Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

ACC

10000/109/188
(VOL. I)

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10000/109/188
(VOL. I)

MUSTER REPORTS
SEPT., OCT. 1944

74

Col.

Ref 73. I agree with Pol Sec's minute and [illegible] approve with note SOE be informed [illegible] suggested at x.

2. You have not seen this file since 60. pp 62-67 are of particular interest.

EL 19/10

DM 22/x

77

Pol Sec

To see 73 & 76.

22/x

EL 23/10

101

C.O.S.

1. Please see folio 100. I have arranged that Political Section now get their own copy and I will pass these reports to you the day they arrive. In the meanwhile you have not seen the file since 76. Pages 80 - 88 are interesting and will pass to Political when you have seen.

2. Report at 97 is particularly good and gives just the sort of things we want. I think I shall pass this particular one to Economic Section, although they have said they do not want them, in case they would like to pass on to any of their Sub-Commissions.

Philip Leon

26 Oct 44.

C.S.O.,
Office, Chief of Staff.

102

B.M. CAS & Economic should see 197 at once.

DM 30/x.

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23/10

101

C.O.S.

1. Please see folio 100. I have arranged that Political Section now get their own copy and I will pass these reports to you the day they arrive. In the meanwhile you have not seen the file since 76. Pages 80 - 88 are interesting and will pass to Political when you have seen.

2. Report at 97 is particularly good and gives just the sort of things we want. I think I shall pass this particular one to Economic Section, although they have said they do not want them, in case they would like to pass on to any of their Sub-Commissions.

W Stipp Lt Col

C.S.O.,
Office, Chief of Staff.

28 Oct 44.

102

B.M. CAS & Economics Should see 97 at once.
DS Cox x.

103.

5171

Dcos — CAS. Ref 97 and 101 and 102 above. Your Political branch has a copy of 97 etc. If you have already seen their copy, while you please pass this file to Dcos Econ Sec, who should return it at the earliest opportunity to me.

W Stipp Lt Col

30 10 44.
CAS
x 302.

CA had seen through Political reports. JL 1/11

Econ Sec

Chief of Staff.

1. It will be arranged that Pol Sec see Muster Reports in future. I was not aware of the arrangements made previously.

2. The following points were decided at a discussion held yesterday:

Page 33. Major Hodgart would find out from OSS whether this money was sent or not.

Page 42. Colonel X was General Cadorna, AAI representative.

Page 44. The answers given to 2 and 3 were in accordance with general policy. Regarding 1, Major Hodgart would go and discuss with Col.Grafftey Smith.

Page 45A. The paraphrase of reply sent out is at 55. It was agreed that this was in accordance with policy.

3. It was pointed out to Major Hodgart that instructions such as the ones issued to "Rankin" Missions by HQ No.1 Special Force should be cleared with ACC HQ before they were sent out.

Page 46-50. Major Hodgart undertook to wire to MONOPOLI to get the wording of 3(c) and 4(c)(i) (Page 47), amended. This wording was most dangerous and ran completely contrary to the policy as stated in the directive issued to all SOE officers in the field which had been approved by General Wilson, Mr.Kirk and Mr.Macmillan.

4. Pol Sec produced a translation of telegram No.0431 of 12.Oct (Page 59) and requested Major Hodgart to ensure that this was not passed to the Italian Government until it had been cleared by him.

16.Oct.44
GMIS/JG.

Lt. Col,
Chief Staff Officer.

61A

Col. Ref this afternoon meeting, I have arranged for Major Tulloch to see Col D'Ausaure at 5 pm to get [illegible] from him

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[illegible] the paraphrase of reply sent out is at 55. It was agreed that this was in accordance with policy.

3. It was pointed out to Major Hodgart that instructions such as the ones issued to "Rankin" Missions by HQ No.1 Special Force should be cleared with ACC HQ before they were sent out.

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16.Oct.44
GWIS/JG.

Lt. Col,
Chief Staff Officer.

61 A

C.O.S. Ref this afternoon's meeting, I have arranged for Major Fulloch to see Col Delmore at 5 pm. He got an Economic Section questionnaire from him

MS/171A 16/10.

71 A

Pol Section

You have seen 69 and up to 70. 170

52 (para 6 on reverse) is interesting in view of signal at 60. I would like your comments on this.

62-68 have very enlightening.

18/10

Yes, but in any view an isolated instance of Sfortunato does not alter decision reached at C.O.S. meeting on 25/10 as regards our attitude to 70. As to that BOS (Ops) AAI agreed with our view and I do not that he would inform Colonel Harding by telegraph if needed. Has anything been received? If not I suggest no reply to 70 - reporting AAI. 171A

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Now may we know following:

Page 33. What has happened about request for 3,200,000 lire and who took this up with Min. of War?

" 42. Who is Col X and what is all this about? And if what is it proposed that he should take command? (N.B. Gen Alexander is in command & we do not want to upset any Italian Pots).

" 4th. What is going to be said in regard to (1) & what has been banged off in reply to (2) & (3).

" 5th. Who is to answer para 4 and how?

As regards pages 46-50, is it pertinent to ask why Major Hodgart only asks our views after the document has been issued? I am not at all sure that para 3 (c) & conclusion c (1) may not make for difficulty when A.M.G. answer. These are all dangerous questions & I suggest a meeting attended by Major Hodgart & Com. Holdsworth as soon as possible to review position in N. & N.W. Italy

A.A. Cavan 14/10

5139

DCCAO HM 37

You will wish to see 11 a, 18, 31, 34 & 35.
Pl let me have any comments you wish to make.

10/10

Seen by DCCAO
no comments
EL 10/10

(W) Shipp DCSO

38

Cos

To see 35 and 36 for info. only.

EL 10/10

39

Pl ascertain the RCs concerned have copies

of the lists mentioned in p. 35. DR Cuk

40

Capt Oder.

Pl take up 39 with Ec Section. — Done
CMF 12/10

EL 4/10

57

Cos.

Ref 46-50. I suggest this should be passed to Pol Sec and CAS Sec for comments on p 48 para 3. I think it is quite hamstrung in view of the directive which has been issued to all SOE and SOE Officers.

(W) Shipp DCSO

13.10.47.

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39

If necessary the RCs concerned have copies

of the lists mentioned on p. 35.

40

Capt Orlebar.

Pl take up 39 with the Section. — Done

51

Col.

Ref 46-50. I suggest these should be passed to Pol Sec and CAS Sec for comments on p 48 para 3. I think it is quite hopeless in view of the directive which has been issued to all SOE and OG officers.

13.10.44.

52.

Pol Sec.

Mr Spalding Will you pl comment on 46-50

13.10.44

53.

and not on those only, for Pol. Sec. have not seen this file for a matter of weeks and not only waived our need for separate copies of these reports on the understanding that we would see this file currently and indeed the same day (or as soon as possible) as new reports came in.

Not notified to me

Now

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0916

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100

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
CMF
Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel. 478790

Ref 510/ /CMS

27th October, 1944

SUBJECT: Banker Reports.

TO : Number 1 Special Force
Attention: Major Tulloch.

1. I have just found out that the information contained in these reports is made available to Regional Commissioners by a patriot organisation at H.Q. A.M.G. and your reports therefore are not required for them. Would you therefore please delete the following recipients from your distribution list:

Brigadier Upjohn
Brigadier Dunlop
Col. Hancock
Col. Peasey
Col. Marshall
Col. Bateman and
Col. Demmers.

2. The reports are, however, of great value to Political Section at this HQ as well as to myself. Could you please see therefore that Political Section get a copy of these reports in the future as well as Chief of Staff.

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

Copy to: Economic Section
Civil Affairs Section
Political Section
Region Puglia
" Venezia
" Lombardy
" Liguria
" Piemonte

5137

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99

SECRET

Copy No. 4

No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force

Confidential

WINTER Sitrep No. 22 of 25th October 1944

PIEDMONT

1. An O.S.S. source reports that the plan for Partisan occupation of PIEDMONT upon German withdrawal designs commanders to 11 sectors and each town in the region with TURIN Military Commander in command of all. Martial law will be imposed to prevent political parties attempting to seize control.

2. The same source reports that following the recent battle in VAL D'OSSOLA, 3,000 Partizans escaped to a safe area. Lack of food may cause some of them to move into Switzerland.

3. The same source also reports that while Germans were unloading baggage at a hotel in TURIN on the 9th October the baggage truck was blown up wounding 12 12 (Germans). The German commander is reported to have ordered the immediate shooting in the street of nine hostages.

4. (a) Information has been received via London that the Germans have evacuated the valley St. St. BERNARD after destroying various road communications. There are no partisans in this valley.

(b) There are about 1,700 Germans in the main and secondary valleys of AOSTA. All Italian carabs and Police have been replaced by Germans who have begun to remove telephone material from AOSTA.

5. Our mission in the CUNEO area reports that the Germans (634684) are-

1. An U.S.S. source reports that the plan for Partisan occupation of VERCELLI and German withdrawal envisages commanders to 11 sectors and area town in the region with TURIN Military Commander in command of all. Martial law will be imposed to prevent political parties attempting to seize control.

2. The same source reports that following the recent battle in VAL D'OSSOLA, 1,000 Partisans escaped to a safe area. Lack of food may cause some of them to move into Switzerland.

3. The same source also reports that while Germans were unloading beverage at a hotel in TURIN on the 9th October the beverage truck was blown up wounding 10 12 (Germans). The German commander is reported to have ordered the immediate shooting in the street of nine hostages.

4. (a) Information has been received via London that the Germans have evacuated the valley St. St. BERNARD after destroying various road communications. There are no partisans in this valley.

(b) There are about 1,700 Germans in the main and secondary valleys of AOSTA. All Italian guards and Police have been replaced by Germans who have begun to remove telephone material from AOSTA.

