

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/178
(VOL. II)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

00/104/178
VOL. II)

ADMIN OF NE FRONTIER PROVINCES
DEC. 1944 - MAR. 1945

RB

Chief Coordinator

Attached is attribution for your information/distribution of copy.

You will notice that the tel. was sent on 2/3
that we have to cable to get a copy. It is

indiscreet!

Dayton end

11/14/53

MAR 1 1954

Mr. Dean

192

190

1. Directive from Allen on "Occupation of E. Italy" in the event of a
German withdrawal to an Alpine line from North of Trieste - Lake Garda -
Sudic Frontier. It tells us nothing we don't know.

2. No more only one copy but, if you approve, I will have 4 copies made
for: E.C. Venezia
E.C. Berlin
E.C. Rome
Economic Section.

ET

17 March 1955.

193

CSO

This is only a draft: it will be corrected & only
after a brief issue (at least I hope so) ~~can~~
No attribution yet

17/10/53

17/1/54

2. To have only one copy but, if you approve, I will have 4 copies made
Part: U.S. Vietnam
U.S. India
U.S. J.
Liaison Section.

17 March 1965.

BT
U.S.C.

193

CSO

This is only a draft. It will be covered orally
after a brief issue (at least I hope so) ~~trans~~
No distribution yet 178/16/13

BT 17/13

]

168.

All Officers

While this file is dormant
you should look through the relevant

folios

SI 8/3.

176

Excerpt

Pr. Sec 178 (175

SI 9/3

177

V.P.E.A.S.

I see signs of this correspondence continuing
forever - and further since of our files ?
then we should accept G's legal opinion
without reply and presumably in the sub

Excerpt

176
M. Sec 174, 175

8/9/5

177

V.P.E.A.S.

I see signs of this correspondence continuing
forever - and for the sake of our files I
think we should accept G's legal opinion
without reply and presumably on the one
agreement.

178/9/3

113
Minute

To: Legal Sub-Commission.

Please see 173, 174 and 175, as well as 177. VT has spoken with
you and directs that you write a memorandum on the information given in
173 and 174.

12th March 1945.

185

C.A. Sec

183

Ref 10.11-183: memorandum at file 17934

13 Mar 45

P. R. CHITTS
CSO CA Section

100

1. Excerpt at
for doc

To : Executive Commissioner

I suggest the following two paragraphs :-

2. From the legal point of view military government is a de facto government which draws its authority from the fact of occupation. If, therefore, Marshal TITO does occupy this eastern part he can legally establish an independent government there, as was done by General Le Clerc in N. Africa.
3. The legal opinion of DCLA of Feb 6th (Folio 137) was issued upon the assumption that SACHED would occupy the territory himself. If, however, SACHED does not adopt this course there can be no legal objection to the establishment of military government by Marshal TITO as a Commander-in-Chief of one of the United Nations.

Legal S/C
19 February 1945

W. E. Barrans
W. E. BARRANS, Colonel,
Deputy Chief Legal Advisor.

See 145 MS 12/12.

CSO

153

Please see folio 8 sent out by the Dep Sec. in
consultation with the CCF. - reply to folio 151
27 Feb.

See by EC p. 2
See 158.

152

Minute for File for Record purposes:

1. I discussed Folios 151 & 152 with the Acting President. We agreed that a working arrangement could be achieved as follows.
2. Marshal TITO would be informed that the administration of parts of liberated Italy under the Allied Commission was a commitment undertaken by the Allies, of which Yugoslavia was one, and that he, therefore, would naturally wish to come into line with any arrangement made for such administration. In order to put him fully into the picture, the Allied

See 140

MS 1012

CSO

153

Please see folio 8 sent out by the Rep. Sec. in
consultation with the C.C.T. - reply to folio 151
27 Feb.

See by EC p. 2
See 158

152

Minute for File for Record purposes:

151 and 152

1. I discussed Folio 6 with the Acting President. We agreed that a working arrangement could be achieved as follows.
2. Marshal TITO would be informed that the administration of parts of liberated Italy under the Allied Commission was a commitment undertaken by the Allies, of which Yugoslavia was one, and that he, therefore, would naturally wish to come into line with any arrangement made for such administration. In order to put him fully into the picture, the Allied Commission would have attached to it a Yugoslav representative in the same way as the French and the Russians.
3. For the administration of Venezia Giulia, a US or British Regional Commissioner would be appointed. These regions occupied by Yugoslav forces would be administered by Yugoslav Provincial Commissioners with agreed Allied terms: those occupied by US or British forces would be administered by US or British Provincial Commissioners. There would be no mention of any particular boundary and thus we should avoid international problems. The matter would become merely an inter-Allied administrative problem.
4. I believe such a set-up is the best solution of what otherwise appears to be an impossible and, well handled under an able Regional Commissioner, I believe could be made to work. From the 6th Army point of view a very capable Provincial Commissioner for TRIESTE would be necessary and it is immaterial whether the Regional Commissioner were British or American.

108

MSL

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

1, Mar. 45.

139Cas

1. PM See 137 & 138. MS/1412

2. For record purposes Could
 you please record in the file
 the fact of your meeting
 with Brig Devlop on 12/2
 in the subject of Zana
 and other W.F. matters.

E 15/2.

140

C80 Except for a review of him at the machine

I had no communication with Brig Devlop -

We did discuss Zana at my time.

My only (previous) discussion with him in N.E.

Italy were (1) in line of 134 (2) a warning in line

of 138. Copies of 137 & 138 should be sent
to him.

MS/1512

Also a copy to Devlop X

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

In the Subject of Latta
and other NE matters.

Ex 15/2

1480

C80 Except for a visit of him at the meeting

There was no communication with Eric Draxton -

19/2 we did discuss Latta at any time.

Only (previous) discussion with him in N.E.

Italy was (1) in line of 134 (2) a warning in line

of 138

Copies of 137 & 138 should be kept

to him.

785/15/2

Also a copy to Dec 40 X

Ex 16/2

X Dec 14/2

100

Chief Commissioner.

I regret that Page 117 was not submitted to you on receipt. Major Talbot, as you will see from Page 118, was admitting enclosures which have only just arrived. I was informed on Monday at AFHQ that SACRED has ruled that VENEZIA GIULIA should be administered by a tripartite AMG dependent from AFHQ. This is contrary to our recommendation. I suggest we take no action until the direction is communicated to us.

31. Jan. 45

127

*Noted. Property of P 125 should
I have been sent me. To whom
was 4's Memo 4(a) on P 125 addressed
or what action taken on it?*

M.S.C.

*Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.*

*→ See File 46783
Vol. I.*

132

*Los Letter from Brig Janlop
at 131, regarding Zana. See
in particular last ~~para~~ sentence
of para 3. I will show to
Pol Sec.*

127

I have been (W) sent me. To whom
was Y's memo 4(a) or p 125 addressed
& what action taken on it? → See File 46-83
Vol 7

132

Los Letter from Brig Janlop
at 131, regarding Zana. See
in particular last ~~para~~ sentence
of para 3. Will show to
Pol Sec.

SA 2/2.

133

CGO For discussion with Brig Deculot.

133/2/2 106

133A

PA Please ensure that I speak to
Brig Deculot on 12/2. Arrange meeting
on 12/2. Th

133/1/1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

I.W.T.

No P/B - five lines except 100 miles N of B
ie just across AoMachete use of Bulk Installation in Vietnam
AFHSA material rehabilitated

No Dax NE as R/B

P B S B/D - Breach Fence a R/B
1/4 la. 1 No 2 Dax

B/D, 4 F/la. Internal + B/D under P B S

A/C del with

100

TO: C.O.S.

1. Reference 102 - 106. This is an extremely important document forwarded from I.S.L.D. direct to Admiral Stone. Briefly it is a resolution passed by the CLM in VERIZIA GIULIA stating their conclusions as to how the area of VERIZIA GIULIA and the port of TRIESTE should be organized after liberation. They propose:

- (a) Administrative autonomy for VERIZIA GIULIA.
- (b) Equality between citizens of Italian and Yugoslav nationality, with a guarantee to preserve Yugoslav national characteristics.
- (c) ^{inter} A national committee to run the port of TRIESTE composed of representatives of all nationalities interested in the port.

2. Admiral Stone has passed this to G-5 (see page 106) with copies to all political representatives at AFHQ and to Political Section at this HQ. I have not so far seen any comments from the latter. I think you will wish to discuss this with all concerned.

1 Jan 45.
Office, Chief of Staff,
Ext 200

W. G. G. 15 Jan
C.S.O.,
to C.O.S.

CSC

110

*Copy under discussion 9-7-45 sent to Ben Doolittle - see 119
185/8/45*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017~~TOP SECRET~~HEADQUARTERS 15TH ARMY GROUP
G-5 SECTION
APO 777

MAR 19 1945

Confidential

Ref: 5/26/G-5

HFM/tm
17 March 1945

SUBJECT: G-5 Appreciation of North East Italy

TO : G-4, HQ 15th Army Group

1. On 25 February 45 this Section presented an Appreciation for North East Italy which included Venetia Giulia e Zara.

2. Enclosed is G-5 Appreciation for North East Italy less Venetia Giulia e Zara.

3. You will also note that in the Appreciation, dated 25 February 45, the Provinces of Sondrio, Bergamo, Brescia, Cremona, all of the compartimento of Lombardia were included, as was also the Province of Parma, in the compartimento of Emilia. These Provinces have all been eliminated from the present Appreciation as they have all been included in what is now known as North West Italy.

Nelson W. Monfort
NELSON W. MONFORT,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-5.1 Encl.
G-5 Appreciation of NE Italy,
dtd 17 March 45.Copies to:
HQ ALLIED COMMISSION ✓
SCAO Fifth Army
SCAO Eighth Army

EX Comm Lst (504/200/24)

ECON SEC
C. A. SEC

CONFIDENTIAL

104

22 MAR 45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

REF 240411

HEADQUARTERS 15TH ARMY GROUP
G-5 SECTION
APO 777

Confidential 99

Ref: G-5/0/26

RMA/ta
17 March 1945

SUBJECT: G-5 Appreciation of North East Italy.

TO: G-4, HQ 15th Army Group.

1. SUBJECT.

To determine the manner in which Allied Military Government will conduct Civil Administration of North East Italy.

2. DEFINITION.

North East Italy is comprised of the following areas:

- a. The compartimento of Venezia (exclusive of Venezia Giulia e Dora).
- b. The compartimento of Emilia (exclusive of the provinces of Piacenza and Parma).
- c. The Province of Mantova in the compartimento of Lombardia.

References to Emilia, Lombardia and Venezia in this appreciation will refer to the area of these compartimenti which comprise North East Italy.

3. PERSONNEL.

Personnel allocated to North East Italy are available at forty-eight hours notice to report to their proper stations. Transportation to take such personnel to their stations will be provided by HQ Allied Commission.

4. FOOD.

On the basis of a 200 gramme bread ration for one month's maintenance, it is estimated that the following amounts of food will be required:

Venezia	12,735
Emilia	3,502
Lombardia	282
Total	17,227

198

5/26/55 dated 17 March 55 (Cont'd)

These figures take into account all estimated availabilities of local resources in wheat and other products and in addition to the basic 200 gramme bread ration, provides for all authorized supplementary rations.

The build up will take place through ANCONA and PORTI or nearest center in the initial stages and through the large provincial centers as they become available. Stocks will be moved in from RARI and NAPLES Areas.

5. TRANSPORT

The total commitment of lift as stated above is 17,227 tons per month of imported supplies. The daily tonnage is as follows:

Venezia	426
Emilia	117
Lombardia	31
Total	574

Certain additional tonnages of local produce will have to be moved within the area e.g. wheat to flour mills. For the first few months these have been estimated to be as follows:

Venezia	264
Emilia	78
Lombardia	20
Total	362

The computation, therefore, of the total estimated tonnage per day is as follows:

	Transport of Imported Stock	Transport of Local Produce	Total
Venezia	426	264	710
Emilia	117	78	195
Lombardia	31	20	51
Totals	574	362	936

The actual number of trucks required per day cannot be accurately given as this depends upon:

- Progress of operations.
- How soon liberated territory is transferred to Regional control.
- The amount of civil transport available.

However, breaking up the territory and grouping around certain

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

a/26/0-5 dated 17 March 45 (Cont'd)

197

supply points as in para 4. above, the following table gives an estimate of what may be required by supply points for local distribution:

Supply Points	Tons per day required	Tons per day Local	Total	Vehicles of 3 ton capacity required on 1 dayround
Belluno	112	75	187	187
Udine	54	36	90	90
Verona	136	99	235	235
Portofino	60	54	122	122
Bologna	93	62	155	155
Montova	31	20	51	51
Polzano	68	54	122	122

If and when the 300 grams ration is applicable in Northern Italy, the estimated tonnages in this appreciation will increase slightly.

As stated in the 0-5 appreciation on North West Italy, HQ Allied Commission expect to have available at two weeks notice 650, 3-ton lorries.

6. FINANCE.

All currency required is already stockpiled in Florence and Siena. This will be moved forward as strong rooms are obtained. No transport problem arises as there is only a list of 5, 3-ton lorries involved.

7. PUBLIC SAFETY.

A pool of spezialised CC.RR. in sufficient number to provide for the immediate needs of North West Italy is now available. Although the equipment and clothing is not considered to be completely satisfactory, it is deemed adequate to permit them to take the field.

HQ Allied Commission will transport CC.RR. to Army Areas. It is the responsibility of the Army to transport CC.RR. to where needed.

Additional CC.RR. will be made available as needed, by transfer from the South and by re-employment of Northern CC.RR. after rehabilitation and screening.

8. PUBLIC HEALTH.

a. Water Supply. In the initial stages this is the responsibility of the Army. However, ~~on approximately 1 March 45~~, HQ Allied Commission ~~will~~ have sufficient basic chemicals available in Rome to provide

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

S/26/0-5 dated 17 March 45 (Cont'd)

196

for civilian water purification in North East Italy. HQ Allied Commission is planning to transport these chemicals into Army areas as required.

b. Medical Supplies. No estimate of the needs in North East Italy are available. Requisitions have been made to cover the whole of Italy for the months of January to June 1945, inclusive. It is considered that by 30 April 45, all these supplies will have been received and will be made available on call. HQ Allied Commission will move these supplies to dumps in the Army areas. Distribution from these dumps will be made by Army.

c. Clothing. Adequate supplies of emergency clothing and blankets are available at Leghorn and Ancona. It is the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission to transport this clothing to Army areas. Distribution therefore will be an Army responsibility. American Relief for Italy will assist in an emergency in this distribution by provision of additional trucks. American Red Cross personnel, supervised by Welfare Officers of AMG, will be responsible for the distribution of clothing.

9. PATRIOTS.

Qualified Patriot Officers will be included on the staffs of Regional Commissioners, who will be initially attached to the Army and under Army supervision. Patriot Centers will be established in VENETIA, LOMBARDIA and EMILIA regions as required. Clothing, food, equipment, hospitalization, and payment will be made available as at present. Transportation to and from these Centers will be initially an Army responsibility and later this responsibility will pass to Regional Commissioners. Requisitioning of transport for use of Patriot personnel and for supplying centers is considered essential. Allied Commission will be responsible for transporting personnel into Army areas.

10. DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES.

The refugee problem in NE Italy will be treated as such problems have been treated in the past. Refugee collecting Centers (5,000 capacity each) will be established at BRESCIA, BOLLANO, VERONA, UDINE, VENEZIA and TREVISO, and Frontier Collecting Posts (1,000 capacity each) will be located at ZOLA, S. LUCIA DI TORINNO, TARVISIO, S. CANDIDO, VISITENO and SPONDICIA. Initial operations will be under the direct control of Army AMG, and they will be assisted and augmented by personnel from HQ Allied Commission. Advanced HQ's of Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission are desired at VERONA and VENEZIA to assist operations and movements. Army transport (back loading) will be required to move refugees SOUTH to Centers. AFHQ has been asked for two (2) OT Coys (240 vehicles) to be used exclusively for Displaced Persons and Refugee activities in North East Italy.

It is the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission to provide food and equipment. Initially the distribution of food, and the securing of equipment for the centers will be the responsibility of Army AMG.

S/26/G-5 dated 17 March 48 (Cont'd) 195

Regional Commissioners will assume this responsibility as territory is released to their jurisdiction. It is anticipated that an over all figure of one million (1,000,000) refugees and displaced persons may have to be dealt with in Northern Italy.

W. W. Monfort
WELSON W. MONFORT,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-5.

Copies to:
HQ Allied Commission
SCAG Fifth Army
SCAG Eighth Army

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

194

Confidential

EXTRACT

SECRET

K 111

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 3rd Meeting
16th March 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

* * *

4. OCCUPATION OF NORTH EASTERN ITALY

190

(JPS Study No. P/267 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft directive to the Commanding General 15th Army Group, on the occupation of Northeast ITALY in the event of the withdrawal of the enemy on some general Alpine line.

MR. OFFIE said that he had been advised by the State Department that the whole matter of the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA was being taken up actively on governmental level.

2. LIEUTENANT GENERAL McNARNEY, referring to paragraph 7 a of the JPS study, considered that the communications over the BRENDA route should be named together with those leading to TRIESTE and UDINE, since the BRENDA would be of vital importance in the line of communications for the United States forces deployed in AUSTRIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft directive circulated under JPS Study No. P/267 (Final) in accordance with General McNarney's remarks at '2' above and issue it to all concerned.

* * *

190

See 204

SECRET

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 394

NPS/AMG/RS

MAR 16 1945

15 March 1945

SUBJECT: Forwarding of directive on "Occupation of Northeast Italy".

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
APO 394,
(Attn: Chief Commissioner).

1. Attached is copy number 36, Directive - Occupation of Northeast Italy, which was item three on the Agenda of the Political Meeting held at AFHQ 15 March 1945.

2. Request acknowledgement of receipt of above mentioned directive on inclosed transmittal form.

Incl:
as above

Norman P. Seagrave
NORMAN P. SEAGRAVE
Major, G.S.C.
Executive Officer

See Mem 192 193

John 194

TOP SECRET

Confidential
Confidential 36

10

Editor: *Correspondence*: Planning Staff

21 March 1965

DATE: 12-17-2008 TIME: 15:47

Cover Photo by Jeffery

1. In accordance with directions received in a memorandum dated 8 March 1946 from the Deputy Chief of Staff, a draft directive to the Commanding General 15 Army Group on the occupation of Northeast Italy has been prepared and is attached as P/269 (Final).
2. In consideration of the circumstances under which the occupation of Northeast Italy is likely to take place, the JCS is of the opinion that such an occupation will result either from the withdrawal of the enemy to some general defensive line or the surrender by the enemy before such a withdrawal. To have, therefore, prepared this draft directive to cover the first circumstance under which occupation may take place and consider that the modifications necessary to cover the circumstances of surrender before withdrawal should form the subject of a separate directive.

2. is consideration of the circumstances under which the occupation of Northeast Italy is likely to take place, the JCS is of the opinion that such an occupation will result either from the withdrawal of the enemy to some general Alpine line or its surrender by the enemy before such a withdrawal. We have, therefore, prepared this draft directive to cover the first circumstance under which occupation may take place and consider that the modifications necessary to cover the circumstances of surrender before withdrawal should form the subject of a separate directive.

Q. I. 20213
Circ. General, U.S.
3-2 plane

L. T. PINKERTON
AIR CONTROLLERS
2205 E. 12th St.

W. A. Doyle
Staff Officer, Plans

[illegible]

Index

2. In consideration of the circumstances under which the occupation of Northeast Italy is likely to take place, the JCS is of the opinion that such an occupation will result either from the withdrawal of the enemy to some general Alpine line or the surrender by the enemy before such a withdrawal. We have, therefore, prepared this draft directive to cover the first circumstances under which occupation may take place and consider that the modifications necessary to cover the circumstances of surrender before withdrawal should form the subject of a separate directive.

W. L. Dwyer

C. L. SMITH
Chief, General, U.S. ...
G-3 Plans

L. T. PARKHURST
Air Commander
U.S. Plans

W. L. Dwyer
W. A. LEAH
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

DISTRIBUTION:

List 'A' plus
3-6

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

P/257 (Final)

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

11 March 1945

SUBJECT: Directive -- Occupation of NE ITALY.

TO : Commanding General, 15 Army Group.

1. PURPOSE

1. The occupation of NE ITALY is likely to take place in one of the two following general sets of circumstances:

a. Withdrawal of the enemy from the PO VALLEY and the coastal area of NE ITALY to some general Alpine line, such as CORTINA - SONDRIO - BRESCIA - MILAN - GALLARATE - Swiss frontier. In this event, however, the enemy may continue to hold both VENICE and TRIESTE as fortresses.

b. Surrender of the German forces in ITALY any time before withdrawal as indicated in a above being carried out.

This instruction deals with the occupation of NE ITALY in the circumstances in a above. Some modification will be necessary in the circumstances envisaged in b. This will form the subject of a separate instruction.

2. Italian Fascist divisions are unlikely to remain intact in NE ITALY after a German withdrawal, but many deserters from these divisions may be picked up and some ardent Fascists may attempt prolonged resistance as guerrillas.

3. Extensive demolitions and the destruction of public utilities are to be anticipated.

4. From the political aspect, the occupation of NE ITALY will be guided by SACRED's declared policy to support the authority of the established Government in

2
the withdrawal of the enemy from the PO Valley and the coastal area of NE ITALY to some general Alpine line, such as C PORETTO - ~~TRONA~~ - BELLUNO - LANA - Swiss frontier. In this event, however, the enemy may continue to hold both VERONA and TRIESTE as fortresses.

b. Surrender of the German forces in ITALY any time before withdrawal as indicated in a above being carried out.

This instruction deals with the occupation of NE ITALY in the circumstances in a above. Some modification will be necessary in the circumstances envisaged in b above. This will form the subject of a separate instruction.

2. Italian Fascist divisions are unlikely to remain intact in NE ITALY after a German withdrawal, but many deserters from these divisions may be picked up and some ardent Fascists may attempt prolonged resistance as guerrillas.

3. Extensive demolitions and the destruction of public utilities are to be anticipated.

4. From the political aspect, the occupation of NE ITALY will be guided by SOVIET's declared policy to support the authority of the established government in

ROMA.

INTENTION

5. To obtain complete operational control of that portion of NE ITALY within the 1939 frontier evacuated by the enemy and to establish Allied military government therein.

METHOD

6. The occupation will be carried out in two phases.

Phase 1. Initial occupation and establishment of Military Government which will take place in the normal course of operations by 15 Army Group in following up the enemy's withdrawal.

TOP SECRET

P/289 (Final)

TOP SECRET

Phase 2. The assumption of responsibility for

- a. Military administration by No. 1 District and PBS
- b. Allied military government by the Allied Commission.

7. Phase 1.

This phase is the responsibility of 15 Army Group.

Tasks are:

- a. The elimination of any remaining German and Fascist Italian formations, the securing and rehabilitation of essential road and rail communications to TRIESTE and UDINE, and the securing of the port of TRIESTE and the UDINE airfields.
- b. The disarmament and disbandment of Italian patriot forces (see para 10 below) and the re-establishment of law and order among the civil population, concurrently with the establishment of Allied military government by Fifth and Eighth Armies.

8. Phase 2.

- a. No. 1 District, PBS and No. 2 District will take over as army rear boundaries are advanced.
- b. Eventual inter District/PBS boundaries will be as indicated on map at

Appendix 'A' attached.

- c. On assuming military responsibility from 15 Army Group, No. 1 District will take over command of such troops as remain in its geographical area. All troops in the PBS area will remain under command of Fifth Army or come under command of PBS or CG MTOUSA, as directed by CG MTOUSA.

- d. Tasks of No. 1 District and PBS will be:

Allied and Italian

and UBINT, and the securing of the port of TRIESTE and the UDINE airfields.

b. The disarmament and disbandment of Italian patriot forces (see para 10 below) and the re-establishment of law and order among the civil population, concurrently with the establishment of Allied military government by Fifth and Eighth Armies.

A. Phase 2.

a. No. 1 District, PBS and No. 2 District will take over as army rear boundaries are advanced.

b. Eventual inter District/PBS boundaries will be as indicated on map at Appendix 1A' attached.

c. On assuming military responsibility from 15 Army Group, No. 1 District will take over command of such troops as remain in its geographical area. All troops in the PBS area will remain under command of Fifth Army or come under command of PBS or CG MTOUSA, as directed by CG MTOUSA.

d. Tasks of No. 1 District and PBS will be:

- (1) Assume command of all US, British, Dominion, Allied and Italian troops which are passed to their control under the provisions of a c above and be responsible for their local administration.
- (2) Assist the regional commissioners to maintain law and order in their districts.
- (3) Secure their respective army 1 of C behind army rear boundaries.
- (4) Safeguard military supplies, communications and stores.
- (5) Coordinate the demands by Allied troops for local resources.
- (6) Coordinate the military and essential civil movement requirements.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(Final)

TOP SECRET

13

9. Passing of Command.

With the advance of Fifth and Eighth Armies, application for the adjustment to the rear boundary of armies will be submitted by Headquarters of Armies, after consultation with No. 1 District and PHS, to AFHQ copy to HQ 15 Army Group, who will comment as necessary to AFHQ.

