

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/179
(VOL. III)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

10000/109/179
(VOL. III)

ADMIN OF NE FRONTIER PROVINCES
MAR. - MAY 1945

286

Chief Clerk

Attached to exhibit for your information

Setu Factory

175/3/1

175/3/1

288

CC & Ex Cant have soon.

Ex

292

Acute

W 4/10

4500

294

Note

293 seen by Ex Cant.

2221

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

268

CC - Ex. Com. have seen.

Sy.

292
No. 292.

Sy. 4/8.

4500

294

Note.

293. Seen by Ex. Com.

Sy. 5/8.

300A

Also 297 seen by Ex. Com.

Sy. 10/5.

2227

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

241

240 Seen by H/Selam

No action
17/4

254.

CSO Selam

You have not seen 247-253. Para 9 & onwards is of particular interest.

25/5/45
Jat
CPS
Smt.
Pamela
Smith

25

25/4 115/10/4

2550

Minute No. 218

To: Executive Commissioner

Reference Folio 213, VP CA Section is of the opinion that integrated independent Regional A.M.G. for Venezia Giulia is a satisfactory solution and favors it.

With regard to Annex "A" Folio 211, as far as CA Section is concerned, establishment appears to be satisfactory. It is, however, not known whether it is intended that these officers should be found on the present war establishment of this Commission. If that is the case there will be some difficulty in finding all the personnel required.

No attempt has been made to answer the questions at Folio 210. A study will be made if required by you. This will, however, entail considerable work and will take some time to complete. Before carrying this out, further directions with regard to the policy in handling this territory will be essential for a satisfactory answer to be made.

30th March 1945.

E. E. Crump
E. E. CRUMP, Col.
CSO CA SECTION.

225

af Ex Com's

Please see 219-223. I have marked portions of particular interest to AC. I believe this document does not contain anything very novel but you may wish to discuss with RC Venezia Region as the one principally affected. I have arranged distribution as on folios 223 & 224.

5 Apr 45

5/4 Noted. T.

E. E. Crump
E. E. CRUMP
5 Apr

227

222

225

A/Ex Com^r

Please See 219-223. I have marked portions of particular interest to AC. I believe this document does not contain anything very novel but you may wish to discuss with RC Venezuela Region as the one principally affected. I have arranged distribution as on folios 223 & 224.

5 Apr 65

E. Shuler
5 Apr

5/4 Noted. 7.

A/Ex.C. to see E.C. dist. reply to 217 at folio 226. JCB 222
528 5/4

7/4 Chas. Commines has decided against an independent region. 2

233

A/Ex Com^r

Please See 232. CA Sec has spoken on telephone to 15 Army Group + has prepared two draft posters which will be sent forward to 16 Army Group today.

9 Apr 65 9/4 Nov. 7

E. Shuler
7/4

Minute 201

To: Executive Commission.

6/17/

While agreeing that this correspondence has continued long enough, the Legal Sub-Commission and myself are so fundamentally opposed to the opinion expressed by Col. HUGHES at Folio 174 that I suggest you sign a letter on the lines of the draft opposite folio 182.

C.R.W.

G. H. UPJOHN, Brig.
VT CA SECTION

17 March 1945

8/11/3.

Issue 174/3

See 208

~~208~~ 208

Ex. Comm.

Director: 2. paid from 208

It is the same as the draft except for the sentence between X in para 4 b. (1) and the renumbering of paras.

These distributed to a committee

192.6 above.

8/19/3.

192.6 209

206

Ex Case

Director's 2nd from 120x
It is the same in the draft
except for the sentence between
X in para 4 b. (1) and the
renumbering of paras.

These distributed to a committee
192 to above.

8/19/3.

209

MS/1913

A/Ex Case

204 10200
Hans for Jan 20
8/21/3.

24/3 Jan 4.

217

V.P. CASE

A/Ex Case will be prepared
for ans comments to be made
here in P 213

8/20/3

300

APHA for Co-3, British heads and in solid

7414

Confidential

OF REPUTATION

TELETYPE

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PAGE FOUR PD INFORMATION IS REPORTED TO THE AREA AND THE AREA
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CONFIDENTIAL

Executive Coordinator

343

TAG

Executive Coordinator

See by CO-SEC

CONFIDENTIAL

10/5
11/5

WC

AMEN for C-5, British main and the rolled

7114

6 my

OF MINORITY

Sheet 2.

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Copy to: US Ambassador
for Ambassador
to/President
O. Comandante
File 500/100

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ITEM FIVE IS THE OPTION OF THE AIR OFFICER AND AIRMAN TO DISCARD
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THEY WOULD BE THE SAME IN THE CASE OF THE MAN OR A CLASH BETWEEN THE TWO AND

Copy to: U.S. Ambassador
Mr. Ambassador
A/President
C. J. Radcliffe
File 500/100

Executive Confidential

33
(Sgt) J. A. Quayle, Major
Brigadier,
Executive Confidential

Confidential

1519

HE QUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

66

Ref: 12/11/41

SUBJECT: Report AG 8 Army - VENEZIA AREA.

TO : Distribution below.

6 MAY 1942

Confidential

Following is copy of my AG 8 report, my report on the situation in Venezia Giulia up to 23.5.42, 3 May 42:

1. My report 1.941 of 3 May gives an outline of the position obtaining in that part of Venezia Giulia at present occupied by British troops. As far as can be ascertained Yugoslav armed forces are also in all the towns and countries occupied.

2. Though the strength of the Yugoslav forces (11 batts) in Trieste and Venezia may not be very great, there are nevertheless considerable numbers of Yugoslav and pro-Yugoslav Italian partisans.

3. The Yugoslav forces and partisans have set up a complete local government administration in the area, and in Trieste which I visited yesterday, I found it to be functioning very efficiently. Reports indicate that Yugoslav sponsored administration is equally efficient in the other areas occupied by their and British forces.

4. The Tito inspired administration in Trieste is reported to be not so far removed as in Venezia, but it is nevertheless in control, while in Venezia it is reported to be in 'complete control'.

5. The administration which has been in existence since liberation, is backed by the presence of Yugoslav forces and partisans, whose obvious intention is, of course, to control the transformation of the area from Italy to Yugoslavia.

6. My information in regard to Venezia itself is from military sources, and is not yet confirmed by AG 8 officers who could only have arrived there today at the earliest, and my report in fact, have arrived yet. The officers consist of the provincial administration designate, Major Gifford and 12 other men from AG 8 (AG 8 report), but owing to the distance and quantity of communications, no report had been received or is expected from them for the past two or three days.

7. My instructions for Venezia Giulia to my officers, which are based on AG 8 directives to AG 8 Army, are to ignore allied military government, using as a matter of fact administration in force, irrespective of military

Copy to my file 298

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

though the strength of the Yugoslav forces (13 Corps) in the area and actual size may not be very great, there are nevertheless considerable numbers of Yugoslav and pro-Yugoslav Italian partisans.

3. The Yugoslav forces and partisans have not up to a certain point shown administration in the area, and in fact, I visited yesterday, I found it to be functioning very efficiently. Reports indicate that Yugoslav sponsored administration is rapidly expanding in the other areas occupied by their and Italian forces.

4. The 1100 hundred administration in the area is reported to be not so far advanced as expected, but it is nevertheless in control, while in the area it is reported to be in complete control.

5. The administration which has been in unimpeded existence for some time, is backed by the presence of Yugoslav forces and partisans, whose obvious intention is, of course, to secure the functioning of the area from ITALY to GERMANY.

6. My information in regard to the area itself is from military sources, and is not yet confirmed by A.C. officers who could only have arrived there today at the earliest, and may not in fact have arrived yet. The officers would consist of the provincial commandant designate, in the morning and 12 officers from the 1100 Light Infantry, but owing to the distance and paucity of communications, no reports had been received or in expected from them for the past few of these days.

7. My instructions for the area itself to my officers, which are based on A.C. directives to Light Infantry, are to secure the area from ITALY to GERMANY, using as a medium whatever administration is found, irrespective of nationality and to post A.C. personnel.

8. With the attention as described above, to attempt to secure the area from ITALY to GERMANY by the method of posting A.C. personnel, would in my opinion produce a result, possibly precipitating a clash between Italian and Yugoslav forces. It would be necessary to discuss Yugoslav partisans immediately which could not be done without military aid and possibly force. It might well also be necessary to remove all Yugoslav troops.

9. Under the circumstances, I consider that there is no alternative other than to accept the situation as it is found, and not to attempt to by attempting any form of A.C. military Government, until the whole question of principles has been discussed by higher authority. It is understood that A.C. are working representations to the area to 13 Corps to attempt to find a solution of the problem.

10. I have discussed the matter with the 1100 Light Infantry in turn has consulted the 13 Corps, and I am acting in my decision not to remove A.C. military Government, with his full knowledge and concurrence.

11. I shall return to 13 Corps tomorrow, by 1400, in an to do there and the officers from A.C. arrive.

See 11.10.30

for irregular, Yugoslav personnel.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

4-0-395

Office of the Executive Commissioner

RECOMMENDATION

Copy 10.1 - 10.1 Information
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10.17 - 10.17 Information

10.18 - 10.18 Information

10.19 - 10.19 Information

10.20 - 10.20 Information

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

9337
Copy No. 28
TOP SECRET
By Auth of :
CO, 15th AG :
Intel: 7/1/45 :
Date: 5/3/45 :
APO 777

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE) To accompany

NUMBER 5) Operations Instruction No. 5.

3 May 1945

Ex-Command (1)

1. OBJECT.

The object of this directive is to define administrative responsibilities:

a. NORTHWEST ITALY.

- (1) For the support of U.S. troops in VENEZIA GIULIA.
- (2) To state military government policies in VENEZIA GIULIA.

b. NORTHWEST ITALY.

- (1) To lay down procedures for Fifth Army to obtain tonnages through the Port of GENOA for forces in NORTHWEST ITALY during Phase I of occupation.

2. OPERATIONS.

See Operations Instruction No. 6, Headquarters 15th Army Group, dated 1 May 1945. Administrative procedures for the administration of NORTH ITALY as stated in Administrative Directives Numbers 1, 2 and 3, this Headquarters, will apply in addition to the procedures stated in this directive.

3. U.S. TROOPS IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

a. The occupation force for VENEZIA GIULIA will consist of one British Corps to which will be attached a U.S. Division under the operational control of Eighth Army. Administratively, the U.S. Division will be self-contained. Supporting troops for the U.S. Division will be as shown in Appendix "A". These troops will be detached from Fifth Army and attached to the designated U.S. Division upon orders issued by Headquarters 15th Army Group.

b. Until such time as the Port of TRIESTE is open, Fifth Army will deliver to dumps designated by the U.S. Division supplies to maintain levels indicated in paragraph 4d. When the Port of TRIESTE is opened

- (1) For the support of U.S. troops in VENEZIA GIULIA.
 - (2) To state military government policies in VENEZIA GIULIA.
- b. NORTHWEST ITALY.

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b. Until such time as the Port of TRIESTE is open, Fifth Army will deliver to dumps designated by the U.S. Division supplies to maintain levels indicated in paragraph 4 d. When the Port of TRIESTE is opened the levels are to be maintained by water shipments by Adriatic Base Command, with the U.S. Division placing demands for requirements directly on Adriatic Base Command. Allocation of tonnages shipped by Adriatic Base Command is the responsibility of AFHQ. Discharge at TRIESTE and transport of tonnages to U.S. Divisional dumps is the responsibility of Eighth Army. As stated in AFHQ letter AG 323.3/159 SUP-O, dated 20 April 1946, subject: "Opening of Trieste", dumping areas will be sited within the area designated as the U.S. Area in the first key plan for TRIESTE.

4. DETAIL U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

a. Personnel Administration.

Responsibility for personnel administration, i.e., processing of recommendations for officer promotion, battle casualty reports, personnel requisitions, etc., will remain with Fifth Army.

See Adm 304, Vol II

22-4-515

TOP SECRET

See
AD300A

TOP SECRET

b. Evacuation of Sick and Wounded.

Evacuation of sick and wounded will initially be by land; thereafter as prescribed by MTOUSA.

c. Evacuation of Major Items of Equipment.

Evacuation of major items of equipment will be to Fifth Army while Fifth Army is supplying the force; later as prescribed by MTOUSA.

d. Levels of Supply.

- (1) Five days level of Classes I, III, and V supplies are to be maintained. (Class V based on "Day of Supply" rate).
- (2) Classes II and IV will be by requisition on Fifth Army until Port of TRIESTE is open; thereafter on Adriatic Base Command.
- (3) Class III (POL) being a common user item, will be supplied from Eighth Army resources.
- (4) Engineer supplies will be supplied from Eighth Army resources, except for equipment peculiar to U.S. which will initially be supplied by requisition on Fifth Army; later, as prescribed by MTOUSA.

e. Movement of U.S. Force.

Only organic transport will be available for movement of the U.S. force. If this is not sufficient to meet the speed of occupation required by Eighth Army, additional transport as necessary must be provided by Eighth Army.

5. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN VENETIA GIULIA.

a. As long as Fifth and Eighth Armies are operating within the 1939 boundaries of Northeast Italy instructions contained in Administrative Directive No. 2, this Headquarters, dated 17 April 1945, subject: "Occupation of Northeast Italy", with the following exceptions, will obtain:

The composition of VENETIA GIULIA, including FRIULI and QUARNAROLO ISLANDS, but excluding the Province of TREVISO.

- (1) Personnel. Allied Commission is responsible for supplying Personnel jointly from U.S. and British sources.
- (2) Military Government. Allied Military Government will

(3) Class III (POL) being a common user item, will be supplied from Eighth Army resources.

(4) Engineer supplies will be applied from Eighth Army resources, except for equipment peculiar to U.S. which will initially be supplied by requisition on Fifth Army; later, as prescribed by NTUSA.

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The composition of VENEZIA GIULIA, including FRIULI and QUARANTARO ISLANDS, but excluding the Province of TRIESTE.

(1) Personnel. Allied Commission is responsible for supplying personnel jointly from U.S. and British sources.

(2) Military Government. Allied Military Government will function through such local authorities as may be found in effective operation, irrespective of nationality.

(3) Public Safety. Carabinieri may be employed in VENEZIA GIULIA only in areas where a Italian administration is operating. In other instances Allied Military personnel will be employed for police duties as circumstances demand, supervising local police where these are found functioning satisfactorily.

b. Additional applicable references:

- (1) AFHQ radio number 37681, dated 30 April 1945.
- (2) Operations Instruction No. 8, this Headquarters, dated 1 May 1945.

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6. PROCEDURE FOR BIDDING AND ACCEPTING TONNAGES FOR SUPPORT OF U.S. TROOPS THROUGH GENOA. Requirements will be bid by Fifth Army on PES; Fifth Army to unload, transport, store and issue supplies shipped to GENOA. Supplies stocked at GENOA will not exceed a level of 3 days for forces served. Fifth Army is responsible for movement of any supplies remaining at GENOA when troops are withdrawn.

7. Fifth Army will nominate to this Headquarters not later than noon, 6 May 1945, the specific units to meet the requirements of supporting units as shown in Appendix "A".

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

A. M. CHURCHER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIALS

WILLIAM H. HATE
Brig. Gen., GSC
A.C. of S., G-4

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G-5	21
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Engr	23
Sig Sec	24
Survey	25
WLO	26
Tec HQ 'A' Force	27
A.C. RQIE	28
ABC	29 - 31
MTUSA	32 - 34
PBS	35 - 37
Hist Sec (Italy) (Er)	38 - 43
Historian US	44
War Diary	45 - 48
AG	49
File	50
91 Division	51 - 54
Spares	55 - 65

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205

APPENDIX "A"

IN SUPPORT OF ONE U.S. DIVISION

ORDNANCE.

1 Ord Mm Co

~~1 Serv Det (SD)~~ (in file 10)

1 Plat, Ord Amm Co

Quartermaster.

1 QM Bakery Co (U.S. equip)

1 QM Laundry Plat

~~1 QM GS Sec~~ (in file 10)

1 QM GS Sec

1 QM GR Sec

1 QM Sv Co

1 QM Trk Co (with augmentation team)

Medical.

1 Evacuation Hospital
(400 bed) & detachments

1 Plat Med Amb Co (10 amb)

Military Police.

~~1 Plat~~ (in file 10)

~~1 Plat~~ (in file 10)

~~to be designated later.~~

~~1 QM 54 Co~~ (in file 10)

1 QM 55 Sec

1 QM 56 Sec

1 QM 57 Co

1 QM 58 Co (with augmentation team)

Medical.

1 Evacuation Hospital
(400 bed) & detachments

1 Flat Med Amb Co (10 amb)

Military Police.

~~1 QM 59 Co~~ (in file 10)

Engineer and Signal

~~1 QM 60 Co~~ (in file 10)
~~to be designated later~~

4585

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COPY No. ¹.....

293

ALLIED COMMISSION --- Incoming Message

Time sent: 041435

FROM : SACRED

Ref: FX 70360

TO : 15 ARMY GROUP (ACTION)
ALCOM for Stone (INFO)

Cite: MEXDI

Confidential

TOP SECRET.

Understand that by reason of conditions existing on entry
Eight Army forces in occupied areas VENEZIA GIULIA, AMG has not
been established east of ISONZO.

Refer FX 68367 of 30 April. This policy should be continued
and no steps to establish AMG in areas East of ISONZO taken until
further direction.

276

EC DISTRIBUTION - 4 May 45

	Copy No.
ACTION - Ex Ecomar	1
INFO - Chief Comar	2
US Embassy	3
Br Embassy	4
C.A. Sec	5
Ecom Sec	6
President	7

TOP SECRET

(See M 294)
[Handwritten initials and marks]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP

~~504~~
SECRET

291

Copy No 2

AFHQ

6899

4 May 45

URGENT

TOP SECRET PD

FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASE OF SIGNAL DATE TIME ZERO FOUR ZERO ZERO ONE ZERO FROM AMG EIGHTH
ARMY PD

PARISK TO AFHQ FOR RE GEORGE FIVE FOR STOPFORD FROM HQ ALONG CITE ACCEIC PAREN
TRIESTE AREA AND GORIZIA IS SUBJECT PD ALLIED FORCES AND YUGOSLAVS ARE BOTH IN
TRIESTE PD ADHERENTS OF TITO SET UP YUGOSLAV ADMINISTRATION BEFORE OUR ARRIVAL PD
THE POSITION IS DESCRIBED AS VERY DELICATE PD AMG IS NOT FUNCTIONING ALTHOUGH AMG
OFFICERS ARE THERE PD FOLLOWING IS THE POSITION IN MONFALCONE AND DISTRICT PD
THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF TITO ADHERENTS IS FUNCTIONING WELL AND HAS COMPLETE
CONTROL PD PLEBISCITE IS TO BE HELD TODAY MAY FOUR PD YUGOSLAV PARTISANS IN LARGE
NUMBERS AND FULLY ARMED ARE PARADING STREETS CMA ALSO YUGOSLAV ARMY PD
DEMONSTRATION IS TAKING PLACE IN FAVOUR TITO BUT WELL BEHAVED PD STRENGTH OF LOCAL
FEELING FOR TITO CANNOT YET BE ASSESSED OR NUMBERS OF PARTISANS PD DISARMING OF
PARTISANS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE EXCEPT BY STRONG MILITARY FORCES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO
EXPLOSIVE SITUATION PD YUGOSLAVS SAID TO BE IN CONTROL AT GORIZIA PD IT IS
REPORTED THAT YUGOSLAVS HAVE DISARMED ITALIAN PARTISANS AND ARRESTED THEM PD AFTER
CONSULTATION AMG THIRTEEN CORPS A STAND STILL HAS BEEN ORDERED ON AMG ADMINISTRATION

Cont'd Page 2/....

P/H/10-2 M.292.

2204

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TOP SECRET

290

6899

Page 2.

UNTIL VISIT BY HIGHER AUTHORITIES FROM AFHQ EXPECTED TODAY FOUR MAY PD IN
CONSEQUENCE NO PROCLAMATIONS POSTED AND NO MILITARY GOVERNMENT IMPOSED AT ANY
PLACE IN VINCENZA GIULIA PD THIS DECISION APPROVED BY ARMY COMMANDER IN CONSULTATION
WITH CORPS COMMANDER PD SENIOR CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER RETURNING TO THIRTEEN CORPS
MAY FOUR PD FOREGOING IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

Cohen To:	
SIGNAL HQ	4
A/PROVINT	3
CHIEF CORPS	4
FILE	2
SPARE	5

Office of Exec Commissioner
735

Maj.

5551

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E & Com

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MAY 040830B

OF PRIORITY

MAY 4 RECD

MAIN AMO 8TH ARMY

ACTION 15 ARMY GROUP FOR G-5 SECTION INFO HQ ALCON, HQ VENEZIA REGION

Confidential

TOP SECRET.

Subject is TRIESTE area and GORIZIA. Both Yugoslav and Allied forces are in TRIESTE. Yugoslav administration has been set up by adherents TITO before our arrival. Position is very delicate. AMO officers are in town but not functioning. Position MONFALCONE and District. Civil administration of TITO adherents in complete control and functioning well. They have made arrangements for plebiscite to be held tomorrow May 4. Large numbers Yugoslav partisans parading streets fully armed also Yugoslav Army. Well behaved demonstration in favour TITO taking place. Impossible yet assess strength of local TITO feeling or number partisans. In any case would be impossible disarm partisans unless carried out by strong military force which would be tantamount to setting off gunpowder. Position GORIZIA understood to be Yugoslavs in complete control. Italian partisans are reported to have been disarmed by Yugoslavs and arrested. In view of all above and after consultation AMO 13 Corps have ordered a standstill on AMO until position examined by higher authorities coming from AFHQ tomorrow. Therefore no proclamations have been posted and no military government has been imposed anywhere in VENEZIA GIULIA. Army commander has approved above decision in consultation with Corps commander. Am returning 13 Corps tomorrow May 4.

Copy No. 6 - Hon. Alexander Link
7 - Mr. Noel Charles
8 - Chief Commis.

LIST
Copy No 1 & 2 ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
3 INFO: A/President
4 Chief Commissioner
5 File

see 291 + M.292

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504

Ex. Commissioner

(287)

TOP SECRET

Copy No 4

FX 69950
MAY 03 1963E

MAY 4 RECD
31461
MAY 040830B
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED SITE PHOTO
ALLIED COMMISSION RE: INFO 15 ARMY GROUP 8 ARMY, 5 ARMY

Confidential

TOP SECRET.

Carabinieri may be employed VENEZIA GIULIA only in cases where an Italian ministration is operating. In other instances Allied military personnel will be employed for duties as circumstances demand supervising local police where they are found functioning satisfactory.

Dist

- Copy No 1 Action - ~~P~~ Safety Ex. Com.
- 2 Info - A/President
- 3 Chief Commissioner
- 4 ~~Exec Com~~ P SAFETY
- 5 CA Section
- 6 File

~~Assess~~ ~~State's~~ ~~comm~~

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see 17 288.

