP/113.1/72

27 January 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have been informed that judicial and operation proceedings have been initiated against Colonel Aldo REMONDINO of the Royal Italian Air Force and that the investigation of the charges made against this officer has already been started.

The Air Vice Marshal commanding the Air Force Sub-Commission advises me that the retention of Colonel REMONDINO as Vice Chief of the Air Staff is essential to the Allied war effort.

Further I am informed that the facts which will be brought to light upon investigation of these charges or in the hearing of the operation proceedings are of such a nature that their publication would be contrary to the Allied interests in the prosecution of the war.

The Procuratore Generale Militare has been interviewed and has been informed that, from the evidence in possession of this Commission, Colonel REMONDINO appears to be entirely innocent of the charges made against him. Nevertheless, he has stated that he has no power to intervene in the case unless this evidence is brought to the notice of the court.

You are, of course, aware that under the Armistice Terms you are required to abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and to carry out promptly and efficiently all orders in relation thereto given by the United Nations.

For the reasons above given, I must require the immediate discontinuance of all proceedings both judicial and under Decree 159 against Colonel REMONDINO.

I shall be glad to hear from you as soon as possible that the necessary action has been taken.

SFC Minute 26

Yours very truly,

27 Jan 1945
Hand of Admiral Stone
DPE

ALLENBY W. STONE
Rear Admiral USNR
Chief Commissioner 4002

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
The President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government, ROME.

Copy to file 1005/1005 Operation

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

25

27th January 1945.

AIR MEMOIRE FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

ATTACKS IN THE ITALIAN PRESS ON SERVING OFFICERS IN THE
ITALIAN NAVY AND THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, and the Deputy Air Officer Commander-in-Chief at Allied Force Headquarters have had brought to their notice attacks made in the Italian press on serving officers in the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force.

2. The Italian newspaper "Avanti" in its issue of 24 January, published an article entitled "The Navy and Naval Men". This article contained an attack on seven Admirals or Rear Admirals of the Italian Fleet and also on the Minister for Marine. It also contained a paragraph which impugned the integrity and good faith of the Allied authorities.

3. In "Voce Repubblicana" of 14 January there appeared an article entitled "The Favourites of the Monarchy. Col. Remondino, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force". This was followed by a similar attack on Colonel Remondino in the same paper on 21 January. Not only do these articles contain attacks on serving officers of the Italian Air Force but it seems clear beyond all doubt and has, I understand, been established by an official investigator appointed by the Italian Government, that material for these articles must have been supplied to the newspaper by an official of the High Commission for Spuration or of the Spuration or Military Tribunal having access to official documents of a confidential nature.

4. I understand that the Air Minister has very properly taken the greatest exception to the publication of these articles and has brought them to your notice.

5. The Supreme Allied Commander has directed me to represent to you in the strongest manner the necessity for ensuring that such newspaper attacks on Italian serving personnel now fighting with the Allied forces should stop. Such attacks in what should be a responsible newspaper cannot fail to have an adverse effect on the morale of such personnel and thus upon our joint war effort against the common enemy. Being serving officers neither the Admirals nor Colonel Remondino can themselves reply publicly to the allegations against them but they should be able to rely for protection upon the Italian Government. It will become quite impossible

-2-

24

confidential source
to ~~press forces~~ of the fighting services in the war if their senior officers are to be exposed to newspaper attacks of a scurrilous nature based upon information itself misleading which, certainly in the case of Colonel Remondino, can only have been supplied by officers in official positions having access to papers which should be treated as strictly confidential.

6. I am to bring to your notice the possibility of dealing with the matter of publication under present Italian military censorship and to request that you should consider taking all necessary powers if your Ministries do not now possess them.

7. I am also to request that you should take the proper measures to deal with officers in responsible positions who betray their trust by making improper use of confidential and official information.

8. Both the appearance of these articles in responsible Italian newspapers and the leakage of confidential information, in the opinion of the Supreme Allied Commander, reflects most unfavourably on the Italian administration and must be stopped.

4080

REPORTING TELEGRAM

From: Caserta (Mr. Broad)

D. 1030 25/2/45

To: Rome

R. 0900 26/2/45

Cypher/OTP

No. 3 Revised of 24/1/45

Following for Chief Commissioner of Allied Commission from
Mr. Macmillan. Begins.

Mediterranean Allied Air Force authorities are much concerned
by a repetition of previous attack in "VICE SPEDITION" on
Colonel REMONDINO, Vice Chief of Italian Air Staff.

2. There are two features of this case which are particularly
disturbing and reflect most unfavourably upon the Italian
administration:

(a) Colonel REMONDINO is an officer who has the confidence
of Italian Air Force personnel now fighting with the
Allied Air Forces and attacks of this sort in what
would be a responsible newspaper cannot fail to have an
adverse effect on morale of those personnel, and thus
upon our joint war effort against the common enemy.
Being a serving officer Colonel REMONDINO cannot
himself reply publicly to allegations against him, but
should be able to rely for protection upon the Italian
Government.

(b) It seems clear beyond all doubt that material for
these articles must have been supplied by an official
in the Italian Air Ministry or High Commission for
Examination having access to official documents of a
confidential nature.

3. Deputy A.O.C. in Chief on January 17th distanced previous article
which appeared on January 14th with the Air Minister, Signor GASPARETO,
who expressed his indignation and promised to take up the matter
strongly in the Council of Ministers on the following day. And it
will become quite impossible to conduct affairs of a fighting service
in the war if its senior officers are to be exposed to newspaper
attacks of a scurrilous nature based on information itself
misleading, which they must be well aware can only have been supplied
by officers in official positions having access to papers which
should be treated as strictly confidential.

disturbing and reflect most unfavorably upon the Italian administration:

(a) Colonel RIZZARDI is an officer who has the confidence of Italian Air Force personnel now fighting with the Allied Air Forces and attacks of this sort in what would be a responsible newspaper cannot fail to have an adverse effect on morale of these personnel, and thus upon our joint war effort against the common enemy. Being a serving officer Colonel RIZZARDI cannot himself reply publicly to allegations against him, but should be able to rely for protection upon the Italian Government.

