

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/173
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/109/173
(VOL. I)

ADMINISTRATION, NW ITALY
AUG. - NOV. 1944

1196

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.2 NND: Not

CONFIDENTIAL

503/COS

TOP SECRET

Proposed
Sullivan

10/2/77

CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATION

NW ITALY

SEE FILE 527/COS OPERATION CINDERS

VOL I.

(CLOSED)

ADMINISTRATION

NW ITALY

SEE FILE 527/COB OPERATION CINDERS

VOL I.
(CLOSED)

4089 4716

109 173

THIS FOLDER CONTAINS PAPERS	
FROM	ALL
TO	ALL
CATALOGUE	

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

1197

cos / 66 on trans. to lead.
 11
 17/11

74

E.O.S.

Reference memorandum from Major-General S. W. H. L. on the recognition of the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy by the Supreme Allied Command and the Italian Government, which it is proposed to discuss at the Political Meeting tomorrow, the following papers on this file are of interest.

1. At B Thin HQ proposal to HQ AAI, paragraph 8.
2. At A Letter from C-5, referring to the previous letter, and forwarding extracts of a memorandum from the Resident Minister.
3. At C A final directive issued to SOE officers in the field.

Don Shipp letter
 C.S.O.
 to C.O.S.

20 Nov 44.

17

Discussed with CC Acting Pres rfd Sec in line 1176

Memo written by Chief of Staff.

Matter will come up at Supreme PA meeting today when the Res Dir will recommend Sub Committee to set up to consider matter.

All papers with CC

17/11

Chief Commissioner

of the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy by the Supreme Allied Command and the Italian Government, which it is proposed to discuss at the Political Meeting tomorrow, the following papers on this file are of interest.

1. At B This HQ proposal to HQ AAI, paragraph 8.
2. At A Letter from G-5, referring to the previous letter, and forwarding extracts of a memorandum from the Resident Minister.
3. At C A final directive issued to SAI officers in the field.

20 Nov 44.

W. G. P. 10/22

*C.S.O.
to C.O.S.*

IT

Discussed with CC Acting Pres rPN Sec on 6.12.44

Memos written by Chief of Staff.

Notice will come up at Sacme's PDI meeting today

when Staff Res. Dir. will recommend S.O. Committee be set up to consider matter.

All papers with CC

18

Chief Commissioners

Would you care to place summary the result of Sacme's meeting in the subject? Mr. P. P. P.

86

CoS

*Please see 84 which approves draft at 69.
See also 83 copy of which has gone to Piemonte Region
+ CA Sec AAI.*

28/4

G. Harder Cpt

CC 189

47

DecAO

Ref 33 Col would like you to redraft this and submit to him an agreed version with STAO and Fifth Army.

W. Gipp 1967
Cdo

18.10.44

Col

55

Ref 33 Col Mearns has taken draft to DAI for final approval. 2 spare copies are in back of file.

Ref 34 Do you require any further action on this or to
✓ DCC to handling? No, Minutes will come in (see 551st)

W. Gipp

23/10

No action on it 55
W. Gipp

23/10

61

Col

Col Mearns handed me to this evening and said he had no objection to Smith's proposed para 4 as he had an agreement with the Home but he would call the Regional Teams forward at his earliest moment and that they would get into their region about as soon as Army Arrives. In view of this I think para 4 is quite in order and recommend that the draft be approved.

2 You might like to talk to DCCAO before he leaves for ARA in the morning

23/10

I agree. W. Gipp

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

1. C.S.O.

P.84 Wm AFHQ & then send copy of AAT letter

M/sep

2. C.S.O.

P.81 Ask Deos to report what action has been
taken & to send me copy of ref. M/sepdone - 522/117
cut. 1/2

NOTE - MISSING FOLIOS put on a New filed 527/COO Operation CINDERS

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017Ref: 241/46/20629 November 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Plebiscite, Lombardy and Liguria.

TO : APTL.

1. With reference to our letter 5/3/44 dated 13 November 1944 to APTL, copy to you, the draft plan enclosed therefore is agreed to by APTL.
2. A copy of APTL letter 16/1/44 (2/44) dated 26 November 1944 is attached for information.

For The Chief Constable

Deputy,
Chief of Staff.

Encl.

4173

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SUBJECT: Assassination of President, Ambassador and Legation.

TO: 1. ADM.

64

1. With reference to our letter of 2/27/64 dated 13 November 1964 to ALL, copy to you, the draft plan mentioned therein is copied to by ALL.

2. A copy of ALL letter 16/1/64 (copy) dated 26 November 1964 is attached for information.

814

For the Chief Consular Officer

Signature,
Chief of Staff.

Encl.

4173

11/1/64

CONFIDENTIAL

1204

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

~~SECRET~~

503 4 NOV 12

FI 60419
NOV 30 1100A

0/2330
NOV 30 1310A
URGENT

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED WILSON CITE FHCAO
TO: HQ ALCOM FOR STONE, AFIRS (RAAC) FOR CURRY, MAIN AAI FOR ROBERTSON

20 NOV Recd

~~SECRET~~

Ref FREEDOM FI 59404 of 28 November.

Confirming conversations CAO AFHQ, CAO AAI, Chief Commissioner AC, Italian Board Meeting and north west ITALY meeting are postponed sine die. New date will be notified later. AFIRS to notify all concerned that Industrial Coordination Committee Meeting will take place 0600 hours 2 December as arranged.

Dist

Action - Econ Sec (3)
Info - S O to Chief Commissioner
C O S (2)
File



4172

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735017

Confirming conversations CAO AFHQ, CAO AAI, Chief Commissioner AC.
Italian Board Meeting and north west ITALY meeting are postponed sine
die. New date will be notified later. AFHQ to notify all concerned
that Industrial Coordination Committee Meeting will take place 1800
hours 2 December as arranged.

Dist

Action - Econ Sec (3)
Info - S O to Chief Commissioner
C o S (2)
File

4172

Action copy on file 4012/CAS

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

1 2 0 4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

103

File

7313(7313)

(4)

PRIORITY

29

AFHQ

TO: AFHQ

7313

29 Nov 44

PRIORITY

(9)

(7)

~~SECRET~~ PD

SUBJECT IS OUTLINE PLAN AND OPERATION INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN FIVE
 OF FOUR D VOUCHER AS SUBMITTED BY HQ AAF AND DRAFT OF AAF ADMINISTRATION
 AS PER OUR FILE FIVE ALSO THREE BLANK SIX SEVEN BLANK ONE OF ONE THREE
 REVERSE TO AAF COPY TO YOU AAF LETTER ONE SIX BLANK ONE BLANK O FIVE
 ONE PART OF TWO SIX NOVEMBER REVERSE PD COPY BEING SENT YOU TODAY PD
REPLY TO AAF FROM AAF FROM LHM PART
 REQUEST INFORMATION AS TO STATUS OF APPROVAL PD

Major L. W. STEARNS

4171

Chief of Staff.

Sec. 300.

See 120

NICHOLAS W. BRADSHAW,
MAJOR, AGO,
ADJUTANT.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

503

Ref. 4012/28/COS.

Tel. 451

30 November 1944

SUBJECT : Cancellation of Meeting.
for North West Italy.

TO : D303, Civil Affairs Section
D303, Economic Section.

1. The special meeting (see our reference 4012/27/COS of 30 Nov 44)
called for 1430 hours Saturday, 2 Dec 44, has been cancelled.

Lt Oden

Chief Staff Officer,
to the Chief of Staff.

Copy to : Major Quayle
HQ Comptant.

4170

Copy to file 503/COS

503

97

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff.

Tel : 451.

30 November 1944.

Ref. 4012/27/COS.

SUBJECT : Special Meeting - Planning
for north west Italy.

TO : DCOB, Civil Affairs Section
DCCB, Economic Section

1. AFHQ have called a special meeting, as above, for 1430 hours, Saturday, 2 Dec 44, under the chairmanship GAO, AFHQ.
2. The meeting will be held in the main conference room AC HQ.
3. The agenda has not yet been received but will be distributed promptly after arrival.
4. The DCS requests the attendance of Brig Upjohn, Mr. Antolini and Mr. Cleveland.

Capt. Odor

Chief Staff Officer
To the Chief of Staff.

Copy to : Major Quarle
HQ Commandant.

Copy to file 503/COS

4169

CONFIDENTIAL

29 November 1944.

REF: 203/214/203

SUBJECT: Administration of Ploetzville, Lacharby and Lacharby.

TO : APP.

1. Reference cable N. 7313 sent to you 10-10-44, attached
is copy of LBI letter 16/1/44 (203) dated 29 November 1944, for
information.

84

For The Chief Commissioner

Brigadier,
Office of Staff.

Encl.

SUBJECT: Administration of Medicine, Laboratory and Supplies.

TO: 1 AME.

1. Reference cable 11-1313 sent to you today, attached is copy of AME letter 15/1/62 (copy) dated 15 November 1962 for information.

84

For The Chief Commanders

Belgian,
Chief of Staff.

Ref.

4168

FX 59400
NOV 28 12 54

~~SECRET~~

503, 4012 + 4005.

(90)
C/2165
Nov 28 14 54
PRIORITY

FROM : AFHQ STATED WILSON

CITE : FHCAG

TO : ACTION : MAIN AAI FOR CAG, HQ ALCON FOR STONE, AFLRS ROME

28 NOV 1954

~~SECRET~~ **CONFIDENTIAL**

1. Programme meetings ~~SECRET~~ Allied Commission, AFHQ and AAI will now all now all be on Saturday 2 December Industrial Coordination Committee 0900 hrs AFLR board 1100 hrs special meeting planning for north west ITALY 1430 hrs under chairmanship CAG, AFHQ.

2. For last following requested to attend additional to Reps AFHQ. Reps Allied Commission. CAG AAI and/or Reps. Papers follow. Allied Commission please arrange room and notify concerned at board meeting.

Dist

Action - Xon Sec (3)
Info - S.O. to Chief Commissioner
- C o S (2)
- File.

*Copies to file 4012/COS AFLR(1) O Ind Coordination Com.
4005/COS AFLR(1) B.*

~~SECRET~~

410.

000000

SUBJECT: Handling of Civilian Supplies.

APR 1944 For attention G-4
" - G-4 (Mov & Trn)

Copy to: - G-4
Q. Mov
Trn(A)
DOCMO

SECRET
HQ AFED ARMS IN ITALY
Tele No: - FILPOT 4
1033/L/Q
26 Nov 44

1. At a meeting held on 18 Nov to bid for tonnage into the ports of ANCONA and LEGHORN, the following bids were placed:-

LEGHORN 7,935 tpd against a capacity of 7,500 tpd
ANCONA 3,250 " " " 4,000 "

Included in the above AO had bid for civil supplies at 850 tpd into LEGHORN and 50 tpd into ANCONA.

2. It is understood that the requirement for feeding the civil population in the area FLORENCE - LEGHORN, i.e. south of the Apennines, amounts to 460 tpd and that the balance of the shipments into LEGHORN are intended for the area of the Po Valley. As the full rail capacity over the Apennines will be required for the maintenance of the FIFTH ARMY it will be necessary to employ road transport to move these civil supplies forward. Owing to shortage of MT and the condition of roads over the mountains in Winter this will be an undertaking of considerable difficulty.

3. To overcome the movement problems it is recommended that supplies destined for the area north of the Apennines should be accepted through ANCONA. By this means the spare capacity at ANCONA could be taken up and the demands on LEGHORN correspondingly reduced. Moreover the road approaches from ANCONA into the PO Valley are not liable to interruptions due to the weather to the same extent as those over the mountains.

4. It is understood that shortage of storage space in the ANCONA area would make it impossible to hold large quantities of civil supplies in that area. It is therefore recommended that requirements for the area North of the Apennines should be discharged in a Southern Italian port, e.g. NAPLES. In Southern Italy the supplies could be stored and moved forward when required either by rail into the Po Valley or by sea through ANCONA. It is considered that this policy should be adopted with the supplies due into Italy during the period 17 - 26 Dec.

Sgt A. L. HARRIS, Brig Gen
for General,
Commander-in-Chief.

SECRET

Civil Affairs Section,

that the balance of the shipments into ISECHORN are intended for the area of the Po Valley. As the full rail capacity over the Appennines will be required for the maintenance of the RIFTH AAI it will be necessary to employ road transport to move these civil supplies forward. Owing to shortage of fuel and the condition of roads over the mountains in winter this will be an undertaking of considerable difficulty.

3. To overcome the movement problems it is recommended that supplies destined for the area north of the Appennines should be accepted through ANCONA. By this means the spare capacity at ANCONA could be taken up and the demands on ISECHORN correspondingly reduced. Moreover the road approaches from ANCONA into the PO Valley are not liable to interruptions due to the weather to the same extent as those over the mountains.

4. It is understood that shortage of storage space in the ANCONA area would make it impossible to hold large quantities of civil supplies in that area. It is therefore recommended that requirements for the area North of the Appennines should be discharged in a Southern Italian port, e.g. NAPLES. In Southern Italy the supplies could be stored and moved forward when required either by rail into the Po Valley or by sea through ANCONA. It is considered that this policy should be adopted with the supplies due into Italy during the period 17 - 26 Dec.

Sgt A. L. HARMEN, Brig Gen
for General,
Commander-in-Chief.

.....

Subject:- Handling of Civil Supplies

SECRET
Civil Affairs Section,
HQ Allied Armies in Italy, 100
TEL: FILPOT 56

To:- HQ Allied Commission
(Att: Food Sub-Commission)

S/14/DOCAO
27 Nov 44

1. Further to S/14/DOCAO, dated 19th November, copy of 1033/I/Q dated 26th November from AAI to AFHQ is forwarded to be read in conjunction with the former.
2. In view of the concrete request now made in para 4 of the AAI letter of the 26th, could early consideration be given to DOCAO letter of the 19th and a reply made.

Copies to:

- Chief of Staff, A.C.
- Zoonomic Section, A.C.
- Transportation Sub-Comm., A.C.
- Q (Maint) AAI
- Q (Movements) AAI
- AMG 5 Army
- AMG 8 Army
- HQ Toscana Region (EAS)
- File 7/5.4
- File 3/6

124
T. NEDIAN STEWARD,
Lt. Colonel, RASC,
for DOCAO

SUBJECT: Administration of Piedmonte,
Lombardy and Liguria.

4250
84
~~TOP~~
~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL
Recd
Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/1/G(Ops)

26 Nov '44.

69
Allied Commission.

1. Your final draft for the administration of Piedmonte, Lombardy and Liguria as submitted in your 503/67/OCS of 13 Nov is agreed.
2. A copy of the directive to Commander 2 PARA BDE for operation 'CINDERS' is attached for your information. An outline plan for this operation has been submitted to AFHQ, but has not as yet been approved by them.

PDM/cob.

By J. H. H. H.
Lieut-General, US
Chief of General Staff.

Subject:- Maintenance, Northern Italy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Civil Affairs Section,
HQ Allied Armies in Italy
TEL: PIRLOT 56

To:- HQ Allied Commission
(For Food Sub-Commission)

S/14/DOOAO
19 Nov 44

1. "Q" Maintenance AAI, have raised the question of maintaining areas forward of the present line when the advance comes. Particularly, they have pointed out that with the advance of the Fifth Army, the call upon the limited rail facilities through the Apennines to Bologna and the north west provinces, may give rise to difficulty in phasing forward stocks now being accumulated in Leghorn and Florence. The present programme is set out in the AC series 40-7/Food.

2. In this latter, a four months programme was set up to cover commitments to a line roughly from the northern boundary of Liguria along the line of the river to the Po estuary. This to be set up through the ports of Leghorn and Ancona with an appreciably heavier target figure at Leghorn than at Ancona. It was anticipated that supplies for the areas north of this line would go through Genoa and Venice when these ports were opened. It is not known here whether this plan was drawn up in consultation with "Q" Movements and agreed to by them as to rail and port acceptances on the long term policy; but it seems now desirable to review it in the light of the request from "Q" Maintenance.

3. In a reconsideration of the plan the following points arise-

a. It might be possible to ship by coaster or schooner from Leghorn through Genoa. As against this on long term maintenance planning, schooners are usually not reliable as they depend so much on weather and in any case carry so little cargo (roughly 30 tons) and coasters are always subject to berthing difficulties and delays.

b. Road transport. Unless there is an appreciable increase in the lift at present available and in sight this means would not be reliable.

c. Whether a greater part of the reserves should not be held in Ancona than in Leghorn where facilities for movement might be better along the Po Valley. The present target figure at Leghorn is 23,000 tons and at Ancona 9,000 tons less two months supply which may be dispersed for maintenance of forward regions and Army areas.

ries 40-7/Good.

2. In this latter, a four months programme was set up to cover commitments to a line roughly from the northern boundary of Liguria along the line of the river to the Po estuary. This to be set up through the ports of Leghorn and Ancona with an appreciably heavier target figure at Leghorn than at Ancona. It was anticipated that supplies for the areas north of this line would go through Genoa and Venice when these ports were opened. It is not known here whether this plan was drawn up in consultation with "Q" Movements and agreed to by them as to rail and port acceptances on the long term policy; but it seems now desirable to review it in the light of the request from "Q" Maintenance.

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b. Road transport. Unless there is an appreciable increase in the lift at present available and in sight this means would not be reliable.

c. Whether a greater part of the reserves should not be held in Ancona than in Leghorn where facilities for movement might be better along the Po Valley. The present target figure at Leghorn is 23,000 tons and at Ancona 9,000 tons less two months supply which may be dispersed for maintenance of forward regions and Army areas.

4. The immediate problem is the move of supplies forward from Leghorn but it is thought and recommended that a comprehensive plan for the maintenance of the whole of North Italy up to the frontier, by ports, and by monthly port and rail tonnages should now be drawn up as a tentative scheme in consultation with the Staff branches concerned, at AAI.