5. Our mission in the CUNEO area reports that the Germans have 2,000 troops massed at BORGARO (63/1684) preparing to attack and retake ALBA (63/2795). (MUSTS Sitrep No. 20 of 19th October refers).

6. From the leader of our organization in PIEDMONT comes the following reports of programs on consumption and power supplies:

(a) According to the EDISON engineer the big power station at BORGO ROSALES will be very difficult to protect.

(b) The Director of the Electrical Company at BRESCIA will hand to the Allies, on their arrival in the town, the plans of the electrical system in VENEZIA with proposals for its protection.

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(c) The leader of the patriot bands in the [illegible] area is supplying men for scouts to protect sub-stations in MILAN. Arms have already been found for them.

7. The Commander of the LAMONI partisans in the CUNEO area has started a small arms factory in his area. So far it produces only mortars and mortar bombs.

8. From a later report received in MILAN, it appears that the Germans and Fascists have reoccupied MONDOVI DOMOSSOLA (15/5940).

TOMBRADIA

1. (a) Our mission north of BERGAMO reports that a big German drive is in progress in the valleys north of BRESCIA.

(b) The German garrison of the LOVERE (34/9499) - BARNICO (34/9593) area has been disarmed by patriots.

2. The same source reports that Fascists and personnel of the Republican Army will shortly have to leave for Germany. Whether or not they will be allowed to take their families with them appears to present a problem. Perhaps to calm the disquiet the German Embassy has started a rumour of the imminent arrival in Italy of ten Divisions and of a new Petrol-solidifying gas capable of immobilizing aeroplanes.

LIGURIA

1. An O.M.S. source report that the destruction of an explosive store in a tunnel near GENOA caused immense damage and destroyed explosives Germans had stored there for demolition of industrial premises in GENOA.

2. According to a document taken from a German officer, the centres of resistance to the north of the Po plain could be BERGAMO, BRESCIA, MANTOVA and VERONA.

---

1. (a) Our mission north of BERGAMO reports that a big German drive is in progress in the valleys north of BERGAMO.

(b) The German garrison of the ZOVRE (30/9499) - SARNICO (34/3078) area has been disarmed by patriots.

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LIGURIA
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1. An O.S.S. source reports that the destruction of an explosive store in a tunnel near ZENOA caused immense damage and destroyed explosives Germans had stored there for demolition of industrial premises in GENOA.

2. According to a document taken from a German officer, the centres of resistance to the north of the Po plain could be BERGAMO, BRESCIA, MANTOVA and VERONA.

3. Our mission in the LIGURIA area reports that the airport of SAN DAMIANO D'ASTI (69/3100) has been destroyed by the Germans.

4. Our mission in the CUNEO area reports that the Germans are using the following route for evacuation of troops in LIGURIA - VENTIMIGLIA area:- CIMA DI MARTA (91/9117) - PASSO DI COLLARDENTE (9414) - TANARELLO (9716) - PIAGGIA (9978) - COLLA DI SAN BERNARDO (0318) - NAVA (1017). Troops using this route then proceed via CEMBA (1495), DAHESSIO (92-93/7330), CEVA, ELIRO (91/4450) and ACQUI. These last six towns have been cleaned up during the last week.

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(Comment: If the above information is correct it is to be presumed that a road has been constructed beyond TIRANO).

MILAN

1. (a) A report from our mission in the SESIA area states that the G.N.R. in MILANO has 2,000 men and that, prior to the Allied bombing of the town, there were also 1,000 partisans in three brigades.

(b) Partisans are now very badly off for clothing. Many of them are walking barefoot. If conditions remain uncertain, some leaders may take their men across the lines before winter sets in.

2. Our mission in Southern EMILIA reports that the Germans are building two branch lines at PIACENZA, one on the right bank of the PO and the other on the left bank. These lines will join at a point 1 km. east of the railway bridge (destroyed). At this point it appears that a new bridge is being built. The above information was furnished by the COMANDO MILITARE, PIACENZA.

NORTH EAST ITALY

1. A report from our mission in VENEZIA area states that the Germans are sending all motor cars towards the north ADIGE.

2. A report from our mission in the VERONA area states that there are few Russian and Czech troops in the area. They do police and guard duties.

3. A report from one of our Italian missions in the North East states that the German Command has ordered the immediate requisitioning in the PO plain of all barbed wire and metal fences, the gathering of all crops and the cutting down of all hedges and trees.

[illegible] remain uncertain, some lumbers may take their men across the lines before winter sets in.

3. Our mission in Southern FRIULI reports that the Germans are building two branch lines at PIACENZA, one on the right bank of the PO and the other on the left bank. These lines will join at a point 1 km. west of the railway bridge (destroyed). At this point it appears that a new bridge is being built. The above information was furnished by the COMANDO MILANO, PIACENZA.

NORTH EAST ITALY

1. A report from our mission in VIPETENA area states that the Germans are requisitioning motor cars towards the north ADIGE.

2. A report from our mission in the VENETA area states that there are few Carabinieri and Guard troops in the area. They do police and guard duties.

3. A report from one of our Italian missions in the North East states that the Germans in that area ordered the immediate requisitioning in the PO plain of all barbed wire and metal fences, the cutting of all crops and the cutting down of all hedges and trees.

4. Our main British mission in the North East reports that the food question for the Partisans is vital since the local villages have nothing to offer and food sent up from the plain is being blocked more efficiently every day. This may force the partisans to reduce their bands to a minimum. Sabotage squads will, however, be maintained.

0163

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, K.M.V.I.,
Comd. No. 1 Special Force.

(for distribution see over)

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Distribution

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Lt. Col. Shipp, (Chief of Staff), A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Upjohn, A.C.C.
4. Brigadier Dunlop, (Venezia), A.C.C.
5. Col. Hancock, (Lombardy), A.C.C.
6. Col. Pesset, (Liguria), A.C.C.
7. Col. Marshall, (Piemonte), A.C.C.
8. Col. Norman, (Emilia), A.C.C.
9. Col. McCarthy, (Patriots' Branch), A.C.C.
10. do.
11. Col. Dessmore, (Economic Section), A.C.C.
12. Mr. Reyner, P.W.B.
13. Major Ramm, I.S.L.D.
14. File.

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SECRET

Ref: LS/16/32 25th October 1944

Confidential

26 OCT Recd

To: Chief of Staff, A.C.C.
Col. McCarthy, Patriots' Branch, A.C.C.
Regional Commissioner, (Piedmont), A.C.C.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

The attached report is based on an interrogation of two delegates sent out by the TURIN Committee of Liberation in early October.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, RNVR.,
Comd. No. 1 Special Force.

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SECRET

NORTH - WEST ITALY

1. A. CHAIN OF COMMAND (Political)

Confidential



(——→ means 'Courier)

B. CHAIN OF COMMAND (Military)



------oOo------

2. TURIN C.L.N.

Representatives of five parties:

Party	Representative	Age	
Communist :	Jaymonat	40	
Socialist :	Passoni	45	Segretario Cassio
	Chiaramello	50	
Liberal :	Verzone	45	Commissario Bande Autonome Piemonte

Definitely Leftist policy since the Partito Azione passed

(———) means (Courier)

B. CHAIN OF COMMAND (Military)

CLNAI (CLNAI) ——— TURIN CLN — Gen. TRABUCCHI - Garde citteadine
(Mil.Adv) — Gen. ALESSANDRI - Garde Unificate
— DUCCIO CALLIGARETTI - Garde G.L.

------oOo------

2. TURIN C.L.N.

(Representatives of five parties:

Party	Representative	Age	
Communist :	Jaymonat	40	
Socialist :	Pessoni	45	Segretario Comaio
	Chiaramello	50	
Liberal :	Verzone	45	Commissario Bande Autonome Piemonte
	Greco	45	
Axion :	Duccio Galliberti	40	
	Bianchi (Avv)		
Democ-Cristiano :	Guglielminetti (Avv.)		
	Guerello		

Definitely Leftist policy since the Partito Azione passed to the Left.

Owing to numerous arrests, the composition of the Committee varies from week to week. The members live in fear of the Gestapo and change meeting places often. In good weather they use the peripatitician methods under the trees of various avenues.

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3.

POLITICAL LIFE

A. General tendency is to distrust political parties. Not more than 5 per cent of the townsfolk, less than one per cent of country folk, have any slightest interest in politics.

Except for a few outstanding personalities, the politicians themselves are either old pre-fascist or young theorists.

Owing to disturbed conditions in Northern Italy, the internal organisation of all parties (except the Communist) is embryonic.

The population not being political-minded or discriminating, is inclined to follow the recruiting agent who last toured the district.

In rural areas, where the peasants are used to a semi-feudal state of life, influential landlords, lawyers, doctors or priests can approach 'parties' with proposals of bringing two or three hundred votes against promises of personal or local advantage.

B. Following of parties among political-minded people is roughly as follows:

	TURIN	OUTSTATE
Communist	50%	10%
Socialist	10%	8%
Liberal	20%	50%
Fascist	15%	20%
Democ-cristiano	5%	12%

--------oo--------

4.

POLITICS IN BARS.

Two kinds of bars must be distinguished:-

(a) Those which started with a political leaning.

(b) Those that acquired a politico-leaning for

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6

[illegible] of Bari, influential landlords, lawyers, doctors or priests can approach 'partisans' with proposals of bringing two or three hundred votes against promises of personal or local advantage.

2. Roll wing of partisans among political-minded people is roughly as follows:

	TURIN	CUNEOSE
Communist	50%	10%
Socialist	10%	8%
Liberal	20%	50%
Action	15%	20%
Demo-christians	5%	12%

-------0-------

4. POLITICS IN BANDS.

Two kinds of bands must be distinguished:-

(a) Those which started with a political leaning.

(b) Those that acquired a politicolcolour for reasons of convenience.