(b) It seems clear beyond all doubt that material for these articles must have been supplied by an official in the Italian Air Ministry or High Commission for Espionage having access to official documents of a confidential nature.

3. Deputy A.C.C. in Chief on January 17th discussed previous article which appeared on January 14th with the Air Minister, Signor CASPAROTTO, who expressed his indignation and promised to take up the matter strongly in the Council of Ministers on the following day. And it will become quite impossible to conduct affairs of a fighting service in the war if its senior officers are to be exposed to newspaper attacks of a scurrilous nature based on information itself misleading, which they must be well aware can only have been supplied by officers in official positions having access to papers which should be treated as strictly confidential.

4. I would be grateful if you would speak to P.M. Bonomi on this matter in suitable terms and discuss with him possible remedies to prevent a repetition. The two points that arise are:

(a) Possibility of dealing with these under present Italian military censorship, and

(b) Taking of appropriate measures to deal with officers in responsible positions who betray their trust by making improper use of confidential and official information.

5. I would be grateful for a report as to present situation under 4(a) and 4(b) respectively. The Italian Government should be asked to consider taking any necessary powers if they do not possess them.

(2)

6. You will no doubt make clear to the P.M. that we are not concerned with actual merits of the case against Colonel HEMMING, but it should be pointed out that his selection was made by Italian Air Ministry and approved by Air Forces sub-commission with full authority of Air Marshal BRASSER. BRAS.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

4000

FLAG OFFICER LIAISON, ITALY,
ALLIED COMMISSION,
HEADQUARTERS,
ROME.

26th January, 1945.

No. 1.334/5.

CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
ALLIED COMMISSION.

EXTRACT FROM ITALIAN NEWSPAPER "AVANTI".

I wish to bring to your notice the attached translation taken from the Italian newspaper "AVANTI", dated 24th January, 1945.

2. I have discussed this matter with Commodore ZIROLI, United States Navy, and we are of the opinion that such press articles are in the worst taste striking as they do by implication at the integrity and administration of the Allied Commission.

Al. H. ...
COMMODORE.

(Copy to :- Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Station.)

TRANSLATION OF EDITORIAL FROM ROME AVANTI
of 24 January 1945.

"The Navy and Naval Men"

After a period of some months we return to a discussion of the Navy and we do so because our long awaiting has been a delusion. We believe, as a matter of fact, that the frontal attack of the Roman leftist press would be followed by action or at least by some official statement.

Various personalities of high rank have been the objects of a series of perfectly precise charges of exceptional gravity.

The matter concerns Admirals Caviglioli, Riccardi and Jachino; of Vice Admiral Sansonetti; of Rear Admiral Parona, Ferreri and Piovano.

Only one of the above mentioned ranking officers has seen fit to publish a letter of denial full of "it is not true", but devoid of concrete facts, so that a precise documented reply by the press forced him to a cautious and shameful silence.

The Ministry of the Via Flaminia has maintained a "reserve" which it would have been more fitting to show on other occasions.

Public opinion asks: Do the facts charged correspond to the truth?

We say yes.

We say yes because we hold circumstantial proof which could hardly be refuted concerning men of the Navy and their actions, (and not only with respect to the persons mentioned above); and in the second place because the simplest and most modest experience leads to the conclusion that when, in any government which is called democratic, charges of this kind are ignored, that means that they are true, and that reply is not made because of the hope that the waters will subside of their own accord.

It is now our duty to dissipate the doubt which the silence of the hierarchy of the Navy has raised in public opinion. Public opinion, which knows little of what goes on behind closed doors in Italy, has been led to believe that everything in that splendid branch of the service is corrupt and rotten.

The time is ripe when the whole Italian people should be informed, and we say it with the greatest firmness, that by far the greater part of the Navy is morally sound, eager for the good of the country. In opposition to an insignificant minority of a particular cast, anxious only about its own interests and determined to survive even though it involves ultimate injury

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The time is ripe when the whole Italian people should be informed, and we say it with the greatest firmness, that by far the greater part of the Navy is morally sound, eager for the good of the country: in opposition to an insignificant minority of a particular cast, anxious only about its own interests and determined to survive even though it involves ultimate injury and shame to Italy.

All of the enlisted men and large bodies of officers of middle and lower ranks are determined not to be confused with the responsible heads at whom the nation points the finger; and it is these who are in the van in calling for the operation which they feel absolutely necessary to bring back to the Navy honest and capable officers who know how to guide its reorganization.

It is to them that the Italian people owes the safety of its flesh, its complete alignment on the side of the Allies, its present intact condition. It is not due, as some would like the ingenuous and even the enlisted men to believe, to the force of an oath which no one ever heard, or to the ability of the Minister whom very few know and who, moreover, confined himself conveniently to giving a few orders and then, still more conveniently going south.

But we

Page 2.

.. .. south.

But we will leave the Minister for a minute and turn to the Admirals; not one of them when he has found himself in really difficult situations where high personal responsibility was in order has been up to his task; as between glory and their own skin many chose their skin.

All of them, all we say, are today in places of command and of privilege.

Mr. De Courten, it is not by smothering scandals and, with perfect Fascist technique, concealing defects both remote and recent that one may hope to recover a strong, well balanced Navy competent for the serious tasks confided to it.

By such tactics you will obtain only an exasperation of impatience of which the signs already are clear and which we openly proclaim.