10. Disarmament and Disbandment of Italian Patriot Forces.

In dealing with patriot forces the provisions of this HQ signal W-26918 dated 14 February 1945, paragraphs 2 - 5 inclusive, will apply.

11. Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA.

The precise measures which will be taken for dealing with Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA are not yet determined but for planning purposes it will be assumed that the whole area will come under Allied military government.

12. Administration.

Separate administrative instructions will be issued.

11. Allied Military Government in VENEZUELA GUAYIA.



The precise measures which will be taken for dealing with Allied Military Government in VENEZUELA GUAYIA are not yet determined but for planning purposes it will be assumed that the whole area will come under Allied military government.

12. Administration.

Separate administrative instructions will be issued.

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.




Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET



APPX. A

TOP SECRET

Confidential



187

COMPARTMENTS & PROVINCES OF ITALY



LEGEND

- COMPARTIMENTO BOUNDARIES
- PROVINCIA BOUNDARIES
- FRONTIERS
- R.A.A.C.
- P.B.S. TERRITORY
- Nº 1 DIST TERRITORY
- 2
- 3
- BRENNER ROUTE



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

A.P.O. 394

Legal Sub-Commission

MEMORANDUM:

TO : C A Section

Confidential 12 March 1945

1. I have read the opinion of Col Hammond of 19 February 1945 but find myself unable to accept his arguments.
2. Col Hammond's opinion is founded upon the contentions:-
 - (a) That the Armistice does not require the Allied Commission to take any particular form and that the Commission could be established in different sections for different parts of Italy;
 - (b) That the appointment of Mr MacMillan as Acting President of the Commission can be revoked by SAC.
3. In my opinion Col Hammond's first contention ignores the fact that under the Armistice terms there is to be set up "a Control Commission" to the HQ of which the Italian Government will send a delegation to represent Italian interests. The function of the Commission was the regulation and execution of the Armistice terms, including Art 20 which provides for the administration of occupied territory. These terms were fulfilled and by their fulfilment the Commission and its one HQ were established for the discharge of these appointed functions. To adopt now, or in the future, the policy that this Commission was not the sole body for this purpose would be to ignore the established course of conduct, and to increase the difficulties of the Italian Government and would in my opinion be inconsistent with the Armistice terms.
4. So far as the revocation of Mr MacMillan's appointment is concerned I am of opinion that since the delegation by SAC was made in pursuance of a declaration by UK and US, which declaration was formally and publicly announced to the Italian Government, this delegation cannot be revoked at the will of SAC. It is irrelevant to this issue that the implementation of this declaration by SAC may have been made in a particular form which appears to enable SAC to revoke the appointment.
5. Since, however, no action is contemplated at the present time on the basis of Col Hammond's opinion, it appears that no immediate reply is necessary.

W. E. Roberts
 W. E. ROBERTS,
 Colonel,
 Deputy Chief Legal Officer.

TOP SECRET

See 183-185

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

504

SECRET
Confidential

10 March 1945

Ref: P/385.04

SUBJECT: Reports of Enemy Anti-Italian Activities

TO : Regional Commissioner,
Venetia Region.

MAR 10 1945

With reference to my letter dated 1 January 1945 (Reference: No. 504/110/006) on the above subject, I attach an additional report regarding conditions in Alto-Adige which was received by the Chief Commissioner from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

110

Major E. Tassin

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

Copy to: 9840 NIGHTS Army

1 Encl: Report: Situation in Alto Adige.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

504

2266

Exec. Comm

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Secretary General Staff

Confidential
10 March 1945.

MAR 11 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters Allied Commission.

Subject: Copy of Cable.

110

Enclosed is a copy of NAF 872 which was requested
in your message No. 3253 of 9 March 1945.

1178

HEADQUARTERS
11 MAR 1945
A.C.

J. F. Easton
J. F. EASTON, Jr.,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary, General Staff.

Incl:
Cy NAF 872
dtl 2 Mar 45.

785017

TOP SECRET
AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

TOP SECRET
URGENT

TOP
SECRET

TO FOR ACTION : AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
AMSSC FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
FOR INFO : SHAEP
REF NO : PX 36545
SIGNED : ALEXANDER

Confidential

This is NAF 872

Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA
is subject.

1. Reference is made to MAT 418 of 23 November in which certain proposals were made for Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA. I have just returned from a meeting with Marshal TITO in BELGRADE. While there I tried to extract from him his views on the subject of VENEZIA GIULIA. In opening the discussion I stated that when forces under my command occupy AUSTRIA the control of the L of C to TRIESTE would seem to demand my occupation of all territory west of the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA and the establishment of Allied Military Government in that area. In reply Marshal TITO offered the following comments:

A. He accepted the idea of Allied Military Government within the zone of my communication provided his civil administration already installed in the areas in question was retained, his reason being that unless such civil authorities were allowed to function chaos would ensue. He was prepared to agree that his civil authorities should be responsible to the Allied Military Government.

B. Assuming that the object was to protect the L of C between TRIESTE and AUSTRIA he did not consider it necessary for the Allies to occupy the ISTRIAN Peninsula.

MC OUT 641

-1-

90

TOP SECRET

COPY NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

56

1. He offered me the use of communications running through LUBLJANA though he pointed out that these of course were well within the frontiers of YUGOSLAVIA.

2. From information obtained over a period of several months there is ample evidence to show that Slovene intention is to extend their hold over as large an area of NE ITALY as possible in order to create a good case for annexation to Federal YUGOSLAVIA of maximum territory in NE ITALY. East of the ISONZO the influence of GASH is paramount in all areas not under effective enemy control and great efforts are being made to extend this influence westwards at least as far as the TAGLIAMENTO. This process included subversion of Italian Partisan Brigades as a condition of their being allowed to operate in this area. In these circumstances it is evident that there is likely to be considerable internal disorder in that part of NE ITALY east of the TAGLIAMENTO when evacuated by the Germans and when the Allied forces first march in.

3. The occupation of AUSTRIA and the safeguarding of the L of C of Allied occupying forces make essential that the port of TRIESTE, and railways leading from it into AUSTRIA be under my control, and that I have full powers to maintain law and order in that area. The international cable line from ROME to VIENNA must also be under my control. In view of the circumstances explained in paragraph 2 preceding, these requirements and the consequent security of the L of C can only be assured by the imposition of Allied Military Government at least upon that portion of NE ITALY which will comprise such L of C area.

4. If nothing but operational interests were concerned, an attempt could be made to conclude an agreement with Marshal TITO which fixed a military boundary running approximately north-south through VERONA GIULAI. The area to the west of this boundary would then be under my military control. In that case no mention need be made of administrative arrangements for the area to the east which would presumably come at once under Yugoslav rule. An assurance could be sought that all Yugoslav and Slovene forces west of such boundary would come under my operational command.

5. The following political considerations, however, appear to preclude an attempt to make such an agreement.

TOP SECRET
AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

A. Any such agreement, expressly limited though it might be to purely operational purposes, would be construed by Marshal TITO, by the Italian Government and by outside world as recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty over territory east of proposed boundary. No doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA in advance of a general peace settlement.

B. Italian Government has been assured that the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA will be placed under Allied Military Government similar to that already obtaining in ITALY.

6. In any event it would be necessary to ensure that naval control of the ports between FIUME and TRIESTE both inclusive be vested in Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander, 15 Army Group or Yugoslav Forces as appropriate.

7. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must take account are:

A. Provision for the control and security of the port of TRIESTE and L of C thence to AUSTRIA.

B. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

C. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied Forces and Yugoslav or Slovene Forces under command of Marshal TITO.

8. It is accepted policy that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the considerations in 7A and B above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Yugoslav (Slovene) Forces are already in occupation of large areas of VENEZIA GIULIA, and Yugoslav Civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Yugoslav Forces will probably be

MC OUT 641

-3-

TOP SECRET

89 NO.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

in a position to extend their hold over the whole country before other Allied forces can arrive, and there may well be some force in TITO's contention that, unless his civil authorities are allowed to continue to function, chaos will ensue. In order, therefore, to meet the requirement in 7C as well as those in 7A and B above, it is suggested that we should make a virtue of a necessity and invite the Provisional Yugoslav Government-as soon as it is formed-to participate, as an ally, in the Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA. In that event, I recommend that the Joint Provisional Yugoslav Government be asked to send representatives to consult with members of my staff in formulating plans for the Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA, and that it should be arranged that British or American Forces occupy the L of C area and perhaps also FIUME and POLA; that the Yugoslav Forces in other parts of VENEZIA GIULIA come under the orders of the appropriate Allied Commander; and that AMG officers should be associated with such existing civil authorities as may be found functioning in the territory.

9. In my view the acceptance of this plan will depend entirely upon an agreement to the general scheme between the three great powers, the UNITED STATES, the UNITED KINGDOM and RUSSIA, before the invitation is made to the provisional Yugoslav Government. I therefore request that urgent steps be taken to secure agreement between the three great powers.

ORIGINATOR: SAC-IN-C

AUTH: W R HEASTON, Major

INFORMATION: G-2 G-3
CAO G-4
G-4 (B) MATN
G-5 LOG PLANS
CINC MED USN
MAAF RES MIN
US POLAD SGS
IS & PS SIGNALS
**



KC OCT 641

2 Mar 45

2038A

Ref No FX 36545

rg/D/J

207
3644
INCOMING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: **F 40979**
Date/Time of Origin: **MAR 101501A**

Message Centre No: **D/4714**
Date/Time Recd: **MAR 101825A**
Precedence: **ROUTINE**

FROM: **AFHQ SIGNED SACRED GITE FHSGS**
TO: **HQ ALCOM**

RESTRICTED

MAR 11 1949

RESTRICTED

Reurad 3253 of 9 March.

Copy dispatched this day by ADLS.

Dist

Action - Exec Comm
Info - A/President
Chief Commissioner
File

ACTION



RESTRICTED

2072
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Float
~~44~~
File 504

M. S. LUSH

(178)

W

APR 11 1945

3253

9 March 1945

ROUTINE

ROUTED TO

SUBJECT IS HAN APR. FOR AGENT GOV. TWO

PASS TO APR. FOR MILO FROM EL ALON CITY AGENT PASS

CHARTER FOR COPY

(Not for Float)

See (180)

Major E. Talbot

Office of Spec. Commissioner

300

PA

87

Major.

TOP SECRET 175

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 387.4-1

Confidential
March 1945
MAR 9 1945


SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.
(Attention: Chief Commissioner)

1. Under date of 6 February 1945 the Deputy Chief Legal Advisor of the Allied Commission wrote an opinion on the above subject, which was forwarded to the Chief of Staff at this Headquarters under date of 12 February 1945.

2. The Chief of Staff has requested that the views of the Legal Adviser of this Section, which are inclosed herewith, be communicated to your Headquarters for any further comments you may wish to make concerning this problem.

3. It is understood that no action predicated on the inclosed opinion is presently contemplated.


CHARLES M. SPOFFORD,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

Incl:
as above.

See 205

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 518

RTB/as

Confidential
19 February 1945

SUBJECT: Governmental Authority in Northeast Italy.

TO : A C of S.

1. The Allied Commission has referred to the possibility of the establishment of a tripartite governmental authority in certain portions of Northeastern Italy, to be independent of the present Allied Commission and responsible directly to SAC. Such an authority, the Allied Commission suggests, could not properly be established because

a. The Instrument of Surrender of Italy is a Treaty with the Italian Govt. which establishes the Allied Commission as the sole authority for all of prewar Italy (as and when liberated) for administering the Instrument of Surrender under the orders of SAC and

b. SAC, having appointed Mr. MacMillan Acting President of the Allied Commission, cannot thereafter establish a governmental agency separate from the Allied Commission or not under the control of Mr. MacMillan.

2. I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached on either ground

a. The Italian Govt. has no vested right under the Armistice to continuance or extension of the Allied Commission as presently constituted.

The Armistice and Instrument of Surrender, executed by the Allied C in C in behalf of all the United Nations, set forth the terms on which the United Nations were prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy and define the position of Italy in relation to the United Nations. By the Armistice Italy is placed, in effect, subject to the will of the United Nations. The moving parties are the British and U.S. Governments acting by the Allied C in C. The latter, who is also Military Governor of occupied Italy, has full power to represent the United Nations. The control commission is an administrative device through which SAC's orders and directions may be executed. So far as the Italian Govt is concerned, the Armistice does not require the control commission to take any particular form. SAC, in an alter ego, is himself President of the Control Commission, and the organization, functions and locations of its component elements are for his determination. Subject to his

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

SECRET

173

own directives from GCS, (which do not concern the Italian Govt) SAC may organize or reorganize the commission as he considers necessary. He might, for example establish different sections for different areas of Italy, in each case under appropriate officials responsible to him. He might include in any section such representatives of the several United Nations as he thought desirable. The Armistice does not preclude these or other minor or major rearrangements of the control commission machinery.

b. The appointment of Mr. Macmillan as Acting President did not divert SAC of the powers held by him in behalf of the United Nations.

By G.O. 27 of 18 Nov 44, SAC deputized an "Acting President", Mr. Macmillan and a "Deputy President", Admiral Stone. Both delegations may be rescinded at the will of SAC, as similar delegations have in the past. Certainly the particular delegation gave the Italian Govt. no additional rights under the Armistice. SAC, under the Armistice, is free to appoint such other officials, with such powers, as he may consider necessary.

3. In addition to his powers of rearrangement of the control commission, SAC also, of course, has under the Armistice, power to place specific areas under Allied Military Government, to be fully and directly responsible to him, his operational commander or such other agent as he may designate.

F. T. HAMMOND, JR
Colonel, Ord.
Legal Advisor

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017Translation

The Minister of Foreign Affairs

16/02/70/a

MAR 7 1945

Rome, 3 March 1945

Dear Admiral,

after my letter of December 28th, 1944,
 N. 05906/10, I enclose further news which I received re-
 bout the situation in the Alto Adige.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Very truly yours,

S. De Gasperi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
 Chief Commissioner
 Allied Commission

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Very truly yours,

S. M. Cooper

Admiral Billy M. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission

3 2 8 9

Rec II 1st - 4 MAR 45

ACTION: OFFICE, PERSONAL FILES

INFO: CHIEF COMMR

EXEC COMMR

See 182

S.M.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TranslationSUBJECT: Situation in Alto Adige

The news contained in the present report were gathered among elements of the Alto Adige, at present living in peace, and who emigrated from these regions after the German occupation. These news are worthy to be taken in consideration, for they have been confirmed by several reliable sources.

1.) GENERAL SITUATION AND NAZI ORGANIZATION

When the Germans occupied the Alto Adige on September 9th 1943, they didn't proceed formally to annex the territory as it has been erroneously said, but they gave it a sui generis status, very much like that which was established in 1939 in the 'Brenner and Brenner Protection'. That is to say, the citizens of German blood were declared to be 'subjects' of the Reich, but the territory itself kept the exterior appearance of Italian sovereignty, though it was ruled by laws which were quite different from those which had been enforced in the rest of occupied Italy.

All the vexing regulations against the Italians were not directly made by the authorities of occupation; local organizations constituted on purpose and exclusively formed of people who were not native of the region were made to issue these regulations, so that when the Italians protested, they were answered that the authorities of the Reich had no intention of controlling the work of these organizations.

In Alto Adige, the German right was and is still in force for the citizens of German blood, while the Italian right is in force for the Italians, (though they have to submit to the German war right). Practically, the Italians are only tolerated and have neither rights nor means of defense.

The Germans who opted for Italy in the 1939 option were and are still considered as the citizens of the 'Reich' who are politically suspect. Those who made anti-Nazi propaganda during the operations connected with the option were charged with high treason.

During the first period of the occupation especially, the vexations against the Italians were numberless. Killing, looting of houses and shops, deportations, regulations restricting personal liberty can no longer be counted.

The ultimate end of all these vexations, as it is easy to understand, is to germanize the region entirely, eliminating the Italian population or obliging it to emigrate.

That this aim hasn't yet been reached is due to the fact that the Italian population of the Alto Adige is numerically much more important than it is thought to be. The legend that the inhabitants of the region are mostly Ger-

All the varying regulations against the Italians were not directly made by the authorities of occupation; local organizations constituted on purpose and exclusively formed of people who were not native of the region were made to issue these regulations, so that when the Italians protested, they were answered that the authorities of the Reich had no intention of controlling the work of these organizations.

In Alto Adige, the German right was and is still in force for the citizens of German blood, while the Italian right is in force for the Italians, (though they have to submit to the German war right). Practically, the Italians are only tolerated and have neither rights nor means of defense.

The Germans who opted for Italy in the 1939 option were and are still considered as the citizens of the 'Reich' who are politically suspect. Those who made anti-Nazi propaganda during the operations connected with the option were charged with high treason.

During the first period of the occupation especially, the vexations against the Italians were numberless. Killing, looting of houses and shops, deportations, regulations restricting personal liberty can no longer be counted.

The ultimate end of all these vexations, as it is easy to understand, is to remove the region entirely, eliminating the Italian population or oblige it to emigrate.

That this aim hasn't yet been reached is due to the fact that the Italian population of the Alto Adige is numerically much more important than it is thought to be. The legend that the inhabitants of the region are mostly Germans spread in Italy and abroad as a result of the 1939 option.

Nevertheless, people didn't take into consideration the way in which this option was organized and took place (it is useless to remind that the German as well as the fascist government made a very active propaganda to have the inhabitants who were of German descent opt for Germany; desert and violence were used), nor did they take in consideration the fact that this was not a plebiscite, as the Germans now pretend it was, for the right of suffrage was exclusively reserved to the citizens of German descent. The option took place in the so-called 'agreement territory' (which included the Bozzeno province and a few German ethnical islands which existed in the Trento Udine and Belluno provinces) and gave the following results.

Provinces	To vote	For Reich	For Italy	%
Bozzeno	229,000	166,188	63,012	27.2%
Trento	24,403	15,015	11,638	46.8%
Udine	5,253	4,076	977	18.3%
Belluno	7,409	1,106	6,423	86.5%

Considering the Italian population living in the Alto Adige, excluded from the vote reserved to the citizens of German descent, we see that the percentage changes considerably, and, while it gives a small German minority in the Trento, Udine and Bolzano provinces, the said percentage is of little more than 5% for Bolzano. To be convinced of that, it is enough to compare the figure of those who voted with the total figure of the population living in the Alto Adige, Italian or of foreign origin.

This can be clearly demonstrated as follows:

Provinces	Residing popul.	Population opting for transf. in Germany	%
Bolzano	313,989	156,488	53.02
Trento	591,309	23,010	3.90
Udine	721,670	4,276	0.63
Belluno	210,333	1,066	0.57

For this reason, the Germans couldn't realize their wish of getting rid of the Italians living in the Alto Adige, for they would have struck a death blow to the economy of the region by doing so.

To sum up, in the Alto Adige the organization of the population of German descent is like that which exists in the Reich. The various Italian organizations have been kept and German commissioners put at their head. These commissioners were chosen among the members of the so-called 'opposite commissions'. (After the 1939 option, the Germans had formed 'commissions for those who opted for Germany'. For instance, there was a syndicate of the Italian agricultural workers and an identical German 'commission' which protected the workers who had opted for Germany during the delay of their transfer. In the Credit Institutes, and in the important organizations, the commissioners were chosen among the German employees of the enterprise itself.

Some of these organizations are still rather important because of the number of their members. For instance, the syndicates of the industrial workers (all the workers were and are Italian). In these syndicates, fascist regulations are still in force, though they are under the control of a German commissioner.

2) NAZI POLICE FORCES

A short time after the German occupation, the inhabitants of German descent were called under arms as in the Reich, (natural consequence of what has been said above). Those who had made themselves prominent for a long time

of this reason, the Germans couldn't realize their wish of getting rid of the Italians living in the Alto Adige, for they would have struck a death blow to the economy of the region by doing so.

To sum up, in the Alto Adige the organization of the population of German descent is like that which exists in the Reich. The various Italian organizations have been kept and German commissioners put at their head. These German commissioners were chosen among the members of the so-called 'opposite commissions'. (After the 1939 option, the Germans had formed commissions for those who opted for Germany'. For instance, there was a syndicate of the Italian agricultural workers and an identical German 'commission' which protected the workers who had opted for Germany during the delay of their transfer). In the Credit Institute, and in the important organizations, the commissioners were chosen among the German employees of the enterprise itself.

Some of these organizations are still rather important because of the number of their members. For instance, the syndicates of the industrial workers (all the workers were and are Italian). In these syndicates, fascist regulations are still in force, though they are under the control of a German commissioner.

2) NAZI POLICE FORCES

A short time after the German occupation, the inhabitants of German descent were called under arms as in the Reich, (natural consequence of what has been said above). Those who had made themselves prominent for a long time by their Nazi zeal (the local Nazi party officially formed after 1939 among those who opted for Germany had been keeping a list of them for a long time) were incorporated in the 'SA' or in the police forces. Most of them were sent in other provinces of occupied Italy where their knowledge of the Italian language might prove useful. (The 'Germans' police battalion was an evil force in Rome).

Local elements were used for the police of the region but they were led and directed by men of the Reich.

Those who lived in the Alto Adige during Nazi occupation state that the police forces are inferior to those of the remaining occupied Italian territory but superior to those which exist in identical zones in Germany.

3) COLLABORATIONIST ELEMENTS

In a general way, all those who had opted for Germany may be considered collaborators of the Nazi.

All those who emigrated from Alto Adige and are now in liberated Italy

- 3 -

are unanimous in describing the hearty welcome given by the part of the population which is of German descent to the German troops, their animosity against the Italian element, and the fanatical help given by them to the Nazi during the present conflict.

This indisputable state of things must be neither hidden, nor diminished, for, should the Alto-Adige question arise tomorrow, we will certainly fear those who are of German descent mentioned as mild 'Austrians'; it will then be advisable to point out that it would be supremely unfair and dangerous to favour at our expense the very part of the population which proved violently Nazi. It will be advisable to remember that ever since the period in which the region belonged to the Habsburg Monarchy, the Bolzano area of German descent (in opposition to the faithful Tyrolese of the north) were pan-Germanist. It would therefore not be advisable to add a population which is traditionally favourable to the 'Anschluss' to the remainder Austria, for it would weaken its organism instead of strengthening it.

The great majority of the Italians of the Alto Adige have and are behaving very well and oppose either passive or active resistance to the invader. A very large number of fascists have also adhered to the idea of the liberation.

4. FINANCIAL QUESTION

In the Alto Adige, the currency is still the Italian one.

As it is well known, the Italian State had pledged itself, through the 1959 agreements, to buy through an organization (ente delle tre Venezie) the property of the elements of German descent, who, in accordance with the same agreements, were to be transferred to the Reich. When the region was occupied, the property of the elements of German descent was in one of the following positions:

- a) - property which had already been bought by the 'ente' and sold by it to Italians;
- b) - property which had already been bought by the 'ente' but not yet sold;
- c) - property for which the estimation operations were taking place.

For what concerns the first category the Italian buyers were expropriated of the property they had bought without receiving any compensation, and the property was given back to its former owner who made a request against payment of a sum to the German Financial Commission. The second and the property of the first which had not been claimed back went to the property temporary administration of the same Commission which also alienated some German property. As for the third, the estimation operations were suspended and everything went back to the 'statu quo ante'.

After the liberation, it will be advisable to deal with the question

leader. A very large number of fascists have also adhered to the ideas of the liberation.

45. FINANCIAL SITUATION

In the Alto Adige, the currency is still the Italian one.

As it is well known, the Italian state had pledged itself, through the 1950 agreements, to buy through an organization (Ente delle tre Venezie) the property of the elements of German descent, who, in accordance with the same agreements, were to be transferred to the Reich. When the region was occupied, the property of the vicinities of German descent was in one of the following positions:

- a) - property which had already been bought by the 'Ente' and sold by it to Italians;
- b) - property which had already been bought by the 'Ente' but not yet sold;
- c) - property for which the estimation operations were taking place.

For what concerns the first category the Italian buyers were expropriated of the property they had bought without receiving any compensation, and the property was given back to its former owner who made a request against payment of a sum to the German Financial Commission. The second and the property of the first which had not been claimed back went to the property temporary administration of the same commission which also alienated some German property. As for the third, the estimation operations were suspended and everything went back to the 'Ente' *quo ante*.

After the liberation, it will be advisable to deal with the question immediately, for the property abusively detained by the Nazis might form one of the few sources of war indemnities which we are entitled to have.

e.e.

TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET.

Extract from the minutes of MARSHAL Tito's Political Conference of 2 March 1945, circulated under Ref: SAC (P) (45) 2nd meeting of CRI (45) 11.

Confidential

5. ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN YUGOSLAVIA.