To the first group belong the GARIBALDI and GIUSTIZIA e LIBERTA formations. To the second, most of the "military" bands. Normally though, the leaders alone have definite political views. The ordinary Partisans join a particular formation because it is well organised, or happens to be nearest to their home, or in the first case they could surrender to. There are reasons to believe that after the German withdrawal the bands will split into various opposing factions.

[illegible]

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Well aware of the fact, the Communists and Partito d'Azione leaders have appointed Political Commissars to their bands. The other parties have not yet done so.

PNI bands have unofficial commissars. He himself says he is non-political, but in reality he depends on the support given to him by the Liberals and in a lesser measure, by the Democratics.

CLN has only nominal authority over bands, owing to

(a) difficulty of functioning properly;

(b) non-collaboration between parties;

(c) difficulty of communication with bands;

(d) incomprehension of local problems.

Even the Communists or the Azione people cannot boast of controlling their own partisans.

-------oOo-------

5. LOCAL C.L.N.s

They are being created in all capitals of the old "circondari": ALBA, BRA, CUNEO, DOGLIO, MONDOVI, PINEROLO, SAVUZZO. No members known to date as consultations are still in progress.

Each Committee will be of five members. Their duties will include compiling prescription lists, denouncing Fascists to the Partisans and acting as skeleton Administration after German withdrawal.

-------oOo-------

6. LABOUR ORGANISATIONS

(TURIN): None. After the 25th July 1943, however, COMISSARI DI FABBRICA were nominated as sorts of co-

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(d) Incomprehension of local problems.

Even the Communists or the Italiano people cannot boast of controlling their own partisans.

------oOo------

5. LOCAL C.L.N.s

These are being created in all capitals of the old "circondari". ASTI, ALE, CUNEO, BOSSANO, MONDOVI, PINEROLO, SAVUZZO. No members known to date as consultations are still in progress.

Each Committee will be of five members. Their duties will include compiling prescription lists, denouncing Fascists to the Partisans and acting as skeleton Administration after German withdrawal.

------oOo------

6. LABOUR ORGANISATIONS

(TURIN): None. After the 25th July 1943, however, COMMISSARI DI FABBRICA were nominated as sorts of go-between Labour and Management. They managed to organise factory meeting.

In general no antagonism between workers and managements, especially in the smaller factories. Some of the bosses, however, are cordially hated as pro-Germans and arch-Fascists.

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7. CLERGY

Generally speaking, support the Partisans. Some priests openly live with them (without being suspended by authorities), others act as recruiting agents, unofficial chaplains, etc. Bishop of MONDOVI is favourable to the movement.

-------oOo-------

8. ECONOMIC SITUATION

A. FOOD

Owing to great difficulties of transport, food is scarce in some areas and plentiful in others. The big towns are usually the worst off. The Alpine valleys are also short of supplies. But such areas as the CUNEENSE or ASTIGIANO have nearly all the food they want.

(a) for fats, such as oil which used to come from LIGURIA and now costs 1,000 - 2,000 lire per litre on black market, and butter, which used to come from the Alpine valleys and now costs about 300 to 400 lire on the black market.

(b) for meat, which costs 150 - 200 lire a kilo. The reason is that the Germans have systematically requisitioned cattle and whatever herds remain cannot be scientifically bred any longer.

Some prices (black or open market).

Bread	- 25 lire per kilo	These prices are only for the CUNEO area, where cost of living is about ten times higher than before the Armistice. They fluctuate to an enormous extent from one area to another: a kilo of flour costs 5 lire in MONDOVI and 300 lire in GENOA.
Potatoes	- 15 " " "	
Cheese	- 250 " " "	
Wine	- 40 " " litre	
Eggs	- 150 lire per dozen	

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Owing to great difficulties of transport, food is scarce in some areas and plentiful in others. The big towns are usually the worst off. The Alpine valleys are also short of supplies. But such areas as the CUNEENSE or ASTIGIANO have nearly all the food they want.

(a) for fats, such as oil which used to come from LIGURIA and now costs 1,000 - 2,000 lire per litre on black market, and butter, which used to come from the Alpine valleys and now costs about 300 to 400 lire on the black market.

(b) for meat, which costs 150 - 200 lire a kilo. The reason is that the Germans have systematically requisitioned cattle and whatever herds remain cannot be scientifically bred any longer.

Some prices (black or open market).

Bread	- 25 lire per kilo	These prices are only for the CUNEO area, where cost of living is about ten times higher than before the Armistice. They fluctuate to an enormous extent from one area to another: a kilo of flour costs 5 lire in MONDOVI and 300 lire in GENOA.
Potatoes	- 15 " " "	
Cheese	- 250 " " "	
Wine	- 40 " " litre	
Eggs	- 150 lire per dozen	

On the producers' side, difficulties are

(a) scarcity of labour, because of call to arms, flight to Partisans or deportations to Germany;

(b) scarcity of fertilisers;

(c) scarcity of selected seeds and selected breeds of cattle and poultry;

(d) scarcity of fuel for tractors, threshing machines, etc.;

(e) requisitions by Germans and Fascists.

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B. CLOTHING

Old pre-war stocks have gradually come to the black market at high prices. The country folk, who barter food against cloth, have never been better dressed. The town people on the contrary can only buy what the peasants have no use for. So spindles, spinning wheels and home-made frames and looms are the fashion. People have begun breeding Angora rabbits, or sheep, or silkworms in their backyards. But that is, of course, insufficient to meet all needs, especially as far as winter clothing is concerned.

Scarcest of all is foot wear. No new supplies are available; on the other hand the Germans and fascists have often requisitioned shoes and boots off the feet of the persons stopped for identity checks at the road blocks.

Prices : Light shoes - 1,000 - 2,000 lire
Boots - 3,000 - 3,500 lire.

-------oOo-------

2. CIRCULATION

(a) RAILWAYS : The TURIN-VENTIMIGLIA line and the TURIN-SAVONA line work only as far as FOSSANO.

(b) ROADS : Irreparable damage inflicted to the TURIN- CUNEO-COLLE della MADDALENA road and the TURIN-MONDOVI-CEVA-SAVONA road. Besides in the MAURI area all the secondary network is practically destroyed.

(c) MOTOR CARS : Nearly all requisitioned. No petrol. In Turin the Germans are using many electric cars. Some cars work on producer-gas plants. Tyres in worst possible conditions.

(d) HORSE DRAWN VEHICLES : Practically all horses and pack-animals have been requisitioned.

(e) BICYCLES : Most have been requisitioned, and the circulation is prohibited in many districts.

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(e) BICYCLES : Most have been requisitioned, and the circulation is prohibited in many districts of TURIN and in all the plain.

-------oOo-------

10. SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES.

Roads are controlled by a system of fixed road blocks and flying squads. Control of documents is severe enough. Italian documents are practically valueless. German documents carry more weight. Lately, however, the police have shown a tendency to arrest people whatever documents they produce (and release them only after thorough investigation), if their behaviour looked in the least auspicious. Patriots therefore always attempt to avoid road-blocks. A special permit is necessary to travel by bicycle.

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10. (Continued)

It is forbidden to walk with one's hands in one's pockets. Any person seen doing this is liable to be shot at sight.

In all towns and villages in the GUIDO area two cards must be pinned on the door of every flat. On the first is a list of all regular tenants of the flat; on the second a list of temporary visitors. At the street door is a cumulative list. In TURIN, the porter has a list of all the tenants and visitors, and is held personally responsible for any name omitted.

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11. COURIERS

Great use is made of women, who always have more chance of getting through. Other couriers are physicians or lawyers who can justify urgent professional need for their frequent journeys.

As trains have been suspended, and bicycles are liable to instant requisition, only practical way is using one of the very few motor cars left in circulation.

MAURI is in contact with TURIN C.L.N. through two couriers

(a) Prof. ROTA, Director of the "SAN/TRIZ" a TURIN clinic, and C.L.N. representative. Weekly trip - TURIN - MONDOVI.

(b) Avv. VERZONE (member of TURIN C.L.N.) who was arrested by Germans in April and let free in August. Frequent but irregular trips.

-------oOo-------

12. RELATIONS between BANDS and CIVILIAN POPULATION

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-------oOo-------

12. RELATIONS between BANDS and CIVILIAN POPULATION

A distinction must be made between areas firmly controlled by partisans and areas where hit-and-run tactics are applied. In the latter, partisans are being considered as a dangerous nuisance, but are also generally feared and respected.

In areas such as MAURI-held CUNEESE, the population is all in favour of the Partisan movement. They are grateful to the Patriots for the security they bring to the area, and help them in every conceivable way.

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13. RELATIONS between PATRIOTS and GERMANS

Wherever the Patriots are weak, they are treated like outlaws. In areas where they can hold their own, they are sometimes granted official GERMAN recognition.

In the MARRI area, the MENDOVI GERMAN commander had granted belligerent status to the bands. An agreement was made, according to which:

(a) were recognised as lawful actions:-

Armed attacks against barracks, storehouses, roadblocks, GERMAN or FASCIST patrols, sabotage actions.

(b) were recognised as unlawful:-

Attacks against lone soldiers.

In the first case, the GERMANS took no hostages and did not carry out any reprisals against the civilian population. In the second case they did both.

Prisoners were treated fairly by both sides and often exchanged. Spies were shot without trial, also by both sides. In general, however, one may say that the GERMANS and the Partisans live in mutual terror of one another.

-------oOo-------

14. RELATIONS BETWEEN BANDS and FASCISTS

The TURIN CLN has issued a directive that should a member of the Italian Regular Army Forces be captured, he must be treated as a prisoner of war.

That, however, does not apply to the members of the S.S., of the Brigate Nere, the S.Marco Battalion, the Monte Rosa Battalion, the Barbarigo Battalion, because they have distinguished themselves for inhuman cruelty.