5. The monthly figures up to the Po line are known. If HQ Allied Commission will supply estimates of requirements for the commitments beyond that line proposals will be drawn up here in consultation with "Q" Maintenance and "Q" Movements. The immediate problem of moving the Leghorn stocks will be the subject of recommendations shortly.

Copies to:
 Chief of Staff, A.C.
 Economic Section, A.C.
 Transportation Sub-Comm., A.C.
 (Maint) AAI
 (Movements) AAI
 AAG 5 Army
 AAG 8 Army
 HQ Toscana Region
 (E. & S.)
 File 7/5.2
 File 3/6

W. NICHOL STEWART,
 Lt. Colonel, RAAG,
 for DOGAG

80
TOP SECRET
1A
DRAZZ

Ref: 5031/008

November 1944

SUBJECT: Allied Computation of Northern Italy.

TO : E.C.C.A.O.

1. I refer to a letter on the above subject from the Land Forces Sub-Commission, No. TS/C/12 dated 16 November 1944 to HQ AAI.

2. In this letter reference was made to a plan proposed by ^{Technical} M.M.I.A. for the set-up of a military organization throughout the whole of Italy which had been proposed by them in an earlier letter of the same reference dated 4 October 1944. I attach three copies of the letter of 16 November for easy reference (with map).

3. With regard to paragraph 4(b) I would be glad of your comments regarding the small advance parties suggested to work with A.M.G. of Rear Army Headquarters. It would seem that nothing but advantage could come of this proposal, since their duties will be to relieve spearhead officers of A.M.G. from work in connection with Italian territory, personnel, stores, equipment, and buildings ^{in the rear} in the forward advance. On this assumption I gave ^{personal} ~~comparing~~ approval, as stated in ^{the} letter, when it was shown to me in draft, but under the ^{hand} write to you on receipt of this letter so as to enable you to obtain the views of Army Headquarters to this proposal.

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same reference dated 4 October 1944. I attach three copies of the letter of 15 November for easy reference (in the copy)

3. With regard to paragraph 4(b) I would be glad of your comments regarding the small advance parties suggested to work with A.M.G. of Rear Army Headquarters. It would seem that nothing but advantage could come of this proposal, since their duties will be to relieve spearhead officers of A.M.G. from work in connection with Italian territory, personnel, stores, equipment, and buildings included in the forward advance. On this assumption I gave ^{personal} ~~considering~~ approval, as stated in ~~the~~ letter, when it was shown to me in draft, but under took to write to you on receipt of this letter so as to be able you to obtain his view of Army Headquarters to his proposal.

4103

Ref: TS/3/12

27 November 1944

SUBJECT: Allied Cooperation of Northern Italy.

TO : SCAG 5 Army

1. I refer to letter No. TS/3/12 dated 16 November 1944 from MIA to SCAG 5 Army on this subject. With reference to paragraph 4 of this letter, the last sentence was written as a result of an interview at which only the broad outlines were sketched out. It was agreed then that the opinion of the AGI Armies would have to be sought before final consent to the scheme could be given, as far as the Allied Commission was concerned.

2. I have overlaid an opportunity of discussing the suggestion in paragraph 4(b) with Gp. Capt. Benson at this Headquarters. He thinks that the scheme should prove most beneficial and is ready to give every possible assistance to your Advance Parties. It is presumed that the chain of command will be from MIA to their Party at Rear Army Headquarters under Colonel Moriarty.

3. I would be glad if you would obtain the comments of 5 Army to these proposals before you represent the views of both Armies to MIA.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copies to: SCAG 5 Army
SCAG 6 Army
Land Forces Sub-Commission

Incls:

3 copies TS/3/12 dated 16 Nov 44 } to MIA
3 " TS/3/12 dated 4 Oct 44 }

1 copy TS/3/12 dated 16 Nov 44 to AGI

416

DRAFT COPY

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

(by Col) dated 20 Nov

1. In his letter of September 14th General Alexander asked what should be his attitude and that of his officers to the various political parties and organizations in Western Italy.
2. In a draft letter of September 9th, the Acting Chief Commissioner in paragraph 8 suggested that officers whom it was proposed to send into the areas where patriot forces were operating should advise the officers operating with the patriots and the National Committee of Liberation on administrative matters during any interim period.
3. The Resident Minister in a memorandum of September 16th to G-5 suggested that the Acting Chief Commissioner should send this paragraph and a directive to SOE officers in the field to the effect that the officers should be specifically warned to enter into no commitments with any of the bands or committees, not even with the National Committee of Liberation at ALLAN whose representative character is purely conjectural even though it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.
4. This was done. The suggestion of the Major-General Commanding S.O.M. that the Committee should now receive official recognition both by SACRED and the Italian Government appears to be contrary to the policy laid down in the Resident Minister's Note and is, in the opinion of the Commission, politically unsound.

These patriot forces were operating should advise the officers

operating with the patriots and the National Committees of liberation on administrative matters during any interim period.

3. The Resident Minister in a memorandum of September 16th to 3-5 suggested that the Acting Chief Commissioner should send this paragraph and a directive to SOG officers in the field to the effect that the officers should be specifically warned to enter into no commitments with any of the bands or committees, not even with the National Committee of liberation at MILAN whose representative character is purely conjectural even though it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

4. This was done. The suggestion of the Major-General Commanding S.O.M. that the Committee should now receive official recognition both by SACRED and the Italian Government appears to be contrary to the policy laid down in the Resident Minister's note and is, in the opinion of the Commission, politically unsound.

5. In the first place it is open to doubt whether the Committee of liberation does really represent the bulk of the population in Northern Italy. Its representatives affirm that they do but there is little evidence except from patriot sources to confirm this. It may be an offshoot from the military point of view that the activities of the patriots should be concentrated into one committee but to credit both the Allied and the Italian Government to recognise this body as the prototype of SOG and the representative of the Italian Government would appear to be, from the political point of view, a most dangerous move. That for instance would be the position if the Italian Government were to change before Northern Italy were liberated. If the Committee

-2-

75

of National Liberation were not to recognise the succeeding Italian Government we should have then set up in Northern Italy the very organisation which we must at all events try to avoid, that is, a separate independent Government.

6. Whereas, therefore, it may be necessary to constitute some ^{military} unified authority to command the patriots in Northern Italy and coordinate their activities from the operational point of view, it would seem useless to give this organisation ^{the} permanent political character recommended by S.O.M. We must allow both AIG and the Italian Government absolute freedom of administrative and political action on the liberation of this area.

3387 73

SUBJECT: Allied Occupation of Northern Italy

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. 23/6/12
16 Nov 44

17 NOV Recd

TO : MCM and (c)

Copy to: G(3)Org, AFHQ
3 DISTRICT (c)
A.C. (6)
INDIAN WAR MINISTRY

144

- On 13 Oct AFHQ in their letter ASI/922 authorized the plan proposed by MCM and agreed to by you in MCM letter IS/6/12 of 4 Oct.
- The attached map shows the layout designed.
- The implementation of this layout has been authorized up to the following line, which is the boundary between L of C under AFHQ and the area under AF control:-

All land AFHQ Northern Provincial Boundaries of TERRAC -
MCM on VIMERO from coast at S. 9477 to A. 1756.

- In order to extend the project as far North and as quickly as possible both now and as we advance North, I request your approval:-
(a) To implement the layout between the AFHQ and line mentioned in para 3 and the Army Rear Boundary or Security line, whichever is the further forward.

(b) For small advance parties of Regional HQ's, as necessary, (approx. 15 all ranks) and 1 ref of Dist. HQ's, as necessary, to work with AFHQ of Rear Army HQ's. This will enable connections to be established and the layout to be implemented progressively as the Army Rear Boundary/Security line moves North.

...no objections from their point of view.

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INDIAN AIR MINISTRY

147

1. On 23 Oct AMQ in their letter AMQ/922 authorized the plan proposed by AMMA and agreed to by you in WIA letter IS/5/12 of 4 Oct.

2. The attached map shows the layout designed.

3. The implementation of this layout has been authorized up to the following line, which is the boundary between L of C under AFHQ and the area under AA? control:-

All land AMQ Northern Provincial Boundaries of TERAMC -
NISTE - CIVILCO from coast at N.9477 to A.1756.

4. In order to extend the project as far North and as quickly as possible both now and as we advance North, I request your approval:-

(a) To implement the layout between the AMQ/AAI line mentioned in para 3 and the Army Rear Boundary or Security line, whichever is the further forward.

(b) For small advance parties of Regional HQ's, as necessary, (approx. 15 all ranks) and 1 ref of Dist. HQ's, as necessary, to work with AMQ of Rear Army HQ's. This will enable connections to be established and the layout to be implemented progressively as the Army Rear Boundary/Security line moves North.

HQ A.O. see no objections from their point of view.

5. On receipt of your approval, I would issue a comprehensive letter, explaining the whole project in detail for the information and action of all concerned, and specifying a date on which the constitution of the Territorial Regions with their HQ's would officially come into force.

6. May I have your early approval please?



d Browning

Major General
M. M. F. A.

15 Nov 79

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.


SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.




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
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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735017



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



Ref: 203/57/300

15th November 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Piedmont, Lombardy and Liguria.

TO: Adversary Headquarters
Allied Armies in Italy.

1. I refer to your letter 16/1/4 (ope) dated 6th September 1944, and I forward for your approval the final draft of a plan drawn up for Allied Military Government in North-West Italy. This plan was drawn up before I knew of the Operation "CHAMBER." If you approve, it will now serve as the alternative plan which Allied Force Headquarters have ordered to be drawn up, in paragraph 3 of their letter No. 2134 of 30th October.

2. The planning for Operation "CHAMBER" has been delegated by you to the Commanding General, 2 Independent Paratroop Brigade Group, and I am making arrangements with him that a suitable Allied Military Government plan is included in his plan for that operation.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to Allied Force Headquarters.

(sgd) Evelyn W. Stone

EVELYN W. STONE
Colonel, BMH
Chief Commissioner

ENC.

Copy to: Allied Force Headquarters
D.O.O.A.C.
Commanding General, 2 Independent
Paratroop Brigade Group
US Fifth Army

4157

DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMAND
Office of the Chief Communications
AIO 394

Ref: 301/56/001

9th November 1944

SUBJECT: Allied Military Government in R., Italy.

TO : Allied Forces Headquarters.

Approved

1. TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

The tactical appreciation as viewed by AIO is that one of two situations will probably develop:-

Case "A": The Allies succeed in cutting off the enemy's withdrawal in which case considerable enemy forces will remain in Western Italy and will have to be mopped up.

Case "B": The enemy succeeds in entangling his forces from Western Italy before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat and only weak German forces and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western Italy.

In Case "A" considerable forces will be needed to clear up Western Italy; in Case "B" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case the minimum force commitments with the tank will be diverted to the West.

2. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PLAN.

Military occupation of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LAZIO and the setting up of Allied Military Government will be necessary. Only the minimum armed forces will be left to support the Government. A static headquarters will be installed immediately organized resources have ceased so that the field formation headquarters and troops engaged in quelling it can be released for

and will have to be moved up.

Case "m" The enemy succeeds in extracting his forces from western Italy before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat and only weak German forces and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in western Italy.

In Case "m" considerable forces will be needed to clear up western Italy; in Case "n" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case the minimum forces concentrated with the task will be diverted to the West.

2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR PLAN, A.I.

Military occupation of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA and the setting up of Allied Military Government will be necessary. Only the minimum armed forces will be left to support the Government. A static headquarters will be installed immediately organized resistance has caused so that the field formation headquarters and troops engaged in quelling it can be released for further operations. All fighting units and formations will be replaced as quickly as possible by partisan troops under the static headquarters. A British administrative district will be set up to command and administer the Garrison of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA as soon as they have been cleared of hostile troops. The Commander will be allotted sufficient 1 of 3 and Italian troops for internal security duties in support of AB until such time as it is decided that the provinces concerned should be handed over to I.C. or the Italian Government. Commanding General, I.C. LOMBARDIA, will remain in control of such areas of consideration as he may require for the support of 5 areas.

3. CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE ALLIED MILITARY COMMANDS IN ITALY.

Civil affairs section, IAI will arrange for the immediate execution of planning between the 5 Army US, Regional Commissioners Liguria, Piemonte and Lombardia, and G.C., British Administrative District and its subordinate military administrative formations.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE CO-OPERATION WITH THE G.C.

Allied Military Government in I.C. Italy will be under the orders of the general officer commanding the Fifth Army during the time that he is in command of that area. He has authority to call forward for duty in their respective regions, the Regional Commissioners of Liguria, Piemonte and Lombardia with their officers and other ranks. Such Regional Commissioners will be under the Fifth Army Commander as long as they are serving within the limits of the Fifth Army. He may attach such Regional Commissioners to task force commanders serving under his orders. As soon as the general officer commanding the Fifth Army is no longer responsible for I.C. Italy, the Regional Commissioner will come directly under A.C.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

In regard to the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the various political parties in Northern Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command will be to support the authority of the government of higher level which includes representatives of the six principal parties in the state who have pledged themselves to maintain unity until the liberation of Italy is completed. The Allies are supporting this Government because (a) it has formally accepted and is bound by the terms of the Armistice (b) it is the only government which can hope to command the general acceptance of the Italian people as a whole (c) it is

is: 100th and other units. Such Regional Commission will be under the Fifth Army Commander as long as they are serving within the limits of the Fifth Army. He may attack such Regional Commissioners to take force commanders serving under his orders. In sum as the general officer commanding the Fifth Army is no longer responsible for E.O. Italy, the Regional Commissioners will come directly under A.C.

2. CONCLUSION

In regards the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the various political parties in Western Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied command will be to support the authority of the government of higher house which includes representatives of the six principal parties in the state who have pledged themselves to maintain unity until the liberation of Italy is completed. The Allies are supporting this Government because (a) it has formally accepted and is bound by the terms of the Armistice (b) it is the only government which can hope to command the general acceptance of the Italian people as a whole (c) it is pursuing a policy of maximum Italian participation in the war effort (d) in internal affairs it is pledged to the abolition of Fascist methods and influences. The Government is also pledged to postwarment of the postwar of the institutional problems of Italy until such time as the whole Italian people are in a position freely to express their opinion. The National Committee of Liberation and its local branches have accepted the authority of the De Gaulle Government.

66

- 3 -

It should be pointed out to the various political elements in Southern Italy that it is their duty to cooperate to the full with the Allied Military Government officials, who will seek to restore civil administration and public services; and that they will be expected to refrain from any political action which would hinder military operations or undermine the position of the Italian Government of Allied Forces. This will not prevent free expression of political opinion by the extent which consideration of security allows.

Contact between the political leaders of Southern Italy and the Italian Government should be encouraged.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Contact between the political leaders of Southern Italy and the
Italian Government should be encouraged.

4154

~~TOP SECRET~~

SOS

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

15/11/44

SAC (M)

Initials: *[Signature]*

Date: 12/11/44

23

COPY NO. —

12 November 1944

RECEIVED: Operations (General).

TO : GPO-Int-2, and.

Reference: Minutes of a meeting of the War Office Operations (General) held at London Headquarters, W.O., on 27 October 1944.

1. With reference to paragraph 5 of the above mentioned minutes, sufficient equipment is already held by the Air Supply Base to drop the barges detailed in paragraph 5 of the minutes.

2. With reference to paragraph 6, the Air Supply Base has constituted a 'Task Force' for the collection of equipment capable of handling the barges required. The same organization would do the minimum required to operate the re-supply for barges.

3. With reference to paragraph 7, a decision to establish necessary communications can be taken until the circumstances to be used have been finally selected.

By command of General WILSON:

J. M. H. G. G. G. G.
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]

Major General H. H. H.

Major General, G.S.C.,

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-1 (P)
G-2

with the Liaison
GSC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Base 1. Drop the 1 mages detailed in paras 5 and 6 of the minutes.

2. With reference to paragraph 5, the Air Supply Base as established for 'MAGNET' was the smallest establishment capable of handling the tonnage required. The same requirement would be the minimum required to handle the re-supply of 'MAGNET'.

3. With reference to paragraph 7, no action to establish necessary communications can be taken until the airfields to be used have been finally selected.

By command of General WILSON:

J. A. H. G. SMITH,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Major General, G.S.C.
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-1 (P)
G-2
G-3 (Sp Ops)
G-3 (Org &)
G-3 (Plans)
G-3 (Ops Air)
G-3 (Ops)
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
Nav & In
G-5
L-8 Plans
G (AE)

Airb rmg adviser
CSG
Patrol Section
British Resident Minister
US POLAD
Liaison
Engineer
Survey
G-3
G-3-C Med
WOLF
WOLF
2 Ind Para Bde Op
Spares (10)

4133

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
FIFTH ARMY
APO 464

27 October 1944.

Colonel Nelson Monfort,
Civil Affairs Section,
AAI, APO 777, U. S. Army.

Dear Colonel Monfort:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of this morning, I send you herewith a text of the substitute para. 4 of the draft of the ACC memorandum on AMG in northwest Italy.

"4. Allied Military Government in northwest Italy will be under the orders of the general officer commanding the Fifth Army during the time that he is in command of that area. He has authority to call forward for duty in their respective regions, the Regional Commissioners of Liguria, Piedmont and Lombardy, with their officers and other ranks. Such Regional Commissioners will be under the Fifth Army Commander as long as they are serving within the limits of the Fifth Army. He may attach such Regional Commissioners to task force commanders serving under his orders. As soon as the general officer commanding the Fifth Army is no longer responsible for northwestern Italy, the Regional Commissioners will come directly under ACC".

If I understand correctly, the intention of para. 3 of this memorandum is to coordinate planning between the British administrative district and the regional commissioners for the period following the time that the Fifth Army is in charge. I am sorry that I have no officer that I can spare to take part in these plans but I will be glad from time to time to give any assistance in my power. Any plans that involve the period of the Fifth Army's administration of northwestern Italy will, of course, have to be made in coordination with us and I would urge that the regional commissioners concerned come here, either individually or together, and go over matters of mutual interest with us in AMG headquarters.