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TOP SECRET

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(1785017)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Allied Commanders' Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 9th Meeting

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

(POLITICAL)

(EXTRACT)

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE (POLITICAL) HELD IN THE 3-5 WAR ROOM AT 1030
HOURS ON THURSDAY 20 MAY 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

2. OCCUPATION OF VENETIA GULIA

THE CONFERENCE had before them a series of signals on the subject of the occupation of VENETIA GULIA, ending with a personal message from Marshal Tito to Field Marshal Alexander.

MAJOR GENERAL LAMBERT read certain further signals which had passed since publication of the agenda and which included one from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff requesting an examination as to whether it would be feasible to maintain the British forces in AUSTRIA without the use of the port of TRIESTE and communications through VENETIA GULIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MURPHY said that there were three possible methods of maintaining British forces in their zone in AUSTRIA. The first was the TRIESTE-TARVISIO route which would be the best and by far the quickest. The second was the VENICE-TARVISIO route which would be slower and the L of C would still run through certain disputed areas in the northeast portion of VENETIA GULIA. The third was the SLOVENIA route and there was no doubt that if we were restricted to it the buildup of our forces in AUSTRIA would be a very slow process. It would be necessary to bridge the PO at GORIZIA and prepare a long I. of C. which would involve a long term commitment. He therefore suggested that an interim reply should be made to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the foregoing lines and that meanwhile a detailed examination should be carried out. He considered that political rather than administrative considerations were the fundamental factors in this problem. However, if we were going to use TRIESTE we must have full control of the port. The Yugoslavs by themselves were quite incapable of opening and rehabilitating the port and repairing the communications.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER felt that the best course would be quietly to push ahead, avoiding open clashes with the Yugoslavs, and occupy the militarily important areas of VENETIA GULIA. He now had the 2nd New Zealand Division in the area and as soon as the administrative situation would permit we would move up the 91st U.S. Division. The personnel and equipment, normally required for opening

...before them a series of signals on the subject of the occupation of Venezia Giulia, ending with a personal message from Marshal Tito to Field Marshal Alexander.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWISTON read certain further signals which had passed since publication of the agenda and which included one from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff requesting an examination as to whether it would be feasible to maintain the British forces in AESTRIA without the use of the port of TRIESTE and communications through VENEZIA GIULIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that there were three possible methods of maintaining British forces in their zone in AESTRIA. The first was the TRIESTE-TARVISIO route which would be the best and by far the simplest. The second was the VENICE-TARVISIO route which would be slower and the L of C would still run through certain disputed areas in the northeast portion of VENEZIA GIULIA. The third was the MONFALCONE route and there was no doubt that if we were restricted to it the buildup of our forces in AESTRIA would be a very slow process. It would be necessary to bridge the PO at OSTEDIA and prepare a long L of C, which would involve a long term commitment. He therefore suggested that an interim reply should be made to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the foregoing lines and that meanwhile a detailed examination should be carried out. He considered that political rather than administrative considerations were the fundamental factors in this problem. However, if we were going to use TRIESTE we must have full control of the port. The Jugoslavs by themselves were quite incapable of opening and rehabilitating the port and repairing the communications.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER felt that the best course would be quietly to push ahead, avoiding open clashes with the Jugoslavs, and occupy the militarily important areas of VENEZIA GIULIA. He now had the 2nd New Zealand Division in the area and as soon as the administrative situation would permit we would move up the 91st U.S. Division. The personnel and equipment, normally required for opening a port and establishing our military communications, should be brought in as required. He did not consider Tito's reply unfavorable and he proposed to assure that the intention of it was, as Tito had previously agreed both at BELGRADE and BELGRADE, that Jugoslav forces in the immediate area of his (Field Marshal Alexander's) military communications would come under his command. He felt that if the matter was handled with tact and firmness no difficulty need arise in the occupation of TRIESTE and the area of such communications, though there might be some difficulty over the establishment of Allied military government. However, it was quite clear that any suggestion of the occupation of the whole of ISTRIA would produce quite different reactions. He felt that the course of going ahead on a military basis had now been forced on him, and he would not be able to do anything about the political problems involved, which must be settled on a governmental level.

- 1 -
See by hC
L. file 3192
T O R E S E C R E T
V L J

EXTRACT ONLY

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BNA

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

MR. MacMillan thought that events had travelled some way since the earlier discussions and any proposal to occupy the whole of VAREZLA GIVILA was no longer practicable. It was quite clear that the British and U.S. Governments did not propose to launch a war with the Yugoslavs in order to secure control of the area. It was, therefore, now of importance to occupy rapidly as much of the area as could be seized without a major clash with the Yugoslav forces. He thought it would be advisable to despatch a considered reply to Marshal Tito, re-stating the course which the Supreme Allied Commander proposed to take, and at the same time to proceed with firmness and tact to occupy areas of military importance, relying on the judgment of local Allied Commanders to avoid serious clashes.

MAJOR GENERAL LEWISTON observed at this point that he had just received a message to the effect that the German garrison in PRINZ had surrendered to the New Zealand Division at 1530 hours on 2nd May. No Yugoslav troops had been concerned and no unusual incidents had been reported.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM observed that it was not without interest that the reports now received from the New Zealand Division were quite contrary to those recently put out from Yugoslav sources.

GENERAL BOMANNEY said that it was quite evident that the Yugoslavs had been claiming to have occupied larger areas than they had in fact done. He was fully in favour of the policy of going ahead firmly and securing the areas vital to us, while avoiding serious clashes.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, agreeing with the Chief of Staff, suggested that POLA might be occupied by sea.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that General Clark had just informed him by telephone that New Zealand troops were proceeding towards POLA. He had, however, warned General Clark to be particularly careful to avoid a clash in connection with this movement. In reply to a question by Rear Admiral Stone he said that if POLA was occupied as a naval port we should control it and Allied military government should be installed. He considered that, as suggested by the British Resident Minister, a telegram should be despatched to Tito, thanking him for his communication, saying that all appeared to be going well and that the Allied forces would go ahead on the lines previously agreed upon. These should then be reiterated on the basis of setting out our military requirements. In response to a query by MR. MacMillan he agreed that it would be best to avoid mentioning Allied military government, though this would be established in the areas we occupied.

MR. KIPP agreed with the Supreme Allied Commander's proposal to despatch a telegram on these lines.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM observed that it was quite evident that the reports now received from the New Zealand Division were quite contrary to those recently put out from Yugoslav sources.

GENERAL HEMMINGWAY said that it was quite evident that the Yugoslavs had been claiming to have captured larger areas than they had in fact done. He was fully in favour of the policy of going ahead firmly and securing the areas vital to us, while avoiding serious clashes.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON, agreeing with the Chief of Staff, suggested that ZOLA might be occupied by us.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that General Clark had just informed him by telephone that New Zealand troops were proceeding towards ZOLA. He had, however, warned General Clark to be particularly careful to avoid a clash in connection with this movement. In reply to a question by Rear Admiral Stone he said that if ZOLA was occupied as a naval port we should control it and Allied military government should be installed. He considered that, as suggested by the British Resident Minister, a telegram should be despatched to Tito, thanking him for his communication, saying that all appeared to be going well and that the Allied forces would go ahead on the lines previously agreed upon. These should then be reiterated on the basis of setting out our military requirements. In response to a query by Mr. Bremmiller he agreed that it would be best to avoid mentioning Allied military government, though this would be established in the areas we occupied.

MR. KIRK agreed with the Supreme Allied Commander's proposal to despatch a telegram on these lines.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that instead of mentioning Allied military government it should be stated that we would send forward the necessary organization to permit the opening of the port and the rehabilitation of communications.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

- (a) Directed that there should be no change in his instructions on this subject to 15th Army Group. These forces should continue to secure the areas of VENEZIA GIULIA of military importance, proceeding firmly and with tact and avoiding serious clashes with the Yugoslavs.
- (b) Instructed the Chief of Staff to draft for his approval a telegram to Marshal Tito in accordance with his remarks at (a) above.
- (c) Directed that full Allied military government be set up in the normal way in areas occupied by Allied forces, in accordance with the policy at (a) above.

TOP SECRET

JKD/day

MAIN HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIA REGION

Allied Military Government
APO 394

Dear General

30 April 1945

Rec'd 3/8

When I last wrote about Trieste to the Chief Commissioner, I promised to keep him in touch with further developments. All further developments have happened rather rapidly and the very latest news as I write this letter, the news of Tito's Partisans fighting in Trieste, overshadows all else of importance.

I think, however, that it might be of use to you to know the story of the last few days from our point of view. When I last wrote we had put in a bid for 35 officers, 25 men and nine vehicles. That bid was subsequently cut down and discussions between Con Benson and army proceeded on the basis of a reduced party to go by water. It still appeared that any Trieste expedition might likely start by water and that Lucera was as good a location as any other for our 'Group D'. This was confirmed in the discussion at AMG 8th Army as late as the night of Thursday 26 April when Piekke was forward visiting us. All this time I had kept forward as part of my own Advance Headquarters, Lt. Col. Armstrong, who I had suggested should go in the Trieste party as Chief Staff Officer to Col. Scholtz, and he had been through all papers with me and had discussed several points with the I branch at 8th Army. We also happened to have at Main Headquarters two officers destined for the Venezia Giulia party.

On Sunday, 28 April, Scholtz arrived at my Advance Headquarters and I arranged at once for him to go through all papers with Armstrong. That afternoon a Staff Officer from 55 Area arrived to say that his Area would be in charge of Trieste and that they were beginning to concentrate at Cesena. In view of this general discussion I proposed to Con Benson that we should send a line to the Lucera party calling them forward to Cesena.

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See Atdo 327, Vol 4

In the meantime I understand that an allotment for officers on the sea party, should it come off, would consist of:-

D or D plus 1 - 2 officers and 1 vehicle
E plus 2 or after - 6 officers, 6 ORs and 2 vehicles

This can be formed from Lt. Col. Orpwood's party when it arrives. Alternatively they can be sent by road to reinforce Col. Scholtz.

You will observe that this entire operation is being carried out by 8th Army and the Civil Affairs aspect is entirely the responsibility of SCAO 8th Army, to whom we are giving every assistance within our power. ^{Naturally} It would not be proper for me to intervene personally in the affairs of Trieste at this stage. I am, however, keeping very closely in touch with the situation, ready to do anything which I am called upon to perform.

You will be aware of the plans which are being made regarding occupation of Venezia Giulia, in the first instance, by one British Division, later by one American and one other British Division. It is quite clear that all these plans are entirely subject to the new developments.

Handwritten signature

Brigadier Maurice Lushcombe,
Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters Allied Commission.

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Map in

M.

Brigadier Maurice LushcsCE.
Executive Commissioner.
Headquarters Allied Commission.

1072

1 Ext: 93.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
NIGHTH ARMY

SECRET

- Lt. Col. Opwood.

OPERATION ORDER - TRIESTE

29 April, 45.

To: Lt-Col. SCHOLTZ
O.C. Civil Affairs Det.
TRIESTE.

Confidential

1. The 2nd New Zealand Division have been directed today by 13 Corps to proceed to the town of TRIESTE by road. It is believed that there was little or no resistance.

MOVEMENT.

2. You will proceed on 30th April, starting from CEREVA to follow 2nd N.Z. Div to TRIESTE. You will arrive as soon as possible after, or with the 8.Z. Div.

PERSONNEL.

3. The following Personnel will compose the TRIESTE Team.

Lt-Col. SCHOLTZ	O.C.	A
Lt-Col. ARMSTRONG		B
Major RUIZI	P.H.O.	A
Capt. MAYDON	Sup Offr.	
Major COWAN	O.A.P.O.	
Major RINGQUIST	Fin Offr.	B
Capt. GAZIANO	Legal Offr.	A
Major FODEN	Public Works	

4 C.A.Os.

3 Clerks.

2 G.D. Men

6 Drivers (4 Cereva Party - 2 ROVICO Party)

4. The officers mentioned b/ name above will rendez-vous at VENEZIA Station H.Q. CEREVA today, 29th April.

MOVEMENT.

2. You will proceed on 30th April, starting from CESENA to follow 2nd M.Z. Div to TRIESTE. You will arrive as soon as possible after, or with the 4.3. Div.

PERSONNEL.

3. The following Personnel will compose the TRIESTE Team.

Lt-Col. SCHOLTZ	C.C.	A
Lt-Col. ARMSTRONG		B
Major RUINI	P.H.O.	A
Capt. MAYDON	Sup Offr.	
Major COHAN	C.A.P.O.	
Major RINGQUIST	Fin Offr.	B
Capt. GAZIANO	Legal Offr.	A
Major FOUEN	Public Works	

4 C.A.Os.
3 Clerks.
2 U.D. Men
6 Drivers (4 Cesena Party - 2 ROVIGO Party)

4. The officers mentioned by name above will rendez-vous at VENEZIA Region H.Q. CESENA today, 29th April.

5. The four C.A.Os will rendez-vous with the CESENA Party at the Prefettura ROVIGO on 30th April or 1st May.

TRANSPORT.

6. CESENA Party:

1 Command Car	ex VENEZIA Region.
1 Jeep	ex Lt-Col. Armstrong.
2 3-tonners	ex VENEZIA Region.
2 15-cwts	with C.A.Os at ROVIGO.

ROVIGO Party:

TIMING & ROUTE.

7. CESENA Party is to move first light 30th April to ROVIGO via FERRARA. Link up with C.A.Os at earliest possible towards TRIESTE. C.C. Party to determine own route from ROVIGO.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT TRIESTE.

5. On arrival at TRIESTE you will set up Allied Military Government in the normal manner.

9. You are to use such existing local administration as you find there, provided that, but irrespective of whether it has been set up by Yugoslav or by Italian Anti-Fascist supporters.

10. If there is no local Government in existence, you will form one, using suitable local people for the purpose, being particular not to discriminate against persons on account of either their Yugoslav or Italian sympathies.

11. It is extremely important to avoid any indication as to the future of TRIESTE or any part of VENETIA GIULIA.

12. In the event of any difficulty with Yugoslav forces you will refer to the local Military Commander for instructions.

POLICE.

13. No Carabinieri or Italian Public Safety personnel from Occupied Italy will be introduced into TRIESTE pending further instructions.

14. Local Police as found may be used subject to screening and supplemented if necessary by suitable civilians or partisans.

FINANCE.

15. All Fascist accounts are to be blocked. Banks may be allowed to remain open or may be re-opened, provided there is sufficient currency available to last until fresh supplies of Allied Military Lire can reach you.

LAW.

16. Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, General Orders Nos. 1 and (Provisional Gen Order No. 29 are to be posted on arrival. You will not permit Italian Courts to function in TRIESTE until receipt of further orders.

PATRIOTS.

17. It is the intention to disarm patriots who are declared by the Military Commander to be of no further operational value. This should be done in your case when you are satisfied that there is sufficient military equipment to do so. Disarmament should be done

to the local Military Commander for instructions.

POLICE.

13. No Carabinieri or Italian Public Safety personnel from Occupied Italy will be introduced into TRIESTE pending further instructions.

14. Local Police as found may be used subject to screening and supplemented if necessary by suitable civilians or partisans.

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LAW.

16. Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, General Orders Nos. 1 and (Provisional) Order No. 29 are to be posted on arrival. You will not permit Italian Courts to function in TRIESTE until receipt of further orders.

PATRIOTS.

17. It is the intention to disarm patriots who are declared by the Military Commander to be of no further operational value. This should be done in your case when you are satisfied that there is sufficient military strength to enforce the order. Disarmament should be done in close cooperation with the local Military Commander.

REPORTS.

18. You are to keep this H.Q. in touch with the civilian situation in TRIESTE by signal at frequent intervals.

19. ACK.

/s/ G Benson
Air Commodore,
Officer Commanding,
HQ., A.M.G. EIGHTH ARMY.

DISTRIBUTION:

Lt-Col. SCHULTZ - G.O. Civil Affairs Det TRIESTE - Sub Regnl Comm
Regional Commissioner, VENEZIA Region (1)
H.Q. Allied Commission, APO 394 (1) AMG Rear Eighth Army. (1)
File OA/15

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/11/01 BY 60322

VENEZUELA REPORT NUMBER NO. 355

BY BRIGADIER J. K. DUNLOP, CBE, MC, RD

29 Apr 45

1. The following Officers and AD/ORS are assigned to Venezia Giulia Team and are placed under command HQ 443 Eighth Army waf date of this order:

Dep. Reg. Commissioner	Br Col J. D. Scholtz	(A)
Provincial Commissioner	Lt Col E. J. Armstrong	(B)
Public Safety	Maj J. H. K. Cowan	(A)
Public Health	Maj J. L. D. Pugh	(A)
Legal	Capt R. A. Galiano	(A)
Finance	Maj W. J. B. Kingquist	(B)
Public Works	Maj J. E. Roden	(B)
Clerks	Cpl Alley R. H.	(A)
	Cpl 5 Rudi A. O.	(A)
General Duty	Pvt McCarver W. F.	(A)
	Pfc Poldi D.	(A)
Drivers	Pte Pawbert J.	(B)
	Pvt Davine S.	(B)
	Pvt Butler S.	(B)
	Capt McCarver M.	(B)
	Cpl Montcalm L. L.	(A)

2. The following transport will be made available for the team:

1	C & R
1	Jeep
2	3-tonners
1	Other vehicles

Public Safety	Maj	J.A.K. Conner	(A)
Public Health	Maj	J.A.O. Puig	(A)
Legal	Capt	R.A. Gagliano	(A)
Finance	Maj	M.L.E. Kingquist	(E)
Public Works	Maj	J.B. Paden	(E)
Clerks	Cpl	Alley S.H.	(A)
	T-5	Modt A.O.	(A)
General Duty	Pvt	Muller W.F.	(A)
	Pfc	Teill D	(A)
	Pte	Rowberry J	(B)
Drivers	Dr	Lawing S	(E)
	Dr	Butler S	(E)
	Sgt	Richards M	(E)
	Cpl	Pericalini L.D.	(A)

2. The following transport will be made available for the team:

- 1 C & R
- 1 Jeep
- 2 3-tonners
- 1 Other vehicle

3. The team will move from Main HQ under command Lt Col Scholtz at 0700 hrs Monday 30 Apr 45.

4. Battalion will be provided by HQ and 84th Army for all personnel for fifteen (15) days.

5. All personal kit and stores as required will be taken.

6. Mess Officer, CO Co. M and HQ Commandant will arrange breakfasts for party at 0630 hrs.

[Signature]
Maj. R.A.

for Regional Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

DISTRIBUTION

- 1 - each Offi. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. N. O. P. Q. R. S. T. U. V. W. X. Y. Z.
- 1 - Lists 'A' & 'B'
- 1 - Advance HQ Variable Region
- 1 - C.O. Co. 'M'
- 1 - Mess Officer
- 2 - HQ AMG Eighth Army
- 1 - HQ A.C. G-3 (a)
- 1 - HQ A.C. G-1 (a)
- 5 - Spares

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FOLIOS 248 + 249
MINUTES 249 + 280

SIGNAL FX 68384 ON 30 APR 45
FROM AFHQ SUBJ "POLICY - VENEZUE
GIULIA" TRANSFERRED TO FILE 522/EC
WITH MINUTES 249 + 280 REFERRING
THERETO.

29 MAY 45


-1001

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

AND MAIN 8 ARMY

6662

1 MAY 45

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

REFERENCE YOUR MINE EIGHT EIGHT FIVE OF ONE MAY PD

PAYEN TO AND MAIN EIGHT ARMY FROM HQ ALDUM CITE ACRCX SIGNED STONE PAREN

COMMANDING GENERAL EIGHTH ARMY HAS COPY OF FULL INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SUBJECT CHA

SENT BY SACRED TO COMMANDING GENERAL FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP PD TOPSED SIGNAL

FX SIX EIGHT THREE EIGHT SEVEN OF THIRTY APRIL REFERS

Approved

75/45/45

6566

Executive Commissioner

300

15/ J. A. Quayle

[Signature] E. TALENT, Major

H. E. DRABNETT
Lt. Col, AGO
Adjutant

2244

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504

271

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Ex-Com

Originator's Reference: H 885
Date/Time of Origin: MAY 011308

Message Centre No: 2/0292
Date/Time Recd: MAY 011515Z
Precedence: PRIORITY
MAY 1 - RECD

FROM: ADG NAES 8 ARMY
TO: HQ ALCON

RESTRICTED ACTION

RESTRICTED

In view operational picture essential be given policy and direction on attitude to be adopted in TRIESTE. Particularly if Yugoslave control has been imposed in such control to be accepted under Allied Military Government alone or jointly with Yugoslav representation. Advance party for TRIESTE gone by road following Armed Forces and are at this moment no longer in touch. You have received copy instruction given officer in charge party.

Dist

Action - Exec Comm 2
Info - A/President
 Chief Commissioner
 File 2
 Float

HEADQUARTERS
1 MAY 1945
A. C.

4505

See 272

(Mrs Talbot)

RESTRICTED

SECRET

Confidential
MAY 1 1967

CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1. OBJECT

To set up JMI and Civil Administration of North West Italy.

Note: These plans do not include measures connected with the Economic field.

2. OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

Whatever may be the circumstances of the enemy's surrender or collapse, the final object to be attained is setting up JMI will, in broad outline, be carried out in accordance with established practices and procedures which have hitherto obtained in the occupation of Italy.

There are, however, special circumstances connected with the sudden collapse or execution of N.W. Italy that require special consideration. There are too, special considerations to be taken into account, i.e., Strategic, Industrial, Economic, large welfare organizations, etc.

3. N.W. ITALY is defined as comprising the following areas:

- (1) VENETIA Division
- (2) MARCONI Division
- (3) The JMI Region less the Province of TRIESTE and TREVISO.

4. FUNCTION

The normal duties of existing Civil Affairs policies will govern the occupation of N.W. Italy through National Control. Plans of the following Sub-Commissions are attached:

- Local Government
- Public Health
- Public Safety
- Displaced Persons & Evacuees

Enclosure

785017

However, may be the circumstances of the case's withdrawal or
 further, the steel object to be retained in matter as will, in
 based outline, be carried out in accordance with established practice
 and procedure which have hitherto obtained in the operation of
 IT/LL.

There are, however, special circumstances connected with the sudden
 collapse or execution of M.V. Italy that require special consideration.
 From the top, however, considerations to be taken into account, i.e. operation
 terms, industrial terms, large output production, etc.

3 M.V. ITALY is defined as comprising the following areas:

- (1) Government
- (2) Military Service
- (3) Military Service

WHILE AND ADVANCE.

4 STAND

The normal method of existing civil affairs policies will govern the
 occupation of M.V. Italy through National Control. Plans of the following
 Sub-Committees are attached:

- Local
- Local Government
- Public Health
- Public Safety
- Displaced Persons & Repatriation

Telephone

IV 4504

Directives on the following have been published already:

Transition

Mine Clearance Plan for M.ITALY of 23 July 45.
 Munitions & Fire Arms Ref: Administrative Memo No. 20
 Education Administration Instruction No. 1.