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-------oOo-------

15. RELATIONS of BANDS among THEMSELVES

Bands generally act independently, and their allegiance to Regional Commands is only theoretical.

At the moment, there exist some groups of bands, but even then the detachments enjoy great independence.

Bands of different political colour join readily enough against the common enemy, but are always ready for petty bickerings. In all cases, they slander each other with gusto.

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Confidential

Copy No.....

SECRET

Ref: IS/16/31

25th October 1944

26 OCT Recd

Subject: Report on PIEDMONT and LIGURIA

To: Chief of Staff, A.C.C.
Col. T. McCarthy, Patriots' Branch, A.C.C.
Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
Regional Commissioner, (LIGURIA), A.C.C.
Regional Commissioner, (PIEDMONT), A.C.C.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

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1. Attached are extracts from a report submitted by a British Officer who recently spent some time in Southern Piedmont and Liguria.

2. The officer was not a B.L.O. and, as much of his information was collected, as he puts it, 'en passant', he confines himself to personal observations.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Comd. No. 1 Special Force.

5131

Confidential
SECRET

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EXTRACTS from GENERAL REPORT on PIEDMONT & LIGURIA

1. POPULATION IN GENERAL

(a) MORALE

As is to be expected the chief concern of the population is when the war will end. The Allied victories have heartened them considerably and the activities of the partisans in their immediate areas have done much to explode the "TEDESCHI" myth.

(b) ATTITUDE TO PARTISANS

They have no alternative but to support the partisans. All the same the population is wholeheartedly behind the movement. Even if it means the possibility of having their homes burned and their possessions looted. As most will say - "we are now free to talk and we get a fair share of what is going. Under the Fascists there was the Gestapo and no share and share alike." They readily help the partisans with all the food and information they have.

(c) ATTITUDE TO ALLIES

This can mostly be assessed from their treatment of ex-POWs and airmen who have 'baled out' in these areas. Most prisoners agree that the population in general has done as much for them as it can, giving lodging; clothing and food wherever possible and helping them to keep out of German and Fascist hands. B.L.O.s will I think agree that they are treated extremely well by all they meet. The people are generous and anxious to reply their earlier deeds as enemies. The B.B.C. news broadcasts are listened to regularly.

(d) ATTITUDE TO GERMANS and FASCISTS

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(d) ATTITUDE TO GERMANS and FASCISTS

Here there is nothing but hatred. Enemy propaganda is still good and a certain proportion still believe that the enemy may pull some last secret weapon out of his sleeve. Mussolini's speech threatening the use in October by the enemy of a death ray which will immobilise Allied air and mechanised forces

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preys on the mind of the more simple sections of the community. The word "TEDESCHI" still arouses fear, but, in general, the average Italian is beginning to realise that it is only a matter of time before the enemy will have to pull out of these areas. From all aspects the future of the Fascist is hopeless. The trail of ruin the Republicans have left behind them will never be forgotten. The population hates them but with no vestige of the respect they still have for the German efficiency and fighting power. The Fascist is the Jackall and as such is loathed.

2. POLITICS

The people at the moment are not particularly interested in politics. They are apprehensive, of course, of what will happen after the war, but, as they have no means of assessing their future, they are occupying themselves with the usual questions of how soon the war will end, how much food they have and the chit chat of daily life. I doubt whether the peasants and village folk of this area ever were politically-minded to any large extent - the whole rise of Fascism seems to indicate political apathy on the part of the majority. There are no indications at the moment, as far as I have observed, that any actual general political movement is afoot. Among the two partisan groupings, Garibaldini on the one hand and Badogliani on the other, there is not much love lost, especially among the leaders, but among the rank and file there is no indication of any schism or uprising between these two groups. A Garibaldini partisan at PIGNA told me that his brother was with MAURI. I asked whether it was because he was pro the Badogliani. The partisan was puzzled and then smiled saying: "No. He lives in that area and one band is as good as another provided they kill the enemy."

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3. FOOD

In Piedmont food appears plentiful in the areas controlled by the partisans and here it is shared out on a communal basis by the head of the band. Reports indicated that in the larger towns, and TURIN especially, the position became really serious with the advent of winter.

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Black markets seem to be encouraged in the towns occupied by the enemy. The partisans raid these towns and the enemy supply routes for such commodities as salt, sugar, tobacco and wheat. For several weeks to come fruit will still be plentiful. At the British Liaison officer's H.Q. we were feeding extremely well with plenty of meat, pasta and eggs. The flour in this area is white.

In LIGURIA the position is totally different. Cut off from the fertile plains by the mountains, and with German forces along both the coast and the main supply roads, there are many shortages. At PIAGGIA and especially PIGNA the average daily diet of the Partisans and civilian population is a potato-soup-cum-stew, sometimes with a meat addition, approximately 300 grammes of brown wheat husk bread and fruit while the season lasts. Some persons have a little rice but there is no pasta.asciuta. The little milk there is is reserved for children. There is no butter and a certain amount of goat's milk cheese. Honey is 280 lire the kilo and oil more valuable than money. Tobacco is virtually unobtainable. Children are the main source of worry to the population and partisans alike as they are definitely undernourished. VENTIMIGLIA's position is exaggerated by the scalling, thus discriminating distribution. By winter, if the Allies are not in possession of this area, the position will become serious.

4. MEDICAL SUPPLIES

The Piedmont area is again in a reasonably good position as parachute drops have contained good quantities of medical supplies including sulphanilamide and other of the rarer drugs. Bandages and gauze are short but the partisans reserve all parachutes for this purpose.

Shortages are more noticeable in LIGURIA for,

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Shortages are more noticeable in LIGURIA for, apart from the question of the supply routes, no drops have been had by the Partisans. Concentrated foods are unobtainable together with bandages and many essential drugs, together with anaesthetics.

N.B. The Partisans in all these areas maintain small hospitals in the safe districts and doctors are attached to each band.

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5. CLOTHES

Clothes are obtainable but all woollens are 'ersatz' and give no wear. The partisans in their areas control the more essential items, such as warm coats, etc. Boots are also controlled in this manner and are obtainable only through Partisan controlled channels. Good boots of the ski type cost from 1200 - 2000 lire. Bootmakers are extremely clever in repairing and studding of boots.

6. SOAP

Extremely scarce and expensive and completely 'ersatz' when one can get it, mainly an abrasive such as sand or pummice.

7. FUEL

The country is well wooded everywhere so fuel is plentiful for domestic use.

8. TRANSPORT

In the Piedmont area the MAURI Division of the Badoglioni have a certain amount of transport. In Liguria the Garibaldini have not more than half-a-dozen vehicles. There is little or no petrol, sometimes the partisans capture it from the Germans and Fascists. In the Garibaldini areas in Liguria there are about 100 mules in use. Mules in this area are valued at between 25,000 - 50,000 lire according to strength and training.

9. COMMUNICATIONS

In Piedmont certain secondary roads are controlled by the Partisans who seem to move reasonably freely in the CUNEO - MONDOVI - BOSSOLASCO areas.

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9. COMMUNICATIONS

In Piedmont certain secondary roads are controlled by the Partisans who seem to move reasonably freely in the CUNEO - MONDOVI - BOSSOLASCO areas. Multi tracks are known and patrolled by the Partisans and all travel is on foot; In Liguria roads suitable for M.T. in the PIGNA - TRIORA - COLLA DONDUN area are controlled by the 5th Brigade of the Garibaldini. In the road PIGNA - ISOLABONA - VENTIMIGLIA is cut below PIGNA by the Partisans. The enemy keeps the TENDA - BREGLIO - VENTIMIGLIA - SAN REMO - IMPERIA open as it is his main supply route for all his forces who hold this front.

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10. INDUSTRY

Little or no industry is continued in Western Piedmont or Liguria except a certain quantity of oil pressing and wine making.

11. GERMAN and FASCIST FORCES

Along the Franco-Italian frontier in Liguria the enemy is keeping what troops he has on the move to give the impression of greater strength than he actually has in the area. When he passed through VENTIMIGLIA it was estimated that he had no more than 200 troops in the town. These numbers vary from day to day and we reported latest information to American Task Force H.Q. in Nice. The enemy is short of transport and it is estimated that except for an occasional small convoy a negligible amount of M.T. passes through VENTIMIGLIA. No tanks have been observed on this front but a certain number of S.P. guns are in use. Against the partisans the usual weapons used by the enemy are M.G. 42s, 81 mm. mortars and occasionally light artillery. Only a small percentage of the Germans and Fascists are equipped with SMGs? Morale is extremely low and desertions are daily occurrences.

There are a number of Ukrainians and Poles with the 5th Brigade and from reports they fight well ..... It is definitely known that the German troops in this area are buying up civilian clothes presumably to aid desertion. German troops have also attempted to lure partisans into ambush by sending out Germans in partisan guise. Fascists have also employed this ruse with some results. Fascists are employed for the more sadistic work such as village burning. As at PIGNA the enemy is not over-anxious to press home the attack on the partisans and in this area is trying to keep his back door open for escape. The day before we left PIGNA a report arrived saying that the enemy was taking every available man in

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12. POSSIBILITIES of SITUATION AFTER GERMAN WITHDRAWAL

(a) POLITICAL and ECONOMIC

From discussions with various civilians and partisans there seems to be the belief that whatever the Italians themselves wish to do the Allies will establish a Government to fit in with their general European policy following the peace. Many have a faith that this will happen and say that after all Italy relies on her neighbours and if they are in line then Italy must be too. Most agree that the differences of political point of view between the various groups of partisan bands will only come into the open when the peace comes but it all depends upon the Allies and what they do - all is conjecture. If there is any solid plan it is not known or spoken of by the majority of partisans and civilians. Everywhere one goes one is asked the same question: "What will the Allies do with us?" and "Poor Italy is in a bad position. We are poor and our industries are no more; we will need much help." Many ask whether emigration to the Americas or Dominions will be allowed to the Italians. No one that I met was optimistic of the future of Italy after the war, but place an almost children belief in what the Allied Armies will do in the immediate future after the liberation of those areas at present in German hands.