(JPS Study No. 2/266 (Final))
Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 11. — 159

THE COMRADES had before them a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggesting the lines on which agreement should be sought for Allied military control in YUGOSLAVIA, together with certain amendments to this telegram proposed by Air Marshal Slesser.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that in his conversations with Marshal Tito he had approached this subject by stating that when Allied troops were operating in or on the borders of ALBANIA, he (Marshal Alexander) would require the use of the port of THIRIAT and road and rail communications leading from it into ALBANIA. He must be fully responsible for his own communications and consequently garrison the area with his own troops and install his own military government. He had suggested that the best solution appeared to be to install military government over the whole area of YUGOSLAVIA up to the 1939 boundary and leave all questions of frontiers to be settled after the war. In reply Marshal Tito had agreed to these suggestions as far as areas containing essential communications were concerned, but had made the point that, as his troops were already in these areas and he had set up his civil administration, this organization could not be withdrawn without chaos resulting, and he had further implied that he had wished eventually, when U.S. and British forces had departed, to take over all northeastern ITALY east of the 190420. In areas containing communications vital to Allied troops, Marshal Tito was willing to put his troops under the Supreme Allied Commander's command and his civil administration under the Allied military government which the Supreme Allied Commander would impose. Marshal Tito had, however, asked why it was necessary to impose military government in the whole of ISPIRIA as control of the entire area was not essential for military communications. Marshal Tito had further offered to make the Yugoslav communications through LUNJAN available to the Allies.

It had become clear from these conversations that the key to obtaining Marshal Tito's agreement for any proposed arrangement in YUGOSLAVIA was to procure Russian approval for such an arrangement before it was presented to the Yugoslavs. He considered that the draft telegram circulated under JPS Study No. 2/266 (Final) should be redrafted to take account of these conversations and to explain that it was as a result of them that proposals were now being made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by Mr. Gifford, the Supreme Allied Commander said he would not agree to Marshal Tito would not agree to

communications leading from it into Albania. He must be fully responsible for his own communications and consequently guarantee the area with his own troops and install his own military government. He had suggested that the best solution appeared to be to install military government over the whole area of YUGOSLAVIA up to the 1939 boundary and leave all questions of frontiers to be settled after the war. In reply Marshal Tito had agreed to these suggestions as far as areas containing essential communications were concerned, but had made the point that, as his troops were already in these areas and he had set up his civil administration, this organization could not be withdrawn without chaos resulting, and he had further implied that he had wished eventually, when U.S. and British forces had departed, to take over all northeastern Italy east of the ISOLOZO. In areas containing communications vital to Allied troops, Marshal Tito was willing to put his troops under the Supreme Allied Commander's command and his civil administration under the Allied military government which the Supreme Allied Commander would impose. Marshal Tito had, however, asked why it was necessary to impose military government in the whole of YUGOSLAVIA as control of the entire area was not essential for military communications. Marshal Tito had further offered to make the Yugoslav communications through ITALY available to the Allies.

It had become clear from these conversations that the key to obtaining Marshal Tito's agreement for any proposed arrangement in YUGOSLAVIA was to procure Russian approval for such an arrangement before it was presented to the Yugoslavs. He considered that the draft telegram circulated under JPS Study No. P/286 (Final) should be redrafted to take account of these considerations and to explain that it was as a result of them that proposals were now being made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by Mr. Gifford, the Supreme Allied Commander said he felt sure that, without Russian agreement, Marshal Tito would not agree to placing under Allied control his troops and his civil administration in those parts of eastern YUGOSLAVIA which did not contain communications of military importance.

MR. MACLELLAN considered that the best hope of a solution lay along the lines suggested by Air Marshal Blomher at the previous meeting. The essential point was that the Yugoslav administration in the area should be merged in Allied military government and not remain as a separate organization acting as the agent of the Allied administration. This might be achieved if on occupation of the area the whole of YUGOSLAVIA was made a military government region, under a US or British military governor, who might have a Yugoslav deputy. Under these officers there could be two provinces. In western YUGOSLAVIA full Allied military control could be established under a US or British provincial governor, with certain personnel of Tito's civil administration merged in this organization. The eastern province might be under a Yugoslav provincial governor and Marshal Tito's administration would, with certain British and US officers associated with it, form the basis of the government machinery. He pointed out that the Royal Yugoslav Government were already

157

represented on the Advisory Council of the Allied Commission and this representation would pass to the Joint Provincial Government when recognized. He suggested that in addition this government might be offered representation on the Allied Commission itself and the Yugoslav officer nominated to this appointment might be charged with the planning of military government for VENEZIA GIULIA in conjunction with the Allies. He considered that Marshal Tito would obtain appreciable advantages from being associated with Allied military government, particularly in regard to civil supplies for his supporters in VENEZIA GIULIA and rehabilitation of communications in that area.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONAGHEY considered that Yugoslav representation on the Allied Commission itself would make Marshal Tito one of the co-governors of ITALY. He did not think it right to offer participation in the government of ITALY to Marshal Tito, when the latter was in fact proposing to seize certain portions of Italian territory. Such an arrangement would have serious repercussions in ITALY and might lead to the fall of the Italian government. As this would have military consequences he could not agree to such action while hostilities against GERMANY continued.

MR. GIFFIN thought Marshal Tito might agree to accepting the Supreme Allied Commander's full control of the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA. He failed to see why special facilities should be offered to Marshal Tito in the control of Allied military government. The prestige he would acquire from cooperating in such military government would be considerable. The United States government was in the process of communicating with the British and Russian governments on the subject but was unwilling to agree the demarcation line proposed at the previous meeting. In addition his government thought we should take every step to prevent Marshal Tito's civil administration from dominating areas of which the population were mainly Italians. He was not satisfied that Marshal Tito's partisans in fact possessed the strength in northeast ITALY which they claimed.

MR. MACMILLAN said he would go further than Mr. GIFFIN in that Marshal Tito's administration ought not only to be prevented from dominating Italian areas but it should be completely merged in the AG system. He agreed with Lieutenant General Monaghey that it was not essential to have a Yugoslav representative accredited to the Allied Commission itself, the important point being that some authorized Yugoslav officer should cooperate in the necessary planning.

AIR MARSHAL BLESSOR considered, and the Supreme Allied Commander and Mr. Macmillan agreed, that no dividing line between eastern and western zones should be proposed, but that arrangements should be suggested whereby the whole area would be under the Supreme Allied Commander's control. He considered that if the final paragraph of the telegram circulated in his paper SAC (P) (45) 2/265 (Final) were amended, substantially as suggested in his paper SAC (P) (45) 11, this would convey the required impression to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRIS, referring to paragraph 1 of the telegram circulated under JCS Study No. 2/265 (Final), observed that the requirement for the establishment of a command order in the areas of the vital

...throughout Marshal Tito might agree to accepting the Supreme Allied Commander's full control of the whole of YUGOSLAVIA. He failed to see why special facilities should be offered to Marshal Tito in the control of Allied military government. The prestige he would acquire from cooperating in such military government would be considerable. The United States government was in the process of communicating with the British and Russian governments on the subject but was unwilling to agree the demarcation line proposed at the previous meeting. In addition his government thought we should take every step to prevent Marshal Tito's civil administration from dominating areas of which the population were mainly Italians. He was not satisfied that Marshal Tito's partisans in fact possessed the strength in northeast Italy which they claimed.

MR. MACILLAN said he would go further than Mr. OTTE in that Marshal Tito's administration ought not only to be prevented from dominating Italian areas but it should be completely merged in the AHS system. He agreed with Lieutenant General McENERY that it was not essential to have a Yugoslav representative accredited to the Allied Commission itself, the important point being that some authorized Yugoslav officer should cooperate in the necessary planning.

AIR MARSHAL BLISSON considered, and the Supreme Allied Commander and Mr. Macmillan agreed, that no dividing line between eastern and western zones should be proposed, but that arrangements should be suggested whereby the whole area would be under the Supreme Allied Commander's control. He considered that if the final paragraph of the telegram circulated in his paper SAC (P) (45) P/266 (Pinal) were amended, substantially as suggested in his paper SAC (P) (45) 41, this would convey the required impression to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HADFIELD, referring to paragraph 3 of the telegram circulated under JPS Study No. P/266 (Pinal), observed that the requirement was not merely for the maintenance of law and order in the areas of the vital communications leading from Trieste into Italy, but also for full control of these transportation facilities.

THE SUPREMACY ALLIED COMMANDER:

Directed the Chief of Staff to redraft the telegram circulated under JPS Study No. P/266 (Pinal), taking into account the above discussion and the substance of the amendments proposed by Air Marshal Blission and, after obtaining the necessary naval, air force and political consultations, to submit the revised draft for his approval. X

X Subsequently Unrepeated on MAP 872.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TO: SECRET
 HEADQUARTERS 15TH ARMY GROUP
 G-5 Section
 APO 777

(165)

Confidential
 25 February 1945

Ref: 8/26/G-5

SUBJECT: G-5 Appreciation of North East Italy

TO: G-4, HQ 15 Army Group

1. OBJECT:

To determine the manner in which Allied Military Government will conduct Civil Administration of North East Italy.

2. DEFINITIONS:

North East Italy is comprised of the following areas:

- (a) The compartimento of Venezia
- (b) The compartimento of Emilia (Exclusive of the Province of Piacenza)
- (c) The compartimento of Lombardia (Exclusive of the Provinces of Varese, Como, Milano and Pavia)

References to Emilia and Lombardia in this appreciation will refer to the area of these compartimenti which with Venezia comprise North East Italy.

3. PERSONNEL:

Personnel allocated to North East Italy are available at forty-eight hours notice to report to their proper stations. Transportation to take such personnel to their stations will be provided by HQ Allied Commission.

4. FOOD:

On the basis of a 200 grammes bread ration for one month's maintenance, it is estimated that the following amounts of food will be required:

The compartimento of Venezia	Tons 15269
The compartimento of Emilia	3954
The compartimento of Lombardia	6327
Total	26246

These figures take into account all estimated availabilities of

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 7850173/26/G-5 dated 25 Feb 45 (Cont'd) (164)

local resources in wheat and other products and in addition to the basic 200 grams bread ration, provided for all authorized supplementary scales.

The build up will take place through ANCONA and FIORE or nearest center in the initial stages and through the large Provincial centers as they become available. Stocks will be moved in from RARI and NAPLES Areas.

5. TRANSPORT.

The total commitment of lift as stated above is 26146 tons per month of imported supplies. The daily tonnage is as follows:

Venezia	528
Basilis	132
Lombardia	<u>211</u>
Total	<u>871</u>

Certain additional tonnages of local produce will have to be moved within the area e.g. wheat to flour mills. For the first few months these have been estimated to be as follows:

Venezia	388
Basilis	97
Lombardia	<u>145</u>
Total	<u>630</u>

The computation, therefore, of the total estimated tonnage per day is as follows:

	Transport of Imported Stock	Transport of Local Produce	Total
Venezia	528	388	916
Basilis	132	97	229
Lombardia	<u>211</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>356</u>
Totals	<u>871</u>	<u>630</u>	<u>1501</u>

The actual number of trucks required per day cannot be accurately given as this depends upon:

- (a) Progress of operations.
- (b) How soon liberated territory is transferred to Regional control.
- (c) The amount of civil transport available.

However, breaking up the territory and grouping around certain

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(163)

S/26/G-5 dated 25 Feb 45 (Cont'd)

supply points as in para 4 above, the following table gives an estimate of what may be required by supply points for local distribution:

Supply Points	Tons per day required	Tons per day		Vehicles of 3 ton capacity required on turnround
		Local	Total	
Belluno	112	75	187	187
Udine	161	115	276	276
Verona	136	99	235	235
Ferrara	68	64	122	122
Bologna	108	90	198	198
Brescia	218	153	371	371
Volterra	68	54	122	122

If and when the 300 gross ton ration is applicable in Northern Italy, as it is going to be in Southern Italy on the 1st of March, the estimated tonnages in this appreciation will increase slightly.

As stated in the G-5 Appreciation on North West Italy, HQ Allied Commission expect to have available at two weeks notice 650, 3-ton lorries.

6. FINANCE.

All currency required is already stockpiled in Florence and Siena. This will be moved forward as strong rooms are obtained. No transport problem arises as there is only a list of 5, 3-ton lorries involved.

7. PUBLIC SAFETY.

A pool of spearhead CC.RR. in sufficient number to provide for the immediate needs of North East Italy is now available. Although the equipment and clothing is not considered to be completely satisfactory, it is deemed adequate to permit them to take the field.

HQ Allied Commission will transport CC.RR. to Army Areas. It is the responsibility of the Army to transport CC.RR. to where needed.

Additional CC.RR. will be made available as needed, by transfer from the South and by re-employment of Northern CC.RR. after rehabilitation and screening.

8. PUBLIC HEALTH.

(a) Water Supply. In the initial stages this is the responsibility of the Army. However, on approximately 1 March 45, HQ Allied Commission will have sufficient basic chemicals available in Rome to provide

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735017

(162)

W/260-5 dated 25 Feb 45 (Cont'd)

for civilian water purification in North East Italy. HQ Allied Commission are planning to transport these chemicals into Army areas as required.

(b) Medical supplies. No estimate of the needs in North East Italy are available. Requisitions have been made to cover the whole of Italy for the months of January to June 1945, inclusive. It is considered that by 30 April 45, all these supplies will have been received and will be made available on call. HQ Allied Commission will move these supplies to dumps in the Army areas. Distribution from these dumps will be made by Army.

(c) Clothing. Adequate supplies of emergency clothing and blankets are available at Leghorn and Ancona. It is the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission to transport this clothing to Army areas. Distribution therefrom will be an Army responsibility. American Relief for Italy will assist in an emergency in this distribution by provision of additional trucks. American Red Cross personnel, supervised by Welfare Officers of AMG, will be responsible for the distribution of clothing.

9. PATRIOTS.

Qualified Patriot officers will be included on the staffs of Regional Commissioners, who will be initially attached to the Army and under Army supervision. Patriot Centers will be established in VENETIA, EMILIA ROMAGNA and ABRUZZO regions as required. Clothing, food, equipment, hospitalization, and payment will be made available as at present. Transportation to and from these Centers will be initially an Army responsibility and later this responsibility will pass to Regional Commissioners. Requisitioning of transport for use of Patriot personnel and for supplying centers is considered essential. Allied Commission will be responsible for transporting personnel into Army areas.

10. REFUGEES.

The refugee problem in North East Italy will be treated as such problems have been treated in the past. Refugee collecting Centers (5,000 capacity each) will be established at TRIESTE, BELLUNO, BOLZANO, VENEZIA, GORIZIA, UDINE, VERONA and TREVISO, and Frontier Collecting Posts (1,000 capacity each) will be located at FIMME, VILLA DEL REVERO, PORTOFINO, S. MARIA DI FORMIGGIA, TARVISIO, S. SIMEONE, VIGEVANO and SPONDIGIA. Initial operations will be under the direct control of Army AMG and they will be assisted and augmented by personnel from HQ Allied Commission. Advanced HQ's of Displaced Persons and Repatriation Sub-Commission are desired at VENEZIA and VERONA to assist operations and movements. Army transport (back-loading) will be required to move Refugees South to Centers, above indicated. AFHQ has been asked for 2 GT Cogs (240 vehicles) to be used for Displaced Persons and Refugee activities exclusively in North East Italy.

It is the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission to provide food

(161)

3/26/45 dated 25 Feb 45 (Cont'd)

and equipment for these refugees. Initially the distribution of food and the securing of equipment for the centers will be the responsibility of Army AGO. Regional Commissioners will assume this responsibility as territory is released to their jurisdiction by AFHQ. It is anticipated that approximately one million refugees will have to be dealt with in Northern Italy. It is not possible to determine accurately the numbers of refugees who will stream down the highways GENOA - BOLOGNA; BERGAMO - BOLOGNA; VARESE - MILANO - BOLOGNA; though it is reasonable to assume that distribution will be about in equal numbers.

R. W. Murphy
RICHARD W. MURPHY
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-5

Copies to:
HQ Allied Commission - Copy No. 2.
USAG Fifth Army " 3
USAG Eighth Army " 4

SECRET

COPY (Circum on 20)

K 92

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (AS) 11
25th February 1945.

SECRET

Confidential 3/3

SUPPLY ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLINDA)

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN YUGOSLAVIA

Note by Deputy Air C-in-C Med.

I suggest that the following amendments should be made to the draft telegram circulated under TFS Paper No. 1/266 (Final):-

1. Paragraph 4, line 7. Delete the words "be withdrawn in default of which it would be insisted that any such as remained". There is no good our seeking an assurance that Yugoslav troops should be withdrawn, because Tito certainly would not agree and it would merely precipitate a row.

2. Paragraph 5. Delete sub-paragraph (a) and add at the end of sub-paragraph (a) "No doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA in advance of a general peace settlement".

3. Paragraph 5(b), line 1. For "confidently expect" substitute "have been assured".

4. Paragraph 7. I suggest should be re-drafted as follows:-

"7. It is accepted policy that all ITALY (including of course YUGOSLAVIA) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the consideration in 6(a) and (b) above require that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Yugoslav (all over) forces are already in occupation of large areas of YUGOSLAVIA, and Yugoslav civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Yugoslav forces will probably be in a position to extend their hold over the whole

2. Paragraph 5. Delete subparagraph (c) and add at the end of subparagraph (a) "No doubt the Foreign Office as well as the State Department are opposed to any action which would compromise the 1939 Convention between ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA in advance of a general peace settlement".

3. Paragraph 5(b), line 1. For "confidently expect" substitute "have been assured".

4. Paragraph 7. I suggest should be re-drafted as follows:-
 "7. It is accepted policy that all ITALY (including of course VENETIA GIULIA) should be subject to Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans, and the consideration in 6(a) and (b) above requires that there should be no departure from that policy. On the other hand, the fact must be faced that Yugoslav (Glovers) forces are already in occupation of large areas of VENETIA GIULIA, and Yugoslav civil authorities are already installed in the areas in question. The Yugoslav forces will probably be in a position to extend their hold over the whole country before other Allied forces can arrive, and there may well be some force in Tito's contention that, unless his civil authorities are allowed to continue to function, chaos will ensue.
 In order, therefore, to meet the requirement in 6(c) as well as those in 6(a) and (b) above, it is suggested that we should make a virtue of a necessity and invite the Provisional Yugoslav Government - as soon as it is formed - to participate, as an ally, in the Allied Military Government of such portions of ITALY as are so governed, including VENETIA GIULIA, with an

-2-

(159)

accredited Yugoslav representative on the Allied Commission. It should be arranged that British or American forces should occupy the L of C area and perhaps also FIUMZ and POLA; that the Yugoslav forces in other parts of VRSIJA GILIA should come under the orders of the appropriate Allied Commander; and that AMG officers should be associated with such existing civil authorities as may be found functioning in the territory who, if Yugoslav, Tito has already agreed should be responsible to AMG.

(Info) J.C.S.

AMG Diethu: Chief Com. HQ AC - Copy Nos. 32-34.

HQ AC Diethu: Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
Political Section.

EX-100-100000 ACC Rome

1307

CONFIDENTIAL (15)

CONFIDENTIAL

26 Feb 45

Copy No. 37

CONFIDENTIAL

43/3

26 February 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL OF YEMEZI GINTEL

Supplementary Note by MOPS

(15)

1. At the request of the Naval Member, the last sentence in paragraph 4 of the draft telegram (J/285) should now read as follows:

"in any event it would be necessary to ensure that naval control of the ports between FUMZ and TALESTZ, both inclusive, will be vested in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander 15 Army Group ~~and~~ JUGOSLAV forces as appropriate."

2. This amendment is agreed.

G. L. BIERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Staff

L. I. PARKHURST
Air Commodore
RAF Plans

R. L. WYDE
T. A. ADAMS
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

With
 C. L. FERRIS
 Brig. General, U.S.A.
 G-3 Flag
 H. H. Hunt

L. T. SAKURAI
Air Commodore
NAF Flare

G. L. Wyde
T. A. DAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Pls

Classification

112000-1000

See 235

TOP SECRET

7/266 (Final)

Ex Comm. 11/10/56
1308

TOP SECRET

Auth: SAC

Initials: *[initials]*

124 Feb 65

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Confidential

24 February 1965.

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENUEZIA GIULIA
(Cover Note By JAFS)

1. In accordance with directions received from the Chief of Staff, we have prepared a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff analyzing the difficulties of the situation existing in VENUEZIA GIULIA and putting forward the proposal of Air Marshal Slessor with supporting arguments as outlined in Minute 5 of SAC (P)(45) 1st Meeting.

2. The draft telegram is attached as 7/266 (Final).

[Signature]

G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

[Signature]

L. T. PANKHURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

[Signature]

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

DISTRIBUTION
List A

W. L. Eberle

W. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

H. T. Panimurst

H. T. PANIMURST
Air Commodore
MAAF Plans

W. A. Adair

W. A. ADAIR
Commander
Staff Officer, Plans

DISTRIBUTION
List A

SECRET

P/266 (Final)

TRUST CABLE

Confidential

This is MAT _____

Allied Military Government in Venezia Giulia is subject.

1. Reference is made to MAT 416 of 23 November in which certain proposals were made for Allied military government of Venezia Giulia. No reply has yet been received. Meantime the matter has been further considered in light of new information now available.

2. There is ample evidence to show that Slovene intention is to extend their hold over as large an area of NE ITALY as possible in order to create strong prima facie case for annexation to Federal JUGOSLAVIA of maximum territory in NE ITALY. East of the ISONSO the influence of JNL is paramount in all areas not under effective enemy control and great efforts are being made to extend this influence westwards at least as far as the TAGLIAMENTO. This process includes subversion of Italian partisan brigades as a condition of their being allowed to operate in the area. In these circumstances it is evident that there is likely to be considerable internal disorder in that part of NE ITALY east of the TAGLIAMENTO when evacuated by the Germans and when Allied forces first march in.

3. The occupation of AUSTRIA and the safeguarding of the L of C of Allied occupying forces make essential the maintenance of law and order in and around the port of TRIESTE and in such L of C area as will contain the main roads and railways leading to AUSTRIA (excluding those through JUGOSLAVIA) and the international cable line from ROME to VIENNA. In view of the circumstances explained in paragraph 2 preceding it is likely that the maintenance of law and order and the consequent security of the L of C can only be insured by the imposition of Allied

facile case for annexation to Federal JUGOSLAVIA of maximum territory in NE ITALY. East of the ISONZO the influence of JUNE is paramount in all areas not under effective enemy control and great efforts are being made to extend this influence westwards at least as far as the TAGLIAMENTO. This process includes subversion of Italian partisan brigades as a condition of their being allowed to operate in the area. In these circumstances it is evident that there is likely to be considerable internal disorder in that part of NE ITALY east of the TAGLIAMENTO when evacuated by the Germans and when Allied forces first march in.

3. The occupation of AUSTRIA and the safeguarding of the L of C of Allied occupying forces make essential the maintenance of law and order in and around the port of TRIESTE and in such L of C area as will contain the main roads and railways leading to AUSTRIA (excluding those through JUGOSLAVIA) and the international cable line from ROME to VIENNA. In view of the circumstances explained in paragraph 2 preceding it is likely that the maintenance of law and order and the consequent security of the L of C can only be insured by the imposition of Allied military government at least upon that portion of NE ITALY which will comprise such L of C area.

4. If nothing but operational interests were concerned, an attempt would be made to conclude an agreement with Marshal Tito which fixed a military boundary running approximately north-south through VENEZIA GIULIA. The area to the west of this boundary would be under our military control. No mention would be made of administrative arrangements for the area to the east which would presumably come at once under de facto JUGOSLAV rule. An assurance would be sought that all Yugoslav and Slovene troops west of such boundary be withdrawn. In default of which it would be insisted that any such as remained would come under our operational command. In any event it would be necessary to ensure that naval control

2108

785017

- over territory east of proposed boundary.
- 2. Italian Government confidently expect that the whole of VENETIA GIULIA will be placed under Allied military Government similar to that already operating in ITALY.
 - 3. US Political Adviser states that his instructions from the State Department preclude him from agreeing to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA.
 - 4. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must therefore take account are:
 - a. Provision for the security of the I of C to AUSTRIA.
 - b. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal of the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.
 - c. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Yugoslav or Slovene forces under command of Marshal Tito.
 - 5. Policy in this matter has hitherto been that all ITALY (including of course VENETIA GIULIA) should pass under Allied military Government on liberation from Germans, and Italian Government has been notified accordingly. It is considered that this policy should be adhered to, since it would at least meet considerations in paras 6a and 2 above. In order to meet consideration in para 6c it is suggested that before the occupation of VENETIA GIULIA, Joint Provisional Yugoslav Government be invited to participate in the Allied military Government which will be set up, on the grounds that they now share in responsibilities of the Allies for such Government in those parts of ITALY (including VENETIA GIULIA) upon which it is imposed. This could be done by inviting the Joint Provisional

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1/266 (Final)

TOP SECRET

^{Between}
of the ports ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~TRINITY~~ and ~~TRINITY~~, both inclusive, will be tested in Commander-
in-Chief Mediterranean whose representatives would work in close cooperation
with Commander 15 Army Group or Yugoslav forces as appropriate.