And if that impatience ends in producing incidents, with what right may the regulations of discipline or the Naval penal code be invoked?

It is well to remember that the whole personnel of the Navy well knew through their own sad experience the misdeeds of their chiefs.

To keep these men at their posts of command shamelessly violating a law of the state is itself a serious breach of discipline and indeed a crime; it should be insisted upon that the guilty be removed at whatever cost.

That the stubborn De Courten should want to continue to enjoy the support of the Allies to keep himself in dictatorial power is serious enough; but it is intolerable that such support should be used for keeping at their posts unworthy and incompetent men.

If it is pretended that the retention of these men can be covered by a supposed vital necessity for the Navy, by taking advantage of the good faith of the Allies, we say that that is false.

The Italian Navy fortunately is full of personnel of undoubted technical capacity, of proven bravery in war, of incorruptible moral and political rectitude.

To these men should be entrusted the responsibility of our new Navy which, only by freeing itself from this rubbish, will be able to recover its efficiency, patriotic spirit, its true function in the life of the nation.

And this is urgent because our war must be fought with a keener enthusiasm, with a fiercer hatred of Nazism and Fascism: an enthusiasm and

And if that laxity alone is producing incidents, with what right may the regulations of discipline or the Naval penal code be invoked?

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And this is urgent because our war must be fought with a keener enthusiasm, with a fiercer hatred of Nazism and Fascism: an enthusiasm and hatred which the higher ups of the Navy have shown that they do not share.

Extract from Headquarters Allied Commission Public Relations Branch,
Daily Digest of Rome Press, for 24th January, 1945.

AVANTI (Socialist)

Another attack on the Navy. The vast majority are honest officers who have served their country well but there is a minority which needs attention from the epurators. It is bad enough that the "unmovable" De Courten is exploiting the support of the Allies to maintain himself "dictatorially" in his post; it is intolerable that this support be further extended to keep "unworthy and incapable people" in office. This is a matter for urgent attention as it affects the war effort, concludes Avanti.

Extract from Italian Theatre Headquarters Psychological Warfare Branch
Unit No. 12's Summary No. 46, Dated 14th December, 1944.

This divergence of views reached a climax when Scoccimaro asked Soleri, the Minister of the Treasury, and Admiral De Courten, the Navy Ministry to dismiss a large number of senior officials from their ministries. These two Ministers maintained that by dismissing all of those they would hamper the efficiency of their ministries, and consequently they only agreed to dismiss a few of the senior officials.

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4053

RECORDED

VISIT TO ITALIAN AIR MINISTER
JANUARY, 1945.

"24TH"

TOP SECRET

17

I visited the Air Ministry with Squadron Leader Morrow at 1600 hours. During a conversation with the Minister and General Aimone-Cat, I was informed that Colonel LUCA of the Carabinieri had been appointed to investigate the leakage of information to the Italian Press (Voce Repubblicana.) He had made considerable progress with his enquiries. It had been established that the leakage could not have taken place at the Air Ministry but took place either at the Epuration Tribunal or the Military Tribunal.

Colonel LUCA said that he thought he had the two people responsible, but that it required confirmation in order to make absolutely certain, and that this might take a further week or ten days. I agreed that provided the culprits were brought to justice, it would not matter how long it took.

The Minister then informed me that he, together with the Ministers of War and Marine, would see Prime Minister Bonomi Thursday the following day (25th), in an endeavour to get him to impose a proper military censorship and prevent the criticism of Serving Officers in the Press. I asked him to keep me in full touch with the progress of this matter as the Air Commander-in-Chief was seriously alarmed about it, and might be getting BACKED to impose a veto. In my view it would always be better if the Italians managed affairs of this sort themselves.

I passed this information to the D/A.C.C-in-C by signal the same evening.

W.A.B. - Bunsick.

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUNICKET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL.

25th January, 1945.

C.O.S.

I am attaching this, as it more or less completes the picture, up to date

WB

4652

AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION, AIRING COMMISSION, 1945
NONE.

TOP SECRET.

APSC/N/20/STPD INT.

25th January, 1945.

ATTACHES ON SERVING OFFICERS OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE
IN THE ITALIAN PRESS.

In accordance with the instructions of the Chief Commissioner, which he gave at this morning's Vice-President's Conference, to lay before you the case of the attacks made on Serving Officers of the I.A.F. in the Italian Press, I am giving you herewith a summary of events.

2. A good deal of this has already been reported, in writing, to the Chief Commissioner, and as these papers have doubtless been placed on your files, it would be a waste of time for me to go over the same ground again. The reports made by me to the Chief Commissioner are as follows:-

- (a) My letter APSC/N/20/STPD INT. of 15th January 1945, forwarding a translation of an article in the "Voce Repubblicana" attacking the Vice Chief-of-Staff at the Italian Air Ministry - Colonel REMONDINO.
- (b) My letter of same reference of 16th January 1945 forwarding a copy of a paragraph from a letter sent to me by Sir John Slessor.
- (c) On 24th January 1945 I gave the Chief Commissioner a translation of another article in the "Voce Repubblicana" of 21st January, also attacking Colonel REMONDINO. Later the same day I sent an Italian version of the same article to the High Commissioner, under cover of my letter of the same reference, dated 24th January 1945.
3. I am attaching herewith, as Appendix "A", a copy of some notes which I made to refresh my memory on the case, dated 16th January 1945.
4. Since 16th January, and until 21st January, the "Voce Repubblicana" has merely printed, with somewhat scurrilous comment, letters from General d'Aurelio denying what he was alleged to have said about Colonel REMONDINO.
5. On 21st January the same paper printed another particularly vicious attack on REMONDINO (para 2(c) above). I saw the Chief Commissioner first thing on the morning of the 24th January about this, and also spoke to Sir John Slessor on the telephone. The latter was of the opinion that something had to be done to stop this abuse of the freedom of the press, at once.

