

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

ACC

10000/109/180
(VOL. IV)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No.

785017

0000/109/180
(VOL. IV)

ADMIN OF NE ITALY
MAY - SEPT. 1945

Political Adviser (A)

You might like to see folio 334B is answer to letter at folio 334C.

Handwritten 30/10/54

(note: Fol. 334B is a copy of 334C, 1/11/54)

358 Jacks to D. 22/10/54

364

Executive Commissioner.

Please see folio 363. The directive referred to in para. 1 was not received, but since para. 2 is being substituted for it, we will not need to obtain a copy.

Handwritten C.S.O.

22/10/54

365

363 seen by G.B. & E.C. 26/5

364

Note: Message letter received 30 copies of folio 366 and I instructed the distribution of same on memo. I have filed the

Please see folio 363. The directive referred to in para. 1 was not received, but since para. 2 is being substituted for it, we will not need to obtain a copy.

22/6/45.

L.S.
O.S.O.

365.

363 seen by G.G. & E.G.

$\frac{26}{5}$

364

Note: Message Centre received 30 copies of folio 366 and I initiated the distribution shown in annex. I have told the

Disposal Office Message Centre to turn back to office of origin my outgoing correspondence addressed to AMC & Army and asked the Disposal Office to do the same with outgoing signals.

Message Centre have deleted AMC & Army from the standard distribution list of mimeographed material.

Major Birch, T.O., has taken note of para 2. and the Amendment of para 3.

Officer, E.C.

13 July 45.

W. H. Hicken

374

A/Ex Com

Please see 373

Ex

24/7/45

24/7/45

375

3 Communication

Please see photos 373, 372.

CSO.

24/7/45.

303

Chief Commissioner

Attached is submitted for your information/see/sum/see/see.

Pt 301 and 302

Mr. G/S

See by C.C. on our file.

J.A. Quark

7.5

302

Executive Commissioner

To see:

(1) Folio ³⁰⁶ - Amendment No. 1 to Administrative Directive No. 2 re Administration North East Italy. ⁽²⁵⁾

(2) Folio ³⁰³ - AMG Eighth Army's instructions relative to M.G. activity in Venezia Giulia and Province of Udine.

(3) Folio ³¹⁰ - Summary of position in Venezia Giulia and Udine signalled by AMG Eighth Army.

8 May 45

[Signature]
Major

313

Chief Commissioner

You should see this excellent Sitrep from VIII Army. After discussion with G & last night

that we can food to

To see:

- (1) Polio ²⁰⁶ - Amendment No. 1 to Administrative Directive No. 2 re Administration North East Italy. (23)
- (2) Polio ²⁰⁷ - AM Eighth Army's instructions relative to M.G. activity in Venezia Giulia and Province of Udine.
- (3) Polio ³¹⁰ - Summary of position in Venezia Giulia and Udine signalled by AM Eighth Army.

5 MAY 45


Major

313

Chief Commissioner

You should see the excellent Sitrep from VIII Army. After discussion with G & last night I agreed that we should NOT send any food to Ven. Gidea with exception of Mafalone which is near the "frontier" and stations.

C.F.A. has already dealt with para 10 and AFHQ recommended instruction of currency to Met. line regarding payment of troops.

This will be repeated to AFHQ.

JUL 11

✓  ²⁰⁶ ³¹⁰

323

Executive Commissioner:

To see folio 317 and the attached article on the liberation of
Istria published in the GROMMAZ DEL MATINO of 5 May. The Chief Commis-
sioner has undoubtedly mentioned this article to you already.

To see folio 318 - letter from Col Montfort summarizing political
situation in Province of Bolzano

To see folio 319 - cable from 15th Army Group Liaison Officer
requesting permission for TONI DALLA a leader of American Freedom Movement
to visit Rome.



11 May 45

325

Chief Commissioner:

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval.

-P32

P318 & P319. I strongly recommend that he

be not allowed to come but to be sent back to

his Province

Mr. [unclear]

Daguer [unclear]

330

C.S.O. Telegram as drafted to issue to 75 Army

Group R.I.F. 5 Army A.T.G.

SEE 331

155/1015.

345

Chief, Communications

Approved to be released for your information/analysis/approval.

-P33

P3189 P3191 strongly recommend that he
be not allowed to come but to sent back to

his Province ¹²⁹

Mr (u/s)

Daguer

330

C.S.O. Telegram as drafted to issue to 675 Army

Group R.F. 5 Army AIG.

SEE 331

155/10/5

336

Ex Com 3

335 for info.

Sh 17/5

Mr 17/5

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Please see H-10 3/5

OK

1/5

1/2

La Lom

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

960

SECRET

102

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 312

Confidential

AF729

SECRET
Auth: SAC MP
Date: 11 Sept 1945
11 September 1945

AG 323/061 LOG 0

SUBJECT: Use of Ports of Venice and Trieste

EC DIST IN SEPT 45

TO: Headquarters
British Troops in Austria

Commanding General
34th Infantry Division
APO 34

97 EAC CM
98 CA SEC
99 ECOM
100 RC VENUE REC
101 SMC VENUE GRM
102 FILE SMC/EC

Allied Force Headquarters letter, file and subject as above, dated 12 July 1945, is amended as follows:

a. Paragraph 9a(4) is amended by the deletion of "26000 tons" and the insertion of "44000 tons", and by the deletion of the words "of this tonnage maximum holdings of 80 octons will be 9000 tons"

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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CG, 34th Inf. Div.	1 - 5	G-2	31 - 32
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SAC, Mediterranean	11	G-4(A)	40
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095

SEEN IN FILE 573/EC

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

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Letter, AFHQ, file 323/051 LOG-O, dtd 11 Sept 45, subj: Use of Ports of Venice and Trieste, Cont'd

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SECRET

377

Ref: 50A/377/NO.

4 Aug 45.

178 refer

Thank you very much for sending the map showing the XIII Corps area boundary. This arrived up here yesterday so that the delay entailed by not handing it to me was truly negligible.

M. S. EUSH

Colonel F.G.A. Parsons,
S-5 Section,
AFHQ.

MR 4/8.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504

345

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

2 August 1945

AUG 3 1945

TO: Brigadier M. S. Lush, CB, CRE, MC.

Dear Brigadier Lush:

As promised I have had the XIII Corps area shown on a map and enclose it herewith. Because of the necessity of pasting maps together and checking with the War Room it was not possible to produce it before you left this afternoon.

Yours, sincerely,



F. G. A. PARSONS,
Colonel, G. S.

See M 376
F 377

Map kept in the TS safe.

693

(CSO)

CONFIDENTIAL

FX 25225
JULY 19911 B

P/462
JULY 200915
PRIORITY
JUL 20 1945

APHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE PHGCT

MAIN 8 ARMY 13 CORPS INFO 5 ARMY DISTONE DISTWO DISTTHREE
PBS ALCON BR EMBASSY BELGRADE FOR COLONEL CLARKE US EMBASSY
BELGRADE.

CONFIDENTIAL.

1. Our FX 24780 of 18 July erroneously routed through incorrect channels is cancelled. Following instructions will now govern.

2. HQ 13 CORPS and troops under command will pass to direct command APHQ with effect from 251200Z hrs July.

3. All territory in ITALY presently the responsibility of 8 ARMY will become the responsibility of 13 CORPS from that time. Minor adjustments to 13 CORPS boundaries will be notified later.

4. Separate instructions will be issued on the control of AMG which is not affected by above.

DIST

INFO-ACTION - EX COMMISSIONER 2
INFO - CHIEF COMMISSIONER
CA SEC
ECON SEC
EST SEC
LAND FORCES
WMD & IPW SC
COMMUNICATIONS
PE BR
INFO DIV
TW SC
FILE

092

CONFIDENTIAL

*BU to CSO
no 372
noted
CSO [unclear]
24/9*

*See 3-74
PA
21/7*

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: FX 34780
Date/Time of Origin: JUL 182129Z

Message Centre No: 2/290
Date Time Rec'd: JUL 190930Z
Precedence: PRIORITY 45

FROM: AFTER SIGNED CG MTCUSA CITE NAGOT
TO: (1) MAIN 8TH ARMY (2) 13 CORPS INFO (3) 8 ARMY (4) DISTONE (5) DISTRO (6)
DISTRO (7) JBS (8) ALBOM (9) IN EMBASSY BELGRADE FOR COL CLARKE US EMBASSY
BELGRADE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL.

1. With effect from 251200Z hours July HEADQUARTERS 13 CORPS and troops under command will pass to direct command ALLIED FORCE HQ.
2. At same time 13 CORPS will assume responsibility for all territory in ITALY which is at present responsibility of 8 ARMY. Minor adjustments to 13 CORPS boundaries will be notified later.
3. The above does not affect control of AMG of which separate instructions will be issued.

DIST

ACTION: Ex Commissioner 2
INFO: Chief Commissioner
CA Sec
Moon Sec
Est Sec
Info Div
File

WNO - I Pw LL
Communication
LAW PRCED SC
P. R. P.

ACTION

MC ~~initial~~

24/7

CONFIDENTIAL

091

COPIES TO FILES 509,522

(Has McLaughlin)

6104

102

CONFIDENTIAL

SAC RPT
Auth: SAC [initials]
Initials: [signature]
Date: 12 July 1945
12 July 1945

E. C. DIST - 16 July 45

$$(573/€ \text{ c})$$

97 - Ex Control
98 - CASC
99 - Econ Sec
100 - Re VENTURE RPT
101 - SCAD VENTURE EIGEN
102 - SD4/ET

This instruction amends that part of letter this headquarters, file as above, dated 19 May 1945, subject: "Administrative Instruction, North Italy," which refers to the use of VENICE and TRIESTE.

This instruction is written in accord with the situation which will obtain when command of that part of NORTHEAST ITALY which is now the responsibility of Eighth Army has passed to XIII Corps under the direct command of this headquarters.

The object of this instruction is to define the policy for the use of TRIESTE and VENICE, the establishment of depots and location of reserves and maintenance stocks at these ports.

The maximum use will be made of TRIESTE for the import of military maintenance and civil supplies but VENICE will be so organized that it can be used as an alternative port of entry for these supplies, should it be necessary to forego the use of TRIESTE. Present policy of holding maintenance stocks at VENICE of all items, excluding Ordnance stores, for forces in the VENEZIA GIULIA area will continue. Detailed application of this policy will be in accordance with the following paragraphs.

a. British Forces in MYSTRA

Reserve and maintenance stocks of all commodities will be held in base installations in AUSTRIA. Authorized levels are being notified in a British Administrative Instruction shortly to be issued.

v90

(SEEN ON FILE 573/EC) ~~SECRET~~

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

AFR 1tr, AG 323/061 LOG-C
dtd 12 July 1945. (Cont'd)

- (1) All commodities excluding ordnance stores. Reserves will be held until further notice at existing installations in ITALY. Maintenance stocks will be held at VENICE. Authorized levels are being notified in a British Administrative Instruction shortly to be issued.
- (2) Ordnance stores. Reserves and maintenance stocks will be held at the Base Ordnance Depot, NAPLES, and at the Advanced Ordnance Depot in AUSTRIA, when established.

c. Local reserves may be held by XIII Corps and located as decided by Commander XIII Corps. The size of these local reserves will also be decided by Commander XIII Corps but will not exceed seven (7) days without the prior authority of this headquarters.

6. USE OF TRIESTE

a. TRIESTE will be used as a "seahed" for the import of the following:

- (1) Military requirements (excluding bulk POL) for British forces in AUSTRIA.
- (2) Military requirements for British forces in the VENEZIA GIULIA area.
- (3) "Common user" items for US forces in the VENEZIA GIULIA area.
- (4) Civil supplies (excluding bulk POL), on AMG account, for the British zone in AUSTRIA.
- (5) Civil supplies, on AMG account, for VENEZIA GIULIA.
- (6) Civil supplies, on UNRRA account, for JUGOSLAVIA.
- (7) Bulk POL as in paragraph 9 below.
- (8) Coal as in paragraph 10 below.

b. No AMG depots will be established at TRIESTE. All imports for Eighth Army in AUSTRIA and XIII Corps in the VENEZIA GIULIA area will be cleared currently to base installations in AUSTRIA and to XIII Corps dumps respectively. Service port detachments will be provided as required; they will be responsible for civil supplies for AUSTRIA in addition to their normal responsibility for military maintenance supplies.

c. All imports for Eighth Army in AUSTRIA and XIII Corps in VENEZIA GIULIA area will be marked to establish easy identification on discharge. Marking instructions will be issued separately.

d. Details of estimated import tonnages are given at Appendix "A".

7. USE OF VENICE

a. Depots will be established at VENICE to hold maintenance stocks of all commodities excluding ordnance for British forces in VENEZIA GIULIA and for local British requirements in NORTHEAST ITALY. Initially, until installations have been established in AUSTRIA, maintenance stocks for British forces in AUSTRIA will continue to be held at VENICE.

SECRET

SECRET

AFHQ Ltr. AG 323/061 IAG-0
dtg 12 July 1945. (Cont'd)

b. VENICE will be organized, as an alternative to TRIESTE, to enable the military requirements for the VENEZIA GIULIA area and for the British zone in AUSTRIA (is those items given in paragraph 6a above less civil supplies for JUGOSLAVIA) to be imported and cleared through the port. Import tonnages for which VENICE will be prepared to handle, if required, will be 2,500 transported military maintenance and 1,500 transported civil supplies.

c. While TRIESTE is used as the port of entry for requirements as in paragraph 6a above, imports through VENICE will be restricted to:

- (1) Military maintenance requirements for British forces in NORTH-EAST ITALY other than those in the VENEZIA GIULIA area.
- (2) Replenishment of maintenance stocks at VENICE.
- (3) Civil requirements for NORTHEAST ITALY, excluding VENEZIA GIULIA.
- (4) Bulk POL as in paragraph 9 below.
- (5) Coal as in paragraph 10 below.

d. Details of tonnages to be handled through VENICE under conditions in sub paragraphs b and c above are given in Appendix "A".

8. TURNOVER OF MAINTENANCE STOCKS AT VENICE

Maintenance stocks at VENICE will be drawn on as necessary for military maintenance requirements to ensure the turnover of stocks.

9. POL

a. Bulk facilities will be rehabilitated at TRIESTE, as second priority; to VENICE, to hold bulk POL for:

- (1) Military requirements in the VENEZIA GIULIA area.
- (2) Naval requirements at TRIESTE.
- (3) Civil requirements, on AMC account, in VENEZIA GIULIA.
- (4) Civil requirements, on UNRRA account, in JUGOSLAVIA. Tonnage of bulk POL held in TRIESTE for all purposes will be limited to the minimum necessary working stocks for the requirements given above and in any event will not exceed 20,000 tons. Of this tonnage maximum holdings of 80 octane will be 9,000 tons.

b. Bulk facilities at VENICE will be used for:

- (1) Military requirements for British forces in AUSTRIA.
- (2) Civil requirements for the British zone in AUSTRIA.
- (3) Military and civil requirements for local consumption in NORTHEAST ITALY, excluding VENEZIA GIULIA.
- (4) Naval requirements at VENICE.

c. Imports of military and civil requirements for VENEZIA GIULIA area as in sub paragraph a(1)(2) and (3) above will be diverted to VENICE should it be necessary to forgo the use of TRIESTE.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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AFHQ Ltr. AG 323/061 100-0
 Add 12 July 1949 (Cont'd)

10. COAL

a. Coal for military and civil purposes for VENEZIA GIULIA and JUGO-SLAVIA will be imported through TRIESTE. Coal for local requirements at VENICE will be imported through VENICE. Coal for the remainder of NORTHEAST ITALY will normally be imported through TRIESTE and backloaded to destination.

b. Coal for NORTHEAST ITALY will be diverted through VENICE should it be necessary to forego the use of TRIESTE.

c. VENICE will be used for the import of low grade industrial coal from the ALBONA coalfields in ISTRIA, when arrangements for this traffic to move have been made.

11. US REQUIREMENTS

Except for "common user" items United States forces in NORTHEAST ITALY will be maintained by rail and road through VERONA. "Common user" items for these forces will be a British responsibility and will be imported through TRIESTE and VENICE in accordance with the policy outlined for these items in paragraphs 6 and 7 above. Maintenance stock levels of "common user" items in British depots will include the requirements of United States forces.

12. ALLOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS BETWEEN VENICE AND TRIESTE

Other than essential supervisory and control personnel, administrative personnel and units will not be duplicated at VENICE to meet the contingency of a possible transfer of import clearance from TRIESTE. If a transfer is necessary administrative units will be drawn from TRIESTE and allocated to VENICE. For the import of bulk P&L duplication of administrative personnel will be unavoidable.

13. CONTROL OF TRIESTE AND VENICE

With the moving forward of Eighth Army rear boundary to the ITALO-AUSTRIAN frontier the present administrative responsibilities of Eighth Army in NORTHEAST ITALY, including control of the port of VENICE, will be transferred to XIII Corps reporting direct to this Headquarters. Such minor adjustments to XIII Corps boundaries as may then be necessary will be dealt with separately. Installations at VENICE will be regarded as AFHQ installations but local control will be exercised by XIII Corps acting as the agents of this Headquarters. No change in authorized reserve levels will be made without prior reference to this Headquarters.

14. EFFECTIVE DATE

The date on which this policy regarding the use of TRIESTE and VENICE will be effective will depend on the date by which installations have been set up, and the necessary maintenance stocks established, in AUSTRIA. This date will be

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SECRETAFHQ ltr. AG 323/061 LCG-0
dtd 12 July 1945 (Contd)

agreed with Headquarters Eighth Army and will be notified later. Meanwhile existing policy governing the use of TRIESTE and VENICE will continue in force.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christensen
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

1 Incl
Appendix "A" - "Tonnage to be Handled
through TRIESTE and VENICE"

DISTRIBUTION:	Copy No		Copy No
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Chief of Staff	13	D JAG (B)	77
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088

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

APPENDIX "A" to AFHQ ltr
AG 3/661 LOG-O, dtd
12 July 1945

TONNAGE TO BE HANDLED THROUGH TRIESTE AND VENICE

Average tonnages to be imported through these ports, based on the policy contained in this instruction, will vary with the forces to be maintained. The following is a guide based on present strengths. Figures exclude bulk POL and coal:

a. TRIESTE

Military forces in AUSTRIA and
VENEZIA GIULIA area.

1,800 tpd reducing to 1,400 tpd
when reserves and maintenance
stocks have been built up in
AUSTRIA.

Civil supplies, for AMG account
in AUSTRIA and VENEZIA GIULIA and
on UNRRA account, for JUGOSLAVIA.

2,300 tpd comprising:
1,000 tpd AUSTRIA
300 tpd VENEZIA GIULIA
1,000 tpd JUGOSLAVIA

b. VENICE

Local military requirements in NE
ITALY

500 tpd) these figures will be
reduced to extent

Replenishment of maintenance stocks

100 tpd) these tonnages are
moved by rail from
SOUTH ITALY.