When you find that you can come to Florence, let me know and we will see that a room is reserved for you. I believe it to your advantage to see at first hand what is being done in the field in our area.

With cordial greetings, I am,

Sincerely yours,



EDGAR ERSKINE HUME
Brigadier General, GSC
Senior Civil Affairs Officer
Fifth Army

EEH:eeb

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ECONOMIC SECTION
APO 394

GDA/hs

22 OCT Recd
20 Oct 44

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Operation Plan (Economic Section)
Northwest Italy.

TO : Acting Vice President, Economic Section.

1. Re your letter, dated 16 Oct 44, subject as above, the plan called for will not be ready by 1200 hours, 21 Oct 44. The plan is dependant upon contribution from the several Sub-Commissions concerned. Due to these Sub-Commissions having been blocked by work directed by higher authority--chiefly in connection with a visiting Economic Mission from Washington and London--some have been unable to prepare the required material. This, in particular, applies to Food, Agriculture, and Transportation. Every effort is being made to complete the report at the earliest possible moment.

G.D. MURPHY
Colonel, GAC

5150

INFORMA N ON PROVINCES BORDERING ON FR E

IMPERIA PROVINCE

<u>Statistics</u>				<u>Rations for 10 days oper- ational emergency.</u>
Area:	1,182 sq. kms.			165 tons
Population:	158,565			
Capital:	IMPERIA	Population (1942)	29,936	30 "
Other Towns:	SAN REMO	Population	35,460	40 "
	VENTIMIGLIA	Population	15,047	17 "
	BORDIGHERA	Population	7,334	8 "

Communications

Besides the coastal railway to GENOA a line runs inland from VENTIMIGLIA connecting IMPERIA with CUNEO and TURIN.

Through traffic to FRANCE via VENTIMIGLIA used to be small as it was mainly goods being distributed to, or carried from, GENOA. Since the war, the Germans and Italians have made extensive use of the route for military movements.

CUNEO PROVINCE

<u>Statistics</u>				
Area:	7,434 sq. kms.			672 tons
Population:	607,767			
Capital:	CUNEO	Population	38,157	42 "
Other Towns:	ERA	Population	20,127	22 "
	FOGGIANO	Population	20,288	22 "
	MONDOVI	Population	20,545	23 "

Communications

CUNEO is on the route followed by road and railway joining TURIN with the Riviera

Besides the coastal railway to GENOVA a line runs inland from VENTIMIGLIA connecting IMPERIA with CUNEO and TURIN.

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Population:	607,767		
Capital:	CUNEO	Population 38,157	42 "
Other towns:	ERA	Population 20,127	22 "
	FOGGIANO	Population 20,288	22 "
	MONDOVI	Population 20,545	23 "

Communications

CUNEO is on the route followed by road and railway joining TURIN with the Riviera and coastal road.

PROVINCE OF TURIN

<u>Statistics</u>			
Area:	5,480 sq. kms.		1391 tons
Population:	1,268,000		
Capital:	TURIN	Population (1943) 712,531	788 "
Other towns:	MONCALIERI	Population 24,000	27 "
	PINEROLO	Population 23,000	25 "
	CHIERI	Population 13,800	15 "

Communications

Town of TURIN is one of main railway centres of PIEMONTE. It lies on the direct

railway connexion between ITALY and FRANCE through the M Genis tunnel.
It is also connected to the coastal route by road and rail to VENTIMIGLIA. 49

AOSTA PROVINCE

Statistics

Area:	4,759 sq. Kms.	263 tons
Population:	237,594	
Capital:	AOSTA	Population 29,665 33 "
Other Towns:	IVREA	Population 16,401 18 "
	CUORONE	Population 10,900 12 "

2491

every 10 days

4113

TOP SECRET

FHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

OF PRIORITY

TO FOR ACTION: SHAEP

REF NO : P 38324

SIGNED : WILSON CITE: PRGCT

1. Having regard to the probability of the early withdrawal of German Forces from Northwest ITALY, I am concerned lest an advance by French Forces over the FRANCO-ITALIAN Frontier may distract Italian Guerillas in the area from their proper operational role of harassing and destroying the Germans.

2. Accordingly I suggest for your consideration:

(A) The desirability of retaining US Forces on the Coast in the vicinity of the Frontier.

(B) The desirability of restraining French Forces from crossing the Frontier.

3. As regards 2-A, I have in mind that such Forces as you might be able to spare (for example), the UNITED STATES PUERTO RICAN Regiment or Plough Force pending its reorganization (could undertake temporary occupational duties in Northwest ITALY until relieved at the earliest possible date by formations from this Theatre. I am now examining the possibility of dropping 2 Para Brigade Group in the TURIN Area immediately on its evacuation. They would be accompanied by Area Command and ANG elements.

4. As regards 2-B, there is evidence that the French may be trying to engineer the voluntary transfer of the AOSTA VALLEY under French Sovereignty.

ORIGINATOR : G-3

AUTH: DANIEL NOCE, MAJ GEN

INFORMATION: IS & PS
MR MACMILLAN
US POLAR
USC
G-2

MAAF
G-5
SGS

MC CUT 3306

13 ~~TOP SECRET~~

REF NO P 38324

YH/J

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY No. 28

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 50746/000.

13 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration - N.W. Italy.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

1. CAC AMI (Maj. Gen. Robertson) held a meeting yesterday at AMI HQ at which his senior officers, SCAC and G-4 5 Army, AC's NW Italy, DCCS and myself were present.
2. The CAC explained the tactical appreciation for the occupation of NW Italy which he explained would be carried out by 5 Army troops who would probably find resistance limited to a few Italian divisions already decimated by the partisans and a small nucleus of German troops.
3. He stated that as soon as occupation was completed, by agreement with G-5 Army and the G-in-C, a British static HQ (No. 2 District) would be set up with several subordinate military HQs (Areas and Sub-areas). The HQ of the District had not yet been determined but would probably be ALGERIA.
4. He explained that in this area in his opinion the duty of the military District was to assist AMC in the administration of NW Italy. The military interests were so small that in this area the rules would be reversed and military interests would probably be subordinate to AMC.
5. After the withdrawal of 5 Army occupational troops the garrison troops of the area would probably be British and Italian. Minimum forces of British troops would be two battalions and one armoured car regiment; the maximum, two tired British divisions with an undetermined number of Italian troops.
6. He laid stress on the difficulties of communications, particularly at the outset before the opening of the port of GENOA and emphasized the fact that it would be impossible to carry much food into the area before that port was open. At this point General Tait, G-4 5 Army, asked it to be made perfectly clear that 5 Army could not provide transport for the haulage of food for civilians.
7. General Robertson stated that he intended to give great weight to the distribution of local resources in the area. A Local Resources Board (Forward) would be set up on which AMC would have the strongest representation. He hoped

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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46A

to set up an Industrial Coordination Committee, located on the AOC with an AOC Liaison whose proposals would carry sufficient weight to be acceptable to the main Board. GAO stated that Major-General Warren, Commanding General designate of the District would set up his Forward Hq. near P/Quetta and agreed that it was most desirable that Regional Commissioners should be located near him. DODAO AAI is trying to arrange this.

6. I gave an appreciation of the entry of AOC into this area. Subject to agreement by Commanding General, 5 Army the Regional Commissioners would accompany the task forces with their provincial teams under the general direction of 5 Army AOC. General Warren proposed and I agreed that it would be necessary for him to have a small AOC Liaison staff at his District Hq. if it was not located near one of the Regional Hqs.

7. General Robertson explained shortly that the role of Hq. No. 2 District would be as follows:-

- (a) To command the Allied and Italian troops placed in the District for the preservation of order.
- (b) To assist AOC and the Italian Government in the preservation of order, prevention of sabotage, etc.
- (c) To coordinate the utilization by the armed forces of local resources.
- (d) Local administration of all British troops in the District.
- (e) Organization of the overland L of C to PUNJAB.

M S LUSH

MSL/JS.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Vte. Adl Sec
DOD, C. Sec
DOD, Hon Sec
DOD, Est Sec
DODAO, AAI

4145

1240

ROLE OF HQ 2 DISTRICT

45

1. To command the Allied and Italian troops placed in the District for the preservation of order.
2. To assist AGC and the Italian Government in the preservation of order, prevention of sabotage, etc.
3. To co-ordinate the utilization by the armed forces of local resources.
4. Local administration of all British troops in the District.
5. Organization of the overland L of C to FRANCE.

Subject:- Conferred

502 /
Civil Affairs Section
HQ Allied Armies in Italy
TEL: ZILFOT 132

To:-

Lt Col G.W.L. Shipp,
HQ AGC

45C
DOGAO/7/5.6
7 Oct 44

1. Ref your 502/2/05. - NOT Read
2. The reservation of the Administrative War Rooms for 12 Oct 44 at 1000 hours has been cancelled.
3. AMG Toscana Region have conferred with this Section concerning arrangements for the conference at the Prefettura Siena on this date.

Arthur James
Lt. Col.
for DOGAO

Capl
10/13/44

10/10

502
73450
9568

Central
C.A. Sec.
Re Sec.
Subsec.
10th Oct. 88
SECRET

6/10

IMMEDIATELY PL. FOR THE SETTING UP OF 10 IV FIFTH ARMY IN
REGION IX AND SPECIAL PROVINCE

4 OCT Recd

~~SECRET~~

1. General.

It is to be expected that, after the capture of Bologna, the occupation of the other provincial capitals in Fifth Army area will be made along Via Emilia. Provincial towns will therefore be held in readiness to move along Routes 65 and 9.

At the same time provision must be made for a possible advance into the subdomains of IV Corps, along the three main lateral roads leading to Modena, Reggio Emilia, Parma, and certain S.C. officers and C.C. are earmarked for this work. If, however, progress along any of these roads is given up for any reason, the personnel concerned will be pulled out and sent round via Bologna to rejoin their provincial towns. In this eventuality the mountainous area concerned will be handled by the provincial Commissioner working South-East from his provincial Capital.

Dec Special Town will shortly also forward under S.C. 10, IV Corps and will be moved forward by air as the situation develops.

Detailed plans for each province follow.

2. Parli and R. under provinces.

Commence occupied by VIII and II Corps will be handled by Corps C.A. 08 until such time as Fifth and Sixth Armies link up in the Po Valley, when they will be handed over to the respective provincial Commissioners who are now operating under Eighth Army.

3. Local arrangements.

The provincial Town is now at Pivigliano, S.C. 10, II Corps and S.C. 10, I.C. III Corps will have necessary arrangements direct with the S.C. when they wish to hand over command to him. One C.A. 08 (Lieut. Barnes, at present with II Corps) will be placed under command S.C. 10, IV Corps forthwith to handle enquiries in S.T. corner of the province.

Provincial Capital is in Fifth Army area will be made along Via Billie.

At the same time provisions must be made for a possible advance into the mountains by IV Corps, along the three main lateral roads leading to Madani, Pucio and Pucio. And certain J.G. officers and C.O.s are earmarked for this work. If, however, progress along any of these roads is given up for any reason, the personnel concerned will be pulled out and sent round via Bologna to rejoin their provincial units. In this eventuality the mountainous area concerned will be handled by the Provincial Commissioner working South-East from his Provincial Capital.

Gen. S. G. will shortly make a forward march under C.O.s. IV Corps can still be moved forward by air in the situation develops.

Detailed plans for each province follow.

2. Province of Ravenna provinces.

Operations occupied by III and IV Corps will be handled by Corps C.O.s until such time as pilot and infantry units link up in the city. But they will be handed over to the Provincial Commissioner who are now parting under Eighth Army.

3. Province of Bologna.

The Provincial Town is now in Bivigliano. S.C.O. II Corps and C.O. I.C. will Corps will take necessary arrangements direct with the I.C. when they wish to be placed under command of I.C. C.O. (Lieut. Barnes, at present with II Corps) will be placed under command S.C.O. IV Corps forthwith to handle operations in S. corner of the province.

4. Province of Modena.

C.O. S.C.O. (Capt. in Buckley, no. in Florence Province) will be placed under command S.C.O. IV Corps forthwith. Captain Grenville (S.C.O. no. with XIII Corps) will be available in addition at a later date if the situation demands.

5. Province of Parma.

On the basis of the nature of the terrain it is unlikely that such progress will be made into this Province from the South. However, I.C. no. will hold one police officer in readiness to be placed under command S.C.O. IV Corps if it appears necessary.

COPIES MADE AND SENT TO:

C A SEC
ECON SEC
ESTAB SEC

7 OCT 44.

HEADQUARTERS
27 OCT 1944

6/10/10

6. Ferra and Piacenza provinces.

The above conditions apply here as to Reggio. However, to assist S.C.M.O. IV Corps in handling his 180 area, and C.M.O. 1st Piacenza Province will be placed under the command forthwith in addition to the one Piana officer at present with him. C.M.O. IV Corps will be available to S.C.M.O. IV Corps if the situation at a later date makes this desirable.

7. Genoa province.

On arrival of transport L. Genoa Provincial P.C. will concentrate and move forward under command S.C.M.O. IV Corps.

8. CC.M.

The following numbers of static CC.M. are now held in the Scuola Centrale, Florence, and are available to accompany the provincial officers enumerated above.

Modena	50
Reggio	25
Piana	20
Vicenza	25

CC.M. for L. Genoa are now concentrated in IV Corps area and will be moved as required by S.C.M.O. IV Corps.

9. Location of Provincial H.Q.

a. Orders for the move of Bologna province have already been issued.

b. Modena and Reggio provinces will remain in Florence until Bologna is captured at which time this H.Q. will arrange a staging area in the Bologna area from which both can move into their respective provincial C.M.O.s.

c. Ferra and Piacenza provinces will shortly move to the staging area at Bivigliano. Separate instructions will be issued for this move. From here onwards they should expect to move via two further staging areas, one in the Bologna area (see b.) and one in the Reggio area.

10. Reports.

Provincial Commissioners will note that they are expected to render reports -

On arrival at the airport in Spain, provincial HQs will concentrate and move forward under command of C.O. IV Corps.

3. CC. HQs

The following numbers of static CC. HQs are now held in the Spanish Central, Valencia, and are available to accompany the provincial officers enumerated above.

Madrid	26
Regio	25
Turin	25
Barcelona	25

CC. HQs for the Spanish are now concentrated in IV Corps area and will be moved as required by C.O. IV Corps.

4. Location of provincial HQs.

a. Orders for the move of Valencia province have already been issued.

b. Madrid and Regio provinces will remain in Valencia until Valencia is captured at which time the HQs will arrange a staging area in the Valencia area from which both can move into their respective provincial HQs.

c. Turin and Barcelona provinces will shortly move to the staging area at Valencia. Separate instructions will be issued for this move. From here onwards they should expect to move via two further staging areas, one in the Valencia area (see b.) and one in the Regio area.

10. Reports.

Provincial commissioners will note that they are expected to render reports - brief but as complete as possible - every 48 hours from the time they first take up their duties for a part of their provinces. It applies to Regional HQs and Corps S.C. HQs (as long as their provinces remain in Corps area).

(1) IV Corps
S.D. HQs.
Colonel, U.D.H.
Chief of Staff.
A.S.G. Fifth Army.

DISTRIBUTION:

S.C. HQs - All Corps
All ... Concerned
All ... Army
HQ 400 - Civil Affairs Section ✓
S.D. HQs
HQ ... Region
HQ ... Region
Circulation

1254

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS
AJJIF AMTRUL COMMISSION
CIC
Office of the Chief of Staff
+++++

45C

Ref: 502/2/008.

4 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Conference.

TO : Lt.Col.Friend James, AOC Adv HQ.

31A

1. Confirming Capt. Oden's telephone conversation with you today with reference to your letter AOC/369 dated 1 Oct 44, copy to this HQ, it is not desired to proceed with arrangements for a Conference at 1000 hrs on 12 Oct 44 at HQ AAI.
2. Instead the Conference for SCAO's and Forward Regions will be held at 1000 hrs on 12 Oct 44 at the Prefettura SIENA followed by the Conference at HQ AAI at 1515 hrs on the same date. In the event of the Agenda not having been completed arrangements will be made to release from the Prefettura Conference those officers required at 1515 hrs at HQ AAI.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

1141

9943

Col. Day

103/10

HR ACC

SUBJECT: Allied Occupation of Northern ITALY.

Military Mission Italian Army.
ROME.

T.E. 16/12.
4 October 44.

6 OCT Recd

R.Q. AMT (2)

1. GENERAL.

I have been shown by A.C.C. the Gelin-Q's letter, MA/536 dated 11 Sep and your 16/11/44 (Ops) dated 6 Sep on the above subject, which is intimately bound up with the future disposition of the Italian Army when Northern Italy is occupied.

2. ASPECTS.

There are, from the Italian Army point of view, 3 main aspects:-

- (a) provision of Italian troops for internal security duties in support of A.M.C.
- (b) control and action in respect of Italian soldiers and military property discovered as to Germany.
- (c) change over from the present military set-up to the future layout as authorized by the Allies under the peace terms.

3. AS REQUESTED (11) - SEE APPENDIX 11.

The only courses from which Italian troops can be made available are:-

- (a) Existing I.S. Divs.

There are three of these - 30th, 40th and 41st, each 5000 strong. A.C.C. requires 30th and 40th complete for SICILY. They also ask for 2 further bn from CALABRIA Div for CALABRIA and 1 other bn from CALABRIA Div for ROME. Virtually no troops from existing I.S. Divs would thus be available for Northern Italy.

I have been shown by A.D.C. the G-2/C-2's letter, 18/4/46 dated 11 Sep and your 16/4/46 (copy) dated 6 Sep on the above subject, which is intimately bound up with the future disposition of the Italian Army when Northern Italy is occupied.

2. ASPECTS.

There are, in the Italian Army point of view, 3 main aspects:-

- (a) provision of vital troops for internal security duties in support of A.S.G.
- (b) control and action in respect of Italian soldiers and military property discovered as an advance.
- (c) change over from the present military system to the future layout as authorized by the Allies under the peace terms.