6 INTERVIEW

The allotment of personnel to Divisions will be issued as a separate
 instruction by Establishment Section.

7 R 4-11-45

G.S. WARDEN, BRIS.
 W. C. Section.

See Distribution over.

(Mrs. Ward) (Copy passed For CC Files)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TO: 15th Army Group, G-5 Section,
APO SF, Army
FROM: APO MA, A107
SUBJECT: REGION (30)
RE: REGION (3)
Dante Commission (1)
W. Noble Section (2)
Political Advisor (2)
No. 2 District (1)
No. 1 District (1)

SECRET

ENCLOSURE I

(to W/ADM/2 of 30 Sep 65)

LEGAL CASE ITALY FILE: LEGAL CASE-074000000

ARMED MILITARY COURTS

- 1 The operation of Armed Military Courts raises problems, similar to those already encountered in newly occupied territory, although these problems are likely to be intensified by the relatively small number of legal officers available for these areas. These problems will not, however, be simplified by any wider delegation of powers either for the purpose of reviewing of court cases or for the constituting or convening of courts.
- 2 A panel for General Courts will be appointed.
- 3 The armed military authorities should, whenever possible, be requested to make available officers to sit on General Courts, and if required, also on Superior Courts and to act as prosecuting and, when necessary, defending officers in such Courts.

ITALIAN COURTS

- 4 The great majority of judicial officials in Italy is believed to have refused the oath of allegiance to the Republican Socialist Government and it is thought that there should be no substantial shortage of judicial personnel not on retention in office. Some 12 officials of varying grades who hold appointments in Italy are at present in Italian Government territory and can be returned to their posts when required.
- 5 In addition to the normal courts special Courts of Appeal will be set up to deal with fascist criminals collaborating with the Germans. An Italian Government decree has been passed for the constitution of these courts; this decree has been implemented for the territory and the Courts should be brought into operation as soon as possible in order to assist the maintenance of law and order.
- 6 The provision of judicial personnel for these Courts and for general operation purposes is likely to involve a heavy strain on the total personnel available. It will be necessary however to ensure that personnel are provided for these purposes and for the subordinate Courts as soon as possible. It will depend upon the numbers available, how soon the Superior Courts can be opened.
- 7 In any case it will be necessary for the local HQ to make detailed appointments of judicial personnel locally available to fill vacancies.

3 The local military authorities should, wherever possible, be requested to make available assistance to all on "military courts, and if required, also to Superior Courts and to act as prosecutors and, when necessary, inflicting sentences in such Courts.

ITALIAN COURTS.

4 The great majority of judicial officials in U.S. Italy is believed to have refused the oath of allegiance to the Revolutionary Socialist Government and it is thought that there should be no suggestion of shortage of judicial personnel who can be retained in office. Some 12 officials of varying grades and solid appointments in U.S. Italy are at present in Italian Government territory and can be authorized to their duties when required.

5 In addition to the local courts Special Courts of Assize will be set up to deal with Fascist criminals collaborating with the Germans. An Italian Government course has been passed for the constitution of these courts; this course has been implemented for all territory and the courts should be brought into operation as soon as possible in order to assist the maintenance of law and order.

6 The provision of judicial personnel for these Courts and for general operations purposes is likely to involve a heavy strain on the total personnel available. It will be necessary however to ensure that personnel are provided for these purposes and for the administrative Courts as soon as possible. It will depend upon the numbers available, how soon the Superior Courts can be opened.

7 In any case it will be necessary for the local law to be provided by appointments of judicial personnel locally available to this transitional government. These appointments in U.S. Italy, in view of communication difficulties, have to be directed to the military authorities in the exception, but the should be reported to Legal and-Consolidation for ratification in the usual way.

8 The Italian Government has appointed by course a Supreme Military Tribunal for Northern Italy. Sections may be established where required. It may be desirable for a Section to be set up in U.S. Italy.

9 It will be necessary to secure close liaison in the work of the above Courts. The Italian Civil Courts and the Military Tribunal is to ensure that prompt disposition is made of the urgent cases. It may be necessary for the Courts, at least in the early stages, to handle cases which would normally be left for the Italian Courts.

785017

4742 J. Neurosci., September 24, 2008 • 28(39):4736–4744

III 30575

2004.05.07.09.27.18

A portion of the of the... to be current... will... to be... to be...

...of liquid... to be... to be...

7. It is expected by all... that should any... arise, staff... to be... to be...

8. ...be... to be... to be...

Medical Supplies

9. A requisition for... medical supplies... in August 1944... to be... to be...

10. There will be... at all times at least... medical supplies... to be... to be...

11. When these... are... medical supplies will be... to be... to be...

12. The medical... in... will be... to be... to be...

13. All... medical... and... to be... to be...

14. Senior... medical... to be... to be...

Italy (Northwest and Northeast Italy)

15. ...to be... to be... to be...

...to be... to be... to be...

11. When the number of Italian internees in the army and in all Italian volunteer units has been furnished to the military authorities.

12. The volunteer organization is authorized for voluntary purposes to be about 5 million and the United States problems certain to occur include mine clearance, engineering, forest-land-clearing, water drainage, clothing and food supplies. A large-scale of volunteer organizations has been built up in Italy, Greece, and other countries. A large-scale supply of Italian volunteer organizations for this area is expected to arrive in 1945.

13. Volunteer organizations are expected to be found in Italy, Germany, France, and other countries and these will be taken to provide their labor force.

DISPATCH

14. It is anticipated that volunteer needs will be greater in North Africa, Italy, and in Germany. It is the intention of this highly industrial nation to be decentralized, without a dependent with standing military. If the production of food, clothing, and other materials for production will come from the government.

15. Plans of the volunteer groups are based on the assumption that they will be in the same distribution and that all of the people will be in the same.

16. Clothing furnished by the American Relief for Italy and to be distributed by the National Italian American Council in 1945, is the intention to be distributed. It is expected that several hundred thousand can be obtained for the 50 trucks now operating under contract, but owned by American Relief for Italy. These trucks will also carry vitamins and food, especially milk for children.

17. Every effort is made to eliminate the shipping of foodstuffs. Distribution of all essential materials will be made in 1945 in the amount they are authorized. The American Relief for Italy, 100,000 blankets for Northern Italy, is expected to be received and will be turned over to the American Relief for distribution to the Italian and American.

18. The American Relief for Italy under the direction of the American Relief for Italy will continue to distribute their clothing which is already authorized.

19. American Relief for Italy clothing will meet the first and pressing needs in the different areas are authorized. American Relief for Italy Inc. clothing will be supplied to the authorized areas after the American Relief for Italy distribution has been completed and after the American Relief for Italy has been received.

20. The supplementary clothing plan will be similar to those used in Italy, England, and Germany with public feeding stations being set up in the largest cities to meet the basic needs. An information system has been set up to coordinate food requirements and information will be immediately passed to the American Relief for Italy.

21. Immediate contact will be made with existing UNRRA and UNRRC for the purpose of having their function under food management as quickly as possible.

22. Labor, industry and commerce (ILO) and UNRRC will be kept in touch of the labor and locations of employment on relief.

1000

STORY OF THE FUTURE

[illegible]

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2002年12月15日

O. V. S. f.
 Guardia Nacionalista Republicana
 Infantry Militia
 Boat and Telegraph Militia.
 Railway Militia.
 Frontier Militia.

TABLE 2. SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS

0282-4002/97/0004-0000\$05.00/0

5. (C. 37). on ring empty occupied territory will start a distinctly shoulder

10
 11
 12
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 14

POLICE FORCES TO BE DISBANDED:

2 The underground organizations will be disbanded immediately upon our arrival:

- A. V. V.
- Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana
- Hitler Youth
- Post and Telecommunications Militia,
- Railway Militia,
- Weather Militia,

REORGANIZATION OF POLICE FORCES:

3 Police personnel, other than CC.MR., will be utilized at once provided there is no objection to any individual on grounds of military security. Subsequently, ordinary operation measures will take their course.

REMARKS:

4 Special plans have been made for sending CC.MR. into Northern Italy for two reasons:

- (a) The CC.MR. in the North are believed to have been disbanded by the Fascists and the Germans, and
- (b) ex-CC.MR. found in the North cannot be immediately re-utilized because the maximum strength of 45,000 for the whole of Italy has already been reached.

5 CC.MR. entering newly occupied territory will wear a distinctive insignia before being distributed there from the CC.MR. found in Northern Italy. Regional Public Safety Officers will ensure that this is complied with.

6 Briefly, CC.MR. will be sent forward in three stages:

- (a) Mobile CC.MR. attached to 5th and 8th Armies will have forward with the advancing troops.
- (b) Specialized CC.MR., already armed forward, will be sent into Northwest Italy for permanent duty as territory is occupied.
- (c) Reserve CC.MR. will be sent to complete the strength of Venezia Division if fixed CC.MR. cannot be used for this purpose.

7 These plans are based on an authorized strength of 55,000 Officers and men. Tentative plans are being made for increasing proportionately the CC.MR. strength if the maximum is raised from 45,000 to 65,000.

Detailed plans are set out in 2 parts.

- 2 -

CHAMBERSHIRE MILITARY BATTALION

8 A Mobile Battalion of CC.MB. will be organized for patrolling the various Region to prevent civil disturbances and banditry.

Personnel

1 Major
3 Captains
6 Lieutenants
6 Sergeants
12 N.C.O's.
27

Equipment

1 Motor Car
12 3-ton Trucks
12 Armoured Cars.

Total 305

All the vehicles (with the exception of 7 armoured cars which are now being procured) are available and the Battalion is in course of being mobilized.

CHAMBERSHIRE MILITARY BATTALION IN NORTHWEST ITALY

9 CC.MB. reporting for duty will be sent to CC.MB. Chambershire Centre established in forward areas, where they will be investigated by a Commission of specially selected N.C.O. Officers. If found suitable they may be re-allocated, provided an equal number of auxiliary or over-age CC.MB. in Southern Italy are released. In the interval between reporting for duty and acceptance into the CC.MB. it is proposed to pay and feed them as in previous. (But this arrangement has not yet been confirmed.)

ARMIES OF PUBLIC SECURITY

10 It is proposed to allow the existing organization to continue. However, it is likely that several Quar and senior Officers may have fled or may have been removed by partisans or by the G.P.I. The appointment of substitutes will be made, or confirmed, by the J.M. Provincial Commissioner with the advice of the local Public Safety Officer.

ARMY QUARTERS

11 The existing organization will be retained. Senior Officers are available in Rome for transfer to the North if necessary.

212 the vehicles (with the exception of 7 armored cars which are now being procured) are available and the Battalion is in course of being mobilized.

ORGANIZED PERSONNEL STAFF IN VENEZUELA

1. CC.BB. reporting for duty will be sent to CC.BB. Some time before established in former cases, where they will be investigated by a Commission of specially selected CC.BB. Officers. If found suitable they may be re-assigned, provided an equal number of suitable CC.BB. Officers, in South America are released. In the interval between reporting for duty and acceptance into the CC.BB. it is proposed to pay and feed these men as prisoners. (But this arrangement has not yet been confirmed.)

POINTS OF INTEREST

10. It is proposed to allow the existing organization to continue. However, it is likely that several CC.BB. and Senior Officers may have fled or may have been removed by prisoners or by the U.S. The appointment of substitutes will be made, or confirmed, by the JAG Provost Marshal with the advice of the local Public Safety Officer.

FINANCIAL GUARANTEES

11. The existing organization will be retained. Senior Officers are available in some for transfer to the North if necessary.

12. It is expected that a large proportion of the CC.BB. strength will be found intact in the North, but a reserve of 600 men is available for transfer if the need arises.

The authorized strength of CC.BB. in Venezuela is as follows:

Officers	Men	Total
171	1,501	1,672
		<u>7,596</u>

RATIONS

13. CC.BB. will draw rations at the Italian Army scale, while other personnel will be supplied with rations at the special scale set out in Memorandum 10/3-1/wood of 12 Oct 44.

SECRET

TRANSPORT

14. Apart from the White Devils of CO. 101, described in paragraph 3 above, no vehicles will be sent to Northern Italy. No will be made of such transport as is found in the possession of the local Police or can be obtained from military sources or by requisitioning.

FRONTIER CONTROL

15. The frontiers to be considered are those of Austria and Yugoslavia.

The control of the frontiers is the responsibility of ARS, and no instructions have yet been published. However, the following principles are likely to be adopted:-

- (a) The enforcement of the control will be carried out by Italian personnel - possibly C.I.F. - not by ARS.
- (b) The assistance of Italian Police will be sought to augment Italian personnel in controlling the frontiers.
- (c) As soon as Northwest Italy is secured the frontiers will be closed.
- (d) At a later stage civilians in possession of Military Travel Authorizations or Allied Forces Permits will be allowed to cross the frontiers.
- (e) At a very much later stage the frontiers may be opened to the conveyance of merchandise in accordance with plans made by Finance Sub-Commission.

16. The task of Public Safety will be to provide the Italian Police to work under Allied Military supervision. The Fascist Volunteer Militia will be disbanded not its place taken by CO. 101, and CO. 102. At the moment it is not proposed to use Agents of Public Security. The main work will be done by CO. 101, and it is expected that most of them will be found at their frontier posts.

17. No firm arrangements can be made until ARS plans have been settled but the following resources are being held in readiness:

CO. 101. 200 (to be available within a few days.)
CO. 102. 800 (to be available within a few days.)

CO-OPERATION WITH THE MILITARY

18. Public Safety Officers in Northwestern Italy will work in the closest touch with Allied Military Police (including C.I.F. and C.I.D.) and also with the Allied Military Security Services (MSS and CIO). In the event of situations arising with which the Italian Police are unable to cope, Allied Military Police will be called upon to assist.

16 The task of Public Safety will be to provide the Italian Police to work under Allied Military supervision. The Frontier Trooper Militia will be disbanded and its place taken by 20,000 and 10,000. At the moment it is not proposed to use Agents of Public Security. The main work will be done by 10,000, and it is expected that most of them will be found at their frontier posts.

17 No firm arrangements can be made until Army plans have been settled but the following reserves are being held in readiness:

March. 200 (to be available within 8 few days.)
 10,000. 600 (to be available within a few days.)

CO-OPERATION WITH THE MILITARY.

18 Public Safety Officers in Northeastern Italy will work in the closest touch with Allied Military Police (including S.I.B. and C.I.B.) and also with the Allied Military Security Services (M.S.S. and C.I.C.). At the moment of discussion arising with which the Italian Police are unable to cope, Allied Military assistance will be obtained.

19 No information is available as to the number of Allied or Italian Garrison Troops likely to be stationed in Northeast Italy.

SECURITY

20 It has been agreed that Regional Criminals will have a Security Officer working under the Regional Public Safety Officer to advise and assist him with security problems. A separate directive will be issued as to their functions.

Briefly, there will consist of screening local officials and Allied Commission civilian employees, liaison with other Military and Civil Security forces, enquiries in regard to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities, liaison between Police officers and intelligence agencies, etc.

SECRET

TRANSITION

- 22 A list of prisons in the area is shown in Appendix 22, together with accommodation and classification. In this connection, attention is drawn to AC Directive 917/522/67, in regard to the requisition of such institutions.

WIDE AREA CIVIL DEFENSE

- 23 Italian Fire and Civil Defense organizations will be reconstituted. At the earliest convenient moment the Civil Defense personnel will be refused to numbers commensurate with the duties to be performed.

- 24 Six trucks also portable pumps are stationed in Rome ready to be sent forward to Vercelle. Two trucks service the met. Trained crews of 10 men for each truck are available in Rome and can be sent forward with the vehicles if there is any shortage of trained personnel in Vercelle.

- 25 Public Safety Officers will maintain liaison with Allied Military Fire and TAD Services, particularly in the Porte.

CONTROL OF CIVILIAN MOVEMENT

- 26 For the purposes of the control of civilian movement, newly occupied territory will continue to be regarded as being within the Army Zone until local military authority authorizes a change-over from Army Zone to Restricted Zone, or from Restricted Zone to Free Zone.

- 27 Decree No. 1, Article 16, will apply until the territory is turned over to Regional Control. General Order No. 20 will then be posted.

- 28 Local adjustments with 10 Km. restriction may be considered necessary in the case of towns with large built up areas. Such adjustments are subject to the permission of the local military command.

- 29 It is anticipated that the frontier provisions will continue to be regarded as a restricted area for an indefinite period.

- 30 The provisions of Executive Decree No. 17 will be complied with by all concerned on all occasions.

- 31 With regard to civilians wishing to leave Italian territory, appli-

sent forward to 2 miles. See which carries ten men. Trained areas of 10 feet for each truck are available in Rome and can be sent forward with the vehicle. If there is any shortage of trained personnel in Rome.

25 Public Safety Officers will remain liaison with Allied Military Police and the British, particularly in the Port.

CONTROL OF CIVILIAN MOVEMENTS

26 For the purpose of the control of civilian movement newly occupied territory will continue to be restricted in being within the Free Zone until military authority establishes a change-over from Army Zone to Restricted Zone, or from Restricted Zone to Free Zone.

27 Proclamation No. 1, Article 16, will apply until the territory is turned over to National Control. General Order No. 2, will then be posted.

28 Local adjustments to the 10 Km. restriction may be considered necessary in the case of towns with large built-up areas. Such adjustments are subject to the permission of the local military commander.

29 It is anticipated that the frontier provisions will continue to be regarded as a restricted area for an indefinite period.

30 The provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 17 will be complied with by all concerned in all instances.

31 With regard to civilians wishing to leave Italian territory, application for Military Travel Authorizations will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Executive Memorandum No. 11.

ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS FOR THE NEW AREA

32 It is expected that all forms of local government will come under the control of civil agencies at an earlier date than in the present liberated portions of Italy. All public buildings and equipment will be reserved for its service, and put at the disposal of civil Government as early as is compatible with military necessity.

Profectura, Municipality	Prison
Carabinieri Caserne	Reformatory
Police Stations	Fire Station
Court House	M.S.F. (Such disposal and time clearance organizations.)

ST 147 of 30/08/2004
 Dr. Patricia da
 Silva Almeida

• **Stressors** – what is causing the stress?

If a selling of \$5,000 is approved, the total strength of the Corps will be increased by 600,000 to 9,500,000.

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<u>Mobile CC, BB,</u>			
Already attached to 5th Army	285		
Already attached to 8th Army	263		
		193	
		4557	
<u>Spencerhead</u>			
On Reserve at NIGHTING	500		
On Reserve at WESTRO	446		

RESEARCH	119	400
TRAINING	136	280
COMBAT	50	336
		194
RESEARCH	60	631
TRAINING	80	1,175
COMBAT	26	369
	11	495
	22	151
		<u>7,508</u>

If a ceiling of 68,000 is approved, the total strength for Vietnam will be increased from 7,508 to 9,500.

PLAN FOR MAINTAINING THE CURRENT

<u>Mobilization</u>	already attached to 1st Army	285	199
	already attached to 8th Army	208	<u>4557</u>
<u>Spent</u>	On reserve at HANOI	500	
	On reserve at HANOI	486	
	On reserve at FLORENCE	254	
	On reserve at ALGERIA	50	<u>1,250</u>
<u>Recruited</u>	Or duty in Southern Region		2,000
<u>Remained</u>	To be provided from Screening Center or from Southern Region at the situation develops		3,745
			<u>7,508</u>

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 (18) was disrupted in interrupted to the level of the
 (19) was disrupted in interrupted to the level of the

Enclosure I

22-1

Displacement and Repatriation

and

Displacement and Repatriation and the Associated and Related

100-1-1-1

Subject: U.S.S.R. Plan for Northern Italy.

1. Area Covered.

As it is impossible to divide Northern Italy into two parts either for dealing with refugees during or between or later repatriation Italian from outside the Frontiers, this plan deals with Northern Italy as a whole and concerns the five Regions of Liguria, Lombardia, Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, and Trentino.

2. General Plan.

This general plan is divided into two phases. The first phase being the operational phase, when the most important task is the care of war refugees. The second phase is mainly repatriation. These two phases may have in function conjointly if North West Italy is liberated before North East Italy.

3. Phase I (Operational)

Refugees Center Model as previously in 1st and 8th Armies' areas, and in the rear of them, by the three existing groups of Centers. Allied Nationals in large towns to be cared for by former representatives of U.S.S.R. who will accompany a.S.S. squadrons, and in addition by mobile Forward Groups, who will deal with both Italian and Allied Nationals, as required, as far as possible centers selected for this phase will be those which will also be required in Phase II.

4. Phase II (Repatriation)

a) Italians. There are approximately one million Italians to be returned to Italy from within the Northern Italian Frontiers. It is impossible at present to forecast by which route most of the Italian are to Germany will arrive - Via: - by train through Switzerland, or from the North East.

They may consist of:-

- (i) Former Italian Soldiers.
- (ii) Ex-Italian P.W.
- (iii) Italian workers, including some women

It has been agreed in view of the difficulties of distinguishing repatriates, that U.S.S.R. in conjunction with the High Commissioner for Italian Refugees, will establish an organization to deal initially with all repatriates arriving in Northern Italy, after the initial processing of

103

the second phase is mainly repatriation. These two phases may have to function concurrently if North Italy is liberated before North West Italy.

5. Phase I (Operational)

Repatres Centers located in previously in 8th and 8th Army's areas, and in the rest of those, by the three existing groups of Italian, Allied Nationals in large towns to be started for by the two representatives of U.S.A., who will accompany a.m.m. personnel, and in addition by public transport stations, who will deal with both Italian and Allied Nationals, as required, as far as possible centers situated for this phase will be those which will also be required in Phase II.

6. Phase II (Appropriation)

a) Italians. There are approximately one million Italians to be returned to Italy from outside the Northern Italian Frontiers. It is impossible at present to forecast by which route most of the Italian war in Germany will arrive - Via: by train through Switzerland, or from the North East.

They may be asked off-

- (i) Former Italian Soldiers.
- (ii) Ex-Italian I.M.
- (iii) Italian women, including some whom

It has been asked in view of the difficulties of distinguishing repatriates, that D.F.A.S.C. in conjunction with the High Commissioner for Italian Refugees, will establish an organization to deal initially with all repatriates arriving in Northern Italy. After the initial processing of repatriates, those who are found to be former Italian soldiers or Italian ex-I.M. will be handed over to be dealt with by the Military Organization concerned, either in part if the same centre of another centre is in convenient.

b) Non-Italian. It is estimated that at present there are some 50,000 non-Italian Italian refugees in Northern Italy who will require to be returned to their own countries. The centres in question will deal with those, and in addition those who will be sent to the U.S.A. and other areas which Allied Nationals can be repatriated. It may be part of centres dealing in this kind, or separate centres according to available accommodation. The further Allied National Centers to be a limited later on.

1 2. Cont.

