

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/177  
(VOL. I)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

/109/177

I)

ADMIN OF NE FRONTIER PROVINCES

APR. - NOV. 1944



Cos

for 96

(Transferred to 5005)

88 answers will be new to you  
and you should read - read first  
p 100 then p 98.

90 97 17/11

Seen. 1

(1) We must watch ATRK Balkans & their  
proposed activities in Trieste

(2) This is the first time we have heard  
that Tito. Objected to ATRK in Venezia Giulia.  
We should of course have been told.

(3) How much of this has gone to Reginald Venetian?

Mr (17/11)

101

P.A. Place for C.C.'s file for discussion 17/11

17/11/11



Seen. 1

(1) We must watch ADK Balkans & others proposed activities in Trieste

(2) This is the first time we have heard that Tito objected to ADG in Venezia Giulia. We should of course have been told.

(3) How much of the has gone to Region Venezia?

MS (17/12)

101

PA Place in CC's file for discussion of PA

MS (17/12)

6.1.6



86  
TO: Acting Chief Commissioner.

- 83-85
1. I submit for your signature two letters to AFHQ regarding the administration of the N.E. Frontier Provinces.
  2. Drafts of these letters have been submitted to A.A.I. who have approved them in principle - please see flagged "A" and "B". 79-77
  3. After our conversation I have stated in the letter that the use of CC.RR and GG.FP as such will be left to the discretion of the Regional Commissioner.
  4. Please sign three copies.

29 Oct 44.

M.S.L.  
Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff.

87  
Major Q -  
Place "A" file copy  
in my Pol folder for  
mtg 10/31  
Tm



1.7A gen

2. NAd

3. See previously MS/4/18

22.

D.C.O.S. ECONOMIC SECTION.

It is important that we should ensure co-ordination in planning for industry and commerce and local resources in the four Northern Regions, particularly Liguria, Lombardy and Piemonte. Industrial planning is undoubtedly the most important of these three Regions.

I have the impression that although the Regional Commissioners themselves are planning within their Regions that there is little or no co-ordination between them and at present none with AAI and IRI.

I should like you to consider setting up an Industrial Planning Committee composed of the Industry and Commerce Divisional Heads in the 4 Northern Regions and presided over by some member of the Economic Section. The Chairman would have to be in close touch with both AAI and the Local Resources Section of IRI and the Committee would, in fact, be the Planning Committee which, from the A.C. point of view would submit proposals to the Industrial Co-ordination Committee of the Local Resources which it is hoped will soon be set up.

It might well be possible for the Chairman of this Committee to combine his duties with those of the Joint Secretary of the I.R.S. which we propose to recommend to the Local Resources Board.

Unless we have co-ordination for industrial planning in the North there will be waste of effort and failure when we get on the spot. I do not think that the Industry Sub-Commission, with the vast amount of work which they will have in preparing the Category B. programme for the DRS will be able to devote sufficient time to this purpose.

Will you please discuss this as soon as possible.

26th October 1944.

(EC has been copy of this  
also C.A. Sales Sec.)

MS/4/18  
Bridgford.  
Chief of Staff.

P-8-77

COS Office

1. We should now issue, over A/C's signature, P/SS-58



over by some member of the Economic Section. The Chairman would have to be in close touch with both JAI and the Local Resources Section of the Committee would, in fact, be the Planning Committee which, from the A.O. point of view would submit proposals to the Industrial Co-ordination Committee of the Local Resources which it is hoped will soon be set up.

It might well be possible for the Chairman of this Committee to combine his duties with those of the Joint Secretary of the L.R.S. which we propose to recommend to the Local Resources Board.

Unless we have co-ordination for industrial planning in the North there will be waste of effort and failure when we get on the spot. I do not think that the Industry Sub-Commission, with the vast amount of work which they will have in preparing the Category B. programme for the ONS will be able to devote sufficient time to this purpose.

Will you please discuss this as soon as possible.

(Lil see how long I can  
also CA, Sub Sec.)

26th October 1944.

*M.S.L.*  
Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff.

P78-74

COS Office

1. We should now issue, over A/C's signature, pp 55-58 as amended, ~~to~~ with proper annexures & special per. "enclosure" letter containing, CAC AAL
  2. We should also issue the Ridgway-Bellino doc. with similar final paragraph.  
Copies of DIVERS Sec. & Brit. & American Embassies + Ref. XX & Sec. VIII & ADG.  
Immediate action *DR 29/1x*
- Copy to AA: *DR 20/1x* — Due Col. by 30/10

*U 1/10*



TOP SECRET

63.

Acting Chief Development

10th October 1944

I submit two drafts which have been prepared as the result of meetings attended by your Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Hittell, G-5, Vice-Presidents, Political Section and Regional Commissioner, Venezia, dealing with the proposed administration of Frontier Provinces of N.E. Italy.

If you agree, I propose to ask Colonel Bonfort to clear them with AAI before submission to AAI.

I must point out that I understand there is an idea in certain quarters in AAI that these Frontier Provinces should be made into a separate Region working under the orders of AAI direct. I think that this idea should be opposed with all the vigour we can muster.

MSL



Brigadier.  
Chief of Staff.

Returned. The draft on Bolzano, Trento & Belluno is approved. I have previously returned the other draft, with some comments

20/10/44

Stene  
(Commodore)

Col.

67

See 40

There has not been any reply from AAI to 13 and 20.

42 should also see 65.

48 does not appear to have been understood. It 23/10

on this file see on 48. no answer required

Col has seen. Pa.

Handwritten initials



Letter to Bellano is approved. I have previously returned the other draft with some comments.

Steve  
Commodore

20/10/44

67

Col.

See 40

There has not been any reply from AFHQ by 13 and 20.

You should also see 65.

48 does not appear to have been answered. It 23/10  
on this file. See N. 48. no answer required

Col has seen. Pa.

It 23/10

TO: C.O.S.

70.

1. Reference 69, I have asked Public Safety for a copy of their letter. I think we should wait to hear what AAI have got to say about these plans before taking any action on this.

2. Reference 68, paras 8 and 9 are interesting. There seems to be a certain divergence of opinion but we have alternative plans laid to deal with any eventuality.

3. Does the end of the month suit you for a conference at CASERTA with Brig. Dunlop and Forrester-Walker?

W. Stupp 1st Lt

C.S.O.,  
Office, C.O.S.

23 Oct 44.

TOP SECRET



Colonel Danmore

38c

Ref. attached file, Administration  
of Frontier Provinces.

Specific Section is being affected  
on the question of

Flint-Ljubljana Railway.  
Ljubljana Coal Mines.

I have discussed the matter with Col. Todd  
and he has no information that conflicts with  
the views expressed by Brig. Dunlop in  
paras 11 and 12 of his letter of the 30th  
Sep. '44.

6 Oct '44.

swackin WRA

61001



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

DEI CONSIGLIO NAZIONALE DELLE CORREZIONI  
DEGLI AFFARI GENERALI E DEL PERSONALE

IL DIRETTORE GENERALE



TOP SECRET

38A

TO: Civil Affairs Section.

Page 38

1. Points raised by Brig. Dunlop in his letter of 2 Oct 44 on the opposite page will be discussed either at or immediately after the next Chief of Staff Meeting on Friday, 6 Oct 44, with Col. Wilmer. Would you please make your comments on this minute about and then pass it as soon as possible to Economic Section for their comments and return to me.

2. It is suggested that a letter should be prepared for submission to Army along the lines of the suggestions made by Brig. Dunlop and it is hoped to be able to draft this letter as a result of the discussion on Friday next.

*W. S. G. L. S.*

C.S.O.,  
To Chief of Staff.

4 Oct 44.

38B

TO: Chief of Staff.

1. The proposals made by S.L. Venetia raise extremely difficult questions of administration. I refer in particular to his proposals Para. 8(b), (d) and (e) of his letter of the 2nd October. Although I agree in principle with his Para. 8(b) I think grave difficulties will arise if it is found that the senior local officials have fled and we try to carry on without replacing them.

2. Even assuming that Allied military police are forthcoming as suggested in Para. 10 (a), I feel that a police force recruited solely from local elements would be extremely difficult to organise and unsatisfactory in operation. It must be remembered that the organisation of a proper police force is a complicated matter and cannot be solved merely by recruiting local bodies to assist Allied military police.

3. With regard to Para 8(e) even greater difficulties arise if Allied officers are to undertake the trial of criminal cases under the local law, the result is bound to be unsatisfactory, even assuming that the local law is Italian. If the local law is Yugoslav the undertaking would be virtually impossible. Furthermore highly technical difficulties would arise with regard to the hearing of cases which have already undergone for instance the instructional stage and would then have to proceed in the entirely different Anglo-Saxon procedure in the middle of the case.

4. If on the other hand courts are not opened and Allied officers do not try cases, then almost inevitably within a month or six weeks prisoner congestion



370  
X:- Chief of Staff.

1. The proposals made by R. S. Venezuela raise extremely difficult questions of administration. I refer in particular to his proposals Para. 8(c), (d) and (e) of his letter of the 2nd October. Although I agree in principle with his Para. 8(b) I think grave difficulties will arise if it is found that the senior local officials have fled and we try to carry on without replacing them.

2. Even assuming that Allied military police are forthcoming as suggested in Para. 10 (a), I feel that a police force recruited solely from local elements would be extremely difficult to organise and unsatisfactory in operation. It must be remembered that the organisation of a proper police force is a complicated matter and cannot be solved merely by recruiting local bodies to assist Allied military police.

3. With regard to Para 8(e) even greater difficulties arise if Allied officers are to undertake the trial of criminal cases under the local law, the result is bound to be unsatisfactory, even assuming that the local law is Italian. If the local law is Yugoslav the undertaking would be virtually impossible. Furthermore highly technical difficulties would arise with regard to the hearing of cases which have already undergone for instance the instructional stage and would then have to proceed in the entirely different Anglo-Saxon procedure in the middle of the case.

4. If on the other hand courts are not opened and Allied officers do not try cases, then almost inevitably within a month or six weeks prison congestion will become a most serious problem.

5. I entirely agree with Para. 8(f) and 9.

6. May I suggest that the earlier letters from and to AFHQ be included in this file as I have no copies.

5th October, 1944.

G. R. Hughes  
G. R. Hughes, Brigadier.  
V.P. Civil Affairs Section

66093



256  
VP Adm Sec.

*Under 25a refers*  
It is suggested that it would be unwise to print in Slovene before arrival of AMG in the area concerned. Pol Sec agree.

(Sgd) M.S.L.

25C  
Ex. Com.

But do you not think we should have a translation ready? Further, if the translation is not put up at the same time as the original all effect is lost and the inhabitants will be ignorant of the laws to which they are subject.

(Sgd) G.R.U.

25D  
C.S. Officer.

*Under 25a*  
For discussion with rest of the Istrian business at next staff meeting.

4. Oct. 44

(Sgd) M.S.L.

50b  
C.O.S.

*50*  
Proc for Istria. Ref end of second para of 1 of minutes on COS meeting, 6 Oct.

CAS want to know if they can go ahead on the printing of revised Proc in Italian straightaway. I think an Italian version will be required anyway, so can see no harm in it.

Will you please say if you agree.

(Sgd) G.W.I.S.

7. Oct. 44.

I AGREE (Sgd) M.S.L. 9. Oct. 44



25 D  
C.S. Officer.

For discussion with rest of the Istrian business at next staff meeting.

4. Oct. 44

(Sgd) M.S.L.

50b  
C.O.S.

50  
Proc for Istria. Ref end of second para of 1 of minutes on COG meeting, 6 Oct.

CAS want to know if they can go ahead on the printing of revised Proc in Italian straightaway. I think an Italian version will be required anyway, so can see no harm in it.

Will you please say if you agree.

7. Oct. 44.

(Sgd) G.W.I.S.

I AGREE (Sgd) M.S.L. 9. Oct. 44

C.S.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref: 504/105/COB.

27 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration - VENEZIA GIULIA.

TO : Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
Italian Government.

In reply to your letter 04071/13 of 16 November signed  
by Visconti Venosta, I have to inform you that the subject has been  
given the fullest consideration at the highest levels and that adequate  
steps have been arranged to meet the circumstances envisaged in the  
letter.

M. S. LUSH

WILBERT W. STONE,  
Commander, USNR,  
Chief Commissioner

65697



→ CofS  
Do you think any thing important  
has done? 99

ROUGH TRANSLATION

Rome, 22th. November 1944

Subj: *for all*  
*delay in stop*

Dear Admiral,

With letter n. 1/236 of August the 15th. and in relation on the present military events. I pointed out to you the anxiety caused to the Italian Government and to the whole Italian nation by the possibility of clashes between armed bands and peaceful citizens on occasion of the departure of the German troops from Venezia Giulia. In the same letter, through your influential authority, I drew the attention and the interest of the Allied Governments on the eventuality of acts of violence and of massacres being carried out in those provinces with a view to them already pre-arranging the necessary countermeasures.

You have been so kind as to inform me, on August the 15th. and H.E. the President of the Council, on September the 22d, that this anxiety had been brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Allied Command and that the matter was being kept in sight by the competent Allied Authorities.

In consideration of the further developments of the military operations, and in the eventuality that



to you the anxiety caused to the Italian Government and to the whole Italian Nation by the possibility of clashes between armed bands and peaceable citizens on occasion of the departure of the German troops from Venezia Giulia. In the same letter, through your influential authority, I drew the attention and the interest of the Allied Governments on the eventuality of acts of violence and of massacres being carried out in these provinces with a view to them already pre-arranging the necessary countermeasures.

You have been so kind as to inform me, on August the 19th, and H.3, the President of the Council, on September the 22d, that this anxiety had been brought to the knowledge of the Supreme Allied Command and that the matter was being kept in sight by the competent Allied Authorities.

In consideration of the further developments of the military operations, and in the eventuality that the victories of the Allied Armies should cause a general withdrawal of the Germans from the Adriatic zone, I take the liberty, my dear Admiral, of now requesting you to interpose your authority in the proper quarters so that the matter should continue to be held in due consideration.

Believe me, my dear Admiral, cordially yours.

*Admiral*

6539



785017

*Die Polysynthesen des Nucle*

myself and

420

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Table 1

What time



...veramente quella la parte della ...  
...veramente quella la parte della ...  
...veramente quella la parte della ...

...ha avuto in ...  
...ha avuto in ...  
...ha avuto in ...

...e nell'eventualità che la ...  
...e nell'eventualità che la ...  
...e nell'eventualità che la ...

...e così, dopo ...

...

*W. H. ...*

Admiral Ellety S t o p e  
Acting Chief Commissioner of the  
Allied Commission

R 6 5 6

C.C.C.



TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

K-437

2C (44) 132

11th November 1944

~~Confidential~~

CONFIDENTIAL

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR VENEZIA  
GIULIA AND RELATED MATTERS

Note by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

1. The establishment of occupational forces of Allied Military Government is envisaged in Venezia Giulia, in connection with Freeborn Operations in AUSTRIA (Freeborn Directive 11 October 1944, AG 381/079-0).
2. SAC's intention in this matter, also to the effect that Allied Military Government would be maintained until the question of post-war territorial jurisdiction has been settled, was communicated to Marshal Tito in August 1944 and subsequently to both the Royal Yugoslav and Italian Governments. Marshal Tito objected to the imposition of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA, while agreeing to and pledging co-operation in the matter of Allied Military command and control of the port of TRIESTE and I of Gs to AUSTRIA. (SAC (44) Special (5) 13 August 1944 and annexed).

3. The Allied Commission has submitted a definitive programme for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA (Appendix A). The basic administrative pattern will be as elsewhere in ITALY except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside will be avoided and responsible local officials, Italian or Slav, will be retained in office. No Italian troops will be employed. Restriction will be exercised in the employment of Carabinieri and Italian provincial police; and the local police will be directly controlled by the Allied authorities. A considerable autonomy in legal, fiscal and currency matters is envisaged. Generally, the status of Allied control will be emphasized. The plan as above contemplates minor variations depending upon the situation found upon Allied entry, in which connection three major possibilities are envisaged:

- (a) Allied troops enter before partizan control has crystallized;
- (b) Local Slav partisans have assumed localized control; or
- (c) Antagonized Yugoslav force has entered and established military government.



and subsequently to both the Royal Yugoslav and Italian Governments. Marshal Tito objected to the imposition of Allied Military Government in VENETIA GIULIA, while agreeing to end pledging co-operation in the matter of Allied Military command and control of the port of TRIESTE and I of G to ANZUS. (SAC (44) Special (5) 13 August 1944 and annexure).

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- (a) Allied troops enter before partisan control has crystallized;
- (b) Local Slav partisans have assumed localized control; or
- (c) An organized Yugoslav force has entered and established military government.

To ensure transition to Allied Military Government in the last case above, the Allied Commission foresees the need for agreement in advance with the Yugoslav authorities and recommends that this take the form of an understanding that any Yugoslav forces which may cross the 1939 frontier into ITALY shall operate as an expeditionary force under Allied command.

4. General Alexander's comments on the Allied Commission programme are attached (Appendix B). He takes the view that, to ensure Allied control of requisite police and communications in VENETIA GIULIA and in the interests of administrative continuity, Allied Military Government on Italian lines should extend up to the 1939 frontiers at any rate until final territorial adjustment has been arrived at. If any part of VENETIA GIULIA is previously occupied by Marshal Tito's troops, control for purposes of military administration and government should pass to him upon arrival. General Alexander also suggests some under the operational control of AAI. He considers that negotiations to secure agreement on the above lines should be taken in hand promptly with Marshal Tito on the Russian Government.

CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET  
BY AUTHORITY OF SAC

6639

TOP SECRET



5. This section approves the plan submitted by the Allied Commission for Allied Military Government in VENETIA GIULIA. We are fully in accord that the basic objective should be to retain all the practical advantages of proceeding along familiar administrative lines, and at the same time to provide appropriate local adaptations and safeguard to ensure impartial administration. We propose, however, greater rigidity in adherence to the following principles:

- (a) The administrative status quo found upon Allied entry, Italian or Slav, partisan or anti-partisan, will be preserved provided it affords reasonable government and is responsive to local public opinion;
- (b) Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office; and
- (c) No Italian troops or Carabinieri will be employed in police duties, for which a special force will have to be recruited locally to take over part of the burden initially assumed by Allied garrison troops.

The plan as approved by this section for Allied Military Government in VENETIA GIULIA is set forth in somewhat greater detail (para 2 of Appendix C) for consideration and submission to COM.