3. AS RESOURCES AVAILABLE - USE AVAILABLE AREAS.

The only sources from which Italian troops can be made available are:-

- (a) Existing I.S. Divs.

There are three of these - Calabria, Sicily and Calabria each 1200 strong. A.C. requires Calabria and Sicily complete for 1000. They also ask for 2 further bn from Calabria Div for Calabria and 1 other bn from Calabria Div for Rome. Virtually no troops from existing I.S. Divs would then be available for Northern Italy.

- (b) Guard Battalions.

18 of these are in use for guarding Allied installations and a further 4 are projected, to be taken out of the 4100 Internal Security troops (see 2/1) of Appendix 1/1. It is not known whether these can be spared and in any event it will be advisable to have properly organized formations rather than a collection of individual battalions.

- (c) Service Units under Allied Control.

Presumably those with P.M.S. 1800 Army and 1800 Airborne cannot be cut. These also are not organized or of the quality to undertake I.S. duties.

Sheet 2.

TOP SECRET

(c) Contd.

Sp - Vice Units under Allied Command (Contd)

"Allied Garrison CORPS" are mainly of Yugo-Slav origin. "Allied Garrison CORPS" have been used for work with the U.S. Air Corps. With the departure of the latter, the figure of 9000 can be reduced considerably. But these are U.S. ITIS and at the disposal of the U.S. for labour etc duties; and they are not organized or of the quality to undertake I.S. duties.

No troops from this source are thus available.

(d) Combat Groups.

These are being organized as fighting formations and will not be ready

Group	Before	15 Nov
CHRONA	"	1 Dec
EDGEMAN	"	1 Jan
PULGORE	"	1 Jan
MAJNOVA	"	15 Jan
RECHER	"	15 Jan

(e) Italian administration 27,000 cannot be cut and is in fact below what is really necessary. Nor can the figures for A.C.C. 3000, SIM 170 and reinforcements etc. 18400 be reduced.

It therefore appears that 10 Italian troops will be available for internal security duties in support of A.M.C. when Northern ITALY is liberated, with a callin on one or two Combat Groups.

4. AS REPARMS 2 (b) and (c)

(a) These two are intimately connected.

(b) Both on military and political grounds, immediately on liberation of territory as we advance and for all ITALY post-war it will be essential to ensure control of the (probably) large numbers of Italian officers and men who will be found in the North. The existing Italian military authority (which will also be the future backbone of ITALY) must be given facilities to ensure this control and establish their authority. About these facilities, I foresee chaos in the Army sphere and a deplorable breeding ground for dis-

order and a breeding ground for the Allied war effort and

these are to be organized as fighting formations and will not be ready

TRUFI Group before	15 Nov
CREMONA	"
LEGNANO	"
POLIGNO	"
MANFROVA	"
PERUGIA	"

- (a) Italian administration 27,000 cannot be cut and is in fact below what is really necessary. Nor can the figures for A.C.C. 3000, 11th 730 and reinforcements etc. 18,000 be reduced.

It therefore appears that 30 Italian troops will be available for internal security duties in support of A.M.A. when Northern ITALY is liberated, with smaller ones or new Combat Groups.

4. AS REGARDS 2 (b) and (c)

- (a) These two aspects are intimately connected.

(b) Both on military and political grounds, immediately on liberation of territory as we advance and for all Italy post-war it will be essential to assume control of the (probably) large numbers of Italian officers and men who will be found in the North. The existing Italian military authority (which will also be the future backbone of ITALY) must be given facilities to assume this control and establish their authority. Without these facilities, I foresee chaos in the Army sphere and a formidable breeding ground for disaffection, to the detriment of the Allied war effort and the post-war stability of ITALY. Without the creation of Italian military authority, Patriot organizations of diverse political creeds and shades will hold sway in their respective areas - a state of affairs which must be avoided at all costs.

- (c) On the above basis, I reach (see Appendix "B") an appreciation of what I consider is the minimum necessary for establishing Italian military authority over all ITALY. The military Government 8.40 and the areas under their jurisdiction are designated as military areas. It is not possible to draw these boundaries so that they fit Allied A.C.C. Regions or Allied Military Districts. Moreover, the boundaries of these latter are liable to change. This is of course no real difficulty and should be accepted, so that the Italian lay-out may continue on into the future without change.

contd./ Sheet 3.

Sheet 3.

TOP SECRET

(c) Contd.

It can be seen that by the allocation of 695 additional personnel, an Italian military organization covering all Italy can be achieved even though on an attenuated basis. I strongly recommend that this be authorized forthwith, so that it can lay their plans now. A matter to be decided is where these additional 695 personnel are to come from, presumably within the ceiling of 113,000. This personnel must be "NATIONAL ITALIAN". I recommend (See Appendix "a") that they be taken out of the figure of 11.5. The 41000 even at the expense of one armed battalion (see para 3(b) above). I consider that these 695 personnel are definitely "effective" in the season of the next 6 or the issue of nations, in that they will contribute materially to the war efforts by the results they should produce. They will also be contributing to Italy's national security and on their initiative to be taken from the 41000. In any event, the approval for their use as a military and political necessity should not be dependent on any local interpretation of whether they are or are not "in fact effective".

(d) I would ask that the Plan proposed in Appendix "a" be approved as a whole, without lengthy discussion of details. TIME is a major factor. Action is needed now for the new North of ITALY up to the Corbato line, and within a few weeks the problem of the rest of Northern Italy may be upon us, with nothing settled. I want to give the Italian M of R a definite, comprehensive plan now, so that they can work out the details and prepare to implement what I consider is a vital military and political necessity.

This plan is important in principle, without a letter for decision by A.F.M.G. But, as the plan is so vitally concerned, I send this letter to you (copy to A.F.M.G.) in order that you may consider my proposals and give your recommendations thereon to A.F.M.G.

forwarded

that, these 655 personnel are definitely "effective" in all senses of the word for the issue of rebellion. In that they will contribute materially to the war effort, by the results they should produce. They will also be contributing to Internal Security and our thus liberatingly to taken from the AIGs. In any event, the approval for their use as a military and political necessity as did not be dependent on any local interpretation of whether they are or are not "in fact effective."

(2)

I would ask that the staff proceed in appendix "B" be agreed as a whole, without lengthy discussion of details. TIME is a major factor. Action is needed NOW for the other North of shifted up to the Carbet line, and within a few weeks the problem of the rest of Northern Italy may be up to us, with nothing settled. I wish to give the Italian M of H a definite, comprehensive plan NOW, so that they can work out the details and prepare to implement when I consider to a vital military and political necessity.

This whole business is presently ultimately a matter for decision by A.F.H.Q. But, as the G-12-2 is so vitally concerned, I need this letter to you (copy to A.F.H.Q.) in order that you may consider proposals and take your recommendations as to A.F.H.Q.

W.S. L.S.

L. Browning

Major General.
W.M.I.A.

copy : C-2 (Crgl)(Br) A.F.H.Q. 2
H.Q. AIG 2

4138

1 - copy off file

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "A" 2. M.I.
1. 1947, 75/6/12 dated
4 Oct 44.

ITALIAN M.I.LATEST A.F.H.S. PROPOSALS.

1. Italian Administrative Installations	27,000
2. Combat Groups	57,000
3. Service Units under Allied Command	
(a) P.B.C.	52,000
(b) Fifth Army	12,000
(c) Allied Garrison, SARDINIA	9,000
(d) Allied Garrison, CORSIKA	5,000
(e) British Command	93,000
4. A.A. & C.D.	600
5. Internal Security troops, including	
(a) A.C.F.	3,000
(b) 18 Guard Battalions (800)	14,400
(c) C.I.M.	1,500
(d) 2 Divs ASWLT (SARDINIA & CORSIKA)	10,000
(e) 1 Div SARDINIA (SARDINIA)	5,000
(f) Internal Security troops	4,100
6. Headquarters, sick in hospital, not assigned to units, and unassigned personnel, including liaison officers, interpreters, etc.	12,400
7. C.G.M., including C.G.M. assigned to military formation	55,000
	308,000

4.	6.4.4 U.D.	12,000
	(c) Allied Garrison, SAKONIA	9,000
	(d) Allied Garrison, OROSTIA	5,000
	(e) British Garrison	93,000
5.	Internal Security troops, including	600
	(a) 7.6.6 C.	3,000
	(b) 1st Guard Battalion (AGG)	14,400
	(c) E.L.M.	1,500
	(d) 2 Divs 3 MILLY (SARSTIA, & LOSTA)	10,000
	(e) 1 Div SAKONIA (SALAMIA)	5,000
	(f) Int and Security troops	4,100
6.	Refugees, sick in hospital, not assigned to units, etc. assigned personnel, including liaison personnel, interpreters, etc.	22,400
7.	6.6.6, including 6.6.6B assigned to Military formations	55,000
		368,000

413

49
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Appendix "B" to MILA letter
TS/P/12 dated 4 Oct 44. LAL

Appreciation of the Situation on 1 Oct 44 in respect
of Territorial Hqs, Districts and Depots of the Italian
Army.

OBJECT.

1. To examine the necessity, or otherwise, for establishing
Territorial Hqs, Districts and Depots of the Italian Army to cover
the whole of ITALY, including the INLANDS.

FACTORS.

2. Functions of Territorial Hqs, Districts and Depots.

(a) Territorial Hqs.

- (i) represent authority of War Ministry and General
Staff throughout area of responsibility
- (ii) admin and discipline of all Italian troops in the area
including troops under Allied operational command
- (iii) responsibility for safe custody and accounting of
all Italian military stores
- (iv) staff includes representatives of services who are
responsible for organisation of services in the area
- (v) Organisation and operation of Districts, Depots,
Hospitals and other military establishments.
- (vi) Supervision and organisation of call-up and decomm-
munication
- (vii) Liaison with local Allied Hqs and civilian author-
ities.

- (b) Districts constitute the documentation and administration
centres through which the citizen enters or leaves the Army.
Essential functions are -

2. Functions of Territorial HQs, Districts and Divisions.

(a) Territorial HQs.

- (i) represent authority of War Ministry and General Staff throughout area of responsibility
- (ii) admin and discipline of all Italian troops in the area including troops under Allied operational control
- (iii) responsibility for safe custody and accounting of all Italian military stores
- (iv) staff includes representatives of services who are responsible for organization of services in the area
- (v) Organization and operation of Districts, Depots, hospitals and other military establishments.
- (vi) Supervision and organization of call-up and demobilization
- (vii) Liaison with local Allied HQs and civilian authorities.

(b) Districts constitute the documentation and administration centres through which the citizen enters or leaves the Army. Essential functions are:

- (i) machinery of conscription and calling-up of classes
- (ii) demobilization and recall of reserves
- (iii) assistance to families of men killed, wounded or taken prisoner
- (iv) payments of allowances to dependents of officers and ORs
- (v) records of junior reserve officers
- (vi) settlements of claims and complaints for INOC and ORs.
- (c) Divisions are the basic and record centres of Italian Regiments. Their functions include:

- (i) Soldier's record while he is with the Army

continues...

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Sheet 2.

FACTORS (Contd)

2. (c) Points (Contd)

- (ii) clothing and arming the soldier when he is first called up; also verse on demobilisation
- (iii) forming personnel into units when required, including units for Allies
- (iv) records of all arms and equipment issued to units
- (v) holding stocks of clothing, unit and personal equipment etc
- (vi) regimental administration and records

3. Existing approved organisations for Rome and South of Naples.

6 Territorial HQs - ROMS, CAMPANIA, APULIA, CALABRIA, SICILY, SARDINIA -	
est. each 150	 total 900
17 Districts	
est. each 10	" 170
22 Depots	
est. each 10	" 220
	Total 1290

4. Pre-war organisation North of Naples.

7 Territorial HQs - PIEMONTE, LIGURIA, LOMBARDY, VENETIA, TREVISO, VENETO, EMILIA, TOSCANA	
70 Districts	
212 Depots	

5. Development of existing organisation.

(vi) organizational administration and records

3. Existing approved organizations for Rome and South of Naples.

6 Territorial HQs - ROME, CAMPANIA, ABRUZZO, CALABRIA, SICILY, SARDINIA -
est. each 150 total 900

17 Districts
est. each 10 " 170

22 Depots
est. each 10 " 220

Total 1290

4. Former organization North of Naples.

7 Territorial HQs - PUGLIA, EMILIA, LOMBARDY, VENETIA, TIRRENIAN, VENETO, SARDEGNA, TOSCANA

70 Districts

212 Depots

5. Development of existing organization.

(a) The existing organization shown in part 3 was instituted to control the large number of Italian troops in South Italy (which had not yet been organized into service and other units under Allied command) and to carry out the functions shown in part 2.

(b) For economy and to save manpower within the existing considerable contraction has taken place within the last months and further reduction is possible.

(c) The area South of Naples is thus a prime concern, where N of N has facilities to exercise its authorized and necessary functions.

6. Conditions North of Naples.

(a) Here the only Italian troops are under Allied command (except for personnel in HQs) and no call-up was necessary as the strength of the army was very thin. For these reasons and to economize in manpower order to reduction in

Sheet 3.

6. Conditions North of Naples (Contd)

(g) (Contd)

ceding, the policy was adopted of refusing the set-up of any H.Q. or Depot which was not directly related to the existing Army and its present functions.

(b) This policy is still in force, with the result that the area North of Naples up to Combat Line has become a "No-Man's-Land" with no direct control by M of W. to the detriment to the latter's authority and ability to carry out its function as in para 2.

7. Civilian personnel to replace Military.

(a) Normal war-time clerical staffs amount to about 90 men for each District and Depot. Trained civilians to replace these are not immediately available in any number. Salaries for such civilians (who are not issued with rations) must be adequate to meet the cost of living and represent a big expenditure by M of W in a direction where previously the cost was small. The Italian Treasury is inevitably being "tetchy" - for example, in refusing to pay pensions as well as salary to retired Army personnel employed as civilians on this work.

(b) Nevertheless, M of W accepts the principle of replacement by civilians, but is faced with the major problem of making a sudden change and training civilians to the work on a very big scale.

(c) It follows that any new H.Q. or Depot set-up North of Naples must have at any rate a nucleus of trained military personnel.

8. Prestige and Authority of Italian Military Administration.

Allied policy throughout has been to establish this. We have set our faces against any "private armies" or usurping of control by Patriots or pseudo-military organizations with a political bias. Italian military authority cannot be confined to one part of Italy; in any case, as we advance, it should be extended as soon as possible to cover all Italy. This will have important psychological and political effects, in that this authority will be demonstrated to have the backing of the Allies, control will be re-established over the military personnel discovered as an advance, pensions and pay and records will be put on a proper footing - in fact the Italian military authority will visibly be doing its proper job. All this will tend to lessen the internal security problems and reduce

(a) Normal war-time clerical staffs amount to about 50 men for each District and Depot. Trained civilians to replace these are not immediately available in any number. Salaries for such civilians (who are not issued with ration cards) must be adapted to meet the cost of living and represent a big expenditure by M of W in a direction where previously the cost was small. The Italian Treasury is inevitably being "sticker" - for example, in refusing to pay pensions as well as salary to retired Army personnel employed as civilians on this work.

(b) Nevertheless, M of W accepts the principle of replacement by civilians, but is faced with the major problem of making a sudden change and training civilians in the work on a very big scale.

(c) It follows that any new line or Depot set-up North of Naples must have at any rate a nucleus of trained military personnel.

8. Pre-war and Authority of Italy in Military Authorities.

Allied policy throughout has been to establish this. We have not our face against any "private armies" or usurping of control by Patriotic or pseudo-military organizations with a political bias. Italian military authority cannot be confined to one part of Italy; in any case, as we advance, it should be extended as soon as possible to cover all Italy. This will have important psychological and political effects, in that this authority will be concentrated to have the backing of the Allies, control will be re-assumed over the military personnel discovered as to advance, pensions and pay and records will be put on a proper footing - in fact the Italian military authority will visibly be doing its proper job. All this will tend to lessen the internal Security problem and reduce danger of disaffection, thus directly aiding the Allied war effort.

9. Post-war considerations.

(a) The primary task is to concentrate all efforts on winning the war. Yet, with the complete liberation of Italy in sight, the creation as far as possible of a state of affairs whereby, in the event of a change-over from existing to post-war organization in 1945, the peace-time factor imposed by the Allies, becomes a factor of importance.

(b) Problems of great magnitude will need solution, perhaps very soon - a.g.

- (1) the demobilisation or absorption into the regular Army of troops evacuated from the BALKANS, and GREECE, and later of P of W from all over the world.

Sheet 6.

9. Post-war considerations. 9 (Contd)

(b) (Contd)

- (11) the reorganization and concentration (to fit the post-war establishment of the Army authorized under the peace terms) of Territorial HQs, Districts and Depots.
- (c) Unless facilities are authorized to the Italian Army to compete with such problems, no orderly change over will be possible and chaos will be inevitable.
- (4) In this connection, the recent agreement between President ROOSEVELT and Mr. MURPHY that Italy is to have a lawyer and more independent part in the Allied Councils, postulated the authorization of some generous freedom of action for Italians than is thought.
- (e) To sum up, the function and status of the Army of a Constitutional power like ITALY demands that, in the present state of affairs, the Allies shall now give the Italian Army facilities meeting its house in order so as to re-establish its authority, carry out its functions, obviate disaffection or even anarchy, as comply with the peace terms.

COURSES OPEN.

10. The only possible course is to extend the Italian military organization, to cover all Italy in the course.

PLAN (See attached sketch map.)