- 2 -

ORGANIZATION.

a) Advanced Registration Headquarters - consisting of advanced representatives of R.A.S.S., R.S.S., with such representation of the Material Personnel and Italian P.W. Sub-Commission and from German Sub-Commission if required, as are considered necessary, and their opposite numbers in the Italian Government, will be set up either at Milan or in the vicinity of the Allied Military Organization concern.

b) Group Headquarters will be set up at each Allied Collection Region Headquarters, except Albania. R.A.S.S. Centres in which would be eventually controlled from the Group Headquarters in Albania region.

c) Each Group Headquarters will control several Collecting and Transit Centres, which in turn will control certain Frontier Registration Posts.

Collecting and Transit Centres - Capacity 5,000 persons.
Frontier Registration Posts - Capacity 1,000 persons.

The most suitable accommodation is ex-P.W. Camps, Barracks, Schools, Hotels, or other large buildings. Such places are essential for centres as MC centres in available. Centres to be in or near to the place names, as if possible not more than ten miles away and sites in or near main communications.

d) Establishments of R.A.S.S. Group Headquarters and various R.A.S.S. Centres are shown in the attached Appendix A, B, C and D. These Appendices do not include the necessary personnel for handling and documenting Italian P.W.'s and visitors. A further appendix will be issued to show this requirement. Additional personnel required have been requested from R.A.S.S. C.O.R.A. If not available, will be replaced by Italian Military personnel.

Collecting and Transit Centres and Frontier Registration Posts are shown on the sketch map (Appendix V) and listed by Regions (Appendix W).

MEDICAL.

10 bedded Block - each Frontier Registration Post.
50 bedded Centre Reception Station - each Collecting or Transit Centre.

100 bedded Hospital will be installed at each and every for Allied Nations.

Medical stores required will be supplied through Public Health Sub-Commission. Equipment is available locally and to be brought up to scale by what may be obtained from Army or M.C. sources.

TRANSPORTATION.

The most suitable accommodation in East V. Corps, Barracks, Schools, Hotels, or other large buildings. Such places are unsuitable for centres as no census is available. Centres to be in or near to the place where, as far as possible not more than ten miles away and within an or near main communications.

d) Installments of D.F.S.S.C. Group Headquarters and various D.F.S.S.C. Centres are shown in the attached Appendixes "A", "B" and "C". These Appendixes do not include the necessary personnel for handling the documentation Italian P.W.'s and soldiers. A further appendix will be issued to show this requirement. Additional personnel required have been requested from A.F.H.Q. C.S.R.B. if not available, will be replaced by Italian Military personnel.

Collecting and Transit Centres and Frontier Registration Points are shown on the sketch map (Appendix "D") and listed by Regions (Appendix "E").

6. REQUIREMENTS.

10 bedded Sick Bay - each Frontier Registration Point.

50 bedded Centre Reception Station - each Collection or

Transit Centre.

100 bedded hospitals will be installed at Gusha and MARS for Allied Nationals.

Medical stores required will be supplied through Public Health Sub-Commission. Equipment as available locally and to be brought up to scale by what may be obtained from Army or A.C. sources.

7. TRANSPORTATION.

The normal method of moving refugees is by back-loading army and Allied Commission transport, as this will be inefficient, one G.C. Coy. of 100 vehicles, 10 ambulances and 10 water carts for each group Headquarters has been requested from A.F.H.Q.

8. FEEDING.

a) Centres will be on the "Allied Commission Italian Refugee Scale". Supplies have been requested from Food Sub-Commission and will be included in bulk supplies to Regions.

b) In special centres set up for Allied Nationals, rations will be A.F.H.Q. Scales 24 - 30.

/ S. Const.

ACCOMMODATION (CHAS. J. GENTILE)

To applicants at present in possession of this Sub-Commission local purchase and army surplus will be utilized.

10. STATUS OF A.S.A.S.

Officers and major group headquarters of A.S.A.S. will work in close touch, and will be available to assist in solving regional problems on Italian affairs or Allied national problems.

In view of their limited numbers A.S.A.S. personnel are naturally only responsible for inmates, or those referred owing to law from A.S.A.S. centres. Referrals of linguistic persons in provinces and the same will continue to be the responsibility of the Italian authorities, supervised by Regional and Provincial Welfare Officers or such other persons as the Regional Commissioner may direct.

W. J. GENTILE,
Colonel,
Director.

27 February 1946.

4534

Reprinted 18 April 1946

Allied 50 80 44 400
 Italian 200 100 20 400

REQUIREMENTS
 Establishment for Frontal Representation Post for
 1,000 persons. (20 years for 100 million people)

Allied 7 35 1 1 1 1
 Italian 2 4 1 1 1 1

Total Requirements for 20 Million Representation Posts.

Italian 80 700 20 80 20 120

REQUIREMENTS
 Establishment for Group Headquarters
 (3 Group Headquarters)

4500

Allied 3 3 1 1 1 1
 Italian 3 12 1 1 1 1

Total Requirements for 3 Group Headquarters.

Allied 15 30 5 5 1 1
 Italian 25 60 1 1 1 1

/ 2 Contd.

- 2 -

APPENDIX OF THE DOCUMENTS

ATTACHMENTS SA, 1944 to 1947.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>C.N.S.</u>	<u>Medical</u>	<u>Med Corps</u>	<u>Pharmacies</u>	<u>C.N.S.</u>
1. Allied Italian	71 335	108 2060	5 100	45 180	2 40	2 520
2. Total Allied Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
3. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
4. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
5. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
6. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
7. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
8. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
9. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
10. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
11. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
12. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
13. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
14. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
15. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
16. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
17. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
18. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
19. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
20. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
21. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
22. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
23. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
24. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
25. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
26. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
27. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
28. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
29. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
30. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
31. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
32. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
33. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
34. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
35. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
36. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
37. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
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41. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
42. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
43. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
44. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
45. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
46. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
47. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
48. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
49. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
50. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
51. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
52. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
53. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
54. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
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59. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
60. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
61. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
62. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
63. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
64. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
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69. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
70. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
71. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
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73. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
74. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
75. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
76. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
77. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
78. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
79. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
80. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
81. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
82. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
83. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
84. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
85. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
86. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
87. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
88. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
89. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
90. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
91. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
92. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
93. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
94. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
95. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
96. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
97. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
98. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
99. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522
100. Total Italian Military	184	2168	105	225	42	522

NOTES :-

- (i) Italian Military Personnel available for release from D.P.R.S.S. Centres in Central Italy - 78.
- (ii) Italian Med Corps Personnel available for release from D.P.R.S.S. Centres in Central Italy - 45.
- (iii) C.N.S. available for release from D.P.R.S.S. Centres in Central Italy - 52.
- (iv) The number of Italian Military required as shown above does not provide for Italian Military staff for handling and documentation of Italian ex P.W. and former Italian soldiers.

Total Allied Military in Italy	284	3. Total Italian Military 3015
not known	45	not known 457
		not known 3015
	238	not known 3015

NOTES:-

- (i) Italian Military Personnel available for release from D.P.H.S. & Centres in Central Italy - 100.
- (ii) Italian M41 Cross Personnel available for release from D.P.H.S. & Centres in Central Italy - 10.
- (iii) D.P.H.S. available for release from D.P.H.S. & Centres in Central Italy - 51.
- (iv) The number of Italian Military required is shown above does not provide for Italian Military staff for handling and documentation of Italian ex F.V. and former Italian soldiers.

785017



APPENDIX A

LOCATION OF U.S. AIRCRAFT COLLECTING AND TRAFFIC CENTERS
AND TRAFFIC CONTROL STATIONS

REGION	Group H.O.	5,000 Capacity Collecting and Traffic Center	1,000 Capacity Frontier Base Port
ITALY		* RICCIONE * CARPI (VARESE) * PAVIA * BERGAMO * MILANO	
LIGURIA	GENOVA	GENOVA PORTUGHERA	GENOVA
LOMBARDIA	MILANO	MILANO INTRA VARESE COMO	TESSA CUNEO GALLARATE GALLARATE VARESE
PUGLIA	BRINDISI	BRINDISI	S. MARINO DI TREVISO
ROMANIA	BUCHAREST	BUCHAREST SIBIU IASI CLUJ	VILLAGGIO TREVISO MANTOVANO DOMODOSSOLA
SPAIN	MADRID	MADRID BARCELONA VALENCIA BILBAO	PIRENE VILLAS DEL N. 1000 DEUTERON S. MARINO DI DOMINGO TREVISO S. MARINO DI VARESE S. MARINO

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

ALSO 334

DISPLACED PERSONS AND REPARATION SUB-COMMISSION

Tel. 489881 Ref. 792

HR/1-8/AD4.

11 April, 1945.

SUBJECT : D.F.A. 3 C. Plan for Northern Italy - AMENDMENT No. 1

TO : DISTRIBUTION.

Please make the following amendments to "D.F.A. 3 C. Plan for Northern Italy", forwarded under cover of this H.Q. letter of even number dated 28 February, 1945.

1. At APPENDIX "B" under "Establishment for Frontier Demeritization Post" REF. 1.100 PERSONS

ADD

Officers	98.14
1	2

"Allied

and under "Total Requirements for 30 Frontier Demeritization Posts"

ADD

Officers	0.1.12
20	40 "

"Allied

2. APPENDICES "B" and "C" to be amended in accordance with alterations enumerated below:-

Region

Amendment

LIGURIA

Substitute VERBICOLA for GENOVA as Frontier Post.
Substitute SAN REPO for PORTOFINO as Collecting Centre.

PIEMONTE

ADD PINOLO (the Italian Equitation School, with extensive barracks) as a Collecting Centre.
SUSA and AOSTA are re-classified from Collecting Centres to Frontier Posts.
Both SALLERUELLA will not be opened as a Frontier Post in the first stages.

LOMBARDIA

Substitute BERGAMO for LEGNA as a Collecting Centre for 5,000.

For the Director.

E.F. POTTERKILL
Lieut. Colonel

7850

and under "Total Requirements for 20 Frontier Registration Posts"

ATTN

Willard
CofRings
20
20

2. ATTENDANCE "W" and "E" to be recorded in accordance with alterations enumerated below:-

Region
Amendment

LIGURIA
Substitute VERONA for GENOVA as Frontier Post.
Substitute SAN LEO for VERONA as Collecting Centre.
FIDJONG
Add PUNGOLO (the Italian Equitation School, with ex-
clusive barracks) as a Collecting Centre.
SIVA and AOSTA are recommended from Collecting
Centres to Frontier Posts.
SIVA. BACHONCHILL will not be opened as a Frontier
Post in the first stage.

LONGARDA
Substitute BERGAMO for MONZA as a Collecting Centre for
5,000.

For the Director.

C.P. PERNICELLI
Lieut. Colonel
Deputy Director.

1830

DISTRIBUTION

- N.W. Italy Planning (1) per A.C. (6)
- C.A. Section, H.C. (1)
- H.C. Italian Region (1)
- H.C. LIGURIA Region (1)
- H.C. LONGARDA Region (1)
- H.C. VENEZIA Region (1)
- No. 2 Sub-Section I.T. (1) per Officer
- A.H.C. 5th Army
- A.H.C. 6th Army
- Reg. 117 P. H.C. (1) in the office of
A.H.C. (1) in the office of
A.H.C. 5th Army for P.I. (1) E.C.
Forward Representative (2)
- H.C. No. 2 District
- H.C. 57 Army
- For Material Division & Italian
P.W. Sub-Commission, A.C.
Land Bureau Sub-Commission, A.C.

- Food Sub-Commission, A.C.
- Public Health Sub-Commission A.C.
- Transportation Sub-Commission, A.C.
- G-5 Section, A.F.H.C. (2)

- British Red Cross War Relief
Inter Governmental Committee on
Refugees
- File
- Plot

2308

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

LC 1000
APR 20 1945
(256)

Ref: 504/SC.

28th April 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

242

I refer to your telegram 5720 of April 19th to Brigadier Dunlop in answer to his letter of April 17th.

(241)

In this letter he proposes to go with his Deputy Regional Commissioner to Trieste with the initial party. I deprecate the absence from the main part of the Region of both the Regional Commissioner and his Deputy and unless we can find another Deputy to act for him in his absence I think we should amend your telegram accordingly.

I am trying to get Colonel Carl Covere re-assigned to the Region from Austria, in which case he will go as Deputy of Venezia proper.

MSL

BU En
4/5
1A
30/4

CC agree. I have told Brn Dunlop
MS 3874

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K-154

MEMO

SAC (P) (45) 8th Meeting
26th April 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

16. OCCUPATION OF VENIZIA GIULIA

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 24)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, informing them that, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, the Supreme Allied Commander proposed to occupy with an Anglo-American task force the entire compartment of VENIZIA GIULIA and set up Allied Military Government throughout this area.

GENERAL MONAGNEY said that he understood the course proposed in the telegram was the most likely, of the four courses suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, to be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that the success of the course proposed would entirely depend upon Russian approval. Unless the Russians exerted pressure, Marshal TITO would refuse to withdraw from the area if asked to do so and would fight if we attempted to disarm his forces.

MR. MACMILLAN said that the only reasons which could be put forward for taking the course suggested in the draft telegram were political ones. He himself believed that the course suggested was politically desirable. However, he thought the Supreme Allied Commander should in his signal re-strict himself to outlining what action would be necessary for military reasons and state that, if his armies were to be used for political ends, he must have early instructions in order that he might appreciate the forces required. These forces would differ according to whether the Russians agreed or disagreed. He felt that a telegram along these lines would have the required result, namely, to produce further directions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MONAGNEY said that he would agree to a telegram stating what would be necessary for military reasons. He felt that the intention, which should be stated in the telegram, was to occupy such parts of VENIZIA GIULIA

300H

1018

2310

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, informing them that, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, the Supreme Allied Commander proposed to occupy with an Anglo-American task force the entire compartment of VENEZIA GIULIA and set up Allied Military Government throughout this area.

GENERAL MONAGHAN said that he understood the course proposed in the telegram was the most likely, of the four courses suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, to be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that the success of the course proposed would entirely depend upon Russian approval. Unless the Russians exerted pressure, Marshal TITO would refuse to withdraw from the area if asked to do so and would fight if we attempted to disarm his forces.

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GENERAL MONAGHAN said that he would agree to a telegram stating that would be necessary for military reasons. He felt that the intention, which should be stated in this case, was to occupy such parts of VENEZIA GIULIA as would be required to ensure the military lines of communication.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Instructed the Chief of Staff to revise the draft telegram circulated under paper No. SAC (P) (45) 24 in accordance with the above discussion and to transmit the revised draft for their approval.

* Subsequently despatched as MAY 952.

202 EIGHT

CONF.

TOP SECRET

CONF.

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

Confidential

SAC (P) (45) 24
24th April 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL).

ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL IN VENEZIA GIULIA.

Note by Deputy Chief of Staff.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have still not defined their policy in regard to the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. However, events have now moved to such an extent that it is imperative to make detailed plans and preparations. A draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which is self-explanatory, is therefore attached at Appendix "A".

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested:

- (a) To approve as his policy for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA the proposals outlined in Appendix "A".
- (b) To authorise the despatch of this signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the action which he intends to take.

(intd) D.D.L.

APPENDIX "A".

DEPT SIGNAL.

To: AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff.
AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff.

Rptd: SHAEF Main

This NAF

Subject is occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA reference signals ending with NAF 872.

1. Events are moving rapidly in this theatre and I am likely to be faced in the near future with the necessity for action in respect of Allied occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. I must now make the necessary plans and preparations and briefs

BELOW

See by EC in

File 207EC

in regard to the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. However, events have now moved to such an extent that it is imperative to make detailed plans and preparations. A draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which is self-explanatory, is therefore attached at Appendix "A".

2. The Supreme Allied Commander is requested:

- (a) To approve as his policy for the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA the proposals outlined in Appendix "A".
- (b) To authorize the despatch of this signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the action which he intends to take.

Below

(Intd) L.L.L.

APPENDIX "A".

DRAFT SIGNAL.

To: AGWAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff.
 AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff.
 Rptd: SHAZV Main

This NAP

Subject is occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA reference signals ending with NAP 872.

1. Events are moving rapidly in this theatre and I am likely to be faced in the near future with the necessity for action in respect of Allied occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA. I must now make the necessary plans and preparations and unless you instruct me to the contrary, these will be as follows:
2. An Anglo-American task force will be set up to occupy the entire compartment of VENEZIA GIULIA under the direction of 15 Army Group. AMG will be set up in the wake of the occupational forces in the usual way. This will be a joint Anglo-American undertaking provided as far as possible equally from US and British resources. It will work through such local authorities as may be found functioning in VENEZIA GIULIA regardless of nationality.
3. Before the task force enters VENEZIA GIULIA I will inform Marshal TITO of my intentions and will request his cooperation in withdrawing all Yugoslav forces from the entire compartment. If necessary I will explain to him that it is my further intention to disarm all forces remaining, regardless of nationality, and to carry out any other measures required to ensure the orderly government and pacification of the compartment. I shall explain that my action is dictated by the agreed policy of the United Nations to reserve all questions of territorial revision until the peace conference, and by the paramount operational need for ensuring a peaceful and secure L of C for the Allied forces carrying out the occupation of AUSTRIA. It will in no way prejudice a decision on any territorial claims which he (Marshal TITO) may make at the final peace settlement.

Seen by EC in

file 207EC. 77

SEE 207EC 2073

2313

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

~~TOP SECRET~~

255

Confidential

30/4

Ref: 504/82

23 April 1945.

SUBJECT: Occupation of N.E. ITALY.

TO : Regional Commissioner,
VENETIAN REGION. (u)
EMILIA REGION. (u)

1. Herewith for your retention Copy No. 40/41 of 15th Army Group Administrative Directive No. 2 of 17 April 1945.
2. Please acknowledge without delay on the attached receipt form.

/JG.

Egh Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

~~TOP SECRET~~

46
26/x

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE) To accompany Operations

NUMBER 2) Instructions Number 5 and 6.

OCCUPATION OF NORTHEAST ITALY

1. Object. The object of this directive is to define the administrative responsibilities for the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY.

2. References: Administrative instructions as given in:

a. Fifteenth Army Group Administrative Directive No. 1, "The Occupation of Northwest Italy", dated 19 February 1945 and amendments thereto.

b. Fifteenth Army Group Administrative Directive No. 3, "The Control and Administration of the Surrendered Enemy Forces", dated 18 April 1945.

3. Operations.

a. Administrative instructions covering the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY are contained in Administrative Directive No. 1, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 19 February 1945.

b. This directive deals with the administrative responsibilities for the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY during Phase I, (see paragraph 3 c. below), which will prevail, when:

(1) The Armes have cleared the areas concerned, operationally, under conditions of a withdrawal as stated in Operations Instruction No. 5, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 12 April 1945, or

(2) There has been a general surrender of German Forces in NORTH ITALY under conditions as stated in Operations Instruction No. 6, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 17 April 1945, (see Administrative Directive No. 3, this Headquarters, dated 18 April 1945, "Control and Administration of Surrendered Forces").

c. The occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY will be carried out in two phases:

(1) Phase I.

The assumption of responsibility by Armes for:

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Italy, dated 19 February 1945 and amendments thereto.

b. Fifteenth Army Group Administrative Directive No. 3, "The Control and Administration of the Surrendered Enemy Forces", dated 13 April 1945.

3. Operations.

a. Administrative Instructions covering the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY are contained in Administrative Directive No. 1, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 19 February 1945.

b. This directive deals with the administrative responsibilities for the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY during Phase I, (see paragraph 3 c. below), which will prevail, when:

(1) The Allies have cleared the areas concerned, operationally, under conditions of a withdrawal as stated in Operations Instruction No. 5, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 12 April 1945, or

(2) There has been a general surrender of German forces in NORTH ITALY under conditions as stated in Operations Instruction No. 6, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 17 April 1945, (see Administrative Directive No. 3, this Headquarters, dated 13 April 1945, "Control and Administration of Surrendered Forces").

c. The occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY will be carried out in two phases:

(1) Phase I.

The assumption of responsibility by Allies for:

- (a) Initial occupation.
- (b) Establishment of Military Government.
- (c) Initiation of relief measures.

(2) Phase II.

The assumption of responsibility for:

- (a) Military Administration by PMS (US troops) and No. 1 District (British troops).
- (b) Allied Military Government by Allied Commission in conjunction with AFHQ.

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4. Territory.

a. For the purposes of this directive NORTHEAST ITALY is defined as all of NORTH ITALY not covered in Fifteenth Army Group Administrative Directive No. 1, dated 19 February 1945, with amendments thereto, namely: (as shown in Appendix "A").

- Compartmento of VENEZIA TRIDENTINA
- VENEZIA PROPRIA
- VENEZIA GIULIA
- EMILIA (less Provinces of PIACENZA and PARMA)

- Province of MANTOVA - In Compartimento of LOMBARDI
- APUANIA/MASSA } In Compartimento of TUSCANA
- LIVORNO }
- PISTOIA }

b. Zones of Responsibility. Appendix "A" indicates the administrative boundary between Fifth and Eighth Armies which will prevail on orders from this Headquarters in case of surrender. In case of a withdrawal the boundary between Armies will be on order from this Headquarters. In the latter case, until the order is issued by this Headquarters establishing the boundary as shown in Appendix "A", the inter-Army boundary will be as defined in Operations Instruction No. 4, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 24 March 1945, or as changed by subsequent order.

c. For administrative responsibilities as Army rear boundaries move forward, see paragraph 5 m. below.

5. AFHQ Administrative Responsibilities.

As stated in AFHQ letter, AG 323/061 CES-O, dated 3 April 1945, subject: "Occupation of Northeast Italy", AFHQ is responsible for the following:

- a. Drawing key plan for opening the Port of TRIESTE.
- b. Furnishing the Chairman of the Siting Board for TRIESTE. In addition to the Chairman, the Board will consist of representatives of Eighth Army, U.S. Base Section concerned and TOTALI.
- c. Allocation of tonnages into TRIESTE between Eighth Army and other bidders whose requirements are not a responsibility of Eighth Army.
- d. Repair of the following rail lines in priority listed:

First Priority:

- PRATO - GRIZZANA - BOLOGNA
- FAENZA - BOLOGNA (Single line)

orders from this Headquarters in case of surrender. In case of a withdrawal the boundary between armies will be on order from this Headquarters. In the latter case, until the order is issued by this Headquarters establishing the boundary as shown in Appendix "A", the Inter-Army boundary will be as defined in Operations Instruction No. 4, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 24 March 1945, or as changed by subsequent order.

c. For administrative responsibilities as Army rear boundaries move forward, see paragraph 5 m, below.