6. This section also concurs in the recommendation that negotiations be undertaken with the Yugoslav authorities to secure their agreement in advance to the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENETIA GIULIA. In our judgement, such agreement need not of necessity be in the form suggested by the Allied Commission, and we do not feel it a position to comment on General Alexander's remarks, insofar as they raise the question of the military command relationship between Allied and Yugoslav/Russian forces operating in VENETIA GIULIA.
7. In recommending negotiations as above, we accept the view that, to ensure the military security of our forces in Northeast ITALY and AUSTRIA, the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the whole of VENETIA GIULIA is desirable. We also appreciate that anything short of this increases the danger of drastic action by the Yugoslav in the matter of VENETIA GIULIA which could provoke a serious reaction in ITALY generally. However, if necessary, the August agreement with Marshal Tito would afford an adequate basis for withdrawal from the military security standpoint. In summary, our recommendation in favour of negotiation is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENETIA GIULIA. Unless they are prepared to make a public declaration to the effect that the arms will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute, we do not think there is much chance of success in a negotiation with Marshal Tito on this sensitive issue. It is submitted, accordingly, that the matter be presented in the above light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (paras 3 and 4 of Appendix C). It is also suggested that the question of Allied Military Government in VENETIA GIULIA might appropriately be raised as a subsidiary issue in paragraph 1 of the plan which will have to be undertaken with Marshal Tito in respect of important military operations now under consideration.



is approved by this section for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA is set forth in somewhat greater detail (para 2 of Appendix C) for consideration and submission to COS.

6. This section also concurs in the recommendation that negotiations be undertaken with the Yugoslav authorities to secure their agreement in advance to the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. In our judgement, such agreement need not of necessity be in the form suggested by the Allied Commission, and we do not feel in a position to comment on General Alexander's remarks. Insofar as they raise the question of the military command relationship between Allied and Yugoslav/Jugoslav forces operating in VENEZIA GIULIA.

7. In recommending negotiations as above, we accept the view that, to ensure the military security of our forces in Northeast ITALY and ALBANIA, the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA is desirable. We also appreciate that anything short of this increases the danger of drastic action by the Yugoslav in the matter of VENEZIA GIULIA which could provoke a serious reaction in ITALY generally. However, if necessary, the August agreement with Marshal Tito would afford an adequate medium approach from the military security standpoint. In summary, our recommendation in favor of negotiation is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA. Unless they are prepared to make a public declaration to the effect that the area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute, we do not think there is much chance of success in a negotiation with Marshal Tito on this sensitive issue. It is submitted, accordingly, that the matter be presented in the above light to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (paras 3 and 4 of Appendix C). It is also suggested that the question of Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA might appropriately be raised as a subsidiary issue in negotiations which will have to be undertaken with Marshal Tito in respect of important military operations now under consideration.

8. The above discussion concerns VENEZIA GIULIA proper. Related questions are submitted, for consideration and presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (para 6 of Appendix C) in the matter of ZARA and Italian ADRIATIC Islands in dispute. Allied Military Government is not envisaged in these areas, which it is assumed will pass to Yugoslav administration in default of Allied action, although it is appreciated that operations now under consideration would require the establishment of effective Allied military control at ZARA and throughout considerable adjacent territory which is properly Yugoslav.



TOP SECRET

K-407

9. It is recommended:-

- (a) That the plan for Allied Military Government in VENETIA OTULIA (para 2 of Appendix C) be approved.
- (b) That a cable, substantially as attached (Appendix C) be despatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(Intd) C.M.E.

DISTRIBUTION

Supreme Allied Commander  
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander  
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean  
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Chief of Staff  
Chief Administrative Officer  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
U.S. Political Adviser  
British Resident Minister  
Director, PAB  
Secretary, General Staff  
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G-1 (B)  
G-2  
G-3  
G-3 Special Operations  
G-4 (A)  
G-4 (B)  
G-5  
Secretary, IS & PS  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
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Director, PMS  
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G-1 (B)  
G-2  
G-3  
G-3 Special Operations  
G-4 (A)  
G-4 (B)  
G-5  
Secretary, IS & PS  
Chief, Liaison Section  
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission  
Spores

66002

TOP SECRET



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~~SECRET~~ Confidential

INDEX SHEET FOR:

APPENDIX 'A' TO FC (44) 132

K-407

Letter HQ AC, Office of S of S, 504/83/COS, 29 October 1944

Cadre Stone to AFHQ, C-5

Subject: Administration of Frontier Provinces - N.E. Italy

See p. 85 (para 3).

Am. S. plan p. 83

66501



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APPENDIX 'B' TO IC (AA) 132 R-407

Letter COS/459, By AAI, Lt Gen Harding, 26 October 1944

To: A/CC, AGO

Subject: Administration of N.E. ITALY

See p 95 (para 4)

AAI Comments p 76



TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C" TO FC (44) 132

DRAFT CABLE TO AGMAR FOR C.C.S.

Subject is Allied Military Government for VENETIA GIULIA.

1. In August 1944 Marshal Tito was informed that it was SAC's intention to establish and maintain Allied Military Government this area until its disposition could be determined by negotiation between the governments concerned. Tito objected to this while agreeing fully to and pledging assistance in the matter of Allied Military command and control of the part of TRIESTE and L of Cs required by Allied Forces occupying AUSTRIA or HUNGARY. Royal Yugoslav and Italian Governments were subsequently informed of SAC's intention.

2. It is approved that Allied Military Government in VENETIA GIULIA follow the pattern established elsewhere in ITALY but that it be made clear from the outset that control will remain in Allied hands until final settlement of the territorial issue. Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are planned, as follows:

(a) Insofar as responsible local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italian and Slav, partisan or non-partisan, will be maintained. Only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.

(b) No Italian Carabinieri or troops will be employed. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied Garrison troops may have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale.



Yugoslav and Italian Governments were subsequently informed of SAC's intention.

2. It is approved that Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia follow the pattern established elsewhere in Italy but that it be made clear from the outset that control will remain in Allied hands until final settlement of the territorial issue. Also, certain special features, designed to fit the local situation and to ensure impartial administration, are planned, as follows:

(a) Insofar as responsible local administration responsive to local public opinion is found upon Allied entry, the status quo as between Italians and Slav, partizan or non-partizan, will be maintained, only indigenous officials will be retained or permitted in office.

(b) No Italian Carabinieri or troops will be employed. Special police will be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation and the importance of the area as an I of C to Austria, Allied garrison troops may have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale.

(c) The basic law will be Italian, but all laws discriminating against the Yugoslav and the right of recourse beyond local courts will be suspended and certain Italian national legislation may be excluded from the area.

(d) Similarly, a certain degree of autonomy in fiscal and banking matters might evolve. Italian lire will continue legal tender but new supplies of currency will be Allied Military lire.

(e) Local advisory committees consisting of indigenous Italians and Slavs, which the Allied regional authorities could consult at their discretion, might be formed.

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/ (e) . . . . .



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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3. If local Slav partisans and/or outside contingents of Tito's forces are in effective control of VENEZIA GIULIA before the Allied forces arrive, we might not be in a position or might not find it expedient to superimpose Allied Military Government. We propose to undertake a negotiation with Tito and representatives of the Royal Yugoslav Government to secure their agreement in advance to the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout the whole area. This is desirable to ensure the military security of our forces in Northeast ITALY and in AUSTRIA. Also absence of agreement increased the danger of drastic action by the Yugoslavs in the matter of VENEZIA GIULIA which could provoke a serious reaction in ITALY generally. If necessary, however, the urgent agreement with Tito would afford an adequate working basis from the military security angle. In summary, our decision to raise this sensitive issue with the Yugoslavs is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. In our judgement, it would materially enhance our chance of success in negotiation if the Allied Governments are prepared at a high level to make a public declaration to the effect that that area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute. In this connection we have also considered, as an alternative which might be more attractive to the Yugoslavs than the plan as outlined in paragraph 3, the creation of an Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA separate and distinct from that in ITALY and possibly even admitting Yugoslav and Italian participation at the local as well as at the local level. Aside from certain practical difficulties,



serious reaction in Italy generally. If necessary, however, the August agreement with Tito would afford an adequate working basis from the military security angle. In summary, our decision to raise this sensitive issue with the Yugoslavs is largely based upon the assumption that the Allied Governments have a definite political interest in the establishment of Allied Military Government throughout

VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. In our judgement, it would materially enhance our chance of success in negotiation if the Allied Governments are prepared at a high level to make a public declaration to the effect that that area will be held in trust by the Allies until final settlement of the territorial dispute. In this connection we have also considered, as an alternative which might be more attractive to the Yugoslavs than the plan as outlined in paragraph 2, the creation of an Allied Military Government for VENEZIA GIULIA separate and distinct from that in IUDER and possibly even admitting Yugoslav and Italian participation at the top as well as at the local level. Aside from certain practical difficulties, it is possible that such a step might be interpreted as a prejudgement of the territorial issue and might constitute a precedent in other situations where mixed nationalities or minorities are involved.

5. Your approval is requested of the plan for Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA outlined in paragraph 2 and the course proposed in paragraph 3.

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/6.....

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6. The above relates to IONIAN ISLANDS proper. ZARA and Italian Adriatic islands in dispute were not specifically subject of discussion with Tito in August. Allied Military Government is not envisaged there although operations now under consideration would require the establishment of effective Allied military control at ZARA and throughout considerable adjacent territory which is properly Yugoslav. It is assumed that ZARA and Italian Adriatic islands, in dispute will, in default of Allied action, pass to Yugoslav administration, as also CORFU to the Greeks. Your approval of our negative course in these subsidiary matters is requested.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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66584



HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Office of the Chief Commissioner

TOE SECRET

200 394

Confide October 14, 1944

Ref: 504/85/305.

SUBJECT: Administration of R.A. Frontier Provinces.

TO : Allied Forces Headquarters.

As. C. 34

1. With further reference to my 508/20/04 - VDC 321 of 26 September 1944, I wish to bring to your notice certain further considerations in respect of the three Provinces of BOLZANO, TRIESTE and MILANO.

2. All available evidence indicates that, since the capitulation of Italy, the control of these three provinces has been taken over by GERMANY. The phrases used by one of our informants is that these three provinces have been 'administratively annexed to the Reich'.

3. Therefore, it appears likely that, on the entry of Allied troops, a situation of some anarchy may be found. The holders of office under the German regime may have fled taking with them all available records.

4. In considering the restoration of an administrative system, it appears likely that a varying method of approach may be found necessary in the case of each of these three provinces.

5. The Province of BOLZANO, though included by the Germans in 'their Alpine Operational Zone', does not form part of VERONA TRIESTINA, nor is it one of the six frontier provinces listed in the Chief of Staff's memorandum (annexure to SAC (44) Special 5 of 13 August).

6. It is therefore, proposed that in the case of the Province of MILANO the normal policy will obtain, and that the return to normal Italian administration will be carried out as rapidly as possible.

7. In the case of the two remaining provinces of TRIESTE and BOLZANO, I am preparing plans for the application of AG rule in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of Staff, AGHQ. I consider it necessary to bring to your notice certain practical differences which exist between the Northern and Southern of the two provinces.

8. In the case of TRIESTE, its largely Italian population and Italian sentiments should render easy a return to the Italian administrative system, and there should be no difficulty in using Italian officials under AGS direction. I propose, therefore, to carry out a replacement of the German administrative machinery by the normal Italian administrative machinery. In order to avoid any obvious differentiation between the policy adopted in the case of TRIESTE and that adopted in the other five frontier provinces of VERONA TRIESTINA and TRIESTINA, I do not propose in principle to import Italian officials or Car-



4. In considering the restoration of an administrative system, it appears likely that a varying method of approach may be found necessary in the case of each of these three provinces.

5. The Province of TRIESTE, though included by the Germans in their "Alpine Operational Zone", does not form part of TRIESTE-TRIESTE, nor is it one of the six frontier provinces listed in the Chief of Staff's memorandum (Annexure to SAC (44) Special 5 of 13 August).

6. It is therefore, proposed that in the case of the Province of TRIESTE the normal policy will obtain, and that the return to normal Italian administration will be carried out as rapidly as possible.

7. In the case of the two remaining provinces of TRIESTE and TRIESTE, I am preparing plans for the application of SAC rules in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of Staff, SAC. I consider it necessary to bring to your notice certain practical differences which exist between the Northern and Southern of the two provinces.

8. In the case of TRIESTE, its largely Italian population and Italian sentiment should render easy a return to the Italian administrative system, and there should be no difficulty in using Italian officials under SAC direction. I propose, therefore, to carry out a replacement of the German administrative machinery by the normal Italian administrative machinery. In order to avoid any obvious differentiation between the policy adopted in the case of TRIESTE and that adopted in the other five frontier provinces of TRIESTE and TRIESTE, I do not propose in principle to import Italian officials or officers. I consider, however, that in certain cases such an importation may be desirable and if carefully controlled will not give rise to difficulties. I intend, however, to take care that no prior commitment in this direction is made with the Italian Government.

9. In the case of the Province of TRIESTE there are special considerations. Over 80% of the population is German speaking. Most of them are passionately attached to Austrian tradition and their recent period of administrative incorporation in the Reich may well have revived aspirations of union with Austria. The majority of the inhabitants may be expected to view with disappointment and disfavor the return of Italian law and administration in the wake of Allied armies; especially will they dislike the return of Italian officials. For precisely these reasons it may be expected that the Italian Government may press for the return of Italian officials to administrative and other posts in TRIESTE.



10. The problem is not one of great magnitude. The total population of the Province is in the neighborhood of 277,000. There are only three towns over 10,000 inhabitants. The country is sparsely populated and the most important position is traversed by the main road and railway which may be expected to be held by Allied troops.

11. I therefore propose that in setting up Allied Military Government in the Province officials will not be brought into this Province to fill any gap caused by the departure of the previous officials. Such vacancies will be made up from the local inhabitants. I propose to avoid emphasis on either the Italian or Austrian connections.

12. Within a short time, however, it will be necessary to reconstitute civil machinery if a complete stagnation of local life is to be avoided. I therefore seek your guidance as to whether such reconstituted civil machinery is to be based on the Italian system, or whether the German machinery which has been running for two years, is to be continued. I appreciate that this proposal will itself depend to some extent on the existence of an AMG rule in Austria.

13. In the meantime I ask your assistance in securing the fullest information as to the state of affairs now obtaining in the Province of TRIESTE. I am taking steps to ensure that the Regional and Provincial Commissioners designate are put in close touch with the Austrian section at C-5 AFHQ.

14. I enclose letter containing views of Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

MALCOLM F. STONE  
Commodore, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Chief of Staff, AFHQ

Copy to: Chief of Staff, AFHQ  
The Hon Alexander Kirk.  
Mr Noel Charles, LCMG, MC.  
R.O. Region III.  
USMC 11th Army.  
Political Section.

17



13. In the meantime I ask your assistance in securing the fullest information as to the state of affairs now obtaining in the Province of Mantova. I am taking steps to ensure that the Regional and Provincial Commissioners designate are put in close touch with the Austrian Section at C-5 AFM.

14. I enclose letter containing names of Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

ALBERT S. BROWN  
Commander, AFM  
Acting Chief Commissioner

Copy to:

Copy to: Chief of Staff, AFM  
The Hon. Alexander Kirk.  
Mr. Noel Charles, LCAD, HQ.  
A.C. Region III.  
SOMO BETHEN ARMY.  
Political Section.  
Civil Affairs Section.

Sam. Lee  
Deputy, AFM  
CGS, AFM  
1st File  
AFM  
File

10 } Reg. Comd. to Col. M. Col  
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66030



HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Office of the Chief Commissioner  
APO 354

Ref: 504/63/203

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces - H.M.ITALY.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,

1. On 26 Sept 1944 under reference 506/20/24 - 4/20 321 I wrote you a letter setting forward certain aspects of the problem of applying military government in the Provinces of TRIESTE, KOLA, TRIESTE and GORIZIA, forming together the area known as VENEZIA GIULIA.

2. Since the despatch of that letter further conferences have been held and it now appears desirable to put forward for your consideration plans based on a series of possible eventualities. At the same time I shall ask your assistance in preliminary negotiations.

3. I consider myself bound by the terms of the Annexure to SAC(44), Special 5, Memorandum of 13 August wherein was declared the policy of the Allied Governments to impose an Allied Military Government upon the four Provinces of VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. It is clear that Yugo Slav national aspirations cannot be left out of account. I am, however, assuming that I have your support in the view that it is not the policy of the Allied Governments to do anything which might encourage a de facto Yugo Slav annexation.

5. It is further clear that any Allied Military Government which is set up will have a very much better chance of success if it avoids machinery likely to exacerbate local feelings. The importation of either Italian or Yugo Slav officials might have such a result. The central and declared aim of the Allied administration should be impartial fair dealing to Italian and Slav alike.

6. Three different possibilities must be envisaged:

Situation "A". "Allied Military Forces" - that is to say, forces under All or Army - enter the country after a rapid advance, before any entry of organized Yugo Slav formations has taken place, and before there has been any crystallization of partisan control. Local administration based on the Italian system continues to function to a greater or lesser degree.

Situation "B". "Allied Military Forces" enter the country after a period of vacuum during which local Yugo Slav partisans have assumed localized control.

Situation "C". A formed Yugo Slav military force enters the country in advance of any other "Allied Military Force".

Confidential

29 October 1944.

Copy No. 14



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

in preliminary negotiations. At the same time I shall ask your assistance in preliminary negotiations.

3. I consider myself bound by the terms of the annexure to SAC(M), Special 5, memorandum of 13 August wherein was declared the policy of the Allied Governments to impose an Allied Military Government upon the four provinces of VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. It is clear that Yugo Slav national aspirations cannot be left out of account. I am, however, assuming that I have your support in the view that it is not the policy of the Allied Governments to do anything which might encourage a de facto Yugo Slav annexation.

5. It is further clear that any Allied Military Government which is set up will have a very much better chance of success if it avoids machinery likely to exacerbate local feelings. The importation of either Italian or Yugo Slav officials might have such a result. The central and declared aim of the Allied administration should be impartial fair dealing to Italian and Slav alike.

6. Three different possibilities must be envisaged:

Situation "A". "Allied Military Forces" - that is to say, forces under Allied or British - enter the country after a rapid advance, before any entry of organised Yugo Slav formations has taken place, and before there has been any crystallisation of partisan control. Local administration based on the Italian system continues to function to a greater or lesser degree.

Situation "B". "Allied Military Forces" enter the country after a period of vacuum during which local Yugo Slav partisans have assumed localised control.

Situation "C". A formed Yugo Slav military force enters the country in advance of any other "Allied Military Force".

It is clear that all three situations may exist at one time within the confines of VENEZIA GIULIA.

7. In the circumstances of Situation "A" it is proposed that Allied Military Government should generally follow normal lines with the following special features:-

(a) The continued operation of existing Italian administration would be subject to the non-introduction of officials from other parts of Italy, and would be dependent solely on those already found within the territory.

(b) No Italian troops will be used as such in the area. The use of OC.MI and MG.MI as such will be left to the discretion of the Regional Commissioners. Local municipal police will be used under direct orders of AME.

(c) Italian...