11. (a) to authorize Albania Territorial HQs, each with an establishment of 100 military personnel. Existing Calabria and CAMPANIA HQs to be amalgamated. SARDINIA HQ to be disbanded in view of the few Italian troops that will shortly be left there. SARDINIA to be treated as a District of the new CAMPANIA HQ, the latter providing a small HQ to take charge.
- (b) to authorize 27 Districts, each with an establishment of 5 military personnel.
- (c) to authorize 90 Depots, each with an establishment of 5 military personnel. The reduction from 240 to 90 Depots will be made by concentrating the work of 3 pre-war Depots into 1. To enable the surplus Depots to be closed down, inventory and stores

core independent part in the Allied Councils, postulated the
 authorization of more generous freedom of action for Italians
 than in the past.

- (c) To sum up, the function and status of the Army of a Con-
 tinental power like Italy demands that, in the present state of
 affairs, the Allies shall now give the Italian Army facilities
 setting its house in order so as to re-establish its authority,
 carry out its functions, obtain disaffection or even amnesty as
 costly with the peace terms.

COURSE OPEN.

- 10. The only possible course is to extend the Italian military organ-
 ization, to cover all Italy in the course.

ELITE (See attached sketch map.)

- 11. (a) to authorize Albania Territorial HQ, and with an estab-
 lishment of 100 military personnel. Existing Calabria and
 Campania HQs to be amalgamated. SARDINIA HQ to be disbanded
 in view of the few Italian troops that will shortly be left there.
 SARDINIA to be treated as a District of the new CAMPANIA HQ, the
 latter providing a small HQ to take charge.

- (b) to authorize 27 Districts each with an establishment of
 5 military personnel.

- (c) to authorize 20 Depots, each with an establishment of 5
 military personnel. The reduction from 240 to 90 Depots will
 be made by concentrating the work of 3 pre-war Depots into 1.
 To enable the surplus Depots to be closed down, records and stores
 to be transferred etc. If it is to take over all Depots initially
 and close down the surplus within one month.

- (d) in order to implement 11 (a), (b) and (c) above, to
 provide (see attached) an additional 605 personnel from some
 source within the ceiling. This, it is suggested, to come from
 the "1200 Internal Security Troops" under A.F.S. Qs latest, propo-
 sed to C.C.S.

34

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 10/1/50 1000 1/AL

TERRITORIAL HQs, DISTRICTS AND BRIGADES OF THE ITALIAN ARMY.

Summary of requirements of all personnel to implement plan.



Type of unit	Present org ROBE and SOUTH of MARINES.	Proposed plan for the whole of ITALY (incl the Islands)	Part of the increase in personnel to be found by reduction of present establishments, The following additional personnel to be required
Territorial HQs	6 HQs Each 150 personnel = 900	11 HQs Each 100 personnel = 1100	200
District HQs	13 Districts Each 10 personnel	87 Districts Each 5 personnel	

ALL OUT	MAIL and GIFTING of MAILERS.	FOR THE WHOLE of 170412 (incl the islands)	Part of the expenses in personnel to be count by rotation of members substitutions. The full wife additional per- sonnel is equal to
Territorial HQs	6 HQs Each 150 personnel = 900	11 HQs Each 100 personnel = 1100	200
District HQs	17 Districts Each 10 personnel = 170	87 Districts Each 5 personnel = 435	265
Depot HQs	22 Depots each 10 personnel = 220	90 Depots each 5 personnel = 450	230
TOTALS	1290	1985	695

41-5

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.


SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



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Appendix B

ITALIAN MIL



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017


Appendix "B" to MIA letter dated October 4, 1944

ITALIAN MILITARY TERRITORIAL H.Q.'s.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017



1277

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



DISTRIBUTION OF ITALIAN ARMY FOR SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY.

BRITISH ITIS.		U.S. ITIS.		INTERNATIONAL ITIS
Service Units	93,000	P.B.S.	52,000	Italian Adm
Reinfts (5%)	4,800	Fifth Army	12,000	Installations
Combat Gps	57,000	Allied Garrison	9,000	A.A. & C.D.
Reinfts (10%)	5,700	SARDINIA		S.C.C.
		Allied Garrison	5,000	18 Guard Bns
		CORSICA		S.I.M.
		Reinfts (5%)	4,500	2 Divs SICILY
				1 Div SARDINIA
				I.C. Troops
				Reinfts (5%)
TOTAL 160,500		TOTAL 83,500		

GRAND TOTAL 243,000 (excl C.C.R.R. 55,000)

8

DISTRIBUTION OF ITALIAN ARMY FOR SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY.

TOP SECRET

Appendix "C" to
 NSCIS letter, 25/10/72
 dated 4 Oct 74.

U.S. ITIS.		INTERNATIONAL ITIS	
23,000	I.I.S.	51,000	Italian Ldr
4,800	Fifth Army	12,000	Installations
7,000	Allied Garrison	8,000	A.A. & G.D.
5,700	SARDINIA	8,000	A.C.D.
	Allied Detachment	5,000	18 Guard Bns
	CORSICA		S.I.M.
	Reinforce (5%)	4,500	2 Divs SICILY
			1 Div SARDINIA
			I.S. Troops
			Reinfts (5%)
0,500	TOTAL	83,500	TOTAL
			69,000

GRAND TOTAL 113,000 (excl C.C.R.B. 55,000)

DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
O. N. P.

Ref: 501/1008

October 1944

SUBJECT: Allied Military Government in N. S. ITALY.

TO: :

*This draft refers to 30
Lt. Gen. being taken up by the AMM by
Capt. Humphreys as a basis of discussion
Wednesday 14/10/44*

1. TACTICAL APPRECIATION.

One of two situations will probably develop:-

Case "A": The Allies succeed in cutting off the enemy's withdrawal in which case considerable enemy forces will remain in Eastern Italy and will have to be mopped up.

Case "B": The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western Italy before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat and only weak German forces and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western Italy.

In Case "A" considerable forces will be needed to clear up Western Italy: in Case "B" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case the minimum forces commensurate with the task will be diverted to the West.

2. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PLAN.

Military occupation of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE AND LOMBARDIA and the

settling up of Allied Military Government will be necessary. Only the minimum

1. TACTICAL ADMINISTRATION.

One of two alternatives will probably develop:-

Case "A": The allies succeed in cutting off the enemy's retreat in which case considerable enemy forces will remain in eastern Italy and will have to be stopped up.

Case "B": The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from western Italy before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat and only weak German forces and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in eastern Italy.

In Case "B" considerable forces will be needed to clear up eastern Italy: in Case "A" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case the minimum forces commensurate with the task will be diverted to the West.

2. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PLAN.

Military occupation of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE AND LANGHIANI and the setting up of Allied Military Government will be necessary. Only the minimum armed forces will be left to support that Government. A static headquarters will be installed immediately organised resistance has ceased so that the field formation headquarters and troops engaged in quelling it can be released for further operations. All fighting units and formations will be replaced as quickly as possible by garrison troops under the static headquarters. British Administrative District will be set up to control and administer the garrison of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE AND LANGHIANI as soon as they have been cleared of hostile troops. The Commander will be allotted sufficient L of C and Italian troops for internal security duties in support of the units mentioned above as it is decided that the provinces concerned should be handed over to L of C.

or the Italian Government. Commanding General, 5th Army will remain in control of each zone of operations as he may require for the support of 5 Army.

3. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT PLAN.

5th Army will allot to the task forces operating in Eastern

4. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT PLAN.

So long as 5 Army troops are operating in Western Italy, 5th Army will be in command of Allied Military Government in the area. In view, however, of the extent of this area he will delegate his powers and functions to the Regional Commissioners of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LANGHARDA, who will be attached at the beginning of the operations to Headquarters of the task forces operating. The Regional Commissioners, under the immediate authority of the task force commander and the general authority of the SCAG, 5 Army AGC, will call forward the Provincial towns of their Regions as required, will accompany the Headquarters of the task force commander and will initiate Allied Military Government in their Region as the Province becomes liberated. In order to secure continuity SCAG 5 Army will also attach each officer of 5 Army AGC as can be spared to work as liaison officers with the units of the task force. These officers will work under the immediate command of the Regional Commissioners.

was purposed.

In view, however, of the extent of this area he will delegate his powers and functions to the Regional Commissioners of LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA, who will be attached at the beginning of the operations to Headquarters of the task forces operating. The Regional Commissioners, under the immediate authority of the task force commander and the general authority of the SCMO, 5 Army AMB, will call forward the Provincial towns of their Regions as required, will accompany the Headquarters of the task force commander and will initiate Allied Military Government in their region as the Provinces become liberated. In order to ensure continuity with 5 Army will also attach such officers of 5 Army AMB as can be spared to work as liaison officers with the units of the task forces. These officers will have under the immediate command of the Regional Commissioners.

4125

his purpose.

3. CO-OPERATION BETWEEN AMB AND BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT.

SCMO will arrange for the immediate co-ordination of planning between SCMO 5 Army AMB, Regional Commissioners, LIGURIA, PIEMONTE and LOMBARDIA, and C.G.O., British Administrative District, and subordinate military administrative formations.

5. POLITICAL.

As regards the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the various political parties in Western Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command will be to support the authority of the Government of Signor Bonomi which includes representatives of the six

-3-

principal parties in the state. The Allies are supporting this Government because it is pursuing a policy of maximum Italian participation in the war effort, and in internal affairs is pledged to the abolition of Fascist methods and influences. The Government is also pledged to postponement of the question of the future constitution of Italy until such time as the whole Italian people are in a position freely to express their opinion.

It should be pointed out to the various political elements in Western Italy that it is their duty to cooperate to the full with the Allied Military Government officials, who will seek to restore civil administration and public services; and that they will be expected to refrain from any political or industrial action which would hinder military operations, or undermine the position of the Italian Government of Victor Emmanuel. This will not prevent free expression of political opinion to the extent which considerations of security allow.

Contact between the political leaders of Western Italy and the Italian Government should be encouraged.

and public services; and that they will be expected to refrain from any political or industrial action which would hinder military operations, or undermine the position of the Italian Government of Signor Bonomi. This will not prevent free expression of political opinion to the extent which considerations of security allow.

Contact between the political leaders of Western Italy and the Italian Government should be encouraged.

4123

Subject:- Conferences.

To:-

Brig. Gen. Hume, SCAO 5th Army
Op. Capt. Benson, SCAO 8th Army
Col. Marshall, RC Piedmonte Region
Lt. Col. Peasey, RC Liguria Region
Col. Poletti, RC Lombardia Region

Ref: ACCA/369.

From:-

ACC Adv., Main HQ. A.A.I.

1. A conference has been convened for 12 Oct 44 at 1515 hours at the Administrative War Room, Main HQ AAI, at which Maj. Gen. Sir Brian H. Robertson, CAO, will preside.

2. The object of the conference is to discuss with Major General E.P. Nares, Commander No. 2 District, AMG organisation and problems appertaining to North West Italy.

3. It will be appreciated that this meeting is of paramount importance and it is requested that SCAO's and Regional Commissioners attend personally.

4. Brig. Lush will preside at a meeting to be held at 1000 hours on the same date and place to confer on AMG in N.W. Italy. It is hoped that addressees will be able to attend but if not will they please send a senior officer representative.

5. It is probable that all these officers will be attending the fortnightly conference at the Prefettura, Siena, on 11 Oct 44.

6. AMG Region 8 have kindly offered dormitory accommodation for the nights of 10, 11 and 12 Oct, also messing for this period. They regret that there are no single rooms available.

7. Will officers in acknowledging receipt of this letter please state if they wish accommodation reserved and messing provided also if such is required for drivers.

8. Mattresses and beds are provided for officers but NOT blankets. Rations need not be brought.

~~SECRET~~

1 Oct 44.

31A

Handwritten signature/initials

2. The object of the conference is to discuss with Major General E.P.Nares, Commander No.2 District, AMG organisation and problems appertaining to North West Italy.
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8. Mattresses and beds are provided for officers but NOT blankets. Rations need not be brought.

Frederick James

Lt.Col.
A.C.C. ADV.

4122

Copies to:

- CAO
- Col 'Q'
- Brig Lush
- Col Monfort
- Col Kirkwood, RC Region 8
- ACC LO, Adv. HQ. AAI

100-100000
100-100000
100-100000

SUBJECT: Allied Occupation of Western Italy.

Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/1/5 (Ops.)

29 Sep 1945

C.G., Fifth Army.
Chief Commissioner, A.C.C.

Reference this Headquarters letter MA/5/6 of 11 September.

1. Approval has now been given by A.Z.H.Q. to the proposals in paragraph 7 (a) & (b).
2. As regards the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the various political parties in Western Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command will be to support the authority of the Government of Signor Bonomi which includes representatives of the six principal parties in the State. The Allies are supporting this Government because it is pursuing a policy of maximum Italian participation in the war effort, and in internal affairs is pledged to the abolition of Fascist methods and influences. The Government is also pledged to postponement of the question of the future constitution of Italy until such time as the whole Italian people are in a position freely to express their opinion.

It should be pointed out to the various political elements in Western Italy that it is their duty to cooperate to the full with the Allied Military Government officials, who will seek to restore civil administration and public services; and that they will be expected to refrain from any political or industrial action which would hinder military operations, or undermine the position of the Italian Government of Signor Bonomi. This will not prevent free expression of political opinion to the extent which considerations of security allow.

Contact between the political leaders of Western Italy and the Italian Government should be encouraged.

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2. As regards the question of the attitude to be adopted towards the various political parties in Western Italy, the Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command will be to support the authority of the Government of Signor Bonomi which includes representatives of the six principal parties in the State. The Allies are supporting this Government because it is pursuing a policy of maximum Italian participation in the war effort, and in internal affairs is pledged to the abolition of Fascist methods and influences. The Government is also pledged to postponement of the question of the future constitution of Italy until such time as the whole Italian people are in a position freely to express their opinion.

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Contact between the political leaders of Western Italy and the Italian Government should be encouraged.

HMW/ocb.

Copy to: C.A.O. ✓
HQS (I).

(Sgd) A.P. HARDING; 121

Lieut-General,
Chief of General Staff.

Declassified E.O. 12350 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

~~TOP SECRET~~

H. QUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Ref: 805/29/CA.

29th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEMONTE & LOMBARDY.


TO : AAI Adv HQ.
Attn: C.G.S.

1. I refer to my letter 805/14/CA of 11th September and C-in-C's letter 44/536 of 11th September addressed to S.A.C., A.P.H.Q., copy to me.

2. After further consideration I would like to amend para 8 of my letter to read as follows:-

"In consultation with B.G.S.(Ops) plans have been made to send directions to Allied officers now operating in those areas with the patriot forces with the object of trying to persuade the local committees and bands to preserve law and order pending the arrival of Allied forces and the establishment of Allied Military Government. The officers have, however, been specifically warned to enter into no commitments with any of the bands or committees, not even with the National Committee of Liberation at MILAN whose representative character is purely conjectural even though it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

It is proposed to infiltrate three officers from P.W.B. who, with the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise and assist these officers on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence for use in providing material for propaganda output, and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable after the arrival of Allied forces."



ELERY W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ
British Resident Minister, AFHQ
US Political Adviser, AFHQ.
British High Commissioner to Allied Advisory Council.
Political Section.

4120

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: BOC/28/CA 23rd September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEMONTE and LIGURIA (Vacuum Period).

TO : Regional Commissioner,
LIGURIA REGION.
PIEMONTE REGION.
Region XI.

1. It has been decided to drop the proposal of sending an AMI officer with each SOE team into German occupied Italy. For your information four officers were selected and sent to MONTEOLI but they will be withdrawn in the next few days and reported to the Regions concerned for normal duty. The reason for this change of policy is that it was considered most important that AOC should not be in any way concerned with whatever local government might be set up during the period before the arrival of Allied troops and the establishment of Allied Military Government.

2. There are attached for your information:

- (a) Copy of instructions to SOE officers in the field. — 27
- (b) Copy of instructions to PAB representatives. — 25

CHIS/JG.

(Sgd) M. S. Lush.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: HQ. AMI Adv (G(Cops)).

Ref: 805/25/VA

22nd September 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of PIRENTE and LOMBARDY (Vacuum Period).

TO : Regional Commissioners,
LIGURIA REGION.
PIEMONTE REGION.
Region XI.

1. It has been decided to drop the proposal of sending an AMG officer with each SOS team into German occupied Italy. For your information four officers were selected and sent to MONTICELLI but they will be withdrawn in the next few days and reported to the Regions concerned for normal duty. The reason for this change of policy is that it was considered most important that AMG should not be in any way concerned with whatever local government might be set up during the period before the arrival of Allied troops and the establishment of Allied Military Government.

2. There are attached for your information

- (a) Copy of instructions to SOS officers in the field. — 27
- (b) Copy of instructions to PWB representatives. — 26

(Sgd) M. S. Lush.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

GWR/AG.

Copy to: HQ. AAI Adv (G(Ops)).
G-5 Sec, AFHQ.
Acting Chief Commissioner.
R.C., Region IX.
R.C., Region XII.
Patriots Bureau.

Received 27/9/44

Subject: Administration of Emergency and War Reliefs

No. 1 Special Force,
O. H. H.

S.O.E. Officers in the Field

22 September, 1944

1. These instructions are being sent to you for action in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area in which you are operating before the arrival of Allied troops. You should communicate any such withdrawal to your headquarters before putting them into operation.

2. Allied military government will be established in the areas in which you are operating as soon as but not before Allied troops arrive with Allied military government officers and you should so inform the local committees of liberation and patriot bands.

3. You should inform the local committees and patriot bands that their first duty is to carry out the operational orders of General Alexander. Their second duty should be so far as possible to protect public utilities and electric power installations from destruction. Their third duty, in common with that of all Italians, should be to preserve law and order until Allied military government is established.

4. You should make it clear to the committees and bands that the length of time which Military Government will last will depend largely on local conditions and the state of order and discipline which has been maintained up to the arrival of the Allied forces. It is the duty of all Italians to maintain the maximum amount of order. The success of the committees and bands in carrying out General Alexander's operational orders, in guarding utilities, in destruction and in preserving law and order will not, however, entitle the committees and bands as such to their recognition as a local or governmental authority on the part of the Allied military authorities when they arrive, and you should scrupulously avoid making any statements to the committees or bands which might be construed as commitments of this kind. This warning applies not only to the smaller bands and committees, but also to the Committee of National Liberation in Milan whose representative character is still purely conjectural, even though it has been encouraged to some extent by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

5. Your Reports should in future include information on the political, administrative and economic situation as well as reports on public opinion.