5. AFHQ Administrative Responsibilities.

As stated in AFHQ letter, AG 323/051 QDS-O, dated 3 April 1945, subject: "Occupation of Northeast Italy", AFHQ is responsible for the following:

- a. Drawing key plan for opening the Port of TRIESTE.
- b. Furnishing the Chairman of the Siting Board for TRIESTE. In addition to the Chairman, the Board will consist of representatives of Eighth Army, U.S. Base Section concerned and POTAFI.
- c. Allocation of tonnages into TRIESTE between Eighth Army and other bidders whose requirements are not a responsibility of Eighth Army.
- d. Repair of the following rail lines in priority listed:

First Priority:

PRATO - GRIZZANA - BOLOGNA
PARMA - BOLOGNA (Single line)
PARMA - PERRERA

Second Priority:

BOLOGNA - VERONA - BRENNER
BOLOGNA - PARMA
PARMA - BOLOGNA (Double line)

e. In addition to these rail lines in 5 d, above, repair of the line leading North to AUSTRIA from TRIESTE; priority to be assigned later, dependent on operational requirements and the time required to move rolling stock to put the line into operation.

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257

f. Development of POL bulk storage facilities at TRIESTE to supply military and civil requirements.

g. Construction and operation of the following 4-inch gasoline pipelines:

(1) From ANCONA - one via BOLOGNA to FERRARA,
one via RAVENNA to FERRARA - ROVIGO

(2) From LAGHETTO - one to BOLOGNA,
one via BOLOGNA to MODENA,
one via BOLOGNA to VERONA.

h. On completion of Phase I to take over supervision of administration of surrendered forces and the guard forces.

i. Complete the disarmament and disbandment of surrendered forces.

j. Furnish personnel to assist in inspecting captured enemy supply and other service installations.

k. In case of a surrender or collapse, supply necessary resources to the headquarters listed below to enable the movement of civil supplies as indicated.

- (1) Fifth Army - 400 tpd to VERONA (US responsibility).
- (2) Fifth Army - 500 tpd to PADOVA (British responsibility).
- (3) Eighth Army - 350 tpd to PADOVA (British responsibility).

Note: The transport made available for the purposes set forth in k, above, is subject to recall and it is not likely that it will be available to exceed one month. (In case of a withdrawal see paragraph 5 c (2), below, as to responsibility for the provision of transportation for the movement of civil supplies).

l. Movement of repatriant enemy surrendered personnel South of the APENNINES.

m. As army rear boundaries move forward, Fifteenth Army Group will pass military responsibility in the territory in rear of Fifth and Eighth Armies zones to PzC and No. 1 District, respectively. Fifteenth Army Group will pass civil responsibility in such areas to Allied Commission in conjunction with AFHQ. In this phase (Phase II) British troops in PzC area will be administered by No. 1 District.

6. Fifth and Eighth Armies Administrative Responsibilities.

n. Administration of forces under their command and such maintenance of the Air Forces as is a ground force responsibility.

a. In case of a surrender or collapse, supply necessary resources to the headquarters listed below to enable the movement of civil supplies as indicated.

- (1) Fifth Army - 400 tpd to VERON. (US responsibility).
- (2) Fifth Army - 500 tpd to FISM. (British responsibility).
- (3) Eighth Army - 350 tpd to FADM. (British responsibility).

Note: The transport made available for the purposes set forth in k, above, is subject to recall and it is not likely that it will be available to exceed one month. (In case of a withdrawal see paragraph 9 c (2), below, as to responsibility for the provision of transportation for the movement of civil supplies).

1. Movement of recalcitrant enemy surrendered personnel South of the APENNINE.

5. As Army rear boundaries move forward, Fifteenth Army Group will pass military responsibility in the territory in rear of Fifth and Eighth Armies zones to FRS and No. 1 District, respectively. Fifteenth Army Group will pass civil responsibility in such areas to Allied Commission in conjunction with AFHQ. In this phase (Phase II) British troops in FRS area will be administered by No. 1 District.

6. Fifth and Eighth Armies Administrative Responsibilities.

a. Administration of forces under their command and such maintenance of the Air Forces as is a ground force responsibility.

b. Reestablishment of Allied Military Government. (See paragraph 9, below.)

c. Initiation of Civil Relief measures.

d. Traffic Control on main arteries within their respective zones.

e. Initiation of the mobilization of civil resources, (reference is made to AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No. 14, dated 7 March 1945).

f. Collection, concentration and guarding of surrendered forces (see Administrative Directive No. 3, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 18 April 1945.)

g. Primary disarmament and supervision of administration of surrendered forces (see Administrative Directive No. 3, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 18 April 1945).

TOP SECRET

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a. Safeguard military supplies, communications and stores.

7. Additional Administrative Responsibilities - Fifth Army.

a. Initiation of repair of roads in priority listed:

- BOLOGNA - MODENA - VERONA,
- VERONA - BOLZANO - AUSTRIA,
- MODENA - PIACENZA,
- GENOA - ALESSANDRIA (by IV Corps)
- PIACENZA - ALESSANDRIA - TORIN (by IV Corps)
- Best route to MILAN (by IV Corps)

8. Additional Administrative Responsibilities - Eighth Army.

a. Initiation of repair of following roads in priority listed:

- BOLOGNA - PARMA - PAVIA,
- Best route - PAVIA - TRIESTE,
- Best route - TRIESTE - AUSTRIA.

b. Opening and initial operation of the Port of TRIESTE to enable 5,000 tpd to be discharged and cleared through it. TRIESTE will be utilized as a transit port. Only the minimum necessary installations will be established at the port. Holdings to be as directed by LTRQ.

9. Allied Military Government in Northern Italy during Phase I.

a. Object.

During Phase I it will be the responsibility of Fifth and Eighth Armies within their respective areas (zones) to re-establish law and order and to initiate relief measures among the civilian population, termination in the establishment of Allied Military Government.

b. Personnel.

The Regional Commissioners of EMILIA and the TRE VENEZIA, with their respective Regional Headquarters personnel, are to be placed under command of Fifth and Eighth Armies in their respective territories to assist in carrying out the mission directed in paragraph 9a above. Headquarters, Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for calling forward this personnel as required, and for their administration while with Armies. Allied Commission is responsible for provision of transportation for this personnel.

c. Civil Supplies.

- (1) Allied Commission is responsible for stockpiling civil supplies for EMILIA and the TRE VENEZIA in the FORLI-RIMINI-MODENA areas. These stockpiles will be sufficient to provide bread plus supplementary

b. Opening and initial operation of the Port of TRIESTE to enable 6,000 ypd to be discharged and cleared through it. TRIESTE will be utilized as a transit port. Only the minimum necessary installations will be established at the port. Holdings to be as directed by AFHQ.

9. Allied Military Government in Northwest Italy during Phase I.

a. Object.

During Phase I it will be the responsibility of Fifth and Eighth Armies within their respective areas (zones) to re-establish law and order and to initiate relief measures among the civilian population, termination in the establishment of Allied Military Government.

b. Personnel.

The Regional Commissioners of EMILIA and the TEE VENETIA, with their respective Regional Headquarters personnel, are to be placed under command of Fifth and Eighth Armies in their respective territories to assist in carrying out the mission directed in paragraph 9 a above. Headquarters, Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for calling forward this personnel as required, and for their administration while with Armies. Allied Commission is responsible for provision of transportation for this personnel.

c. Civil Supplies.

- (1) Allied Commission is responsible for stockpiling civil supplies for EMILIA and the TEE VENETIA in the FORLI-RIMINI-ARCONA areas. These stockpiles will be sufficient to provide an initial ration of 200 grams of bread plus supplementary scales.
- (2) In the event of a withdrawal, Fifth and Eighth Armies are responsible for the movement forward and local distribution of civil supplies in the normal manner. As soon as control of any part of NORTHWEST ITALY is assumed by PES/No. 1 District, the responsibility for movement forward and distribution of civil supplies in the area no longer under Fifth or Eighth Army is to pass to Allied Commission.
- (3) In the event of a surrender or collapse, AFHQ is to furnish Fifth Army and Eighth Army, from other than present Army resources, all transport necessary to move civil supplies from stockpiles to forward points and for local distribution. (See paragraph 5 k above).

TOP SECRET

251

d. Finance

Allied Commission is responsible for stockpiles of Allied Military Life for the needs of NORTHEAST ITALY. Fifth Army and Eighth Army will be responsible for transportation from these stockpiles to locations where required.

e. Labor

The Directorate of Labor, Labor Offices, etc., will cooperate with Fifth Army and Eighth Army in making available sufficient civilian labor for all military requirements.

f. Public Safety

(1) Allied Commission is responsible for concentration of CC PR, fully equipped and ready to take the field. Allied Commission is to provide CC PR with a distinctive shoulder patch in order to distinguish them from the CC PR to be found in NORTHEAST ITALY.

(2) Fifth Army and Eighth Army will be responsible for culling forward CC PR as required within their respective areas (zones).

(3) Allied Commission is responsible for transportation of CC PR to Rear Army Areas (zones). It is the responsibility of Fifth Army and Eighth Army to transport CC PR to their stations within their respective Army Areas (zones).

g. Public Health

(1) Allied Commission is responsible for stockpiling adequate medical supplies at LIVOLINO and FLORENCE and in the BOLOGNA area as soon as liberated.

(2) Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for transporting medical supplies forward and for local distribution.

h. Refugees, Repatriates and Displaced Persons

(1) The screening, registering, maintenance and movement of all refugees, repatriates and displaced persons, including Russians, will be the responsibility of Fifth Army and Eighth Army within their respective areas (zones). Initially free movement (unrestricted travel) of refugees, repatriates and displaced persons, will be prohibited. This restriction is not intended to curtail or interfere in any way with the normal controlled movement of such people under supervision of Armies to designated collecting centers or camps.

- (2) Fifth Army and Eighth Army will be responsible for sending forward CC HR as required within their respective areas (zones).
- (3) Allied Commission is responsible for transportation of CC HR to Rear Army areas (zones). It is the responsibility of Fifth Army and Eighth Army to transport CC HR to their stations within their respective Army areas (zones).

8. Public Health.

- (1) Allied Commission is responsible for stockpiling adequate medical supplies at LIVIGNO and FIERCHUE and in the SOLOGNA area as soon as liberated.
- (2) Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for transporting medical supplies forward and for local distribution.

9. Refugees, Repatriates and Displaced Persons.

- (1) The screening, registering, maintenance and movement of all refugees, repatriates and displaced persons, including Russians, will be the responsibility of Fifth Army and Eighth Army within their respective areas (zones). Initially free movement (unrestricted travel) of refugees, repatriates and displaced persons, will be prohibited. This restriction is not intended to curtail or interfere in any way with the normal controlled movement of such people under supervision of Armies to designated collecting centers or camps.

(c) The procedures set out in the following directives will apply for nationals in the U.S. controlled areas:

(i) Russian Nationals. *See Dir 12*

Letters, Headquarters, Moscow, AG 303.7/414 A-C, 9 March 1945 and 9 April 1945, "Disposition of Soviet Citizens."

(ii) Other Nationals. (Exclusive of Italian Republican Army).

Chapter XVIII, Administrative Instructions for United States Prisoner of War Enclosures in MTOC, AG 303.6/326 PW-0, Headquarters, MTOC.

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(b) The procedures set out in the following directives will apply for nationals in British controlled areas:

(i) Russian Nationals.

Letters, AFHQ, CR/2491/2 S-1 (Br), dated 6 March 1945, 7 March 1945, 15 March 1945.

(ii) Other Nationals. (Exclusive of Italian Republican Army).

AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No. 60, dated 14 December 1944.

(2) Allied Organizations will attach to Regions specialists and equipment for dealing with refugees, repatriates and displaced persons. This personnel will be attached to Headquarters, Fifth Army and Eighth Army to advise and supplement the existing Army staffs until Phase I is completed.

1. Civilian Relief - Clothing.

(1) Allied Commission, in cooperation with American Red Cross and American Relief for Italy, is making available such clothing as is obtainable to meet the initial emergency needs, and is stockpiling such items in forward areas.

(2) Fifth Army and Eighth Army will be responsible for calling forward, transporting and distributing these items within their respective areas (zones).

2. Partisans.

For treatment of Partisans see Appendix No. "1", Operations Instruction No. 5, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 12 April 1945, entitled "Partisan Problems in North Italy."

10. Additional Responsibilities - Allied Commission.

As stated in AFHQ letter, 45 343/061 G16-0, dated 3 April 1945, Subject: "Occupation of Northeast Italy," in addition to the responsibilities set forth in paragraph 9, Allied Commission is responsible for the following:

a. Opening and operating the Port of VALLER in all respects except for those responsibilities which are Naval. It is unlikely that any military assistance can be allocated Allied Commission for this purpose.

These I is completed.

1. Civilian Relief - Clothing.

(1) Allied Commission, in cooperation with American Red Cross and American Relief for Italy, is making available such clothing as is obtainable to meet the initial emergency needs, and is stockpiling such items in forward areas.

(2) Fifth Army and Eighth Army will be responsible for moving forward, transporting and distributing these items within their respective areas (zones).

2. Partisans.

For treatment of Partisans see Appendix No. "I", Operations Instruction No. 5, Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Group, dated 12 April 1945, entitled "Partisan Problems in North Italy."

10. Additional Responsibilities - Allied Commission.

As stated in AHA letter, AS 323/661 616-0, dated 3 April 1945, Subject: "Occupation of Northeast Italy," in addition to the responsibilities set forth in paragraph 9, Allied Commission is responsible for the following:

a. Opening and operating the Port of Venice in all respects except for those responsibilities which are Naval. It is unlikely that any military assistance can be allocated Allied Commission for this purpose.

b. Restoration and operation of the INT system for movement of civil supplies.

c. Development of POL bulk storage facilities at VENICE for civil requirements.

11. Recovery, Maintenance and Evacuation of Allied PW's.

The protection, care, maintenance and evacuation of Allied PW's is the responsibility of Fifth and Eighth Armies. For maintenance and evacuation of Allied PW's: By air, see Appendix "E" to Operations Instruction No. 6, this Headquarters, dated 17 April 1945, "Recovery, Maintenance and Evacuation of Allied PW's"; by ground forces, see Appendix "E", Administrative Directive No. 2, "Occupation of Northeast Italy" (this directive).

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12. Administrative Buildings for AFHQ and AG.

It is expected that all forms of local government will come under the control of civil agencies at an earlier date than in the present liberated portions of Italy. All public buildings and equipment will be reserved for the service named below and put at the disposal of Civil Government as early as commensurate with military necessity. The service buildings required are:

Prefecture, Municipi
Carabinieri Caserma
Police stations
Court houses
Police barracks
Prisons
Reformatories
Fire stations
U.S.P.A. (Bomb disposal and mine clearance organizations)

13. Protection of Historical Monuments, Archives, etc.

It will be the responsibility of armies to prevent unnecessary damage to historical monuments, deposits of important documents (archives), and artistic treasures within their area (zones). In this connection, Administration Memorandum No. 26, AFHQ, dated 3 April 1945, Subject: "Preservation of Property of Historical and Educational Importance," will be the document of reference and direction. Headquarters, Allied Commission will make available on request of armies trained officer specialists to assist and advise in this important field.

14. Disposal of Captured Animals.

a. The policy of screening, collecting and disposing of captured animals is at present under consideration by AFHQ, and a separate directive is to be issued on this subject. Detailed instructions are being issued through Service channels.

b. For information, there is an Italian Remount Depot at SAN MARTINO, L. 8297, just East of ALLABOLA, which AFHQ have earmarked as a future AFHQ Remount Depot and where as soon as possible they propose to locate an AFHQ Veterinary Unit. As soon as this is established it is probable that both armies will be authorized to evacuate captured animals to this centre, irrespective as to whose boundary area the territory may lie within.

15. It is desired that plans be prepared by armies covering administrative arrangements outlined in Phase I, 3 copies to reach this Headquarters by 1200 hours, 26 April 1945. For purpose of planning, Fifth and Eighth armies are authorized to contact directly FHS and No. 1 District and other necessary Headquarters.

It will be the responsibility of Armies to prevent unnecessary damage to historical monuments, deposits of important documents (archives), and artistic treasures within their area (zones). In this connection, Administration Memorandum No. 20, AFHQ, dated 3 April 1945, Subject, "Preservation of Property of Historical and Educational Importance," will be the document of reference and direction. Headquarters, Allied Commission will make available on request of Armies trained officer specialists to assist and advise in this important field.

14. Disposal of Captured Animals.

a. The policy of screening, collecting and disposing of captured animals is at present under consideration by AFHQ, and a separate directive is to be issued on this subject. Detailed instructions are being issued through Service channels.

b. For information, there is an Italian Remount Depot at SAN MARTINO, L. 8297, just East of ALBAFIORE, which AFHQ have earmarked as a future AFHQ Remount Depot and where as soon as possible they propose to locate an AFHQ Veterinary Unit. As soon as this is established it is probable that both Armies will be authorized to evacuate captured animals to this centre, irrespective as to whose boundary area the territory may lie within.

15. It is desired that plans be prepared by Armies covering administrative arrangements outlined in Phase I, 3 copies to reach this Headquarters by 1200 hours, 26 April 1945. For purpose of planning, Fifth and Eighth Armies are authorized to contact directly PES and No. 1 District and other necessary Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

Ralph H. Tate

OFFICIAL:

RALPH H. TATE
Brig. General, GSC
A.C. of S., G-4

A. M. GRUNTHIER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

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APPENDICES:

"A" Overlay on 1:200,000 Road Map of Italy
"B" Treatment of Allied PW's.

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 15th Army Group

SCS
 G-1
 G-2 Branch
 G-2
 G-3 Plans
 G-4
 G-4 Plans
 G-4 Branch
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
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
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G-2	53
G-3 Plans	54
G-4 Plans	55
*Q. Branch	56 - 58
G-5	59
Sigs	60 - 69
CSO L of C	70
Engr	71
Arty	72
Tac & Force	73
Hist Sec (Italy) Br	74
Hist US	75
War Diary	76 - 77
AG File	78
File	79 - 80
Spores	81 - 83
	84
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


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
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APPENDIX 'A'
ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE No. 2,
OCCUPATION OF N.E. ITALY.

APPENDIX 'H'

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE No. 2,
OCCUPATION OF N.E. ITALY.

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OVERLAY ON 1:50,000

ROAD MAP OF ITALY.

INTER-ARMY BOUNDARY IS IDENTICAL WITH THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN
I B S AND No. 1 DISTRICT AS SHOWN IN APPENDIX TO LETTER,
A P H Q: FILE AG 323/061: SACS - C, DATED 15 MARCH 45:
SUBJECT :- "DIRECTIVE - OCCUPATION OF NORTHEAST ITALY";
EXCEPT THROUGH B O L G N A PROVINCE WHICH IS SHOWN ON
THIS TRACE.

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APPENDIX "B"

TREATMENT OF ALLIED PW'S

1. The following references will be followed as a guide in the execution of these responsibilities:

- a. Letter HQ MTCUSA, Subject: "Repatriation of American Personnel," dated 31 March 1945, AG 383.6/470 A-C.
- b. Letter WD AGO, 29 March 1945, AG 383.6 (24 March 1945) OB-S-B-M. Subject: "Publicity in connection with Escaped, Liberated or Repatriated Prisoners of War, to Include Evaders of Capture in Enemy or Enemy Occupied Territories and Internees in Neutral Countries."
- c. Letter HQ MTCUSA, AG 383.7/414 A-C, 9 March 1945, "Disposition of Soviet Citizens" and letter HQ MTCUSA same subject and AG reference number dated 9 April 1945.

d. Allied PW Repatriation Unit Instruction No. 9. Issued under reference 11/ HQ dated 30 March 1945, copies furnished armies.

e. Letters AFHQ CR/3491/2/3-1 Br. dated 6 March and 15 March 1945, Subject: "Soviet Citizens" and "Disposal of Soviet Citizens in Italy", respectively.

2. From all available information, Numbers of Allied PW's, evaders and escapees are located in the vicinity of the areas listed below. The strengths shown are considered to be the maximum. Transit camps are believed to be located near VERONA and MANTOVA. Sick and wounded are believed to be concentrated near VERONA.

AREA	STRENGTH IN VICINITY
TORINO	500
MILANO	500
VERONA	1000
MANTOVA	1000
UDINE	500
TRIESTE	500
Total	4000

Of this total, the great majority are believed to be evaders and escapees, the numbers held in camps being small.

3. It is the responsibility of Commanders to provide the following for recovered Allied PW's:

- a. Protection.
- b. Shelter.

4539

e. Letters AFHQ CR/3491/2/0-1 Br. dated 6 March and 15 March 1945. Subject: "Soviet Citizens" and "Disposal of Soviet Citizens in Italy", respectively.

2. From all available information, Numbers of Allied PW's, evaders and escapees are located in the vicinity of the areas listed below. The strengths shown are considered to be the maximum. Transit camps are believed to be located near VERONA and MANTOVA. Sick and wounded are believed to be concentrated near VERONA.

AREA	STRENGTH IN VICINITY
TORINO	500
MILANO	500
VERONA	1000
MANTOVA	1000
UDINE	500
TRIESTE	500
Total	4000

Of this total, the great majority are believed to be evaders and escapees, the numbers held in camps being small.

3. It is the responsibility of Commanders to provide the following for recovered Allied PW's:

- a. Protection.
- b. Shelter.
- c. Food.
- d. Clothing.
- e. Medical Examination, care and supply.
- f. Post Exchange/RFI Supplies.
- g. Pay.
- h. Preparation of necessary records.
- i. Screening of PW's and preliminary interrogation.
- j. Evacuation by quickest means.

4539

In the case of British formations these functions will, where applicable, be carried out through Allied PW Repatriation Units or Detachments.

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4. Stay-Put Order.

Allied PW should be instructed to remain in camps until evacuated. To assist in this, Commanding General Fifteenth Army Group is preparing "Stay-Put" leaflets, to be dropped from planes upon his orders, if operationally feasible.

For U.S. Commanders Only.

5. To carry out the instructions in paragraph 4, above, where believed desirable by the U.S. commander concerned, a U.S. staff section may be organized whose duties would include the following:

a. Maintain close liaison with Allied PW Repatriation Units and Detachments.

b. Proceed to each PW Concentration or Transit Camp overrun by our forces, where their main functions will be as follows:

- (1) Enforce the "Stay-Put" order.
- (2) Take over all records at the camp appertaining to PW.
- (3) Prepare nominal rolls of PW's within the camps.
- (4) Screening of PW's and initial intelligence interrogation of US/Br PW's.
- (5) Forward rolls to AG Casualty Sections for comparison with casualty lists.
- (6) Conduct medical examination of PW's.
- (7) Issuance of a PW Identity Card, signed by the PW, and retained by him at all times thereafter. For specimen identity card for Ex-PW's see Annexure A. This form may be mimeographed.

c. Issue of PX/EFI supplies to US/Br PW's, and to other nationals as authorized by current instructions.

d. Arrange for payment to PW's.

e. Arrange for outgoing mail of PW's. Mail to be marked, "Repatriated PW Mail", and dispatched as follows:

- (1) US PW's - to nearest Base Censor.

f. Consols with PW's - letter described in sub-paragraph b(2)

- (1) Enforce the "Stay-Put" order.
- (2) Take over all records at the camp appertaining to PW.
- (3) Prepare nominal rolls of PW's within the camps.
- (4) Screening of PW's and initial intelligence interrogation of US/E- PW's.
- (5) Forward rolls to AG Casualty Sections for comparison with casualty lists.
- (6) Conduct medical examination of PW's.
- (7) Issuance of a PW Identity Card, signed by the PW, and retained by him at all times thereafter. For specimen identity card for Ex-PW's see Annexure 1. This form may be mimeographed.

c. Issue of PX/EFI supplies to US/E- PW's, and to other nationals as authorized by current instructions.

d. Arrange for payment to PW's.

e. Arrange for outgoing mail of PW's. Mail to be marked, "Repatriated PW Mail", and dispatched as follows:

- (1) US PW's - to nearest Base Censor.

f. Comply with WD letter described in sub-paragraph b(2) above. Note: The presence of available detachments of Allied PW Repatriation Units may be attached to units concerned on request of U.S. Commanders.