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Later the same day I saw the Air Minister and General Almondo Ost. I attach as Appendix "B" a record of my talk with them. In view of the proposed meeting with Prime Minister Bonomi today, I signalled to Sir John Slessor telling him of the meeting, and suggesting that any action he might have in hand to impose a veto by the Allies on these articles should be delayed until we saw whether the Ministers' representations were effective.

6. I shall be ready to discuss this matter with you at any time, and will place any further information which I have at your disposal.

7. We have information that further attacks are to be expected against other serving I.A.F. personnel. It is most important that these should be prevented. My personal view is that the Italian Government will be quite ineffective in stopping these articles, and that, however undesirable it may be, the sooner we step in with a veto from A.E.H.Q. the better.

CHIEF OF STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION,
ROME.

See Min.
15 + 16

R.A.B. BOWEN-BROOKS,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

W.B. B. B. B.

TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

On Sunday morning 14th January 1945 my attention was called to a large article on the first page of the Times newspaper which made a savage attack on the Italian Vice-Chief of Staff, Colonel MONTICELLI.

This attack is of a particularly cowardly nature, since it is known that Colonel MONTICELLI was, in fact, acting under Allied orders during the German occupation of Rome, but that this fact must not be publicly disclosed, partly for reasons of security, and partly because he has relations in Mussolini's Italy, who would undoubtedly be subjected to reprisals.

This particular paper has been noted for its vicious attacks on Air Force officers, but this article is of far greater importance than the comparatively small ones which have preceded it. The L/A.O. (Colonel), Air Marshal Sir John Macmillan, was in Rome at the time, and I showed him this article. He agreed with me that, particularly at the present time when the morale of the Italian Air Force is rather shaky, it is impossible to maintain order and discipline in an armed force when attacks of this nature are made in the Press.

The L/A.O. (Colonel) was returning to Caserta that afternoon, and hoped to see Mr. Macmillan, and would attempt to get something done to stop a recurrence of anything of this kind.

I also read the Public Relations Officer, Major Stelton, and asked if he had read the article. I later saw him in front of the L.O. building, and he told me that he could see no possible harm in the article. Unfortunately it is not he who is responsible for maintaining discipline in the Italian Air Force.

The article itself amounts to a brief for the prosecution of Colonel MONTICELLI before one or other of the Tribunals dealing with the Fascist or Collaborationist activities of Italian officers. It is clear that it is "an unimpeachable" job, and that the information must have come either from the Air Ministry, or from the staff of one of the Tribunals mentioned above.

The article has caused tremendous indignation within the Italian Air Ministry, but its effect on the morale of the Operational Group is not yet known. My Chief Intelligence Officer was visited throughout during the 14th and the following day by many officers of the Italian Air Force. Most of them were from one or other of the Intelligence Branches and were now above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. All of them were of the opinion that Colonel MONTICELLI was to blame for this article; this officer is the Italian Air Force representative on the High Commission for Spain, and would certainly be in a position to hand the information to the press. Although he was given a clean bill by the Intelligence Services at the time that this article was given, his appointment to the Tribunal, it is now known that he is a Sub-Commissioner, and that of a Civil

the article, and I showed him the article. He agreed with me that, particularly at the present time when the morale of the Italian Air Force is rather shaky, it is impossible to maintain order and discipline in an armed force when attacks of this nature are made in the press.

The U.S. Air Force was returning to Caserta that afternoon, and hoped to see Mr. Macmillan, and would attempt to get something done to stop a recurrence of anything of this kind.

I also saw the Public Relations Officer, Major Eddolls, and asked if he had read the article. I later saw him in front of the U.S. building, and he told me that he could see no possible harm in the article. Unfortunately it is not he who is responsible for maintaining discipline in the Italian Air Force.

The article itself amounts to a letter for the resignation of Colonel [redacted] before me or other of the [redacted] dealing with the [redacted] or Collaborationist activities of Italian Officers. It is clear that it is "an inside job", and that the information must have come either from the Air Ministry, or from the staff of one of the [redacted] mentioned above.

The article also caused tremendous indignation within the Italian Air Ministry, but its effect on the morale of the Constitutional Guard is not yet known. 7 Major Intelligence Officer was visited throughout during the 15th and the following day by many officers of the Italian Air Force. Most of them were from one or other of the Intelligence Branches and none was above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. All of them were of the opinion that [redacted] was to blame for this article; this officer is the Italian Air Force representative on the High Commission for Separation, and would certainly be in a position to have the information for the paper. Although he was given a clean bill by the Intelligence Services at the time that this Sub-Commission approved his appointment to the Tribunal, it is now known that he is a Communist and is described as "a fanatic". Coupled with his name was that of a chief servant [redacted], who was Secretary to U.S. [redacted], and had previously been taken on by the new Air Minister, U.S. [redacted].

The evidence against both these is of a somewhat circumstantial nature, and the further one gets into the case, the more circumstantial it becomes, and it is therefore necessary to proceed with some care. It is now not thought that [redacted] could have had anything to do with the article, although he undoubtedly knew that it was going to be published.

On the afternoon of January 15th I called General [redacted], the Chief of Air Staff to my office, and had a very frank talk with him. He said he did not know who had given the information to the paper and did not think that it was accurate in the Air Ministry. He did not think that [redacted] could have had access to the papers, but [redacted] certainly had. It seemed more probable to him that the leakage came from the High Commission for Separation. He said that he had been informed that it was going to be published, but the Director of the paper had promised that publication. It would be submitted to the Air Ministry for approval. During the course of our conversation he continuously said that this was the outcome of the way in which the Allies allowed separation to be carried out, and no-one was bound to do this, having in view the treatment of justice which were constituted under the [redacted] regime.