5. The following political considerations, however, appear to preclude an attempt
to make such an agreement:

a. Any such agreement, expressly limited though it might be to purely operational purposes, would be construed by Marshal Tito, by the Italian Government, and by outside world to be de facto recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty over territory east of proposed boundary.

b. Italian Government confidently expect that the whole of ~~VENEZIA~~ ^{VENEZIA} ~~CIVILIA~~ will be placed under Allied military government similar to that already obtaining in ITALY.

c. US Political Adviser states that his instructions from the State Department preclude him from agreeing to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA.

6. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must therefore take account are:

a. Provision for the security of the I of O to AUSTRIA.

b. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal of the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

c. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Yugoslav or Slovene forces under command of Marshal Tito.

TOP SECRET

2/256 (Final)

TOP SECRET

of the ports ^{between} ~~of~~ FUMZ and THISTZ, both inclusive, will be vested in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean whose representatives would work in close cooperation with Commander 15 Army Group or Yugoslav forces as appropriate.

5. The following political considerations, however, appear to preclude an attempt to make such an agreement:
 - a. Any such agreement, expressly limited though it might be to purely operational purposes, would be construed by Marshal Tito, by the Italian Government, and by outside world to be de facto recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty over territory east of proposed boundary.
 - b. Italian Government confidently expect that the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA will be placed under Allied military government similar to that already obtaining in ITALY.
 - c. US Political Adviser states that his instructions from the State Department preclude him from agreeing to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA.
6. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must therefore take account are:
 - a. Provision for the security of the L of C to AUSTRIA.
 - b. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.
 - c. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Yugoslav or Slovene forces under command of Marshal Tito.

2104

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735017

over territory east of proposed boundary.

b. Italian Government confidently expect that the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA will be placed under Allied military government similar to that already obtaining in ITALY.

c. US Political Adviser states that his instructions from the State Department preclude him from agreeing to any action which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA.

6. Essential considerations of which any solution to the problem must therefore take account are:

a. Provision for the security of the L of C to AUSTRIA.

b. Avoidance of any action that would appear to pre-judge the final disposal at the peace conference of disputed territory, or that would appear to be a breach of faith with the Italian Government.

c. Avoidance of armed conflict between Allied forces and Yugoslav or Slovene forces under command of Marshal Tito.

7. Policy in this matter has hitherto been that all ITALY (including of course VENEZIA GIULIA) should pass under Allied military government on liberation from Germans, and Italian Government has been notified accordingly. It is considered that this policy should be adhered to, since it would at least meet considerations in paras 6a and b above. In order to meet consideration in para 6c it is suggested that before the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA, Joint Provisional Yugoslav Government be invited to participate in the Allied military government which will be set up, on the grounds that they now share in responsibilities of the Allies for such government in those parts of ITALY (including VENEZIA GIULIA) upon which it is imposed. This could be done by inviting the Joint Provisional

TOP SECRET

1/255 (Final)

TOP SECRET

Yugoslav Government to send to the Allied Commission an accredited Yugoslav representative with rights and functions similar to those of Soviet representative.

8. Approval is requested to the proposal made in paragraph 7 above so that early action can be taken to discuss the matter with Marshal Tito and the Joint Provisional Yugoslav Government, in order to arrive at an agreement prior to the occasion for Allied consultation arising.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

67

TOP SECRET

-3-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 78501750+
TOP SECRET

FEB 27 1945

Copy #3

AFHQ FOR SACMED

2542

26 FEB 1945

PRIORITY

Confidential

TOP SECRET PD

F 33726

PARA ONE PD YOUR FOX THREE THREE SEVEN TWO SIX REFERS PD
 PAREN TO AFHQ FOR SACMED FROM ALCOM SIGNED STONE CITE ACSCC PAREN
 PARA TWO PD PROPOSAL FEASIBLE BUT STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT
 MARSHAL TITO AGREE THAT SACMED AS MILITARY GOVERNOR WOULD BE
 IN SUPREME COMMAND OF AMG REPEAT AMG IN VENEZIA GIULIA AND
 TITOS OCCUPATIONAL FORCES ARE UNDER SACMEDS ORDERS INSOFAR AS
 MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENFORCE HIS AMG REPEAT AMG PROCLAMATIONS
 AND ORDERS PD THIS IS PARTICULARLY NECESSARY TO ENSURE
 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIAN SUPPLIES AND EQUAL TREATMENT
 TO ALL ELEMENTS OF POPULATION PD

SEE MIN 153

MIN 158

Deputy Executive Commissioner
 (Col. Fiske)

301

TOP SECRET

66

TOP SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

FEB 26 1945

15L

Originator's Reference: E-33726
Date-Time of Origin: FEB 26 1158

Message Centre No: D/3367
Date-Time Recd: FEB 26 1937
Precedence: PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED
TO: ALCOM FOR ACTION

Confidential
H 3/3

TOP SECRET.

Suggestion made to place civil governmental machinery of Marshal TITO now functioning in Venezia Giulia under Allied Military Government.

Please comment urgently on feasibility.

ALCOM DIST:

ACTION: Exec. Comm. (Copies No. 1 & 2)

INFO: A/President Copy No. 3
Chief Comm. " " 4
Pol. Sec. " " 5
CA Sec. " " 6

See 152

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET.

Extract from the Minutes of SAJCE's
Conference (Political) of 20 February
1945. Ref: SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting
dated 20th February (Original on 27/50).

5. BRIEF VISIT OF SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TO BELGRADE.
(Paper No. SAC (O) (45) 9 and Addendum)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a draft brief for the Supreme Allied Commander's projected visit to Marshal TITO at BEOGRAD, together with the text of a draft agreement regarding the establishment of Allied military control in VENETIA GIULIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER explained that there had been much discussion regarding the form of government which should be set up in VENETIA GIULIA at the time when the port of TRIESTE would be required as a base from which to maintain Allied occupational forces in AUSTRIA. It was essential that any arrangement agreed should be acceptable to Marshal TITO, since there was Yugoslav Partisan forces in the area and it was known that Marshal TITO wished to incorporate the area in the new JUGOSLAVIA. During the recent conferences he had spoken to the Foreign Secretary and others on this matter and it had been agreed that he should endeavour to make an arrangement with Marshal TITO on purely military grounds. He intended, therefore, to propose to Marshal TITO that a military boundary should be established which would run north and south over certain well-defined physical features at a distance of approximately ten miles east of the lines of communication required by the Allies. It would be stated that territory to the west of this boundary would be administered under Allied Military Government, but no reference would be made to the form of administration east of the boundary. An effort would be made to induce Marshal TITO to remove any Jugoslav troops west of the boundary, but if he insisted that they should remain west of the boundary, then he must agree that they should come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander. Similarly, it would be agreed that any Allied troops which it was found necessary to station east of the boundary would come under the supreme command of Marshal TITO.

MR. KILN said that his instructions from the State Department indicated that the United States Government wished Allied Military Government to be extended to all disputed areas which in 1939 were part of ITALY, including ZARA and the Italian islands in the ADRIATIC. No action should therefore be taken which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and JUGOSLAVIA. The President had given no indication during his recent discussions with him that he wished to revise his view in this respect. He feared that the intention announced by the Supreme Allied Commander would imply that the Allies were prepared to restore some of VENETIA GIULIA to JUGOSLAVIA, and in any case the proposal involved a restriction in the exercise of Allied Military Government over the area. He felt that, if it were necessary to discuss this question with Marshal TITO, he should be told at first that it was the intention to

essential that any arrangement agreed should be acceptable to Marshal Tito, since there was Yugoslav Partisan forces in the area and it was known that Marshal Tito wished to incorporate the area in the new YUGOSLAVIA. During the recent conference he had spoken to the Foreign Secretary and others on this matter and it had been agreed that he should endeavour to make an arrangement with Marshal Tito on purely military grounds. He intended, therefore, to propose to Marshal Tito that a military boundary should be established which would run north and south over certain well-defined physical features at a distance of approximately ten miles east of the lines of communication required by the Allies. It would be stated that territory to the west of this boundary would be administered under Allied Military Government, but no reference would be made to the form of administration east of the boundary. An effort would be made to induce Marshal Tito to remove any Yugoslav troops west of the boundary, but if he insisted that they should remain east of the boundary, then he must agree that they should come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander. Similarly, it would be agreed that any Allied troops which it was found necessary to station east of the boundary would come under the supreme command of Marshal Tito.

MR. KILPATRICK said that his instructions from the State Department indicated that the United States Government wished Allied Military Government to be extended to all disputed areas which in 1939 were part of ITALY, including ZARA and the Italian islands in the ADRIATIC. No action should therefore be taken which would compromise the 1939 frontier between ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA. The President had given no indication during his recent discussions with him that he wished to revise his view in this respect. He feared that the intention announced by the Supreme Allied Commander would imply that the Allies were prepared to restore some of VENETIA GIULIA to YUGOSLAVIA, and in any case the proposal involved a restriction in the exercise of Allied Military Government over the area. He felt that, if it were necessary to discuss this question with Marshal Tito, he should be told at first that it was the intention to establish Allied Military Government throughout VENETIA GIULIA. Moreover, there was no indication as yet that the extension of Allied Military Government throughout the area would not be acceptable to the Russians. If it were acceptable to the Russians, it would also presumably be accepted by Marshal Tito.

MR. ARTHUR STONE said that the Italian Government had been notified that all VENETIA GIULIA would pass under Allied Military Government on liberation from the Germans. This was in accordance with proposals which had been made by the previous Supreme Allied Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He felt that the proposal now put forward by the Supreme Allied Commander would have an unfortunate effect as regards the surrender instrument concluded with the Italian Government, by his predecessor on behalf of the United Nations, since the implied invitation to Marshal Tito (who was not under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander) to occupy territory which was previously Italian could be considered as a breach of the spirit, if not of the terms, of the surrender instrument. He added that, however much it was desired to conduct discussions on a purely military basis, an agreement of the kind contemplated would of necessity have political implications.

The Supreme Allied Commander pointed out that the establishment of a working military arrangement for the area was nevertheless essential and urgent.

Mr. MacMillan observed that, from the practical viewpoint, an arrangement of the kind proposed would in fact benefit the Italians, since their retention of the port of TRIESTE would be immediately assured. He agreed, however, that theoretically such an arrangement might be held to imply the 'de facto' right of the Jugoslavs to occupy that part of Venezia Giulia lying to the east of the proposed boundary. Mr. Allen had raised this question in a recent note to Mr. Stettinius but unfortunately opportunity had not been found to discuss the matter at the recent conferences. He felt that there were three courses open:

(a) The Supreme Allied Commander might carry out the intention he had expressed above. This course carried the risk that, since the Jugoslavs would certainly assume control of the territory to the east of the proposed boundary, the Supreme Allied Commander would be in the position of having taken the first step precipitating the assumption of Yugoslav control without authority from both governments. Moreover, the eviction of Yugoslav forces by the United States and Britain after the collapse of Germany could not be envisaged.

(b) The Supreme Allied Commander might refer his proposed draft agreement to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before discussion with Marshal Tito.

(c) The United States and British Governments might approach the Russians with the object of obtaining their agreement to the proposed line and asking for their co-operation in establishing it.

There was little doubt that the Russians would wish to transfer the whole of Venezia Giulia to Jugoslavia, including especially the port of TRIESTE, since this would give them a Russian controlled outlet to the Mediterranean. He considered that the best course was that indicated at (b). It should be pointed out to the Chiefs of Staff that, if they wished to occupy Trieste from the north, it would be necessary that Marshal Tito should accept the 1939 frontier or the boundary now proposed, and that the alternative to his acceptance of at least the latter boundary was to fight the Yugoslav Army for possession of the disputed territory.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCMAHER pointed out that an agreement with Marshal Tito had already been concluded in respect of Zadar, which in 1939 was Italian territory. This Italian possession was therefore already compromised. The Jugoslavs were already in possession of large parts of Venezia Giulia and it might be necessary to move into Austria and to make use of the port of TRIESTE before the matter could be settled in accordance with course (b) or (c) proposed by Mr. Macmillan. He regarded the early conclusion of some arrangements providing for the Supreme Allied Commander's control over the I. of O. from TRIESTE to Austria as a matter of urgent military necessity and considered that the view held by the State Department regarding this territory was not

(b) The Supreme Allied Commander did not refer his proposed draft agreement to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before discussion with Marshal Tito.

(c) The United States and British Governments might approach the Russians with the object of obtaining their agreement to the proposed line and asking for their cooperation in establishing it.

There was little doubt that the Russians would wish to transfer the whole of VENEZIA GIULIA to JUGOSLAVIA, including especially the port of TRIESTE, since this would give them a Russian controlled outlet to the Mediterranean. He considered that the best course was that indicated at (b). It should be pointed out to the Chiefs of Staff that, if they wished to convey ALLIED forces to the south, it would be necessary that Marshal Tito should accept the 1959 frontier or the boundary now proposed, and that the alternative to him acceptance of at least the latter boundary was to fight the Yugoslav Army for possession of the disputed territory.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONAGHAN pointed out that an agreement with Marshal Tito had already been concluded in respect of KARL, which in 1939 was Italian territory. This Italian possession was therefore already compromised. The Yugoslavs were already in possession of large parts of VENEZIA GIULIA and it might be necessary to move into ALLIED and to make use of the port of TRIESTE before the matter could be settled in accordance with courses (b) or (c) proposed by Mr. Macmillan. He regarded the early cancellation of some arrangement providing for the Supreme Allied Commander's control over the I. of C. from Trieste to ALLIED as a matter of urgent military necessity and considered that the view held by the State Department regarding this territory was not entirely realistic.

ADMIRAL CUTHBERT suggested that, if it were decided to negotiate with Marshal Tito the agreement as proposed in sub (b) (45) 9 (Addendum), a paragraph should be added to the effect that the naval control of the ports between TRIESTE and TRIESTE inclusive would be vested in Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, whose representatives would work in close co-operation with the Commanders of 15 Army Group or of the Yugoslav Forces as appropriate. He pointed out that the existing Anglo-Yugoslav naval agreement covered Yugoslav ports only.

X (AIR MARSHAL BLESSOR suggested that the most promising course appeared to be, once a joint provisional government had been established in JUGOSLAVIA, to point out to them that they now shared in the responsibility of the Allied Military Government in those parts of ITALY (including VENEZIA GIULIA) in which it was exercised.

MR. MACMILLAN supported Air Marshal Blesor's suggestion, pointing out that the joint provisional Yugoslav government would be required to participate in the obligations of the United Nations once it was established and that

these obligations included being parties to the Italian surrender instrument, which provided for the establishment of Allied Military Government over all Venezia Giulia. There would be no difficulty in appointing to the Allied Commission an accredited Yugoslav representative parallel to the present Soviet representative. He suggested that he and Mr. Kirk should make no report to their respective departments until the return of the Supreme Allied Commanders, when a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff might be drafted, and reports made to the State Department and Foreign Office, in the light of the views already expressed and of the Supreme Allied Commander's visit.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE also supported Air Marshal Slessor's suggestion but pointed out that any Yugoslav occupying forces or occupational administration established in Venezia Giulia would have to come under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander through the Allied Commission.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER observed that Marshal Tito had already agreed in principle to Allied control of TRIESTE and the I of C to AUSTRIA. It would be possible to inform Marshal Tito that military necessity demanded that the whole of Venezia Giulia be subjected to Allied Military Government and that Marshal Tito's forces in the area must come under Allied control. There were bound, however, to be complications in respect of any Yugoslav occupational forces. On balance it appeared that the best course during his visit to BELGRADE was to raise the question of Venezia Giulia only in the most general military terms, without seeking any form of agreement, and to endeavour to ascertain Marshal Tito's view on the question. The direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff could then be sought on his return.

Turning to paragraph 4 of his brief, he enquired whether it was considered undesirable that Marshal Tito should be informed that Allied action against DUSIN PICCOLLO was possible, since this was Italian territory. He pointed out that Marshal Tito's Partisans had operated in these islands and that considerable assistance might be expected from them.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR observed that, provided there was no implication that DUSIN PICCOLLO was regarded as at present, or likely in the future to be, Yugoslav territory, there should be no objection to informing him that such operations were a possibility. There was general agreement with this view.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Agreed that the question of Venezia Giulia should be raised only in the most general military terms during his forthcoming discussions with Marshal Tito and instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with other appropriate authorities, to prepare on his return a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff analysing the difficulties of the situation existing in Venezia Giulia and putting forward the suggestion made by Air Marshal Slessor at 'X' above, with supporting arguments.

- (b) Accepted the brief circulated under paper No. SAC (O) (45) 9 subject to (a) above and to the considerations recorded in the

See
Fotos
15u-107

There were bound, however, to be complications in respect of any Yugoslav occupational forces. On balance it appeared that the best course during his visit to BELGRADE was to raise the question of VENEZIA GIULIA only in the most general military terms, without seeking any form of agreement, and to endeavour to ascertain Marshal Tito's views on the question. The direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff could then be sought on his return.

Turning to paragraph 1 of his brief, he enquired whether it was considered undesirable that Marshal Tito should be informed that Allied action against MASINI PRODOLO was possible, since this was Italian territory. He pointed out that Marshal Tito's Partisans had operated in these islands and that considerable assistance might be expected from them.

AIR MARSHAL GLESSON observed that, provided there was no implication that MASINI PRODOLO was regarded as at present, or likely in the future to be, Yugoslav territory, there should be no objection to informing him that such operations were a possibility. There was general agreement with this view.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Agreed that the question of VENEZIA GIULIA should be raised only in the most general military terms during his forthcoming discussion with Marshal Tito and instructed the Chief of Staff, in conjunction with other appropriate authorities, to prepare on his return a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff analysing the difficulties of the situation existing in VENEZIA GIULIA and putting forward the suggestion made by Air Marshal Glessor at 'X' above, with supporting arguments.

- (b) Accepted the brief circulated under paper 50. SAC (O) (45) 2 subject to (a) above and to the considerations recorded in the above minute and in Minute 3 of SAC (O) (45) 3rd Meeting.

See
Folios
154-157

21

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

PTH/as

19 February 1945

SUBJECT: Governmental Authority in Northeast Italy.

TO : A C of H.

1. The Allied Commission has referred to the possibility of the establishment of a tripartite governmental authority in certain portions of Northeastern Italy, to be independent of the present Allied Commission and responsible directly to SAC. Such an authority, the Allied Commission suggests, could not properly be established because

a. The Instrument of Surrender of Italy is a Treaty with the Italian Govt. which establishes the Allied Commission as the sole authority for all of prewar Italy (as and when liberated) for administering the Instrument of Surrender under the orders of SAC and

b. SAC, having appointed Mr. MacMillan Acting President of the Allied Commission, cannot thereafter establish a governmental agency separate from the Allied Commission or not under the control of Mr. MacMillan.

2. I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached on either ground

a. The Italian Govt. has no vested right under the Armistice to continuance or extension of the Allied Commission as presently constituted.

The Armistice and Instrument of Surrender, executed by the Allied C in C in behalf of all the United Nations, set forth the terms on which the United Nations were prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy and define the position of Italy in relation to the United Nations. By the Armistice Italy is placed, in effect, subject to the will of the United Nations. The moving parties are the British and U.S. Governments acting by the Allied C in C. The latter, who is also Military Governor of occupied Italy, has full power to represent the United Nations. The control commission is an administrative device through which SAC's orders and directions may be executed. So far as the Italian Govt is concerned, the Armistice does not require the control commission to take any particular form. SAC, in an alter ego, is himself President of the Control Commission, and the organization, functions and locations of its component elements are for his determination. Subject to his

SECRET

own directives from CCS, (which do not concern the Italian Govt) SAC may organize or reorganize the commission as he considers necessary. He might, for example establish different sections for different areas of Italy, in each case under appropriate official responsible to him. He might include in any section such representatives of the several United Nations as he thought desirable. The Armistice does not preclude these or other minor or major rearrangements of the control commission machinery.

b. The appointment of Mr. MacMillan as Acting President did not divest SAC of the powers held by him in behalf of the United Nations.

By G.O. 27 of 18 Nov 44, SAC deputized an "Acting President", Mr. MacMillan and a "Deputy President", Admiral Stone. Both delegations may be rescinded at the will of SAC, as similar delegations have in the past. Certainly the particular delegation gave the Italian Govt. no additional rights under the Armistice. SAC, under the Armistice, is free to appoint such other officials, with such powers, as he may consider necessary.

3. In addition to his powers of rearrangement of the control commission, SAC also, of course, has under the Armistice, power to place specific areas under Allied Military Government, to be fully and directly responsible to him, his operational commander or such other agent as he may designate.

F. T. HAMMOND, JR
Colonel, Ord.
Legal Adviser

SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

AGO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Confidential

Ref: 504/143/AD.

12 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Administration of N.E. ITALY.

TO : Chief Commissioner.

1. The Acting President suggested that we should explore once more the situation in VENETIA GIULIA on the supposition that Field Marshal ALBANINI by agreement with Marshal TITO, established the eastern boundary of his military administration somewhere west of the 1939 international boundary.

2. I must point out that the inevitable result of such an agreement will be that forces under Marshal TITO will enter Italian territory up to the agreed boundary line and establish (as they legally may by right of military occupation) a military government in such territory which will not be under the authority of SACHSE. It is indeed not too much to say that such an agreement would be construed by Marshal TITO and by the Italian Government as implying an invitation to Marshal TITO to enter such territory and set up military government there.

3. The effect of such an agreement would therefore be unfortunate in the extreme. SACHSE's predecessor executed the armistice terms on behalf of the United Nations and set up a body, the Allied Commission, to execute these terms. SACHSE is the person to whom the Italian Government may rightly look on all matters arising out of their defeat and surrender. It may be strongly argued from a strictly legal point of view, and is certainly apparent from a moral point of view, that an implied invitation to Marshal TITO, who is not under SACHSE's command, to occupy any part of Italy would be a serious breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the armistice terms. It would certainly be so understood by the Italian Government who looked to the Allied Commission as the proper authority to administer AGO in all parts of metropolitan Italy.

4. It must not be overlooked, too, that you on behalf of SACHSE have already informed the Italian Government of SACHSE's intention to set up an Allied Military Government in VENETIA GIULIA. An administration under Marshal TITO would not, in my view, be such an administration.

5. Apart from the foregoing and while fully appreciating the difficulties in reaching any agreement with Marshal TITO and the probability that whatever may be proposed, in fact, part of VENETIA GIULIA, if not all, will be overrun by Yugoslav forces, we must as an Allied Commission point out the very serious

point out that the inevitable result of such an agreement will be that forces under Marshal TITO will enter Italian territory up to the agreed boundary line and establish (as they legally may by right of military occupation) a military government in such territory which will not be under the authority of SACHED. It is indeed not too much to say that such an agreement would be constrained by Marshal TITO and by the Italian Government as implying an invitation to Marshal TITO to enter such territory and set up military government there.

3. The effect of such an agreement would therefore be unfortunate in the extreme. SACHED's predecessor executed the armistice terms on behalf of the United Nations and set up a body, the Allied Commission, to execute these terms. SACHED is the person to whom the Italian Government may rightly look on all matters arising out of their defeat and surrender. It may be strongly argued from a strictly legal point of view, and is certainly apparent from a moral point of view, that an implied invitation to Marshal TITO, who is not under SACHED's command, to occupy any part of Italy would be a serious breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the armistice terms. It would certainly be so understood by the Italian Government who looked to the Allied Commission as the proper authority to administer AMI in all parts of metropolitan Italy.
4. It must not be overlooked, too, that you on behalf of SACHED have already informed the Italian Government of SACHED's intention to set up an Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA. An administration under Marshal TITO would not, in my view, be such an administration.
5. Apart from the foregoing and while fully appreciating the difficulties in reaching any agreement with Marshal TITO and the probability that whatever may be proposed, in fact, part of VENEZIA GIULIA, if not all, will be overrun by Yugoslav forces, we must as an Allied Commission point out the very serious reactions which will be provoked on all sides in Italy by any action which prejudges the ultimate fate of VENEZIA GIULIA.
6. I can foresee the overthrow of any Italian Government which agreed with any surrender of territory. I can foresee grave disorders with an anti-Allied basis against any action on the part of the Allies which would prejudice the VENEZIA GIULIA issue. We do not ask that the impossible should be achieved but we should press, in my opinion, for the utmost to be done to prevent the serious troubles, political and administrative, which must arise if VENEZIA GIULIA or part of it is handed over to Yugoslav military government before the peace treaty.
7. If it is impossible to prevent partition, then we should urge in the strongest manner for the parts of TRIESTE and FRIULI to be in Allied (Anglo-American hands).
8. I think you should also make it clear that the Allied Commission has no official intimation from AMI that the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief (then General ALLANHEAD) and yourself, transmitted to AMI on 29 October, had not been approved and that any other scheme of separate administration was being

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

considered; and I think you should demand that the Allied Commission should be notified officially and in good time of any change in basic policy, - or consideration thereof, so that the authority set up to administer the country and execute the terms of surrender (which is the Allied Commission and not the Staff Sections at AFHQ) may have the opportunity to study the problem in good time.

五、

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: At President.

VP. Col. de.