247

TOP SECRET

ANNEXURE "1" to
APPENDIX "B"

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SPECIMEN IDENTITY CARD FOR EX-PRISONER OF WAR

OUTSIDE OF CARD:

Certification: I certify that the holder of this card has been given a pro- linary interrogation, and no further interrogation should be given until detailed interroga- tion is given by proper authori- ties. (Signed) _____ (Rank) _____ (or) <u>Endorsements</u>	<u>IDENTITY CARD</u> <u>FOR</u> <u>EX-PRISONER OF WAR</u> This Identity Card must be retained until collected or disposed of by proper authority
---	--

INSIDE OF CARD:

Service No. _____	Nationality _____
Serial No. _____	
Surname _____	
Last Name _____	
Initials _____	
Rank _____	
Regiment, Squadron, Ship or Organization _____	
Holder's Signature _____	
Signature of _____	

1000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

(Signed) _____	Authority _____
(Rank) _____ (or) _____	
<u>Endorsements</u>	

INSIDE OF CARD:

: Service No. }	: Nationality _____
: Serial No. }	
: Surname _____	
: Last Name _____	
: Initials _____	
: Rank _____	
: Regiment, Squadron, Ship } : or Organization }	
: Holder's Signature _____	1000
: Signature of _____	
: P.W. Camp Contact Officer _____	
: Issued at _____	on _____ 194

TOP SECRET

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 7th Meeting
12th April 1945

F 147

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

4. RESCUING OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION OF VENETIA GIULIA

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 21)

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper noting previous discussions at SAC (P) (45) 32nd Meeting - Minute 10 and SAC (P) (45) 33rd Meeting - Minute 7, where it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian forces for policing VENETIA GIULIA, and requesting exceptions to this policy in regards to the use of TRIDENT by Italian Naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM stated that there were a number of Naval problems in regard to the opening of the port of TRIESTE which must be settled before military needs were met. Since any electric power provided in the port must come from a vessel equipped for the purpose, the use of an Italian ship was militarily desirable, as also was the employment of an Italian Cooperator Engineer Company. In response to a question by Mr. Affie, he stated that the use of an Italian corvette would obviate the necessity for use of a French vessel.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that while Marshal Tito's forces might be in possession of a large part of VENETIA GIULIA at the time of our occupation of TRIESTE, he nevertheless believed that there was little likelihood of Yugoslav objections to the use of Italians in the port of TRIESTE, since these Italian forces could be under the Allied military command. In any case he would not allow any political considerations to interfere with the development of the port of TRIESTE, which could be his main military base, in any manner he thought fit. Similar considerations would apply in the immediate area of the military L of C from TRIESTE into ATHENS. However, no Italian personnel should be introduced into those parts of VENETIA GIULIA, outside the L of C area which it might be necessary to occupy for political reasons. It would also be unwise to introduce Carabinieri from other parts of ITALY into any part of VENETIA GIULIA. He added that he had recently

2343

THE COMMISSIONER had before them a paper noting previous discussions at SAC (P) (44) 32nd meeting - Minute 10 and SAC (P) (44) 33rd meeting - Minute 7, where it was considered that constraint should be observed in the use of Italian forces for policing VENEZIA GIULIA, and requesting exceptions to this policy in regards to the use of TRINITY by Italian Naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.

ADMIRAL CUMMINGS stated that there were a number of Naval problems in regard to the opening of the port of TRINITY which must be settled before military needs were met. Since any electric power provided in the port must come from a vessel equipped for the purpose, the use of an Italian ship was militarily desirable, so also was the employment of an Italian Cooperator Engineer Company. In response to a question by Mr. Coffin, he stated that the use of an Italian corvette would obviate the necessity for use of a French vessel.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER stated that while Marshal Tito's forces might be in possession of a large part of VENEZIA GIULIA at the time of our occupation of TRIESTE, he nevertheless believed that there was little likelihood of Yugoslav objections to the use of Italians in the port of TRIESTE, since these Italian forces would be under the Allied Military command. In any case he would not allow any political considerations to interfere with the development of the port of TRIESTE, which would be his main military base. In any manner he thought fit. Similar considerations would apply in the immediate area of the military L of C from TRIESTE into AUSTRIA. However, no Italian personnel should be introduced into those parts of VENEZIA GIULIA outside the L of C area which it might be necessary to occupy for political reasons. It would also be unwise to introduce Carabinieri from other parts of ITALY into any part of VENEZIA GIULIA. He added that he had recently sent a communication to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff expressing his concern over the delay in deciding the policy to be adopted in regard to the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA.

MR. KIPP agreed with the view expressed by Admiral Cunningham that military necessity in the use of Italian forces would override political desirability.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENDERSON was of the opinion that the introduction of any Italian troops into VENEZIA GIULIA was undesirable, even though those might be attached to British or American Army units. There were, for example, a number of Italian personnel attached to Headquarters Eighth Army as cooks, mess ordies, and batmen. It was his view that in the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA these troops should not accompany that headquarters, especially as it would at a later date move into AUSTRIA.

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MAJOR GENERAL ARMY considered that any introduction of Italian personnel would be undesirable from the counter-intelligence viewpoint.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that it could be detrimental to Allied prestige if we were to remove Italian personnel, normally employed by any headquarters, simply because that headquarters was moving into VENEZIA GIULIA. Such personnel would not, however, be employed in VENEZIA and could therefore be removed from headquarters destined for that country. In reply to a question by the U.S. Political Adviser as to whether this view applied to the use of cooperator companies, he stated that even though it might be necessary to use them in VENEZIA, they should not be moved to AUSTRIA.

GENERAL McHANEY stated that the employment of Italians in VENEZIA was analogous to the use of Italians in FRANCE, and since we had found it necessary to use them in the latter country, the precedent so established could be applied to the arm of our communications in VENEZIA GIULIA if necessary. He added that he had recently been pressed by the United States Chiefs of Staff to commence redeployment of certain American service troops to the FAR EAST. Lack of sufficient American service units might therefore require the employment of Italians in the occupation of the U.S. zone of AUSTRIA and the development of the I of C into it.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Reaffirmed the general policy that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian forces in the occupation of VENEZIA GIULIA, and.
- (b) Authorized as exceptions to the above policy:
 - (i) The use of POWs by Italian naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.
 - (ii) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied I of C into AUSTRIA as might, for military reasons, be unavoidable.
- (c) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to arrange for British units, to which Italian personnel were attached, to absorb such personnel at a suitable time before entry into AUSTRIA.

...and area of our communications in Venezia Giulia if necessary. He added that he had recently been promised by the Italian Chief of Staff to command reception of certain American service troops to the IAS staff. Lack of sufficient American service units might therefore require the employment of Italians in the occupation of the V.S. zone of AUSTRIA and the development of the ... of C into it.

THE EUROPEAN ALLIED COMMAND:

- (a) Reaffirmed the general policy that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian forces in the occupation of TRIESTE, GORIZIA, and.
- (b) Authorized as exceptions to the above policy:
 - (i) The use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port.
 - (ii) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied I of C into TRIESTE as might, for military reasons, be unavoidable.
- (c) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer to arrange for British units, to which Italian personnel were attached, to absorb such personnel at a suitable time before entry into TRIESTE.

4536

Copy sent to: MMIA.
BRIG. DUNN, VENEZIA REG. 17/4.
Col. SCHEFFER.
Copy - : file 1351/2.

SECRET.

C O P Y. 604

SECRET.

Confidential

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

SAC (P) (45) 21
9th April 1945

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S COM-
MUNDE (POLITICAL).

EMPLOYMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES IN OCCUPATION OF VENEZIA GIULIA.

Note by Secretary.

1. The policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENEZIA GIULIA has been requested in MAP 872 to which a reply is awaited.
2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.
3. In discussion at SAC (P) (44) 32nd Meeting, Minute 10, and SAC (P) (44) 33rd Meeting, Minute 7, it was considered that restraint should be observed in the use of Italian carabinieri or troops for policing the area. Special police should be recruited locally, but, due to difficulties inherent in the situation, and the importance of the area as an L of C to AUSTRIA, Allied garrison troops would probably have to be supplementally employed on a relatively large scale. The basic administrative pattern was to be as elsewhere in ITALY, except that the introduction of Italian officials from outside was to be avoided.

4. However, Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has now requested a decision on the following specific matters:

- (a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.
- (b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited.
(Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).

Reviewed
by
CAGS on
2/5/45

Policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard to Allied Military Government of VENETIA GIULIA has been requested in MAP 872 to which a reply is awaited.

2. Meanwhile, in order that detailed planning may proceed, it is believed desirable that the Supreme Allied Commander should state his policy regarding the use of Italian forces in the occupation of the area.

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(a) The advisability of permitting Italian escort vessels to visit TRIESTE.

(b) The basing at TRIESTE of Italian corvettes to supply electric power, for which task these vessels are particularly suited.

(Note: The alternative to the use of the corvettes for power supply duties would be the employment of submarines. It is, however, improbable that any British submarines will be available, although French or Italian vessels could be detailed if such a step were considered politically desirable).

(c) Whether personnel of Number One Italian Cooperator Company would be permitted to enter TRIESTE for work with Officer-in-charge, Works. (Note: These would be in substitution for the Royal Marine Engineer Company recently withdrawn from the theatre, and failure to use these would prejudice the work of the port).

5. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to:

(a) Reaffirm that the general policy outlined at paragraph 3 above is, in the absence of further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to form the basis of plans for the occupation of VENETIA GIULIA.

(b) Authorise, as exceptions to the above policy, the use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and the employment of Italian personnel at that port as suggested by Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, at paras 4(a), (b) and (c) above.

(Sgd) J.G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

Sup. Allied
Cmndr in Ch
2/5/45

See Folio

Chief Commissioner,

Allied Commission,..... Copy No. 34-36

Chief Commissioner..... Copy No. 34.

Executive Commissioner..

Political Advisors.....

No. 36

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

EIGHTARMY REAR

5720

19 April 1945

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

REFERENCE YOUR TORSEC LETTER ONE SEVEN APRIL PD

PAREN TO EIGHTARMY REAR FOR AMG FOR VENEZIA REGION FOR DUNLOP FROM HQ

ALCOM FROM STONE

YOUR PARA FOUR IS APPROVED

Int Dist

Copy to: Chief Commissioner

Major E. Talbot
Executive Commissioner

300

NICHOLAS PIGMBINO
CWO, USA,
Asst Adjutant.

1586

PA. 1/3

TOP SECRET

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS

REGION VENEZIA

Allied Military Government

17 April, 1945

APR 19 REC'D

for

I have the honour to report for your private information that I was today asked by 8 Army to submit my proposals for an AMG party to accompany a possible expedition by water to Trieste.

I was informed, on a top-secret level, that the proposal contemplated the securing of the city and a limited surrounding area only. It was also emphasized that the matter was only at the exploratory stage and it was by no means likely that such an operation would take place. As landing craft would be used, numbers would be cut to a minimum and limited to essentials.

I have therefore submitted a bid for a party of thirty-five officers, twenty-five men and nine vehicles. This will constitute a reinforced Trieste Provincial Team.

Subject to your concurrence I propose that both Lt. Col. Sholtz and I go in with the initial party.

The officers and men whom I propose to include in the party are either now with the Region, or could

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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I have therefore submitted a bid for a party of thirty-five officers, twenty-five men and nine vehicles. This will constitute a reinforced Trieste Provincial Team.

Subject to your concurrence I propose that both Lt. Col. Sholtz and I go in with the initial party.

The officers and men whom I propose to include in the party are either now with the Region, or could be assembled without undue stir.

I shall not fail to keep you informed of any developments.

I am, yours very sincerely,



J. K. Dunlop, Brigadier
Regional Commissioner

Rear Admiral Allery M. Stone
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

88

48

TOP SECRET

Headquarters
10TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

TOP SECRET
 BY AUTHORITY OF
 : Intls, P&A
 : Date: 4/12/43
 : 12 APRIL 1943

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTION)

NUMBER

5

104

APR 16 REC'D

OCCUPATION OF NORTHEAST ITALY

1. In compliance with AFHQ Directive, "Occupation of Northeast Italy" (AG 323/Oel SAC 3-0), dated 16 March 1943, the following instructions are published. Instructions for the occupation of Northwest Italy have been issued separately.

2. GENERAL:

a. The occupation of Northeast ITALY may come about in one of two ways:

(1) The enemy may withdraw from Northeast ITALY to some general alpine line such as REFUGITO - GALLARATE - COLLEONE - Lake Garda - Swiss frontier because of a collapse of German resistance or because our offensive is threatening his major line of withdrawal. In this event the enemy may continue to hold both VENICE and TRIESTE as fortresses.

(2) The enemy may surrender in ITALY on or North of his present line or at any time before a final withdrawal as indicated in a (1) above.

b. This instruction deals with the occupation of Northeast ITALY under normal operations. Separate instructions will be issued covering surrender conditions.

c. Extensive demolitions and the destruction of public utilities are to be anticipated.

3. DEFINITIONS:

Northeast ITALY will be defined as that portion of Northern ITALY East of the sector designated as Northwest ITALY in Operations Instruction No. 3, this Headquarters, dated 12 February 1943.

2333

a. The occupation of Northeast ITALY may come about in one of two ways:

- (1) The enemy may withdraw from Northeast ITALY to some general Alpine line such as CAPODARTO - GEMONA - LIVENZO - LAMB GRANA - Swiss frontier because of a collapse of German resistance or because our offensive is threatening his major line of withdrawal. In this event the enemy may continue to hold both VENICE and TRIESTE as fortresses.
- (2) The enemy may surrender in ITALY on or North of his present line or at any time before a final withdrawal as indicated in a (1) above.
- b. This instruction deals with the occupation of Northeast ITALY under normal operations. Separate instructions will be issued covering surrender conditions.
- c. Extensive demolitions and the destruction of public utilities are to be anticipated.

3. DEFINITION:

Northeast ITALY will be defined as that portion of Northern ITALY East of the sector designated as Northwest ITALY in Operations Instruction No. 3, this Headquarters, dated 12 February, as amended by Amendment No. 1 to Administrative Directive No. 1 to accompany Operations Instruction No. 3, dated 3 March, and will include the following:

Compartment of VENETIA TRIDENTINA - VENETIA PROPRIA - VENETIA GIULIA - EMILIA (except the Province of PARMA) and PARMA. In the Compartments of LOMBARDIA the Province of LAITOVA. In the Compartments of TOSCANA the Province of AREZZO/AREZZO - LUCCA - PISTOIA.

See the attached maps for defined area. *See No. 241*

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4. POLITICAL:

The Supreme Allied Commander has directed that the policy of the Allied Command will be to support the authority of the established Government in Rome.

5. MISSION:

15th Army Group will:

- a. Destroy enemy forces remaining in Northeast Italy.
- b. Obtain complete operational control and establish Allied Military Government in that portion of Northeast Italy within the 1939 frontier which has been.

- (1) Occupied by Allied forces as a result of our offensive.
- (2) Voluntarily evacuated by the enemy.

6. PLAN:

The occupation of any or all of Northeast Italy will be carried out in two phases:

a. Phase I

Under command of 15th Army Group to occupy and to establish Allied Military Government in that portion of Northeast Italy which will be occupied as a result of normal operations in following up the enemy's withdrawal.

b. Phase II

Under command of ARHQ the assumption of responsibility for:

- (1) Military administration by No. 1 District and PAs in their respective zones.
- (2) Allied Military Government by the Allied Commission in that portion of occupied Northeast Italy.

7. TROOP DIST:

- a. Eighth Army - Current (Note when conditions

(1) Occupied by Allied forces as a result of our offensive.

(2) Voluntarily evacuated by the enemy.

6. PLAN:

The occupation of any or all of Northeast ITALY will be carried out in two phases:

a. Phase I

Under command of 10th Army Group to occupy and to establish Allied Military Government in that portion of Northeast ITALY which will be occupied as a result of normal operations in following up the enemy's withdrawal.

b. Phase II

Under command of AFHQ the assumption of responsibility for:

(1) Military administration by No. 1 District and FAs in their respective zones.

(2) Allied Military Government by the Allied Commission in that portion of occupied Northeast ITALY.

7. TROOP DIST:

a. Eighth Army - Current (Note when conditions "PRASBOXN" become operative, three British divisions with necessary supporting troops will proceed to AUSTRIA).

b. Fifth Army - Current (Note when conditions "PRASBOXN" become operative, two or three U.S. divisions, depending on French participation in AUSTRIA, with necessary supporting troops will proceed to AUSTRIA. IV Corps will be released by Fifth Army when necessary to accomplish its mission for the occupation of Northwest ITALY). (See 15th Army Group O.I. No. 4 par. 3 h, dated 24 March 1945).

c. Boundary - Inter-Army boundary in the advance into Northeast ITALY against German resistance is given in Operations Instruction No. 4, this Headquarters, 24 March 1945. The continuation of the boundary as given on the attached map, may be used for planning purposes.

TOP SECRET

B. MISSIONS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

a. Eighth Army will, during Phase I:

- (1) Occupy the Provinces or parts of Provinces in its operational zone of action. (See attached map for details of boundaries).
- (2) Destroy any remaining hostile German or Italian forces in Provinces occupied.
- (3) (a) Establish law and order.
(b) Be responsible for Allied Military Government.

(4) Safeguard military supplies, communications and stores.

(5) Initiate civil relief measures.

b. Fifth Army will, during Phase I:

- (1) Occupy the Provinces or parts of Provinces in its operational zone of action. (See attached map for details of boundaries).

(2) Destroy any remaining hostile German or Italian forces in Provinces occupied.

(3) (a) Establish law and order.

(b) Be responsible for Allied Military Government.

(4) Safeguard military supplies, communications and stores.

(5) Initiate civil relief measures.

c. Phase II:

- (1) Fifth and Eighth Armies will, on orders from Army Group, pass:

- sent.
- (4) Safeguard military supplies, communications and stores.
 - (5) Initiate civil relief measures.
2. Fifth Army will, during Phase I:
- (1) Occupy the Provinces or parts of Provinces in its operational zone of action. (See attached map for details of boundaries).
 - (2) Destroy any remaining hostile German or Italian forces in Provinces occupied.
 - (3) (a) establish law and order.
 - (b) be responsible for Allied Military Government.
 - (4) Safeguard military supplies, communications and stores.
 - (5) Initiate civil relief measures.

6. Phase II:

- (1) Fifth and Eighth Armies will, on orders 15th Army Group, phase:
- (a) Responsibility for military administration of their occupied zones to FAS and No. 1 District respectively.
- (b) Responsibility for Allied Military Government to the Allied Commission.

9. COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY:

- a. Phase I:
15th Army Group is responsible for Phase I above, with Fifth and Eighth Armies as its operating agencies, with necessary attachments from FAS and No. 1 District. The Regional Commissions for the Compartments indicated will come under command of Fifth and Eighth Armies as and when requested by Armies.

T O P S E C R E T

b. Phase II:

Fifth Army Group for Phase II will pass responsibility for the Military Administration of occupied Northeast Italy to PBS and No. 1 District and for Allied Military Government to the Allied Commission both under command of AFHQ. 15th Army Group, on recommendations from Fifth and Eighth Armies, will report to AFHQ when Phase II can be implemented. If the situation is such that it would be more convenient to hand over Northeast Italy to PBS and No. 1 District in stages, 15th Army Group, after consultation with Armies, PBS and No. 1 District will recommend a program for the transfer of responsibilities to AFHQ.

NOTE: In compliance with AFHQ Directive - Occupation of Northeast Italy, dated 18 March 1945, No. 1 District will, on assuming military responsibility, take over command of all British, Dominion, Allied and Italian troops as remain in its geographical area. All U.S., British, Dominion, Allied and Italian troops in the PBS area will remain under command of Fifth Army or come under command of PBS or Commanding General, WFOUSA as directed by Commanding General, WFOUSA.

10. DISARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT OF ITALIAN PATRIOT FORCES:

See Appendix I, "Partisan Problems in Northeast Italy".

11. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS:

See Administrative Directive No. 2, Headquarters, 15th Army Group, with reference to:

- a. Refugees and Displaced Persons.
- b. Treatment of Russian Nationals.

12. ADMINISTRATION:

See Administrative Directive No. 2, Headquarters, 15th Army Group. Being issued separately.

13. It is desired that plans be prepared by Armies covering operations outlined in Phase I above to reach this Headquarters by 1000 hours 23 April 1945. See annexes of planning. Fifth

no. 1 District will, on assuming military responsibility, take over command of all British, Dominion, Allied and Italian troops as remain in its geographical area. All U.S., British, Dominion, Allied and Italian troops in the FAS area will remain under command of Fifth Army or come under command of FAS or Commanding General, AFUSA as directed by Commanding General, AFUSA.

10. DISARMAMENT AND DISARMMENT OF ITALIAN PATRIOT FORCES:

See Appendix 1, "Partisan Problems in Northern Italy".

11. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS:

See Administrative Directive No. 2, Headquarters, 15th Army Group, with reference to:

- a. Refugees and Displaced Persons.
- b. Treatment of Russian Nationals.

12. ADMINISTRATION:

See Administrative Directive No. 2, Headquarters, 15th Army Group. Being issued separately.

13. It is desired that plans be prepared by Armed covering operations outlined in Phase I above to reach this Headquarters by 1200 hours 22 April 1945. For purposes of planning, Fifth and Eighth Armies are authorized to contact directly FAS and No. 1 District and other necessary Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

OFFICIAL:

M. G. G. M. M. M.
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

(Handwritten: 2-4-45)
COLL W. BRAN
Brig. Gen., GSC
a.c. of S, G-3

3 Incls:

1. Appendix 1, "Partisan Problems in Northern Italy" (to be issued separately)

2. Map of Provinces of ITALY

3. Road Map - ITALY

DISTRIBUTION - See over TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

238

TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION 15th Army Group O.I. No. 3.