Civil requirements in NE ITALY

500 tpd excluding items such as
sulphur, phosphates, etc.

c. If the situation requires the transfer of military and civil imports from TRIESTE to VENICE in accordance with the policy in paragraphs 4 and 7b of the instruction, there is likely to be an increase in military maintenance requirements. VENICE will, therefore, be organized to handle import tonnages as follows:

Military maintenance

2,500 tpd

Civil supplies

1,800 tpd (excluding items such as
sulphur, phosphates etc.)

504
Lm
366
Lm
HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
EIGHTH ARMY.

SUBJECT: Liquidation of A.M.G. EIGHTH ARMY.

CA/ITALY.

HQ Allied Commission - (30 Copies).

10 Jul 45.

JUL 13 1945

1. W.c.f. 12 Jul 45, Eighth Army will deal direct with AMG 13 Corps and VENEZIA Region in respect of all AMG matters concerned with their respective areas, and this HQ ceases to be concerned with any aspect of Military Government in ITALY or VENEZIA GIULIA.
2. Will you, therefore, please note that the Courier should NOT call here after 14 Jul 45; that no further correspondence on ITALY should be addressed here, and that this Headquarters should be omitted in future from your Distribution Lists.
3. All files relating to ITALY are being closed and dispatched to the Archivist on the Courier leaving this HQ on 15 Jul 45. Those relating to VENEZIA and VENEZIA GIULIA will be sent to HQ AMG VENEZIA Region and AMG 13 Corps respectively.
4. Sufficient copies of this letter are being sent to you for distribution to all branches and sub-commissions.

W. P. M.
Air Commodore,
Officer Commanding,
H.Q., A.M.G. EIGHTH ARMY.

Copy to: SCAG, AMG 13 Corps,
SC AMG VENEZIA Region,
SC AMG LOBODRIA Region,
SC AMG EMBLIA Region,
SC AMG PIEMONTE Region,
SC AMG LIGURIA Region,
SCAG, AMG Fifth Army,
G-3 Section, U.S.F.A.,
M.V.S. (AUSTRIA),
PC, AMG UDINE Province,
G-3 Section, A.F.H.Q.

W. P. M.
14/7
DISTRIBUTION

(See Reverse)

086 (See 367)

Chief Clerk

Executive Clerk

C A Sec (5)

Econ Sec (4)

ESTAB SEC (3)

NAVY SC

LAND FORCES SC

AIR FORCES SC

COMMUNICATIONS SC

WMD + IPW SC

P.R. B.

HQ CANT

ADJUTANT

HQ CMMS. O.

ARCHIVIST

LIBRARIAN III

MESSAGE CENTRE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504 - 522 Ex Commissioner 363
INCOMING MESSAGE

22 JUN 1945

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Copy No 1

Originator's Reference: FX 97104

Message Centre No: E/6132

Date-Time of Origin: JUN 212011E

Date Time Rec'd: JUN 220840B

Precedence: URGENT

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHOCT

TO: CG 15 ARMY GROUP, CINC MED, AIR CINC MED, INFO SHAFF MAIN, GREENMIL, ALCOM

TOP SECRET.

1. The directive this HQ subject "Operations Against Jugoslavs in NORTHEAST ITALY and SOUTHERN AUSTRIA" date 17 May 1945 reference number B806 is hereby rescinded.

2. On completing the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY 15 ARMY GROUP will operate in conformity with the provisions of the agreement signed on 9 June by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister and the UNITED STATES and British Ambassadors and amplified by the agreement signed by the Chief of Staff AFHQ and the Chief of Staff Yugoslav Army on 20 June. In connection with carrying out the agreement you will continue to take all precautionary steps to avoid hostilities with the Jugoslavs and the greatest care will be taken to ensure that any overt action is taken first by the Jugoslavs rather than by our own forces.

DIST

Copy No 1 & 2	INFO ACTION: Ex Commissioner 2
3	INFO: Chief Commissioner
4	Folad (A)
5	Folad (B)
6	File

TOP SECRET

(INFO COPY ON "V G POLICY" FILE)

085

364
365
1A 11/25/6

SECRET

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RHF/1ja AP 221

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

.....
: S E C R E T :
: auth: S.C. :
: Initial: [Signature] :
: Date: 14 June 1945 :
: [Signature] :
16 June 1945

Confidential

316

AG 323/061 LOG-0

19 JUN 1945

SUBJECT: Administration of NORTH ITALY

TO: Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District
General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District

1. REFERENCES: Reference is made to the following AFHQ letters:

a. AG 323/061 GDS-0, dated 25 January 1945 and 30 January 1945,
Subject: Administration of NW ITALY.

b. AG 323/061 LOG-0, dated 19 May 1945, Subject: Administration of
NORTH ITALY.

c. AG 323/061 GCT-0, dated 10 June 1945, Subject: Command and Admini-
stration FLORENCE City Command.

The instructions contained in these letters will continue in force except as
modified in this instruction.

2. OBJECT: The object of this instruction is to allocate the responsi-
bilities for administration of British maintained forces in that part of NORTH
ITALY under control of Fifth Army (Phase I).

3. METHOD: a. Allocation of Responsibilities for Administration. Re-
sponsibility for administration of British maintained troops under command Fifth
Army with effect from 23 June 1945 will be allocated as follows:

(1) HQ 1 District will be responsible for the administra-
tion of the FRIULI and FOLGORE Gruppi and HQ 216
Sub-Area (British Element BOLOGNA City Command).

(2) HQ 2 District will be responsible for the administra-
tion of all British maintained troops other than those
mentioned in paragraph (1) above.

b. Disbandment of British Increment Fifth Army. British Increment
Fifth Army will be disbanded at a later date. Detailed instructions will be is-
sued separately.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE COMMUNICATIONS: Allied Force Headquarters will deal
direct with HQ Nos 1 and 2 Districts on British administrative matters affecting
British maintained troops in Fifth Army, sending copies of letters and signals to
HQ Fifth Army, where it is necessary for the latter HQ to be kept informed.

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SECRETLtr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 GGT-O,
dtd 16 June 1945 (Cont'd)

5. LLAISON: The following personnel found from the British Increment Fifth Army, will remain at HQ Fifth Army for liaison duties with British troops under command Fifth Army and with HQ Nos 1 and 2 Districts.

Colonel GS	one
GSO Grade I	one
GSO Grade II	one
DJAGG	one
D.DST	one

6. MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE: Separate instructions will be issued giving the procedure for the placing of bids for rail tonnages for the maintenance of British troops in Fifth Army area.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christensen
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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dtd 16 June 1945 (Cont'd)

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EXTRACT from the Minutes of the 15th Meeting (political) held on 31st May 1945

359

MINUTE No. 4.

4. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVIA.

(Previous reference SAS (2) (45) 12th Meeting, Minute 6).

MAJOR GENERAL LEQUITZER reported that the text of the note to be handed to Marshal Tito by the British and American Ambassadors in BELGRADE regarding the occupation of VIENNA (GULIA had been agreed upon. Information had been received from the United States Political Adviser that the port of DOLA was to be included in the demands and, accordingly, marked maps had been dispatched to the embassies in BELGRADE showing the area around that Port which the Supreme Allied Commander would need to control in the event that Marshal Tito acceded to his demands.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

31. May 1945.

Source: General LAMBERT reported that the text of the note to be handed to Marshal Tito by the British and American Ambassadors in BELGRADE regarding the occupation of VERONA GILIA had been agreed upon. Information had been received from the United States Political Adviser that the port of PULA was to be included in the demand and, accordingly, marked maps had been dispatched to the Ambassadors in BELGRADE showing the areas around that Port which the Supreme Allied Commander would need to control in the event that Marshal Tito acceded to his demand.

THE DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

31 May 1945.

082

W. J. 6/10

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

359

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TOP SECRET Confidential

EXTRACTALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's SecretariatSAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting
23 May 1945

K 182

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)6. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVIA

(previous reference SAC (P) (45) 12th Meeting - Minute 5)

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZ outlined developments in the Yugoslav situation in VENETIA-GIULIA and Southern AUSTRIA which had taken place since the last meeting. The Yugoslav Foreign Office had forwarded a note on 21 May to the British and American Ambassadors in BELGRADE stating that the Yugoslav Government would accept in principle the establishment of Allied Military Government under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, on the basis of the demarcation line proposed in BELGRADE by the Chief of Staff, subject to certain minor modifications and to certain conditions. A message had been dispatched to the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting out certain details of the Supreme Allied Commander's military requirements in VENETIA-GIULIA, which it seemed desirable to emphasize in light of recent developments. Meanwhile the forces under Eighth Army had been strengthened, and SHAEF were assisting by taking over part of Eighth Army's area of AUSTRIA. He observed that as the matter was now on a governmental level no further action could be taken by this Headquarters pending receipt of instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

081

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(356)

HEADQUARTERS 15TH ARMY GROUP
G-5 SECTION
APO 777

HMC/mjm

Ref: G-5/11/16.1

24 May 1945

SUBJECT: South-Tyrolia Party.

TO: Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters, Allied Commission.

MAY 27 1945

1. Attached herewith is a letter from Mr. Erich Amon, who signs himself as the Leader of the South-Tyrolia Party.
2. Some time ago the Mr. TOSI DEZIA referred to in the attached letter was brought into my office by Col JOHN RIEPE, G-3 Spec Ops Chief, of this Headquarters. The subject of our conversation was briefed into letter form and forwarded to the Allied Commission, with copy to G-5, Fifth Army. (See ltr, G-5/11/16.1, this Hq, dtd 6 May 45, subj: "Political Situation, Province of Bolzano".)
3. I am now asking you to take such action on Amon's letter as you see fit. There has been no reply from the Allied Commission to my letter referred to above, and DEZIA was refused permission to visit Rome to press the case of the South-Tyrolia.

Incl
Ltr fr South-Tyrolia
Party, dtd 17 May 45.

Copy to:
G-5, Fifth Army

331
NELSON W. MONTFORT
Colonel, GSO
A. C. of B., G-5

HEADQUARTERS
26 MAY 1945
C.

USA P MR
(see Min 358)
6/1

South Tyrolian Party

South, May 17th 1944

Col. Nelson W. Moffatt
15th Army Headquarters
N F

P R E S E N C E.

Sir,

In my quality of leader of the South-Tyrolian Party I want to thank you, in the name of our South-Tyrolian people, for the kindness shown to our Mr. Toni Duda. He has told us about the interview you accorded to him at 15th Army Headquarters on Saturday, 5th May, Florence, and of your interest in our statements.

Mr. Duda has expressed our hopes and our apprehensions as to the treatment of the Tyrolian people up to the time of the final decision to be taken by the Allied, concerning the future of our country.

You kindly informed Mr. Duda, that decisions concerning the treatment of the South-Tyrolians up to the time mentioned can only be taken by the political advisers of General Alexander, to whom you promised to report about our problems. We have prepared all the necessary informations on the questions, which Mr. Duda could not give you on the spot. We hope to be given in the near future the opportunity to speak to the interested political advisers, either in Rome or here, or at any other place they will find suitable.

The South-Tyrolians were greatly relieved to see that one of the most important questions, put before you by Mr. Duda, the bringing of South-Italian Partisans in the province of Bozen, has been settled favourably. On the other hand, another of our main apprehensions seems to become a fact; as it is one of the questions we believe to be decided by the before mentioned political advisers of General Alexander, we beg you to consider this fact:

We hear that all the local South-Tyrolian Police and Carabinieri are being replaced by purely Italian men.

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you, is the name of our South-Tyrolen people, for the kindness shown to our Mr. Toni Dacia. He has told us about the interview you accorded to him at 15th Army Headquarters on Saturday, 5th May, Florence, and of your interest in our statements.

Mr. Dacia has expressed our hopes and our apprehensions as to the treatment of the Tyrolen people up to the time of the final decisions to be taken by the Allied, concerning the future of our country.

You kindly informed Mr. Dacia, that decisions concerning the treatment of the South-Tyrolen up to the time mentioned can only be taken by the political advisers of General Alexander, to whom you promised to report about our problems. We have prepared all the necessary information on the questions, which Mr. Dacia could not give you on the spot. We hope to be given in the near future the opportunity to speak to the interested political advisers, either in Rome or here, or at any other place they will find suitable.

The South-Tyrolens were greatly relieved to see that one of the most important questions, not before you by Mr. Dacia, was being taken up by the political advisers of General Alexander, to whom you promised to report about our problems. We have prepared all the necessary information on the questions, which Mr. Dacia could not give you on the spot. We hope to be given in the near future the opportunity to speak to the interested political advisers, either in Rome or here, or at any other place they will find suitable.

We hear that all the local South-Tyrolen Police and Carabinieri Forces (Gendarmerie) are to be replaced by purely Italian men from Southern Italian Provinces, Carabinieri and GNL-people, ex-civilians. Our opinion on this matter has not been asked, which is another reason for us to believe that this order has come from higher Headquarters. The former Gendarmerie and Police forces stationed in this province consisted of Germans and Austrian subjects; but among those Austrians were many Tyrolens from this province, who could be relied upon. Even if these Tyrolen Policemen, who have been transported south a few days ago, cannot be brought back soon enough, there are enough trained and reliable men in our villages to assume these functions along with

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local Italians, according to an agreement that could easily be obtained with Allied help.

We may recall, that in spite of twenty-years fascist aggression and forced Italianisation the South-Tyrolians represent still about 2/3 of the population of this province, viz. 200,000 South-Tyrolians against 110,000 recently immigrated Italians. About 50,000 Tyrolians emigrated north in the years from 1940 to 1943, and have nearly been replaced by Italians. Of the local communities in this province 47 have a more than 50% majority of Tyrolians, while there is not one Italian community with such a majority of Italians. 16 communities show a 2/3 majority in favour of the Tyrolians. 10 communities are mostly Italian, whilst only 5 communities (including Vöden and Meran) have an Italian majority. 4 others show about equal Tyrolian and Italian percentages, with a slight majority of Italians, whilst in 7 other communities the balance shows a slight Tyrolian majority.

There cannot be any doubt about the importance of Tyrolian land-property and economy. About 9/10 of the land is still owned by Tyrolians, who form certainly an element of peace and order in this country. It seems only just that our people should be accorded the right to cooperate with the Allied forces and the local Italian people in keeping order and peace in this country.

The South-Tyrolian people are therefore hoping that given orders concerning the Italianisation of the police-forces in this province will be altered to give us a chance to show our good will and our resolution to keep peace and order at all costs.

I am, Sir,

Yours very respectfully



Erich Amann

Leader of the South-Tyrolian Party

four of the Tyrolians. In communities are mostly Italian, whilst only 5 communities (including Rosen and Voser) have an Italian majority. 4 others show about equal Tyrolian and Italian percentages, with a slight majority of Italians. Whilst in 7 other communities, the balance shows a slight Tyrolian majority.

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I am, Sir,

Yours very respectfully



Reich Anon

Leader of the South-Tyrolian Party

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat.

SAC (P) (45) 25
13 MAY 1945

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Copy No. 36

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL).

CONFERENCES WITH JUGOSLAVS.

Note by Secretary.

Records of the meeting held recently in BELGRADE between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito are circulated herewith for information.

(Signed) J. G. SWEETMAN
Lieut Colonel,
SECRETARY.

AFHQ Distribution:

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, Copy No. 35-37.

Ex. Commissioner's Distribution:

Chief Commissioner - Copy No. 35
Executive Commissioner - " No. 36 (Copy of File 504/20).
Political Advisers - " No. 37

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ANNEXURE I.

Confidential

RECORD OF THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN AND MARSHAL TITO
IN BELGRADE AT 1700 HOURS ON TUESDAY 27TH MAY 1945

PRESENT:

YUGOSLAVIA

Marshal of Yugoslavia,
Josip Broz Tito

Lieut-General Arso Jovanovic,
Chief of Staff.

Lieut-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

Major-General Marola,
Chief of Naval Staff.

Major-General Djuric,
Chief of Military Cabinet.

Captain Petrnicki,
Liaison Staff.

Captain Brkic,
Liaison Staff.

A.P.H.Q.

Lieut-General W.D. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander.

Brigadier General A.L. Hambler,
Assistant Chief Adminisra-
tive Officer.

Air Vice Marshal A. Low,
Commander, 37 Military
Mission.

Lieut.Colonel F.A. Lindsay,
Commander, US Military
Mission in Belgrade.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN introduced himself and conveyed greetings to Marshal Tito on behalf of Field Marshal Alexander. He then handed Marshal Tito a draft agreement containing Field Marshal Alexander's proposals in regard to arrangements in VENETIE GIULIA as attached at Appendix "A".

MARSHAL TITO after examining this document said that an understanding could not be reached on the basis suggested. That solution might have been applicable previously, but recent events had changed the position. As the war was over the problem was now a political and not a military one. Jugoslavs had a right to those sections of their country which were formerly under Italian rule and which they had freed. These territories were Yugoslav and he believed that they would be obtained by JUGOSLAVIA at the Peace Conference. Under Field Marshal Alexander's proposal, he would be required to withdraw his troops. He believed that it would be possible to find a better solution for these matters. Ethnologically and geographically the territories belonged to JUGOSLAVIA. He had no controversy with the Allies, but he did have with ITALY. He considered the whole matter was not a military but a

Major-General Marola,
Chief of Naval Staff.

Major-General Djurdic,
Chief of Military Cabinet.

Captain Petricki,
Liaison Staff.

Captain Brkic,
Liaison Staff.

Air Vice Marshal A. Lov,
Commander, 37 Military
Mission.

Lieut. Colonel F.A. Lichner,
Commander, US Military
Mission in Belgrade.

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MARSHAL TITO after examining this document said that an understanding could not be reached on the basis suggested. That solution might have been applicable previously, but recent events had changed the position. As the war was over the problem was now a political and not a military one. Yugoslavs had a right to those sections of their country which were formerly under Italian rule and which they had freed. These territories were Yugoslav and he believed that they would be obtained by JUGOSLAVIA at the Peace Conference. Under Field Marshal Alexander's proposal, he would be required to withdraw his troops. He believed that it would be possible to find a better solution for these matters. Ethnologically and geographically the territories belonged to JUGOSLAVIA. He had no controversy with the Allies, but he did have with ITALY. He considered the whole matter was not a military but a political one. He agreed that the Allies should use the port of TRIESTE and the communications. A joint commission could be set up to coordinate matters on the ground.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he could not discuss the matter from a political standpoint. From a military aspect, however, the British and American forces had found from experience that as long as one commander did not have full control in an area, it was not possible to operate efficiently. For example, in FRANCE certain cities were directly under British and others under American control. Similarly in ITALY, ANCONA was under British control and other ports under American control. A similar position existed even in ENGLAND where certain areas were under complete American control. For corresponding military reasons, the Supreme Allied Commander sought to be the controlling authority in the area of his communications in VEREŽIN CIUJLA. The final status of the whole province would, undoubtedly, be decided by the Peace Treaty.

MARSHAL TITO repeated that he could not approve the agreement in the form proposed. He could not see why the Allies would not agree to the idea of a joint command. This had worked very well on VRS. The Yugoslav authorities would give full assistance to the Allies and he guaranteed that everything would be in order in the presence of the Yugoslav troops.

Confidential

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that neither Marshal Alexander were authorized to do anything other than claim the area stated. The Allies required complete control of TRIESTE.