-2-

As seen as ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ left me a secret letter from the Security Division of the Allied Commission was brought in, a copy of which is attached. This concerns ~~GENERAL MACCARI~~, a member of the Mutation Committee, as being responsible for the spread of Communism in the Italian Air Force. It also states that the movement derives influence from the attitude of ~~GENERAL PLACENTINI~~, the late Minister for Air. It will be remembered that this sub-Commission has commented many times on ~~GENERAL PLACENTINI~~'s contacts with the Communists. During his period of office as Minister he was extremely foolish in the open way in which he paid court to the leading communists.

It is noteworthy that ~~MACCARI~~ in another version who might have had access to the documents which must have been used in the article in the Voice, and it is also noteworthy that he, and ~~CARONZONI~~, were appointed to their positions on the Tribunals under the eagle of ~~GENERAL PLACENTINI~~.

Later the same evening I saw the new Air Minister, ~~S.E. GALASSINO~~ - It was the first time I had met him. He expressed the greatest concern over the matter of the letter, and promised an immediate investigation. I did not go into the affair in any great detail with him, although I did say that we had our suspicions about ~~CARONZONI~~. He also confirmed that the Director of the Voice Repubblica had promised that the article would not be published until it had been submitted to the Air Ministry.

At the moment my Intelligence Staff is sifting the evidence which has so far come to light, a matter of some difficulty as they have interviewed a very large number of people during the last 48 hours. Investigations are being perused, and it is hoped that some more substantial proofs of the authorship of this article will shortly come to light.

16th January, 1945.

W.G.B. v. B. v. B.

A.W.B.

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and it is hoped that some more substantial proofs of the authorship of this article
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16th January, 1945.

W.G.B. Bunsell

A.M.

4049

TOP SECRET

RECORD OF VISIT TO ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY ON 24TH JANUARY, 1945.

Confidential

and Generalissimo Cat.

I visited the Air Ministry with Squadron Leader Morrow at 1600 hours. During a conversation with the Minister I was informed that Colonel DIKA of the Carabinieri had been appointed to investigate the leakage of information to the Italian Press (Voco Repubblica). He had made considerable progress with his enquiries. It had been established that the leakage could not have taken place at the Air Ministry but took place either at the Expiration Tribunal or the Military Tribunal.

Colonel DIKA said that he thought he had the two people responsible, but that it required confirmation in order to make absolutely certain, and that this might take a further week or ten days. I agreed that provided the culprits were brought to justice, it would not matter how long it took.

The Minister then informed me that he, together with the Ministers of War and Marine, would see Prime Minister Bonomi Thursday the following day (25th.) in an endeavour to get him to impose a proper military censorship and prevent the criticism of Serving Officers in the press. I asked him to keep me in full touch with the progress of this matter as the Air Commander-in-Chief was seriously alarmed about it, and might be getting SACRED to impose a veto. In my view it would always be better if the Italians managed affairs of this sort themselves.

I passed this information to the D/A.C.C.-in-C by signal the same evening.

Following this visit I saw General GATTA with General ALMOND-CAT. It was agreed that it was unnecessary to send a General Officer to Sardinia as affairs there were so near completion, and a new man would only disrupt matters. General GATTA could, by means of occasional visits from Bari, finish off affairs in Sardinia quite easily.

General GATTA referred to the graft which was going on in Sardinia quoting Colonel MARTINI of the I.A.F. and Lieutenant STEIN an American. I agreed to send over my American Officer when General GATTA next visits Sardinia, in order to investigate the matter.

25. January, 1945.

W.E.B. Bennett

W.M.

COPY.

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO : ADMIRAL ELLERY W. STONE,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 24TH JANUARY 1945.

REF : A-SC/R/20/SPNS INT.

(English translation only)
Herewith the Italian version of the attack on REMONDINO in
the Voce Repubblicana of January 21st.

(Sgd) W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

CARRIAGES AND KINGS.

The analysis of the Remondino case has created a great buzzing in the military bureaucratic camp, rotating round the axis of opinion.

What alarms, mobilization of defense reserves, speculations and what not.

In the scramble to defend, by Italians and non Italians, there is an effort to repair the breach in the ranks of the Monarchists caused by a surprise action.

They didn't expect that one.

The scene of silence they thought to have created around the person of one of the prototypes of the double game was suddenly subjected to the light of day.

They counted profoundly on the subtle comprehension of the Military Tribunal, in which composed and austere isolation it would have been possible to have wangled a fait accompli, saving the face of (the King) and in doing so saving the faces of the underlings automatically and with convenience.

It is incomprehensible however, that Remondino did not think that at least some of his associates would be sacrificed and muddled by the Id. General's decree of July 44.

No. He wanted to play his cards for all they were worth, strong in the protection of the Monarchy and a small coterie of fortune's favourites and by the latitude of his place of residence.

His escort of parasites was numerous, and grew between Sept. 8th 43 and June 44. It cannot therefore be excluded that, exactly on the 4th of June, at eight in the morning, somebody bolted into a rabbit hole by way of Viale Castro Pretorio, under the noses of American tanks, to ask whether they really were allies - whether they really intended to stay in Rome! One never knows does one? In October 43 the big shots and their underlings changed flags pronto in order to secure a bi-lingual certificate for their pockets, and in December they made ready to hop off. Some-where about that time they swore to Remondino, who had been to Passano and who had returned to create the set-up of a double game with the Musco-Santini radio station and make contact with General Capra. General Capra - only in December he it remembered - took advantage of information from the open city, connected up the bands that had been operative since September and October inside and outside the Roman walls, placing them under the command of himself and other generals and making provisional arrangements for assistance, without which a large part of the courageous and faithful airmen would have died of starvation and demoralization.