P E R S O N A L & C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHERN REGION, ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
APO 394

143
JKD/am

17 February 1945

Dear Sir,

Acting on your instruction, I telephoned to G-5, Caserta on Wednesday to say that I was authorised to discuss directly with them, the outline of Northeast Italy planning. Consequent upon this, I went to Caserta yesterday for a conference with Henn and Jacklin. I was showing the outline plans for "Freeborn" and also the draft letter on the subject of Venezia Giulia.

You know the line of thought which is being explored in G-5; that of a more or less autonomous organisation for Venezia Giulia. I said that the decision would obviously be reserved for a high level, but pointed out that any proposal for the autonomous regime in Venezia Giulia would involve a very large number of detailed administrative questions: Legal, Financial, Commercial, Postal, Agriculture, etc., which would have to be worked out before hand. I also pointed out that such a plan would certainly involve a large increase in staff of Allied Officers.

G-5 are now considering the proposal further, and I shall be seeing Henn again tomorrow, Sunday, the 18th.

I shall keep you in close touch with any discussion we may have.

Yours in
[Signature]

Brigadier Maurice Lush, C.B., C.B.E., MC.
Chief of Staff,
Headquarters Allied Commission,
C.M.F.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

File
1134

TOP SECRET.
Confidential

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 504/143/EC.

16 February 1945.

Subject: Responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

To : DOGAG
15 Army Group.

For your information I enclose copy of the Chief Commissioner's letter to AFHQ dated 12 February 45 on the responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

130
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

(Similar letter sent to EC Southern Region - 504/142/EC).

142

TOP SECRET

Confidential

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF THE Executive Commissioner
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Ref: 504/142/EC.

16 February 1945.

Subject: Responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

To: Brigadier J. F. Dunlop,
Regional Commissioner,
Southern Region.

138

For your information I enclose copy of the Chief Commissioner's letter to AFM dated 12 February 45 on the responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

(Similar letter sent to DOCAO 15 Army Group).
504/143/EC.

2124

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504

Copy No. 5

138

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

904/CCS

12 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. It is understood that the possibility of establishing a tripartite governmental authority in certain portions of North-eastern Italy has been under discussion at AFHQ. This governmental control authority, it was suggested, would be independent of the Allied Commission and responsible directly to AFHQ.

2. The attached memorandum from the Legal Sub-Commission^{B6-137} of the Allied Commission, with which I entirely concur, would seem to point to the undesirability of such a proposed course.

ELLIOT W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Enc.-1

Copy to: The Honorable Alexander Kirk, American Ambassador.
Sir Noel Charles, St., K.C.M.G., British Ambassador.
Acting President, Allied Commission.
COS ✓
POL Section

see M 139, 140, 141
9 Feb 14293

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

AG/1134/L

6 February 1945

SUBJECT :- Responsibilities of the Allied Commission

TO :- Chief Commissioner, HQ Allied Commission

1. This sub-commission has been asked to advise whether it would be in order for a governmental authority to be established, independent of the Allied Commission and dependent directly upon AFHQ, which should assume responsibility for administration and control of a portion of Italian territory, either by itself or in conjunction with some foreign power.
2. Under Articles 37 and 42 of the Instrument of the Surrender of Italy it is provided that a Control Commission will be appointed representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing, under the orders of SACMED, the instrument of surrender, and that the Italian Government will send a delegation to the HQ of the Control Commission to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the Control Commission to the competent Italian authorities.
3. In the opinion of this sub-commission it is clear from the general terms of the Instrument of Surrender that the provisions thereof extend to the whole of Italian territory within the limits prescribed by Article 41. This territory, for the purpose of this opinion, includes all territory which before the outbreak of the present war formed part of the mainland of Italy.
4. It is the further opinion of this sub-commission that the effect of these Articles is, by treaty with the Italian Government, to establish the Allied (Control) Commission as the sole authority, within the territory of Italy as so defined, for administering and executing the terms of the Instrument of Surrender of Italy under the orders of SACMED, and as the channel of communication between SACMED and the Italian Government for this purpose. Any portion of Italy which is, or may hereafter be, liberated by the Allied Forces is, or will become, subject to the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, and subject to control thereunder through the Allied Commission.
5. It would seem clear that this is the opinion of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, since in the appointment of Mr MACMILLAN as Acting President of the Allied Commission it was publicly announced that he should become the responsible head of the Commission and that in order to effect this, General WILSON would delegate to Mr MACMILLAN his functions as President of the Commission.

/6 It is...

TOP SECRET

COPY

TOP SECRET

136

- 2 -

- 6 It is assumed that General WILSON did in fact so delegate his functions. On this assumption, it is considered that SACRED would have no authority thereafter to establish a different Governmental institution separate from the Allied Commission or not under the control of Mr. MACMILLAN.
- 7 On each of the above grounds, therefore, it is the opinion of this sub-commission that the creation of such an authority as is envisaged in paragraph 1 hereof would be irregular and improper.

(Sgt) W. E. BARRIS,
Colonel,
Deputy Chief Legal Advisor.

504
HEADQUARTERS VENEZIA REGION
Allied Commission
APO 394

TNP/bh
SECRET

Cy/S. at
Confidential

TO : HQ Allied Commission
Office of the Chief of Staff

31 Jan 45

FEB 1 1945

SUBJECT: Reports of Enemy Anti-Italian Activities

FILE No: RXII/O24.111

110
Your letter 504/110/COS of Jan 1 regarding the activities of the Germans in Trento and Bolzano Provinces with its enclosure from s. De Gasperi was most interesting and informative. It would seem that the Germans are carrying on a definite program here as elsewhere in past years. There is nothing new in the pattern and there is also nothing we can do about it at the present moment. It is, however, important that we know what is in progress in the territory we are to occupy so as to make plans ahead, and for this reason it would be appreciated if all information of this sort be furnished this office whenever available.

Thomas H. Page, Col. M.C.
Acting Regional Commissioner

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
5 FEB 1945
32 A. C.

1 Spore D. Hill

Copy No 12

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APC 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

.....

Confidential

2 February 1945

Ref: 504/134/008

SUBJECT: Planning - NE ITALY.

TO : Distribution Below.

1. CAO, APCQ yesterday gave me some advance information regarding the military administrative organization for NE ITALY:

(a) ports.

(4) TRIESTE will be operated by 6 Army as a military port.

(41) VENICE will not be operated as a military port and the minimum of military assistance will be available. This may be restricted simply to mine clearance. If the Allied Commission requires the port it must be prepared to clear it and operate.

(b) Railways.

The following railways will be opened:

PADUA - BOLOGNA

BOLOGNA - PADUA

Rust Route from BOLOGNA to the BRESCIA PASS.

The railway BOLOGNA - VENICE - TRIESTE will not be opened under military administration.

(c)

Inland Water Transport. CAO directed close attention to the possibilities of inland water transport.

(d)

Gasoline. No pipe line will be laid further than 100 miles North of BOLOGNA, ie, just across the PO. APCQ may insist in the rehabilitation of the extensive bulk installations in VENICE.

(e)

Military Administrative Boundaries. No.1 District will operate on the right bank as far as VENEZIA GIULIA but will not include VENEZIA GIULIA. IAS will operate from BOLOGNA

(a) Ports.

- (1) TRIESTE will be operated by 8 Army as a military port.
- (4) VENICE will not be operated as a military port and the minimum of military assistance will be available. If this may be restricted simply to mine clearance. If the Allied Commission requires the port it must be prepared to clear it and operate.

(b) Railways. The following railways will be opened:

PARMA - BOLOGNA
BOLOGNA - FERRARA
Best route from BOLOGNA to the BRESCIA PASS.

The railway BOLOGNA - VERONA - TRIESTE will not be opened under military administration.

(c) Inland Water Transport. CAD directed close attention to the possibilities of inland water transport.

(d) Gasoline. No pipe line will be laid further than 100 miles north of BOLOGNA, ie, just across the PO. ARHQ may assist in the rehabilitation of the extensive bulk installations in VENICE.

(e) Military Administrative Boundaries. No.1 District will operate on the right bank as far as VENEZIA GIULIA but will not include VENEZIA GIULIA. PMS will operate from BOLOGNA to the BRESCIA PASS leaving FERRARA on the East with No.2 District's Eastern boundary as their Western boundary.

(f) BOLOGNA and FERRARA will become International HQ under PMS.

2. Heads of Sections and EC, VENEZIA Region will bear the above points in mind for planning for NE ITALY. Planning should now be accelerated in order that ARHQ may be advised.

51 775/101

ASL/30.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief Commissioner	1	EC, VENEZIA Region	6
DOCS, East Sec	2	EC, EMILIA, Region	7
DOCS, East Sec	3	DOCS, 15th Army Group	8
DOCS, East Sec	4	EC, Southern Sec (Attn. Brig. Amalg.)	9
AMG 5 Army	5	AMG 5 Army	10
NY Italy Coordinating Committee			

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff, CVA

5. Spas c.p. 13 017 (a.c.)

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHERN REGION, ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

JED/aa

9319

R/1558

1 February 1945

2 1945

SUBJECT: Frontier Provinces, Zara

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission

1. I am writing this letter in the capacity of Regional Commissioner elect of Venezia Region, as a matter of information.
2. In the course of my recent visit to Bari, I met, on the afternoon of Tuesday, 30 January, Colonel F.N. Whitley, Chief of Staff to the Yugoslav Mission, for the purpose of discussing any further developments in respect of Venezia Giulia.

3. Colonel Whitley, in course of conversation, informed me that the Allied forces were in process of constructing an emergency airfield at Zara, to serve as a landing ground for bombers returning from missions short of fuel. I gather that the town of Zara is very badly destroyed and that few of the former Italian residents remain in the place. The port is badly damaged and supplies for Yugoslavia are being brought in through Split and Dubrovnik. In other words, there is no present traffic which would lead to the Yugoslavs taking a great interest in Zara.

4. I feel however, that I should bring these developments to your notice because Zara is today Italian soil, forming part (a Province consisting of one Comune) of Venezia Giulia. It may be, that the matter will be brought to your attention from either the Italian or Yugoslav side and you may wish to have your own attitude clarified before hand.

5. I did not converse with any discussion with Colonel

of information.

2. In the course of my recent visit to Bari, I met, on the afternoon of Tuesday, 30 January, Colonel P.N. Whitley, Chief of Staff to the Yugoslav Mission, for the purpose of discussing any further developments in respect of Venezia Giulia.

3. Colonel Whitley, in course of conversation, informed me that the Allied forces were in process of constructing an emergency airfield at Zara, to serve as a landing ground for bombers returning from missions short of fuel. I gather that the town of Zara is very badly destroyed and that few of the former Italian residents remain in the place. The port is badly damaged and supplies for Yugoslavia are being brought in through Split and Dubrovnik. In other words, there is no present traffic which would lead to the Yugoslavs taking a great interest in Zara.

4. I feel however, that I should bring these developments to your notice because Zara is today Italian soil, forming part (a Province consisting of one Comune) of Venezia Giulia. It may be, that the matter will be brought to your attention from either the Italian or Yugoslav side and you may wish to have your own attitude clarified before hand.

5. I did not persevere with any discussion with Colonel Whitley and he himself vouchsafed no suggestion as to any immediate Yugoslav reaction.


Brigadier, Regional Commissioner

Copies 1 & 2 to Headquarters Allied Commission
" 3 & 4 to Files

C O P Y.

Minute from the Office of the United States
Political Adviser and British Resident Minister.

FEB 1 1945

In connection with the occupation of Northern Italy, it would seem desirable to give consideration to the division of that part of the country into two areas: North-western Italy and North-eastern Italy. This is necessary because, in the case of the latter, other interests, particularly Yugoslav, are involved, whereas in the case of the former we need only take Italian interests into consideration.

Our first thoughts should be the conditions which will probably exist when the Germans leave the territory in which CIMA is operating now as delegate of the Italian Government, in accordance with the Agreement recently concluded. It is our policy to establish Allied Military Government in those areas, and for the period that Allied Military Government is in operation, Italian sovereignty will be in suspense.

The Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command shall be to support the policies of the Roman Government, which has pledged itself to maintain national unity until the liberation of Italy is completed. Therefore no action must be taken in those areas which might tend to weaken the authority of the central Government. Speed in getting ourselves firmly established is the essential factor: without this there is a real danger of extreme Communist elements taking control regardless of Allied Military Government or the Italian Government.

It should be made clear to the various political elements (there are at least six different political parties represented with CIMA) which we may find in North-western Italy that it is their duty to cooperate to the fullest extent with Allied Military Government officers who will seek to restore public administration and public services, and that they will be expected to refrain from any political actions which might hinder military operations or undermine the position of the Italian Government.

In North-eastern Italy the situation is complicated by the fact that there are Yugoslav claims to territory hitherto recognised as Italian. For some time past the Yugoslav Partisans have been building up an organisation in this area with the obvious intention of staking out a claim as soon as the moment is convenient. If, therefore, Allied Military Government is to function in these areas, it is essential that it should not come into conflict with these Partisan elements, which are particularly strong in the country as opposed to the towns. It follows that some degree of understating must be established in advance with Marshal Tito. This should not prove impossible, if, as now seems likely, a united Yugoslav Government is established in the very near future. There is no suggestion that a formal agreement should be concluded with Tito on this subject, but it is submitted that Tito should be informed, well in advance, of our intentions.

Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command shall be to support the policies of the Borosi Government, which has pledged itself to maintain national unity until the liberation of Italy is completed. Therefore no action must be taken in these areas which might tend to weaken the authority of the central Government. Speed in getting ourselves firmly established is the essential factor; without this there is a real danger of extreme Communist elements taking control regardless of Allied Military Government or the Italian Government.

It should be made clear to the various political elements (there are at least six different political parties represented with CLNAI) which we may find in North-western Italy that it is their duty to cooperate to the fullest extent with Allied Military Government officers who will seek to restore public administration and public services, and that they will be expected to refrain from any political actions which might hinder military operations or undermine the position of the Italian Government.

In North-eastern Italy the situation is complicated by the fact that there are Yugoslav claims to territory hitherto recognised as Italian. For some time past the Yugoslav Partisans have been building up an organization in this area with the obvious intention of staking out a claim as soon as the moment is convenient. If, therefore, Allied Military Government is to function in these areas, it is essential that it should not come into conflict with these Partisan elements, which are particularly strong in the country as opposed to the towns. It follows that some degree of understanding must be established in advance with Marshal Tito. This should not prove impossible, if, as now seems likely, a united Yugoslav Government is established in the very near future. There is no suggestion that a formal agreement should be concluded with Tito on this subject, but it is submitted that Tito should be informed, well in advance, of our intentions.

Copy on: File 503/COB
File 504/COB
File 6519/COB.
"A" File

49

TOP SECRET

S O 3 4 (S O 4)

G-3 Plans/134

Confidential

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G-3 DIVISION

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD AT CASERTA
1430 HOURS, 29 January 1945

PRESENT

Brigadier General George
Brigadier Nicholson
Brigadier Anderson
Brigadier Lush

Brigadier Jeffries
Colonel Torrence
Colonel Nichols
Colonel Milne
Colonel Batterworth
Colonel Marshall
Colonel King
Lt. Colonel Birch
Lt. Colonel Stapleton
Lt. Colonel Boyd
Lt. Colonel Jacalline
Lt. Colonel Craig
Lt. Colonel Playdell-Bourville
W/Sond Sharpe
Mr. Offie
Mr. Broad
Mr. Raynor

Major Sweetman

SECONDARY

OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN ITALY

CHIEF

i. The meeting had before them a note by the Chief of Staff calling for the completion of plans for the occupation of Northern Italy, together with a joint minute by the Political Advisors setting out the political situation likely to

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Brigadier Jeffries
Colonel Torrence
Colonel Nichols
Colonel Milne
Colonel Dittmerorth
Colonel Marshall
Colonel Zine
Lt. Colonel Birch
Lt. Colonel Stapleton
Lt. Colonel Boyd
Lt. Colonel Jackson
Lt. Colonel Craig
Lt. Colonel Playdell-Bowyer
T/Col Sharp
Mr. Offis
Mr. Stord
Mr. Raynor

Major Sweetman

SECRETARY

OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN ITALY

GENERAL

1. The meeting had before them a note by the Chief of Staff calling for the completion of plans for the occupation of Northern Italy, together with a joint statement by the Political Advisers setting out the political situation likely to exist in Northern Italy. The Chairman pointed out that the purpose of the meeting was exploratory. It was intended to be an opportunity to bring to light the various factors and considerations involved, so that the whole problem and its implications could be determined. This would provide the basis for further study and submission of recommendations on action to be taken.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OCCUPATION

2. G-3 Plans pointed out that the occupation of Northern Italy could occur in a variety of circumstances, namely:

- a. Enemy collapse or surrender on his present line.
- b. Enemy withdrawal to the 2002 or 2003.
- c. Enemy surrender in the course of such a withdrawal.

ACTION COPY: 726 503/CO3

TOP SECRET

G-3 Plans/134

TOP SECRET

It was not possible at present to forecast which of the foregoing circumstances was most likely. Plans must therefore be cap ble of being adapted to any of them.

FACTS AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN NORTHERN ITALY

3. It was considered likely that we should have to deal with the following numbers of partisans in Northern Italy.

a. Northwest Italy - 75,000 of which 50,000 were armed and at present active.

b. Northeast Italy - 25,000 of which 10,000 were at present armed and active.

The total commitment was therefore 100,000.

4. G-2 considered it probable that the Fascist divisions would disintegrate and that elements of them would take to the hills as anti-allied partisans.

5. The Political Advisors stressed the need for speed in establishing occupational forces and Allied military government, otherwise there was a danger, especially in Northwest Italy, that the partisans would regard themselves as the rightful government of Italy, whereas the Allies were pledged to support the ADGE government. Allied Commission in agreeing with this view concluded that as a result it would be necessary for 125 personnel to move in at the same time as the occupational task forces.

NORTHWEST ITALY.

Occupational Forces - Requirements and Availability.

6. It was considered that forces of the order of 2 Allied divisions with supporting Italian troops could be required for occupational duties in Northwest Italy. These forces would be additional to those necessary to deal with any German threat to the area, existing at the time of its occupation.

7. G-3 Plans and G-3 Ops pointed out that in the event of German withdrawal, the diversion of forces to a purely occupational task in Northwest Italy could be most undesirable from the operational point of view. In the event of such withdrawal, all our available forces are likely to be required to seize the opportunity of achieving our military object -- the destruction of the main German forces. As soon, however, as the enemy falls back or is driven back to a general line DICE - ALPS, considerable forces could be made available for the occupation of Northwest Italy without prejudice to further operations against the enemy in this theatre. In any case, we are likely to have to accept some delay in carrying out the effective occupation of Northwest Italy (see paragraph 11 below), and in the event of a rapid enemy withdrawal to the ADICE - ALPS line, the time taken in such withdrawal might correspond reasonably closely to such

5. The Political Advisors stressed the need for speed in establishing occupational forces and Allied military government, otherwise there was a danger, especially in Northwest Italy, that the partisans would regard themselves as the rightful Government of Italy, whereas the Allies were pledged to support the AMG Government. Allied Commanders in agreeing with this view concluded that as a result it would be necessary for AMG personnel to move in at the same time as the occupational task forces.

NORTHWEST ITALY.

Occupational Forces - Requirements and Availability.

6. It was considered that forces of the order of 2 Allied divisions with supporting Italian troops would be required for occupational duties in Northwest Italy. These forces would be additional to those necessary to deal with any German threat to the area, existing at the time of its occupation.

7. G-3 Plans and G-3 Ops pointed out that in the event of German withdrawal, the diversion of forces to a purely occupational task in Northwest Italy would be most undesirable from the operational point of view. In the event of such withdrawal, all our available forces are likely to be required to seize the opportunity of achieving our military object -- the destruction of the maximum enemy forces. As such, however, as the enemy falls back or is driven back to a general line (NICE - ALES - ALES), considerable forces could be made available for the occupation of Northwest Italy without prejudice to further operations against the enemy in this theatre. In any case, we are likely to have to accept some delay in carrying out the effective occupation of Northwest Italy (see paragraph 11 below), and in the event of a rapid enemy withdrawal to the ALES - ALES line, the time taken in such withdrawal might correspond reasonably closely to such delay.

8. On the other hand, the political necessity for early and rapid occupation of Northwest Italy may compel the diversion of forces from the main battle to this task. In these circumstances, it appears that while all plans and arrangements (including the earmarking of the appropriate formations) for the occupation of Northwest Italy should be made now, the actual decision to carry out this operation should be made by SACMED in the light of the whole situation existing when the opportunity to occupy Northwest Italy arises.

Key Points and Priorities.

9. It was agreed that the establishment of occupational forces and AMG should be a steady process, being effected area by area as the advance into Northwest Italy progressed. undue dispersion of troops in the early stages was to be avoided.

TOP SECRET

9-3 Plans/134

TOP SECRET

10. It was considered that the key areas in order of importance:

MILAN
TORIN
GENOVA

To establish ourselves in any of these areas it would first be necessary to secure PIACENZA.

Factors affecting Speed of Occupation.

11. The time required for the establishment of occupational forces by land would depend on the degree of demolition carried out by the enemy. In the event of German withdrawal, a delay of three weeks, before TORIN could be reached, was likely. In the event of enemy collapse or surrender, the scale of demolitions would be less and a more speedy occupation could be expected. G-2 agreed to examine this further.

12. The introduction of occupational forces by air was limited by the availability of 2 Para Brigade and no such operation was possible in the near future. It would be desirable to prepare a modified plan for Operation GINERAS for a landing in the MILAN area as an alternative to TORIN.

NORTHEAST ITALY.

Occupational Forces.

13. In the event of German withdrawal, all key points in Northeast ITALY would necessarily be occupied in the course of continued operations. In event of German collapse the area would be occupied in the course of FREEDOM operations. No special occupational task forces were therefore required in this area. It was, however, essential that AMG personnel should move forward and establish military government immediately.

14. Although there was some doubt as to the treatment of VERDELLA GIULIA 15 Army Group should be prepared to establish occupational forces and AMG up to the 1939 frontier.

Cooperation with Tito.

15. The disarmament of partisans and establishment of forces in Northeast ITALY would require the cooperation of TITO.

PROVISION FOR PARTISANS

16. Provision for partisans in Northern ITALY should be based on a commitment for

examine this further.

12. The introduction of occupational forces by air was limited by the availability of 2 Para Brigade and no such operation was possible in the near future. It would be desirable to prepare a modified plan for Operation CIVILIS for a landing in the HILAN area as an alternative to TURIN.

NORTHEAST ITALY.

Occupational Forces.

13. In the event of German withdrawal, all key points in Northeast ITALY would necessarily be occupied in the course of continued operations. In event of German collapse the area would be occupied in the course of FIVEGOLD operations. No special occupational task forces were therefore required in this area. It was, however, essential that AMG personnel should move forward and establish military government immediately.

14. Although there was some doubt as to the treatment of VENEZIA GIULIA 15 Army Group should be prepared to establish occupational forces and AMG up to the 1939 frontier.

Cooperation with TITO.

15. The disarmament of partisans and establishment of forces in Northeast ITALY would require the cooperation of TITO.

PROVISION FOR PARTISANS

17

16. Provisioning for partisans in Northern ITALY should be based on a commitment for 100,000 for three months. In view of the partisans' services to the Allies, which should be rewarded, and because of the absence of civil supplies, the provisioning of food and clothing should be undertaken as a military commitment.

17. By offering food, clothing and money, the partisans should be induced to concentrate in convenient areas as soon as, but not before, we would be ready to supply them. They would then be disarmed, a proportion would be enlisted into the Italian Army and others would be formed into labor units for employment by AMG and for military purposes. The balance would need to be cared for until they could be absorbed into normal employment. Arrangements would be made for partisans reporting at the concentration areas to be screened by members of their own organizations.

18. It was considered that except when they were enlisted into the Italian Army, partisans treated in accordance with paragraph 17, should not be held against any of the existing ceilings for the Italian Army, but should form a fresh

TOP SECRET

G-3 Plans/134

TOP SECRET

category of Italians, the military responsibility for whom would be shared equally between BRITAIN and the U.S.

19. Authorization for feeding and clothing Italians on this basis would need to be obtained from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

20. The availability of rations and clothing to meet this commitment was doubtful but LOG Plans and G-4 Plans agreed to examine it further.

21. Money for the partisans would be provided by the Italian government and issued through ANG. No difficulty was foreseen in this respect.

ORDERS TO PARTISANS

22. G-3 Special Ops in conjunction with Allied Commission agreed to prepare a draft of orders which would need to be issued to the partisans instructing them to:

- a. Carry out anti-scorch and harassing activities during the Germans withdrawal.
- b. Concentrate in agreed areas at such times as the Allies would be ready to supply them.

23. The channels for issue of orders to partisans when necessary would be

- a. Through special operational channels to LOG who would pass the instructions to the partisan bands.
- b. By PW means (including the use of the broadcasts and leaflet dropping).