MARSHAL TITO was willing to offer complete control of the communications and the Port, but that was the most that he could concede. He was sorry to see a disagreement arising between Field Marshal Alexander and himself, but Joint en Field Marshal Alexander was not in a position to go any further, so he (Marshal Tito) had a duty to the interests of his country. He indicated that a line, considerably to the west of that proposed by Field Marshal Alexander, would be recognized at the Peace Conference as the boundary of SLOVENIA. Ethnologically all this territory belonged to SLOVENIA.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN stated that he was restricted to considering the matter from a military standpoint. He asked if Marshal Tito realized the privileges which YUGOSLAVIA would obtain if the port of TRIESTE was opened to the Allies. They could not, however, open the port until they had full control. He also asked Marshal Tito to explain more fully what he had in mind in saying that the Allies could have full use of the port of TRIESTE.

MARSHAL TITO said that he meant use of the coast, the port itself, ships, the warehouses at the port, and all that is necessary for war materials for supplying the army and all defenses of the port or harbour. The harbour included the city, buildings in the city and other things. A Yugoslav command would also be operative in the area and a joint command could be set up, under which the Yugoslav civil authority would produce the necessary civil labour to assist the Allies in handling large tonnages through the port.

The essence of the arrangements which he suggested was that the territory would be occupied by Yugoslav troops. The Yugoslav government had sent a note a month ago to the USSR, American and English governments asking that a part of AUSTRIA be turned over for occupation by Yugoslavs. No answer had as yet been received from ENGLAND and AUSTRIA although the consent of the USSR had been obtained. In regard to VENETIA GIULIA the Yugoslavs themselves had liberated this area and accordingly under military law they could rightfully occupy it, even if it had not yet been legally given to them by the Peace Conference. The area had been conquered by force of arms.

In reply to questions by Lieutenant General Morgan, he said that he would be agreeable to Allied troops being stationed at any important points necessary to safeguard their communications. The Allies were also at liberty to bring in service troops. However, the Yugoslavs would require freedom of movement, and the Allied troops could not restrict this. All matters of controversy between the two forces would be settled by the Joint Coordinating Commission. For the present, Italian metropolitan law would be the currency in the area. The civil administration would be through National Liberation Committees and TRIESTE would be an autonomous city within Federal SLOVENIA. Allied soldiers would, however, be subject to their own military courts.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he must submit his report on their meeting to Field Marshal Alexander, who would in turn have to consult with the United States and British governments. Field Marshal Alexander would be dis-

warehouses at the port, and all that is necessary for war materials for supplying the army and all defences of the port or harbour. The harbour included the city, buildings in the city and other things. A Yugoslav command would also be operative in the area and a joint command could be set up, under which the Yugoslav civil authority would produce the necessary civil labour to assist the Allies in handling large tonnages through the port.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he must submit his report on their meeting to Field Marshal Alexander, who would in turn have to consult with the United States and British governments. Field Marshal Alexander would be disappointed because he had expected that matters would proceed differently, as the Allies had reduced their demands to the minimum.

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APPENDIX "A"

Confidential

DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY LIEUTENANT
GENERAL MORGAN ON BEHALF OF FIELD MARSHAL
ALEXANDER TO MARSHAL TITO IN BELGRADE AT
1800 HOURS, TUESDAY, 5th MAY 1945.

1. As it is agreed, Field Marshal ALEXANDER requires the port of TRIESTE and the railways and roads from there to AUSTRIA via CORIZIA and TARVISIO to maintain his forces in NE ITALY and in AUSTRIA, the portion of the compartment VENETIA GIULIA west of the line on the attached map will be under his Command.
2. All Naval, Military and Air Force West of the line on the attached map will be placed under his Command from the moment at which this comes into force.
3. Field Marshal ALEXANDER will govern this area using an Allied Military Government. Use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and working satisfactorily.
4. To facilitate and simplify the working of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, Marshal TITO will withdraw the Yugoslav regular forces now in the portion of VENETIA GIULIA by a double line on the attached map 14 May 1945.
5. Any irregular forces in this area will either hand in their arms to the Allied military authorities and disarm, or will be withdrawn from the area.
6. In order establish safe shipping lanes in the North ADRIATIC and particularly the approaches to TRIESTE, the port of POLA and the anchorage on the West Coast of ISTRIA between POLA and TRIESTE will be open to unrestricted use by Allied Naval forces.
7. This agreement is purely military, and in NO way prejudges or affects long term policy regarding the ultimate disposal of the compartment VENETIA GIULIA.

2. All Naval, Military and Air Force west of the line on the attached map will be placed under his Command from the moment at which this comes into force.

3. Field Marshal ALEXANDER will govern this area using an Allied Military Government. Use will be made of any Yugoslav civil administration which is already set up and working satisfactorily.

4. To facilitate and simplify the working of the arrangements in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, Marshal TITO will withdraw the Yugoslav regular forces now in the portion of VENETIA GIULIA by a double line on the attached map 11 May 1945.

5. Any irregular forces in this area will either hand in their arms to the Allied military authorities and disarm, or will be withdrawn from the area.

6. In order establish safe shipping lanes in the North ADRIATIC and particularly the approaches to TRIESTE, the port of POLA and the anchorages on the West Coast of ISTRIA between POLA and TRIESTE will be open to unrestricted use by Allied naval forces.

7. This agreement is purely military, and in NO way prejudges or affects long term policy regarding the ultimate disposal of the component VENETIA GIULIA.

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XI

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF THE SECOND MEETING BETWEEN
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN AND MARSHAL TITO
IN BELGRADE AT 1100 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 9TH MAY 1945.

YUGOSLAVIA

Marshal of Yugoslavia
Josip Broz Tito

Lieut-General Arso Jovanovic
Chief of Staff

Lieut-General Arsic,
Chief Administrative Officer

Major General Manole
Chief of Naval Staff

Major General Djuric,
Chief of Military Cabinet

Captain Petnicki,
Liaison Staff

Captain Ristic
Liaison Staff

ALIAS

Lieut-General W.D. Morgan
Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander

Major-General A.C. Duff,
RSM, G-4 (British).

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief Admin-
istrative Officer.

Captain M.B. Leing,
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff

Colonel D.M. Jackling,
G-5 Section

Lieut-Colonel L.M. Cooper,
AGMR, Nov & En (Br)

Air Vice Marshal A. Lee,
Commander, 37 Military Mission

Lieut-Colonel P.A. Lindsay,
Head of US Military Mission
in Belgrade.

A draft summary of the proposals put forward by Marshal Tito at the first meeting had been prepared by the ARHQ delegation and translated into Croat. This paper was handed to Marshal Tito.

MARSHAL TITO asked whether the minutes of the previous meeting which had been prepared by his staff, and which contained all his views, had yet been read by General Morgan.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN pointed out that these minutes had not yet been translated into English. He asked Marshal Tito to say where he disagreed with the draft paper so that it could be altered to represent an accurate statement of his proposals.

Major General Kuolea
Chief of Naval Staff

Major General Dhumic,
Chief of Military Cabinet

Captain Petnichki,
Liaison Staff

Captain Neric
Liaison Staff

Intuitive Officer.

Captain M.B. Iain,
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff

Colonel D.S. Sachling,
G-5 section

Lieut-Colonel L.M. Cooper,
AGMR, Now & In (Br)

Air Vice Marshal A. Ios,
Commander, 37 Military Mission

Lieut-Colonel V.A. Lindsay,
Head of US Military Mission
in Belgrade.

A draft summary of the proposals put forward by Marshal Tito at the first meeting had been prepared by the AFM delegation and translated into Croat. This paper was handed to Marshal Tito.

MARSHAL TITO asked whether the minutes of the previous meeting which had been prepared by his staff, and which contained all his views, had yet been read by General Morgan.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN pointed out that these minutes had not yet been translated into English. He asked Marshal Tito to say where he disagreed with the draft paper so that it could be altered to represent an accurate statement of his proposals.

MARSHAL TITO said that the territory was clovered and his forces had liberated it. On account of their services and sacrifices in the Allied cause, he considered that his forces had a right as an Allied Army to occupy this territory. He therefore requested that the draft be amended accordingly. He also considered the Commission referred to should be called a Joint Military Commission as it would coordinate with the Yugoslav military as well as civil authorities. He had not other comments to make.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN asked exactly what was meant by "full and unrestricted" use of the port of BRISB.

MARSHAL TITO replied that the Allies could operate the port as they chose. He would agree to it being placed under control of an Allied Naval officer who would be responsible to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, who would be assisted by a port committee on which there would be Yugoslav representation. He also agreed that use of the harbour at POLA and the anchorages between POLA and TRIESTE could be granted to the Allies. He further

-2-

stated that the Allies could have full use of the railways between PRISHTINE and GORISKA. The right to operate, maintain and repair the underground cable from Ljubljana to PRISHTINE would also be granted.

Replying to a question about the use of airfields, he said there was no airfield at PRISHTINE but there was one at GORISKA. This should be used jointly by Yugoslav and Allied air forces and should be under their joint control.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MONAGHAN said that he was now clear as to the Marshal's views and all that remained for him was to return and report accordingly to the Supreme Allied Commander.

TOP SECRET

Confidential

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RECORD OF THE THIRD MEETING BETWEEN
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN AND MARSHAL TITO
IN BELGRADE AT 1300 HOURS ON MONDAY 9th MAY 1945

PRESENT:

YUGOSLAVIA

Marshal of Yugoslavia,
Josip Broz Tito.

Major-General Djuric,
Chief of Military Cabinet.

ALIA

Lieut-General W.E. Morgan,
Chief of Staff to
Supreme Allied Commander.

Brig-General A.B. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief Administrative Officer.

The Paper setting out the draft proposals made by Marshal TITO, which had been handed to him at the 2nd meeting, had been revised in the light of his remarks at that meeting and had been resubmitted to him at 2030 hours. As a result, Marshal TITO had requested this third and final meeting with Lieutenant General MORGAN.

MARSHAL TITO requested that the word "unrestricted", which appeared in the draft in relation to the use of the ports of TRIGLAV and FOJA, should be deleted and the word "fully" inserted. He said that his reason was that "unrestricted" had a more far-reaching meaning in the Yugoslav language. In all other respects, he accepted the draft as fairly representing his views.

This summary of Marshal Tito's views, as so accepted by him, is attached as Appendix 'A' to these Minutes.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he wished to make it clear to Marshal Tito that his failure to accept the proposals, presented to him on the previous day on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, was a great disappointment to the latter. As a result, the matter was now out of the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander who would have to refer it to the authorities in WASHINGTON and LONDON.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reminded Marshal Tito that the Supreme Allied Commander had always been a good friend of his, as the Marshal must have realised from the amount of material and military aid which he had received. This had only been achieved by the close personal contact which the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito had had in the past. As Marshal Tito would not deal with the Supreme Allied Commander along the lines of the agreement which the Chief of Staff had presented on his behalf, Field Marshal Alexander would not be able to go further in the matter.

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the paper setting out the draft proposals made by Marshal Tito, which had been handed to him at the 2nd meeting, had been revised in the light of his remarks at that meeting and had been resubmitted to him at 2030 hours. As a result, Marshal Tito had requested this third and final meeting with Lieutenant General Morgan.

MARSHAL TITO requested that the word "unrestricted", which appeared in the draft in relation to the use of the ports of TRINITE and POLA, should be deleted and the word "full" inserted. He said that his reason was that "unrestricted" had a more far-reaching meaning in the Yugoslav language. In all other respects, he accepted the draft as fairly representing his views.

This summary of Marshal Tito's views, as so accepted by him, is attached as Appendix 'A' to these Minutes.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN said that he wished to make it clear to Marshal Tito that his failure to accept the proposals, presented to him on the previous day on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, was a great disappointment to the latter. As a result, the matter was now out of the hands of the Supreme Allied Commander who would have to refer it to the authorities in WASHINGTON and LONDON.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN reminded Marshal Tito that the Supreme Allied Commander had always been a good friend of his, as the Marshal must have realised from the amount of material and military aid which he had received. This had only been achieved by the close personal contact which the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito had had in the past. As Marshal Tito would not deal with the Supreme Allied Commander along the lines of the agreement which the Chief of Staff had presented on his behalf, Field Marshal Alexander would not be able to go further in the matter and in the future it would be necessary for Marshal Tito to deal with the British and American Governments.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS WHICH MARSHAL TITO
MADE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE DRAFT AGREEMENT
SUBMITTED BY LIEUT-GENERAL MORGAN ON BEHALF OF
FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER.

1. Marshal TITO said he was sorry he could not accept Field Marshal ALEXANDER's proposals. His reason for this was that as his troops had liberated territory which is blowed, he considered that they had a right to occupy it as an Allied Army on account of their services and sacrifices in the Allied cause. He further mentioned that at the Peace Conference he would claim territory to the West of the ISONZO.

In view of this he pointed out that the matter had taken on a pre-dominantly political significance.

2. He offered to Field Marshal ALEXANDER full use of the Port of TRIESTE and the communications he required, and he considered that this should meet all reasonable military requirements.

3. He suggested that there should be a joint commission in TRIESTE which would coordinate with the Yugoslav civil and military authorities all military matters in TRIESTE and throughout the lines of communication. This joint commission would have overriding powers over the civil and military authorities in matters pertaining to military interest.

4. Civil government would be carried out by National Liberation organisations which had been set up previously and were now functioning.

5. Allied personnel would have extra territorial rights under their own commanders.

6. Italian metropolitan line would be the currency for the time being.

7. Allied personnel would have full liberty to operate TRIESTE as a base, including shore facilities and railways as they deemed necessary. Local labour and employees would be provided as required.

8. An Allied naval officer, responsible to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean would be in charge of the Port of TRIESTE. He would be assisted by a Port Committee, on which there would be Yugoslav representatives. Naval forces under Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would have full use of the harbour at POLA and anchorages between POLA and TRIESTE.

9. The Allies would be at liberty to operate any airfield at TRIESTE or along the lines of communication. Such airfields would be under joint control.

ordered to permit Italian shipping full use of the Port of TRIESTE and the communications he required, and he considered that this should meet all reasonable military requirements.

3. He suggested that there should be a joint commission in TRIESTE which would coordinate with the Yugoslav civil and military authorities all military matters in TRIESTE and throughout the lines of communication. This joint commission would have overriding powers over the civil and military authorities in matters pertaining to military interest.
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5. Allied personnel would have extra territorial rights under their own command.
6. Italian metropolitan life would be the currency for the time being.
7. Allied personnel would have full liberty to operate TRIESTE as a base, including shore facilities and railways as they deemed necessary. Local labour and employees would be provided as required.
8. An Allied naval officer, responsible to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean would be in charge of the Port of TRIESTE. He would be assisted by a Port Committee, on which there would be Yugoslav representatives. Naval forces under Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would have full use of the harbour at PULA and anchorages between PULA and TRIESTE.
9. The Allies would be at liberty to operate any airfield at TRIESTE or along the lines of communication. Such airfields would be under joint control.
10. Allied forces necessary for service and garrison purposes would be stationed in TRIESTE and on the lines of communication.

Lieut-General MORGAN pointed out that these proposals differed fundamentally from the draft agreement put forward by Field Marshal ALEXANDER. He would refer the matter to Field Marshal ALEXANDER, who would almost certainly have, in turn, to refer it to the United States and British Governments.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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CC 1008

21 May 1945

Subject: Transmittal of letter received from the Julian Committee for National Liberation

To: G-5, Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512

MAY 22 1945

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a letter dated 17 May in which the Julian Committee for National Liberation points out its views on the situation in Venezia Giulia as the Committee has summarized it.

For the Chief Commissioner:

J. A. Quayle

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

1 Incl.

cc: American Ambassador
British Ambassador
Executive Comm'r
Chief Comm'r Files

SH PM

070

11/24/5

(The En. Bureau)

342
Admiral Giffery E. Stone
Allied Commission

Re: me

Conscious of the claims it has to make and of its tasks for the protection of democratic liberties, and proud of the political and military contribution it gave to the fight for liberation, the Committee for National Liberation of Trieste and Venezia Giulia means to carry on its activity according to a political plan which will be a real contribution to national and international reconstruction.

its brief for what is taking place in Venezia Giulia doesn't make it blind to the great problems, and huge difficulties which must be faced by the Allied powers and it is ready to offer its collaboration to all the efforts, made by any side without distinction, for the passage from Nazi-fascist tyranny to perfect equilibrium and normality, to take place, on the Eastern border of Italy, with the smallest possible offences to individual right, to the personal safety of the citizens, and to the cordiality of the relations between the Italians and the various Slav groups which have been living together for several centuries on the Julian territory.

In such a spirit and with such intentions, the Julian Committee for National Liberation points out what follows:

- 1) All the Julian democratic milieu consider, on general principles, that there are no reasons why the Julian territory, including Trieste and the islands, should be treated differently from the rest of Italy, for what concerns civilian administration.

Anglo American administration in Venezia Giulia is an indispensable condition for an unanimous settlement of the political problems which arose between Italy and Yugoslavia.

- 2) Everybody wishes that, above all political and national questions, the need of an immediate allied intervention be examined without delay, to guarantee the life and property of the citizens, and liberate the people who have been arrested for political motives, deported or killed under arms by the Yugoslavs.

The Julian Committee for National Liberation is thinking not only of the Italians speaking citizens, but of all the other Italians who are unjustly exposed to acts of persecution.

- 3) The above mentioned Committee draws the attention of the Allied Commission on the disastrous food conditions of all the Julian region, particularly in the centres of Trieste, Pola, and above all, Trieste, whose neighbourhood cannot supply food, and whose food supplies are exhausted.

It therefore asks to give all possible support to the organs of SERRAVALLE, principally for that concerned with the food supply.

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Anglo American administration in Venezia Giulia is an indispensable condition for an expeditious settlement of the political problems which arose between Italy and Yugoslavia.

2) Everybody wishes that, above all political and national questions, the need of an immediate allied intervention be examined without delay, to guarantee the life and property of the citizens, and liberate the people who have been arrested for political motives, deported or killed under arms by the Yugoslavs.

The Julian Committee for National Liberation is thinking not only of the Italian speaking citizens, but of all the other Italians who are unjustly exposed to acts of persecution.

3) The above mentioned Committee draws the attention of the Allied Commission on the disastrous food conditions of all the Julian region, particularly in the centres of Trieste, Pola, and above all, Trieste, whose neighbourhood cannot supply food, and whose food supplies are exhausted.

It therefore asks to give all possible support to the organs of SUPRAL, principally for that concerns transport.

POST-SCRIPTUM

669

We have lately received most alarming news from Trieste, which we want to sum up for your information, asking you to take action without delay to protect the safety and life of the Italian population.

1) On May 3rd, a one sided accomplished fact was created by the annexation of the town to Trieste.

2) More than the fascists, those who had been autonomists for a long time were arrested in mass, i.e., those who during the fascist period had suffered the greatest persecutions from the past regime.

- 2 -

3) Dr. Mario Simeich, respected leader of the party, with Zenselis, an invalid and paralyzed, was strangled in his house. A very popular leader of the party Mr. Giuseppe Simeich was shot.