What was Remondino doing? He assisted those who had made over to the King's government in various ways, or who had catered this way and that in search of employment with the republicans.

He attached himself to the others, for he thought they too compromised

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No. He wanted to play his cards for all they were worth, strong in the protection of the Monarchy and a small coterie of fortune's favourites and by the latitude of his place of residence.

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What was Remondino doing? He assisted those who had made over to the King's government in various ways, or who had countered this way and that in search of employment with the republicans.

He attached no importance to the others, for he thought them too compromised and sought-after by the SS because they had remained indifferent and deaf to all appeals and threats and because they did not seek evasion in convalescent leave or clinics; because they faced things in the streets alongside the partisans of whatever political creed who risked their lives and did not do any acrobatics in the shape of double games.

But what was Remondino's game from December to December? He was close to Gen. Uffend in order to save himself in the first sad days and to justify his failure to leave Sardinia: he was the under secretary of Botto, to play a double game for both; he was with the Republican under secretary Tessari, the so called "ferocious Saladin" for the spoliation of offices and stores; he was with Gen. Lombard in order to obey all the orders of Berselrin, and, finally, he was in contact with Gen. Cappa in order to put himself in the right for the future.

-2-

(8)
To us, enemies of the too-intelligent and the Mac wellian and friends of courageous decision in face of any risk, it would have been pleasant to have had a Remondino of sincerity who would have spoken to us thus -

"Dear friends - I am a good chap, just as you are. I have a family, and I want to stay with them. To do so I will abandon to their fate the units in Sardinia, who, after all are quite well off and can get along without me. But I am scared pink that I might lose everything, perhaps my life, and with it the rank of Colonel, which I have gained with such ease by means of my smooth tongue and one or two gambles of a fortunate nature along the way. Everything has gone jolly well for me and I don't want to bust things up by doing anything rash. So as to save myself I shall hang up my hat here, with a pretty comfortable income, plenty of good food, a car for running around, and a corps of yes-men admirers under my thumb which I can count upon after having paid them, fed them, protected them from every present and future inconvenience by means of my certificates in various languages - German, North Italian, South Italian and - well, why not say it? - English. If those of the North return again I shall be O.K. If those of the South come North I shall be OK just the same.

But for you there is no salvation. Either you take a chance with the Republicans or you get out and fend for yourselves. But be careful of your step, of the guns of the PAI and the SS, the Posse Ardeatine; and if you have not enough to eat, then resist, resist and resist - for the honour of the IAP".

Remondino did not speak those words but he acted them.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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4043

COPY.

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO : ADMIRAL KILBRY W. STONE,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

DATE: 16TH JANUARY 1945.

REF : AFSC/R/20/STEC DNE.

TOP SECRET.

Attached is a copy of a paragraph from a letter which I received this morning from Sir John Slessor.

2. I have already notified you of the article in the Voce Repubblicana. The case now divides itself into two:

(a) To find who was responsible for the leakage of information disclosed by the article.

(b) To stop the attacks in the press, on serving Officers.

3. As regards 2(a) this is a very complicated and rather delicate matter, but I hope to let you have an interim report on reports very shortly.

4. As regards 2(b), Sir John told me, when he left Rome, to leave the matter to him to settle. From the attached you will see that the onus is now on us again. A translation of the article was sent to you with my original report.

5. I understand I am seeing you about this at 1800 hours this evening.

(Sgt) W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

(6)

Paragraph from letter from Sir John Slessor:

" As regards the newspaper article, Mr. Macmillan is inclined to think that we might get the Italian Government to take some action in this matter, because it is definitely one which affects the military efficiency and morale of the Italian Air Force which is fighting with us against the Germans. He wishes you to have the article translated and, again in the first instance, to consult the Chief Commissioner on the action taken. You mentioned the possibility of getting the Italians to establish their own censorship to deal with this sort of thing, though I am in some doubt as to whether that would be much good. But I think the line we should stand on is that the Italian Government should make it clear that they will not tolerate this sort of personal attack in the Press upon serving officers of the Italian Forces, because that is a military matter as affecting military efficiency.

I understand Mr. Macmillan will be back in Rome on Sunday and you will probably have had time to do so preliminary exploration of both these points in conjunction with the Chief Commissioner before he returns.

See (7)

COPY

FROM: AIR FORCES 8 COMMISSIONER
ALLIED COMML. CH. WORE.

TO: ADMIRAL ELBERT W. STONE, U.S.N.R.,
CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION, WORE.

DATE: 15TH JANUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/3/20/5280 INT.

TOP SECRET.

Confidential

Attached herewith is a translation of an article which appeared in yesterday morning's issue of the *Voce Repubblicana*.

2. By a stroke of fortune the Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Slessor, was in Rome yesterday. He views this sort of thing with the very gravest concern, as it is obviously quite impossible to maintain order and discipline in an Armed Force when articles of this kind, directed against serving Officers in high positions, are allowed to appear in the Public Press. Sir John went back to Caserta yesterday afternoon and hoped to see Mr. Macmillan, but I have not yet heard that he has done so. His intention was to ask SACRED to issue an order prohibiting articles containing criticisms of serving Officers, on the grounds that these are prejudicial to the war effort.

3. The article really amounts to the brief for the Prosecution against Remondino, before the Commission for Sanctions against Fascism or the Military Tribunal. It is scandalous that an article of this sort, containing information which can only be obtainable within the Air Ministry, should reach the press. In fact it is quite obvious that it is "an inside job".