(c) Italian law would be applied, and local Courts would be re-opened under existing approved judges, but the Court of Appeal at Palermo and the detached section at Piana would be final Courts. The right of recourse to the Court of Cassation in Rome would be suspended.

(d) Italian legislation since 8 September 1943 would not be implemented as is now done in other parts of Italy. Any legislation deemed necessary would be achieved by publication of General or Regional Orders. However, they might follow current Italian legislation.

(e) The Provinces would be financed entirely by APA funds. Existing banks would be used but Italian Government funds would not be introduced from outside.

5. In the circumstances of situation "B" a similar policy will be adopted with the difference that :-

- (a) No Italian police would be re-employed in partisan areas.
- (b) That any working *de facto* administrative machinery whether using Italian or Tugo Slav officials or both would be kept in being.
- (c) As with "A", importation of officials from outside would be avoided.
- (d) Courts of law would be initially closed and re-opened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioner. Offences against Allied proclamations would be tried by AG Courts. Any Courts permitted to re-open would, under International Law, have to apply the Italian Code, as being the law legally in force. As with "A", final appeal would be to the local Courts of appeal, recourse to the Court of Cassation at Rome being suspended.

9. The essential consideration both in Case "A" and Case "B" is that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants, or of parties outside the territory, that the only governing authority is the Allied Military Government. As a visible indication of this fact only American and British flags will be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

10. In the case of "C", a more difficult situation would arise inasmuch as the commander of any regularly constituted Tugo Slav invading army operating under the independent orders of his government, would automatically become the Military Governor of any territory occupied by his troops. In this case he should expect to find a Tugo Slav administration set up, with legal sanction under International law, under Tugo Slav officers. It would be extremely difficult, if not wholly impossible, for AG officers on the spot to displace such an administration or locally to attempt to impose Allied Military Government on such an administration. Such a difficulty might be overcome if agreement could be secured in advance with the Tugo Slav Government that any Tugo Slav army crossing the 1939 frontier into Italy should be regarded as an



- (b) that any working de facto administrative machinery whether using Italian or Yugo Slav officials or both would be kept in being.
- (c) as with "A", importation of officials from outside would be avoided.
- (d) Courts of law would be initially closed and reopened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioner. Offences against Allied proclamations would be tried by AM Courts. Any Courts permitted to reopen would, under International Law, have to apply the Italian Code, as being the law legally in force. As with "A", final appeal would be to the local Courts of Appeal, recourse to the Court of Cassation at Rome being suspended.
9. The essential consideration both in Case "A" and Case "B" is that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants, or of parties outside the territory, that the only governing authority is the Allied Military Government. As a visible indication of this fact only American and British flags will be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

10. In the case of "C", a more difficult situation would arise inasmuch as the commander of any regularly constituted Yugo Slav invading army operating under the independent orders of his government, would automatically become the Military Governor of any territory occupied by his troops. In this case we should expect to find a Yugo Slav administration set up, with legal sanction under International Law, under Yugo Slav officers. It would be extremely difficult, if not wholly impracticable, for AM officers on the spot to displace such an administration or locally to attempt to impose Allied Military Government on such an administration. Such a difficulty might be overcome if agreement could be secured in advance with the Yugo Slav Government that any Yugo Slav army crossing the 1935 frontier into Italy should be regarded as an expeditionary force joining the Allied troops under command of General Alexander. This formula would cover the legal position of the installation of an Anglo-American AMR under the authority of General Alexander. It is, however, clear that some agreement must be made with the Yugo Slav authorities which will include a clause to the effect that civil administration will be carried out by Anglo-American Military Government officers, in order to avoid difficulties, embarrassment, and probably unfortunate incidents in the area, and I would ask that at the appropriate moment this be done. It is also clear that a token force of American or British troops or both, should be moved into the area at the earliest possible opportunity. An undertaking should also be obtained from the Yugo Slav authorities that in the event of a Yugo Slav force occupying any part of the territory no attempt would be made to alter laws in force on 28 September 1943. In all three cases the Regional Commissioner and his staff will have full discretion to consult local opinion in the conduct of civil affairs.

11. 66653x  
12. 66653x.....



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11. It is evident that the imposition of Allied Military Government, whether under Conditions "A", "B" or "C", will require a considerably higher concentration of officers and men than has been available lately. Moreover, a fundamental prerequisite for the execution of this plan under "A", "B" or "C", is the provision of an adequate force of Allied Military Police to be placed at the disposal of the Provincial Commissioners. The minimum numbers deemed necessary for this are shown in Annexure "A". In any event it is proposed to concentrate available resources on three main centres:-

- (a) The port of TRINIDAD.
- (b) The port of SULA and the coal and bauxite mines of Southern LITHIA.
- (c) The port of FIUME.

It is felt that a fair, firm and consistent Allied administration in these three important centres will have a steady effect on the remainder of the area, much of which is sparsely populated and will be, under winter conditions, difficult of access.

12. It is further requested that, should circumstances permit, full opportunity be taken of Allied naval power to make rapid and demonstrative landings in the three ports of TRINIDAD, FIUME and SULA.

13. The small Province of SULA was not mentioned in the Chief of Staff's memorandum referred to in para 3. I should be glad of your instructions as to the policy to be adopted in respect of this port and of the islands off the Palantian Coast.

14. I have considered the desirability of setting up a separate Regional organization for VENEZIA GIULIA. It is clear that the problem of all six frontier Provinces, the four of VENEZIA GIULIA and the two of VENEZIA TRIDENTINA, rest not only on each other but upon the neighbouring provinces of VENICE and BOLZANO and upon the whole of N.E. ITALY. The over-emphasis upon the creation of separate administrative machinery may create upon the minds of both Yugo Slav and Italians precisely that impression of a fait accompli for the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA which it appears desirable to avoid. Moreover, having regard to our very limited establishment, I am anxious to avoid the additional overhead that must arise from the formation of new Regions. Therefore, without prejudice to any future installation of a separate Regional Headquarters at TRIESTE, I propose to handle the organization of administration for VENEZIA GIULIA as for VENEZIA TRIDENTINA, through the one Regional HQ of Region XII, with sub-regions for VENEZIA GIULIA and VENEZIA TRIDENTINA if such be found necessary.

15. In view of the above considerations, I recommend an agreement be negotiated with the Yugo Slav authorities that in the event that any Yugo Slav troops cross the 1939 frontier into Italy they shall operate as an expeditionary force, and come immediately under orders of AAI.



12. It is further requested that, should circumstances permit, full opportunity be taken of Allied naval power to make rapid and demonstrative landings in the three ports of Belisario, Pinar and KOLA.

13. The small Province of ZABA was not mentioned in the Chief of Staff's memorandum referred to in para 3. I should be glad of your instructions as to the policy to be adopted in respect of this part and of the islands off the Balantian Coast.

14. I have considered the desirability of setting up a separate regional organisation for VENEZIA GIULIA. It is clear that the problem of all six frontier Provinces, the four of VENEZIA GIULIA and the two of VENEZIA TRIESTINA, reach not only on each other but upon the neighbouring Provinces of UMBRIA and BELLARIO and upon the whole of N.E. ITALY. The over-emphasis upon the creation of separate administrative machinery may create upon the minds of both Yugo Slav and Italian precisely that impression of a fait accompli for the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA which it appears desirable to avoid. Moreover, having regard to our very limited establishment, I am anxious to avoid the additional overhead that must arise from the formation of new regions. Therefore, without prejudice to any future installation of a separate Regional Headquarters at TRIESTE, I propose to handle the organisation of administration for VENEZIA GIULIA as for VENEZIA TRIESTINA, through the one Regional HQ of Region XII, with sub-regions for VENEZIA GIULIA and VENEZIA TRIESTINA if such be found necessary.

15. In view of the above considerations, I recommend an agreement be negotiated with the Yugo Slav authorities that in the event that any Yugo Slav troops cross the 1959 frontier into Italy they shall operate as an expeditionary force, and come immediately under orders of AAI.

16. I enclose letter containing views of Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

66682

Copy to: Chief of Staff, AFHQ  
The Hon Alexander Mack,  
Sir Noel Charles, CBE, MC,  
R.G. Region XII.  
SOMO NORTH ARMY.  
Political Section.  
Civil Affairs Section.  
Economic Section.  
JCS: AA  
RHS: CGS, AA  
RHS: CGS, AA

ALBERT J. STONE  
Commander, USAR  
Acting Chief Commissioner  
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Amendment "A" to SOG, VOM dated 29 Oct 64.

It is considered that, to carry out the above policy, the following additions to normal AGO strength would be required:-

- (a) Military Police: For TRIESTE - 4 Provost Companies.  
For CORNIGIA, POLA and FIUME - 1 Company each.
- (b) Additional and Legal Officers: For TRIESTE - 6  
For CORNIGIA, POLA and FIUME - 2 each.
- (c) GAO's to be on the basis of:

|                   |                |       |
|-------------------|----------------|-------|
| TRIESTE Province  | (30 companies) |       |
| City of TRIESTE   |                | 4     |
| Remainder         |                | 5     |
| CORNIGIA Province | (42 companies) | 7     |
| POLA Province     |                |       |
| City of POLA      |                | 2     |
| Remainder         |                | 7     |
| FIUME Province    |                |       |
| City of FIUME     |                | 2     |
| Remainder         |                | 3     |
|                   |                | <hr/> |
|                   |                | 30    |

- (d) Special requirements in the direction of additional officers for Public Safety, Public Health, Finance and other commissions will be submitted at an early date.

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CONFIDENTIAL  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
E.O. 334

6 OCT Recd

Ref: W-2/1-1

6th October, 1944

Subject - Appointment of Italian Government officials.

Re - All Sub-Divisions Of Section.

Until further orders Sub-Divisions will NOT have any discussions with the Italian Government as to possible Italian Government officials for any appointments whatever in the provinces of TRIESTE, FRIULI, VENETO or GORIZIA.

*C. R. Epp*

C. R. EPP, Brigadier  
R. E. C. A. Sec.  
Dep. Sec. of S.

CU/psh

*Let's skip*  
*6/10*  
*6/10*

RECOMMENDATION -  
1. and 2. Sec.  
R. E. C. A.  
Legal  
Legal Sec.  
Int.  
P. S.  
P. S.  
Copy to C. of S.

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file 204005



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1/15  
2609  
GOMIG... 2

Headquarters  
MILITARY CONTROL COMMISSION  
L.F.O. 374

6 OCT Recd

Ref: 26.2/1.

6th October, 1944.

Subject: Appointment of Italian Government officials.

Re: All Sub-Commissions (A) Section.

Until further orders Sub-Commissions will NOT have any  
discussions with the Italian Government as to possible Italian  
Government officials for any appointments whatever in the provinces  
of FROS, FROS, TRINIS or COTILA.

*C.R. Lipp*

C.R. LIPP, Brigadier  
V.P. C.A. Sec.  
L.F.O. 374

100/100.

*Letter Stamp*  
*6/10*  
*6/10*

RECEIVED -  
Ad.  
Land R.T. Sec.  
M.P.A.A.  
Legal  
Local Gov.  
Int.  
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Copy to C. of S.

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7/A



CGS/460

504/66

TOP SECRET

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Confidential.

6th October, 1944.

28 OCT Recd

Acting Chief Commissioner,  
Allied Control Commission.  
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1. In reply to your 504/66/CGS dated 31 Oct 44, the C-in-C agrees generally with the proposals contained in the memorandum attached to your letter referred to.

2. He considers that the question whether the Italian or German system of civil machinery should be reconstituted in the province of BOLZANO should be related to the political future of that province. If that is in doubt the C-in-C suggests that as long as the province is administered by A.H.G. in Italy the Italian civil system should be adopted for the sake of uniformity and simplicity.

D. C. O. G. S.  
W. J.

66080  
Gen Harding

Lieut-General,  
C.G.S.

See para 10  
10/10/44



**SECRET**

*Executive Communication*

M 1095  
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JUNE 130900Z  
URGENT

MAIN AMG 8 ARMY FROM UPJOHN  
ACTION: HQ AIGOM FOR LUSH. INFO: AMHQ FOR G-5 SECTION

*Confidential*

SECRET

1. At a meeting presided over by General MORGAN this afternoon it was decided to put before (before?) the Yugoslav Reps tomorrow an Aide Memoire containing certain proposals which are briefly summarised below so far as they affect AMG. Since the line of demarcation cuts across existing areas of Div administration and economic activity mutual arrangements should be arrived at which will ensure minimum of interference with the normal life of VENETIA GIULIA as a whole. Specific arrangements will have to be the subject of study and negotiation between experts of AMG and of the Yugoslav authorities. The more important subjects to be covered are as follows.

- A. Communications. Telephone and telegraph communications to be uncontrolled between the 2 areas and mail facilities continued.
- B. Transportation. Rail communications to be continued and a joint operating control agency set up to regulate traffic and use of equipment.
- C. Commerce and industry. Normal economic movement across the line of demarcation to continue subject only to

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

- 2 -

*Confidential*

control sufficient to prevent unauthorized shipment of supplies. In order to work out detailed arrangements for interchange of power and of industrial mineral and agricultural resources of both areas a joint economic agency rear sending AMG and the Yugoslave authorities is proposed.

- D. Finance. Arrangements will be made for provision of funds from principal finance institutions under AMG to communities, post offices and branch banks in area East of the demarcation line subject to normal financial control. Mutual arrangements to be made for collection of cheques and continuation of insurance payment and pensions.
- E. Administrative records. Reps of Govt departments and public and private enterprises to have access to records throughout both areas to facilitate normal activities.

2. If Yugoslav authorities accept these proposals in principal it is proposed to set up expert sub-committees as soon as possible to work out the details. The most important sub-committees will deal with coal, rail transportation and electric power. I strongly

- 2 -

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

- 3 -

recommend that you select and prepare to send forward at short notice at least one expert in each of these subjects.

3. General MORGAN also proposes to require the right of access for military and civilian supplies along roads from TRIESTE to POLA. 8TH ARMY AMG have already put in bids to AFHQ for supplies to POLA.

4. Allied Military Govt was established in TRIESTE today and the Yugoslav flag was replaced in the principal buildings by the Allied flags without incident. However, the Yugoslav representative has not yet evacuated his office and mixed Allied and Yugoslav guards are guarding all buildings. It is proposed to establish Allied Military Govt in GORIZIA tomorrow. I am going to BOLZANO tomorrow and will return here on Friday.

Dist

Action - Exec Commissioner 3  
Info - Chief Commissioner  
POLAD A  
POLAD B  
CA Sec  
Econ Sec  
Ext Sec  
Communications SC  
File

- 3 -

66676

**SECRET**



Advanced Headquarters,  
Allied Armies in Italy.

30th October, 1944.

Confidential <sup>25 Oct Recd</sup>

Acting Chief Commissioner,  
Allied Control Commission.

1. In reply to your letter No. 504/CA/COS dated 18 Oct 44, regarding problems likely to be encountered in the administration of N.E. Italy, the C-in-C wishes to emphasise the following principles:-

(a) When TRIESTE and Fiume have been captured our troops will be maintained through these ports and the road and rail communications radiating from them. These ports and communications must therefore be under the direct operational and administrative control of the C-in-C. This was accepted by Marshal TITO when he visited the C-in-C in August.

(b) To provide the measure of control required to give full effect to the principle stated in (a) above, the Allied Military Government in the areas concerned must also be under the C-in-C's control. For continuity the system of government must be in extension of the A.M.G. for Italy, not a separate organisation superimposed to deal with these areas. The A.M.G. for Italy should therefore extend up to the 1939 Italian frontier, at any rate until final territorial adjustments in that area have been accepted by the Allied Governments.

(c) If any part of the area in question is occupied by Marshal TITO's forces before the arrival of A.A.I., control for purposes of military administration and government should pass to A.A.I. on the arrival of our troops.

(d) If any of Marshal TITO's forces or Russian forces enter the tactical zone of A.A.I. they should automatically come under the operational control of General ALEXANDER.

2. The C-in-C considers that negotiations to secure agreement on the lines of para 1 above with Marshal TITO and the Russian



(b) To provide the measure of control required to give full effect to the principle stated in (a) above, the Allied Military Government in the areas concerned must also be under the C-in-C's control. For continuity the system of Government must be in extension of the A.A.G. for Italy, not a separate organization superimposed to deal with those areas. The A.A.G. for Italy should therefore extend up to the 1939 Italian frontier, at any rate until final territorial adjustments in that area have been accepted by the Allied Governments.

(c) If any part of the area in question is occupied by Marshal Tito's Forces before the arrival of A.A.I., control for purposes of military administration and Government should pass to A.A.I. on the arrival of our troops.

(d) If any of Marshal Tito's Forces or Russian forces enter the tactical zone of A.A.I. they should automatically come under the operational control of General ALEXANDER.

2. The C-in-C considers that negotiations to secure agreement on the lines of para 1 above with Marshal Tito and the Russian Government should be taken in hand now, and completed as quickly as possible to ensure that there are no unfortunate misunderstandings when the occasion arises.

*John Harding*

Ident-General,  
C.I.S.

*Let para 1 flow*

Copy to: C.A.C.  
BGS(C) (1)  
BGS(I)

000000



COS ~~75~~  
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
G-5 Section  
APO 512

25 October 1944

Dear Guy:

Here are the best answers we have to Brigadier Dunlop's list of points enclosed in your letter to me of 18 October 1944 (Ref: 504/COS):

1. Relation Bolzano and Gauleiter at Innsbruck.

No definite information is available. The Voralberg constitutes a gau. It is known that in the summer of 1943 a gauleiter was appointed, "within the framework of the German military administration", for the Sud-Tirol region, comprising the provinces of Bolzano and Trento. The latest intelligence indicates that the provinces of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno have been amalgamated by the German authorities under the name of "Pre-Alpine Operational Area", as distinct from the "Litorale Adriatico" group comprising the provinces of Udine, Trieste, Gorizia, Pola and Piume, and presumably also, as distinct from the Voralberg Gau.

2. Local administration Voralberg and Sud-Tirol.

All Austrian administration is under German auspices and German administrative laws are applicable. Austrian Nazis are, however, employed in practically all government offices although key positions are held by Germans. The German administrative system has similarly been imposed in the "Pre-Alpine Operational Area". It is not known whether the local administrative personnel are indigenous officials of Nazi stripe or, as is the case in the "Litorale Adriatico", largely former Austrian officials imported.

3. Food and economic conditions Tirol and Sud-Tirol.

No special information is available here, but nutrition is probably just above subsistence level.

4. Rate of exchange for Austria.

This has not yet been determined.

5. Proposed AMG policy for Austria.

Policy Directives in respect of police, courts of law,



7A

banks, post offices and schools, are in the process of being prepared, but have to be coordinated with various branches and with London. When approved, we will forward copies to ACC.

Copies of the proposed Civil Affairs Handbook on Austria from here were given to Brigadier Lush which, as I imagine he has no further use for them, might be handed over to Brigadier Dunlop.