These facts form the realization of a program traced in the various newspapers and in an interview with Marshal Tito, in which the autonomists are declared to be enemy n. 1.

4) All technicians, (doctors, chemists, veterinary surgeons, drivers, mechanics and radio-mechanics) have been mobilized to complete the Yugoslav army.

5) A general calling under arms of 26 classes (1900-1926) has been ordered; the craftsmen must bring with them: linen, mess tin, knife, fork and spoon.

This regulation means practically the deportation of all able men.

6) All State employees, all parastatal and communal employees who do not speak Croatian are being dismissed. This regulation means unemployment for 80 or 90% of the class of the employees and their families in Piave.

7) The workers must work in the plants; they get only their food, and no pay.

8) The banks, shops and chemist's shops have to remain closed till further orders and have given their inventory to the Committee for Liberation. A trustee of the Yugoslav Committee for Liberation has been placed in every enterprise.

9) It is possible to requisition anything whatever.

The situation of the home is getting worse and worse and the population is getting desperate for it feels it is being abandoned by all.

Rome, 17 May 1945

THE JULIAN COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

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The situation of the town is getting worse and worse and the population is getting desperate for it feels it is being abandoned by all.

Roma, 17 May 1945

THE JULIAN COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504-1503
SECRET

0-5623
MAY 21/150 B

343
E/1896
MAY 22/10 30B
ROUTINE

15 ARMY GROUP

ACTION: AFHQ

INFO: ALDOM, TWODIST, 5 ARMY, PBS

Confidential

MAY 22 1940

SECRET.

Your EX 76659 not to all is ref subject hand over of North West ITALY from 5 ARMY to TWODIST. Change over responsibility for Admin and Civil Affairs in NW ITALY not advisable until military situation on Franco Italian frontier is cleared up and until Axis surrendered personnel have been substantially all secured in final concentration localities. Our 0-5622 refers to conference being held here to further examine question

LIST

INFO-ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO : A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE

ACTION COPY 2N 502/30

SECRET

067

RECEIVED
22 MAY 1940
3.3.3

(H. C. T. B. G.)

504

~~SECRET~~

342

Ref: 573/EC.

Tel: 478204
29 May 1945.

Confidential

SUBJECT : Administrative Instruction, NORTH ITALY.

TO : R.G. VENETIE Region
" LOMBARDIA Region }
" PIEMONTE Region } Thru' AND FIFTH Army.
" LIGURIA Region }
" EMILIA Region }

Copy No.
21
207
208
209
210

1. Copy No. 341 of AFHQ letter AG 325/061 LOG-0 dated 19 May 1945, defining the policy for the administration of forces in NORTH ITALY is forwarded herewith for information and guidance.

2. Please acknowledge.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Incl:
as above.

Copy to : C.A. Sec } Copy AFHQ letter under reference (copy 21)
Econ Sec } received separately 22 May 45. (copy 11)
503/30 (Copy No. 11)
504/30 (Copy No. 20)

(Note: Corr No 16 on file 573/EC)

066

24/5

TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
E 173

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

EXTRACT

SAC (P) (A5) 11th Meeting
18 May 1945

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

5. RELATIONS WITH JUGOSLAVS
(Previous reference SAC (P) (A5) 10th Meeting, Minute 3)

MAJOR GENERAL LAMMINGTON outlined developments in the Yugoslav situation in YUGOSLAVIA and Southern AUSTRIA which had taken place since the last meeting.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that he had been advised that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had received Marshal Tito's reply to the note presented to him by the British Ambassador to BELGRADE. This reply merely re-stated the counter-proposals which Marshal Tito had given to the Chief of Staff at the recent BELGRADE conferences.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER considered that since the whole matter was now being handled on a governmental level, no further action, other than to prepare for hostilities, could be taken pending the receipt of instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He reiterated, however, that Marshal Tito's counter-proposals were quite unacceptable to him.

MR. OFFIS reported that he had received information that the State Depart-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017SAC (a) (u) 11th meeting
16 May 1945

TOP SECRET

SUMMER ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)5. RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVS

(Previous reference SAC (P) (u) 10th meeting, minute 3)

MAJOR GENERAL LAMONTAIN outlined developments in the Yugoslav situation in YUGOSLAVIA and Southern AFRICA which had taken place since the last meeting.

MR. MACMILLAN reported that he had been advised that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had received Marshal Tito's reply to the note presented to him by the British Ambassador to BELGRADE. This reply merely re-stated the counter-proposals which Marshal Tito had given to the Chief of Staff at the recent BELGRADE conference.

THE SUMMER ALLIED COMMANDER considered that since the whole matter was not being handled on a governmental level, no further action, other than to prepare for hostilities, could be taken pending the receipt of instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He reiterated, however, that Marshal Tito's counter-proposals were quite unacceptable to him.

MR. OFFIE reported that he had received information that the State Department had also received Marshal Tito's reply.

THE SUMMER ALLIED COMMANDER:

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Took note of the above reports.

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342B

10. CONFERENCE WITH JUDICIALS
(Paper No. SAS (S) (AS) 35)

THE CONFERENCE had before them records of the meetings held between the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander and Marshal Tito in BELGRADE on the 8th and 9th of May 1945.

THE CONFERENCE:

Took note of the above.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Extract from minutes of SAC's 11th
meeting (Political) - 18 May 1945

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512AF 964 RVD/VFB
.....
S E C R E T
Auth: SAC, AF
Initials: [unclear]
Date: 12 May 1945
.....
12 May 1945

341

AG 323/061 LOG-O

SUBJECT: Administrative Instruction, NORTH ITALY.

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464
Headquarters, Eighth Army
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District
General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District
Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782USE OF FORCES OF
VENICE AND TRIESTE
SEE ANNEXMENT
AF 371

1. GENERAL

a. This instruction supersedes those contained in AFHQ letters AG 323/061 GDS-O, dated 3 April 1945, subject: "Occupation of Northeast Italy", and 2 April 1945, subject: "Occupation of Northeast Italy", which are hereby rescinded.

b. The instructions contained in AFHQ letters AG 323/061 GDS-O, dated 25 January 1945, subject: "Occupation of NW Italy", and 30 January 1945, subject: "Occupation of NW Italy", will continue in force except as modified in this instruction.

2. OBJECT - The object of this instruction is to define the policy for the administration of forces in NORTH ITALY.

3. SCOPE OF THIS INSTRUCTION - For the purpose of this instruction NORTH ITALY is divided into:

a. NW ITALY comprising:

Compartimento of LIGURIA
Compartimento of PIEMONTE
Compartimento of LOMBARDIA (less the Provincia of MANTOVA)
Provincia of PARMA) In the Compartimento of EMILIA
Provincia of Piacenza)

Instructions referred to in paragraph 1 b above are modified accordingly.

b. US Corridor comprising:

Compartimento of VENEZIA TRIDENTINA
Provincia of VERONA (in the Compartimento of VENEZIA PROPRIA)
Provincia of MANTOVA (in the Compartimento of LOMBARDIA)
Provincia of REGGIO EMILIA) in the
Provincia of MODENA) Compartimento
That part of the Provincia of BOLOGNA WEST) of EMILIA
of the present No 1 District boundary)

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 LOG-O,
dtg 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

c. NE ITALY comprising:

Compartimento of VENEZIA PROPRIA

d. VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES - Within their respective areas Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for:

a. The administration of ground forces under their command and such maintenance of air forces located in the Army areas as is a ground force responsibility.

b. Civil administration and relief measures in conjunction with Army AAG organizations.

c. The execution of specific administrative tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATIC HEADQUARTERS

a. NE ITALY - Responsibilities and arrangements for administrative matters and military government at present in force will continue until a date to be notified by AFHQ. As from that date these responsibilities will be assumed as follows:

- (1) All supply and administrative matters for US forces as directed by Commanding General, MFOUSA.
- (2) Administration of British forces by Headquarters 2 District under direct command of AFHQ.
- (3) Military government by Headquarters Allied Commission. Headquarters 2 District will be the controlling agency as defined in Administrative Memorandum Number 11 of 24 January 1943.

b. US Corridor

- (1) Administration and military government will continue to be the responsibility of Fifth Army. At a date to be notified by AFHQ this responsibility for the whole or part of this territory will pass from Fifth Army to Headquarters 1 District and Headquarters Allied Commission respectively.
- (2) Supply responsibility in respect of US forces will be as directed by Commanding General, MFOUSA in accordance with normal administrative procedure.
- (3) During the period of Fifth Army's responsibility, such administration of British troops, as must be performed by a British Headquarters, will be the responsibility of Headquarters 1 District.

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Mr. AFH, AG 323/061 LOG-O,
dtd 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

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c. NE ITALY (OTHER THAN VENEZIA GIULIA)

- (1) As the Army rear boundary is progressively moved forward to the Italian frontier, administrative and military government responsibilities will be assumed by Headquarters 1 District and Headquarters Allied Commission respectively for areas behind this rear boundary with the exception of VENEZIA GIULIA.
- (2) Supply responsibility in respect of any US forces which may be located in the area will be as directed by CG MTOUSA.
- (3) Headquarters 1 District will be the controlling agency as defined in Administrative Memorandum Number 11 dated 24 January 1943.

d. VENEZIA GIULIA - Separate instructions will be issued regarding this Compartimento when it is no longer within the Eighth Army area.

e. Layout of Static Headquarters - Letter, this headquarters, AG 323/061 OCT-O, dated 19 April 1945 will be amended separately.

f. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SURRENDERED ENEMY FORCES - Separate instructions will be issued.

7. DEVELOPMENT OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION

a. NE ITALY - British requirements will be supplied through GENOA. United States requirements will partly be supplied through GENOA and partly by road BOLOGNA-PIACENZA and later by rail when developed.

b. US Corridor - United States requirements will be supplied by rail and road BOLOGNA-OSTIGLIA-VERONA-BRENNER.

c. NE ITALY (less VENEZIA GIULIA) - Maximum use of rail capacity NORTH from BOLOGNA will be made, balance of requirements being met by sea through VENICE. Should there be US requirements in NE ITALY, the following general policy will obtain regarding the use of Lines of Communication.

- (1) United States supply requirements of items peculiar to US forces will be moved by rail and road NORTH from BOLOGNA.
- (2) The primary route for British requirements and United States common user requirements will be by sea through VENICE.

d. VENEZIA GIULIA - British and United States requirements will be provided through TRIESTE, supplemented as necessary by Lines of Communication given in 7 c above.

e. AUSTRIA - British requirements will be provided through VENICE and thence by rail and road through TRIESTE. An alternative Line of Communication through the BRENNER will also be developed. United States requirements will be provided through SOUTH GERMANY.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735017

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Dir, AFHQ, AG 323/061 100-0,
 dtd 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

8. PORTSa. Import Requirements

- (1) Maximum military and civil tonnage (exclusive of bulk fuels and coal) to be imported through VENICE and TRIESTE will be 6,500 tpd.
- (2) Of this figure, imports through TRIESTE will, as a temporary measure, be limited to 2,000 tpd.
- (3) VENICE will be developed to enable the full tonnage of 6,500 tpd to be handled if required.

b. VENICE

- (1) The port will be developed as a "seaharbor" to enable the tonnage given in sub-paragraph a (3) above to be discharged and cleared through it.
- (2) The opening and operation of the port will be a British responsibility in respect of all tonnage handled. Should it be necessary to handle substantial US tonnage the US may be called upon to give countervailing assistance and clearance at a port elsewhere in Italy.
- (3) Responsibilities under (1) and (2) above will be those of AFHQ. The responsibility for initial preparations, as specifically directed by AFHQ, will be delegated to Headquarters Eighth Army.
- (4) AFHQ, in conjunction with Headquarters Eighth Army, US Headquarters concerned and VUKH will prepare the key plan. The Chairman of the Siting Board, on which these authorities will be represented, will be provided by AFHQ.

c. TRIESTE - Eighth Army will be responsible for operating TRIESTE as a seaharbor to enable the tonnage given in sub-paragraph a (3) to be discharged and cleared through it. Should it be desired to increase this figure application will be made to AFHQ.

d. Allocation of resources between VENICE and TRIESTE - Initial preparations referred to at 8 (3) above will include the allocation of administrative resources at present designated for TRIESTE, between that port and VENICE, subject to adjustment by AFHQ when the Key Plan for VENICE is determined.

9. RAILWAYS - The priorities of railway construction, extensions and estimated dates of completion will be notified separately.

10. ROADS

a. Priority of repair and construction will be as follows:

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Mr. AFHQ, 30 323/061 LOG-0,
dtd 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

339

(1) Eighth Army/1 District territory

First priority VICENZA-TREVISO-UDINE with connection
VENICE-TREVISO.
Second priority FERRARA-PADUA-TRIESTE-PORCENI-ARCO-
MONFALCONE and UDINE.

(2) Fifth Army territory

First priority BOLOGNA-COSTIGLIA-VERONA-VICENZA.
Second priority VERONA-BRENNER.
Third priority BOLOGNA-MODENA-PARMA.

b. The headquarters in whose territory the above roads are situated will be responsible for the repair and construction. If US assistance is allotted in the case of the first priority listed under paragraph a (1), separate instructions will be issued.

11. POL BULK STORAGE AND PIPELINES

a. Bulk storage facilities will be provided at VENICE to supply military and civil requirements. This will be the responsibility of AFHQ.

b. Pipeline construction will take place to provide the following:

- (1) Two 4-inch pipeheads, fed from BRESCIA, one at ROVIGO and one at P.D.M.
- (2) Two 4-inch pipeheads, fed from VENICE, at TREVISO.
- (3) One 4-inch pipehead, fed from LEGHORN, at MODENA.
One 4-inch pipehead, fed from LEGHORN, at BOLOGNA.
One 4-inch pipehead, fed from LEGHORN, at NOVARA.
- (4) As second priority to all above - extension of NOVARA pipeline to VERONA.

12. LAYOUT OF ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS

a. Advanced base installations, including hospitals, to serve forces in AUSTRIA will be located in AUSTRIA. These installations will not be established without authority from AFHQ.

b. No reserves will be held at TRIESTE. As a temporary measure only such facilities will be established as are necessary to meet the local needs of a corps of three divisions and to hold a ten (10) days maintenance stock of supplies for this force. These supplies and maintenance requirements of troops in the area will be held WEST of the ISONZO.

c. No reserves will be held at VENICE. Depots will be provided to allow for the handling of imports up to 5,000 tpd of US and British military stores, and for the holding of transit stocks up to a maximum of ten (10) days for troops supplied through VENICE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 100-0,
dtg 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

d. Separate instructions will be issued regarding the breakdown by nature of commodity, British and US, of the 5,000 tpd to be handled at VENICE.

13. INTERFERENCE PROCEDURE - Provisions of Administrative Memorandum Number 16 of 20 March 1945 will apply. Amplifying instructions regarding:

a. Allocation of tonnages through VENICE or TRIESTE while these ports are in Eighth Army area.

b. The procedure for demanding requirements of US forces under command of Eighth Army, will be issued later.

14. CIVIL SUPPLIES

a. Civil supplies will be made available to the civil population, except in VENEZIA GIULIA, on a scale sufficient to prevent unrest and disease. No civil supplies will be provided for VENEZIA GIULIA until instructions to do so are issued.

b. Within the Army areas Armies will be responsible, in conjunction with their attached AHB organizations, for the provision of such supplies.

c. Behind the Army rear boundaries the provision of civil supplies will be the responsibility of Headquarters Allied Commission.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christensen
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
(see next page)

SECRET

SECRETSECRETLtr, AFHQ, LG 323/061 LOC-0,
dtd 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

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Judge Advocate	103		
D JAG (B)	104		

060

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CONFIDENTIAL
AFHQ MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

357
Confidential

TO FOR ACTION : FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP

INFORMATION : EIGHTH ARMY

REF NO : PX 79563

SIGNED : SACMED

CITE: FHDSC

For your information following is a text of a note received from US Ambassador in BELGRADE from the Yugoslav Foreign Office at 1100 hours today.

"The Yugoslav Government agrees to the establishment of Allied Military Government under the authority of the Allied Supreme Command in the MEDITERRANEAN, in the Slovene Littoral Area on the basis of the demarcation line proposed by Field Marshal ALEXANDER subject to certain minor modifications to be suggested later by the Yugoslav Government. At the same time, the Yugoslav Government in accepting in principle such a solution consider indispensable:

1. That the representatives of the Yugoslav Army should be included in the military administration of this area,

2. That Units of the Yugoslav Army should remain in that area (being, of course, under the command of the Supreme Allied Command in the MEDITERRANEAN),

3. That, as it has been already stated in the proposal of Field Marshal ALEXANDER, the Allied military administration should act through the civil authorities which are already set up in that area.

The Yugoslav Government propose that the Governments of the UNITED STATES and of GREAT BRITAIN start immediate negotiations with the Yugoslav Government in order to settle all questions in this connection. Message liable to be published.

ORIGINATOR : D C/S

AUTH: J G SWEETMAN, LT COL.,

INFORMATION: SACS

G-2

G-3

CAO

G-5

RESMIN

USPOLAD

CINC MED

USN

MAAF

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO.

MC OUT 7092

21 May 45

1843P

REF N.: PX 79563

as/H/GB

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

(SEEN IN PRAIRIE BY C20 - THAT ALDEN)

504

337A

CG 1008

19 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Venezia Giulia.

MAY 20 1945

337B

TO : Brigadier General Charles M. Spofford, U.S.A.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ.

At their request, I received a delegation from the Trieste
CLN on 17 May 1945. They left with me an aide memoire, a translation
of which I am forwarding herewith for your information.

ELBERT W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

Executive Commissioner
US Political Adviser
British Political Adviser
CG Files

PA Sh

M/S

(Mae Anderson)

337B

C O P Y

A I D E M E M O I R E

The "Comitato di Azione Giuliana" has been informed by absolutely reliable sources that following the occupation of part of the Venezia Giulia by forces of Tito:

(a) In Trieste turbulent Yugoslav elements have entered the city together with Tito's troops, staging great demonstrations pro-Yugoslavia; the hoisting of the Italian flag has been forbidden; shots have been fired against the windows from which the Italian flag was flown; a ruthless persecution of Italians has begun with mass arrests (with the aid of lists carefully prepared and without distinction between fascists and anti-fascists) and executions; even the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale is being actively searched for and has been compelled to seek refuge; the city is lacking of food and the population is terrorized.

(b) In Gorizia and surroundings the violences committed are even worse; arrests are on a tremendous scale (even among priests) and summary executions are countless; all men above 16 in good physical shape (including the pupils of the ecclesiastical seminary) have been mass deported to Yugoslavia and forced to join Tito's Army; the terrified population escapes westward.

(c) Zara has been the scene of mass murders and indescribable atrocities.

(d) From Istria and Fiume there is no information, but from

337A

337c

what has trickled through the situation appears to be as serious, if not worse.

(e) The unhappy Italian population of the region, after the many persecutions suffered under the Nazi-fascist domination, is now undergoing the violence of the Yugoslavs; it is actually abandoned to itself because the Yugoslav partisans have set up control posts along the Isonzo river preventing any aid from Italy, while the Anglo-American troops that have been hailed enthusiastically by the people, although benevolent towards the Italian collectivity, do not intervene in order to avoid political complications.