DISTRIBUTION:

G-2
G-3 Org (.)
G-3 Org (u)
G-3 O, B
G-3 Sp Ops
G-4 Plans
G-4 Plans
G-5

G-7
US Col. M.
Br. Gen. Min.
SCH. Minster
SC Plans
G-4 for & To
G-4 & B
Engns

Allied Commission, AGC (C)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

- a. Carry out anti-aircraft and harassing activities during the Germans withdrawal.
 - b. Concentrate in agreed areas at such times as the Allies would be ready to supply them.
23. The channels for issue of orders to partisans when necessary would be
- a. Through special operational channels to LOS who would pass the instructions to the partisan bands.
 - b. By PTT means (including the use of the broadcasts and leaflet dropping).

DISTRIBUTION:

0-2
0-3 Org (1)
0-3 Org (2)
0-3 Org
0-3 52 Org
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans

0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans
0-4 Plans

1-1st Commission, 2012 (2)

J. G. STEPHENSON
J. G. STEPHENSON
Secretary

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TGH/PML/wsw

127

G-5: 014.14-10

26 January 1945

SUBJECT: AMG for Bolzano, Trento and Belluno.

MAR 6 1945

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.
(Attention: Major Talbot)

Reference your 504/118/COS of 18 January and various telephone conversations, one copy of each of the papers listed in Colonel Henn's letter of 8 January is now forwarded.

T. R. Henn
for T. R. HENN,
Colonel,
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5.

127A 62
127A1 621
127A2 622

Incl:
as above

SW/30/1

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

897839
B-201
T-3

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

10000/109/178

Date

11/6/44

From

HQ 2677 Rpt OSS

To

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: S/C 11/10

☒ Security-Classified Information☐ Otherwise Restricted InformationCIA/OS5/15/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 10000/109/178

Date 11/6/44

From HQ 2677 Rgt OSS

To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: SP/1/10

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

CIA/SS _____ 5/15/89
Authority Date

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

Date

From

To

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☐ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Authority

Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation _____

Date _____

From _____

To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☐ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority _____

Date _____

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FPMR 7117 (2-77)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

897539
Bx 201
T-4

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 10000/109/178
Date 10/26/44
From HA 2677 Regt GSO
To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: SEC 1/1/5

- ☒ Security-Classified Information
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

CIA/SS 5/15/89
Authority Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

10000/109/172

Date

10/26/44

From

HQ 2677 Rpt 682

To

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: SC/1/5

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

CIA/CSS
Authority

5/15/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation _____

Date _____
From _____
To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☐ Security-Classified Information
- ☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation _____

Date _____
From _____
To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☐ Security-Classified Information
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority _____ Date _____

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

897539
Bx 201
F-5

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 10000/108/178

Date 10/26/44
From HQ 2677 Regt 035
To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: S/C/1/5

- ☒ Security-Classified Information
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

CIA/053 5/15/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 10000/108/128
Date 10/26/44
From HTA 2677 Regt OSS
To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: 3/2/1/5

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

CIP/OSS 5/15/89
Authority Date

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation	_____

Date	_____
From	_____
To	_____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☐ Security-Classified Information
- ☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation _____

Date _____

From _____

To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☐ Security-Classified Information
- ☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority _____

Date _____

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

GSA FORM 7117 (10-7-77)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

785017

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis

Confidential

R and A No. 2206

MR. L. B. 1025

THE GERMAN DE FACTO ANNEXATION OF THE
NORTHEASTERN ITALIAN PROVINCES

Description

An account of German administrative and cultural measures in the northeastern Italian provinces since the Italian surrender, showing that these territories have been practically annexed to the Greater German Reich.

1 September 1940

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 1(a) and 5(D) (E)
5/2/74
19/4/74

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Copy No. 41

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALTable of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Summary	iii
I. Introduction	1
A. Map of Italian Provinces annexed by Germany	4
II. German De Facto Annexation	4
A. Establishment of Operational Zones	5
B. Frontier Regulations	7
C. Military Conscription	8
D. German Statements on Annexation	10
E. The Fascist Reaction	11
III. The Administration of the Annexed Regions	11
A. The Supreme Commissioners	11
B. The Executive Power	12
C. Legislation	15
D. The Judiciary	17
E. Economic Control	18
F. Fascism	19
IV. The Suppression of Italian Rights	20
A. The Press	22
B. Italian Language and Education	23
C. Motion Pictures and Radio	24
D. Deportation and Persecution	25
Appendix I: Administrative Personnel of the Annexed Provinces	27
Appendix II: The Population of the <u>Alpenvorland</u> and the Plebisite of 1939	30

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL W

Summary

The northern and northeastern Italian provinces of the Trentino and Venezia Giulia, annexed to Italy at the conclusion of the World War after decades of irredentist agitation, have great sentimental importance to Italians as symbols of Italian patriotic aspirations. Because of the substantial non-Italian population in these regions (German in Bolzano and Yugoslav in Venezia Giulia) the Italian government carried out a harsh policy of Italianization after 1919. All German claims to Bolzano were renounced by Adolf Hitler in 1938, and a plebiscite held in this region and the province of Belluno in 1939 resulted in a decision of 185,000 voters of German origin to return to Germany. Despite this German renunciation, the Fascist government attempted to strengthen its Alpine frontiers against Germany; but after the Italian surrender in 1943 German military control was speedily established throughout northern Italy.

Both the Venezia Tridentina and the province of Belluno as well as the Venezia Giulia and the province of Udine were given special administrative status, clearly pointing toward German annexation, shortly after the Italian collapse. Two special administrative zones were established, the Alpenvorland, embracing the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, and Belluno, and the Adriatisches Küstenland, embracing the Italian provinces of Udine, Gorizia, Trieste, Pola,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL X

and Fiume, together with the Yugoslav region of Ljubljana, the city of Trieste and surrounding territory, and the island of Krk. Each zone was placed under a High Commissioner, who is at the same time Gauleiter of the adjacent administrative division of the Greater German Reich (the Gaue of Tirol-Vorarlberg and Kärnten, respectively). Frontier control has been established between the two zones and the provinces under the Fascist puppet government. Inhabitants of the two zones are treated as German nationals and are subject to military service in the Wehrmacht. German official spokesmen have avoided declaring these regions actually annexed to Germany, but unofficial German statements show that the Alpenvorland, at least, is already regarded as an integral part of Reich territory.

The administration of the Alpenvorland and Adriatisches Küstenland has been divorced from that of Italy, and the Italian system of provincial and local government has been modified in such a manner as to ensure German control. German advisers act as representatives of the High Commissioner in each province and supervise the activities of the prefects, all of whom have been replaced by the Nazi authorities. The police is under German control. Far-reaching changes have been effected in the existing legal system. Italian law is valid only when it does not conflict with subsequent German orders, and the legislation of the Fascist puppet government is not enforced. The courts have

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL Y

been made independent of the Italian national judicial system. Economic control is in German hands. The influence of the Fascist Party has been reduced to a minimum, and in the Alpenvorland the Party appears to have been dissolved altogether.

The Nazi authorities have systematically endeavored to de-Italianize the Alpenvorland and Adriatisches Küstenland and to suppress every vestige of Italian culture, notwithstanding the fact that Italians constitute a great majority of the population of the Alpenvorland and a majority in the Adriatisches Küstenland. Italian newspapers have been suppressed and replaced by German or Slovene-language publications. Use of the Italian language is discouraged. Italian schools have been suppressed. The cinema and radio have been Germanized. Italians are discriminated against in public and private life, and in some instances have been deported.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 2


THE GERMAN DE FACTO ANNEXATION OF THE
NORTHEASTERN ITALIAN PROVINCES

1. INTRODUCTION


One of the earliest and most enduring of Italian territorial aspirations has been the acquisition of all of the peninsular territories lying on the southern side of the Alps. The completion of Italian unification in the 1860's left Italy with unsatisfied claims to several northern and northeastern provinces, largely populated by Italians, which remained under Austrian rule. These provinces, known collectively as Italia Irredenta or "Unredeemed Italy," embraced both the Trentino in the north and the so-called Julian Region (corresponding to the former compartimento of Venezia Giulia) in the northeast. Both territories acquired great sentimental importance as symbols of Italian patriotic aspirations. They were annexed to Italy at the conclusion of the World War.

The presence of substantial non-Italian populations in the new provinces gave rise to further problems. The province of Bolzano contained a large proportion of German-speaking people who continued to regard themselves as members of the cultural German community. Farther east, in the Venezia Giulia, was a large Slavic (Slovenian and Croatian) population which resented its transference to Italian rule instead of to the new Yugoslav state. In order to eliminate the possibility of foreign claims to the newly

CONFIDENTIAL



AI



annexed territories, the Italian government carried out a harsh policy of Italianization in both regions. Italian was made the only legal language, and various extreme measures were applied with the aim of eliminating all cultural and sentimental ties with Germany or Yugoslavia.

The rise of an aggressive nationalist government in Germany in 1933 was a serious threat to Italy's permanent possession of the German-speaking areas of the Venezia Tridentina. German claims to these areas had never been entirely given up. After the formation of the Rome-Berlin axis, however, Germany clearly intimated that it had no territorial demands to make against Italy. A series of statements to this effect made by Hitler himself in the spring of 1936 was crowned by his declaration at Rome (7 May 1936): "It is my irrevocable will and my legacy to the German people that the frontier of the Alps, which nature has erected between us, shall be regarded as forever unchangeable."¹

Mussolini apparently believed Hitler's promises for in March 1940, while addressing a delegation from Bolzano, he assured the inhabitants of the Alto Adige who chose to remain in Italy that they would be protected. After stating that the Brenner was Italy's natural boundary, Mussolini added that: "The Alpine frontier ... should never again be a reason for a possible controversy."²

1. CID F-6431, 7 October 1943.

2. New York Times, 22 March 1940.

The counterpart of this German renunciation was a German-Italian agreement for the return of German-speaking Italian nationals to the Reich. An agreement signed at Rome on 21 October 1939 provided for a plebiscite to be held among persons of German origin and language in the provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Udine, and Belluno. Those who opted for Germany were to be "repatriated" to the Reich not later than 31 December 1942. Those who elected to remain in Italy were to renounce German citizenship.¹ The results, announced on 10 January 1940, showed that out of a total of 267,000 voters about 185,000 had opted for Germany and 82,000 for Italy. The province of Bolzano by itself accounted for 86 percent of all persons voting, and 90 percent of those opting for Germany.² The repatriation appears to have been commenced immediately,³ but during 1941 it was apparently decided to postpone completing it until the end of the war.⁴

Despite these arrangements for a permanent solution of the German-Italian boundary issue, the Fascist government instituted a vigorous program of fortifications along the German frontier prior to Italy's entrance into the war. The work was halted for a time, apparently in response to

1. Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale: Annuario di politica internazionale, 1939 (Milan, 1940), p. 289.
2. Appendix II.
3. CID #54058, 10 December 1942.
4. CID #16420, 7 October 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

DI

German pressure, but was resumed during 1941¹ and substantially completed, according to reports, by April 1943.² Defensive measures were adopted by the Italians at the time of Mussolini's overthrow at the end of July 1943,³ but failed to prevent the disarmament of the Italian garrisons by the Germans as soon as the Italian surrender was announced.⁴ Thereafter German military control was speedily established in all parts of northern Italy.

II. GERMAN DE FACTO ANNEXATION

The rapidity with which the Germans took over the civil administration of the northern Italian border provinces suggests that they were acting in accordance with plans laid long before the Italian surrender. Clear intimation that the Germans planned to profit by Italy's difficulties to incorporate Italian territory into the Reich was given by the National Fascist Government Radio, via Berlin, within a fortnight of the Italian surrender. A broadcast describing arrangements allegedly made by Hitler and Mussolini for the stabilization of Europe stated: "Venezia Giulia naturally will be incorporated into the Greater German Reich." The same broadcast declared that Mussolini's Italy would not be asked to return the Trentino, which had been "definitely" given to Mussolini by

1. CIA #1642, 7 October 1941.
2. CIA #33508, 30 April 1943.
3. TSP wire 18629, 12 September 1943.
4. Ibid., CIA #2199, 27 October 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Hitler;¹ however, rumors that Germany had already annexed the provinces of Trento, Bolzano, and Belluno became current within a few days.²

A. Establishment of Operational Zones

A special administrative status, clearly pointing toward German annexation, was given to both the Venezia Giulia and province of Udine as well as the Venezia Tridentina and province of Belluno by the Germans during the early autumn of 1943. Unlike the rest of German-controlled Italy, which was nominally turned over to the administration of an Italian puppet government,³ these regions were independently administered by German civilian officials who also held corresponding administrative posts inside the Greater Reich.

For purposes of a direct type of administration the Germans established two special administrative or "operational" zones -- the Alpenvorland or Cisalpine Territory and the Adriatisches Küstenland or Adriatic Littoral.⁴ The Alpenvorland

1. FCC: Daily, 22 September 1943.
2. La Suisse, 10 October 1943 (News Digest #1263).
3. "German Administrative Control in Northern Italy," R & A No. 2161.
4. FCC: Daily, 27 October 1943, 2 November 1943; Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 17 November 1943 (News Digest #1301); Neues Wiener Tageblatt, 7 December 1943 (News Digest #1318); Donauzeitung, 30 March 1944 (News Digest #1421); Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 27 April 1944 (News Digest #1441); Libera Stampa, 5 May 1944 (News Digest #1445); Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1483); OTD #50029, 17 February 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FI

embraces not only the historical provinces of Bolzano and Trento but also the province of Belluno, which has been Italian since 1866.¹ The Adriatisches Küstenland embraces not only the entire compartment of Venezia Giulia (provinces of Gorizia, Trieste, Pola (or Latria) and Fiume (or Carnaro or Quarnero), but also the province of Udine (Italian since 1866) as well as the Yugoslav territory of Ljubljana (Ljubiana, annexed by Italy in 1941), the city of Trieste and surrounding territory, and the island of Krk (Veglia).²

The administration of each zone is headed by a High Commissioner, who is at the same time Gauleiter of the adjacent administrative division within the Greater German Reich. The High Commissioner of the Alpenvorland, who resides in Innsbruck,³ Franz Hofer, is also Gauleiter of the German Gau

1. Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 27 September 1943 (News Digest #1285); Ibid., 17 November 1943 (News Digest #1301); Avanti! (Naples), 7 February 1944; Aftenbladet, 17 April 1944 (Press Intelli Cable); Darsna Nyheter, 18 April 1944 (News Digest #1428); Libera Stampa, 8 May 1944 (News Digest #1430); Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1435); New York Herald Tribune, 12 June 1944; CID #48431, 7 October 1943; CID #55623, 17 February 1944. The generic term Venezia Giulia (one of Italy's compartments) includes both the provinces of Bolzano and Trento. The Germans refer to the province of Bolzano as Süd Tirol, while the Italians use the name Alto Adige. The province of Trento is commonly referred to as Italian South Tyrol or Trentino.
2. Donauseltung, 30 March 1944 (News Digest #1411); Libera Stampa, 8 May 1944 (News Digest #1445); Aftenbladet, 17 May 1944; Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1488); New York Herald Tribune, 12 July 1944; CID #52179, 16 February 1944.
3. CID #48431, 7 October 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 61

Tirol-Vorarlberg,¹ the High Commissioner of the Adriatisches Küstenland, Dr. Friedrich Rainer with headquarters in Trieste,² is also Gauleiter of the German Gau Kärnten.³ These arrangements are similar to those which obtained in Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg, Lower Styria, and Upper Carniola, which were also regarded as slated for eventual incorporation into the Reich.

3. Frontier Regulations

Frontier regulations in force at the borders of Alpenvorland and Adriatisches Küstenland afford a further indication that these territories have in effect been annexed to Germany. They cannot be entered from Italy without a passport bearing a visa from the German Command in Italy.⁴ Italy's frontiers are no longer at the Brenner and Fiume. The Nazi authorities have dismissed the Fascist customs officers and

1. Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 27 September 1943 (News Digest #1255); Ibid., 27 October 1943 (News Digest #1294); Neues Wiener Tagblatt, 7 December 1943 (News Digest #1318); Deutscher Lybeter, 18 April 1944 (News Digest #1408); Arbeiter, 26 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable); New York Herald Tribune, 12 July 1944; CID #46431, 7 October 1943; CID #20039, 17 February 1944; CID #73902, 30 May 1944.
2. CID #C 179, 16 February 1944; CID #80333, 29 June 1944.
3. Longueville, 30 March 1944 (News Digest #1421); La Suisse, 12 May 1944 (News Digest #1445); Attenclanice, 17 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable); New York Herald Tribune, 12 July 1944; CID #80333, 29 June 1944; CID #79335, 12 June 1944.
4. London radio, 5 May 1944 (FOG: Ticker); Agence Télégraphique Suisse, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1446); Gazette de Lausanne, 26 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable); Deutsche Adriazeitung, 4 June 1944 (News Digest #1474); Ibid., 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1475); Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1485); Deutsche Adriazeitung, 8 July 1944 (News Digest #1503); New York Herald Tribune, 12 July 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

H1

- 8 -

CONFIDENTIAL

replaced then by Germans.¹ In the Alpenvorland customs offices have been established at Borghetto (near Ala, on the 1914 Austro-Italian frontier), at Primolano, and at Alano-Panor; travelers are stopped at these points and permitted to pass only if they can produce proper credentials.² A similar situation exists in the Adriatisches Küstenland, where all entry or exit has been prohibited (effective 10 June 1944) except for persons bearing a military pass.³

C. Military Conscription

The Nazis appear to regard the inhabitants of the annexed provinces as German and not Italian nationals. A communiqué issued after a meeting of the prefects of the Alpenvorland, called by Gauleiter Dr. Hofer (1 April 1944), stated that the Gauleiter appreciated the ready cooperation of the people, and that, as they had the same obligations, they had also the same rights as other inhabitants of the

1. London radio, 8 May 1944 (RSC: Ficker), Agence Télégraphique Suisse, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1446); New York Herald Tribune, 12 July 1944.
2. Agence Télégraphique Suisse, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1446); Deutsche Adressierung, 8 July 1944 (News Digest #1603); Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1485).
3. Deutsche Adressierung, 4 June 1944 (News Digest #1474); ibid., 9 June 1944 (News Digest #1480).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL II

Reich.¹ The Germans have been recruiting troops in the Alpenvorland since April 1944, with the object of forming a separate Trentino Corps as part of the German Army.² In the Adriatisches Küstenland, mobilization for war service was ordered in July 1944 on the basis of a decree issued by Gauleiter Rainer on 23 November 1943.³ It was announced that the conscripts would receive the pay and enjoy all of the privileges of German members of the Wehrmacht.⁴ Drafted troops are liable to serve wherever German authorities deem most opportune. On the other hand, German authorities have forbidden the Mussolini government to recruit troops in either the Alpenvorland or the Adriatisches Küstenland.⁵ German efforts to enforce universal conscription in the annexed territories, however, met with decided popular opposition in both the Alpenvorland and Adriatisches Küstenland, where the great majority of the conscripts did not answer the call preferring to join the patriots.⁶

1. Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1486).
2. CID 773903, 30 May 1944; Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1485).
3. Deutsche Adriazeitung, 30 July 1944 (News Digest #1382).
4. Wern Wire #8393, 18 August 1944.
5. Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1486); New York Herald Tribune, 12 July 1944.
6. CID 773903, 30 May 1944; Situation Report: ITALY, 26 August 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. German Statements on Annexation

Hitherto German official spokesmen have refrained from declaring the Alpenvorland and Adriatisches Küstenland annexed to Germany. A high Berlin official in October 1943 actually denied a Reuters report of the annexation of Bolzano, Trento, and Belluno.¹ Unofficial German statements, however, make it clear that the Nazis look upon the Alpenvorland, at any rate, as forming to all intents and purposes an integral part of the Reich territory. A writer in the NSZ Westmark declared that "the Reich, since 1933, has systematically proceeded to reunite all Germans by abolishing frontiers. It began with the Saar, once cut off. There followed the Ostmark (i.e. Austria), the Sudetenland, the German provinces in the East, Alsace and Lorraine, and the South Tyrol (sic). Even the scattered German settlements in other countries (Volksdeutsche Klaven) are today intimately linked with the Reich."² At an East Tyrolean shooting competition held on 3-4 June 1944, Gauleiter Hofer of the Alpenvorland thanked Gauleiter Rainer of the Adriatisches Küstenland for his support in bringing the Nord, South, and East Tyrol closer together.³ Similarly, the leader of the German Ethnic Group in Slovakia, Hermann, stressed the community of the German advance posts in the Carpathian Region and the South Tyrol.⁴

1. DNB, 9 October 1943 (News Digest #1261); CTD #60629, 17 February 1944.

2. CTD #60629, 17 February 1944.

3. Kärntner Zeitung, 5 June 1944 (News Digest #1473).

4. Slovak Radio, 13 December 1943 (News Digest #1316).

E. The Fascist Reaction

The neo-Fascist government has been powerless to resist these German encroachments. The Fascist press simply denied the reports of German annexation as long as it could do so with any measure of credibility.¹ More recently the futility of such denials appears to have been realized, although news of the real state of affairs is still carefully kept from the Italian public.² Mussolini, when requested to intercede with the Germans, is reported to have said that he could do nothing about the annexation of the northeastern Italian provinces adding cynically: "I am sorry about Udine."³

III. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANNEXED REGIONSA. The Supreme Commissioners

The Supreme Commissioners enjoy absolute civilian powers: all authorities, including especially the judicial, are under them.⁴ They issue decrees and legislative decisions, appoint prefects for the various provinces and German Advisors to the prefects, have the prerogative of granting pardons and can annul every civil and criminal sentence.⁵

1. La Suisse, 10 October 1943 (News Digest #263); CID #60323, 17 February 1944; Libera Stampa, 26 January 1944 (News Digest #1356).
2. Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1486).
3. Libera Stampa, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1445).
4. CID #60179, 16 February 1944; Aftenbladet, 17 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable); Il Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1485).
5. Libera Stampa, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1445).

B. The Executive Power

As already pointed out, ultimate executive power rests with the Supreme Commissioners of the Alpenvorland and Adriatisches Küstenland, who are also Gauleiters of Tirol-Vorarlberg and Kärnten respectively.¹

1. Provincial Administration

Within the two territories the Italian system of provincial and local government has been retained, with modifications which ensure German control. It appears to be a consistent policy of the German press to refer to the Italian provinces by the German term Kreise.²

The prefects have been replaced to make way for new appointees more reliable from the German point of view. Appointive practices seem to differ somewhat in detail in the two zones. In the predominantly German-speaking province of Bolzano (Alpenvorland) a German prefect, Peter Hofer, was appointed.³ (Hofer was also the Volksgruppenleiter, or leader of the German Ethnic Group, for the province.⁴ He is reported to have been killed in an Allied air raid and replaced by another German, Dr. Karl Tinsl.)⁵ In the Adriatisches Küstenland, on the other hand, the High Commissioner has not

1. Above, sec. II, A.

2. Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 17 November 1943 (News Digest #1301); Deutsche Adriazeitung, 2 June 1944 (News Digest #1473).

3. Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 27 September 1943 (News Digest #1259); Arbeiteren, 25 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable); CID #46431, 7 October 1943. A list of prefects and mayors appointed by the German Gauleiters appears in Appendix I.

4. Slovak radio, 12 December 1943 (News Digest #1316).

5. Neuer Wiener Tagblatt, 7 December 1943 (News Digest #1318); Slovak radio, 12 December 1943 (News Digest #1316).

named German prefects, but has appointed Slovene and Croat vice-prefects to serve under the Italian prefects -- allegedly with the object of relieving the strained national relations prevailing in the area.¹ In the Italian-annexed areas of Ljubljana and Sušak-Kra,² and possibly in the province of Pola (Istria),³ the prefects themselves are believed to be either Slovene or Croat.

More important than these changes of prefectural personnel has been the appointment of German Advisers whose duty is to act as representatives of the High Commissioners in the individual provinces. All administrative actions of the provincial prefects must receive the advance approval of the German Advisers.⁴ Mayors of individual communes are appointed by the High Commissioners, acting through the German Advisers.⁵ In effect, the German Advisers are the real administrative heads of the provinces, and the prefects merely act as figureheads.⁶ So far as is known, no German Adviser has been appointed for the Province of Bolzano, where the Prefect is himself a German.

1. FCC: Daily, 8 December 1943 (Bari radio); Donauszeitung, 30 March 1944 (News Digest #1421).
2. CID #80333, 29 June 1944.
3. CID #79596, 18 June 1944; cf. also FCC: Daily, 8 December 1943 (Bari radio).
4. CID #62179, 16 February 1944; CID #80333, 29 June 1944.
5. Deutsche Adriazeitung, 27 May 1944 (News Digest #1470).
6. Deutsche Adriazeitung, 27 May 1944, 2 June 1944, 21 June 1944 (News Digest #1470, 1473, 1490); CID #80333, 29 June 1944.

- 14 -

CONFIDENTIAL NI

Attempts by the neo-Fascist authorities to install their own prefects in the northeastern provinces were quickly frustrated by the Nazis. In one case a certain Dr. Salerno, was requested by German authorities to leave within twenty-four hours or risk internment. He left.¹ Indicative of the low esteem in which the Mussolini government is held in this area is the fact that the Germans choose prefects or mayors who are not even members of the Fascist Party.²

3. The Police.

Information as to the present organization or nationality of the state (mural) police is not obtainable. (Under the Fascist regime the maintenance of order in the provinces was entrusted to agents of the questura (under the prefect) and to the carabinieri.) It is considered very likely that the administration of the state police is now carried out by German SS agents.³

The Italian city police has been retained by the Nazis, at least in the Adriatisches Kustenland, but even the local police is subject to the control of German police.