(b) PARTISAN INTERVENTION

Again I have heard no definite plan except that of making sure that no Fascists remain after the Allied liberation of the territory. When there was mention of arms having to be collected, many understood, as it was realised that it was impractical to allow indiscriminate armed bands to roam the countryside once it was in Allied hands.

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The above are only impressions - it would require a trained political observer to begin to assess the possibilities as a whole of the situation after the German withdrawal.

13. FASCIST INTENTIONS

Many Republicans when captured reiterate the

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maxims poured out by the Fascist Radio - all realise that they will receive short shift from the partisans. In most cases the Republicans stick firmly with the German forces and move when they move. A number have deserted to the Partisans, but in the main they will await the arrival of the Allies where they feel they will have more chance of getting off with their lives. The Germans must have much difficulty with the families of the Fascists who, when the Germans withdraw, will want to move with them. News that the Germans were moving with Fascist families from TURIN to VENICE came through when we were in Piedmont - this may only be a rumour.

14. IMPORTANCE OF PARTISAN BANDS in the GENERAL SCHEME of THINGS

The obvious observation that comes to the mind is that with good direction, liaison and co-ordination these bands could materially help the Allied advance in the first part and in the subsequent period of occupation. With the Garibaldini in Liguria one sees the effect of ignorance of any Allied plan in the area upon the population as a whole. Here direction and specific propaganda would dispel many of the illusions regarding Allied strength and intentions - the food shortage and apparent inability of the Allies to liberate the area round VENTIMIGLIA (held only by a skeleton force) some undoubtedly dampen the morale of partisans and civilian alike. Even a radio link with the Allies would work wonders in the effectiveness of the bands in this area. The results achieved in Piedmont are, I am sure, in no small way due to the S.I.S. and the partisans morale and activities are boosted by the fact that they know that news of their achievements is reported to the advancing Allied Armies.

15. PROPAGANDA

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15. PROPAGANDA

In PIGNA we heard an announcement on the B.B.C. that British troops were within six miles of TURIN. This, together with the earlier announcement of the capture of VENTIMIGLIA caused considerable depression among the population - possibly this news emanates from enemy sources - if so the news bulletin we heard was a remarkable

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fake. Many of the partisans who had come down to VENTIMIGLIA narrowly avoided capture and affirmed that the Allies had given out the news to find out information from the Germans at the expense of the partisans. This sort of thing is difficult to explain away. Many partisans ask if it is not possible on the Italian news to give fuller information re the Italian front. All news bulletins on partisan activities are eagerly listened to.

FILMS

Many of the small towns have projections and a cinema - Allied propaganda films could be shown with great effect.

Matches and cigarette papers are very scarce and the type used by the Americans in North Africa would serve as excellent propaganda and be circulated immediately.

WEATHER

PIEDMONT. Normally there is no snow in the plains round CUNEO - MONDOVI. Villages in the foot hills of the Alpes Maritimes such as PEVA - BARACCA, etc. are snowed in and in peace time the valleys of VALPESIO - VAL STURO - VAL CORSAGLIA (the area of the 3rd Alpine Division of the Badogliani) were minor winter sports resorts.

LIGURIA. Mountains such as Monte Collardente and Pietracchia will be snow covered but villages such as PIGNA, ISOLABONA and ROCCHETTA will be free from snow. Snow, if it does fall here, will not lie.

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PARTISAN DRESS

The most popular uniforms are those made from camouflaged Italian ground sheets and are cut on ski-suit lines. Magazines for automatic arms are

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carried vertically on the chest in a canvas compartmented pocket. Caps in the same material and cut on the pattern of the Italian peaked cap used in Africa and much worn.

SPIES

Fascists in partisan and civilian dress are known to abound. Women suspected of spying for the fascists are shaved by the partisans, if found guilty are shot. The partisans usually know the areas where the population (if any) is pro-Fascist. Here movement is made at night and all contact with the population avoided.

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510

Copy No. 1

SECRET

Ref: LS/16/29

25th October 1944.

Confidential

Subject: Report from UDINE Area.

To: Chief of Staff, A.C.C.
Colonel McCarthy, Patriots' Branch, A.C.C.
Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
Regional Commissioner, (Venezia), A.C.C.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

26 OCT Recd

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1. The attached interim report received from our Senior British Liaison officer in North East Italy is forwarded for your information.

2. A few of the points raised have appeared in MUSTER Sitreps and are repeated here in the text of our B.L.O.'s signal.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.
Coml. No. 1 Special Force.

5137

SECRET

REPORT FROM UDINE AREA

The following is an interim report from our Senior British Liaison officer in the UDINE area:

"I am unwilling to report fully on the political problem in Partizan circles until the result of the Nine Corps conference is known. The military situation for the Partizans presents grave problems for the following reasons:

The zone between the rivers ISONZO and TAGLIAMENTO is vital to enemy communications. He is fortifying a line along the ISONZO through GORIZIA into CARIO. He maintains strong forces at GORIZIA, CAPORETTO, SANTA LUCIA, TOLMINO, and CIVIDALE, and has already carried out offensives against us and Nine Corps. A similar offensive is expected in the zone between the ISONZO and NATISONE rivers.

As he retreats on both fronts his forces converge in the Northern zone and more frequent cleaning up attacks must be expected in his endeavour to remove the danger from his rear.

He will continue to employ his Russian troops to garrison those areas, once they have been cleared of Partizans.

The food question for Partizans here is vital since local villages have nothing to offer and food sent up by the organization in the plains is being blocked more efficiently every day. In our particular zone there is no depth of retreat in the face of serious attacks. With lack of food and clothes in the face of winter, it is obvious that only a small number of Partizans can exist here.

We shall always maintain our sabotage squads, of which details follow later."

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5136

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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SECRET

Confidential

No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force.

MUSTER Sitrep No. 21 of 19th October 1944

EMILIA

1. An O.S.S. source reports that the coastal region East of RAVENNA (PG/N4) has been flooded to a depth of 20 centimetres over an area of some 120 Hectares north of M.6534.

2. A British officer with our mission in Southern Emilia reports on the 16th October that he has met two representatives of the PARMA C.N.L. which is a clandestine body consisting of 5 members representing the Communists, Christian Democrats, Partito d'Azione, Socialists and Republicans (sic. presumably Liberals). Their present intentions are:

(a) to raise money from the PARMA citizens,
(b) to appoint anti-Fascists for civil government of the province,
(c) to prepare lists of Fascists and their acts.

The Committee has attached to it the 'Commandante de PIAZZA', who is a Communist commanding groups and squads of patriots who shoot up Germans and Fascists in the city and do minor sabotage. The Christian Democrat representative expressed privately his fears that the Communists will hide arms for future internal use. There is much feuding in PARMA between the two parties.

3. The head of our British Mission in the SPEZIA area reports that he has established contact with the COMMANDO UNICO of the province of PIACENZA. The Commander is CANZI EMILIO. The patriot forces which total some 5,000 men control PIACENZA province with the exception of the town and the area north of VIA EMILIA and route 32.

2. A British officer with our mission in Southern Emilia reports on the 14th October that he has met two representatives of the PARMA C.N.L. which is a clandestine body consisting of 5 members representing the Communists, Christian Democrats, Partito d'Azione, Socialists and Republicans (sic. presumably Liberals). Their present intentions are:

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(b) to appoint anti-Fascists for civil government of the province,
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The Committee has attached to it the 'Commandante de PIAZZA', who is a Communist commanding groups and squads of patriots who shoot up Germans and Fascists in the city and do minor sabotage. The Christian Democrat representative expressed privately his fears that the Communists will hide arms for future internal use. There is much hatred in PARMA between the two parties.

3. The head of our British Mission in the SPEZIA area reports that he has established contact with the COMMANDO UNICO of the province of PIACENZA. The Commander is CANDI EMILIO. The patriot forces which total some 5,000 men control PIACENZA province with the exception of the town and the area north of VIA EMILIA and route 32.

PIEDMONT
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1. One of our Italian Missions north east of MILAN reports that with arms the Partisans would be able to control the MILAN - TURIN road and safeguard industries and power plants.

2. (a) One of our missions south of TURIN reports that according to a reliable source no Provincial C.N.L. has yet been formed in CUNEO (PO/C3).

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(b) The names of the members of the ALESSANDRIA (70/Vil) Committee are:

Liberal	AVV. FERRARI MARIO
Christian Democrat	AVV. BRUGAROA
Part. d'Azione	PROF. PICCININI
Socialist	AVV. BASSONE MARIO
Communist	AVV. VEGGI RENATO

(c) The names of the members of the ASTI (69/Vil) Committee are:

Liberal	AVV. UGGO BARTURI
Part. d'Azione	DOTT. CORTELLO GIOVANNI
Communist	PILOUS FELICE
Demo Christian	SCOTTI ALESSANDRIO

3. A British Mission in Southern PIEDMONT report on 17th October that two groups of medium artillery have moved from GENOA to TURIN. The road from VERCELLI to MILAN is being mined. Commander and staff at NOVOVI have been ordered to move to ALESSANDRIA.

4. A report received via Switzerland from our British Mission North of MILAN states that in view of the Politico-Military crisis caused by the Communists in BIELLA and of its industrial importance it is urged that a resolute but diplomatic senior officer be sent there sooner.

Comment: A strong mission is standing by for the BIELLA.

5. An I.S.I.D. source reports from TURIN that there are some 900 men of the "X° Flotilla M.A.S. and 200 parachutists of the "FOLGORE". The Fascists are intended to be rearguards to the German Army. There should be 2,500 policemen remaining in the town.