(f) The Italians of the Venezia Giulia are in the greatest despair and they implore immediate help from their Government.

On account of these grave facts the "Comitato di Azione Nazionale", formed exclusively by democratic anti-fascist individuals and representing the opinion of all refugees from the Venezia Giulia begs the Government to see that the following measures be taken without delay:

- (1) Extension of the Anglo-American military occupation to the whole of the Venezia Giulia up to the Italo-Yugoslav boundary of 1939.
- (2) Maintenance of public order, and especially of the executive power, to be entrusted to the Anglo-American authorities, eventually in collaboration with members of the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale.
- (3) Official assurance to the Italian population of the Venezia Giulia (through radio, leaflets, etc.) that they will be protected from all arbitrary acts, and specific indication of military

337D

Commands and Authorities from which the population may obtain protection if necessary.

- (4) Dispatch on the spot of stern Allied officials with precise instructions and assisted by reliable persons (eventually appointed by Italian Government), fully aware of places and the situation.

The Committee wishes to stress the fact that it is intolerable that on the very day ending the bloody six years' war which has half destroyed Europe and was waged to punish an aggressor, there should be committed under the eyes of the Allies themselves acts of force against a helpless people, and that a region claimed by two Nations should be allowed to be occupied militarily by one of these Nations alone, just like Danzig at the beginning of the war.

Furthermore the Committee points out that what is requested should come within the interest of the Slavs, as the longed for fraternal cohabitation and collaboration of the Italian and Slav people in the Venezia Giulia risks being compromised again, digging an abyss between Italians and Slavs and jeopardizing the pacific relations between Italy and Yugoslavia and the European peace itself.

Finally the "Comitato di Azione Giuliano" deems it its duty to state that it intends not to abandon in any case its fellowmen who are pleading for help and that if it should not succeed in obtaining within a very short time, the requested measures, it will use all legal means at its disposal to point out to the Italian and world public opinion what is happening in the Venezia Giulia and to bring all help in its power to those populations.

Roma, 9/5/1945

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9
337E

Ex Com

To see folio 8 - AFHQ's declaration
of policy regarding Tito's claims.
19th May.

13

On Ex. Com's instructions informed PRO that
copy of 8 was to be printed on notice board -
Adjustment in printed message should be issued in
Daily Bulletin. P.R. PA to Ex. Com: 19/5.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504

337E

CONFIDENTIAL

FX 78090
MAY 191102B

R/1436
MAY 1911420B
OF PRIORITY

From: AFHQ SIGNED MONARCHY CITE NAAG
To: CG ALCOM, CG 12 AF, CG REPL & TN COMD

CONFIDENTIAL

The following is a special message from the Supreme Allied Commander to all the Allied Armed Forces in the Mediterranean Theatre:

"The territory around TRIESTE and GORIZIA and east of the ISONZO River is part of ITALY known as VENEZIA GIULIA. The territory around VILLACH and KLAGENFURT is part of AUSTRIA. The above Italian and Austrian territory is now claimed by Marshal TITO who wishes to incorporate it in JUGOSLAVIA. We have no objection to claims being put forward by Marshal TITO to this territory. His claims will be examined and finally settled with fairness and impartiality at the peace conference, in exactly the same manner as other disputed areas throughout Europe. Our policy, as has been publicly proclaimed, is that the territorial changes should be made only after thorough study and after full consultation and deliberation between the various government concerned. It is, however, Marshal TITO's apparent intention to establish his claims by force of arms and military occupation. Action of this kind would be all too reminiscent of HITLER, MUSSOLINI and JAPAN. It is to prevent such actions that we have been fighting this war. We have agreed to work together to seek an orderly and just solution of territorial problems; this is one of the cardinal principles for which the peoples of the United Nations have made their tremendous sacrifices in an endeavour to obtain a just and lasting peace. It is one of the cornerstones on which our representatives, with the approbation of world public

CONFIDENTIAL

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(FX 78090

cont'd)

CONFIDENTIAL

opinion, are now at work at SAN FRANCISCO to build a system of world security. We can not now throw away the vital principles for which we have all fought. Under these principles it is our duty to hold these disputed territories as trustees until their ultimate disposal is settled at the peace conference. Within these territories our duty and responsibility is to keep law and order by our military forces and to ensure a peaceful and secure life for their peoples through our Allied military government. We may be relied on to act impartially as we do not cover these territories ourselves. In this situation I tried my best to come to a friendly agreement with Marshal TITO, but did not succeed. The UNITED STATES and British Governments have therefore taken the matter up directly with Marshal TITO. The Soviet Government have been kept fully informed. We are now waiting to hear whether Marshal TITO is prepared to cooperate in accepting a peaceful settlement of this territorial claims, or whether he will attempt to establish them by force. It has always been my policy to keep you all, whatever your rank, fully informed about the general situation and the objects for which you have fought. I send you this message so that you may know the issues which are now at stake.'

This message will be released to all troops under your command at 1200 hours
19 May.

DIST

ESTAB SEC (2)

ACTION: Executive Commissioner

INFO: A/President

Chief Commissioner

Asst Sec

CA Sec

Econ Sec

PR Br

File 2

Float

CONFIDENTIAL

052

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: 785 526
Date/Time of Origin: MAY 19 1948

Message Centre No. 31071
Date/Time Rec'd: MAY 17 0830
Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP
TO: US MILITARY AID COM.

SECRET

Confidential

MAY 17 1948

INFO-ACTION

SECRET.

Please convey to your Liaison Group at TOLIANO instructions that TONY BUCIA leader of Austrian Freedom Movement is not to be permitted to go to TOL to discuss return or part of province of TOLIANO to AUSTRIA. This request was initiated by BUCIA through the old 15TH ARMY GROUP Liaison at TOLIANO and was forwarded to ALCOM who have denied the request and advised that BUCIA be sent to his province.

DIST

INFO-ACTION - ER COMMISSIONER 2
INFO - A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE 2
PLOAT

SECRET

785017

334

FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP RPTD FIFTH ARMY AMG (INFO)

7810

17 MAY 45

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED ID

SUBJECT IS YOUR CHARLIE AMLE SUGAR SLANT FIVE ZERO SIX OF ONE ^{ONE} MAY ID

PAID TO FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE SECTION RPTD FIFTH ARMY AMG
FOR INFO FROM HQ ALCON CITY AGEDC BORN

CAN SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN THE PROPOSED VISIT AND WOULD ASK THAT HE BE SENT BACK
TO HIS PROVINCE

Note 330 refer

OFFICE OF EXEC COMDR

41

MAJ. L. W. STEARNS

for Executive Commissioner

NICHOLAS STOMBINO
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

050

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

For Com?

Draft at it is submitted for approval as
a reply to 3. (37)

14/5/45

Issue.

DS 17/5

Th

0083

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

3345
(4)

Ref: 504/83.

20 May 1945.

3345

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am in receipt of your letter No. 16872 dated 14 May 1945 with reference to the situation in Bolzano Province.

I have had a number of reports on the state of affairs there and would ask you to realize that a very unnatural situation exists at present. In this Province there was a heavy concentration of German troops and materials because, as you are no doubt aware, it was intended by the Germans that it should form part of the Southern Redoubt which they were intending to defend. The Allies, of course, are making arrangements for the disposal of the Germans who are there but you will appreciate that this will take a little time. When this has been accomplished so that AMS is capable of functioning normally, I feel sure that the situation will be restored.

Yours very truly,

1st Deputy

ELLEN W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
R O M E.

see 334A

Ch

504

334³

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

10072

June 14, 1943

Dear Sir:

The actual situation of the Polish provinces has been
reported to the Italian Government and may be summed up as follows:

- 1) While the German Prefect and the German Prefect of the Polish provinces
have already been replaced by those appointed by the Allied Command
and by the local committee for liberation, in the other provinces of the
region, the prefects appointed by the German administration, who are all
enemies, are still in charge.
- 2) In the province of Polesie, police duty is still entrusted to German troops.
- 3) In the provinces of the province, Italian flags have been burnt and replaced
by Polish flags.
- 4) Property seized by Italian citizens by German citizens who had transferred
to Germany are being forcibly taken by foreign elements.
- 5) The jurisdiction of the Polish provinces has been transferred to the Commander of the
Polesie and Polesie provinces, transferred to the competence of that of
Polesie by the German authorities after September 8th, 1943.

Considering all this, I ask for your kind intervention, my dear Sir,
to react with the Polish provinces as much as possible a state of things,
and in harmony with the principles followed by the Allied Military Government
in the other provinces under its administration.

I must also emphasize the need for an initiative tending to lessen the
weight of right of this territory which belongs to the Italian State, to be
made.

The Italian Government asks:

- 1) for the authorities formerly appointed by the German Government or by its re-
presentatives in the Polish provinces ought to be replaced.
- 2) for the Allied or Italian police forces to be put in charge of the
police service.

See 334³

General Secretary of the Council
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
June 14

(Max Nelson)

018 (Copy to cc files)


334/2

- 1) For the flag and emblem of the Italian State to be respected; it should be forbidden to display symbols of Austrian flag and coat of arms in public offices.
- 2) Coercive action to be taken to take the property of citizens of Italian nationality.
- 3) For the jurisdiction of the Bolzano province to be limited to the communes which were part of it before German occupation, 1945.

I remain, my dear General,

truly yours,

A. I. Robert



IL PRESIDENTE
DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI
MINISTRO DELL'INTERNO

Roma, 14 maggio 1945

Caro Ambasciatore,

è stata segnalata al governo italiano l'anormale situazione della provincia di Bolzano, che si può riassumere nei seguenti termini:

1°) Mentre il Prefetto tedesco ed il Sindaco tedesco del Comune di Bolzano sono già stati sostituiti con elementi di fiducia del Comando Alleato e di quel Comitato di Liberazione, negli altri Comuni della provincia sono tuttora in carica i Podestà nominati dalle Autorità Germaniche, che sono tuttora ex nati;

2°) Il servizio di ordine nella provincia di Bolzano è tuttora affidato a truppe Germaniche;

3°) Le bandiere italiane, nei Comuni della provincia, sono state bruciate e sostituite da bandiere tirolese;

4°) I beni ceduti a cittadini italiani da cittadini germanici trasferiti in Germania, vengono ripresi con la forza da elementi alleati;

5°) La giurisdizione della provincia di Bolzano si estende ora anche a 18 Comuni della provincia di Trento e Belluno. Trasferiti alla competenza di quella di Bolzano dalle Autorità Germaniche dopo l'8 settembre 1943.

Premesso quanto sopra, la interesso vivamente, Signor Ambasciatore, affinché sia ripristinato, nella provincia di Bolzano, uno stato di cose per quanto è possibile normale, e comunque in armonia con i criteri seguiti dal Governo Militare Alleato nelle altre provincie soggette alla sua amministrazione.

Debbo, inoltre, sottolineare la necessità che nessuna iniziativa venga tentata a menomare lo "status di diritto" di quel territorio che fa parte dello Stato italiano sia, comunque, attuata.

In particolare, il Governo italiano chiede:

è stata segnalata al governo italiano l'anormale situazione della provincia di Bolzano, che si può riassumere nei seguenti termini:

- 1°) Mentre il Prefetto tedesco ed il Sindaco tedesco del Comune di Bolzano sono già stati sostituiti con elementi di fiducia del Comando Alleato e il quel Comitato di Liberazione, negli altri Comuni della provincia sono tuttora in carica i Podestà nominati dalle autorità germaniche, che sono tutti ex nazisti;
- 2°) il servizio di ordine nella provincia di Bolzano è tuttora affidato a truppe germaniche;
- 3°) le bandiere italiane, nei Comuni delle provincie, sono state bruciate e sostituite da bandiere tirolesi;
- 4°) i beni ceduti a cittadini italiani da cittadini germanici trasferiti in Germania, vengono ripresi con la forza da essenti allogeni;
- 5°) la giurisdizione della provincia di Bolzano si estende ora anche a 18 Comuni della provincia di Trento e Belluno trasferiti alla comunità di quella di Bolzano dalle autorità germaniche dopo l'8 settembre 1943.

Presumo quanto sopra, da interesse vivente, Signor Ambrogio, affinché sia ripristinato, nella provincia di Bolzano, uno stato di cose per quanto è possibile normale, e comunque in armonia con i criteri seguiti dal Governo Militare Alleato nelle altre provincie soggette alla sua amministrazione.

Debo, inoltre, sottolineare la necessità che nessuna iniziativa tendente a menomare lo "status di diritto" di quel territorio che fa parte dello Stato italiano sia, comunque, attuata.

In particolare, il Governo italiano chiede:

- 1°) Che nei Comuni della provincia di Bolzano siano sostituite le autorità nominate a suo tempo dal Comando Germanico o da suoi esponenti;
- 2°) che il servizio d'ordine sia sempre, e da allora regolare, fatto da polizia alleata ed italiana;

Ammiraglio

Henry B. STONE

Comissario Capo della Commissione Alleata

R. G. A.

016

30) che le bandiere e gli emblemi dello stato italiano siano rispettati e che non si bandisca l'esposizione di bandiere o di stemmi stranieri od austriaci ai pubblici uffici;

40) che nessun provvedimento coattivo sia arbitrariamente attuato per togliere ai cittadini la nazionalità italiana o il possesso dei loro beni;

50) che la giurisdizione della provincia di Bolzano sia limitata ai Comuni che ne facevano parte prima della proclamazione tedesca (8 novembre 1943).

Si crede, Signor ambasciatore, con saluti cordiali,

Handwritten signature

785017

SECRET

50444026 Exp. Comm 393

EX 76113
MAY 15 1945

E/288
MAY 16 1945
RUTHER

FROM: AFHQ WASH DC BY AIR MAIL

Confidential

TO: 15 ARMY GROUP INFO ALCON - BERTON - DISTRO - PMS - 5 ARMY FOR
REIT INDR - APLRS

MAY 16 1945

file 4026/EC

SECRET


Your 25 107 of 5 May. Provinces of MONTE BERGAMO GRENDA
BRESCIA PAVIA will be included in NW ITALY as shown appendix
A AG 103/051 WASH DC of 18 March.

3227

204 Vol III

Dist

Info-Action - Leon Sec 3
Info - 1/President
Chief Commissioner
Exec Comm 2
File



INFO ON 4026/EC

SECRET

PA
[Signature]

Excom

3

To see para 2 Air Comadre Benoit's
report on NE Frontier Troopers.

for 12 May.

Chair Commission

P 2 for reading.

A little out of date but valuable. I will summarize

para 3 for after.

175/15/5

EL

5

Also para 12

also para 12

CL

CSO

Mar 4+C

Action - copy to CAS recon sect

155/15/5

see 4/23/5

Report on NE Frontier Troopers

15
EC
Also para 12
Also
CL

Cisco
Action - copy to CAS & Econ. Sec.
15/15/15
See 4-15-15

Special Agent in Charge
Department of Justice

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

Tel: 478201

16 May 1945

Ref: 304/PC.

SUBJECT: Situation Report - TRIESTE.

TO : C-5, AFHQ.

The following extract from a situation report from SCAD Eighth Army dated 5 May may be of interest to you.

"From talks which AMG officers have had with local people both in TRIESTE, MONFALCONE and GORIZIA I am led to believe that in the first two places the great majority of people are pro-Italian. The percentage given is as high as 80%, though it must be remembered that in TRIESTE this probably represents the attitude of the town itself, which is highly Italianised, and not the commune. GORIZIA is possibly more doubtful, although even there the opinion is that the majority are pro-Italian.

So far as can be ascertained no Yugoslav currency is circulating in TRIESTE and metropolitan lire are being used by the Yugoslavs. A certain amount of AMG lire is in circulation but only because of it having been accepted by a limited number of civilians from troops. The Yugoslav authorities in TRIESTE have stated that AMG lire will not be used in TRIESTE. This is a matter which must be settled forthwith."

For the Chief Commissioner:

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: C.A. Section
Comm. Section

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504
HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
AT 13 CORPS

SECRET 336
Ex. Comm.

1941
Confidential

RM

SUBJECT

TO: H.Q. A.M.C. 8th Army Main

COPY TO: H.Q. A.C. Rome

1. On Friday 4 May 1945 I saw the Corps Commander and discussed with him the situation in so far as the question of imposing Military Government was concerned.
2. The Yugoslav forces in the Area of TRIESTE consist of some three divisions of the 4th Army amounting in all to say 15,000 men. The number of partisans in the area is unknown.
3. From talks which A.M.C. officers have had with local people both in TRIESTE, MONFALCONE and GORIZIA I am led to believe that in the first two places the great majority of people are pro Italian. The percentage given is as high as 80%, though it must be remembered that in TRIESTE this probably represents the attitude of the town itself, which is highly Italianised, and not the commune. GORIZIA is possibly more doubtful, though ^{even} there opinion is that the majority are pro Italian.
4. I think there is no doubt that the Yugoslavs are putting up a bluff which bluff could be called if the risk of an armed clash were accepted. I do not believe that it would be possible to impose Military Government "by negotiation" without the backing of the armed forces. To try and impose Military Government without such backing and to fail would jeopardise the whole future.
5. I therefore feel that any negotiations on my level unless they were carried out with the certainty they would be backed by armed force if necessary would be risking compromising the whole situation.
6. The army are not prepared to run the risk of an armed clash unless the opening of the port of TRIESTE and the line of communication through GORIZIA are definitely jeopardised.
7. General FRIBURG who came in during the time I was with the Corps Commander was definitely of the opinion that a clash must be avoided at all costs unless the Yugoslavs were the first to start it or unless a situation were to develop such as in paragraph 6.
8. In view of the situation the decision taken by the Army Commander is that Allied Military Government cannot at this stage be enforced East of the Isonzo river. Military Government officers therefore who are East of the river have been instructed to remain in their present location but to set up no form of government. They have also been instructed to obtain what information they can and keep in close touch with the nearest military or area commanders.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

-2-

3350

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
AT 13 CORPS

Re:

SUBJECT

TO

Confidential

9. Arising from the presence of Yugoslav troops East of the ISONZO, another problem is presented. The Yugoslav army to a great extent depends for its maintenance on the country. Both GORIZIA and TRIESTE are deficient in food supplies and depend upon UDINE. Yugoslav units are therefore infiltrating across into UDINE Province and are requisitioning food from farmers and demanding access to captured German dumps which are in Allied hands.

10. To avoid any clash a limited amount of food is being supplied on an "ad hoc" basis until the whole situation can be reviewed, but without resorting to arms there at present no means of preventing requisitioning by such Yugoslav parties from farmers.

11. The attitude of the Yugoslavs would appear to be perfectly friendly but it is difficult to obtain any information from the administrations they have set up. I am endeavoring to obtain copies of their proclamations but, as an instance of what is happening, one orders all males between the ages of 16 and 60 to report for duty with the Yugoslav forces. All Italian administration officials have been removed from office in TRIESTE and Yugoslavs substituted.