3. You are operating as soon as but not before Allied troops arrive with Allied military government officers and you should inform the local authorities of liberation and patriot bands.

4. You should inform the local committees and patriot bands that their first duty is to carry out the operational orders of General Alexander. Their second duty should be as far as possible to protect public utilities and electric power installations from destruction. Their third duty, in common with that of all Italians, should be to preserve law and order until Allied military government is established.

5. You should make it clear to the committees and bands that the length of time which Military Government will last will depend largely on local conditions and the state of order and discipline which has been maintained up to the arrival of the Allied forces. It is the duty of all Italians to maintain the maximum amount of order. The success of the committees and bands in carrying out General Alexander's operational orders, in guarding utilities, from destruction and in preserving law and order will not, however, entitle the committees and bands as such to their recognition as a local or governmental authority on the part of the Allied military authorities when they arrive, and you should scrupulously avoid making any statements to the committees or bands which might be construed as commitments of this kind. This warning applies not only to the smaller bands and committees, but also to the Committee of National Liberation in Milan whose representative character is still purely conjunctural, even though it has been encouraged to some extent by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

6. Your citizens should in future include information on the political, administrative and economic situation as well as reports on public opinion.

7. Three officers from P.M.B. are being sent to the chief centres to work under the authority of S.O.S. officers to assist and advise them on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence to help them in providing material for propaganda output and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as the Allied forces arrive.

My Chatter
p. 2 page 65

C. C. No. 1 Special Police.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017DRAFT.~~TOP SECRET~~

25

TO : PWB Reps (LIGURIA, PIEMONTE & LOMBARDY).

1. You will work under the instructions of the Commanding Officer, No.1 Special Force mission.
2. You will assist No.1 Special Force mission, particularly in that aspect of their work which is related to Psychological Warfare activities.
3. The Psychological Warfare activities which it will be your duty to organize to as great an extent as you are able, include:-
 - (a) The monitoring and dissemination of news in English where required, for example for B.I.Cs.
 - (b) The monitoring and dissemination of news in Italian so that the local patriots and Committee of Liberation have accurate up to date information, thus discrediting rumours.
 - (c) The collection of intelligence for transmission to base which will be of assistance in providing our material for propaganda output and also for providing guidance for the lines which our output should take.
 - (d) The surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable.
4. You will make any preliminary preparations which seem necessary to you for the setting up of a P.W.B. outpost when P.W.B. officers reach your area.

Copy sent to Major Hodgson to check with Major
 PWB and when checked by Major Hodgson and if
 OK, copy prepared and handed to him
 for dist. to his 3 reps. If OK
 box of instructions to his 3 reps prepared and
 sent. Hodgson's signature & handed to Major
 Hodgson

V. 29

8111
22/5

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

DSJ/mit

G-5: 014.14-10

19 September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEDMONTE & LOMBARDY

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner, HQ ACC, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to your letter of 805/14/CA of 9 September to Advance Headquarters AAI and to letter of the same date, reference 805/12/CA from Executive Commissioner to this Section. Contents of these letters and their enclosures have been fully considered by the Political Council.

2. As a result certain amendments of the procedure contemplated ~~and~~ suggested, and this Section is directed to send you the enclosed extract from the British Resident Minister's memorandum dealing with the matter.

3. Your letter of September 17 under reference 809/19/CA, delivered by hand of Brigadier Lush yesterday, also refers.

For the Ass't Chief of Staff, G-5:

D. S. Jackling
D. S. JACKLING
Lieut. Colonel

Incl. as above.

4136

EXTRACT FROM RES. MIN'S MEMORANDUM TO G-5 (9/150/0) OF 16 SEPT. 1944

5. We suggest:-

(a) That Captain Stone should be asked to write a further letter to the C.G.S. amending paragraph 8 of his letter of September 9th so as to read as follows:-

"In consultation with G.O.S.(Ops) plans have been made to send directions to Allied officers now operating in those areas with the patriot forces with the object of trying to persuade the local committees and bands to preserve law and order pending the arrival of Allied forces and the establishment of Allied Military Government. The officers have however been specifically warned to enter into no commitments with any of the bands or committees, not even with the National Committee of Liberation at Milan whose representative character is purely conjectural even though it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

It is proposed to infiltrate three officers from P.W.B. who, with the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise and assist those officers on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence for use in providing material for propaganda output, and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable after the arrival of Allied forces."

(b) That the directive to S.O.B. [and C.S.S.] officers in the field should be amended to read as follows:-

"1. These instructions are being sent to you for action in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area in which you are operating before the arrival of Allied troops. You should communicate any such withdrawal to your headquarters before putting them into operation.

2. Allied military government will be established in the areas in which you are operating as soon as but not before Allied troops arrive with Allied military government officers and you should so inform the local committees of liberation and patriot bands.

3. You should inform the local committees and patriot bands that their first duty is to carry out the operational orders of General Alexander. Their second duty should be so far as possible to pro-

See
Page 22

O.S.S. on

but for the fact that
under order
from ~~the~~

T.C. 4/08

21

under representative character is purely conjectural even though it has to some extent been encouraged by the Italian Government to regard itself as their agent.

It is proposed to infiltrate three officers from P. B. who, with the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise and assist these officers on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence for use in providing material for propaganda output, and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable after the arrival of Allied forces."

That the directive to S.O.S. [and U.S.S.] officers in the field should be amended to read as follows:-

688 an
but further down
from [unclear]
T.C. 4/56

"1. These instructions are being sent to you for action in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area in which you are operating before the arrival of Allied troops. You should communicate any such withdrawal to your headquarters before putting them into operation.

2. Allied military government will be established in the areas in which you are operating as soon as but not before Allied troops arrive with Allied military government officers and you should so inform the local committees of liberation and patriot bands.

3. You should inform the local committees and patriot bands that their first duty is to carry out the operational orders of General Alexander. Their second duty should be so far as possible to protect public utilities and electric power installations from destruction. Their third duty, in common with that of all Italians, should be to preserve law and order until Allied Government is established.

4. You should make it clear to the committees and bands that the length of time which military government will last will depend largely on local conditions and the state of order and discipline which has been maintained up to the arrival of the Allied forces. ~~It is therefore to the advantage of all Italians to maintain the~~ maximum amount of order. The success of the committees and bands in carrying out General Alexander's operational orders, in guarding utilities from destruction and in preserving law and order will not however entitle the committees and bands as such to their recognition as a local or governmental authority on the part of the Allied military authorities when they arrive, and you should scrupulously avoid making any statements to the committees or bands which might be construed as commitments of this kind. This warning applies not only to the smaller bands and committees, but also to the Committee of National liberation in Milan whose representative character is still purely conjectural, even though it has been en-

127

W. H. [unclear]

21

CONFIDENTIAL

couraged to some extent by the Italian Government to regard it-
self as their agent.

5. Your Sitreps should in future include information on the political, administrative and economic situation as well as reports on public opinion.

6. Three officers from F.W.B. are being sent to the chief centres to work under the authority of S.O.S. and O.S.S. officers to assist and advise them on the monitoring and dissemination of news, on the collection and transmission of intelligence to help them in providing material for propaganda output and on the surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as the Allied forces arrive."

(c) That there should be no directive to A.C.C. representatives (since it is not proposed that there should be any A.C.C. representatives in the area in question before Allied forces arrive).

and

(d) That the directive to the three F.W.B. representatives should be amended to read as follows:-

1. You will work under the instructions of the Commanding Officer Number One Special Force mission.

2. You will assist Number One Special Force mission, particularly in that aspect of their work which is related to Psychological Warfare activities.

3. The Psychological Warfare activities which it will be your duty to organise to as great an extent as you are able include:

(a) The monitoring and dissemination of news in English where required, for example for B.L.Os.

(b) The monitoring and dissemination of news in Italian so that the local patriots and Committee of Liberation have accurate up to date information, thus discrediting rumours.

(c) The collection of intelligence for transmission to base which will be of assistance in providing our material for propaganda output and also for providing guidance for the lines which our output should take.

Warfare activities

- (c) That there should be no directive to A.C.C. representatives (since it is not proposed that there should be any A.C.C. representatives in the area in question before Allied forces arrive), and
- (d) That the directive to the three P.W.B. representatives should be amended to read as follows:-
1. You will work under the instructions of the Commanding Officer Number One Special Force mission.
2. You will assist Number One Special Force mission, particularly in that aspect of their work which is related to Psychological Warfare activities.
3. The Psychological Warfare activities which it will be your duty to organise to as great an extent as you are able include:
- (a) The monitoring and dissemination of news in English where required, for example for H.I.Cs.
- (b) The monitoring and dissemination of news in Italian so that the local patriots and Committee of Liberation have accurate up to date information, thus discrediting rumours.
- (c) The collection of intelligence for transmission to base which will be of assistance in providing our material for propaganda output and also for providing guidance for the lines which our output should take.
- (d) The surveying of radio installations and newspaper activities with a view to their control as soon as practicable.
4. You will make any preliminary preparations which seem necessary to you for the setting up of a P.W.B. outpost when P.W.B. officers reach your area."

4113

805
C A B 220

SUBJECT: - Provision of Transport - A.C.C.

Adv Headquarters,
Allied Forces in Italy.

16/11/44 (Copy)

16/11/44

19 SEP Recd

Allied Control Commission.

1. In reply to your letter No. 805/14/GA of 11 Sep 44, the plans put forward by you are approved in principle.

2. With regard to the need for a larger number of vehicles for the transport of food mentioned in para 6, it is pointed out that provision for supply of vehicles is made by the War Office and War Department, on the basis of troop entitlements and does not admit of large scale issues to A.C.C. You should therefore pursue this question direct with A.P.H.C.

3. In connection with the transport of food, requests for help to this or either Army H.Q. should whenever possible be made in terms of tonnage to be lifted from A to B, and not in terms of G.C. or Truck Coys etc.

4. Requests for assistance over the transport of extra personnel mentioned in para 7 of your letter should be made to the H.Q. of the Army responsible for the military occupation of the area concerned.

W. D. D. D. D.

General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Copy to: - A.P.H.C. with the request that the questions raised in para 2 be taken up with the War Office and War Department as a matter of urgency. Lack of adequate transport for the distribution of food will almost certainly increase the risk of disorders, and hence has a direct bearing on the military commitment.

the transport of food mentioned in para 6, if it is pointed out that provision for supply of vehicles is made by the War Office and War Department, on the basis of troop entitlements and does not admit of large scale issues to A.C.C. You should therefore pursue this question direct with A.C.C.

3. In connection with the transport of food, requests for help in this or other Army M.A. should wherever possible be made in terms of tonnage to be lifted from A to B, and not in terms of A.T. or Truck Coys etc.

4. Requests for assistance over the transport of other personnel mentioned in para 7 of your letter should be made to the H.Q. of the Army responsible for the military occupation of the area concerned.

W. D. D. D. D. D.

W. D. D. D. D. D.
Commander-in-Chief.

/AM

Copy to:- A.P.H.A. with the request that the questions raised in para 2 be taken up with the War Office and War Department as a matter of urgency. Lack of adequate transport for the distribution of food will almost certainly increase the risk of disorders, and hence has a direct bearing on the military commitment, which it is essential to keep down to a minimum.

CAC
C(23) Main A.T.

4412

1944
A.C.C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017~~TOP SECRET~~HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394Ref: 505/12/CA17 September 44.

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEMONTE & LIGURIE.

TO: AFHQ

I refer to the Commander-in-Chief's letter of September 11th. (14-36)

1. The general plan for establishment of Allied Military Government was outlined in my 505/14/CA of September 11th. In para 2 of the Commander-in-Chief's letter (para. 1) I should assume that A.M.G. 5th Army would be occupied elsewhere and I should employ the Regional Staffs to set up the initial stages of A.M.G.; they would then enter the areas with the light mobile columns and would come under the command of the task force commander.

2. Para 3 of my letter of September 11th defined the action proposed in any vacuum period which may elapse between withdrawal of enemy forces and occupation by Allied troops. A copy of the proposed directive to Allied officers now or then in those areas was attached to my 505/12/CA of September 9th.

3. In the absence of any other instructions from you I would suggest that the attitude of A.M.G. officers to the various political parties or organizations in Western Italy (vide 7c of the Commander-in-Chief's letter) should be that followed in the past and in operations now, namely immediate contact with and use of Italian local government's administrative machine, taking the advice of the National Committee of Liberation in the appointment of temporary (Italian) officials wherever these committees are found to be satisfactory. Care will be taken, as is now done, to prevent these committees setting themselves up as alternative government and every effort will be made to preserve the structure and machinery of Italian local government.

ELMER V. STONE
Captain, USAR
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to: A.A.I.
Political Section
Captain Stone
CA Branch (thru EC & MD Section)

505-12-1
RECEIVED
11 DISPATCHED
11 HQ ACC, Secy Gen
11 18 Sep 1944
RECEIVED

COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

To: Brig. LUSH. A.C.C.
Mr. CAOCIA. A.C.C.

TOP SECRET

From: No 1 Special Force.

GERMAN ACTIVITIES IN TURIN.

Our British Liaison Mission near CUNEO reports
as follows:

- a) In TURIN the Military Hospital has been handed
back to the Italians. The Germans first removed
1,000 blankets and activity is at a standstill.
- b) Germans in the town are talking about leaving.
All cycling in the City prohibited.

Field.
9 Sep 44.

Copies to: Col. HANCOCK. ACC.
Mr. J. RAYNER. PWB.

D.B. Newman Major.
No 1 Special Force.

JP See by
dec 1 re

1110

14th September 1944

Ref: 808/17/34.

Acting Chief Commissioner.

1. I attach General Alexander's letter to SAC.

2. You will notice that Case 778 suggests that weak German Forces and Italian Fascist divisions will remain in Western Italy while the enemy is extricating his forces. This to a certain extent nullifies the vacuum period of which we were warned by HCS(Ops).

3. You will also notice in para. 2 that a static headquarters is to be organised immediately resistance has ceased. Paras 4, and 5 would appear to exclude 5 Army, and therefore 5 Army AGF, from eventual occupational duties in this area.

4. If you feel moved to suggest a reply to the last sentence of para 6 and para 7(c), I submit that a suggestion be made that the policy to be followed by AGF should be the same as that carried out hitherto, namely, immediate contact with and use of the Italian local governments, taking the advice of the National Committee of Liberation in the appointment of temporary officials (Italian) wherever those Committees are found. This is the policy which has been followed for the last year and has proved, I submit, successful.

(Sgd) M.S. Lush.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

MSL/JT.

concern - please
draft. full

15th September 1944

15th September 1944

Acting Chief Commissioner

1. I attach General Alexander's letter to SAC.

2. You will notice that Case "P" suggests that weak German forces and Italian Fascist divisions will remain in Western Italy while the enemy is extricating his forces. This to a certain extent modifies the previous period of which we were warned by DCS(Ops).

3. You will also notice in para. 2 that a static headquarters is to be organised immediately resistance has ceased. Paras 4 and 5 would appear to exclude 5 Army, and therefore 5 Army AG, from eventual occupational duties in this area.

4. If you feel moved to suggest a reply to the last sentences of para 6 and para 7(e), I submit that a suggestion be made that the policy to be followed by AG should be the same as that carried out hitherto, namely, immediate contact with and use of the Italian local governments, taking the advice of the National Committee of Liberation in the appointment of temporary officials (Italian) wherever these Committees are found. This is the policy which has been followed for the last year and has proved, I submit, successful.

draft. GILL

(Sgd) M.S. Lush.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

MS/JS.

11 Aug 44
Lt. Col. Shipp.
K/9. K.

1305

Advanced Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

11th September 1944.

Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Force Headquarters.

Allied Occupation of Western ITALY.

1. I appreciate that when it becomes clear to the enemy that he cannot hope any longer to hold the APENNINE position against the attacks of the Eighth and Fifth Armies, he will endeavour to withdraw his forces including those in Western ITALY to the line of the ALPS, the MINCIO and the PO. I hope to prevent this withdrawal by a rapid advance over the PO. In any case one of two situations seems likely to develop, viz:-

Case "A"

We succeed in cutting off the enemy's withdrawal, in which case considerable enemy forces will remain in Western ITALY and will have to be mopped up.

Case "B"

The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western ITALY before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat, and only weak German forces, and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western ITALY.

In case "A" I should be compelled to divert considerable forces to clear up Western ITALY, whereas in Case "B" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case it is essential to divert the minimum forces commensurate with the task from the much more important role of continuing the advance with the least possible delay and in the greatest possible strength into AUSTRIA and GERMANY.

2. Conflict between Partisans and Fascists, internal political factors, and economic dislocation consequent upon a German withdrawal will constitute, in my opinion, a fertile seed bed for serious disorder in Western ITALY. As the military commitment can only be kept to the minimum by preventing disorders or nipping them in the bud, I have come to the conclusion that whatever the circumstances, military occupation of PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY and the setting up of Allied Military Government, at any rate in the first instance, will be necessary. At the same time I consider it most important that only the minimum armed forces should be left to be necessary to continue this military

Italy to the line of the Alps, the Mincio and the Po. I hope to prevent this withdrawal by a rapid advance over the Po. In any case one of two situations seems likely to develop, viz:-

Case "A"

We succeed in cutting off the enemy's withdrawal, in which case considerable enemy forces will remain in Western Italy and will have to be mopped up.

Case "B"

The enemy succeeds in extricating his forces from Western Italy before our troops establish themselves across his main lines of retreat, and only weak German forces, and the Italian Fascist divisions remain in Western Italy.