6. According to an O.S.S. source the following industrial establishments are scheduled by the Germans for destruction before their withdrawal:-

TURIN	FIAT MIRAFIORI
	FIAT AERONAUTICA

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Demo Christian SCOTTI ALESSANDRIO

3. A British Mission in Southern PIEDMONT report on 17th October that two groups of medium artillery have moved from GENOA to TURIN. The road from VERCELLI to MILAN is being mined. Commander and staff at MONTEVI have been ordered to move to ALESSANDRIA.

4. A report received via Switzerland from our British Mission North of MILAN states that in view of the Politico-Military crisis caused by the Communists in BRESCIA and of its industrial importance it is urged that a resolute but diplomatic senior officer be sent there soonest.

Comment: A strong mission is standing by for the BRESCIA.

5. An I.S.S.D. source reports from TURIN that there are some 500 men of the "X" Flotilla M.A.S. and 200 parachutists of the "MONGRE". The Fascists are intended to be rearguards to the German Army. There should be 2,500 policemen remaining in the town.

6. According to an O.S.S. source the following industrial establishments are scheduled by the Germans for destruction before their withdrawal:-

TURIN	FIAT MIRAFIORI FIAT AERONAUTICA ITALIA S.P.A. MOTORI LANCIA
ASTI	STABILIMENTI MECCANICI
CUORGNE	FABBRICA BRONZINE BOTTO

7. A British Mission West of TURIN reports that 20 Russians have deserted to the Patriots with their arms. The German Company Commander in the area has taken 50 civilians from ORBASSANO (56/9122) and threatens to shoot 10 this Sunday and 10 next week if the Russians are not handed over.

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LIGURIA

1. An O.S.S. source reports on the 11th October that the LIGURIAN RIVIERA is completely empty of German troops and that the 90th P.G. Division is leaving PIEDMONT and going East.

2. The head of our British Mission South East of CUNEO reports that the Patriot commander in the area has earmarked 2,000 armed and equipped men for the defence of public services in CUNEO.

3. S.I.O. with our mission North of MILAN reports that Major MAURI, the leader of a large group of Partisans in the area South of TURIN, has joined the liberal party and thus has a mouthpiece on the C.L.N.

LOMBARDIA

1. According to an O.S.S. source the following industrial establishments have been earmarked by the Germans for destruction before their withdrawal:-

MILAN	BREDA PIRELLI ALFA ROMEO INNOCENTI MAGNETI MARELLI ISOTTA FRASCHINI
VARESE	MACCHI
SESTO CALENDE	MOCI (Possibly CIAI, Compagnia Industria Aeronautiche Italiane)
BRESCIA	O.M. TUBI (Probably TUBIFICIO) TEMPINI (Metallurgica Italiana Gia' Tempini)
CARDONE VAL TROMPIA	BERETTA

1. S.I.O. with our mission North of MILAN reports that Major MATTEI, the leader of a large group of Partisans in the area South of TURIN, has joined the liberal party and thus has a mouthpiece on the C.L.N.

LOMBARDIA

1. According to an O.S.S. source the following industrial establishments have been earmarked by the Germans for destruction before their withdrawal:-

MILAN	BREDA PIRELLI ALFA ROMEO INNOCENTI MAGNETI MARELLI ISOTTA FRASCHINI
VARESE	MACORI
SESTO CALENDE	FOGGI (Possibly CIAI, Compagnia Industria Aeronautiche Italiane)
BRESCIA	C.M. TUBI (Probably TUBIFICIO) TEMPINI (Metallurgica Italiana Gio' Tempini)
GARDONE VAL TROMPIA	BERETTA
CREMONA	AERI ITALIA
LODERE	FRATELLI GREGORINI
MELZO	STABILIMENTI TUDOR
BERGAMO	STABILIMENTI GARONIO
BAGNANO	The Blast Furnaces.

2. (a) An Italian mission North of BERGAMO reports that the active C.L.N. members for BRESCIA are:

Demo Christian	ZANETTI MARIO
Part. d'Azione	PASSERELLA
Liberal	Pelizzari

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Page 4

(b) and those for [illegible]

Part. d'Azione [illegible] and [illegible]

(c) Neo-Fascist reactions render the functioning of political Committees impossible in the towns.

NORTH EAST

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1. Our British Mission north of UDINE reports that the Germans have entirely looted CARNIA (S.E. of TOLMEZZO) where they burn houses and rape the women. A member of the mission was a witness to these atrocities.

2. Our Italian mission north of VENEZIA reports the names of members of the Provincial Committees of the C.L.N. as follows:

ROVIGO	[illegible] UMBERTO	Lawyers
	[illegible] NINO	
PADOVA	LAZZONI ADOLFO	Professors
	[illegible] SEBASTIANO	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	BARGI	Doctor
VERONA	[illegible] SANTA'UPI	
	DESOSIN [illegible]	
VICENZA	[illegible]	Solicitor
	[illegible]	Professor
	[illegible]	Priest
	[illegible]	Lawyer

[illegible]

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, A.N.V.S.,
Comd. No. 1 Special Force.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

2. Our Italian mission north of VINCENZA reports the names of members of the Pr Ministel Committees of the C.L.N. as follows.

ROVIGO	MERLINI MARCELLO MILLEPRI MINO	Lawyers
PADOVA	GAZZONI ADOLFO GIACOMO DI SEBASTIANO [illegible] GEGLIO MILLONI FARRI	Professors Doctor
VERONA	[illegible] PASQUALUPI BRAGSIN [illegible]	
VICENZA	GIRARDI MICOLETTI DALLA MAZZOLO	Solicitor Professor Priest Lawyer

[illegible],
for Commander, R.N.V.S.,
Comd. No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution
---

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Lt. Col. Shipp, (Chief of Staff), A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Udjohn, A.C.C.
4. Brigadier Dunlop, (Venezia), A.C.C.
5. Col. Hancock, (Lombardy), A.C.C.
6. Col. Ferney, (Liguria), A.C.C.
7. Col. Marshall, (Piedmont), A.C.C.
8. Col. Somers, (Emilia) A.C.C.
9. Col. McCarthy, (Patriotic Branch), A.C.C.
10. do.
11. Col. Demmers, (Economic Section),
12. Mr. Rayner, F.W.B.
13. Major Tare, I.S.L.D.
14. File.

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29 October 1944

TO: Chief of Staff

FROM: Political Section

1. I am afraid that I am going to be "difficult" about the C.L.N.A.I. Section of the supplement to operation order to Rankin Missions. I do not like the amendment anymore than the original and the more I think of it the less I like the whole of the Section in question. The heading is "Support to C.L.N.A.I." Is that policy? And why should there be any supplement on this question over and above the original instructions about committees of liberation? 47-49

2. My conclusion, therefore, is that the whole Section should be deleted. The original instructions were passed by very high authority and I think that we should leave well alone. In the place of this Section as well as of Conclusion "C 1", all that is necessary is surely a reference to the previous instruction on the attitude towards committees of liberation.

x

TAC

H. A. CAGGIA

Spoke Major Tulloch who took the gist of this & memorandum with him on 30 Oct.

28/10

5133

MOST SECRET

MESSAGE FORM

72 IN

From Maryland

Orig No. 902

Serial No. 975

Date 17/10

902.

Your 588.

1. Propose following amendments to suplementary brief. Please obtain A.C.C.'s approval if possible.

2. Delete paragraph 3 (c) and substitute following. Quote paragraph 3 (c). Thesituation of committees of Liberation and their prestige in all main towns of Northern Italy makes them a convenient instrument to assist in the maintenance of law and order and reconstruction of provinces evacuated by the enemy. This assistance however will not entitle them to recognition as a local or governmental authority by the allied military authorities when they arrive. Unquote.

3. Delete paragraph 4 (c) (i) and substitute following. Quote. paragraph 4 (c) (i). Broadening the basis of the committee of Liberation so that it can more effectively assist in the organisation of Pzan groups and in the maintenance of law and order within the area. Unquote.

Mr Caccia

Speaking without the book in front of me, have a vague recollection OK to me now but I am not

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47 2. Delete paragraph 3 (c) and substitute following. Quote paragraph 3 (c). The situation of committees of Liberation and their prestige in all main towns of Northern Italy makes them a convenient instrument to assist in the maintenance of law and order and reconstruction of provinces evacuated by the enemy. This assistance however will not entitle them to recognition as a local or governmental authority by the allied military authorities when they arrive. Unquote.

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Mr Caccia

Speaking without the book in front of me, para 2 seems perfectly OK to me now but I am not sure about 3. Will you please comment on these amendments.

EL 18/10

See attached minute JAE 19/10

Decoded by JAE. Time 1815/17 G. M. T.
Checked by Time G. M. T.
Time Rcvd. 1600/17 G. M. T.

Distribution

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SECRET

Copy No. 2

No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force

Confidential

MUSTER Sitrep No. 20 of 17th October 1944

GENERAL

Recent reports from a mission in the BERGAMO area indicate that some sort of agreement has been reached over the composition of the General Command of the C.L.N.A.I. General CADORNA appears to have been accepted as Commander with a Communist representative as Second in Command and a PARTITO D'AZIONE representative as Chief of Staff. Full details regarding this agreement have not yet been received and it is not certain whether all parties, particularly the Liberals, have accepted it.

In confirmation of previous reports information has been received from an Italian Mission north of MILAN that the Germans have started to evacuate stores, machinery and medical supplies via the TONALE pass (PC/3746) towards the BRENNER.

The Ministry of War Production has left MILAN and the destruction of armament factories in the west has begun.

PIEDMONT

1. Report from DOMO D'OSSOLA received via Switzerland states that despite strong enemy attacks, the Patriots hold their own at ORNAVASSO (PC/N14) and that they have successfully counter-attacked at CANDOGLIA which lies across the river from ORNAVASSO.

The political GIUNTA is still at DOMO D'OSSOLA and order is reigning in the valley.