	<u>Copy Nos</u>		
Eighth Army	1 - 3	Engineers	30
Fifth Army	4 - 6	Sig Section	31
AFHQ	7	Survey	32
No. 1 District	8 - 12	RLO	33
No. 2 District	13	Tac 'A'	34
FM	14-18	Hist Sec Italy	
MAJAF	19	(Br)	35-40
SGS	20-21	Historian(U.S.)	41
G-1	22	War Diary	42-45
G-2	23	AG	46
G-3 Plans	24	File	47
G-3 Sp Cps	25	Spares	48-53
G-4	26-27		
G-5	28		
Arty	29		




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
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
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COMPARTMENTS &
PROVINCES OF ITALY



LEGEND

- COMPARTIMENTO BOUNDARIES
- PROVINCIA BOUNDARIES
- FRONTIERS

Map Boundaries

O. I. N° 5


12 April 1945.

IV CORPS
5 ARMY
8 ARMY

785017

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COMPARTMENTS & PROVINCES OF ITALY



LEGEND

COMPARTIMENTO BOUNDARIES

PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES

FRONTIERS

Map Boundaries

O. l. [№] 5

12 April 1945.

IV CORPS

5 ARMY

8 ARMY



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



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FRONTIERS


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
12 April 1945.

IV CORPS**5 ARMY****8 ARMY**

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017



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**AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PLANNING THE OCCUPATION
OF NORTHERN ITALY.**


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**AS OF RESPONSIBILITY
PLANNING THE OCCUPATION
NORTHERN ITALY.**

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


AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING THE OCCUPATION OF NORTHERN ITALY.

12°

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

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**S OF RESPONSIBILITY
PLANNING THE OCCUPATION
NORTHERN ITALY.**


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IV CORP



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

IV CORPS

5 ARMY

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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
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8 ARMY

Map Boundary

O.I. NO 5

12 April 19



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.


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8 ARMY

Map Boundaries

O.I. N°5

12 April 1945.



Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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


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
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**AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PLANNING THE OCCUPATION
OF NORTHERN ITALY.**

COPY ⁵⁰⁴

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

GDW/emg

ES/1.CO

12 April 1945

MEMORANDUM :

APR 14 RECD

TO : Executive Commissioner

1. It is requested that conferences be arranged at the earliest practicable moment as follows:

a. A conference between the Commanding Generals, IV Corps, No.2 District, and such members of their staffs as they may deem desirable, and members of the Economic Section, AC. Regional Commissioners concerned should also attend this conference. The Economic Section representatives will comprise the Vice-President, two or three assistants to the Vice-President and the Directors of all Sub-Commissions. This conference is for the purpose of discussing the IV Corps plan for the occupation of North west Italy.

b. A similar conference as that indicated in a above between the Commanding Generals, 15 Army Group, 5 Army, 8 Army and District No.1, and such members of their staffs as they may indicate. Regional Commissioners concerned should also attend this conference. This conference is for the purpose of discussing the plan for the occupation of Northeast Italy.

/s/ A.G. ANTONINI
/t/ A.G. ANTONINI
Acting Vice-President
Economic Section

4527

ACTION copy in file 4026/EC Commission NW Italy

PA
14/4.

SECRET

SECRET

17

AG 323/061 GDS-0

SUBJECT: Occupation of Northeast ITALY

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
General Officer Commanding, No. 1 District
General Officer Commanding, No. 2 District

Paragraph 9 b (1) of letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 3 April 1945, is amended to read as follows:

9 b (1) By rail northward from ANCONA to railheads on line 86 and extensions of this line in the FERRARA area, and by road FERRARA-PADUA-UDINE."

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Jack Carter
JACK CARTER
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

See Reverse Side

M.C. DITE - 11 April 45

No. 16 - Chief Commr.
No. 17 - Exec Commr.
No. 18 - Hon Sec.
No. 19 - C.A. Sec.
No. 20 - Venezia Region
No. 21 - Emilia Region.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017**SECRET**SECRETLtr, AFHQ, LG 323/001 GDS-O,
dtd 9 April 44 (sent'd)

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>COPY NO</u>	<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>COPY NO</u>
CG 15th Army Group	1 - 15	In (B)	99
CG Allied Commission	16 - 21	DMRS	100
GOC No 1 District	22 - 27	PMG (A)	101
GOC No 2 District	28 - 31	Provost Marshal (B)	102
CG PHS	32 - 35	Judge Advocate	103
SAC Med	36	BJAG (B)	104
D/Sac, Med	37	Pay	105
Chief of Staff	38	Labor	106
CAO	39	AG Postal	107
A/CAO	40	Postal (B)	108
C/S MTOUSA	41	INT	109
CinC Med	42 - 46	Hq RAC	110
Commander, Eighth Fleet	47	Fld Arty	111
Air CinC Med	48 - 51	Pa	112
G-1 (A)	52 - 53	QM	113 - 115
G-1 (B)	54 - 55	Pat Sec	116
G-2	56 - 57	Coal Sec	117
G-3	58 - 64	CMS	118
G-4 (A)	65	US GOC	119
G-4 (B)	66	Fiscal Dir	120
G-4 (Plans)	67	5 Airborne Div Plans	121
Log Plans	68	PSTO	122
G-4 (Mov & In)	69 - 72	Med Shipping Board	123
Q(Maint)	73 - 74	US POLAD	124
Q(SE)	75 - 76	Br Res Min	125
G-5	77 - 79	Hq APLAS, Rome	126
Engns (A)	80 - 81	Hq MTOUSA (for distribu-	127 - 136
Engns (B)	82 - 83	tion as required)	
Signals	84 - 85	Hq No 3 District	137 - 139
AA & CD	86	Land Forces Sub-Comm	140
PAD & CD	87	TRANS	141 - 143
Survey	88	AG Records AF	144
Liaison	89 - 90	AG Records MTO	145
Works	91 - 92	Sporas (Log Plans)	146 - 200
S & T	93		
Surgeon	94		
Medical (B)	95		
Ord (A)	96		
Ord (B)	97		
REMP	98		

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017**TOP SECRET**504 ~~Ex Commissioner~~

Copy No. 6

(232)

045/407
172 05153087/7026
172 0700002

15 APR 1945

172 0515308

Confidential

APR - 7 1945

223

TOP SECRET

Refer AFM 45102/061 dated 1 April. Subject corruption North East ITALY.

Request you prepare North East ITALY standstill order to be issued for refugees and displaced persons also prepare separate standstill order for Patriots. This latter order may not be issued but it is wanted in case it is decided to stop all Patriot movements.

Dist

Copy No 1, 2 & 3	- Action - CA Sec (1)
"	4 Info - A/President
	5 Chief Commission-
	6 Exec Comm ner
	7 File

BU 9/14

Lester J.

233

235

CIA

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

Confidential

Tel: 451

6 April 1945

Ref: 504/203/EC.

SUBJECT: Feeding POLAND.

TO : Economic Section.

The attached copy of letter from AGC Rear Eighth Army, reference 04/219 dated 3 Apr 45, is passed to you for information and any action considered necessary.

4 Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Incl:
as above

COPY

230

TOP SECRET

URGENT

ASST. Chief of Staff

GA/210

3 Apr 45.

G-5, HQ 15 Army Group.

Copy to: HQ Allied Commission,
HQ AMG Fifth Army.
CRASC, Eighth Army Tps.
HQ 358 Main Eighth Army.

200 11 II

Ref your letter 3/26/45 dated 17 Mar 45.

1. It will be appreciated that if this HQ is expected to lift 93 TED of imported sups by road from FORLI to BOLOGNA a detailed breakdown by commodities is required. By our calculation 95 TPD would be required as follows:

Total population = 784,000

Population of BOLOGNA Town = 285,000

TPD

Flour	70.4	(160 gr per day + 10% for heavy workers for 400,000).
Sugar	6.5	(8.3 g.p.d., for total population).
D.veg.	3.7	(13 " " town only).
MW or Meat	3.7	(" " " " " ").
Salt	7.8	(10 " " total population).
P.Milk	1.2	(50 " " 3% total population).
Lard	1.2	(6.7 " " town only).

95.2

Your comments on these figures will be welcomed.

2. Information is requested on the amounts of POL which require to be lifted from FORLI, where substantial stocks are available at UIP Depot.

3. Some idea of the expected duration of this lift will prove useful in planning, since we have definitely committed ourselves to supplying the Province of VERBARA with 1001 G.T. Coy tpt. (See this HQ GA/113 dated 1 Apr 45, not to all).

4. A maximum/.....

231

-2-

229

4. A maximum of 100 vehs of 1001 G.T. Coy per day will be available for all duties, assuming the present maintenance programme remains in effect. Not more than 80 of these vehs will be available for forward hauls. Assuming 1/2 turn round to BOLOGNA, 60 vehs will be required. Should the BOLOGNA haul still be a commitment when FERRARA falls, (which will require 68 TPD at 1/3 turn round - 68 vehs per day), a serious crisis will occur unless further tpt is made available. Two plus, placed under op control of this HQ is considered a minimum number.
5. Presumably, AMG 5th Army will communicate with this HQ by fastest means on the exact point of off-loading sups in BOLOGNA, providing sufficient labour. AMG 5th Army please confirm this.
6. If Eighth Army takes BOLOGNA first, this HQ will make arrangements, informing AMG Fifth Army and G-5, 15 Army Group.

Air Commodore,
Officer Commanding,
AMG, Eighth Army.

4522

2343

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504
ALLIED [REDACTED] COMMISSION (226)
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

RS/1.00

TOP SECRET

GDM/emg

SUBJECT:

FILE No.

TO : Acting Executive Commissioner 4 April 1945

27

1. Reference 504/218/EC, 29 March 1945.
2. The Economic Section is opposed to any "integrated independent Regional AMO", and recommends that no action be taken toward establishing such a set-up.


G. ANTOLINI
Acting Vice-President
Economic Section

Enclosure:
504/218/EC - 29 March.

4321

(4/5/45 - [illegible])
[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

H. QUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 304/234/011 April 1945

SUBJECT: Occupation of NE Italy.

TO : Venezia Region (Rear). (20)
 Emilia Region. (3)
 DDCAO, G-5 and 15 Army Group.
 Toscana Region
 Lombardia Region.

1. Copy No. of AFHQ letter AG 327061 430-0 of 1 April 1945 on the subject of the occupation of NE ITALY is forwarded herewith.

2. HQ, Venezia Region will please arrange to show this document to HQ, Lombardia Region.

3. It is anticipated that DDCAO, 15th Army Group will be included on the distribution of this document by HQ, 15th Army Group. HQ Toscana Region will please arrange to see copy held by DDCAO, 15th Army Group.

/36.

Chief Staff Officers,
 to the Executive Commissioner.

1520

785017

TOP SECRETTOP SECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

17

AG 323/001 GDS-0

SUBJECT: Occupation of Northeast ITALY

APR 5 1945

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
General Officer Commanding, No. 1 District
General Officer Commanding, No. 2 District1. GENERAL. Operational Directives on the occupation of Northeast ITALY have been issued as follows:

a. AFHQ letter, AG 323/001 SACS-0, dated 18 March 1945, subject: "Directive - Occupation of NE ITALY", which deals with the situation which will arise in the event of the withdrawal of the enemy from the PO Valley to some general Alpine line.

b. AFHQ letter, AG 387/147 SACS-0, dated 31 March 1945, subject: "Local German Surrender in ITALY", (not to all addressees) which deals with the situation which will arise should German forces in ITALY surrender on or about their present line.

2. OBJECT. Object of this memorandum is to give the administrative instructions corresponding to the operational directives in paragraph 1.3. PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED. Administrative instructions in respect to the occupation of Northwest ITALY are given in AFHQ letter, AG 323/001 GDS-0, dated 25 January 1945, subject: "Occupation of NW ITALY", as amended by AFHQ letter, same file, dated 30 January 1945. These instructions remain unchanged in the event of a German withdrawal (paragraph 1 a, above). In the event of a German surrender or collapse, they will be subject to certain modifications as given in the following paragraphs.4. SCOPE OF THIS INSTRUCTION. Northeast ITALY is defined as follows:Compartimenti of VENEZIA TRIDENTINA
VENEZIA PROPRIA
VENEZIA GIULIA
EMILIA (except the province of PIACENZA)

E.C. 214 - 6 Apr 45

No. 4	-	C. Com.
No. 17	-	Ev. Com.
No. 18	-	Gen. Sec.
No. 41	-	CA 316
No. 22	-	Venezia Reg.
No. 21	-	Emilia Reg.

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B-517

TOP SECRET

Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061, QDE-0, dtd 3 Apr 46
 "Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

Provincia of	SONDRIO	}	in the Compartimento of LOMBARDIA
	BRESCIA		
	BERGAMO		
	MANTOVA		
	CREMONA		
	APUNIA/MASSA	}	in the Compartimento of TOSCANA
	LUCCA		
	PISTOIA		

i.e., that part of NORTH ITALY not covered in the instructions referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5. PHASES

a. The definition of "phases" of the occupation of NE ITALY given in the AFHQ directive referred to in paragraph 1 a above, is also followed in this instruction.

b. Phase I will be deemed to be complete, and Phase II to start, in respect to any particular territory, when the rear boundary of Armies is moved forward and the territory passes from control of Armies to HQ 1 District, HQ 2 District, or CG PBS.

6. TERRITORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATIC HEADQUARTERS

a. In the case of progressive liberation of NORTH ITALY as a result of enemy withdrawal:

- (1) The territory to be controlled by HQ 2 District will be as given in the administrative instructions on NE ITALY referred to in paragraph 3 above.
- (2) HQ 1 District and CG PBS will take over the responsibilities of the Armies as the rear army boundaries are moved forward.
- (3) At a later stage, on completion of enemy withdrawal from NORTH ITALY and when the Army rear boundaries have been moved forward to the Austrian frontier and VENEZIA GIULIA, boundaries of static HQs will be adjusted to correspond with those laid down in sub-paragraph b, below.

b. In the case of the simultaneous liberation of NORTH ITALY, as would occur as a result of enemy surrender or collapse, the eventual territories to be controlled by static HQs in ITALY will be as defined in AFHQ directive referred to in paragraph 1 c, above.

c. Initially, VENEZIA GIULIA will be the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army. Subsequent responsibility for this Compartimento will be of the

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AG 725/061
Occupation of NE ITALY

O, dtd 3 Apr 48
(cont'd)

B-517

272

d. Instructions giving the territorial responsibilities of PBS and District HQs will be issued separately in amplification of instructions already issued in paragraph 15, ARHQ letter, AG 091.711-005 GCT, dated 3 January 1945, subject: "Reorganization of British Command and Static Headquarters", and ARHQ letter referred to in paragraph 1 a, above.

7. ALLOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES. Within their respective areas, Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for:

a. The administration of ground forces under their command and such maintenance of Air Forces located in the Army area as is a ground force responsibility.

b. The initiation, in conjunction with Army AMG organizations, of civil administration and relief measures.

c. The execution of specific administrative tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

8. ALLOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATIC HQs in NE ITALY

a. HQ 1 District will be responsible for:

(1) The local administration of all British troops in its territory and in that of PBS, North of the northern boundary of the Compartimento of TOSCANA.

(2) The coordination, in conjunction with HQ Allied Commission, of matters being undertaken in its territory jointly by military and civil authorities.

(3) The execution of specific administrative tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

b. HQ 2 District will be responsible for the local administration of all British troops in the territory of PBS, within the boundaries of the Compartimento of TOSCANA, in addition to the responsibilities defined in the administrative instruction referred to in paragraph 3 above.

c. CG PBS will be responsible for:

(1) Supply matters in respect to US Forces in Fifth Army in accordance with normal administrative procedure.

(2) Supply matters in respect to US Forces in the territory under its control.

(3) The coordination, in conjunction with HQ Allied Commission, of matters being undertaken in its territory jointly by military and civil authorities.

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B-517

Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-C, dtd 3 Apr 45
"Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont.)

(4) The execution of specific tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

d. HQ Allied Commission will be responsible for:

(1) The continuation of civil relief measures

(2) The development and operation in accordance with policies laid down by AFHQ of essential communications, industries and public utilities which are not a military responsibility.

9. DEVELOPMENT OF Ls OF C IN NORTH ITALY. Subject to changes which may be dictated by the course of operations, relative state of damage to communications or other considerations:

a. The US Ls of C will be by rail and road from LEGHORN through BOLOGNA and the BRESCIA to AUSTRIA.

b. The British Ls of C will be:

(1) By rail northward from RICCIA to railheads on line 86 and extensions of this line in the FERRARA area, and by road FERRARA-UDINE-UDINE.

(2) By sea, through the port of TRIESTE, and thence by the least damaged road and rail route to AUSTRIA.

10. PORTS.

a. It is not planned to open the port of VENICE immediately on capture. Later, when resources can be spared for the purpose, it will be opened for the importation of civil supplies.

b. TRIESTE will be developed as a military port and opened as a higher priority than VENICE.

c. With reference to the administrative instructions on NE ITALY referred to in paragraph 3 above, there are sufficient naval and military resources available to enable GENOA and TRIESTE to be opened simultaneously. However, should any conflict arise in the allocation of resources between these two ports, TRIESTE will have priority.

d. Naval responsibilities in respect to the opening and operation of TRIESTE and VENICE have been given to FOTALL.

e. TRIESTE

(1) TRIESTE will be developed to enable 6,000 tons to be discharged and cleared through it.

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B-617

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AFHQ, AG 323/061 GD, dtd 3 Apr 45.
"Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

221

- (2) The opening and operation of the port will be a British responsibility in respect of all tonnages handled. Should it be necessary to handle US tonnages the US will give counter-vailing assistance in discharge and clearance at a port elsewhere in ITALY.
- (3) TRIESTE will be developed as a transit port forming the southern end of the L of C to AUSTRIA and only the minimum necessary installations will be established at the port.
- (4) Responsibility under e (1), (2) and (3) will be undertaken initially by HQ Eighth Army subject to the following reservations:
 - (a) The key plan for the port will be prepared by AFHQ in conjunction with HQ Eighth Army, CG US base section concerned and POTAH.
 - (b) Chairman of the Siting Board, on which the HQs given in (a) above will be represented, will be provided by AFHQ.
 - (c) Allocation of tonnages between HQ Eighth Army and other holders, whose requirements are not the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army, will be made by AFHQ.

f. VENICE

- (1) The opening and operation of the port will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission in all respects other than those which are a naval responsibility (see sub-paragraph d above).
- (2) Other than certain organizational assistance of a supervisory nature, it is unlikely that any military resources can be allotted to HQ Allied Commission for this purpose. The extent of this assistance will be notified later.

ii. RAILWAYS.

a. The general order of priority of repair and construction will be as follows:

<u>First Priority</u>	: PRATO-BOLOGNA Single line FAENZA-BOLOGNA FAENZA-FERRARA
<u>Second Priority</u>	: BOLOGNA-VERONA-BRENNER BOLOGNA-PARMA Double line FAENZA-BOLOGNA
<u>Third Priority</u>	: PARMA-ALESSANDRIA-TURIN Shortest route to MILAN GENOA-ALESSANDRIA

4516

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B-317

Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/001 GDS-0, dtd 3 Apr 46,
 "Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

b. In addition to the above a line leading north to AUSTRIA from TRIESTE will be repaired. This line will be inserted into the above priorities according to operational requirements and the time required to move such locomotives and rolling stock, as may be necessary, to put the line into operation.

c. The above order of priority will be subject to adjustment in accordance with the speed and manner in which NORTH ITALY is occupied and whether the occupation follows a progressive enemy withdrawal or surrender.

12. ROADS

a. Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for road repair and construction within their own areas to meet the operational requirements of CG 15th Army Group.

b. Should the whole of NORTH ITALY be liberated simultaneously as a result of enemy surrender or collapse, responsibility and priority for repair of roads during Phase II will be as follows:

<u>Priority 1</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
BOLOGNA-MODENA-VERONA BOLOGNA-FERRARA-PADUA	CG PBS HQ 1 District
<u>Priority 2</u>	
VERONA-BRESCIA	CG PBS
<u>Priority 3</u>	
Best route PADUA-BRESCIA-TRIESTE MODENA-PIACENZA	HQ 1 District US HQ, designated at the time by CG MTOUSA and HQ 2 District in their respective territories
<u>Priority 4</u>	
GENOVA-ALESSANDRIA	HQ 2 District
<u>Priority 5</u>	
PIACENZA-ALESSANDRIA-TURIN Best route to MILAN	HQ 2 District HQ 2 District

c. Responsibility for the subsequent repair of the road L of C leading north from TRIESTE into AUSTRIA will be allotted in the separate instructions referred to in paragraph 6 c.

13. INT. HQ Allied Commission will be responsible for the restoration and operation of the INT system to the maximum extent possible for the movement of civil supplies.

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220
8-517

Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/051 GDS-O, dtd 3 Apr 45,
"Occupation of NW ITALY" (cont'd)

14. BULK STORAGE AND PIPELINES

a. Bulk storage facilities will be developed as follows:

- (1) At TRIESTE, to supply military and civil requirements. This will be a military responsibility.
- (2) At VENICE, to supply civil requirements. This will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission. The provision of facilities at TRIESTE will have first priority.

b. Pipeline construction will take place to provide the following four-inch lines:

- (1) From ANCONA - one via BOLOGNA to FERRARA) One of these lines
- one via RAVENNA to FERRARA) to be extended to
ROVIGO.
- (2) From LEGHORN - one to BOLOGNA
- one via BOLOGNA to MODENA
- one via BOLOGNA to VERONA

15. CIVIL SUPPLIES

a. In Phase I the provision of supplies for the civil population will be the responsibility of Armies, in conjunction with their attached AMG organizations.

b. In Phase II the provision of supplies for the civil population will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission.

c. Should German forces in ITALY surrender or collapse on or about their present line, and subject to overriding operational requirements, the following will be undertaken as a military responsibility to assist HQ Allied Commission in the movement of civil supplies:

- (1) Movement of 350 tpd to PARMA. This will be a British responsibility to be undertaken by HQ Eighth Army in Phase I and HQ I District in Phase II.
- (2) Movement of 400 tpd to VERONA. This will be a US responsibility to be undertaken by CG Fifth Army in Phase I and CG PMS in Phase II.

This assistance is in addition to the movement of 500 tpd to PARMA which has been accepted as a British military responsibility in the administrative instructions on NW ITALY referred to in paragraph 3 above.

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B-517

Ltr. AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dtd 3 Apr 45,
"Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

d. AFHQ/MTUSA will be responsible for the allocation of the necessary resources to enable the responsibilities allotted to the HQs concerned in sub-paragraphs c (1) and (2) above, to be implemented. These resources will be subject to recall and should be assumed to be available for a period not exceeding one month.