In case "A" I should be compelled to divert considerable forces to clear up Western Italy, whereas in Case "B" that task should be within the power of light mobile columns. In either case it is essential to divert the minimum forces commensurate with the task from the much more important role of continuing the advance with the least possible delay and in the greatest possible strength into AUSTRIA and GERMANY.

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3. Consideration of these problems brings to light the need for an early decision for planning purposes as to the system of military administration eventually to be set up in Western Italy; whether it should be British, American or Inter-Allied, what form it should take, and how it should be controlled.

4. The country between LAKE GARDA and the Swiss Frontier is unsuitable for active operations, and the troops employed there would be the minimum required for blocking and reconnaissance purposes. The area west of ~~the~~ ^{the} PLACENZA - MILAN - COMO road would therefore be of no interest to Fifth Army from an operational point of view, except for the route from GENOA to supply points in the army area. Responsibility for such a large non-operational area would in fact be an encumbrance to an Army H.Q. in the field.

Responsibility for opening and working the port GENOA will, I understand, be accepted by CG, NATOUSA, but I imagine that he is hardly likely to wish to extend his responsibilities for territorial administration beyond the actual port and the road and rail routes from it to Fifth Army area. The only alternative therefore appears to be to set up a British Administrative District to take over responsibility for Western ITALY as soon as it has been cleared of hostile forces, and to allot ~~the~~ to the commander sufficient L of C and Italian troops for internal security duties in support of A.M.G., until such time as it is decided that the provinces concerned should be handed over to A.G.C or the Italian Government.

6. There is one other matter which is connected with the question of the military government and military administration of Western ITALY on which it seems to me that a decision of policy is required now if serious disorders are to be avoided. It is the question of the attitude to be adopted by officers of the Allied Military Government to the various Italian political parties in Western ITALY. According to my information there are three main parties, viz:- the Army Patriots (Monarchists), the Action Party (Republicans) and the Communists who are numerically the strongest and almost certainly the best organised. There is also the Committee of National Liberation to whom many thousands of armed patriots owe allegiance in greater or lesser degree. Naturally I have no wish to intervene in any way in local politics, but I am very much interested in their effect on the possibilities of disorders which, as I have already pointed out directly affect the military commitment. For that reason I consider that firm and clear instructions on this subject are required to make sure that disorders do not break out by reason of uncertainty on the part of the Italian people as to the attitude of the Allied Governments to their various political factions.

7. To summarise, I should be grateful for the earliest possible instructions and information on the following points:-

- (a) Your acceptance of my proposal that a static H.Q. should be set up to command and administer a garrison in PIERMONTI and LOMBARDY as soon as possible after occupation.
- (b) Confirmation that, if my proposal under (a) above is accepted, the static H.Q. should take the form of a British District H.Q., CG, SOS NATOUSA retaining in control of such scope of communications as he may require for the support of Fifth Army.
- (c) What should be my attitude and that of my A.M.G officers to the various political parties and organisations in Western ITALY.

(Sgd) H.R. ALEXANDER
General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

...ation to show many thousands of armed patriots owe allegiance in greater or lesser degree. Naturally I have no wish to intervene in any way in local politics, but I am very much interested in their effect on the possibilities of disorders which, as I have already pointed out directly affect the military commitment. For that reason I consider that firm and clear instructions on this subject are required to make sure that disorders do not break out by reason of uncertainty on the part of the Italian people as to the attitude of the Allied Governments to their various political factions.

7. To summarise, I should be grateful for the earliest possible instructions and information on the following points:-

- (a) Your acceptance of my proposal that a static H.Q. should be set up to command and administer a garrison in PIEDMONT and LOMBARDY as soon as possible after occupation.
- (b) Confirmation that, if my proposal under (a) above is accepted, the static H.Q. should take the form of a British District H.Q., CG, SOS NATOUSA remaining in control of such some of communications as he may require for the support of Fifth Army.
- (c) What should be my attitude and that of my A.M.G. officers to the various political parties and organisations in Western ITALY.

(Sgd) E. R. ALEXANDER

General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Copy to: C.G., Fifth Army.
Chief Communications, A.C.C.

~~TOP SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner,
APO 39.

14
11th September 1944.

Ref: SOS/14/04

SUBJECT: Administration of PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY.

TO : Advance Headquarters,
Allied Areas in Italy.
Attn: C.G.S.

1. I have to acknowledge your 16/1/G(Ops) dated 6 Sep. 44, and note the principles laid down for the conduct of civil affairs in PIEMONTE and LOMBARDY.

2. Plans will be made to meet, as far as is possible, the varying conditions which may be found in these areas. I would point out, however, that the number of troops to be employed must be closely related, in inverse proportion, to the amount of food for the civil population which can be made available in these areas.

3. It is intended to carry out the initial stages of Allied Military Government in the same manner as has been done throughout this campaign. That is to say, civil affairs officers will accompany the occupying troops and set up the preliminary stages of government. These civil affairs officers would normally be drawn from AMG 5 Army if the occupying troops are to be found from that Army. If, however, 5 Army is fully occupied operationally and light mobile columns only are used, it will be appreciated that the AMG staff of 5 Army will also be fully occupied with the Army and that only a small number of advanced civil affairs officers will be available from that source. I should be grateful, therefore, for the earliest information possible as to the composition of the occupying force to be employed and the sources from which it will be drawn.

4. Following up the spearhead forces, three Regional organisations are in process of formation. These will be employed in place of 5 Army AMG if those officers are not available.

5. These organisations or AMG task forces will be directed towards GENOA the centre of LIGURIA, TURIN the centre of PIEMONTE, and MILAN the centre of LOMBARDY. Their total strength will amount to approximately 250 officers.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NN0 No. 735017

-2-

6. Steps have already been taken to furnish the minimum amount of food required for the urgent operations but so far as is known at present no transport will be available to move this food into the areas. For this purpose it will be necessary for the AMO task forces to be provided with:-

120	3-ton trucks for	LIBERIA
360	"	"
360	"	"
		PIEDMONT
		IASBARIH.

This fact has already been brought to the notice of G-5 AMHQ with the suggestion that in the event of the employment of mobile columns entering the country in the face of weak and comparatively docile enemy forces, certain units with their transport should be allotted to the task of carrying food for civilian needs.

7. The mobility of the AMO task forces is by no means assured. Requests for extra personnel vehicles have not yet been met and I have been advised that in the event of rapid occupation, I should request your Headquarters to provide personnel vehicles.

8. In consultation with RGS(Ops), plans have been made to send directions to Allied officers now operating in these areas with the patriot forces with the object of ensuring that during any period which may elapse between the withdrawal of enemy forces and the arrival of Allied forces, law and order should be preserved by the National Committee of Liberation. In accordance with these plans it is proposed to infiltrate into the area three officers from AMO and three officers from PMO who, under the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise both these officers and the National Committee of Liberation, during any such period. It is not intended to set up Allied Military Government through the means of these officers who will have no executive powers. Allied Military Government will not be set up until the arrival of Allied troops with their accompanying civil affairs officers.

9. I trust these plans have your approval in principle. A copy of this letter is being sent to AMHQ.

WILKINSON S. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AMHQ
British Resident Minister, AMHQ
US Political Adviser, AMHQ
British High Commissioner to Allied Advisory Council.
Political Section.

W. S. Stone

113

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 594.

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 805/12/34.

9th September, 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of PIRENNE & LIGURIA.

To : G-3 Section, AFHQ.
Attn: Colonel Charles Spofford.

My dear Spofford:

As we come under you tomorrow I am sending you copies of the Acting Chief Commissioner's reply to the CCS outlining his plans for the setting up of Allied Military Government in E.W. Italy, including his plans for the period of vacuum which may take place before Allied Military Government can be established.

2. In this connection we have had various meetings with General Alexander's SAG(Ops), the Political Section, S.O.S. and P.W.S. With the approval of the CCS it is proposed to act in accordance with para. 8 of Captain Stone's letter to the CCS, that is to say, three AGC officers will be infiltrated into the chief centres of the territory in an advisory role and will report NOT as executive AGC officers. I enclose a directive which it is proposed to send to S.O.S. and G.R.S. officers in the field and a directive for the AGC and PWS officers which it is proposed to infiltrate.

3. As Mr. MacMillan and Mr. Kirk were brought into the initial discussions on this matter I am sending a copy by hand to Mr. MacMillan and am seeing that a copy is sent to Mr. Kirk. You may care to discuss with them.

4. If there are any objections to the plan as outlined from any source, would you kindly let me know immediately because it is essential that we should set the plans in operation without delay.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Maurice Lush.

ESH/JS.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: British Resident Minister, AFHQ.
US Political Adviser, AFHQ.
British High Commissioner in Advisory Council
Political Section.

(with copies of 805/12/34 of 6 Sep.)
(805/12/34 of 9 Sep. 1 copied
& despatched)

S.O.S. (and O.S.S.) Officers in the Field.

1. These instructions are being sent to you for action in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area in which you are operating before the arrival of Allied troops. You should communicate any such withdrawal to your Headquarters before putting them into operation.
2. Until Allied troops arrive with Allied Military Government officers, Allied Military Government will not be set up in the areas in which you are operating. Your objective in the meantime should be to do everything in your power through the local Committees of Liberation or Patriots Bands to ensure that a total breakdown of local administration is avoided until the arrival of Allied troops, when Allied Military Government will be established. You should make this latter fact clear to the Committees and Patriots Bands and you may add that the length of time which Military Government will last will depend largely on local conditions and the state of order and discipline which has been maintained up to the arrival of the Allied Forces. A message signed by General Alexander to the Committees and Patriots is being sent with these directions.
3. Allied Military Government implies that the proclamations of General Alexander, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, have the force of law. The execution of these proclamations and General Alexander's orders on civil matters is carried out by Allied Military officers who work through the local Italian Government machinery, stripped of Fascists. It has been the policy to invoke the advice of National Committees of Liberation in the execution of these orders.
4. In carrying out the general policy defined above before the establishment of Allied Military Government you should follow such further orders as may be given by General Alexander. In civil matters everything will be done in ROME to see that the Italian Government are associated with these orders. You, on your part, should do your utmost to assure the local Committees and Patriot Bands that the Central Italian Government in Rome has the support of General Alexander and the Allied Nations. Consequently, you should warn Local Committees against challenging the authority of the Government.
5. The first duty of Patriot Bands is to carry out the operational orders of General Alexander. Their second duty is to preserve law and order. As they may be the only friendly armed units in the area, Patriot Bands should be used at your discretion for such police purposes as may be possible and consonant with their first duty. Police arm bands will be provided to you for such police purposes.

-2-

6. It will be found necessary, in order to set up local Government for the preservation of law and order, to appoint Prefects, Sindacos and other local Government officials in the place of Fascists. You should warn the National Committees that any appointments made by them must be regarded as provisional (Regenti) only and that they will be subject to confirmation by the Allied Military Government in consultation with the Italian Government in Rome.

7. It should be remembered that public utilities and electric power installations are of vital importance and should be protected from destruction by all possible means. They should be guarded whenever possible.

8. It is essential that your Sitreps in future should include information as to the political, administrative and economic situation and reports on public opinion.

9. In order to assist in preparing for the state of affairs outlined above, three officers from A.C.D. and 3 officers from P.V.B. are being sent to the chief centres to work under the authority of S.O.E. and C.S.S. officers and advise them on the lines of the directions above. These directions are also being sent to all S.O.E. and C.S.S. officers in the field in order that co-ordination of policy may be assured.

2th September 1944.

4136

DRAFT.

TO : A.S.C. Representatives (LIVORNA, PIZZUNO, and LONGARDY)
F.S.B. Representatives (and LONGARDY).

1. You are being sent to LIVORNA, PIZZUNO, and LONGARDY in order to assist the A.S.C. and F.S.B. officers now working with the patriots in carrying out the instructions attached.

2. You will operate under the command of the senior Allied officer in whose area you are located. ^{After consulting} You will advise him, and with his agreement you will advise the National Committee of Liberation, on any aspects which may be of assistance regarding local government and preservation of law and order.

3. You will appreciate that Allied Military Government will not be set up in these areas until the arrival of Allied troops and civil affairs officers. You will NOT set up Allied Military Government and you will make this perfectly clear to all concerned. You will act in an advisory and not an executive capacity in your relations with the National Committee of Liberation and the civilian population. You are being sent to advise and guide in preparation for Allied Military Government but you are not an executive officer of Allied Military Government.

4. You should report to the senior Allied officer working with the patriots and your communications to this headquarters should be addressed through him. You will likewise receive any further instructions

officer in whose area you are located. A You will advise him, and with his agreement you will advise the National Committee of Liberation, on any aspects which may be of assistance regarding local government and preservation of law and order.

3. You will appreciate that Allied Military Government will not be set up in these areas until the arrival of Allied troops and civil affairs officers. You will NOT set up Allied Military Government and you will make this perfectly clear to all concerned. You will act in an advisory and not an executive capacity in your relations with the National Committee of Liberation and the civilian population. You are being sent to advise and guide in preparation for Allied Military Government but you are not an executive officer of Allied Military Government. You should report to the senior Allied officer working with the patriots and your communications to this Headquarters should be addressed through him. You will likewise receive any further instructions after your arrival at his Headquarters through him.

4039

DRAFT.

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394.

Ref: 805/ /Ch.

24th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of FRIEDRICH & LOMBARDY.

TO : Advance Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.
Attn: C. G. S.

1. I have to acknowledge your 16/1/C(Ops) dated 6.9.44 and note the principles laid down for the conduct of civil affairs in FRIEDRICH and LOMBARDY.

2. Plans will be made to meet, so far as is possible, the varying conditions which may be found in these areas. I would point out, however, that the number of troops to be employed must be closely related, in inverse proportion, to the amount of food for the civil population which can be imported into these areas with the troops.

3. It is intended to carry out the initial stages of Allied Military Government in the same manner as has been done throughout this campaign. That is to say, civil affairs officers will accompany the occupying troops and set up the preliminary stages of Government. These civil affairs officers would normally be drawn from APO 5 Army if the occupying troops are to be found from that Army. If, however, 5 Army is fully occupied operationally and light mobile columns only are used, it will be appreciated that the APO staff of 5 Army will also be fully occupied with the Army and that only a small number

1. I have to acknowledge your 16/1/0(Ops) dated 6.8.64 and note

the principles laid down for the conduct of civil affairs in PLINSETH and

LOWRANCE.

2. Plans will be made to meet, so far as is possible, the varying conditions which may be found in these areas. I would point out, however, that the number of troops to be employed must be closely related, in inverse proportion, to the amount of food for the civil population which can be imported into those areas with the troops.

3. It is intended to carry out the initial stages of Allied Military Government in the same manner as has been done throughout this campaign.

That is to say, civil affairs officers will accompany the occupying troops and set up the preliminary stages of Government. These civil affairs officers would normally be drawn from AMF 5 Army if the occupying troops are to be found from that Army. If, however, 5 Army is fully occupied operationally and light mobile columns only are used, it will be appreciated that the AMF staff of 5 Army will also be fully occupied with the Army and that only a small number of advanced civil affairs officers will be available from that source. I should be grateful, therefore, for the earliest information possible as to the composition of the force to be employed and the source from which it will be drawn.

4. Following up the spearhead forces, three Regional organisations are in process of formation. These will be employed in place of 5 Army AMF if those officers are not available.

5. These organisations or AMF task forces will be directed towards UNION the centre of LIBERIA, THRU the centre of PLINSETH, and MILAN the centre of LOWRANCE. Their total strength will amount to approximately 250 officers.

-2-

6. Steps have already been taken to furnish ^{the} minimum amount of food required for the urgent operations but so far as is known at present, no transport will be available to move this food into the areas. For this purposes it will be necessary for the AMT task forces to be provided with:

120 3-ton trucks for LIGURIA
360 " " " PIEDMONT
360 " " " LOMBARDY

This fact has already been brought to the notice of G-5 AFHQ with the suggestion that in the event of the employment of mobile columns entering the country in the face of weak and comparatively docile enemy forces, certain units with their transport should be allotted to the task of carrying food for civilian needs.

7. The mobility of the AMT task forces is by no means assured. Requests for extra personnel vehicles have not yet been met and I have been advised that in the event of rapid occupation, I should request your Headquarters to provide personnel vehicles.

8. In consultation with JCS(Ops), plans have been made to send directions to Allied officers now operating ~~xxx~~ in those areas with the patriot forces with the object of ensuring that during any period which may elapse between the withdrawal of enemy forces and the arrival of Allied forces, law and order should be preserved by the National Committee of Liberation. In accordance with these plans it is proposed to infiltrate into the area three officers from A.C.C. and 3 officers from P.M.B. who, under the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise both

the suggestion that in the event of the employment of mobile column entering the country in the face of weak and comparatively feeble enemy forces, certain units with their transport should be allotted to the task of carrying food for civilian needs.

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8. In consultation with HQS (Ops), plans have been made to send directions to Allied officers now operating ~~with~~ in those areas with the patriot forces with the object of ensuring that during any period which may elapse between the withdrawal of enemy forces and the arrival of Allied forces, law and order should be preserved by the National Committee of Liberation. In accordance with these plans it is proposed to infiltrate into the area three officers from A.C.C. and 3 officers from P.M.B. who, under the authority of the Allied officers now operating, will advise both these officers and the National Committee of Liberation, during any such period. It is not intended to set up Allied Military Government through the ^{hand} of these officers who will have no executive powers. Allied Military Government will not be set up until the arrival of Allied troops with their accompanying civil affairs officers.

9. I trust these plans have your approval in principle. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.M.

SECRET - Administration of PIEDMONT and LOIREAUX.

TOP SECRET

Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

16/1/5 (Ops)

6 Sep 44.

Acting Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission.