12. [So far as can be ascertained no Yugoslav currency is circulating in TRIESTE and metropolitan lire are being used by the Yugoslavs. A certain amount of A.M.G. lire is in circulation but only because of it having been accepted by a limited number of civilians from troops. The Yugoslav authorities in TRIESTE have stated that A.M.G. lire will not be used in TRIESTE. This is a matter which must be settled forthwith.] In TRIESTE the Yugoslav authorities have imposed a curfew from 1500 hours to 1000 hours.

13. There is no doubt that the Italian element in this area is in fear of what may happen and frequent instances are occurring of Italians asking troops to be billeted on them. It is also understood that people from outside TRIESTE who are predominantly Yugoslav have been infiltrated into the city.

14. Whatever decision may be arrived at from a military point of view with regard to opening the Port of TRIESTE and securing the I. of C to AUSTRIA, the political situation must remain acute until and unless agreement can be obtained on the highest level. Any military decision which achieves the object of securing the I. of C but leaves the administration in the hands of the Yugoslavs must seriously compromise the future on the political side.

C. E. BENSON,
Air Commodore,
Officer Commanding,
AMG EIGHTH ARMY.

CER/mwg.

333E

1

333G

Ex Com's

I did not know there was a "Julian Committee" (Venegia Giulie). Folio 2 refers.

GH

17/5

5

S.O. to C.C.

Why is this not dealt with through

Channels?

11/16/5

6.

Ex: Com:

No channel had, as yet, been dug. Cittadini asked if the Admiral would grant an interview to the Indians - & he wouldn't. I don't think he actually sent this memorandum to the P/T but merely said to him that they were flapping.

J.A.D.

12.5

Why is this all dealt with through a

Channel?
MM/10/15

6.

Ex: Can:

No channel had, as yet, been dug. Cittaadini
asked if to Administ would grant an interview to
these Indians - & he couldn't. I don't think
he actually sent this memorandum to the P/T but
merely said to him that they were happening.

J.A.D.
18.5

MM/10/15

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

COPIE

504

EC ~~333F~~

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

16 May 1945

Marchese Cittadini-Gene

Subject : Julian Committee

MAY 16 REC'D

Would you please tell the Julian Committee that the Admiral has passed on their letter to Field-Marshal Alexander with favorable comments and that, therefore, unless it is really important, he would prefer not to see them at present, as he is extremely busy. If, however, they really press for an interview, then he will arrange one for 1000 on Friday.

Will you let me know later?

/s/ J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to CC

JAG/HD

10/19/5

333 ~~10~~

COPIE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

TRANSLATION

Julian Action Committee
Rome, Via Regina Elena, 20
tel 48911,1

CC 1555 333
Exec Comm

MAY 16 RECD

This Committee learnt from reliable sources that after the occupation of part of the Venezia Giulia by Tito's military forces, the following facts took place:

Following Tito's troops, turbulent Slav elements have entered Trieste where they staged great pro-Slav demonstrations: the tricoloured flag was forbidden, and shots were fired against the windows which had the national flag; a merciless persecution was started against the Italians who were arrested in mass (according to carefully prepared lists and without distinction between fascists and anti-fascists); many of them were shot; the Committee for Liberation itself is being actively looked for and has had to hide; the town is without food; the population is being terrorized.

In Gorizia and in the neighbourhood, worse acts of violence are being committed; there have been numberless arrests, (also priests) and a great many summary executions; all able men over 16 (including the pupils of the Ecclesiastical Seminary) have been deported in mass to Yugoslavia to be compulsorily enrolled in Tito's militia; the terrified population is flying towards the west.

In Tarvis, there have been mass massacres and undecipherable atrocities.

We lack information about Istria and Piuma, but, from what we gathered, it seems that the situation is quite as serious, if not worse.

After undergoing so many persecutions under the Nazi-fascist domination, the unfortunate Italian population of the region must now suffer from the violence of the Slavs. THEY ARE PRACTICALLY ABANDONED TO THEMSELVES, for the Yugoslav partisans have established control posts along the Isonzo, which made it quite impossible to send relief from the Italian side, while the Anglo-American troops which were received with enthusiastic demonstrations of sympathy, though they show benevolence towards the Italian population, do not intervene to avoid political complications.

The Italians of the Venezia Giulia are getting quite desperate and ASK FOR IMMEDIATE HELP FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

The Italian Government must therefore intervene IMMEDIATELY AND STRONGLY with the Allied Authorities, asking them to take without delay the following action:

- 1) Extension of the Anglo-American military occupation to the whole of Venezia Giulia up to the Italo-Yugoslav border of 1938.
- 2) The Anglo-American Authorities should assume the maintenance of public order, and the executive power, possibly in collaboration with the members of the Committee for National Liberation.

3331

- 2 -

3) The Italian population of Venezia Giulia should be given the official assurance (through the radio and by means of newspapers, manifests, etc) that it will be protected against arbitrary acts of all kind, and the military Commands and Authorities to which the population may appeal for the necessary protection should be mentioned.

4) A certain number of very energetic allied officers, with precise orders, and with trustworthy assistants (possibly suggested by the Italian Government) with a sound knowledge of the place and of the situation, should be sent on the spot.

The Julian Committee points out to the Government that the worse repercussions are to be expected if action is not taken without delay for the question of Venezia Giulia (question of NATIONAL IMPORTANCE WHICH MUST COME BEFORE EVERYTHING ELSE)

The Julian Committee feels it is its duty to inform the Government that IN NO CASE IT WILL ABANDON THE JULIAN POPULATIONS WHICH ARE ASKING FOR HELP, and in case it shouldn't obtain without delay that the required action be taken for their protection, it will MAKE USE OF ALL THE LEGAL MEANS IT CAN DISPOSE OF to bring to the notice of of the world's and Italy's public opinion what is taking place in Venezia Giulia, and give all the help it can to these populations.

Rome, 9 May 1945

DIST - 14 May

Chief Comm
Exec Comm

503 4-504

SECRET

FX 76659
MAY 161941E

E/1089
MAY 171000B
OP PRIORITY

From: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE PHOTO
To: 15 ARMY GROUP INFO ALOOM, 2 DISTRICT

Confidential

SECRET.

1. Refer AFHQ Operation Instruction "Occupation of NORTH WEST ITALY" dated 21 December 44.

2. Desirable to changeover to phase 2 as soon as schedule practicable. Appreciate that surrender of enemy forces and situation on French frontier presents complications but grateful if you would examine urgently whether these difficulties cannot be surmounted without deferring unduly the change in responsibility for administration and civil affairs.

3. You might wish to retain temporary operational control of all or part of the troops remaining the NORTH WEST ITALY after the change to phase 2.

DIST

INFO-ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
File

SECRET

036

(Action Copy On 503/EC)

(1A)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

✓
503 + 504

file
504

16th May 1945

SUBJECT : Regional Control
TO : Chief Commissioner.

VF., Civil Affairs Section, reports to me that Colonel Findlay, on his return from Liguria, Piemonte and Milan, states that the bottle-neck of 5th Army Control is seriously effecting the easy running of the Displaced Persons and IPOW organization, and presses strongly for Regional Control at the earliest possible moment.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

156, 1004
SECRET

MI002
MAY

332
E/724
MAY 14 1225B
ROUTINE
MAY 14 1950

FOR: MAIN 8 ARMY

10; ACTION HQ ALCON FOR AGING INFO CHIEF OF STAFF MAIN 8 ARMY, ZADOVA FOR AG
VENEZIA REGION FOR RED CODE

SECRET.

Subject is UDINE and VENEZIA CIVILIA.

Position COMBANS area improved and military government installed. Jugoslavs reported to have left TAVVISO and CIVIDALE. UDINE town running smoothly. 60 million Lire presumably German issue for troop payment blocked in KLACERFURT. 8 Army Paymaster notified as may be required to help situation in TRIESTE where payment troops presenting difficulty as ASD Lire not accepted. Brigadier DUNLOP's letter to Brigadier LUSH gives most recent picture. Am making arrangements for boundary commission to come (3 cipher groups missing) along lines discussed in letter and will try put extra offre in UDINE but owing to dealer requirements AUSTRIA due to similar political position will not be able to spare many.

(ALCON, herewith clear copy of 3003. Note 3 cipher groups missing, crypto follows under separate cover). Ack by phone psc.

PLST

ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
INFO: A/President

reported to have left TARVISO and CIVIDALE. UDINE town running smoothly. 60 million lire presumably German issue for troop payment blocked in TRIESTE where payment Paymaster notified as may be required to help situation in TRIESTE where payment troops presenting difficulty as AMG Lire not accepted. Brigadier DIMLOP's letter to Brigadier LESH gives most recent picture. Am making arrangements for boundary commune. to come (3 cipher groups missing) along lines discussed in letter and will try put extra efforts in UDINE but owing to smaller requirements AUSTRIA due to similar political position will not be able to spare many.

(ALCON, herewith clear copy of 3083. Note 3 cipher groups missing, crypto follows under separate cover). Ack by phone psc.

PIST

ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2

INFO: A/President

Chief Commissioner

CA Sec

John Sec

Finance S/C

Lat Sec

IR Br

U34
SECRET

(Action Copy in 152/LC file)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

33/

15th ARMY GROUP *aptl 5 Army ANG (INFO)*

7539

14 May

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED PD

SUBJECT IS YOUR CHARLIE ABLE SUGAR SLANT FIVE ZERO SIX OF ONE ONE MAY PD
aptl 5 Army ANG for info
PAREN TO FIFTEENTH ARMY GROUP FORGEORGE DASH FIVE SECTION FROM HQ ALCOM

CITE ACXG PAREN

CAN SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN THE PROPOSED VISIT AND WOULD ASK THAT HE BE SENT
BACK TO HIS PROVINCE

Executive Commissioner

E.S.M. 343
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA
Asst Adjutant

033

11 May 1945

TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE OWEN'S STATEMENT

"One of the most difficult problems to be solved in coming months will be the just and equitable solution of the many territorial questions which have for so many years plagued Europe. It is the firm policy of the United States as its allies have been officially informed, that territorial changes should be made only after thorough study and after full consultation and deliberation between the various Governments concerned. Only on this basis can adequate consideration be given to the human, economic, and political elements involved and a just and stable solution be found.

There are thirty or more territorial questions in Europe which require careful study before satisfactory decisions can be reached.

Among these is the question of the much disputed Northeastern Frontiers of Italy. Many months ago it was decided that the best way to avoid costly and protracted territorial negotiations in the Anglo-American theater of operations would be to establish and maintain an Allied military Government in the disputed areas pending settlement by the orderly processes to which the United Nations are pledged.

Apart from the fact that this is an Anglo-American theater of operations, and that Anglo-American troops forced the surrender of their German Garrisons at TRIESTE, the disputed areas are temporarily of prime importance from a military point of view. Since the Allied Occupation Forces require a zone of administration to include adequate port facilities and lines of communication and supply leading to central Europe, it was deemed particularly essential to establish Allied Military Control in this part of Italy.

Aware of Yugoslav interest in the VEREZIA-GIULIA area, proposals along the above lines were presented to, and accepted by Marshal Tito last February. Notwithstanding this agreement, claims have now been advanced that by virtue of conquest Yugoslav forces are entitled forthwith to occupy and control the administration of this region. These claims are put forward regardless of the operations of Field Marshal Alexander's forces in bringing about the defeat of the Germans in that area. According to radio reports, Yugoslav elements are already setting up a 'National Federal Government of Slovenia' in TRIESTE.

Aside from the extent of the facilities required by the Allied Military Forces in this area, this Government reiterates its view that disinterested

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Section 3.3 NND No.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

~~TOP SECRET~~

329A/le

Ref: 504/BD.

Tel: 478203

12 May 1948.

SUBJECT: HQ 15 Army Group Administrative Directive No.2.

TO : Regional Commissioner, VARESE Region. (Copy No.40)
" " " EMILIA Region. (" " 42)

1. Copy No. of Amendment No.1 to HQ 15 Army Group Administrative Directive No.2 is forwarded herewith.
2. Please acknowledge immediately on the enclosed receipt form.

Shorley
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Incl;
as above

504

328

AFHQ

7503

13 MAY 45

OF PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL PD

HOME PRESS YESTERDAY CARRIED DE GAFFNEY APOSTROPHE SUGAR REPORT
TO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON THE APPEAL MADE BY PRIME MINISTER AND
HIMSELF TO AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF PD

PARISH TO APPEL FOR GEORGE FIVE FROM HQ. ALCOM FROM STONE PD

TODAY MAY THIRTEEN MOST PAPERS CARRY REPORTED CATEGORICAL STATEMENT
MADE BY MINISTER GUNN THAT TRUSTEES WOULD REMAIN UNDER ALLIED CONTROL PD
THIS ALSO REPORTED SHORTLY ON BAKER BAKER CHARLIE ZERO FIVE ZERO ZERO
HOURS

Int Distribution

US Ambassador	Pol Adv (A)
Br Ambassador	Pol Adv (B)
A/President	File
Ex Commr	Float

Executive Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 735017SECRET & PERSONAL.

328A

Ref: 504/327/82.12 May 1945.

My dear J.K.:

Thank you for your letters of April 30 and May 3. I am glad you are obviously so full of energy and enthusiasm. It is most reassuring to know that the administration and coordination between you and 8 Army in the East are working so well.

I am afraid Venezia Giulia must for the moment be a disappointment to you. The matter, as you know, is still sub judice at very high levels and none of us know what will be the results. In the meantime I am sure both you and Con have your hands full in Venezia proper. We are getting excellent reports from 8 Army and it has made it easier for myself and others to restrain ourselves from coming North and seeing what is happening with our own eyes. That I hope to do soon but we have had here in the last fortnight, or at any rate since the surrender, the busiest time that I have every known in Italy.

I have no further news of Carl Govers but am prosecuting that subject. It is difficult to get decisions on these matters from AFHQ at the moment.

I shall be most grateful for a rapid sitrep on your refugee problem, particularly with regard to returning POW. If you can give me an assurance that all is going as well as possible in that direction it will help tremendously to lay at rest some doubts that have been expressed in higher quarters about this subject.

I should also be grateful to know what the position is between yourself and your Provincial Commissioners who are working in 8 Army area. I am very much hoping that Phase II, that is to say, Regional control, will come about, at any rate in the NE, quite soon, and I shall be glad to know from Con or yourself what the form is on the Adriatic.

If you do not have to administer Venezia Giulia I may have to switch some of your officers to the NE where they are a bit thin on the ground and have a very difficult frontier problem which needs more personnel. Will you please thank Con for his letter of 2nd May and I know that you will both realise that we are sending almost daily telegrams on the Venezia Giulia subject, pointing out all that you feel and that you have our warmest support in trying to arrive at our planned solution.

Yours ever,

Brigadier J.K. Dunlop, CBE, MC, TD,
Regional Commissioner,
Allied Military Government,
VENETIAN REGION.

(Sgd) Maurice Lash.

Copy to: File 110/82.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

50497
INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

326

Originator's Reference: CAS/506
Date/Time of Origin: MAY 11/0900B

Message Centre No: E/366
Date/Time Rec'd: MAY 11/1840B
Precedence: ROUTINE

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP
TO: ACTION: ALCON INFO: 5TH ARMY AND

SECRET

SECRET.

G-5/11/16.1 this headquarters dated 6 May subject: "Political situation province of BOLZANO refers. CAC 10 has been received from 15 Army Group Liaison" TONI DUCIA a leader of Austrian Freedom Movement desires visit ROME to discuss political situation in AUSTRIA and also submit arguments for return of part province BOLZANO to AUSTRIA. Maintains villages are 100 percent German speaking flage of TYROL are fairly numerous". This headquarters have no objection to this visit to ROME. If you concur please advise 5TH ARMY direct to issue the necessary permit.

DIST

ACTION : KX COMMISSIONER (2)

INFO : A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE

SECRET

028

504

File 824

FOR ACTION PERSONAL FOR AIR COMMANDEER HENSON AND HIGH ARMY

7208

9 May 1945

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD I REALISE DIFFICULTY OF COMMUNICATIONS BUT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT WE SHOULD RECEIVE THE FULLEST DAILY INFORMATION FROM ABLE MINE GEORGE LIAISON OFFICERS IN VERRELLA CIVILIA AS TO LOCAL SITUATION PD

PAUSE TO FOR ACTION PERSONAL FOR AIR COMMANDEER HENSON AND HIGH ARMY FROM HQ ALCON CITE
ALCON PAREN

PARA TWO PD REPORTS ARE BEING RECEIVED BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WITH FULLER INFORMATION THAN WE HAVE AT OUR DISPOSAL. BRIGADIER KASY POINT GEORGE POINT TRIESTE PARENTS OF MAY EIGHT PD GRATEFUL IF YOU CAN HELP

Executive Commissioner

343

M. S. LUSH, Brigadier
Executive Commissioner.

NICHOLAS PLOMBING
CWO, USA,
Asst. Adjutant.

Ex Com

S

3247

3247
I would like to see
from Dept of State
3247-3248

Please see 7 particularly portion underlined.
action being taken elsewhere or remainder.

11/5/45

HL

Chief Commissioner

An interview w/ Mr. Park underlined will go

OP's Priority to AFTER 8 15 Army Group

W/11/5.

E.C.

This should go at once. Also
and cc's of information to G-5
G Ambassadors
JW

Chief Commissioner

An interview w/pt. Park underlines will go

OPs Priority to AFTER 8 15 Army Group

DD/115.

E.C.

This should go at once. Also
send ccs of parliament; no TO G-5
G Ambassadors

Int

11/5

CC

C-80

Action. Fundations telegram has already

Gen.

DD/115.

yes Jhy

026

0114

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

504

3248

AFHQ

7589

11 May 1945

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

BRIEF ID

URGENT IS SUTTER DATED ONE ZERO MAY TWO ONE ZERO ZERO HOURS FROM
 MAIN AIR MIKE GROUP HEADQUARTERS ON YUGOSLAV AND CORIZIA ID
PARM TO ADV FOR GROUP DASH FIVE NOT ONE FIVE ARMY GROUP FOR
GEORGE DASH FIVE FROM HQ ALONG ONE ACXIC PARM
 YUGOSLAVS ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE AUTHORITY IN CORIZIA PROVINCE WEST
 OF RIVER ISCHIO ID SITUATION DETERIORATING ID MILITARY GOVERNMENT
 CAN BE ENFORCED WEST OF ISCHIO AND TARVINO AREA BUT MUST HAVE
 MILITARY FORCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO RESIST UNITED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
 ID ALTERNATIVELY WILL HAVE TO RETREAT WHENEVER YUGOSLAVS COME IN
 ID EACH DAY OF DELAY ON DECISION MAKES POSITION MILITARY WORSE

Office of Exec. Comm.

735

J.C.A.

IN COMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: M 973
Date/Time of Origin: MAY 102100P

Message Centre No: E/338
Date/Time Rec'd: MAY 111550P
Precedence: IMMEDIATE

FROM: MAIN AMB 8 ARMY

TO: ACTION HQ ALCOM FOR ACEXC INFO 8 ARMY MAIN FOR C OF S PADOVA FOR REG COMM
VENEZIA REGION AMB

SECRET ACTION

SECRET.