[illegible] Mission in the OUMBO

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

[illegible] of the C.L.N.A.I. General CADORNA appears to have been accepted as Commander with a Communist representative as Second in Command and a PARTITO d'AZIONE representative as Chief of Staff. Full details regarding this agreement have not yet been received and it is not certain whether all parties, particularly the liberals, have accepted it.

In confirmation of previous reports information has been received from an Italian Mission north of MILAN that the Germans have started to evacuate stores, machinery and medical supplies via the TONALE pass (20/3746) towards the BRENNER.

The Ministry of War Production has left MILAN and the destruction of armament factories in the west has begun.

PIEDMONT
---

1. Report from DOMO D'OSSOLA received via Switzerland states that despite strong enemy attacks, the Patriots hold their own at ORNAVASSO (30/N14) and that they have successfully counter-attacked at CANDOGLIA which lies across the river from ORNAVASSO.

The political GIUNTA is still at DOMO D'OSSOLA and order is reigning in the valley.

2. A message from the British Mission in the CUNEO area states that the town of ALBA (69/2785) was occupied by the Patriots on the 10th October.

3. (a) A British Mission west of TURIN reports that most of the factories in the area are not producing vehicles but spare parts for them. 5130

(b) The same Mission reports that according to a German source all German women are to leave Italy shortly.

4. A unified command has been established in the BIELLA (43/D11) and VERCELLI (57/O15) areas. In the Alpine valleys, the approach of winter, the already heavy snowfalls and the lack of food and ammunition have put the Partizans in an almost

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untenable position. They have had to abandon VAL VIY (85/7947) and IAGO DRIA ROSSA (85/6252) to the Germans who are now pushing south to VAL SUSA against strong Partisan resistance.

APPENINES

The Germans have been much more aggressive than last week. Resuming their attempts at clearing the network of roads leading north from the coast, on 11th October they occupied SOVRANO (85/0553) and took up positions which temporarily secured the road. They were forced to withdraw again on 13th October.

The enemy is expected to launch a strong drive in the area so as to ensure the destruction of the large power-stations at ITOLA (85/9547), BIVANEA (85/9140), MIGOSO (85/0138) and ROSSO (85/9036) as well as the dam at (85/9236).

Outbreaks of Diphtheria, totalling 32 cases have been reported from SAEDI (84/616) and PALANZANO (84/8164). Measures to limit this outbreak are being taken by the Partisan authorities who have started a hospital of 30 beds at COMMIZIO (85/9350).

Major, G.S.,
for Commander T.N.T.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Lt. Col. Shiep, (Chief of Staff), A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Colchn, A.C.C.
4. Brigadier Dunlop, (VENETIA), A.C.C.
5. Col. Hancock, (LOMBARDY), A.C.C.
6. Col. Peaser, (LIGURIA), A.C.C.
7. Col. Marshall, (PIEDMONT), A.C.C.
8. Col. Bowman, (EMILIA), A.C.C.

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The enemy is expected to launch a strong drive in the near so as to insure the destruction of the large power-stations at IGOLA (PS/9545), RIMAGGE (PS/9140), RIFOSO (PS/9138) and BOSCO (PS/9036) as well as the dam at PS/9036).

Outbreaks of Diphtheria, totalling 22 cases have been reported from BARDI (PS/6161) and PALANZANO (PS/9554). Measures to limit this outbreak are being taken by the Partisan authorities who have started a hospital of 30 beds at CORNIGLIO (PS/9560).

Major, G.S.,
for Commander R.S.F.A.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution
---

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Lt. Col. Shipp, (Chief of Staff), A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Upjohn, A.C.C.
4. Brigadier Dunlop, (VENEZIA), A.C.C.
5. Col. Hancock, (LOMBARDY), A.C.C.
6. Col. Feasey, (LIGURIA), A.C.C.
7. Col. Marshall, (PIEDMONT), A.C.C.
8. Col. Bowman, (EMILIA), A.C.C.
9. Col. McCarthy, (Patriots' Branch), A.C.C.
10. do.
11. Col. Dennmore, Economic Section.
12. Mr. Gayner, P.W.B.
13. Major Pope, I.C.I.D.
14. File.

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SECRET

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ATHQ SIGNED SACMED

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Confidential

ROUTINE

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CITE PHGEC

SECRET. Suggestion by combined Chiefs of Staff that if Italian Partisans fulfill conditions of Article 1 of Regulations appended to HAGUE Convention Number IV of 1907 a statement should be prepared for issuance by the Italian Govt stating the facts and demanding treatment as Prisoners of War in the event of capture by enemy. Such statement is to be submitted to this HQ and will not be issued until released here.

DIST

Action - C A Sect (3)
Info - Pol Sec
Army SC
Patriots Br
IPOW SC
A/CC
C of S Sec
File

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Copy No. 12

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No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force.

MUSTER Sitrep No. 19 of 15th October 1944

GENERAL

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1. Italian W/T operator in MILAN reports on 12th from a reliable source that the removal of materials towards Germany continues. The destruction of war factories in PIEDMONT has begun and the Germans have mined other factories and public works. The destruction of air fields in PIEDMONT, LOMBARDY and SUSA continues. The Ministry of War Production has left MILAN and dependent sections are to follow.

PIEDMONT

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2. An Italian mission north of IVREA reports on the 11th that the food situation is excellent. Sole command has been established in BIELLA area for the whole of the VERCELLI province and is recognised by the C.L.N.A.I.

3. A British mission on the Franco-Italian frontier reports on the 10th that according to PORRINI (partisan leader) the TIRAN battalion (Republican Fascists) are ready to desert. They have been told to await an right moment.

4. This mission also reports that an anti-Partisan organisation has been formed in TURIN consisting of 300 officers and 900 troops commanded by LIEUTENANT COLONEL S.I. Its function is to circulate in the city armed with pistols and grenades and attack Partisans. Light internal defences have been set up in TURIN.

LIGURIA

[illegible] and the Germans have mined other factories and public works. The destruction of air fields in SIENA, IOMA and [illegible] continues. The Ministry of War Production has left MILAN and Brescia are to follow.

PIEMONT

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3. A British mission on the France-Italian frontier reports on the 10th that returning to VALCHILIA (certain leaders) the Italian patriots (Republican Partisans) are ready to assist. They have been told to wait for right moment.

4. This mission also reports that an anti-fascism organization has been formed in TURIN consisting of 100 officers and 900 troops commanded by LIEUTENANT COLONEL G.I.. Its function is to circulate in the city areas with pistols and grenades and attack Partisans. Illegal internal defence have been set up in TURIN.

LIGURIA

5. A British mission east of GENOA reports that according to Italian Army deserters there are only small German forces left in the mountains. The enemy is withdrawing all heavy equipment along highway 12 and using minor roads for infantry. The enemy has prepared the following utilities for demolition: the dams at MONTANEGRINO (97/2135) and RIGIUNATO (97/3121), and the substation at STRETTA (97/3824).

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VENETIA

6. A British mission north of VICENZA reports on the 11th that according to [illegible] working with them.

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[illegible] and Foreign Relations
[illegible] in the area of [illegible] (37/73)
[illegible] Top Secret
[illegible] for "[illegible]"

Director, [illegible]
Joint Commander, [illegible]
Commanding Officer, 1 Special Forces

Distribution

Brigadier Commissioner, British Embassy,
Brig. [illegible] Colonel, [illegible]
Col. [illegible] Colonel, [illegible]
Col. [illegible] Colonel, [illegible]
Col

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SECRET Copy No. 2

Ref: 19/14/17 16th October 1944 68

Subject: Report from the field

To: Colonel McCarthy, Patriots' Branch.
Lt. Colonel Shipp, Chief of Staff Sec.,
Regional Commissioner, Piedmont.
Regional Commissioner, Liguria.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

Attached report was written by the Second-in-Command of the British Mission operating in the area East of CUNEO in PIEDMONT.

This officer was exfiltrated early in October.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, N.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

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[illegible]th October 1944

RELATIONS and GENERAL

The MISSION is on excellent terms with the Partisans. They appreciate the presence of British personnel and the assistance given them. The Partisans are always ready to take advice and grateful for encouragement or acknowledgement of their work and will obey British orders and directives. The Partisans are quite frank and open with the British on all matters, including politics, and provided us with daily situation reports covering all their work.

The Partisans to whom the Mission were attached are the BADOGLIANI or Military Party taking their directives from "the General", who is a member of the TURIN Committee. In fact the directives are few and far between, and to all intents and purposes the Commander of each Partisan Division is supreme commander of his area for all purposes. Directly through the Partisans it would be easy for the British to take complete administrative control of the area on evacuation of the enemy.

ORGANISATION, etc.

The BADOGLIANI with whom we were working were organised in two divisions based on mountain areas:

(i) Major [illegible]'s Division ([illegible] Division) was based in the hills called the [illegible], to the North West of [illegible], the H.Q. being at [illegible] near [illegible]. The area controlled by Partisans stretched North from this point to [illegible] and [illegible], West to [illegible] and South to [illegible]: on the East it was bounded by the plains. This area is not by any means impassable to the enemy, but in passing they must come in force and are always liable to be attacked.

(ii) The 3rd ALPINE Division (Capt. [illegible]). This Division is situated in the mountains South of [illegible] in three valleys: VAL [illegible] - VAL [illegible] (Div. H.Q.) - VAL [illegible]. The area is se-

the [illegible] or Military Party taking their directives from "the General", who is a member of the [illegible] Committee. In fact the directives are few and far between, and to all intents and purposes the Commander of each Partisan Division is supreme commander of his area for all purposes. Directly through the Partisans it would be easy for the British to take complete administrative control of the area on evacuation of the enemy.