1. Libera Stampa, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1445); Affondamenti, 17 May 1944 (Press Intell Cables).
2. Libera Stampa, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1445); CID #62178, 10 February 1944.
3. Trieste radio, 8 March 1944 (News Digest #1391); CID #20335, 29 June 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 15 -

CONFIDENTIAL

commissioners.¹ In Trieste, policemen wear yellow armbands bearing the German word "Polizei".² In Fiume, the present Nazi police commissioner was already in the city before the Italian surrender, posing as manager of a garage.³

C. Legislation

The German administration in the Alpenvorland and Adriatisches Küstenland has effected far-reaching changes in the existing legal system. In the Alpenvorland German law has replaced Italian law in certain instances, while in others, as in the case of the Adriatisches Küstenland, Italian law is valid only when it does not conflict with subsequent orders issued by the Germans.

1. The Alpenvorland.

In November 1943 the High Commissioner established at Bolzano a special court for the "district" (Kreis) of Bolzano, Trento, and Belluno, with jurisdiction over all cases involving German citizens or interests. It was expressly provided that the special court would apply the German law of the Alpen and Donau Gaus.⁴ In effect

1. La Suisse, 12 May 1944 (News Digest #1448); CID #68179, 15 February 1944, cf. also New York Herald Tribune, 12 July 1944.
2. La Suisse, 12 May 1944 (News Digest #1448).
3. CID #68179, 16 February 1944.
4. Landrucker Nachrichten, 17 November 1943 (News Digest #15011; CID #68123, 17 February 1944).

CONFIDENTIAL

this provision uprooted the Italian legal system which had been in force in Belluno since 1866 and in Bolzano and Trento since 1919.

New legislation has been issued by the German authorities in the form of "wartime and economic laws" and regulations ostensibly designed to "ensure the supply of the front and homeland with all vital goods and those essential for the conduct of war."¹ On the other hand, laws passed by the neo-Fascist regime are invalid.²

C. The Adriatisches Küstenland.

A decree issued by the High Commissioner of the Adriatisches Küstenland in September 1943 preserved the validity of Italian law then in force, provided it did not conflict with subsequent orders issued by the Germans.³ Fascist legislation in force up to that time is believed to be still valid.⁴ The Fascist Official Gazette, in which all laws and decrees are published, is not circulated, and the local press does not carry notice of neo-Fascist decrees.⁵

1. Langbrucker Nachrichten, 27 April 1944 (News Digest #1442).

2. Il Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1435).

3. Radio Littorale Adriatico, 17 March 1944 (News Digest #1400).

4. Libera Stampa, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1435).

5. Idid.; Altenburger, 17 May 1944 (Press Intelli Cable).

New decrees issued by the German authorities are reported to be published only in the German and Croatian languages.¹

D. The Judiciary

Measures have been taken to make the courts of the Alpenvorland and the Adriatisches Küstenland independent from the Italian judicial system.

1. The Alpenvorland.

In addition to instituting the special court at Bolzano with jurisdiction over all controversies involving German citizens or interests -- the decisions of which cannot be appealed² -- the Germans have divorced the existing courts from the Italian judicial system. A decree of November 1943 established the Trento Court of Appeal as an "independent" court of appeal under the German name Appellationsgericht Trient. It has jurisdiction over the "administration of civilian justice" for persons of Italian origin in the "districts" of Bolzano, Trento, Belluno, and Rovereto (in the province of Trento).³

2. The Adriatisches Küstenland.

An order of the High Commissioner of the Adriatisches Küstenland prohibits judicial petitions to courts outside the zone.⁴ The effect of this decree is to accentuate

1. ABC Daily, 9 December 1943 (Bari radio).
2. Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 17 November 1943 (News Digest #13617); cf. sec. B, 5, above.
3. Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 17 November 1943 (News Digest #13617); CID #80529, 17 February 1944.
4. Libera Stampa, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1445).

the separation from Italy, as it abolishes the right to have recourse to the Italian supreme court (Corte di Cassazione) and the special Court of Accounts (Corte dei Conti). It appears, therefore, that the judgments of the local courts of first instance and the Trieste Court of Appeals are final, unless vacated or modified by orders of the High Commissioner. No judgment apparently becomes final until it has the High Commissioner's approval.¹

B. Economic Control

Information of German economic control is available only for the Adriatisches Küstenland, where stringent measures have been applied, particularly in the agricultural field. Although Italians have been installed in a number of economic offices, they are subordinate to higher German officials.²

The German Provincial Peasant Leader (Landesbauernführer) of the Gau Kärnten, Reinhold Huber,³ holds a key position in the "occupied" territory as leader of the Agricultural and Forestry Section of the High Commissioner's headquarters in Trieste.⁴ Huber appoints the provincial agricultural leaders; those of Udine (Baron Pyrrhus Locatelli Nagelauer) and Gorizia (Alberto Schaller) appear to be Germans.⁵

1. Libera Stampa, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1445); Avanti! (Naples), 7 February 1944.
2. Deutsche Adriazeitung, 19 May 1944, 23 May 1944, 27 May 1944 (News Digest #1463, 1469, 1472).
3. Kärntner Zeitung, 21 February 1944 (News Digest #1384).
4. Deutsche Adriazeitung, 19 May 1944 (News Digest #1463).
5. Deutsche Adriazeitung, 23 May 1944, 27 May 1944 (News Digest #1463, 1472).

- 10 -

CONFIDENTIAL SI

The economic police and the suppression of the black market are directly subordinate to the German SS. SS Sturm-bannführer Wölbinger has been commissioned to deal with the black market.¹ The Supreme Commander of the SS (who is subordinate to the Gauleiter-High Commissioner) heads a newly organized Economic Police Force, with headquarters in Trieste. The functions of the Economic Police, which is recruited locally, are: (a) control of the State Pool and of the processing and distribution of foodstuffs, and measures against extortion; (b) prevention of unauthorized removal of goods from the zone; (c) control and enforcement of prices fixed by the competent authorities.²

The president of the Council of Corporative Economy for the province of Fiume, a post held under the Fascist regime by the prefect, is now a German. Before Italy's capitulation he was in Fiume disguised as a waiter in a local restaurant.³

F. Fascism

The influence of neo-Fascists in the annexed territories is merely nominal, where it exists at all. The Mussolini regime no longer exercises the power of appointment, and Fascist officials receive no support or consideration from the Germans.

1. Deutsche Adriaseitung, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1473).
2. Trieste radio, 5 March 1944 (News Digest #1391).
3. CTD #62170, 16 February 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

espionage and denunciation are said to be the only activities in which the Fascists are still permitted to engage.¹

In the Alpenvorland the Fascist Party actually appears to have been liquidated. As early as last winter it was reported that the Fascist lodge was seldom seen.² The remaining Fascist officials are forbidden to wear their uniforms.³ The Nazi banner flies over the "Casa Littoria" at Trento, and the word "Platzkommandant" appears in huge letters across the facade.⁴ According to press reports of June 1944 and later, the Fascist Party is strictly forbidden in the Alpenvorland,⁵ and all Fascist organizations in that area have been dissolved.⁶ In the Adriatisches Küstenland, on the other hand, a new Fascist Party weekly, Italia Repubblica, was inaugurated by the Party's federal commissioner as recently as May 1944.⁷

IV. THE SUPPRESSION OF ITALIAN RIGHTS

Shortly after Italy's capitulation the Nazi authorities began systematically to de-Italianize the annexed territories and to suppress every vestige of Italian culture. These anti-Italian measures affected all fields of activity, ranging from the curtailment of the Italian press and motion pictures to the outright suppression of Italian schools and discrimination against Italians in public and even private concerns. In the

1. Libera Stampa, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1445).

2. SN 832179, 16 February 1944.

3. New York Herald Tribune, 12 July 1944.

4. Il Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1489).

5. IBID.

6. Agence Télégraphique Suisse, 11 August 1944 (News Digest #1529).

7. Deutsche Adria-Zeitung, 21 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable).

- 21 -

CONFIDENTIAL 01

Alpenvorland Italian culture and rights have been replaced by German; in the Adriatisches Küstenland, where there is no significant German settlement, Slavic interests have been promoted at the expense of the local Italian population. The mayor (podestà) in Fiume is a Croat appointed by the Germans, who in general are following a pro-Croatian policy.¹ Dr. Reiner, High Commissioner of the Adriatisches Küstenland, stated that German policy was directed toward aiding the people, particularly farmers and workers, without regard for nationality or religion provided only that the recipients of help were "decent and willing to collaborate."² In a similar vein Regierungspräsident Selzerger, Dr. Reiner's first assistant, stated that until the end of the war administration must be markedly tolerant and every extreme avoided.³

This campaign was undertaken without reference to the real ethnic situation in the annexed territories. In the total population of the Alpenvorland Germans constitute only a small minority. Out of a total resident population of 385,000 (1936), only 261,000 (29.5 percent) were qualified as Germans to vote in the plebiscite of 1939, and only 100,000 (20.3 percent) opted for Germany. The great majority of the voters (97.9 percent, or 229,500 persons) came from the province of Bolzano alone, where Germans apparently still constitute a majority of the

1. CID #62179, 16 February 1944.

2. Donaueitung, 30 March 1944 (News Digest #1421).

3. Deutsche Zeitung in Kroatien, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1453).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

YI

population.¹ In the other two provinces of the Alpenvorland, however, German settlement is too slight to justify any Nazi claims to these territories based on ethnic grounds.²

Similarly in the Adriatisches Küstenland, the Nazi pro-German and pro-Slavic policy overlooks the fact that this area is largely Italian in ethnic composition and culture. Valid statistics concerning the ethnic situation in this area are not available; however, it is clear that among the 1,700,000 resident population of the Adriatisches Küstenland (1936) minus Ljubljana, Trieste, and Kerk, there are at least 1,050,000 Italians.³

A. The Press

In the Alpenvorland Italian newspapers have in many instances been suppressed and replaced by German-language dailies. In Bolzano the Italian paper Provincia di Bolzano has ceased publication. Simultaneously there reappeared a strongly nationalist German daily, the Bozener Tageblatt, which had been discontinued under the Italian regime.⁴ At present no Italian dailies are published in Bolzano, and for a long time the sale of all Fascist papers has been forbidden. News about Italy is published in a special column in the German-language press.⁵

1. See Appendix II.

2. In the 1939 plebiscite only 2 percent of the total population voted for Germany in the provinces of Trento and Belluno.

3. The figure of 550,000 Yugoslavs in Venezia Giulia given by Gaetano Salvemini (What to do with Italy, New York, 1943, p. 107) is accepted by the Yugoslav Partisan Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Josip Smoljaka, in the Partisan magazine Nova Jugoslavija for June-July 1944.

4. Transocean, 1 October 1943 (News Digest 1355); Svenska Dagbladet, 7 October 1943 (News Digest 1360); Borgundidagbladet, 15 February 1944 (News Digest 1370); Arbeideren, 25 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable); CID 700639, 17 February 1944.

5. Il Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest 1400).

CONFIDENTIAL

- 22 -

CONFIDENTIAL W1

a substantially similar situation exists in the Adriatisches Küstenland. With a few exceptions, only Slovene and German-language newspapers are allowed to appear. Official bulletins are printed exclusively in German.¹ In Trieste, Il Piccolo is still published in Italian, but its editor is appointed by the Germans and it features the reports of German news agencies; those of the Italian Stefani agency are relegated to the category of news of foreign origin.² Meanwhile Il Piccolo is overshadowed by a new German daily, the Deutsche Adriazeitung, also published at Trieste.

German propagandists and the German-controlled press have attempted to portray the Germans as impartial arbiters among the various local ethnic groups. A German controlled Yugoslav paper announced that the weekly Adria Illustrierte, published by the Adria Verlag, had issued its first number in German, Slovene, Croat, and Italian.³

B. Italian Language and Education

The Italian provinces annexed to the Reich appear to be rapidly losing their Italian appearance. In the province of Bolzano the Italian language is said to be prohibited, with German the only authorized language. In Bolzano, however, bilingual ration cards are reportedly being used.⁴ Italian is

1. Avanti! (Naples), 7 February 1944.

2. Libera Stampa, 9 May 1944 (News Digest #1445); Attenzione, 17 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable).

3. Hrvatski Narod, 23 April 1944 (News Digest #1440).

4. Il Popolo, 7 June 1944 (News Digest #1457).

CONFIDENTIAL

- 24 -

CONFIDENTIAL XI

no longer taught in the schools. The only vestiges of Italian rule appear to be a few street signs and a few small advertisements in shop windows.¹

In the Adriatisches Küstenland all Italian schools have been closed except in Trieste. Everywhere else the schools are either German or Slovene. Over 200 Italian kindergartens are said to have been suppressed, and 300 teachers dismissed. Furthermore, public advertisements in Italian are said to be forbidden.²

C. Motion Pictures and Radio

German news films are shown to the exclusion of films made by the Italian LUCE agency (L'Unione Cinematografica Educativa), and German feature pictures with badly translated subtitles are frequently presented in the theaters.³ In the Alpenvorland, the Italian state-operated broadcasting monopoly, EIAR (Ente Italiano Audizioni Radiofoniche), appears to be no longer under Italian control. Its Italian employees are reported to have been refused access to the stations.⁴

D. Deportation and Persecution

German anti-Italian measures are directed not only against Italian culture but also against the Italian population

1. Avanti! (Naples), 7 February 1944; Korrespondenzen, 13 February 1944 (News Digest #1370), Dagens Nyheter, 19 April 1944 (News Digest #1426).
2. Avanti! (Naples), 7 February 1944; Libera Stampa, 28 February 1944 (News Digest #1384).
3. Libera Stampa, 6 May 1944 (News Digest #1445).
4. Avanti! (Naples), 7 February 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 35 -

CONFIDENTIAL

itself. An obvious effort is being made to force Italians to leave the annexed regions and to prevent further Italian immigration from other provinces.¹ The methods used are alleged to range from various forms of discrimination against Italians to outright deportation of sections of the population.

German technicians placed in key positions in industrial and mining concerns hamper the freedom of action of Italian management to such an extent that the authority of Italians has become merely nominal. Public utilities are controlled by the Nazi authorities, who employ exclusively German personnel. An outright anti-Italian terrorism, ostensibly designed to protect the interests of the non-Italian local population against the Italians, is said to reign in the rural districts and smaller communities of the Adriatisches Küstenland. In the Alpenvorland, persons who opted for Italy in the 1939 plebiscite are said to be the victims of particular discrimination.²

In February 1944 the Swiss newspaper Libera Stampa reported that the Nazi authorities were laying plans for mass expulsions of Italians, or for their deportation to work in Germany. The same paper stated that Italians were being dismissed from their posts and heavily taxed, thus forcing them to emigrate by economic pressure.³ In Piuma all non-resident

1. Transocean, 20 March 1944 (News Digest #1400).
2. Avanti! (Naples), 7 February 1944; Agence Télégraphique Suisse, 9 Feb. 1944 (News Digest #1446).
3. Libera Stampa, 28 February 1944 (News Digest #1364).

CONFIDENTIAL

Z1

Italians have been reported forced to leave, while preparations to deport Italian nationals from Trieste and Bolzano have also been reported.¹ In August 1944 the Swiss press reported that Italians who had settled in the Alpenvorland since the fall of Mussolini were being deported to Germany.² It has also been reported that persons of German origin who left the Alpenvorland after the 1939 plebiscite are being returned to their former homes.³

1. Avanti! (Naples), 7 February 1944; CID 62179, 10 February 1944; OS source 3, 10 June 1944.
2. Agence Télégraphique Suisse, 11 August 1944 (News Digest FISH4).
3. Avanti! (Naples), 7 February 1944.

Appendix I: ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL OF THE
ANNEXED PROVINCES

ALPENVORLAND

High Commissioner: Franz Hofer (Gauleiter of Tirol-
Vorarlberg)

Prefects: ¹

(a) Bolzano: Dr. Karl Eitel (replacing Peter Hofer)

(b) Trento: Franz Bartolini

(c) Belluno: Italo Foschi

1. Innsbrucker Nachrichten, 27 September 1943 (News Digest #1259); Neues Wiener Tagblatt, 7 December 1943 (News Digest #1318); Slovak radio, 12 December 1943 (News Digest #1318); Arbetaren, 25 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable); CID #46431, 7 October 1943.

- 23 -

CONFIDENTIAL

ADRIATISCHES KRIESTENLAND

High Commissioner: Dr. Friedrich Rainer (Gauleiter of
Kärnten)

Prefects:

- (a) Trieste: Dr. Bruno Coccani (or Pocianni)¹
(b) Gorizia: Count Marino Padoa²
(c) Fiume (Carnaro): Dr. Alessandro Spalatini (or Spalatini)³
(d) Udine (Friuli):
(e) Pola (Istria): Dr. Oskar Turina⁴
(f) Ljubljana: Ravnik⁵
(g) Sausal and Koko: (Dr. Oskar Turina⁶
(Kolacic (?))⁷

German Advisors

- (a) Trieste: Landrat Hinterregger⁸
(b) Ljubljana: Dr. Dovjak⁹

1. FCC: Daily, 27 October 1943, 12 June 1944.
2. FCC: Daily, 2 November 1943.
3. FCC: Daily, 2 November 1943; CID #62179, 16 February 1944.
4. CID #78596, 12 June 1944.
5. CID #90333, 29 June 1944.
6. Hrvatski Narod, 1 August 1944 (News Digest #1524).
7. Hrvatski Narod, 20 April 1944 (Balkan Press Review).
8. Deutsche Adriazeitung, 27 May 1944 (News Digest #1472);
CID #90333, 29 June 1944.
9. CID #90333, 29 June 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 25 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Mayors (Podestà):

- (a) Trieste: Dr. Cesare Pallini¹
- (b) Gorizia: Count Alessandro Coronini²
- (c) Sušak and Krk: Kolacic (T)³

Mayor Commissioners:

- (a) Trieste: Luigi Russier⁴
- (b) Fiume (Carnaro): Dr. Stenver⁵
- (c) Ljubljana: Luigi Angelo Piazani⁶

1. PCB: Daily, 27 October 1943.
2. Deutsche Adriazeitung, 27 May 1944 (News Digest #1473).
3. Hrvatski Narod, 20 April 1944 (Balkan Press Review).
4. Deutsche Adriazeitung, 31 May 1944 (Press Intell Cable).
5. PCB: Daily, 27 October 1943.
6. Italian Home Service radio, 28 June 1944 (News Digest #1487).

CONFIDENTIAL

- 33 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix II: THE POPULATION OF THE ALPINE HIGHLAND AND
THE PLEBISCITE OF 1939^a

	Alpenvorland				Udine Province	Total (Four Provinces)
	Solano	Verona	Belluno	Total		
Italian Census 1921						
Germans	190,539	4,751	?	?	?	?
Italians	30,952	377,433	?	?	?	?
Latins	11,694	6,559	?	?	?	?
Total	233,535	388,753	225,714 ^b	851,002	721,804	1,572,806
Italian Census 1936						
Resident	303,306	354,610	205,297	863,213	723,203	1,586,416
Present	277,720	391,309	216,333	885,362	721,670	1,607,032
Plebiscite 1939						
For Germany	166,468	13,615	1,606	180,689	4,576	185,265
For Italy	63,012	11,438	6,423	80,873	1,027	81,900
Total	229,500	24,453	7,429	261,382	5,603	266,985

^a Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1921; Nuovo Dizionario dei Comuni...
del Regno d'Italia, 1935; New York Times, 4 and 7 January 1940;
CIS #54085, 10 December 1942.

^b "Present" population.

CONFIDENTIAL

125

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APG 324

Office of the Chief of Staff

+++++

Ref: 50/100/000.

Confidential

JAN 25 1945

PROCLAMATION ON NORTH EAST ITALY1. Description of the area.

The area covered by the term "North East Italy" originally comprised the 6 Provinces of TRIESTE, UDINESE, VENEZIA, VERONA, TREVISO and GORIZIA. It has been assumed by Allied Commission that the two extra Provinces of UDINESE and GORIZIA should be added.

The Italian Government has been informed that it is our intention to impose Allied Military Government on the first six named Provinces. No query has ever been raised by them on the other two Provinces, which they presumably have assumed were not the subject of argument, having been Italian since 1866.

2. Policy of SACRED.

The policy of SACRED is as follows: "To impose Allied Military Government in the area which was under Italian rule at the outbreak of war. This automatically suspends Italian sovereignty. The Military Governor will be the General Officer Commanding the Allied forces in the area. It is intended that the area will remain under direct Allied administration until its disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned. This intention was communicated to Marshal TITO on 13 August, but he has objected to

should be added.

The Italian Government has been informed that it is our intention to discuss Allied Military Government on the first six noted provisions. No query has ever been raised by them on the other two provisions, which they presumably have assumed were not the subject of argument, having been Italian since 1866.

2. Policy of SACRED.

The policy of SACRED is as follows: "To impose Allied Military Government in the area which was under Italian rule at the outbreak of war. This automatically suspends Italian sovereignty. The Military Government will be the General Officer Commanding the Allied armies in the area. It is intended that the area will remain under direct Allied administration until its disposition has been determined by negotiation between the Governments concerned. This intention was communicated to Marshal TITO on 13 August, but he has objected to it."

3. Present Organization of the Area under German Rule.

The Germans are believed to have organized the area into two parts:-

- (a) Pre-Alpine Operational Area: BOLZANO, TRIESTE and UDINESE
- (b) Littoral Adriatic Group: UDINESE, TRIESTE, GORIZIA, PULA and PIUMA.

4. Political Aspect of the Problem.

This is obviously vital, but is only briefly mentioned here. The three outstanding points are as follows:-

- (a) A memorandum from Mr. SCHIMMIO, Yugoslav Member of the Advisory Council, asking for special treatment for VERONA, GORIZIA and TRIESTE, but saying

124
2.
he would agree to "an exclusively Allied transitional administration, without the least direct or indirect contact or even collaboration with the Italian authorities", such administration to remain in force until a final settlement of the frontiers between Yugoslavia and Italy.

(b) Marshal TITO's speech of 12 September claiming ISLH and the Slovians littoral.

(c) A Resolution of the UN in VERDIA GIULIA forwarded by ISLH. Their conclusions are briefly:

- (1) Administrative autonomy for VERDIA GIULIA.
- (2) Equality between Italians and Yugoslavs with a guarantee to preserve Yugoslav national characteristics.
- (3) An international committee to run the port of TRIESTE, composed of all nationalities interested in the port.

5. Allied Military Government Plan.

Allied Commission's plan now awaits COM approval, having received the previous consent of General Alexander at AAI. It will be convenient to treat the area in two parts, namely VERDIA GIULIA (corresponding roughly to the Littorale Adriatico Group) and VERDIA TRIESTINA (corresponding roughly to the Pre-Alpine Operational Area). The salient features of this plan are as follows:

6. VERDIA GIULIA.

Three different situations were envisaged:

- A. We get there before the Yugoslavs.
- B. We arrive to find Yugoslav Partisans have assumed some local

to preserve Yugoslav national characteristics.

- (5) An international committee to run the port of TRIESTE, composed of all nationalities interested in the port.

5. Allied Military Government Plan.

Allied Commission's plan now awaits OAS approval, having received the previous consent of General Alexander at ANI. It will be convenient to treat the area in two parts, namely VENETIA GIULIA (corresponding roughly to the Littoral Adriatic Group) and VENETIA INTERIORA (corresponding roughly to the Pre-Alpine Operational Area). The salient features of this plan are as follows:

6. VENETIA GIULIA.

Three different situations were envisaged:

- A. We get there before the Yugoslavs.
- B. We arrive to find Yugoslav Partisans have assumed some local control, but there are no regular Yugoslav or Russian troops.
- C. Yugoslav or Russian troops get there before we do.

A combination of all three of these situations in the whole area is considered possible.

7. Under situation A. Allied Military Government is to follow normal lines except:

- (1) No officials to be imported into the area, only indigenous inhabitants being used.
- (2) No Italian troops to be used, the use of O.A.S. as such to be left to the Regional Commissioner.

123

3.

- (3) Italian law to be applied.
- (4) Provinces to be financed entirely by APAs.

8. Under situation B, a similar policy would be adopted with the following modifications:

- (1) No Italian police would be employed in Partisan areas.
- (2) Any existing administrative machinery would be kept in being regardless of whether it was using Italian or Yugoslav officials.
- (3) Courts of law would initially be closed and only reopened at the discretion of the Regional Commissioner.

It is important that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants in both these cases that the only government authority is the Allied Military Government. To indicate this only American and British flags would be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

9. Under situation C, we admit find a Yugoslav administration legally set up under Yugoslav officers. To avoid this it was recommended to JMWG that an agreement be negotiated with TITO that any Yugoslav troops crossing the 1939 frontier into Italy should come immediately under the orders of ALI. This recommendation had the strong support of ALI in view of the importance to them of TRIESTE and FRIULI.