Subject is TARVISIO and VENEZIA GIULIA. Yugoslavs in TARVISIO but military Govt functioning and Yugoslavs under control. Important tin mine at LAVA DEL FREDEL under guard troops with Yugoslavs also present. Mine British owned and notices being posted. Manager Signor NOFARA cooperating with AMB. Request inform BENICK DORING (?) 62 LONDON WALL this effect. Refugee situation as follows. Large numbers coming over mountains and being routed down to UDINE. Capacity accommodation UDINE 22000. Feeding being arranged and line down from TARVISIO via PONTREBA arranged by BRG. Evacuation by 5 Corps backloading to MESTRE. TRIESTE. CORIZIA situation. Deteriorating in CORIZIA as Yugoslavs attempt impose their authority on that portion CORIZIA Province west of ISONZO River. Summary. Every day of delay in coming to settlement makes position military worse. We can enforce military govt west of ISONZO and in TARVISIO Area but to do so must have military force with instructions to resist behind military govt. Alternative is to retreat wherever Yugoslavs choose to come in.

DIST

ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
File

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Copy No. 6

APR

7300

10 May

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET PD

SUBJECT IS BIKER VERENA GUELA AND THEIR POSITION AS AT RIGHT MAY PD
 PARA ONE PD ALL ARE OFFICERS OTHER THAN THOSE NECESSARY FOR LIAISON ONLY WITH
 FIVE FIVE AREA THIRTE AND DIVISIONAL LIAISON OFFICERS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY VERENA
 GUELA PD IN MONTECARLO FOOD SITUATION IS ALMOST VERY SERIOUS AND ENDURING SITUATION
 IN THIRTE PD

PARA TWO AREA FIVE GUELA DASH FIVE SECTION FROM EL ALON GUELA AREA DASH

PARA TWO PD IN VERENA GUELA NOT UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT CONTROL USUALLY
 RESERVE POLICY OR RESERVE SITUATION IN MIND FOLLOWING GUELA DASH ONE DASH GUELA
 AND THIRTE PROVINCES ARE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON PD VALLEY FOR SUPPLIES GUELA DASH
 TWO DASH IN THEIR RAISING DASHES ARE ALMOST COMPLETELY AGENTS AND RESERVE FOOD AND
 WILL PROBABLY DO SO IN VERENA GUELA PD ONLY FOUR EIGHT HOURS SUPPLY LEFT IN
 MONTECARLO FIVE FIVE DASH DASH DASH DASH DASH PD IN MONTENEGRO DASH PROVINCE
 YUGOSLAV PARTISANS HAVE ALREADY REQUISITIONED VERY LARGE QUANTITIES FOOD PD
 SUFFICIENT FOOD ONLY UNTIL MAY ONE TWO IN DASH PROVINCE PD ONE TWO DASH DASH
 TONS HAVE BEEN IN TO DASH GUELA ONE FOUR DASH TO MONTECARLO PD

Continued Sheet 2.

Executive Commissioner

343

Brigadier
 Executive Commissioner

023

APR

7300

10 May

PRIORITY

Sheet 2.

TOP SECRET PD

PARA THREE PD CURRENT INFO ON POLITICAL SITUATION WAS ALREADY REPORTED PD
APPARENTLY SOUTHERN ITALIANS ARE BEING FORCED IN YUGOSLAVIA TO LEAVE THEIR OWN
ONE FIVE ZERO ZERO COUNCIL SECRETARY PD PD

PARA FOUR PD PRESENT POSITION UNDER REVIEW AS POSSIBLE PD ACTIONS ARE BEING
KEPT AHEAD BECAUSE OF POSITION ON DOSEK PD PARTISANS OF OSOPKO ARE COOPERATING
AND FIRST CLASS PD CARINALEI ARE LOSS GOOD BUT SITUATION IS HARD PD AS REARMS
TRANSPORT AND FUELER HAVE BEARS OF UTILISING OSOPKO AND CARINALEI WELL PD CHARLIE
LOVE HAS REASONABLY COOPERATIVE AND POLITICAL SITUATION PRESENTLY THE SIX DO NOT
UNDERSTAND POSITION PD

PARA FIVE PD POSITION REGARDING REFUGES MAY BECOME VERY SERIOUS PD OVER
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ALREADY ESTIMATED IN URBAN AND EVEN GREATER NUMBERS OXIDED
OVER ALPS DAILY PD DIFFICULT TO FEED THEM PD AN TEMPORARILY UNKID CAPTURED BEAR
DANCE ON AUTHORITY FIVE OXIDED PD

PARA SIX PD DUE TO LOCATION OF YUGOSLAV TROOPS AND PARTISANS IN URBAN AND
SURROUNDING DEFENSES SITUATION BECOMES PD

Continued Page 3.../

EX-Condolence

APRIL

7300

10 May

Confidential

Slows 2.

TOP SECRET

PARA SEVEN PD ONE SIX ZERO MILLION IN CASH IN BULG PD CITY VERY SLIGHTLY
DAMAGED AND WELL UNDER CONTROL PD

PARA EIGHT PD NO YUGOSLAV CURRENT BELIEVED TO BE CIRCULATING PD AND LINE
NOT ACCEPTED IN VERDIA GUELLA AND YUGOSLAVS USE ONLY INTERPRETER LINE PD AND
LINE IS CIRCULATING THROUGH TROOPS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT PD SUSPECT POLICY OF
WITHDRAWING THIS BE CONSIDERED PD RELATING PAYMENT OF TROOPS IN TROOPS
UNDERSTAND ARMY HAVE ASKED PD

PARA NINE PD IN ORDER TO TRY AND STOP INFILTRATION OF YUGOSLAVS INTO EAST TROOPS
HAVE BEEN IN AS MANY CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS AS POSSIBLE

XXXXX

Copy to: Copy No. 1 + 2 - Signals
No. 3 - US Ambassador
No. 4 - Br Ambassador
No. 5 - C. Coordinator
No. 6 - File

Executive Coordinator

5.3

Brigadier,
Executive Coordinator

621

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Ex. Comm.

319

Originator's Reference: AC 10
Date/Time of Origin: MAY 091545B

Message Centre No: E/140
Date/Time Recd: MAY 100830B
Precedence: IMPORTANT

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP LIAISON
TO: 15 ARMY GROUP INFO ALCON

MAY 10 RECD

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL.

TONI DUCIA a leader of Austrian Freedom Movement desires visit ROME to discuss political situation in AUSTRIA and also to submit arguments for return of part province BOLZANO to AUSTRIA. Main towns villages are 100% German speaking flags of TYROL are fairly numerous.

DIST

INFO-ACTION: Executive Commissioner 2
INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
Liaison Div 2
File

HEADQUARTERS

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File 331

CONFIDENTIAL

020

EXTRACT

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 10th Meeting
10th May, 1945

K 163

TOP SECRET

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

3. SITUATION IN VENETIA GIULIA

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 9th Meeting - Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LAMMETER outlined the development in the situation in VENETIA GIULIA and southern AUSTRIA, which had taken place since the last meeting. He pointed out that the Jugoslavs appeared to be increasing their forces in VENETIA GIULIA and had taken control of villages over the Austrian border in the KLAGENFURT area, though British forces had fore-stalled them in that town. Meanwhile, the latest signals from the Chief of Staff in BELGRADE indicated that Marshal Tito would not sign an agreement on the lines proposed by the Supreme Allied Commander but had suggested a form of dual command in the area of TRIESTE and GORIZIA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER said that the Jugoslav proposals for dual command were not militarily acceptable to him. His military requirement, to have his I of C under his own control, was a normal one for any commander. On Marshal Tito's proposals the long I of C into AUSTRIA would be dependent for its safety on the goodwill of the Jugoslavs. This could not be satisfactory in the long run, and a clear demarcation line, all forces on the west of which would be under his (Field Marshal Alexander's) command, was therefore required.

There were, therefore, only two courses open - either to turn out Tito by force or to accept a diplomatic defeat. From the military point of view such a diplomatic defeat would not be serious as we could develop VENICE and maintain our forces in AUSTRIA from that port, at any rate for a period. He thought, however, that consideration should be given to the maintenance of the force in the British zone from the west through the SHAW area, as any occupation of AUSTRIA from the southwest would never be satisfactory as long

3. SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 9th Meeting - Minute 2)

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There were, therefore, only two courses open - either to turn out Tito by force or to accept a diplomatic defeat. From the military point of view such a diplomatic defeat would not be serious as we could develop VERICE and maintain our forces in AUSTRIA from that port, at any rate for a period. He thought, however, that consideration should be given to the maintenance of the force in the British zone from the west through the SLOVAK area, as any occupation of AUSTRIA from the Southwest would never be satisfactory as long as the Yugoslavs maintained claims on the TRIESTE and KLAGENFURT areas.

In connection with any proposal to use force against the Yugoslavs, he pointed out that on present governmental policies, of the divisions in the Italian theatre only United Kingdom divisions were likely to be available. Such a force alone would not be adequate. Moreover, it was necessary to consider the effect of such hostilities on the morale of troops, who were expecting to return home and who would have every sympathy with the Yugoslavs as our press and radio had built up their prestige as allies fighting for their liberation against the Germans.

As an interim measure and pending receipt of further directions, he proposed, therefore, to use TRIESTE without any formal agreement with the

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Seen by SAC
on file 22/EC
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Jugoslavs, acting as we had already been doing. Meanwhile, as a second priority we should also develop VIMICE, so as to have it available for use if required. He thought that the Jugoslavs would in fact be anxious to avoid open clash at present, and use of THIRST on this basis should work until the governments had made their decision. Meanwhile, his forces would remain deployed in the THIRST-GORIZIA area as they were at present. He further proposed to send a full military appreciation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, estimating the resources that would be required if it were decided to use force against the Jugoslavs, so that the British and United States governments should take this into account when making their decision. In reply to questions by Rear Admiral Stone he said that while the interim measure was being adopted in THIRST we would not occupy the whole of the town, but only the port and essential installations. AMG would not be established in the area we occupied as this could not be done without hostilities.

Mr. KING observed the arguments now being put forward by Marshal Tito were precisely similar to those advanced by the Japanese prior to their invasion of MANCHURIA and by Mussolini before the invasion of AETHIOPIA. There was every indication, therefore, that the Jugoslavs proposed to carry out what would be the first act of post-war aggression. He considered that the issue at stake was larger than that merely affecting the territory concerned. It was the principle, for which the British and American peoples had been fighting, of the adjustment of disputes by legal procedure and not by unilateral action. He also thought that the reaction of the Italian people to a Yugoslav diplomatic victory would be such as to cause serious unrest in ITALY, which would prejudice the use of the country as a base for military operations or the maintenance of military forces.

GENERAL MCNARNEY did not believe that public opinion in the United States would support hostilities against the Jugoslavs. In fact such hostilities would mean siding with the Italians, our enemies, in regard to territory they seized after the last war, against the Jugoslavs who were our Allies. He thought that if a plebiscite was taken in the area there was little doubt that the result would be favourable to the Slovenes. He had therefore a certain sympathy with Marshal Tito who had been fighting a long, hard war and now demanded the right to occupy a certain amount of enemy territory which his forces had won, in the same way as the French had demanded to participate in the occupation of AUSTRIA and GERMANY. The Jugoslavs could, therefore, say that it was merely a choice as to whether the territory should be occupied by one Ally or another.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that the Supreme Allied Commander's proposal to Marshal Tito merely amounted to a slight readjustment of their two occupational areas from those which their forces had reached in the course of the war, rather than to the adjustments which

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ADMIRAL CUMMINGS considered that the Supreme Allied Commander's proposal to Marshal Tito merely amounted to a slight readjustment of their two occupational areas from those which their forces had reached in the course of battle. This was entirely reasonable and similar to the adjustments which had been effected between SPAIN and the Russians. In regard to the opening of VENICE he pointed out that it could not be an alternative to TRIESTE within the next six weeks. Both the approaches and the inside of the harbor were mined and it would require that period, from the time when the decision was taken to divert to it some of the resources at present employed for TRIESTE, to open the port. Moreover, even then it would only take ships of certain draught and was by no means as satisfactory as a military port at TRIESTE.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the task of the conference was to advise the Supreme Allied Commander and not to make political decisions, which were matters for their governments. Marshal Tito had refused reasonable military proposals. The Supreme Allied Commander's first duty was to report accordingly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Marshal Tito had suggested as an alternative a type of condominium. The difficulty in accepting his proposals was that the United States and United Kingdom governments would be put in the

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 position of appearing to condone undesirable Yugoslav actions in YUGOSLAVIA. In regard to the political issue it was relevant that both the United States and British Ambassadors at BELGRADE had now telegraphed their governments recommending that Marshal Tito be presented with an ultimatum.

The governments really had only two courses open to them. The first was to give in and accept the consequences of a political defeat. The second was to enforce the will of the United States and British governments by military action. The first course could be carried out either by acceptance of Marshal Tito's proposals or, with less loss of face, by means of the Congress the Supreme Allied Commander had suggested, namely temporary use of TRUSTE and disavowment of YUGOSLAVIA. The latter method would probably have the same result in the end, but it would be possible for the governments, at the same time, to show their disapproval by economic sanctions and withdrawal of their ambassadors.

Be felt sure that the two governments would be at first somewhat hesitant and that they would probably approach the Russians in regard to the matter. However, it was most important that the governments in making their decision had before them complete military information of what the use of force would involve. It was the Supreme Allied Commander's duty to supply them with this information. The governments would receive the necessary political advice through other channels.

AIR MARSHAL GARRON considered that we should not be frightened by the idea of using force against the Yugoslavs as this would result in a wrong approach to the problem. He considered that Marshal Tito was placing himself in the position of the first post-war criminal requiring to be brought under police control. The use of force, and considerable air forces were available, would therefore be a police action.

GENERAL MURPHY observed that Marshal Tito was our ally and that until he had refused to abide by the Peace Treaty he could not be regarded as a criminal. The position was that two Allied governments wanted to do one thing and one Allied government wanted to do another.

MR. MACMILLAN said that unless the British and American and Russian governments agreed on this matter, the whole question of police control would not arise. In addition, many governments other than those of the United States were involved, and in particular the South African and New Zealand governments, owing to the possibility of their troops being employed.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Instructed the Chief of Staff,

(1) To despatch a telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff informing them of the Yugoslav refusal to accept his military proposals and stating that his military appreciation of the situation would be forwarded in a subsequent telegram for their consideration, in connection with any further directive they might wish to give him.

(ii) To prepare for his approval a draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff giving his military appreciation of the resources required to impose the will of the United States and British governments, by force, should it be decided to do so.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Confidential

(b) Directed that, pending further instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff,

- (i) First priority should be given to the development of TRISTE and the discharge through that port of such tonnage as might be possible and desirable in view of the local situation.
- (ii) As second priority, and as far as might be possible consistent with (i) above, the port of VENICE should be opened and developed.
- (iii) The Allied forces should retain their present dispositions in VENEZIA GIULIA and no attempt should be made to establish Allied military government east of the ISONZO.

* Despatched as MAY 957 of 10 May 1945

*2 Despatched as MAY 960 of 11 May 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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be made to establish Allied military government east
of the ISONZO.

* Despatched as NAF 957 of 10 May 1945

*₂ Despatched as NAF 960 of 11 May 1945

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Ex Commissioner

HEADQUARTERS 15TH ARMY GROUP
G-5 SECTION
APO 717

NW/mjm

(318)

Confidential

Ref: G-5/11/16.1

6 May 1945

MAY 10 RECD

SUBJECT: Political Situation Province of BOLZANO.

TO: Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters Allied Commission.

1. Col RIEPE, G-3 Special Ops this Headquarters, brought to my office today Wing Commander H.M.A. DAY, who has been a prisoner of the enemy in and around Bolzano since 1939, and a Mr. DUCIA who he introduced as an influential citizen of Bolzano. The purpose of the visit was to inform me of the political situation in that Province.

2. Mr. DUCIA says that the South Tyrolean freedom movement is very strong in the Province of Bolzano. Among the leaders of this movement are Dr. TINZEL, the Prefect of Bolzano and another very influential person, Mr. ERICH AMON. Mr. DUCIA stated that 80% of the population are Austrian, and he predicts serious trouble if Italians from the South are permitted to enter and take over the provincial government. He says the population is peaceful but that if they are governed by Italians without a proper representation of their own, their actions will be unpredictable. Mr. DUCIA's real mission is to induce the Allies, in the early stages, to set up a complete military government in Bolzano Province including Allied Military Police, and later to insure that the government is set up on a 4 to 1 ratio, i.e., 4 Austrians to 1 Italian.

3. Mr. DUCIA says that the conditions outlined above do not obtain in the Provinces of TRENTO and TRIESTE.

4. The foregoing is submitted for your information and any action you care to take.

Lincomper

NELSON W. MCNEPORT
Colonel, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-5

Copy to:

Brig Gen E. E. Hume,
G-5, Fifth Army.

See 368
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See 326
327
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Action at 330

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015

(HAS HADOWN)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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(317)

5 May 1945.

To : Brigadier General Charles A. Scofield, U.S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,
Allied Force Headquarters,
APO 512.

MAY 6 REC'D

Admiral Stone has directed me to forward to you for
your information the enclosed translation of an article appearing
in this morning's *Shanghai Daily Morning*.

(26)

H. J. Lammie
J. LAMMIE
Lieutenant, USNR
Aide

cc: Exec. Commr.

(HAS STEARNS)

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TRIESTE LIBERATED BY ALLIED TROOPS

London, May 4th (Reuters).-- The Yugoslav radio broadcast today an order of the day of Marshal Tito announcing that Allied troops have liberated Trieste, a zone not included in the jurisdiction of General Vietinghoff. Marshal Tito reported that two German divisions (80,000 men) were completely destroyed in the operations which led to the taking of Trieste.

A communiqué from Marshal Tito's headquarters, after protesting against the entry of the Allied troops into Trieste, Monfalcone and Gorizia, goes on to say that the Allies have acted in this matter without previous agreement with the Yugoslav military authorities. This misunderstanding must be cleared up, adds the communiqué, if unpleasant consequences are to be avoided.

The situation created by the surrender of German troops south of the Alps is now the subject of much discussion in the best informed circles of the capital. The first sense of satisfaction created by the exchange of messages between Churchill and Bonomi has been intensified by the rumors of other significant contacts between Italian and Allied authorities, as for example, the recent conversation between Bonomi and Alexander, which is reported to have been most cordial. It is felt that, with the end of military operations, the international situation of Italy will undergo rapid development and that Italian expectations will not be disappointed.

The news that Trieste has been occupied by Eighth Army troops and that more are coming in from central Italy is regarded as a confirmation of the assumption that, from the point of view of Washington and London, Trieste is an integral part of Italy. It is known that Trieste is destined to become an important base for Anglo-American occupation troops in central Europe and

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for this reason Allied occupation cannot be limited merely to the city and the port. It is expected here that the zone to be occupied by General Clark's forces will extend to the watershed of the Julian Alps, including Istria, just as it will extend as far as the old Italian boundary of the Brenner.

... GRADAL DEB. DATTING, 5 May 1945.

0132

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

314

Ref: 503/EC.