*J. Murray Mitchell*  
J. MURRAY MITCHELL  
Lt. Colonel, G.S.C.

Lt. Colonel G. Shipp  
Office of the Chief of Staff  
Headquarters, Allied Control Commission  
APO 394

HEADQUARTERS  
27 OCT 1944  
A. C. C.

00075



1938

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNQ No. 785017

73

5457

AMC 8TH ARMY REAR FOR VENEZIA REGION

HQ. A.C.G.

5457

26 Oct

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

CHIEF OF STAFF

RESTRICTED PD YOUR LETTER D O AXII/THIRTEEN OF TWENTY FIRST OCTOBER PD  
 WOULD PREFER POSTPONE CONFERENCE TILL AFTER SIGMA MEETING ON NOVEMBER FIRST PD  
PAPER TO AMC EIGHTH ARMY REAR FOR VENEZIA REGION FROM HQ AOC PAPER PD I SHALL  
 THEN HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH YOU PD ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ PLEASE TRY  
 FORESTIER WALKER PD

L. T. MONTANT, JR.  
 1st LT. AGO  
 ADJUTANT

60072



TOP SECRET

(Copy No. 1) 69


ADVANCED  
HEADQUARTERS VERMONTIA REGION  
Allied Commission  
APO 194

JED/ab

TO : H.Q. A.C.C., Attn: Chief of Staff / 21 October 1941  
FROM : Brigadier John E. Dunlop, OBE, MC, TD  
SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces  
FILE NO: AXHII/1

NR - (File in appropriate  
+ 57 (JED/ab))

1. It is noted from your AGC/18601/10/PS of the 11 October that T.O.R.R. officers have already been appointed to the regions of Bolzano and Trieste.
2. You may wish to take no action in this matter until a reply has been received from AFHQ to our outline plans.
3. The facts are however, brought to your notice in order that no definite commitments may be made with these officers.

  
Regional Commissioner

H.Q. A.C.C. (Chief of Staff) Copy No. 1 ✓  
Colonel G.M. Gervers Copy No. 2  
File Copy No. 3

00073



TOP SECRET

PERSONAL

ADVANCED  
HEADQUARTERS VENETIA REGION  
Allied Commission  
APO 394

D/O ARXII/13

21 October 1944

Dear *Francis,*

1. I returned to Cattolica late last night, and am sending this letter down to you by Harold Cookson, who will leave with it on Sunday morning.

2. In the meantime, I sent you a telegram from Bari copy whereof, I attach to this letter giving you my outline plans.

3. It struck me very forcibly, as a result of my visit to Forcettier-Walker that we should not leave out of account the possibility of Allied amphibious operations in the northern Adriatic.

4. I have therefore instructed Lt. Col. Craig, Provincial Commissioner for Trieste and Lt. Col. Armstrong, Provincial Commissioner for Fiume, that they should proceed tomorrow (Sunday, 22 October) to Bari to get in touch with Forcettier-Walker and with his officers. The two teams - not yet at full strength - have already moved to Ascoli, where they will be within a day's run of Bari.

5. By making certain adjustments within our present strength we can find most of the people required for the two Provincial teams for Trieste and Fiume - that is to say for the initial entry into the two towns. Of course we should require many more officers for the whole job.

6. I am not at present forming up any teams for Fola or Gorizia, we have not enough officers to allow for that.

7. I am sending down one copy of this letter to Colonel Gavers and am telling him to discuss with Norman Pike the filling of the one or two positions still vacant.

8. To revert to the general problem ahead, Brigadier Forcettier-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Copy No. 1  
VII/20  
68



2. In the meantime, I sent you a telegram from Bari copy whereof, I attach to this letter giving you an outline plans.

3. It struck me very forcibly, as a result of my visit to Forrester-Walker that we should not leave out of account the possibility of Allied paratrooper operations in the northern Adriatic.

4. I have therefore instructed Lt. Col. Craig, Provincial Commissioner for Trieste and Lt. Col. Armstrong, Provincial Commissioner for Fiume, that they should proceed tomorrow (Sunday, 22 October) to Bari to get in touch with Forrester-Walker and with his officers. The two teams - not yet at full strength - have already moved to Ascoli, where they will be within a day's run of Bari.

5. By making certain adjustments within our present strength we can find most of the people required for the two Provincial teams for Trieste and Fiume - that is to say for the initial entry into the two towns. Of course we should require many more officers for the whole job.

6. I am not at present forming up any teams for Pola or Gorizia, we have not enough officers to allow for that.

7. I am sending down one copy of this letter to Colonel Gervere and am telling him to discuss with Norman Pinks the filling of the one or two positions still vacant.

8. To revert to the general problem ahead. Brigadier Forrester-Walker was of the opinion that we should find a good deal of cooperation from the Jugo Slav authorities. He felt that they would definitely wish to avoid any sort of conflict with the western Allies. He also thought that the influence of the Russians would be wholly helpful. He had evidence that the Russians were adopting a very cooperative attitude in warning Tito ~~about~~ *any anti-Allied activities*.

Philip Broad was not quite so optimistic. He seemed to think that Tito might be rushed by people on his staff. His view was that condition 'A' in our draft letter was very unlikely.

9. Both Forrester-Walker and Broad were in complete agreement with our proposed handling of the position. Forrester-Walker, from the Jugo Slav angle, was inclined to like the idea of a separate region, but agreed that the very fact that the Jugo Slavs would like it, would be an argument against it.


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67  
10. Forrester-Walker would like a further talk with you fairly soon, say about 20-30 October, probably at Cadiz - maybe present if you agreed.

11. It looks as if any decision in your letter to ARHQ will have to be taken fairly quickly. In the meantime, I am carrying on with all plans on the basis that Trieste and Pines parties might go in under the aegis of Region XII.

Yours *Leon*



Incl. (1) Telegram

Brigadier Maurice Lash, C.B.E., M.C.

Copy No. 1

Copy to: Colonel C.M. Gavers  
File Copy

Copy No. 2  
Copy No. 3



CONFIDENTIAL

Yours Low

*[Handwritten signature]*

Incl. (1) Telegram

Brigadier Maurice Leah, C.B.E., M.C.

Copy No. 1

Copy to: Colonel G.M. Havers  
File Copy

Copy No. 2  
Copy No. 3



TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 394

Confidential 66

Office of the Chief of Staff  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 504/66/003.

21st October, 1944.

SUBJECT: Administration of NE Frontier Provinces (BOLZANO).

TO : HQ. Allied Armies in Italy.

1. I forward by hand of Colonel Monfort, DCCAO, copy of a memorandum which has been drawn up in consultation with officers of this HQ, setting forth the problems which it is expected to encounter in the three frontier Provinces of BOLZANO, TRENTO and RELLUNO.

2. I should be grateful for any comments you have to make before submitting this letter to AFHQ.

GWIS/JG.

Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff,  
for Acting Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: DCCAO, AAI.

00070



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017TOP SECRET62HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
APO 594

Confidential

Office of the Chief of Staff  
-----Ref: 504/62/00015 October 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces - NS ITALY.

TO: NS. Allied Armies in Italy.

60

1. I forward by hand of Colonel Benfert, DODAC, copy of a memorandum which has been drawn up in consultation with officers of this NS, setting forth the problems which it is expected to encounter in NS Italy.
2. You will see that in Situation "C" a very difficult situation will arise and in order to overcome this I would like to put forward to ACHS a suggestion that any Yugo Slav Army crossing the 1959 frontier into Italy should be regarded as an expeditionary force joining Allied troops under command of General Alexander.
3. Before submitting this letter to ACHS for consideration I would be glad of your comments.

MEL/JO.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
M. S. LUSH  
Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff,  
for Acting Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: DODAC, AAI.

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1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

61

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff  
\*\*\*\*\*

Confidential

Ref: 504/COS.

18 October 1944.

Brigadier Dunlop has drawn up a list of points which he would like cleared up with AFHQ and asked me to give them to you. I would be most grateful if you could let me have the answers back and I will send them to Brigadier Dunlop.

Lt. Col. Mitchell,  
G-5 Section,  
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.  
\*\*\*\*\*

Copy to: Brig. J. K. Dunlop, RC., Region XII.

*Pa. Sec.*

*61600*



TOP SECRET

60

SUBJECT: North East Frontier Provinces.

Confidential

Points upon which information is sought from A/AF.

1. Any general information on the relations between the Provinces of BILAND and the office of the Gauleiter at LIEBKNECHT.
2. Any specific information as to whether the local administration in the Tirol and VORARLBERG is carried on by Germans or Austrians. Similar conditions may be expected to exist in the Sud-Tirol - Province of SÜDTIROL.
3. Information as to food and economic conditions in the Tirol and Sud-Tirol.
4. Proposed rate of exchange to be fixed in Austria.
5. Proposed AAF policy in Austria in respect of police, courts of law, banks, post offices and schools.

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1943

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 394

Confidential

Office of the Chief of Staff.  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 508/008.

17 October 1944.

55

This is a copy of the letter which we agreed in conference today should be put up to AFHQ on the subject of HQ. ISMIX. Colonel Monfort is taking a copy up to AAI to get it cleared with them and it cannot be considered official until this clearance has been obtained. However, I understand you would like to use this in your discussions at AFHQ and you are quite welcome to do so, subject to this proviso, I will let you know as soon as possible when final approval from AAI has been received.

M S. LUSH

Lieut. Colonel Mitchell,  
G-5 Section,  
ALLIED PURCH HEADQUARTERS.

Dist to 55

Le Col. Mitchell, AFHQ  
DCCAD, AMI  
Brig Dunlop, Le Vauquien  
file

CC:CO



TOP SECRET.

REPLY of letter from ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER to AFHQ.

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces - N.E. ITALY.

1. On 26 Sep under reference 002/20/CA - A/20 324 I wrote you a letter setting forward certain aspects of the problem of applying military government in the Provinces of TRIESTE, PORDENONE, TREVISO and VERONA, forming together the area known as VENETIA GIULIA.  
2. Since the dispatch of that letter further conferences have been held and it now appears desirable to put forward for your concurrence plans based on a series of possible eventualities. At the same time I shall ask your assistance in preliminary negotiations.  
3. I consider myself bound by the terms of the Annexure to SAC(4A), Special 5, Memorandum of 13 August wherein was declared the policy of the Allied Governments to impose an Allied Military Government upon the four Provinces of VENETIA GIULIA.  
4. It is clear that Yugo Slav national aspirations cannot be left out of account. I am, however, assuming that I have your support in the view that it is not the policy of the Allied Governments to do anything which might encourage a de facto Yugo Slav annexation.  
5. It is further clear that any Allied Military Government which is set up will have a very much better chance of success if it avoids machinery likely to exacerbate local feelings. The importation of either Italian or Yugo Slav officials



2. Since the dispatch of that letter further conferences have been held and it now seems desirable to put forward ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> conference plans based on a series of possible eventualities. At the same time I shall ask your assistance in preliminary negotiations.

3. I consider myself bound by the terms of the Annexure to SAC(44), Special 5, memorandum of 13 August wherein was declared the policy of the Allied Governments to impose an Allied Military Government upon the four Provinces of YUGOSLAVIA.

4. It is clear that Yugo Slav national aspirations cannot be left out of account. I am, however, assuming that I have your support in the view that it is not the policy of the Allied Governments to do anything which might encourage a de facto Yugo Slav annexation.

5. It is further clear that any Allied Military Government which is set up will have a very much better chance of success if it avoids machinery likely to exacerbate local feelings. The importation of either Italian or Yugo Slav officials might have such a result. The central and declared aim of the Allied administration should be impartial fair dealing to Italian and Slav alike.

6. Three different possibilities must be envisaged:-

Situation "A". "Allied Military Forces" - that is to say, forces under AAI or AYFA - enter the country after a rapid advance, before any entry of organised Yugo Slav formations has taken place, and before there has been any crystallisation of partisan control. Local administration based on the Italian system continues to function to a greater or lesser degree.

Situation "B". "Allied Military Forces" enter the country after a period of vacuum during which local Yugo Slav partisans have assumed localised control.



-2-

Situation "C". A formed Togo Slav military force enters the country in advance of any other "Allied Military Force".

It is clear that all three situations may exist at one time within the confines of VENETIA GIULIA.

7. In the circumstances of Situation "A" it is proposed that Allied Military Government should generally follow normal lines with the following special features:-

(a) The continued operation of existing Italian administration would be subject to the non-introduction of officials from other parts of Italy, and would be dependent solely on those already found within the territory.

(b) ~~no~~ <sup>No</sup> Italian troops will be used as such in the area. ~~The area will be left to the discretion of the Regime (Communist)~~ Local municipal police will be used under direct orders of AMG.

(c) Italian law would be applied, and local Courts would be re-opened under existing approved judges, but the Court of Appeal at TRIESTE and the detached section at Fiume would be final Courts. The right of recourse to the Court of Cassation in Rome will be suspended.

(d) Italian legislation since 8 September 1943 would not be implemented in other parts of Italy. Any legislation deemed necessary would be achieved by publication of General or Regional Orders. ~~However, they might find some Italian legislation.~~

(e) The Provinces would be financed entirely by APA funds. Existing banks would be used but Italian Government funds would not be introduced from outside.



within the territory.

(b) ~~Whereas~~ <sup>No</sup> Italian troops will be used as such in the area. Local municipal police will be used under direct orders of AMG.

(c) Italian law would be applied, and local Courts would be re-opened under existing approved judges, but the Court of Appeal at TRIESTE and the detached section at Fiume would be final Courts. The right of recourse to the Court of Cassation in Rome will be suspended.

(d) Italian legislation since 8 September 1943 would not be implemented in other parts of Italy. Any legislation deemed necessary would be achieved by publication of General or Regional Orders.

(e) The Provinces would be financed entirely by AVA funds. Existing banks would be used but Italian Government funds would not be introduced from outside.

3. In the circumstances of Situation "B" a similar policy will be adopted with the differences that:-

- (a) No Italian police would be re-employed in partisan areas.
- (b) That any working de facto administrative machinery whether using Italian or Yugo Slav officials or both <sup>and</sup> will be kept in being.
- (c) As with "A", importation of officials from outside <sup>and</sup> will be avoided.
- (d) Courts of law would be initially closed and re-opened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioner. Offences against Allied proclamations would be tried by AMG Courts. Any Courts permitted to re-open would, under International Law, have to apply <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>Italian</sup> ~~Italian~~ law.



-3-

Code, as being the law legally in force. As with "A", final appeal would be to the local Courts of Appeal, recourse to the Court of Cassation at Rome being suspended.

9. The essential consideration both in Case "A" and Case "B" is that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants, or of parties outside the territory, that the only governing authority is the Allied Military Government. As a visible indication of this fact only American and British flags will be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

10. In the case of "C", a more difficult situation would arise inasmuch as the commander of any regularly constituted Yugo Slav invading army operating under the independent orders of his government, would automatically become the Military Governor of any territory occupied by his troops. In this case we should expect to find a Yugo Slav administration set up, with legal sanction under international law, under Yugo Slav officers. It would be extremely difficult, if not wholly impracticable, for AMG officers on the spot to displace such an administration or locally to attempt to impose Allied Military Government on such an administration. Such a difficulty might be overcome if agreement could be secured in advance with the Yugo Slav Government that any Yugo Slav army crossing the 1939 frontier into Italy should be regarded as an expeditionary force joining the Allied troops under command of General Alexander. This formula would cover the legal position of the installation of an Anglo-American AMG under the authority of General Alexander. It is, however, clear that some agreement must be made with the Yugo Slav authorities which will include a clause to the effect that civil administration will be carried out by Anglo-American Military Government officers, in order to avoid difficulties, embarrassment, and probably



under the independent orders of his government, would automatically become the Military Governor of any territory occupied by his troops. In this case we should expect to find a Yugo Slav administration set up, with legal sanction under international law, under Yugo Slav officers. It would be extremely difficult, if not wholly impossible, for AMG officers on the spot to displace such an administration or locally to attempt to impose Allied Military Government on such an administration. Such a difficulty might be overcome if agreement could be secured in advance with the Yugo Slav Government that any Yugo Slav army crossing the 1939 frontier into Italy should be regarded as an expeditionary force joining the Allied troops under command of General Alexander. This formula would cover the legal position of the installation of an Anglo-American AMG under the authority of General Alexander. It is, however, clear that some agreement must be made with the Yugo Slav authorities which will include a clause to the effect that civil administration will be carried out by Anglo-American Military Government officers, in order to avoid difficulties, embarrassment, and probably unfortunate incidents in the area, and I would ask that at the appropriate moment this be done. It is also clear that a token force of American or British troops, or both, should be moved into the area at the earliest possible opportunity. An undertaking should also be obtained from the Yugo Slav authorities that in the event of a Yugo Slav force occupying any part of the territory no attempt would be made to alter laws in force as on 8 Sep 1943. In all three cases the Regional Commissioner and his staff will have full discretion to consult local opinion in the conduct of civil affairs.

11. It is evident that the imposition of Allied Military Government, whether under Conditions "A", "B" or "C", will require a considerably higher concentration



if officers and men that has been available lately. Moreover, a fundamental prerequisite for the execution of this plan under "A", "B" or "C", is the provision of an adequate force of Allied Military Police to be placed at the disposal of the Provincial Commissioners. The minimum numbers deemed necessary for this are shown in Annexure "A". In any event it is proposed to concentrate available resources on three main centres:-

- (a) The port of TRIESTE.
- (b) The port of POLA and the coal and bauxite mines of Southern ISTRIA.
- (c) The port of FIUME.

It is felt that a fair, firm and consistent Allied administration in these three important centres will have a steadying effect on the remainder of the area, much of which is sparsely populated and will be, under winter conditions, difficult of access.

12. It is further requested that, should circumstances permit, full opportunity be taken of Allied naval power to make rapid and demonstrative landings in the three ports of TRIESTE, FIUME and POLA.

13. The small Province of ZARA was not mentioned in the Chief of Staff's memorandum referred to in para 5. I should be glad of your instructions as to the policy to be adopted in respect of this port and of the islands off the Dalmatian Coast.

14. I have considered the desirability of setting up a separate Regional organisation for VENETIA GIULIA. It is clear that the problem of all six frontier provinces, the four of VENETIA GIULIA and the two of VENETIA TRIDENTINA, rest not only on each other but upon the neighbouring Provinces of UDINE and BELLUNO and upon the whole of N.E. ITALY. The over-emphasis upon the creation of separate administrative



three important centres will have a steady effect on the remainder of the area, some of which is sparsely populated and will be, under winter conditions, difficult of access.

12. It is further requested that, should circumstances permit, full opportunity be taken of Allied naval power to make rapid and demonstrative landings in the three ports of TRIESTE, Fiume and ZOLA.

13. The small Province of ZARA was not mentioned in the Chief of Staff's memorandum referred to in para 3. I should be glad of your instructions as to the policy to be adopted in respect of this port and of the islands off the Dalmatian Coast.