4. One of the more serious aspects of this is that it is a fact that Remondino was risking his life under the direct orders of the Allies, who had ordered him to join the Germans and create as much confusion as possible, while submitting information to us. At present this fact cannot be publicly disclosed, the more so as Remondino's relatives are in the North, and undoubtedly reprisals would be taken against them.

5. My Intelligence Staff are convinced that they know who is responsible for this, and so far have produced a certain amount of circumstantial evidence; direct evidence would, of course, be almost impossible to get. The individuals we consider responsible are a certain Colonel CAPREZZONE, and a Civil Servant called BUCCHIANI. Both are employed in the Air Ministry, and CAPREZZONE is Air Force Liaison Officer to the Expedition Commission. We have known for some time that it has been the avowed intention of these two to disrupt the Italian Air Force. This article is the first of a series which the *Voce Repubblicana* intends to publish, dealing with other Senior Officers of the Air Force.

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6. I have not yet paid my official call on the new Air Minister, but through the Chief of Staff I have sent him a message asking him to investigate this matter at once, and if he is satisfied that these individuals are responsible, he is to dismiss them at once. If he will not do so, I intend to step in and order him to do so; this step has the full approval of Sir John Slazenger.

7. I do not wish to be precipitate in this matter, but it is essential that action should be taken as soon as possible. The morale of the Operational crews is already badly shaken by the departure of General Piacentini, and we know that Remondino is held in the highest esteem by them, and that even this article may cause a collapse in morale in the Air Force.

(SOD).

W.A.B. BOWEN-MUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL.

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

THE FAVORITES OF THE MONARCHY.

COL. MONTEINO DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE.

Remondino denounced to the High Commissioner.

On the basis of a number of unquestionable documents in November 1944 the High Commissioner for Sanctions against Fascism deferred Col. Aldo Remondino, who is at present Deputy Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force, to the Military Tribunal of Rome for having committed the crimes contemplated in article 5 of the defascising laws.

The denunciation was drafted as follows :

"On September 8th, 1943 Col. Pilot Aldo Remondino was Commanding Officer of the Fighter Wing of Sardinia which was acting in collaboration with squadrons of the 51st Fighter Group. At that time a group of aircraft of the above Wing, comprising a reduced number of personnel, was at Poligno for re-equipment.

On September 6th 1943 Col. Remondino left for Rome on official duty and landed at Ciampino Sud A/D where his plane was parked. On the evening of the 8th, having already carried out his mission, he heard of the Armistice.

It was his duty to return to his post immediately, and in consideration of the important task which he should have performed in that very critical and delicate crisis with his Fighter Wing, he should have used whatever means possible to reach his operational base.

It is known that Ciampino Sud A/D was occupied by the Germans on the evening of September 10th at 2300 hours, he therefore had two days' time to leave by the same means he had arrived by. Further, the other A/Ds in the vicinity only fell under the actual control of the Germans between the 15th and the 16th of September. This is proved by the fact that :

(a) Major Modi left the Urbe A/D on September 14th;

(a) Major Casini left Litteria together with the whole garrison of that A/D on September 12th.

(c) Col. Cigera left Perugia A/D with 36 aircraft on September 14th.

As it was not necessary for him to reach his post by means of his own plane, he could easily have used any aircraft parked in the above A/D which contained a considerable number. Col. Giuseppe Bordini, Commanding Officer of the Corsica A/D, acted on those lines. He was also in Rome at the time, and on the morning of September 9th he went to Centocelle A/D, took the first plane he could get hold of, and reached his post in Corsica.

In his memorandum, Col. Remondino himself states that immediately after the declaration of Armistice, five planes of his Wing left for Sardinia under the orders of Captain Spagnuolo. Why did he not feel that it was his duty to go too?

He made no effort to leave either by land or air. His honour as a soldier, Commanding Officer of a Group which was on the other side of the lines,

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He made no effort to leave either by land or air. His honour as a soldier, Commanding Officer of a Group which was on the other side of the lines, required that he cross the lines, even if he had to do so by foot, as many others did.

It must therefore be assumed that Col. Remondino failed to leave because he had decided not to take up a position hostile to the Germans. Evidence of his mental outlook on this subject is given by:

- his having taken part as a volunteer in the Spanish war, where he fought two years for the defence "of the high ideals of fascism" as indicated in the motivation of a silver medal awarded to him on this occasion.

- Gen Vincenzo d'Aurelio - I.A.F. - Ministry Rome, who was his Commanding Officer for some time, can testify as to his Germanophile and fascist sentiments, which he often displayed in a sectarian manner.

Remondino at the Orders of Fascism.

It is also known that a few days after armistice Remondino made contacts with the Fascist Air Force Authorities of Rome, and as soon as the organisation of the

3
Republican Air Force was initiated, he began to collaborate under the new minister
etio.

Confidential

This activity is proved:

- a) By the above named Gen. D'Aurelio who, before crossing the lines to reach the Royal Government was in Rome and by means of reliable sources was informed of everything that took place in the Roman Air Force circles.
- b) By a circulation permit issued to Remondino by the Nazi/Gascon authorities on October 13th 1943.
- c) By Remondino's own admissions in the above mentioned memorandum.

Remondino served in the Republican Air Force up to the 5th of June 1944.

An examination of the documents of the case proves that:

there is no evidence that Remondino, before joining the Republican Air Force, was authorized to do so by the Royal Government or by the Committee of National Liberation.

On the other hand there is evidence, by his own admissions, that his adhesion was spontaneous. He now justifies this adhesion by saying that he meant to serve the cause, but it is obvious to all that this is a childish excuse, for to serve the National cause he had but to do his duty by returning to his Unit.