5th May 1945.

MAY 1 1945

AIDS UNDER FOR LIAISON GENERAL AGREEMENT.

CHANGE TO PHASE II IN N. ITALY.

It is strongly recommended that, particularly in N. Italy, the change from Phase I to Phase II be effected as rapidly as possible. It is impossible for the civil administration of N. and S. Italy to be continued in present circumstances by one AMG Headquarters at each Army. In N. Italy this AMG Headquarters is already concerned with the advance into Austria. The Regional staffs are in position in all four Regions and it is essential for the proper functioning of civil administration that full delegation should be made by the Allies to the Regional Commissioners in order to make effective Allied Military Government by decentralization.

DISTRIBUTION: Lt. Gen. Robertson, GAO, AFM.
Chief Commissioner
CA Section
Econ Section
Ext Section
File 504/EC
File

785017

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

MAY 8 RECD 311

Confidential

Originator's Reference: M 942
Date/Time of Origin: MAY 7/2025B

Message Centre No: 0/9992
Date/Time Rec'd: MAY 8/0925B
Precedence: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: MAIN AND EIGHTH ARMY CITE M 942
TO: ACTION REPORT FOR G-5 SECTION INFO: HQ ALCON, PG VENEZIA REGION FOR
REGIONAL COMMISSION

TOP SECRET.

TOP SECRET

1. Since my M 941 have sent several signals which owing congestion of line may not have reached you.
2. Following is a summary of position in VENEZIA GIULIA and UDINE.
3. VENEZIA GIULIA have removed all Military Government Officers other than those necessary for liaison only with 55 Area TRIESTE and Divisional Liaison Officers. Understand food situation TRIESTE becoming serious and already very serious MONFALCONE.
4. Require urgently policies on feeding VENEZIA GIULIA if not under Military Government control, bearing in mind following, firstly provinces TRIESTE and GORIZIA largely depend for supplies on PG Valley. Secondly raiding parties will probably come across and seize food, anyway they are already doing so UDINE. MONFALCONE 55000 inhabitants only 48 hours supply left. Yugoslav partisans have already requisitioned very large quantities food from eastern UDINE province. UDINE province sufficient food only until May 12. Am sending in 1200 tons, am sending 140 tons MONFALCONE.
5. Political situation no more than have already reported. Yugoslavs seem to be allowing southern Italians to leave TRIESTE 1500 coming through now.
6. UDINE Province patriot position as follows. Keeping patriots armed because of border position, OSSCOPPO partisans first class and cooperating, GARIBOLDI Brigade not so good but situation in hand. Have hopes that will turn both OSSCOPPO and GARIBOLDI to good use both as regards transport and police. Political position all friendly and committee of liberation reasonably cooperative but do not understand the position.

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See Memo 312, 313

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CONTINUATION PAGE 2

D/9992

Confidential

7. Refugee position may get very serious. Estimates of over 100000 already in UDINE are given and more enlarged numbers coming daily over the Alps. Feeding them is difficult. Authority Five Corps are temporarily using captured enemy dumps.
8. Situation delicate owing to location of Yugoslav troops and partisans in UDINE and surrounding districts.
9. Currency in cash in UDINE 160 million, city well under control and very slightly damaged.
10. Do not believe any Yugoslav currency circulating. Yugoslavs only use Metropolitan Lire in VENEZIA GIULIA and AMG Lire not accepted. Certain amounts AMG Lire in circulation through troops. You should consider policy of withdrawing this. Understaff army have asked emergency payment of troops in TRIESTE.
11. Have put as many CAOS as possible into Eastern UDINE to try and stop infiltration Yugoslavs.

LIST

COPY Number 1 & 2 ACTION: KX COMMISSIONER

.	.	3	Info 1	CA SEC
.	.	4		ECOM SEC
.	.	5		EXT SEC
.	.	6		A/PRESIDENT
.	.	7		CHIEF COM
.	.	8		FILE

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CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN VENEZUELA, GUYANA, AND PROVINCE OF UDENB.

1. Political negotiations are proceeding with a view to determining the limits of occupation of the Yugoslav and Allied Forces, and the responsibility for local administration in their respective areas.
2. Pending instructions as a result of these negotiations the following policy is to be adopted in VENEZIA GIULIA (excl the Province of TRIESTE) and UDINE incl TARVISIO and surrounding areas which before 1949 formed part of the Austrian Province of CARINTHIA.

5. It is extremely important to avoid any indication as to the future of VERBZIA CIVILIA or IDINE or any part of those areas which may have been occupied by Yugoslav Forces or in which Slovans, Croat or other non-Italian separatist elements exist.

5. All the Military Government will be established and maintained in the normal manner in such areas.

if there are no local authorities in existence, administration will be formed, using suitable local people for the purpose, without discrimination against persons on account of either their Yugoslav or Italian sympathies.

In the event of there being Yugoslav military forces in these areas, who resist or appear to object to the superimposition of A.M.G. on the local administration, you will signal to this H.Q. for instructions before taking any action which would precipitate a crisis, and if necessary will not set up Military Government administration until receipt of such instructions.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

3. It is extremely important to avoid any indication as to the future of VENEZIA GIULIA or UDINE or any part of these areas which may have been occupied by Yugoslav forces or in which Slovans, Croat or other non-Italian separatist elements exist.
4. C.I.G. will accompany British forces to any parts of VENEZIA GIULIA or UDINE which they occupy.
5. Allied Military Government will be established and maintained in the normal manner in such areas.
6. A.M.G. is to recognize and work through local authorities as they find in these areas, irrespective of nationality, i.e., whether they are Yugoslav, Yugoslav sponsored or Italian, provided of course, that they are anti-Fascist.
7. If there are no local authorities in existence, administration will be formed, using suitable local people for the purpose, without discrimination against persons on account of either their Yugoslav or Italian sympathies.
8. In the event of there being Yugoslav military forces in these areas, who resist or appear to object to the supersession of A.M.G. on the local administration, you will signal to this H.Q. for instructions before taking any action, which would precipitate a crisis, and if necessary will not set up Military Government administration until receipt of such instructions.
9. A Provincial administration should not be set up by A.M.G. unless the greater part of the province is occupied by British troops. If, however, a Provincial administration is found on arrival, the provisions of para 5 will apply.
10. In all cases you will work very closely with the Military Commander and refer to him in any difficulty.

POLICE.

11. No Carabinieri or Italian Public Safety personnel from other parts of occupied Italy (incl mobile Carabinieri with C.I.G.) will be introduced into VENEZIA GIULIA. They may, however, be used in UDINE if considered desirable by the Provincial Commissioner.

See Minute 312

(1 Source Copy)

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2.

Confidential (307)

12. For maintenance of law and order, local police as may be found within the provisions will be used, subject to screening, and there may be augmented as necessary by suitable partisans or civilians recruited for the purpose, and who may be armed.

FINANCIAL.

13. Instructions will be issued in the course of inspecting any financial circumstances found circulating in the area.

LAW.

14. Proclamations Nos. 1 and 2, General Order No. 1 and (Provisional) General Order No. 27 are to be posted on arrival. You will not permit Italian Courts to function until receipt of further orders.

PATRIOTS.

15. It is the intention to disarm patriots who are declared by the Military Commander to be of no further operational value. This should be done in your case when you are satisfied that there is sufficient military strength to enforce the order. Disarmament should be done in close cooperation with the local Military Commander.

REPORTS.

16. You are to keep this H.Q. in touch with the political and administrative situation in the area by signal at frequent intervals, stating also any requirements.

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DISTRIBUTION:

AMELO 13 Corps (50) for dist to P.C. UDINE

P.C. GORIZIA
P.C. TRIESTE
P.C. PORDENONE
P.C. FRIEDL

Air Commander,
Officer Commanding,
H.Q., A.M.C. EIGHTH ARMY.

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REMARKS.

16. You are to keep this H.Q. in touch with the political and administrative situation in the area by signal at frequent intervals, stating also any requirements.

Air Commander,
Officer Commanding,
H.Q., A.H.Q. EIGHTH ARMY.

DISTRIBUTION:

AMZLO 15 Corps (50) For list to P.O. DINE

P.O. GONZALEZ
P.O. TRINITY
P.O. POL.
P.O. PHASE
C.A.G.

Regional Commander, Venezuela Region
H.Q. 15 Army Group (G-5 Section)
H.Q. Allied Commission, AMG 302.
File 01/23.

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Copy No. 37

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HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

306

TOP SECRET
By Auth of
CG, 15th AG
Intls: ~~AFHQ~~
Date: 5/5/45
5 May 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

E. J. Connelley (S)

AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO

) To accompany

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE NO. 2) Operations Instruction Nos. 5 and 6. MAY 7 RECD

1. Add paragraph as follows:

"9 f (h) Carabinieri may be employed in VENEZIA GIULIA only in areas where an Italian administration is operating. In other instances Allied Military personnel will be employed for police duties as circumstances demand, supervising local police where these are found functioning satisfactorily."

2. The following paragraphs are changed to read:

"9 h (1) (b) The procedure set out in the following directive will apply for Russian Nationals in British controlled areas:

(1) Letters, AFHQ, CG/34.91/28-1 (Br), dated 6 March 1945, 7 March 1945, 15 March 1945."

3. Delete 9 h (1) (b) (ii).

4. The following paragraph is changed to read:

"9 h (2) Allied Commission will attach to Regions specialists and equipment for dealing with refugees, repatriates and displaced persons. This personnel will be attached to Headquarters, Fifth Army, Eighth Army and/or IV Corps to advise and supplement their existing Staffs until control of the areas passes to Districts and Allied Commission under AFHQ authority."

5. Add paragraph as follows:

"9 h (3) F3 68656 from AFHQ dated 1 May 1945, will be used by tactical Formation Commanders as a guide for the assistance they will give to the specialist personnel indicated in paragraph (2), above.

PERSONNEL OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES SUBCOMMISSION OF ALLIED COMMISSION HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO FIELD COMMANDS TO ASSIST IN THE CARE OF CONTROL OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES NORTH ITALY IN CONJUNCTION WITH AND OFFICERS 5TH AND 8TH ARMIES.

* NUMBERS AND CONDITIONS OF SUCH PERSONS ARE CONSIDERED LIKELY PRESENT VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM TO MILITARY APART FROM HUMANITARIAN ASPECT.

"9 h (1) (b) The procedure set out in the following directive will apply for Russian Nationals in British controlled areas:

- (i) Letters, AFHQ, CR/3491/28-1 (Br-), dated 6 March 1945, 7 March 1945, 15 March 1945."

3. Delete 9 h (1) (b) (ii).

4. The following paragraph is changed to read:

"9 h (2) Allied Commission will attach to Regions specialists and equipment for dealing with refugees, registration and displaced persons. This personnel will be attached to Headquarters, Fifth Army, Eighth Army and/or IV Corps to advise and supplement their existing Staffs until control of the areas passes to Districts and Allied Commission under AFHQ authority."

5. Add paragraph as follows:

"9 h (3) FG 68656 from AFHQ dated 1 May 1945, will be used by tactical formation Commanders as a guide for the assistance they will give to the specialist personnel indicated in paragraph (2), above.

PERSONNEL OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND STUDIES SUBCOMMISSION OF ALLIED COMMISSION HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO FIELD COMMANDS TO ASSIST IN THE CARE OF CONTROL OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES NORTH ITALY IN CONJUNCTION WITH AND OFFICERS 5TH AND 8TH ARMIES.

NUMBERS AND CONDITIONS OF SUCH PERSONS ARE CONSIDERED LIKELY PRESENT VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM TO MILITARY APART FROM HUMANITARIAN ASPECT.

COMMISSIONERS WILL BE APPROACHED FOR ASSISTANCE BY OFFICERS ENGAGED IN HANDLING. PROBABLE NEEDS ARE:

- A. LOAN ADMINISTRATIVE AND MEDICAL OFFERS AND EM/CR.
- B. LOAN TRUCKS AND WATER CARRIERS.
- C. DIVERSION FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES.
- D. LOAN TENTAGE FOR HOSPITALS.
- E. LOAN MESSING EQUIPMENT.
- F. LOAN BLANKETS.
- G. LOAN SANITATION SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT.
- H. ASSISTANCE IN ENFORCEMENT OF STANDSTILL ORDERS AND IN CONTROL REFUGEE MOVEMENTS.

See Mem. 312

003

26-5302-1
IN ALL HELP YOU ARE ABLE TO GIVE YOU WILL BE BACKED BY SUPPLY SERVICES TO EXTENT OF AVAILABILITY.

6. Add the following paragraph:

"15. Any dissident or Quisling troops of Yugoslav origin found in VENEZIA GIULIA, after surrender or hostilities have ceased, will be treated as disgraced hostile troops and pending discharge will be administered and maintained by themselves as far as possible."

7. Paragraph 15 is changed to number 16.

8. Add the following paragraph to Appendix "B":

"5 G. Disposal of U.S. Personnel.

It is desired to evacuate all U.S. repatriated PW's by quickest available means to the 7th Replacement Depot. In cases where this is not feasible, they may be delivered to the nearest Replacement Depot or Battalion.

(1) Whenever feasible, small numbers of ex-PW's (groups of 15, 20, 25, etc.) will be evacuated by air.

(At present 12th A.F. is doing this, through arrangements made by Detachment No. 5, Allied PW Repatriation Unit). Where direct arrangements cannot be made, Fifth Army and/or IV Corps may make request for air evacuation to Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Group (Attention G-3 Air).

(2) For large numbers of U.S. ex-PW's, where air evacuation is not feasible, units concerned may arrange for evacuation by train by:

(a) Arranging for the train through their own facilities, or

(b) Making request for the train to AFHQ.

In both (a) and (b) above, box cars will not be used, coaches will be provided."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

Alex
A. M. GRUNTHIER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

(1) Whenever feasible, small numbers of ex-PW's (groups of 15, 20, 25, etc.) will be evacuated by air.

(At present 12th A.F. is doing this, through arrangements made by Detachment No. 5, Allied P/W Repatriation Unit). Where direct arrangements cannot be made, Fifth Army and/or IV Corps may make request for air evacuation to Commanding General, Fifteenth Army Group (Attention G-3 Air).

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- (a) Arranging for the train through their own facilities, or
- (b) Making request for the train to AFHQ.

In both (a) and (b) above, box cars will not be used, coaches will be provided."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

OFFICIAL:

Ralph H. Tate

RALPH H. TATE
Brig. General, GSC
A.C. of S., G-4

Aug 7/5
A. M. GRUTHER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

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DISTRIBUTION:

Eighth Army
 Fifth Army
 IV Corps
 AFHQ
 MONGA
 No. 1 District
 Allied Commission
 PBS
 C-in-C Med
 Air C-in-C MAF
 No. 2 District
 TOTAL

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15th Army Group

SCS
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 "A" Branch
 G-2
 G-3 Plans
 G-4
 G-4 Plans
 "M" Branch
 G-5
 SIGS
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 Tac A Force
 Hist Sec (Italy) Br
 Hist US
 War Diary
 AG File
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 Spares

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EC II - 11 May 45COPY

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 41 - EMILIA REGION

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CG, 15th AG
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Date: 5/5/74

HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

207, 13

EX-671715-01/K
5761 Area 5
5 May 1985

ALFRED H. NO. 1 TO

9) To Accompany:

MAY 7 REC'D

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE NO. 5) Operations Instruction No. 8.

1. The following changes are made in Appendix "A", "Troops in Support of one U.S. Division in Venezia Giulia":

- a. Under Ordnance, delete 1 Ordnance MAN Co.
- b. Under Quartermaster, delete 1 QM Bn Hq.
- c. Under Military Police, delete 1 MP Co.
- d. Delete reference to Engineer and Signal.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

OFFICIAL:

~~RALPH H. TATE
Brig. Gen., GSC
A.C. of S., G-4~~

A. M. GRUENTHER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

OFFICIAL:

[Signature]
 RALPH H. TATE
 Brig. Gen., GSC
 A.C. of S., G-4

A. M. GRUENTHER
 Major General, GSC
 Chief of Staff

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DA&MO

G-5

Arty

Engr

Sig Sec

Survey

NIC

Tac HQ 'A' Force

A.C. ROE

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Hist Sec (Italy) (Br)

Historian US

War Diary

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E. Commission 13

INCOMING MESSAGE

MAY 7 REC'D

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Copy No 1

302

Originator's Reference: F 71706
Date/Time of Origin: MAY 062255Z

Message Centre No: D/9874
Date/Time Rec'd: MAY 070700Z
Precedence: OP PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED SITE PHGEG
TO: HQ ALCOH FOR STONE

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TOP SECRET

Reur 7112 of 5 May cite AGXEC.

1. You should not discuss the establishment of AMO in VENEZIA GIUDIA with Prime Minister.
2. The delicacy of the situation is fully realised and we are in close touch with WASHINGTON and LONDON. A statement will be authorised as soon as practicable.

Dist

Copy No 1 & 2 Action - Exec Comm 2
3 Info - A/President
4 Chief Commissioner
5 File

See Minute 303

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

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[Handwritten signature]

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AMIC for 1-5, included. Should not be folded

7112 6 1957 01/01/1957

THE SECRETARY OF
YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION I MENTIONED
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE 10th SEPTEMBER AND THE 10th NOV. FROM THAT DATE ONWARDS IS
NOT BE IN VENICE. GUESS THE CONNECTION BE LATER BEING IN
JAMES TO AMIC FOR OFFICIAL INFO. FIVE LATER THE INITIAL MESSAGE WAS
IN FORCE FROM THE ALONG CITY. AFTER LATER
AND JAMES HAD REPORT THAT THE 10th NOV. WAS NOT IN THE FIELD. GUESS THAT BELONGS
IT TO BEING THE CASE OF INVESTIGATION AS TO WHETHER I SHOULD ADVISE JAMES
REMARKS ON INVESTIGATION THAT THE 10th NOV. WAS NOT IN THE FIELD. GUESS THAT BELONGS
POINTS OUT THE SEVERAL DIFFERENCES AS TO WHETHER JAMES WAS ADVISED TO DO
UNANNOUNCED TO I HAVE ALSO MENTIONED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 10th NOV. WAS NOT
OF THE ALONG IN THE CASES IF IN FALL TO GUESS THE CASE WAS NOT INVESTIGATION
TO ABOVE CASE AS LEAD TO BEING OF INVESTIGATION AS TO WHETHER JAMES WAS
REPRESENTATIVE OF US AND OTHER DIFFERENCES THAT WOULD BE THE CASE. THESE
GUESS THAT JAMES ON THE 10th NOV. WAS NOT IN THE FIELD. GUESS THAT BELONGS

Copy to: US Ambassador / President / Record - Ad. Char. Tech

THE ABOVE LISTED PERSONS ARE ALL REGISTERED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN AND ARE ALL CURRENTLY ENROLLING IN THE FALL SEMESTER OF 1964.

PAGE 20 111 THE CHERRY BLOSSOM THE SECTION HAS BEEN RECORDED

THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, NEW YORK CITY, ADVISES THAT

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Copy to: U. Ambassador
 At: Ambassador

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3.2. Generalized linear model

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David
L. Olson

Feb 302

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