14. I have considered the desirability of setting up a separate Regional organization for VENETIA GIULIA. It is clear that the problem of all six frontier provinces, the four of VENETIA GIULIA and the two of VENETIA TRIDENTINA, must not only on each other but upon the neighbouring Provinces of UDINE and BELLUNO and upon the whole of N.E. ITALY. The over-emphasis upon the creation of separate administrative machinery may create upon the minds of both Yugo Slavs and Italians precisely that impression of a fait accompli for the whole of VENETIA GIULIA which it appears desirable to avoid. Moreover, having regard to our very limited establishment, I am anxious to avoid the additional overhead that must arise from the formation of new Regions. Therefore, without prejudice to any future installation of a separate Regional Headquarters at TRIESTE, I propose to handle all the organization of administration for VENETIA GIULIA as for VENETIA TRIDENTINA, through the one Regional HQ of Region XII, with sub-Regions for VENETIA GIULIA and VENETIA TRIDENTINA if such be found necessary.

15. In view of the above considerations, I recommend ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> be negotiated with the Yugo Slav authorities that ~~Yugo~~ Yugo Slav troops crossing the 1939 frontier into Italy <sup>operate as an expeditionary force, and come immediately under orders of AAI.</sup>



1955

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 394.

Office of the Chief of Staff.  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 504/54/008.

7th October 1944.

Thank you for your letters and in particular your very interesting and lucid memoranda on the administration of the frontier provinces.

I have had a staff meeting to consider these problems in the light of your memoranda and we find that we are in agreement with a great deal of what you say. At the same time the whole question is fraught with problems which effect high policy that we should be wrong to give you any directions without a great deal of consideration and consultation with AFHQ and SACRED's political advisers.

The statement alleged to have been made by Tito and a long memorandum submitted yesterday by the Royal Yugoslav Government, the un doubted representations which will continue to be made by the Italian Government, all point to this particular problem being one of the greatest importance over which we cannot afford to make any mistakes.

I shall try, therefore, to give you general directions on policy, leaving to you certain discretion as to the application of that policy according to the conditions which you find on occupation. I do not think I can give you the wide latitude of which I think Harold Gaccia would be in favour because I am sure you will appreciate that any false step made by one of your Provincial Commissioners might land us into a most horrible international quagmire.

In our directions, which it will take a little time to prepare, and in the preparation of which I shall probably want your personal advice, we shall have to be fairly precise and certainly give you instructions for alternative procedure in the various conditions which will be found.

I hope we shall get all this cleared up within a week which will be in plenty of time as things are going at present.

M S

Brigadier J.K. Dunlop, CBE, MC, TD,  
Regional Commissioner,  
Allied Control Commission,  
VENETIA REGION.

00054



Chief of Staff.

Mr Gaccia dictated the note below to me, but  
could not wait to sign it:-

"This is the note which I would have sent to  
Brigadier Dunlop about Tito's speech for  
his information. You may find it useful  
in drafting the message which I understand  
you have in hand for AFHQ."

P.R.

6.10.44.

CCSC:



TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
POLITICAL SECTION  
APO 894

Ref # 385.04

6 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Marshal TITO'S Speech.

TO : Brigadier J. K. Dunlop, O.B.E., M.C., T.D.,  
Regional Commissioner,  
Venetia Region.

I let you know via your P.A. that I was making enquire from Philip Broad in Bari, about a statement alleged to have been made by Tito claiming Istria etc. Broad has now replied sending me the translation of the speech made by Tito on the 18th September as reported in the newspaper of the 26th Dalmatian Division of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation.

I enclose the relevant extract. About it Philip Broad writes:

"So far as I am aware, the claim which he puts forward in this speech for the inclusion of all persons of Yugoslav origin living in Istria, the Slovene Primorje, and in Carinthia within the frontiers of the new Yugoslavia is the first and only statement made by Tito regarding any post-war claims which Yugoslav may wish to make for the revision of her frontiers. In view of the categorical terms in which the claim is expressed it may be expected that the Marshal intends to follow up his demand.

He is evidently referring to Count Ciano and the Italians when he says that: "... but our neighbours of the other side have talked too much about it [the problem of frontiers] ... They have appealed to our magnanimity according to which we are to leave our brethren further under foreign rule."

H. A. Caccia  
Vice President.

Brigadier J. K. Dunlop, O.B.E., M.C., T.D.,  
Regional Commissioner,  
Venetia Region.

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TOP SECRET



1958

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

51

Extracted from Marshal TITO'S Speech  
delivered on 18 September 1944.

No. 20  
Date of Issue: 20 Sept  
Date of Info: 13 Sept

"The hour is nearing when discussions regarding the frontiers of our country must begin. We have never in the course of this war spoken concerning this. But I must say a few words about this. Our people have fought for their freedom, their independence, for a better and happier future, but they have also fought for the liberation of those of our brethren who for decades have groaned under a foreign yoke. By this struggle our brethren in Istria, in the Slovenian Littoral, and Corinthia must be and shall be freed, (So it is!) and they shall live freely in their homeland with their brethren. That is the wish of all of us; that is the wish of all of them there. We do not wish what belongs to another, and we do not relinquish our own.

I have had to touch on this question for during all this time we have been over modest regarding that problem. In the entire course of this war we have never spoken concerning this, but our neighbors of the other side have talked too much about it and are making various combinations. They have appealed to our magnanimity according to which we are to leave our brethren further under foreign rule. Corrections of the past injustices of Versailles, Rapallo and other treaties, which we ask, are regarded as some sort of imperialism, as something which in a few years might cause another war, by some men in neighboring countries, in those very countries which not so long ago waged war against us, whose armies have devastated our villages and towns and killed thousands and thousands of sons of our land. This they think that we should continue to leave our brethren under a foreign yoke, I have spoken thus knowing that you think as I do. (So it is! Applause)."

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1959

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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504

50

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
C. H. F.

Office of the Chief of Staff

Confidential

Ref: 210/3/CSS.

6th October 1944.

MINUTES OF CHIEF OF STAFF'S MEETING - 6 OCTOBER 1944.

PRESENT:

Brigadier H.S. Lush, Chief of Staff - Chairman.  
Brigadier G.A. Upjohn, DCOB, Civil Affairs Section.  
Mr. A. Antolini, A/DCCB, Economic Section.  
Mr. H. Cascia, Jt V.P., Political Section.  
Mr. Schott, Jt. V.P., Political Section.  
Colonel L.B. Deane, DCO, Economic Section.  
Colonel Parkin, Ex.Off(A), Establishment Section.  
Colonel R.E. Cripps, DCO, Civil Affairs Section.  
Lt. Colonel G.W.L. Skipp, DCO, Chief of Staff's Section.  
Colonel Silber, RLO, Venezia Region.

1. The meeting discussed a letter from Brigadier Dunlop on the administration of the four Eastern Provinces of ISIRIA. The problem before the meeting was whether to use existing machinery of law and order or to impose AMB. This was particularly relevant to the latest speech of Marshal Tito which implied he had every intention of occupying this territory with Yugoslav forces. The Chief of Staff said he proposed to write to AFHQ asking for full information on the area from all sources: he would also draft a questionnaire to be sent to other agencies (SSR, etc). He would also submit to AFHQ proposals of action to be taken, giving Regional Commissioners full discretion to act in the light of conditions found. It was suggested that Italian officials or Carabinieri should be imported from the mainland. We should set up our own police force, using such suitable personnel as we found there, either Italian or Yugoslav, based on a nucleus of Military Police companies.

Brigadier Upjohn raised the question of printing Proclamations in Slovene. It was decided that this should also be referred to AFHQ, as there might be objections from the point of view of security. It was also open to question whether Serb, Croat and Hungarian translations might not also have to be made, once Italian was departed from. The meeting was in favour of printing the Proclamations only in Italian which was the official and legal language of the country.

Mr. Cascia reported that the civilian population of 46,000 said to be in the process of total evacuation.



The Chief of Staff said that Brigadier Dunlop had asked for an increase of staff. He wanted 12 Legal Officers for the area and 30 Civil Affairs Officers for the 4 Provinces.

2. The Chief of Staff asked Mr. Intalini to restrict demands of returns from the understaffed Regions. The Regional Commissioner, Southern Region had reported that one demand from Transportation Sub-Commission would entail the making of 1000 documents.

3. The final form of Channels of Communication was produced and passed subject to any comment from V.S. Economic Section who would give it further study.

4. A meeting of the Personnel and Organisation Committee was fixed for Tuesday, October 10th at 1500 hours. Establishment Section were asked to obtain final proposals from Sections as to their establishment.

Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff.

|                       |                       |   |     |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|-----|
| <u>RECOMMENDATION</u> | Chief of Staff        | - | 1   |
|                       | Political Section     | - | 2   |
|                       | Civil Affairs Section | - | 1   |
|                       | Establishment Section | - | 1   |
|                       | Economic Section      | - | 1   |
|                       | File                  | - | 1 ✓ |

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CONF.

TOP SECRET.

49

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 194

Confidential

Ref: 9/6.2/6.2.

8th October, 1944.

SUBJECT: Appointment of Italian Government Officials.

TO : All Sub-Commissions JA Section.

Until further orders Sub-Commissions will NOT have any discussions with the Italian Government as to possible Italian Government officials for any appointments whatever in the provinces of REGGIO, TUNIS, TRIESTE or VENETIA.

(Sgd) R.B. CHIFFS, Col.,  
Gen. G.F. HARRIS, Brig.,  
V.P. C.A. Sec.  
Dep. C. of 3.

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P.M.  
P.M.  
C.A.

Copy to: C of 4.

0005





Délégation Royale de Yougoslavie  
au Conseil Consultatif pour l'Italie

Rome, September 5th, 1944.

Dear Sir,

In connection with the swift advance of the gallant Allied troops, the 7th and especially the VIIIth Army, I have the honour to present to You the enclosed Memorandum, which is intended to point out the necessity to create an exclusively Allied Transitional Administration for the administrative units (compartimenti) of Venezia Giulia, Zara and part of the province of Udine, owing to the fact that all these territories are populated by non-Italians, i.e. by Yugoslav populations. Such an Allied temporary administration would be in the interest not only of the Allied military aims, but also of Allied Yugoslavia.

Hoping that this demand shall meet Your understanding and approval,

ai,

I am,

Dear Sir,

Yours Faithfully



groups, and for the respectability of the Viceroy, I have the honour to present to You the enclosed Memorandum, which is intended to point out the necessity to create an exclusively Allied Transitional Administration for the administrative units (compartimenti) of Venezia Giulia, Dalmatia and part of the province of Udine, owing to the fact that all these territories are populated by non-Italians, i.e. by Yugoslav populations. Such an Allied temporary administration would be in the interest not only of the Allied military aims, but also of Allied Yugoslavia.

Hoping that this demand shall meet Your understanding and approval,

al,

I am,

Dear Sir,

Yours Faithfully

*W. Churchill*

(Dr. Misha KUKIC)

ambassador.

Royal Yugoslav Representative to the  
Advisory Council for Italy.

To the Acting Chief Commissioner  
of the Allied Control Commission,  
apt. WILSON S. STONE, WASH.

No action. Mr Krebs

has left.

MS/1412

CC-1412





Royal Yugoslav Delegation  
to the Advisory Council for Italy

MEMORANDUM

At a recent meeting of the Allied Control Commission, attended also by the members of the Advisory Council for Italy, a map, issued by the Public Works and Utilities Sub-Commission was shown. From this map it can be seen that the whole Italian territory is being divided according to the Italian administrative units and according to ACC regional boundaries.

In connection with the said map the Representative of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Deputy Member, to the Advisory Council for Italy, Mr. D. SMILJANIĆ, Minister plenipotentiary, immediately formulated the following declaration:

"Mr. Smiljanic declares that, as representative of Yugoslavia, he can but thank General MAG FANTAUZE for his exposé. He thinks it his duty, however, to formulate a remark as to the map of Italy issued by the Council regarding the way the peninsula has been divided into administrative regions. Among these the Julian Venetia (Venezia Giulia) - region is - with its population of 500,000 to 600,000 Slovenes and Croats who, for years, have had to endure Italian domination, is of par-



territory is being divided according to the Italian administrative units and according to ACO regional boundaries.

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Mr. Smiljanid declares that, as representative of Yugoslavs, he can but thank General MAC FARLAND for his exposé. He thinks it his duty, however, to formulate a remark as to the map of Italy issued by the Council regarding the way the peninsula has been divided into administrative regions. Among these the Julian Venetia (Venezia Giulia) - region is with its population of 500,000 to 600,000 Slovenes and Croats who, for years, have had to endure Italian domination, is of particular interest to Yugoslavia. To this General MacFarlane remarks that the maps of the Allied Control Commission are not to be taken into consideration beyond the line Piave-Rimini, and that divisions marked on the map North of that line are only due to the initiative of the drawers' office. Mr. Smiljanic takes note with satisfaction of this presentation, and describes the fate of the Yugoslav population of the Julian Venetia : 40 to 60,000 people deported to Italy and interned there, more than 100 villages destroyed. All Yugoslavs, who had been recruited by force into the Italian army, have entered as volunteers into the Yugoslav army, and 7,000 fought to-day, without counting many more thousands fighting at





Royal Yugoslav Delegation  
to the Advisory Council for Italy

• 2 •

the Yugoslav partisans. The Yugoslav Government, in June 1943, presented to the Governments of Great Britain and of the United States a note concerning the future status of that region. Mr. Sted explicitly answered that, when the moment comes the Yugoslav request will be taken into consideration. That moment will be there, Mr. Miljenić said, when the Allied Control Commission shall have to take over the administration of that region. As Yugoslav is not being represented in the Control Commission, it would be useful, from now on already, to study the administration of that region separately, as it differs completely from the remaining Italian territory by its ethnical character, and not to include her in region Nr. 12 as foreseen now on the map issued by the Council.

Mr. GURINI takes note, on behalf of the Council, of the desire expressed by Mr. MILJENIĆ.

In order to make the above declaration more easily comprehensible, and in order to make it possible for the preliminary preparations of the Allied administration on behalf of the territories to be more particularly adapted to the special needs and wishes of the Yugoslav populations living in North Eastern Italy, I take the liberty to add the follow-



of that region. As Yugoslavia is not being represented in the Control Commission, it would be useful, from now on already, to study the administration of that region separately, as it differs completely from the remaining Italian territory by its ethnical character, and not to include her in region Nr. 12 as foreseen now on the map issued by the Council.

Mr. QUINN takes note, on behalf of the Council, of the desire expressed by Mr. MILANČIĆ.

In order to make the above declaration more easily comprehensible, and in order to make it possible for the preliminary preparations of the Allied administration on behalf of the territories to be more particularly adapted to the special needs and wishes of the Yugoslav populations living in North Eastern Italy, I take the liberty to add the following complementary explanations :

In the sectors of Venezia Giulia and Zara, i.e. in the provinces of Gorizia, Trieste, Pola, Fiume and Zara, the great majority of the population is Yugoslav. In the provinces of Gorizia (Gorican) and Trieste (Trest) this majority consists of Slovenes; in the provinces of Zara (Zadar) and Fiume (Rijeka) the majority is formed by Croats, whereas in the province of Pola (Pulj) the Yugoslav majority consists of Slovenes in the North and Croats in the South.

None of the Yugoslav populations of the above mentioned provinces have ever accepted their annexation to Italy, notwithstanding the international decisions on the matter. On the contrary, they always wished to be part of Yugoslavia ./.  
00542





Royal Yugoslav Dilegation  
to the Advisory Council for Italy

3

for these populations belong to the Yugoslav national territory and form an indivisible unit with it; and historically all these territories remained until 1918 under the same "state administration" and never were under the Italian administration.

During the whole period between the two World Wars these Yugoslav populations, who had been obliged to live in the Venezia Giulia, repeatedly claimed to be liberated from Italy and to return to Yugoslavia. On the other hand, each Italian administration, even the pro-Fascist one (1918-1921) has been trying desperately and with the utmost brutality to consolidate and Italianize these provinces, trying to crush the population by physical, economic and moral pressure. (See the book "The Yugoslav Minority under Italy", by Prof. Gersliff, translated into English by Penny S. Gervilland, D.B.E.).

During the Second World War, the soldiers recruited from the Venezia Giulia have given permanent evidence of their unwillingness to serve Italy and, therefore, the Italian authorities separated them from the regular units and put them, as unreliable elements, into special formations of forced labour units. As soon as these soldiers were offered the slightest

... as volunteers in the



the to return to Yugoslavia. On the other hand, each Italian administration, even the pro-Fascist one (1918-1921) has been trying desperately and with the utmost brutality to denationalize and Italianize these provinces, trying to crush the population by physical, economic and moral pressure. (See the book "The Yugoslav Minority under Italy", by Prof. Gernsheim, translated into English by Penny S. Gervand, O.B.E.).

During the Second World War, the soldiers recruited from the Venezia Giulia have given permanent evidence of their unwillingness to serve Italy and, therefore, the Italian authorities separated them from the regular units and put them, as unreliable elements, into special formations of forced labour units. As soon as these soldiers were offered the slightest opportunity they passed over to the Allies as volunteers in the Yugoslav forces. Furthermore, there are 5,400 of these "Italian" Yugoslav soldiers serving with the Allied Forces in North Africa and about 5,500 in Corsica. These "Italian" Yugoslav soldiers from the Venezia Giulia, who are nowadays in the liberated Italian territories, are obliged to serve in the Italian units in Sardinia (about 6,000) and elsewhere, but they are doing it exclusively under the pressure of circumstances, because the question of their passage into the Yugoslav Army has not yet been settled by the Allies. The undersigned is permanently receiving petitions ~~and~~ from them asking to be released from the Italian units and allowed to offer their services as Yugoslav volunteers fighting for the Allied cause./.





Royal Yugoslav Delegation  
to the Advisory Council for Italy

- 4 -

The whole Yugoslav population in the territory of the Venezia Giulia is fighting, as is well known, against the invaders, i.e. the Italians and the Germans. It is notorious that the guerrilla-fighters of that region have carried out innumerable actions of military value and that they have lost over 10,000 killed in actions against the Italians and Germans. Recently over 10,000 men fit for fighting were deported by the Germans from their country in order to prevent them to join their brothers fighting in the mountains and in the woods.

The guerrilla high command of General Drago Mihailovic has solemnly proclaimed the liberation of the Venezia Giulia and its return to the future Yugoslavia as an essential part of his program. The guerrilla high command of Tito, Zecelj and, also claims the integration of the Venezia Giulia into the Yugoslav national territory.

The Yugoslav Government in London has also presented a note to the Allies asking for the union of the territory of the Venezia Giulia with the mother-country Yugoslavia and declaring this claim as their war aim. The recent agreement between the Yugoslav and the Italian governments has stated the



Germany from their country in order to prevent them to join their brothers fighting in the mountains and in the woods.