The contacts he had with Lt/Col. Musco and Major Santini, his inferiors, during the period in which he approached the new republican Air Minister, Botto, do not mean anything; these two officers had no contact at the time with the Royal Government and could not therefore but give egoistical and interested advice as they too had joined the Command of the Open City of Rome under the orders of the Nazis.

The first evidence of an official request by Remondino to the Royal Government for authorization to play a double game is a cable dated February 15th 1944, i.e. after the consolidation of the Allied bridgehead at Anzio, and that authorization was issued on February 20th 1944.

In the above mentioned memorandum Remondino, in order to justify his attitude, mentions a programme that he intended to carry out in the interest of the National cause, but does not clearly specify the nature of same. Briefly, this programme can be summarized in the contents of page 4 on the following lines:

- (a) the assistance due to families of fallen, missing and P.O.Ws. was to be continued and encouraged;
- (b) all military personnel who actually or subsequently was in the territory depending from the Royal Government, was to be considered P.O.W. and assistance was to be afforded to their families;

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In the above mentioned memorandum Remondino, in order to justify his attitude, mentions a programme that he intended to carry out in the interest of the National cause, but does not clearly specify the nature of same. Briefly, this programme can be summarized in the contents of page 4 on the following lines:

- (a) the assistance due to families of fallen, missing and P.O.Ws. was to be continued and encouraged;
- (b) all military personnel who actually or subsequently was in the territory depending from the Royal Government, was to be considered P.O.W. and assistance was to be afforded to their families;
- (c) Military and Civilian personnel of the Air Ministry, either mutilated, wounded, invalided or convalescent, following war or service causes, were to be amply assisted.
- (d) a partial administrative liquidation of the supplies to the R. Aeronautica was to be effected (for this reason he was also provided with a Power of Attorney);
- (e) he was to take charge of de-requisitioning and effect the administrative liquidations relating to same;
- (f) a line of conduct with a view to safeguarding the estates and property of the R. Aeronautica actually in Rome.
- (g) a method of treatment was to be devised for the Personnel of the R. Aeronautica who would refuse to join the Republicans;
- (h) the property and goods belonging to Firms and Institutes relating to or in touch with the Air Force were to be safeguarded
- (i) the activities of the C.M.F.A. and the A.N.P.C.A.M.V. were to be continued and encouraged.

On this subject it is to be observed that

- (1) With regard to para (a) (b) and (c) the Republican Ministry of National Defense made a number of decrees covering all forms of assistance for the families of absent military personnel, therefore Remondino's activity in this field was superfluous (see enclosure B Circular Ministry National Defense No. 910 of November 20th 1943).
- (2) With regard to para (d) it is not clear what connection there is between the National cause and the suppliers of the Regia Aeronautica, who had many other ways of getting their credits acknowledged.
- (3) The same be said with regard to de-requisitioning - para (e).
- (4) Para (f). It appears that nothing was done to safeguard the property of the Air Force, for it was possible (impossible?) to remove the estates, and the movable property, as proved by enclosure F and G, were anything but safeguarded by Remondino.
- (5) With regard to para (g) it is remarked that the goods and liquid funds of the various institutes depending from the Air Force were not safeguarded at all, as everything possible was carried North.
- (6) The activities of the O.N.F.A. and the A.N.G.A.M.V. could not have been subject to charges.

Nothing in favour of the National Cause.

From the above it is clear that Remondino's activity in favour of the National cause was nil, with the exception of some sporadic information of military character casually supplied to some patriot who managed to extort it from him, and even this information was only supplied in the later days when there was no longer any doubt on the adverse fate of the fascist arms.

On the other hand it is quite clear that

- in those Air Force circles which never would have anything to do with the authorities, Remondino was considered a hostile element, dangerous to non-collaborationists.
- he persuaded much personnel to go North.
- he presided the ceremonies of taking the oath for the Republic which were performed in Rome, and took part in public manifestations representing the Republican Air Ministry (La Tribuna 11th December 1943).

Remondino never belonged to the Gladio Front. These members of the Front who were in charge of its records testify in this sense, and it can be also gathered from a perusal of his memorandum, in which he never mentions this fact. He never boasted of having done so either, until November 1944, that is, five months after the liberation of Rome, and during the latter period there was no reason to justify this reserve on his part.

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- (6) The activities of the D.N.F.A. and the A.M.C.A.M.V. could not have been subject to charges.

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Remondino never belonged to the Clandestine Front. Those members of the Front who were in charge of its records testify in this sense, and it can be also gathered from a perusal of his memorandum, in which he never mentions this fact. He never boasted of having done so either, until November 1944, that is, five months after the liberation of Rome, and during the latter period there was no reason to justify this reserve on his part.

At present, following the proceedings taken up against Remondino, a Committee of the Clandestine Front has made a statement declaring that Remondino was a member of the same from November 1st 1943 on, but in enclosure N, issued by an Officer who was in charge of the records of the Clandestine Front and who took part in all the clandestine movement during the Nazi/Fascist domination, it is stated that this admission is completely false.

From the above it can be understood that Remondino :

- failed in his loyalty to the State and in his military honour for not having reached or attempted to reach his unit in his Country's most critical period.
- enlisted in the armed forces of the enemies of his Country collaborating actively in their field.
- induced by persuasion and threats military personnel to take the oath of loyalty to the Republic and go North.
- by his activity facilitated the transfer North of a greater part of the movable property.

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Apart from the fact that he was a legionary in Spain and a convinced
Germanophile, the following sentence uttered by Remondini in the presence of a
senior Air Force Officer, who had turned to him for advice, can give an idea of
his moral character. He said: "They are both enemies, but at least with those
we eat."

These are the results of the incipient. In spite of this Remondini is
being saved. Instead of being arrested he is protected by all the military
monarchist caste.

Translation from the "Voz Republicana,"
Sunday 14th January 1945.

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