1. In reply to your 805/3/CA of 1 Sep 44 the C-in-C has given careful consideration to the problems raised by you. As a result he has decided that the conduct of civil affairs in PIEDMONT and LOIREAUX shall be governed by the following principles:-

- (a) Military occupation of these provinces and the setting up of an A.M.G. administration at least in the first instance will be essential.
 - (b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.
 - (c) The quicker an A.M.G. organisation can be set up the less the military commitment will be. The A.M.G. organisation must therefore be prepared to take over these provinces at short notice.
 - (d) The military commitment must be reduced and all Allied troops released as quickly as possible. The A.M.G. organisation must therefore be prepared for the early withdrawal of Allied troops for operations, and their replacement by Italian troops again on a minimum scale.
2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let us know at once.
3. The C-in-C has discussed these matters with the SAC-in-C who expressed himself in agreement with the principles enunciated above.
4. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.F.H.Q.

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(b) The method by which military occupation will be effected will depend mainly on the strength and attitude of the enemy forces remaining in these provinces. If they are in strength and aggressive considerable forces will have to be employed. If they are weak and comparatively docile light mobile columns will be used. In either case the minimum forces necessary for the tasks will be diverted for this purpose.

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2. The C-in-C would be glad if you would prepare plans based on the principles mentioned above. If there are any points on which you require further guidance, please let me know at once.

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4. A copy of this letter is being sent to A.P.H.Q.

AMH/bps

Handling
Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

Copy to: - A.P.H.Q.

*Send CC5 by hand TO Done by
Sir Noel Charles
Pl. Hink
Capt Slaughter*

05/11/0A.

CONFIDENTIAL

Acting Chief Commissioner.

The directions contained in the attached Draft will, with your approval, be communicated to Allied Officers operating with the Patriots in Region X and XI. These officers and officers who may be sent subsequently will also carry an authority signed by General Alexander to carry out his directions in maintenance of civil law and order until the arrival of A.M.G. The latter category of officers will also be briefed verbally by Colonel Hancock (A.M.G. Region XI.).

B.G., A.C.C., is now considering the nomination of officers to be dropped by parachute, together with P.W.B. officers, at three main centres in the area.

The Director, P.W.B., with the Director, Patriot Branch, are drafting a message to Patriots on the same lines as the original message sent by General Alexander, suitably amended.

Copy to:

V.Pa. Political Section. (2)
Director, P.W.B.
Director, Patriots Branch.
Commander Holdsworth.
V.P. Adm. Sec.

3rd September, 1944.

See by M.C.

4035

5A
TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 12356, Section 3.3/NND. Officers in the Field.

These instructions are being sent to you for action in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area in which you are operating before the arrival of Allied troops. You should communicate any such withdrawal to your Headquarters before putting them into operation. Your objective should be to do everything in your power through the local Committee of Liberation or Patriot Bands to ensure that a total breakdown of local administration is avoided until the arrival of Allied troops, when Allied Military Government will be established. You should make this latter fact clear to the Committees and Patriot Bands and you say add that the length of time which Military Government will last will depend largely on local conditions and the state of order and discipline which has been maintained up to the arrival of the Allied Forces. A message signed by General Alexander to the Committees and Patriots is being sent with these directions.

2. Allied Military Government implies that the proclamations of General Alexander, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, have the force of law. The execution of these proclamations and General Alexander's orders on civil matters is carried out by Allied Military Officers who work through the local Italian Government machinery, stripped of Fascists. It has been the policy to invoke the advice of National Committees of Liberation in the execution of these orders.

3. In carrying out the general policy defined above you should follow such further orders as may be given by General Alexander. In civil matters everything will be done in Rome to see that the Italian Government are associated with these orders. You, on your part, should do your utmost to ensure the local Committees and Patriot Bands that the Central Italian Government in Rome has the support of General Alexander and the Allied Nations. Consequently, you should warn local Committees against challenging the authority of this Government.

4. The first duty of Patriot Bands is to carry out the operational orders of General Alexander. Their second duty is to preserve law and order. As they may be the only friendly armed units in the area, Patriot Bands should be used at your discretion for such police purposes as may be possible and consistent with their first duty. Police Arm Bands will be provided to you for such police purposes.

5. It will be found necessary in order to set up local Government for the preservation of law and order, to appoint Prefects, Sindacos and other local Government officials in the place of Fascists. You should warn the National Committees that any appointments made by them must be regarded as provisional (Provisori) only and that they will be subject to confirmation by the Allied Military Government in consultation with the Italian Government in Rome.

6. It should be remembered that public utilities and electric power installations are of vital importance and should be protected from destruction by all possible means. They should be guarded whenever possible.

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5. It will be found necessary, in order to set up local Government for the preservation of law and order, to appoint Prefects, Sindacos and other local Government officials in the place of Fascists. You should warn the National Committees that any appointments made by them must be regarded as provisional (Segretti) only and that they will be subject to confirmation by the Allied Military Government in consultation with the Italian Government in Rome.

6. It should be remembered that public utilities and electric power installations are of vital importance and should be protected from destruction by all possible means. They should be guarded whenever possible.

7. It is essential that your Officers in future should include information as to the political, administrative and economic situation and reports on public opinion.

4054

1st September, 1944.

1327

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

14

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
POLITICAL SECTION
APO 394

~~TOP SECRET~~

3rd September, 1944.

I am just off for a couple of days to accompany Gen Benson to San Marino, in accordance with paragraph 4 of memorandum 776/3/0A of the 18th August about the neutrality of that Republic. Before going I send you a first draft of the directions which it is proposed should be communicated to Allied officers operating in Regions X and II for their guidance in the event of German forces withdrawing from the area before the arrival of Allied troops. As you will have heard from Henry Hopkinson (see record of meeting held here on the 31st August, paragraph 4), this period may even, according to military appreciation of A.A.I., last for two or three weeks. I expect that Henry also told you that there are some 26 British officers already in the field. They will have a tough assignment if there is any appreciable interval before the arrival of Allied troops. But we must try to make the best of them for lack of any other means.

I was very glad to hear from you that you would support our urgent plea for the necessity of Allied troops entering this area at the earliest possible moment so that military government can be established at least for a time. From what Brookes Burrows told the High Commissioner last night, on his return from A.A.I. Advanced, where he had seen Generals Wilson and Alexander, it looks as if they too will agree. Whether we get the two divisions which were thought at the meeting to be a minimum is another matter!

A copy of this letter, as well as of the enclosures, has of course gone to the High Commissioner.

CAC:ic

M/3/9.

H. Makins, Esq., C.M.G.,
Office of the British Resident Minister.

4053

1st September 1944.

Ref: 805/3/2A.

SUBJECT: Administration of PIRENOST and LOMBARDY.

TO : Commander-in-Chief,
Headquarters,
Allied Forces in Italy,
G. M. F.

1. In forwarding the attached record of a meeting held yesterday at which your HQS (Ops) was present, I feel it my duty to present to you the important political and administrative issues which will be at stake in PIRENOST and LOMBARDY in whatever manner they are liberated. It is not improbable that the outcome of events in this area may affect the political future of Italy for a considerable period.

2. I have consulted Mr. Ambassador Kirk and Sir Noel Charles who are in full agreement with me as to the importance of this matter and who are greatly concerned at the possibility that no Allied Forces may be available to preserve order. I would add my own recommendation that without the presence of Allied Forces it would be most impracticable to attempt to establish Allied Military Government in this area. If no such attempt can be made, it will be realised that grave risks of disorder will arise.

3. I should be grateful, not only from the point of view of the Allied Control Commission but also on behalf of Mr. Ambassador Kirk and Sir Noel Charles, for an opportunity to ascertain your views.

(Sgd) WALTER H. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

1. In forwarding the attached record of a meeting held yesterday at which your MSB(Ops) was present, I feel it my duty to present to you the important political and administrative issues which will be at stake in PIREMONT and LONGMONT in whatever manner they are liberated. It is not improbable that the outcome of events in this area may affect the political future of Italy for a considerable period.

2. I have consulted Mr. Ambassador Kirk and Sir Noel Charles who are in full agreement with me as to the importance of this matter and who are greatly concerned at the possibility that no Allied Forces may be available to preserve order. I would add my own recommendation that without the presence of Allied Forces it would be most impracticable to attempt to establish Allied Military Government in this area. If no such attempt can be made, it will be realized that grave risks of disorder will arise.

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(Sgd) ELLERY F. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

1330

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 596

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

1st September 1944

REPORT OF MEETING HELD AT APO HQ ON
1st AUGUST 1944

- | | | |
|-----------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <u>Present:</u> | Brigadier W. S. Bush | - Executive Commissioner, HQ APO |
| | Brigadier H. R. E. McInnes | - JCS (Ops), HQ AAI. |
| | Mr. Harold Jacobs | - Political Section, HQ APO |
| | Colonel C. V. McCarthy | - Patriots Branch, HQ APO |
| | Colonel A. H. Harcourt | - R.C. Headquarters, Region XI. |
| | Col. Goldworth | - R.C. Designate, Region XI. |
| | Lt. Colonel G. C. Penney | - R.C. Designate, Region XI. |
| | Mr. Rayner | - R.C. Designate, Region XI. |

1. The meeting was held in order to discuss:
 - (a) the measures to be taken with regard to civil affairs in FIVELETS and LINDSEY in the event of a German withdrawal from those areas without simultaneous entry of Allied troops;
 - (b) the form of administration to be set up (APO or Italian Government under APO);-
 - (i) in the preliminary stages;
 - (ii) in the final stages.
2. It appeared possible that:-
 - (a) the German and Italian forces would be withdrawn from the area before it would be physically possible for Allied troops to enter;
 - (b) the German forces would be withdrawn leaving behind the Italian forces.
3. In the case of (b) the Fascist Republic Government would presumably exercise in nominal authority and although it appeared probable that the Italian Government would be gradually destroyed by the patriots, the situation would be one in which the Allies might not be able to intervene in certain areas until Allied forces entered.

Declassified E.O. 12350 Section 3.2/NND No. 1725717

Mr. Tolson, Mr. E. A. Tamm, Mr. Clegg, Mr. Glavin, Mr. Ladd, Mr. Nichols, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Tracy, Mr. Carson, Mr. Egan, Mr. Gurnea, Mr. Hendon, Mr. Pennington, Mr. Quinn, Mr. Nease, Mr. Gandy

1. The meeting was held in order to discuss:
 - (a) the measures to be taken with regard to civil affairs in Germany and Italy in the event of a German withdrawal from those areas without simultaneous entry of Allied troops;
 - (b) the form of administration to be set up (AMG or Italian Government under AMG);
 - (c) in the preliminary stages;
 - (i) in the final stages.
 - (d) It appeared possible that:-
 - (a) the German and Italian forces would be withdrawn from the area before it would be physically possible for Allied troops to enter;
 - (b) the German forces would be withdrawn leaving behind the Italian divisions.

In the case of (b) the Fascist Republic Government would presumably remain in nominal authority and although it appeared probable that the Italian divisions would be gradually destroyed by the patriots, the situation would be one in which the Allies might not be able to intervene in certain areas until Allied forces entered or occupied.
2. In the case of (a), however, a state of affairs would come about which might last for two or three weeks in which the area would be devoid of any troops. The meeting discussed the measures to be taken to cover this period.
3. It was decided that:-
 - (a) the Central National Committee of Administration in Northern Italy, which is already in touch with the Italian Government and the Allies, would visit the area and should be regarded as the central authority and should be regarded as the representative of the Government;
 - (b) the meeting recommended that a small team headed by an experienced (preferably AMG) officer, should be despatched by air to get in touch with this Committee as soon as possible, that is to say, before the German withdrawal. This officer's duty would be to advise the central committee and to guide them as far as possible in the management of affairs.
6. The meeting decided to recommend that for the purposes of local conditions, particularly in the larger towns, Special Service officers already detailed for the

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area, should be briefed by APT and should be used for that purpose preferable to sending other APT officers.

7. It was decided to prepare a division to cover the political, administrative and economic issues which will arise during the period of vacuum. This division would be given to such officers as were sent in and sent to those already in the area.

8. On the political side this division would stress the importance of the Central Committee assuming temporary control as the representative of the Government-in-Exile and of the Italian Government. The administrative part would give general directions with regard to the establishment of law and order through the troops and the Carabinieri, of courts and local government, and control of the press. It was noted that IAP would wish to send a team at the same time or later and it was suggested that they might arrange to take control of the more important papers. It was realized that on the economic side the division would be confined to a survey of the position.

9. It was arranged for Commanders of Special Forces (SOF and 403) and Colonel Hancock and Messing to discuss arrangements for briefing the officers and for dropping the APT team. Political Section and Colonel Hancock to prepare draft directive for instructions for Brigadier Messing to inform the Government-in-Exile of the recommendations.

10. The meeting then proceeded to discuss the desirability of setting up Allied Military Government in the area after the period of vacuum, i.e., when Allied troops can enter, or of turning the two regions over immediately to the Italian Government.

11. The operational importance of avoiding, if possible the necessity of having to send any troops to the area was fully realized. At the same time the definite possibility of grave disorder which might arise as a result of the continued absence of troops raised political and administrative problems of the highest order which would not be disregarded. IAP stated that the Italian Army would not be in a position to send any units for more than a month. At the same time it appeared to the meeting that whatever form of government was set up, having regard to the probable almost total absence of Carabinieri, it would be necessary for that government to have two divisions in the case of Allied troops and 3 divisions in the case of Italian troops. It was agreed that unless Allied troops were sent to the area no attempt would be made to set up IAP and hence the direct administrative responsibility which it would entail. If it was handed over to the Italian Government, Italian troops would be available, but would have to be provided. In the latter event, of course, the Italian Government should be consulted particularly as regards the necessity for Italian troops. In either case law and order could only be maintained if adequate food supplies are made available and this in turn would depend upon transport being available.

12. The advantages of handing over to the Italian Government were:-

- (a) the avoidance of the use of Allied troops;

For bringing the 1st Army Political Section and Colonel Harwood to prepare draft directive for submission for Brigadier commanding to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the recommendations.

10. The meeting then proceeded to discuss the desirability of setting up Allied Military Government in the area after the period of truce, i.e., when Allied troops can enter, or of turning the two regions over immediately to the Italian Government.

11. The operational importance of avoiding, if possible, the necessity of having to send any troops to the area was fully realized. At the same time the definite possibility of grave disorder which might arise as a result of the continued absence of troops raised political and administrative problems of the highest order which could not be disregarded. ICG stated that the Italian Army could not be in a position to send any units for more than a month. At the same time it appeared to the meeting that whatever form of government was set up, having regard to the probable almost total absence of Carabinieri, it would be necessary for that government to have two divisions in the case of Allied troops and 3 divisions in the case of Italian troops. It was agreed that unless Allied troops were sent to the area no attempt should be made to set up law and order until the direct administrative responsibility which it is would entail. If it was turned over to the Italian Government, Italian troops would be suitable, but would have to be provided. In the latter event, of course, the Italian Government should be consulted particularly as regards the necessity for Italian troops. In either case law and order could only be maintained if adequate food supplies were provided and this in turn would depend upon transport being available.

12. The advantages of handing over to the Italian Government were:-

- (a) the avoidance of the use of Allied troops in Italy
- (b) political - both internally and internationally.

The disadvantages appeared to be that there would be a grave risk, especially if so or only a few Italian troops were employed, of disorders, food riots, and great delay in the return to normal life, particularly in industry. It seemed that even if the area was handed back to the Italian Government, the responsibility for such disorder and delay would rightly or wrongly be attributed to the Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Allied Commander.

13. The advantages of Allied Military Government were that it ensured a better and more orderly return to normality and reduced the risk of disorder, provided that Allied troops were available to back it, and that adequate food supplies could be transported to the area. The disadvantages were that it entailed the detachment of two divisions of Allied troops.

14. It was decided that ICG and Executive Commissioner should recommend the views of the meeting to the Commander-in-Chief and the Acting Chief Commissioner respectively.

Dir: C-in-C, S.C., A.M.
SAC(S), M. A.M.
Col. Macmillan
Lt. Col. Macmillan
Lt. Col. Macmillan
Lt. Col. Macmillan

(Sgd) M.S. Lusk
Executive Comm.

22/1/44

A/C.C

EG

~~TOP SECRET~~

31st August 1944

MEMORANDUM:

CONFIDENTIAL

1. We have to face the possibility of the Germans withdrawing their forces from Region X and the Western Provinces of Region XI, including Milan, without physical pressure in those areas from Allied Forces. It may well be that these areas will be left without either enemy forces or Allied forces for some considerable time. At the best we can probably hope for only a small, and a very small, token force entering into the area after the expiration of that period.
2. We therefore have to consider how to deal with a densely populated area liberated from the Germans without presence of Allied troops.
3. In the initial stages to introduce full Allied Military Government in these circumstances would seem to be out of the question. Such administration depends to a large extent on the presence of Allied troops.
4. The earliest moment when the full teams could enter would appear to be with the token force which will be sent when they can be spared from the operational front.
5. We therefore have to consider whether we are to leave the people in this area to their own devices and to face the consequent political chaos and physical disorder that will inevitably arise, or whether we can ameliorate conditions by the infiltration, as soon as possible after the retirement of the German forces, of a few Civil Affairs Officers who would try to persuade the various elements in the area to preserve some kind of order and establish some kind of local government which would have a nexus with the Italian Government and ourselves.
6. There are with the patriot bands a number of Allied Officers on purely military duty. It would be possible, so I am informed, to reinforce these officers with a few Civil Affairs Officers who would either enter the country by sea, land or by air.
7. There is also, I understand, a strong Italian personality with two political assistants now in the area. It would be possible to send a senior officer to conduct this party, furnished with some kind of authority from AAI or ASD, with the object of making him the authorized representative of Government.
8. Such officers would have the necessary experience to re-organise such of the Carabinieri as were left, to deal with the Comitato di Liberazione, and in a small way they would probably do much to preserve the area from chaos and might by its support of the Italian triumvirate, help them to form an approved Italian authority in the North. Ways and means of effecting this second alternative will be discussed at a meeting this afternoon.

CONFIDENTIAL

M.S.L.
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1335