The guerrilla high command of General <sup>FRANK</sup> ~~FRANK~~ <sup>STRAUSS</sup> ~~STRAUSS~~ has solemnly promised the liberation of the Venezia Giulia and its return to the future Yugoslavia as an essential part of his program. The guerrilla high command of Tito, Josip <sup>BRUTIC</sup> ~~BRUTIC~~, also claims the integration of the Venezia Giulia into the Yugoslav national territory.

The Yugoslav Government in London has also presented a note to the Allies asking for the union of the territory of the Venezia Giulia with the mother country Yugoslavia and declaring this claim as their war aim. The recent agreement between the Yugoslav and the Italian governments has stated the same aim: the liberation of these Yugoslav territories from Italy and their return to Yugoslavia.

All these facts are proving that the territories of the Venezia Giulia and here are to be regarded as special territories, and considering their particular position they require a special treatment even before the final settlement of the future frontiers, as so to meet the wishes and needs of the Yugoslav population of the said regions, which neither the Italians and is refusing with the utmost indignation to have anything in common with the Italian administration and its authorities, whom they consider as beaten enemies. <sup>66550</sup> ~~66550~~ is the primary aim of their present fight for the liberation of





Royal Yugoslav Delegation  
to the Advisory Council for Italy

- 5 -

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It is advisable, therefore, and urgently necessary that for the whole region of the Venezia Giulia and of Gora a special plan be set up immediately for a transitional Allied administration of the said regions.

This plan should foresee an exclusively Allied Transitional Administration and Power, without the least direct or indirect contact or even collaboration with the Italian authorities. Such non-Italian Allied Temporary Administration ought to remain in force until the final settlement of the frontiers between Yugoslavia and Italy. Only such an Administration would be accepted, and most heartily welcomed by the local Yugoslav population who would give it its full support. The slightest interference by the Italian authorities, whichever they would be, in the temporary administration of these regions would be regarded as unacceptable and humiliating and as an unfriendly act.

This also relates to the question of the Administration of the Yugoslav population in the frontier regions of the Venezia Giulia, administratively included in the province of Udine (Videm). These are especially the districts of Mesero (Mesera), Gorizia (Gorizia), Trieste (Trieste), Cividale (Cividale)



indirect contact or even collaboration with the Italian authorities. Such non-Italian Allied Temporary Administration ought to remain in force until the final settlement of the frontiers between Yugoslavia and Italy. Only such an Administration would be accepted, and most heartily welcomed by the local Yugoslav population who would give it its full support. The slightest interference by the Italian authorities, whichever they would be, in the temporary administration of these regions would be regarded as unacceptable and humiliating and as an unfriendly act.

This also relates to the question of the Administration of the Yugoslav population in the frontier regions of the Venezia Giulia, administratively included in the province of Udine (Vidua). These are especially the districts of Mesero (Morze), Gemona (Gumina), Tarcento (Tarcent), Cividale (Cedee) and San Pietro (Sempeter).

Rome, September 7th 1944.

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TOP SECRET

ADVANCED

HEADQUARTERS REGION XII

Allied Control Commission

AFG 194

Copy No. 1

503

142

IND/AM

1 OCT 1944

TO : H.Q. Allied Commission 1 October 1944

Attn: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces

FILE NO: ARXIE/4

38

1. This letter is forwarded to you in accordance with the promise contained in our letter of the 2 October, Para. 2. I have NOT discussed the matter with AMG 5 Army who may, of course, be intimately concerned.
2. The problems of Venezia Tridentina vary to a considerable extent from those detailed in respect of Venezia Giulia, the difference being, mainly, due to the form of government in existence at the present time.
3. All available evidence indicates that, since the capitulation of Italy, the control of the three provinces of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno has been taken over by Germany. The phrase used by one of our informants is that these three provinces have been "administratively annexed to the Reich".
4. Therefore it appears likely that, on the entry of Allied troops, a situation of some anarchy may be found. The office holders under the German regime will probably have fled, taking in many cases, records and available cash with them.
5. It is possible that some sort of interim administration may have been set up by Patriotti. The probability and scope of such temporary organization will be likely to vary within the three provinces named.
6. It is to be noted that the province of Belluno, though included by the Germans in their "Five Alpine Operational Zone", does not form part of Venezia Tridentina, nor is it one of the six frontier provinces listed in the Chief of Staff's Memorandum.
7. It is therefore presumed that, in the case of the province



2. The problems of Venezia Tridentina vary to a considerable extent from those detailed in respect of Venezia Giulia, the difference being, mainly, due to the form of government in existence at the present time.

3. All available evidence indicates that, since the capitulation of Italy, the control of the three provinces of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno has been taken over by Germany. The phrase used by one of our informants is that these three provinces have been "administratively annexed to the Reich".

4. Therefore it appears likely that, on the entry of Allied troops, a situation of some anarchy may be found. The office holders under the German regime will probably have fled, taking in many cases, records and available cash with them.

5. It is possible that some sort of interim administration may have been set up by Patriotti. The probability and scope of such temporary organization will be likely to vary within the three provinces named.

6. It is to be noted that the province of Belluno, though included by the Germans in their "Three Alpine Operational Zones", does not form part of Venezia Tridentina, nor is it one of the six frontier provinces listed in the Chief of Staff's Memorandum.

7. It is therefore presented that, in the case of the province of Belluno, the normal policy will obtain, and a return to normal Italian administration will be carried out as rapidly as possible.

8. In the case of the remaining two provinces of Trento and Bolzano, plans for the application of AMG rule in accordance with the instructions from the Chief of Staff, will be developed in accordance with information obtainable. It appears likely that certain practical differences will be found between the two provinces.

9. In the case of the southern province of Trento, its largely Italian population and Italian sentiment should render easy a return to the Italian administrative system, and there should be no great difficulty in using Italian officials under AMG direction. It may even be possible to introduce Italian officials from continental Italy, and to bring in Carabinieri, though it is suggested that no prior engagement in this direction be entered into with the Italian Government.

00553



10. In the past as the province of Bolzano, where the German speaking people live over 80% of the total, it may be expected that the recent period of administrative incorporation in the Reich may have revived aspirations of union with a new Austria. The local Italian say view with disappointment and disavowal, the return of Italian law and administration in the wake of the Allied Armies. Especially will they dislike the return of Italian officials.

11. The problem is not of any great magnitude. The population of the whole of the province of Bolzano is 277,000 people. The country is sparsely inhabited, and the most important portion is traversed by the Brenner road and railway, which may be expected to be held by Allied troops.

12. It is therefore submitted that in Bolzano, the administration should be carried on under direct AMG rules using, as necessary, local inhabitants in minor posts but without the introduction of Italian officials from the south.

13. It would of course be valuable, if witnesses could be obtained by A.E.M.G., as to whether the local administration were to be based on the recent German administration or upon a new affiliation to the Italian system. If, however, it is felt at A.E.M.G. that such a matter cannot be decided in advance of the Peace Treaty, then it should not be impossible to contrive a local autonomy for the province, avoiding emphasis on either Austrian or Italian connection, and holding all administration under the tight control of local AMG.

14. No estimate is being made of additional officers required to administer this AMG rule in Bolzano. It is not thought that additional numbers will be large, provided that local support can be obtained on the lines proposed. The presence of Allied Traffic Control, Engineer, and Maintenance personnel should be an added measure of security.

*John A. D. L. Dr*

Regional Commissioner

*cc: [illegible]*



based on the recent German administration were to be to the Italian system. If, however, it is felt at A.P.M.A. that such a matter cannot be decided in advance of the Peace Treaty, then it should not be impossible to contrive a local autonomy for the province, avoiding emphasis on either Austria or Italian connection, and holding all administration under the tight control of local A.P.M.

14. No estimate is being made of additional officers required to administer this A.P.M. rule in Bolzano. It is not thought that additional numbers will be large, provided that local support can be obtained on the lines proposed. The presence of Allied Traffic Control, Engineer, and Maintenance personnel should be an added measure of security.

*John R. D. L. Jr.*  
Regional Commissioner  
*cc: [illegible]*

Chief of Staff, A.C.      Copies 1 & 2  
Colonel Gervais      Copy 3  
File      Copy 4 & 5



1978

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

40

Ref: 904/001

3rd October 1974

Police

Subject: Investigation of

Re: Letter from

After 43 minutes with V.P. Political Section and having read a memorandum by Mr. [Name], I should be grateful if you could let the [Name] be added to the [Name] for [Name] for [Name] in [Name] will they have been further [Name] from [Name]. I will have [Name] drafted as [Name] to put in the [Name] of the next [Name] of [Name] [Name].

has been by  
[Name]

cc: "A" files

of this  
Copy forwarded to  
G-5 EWS

M.S.L.  
O.C. [Name]  
Chief of Staff.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

ADVANCED  
HEADQUARTERS REGION III  
Allied Control Commission  
APO 394

*146*  
*29* / *am*

TO : Political Section, H.Q. A.C.C.

2 October 1944

SUBJECT: File

FILE NO: ARXII/6

I am sending back by the hand of Colonel Willner, your file 806/CA and also and also two Foreign Office prints of the Istrian problems, which you left with me.

  
Regional Commissioner

00046



TOP SECRET

ADVANCED  
HEADQUARTERS REGION XII  
Allied Control Commission  
APO 394

TO : H.Q. Allied Commission  
Attn: Chief of Staff  
SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces

2 October 1944

FILE NO: ARXII/4

1. A letter on the above subject dated this H.Q. 30 Sept. has been sent to you by the hand of Mr. Harold Caccia.

2. That letter was written before there was an opportunity of a discussion with Mr. Caccia, Colonel Fiske and Group Captain Benson. A conference with these officers was held last night, at which it was decided:

- (a) That the letter of 30 September should go forward as it stood, in order that you might be aware, at the earliest opportunity of certain points upon which we sought guidance
- (b) That we should prepare a revised letter dealing with, and elaborating the main points raised in our letter of 30 September,
- (c) That we should prepare a first estimate of the additional officers and men required.

(d) That we should confine our first comments to the problems of Veneto Giulia, but that this should be followed by a similar letter dealing with the situation in Veneto Tridentina.

3. I hold myself in readiness to proceed to Rome at any time on your instructions in order to attend a conference on these important matters.

In order to facilitate communication, I have arranged with the agreement of Group Captain Benson, to form a small mobile Tactical Regional H.Q. which will always be situated within a few miles of Main H.Q. 5th Army, wherever the latter may move.

In all matters the closest liaison will be maintained with Group Captain Benson, with whom this letter has been discussed.

4. Any consideration of the problem must start from the

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



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In order to facilitate communication, I have arranged with the agreement of Group Captain Benson, to form a small mobile Tactical Regional H.Q. which will always be situated within a few miles of Main H.Q. 8th Army, wherever the latter may move.

In all matters the closest liaison will be maintained with Group Captain Benson, with whom this letter has been discussed.

4. Any consideration of the problem must start from the Annexure to SAC (44) Special (5) Memorandum of the 13 August. Therein is laid down the declared policy of the Allied Governments to impose an Allied Military Government on, inter alia, the frontier provinces of Gorizia, Trieste, Piuma, and Pola. This decision has been communicated officially to both the Yugoslav and Italian Governments.

5. It is therefore clearly the duty of the Allied Commission to prepare to carry out, literally, the instructions issued by the Supreme Allied Command. Any retrogression from a position so deliberately taken up by the Allied Governments must inevitably weaken Allied authority in general.

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6. There is the obvious danger that both the Italian and Yugoslav Governments may attempt to produce a condition whereby Allied Military Government on entering upon the territory - possibly after a period of vacuum - will be confronted with a series of faits accomplis the reversal of which might lead to local disorder tending to displace Allied control.

7. It appears desirable to take preliminary measures now, in order to render more easy the delicate task that lies ahead. It is submitted for your consideration that the following are matters wherein the support of A.F.M.Q. might be sought, or action taken by H.Q. Allied Commission.

(a) The maintenance of a firm attitude vis a vis the Yugoslav Government coupled, as may be necessary, by friendly warnings as to the serious effects of any attempted coup de main.

(b) The avoidance of any action or language on the part of the Allied Governments which would give to the Italian Government any pretext for believing that it would have a part in the administration, under Allied Military Government, of the four provinces concerned. In this connection policy must be coordinated with all Sub Commissions of the Allied Commission, with P.W.S. and with M.M.I.A. and the Naval and Air Commissions.

(c) The securing through A.F.M.Q. and otherwise, of a regular and up to date series of reports of the existing political and administrative position in the provinces of Veneto Giulia.

(d) The planning, with A.F.M.Q., of a rapid and adequate Allied occupation of the Ports of Pola, Trieste and Fiume. Such occupying forces might, in the first instance and for a limited period, exceed those required on a purely military basis.

8. While it is clear that the action to be taken by Allied Military Government will have to depend, to some extent, on the situation as it is found to exist at the moment of entry, there are certain considerations which appear to be fundamental, and upon which your approval is sought.

(a) There appear to be three main centres of importance within the general area.

- (i) The Port of Trieste
- (ii) The Port of Pola and the coal and bauxite mines of Southern Istria
- (iii) The Port of Fiume

It is felt that a firm, fair, and consistent Allied administration in these three important centres will have a



provinces concerned, under Allied Military Government, of the four provinces concerned. In this connection, it must be coordinated with all Sub-Committees of the Allied Commission, with P.W.S. and with M.M.F.S. and the Naval and Air Commissions.

(c) The securing through A.M.F.S. and otherwise, of a regular and up to date series of reports of the existing political and administrative position in the provinces of Veneto Giulia.

(3) The planning, with A.M.F.S., of a rapid and adequate Allied occupation of the Ports of Pola, Trieste and Lissa. Such occupying forces might, in the first instance and for a limited period, exceed those required on a purely military basis.

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- (i) The Port of Trieste
- (ii) The Port of Pola and the coal and bauxite mines of Southern Istria
- (iii) The Port of Fiume

It is felt that a firm, fair, and consistent Allied administration in these three important centres will have a steady effect on the remainder of the area. Much of the remainder is sparsely populated and in any event, under winter conditions, will be difficult of approach.

It is therefore proposed, to allot a large share of our limited resources to these three main centres - if necessary Allied control over the remainder of the territory will have to be limited to communes adjacent to main roads and main railways.

(b) It is felt that the introduction to the area, under the shield of Allied Military Government, of Italian Officials and Carabinieri, is likely to be a fruitful source of local disension. It is therefore proposed that the government shall be by direct control by A.M.F.S., using as subordinates, officials of local extraction of both Italian and Yugoslav races.

(c) This will involve a departure from the general policy, adopted since the Cassino offensive, of the most rapid possible return to normal Italian administration.

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(d) In the event of a case of the police it is felt that the return to the territory of Carabinieri from Carabinieri Italy would be undesirable. It will therefore be necessary to raise a local police force from the best local elements, to be paid and controlled by A.M.B. Such a force will need backing of Allied Military Police and our estimate of such requirements is set out in Paragraph 10.

(e) It is proposed that all criminal cases, including cases between local nationals be tried before Allied Military Courts, and the local courts both civil and criminal be closed till the local situation be further considered.

(f) It is proposed that any required legislation be by direct promulgation by A.M.B., and that the method recently adopted of A.M.B. endorsement of Italian legislation, be NOT found.

(g) It is submitted that the Regional Commissioner should be given a reasonably free hand to continue in being or dissolve, administrative agencies of an autonomous character, which may be found to be in existence upon the arrival of Allied Military government.

9. Your approval is requested for the prohibition of the flying of either Italian or Yugoslav flags in the territory involved.

10. It is considered that, to carry out the above policy, the following additions to current ACC strength would be required:

- |                                        |                                                |   |
|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|---|
| (a) Military Police:                   | For Trieste - four Provost Coy's               |   |
|                                        | For Gorizia, Pola, and Trieste - one Coy each. |   |
| (b) Additional A.M.B. local officers - | For Trieste - 5                                |   |
|                                        | For Gorizia, Pola, and Trieste - 2 each        |   |
| (c) CAC's to be on the basis of:       |                                                |   |
| Trieste Province                       | (30 communes)                                  | 4 |
| City of Trieste                        |                                                | 5 |
| Remainder                              |                                                | 7 |
| Gorizia Province                       | (42 communes)                                  | 2 |
| Pola Province                          |                                                | 7 |
| City of Pola                           |                                                | 2 |
| Remainder                              |                                                | 3 |
| Trieste Province                       |                                                | 2 |
| City of Trieste                        |                                                | 3 |
| Remainder                              |                                                | 3 |



9. Your approval is requested for the prohibition of the flying of either Italian or Yugoslav flags in the territory involved.

10. It is considered that, to carry out the above policy, the following additions to normal AGO strengths would be required:

- (a) Military Police: For Trieste - four Provost Coye  
For Gorizia, Pola, and Trieste - one  
Coy each.
- (b) Additional A.M.G. legal officers - For Trieste - 5  
For Gorizia, Pola, and Trieste - 2 each
- (c) CAO's to be on the basis of:
- |                  |               |           |
|------------------|---------------|-----------|
| Trieste Province | (30 communes) | 4         |
| City of Trieste  |               | 5         |
| Remainder        |               | 7         |
| Gorizia Province | (42 communes) | 2         |
| Pola Province    |               | 7         |
| City of Pola     |               | 2         |
| Remainder        |               | 3         |
| Trieste Province |               | <u>30</u> |
| City of Trieste  |               |           |
| Remainder        |               |           |

(d) Special requirements in the direction of additional officers for Public Safety, Public Health, Finance and other Commissioners will be submitted at an early date.

*John A. G. A.C.*  
Regional Commissioner

Copies No. 142 Chief of Staff, H.Q. A.C.  
Copy No. 3 Colonel Willmer  
Copy No. 4 Colonel Howell



CC

Tipsee 3

A put in holder until  
the arrives & to be  
on its arrival.

U 3/10

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1982

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COS & Affs

34

Brie Dea lof here the file : he will  
send further memo. Hold until then.

W/3/x. 06.12



Brig Dualop

33

My understanding of  
our conversation last night was  
that you would redraft pages 2  
and 3 of your memorandum to  
make the following points.

- 1) That your three areas were Trieste,  
Fiume & Pola plus coal & timber  
areas
- 2) That your scheme of administration  
for all would be the same as  
Austrian military Govt. All other military  
courts (no civilian courts to begin  
with) & Austrian military police  
command to form backbone

00040



- 32
- 3) In each area there would be local recruitment for local administrative posts as well as for local district police guards to supplement Armed MP Companies.
- 4) In no area would Italian Govt officials or Carabinieri be introduced and in reply to any inquiries from the Italian Govt we would restrict ourselves to saying that we intended to apply strict military Govt - see our letter of 4 September. 00039



317

In no circumstances would any  
statement of our intentions be  
volunteered to Italian Govt

5) By above plan SAC Med's  
instructions to Commission could be  
carried out but his support  
would be essential in two ways

(A) Tito would have to be made  
to understand that we meant  
business (NB this should be easier  
for him to accept if we explained  
how we intended to operate  
without bumping in Italian  
authorities from Italy border)

(B) M.P. Company is, extra legal  
officers & AME officers would

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30

have to be provided. An estimate of  
numbers will be submitted by you at  
the earliest date - your estimate  
guess was 4 inspectors for Trieste plus  
1 each for Fiume, Pola & Gorizia  
6 legal officers for Trieste plus  
2 for each other place above. C.A. Os  
on original scale of AMIC reckoning  
is 1 per every 6 communes. Thus  
on the presumption that the Army  
will look after the protection of its  
own railway <sup>road</sup> L.R.