10. One final important point was made. Allied Commission require a much higher concentration of officers than elsewhere in Italy, and, in addition, the provision of an adequate force of military police.

11. YUGOSLAV REINFORCEMENT.

It is important that no doubt should be left in the minds of the inhabitants in both these cases that the only government authority is the Allied Military Government. To indicate this only American and British flags would be permitted to be flown from public buildings.

9. Under situation C, we might find a Yugoslav administration legally set up under Yugoslav officers. To avoid this it was recommended to AFHQ that an agreement be negotiated with Tito that any Yugoslav troops crossing the 1959 frontier into Italy should come immediately under the orders of AII. This recommendation had the strong support of AII in view of the importance to them of TRIESTE and FRIULI.

10. One final important point was made. Allied Commanders require a much higher concentration of officers than elsewhere in Italy, and, in addition, the provision of an adequate force of military police.

11. YUGOSLAV TRIPARTITE.

The three Provinces of TRIESTE, TRIESTE and TRIESTE differ from each other, TRIESTE being entirely Italian, TRIESTE wholly Austrian, and TRIESTE predominantly Austrian. AFHQ have ruled that all three should be administered alike under the same form of Allied Military Government as we have hitherto applied everywhere in Italy, and the same basic principles should be applied as in the case of YUGOSLAV CROATIA.

12. Present Situation.

(a) VENEZUELA CIVILIA.

Allied Commission plans await OCS approval. AMHQ cabled to AGHAR for OCS in November stressing in particular the following points:

- (1) The importance of making an agreement with TITO.
- (2) The need for a public declaration by Allied Governments that the area would be held in trust.
- (3) The inadvisability of a separate Allied Military Government for VENEZUELA CIVILIA.

(b) VENEZUELA BRITANNICA

The plan for VENEZUELA BRITANNICA was recently approved by AMHQ for Interior guidance and for planning purposes only.

Copy to: E19/OCS.

122
4.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(S) VERMILION BRIDGES

The plan for VERMILION BRIDGES was recently approved by ARS for interior guidance and for planning purposes only.

Copy to: EIS/OS.

504
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 121
 JKD/uk

HEADQUARTERS
 SOUTHERN REGION, ALLIED COMMISSION
 APO 334

Confidential
 January 1945

8/1456

JAN 19 1945

SUBJECT: Planning for Venezia Region

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission
 ATTS: Chief of Staff

III

1. Your 504/III/203 of 1 January was forwarded to me by Colonel E.H. Page, Acting Regional Commissioner, Venezia.
2. I have been studying the implications of this letter and I wish to put forward to you a suggestion which I have sincerely had an opportunity of discussing with Colonel Fiske and Lt. Col. Snipp.
3. This proposal is submitted, on the assumption that I shall return to Venezia Region when the northern move takes place. I believe that to be your present plan.
4. Based on this assumption, I wish to suggest, for your consideration, that Tactical H.Q. Venezia, move from its present H.Q. at Mondovio, near Rimini, to Naples.
5. In making this suggestion, I wish to make it absolutely clear beyond any doubt, that I have complete confidence in Colonel E.H. Page, and that I should most willingly endorse any plans made by him. I feel, however, that Colonel Page himself will feel, in the weeks to come, that many points arise in which he will wish to consult me.
6. Such a move South of Tactical H.Q., would have the disadvantage of loss of contact with 8 Army, and 5 Army (contact with the latter is by difficult roads). It would have the advantage of closer contact with H.Q. A.C., with A.F.H.Q., with Austrian Planning Group at Portici, and with the Yugoslav Mission at Bari.
7. You will also appreciate that many officers who will hold important positions in Venezia, such as, Lt. Col. Orwood, Colonel Howell etc, or will

2. I have been studying the implications of this letter and I wish to get forward to you a suggestion which I have already had an opportunity of discussing with Colonel Pinks and Lt. Col. Shipp.

3. This proposal is submitted, on the assumption that I shall return to Venezia Region when the currently move takes place. I believe that to be your present plan.

4. Based on this assumption, I wish to suggest, for your consideration, that Tactical H.Q. Venezia, move from its present H.Q. at Mondaino, near Rimini, to Naples.

5. In making this suggestion, I wish to make it absolutely clear beyond any doubt, that I have complete confidence in Colonel J.H. Rose, and that I should most willingly endorse any plans made by him. I feel, however, that Colonel Page himself will feel, in the weeks to come, that many points arise in which he will wish to consult me.

6. Such a move South of Tactical H.Q., would have the disadvantage of loss of contact with 8 Army, and 5 Army (contact with the latter is by difficult roads). It would have the advantage of closer contact with H.Q. A.C., with A.E.H.Q., with Austrian Planning Group at Tortici, and with the Yugoslav Mission at Bari.

7. You will also appreciate that many officers who will hold important positions in Venezia, such as, Lt. Col. Orpwood, Lt. Col. Armstrong, and possibly Colonel Howell are, or will shortly be working in Southern Region.

8. My suggestion would be that only a planning C.O. should move South. This to consist of Colonel J.H. Rose, Jnr Col. Proby, possibly one P.M.U. officer, and two or three clerks with necessary transport for a quick move. Main Headquarters would remain, with all stores, at its present location at Mondaino.

9. I suggest, that unless he is required by Rose, Lt. Col. Archibald might be the Liaison Officer at H.Q. No. 1 District.

10. In this connection, I wish to bring to your notice, the desirability of settling, so far as possible, the key personnel of Venezia Region. We have already lost Colonel Geyers, Lt. Col. Craig, and I understand that we shall lose other officers for Austria. With all respect to all the important problems of Austria,

ccs NOTE:- Minute 7 on file T/36/EST.

I have instructed RC not to move him See folio 120.

TAC HQ will I have seen him. MSH. 1/2

Noted
20
J.H. Rose
19/11

120

I do feel that the frontier provinces of Venezuela, nearly as many
difficult problems and nearly as much explosive material as
exist in Austria.

I should therefore appreciate it, if the make-up of
Venezuela Regional Team could be settled as soon as possible. You
know how far below strength we are. If reinforcements are to
be available from A.A. and other units, I should like to have them
as soon as possible. We could train them in Southern Region on
the olive oil campaign.

I am sending this letter forward in triplicate so that,
if you think fit, you can forward one copy to Colonel F.B. Page
with your views.


Brian H. Jones, Regional Commissioner

Copies 1 G3 G HQNC
Copy 4 File

Copy No 2 passed to Estate Sec
19 Jan 42 with following comment:

"ESTAB Sec

We have a copy, but this should
be if it is not sent and I think it


Donald R. Davis, Regional Commissioner

Copies 163 & HQMC
Copy 4 file

Copy No 2 forward to Estate Sec
19 Jan 48 with following comment:

"ESTAB SEC"

You have a copy, but who should
be the Action copy, and I think it
should come up to COS on your file
and with your comment.

(900) E. T. GORT
Master
Office, C-1 S
18/1

19

Copy No 3 held as a 'SPEC'



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

119

FORNTEL AND REPORT.

Ref: SOA/119/COM.

10 January 1965.

SUBJECT: Political Developments in UGANDA.

TO: Brigadier ADAMS,
Regional Commissioner, Southern Region.

~~Confidential~~ 102-106

The attached copy of a report received from ISUP is forwarded for your information.

Major E. Talbot

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Encls: 5.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Ref : 504/118/COS.

18 January 1945

Subject : AMG for BOLZANO, TRENTO and BELLUNO.

To : G-5 Section, AFHQ
(for attention of Col. HENN)

Reference your letter of 8 January in reply to this HQ
504/85/COS of 29 October 44.

I should like to draw your attention to the fact that the intelligence material referred to in para 7, which was not enclosed with the above letter and subsequently asked for by telephone, has not yet reached this HQ. I shall be grateful, therefore, if you will despatch it as soon as possible.

Major E. Talbot
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff,

BU
24 Jan 1945

12

SECRET

7463

117

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
G-3 Section
APO 512

JAN - 9 1945

8 January 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

117

SUBJECT: AMI for BOLZANO, TRIESTE and BELLISSIMO

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
(Attention: Chief Commissioner)
A.P.O. 394

VOL I

1. Reference is made to your SA/PB/AS of 29 October 1944.
2. The program outlined by you is approved for interim guidance for planning purposes only. No definite plan should be committed until replies are received from State Department and Foreign Office channels, which have the matter under current consideration.
3. Importance is attached to the principle enunciated by you, particularly relevant in the case of Bolzano and the German speaking areas of Trieste, that outside officials should not be imported into these provinces.
4. Reference paragraph 12 of your paper, the civil government in Bolzano should be reconstituted under AMI auspices along Italian rather than along German/Austrian lines.
5. The following considerations are set out as being pertinent in the case of planning in Bolzano:
 - a. It may be assumed that the province will not be detached from Italy notwithstanding the case which can be put forward on historical or ethnic grounds. Nor is the policy of forced migration along the lines of the Italo-German agreement of 1939 likely to be pursued after the war. On the other hand, it may be assumed that provision for the protection of the German speaking inhabitants of the South Tyrol (as a minority within the Italian State) will be included in the final settlement with Italy.
 - b. Direct control by AMI methods will probably be continued until permanent provision for the minority protection envisaged under 1. above is assured.
 - c. The AMI policy, in the light of the above, should not encourage separatist hopes or the creation of local government institutions which cannot be expected to survive the return to Italian rule. On the other hand, while reconstituting the Italian system of local government in name and form, AMI policy should encourage the substance of local self-government. As proposed by you, only indigenous officials

see 127

SECRET

SEEN BY CC

Nob
Fwa

TOP SECRET

116

should be employed and emphasis on either the Italian or Austrian connection of assassinations should be avoided.

1. The use of Italian troops and Carabinieri should be avoided but if a special police force cannot be recruited locally which is free of Nazi taint then they may be employed.

c. It should be contemplated that after the initial occupational phase Allied troops will not be available for police duties in Bolzano.

d. Intelligence so far as Bolzano, Trento and Belluno are concerned indicates:

a. Since the Italian collapse in the fall of 1943 these provinces have been under German military and civilian control to the exclusion of Italian Neo-Fascist influence.

b. The provinces have been administered on German lines, every effort having been made to supersede Italian institutional forms and news organs.

c. They have been given, under the name of "Alpenvorland" a special status clearly pointing towards annexation by Germany.

d. The positions of Reich Commissioner in the Alpenvorland and Gauleiter of the adjacent Austrian Gau (Vorarlberg i.e. Innsbruck) have been combined in one individual.

7. Reference to paragraph 13 of your paper, Intelligence material as set out in the attached sheet, is forwarded for your information.

Th. Henn

T. R. HENN, Colonel
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

Incl:
as above

TOP SECRET

15

INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

1. One copy of OSS, R & A Report No. 2208, dated 1 Sept 1944.
2. Two copies of OSS paper, "Memorandum on the Upper Adige", dated 6 November 1944.
3. Two copies of paper, "Manifesto to the Germans and Italians of the Upper Adige".
4. Two copies of OSS paper, "Report concerning the Activities of Patriot Groups and Anti-Fascist Parties of Northern Italy", dated 26 October 1944.
5. Two copies of OSS paper, "General and Military Situation in Trentino up to 30 September 1944, ONL Report No. 6.", dated 26 October 1944.

SO 4

~~TOP SECRET~~

114

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

JMM/300/thh

JAN - 4 1945

2 January 1945

Confidential

SUBJECT: AMG for Bolzano, Trento, and Belluno

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
(Attn: Chief of Staff)
APO 394.

1. Attached is copy of our letter, subject as above.
2. The Allied Commission plan has been approved with minor modifications but we are withholding the original until the intelligence material mentioned in paragraph 7 is collected.
3. I am asking Major Barratt to deliver this to you for your information.

J. Murray Mitchell
J. MURRAY MITCHELL,
Colonel, G.S.C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

29 December 1944

SUBJECT: AMG for BOLZANO, TRENTO and BELLUNO

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
(Attention: Chief Commissioner)
A.P.O. 394

Confidential

You I (Index 85)

1. Reference is made to your 504/85/COG of 29 October 1944.
2. The program outlined by you is approved for interim guidance for planning purposes only. No definite plan should be committed until replies are received from State Department and Foreign Office channels, which have the matter under current consideration.
3. Importance is attached to the principle enunciated by you, particularly relevant in the case of Bolzano and the German speaking areas of Trento, that outside officials should not be imported into these provinces.
4. Reference paragraph 12 of your paper, the civil government in Bolzano should be reconstituted under AMG auspices along Italian rather than along German/Austrian lines.
5. The following considerations are set out as being pertinent in the case of planning in Bolzano:
 - a. It may be assumed that the province will not be detached from Italy notwithstanding the case which can be put forward on historical or ethnical grounds. Nor is the policy of forced emigration along the lines of the Italo-German agreement of 1939 likely to be pursued after the war. On the other hand, it may be assumed that provision for the protection of the German speaking inhabitants of the South Tyrol (as a minority within the Italian State) will be included in the final settlement with Italy.
 - b. Direct control by AMG methods will probably be continued until permanent provision for the minority protection envisaged under a. above is assured.
 - c. The AMG policy, in the light of the above, should not encourage separatists hopes or the creation of local government institutions which cannot be expected to survive the return to Italian rule. On the other hand, while reconstituting the Italian system of local government in name and form, AMG policy should encourage the substance of local self-government. As proposed by you, only indigenous officials

112

should be employed and emphasis on either the Italian or Austrian connection of candidates should be avoided.

d. The use of Italian troops and Carabinieri should be avoided but if a special police force cannot be recruited locally which is free of Nazi taint then they may be employed.

e. It should be contemplated that after the initial occupational phase Allied troops will not be available for police duties in Bolzano.

6. Intelligence so far as Bolzano, Trento and Belluno are concerned indicates:

a. Since the Italian collapse in the fall of 1943 these provinces have been under German military and civilian control to the exclusion of Italian Neo-Fascist influence.

b. The provinces have been administered on German lines, every effort having been made to supersede Italian institutional forms and news organs.

c. They have been given, under the name of "Alpenvorland" a special status clearly pointing towards annexation by Germany.

d. The positions of Reich Commissioner in the Alpenvorland and Gauleiter of the adjacent Austrian Gau (Vorarlberg i.e. Innsbruck) have been combined in one individual.

7. Reference to paragraph 13 of your paper, intelligence material as set out in the attached sheet, is forwarded for your information.

T. R. HENN, Colonel
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5

Incl:
as above

2212

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

Confidential

Tel: 478730

1 January 1945.

Ref: 504/111/003

SUBJECT: Planning, No.1 District.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
VENETIA Region.

1. It is probable that No.1 District will administer VENICE and TRIESTE. If this is the case they will no doubt form a Planning Group in the same way as No.2 District has for N.W.ITALY, and it is suggested that you should attach a Liaison Officer, with possibly one or two other officers to assist him in planning, to Headquarters No.1 District.

2. Will you please make necessary arrangements direct with HQ No.1 District and inform DOCAO Civil Affairs Section and this HQ of any arrangements which you make.

See 121

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: DOCAO Civil Affairs Section,
HQ 15 Army Group.

104

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

110

Confidential

Tel: 478720

1 January 1945.

Ref: 504/110/008

SUBJECT: Reports of Enemy Anti-Italian Activities.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
VIENNA Region.

108

I forward copy of a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs for your information. You probably receive such information of this sort from other sources but I think that seeing that this comes from the Minister himself and appears to be a summary of various reports which he has received, and in view of the importance which the Italians attach to this area, I would be grateful for your comments on the matter.

See Folio 135

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: SCAD EIGHTH Army.

Incl:
16/05988/15 dtd 28 Dec 44.

108

2214

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

584

100

Ref: P/365.04

31 December 1944
1 JAN 1945

SUBJECT: Anti-Italian Activity in the
Trento and Bolzano Provinces.

TO : Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

1. Reference letter No. 16/05938/15 dated 23 December 1944,
From His Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the
Chief Commissioner, A. C.
2. The receipt of the information contained in this communi-
cation is acknowledged with appreciation and it is being for-
warded to the appropriate Allied Authorities for their informa-
tion.

WILLIAM W. SCROTT
Vice President, Political Section

Copy to Chief Com
Staff of Staff

8

(Seen By Major QUAYLE)

117A
117A
3/1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Translation

Department of State
16/5, 200/13

Rome, 28 December 1943

Dear Admiral,

I want to draw your attention on some very serious news which we recently received, through the Committee of liberation of North Italy, about the anti-Italian activity which is being exercised by the Nazis in the Trento and Bolzano provinces.

This activity and the ferocity and acts of intimidation which go with it, have the unavowed but obvious aim of trying to change the character of these provinces to include them in the Reich, by making them appear as German and not Italian provinces.

The said regions have been included in a 'zone of operation' of the Pre-Alps, officially created with exclusively military aims and with a purely military character, and tending to eliminate all that is Italian.

Neither a single Carabinieri, nor a single agent of the Italian Police have been left in the Alto-Adige; the Italian Administration have been turned out from every office and every organization, and substituted by German Commissioners whose activity consists in sending away the greatest possible number of Italians.

Arbitrary acts, acts of violence are too numerous to be counted; arrests and murders take place more and more frequently. The Italian schools have been closed and Italian newspapers stifled. The Italian names of the villages, streets and squares have been replaced by German names. Orders dismissing the Italian employees have been issued; while continuous drafts and deportation of the Italians of the 1891-1920 for compulsory work take away large masses of the population.

The elements belonging to the minorities, and which according to the Italo-German agreements of 1939 had chosen Italy, are now being bullied into forsaking their choice, and those who refuse to are sent away.

Recent acts of violence have already caused 30-40 thousand people to be sent away from these regions, but this figure is destined to increase with an accelerated rhythm as long as the Nazis will occupy this region.

I have deemed it necessary to inform you about all this, my dear Admiral, so that the Allied organs which will have to govern these regions as soon as they will be liberated, get timely information, about the anti Italian action taken by the Nazis. I will forward to you all the informations which I will receive.

I remain,

Truly yours,

G. De Gasperi

To Admiral Stone
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

LIST
ACTION: POLITICAL SEC
INFO: CHIEF COMMR
C O A S

G.E.

304

107

Subject:- Northeastern Italy

~~TOP SECRET~~

Civil Affairs Section,
HQ 15 Army Group, GMP,
TEL: FILPOT 35 - 1

To:- Chief of Staff,
HQ Allied Commission

3/9/DOCAO
26 Dec 44

CONFIDENTIAL
DEC 30 1944

"Q" state that No. 1 District will probably administer Venice and Trieste. Have they a Planning Group? If so, I suggest that Venesia Region attach a liaison officer together with one or two other officers to do joint planning.

Nelson W. Morfont
NELSON W. MORFONT
Colonel, A. U. S.,
DOCAO

I agree

W/ 35/100

See III

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504
SECRET

005

106

CC 1014

25 December 1944

Subject: Political Developments in Trieste.

29 DEC 1944

To: G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters, AFHQ.

102-105

There is enclosed herewith copy of a report received from INFO dealing with recent political developments in Trieste.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

Encls.

cc: U.S. Consul
British Consul
Sir Noel Charles
Hon. Alexander Kirk

Political Section
Chief of Staff
CC Files

see Minute 110 copy sent to
Big Dangle in 500/105

SECRET

SECRET

105

To: R.G.S.(I), 15 Army Group
Admiral Stone, A.C.

No. 0730

From: I.S.I.D. (Major Page),
c/o R.A.A.C.

23 December 1944.

102-10H

The enclosed reports are from SAND/C, who is in BELGRADE, and who is reported to have presided at the meetings in question.

It is suggested that these reports should be considered together with recent information on the formation of new units of the 10th MAS Flotilla and their departure to the TRIESTE area in order eventually to oppose any attempted coup d'etat by Jugoslavs in the city.

/s/ M Page

Major, R.M.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NNN No.

785017

104

ITALY

PART I

1. Three recent meetings of TRIESTE'S National Committee of Liberation culminated in the passing of the following resolution:

We, the VENEZIA GIULIA representatives of the PARTITO P'AZIONE, PARTITO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO, PARTITO LIBERALE DEMOCRATICO and PARTITO SOCIALISTA ITALIANO, all members of the VENEZIA GIULIA C.L.S. which at this moment is responsible for the direction and organization of the struggle against the Germans and Fascists in VENEZIA GIULIA, have met in this month of December 1945, at TRIESTE, to discuss the urgent national and economic problems of the region, and have reached complete agreement on the following points:-

1. We are unanimous in our belief in the sacred and inextinguishable principle of Italian unity, a unity which has been achieved in VENEZIA GIULIA by the highest sacrifices and the rightful necessity of which was recognized by the western democracies in the 1914-1918 war of liberation, which closed the cycle of centuries of unification. We consider, therefore, the adherence of VENEZIA GIULIA to ITALY as a definite, basic principle of the well-being of the European comity of nations.

2. We are resolved to remove every obstacle standing in the way of friendly and complete collaboration between Italian and Slav by proposing an arrangement which will dispose of any valid reason for the existence of nationalist movements between the Italian and Slav peoples and enable them to live in a just and equitable harmony, while fully respecting their separate nationalities. This will be a true and concrete application of the four freedoms proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter, open up for the New Europe which is arising.

3. We are in favour of the granting of the widest possible autonomy to VENEZIA GIULIA, within the post-war Italian Constitution, for we believe that such an autonomy can be the only solution to the nationalist and economic problems affecting the commercial future of TRIESTE and PORD. This autonomy must be established in accordance with democratic principles and the economic and political requirements peculiar to VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. We propose, therefore:-

(a) The administrative autonomy of VENEZIA GIULIA and of its various local communities (Italian: "comuni"), in the interest of the VENEZIA GIULIA people, who will benefit directly from such resources. This, however, without compromising Italian national unity.

(b) The establishment of juridical, cultural and economic equality amongst the citizens of the two different nationalities, with, at the same time, the guarantee of the preservation of their respective cultural and language characteristics, thus recognizing the sacred right of peoples to the use of their own language, to the following of their own ideology and to the founding of their

SECRET

103

and cultural, religious, international and economic institutions.

- (c) The co-operation and consulting in the realm of a basis which will eliminate all questions of minorities and thus enable each people to regard the other as an equal and not as an inferior.

5. It is our conviction that, in the New Europe - freed from all national and imperialistic prejudices which have brought the world to disaster and scaled off nations one from the other behind the absurd and superficial barriers of self-sufficient economies and falsely proclaimed rights to Lebensraum - its peoples will overcome all obstacles in the way of the establishment of free trade. We consider it, therefore, our essential duty to promote the highest economic and financial development of Germany, which is the natural centre of the European Central region, and whose prosperity is essential to the life and well-being not only of the town's inhabitants but also of those in the whole of an area so poor in natural resources. TRIESTE must become a truly free port, that is a trading centre open to the ships of every nation and governed in administrative and commercial matters by a Port Committee, with proportionate numbers of representatives from the TRIESTE Municipality, the appropriate civil authorities and the industrial and commercial firms of all nationalities concerned in the functioning of the port. In this way all nations using the port of TRIESTE will be sure of every facility for navigation and all possibilities for industrial and commercial enterprise within the TRIESTE area. Merchants of all nations will thus find in us diligence and democratic spirit, a generous hospitality and complete freedom to participate industrially and commercially in the rapid post-war recovery of Central Europe.

6. We urge the people of TRIESTE, Italy, and in particular those of TRIESTE, to take the most active interest in their national and economic future. Only by the courageous and generous contribution of all concerned will it be possible to achieve those principles of justice and democracy to which they have the good right to aspire after so many cruel sufferings and so much bitterness and subjugation.

II.

1. At these three meetings of the TRIESTE C.I.N. the Communists were absent, although a seat was kept for them.

2

2. Amongst other matters the possibilities of organising Italian units to counter-balance existing Slav formations were examined, but the proposal was rejected as impracticable. Instead a motion recommending the organisation of groups of TRIESTE youth was passed unanimously. These groups were to be ready to act at the opportune moment, putting themselves at the disposal of the nuclei of Italian soldiers leading at TRIESTE together with, or before, allied troops.

3. The members of the C.I.N. beg that such a proposal be given favourable consideration since they believe it might well alter the situation radically.

4. It was decided to place the organisation of these groups in the hands of a regular army officer and not of a political leader.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

SECRET

102

Report 2.

1. The position of Italian nationals in the VERBAZIA GIULIA region is undoubtedly serious. The conviction is general that the United Nations have agreed to a request from TITO that territories in that area should pass into the Yugoslav sphere of influence. The result is that the majority of Italians in TRIESTE await events in an attitude of complete apathy.

2. Attempts to organize Italian units in the CARST area have been opposed by the Slav partisans who have even, on occasions, disbanded units thus formed. Moreover, the lack of food supplies and the co-operation of the people has been a great problem.

3. It is believed certain that the Slav partisans will descend upon the towns in VERBAZIA GIULIA the moment the Germans begin to withdraw from the area.

1

10-61

00000

0-62

20 0

SECRET

2 2 2 2