16. ADMINISTRATION OF ENEMY FORCES FOLLOWING A CAPITULATION IN ITALY.

a. General. The policy will be that the surrendered enemy forces will carry out their own administration. To this end enemy forces will retain or, where they have disintegrated, be reformed into formation and unit organizations. In accordance with this general policy, as amplified in sub-paragraphs b and c below, the arrangements for the concentration, holding and maintenance of enemy surrendered forces will be the responsibility of Fifth and Eighth Armies under the coordinating direction of CG 15th Army Group. When the Army rear boundaries are moved forward (Phase II) this responsibility will pass to AFHQ/MTUSA. Separate instructions on this subject will be issued at the time.

b. Concentration of Surrendered Enemy Forces. Surrendered enemy forces will be concentrated where they can be easily maintained and where they can be put to work in accordance with the Terms of Surrender, in relief of Allied administrative resources. The most suitable area, from these points of view, is that between the River PO and Highway 9 (exclusive of this route, major towns in the area and the material coastal belt adjoining the ADRIATIC Coast). Subject to operational requirements, this area should be the main concentration area for enemy forces surrendering south, and in the general vicinity of, the PO. As soon as it is operationally possible, forces surrendering north of the PO should be moved to this concentration area.

c. Holding and Evacuation of Surrendered Enemy Forces. Surrendered enemy forces will be held in the main concentration areas. Recalcitrant enemy personnel will be evacuated to PW cages south of the APENNINES. Movement of these recalcitrant elements out of Army areas will be the responsibility of AFHQ/MTUSA. Ultimate disposal of surrendered enemy forces will be the subject of separate instructions as required.

d. Accommodation of Surrendered Enemy Forces. Surrendered enemy forces will accommodate themselves, using their own resources. Use will be made of warehouses, large buildings, etc., only if these are not required for Allied military or civil purposes. There will be no requisitioning of houses for the accommodation of enemy forces.

e. Maintenance of Surrendered Enemy Forces. The maximum use of enemy administrative resources will be made for this purpose. When these resources are exhausted these forces will be maintained from Allied stocks. Except for such items as are declared surplus to Allied military and civil requirements, local resources will not be used for the maintenance of these forces without the authority of AFHQ.

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8-517

TOP SECRET

Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dtd 3 Apr 45,
"Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

219

f. Use of Enemy Transport and Service Units. Enemy transport and service units will be used for the maintenance of the surrendered enemy forces regardless of whether they are being maintained from their own resources or from Allied depots. Maximum use of enemy animal transport will be made for this purpose in place of enemy motor transport units. The latter units will be used to assist in the movement of civil supplies in relief of Allied military transport employed on this task (see paragraph 15 c).

g. Disposal of Surrendered Enemy Material. Separate instructions will be issued on this subject.

17. PARTISANS. Policy regarding partisans is defined in AFHQ signal F 20912, dated 14 February 1945 to HQ 15th Army Group only. Instructions regarding their feeding, clothing, payment and hospitalization will be issued separately.

18. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

a. Initially, refugees and displaced persons will be subject to a "stratostall" order, to be issued through military channels by CG 15th Army Group.

b. In Phase I, Armies, in conjunction with their attached AMG organizations, and in Phase II, HQ Allied Commission, will be responsible for screening, registering and maintaining displaced persons.

c. Overall plans for the disposal of these persons will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission in conjunction with the military HQ concerned in matters affecting their movement within ITALY.

19. RUSSIAN CIVILIANS. Feeding, clothing and hospitalization of Russian civilians will be a military responsibility to be implemented in Phase I by Armies, and in Phase II by PES and the District HQ concerned.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christensen
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

4513

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~1st AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O,
"Occupation of NE ITALY"

B-617

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>COPY NO.</u>	<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>COPY NO.</u>
CG 15th Army Group	1 - 15	Pay	105
CG Allied Commission	16 - 21	Labor	106
GOC No 1 District	22 - 27	AG Postal	107
GOC No 2 District	28 - 31	Postal (R)	108
CG PMS	32 - 35	DMT	109
SAC, Mediterranean	36	Hq RAC	110
D/SAC, Mediterranean	37	Pd Arty	111
Chief of Staff	38	FA	112
CAO	39	QM	113 - 115
A/G-1	40	Pat Section	116
C/S MTOUSA	41	Coal Section	117
C-in-C Med	42 - 46	CEMS	118
Commander, Eighth Fleet	47	US GOC	119
Air C-in-C Med	48 - 51	Fiscal Director	120
G-1 (A)	52 - 53	5 Airborne Div Plans	121
G-1 (B)	54 - 55	PSTO	122
G-2	56 - 57	Med Shipping Board	123
G-3	58 - 64	US POLAD	124
G-4(A)	65	Sr Res Minister	125
G-4(B)	66	Hq APLAS, Rome	126
G-4(Plans)	67	Hq MTOUSA (for distribu-	127 - 136
Log Plans	68	tion as required)	
G-4 (Mov & Tr)	69 - 72	Hq No 3 District	137 - 139
Quarterm	73 - 74	Land Forces Sub-Commission	140
G(AE)	75 - 76	AG(MOIA)	
G-5	77 - 79	SHARP	141 - 143
Engrs (A)	80 - 81	AG Records, AFHQ	144
Engrs (B)	82 - 83	AG Records, MTOUSA	145
Signals	84 - 85	Spares (Log Plans)	146 - 200
SA & CD	86		
Pd & CD	87		
Survey	88		
Liaison	89 - 90		
Works	91 - 92		
S & T	93		
Surgeon	94		
Medical (B)	95		
Ord (A)	96		
Ord (B)	97		
REMS	98		
Tn (B)	99		
DMGS	100		
Provost Marshal General (A)	101		
Provost Marshal (B)	102		
Judge Advocate	103		
DJAG (B)	104		

TOP SECRET

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2403

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

~~TOP SECRET~~ 217

Confidential

Ext: 209.

Ref: 504/218/10.

29 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Planning, VERBENA GRULLA.
TO : Economic Section.

209-213

The A/Executive Commissioner will be grateful for any comments you may have on the attached letter, subject as above, (TOP SECRET, Copy No. 4) from R.C., Southern Region, dated 23 Mar 45.

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

Encl: As stated above.

See 22612

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

216

Ref: 504/216/80

NEF/mrd
27 March 1945

Memo:

To : Regional Commissioner, Venezia Region

213

1. Reference is made to your memorandum to G-5, AFHQ, of 23 March 1945, copies No. 3 and 4 to this Headquarters.

2. The Chief Commissioner wishes to call your attention to the fact that direct communication between a Region and AFHQ has not been authorized and to enjoin you, in the future, to deal with all matters affecting your Region through the recognized appropriate channels.

J. H. FINE

NORMAN E. FISER
Colonel
Acting Executive Commissioner

4511

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INTER OFFICE MEMO

215

From: Colonel Fiske

SUBJECT: Channels of Communication

FILE No.

27 March

1945

TO: Chief Commissioner

MAR 28 1945

I presume I am correct in saying that you have not authorized Dunlop to deal officially with G-5. He and Henn have had informal conversations on this subject, to which I see no serious objection, but I think we must insist that channels of official communication be observed.

7

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel

4510

Acting Executive Commissioner

Donnan (u) cc

*28
7*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

SOUTHERN REGION
ALLIED COMMISSION

TOP SECRET

Confidential
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER

Subject: Venerable Galt

March 28th
MAR 28 1945

To: HQ Allied Commission (attn Col R.T. Flako)

1. Herewith two copies (one to you & one to staff copy) copy to HQ and to
Colonel R.T. Flako.

Please acknowledge receipt.


J.K. HURLER

REGIONAL COMMISSIONER

NOTE: copy no. 4 HRLD IN TOP SECRET SPARES.

4509

HEADQUARTERS

SOUTHERN REGION, ALLIED COMMISSION

AFPO 194, U. S. ARMY

23 MARCH, 1945

MAR 28 1945

SUBJECT: Planning, Venezia Giulia

TO : G-5, AFHQ

1. Reference, conversation of 22 March, (Hean-Dunlop speaking) I forward herewith

(a) Suggested establishment for an integrated independent Regional A.M.G., administering an autonomous Venezia Giulia.

(b) Points of administrative detail which would require- if possible- prior consideration before the setting up of such a Regional A.M.G.

2. It may save your further reference if the following facts concerning Venezia Giulia are tabulated. The Provinces are given in order, North to South.

PROVINCE	AREA - (Sq. Km.)	POPULATION	COMMUNITIES - TOTAL OVER 10,000
Corisia	2,724 46	205,795	42
Trieste	1,279 42	370,864	30
Fiume (Carnaro)	1,121 57	109,018	13
Pola (Istria)	3,720 46	307,983	42
			Corisia Idria Trieste Monfalcone Muggia Fiume Pola Albona Capo D' Istria Pignano D'Istria Farenzo Pinguente Pirano

2. It may save your further reference if the following facts concerning Venezia Giulia are tabulated. The Provinces are given in order, North to South.

PROVINCE - AREA - POPULATION - COMMUNES - TOWNS OVER 10,000				
(See-29.)				
Gorizia	2,724 46	205,795	42	Gorizia Idria
Trieste	1,279 42	370,864	30	Trieste Monfalcone Suglia
Fiume (Carnaro)	1,121 57	109,018	13	Fiume
Pola (Istria)	3,720 46	307,983	42	Pola Albona Capo D'Istria Dignano D'Istria Parenzo Pinguente Pirano Pisino
Total	8,845 31	993,660	127	

3. The city of Trieste with a population of 260,000 is the only large city in the Region and accounts for over one quarter of the total population.

4. The attached tables are compiled on the basis that:
 (a) The opening and management of the ports will be an Army responsibility.
 (b) The handling of AMG supplies entering the port of Trieste for Austria or Yugoslavia will be the responsibility of the AMG (Venezia-Giulia).
 (c) Allied Military Police companies and garrison troops will be available to support in case of need locally raised police forces.

-2-

5. About half the towns listed above are old Venetian trading settlements built on peninsulars on the Western coast of the Istrian peninsula. They form Italian blocks with a Slovene or Croat hinterland. It would be valuable to find out beforehand to what extent Yugoslav partisan activities have actually affected, to date, the machinery of town administration.



J.A. Dunlop
Brigadier, Regional Commissioner.

Distribution

G.5 A.F.H.Q. Copies 1 - 2
H.Q. A.C. Executive Commissioner, Copies 3 - 4
Regional Commissioner Venezia Region . Copies 5.
File. Copy 6.

1807

232/211

EXHIBIT A

Draft Establishment for Integrated Independent HQ.

REGIONAL HQ. <i>Communications</i>		
Commissioner	1	
Deputy Commissioner	1	
Staff Officers	2	
Commander, Co. X, 2675 Regt.	1	
Commander, British Detachment	1	
Purchasing Officer	1	
TOTAL	7	
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.		
Education	1	
Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives	1	
Legal	13	(3 Reg. HQ.) (4 Trieste) (2 each others)
Public Health and Welfare	8	
Public Safety	15	(3 Reg. HQ.) (6 Trieste) (2 each others)
TOTAL	38	
ECONOMIC SECTION		
Finance	10	(Incl. Property Control)
P.W.U.	6	
Agriculture	2	
Commerce	2	
Industry	2	
Labour	1	
Food	7	(2 Reg. HQ.) (2 Trieste) (1 each others)
Transportation	6	
TOTAL	36	
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONERS	4	

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Regul	13	(3 Reg. HQ.) (4 Trieste) (2 each others)
Public Health and Welfare	8	
Public Safety	15	(3 Reg. HQ.) (6 Trieste) (2 each others)
TOTAL	36	
ECONOMIC SECTION		
Finance	10	(Incl. Property Control)
P.W.U.	6	
Agriculture	2	
Commerce	2	
Industry	2	
Labour	1	
Food	7	(2 Reg. HQ.) (2 Trieste) (1 each others)
Transportation	6	
TOTAL	36	
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONERS	4	
C.A.O.B		45.6
Trieste	10	
Corizia	8	
Fiume	4	
Pola	8	
TOTAL	34	
TOTAL	115	
Compared with present establishment of 60.		

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

APPENDIX B

Administrative matters requiring prior consideration in the event of the organization of an independent Region administering A.M.G. in Venezia Giulia.

1. Civil Affairs Section

(a) Local Government

- i. Are Prefects and Sindaco to be appointed. If so, what styles are to be used.
- ii. Is the complete Italian Administrative machinery of capo di gabinetto, vice prefetto etc. to be followed.

(b) Legal.

- i. Is the Italian code of law to be followed.
- ii. Is the Italian language or both Italian and Slovene to be used.
- iii. Will the Court of Cassation at Trieste also act as ultimate Court of Appeal.
- iv. To what extent, if any, are Italian Government decrees to be carried into Venezia Giulia.

(c) Public Safety.

- i. Assuming that no carabinieri are imported, and it is proposed to raise a local uniformed police force, what is to be its strength. Fewer figures were:

Gorizia	473
Trieste	857
Pola	558

600 (special for Arsenal possibly not needed)

Fiume

262

2258 (excl. 600)

How is this police force to be clothed, paid, officered.

- ii. Are the agenzie di pubblica sicurezza to be maintained.
- iii. Are the guardie di finanza and guardia forestale to be maintained. If so under what names.

Assault points.

iii. Will the Court of Cassation at Trieste also act as ultimate Court of Appeal.
iv. To what extent, if any, are Italian government decrees to be carried into Venezia Giulia.

(c) Public Safety.

i. Assuming that no carabinieri are imported, and it is proposed to raise a local uniformed police force, what is to be its strength. Previous figures were:

Gorizia	473
Trieste	857
Fels	658
	600 (special for Arsenal possibly not needed)
Fiume	262
	2258 (excl. 600)

How is this police force to be clothed, paid, officered.

ii. Are the agenzie di pubblica sicurezza to be maintained.
iii. Are the guardia di finanza and guardia forestale to be maintained. If so under what names.

(d) Public Health. No very difficult points.
i. Is the Medico Provincial system to be maintained.

(e) Education.
i. Is the University of Trieste to open. If so, under what direction. 1303
ii. Are schools to reopen. If so, is Italian or Slovene to be taught. 1303

2. Economic Section.

(a) Finance

i. How is the Region to be financed. Presumably the Italian Government will refuse to accept its financing as a charge against the Italian Budget.
ii. Is Lira currency to be used.

259
APPENDIX B

- iii. Are the local (Trieste) branches of North Italian Commercial Banks to be allowed to communicate with their head offices, or is the Banking System to be autonomous.
 - iv. Are Post Offices to be reopened. If so, are Italian stamps etc., to be sold.
 - v. What will be the status of Post Office Savings Bank deposits.
- (b) Food. No special problems, except as linked with 2a (i) above.
- (c) Industry.
- i. The status of the coal mines of Arsa will have to be worked out.
 - ii. Status of works at Monfalcone.
- (d) Commerce. No problems in first instance.
- (e) Transportation. No special problems in first instance as civilian traffic will be negligible.
- (f) Labour. How far will Italian Government legislation regarding rates and condition of labour be implemented by AMG decree.
- (g) Public Works and Utilities. No immediate problems, except that Trieste Gas Works depend on Istrian coal.
3. General Matters.
- 1. What will be the status of Italian soldiers who have been fighting with the Partisans of Venezia Giulia.
 - ii. Presumably all frontiers of the Independent Region will be closed. Allied police must be allowed for, to enforce this.

which will have to

be worked out.

ii. Status of works at Monfalcone.

- (d) Commerce. No problems in first instance.
- (e) Transportation. No special problems in first instance as civilian traffic will be negligible.
- (f) Labour. How far will Italian Government legislation regarding rates and condition of labour be implemented by AMG decree.
- (g) Public Works and Utilities. No immediate problems, except that Trieste Gas Works depend on Istrian coal.

3. General Matters.

- i. What will be the status of Italian soldiers who have been fighting with the Partisans of Venezia Giulia.
- ii. Presumably all frontiers of the Independent Region will be closed. Allied police must be allowed for, to enforce this.

4504

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

208

TOP SECRET

Ref: 504/184/EC.

20 March 1945.

Subject: Responsibilities of the Allied Commission.

To : G-5 Section,
APHQ.

175

154

1. The Deputy Chief Legal Adviser of this Commission has considered the opinion expressed by Col. Hammond and sent to this Commission in your letter G-5: 387.4-1 dated 6 March 45, and I attach his memorandum in reply thereto for your records.

2. In view of the statement made in paragraph(3) of your letter, I suggest that the whole matter may be allowed to rest for the time being.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

Major E. Talbot

✓

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Encl.

Copy to: C.A. Sec.

4563

11/13

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Note for New Italy file (with VP CAG) (207)

AFTHQ have approved a scheme whereby
Ven Gaudin comes within Venetian Military
Region

M

MINISTERO DELLE CORPORAZIONI
ISPETTORATO CORPORATIVO
CIRCOLO DI

19 MAR 45

501502

242

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

FILE

(205)

TOP SECRET

Confidential

Ref: 504/20.

19 March 1945.

Subject: Occupation of RE ITALY

To: Regional Commissioner, VENETIA Region (Planning B3) - No. 23
Regional Commissioner, ROMANIA Region. - No. 24

204

I enclose for your information and guidance copy No. of AMEJ
Directive AS 303/061 SACI-0 dated 15 March 1945.

Please acknowledge on the enclosed receipt form.

Major E. Talbot

Chief Staff Officer,
to Executive Commissioner.

1501

~~TOP SECRET~~

20

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AG 323/061 SACS-0

Exec Comm (5 copies)
B-399 (20-24)
JEF/vp

.....
: ~~TOP SECRET~~ :
: Auth: SAC, PO :
: Initials: JEF :
: Date: 18 March 45 :
: :

18 March 1945

MAR 19 1945

SUBJECT: Directive -- Occupation of North East ITALY.

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District

1. GENERAL.

a. (1) The occupation of NE ITALY is likely to take place in one of the two following general sets of circumstances:

(a) Withdrawal of the enemy from the PO VALLEY and the coastal area of NE ITALY to some general Alpine line, such as CAVORETTO - GEMONA - BELLUNO - LAKE GARDA - Swiss frontier. In this event, however, the enemy may continue to hold both VENICE and TRIESTE as fortresses.

(b) Surrender of the German forces in ITALY any time before withdrawal as indicated in (a) above being carried out.

(2) This instruction deals with the occupation of NE ITALY in the circumstances in a (1) (a) above. Some modification will be necessary in the circumstances envisaged in a (1) (b). This will form the subject of a separate instruction.

b. Italian Fascist divisions are unlikely to remain intact in NE ITALY after a German withdrawal, but many deserters from these divisions may be picked up and some ardent Fascists may attempt prolonged resistance as guerrillas.

c. Extensive demolitions and the destruction of public utilities are to be anticipated.

d. From the political aspect, the occupation of NE ITALY will be guided by SACMED's declared policy to support the authority of the established government in Rome.

2. INTENTION. To obtain complete operational control of that portion of NE ITALY within the 1939 frontier evacuated by the enemy and to establish Allied military government therein.

3. METHOD. The occupation will be carried out in two phases.

See Jello 205.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

B-399

Ltr. AFHQ, AG 323/061 SACS-O,
dated 18 March 1945, (Cont'd)

a. Phase 1. Initial occupation and establishment of Military Government which will take place in the normal course of operations by 15th Army Group in following up the enemy's withdrawal.

b. Phase 2. The assumption of responsibility for:

- (1) Military administration by Number 1 District and PBS.
- (2) Allied military government by the Allied Commission.

4. PHASE 1.

a. This phase is the responsibility of 15th Army Group.

b. Tasks are:

- (1) The elimination of any remaining German and Fascist Italian formations, the securing and rehabilitation of essential road and rail communications to TRIESTE and UDINE, the securing of the port of TRIESTE and the UDINE airfields, and the rehabilitation of such portions of the BRESCIA and TRIESTE - TARVISIO routes into AUSTRIA as are in our hands.
- (2) The disarmament and disbandment of Italian patriot forces (see paragraph 7 below) and the re-establishment of law and order among the civil population, concurrently with the establishment of Allied military government by Fifth and Eighth Armies.

5. PHASE 2.

a. Number 1 District, PBS and Number 2 District will take over as army rear boundaries are advanced.

b. Eventual inter District/PBS boundaries will be as indicated on map attached as Appendix "A".

c. On assuming military responsibility from 15th Army Group, Number 1 District will take over command of such troops as remain in its geographical area. All troops in the PBS area will remain under command of Fifth Army or come under command of PBS or CG MTOUSA, as directed by CG MTOUSA.

d. Tasks of Number 1 District and PBS will be:

- (1) Assume command of all US, British, Dominion, Allied and Italian troops which are passed to their control under the provisions of 2 g above and be responsible for their local administration.
- (2) Assist the regional commissioners to maintain law and order in their districts.
- (3) Secure their respective army L of C behind army rear boundaries.

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Ltr. AFHQ, AG 323/061 SACS-O,
dated 18 March 1945 (Cont'd)

B-389

203

- (4) Safeguard military supplies, communications and stores.
- (5) Coordinate the demands by Allied troops for local resources.
- (6) Coordinate the military and essential civil movement requirements.

6. PASSING OF COMMAND. With the advance of Fifth and Eighth Armies, application for the adjustment to the rear boundary of armies will be submitted by headquarters of armies, after consultation with Number 1 District and PBS, to AFHQ copy to Headquarters, 15th Army Group, who will comment as necessary to AFHQ.

7. DISARMAMENT AND DISBANIMENT OF ITALIAN PATRIOT FORCES. In dealing with patriot forces the provisions of paragraphs 2 - 6, inclusive, of cable, this Headquarters, reference number F-26918, dated 14 February 1945, will apply.

8. ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN VENEZIA GIULIA. The precise measures which will be taken for dealing with Allied Military Government in VENEZIA GIULIA are not yet determined but for planning purposes it will be assumed that the whole area will come under Allied military government.

9. ADMINISTRATION. Separate administrative instructions will be issued.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

1 Incl
Appendix "A" - Map,
Compartments & Provinces
of ITALY

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C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGO
Adjutant General

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Exec Comm	20
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Econ Sec	22
R.G., Venezia Region	23
R.G., Emilia Region	24

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

15th Army Group	1 - 5
PERMASE	6 - 10
Number 1 District	11 - 15
Fifth Army	16 - 17
Eighth Army	18 - 19
ALCOM	20 - 24
Number 2 District	25
Number 3 District	26
SHARP	27 - 29
SACMED	30
Deputy SACMED	31
C/S, AFHQ	32
CAO	33
CG, MFOUSA	34
CinC, Mod	35 - 36
Com 8th Flt	37
Air CinC, Mod	38 - 43
G-1 (A)	44
G-1 (B)	45
G-2	46 - 47
G-3	48 - 54
G-4 (A)	55
G-4 (B)	56
G-4 (Log Plans)	57
G-4 (Mov & Tr)	58
G-5	59
Q (Maint)	60
Q (AE)	61
AG	62
AA & CD	63
PAD & CIV DEF	64
Fiscal Director	65
Linison	66
USO	67 - 68
B & T	69
US POLAD	70
British Resident Minister	71
Judge Advocate	72
Pat Sec	73
Coal Sec	74
CEMS	75
5 A/B Div (Plans)	76
REME	77
Surgeon (B)	78
Ordnance (B)	79
Provost Marshal (B)	80
IG	81
SACS (Spares)	82 - 95
AG records	96 - 97


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
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


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
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
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
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