- 6) Although the essence of the scheme  
is that each Provincial Commissioner  
would be at liberty to

00037



29

assistance from local population in  
the light of the circumstances that  
he finds in Trieste, Pola or  
Fiume. It would be helpful to  
you to have as much advance  
information as you can get on  
what these circumstances are  
likely to be. In particular you  
should know the system of local  
administration being applied now.  
Are the Italian courts administering  
Italian law in Fiume now etc. also  
what personnel are being used as  
police.

000000

7) Unless you are otherwise instructed



28  
The above is the ~~plan~~ schedule for which  
Tom will plan and which later  
Tom intend to carry out.

Is this right?

AA (accn)  
Oct 2

I agree, and shall send a further letter  
in the course of the day on the above lines.

Phillips  
Oct 2

00035



TOP SECRET

ADVANCED  
HEADQUARTERS REGION XII  
Allied Control Commission  
APO 304

27  
JED/AM

TO : H.C. Allied Commission  
Attn: Chief of Staff  
30 September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces

FILE NO: ARXII/4

20

1. Receipt is acknowledged of a copy of your letter on the above subject No. 803/20/CA - A/CC 321 dated 26th September 1944.

2. I await with great interest your further information based on the replies which you still await to your letters of the 11th and 26th September.

3. In the meantime further study has been given to certain aspects of the problem, seen from the point of view of the officers who might have to undertake the responsibility of the Military Government of the area involved. The following considerations are submitted to you in this sense. Please appreciate that in making these suggestions we are not attempting to interfere in matters of high policy. It is evident that the Supreme decisions must be taken on the highest level. It may however be of some assistance to you, in your own discussions with the Advisory Council and other such authorities, if we put forward certain technical considerations.

4. Any consideration of the problem must start from the Annexure to SAC (44) Special (5) Memorandum of the 13th of August. Inasmuch as it is the declared policy of the Allied Governments to impose an Allied Military Government over the Italian frontier provinces, it is obvious that any acquiescence in a de facto Yugoslav sovereignty will automatically involve a retrocession from a position deliberately taken up by the Allies and will to that extent weaken Allied authority in general.

5. Subject to the above general consideration, it is clearly a matter of great importance to the Allied Governments if the conditions as far as possible,



2. I await with great interest your further information based on the replies which you still await to your letters of the 11th and 26th September.

3. In the meantime further study has been given to certain aspects of the problem, seen from the point of view of the officers who might have to undertake the responsibility of the Military Government of the area involved. The following considerations are submitted to you in this sense. Please appreciate that in making these suggestions we are not attempting to interfere in matters of high policy. It is evident that the supreme decisions must be taken on the highest level. It may however be of some assistance to you, in your own discussions with the Advisory Council and other such authorities, if we put forward certain technical considerations.

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5. Subject to the above general consideration, it is clearly a matter of great importance to the Allied Governments if the conditions of local Military Government can approximate, so far as possible, to the wishes of the majority of the local inhabitants.

6. If it is conceded in principle that some change in the prewar boundary is in contemplation, there need be no insuperable practical difficulty in giving effect to local sentiment, so long as it is clearly understood, throughout the community, that the executive power is held in the hands of the Allied Government and that such local changes as are made, are subject to later alteration in the light of the general sentiment.

7. Indeed, unless the Allied Governments are prepared to make some form of local concessions they will be forced to send large local forces to maintain order, or to allow movement of Italian troops into the area with the inevitable counter move of Yugoslav troops or partisan formations.

8. The comparatively sharp division along the ethnic line and the absence of large minority communities among majority populations render more easy such local concessions.



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9. There are three main problems that have to be faced in the general consideration of the immediate future of Veneto Giulia. They are:-

The problem of Trieste

The problem of Fiume and the Trieste-Ljubljana railway

The problem of the Istrian coal mines.

There is a minor problem in connection with the port of Pola.

10. In the case of Trieste it appears exceedingly important to prevent any approach to a coup de main by Yugoslav elements. It is supposed that whatever may be the future status of Trieste its out and out possession by Yugoslavia is not the most likely. Possible seizure of Trieste by Yugoslav and Allied acquiescence therein, would be the one thing which would cause serious repercussions in Italy. Therefore, from the military point everything possible should be done to make the initial Allied occupation really strong - even for a brief period. Everything possible should be done to make the maximum showing of the Allied use of the port as a supply base. From the point of view of Allied Military Government the entry into the city of a strong team at the first juncture will be planned. Local administration will be maintained on an entirely Italian basis, but the introduction of new Italian Officials must be most carefully controlled. It is suggested that the Italian Government might be warned at an early date of the intention of the Allied Military Government to maintain Italian administration but to employ, to the maximum extent, in that administration, persons of local extraction. In this connection it is observed that the Italian Government have already nominated a chief of the Carabinieri for the Province of Trieste. It appears desirable to issue a caveat against giving the Italian Government any overt promise as to the future of Trieste which might arise from applications from various Sub Commissions direct to the Italian Government, for the appointment, in advance, of Italian Officials, for various administrative posts in the Province. The above considerations only apply to the commune of Trieste and the communes of the province which lie generally west thereof. The communes east of the ethnic line - poor and sparsely inhabited - will demand different treatment.

11. In the case of Fiume and the Trieste-Ljubljana railway appears, in the contrary sense, that its out and out possession by Italy is the least likely postwar contingency. Hence Allied interests would appear to lie in the direction of scrupulous avoidance of any act which might give the Italian Government any opening for interference in Fiume. Subject to the clear recognition of Allied

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the city of a strong test of Allied Military Government the entry into local administration will be maintained on an entirely Italian basis, but the introduction of new Italian Officials must be most carefully controlled. It is suggested that the Italian Government might be warned at an early date of the intention of the Allied Military Government to maintain Italian administration but to employ, to the maximum extent, in that administration, persons of local extraction. In this connection it is observed that the Italian Government have already nominated a chief of the Carabinieri for the Province of Trieste. It appears desirable to issue a caveat against giving the Italian Government any overt promise as to the future of Trieste which might arise from applications from various Sub-Commissions direct to the Italian Government, for the appointment, in advance, of Italian Officials, for various administrative posts in the Province. The above considerations only apply to the commune of Trieste and the communes of the province which lie generally west thereof. The communes east of the ethnic line - poor and sparsely inhabited - will demand different treatment.

11. In the case of Fiume and the Trieste-Ljubljana rail 000333 appears, in the contrary sense, that its out and out possession by Italy is the least likely postwar contingency. Hence Allied interests would appear to lie in the direction of scrupulous avoidance of any act which might give the Italian Government any opening for interference in Fiume. Subject to the clear recognition of Allied Military Government as the supreme master, considerable concession might be made to local Yugoslav feeling. It is suggested that, if on investigation, it be found that courts are in existence administering Yugoslav civil law, that these should be retained. The police system must be retained rigidly in Allied control and the cost of its administration must be regarded, at least temporarily, as an Allied liability. The civil administration must similarly be financed through Allied Military Government and be regarded as autonomous under Allied control. So far as is found necessary a general approximation to Yugoslav form may be made.

As in the case of Trieste, the maximum outward display should be made of any Allied use of the port.

The whole of the province of Fiume lies to the east of the ethnic boundary and can therefore be treated as a whole in the application of the above suggested plan.



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12. A special problem is presented by the coal mines at Alton near Altona in the south of the Istrian Peninsula. These mines have been considerably developed as part of the programme of Italian "autonomia" and are economically closely linked with the industrial developments at Trieste and Mestre. Your Economic Section will be able to give you more expert advice on these matters, but it appears on first consideration that these coal mines would have little value to Yugoslavian industry since the coal would have to be hauled on the long and costly Piave and Ljubljana railway. In other words the only justification for the working of the mines lies in their close incorporation with the Italian economic system. This will be a matter of especial importance in the postwar period when lack of valuta, shortage of shipping tonnage, and high freights, will reduce ability of Italy to import coal.

Therefore it appears to the Allied interest to obtain the coal fields, - the port of Pola, and the Pola - Trieste railway, within the area in which the Italian administrative system is followed. This will have the disadvantage of placing the administrative frontier east of the ethnic line. What adjustments may be needed will be determined by experience.

13. The province of Gorizia has a fairly clearly defined distinction between the town of Gorizia and the communes immediately west thereof, which are Italian, and the sparsely inhabited remainder of the province which is Yugoslav. In this case it appears possible to make concession to Yugoslav sentiment on the mountain plateaux where administration will be, at best, a matter of local affairs.

14. In general it is felt that a realist, firm and consistent policy, in respect of the three main problems of Trieste, Piave and the coal fields, will have a stabilizing effect on the remainder of the region. It will then be possible to concentrate those Military Government officers, who are available after the needs of the cities are met, on:

(a) the communes adjacent to the main railway lines and main roads

(b) the communes on the ethnic line.

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which the western administrative system is followed. This will have the disadvantage of placing the administrative frontier east of the ethnic line. What adjustments may be needed will be determined by experience.


13. The province of Gorizia has a fairly clearly defined distinction between the town of Gorizia and the communes immediately west thereof, which are Italian, and the sparsely inhabited remainder of the province which is Yugoslav. In this case it appears possible to make concession to Yugoslav sentiment on the mountain plateau where administration will be, at best, a matter of local affairs.

14. In general it is felt that a realist, firm and consistent policy, in respect of the three main problems of Trieste, Slaves and the coal fields, will have a steady effect on the remainder of the region. It will then be possible to concentrate these military Government officers, who are available after the needs of the cities are met, on:

(a) the communes adjacent to the main railway lines and main roads

(b) the communes on the ethnic line.

00002

  
Regional Commissioner

Page 4



SECRET

MEMORANDUM

Confidential 25A

TO:- Political Section  
Executive Commissioner.

1 agree re 24/11

SUBJECT:- Proclamations

25th Sept., '44.

On back cover

Herewith draft of proposed proclamation No. 1 for use in the 6 provinces of Venezia Giulia, and if so decided by AFHQ, in the provinces of Venezia Tridentina. Your comments are requested please.

In this connection it would be appreciated if the name of an individual who could translate this Proclamation into Slovene could be furnished to this branch.

YMB.

Jr. C. R. UPJOHN. Brigadier.  
V. P. Admin. Section.



24

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
POLITICAL SECTION

16 September 1944

TO: Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner, Hq ACC.

As I told you after the Siena meeting, Brigadier Dunlop is most anxious to have copies of the correspondence with A.F.H.Q. about the administration of the territories in dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia. I promised to ensure that this was done. Have you already laid this on or shall I?

*HAC*

Political Section

*PA Sec*

*This has already been done*

*DBL 10/5*

00031



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

SECRET 23

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 394.

Regional Control & Military Government Section.  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 806/CA.

30th September 1944.

SUBJECT: VENEZIA GIULIA.

TO : Regional Commissioner,  
VENEZIA Region.

I am directed by the Executive Commissioner  
to forward the attached file on VENEZIA GIULIA received from  
Brigadier Forestier Walker, AME HQ(Yugoslavia), for your  
information and retention.

(Sgt) A. J. Stewart

Major,  
MA to Executive Commissioner.

00030



2001

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET & PERSONAL.

22

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section,  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 808/CA.

23th September, 1944.

Thank you for your letter IS/3/Comd of 15th September.

All this information about VERZILIA GUSLIA is of immense importance and interest to us and I have sent the file, after studying it, to the Regional Commissioner concerned, Brigadier J.M. Dunlop, c/o of 8 Army HQ.

I notice that it is stated in the document that the partisans have formally proclaimed the compartment as an integral part of Yugoslavia. You probably know that the Supreme Allied Commander has laid down that this area will be administered under Allied Military Government which infers that no recognition of any national claims to the area will be made until the peace conference.

Yours sincerely:

(Sgd) Maurice Bush.

Brigadier C.F. Forestier Walker,  
AML HQ (Yugoslavia),  
C. M. F.

MSL/30.

00029

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2004

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

21

From:- Brig. C.F. FORESTIER WALKER  
AML HQ (YUGOSLAVIA) CMC

Ref:- YS/3/Comd  
15 Sep 44

808/CA

Dear Lush,

In our conversation in ROME early last month, I told you that we had had an interest in VENETIA JULIA and that we had collected a certain amount of information. You expressed a wish to see this information, so I enclose the attached file for you to retain and make any use of it you think fit.

It seems quite clear now that AMG will be in control in that area, and I hope that we may later arrange for my HQ to have a small detachment working with your people in connection with the transit of civil supply to YUGOSLAVIA through the ports of VENETIA GIULIA. *It is from which may require special treatment with SUSAK.*

Yours ever

To:- Brig. Maurice Lush, CBE., MC.  
Chief Executive Officer  
Allied Commission of Control,  
ROME.

*P. J. Forestier Walker*  
See 22



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Chief of Staff  
~~Confidential~~

Ref: 808/25/CA - A/CC 321.

10th September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.  
 Attn: Chief of Staff.

1. Since writing my letter A/CC 321 - 808/13/CA of 11th September (to which I await a reply), further information has come to hand, which may also have reached you, regarding the present form of administration in the frontier Provinces of North Eastern Italy.

2. Reports have been received to the effect that the Provinces of BOLZANO, TRENTO and BELLUNO have been amalgamated by the German authorities, given the name of "Pre-Alpine Operational Area", and administered under German administration. The political, administrative and military authorities are all German. German ration cards have been issued and the quantity of rationed goods are the same as in Germany. German law is used and enforced.

3. The Provinces of UDINE, TRIESTE, GORIZIA, POLA and FIVERR, are said to have been organised as the "Litorale Adriatico" group under the German command. It appears, however, probable that in these Provinces the assimilation of the German administration system is not so complete as in the case of the "Pre-Alpine Operational Area".

4. I should be glad to know if this information is confirmed.

5. In this connection it is to be remembered that the Provinces of BELLUNO and UDINE included by the Germans, one in the "Pre-Alpine Operational Area" and the other in "Litorale Adriatico", have been under Italian rule since 1866. They are not included in the six Provinces mentioned in your letter of 2nd September and it is therefore assumed that in the case of these two Provinces normal Allied Military Government practice will be followed of restoring them as quickly as possible to Italian administration. I should be glad of confirmation on this point.

6. In the case of the Provinces of BOLZANO and TRENTO, I request direction as to whether the existing German administration as may be found on our arrival is to be continued under AMG control, or if it is to be replaced by the administrative system of Metropolitan Italy. You will appreciate that the population is largely German-Austrian; the political implications which may arise from the introduction of Italian police and other administrative machinery; also the practical difficulties of doing anything else.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Confidential 19

7. With regard to the four Provinces of VENEZIA GIULIA, it may be possible to continue the existing form of administration (whatever that may be) so long as we do not find that this in turn has been replaced, before our arrival, by some form of Yugo Slav authority. I should be glad of guidance as to whether this is desired.


8. Furthermore, I should be glad to know what steps are to be taken if it is found that in spite of the memorandum handed to Marshall Tito, a Yugo Slav form of administration has already been set up. I understood that the underground authority of the Yugo Slavs in this area is extremely strong and that, with any breakdown of the existing Government, they may be expected to come forward and take over authority very rapidly.

9. I am sure you will appreciate the administrative difficulties which will arise at once in the other six frontier Provinces. In addition to the points raised in my letter of 11th September, such matters as Post Offices, the hospitals and their staffs and the re-establishment of the service of Medico Provinciale, the re-establishment of SEPTEL and Consorzio Agrario, the organization of the Genio Civile, the re-opening of schools, and the distribution of C.I.P., all pressing problems which will be far more difficult to solve if the basic plan of administration is different from that in the rest of Italy.

10. I must again remind you that the number of officers estimated for the administration of these Provinces was based on the possibility of employing some kind of local administrative machinery and that if this does not exist or cannot be employed, many more officers and large forces of Allied police or troops will be necessary.

11. Whatever may be your decision the matter will need a great deal of detailed study and planning and for this reason I must ask you for a very early indication and if possible an early reply to the points raised in this letter and my communication of 11th September.

HILARY W. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner



8000  
00007



MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
Allied Control Commission  
E.O. 304.

CONFIDENTIAL  
17  
a

To: U.S. A.C.C. (H.Q. & A.C.C. Section).  
Subject: Administration of Frontier Province.  
Date: 12 September 1947.

With reference to the report of the Frontier Province  
subject of 14-10-47, it is submitted for your information  
that the working in the Province is proceeding well. I  
enclosed "All Provincial News" from the Frontier Province  
to show to display a picture of the Frontier Province  
with the view of the Province regarding the Frontier  
Province.

*[Signature]*  
Regional Commissioner.

Enclosed are:

U.S. A.C.C. - Copies 1, 2, & 3.  
Regional Commissioner - Copy No. 1.  
Allied Staff - Copy No. 3.

00026



COPY NO. 1

HEADQUARTERS REGION XII  
Allied Control Commission

APC 394

JED/ajr

TOP SECRET

Confidential

TO : HQ ACC ( R.C. & M.G. Section) 18 Sept. 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier Provinces

1. I have to acknowledge receipt of your Top Secret Memorandum 808/15/CA of 14 September.

2. The contents of this letter have been disclosed to the following officers only: Col. Gevers (Executive Officer), Col. Willmer (Regional Legal Officer), Col. Howell (Regional Finance Officer), Lt. Col. Millhouse (Regional Public Safety Officer), Lt. Col. Craig (Prov. Com. Trieste).

3. Some of these officers have asked whether they are permitted to discuss certain implications of the problem with their respective sub-commissions. I have replied that such discussion should not take place until your authority has been obtained.

4. It is not clear whether you have also communicated with SCAO's 5th and 8th Armies. They may of course be intimately concerned with the problems in the six provinces named in the letter from the Chief of Staff. I propose not to discuss matters with them till so authorized by you.

5. Full note is taken of the important points raised by you in your letter of 11 Sept.. On the reply received to this letter the whole of our future policy must depend.

6. You have clearly pointed out that the automatic suspension of Italian sovereignty mentioned in paragraph 1 of the annexure, may or may not carry with it many implications affecting the every day life of the people.

7. In previous administration of other regions the policy has been adopted of the earliest possible return to normalcy. This involved inter alia: the reopening of Italian Courts

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Officer), Lt. Col. Millhouse (Regional Public Safety Officer), Lt. Col. Craig (Prov. Com. Trieste).

3. Some of these officers have asked whether they are permitted to discuss certain implications of the problem with their respective sub-commissions. I have replied that such discussion should not take place until your authority has been obtained.

4. It is not clear whether you have also communicated with SCAG's 5th and 8th Armies. They may of course be intimately concerned with the problems in the six provinces named in the letter from the Chief of Staff. I propose not to discuss matters with them till so authorized by you.

5. Full note is taken of the important points raised by you in your letter of 11 Sept.. On the reply received to this letter the whole of our future policy must depend.

6. You have clearly pointed out that the automatic suspension of Italian sovereignty mentioned in paragraph 1 of the annexure, may or may not carry with it many implications affecting the every day life of the people.

7. In previous administration of other regions the policy has been adopted of the earliest possible return to normalcy. This involved inter alia: the reopening of Italian Courts (Civil as well as Criminal); the reopening of Italian Banks and Post Offices; the reinstallation and organization of Italian Carabinieri; the reopening of hospitals and the re-establishment of the service of Medico Provinciale; the re-establishment of SEPRAI and Consorzi Agrario; the organization of the Genio Civile; the reopening of schools; the distribution of CIP products. Each of the quoted cases raises its own particular problem in the case of Border States administered by direct Military Government.

8. There is no intention to exaggerate the difficulties of the problem; such difficulties will, in any event, be reduced by adequate fore-knowledge.



16

9. It is noted that your reply dealt only with the problems of Venezia Giulia. An equivalent, or even more delicate problem will exist in Venezia Tridentina.

10. According to information available here, information which no doubt will be before you, the provinces of Bolzano, Trento and Belluno have been amalgamated by the German authorities and given the name of "Pre-Alpine Operational Area". The political, administrative and military authorities are all German. German ration cards have been issued and the quantity of rationed goods are the same as in Germany. German law is used and enforced.

The provinces of Udine, Trieste, Gorizia, Pola and Fiume have been organized as the "Litorale Adriatico" group under German command. It appears probable that the assimilation to the German system is not so complete as in the case of the "Pre-Alpine Operational Area".

11. In this connection it is to be remembered that the provinces of Belluno and Udine, included by the Germans in their above quoted administrative zones, have been Italian since 1866, and are not included in the six provinces mentioned in the Chief of Staff's letter. It is therefore assumed that in the case of these two provinces the normal AMG/ACC practice will be followed of restoring as quickly as possible normal Italian Administration.

12. In the case of the other six provinces it will be a question for a major decision whether such existing German (or indeed Yugoslav) administration as may be found on our arrival be continued under AMG control or replaced by the administrative system of metropolitan Italy. From the point of view of the easy passage of troops there may be arguments in favour of the use of *de facto* organizations.

13. It is submitted that immediately on entry a regulation be posted forbidding the flying of contestant flags or the public use of contestant emblems.

14. It is clear that:

(a) A considerable additional staff will be required

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the German system is not so complete as in the case of the "Pre-Alpine Operational Area".

11. In this connection it is to be remembered that the provinces of Belluno and Udine, included by the Germans in their above quoted administrative zones, have been Italian since 1866, and are not included in the six provinces mentioned in the Chief of Staff's letter. It is therefore assumed that in the case of these two provinces the normal AMG/ACC practice will be followed of restoring as quickly as possible normal Italian Administration.

12. In the case of the other six provinces it will be a question for a major decision whether such existing German (or indeed Yugoslav) administration as may be found on our arrival be continued under AMG control or replaced by the administrative system of metropolitan Italy. From the point of view of the easy passage of troops there may be arguments in favour of the use of de facto organizations.

13. It is submitted that immediately on entry a regulation be posted forbidding the flying of contestant flags or the public use of contestant emblems.

14. It is clear that:

(a) A considerable additional staff will be required for the six Provinces.

(b) That at the earliest possible moment a considerable amount of preliminary detailed work must be put in hand.

15. If you so direct, I am prepared, with my staff, to study and report at any early date on both these problems.

Distribution:

HQ ACC (RC & MG Sec) Copies 1, 2, 3.  
Regional Cmr., Reg XII " 4.  
Col. C.M. Gervers " 5.  
Lt. Col. Craig " 6.

  
Regional Commissioner



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS,  
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,  
APO 39.

Regional Control and Military Government Section.  
+++++

Ref: 833/15/CA.

11th September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of VENETIA GIULIA.

TO : E.C., Region XII.

As directed by the Executive Commissioner to  
forward for your information copies of correspondence which  
has passed between this Headquarters and AFM regarding the  
administration of the compartments of VENETIA GIULIA.

Please acknowledge. - *See 7*

(Sgt) A. J. Stewart.  
Major,  
MA to Executive Commissioner.

*But why not 118 - most important*  
*See 7*  
*8/16/5* 00028



14  
EWS,

11 September 1944

1/CC 321

My dear Marchese Visconti:

With reference to your letter of August 15th I have to say that in view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the Liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement.

Yours very truly,

MILTON W. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

Marchese Giovanni Visconti Venosta  
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
Italian Government

Drafted by Mr. Schott, Political Section

Copy to: Executive Commissioner

See by EC 12/9  
for  
000000

11 Sept 1945

HO

BRK



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017**TOP SECRET**

EAB/hjp 13

**Confidential**

11 September 1944

/cc 321  
BGS/13/CA

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the Peace Settlement

TO: Allied Force Headquarters, AFHQ 512  
Attention: Chief of Staff

1. I have taken note of your unnumbered direction dated 2 September with regard to the administration of the compartimento of Venezia Giulia. I should be glad if you would give further direction on the following points:

a. Is it the intention that the Italian personnel who now form the bulk of the machinery of local government should be retained and employed by AFHQ? If not, by whom should they be replaced? You will realize that the numbers will be considerable.

b. Is it the intention to open Italian Courts (as well as AMG Courts)? You will realize that failure to do so will increase very materially the number of officers required for AMG Courts.

c. Is it the intention to employ Italian Carabinieri for purposes of public safety? If not, by whom should they be replaced?

2. It will be, of course, appreciated that unless use is made of the existing Italian Government machinery found in these provinces the local government will be extremely difficult to maintain. It will also be appreciated that the retention of Italian officials will be deeply resented by the Yugoslavs who will see in AFHQ a continuance of Italian rule.

3. Meanwhile I have notified the Italian Government as requested in paragraph 3 of your direction.

4. I should be glad of an immediate reply.

ELBERT W. BRUNE

Captain, USAR

11 Sept 1500 Acting Chief Commissioner

H/13

BVR

cc: G-5, AFHQ

Draft submitted by: Brig. M. S. Lush  
Executive Commissioner

**TOP SECRET**

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017**TOP SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner  
APO 394

EWS/hjp

7 September 1944

To: Brigadier Lush, Executive Commissioner  
Political Section

1. I enclose for your information copy of a letter dated 2nd September from General Gammell, dealing with Military Government of the north and north-eastern frontiers of Italy. The copy of the memorandum from SACMED to Marshal Tito dated August 13th was not enclosed as stated and we have telegraphed for it.

See 11A

2. In the meantime, the Executive Commissioner will please implement paragraph 2 by necessary instructions to Brigadier Dunlop.

3. The Political Section <sup>will</sup> kindly draft for my signature a letter to implement paragraph 4 of the enclosed.

See 1st

*W. H. Stone*  
ELLERY W. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Incl:  
as per para 1 above

See by 10/10  
00020**TOP SECRET**



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

COPY

CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET BY:  
AUTHORITY OF SACRED

Confidential

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Office of the Chief of Staff

2nd September 1944

SUBJECT: Administration of Frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy  
which may be in dispute at the time of the Peace Settlement.

1. Deputy Chief Commissioner, Allied Control Commission.

Your memorandum ACC/321 of 19th August 1944.

1. As regards liberated areas on the north and north-eastern frontiers of Italy, I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum communicated by the Supreme Allied Commander to Marshal Tito on August 13th. This memorandum was subsequently communicated to the Yugoslav Prime Minister as well.

2. You will observe from this document that it is the policy of the Supreme Allied Commander to impose and maintain direct military government on all those frontier areas of Metropolitan Italy which may be in dispute at the time of the peace settlement. You should make your plans accordingly.

3. As regards the communication dated August 15th which you received from the Italian Government, it is requested that you should reply in the following sense :-

4. "In view of the necessity to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of Allied troops in Central Europe, it is the present intention of the Supreme Allied Commander on the liberation of Northern Italy to maintain under Allied Military Government the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Trieste, Fiume, Pola, Trieste and Gorizia.

The final disposition of these territories and the drawing of frontiers will naturally be a matter for post-war settlement."

By command of General WILSON :

/s/ J. A. H. Gansell  
/c/ J. A. H. Gansell,  
Lieutenant General,  
Chief of Staff.

## DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - United States Political Adviser
- 1 - British Resident Minister
- 1 - G-5
- 2 - Addressee

TOP SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

TOP SECRET

11A.

ANNEXURE TO SAC (44) SPECIAL (5)  
MEMORANDUM

1. In the event of Allied forces occupying Northern ITALY, AUSTRIA or HUNGARY it is the Supreme Allied Commander's intention to impose Allied Military Government in the area which was under Italian rule at the outbreak of war. This automatically suspends Italian Sovereignty. The Military Governor will be the General Officer Commanding the Allied armies in the area. It is intended that the area will remain under direct Allied administration until its disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned.
2. This direct Allied Military Government is necessary in order to safeguard the bases and lines of communication of the Allied troops of occupation in Central EUROPE.
3. As the Allied forces of occupation will have to be supplied through the Port of TRIESTE, it will be necessary for them to have secure lines of communication protected by British troops on the route through LJUBLJANA - MARIBOR - GRAZ.
4. The Supreme Allied Commander looks to the Yugoslav authorities to co-operate with him in carrying out this policy, and he intends to maintain the closest liaison with them.

13th August 1944.

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00048  
13/9  
13/9

CONFIDENTIAL



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

735017

10  
Acting Chief Commissioner

In view of Rogatkins letter (tabbed)  
OK I think we should await arrival of instructions  
WJ before raising the point. MW 11/5/44



808

TOP SECRET.

31st August 1944.

Acting Chief Commissioner

1. I believe telegrams have passed with regard to the future administration of IBERIA, that is to say, the present Italian Provinces of CORTINA, TRIESTE and FRIA.
2. I understand from the SAC that this area is to be administered by Allied Military Government in toto, that Italian officials are not to be used and presumably Yugo Slavs are not to be used.
3. It is probable that a small holding force will be stationed in the area to carry communication from TRIESTE to the North. These forces, however, would be kept at a very low figure.
4. We may be faced with the occupation of the area by Marshal Tito's forces and presumably administrative officials. Instructions will be needed as to how to deal with that situation at the outset.
5. But whatever we find there we are faced with the administration of a large area containing 824,642 people with no native machinery of government on which to depend. Every cog in the machine will have to be filled by Allied Officers or Other Ranks. This will demand a strength of officers far greater than that envisaged in Appendix "C" and will probably demand some 70 - 100 Officers and 300 Other Ranks.
6. I think the whole problem should be brought to the notice of AMHQ without delay in order that they may realise the full implications of the SAC's verbal direction and in order that they may furnish the necessary staff.

Think you should  
prepare letter from me to  
ML/JG. E-5, asking for  
confirmation that we  
cannot use Italians. If not, the require-  
ments will probably greatly exceed 100 officers  
Gus

Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.



copy

Office of the Resident Minister,  
Central Mediterranean.

TOP SECRET.  
3/1/44.

26th August 1944.

My dear Harold:

Your File A/CC 121 deals with the administration of provinces on the boundaries of Italy and Ellery Stone has requested a ruling on this matter from A.F.B. 9.

Owing to the demands of the tourist season it will not be possible for the Political Committee formally to settle this question until the middle of next week but I can give you advance information to the effect that Peto has been told that it is the intention of the Supreme Allied Commander to impose Allied Military Government in all those areas which were under Italian rule at the outbreak of war, i.e., up to the 1919 frontier of Italy, and to maintain under direct Allied administration all areas which may be in dispute until their disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned. The State Department have expressed their full agreement with this policy.

Pending the arrival of the formal communication to Stone, I hope this may be of some use as unofficial guidance to your planners.

Yours ever,

(Sgd) Roger Makins.

R.A. Crooks, Esq.,  
Political Section,  
Allied Control Commission.

0016



TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION  
Office of the Chief Commissioner  
APO 390

A/CC 321

19 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: C-5 Allied Force Headquarters, APO 513.  
British Resident Minister  
U.S. Political Adviser.

1. In my memorandum A/CC 321 of the 24th July I requested a ruling as regards the policy to be pursued over the administration of provinces on the borders of Italy, and I pointed out the danger that unfortunate incidents were most likely to occur in these provinces which lie towards the Italo-Yugoslav frontier of 1919.

2. The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs has now sent me a letter, of which I enclose a copy, drawing attention to this danger in Venezia Giulia. I shall be glad, therefore, if the ruling requested in my previous memorandum may be expedited and if at the same time I may be authorized to make some communication to the Italian Government regarding Allied intentions in this matter. Meanwhile I have acknowledged U.S.'s letter and said that he may rest assured that this is a matter of which the Allied authorities will not lose sight.

3. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to BGS(Ops), AAI Advanced as well as to Sir Noel Charles and Mr. Alexander Kirk.

(Sgd) KILBURN R. STONE  
Captain, USNR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Encl: Copy of translation of  
letter No. 1/256 of 15 Aug 44  
from Under-Sec'y for Foreign  
Affairs

cc: : BGS(Ops) AAI Adv  
Mr. Alexander Kirk  
Sir Noel Charles  
Political Section  
Files A - 8

06515

lms/dfs 6

A/C 121

17 August 1944

My dear Marchese Venturi:

I am writing to acknowledge your letter 1/236 of the 15th August in which you draw attention to the possibility of unfortunate incidents when Venezia Giulia is liberated. I have not failed to pass on what you said to the proper quarter but in the meantime you may be sure that this is a matter of which the Allied authorities concerned have not lost sight.

Yours very truly,

HARRY S. STONE  
Captain, USMC  
Acting Chief Commissioner

Marchese Giovanni Vincenti Venturi  
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
Italian Government

cc: Political Sec

Hq SCC Secy Gen.  
DISPATCHED  
Date Time 20 Aug 1944  
VIA 175  
NOTES 224

0814.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner

No. 200 Secy Gen.  
DISPATCHEDDate - Time 17 Aug 1958  
Via  
By

Public Order - "Venetia Giulia"

A/CC 250.1

1. Political Section )
2. RC & MI Section ) IN TURN

18 August 4

1. Reference attached letter No. 1/236 from Visconti Venosta, dated 15 Aug 44 relative to the possibility that at the moment when the "Venetia Giulia" is liberated conflicts may break out.

2. Request your comments as to appropriate action and reply to be made.

3. Since reference has not been acknowledge, may this matter be expedited?

Incl-  
as in para 1 above.

Stone.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

735017

ROUGH TRANSLATION

No. 1/236

Rome, August 15th, 1944

Dear Admiral,

The present military Achievements, so glorious for the Nations that together are fighting against Germany, lead to believe that the day, when all the invaded lands will finally be liberated, is not too far away.

The Italian Government is very concerned regarding the possibility that at the moment when the "Venezia Giulia" will be liberated, conflicts may break out between armed bands and peaceful citizens, causing bloodshed in the towns and villages of a region that already has been sorely tried.

In order to avoid the possibility of violence and slaughter we consider it our duty to draw the attention of the Allied Governments on such painful eventuality, so that whatever measures may be deemed suitable shall be taken in useful time.

The Italian Government is inspired by a sense of high human solidarity, by the desire to avoid violence and disorder as well as to prevent fresh reasons of antagonism and grievance amongst populations which in future should, in their own interest and in that of European peace, forget ancient strife and knit ties of fruitful cooperation.

etc. etc. etc.

(sgd) VISCONTI VEROSTA

Admiral Ellery W. Stone, U.S.N.R.  
Acting Chief Commissioner,  
Allied Control Commission,  
Rome.

See 5

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(COPY)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COPY

WES/afe

A/C 321

28 July 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-5, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512  
 British Resident Minister  
 U. S. Political Adviser

1. In order that A.C.G. may issue the appropriate instructions to the A.R.G. officers concerned we shall be grateful for guidance on what provinces should be included within ACG/ASG administration on the boundaries of Italy.
2. In the case of those areas which abut on France, Switzerland and Austria, we should be glad to know whether the provinces which ACG/ASG must be prepared to administer should include all those territories up to the frontier of Italy as drawn in 1939.
3. Those provinces which lie towards the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939 present what seems likely to be a more immediate and more difficult problem. There is already indication that Yugoslav forces under the control of General Tito are preparing to make a bid at the earliest possible moment to take over certain areas to the West of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939. In such circumstances various possibilities are open:
  - a. Allied authorities might insist that until a peace treaty has been drawn up, it is the duty of Allied military government to function in all those territories which were under Italian sovereignty at the time of the Italian declaration of war.
  - b. At the other extreme Allied authorities might be prepared to accept as a purely temporary and provisional arrangement Yugoslav military government over those Italian territories which Yugoslav forces had already occupied and were controlling at the time that contact was made between Allied forces and Marshal Tito's forces.
  - c. Various other courses could be followed, such as de facto acceptance of the Italian Eastern boundary as it existed before 1918 or negotiation with the Yugoslavian Government, or Marshal Tito as its military commander in the field, of some other arbitrary line accepted for reasons of practical convenience but without any commitment insofar as the future boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy was concerned.
4. It will be appreciated that unless some clear ruling is given on the policy to be pursued, unfortunate incidents and complications between

00512



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

2

A/OC 321, 28 Jul 44, to G-5 AFHQ (continued):

Allied authorities and the Yugoslav forces are likely to occur. We should therefore be grateful for the earliest possible instructions on this point so that the appropriate orders can be issued to all Allied officers concerned.

5. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to E.C.S. (Ops), A.A.I. Advanced, as well as to Mr. Alexander Kirk and Sir Noel Charles.

ELIJAH W. SNOW  
Captain, USAR  
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: E.C.S. (Ops), A.A.I. Adv  
Mr. Alexander Kirk  
Sir Noel Charles

COPY

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Legation's Telegram No. 103 dated April 13 for  
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

The Royal Charge d'Affaires to the Holy See has communicated that he has been approached by outstanding personages from Venezia Giulia with the request that their strong concern regarding the situation which might arise in the case of the withdrawal of the Germans be communicated to you. They desire to inform Your Excellency that, since they fear actions by Slav Partisans against Italian population, the timely arrival of Anglo-American units on the Adriatic littoral could possibly give the necessary protection, especially in the ports of Trieste and Piuma.

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2028