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(ii) The 3rd [illegible] Division (Capt. [illegible]). This Division is situated in the mountains South of [illegible] in three valleys: [illegible] - [illegible] (Div. H.Q.) - [illegible]. The area is definitely a free area in these valleys and on the mountains between, and it is very doubtful if the enemy would penetrate the area without considerable force.

STRENGTHS and EQUIPMENT

The [illegible] Division is estimated at about 3,000 armed men, and the [illegible] at about 1,200 armed men. They are armed with a few LMG's (of all patterns, chiefly [illegible]), STEN guns and rifles.

Recently they have received in drops some [illegible]'s which are very well received. There are NO heavy guns, mortars, A/T guns or artillery. The [illegible] Division is better armed and equipped than the 3rd [illegible].

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WORK, TRADE, etc.

The morale of the Partisans is excellent. The Italians are particularly suited to this flamboyant type of work. They have great ingenuity and are very keen. They do not need encouragement to carry out demolitions.

On a separate report will be seen the actual demolitions carried out by these Divisions. The 3rd ALPINE has done particularly meritorious work in road and railway destruction.

The Partisans do not carry out attacks on enemy formations and personnel to any large extent. This is partly due to reprisals which render it costly in goodwill of civilian population, but also due to lack of desire for direct action. On account of lack of enemy troops to guard communications, the Partisans can usually carry out their demolitions without contact with the enemy.

On the other hand, if the enemy come into Partisan held country, the Partisans will fight if they consider they can hold, thereby safeguarding the civilian population.

The Partisans should be encouraged by broadcast to mine all roads and attack German convoys and troops on the move. There are tremendous possibilities in this type of work but as yet the Partisans have not achieved much.

CHARACTERS, etc.

The Partisans as a whole are much as is to be expected. They are fighting largely for selfish interests in that it is far easier, safer and more comfortable to live as a Partisan than in the towns under FASCISTI surveillance and in constant danger of deportation to the REICH. On the other hand, they loathe the Germans, and, more so, the Fascists, and want to clear them out of the country. On the whole,

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enemy formations and personnel to any large extent. This is partly due to reprisals which render it costly in goodwill of civilian population, but also due to lack of desire for direct action. On account of lack of enemy troops to guard communications, the Partisans can usually carry out their demolitions without contact with the enemy.

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CHARACTERS, etc.

The Partisans as a whole are much as is to be expected. They are fighting largely for selfish interests in that it is far easier, safer and more comfortable to live as a Partisan than in the towns under GESTAPO surveillance and in constant danger of deportation to the REICH. On the other hand, they loathe the Germans, and, more so, the Fascists, and want to clear them out of the country. On the whole, the officers with the BADOGLIANI Partisans are good. They take their job seriously and are not politically minded. It would be stupid to say they have NO politics, but the trend is merely towards a military control by themselves and the Partisans, with no radical change until after the war. They are firmly anti-Communist. The BADOGLIANI group are undoubtedly the only people now who could take over the TRIEST area on evacuation of the enemy and run it with some semblance of organisation.

TURIN

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In TURIN the committee is a rather uncertain factor.

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It has very little control over the work of the Partisans outside and only serves them as an information service and liaison with the Allies. "The DESTRAI", who, as a member of both Military and Political Committees, represents the Military body (GARIBALDINI), is trying hard to obtain command of the whole Committee. His representative put out very strong feelers in an interview with us towards this end.

The other Military parties, the Communists (GARIBALDINI) and "Giustizia e Liberta", want to keep firmly separate.

ORGANISATION IN TURIN

There appears to be only a very small force available in TURIN, due to lack of arms, inclination and opportunity to organise a force. The city is divided up into six zones. Each zone is subdivided into squads. Each squad has its designated job on evacuation of the enemy, and order for action, but at the moment they could not possibly fulfil it. Political differences will also hinder any proposed action. It is essential at the moment to supply arms on a large scale to TURIN. For this purpose dropping grounds have already been submitted. It is also highly desirable that a British officer arrives in TURIN soon to settle political differences and insist on organisation and action at once. The representative was very vague about the arrangements made for taking over civil services after the German evacuation: it appeared that these matters had in no way been taken in hand.

The COMMUNISTS (GARIBALDINI)

In PIEDMONT, South of TURIN, there is a powerful group of GARIBALDINI in the LANGHE area. This group is the 9th GARIBALDINI Division and consists of three Brigades, the 16th, 18th, and 48th, with

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The COMMUNISTS (GARIBALDINI)

In PIEDMONT, South of TURIN, there is a powerful group of GARIBALDINI in the LANGHE area. This group is the 9th GARIBALDINI Division and consists of three Brigades, the 16th, 18th, and 48th, with H.Q.'s at PRUNETTO north east of MONDOVI, at BORGO-LANGO and at MONFORTE respectively. The strength of the whole Division is about 1,500 - 2,000 armed men and innumerable possible recruits as yet unsumoned. The Commander is called NANNI, an excellent type, young, and a scholar. He is very efficient and highly respected by his men. This division has a high proportion of FRENCH personnel and is very aggressive. I landed with one of their units and the following day saw them in action against the enemy. This group is by no means all Communists. The leaders are Communists and they have Political Commissars - also Communists. Of the rank and file, about 50% are Communists. Apart from the leader, NANNI, and the French officers, I was not impressed by the other officers.

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LIGURIA

In LIGURIA the only partisan band in force is the GARIBALDINI band of CURTO. This band is the 2nd GARIBALDINI Division with H.Q. at PIAGGIA. They control officially an area West to the French frontier, South to the sea, North till they meet the BADOGLIANI in the high Maritime Alps and East to the RAPALLO IMPERIA road. In fact they do not cover this area, and are based on and control about three small towns: e.g. PIAGGIA, TRIORA, PIGNA. Their strength may be estimated at about 500 - 1,000 armed men, and again large numbers of unarmed "intellectuals" who hang around PIAGGIA in keen competition to grow the longest and most desirable head of hair. Their organisation is very bad and CURTO struck me as a very decadent type, possibly an idealist but certainly no soldier. This band's activities have been limited to occasional raids on the coastal towns for arms and supplies, and denying of the inland routes to their H.Q.s. On the otherhand, the NANNI organisation carried out considerable demolitions and sabotage in their area.

ENEMY

Enemy situations will be covered by Italian 'Servizio X' Reports brought with me, except for the situation on the frontier with France. This has already been reported in full to the American General Staff at NICE, so is only briefly dealt with here. On the frontier between SAORGIO and VENTIMIGLIA the line is held by enemy artillery, their O.P.s and MMGs. As such, there is no infantry. The infantry of the 34th Division has left the area and returned to CUNEO. Along the coast from VENTIMIGLIA to SAVONA, the Germans are withdrawing and handing over to FASCIST troops. Eastwards from the CUNEO - VENTIMIGLIA road there are prepared defensive positions on each successive mountain ridge. These are very strongly fortified and could be defended by a small force. The Germans, however, do [illegible] their posi-

the hair around [illegible] in keen competition to grow the longest and most desirable head of hair. Their organisation is very bad and [illegible] struck me as a very decadent type, possibly an idealist but certainly no soldier. This band's activities have been limited to occasional raids on the coastal towns for arms and supplies, and denying of the inland routes to their H.Q.s. On the otherhand, the BARNI organisation carried out considerable demolitions and sabotage in their area.

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REPUBBLICANI

The "Repubblicani", as the Fascists are called,

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are organised, fed, paid and equipped by the Germans. They are partly volunteers, partly conscripts, and have exceedingly low morale. Apart from the SAN MARCO and [illegible] Divisions operating near [illegible], there are detachments in TURIN (about 10,000; 5,000 armed; with one Mechanised Brigade), CUNEO, [illegible] and other towns. They are used by the Germans to guard lines of communication and base areas, and also to search for and attack Partisans. As the Partisans have always openly adopted the policy of executing without exception all "Repubblicani" captured, the "Repubblicani" will on no account surrender to the Partisans. This will produce a difficult situation when the Germans leave the area, as the "Repubblicani" will undoubtedly not surrender to the Partisans and will hold out in the towns until, as they hope, an Allied Force arrives to which they can safely surrender.

At present Partisans in the towns are not sufficiently strong to defeat the "Repubblicani", and all the Partisan forces, irrespective of party, will have to be called in to dislodge the "Repubblicani" from their stronghold. This will presumably need some coordinating H.Q. and must be done by the British, as the Italians would at present be incapable of organising it.

MOVEMENT

Movement in the mountains is quite unhindered by the enemy. It is in very few cases by car on mountain roads, more usually by foot and mule. Mules are not very plentiful, but sufficient to carry essential Mission stores can always be obtained. Personnel must travel on foot. Horses are not available, and impracticable. In the plain, movement is possible by car only. The Partisans have M.T. but insufficient petrol. Cars travelling in the plains move in small highly armed convoys and travel fast. The plains are of course controlled by the enemy, but movement is possible by travelling on

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GENERAL POINTS

(1) Political

At present the political situation is not dangerous. There is ill-feeling among the two main Parties, but as yet no action. With

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fire Allied control, there is no reason why any dissension should arise. The BADOGLIANI continually accuse the GARIBALDINI of organising large-scale underground movements with hidden arms, ready to upvise at any given moment, and take supreme Communist control. This is exaggerated but not without basis. The Communists are jealous of the British support of the BADOGLIANI and accuse them of only half-resisting the enemy.

(ii) Civil

The population are pro-Allied in feeling but indifferent in action: they will help the Partisans but not at risk to themselves. They are apathetic and would be quite ready to accept Partisan administrative control. They would welcome any Allied influence.

(iii) Food and Supplies

A separate report has been sent in by the Italian Command on this subject. In all country districts and small towns the situation is good enough. In the larger towns such as TURIN and GENOA some organisation must be made for the winter months.

At present the partisans live exceedingly well. They requisition, but pay for, all necessary products, but do not cause the civilian population shortage or hardship.

(iv) Medical Supplies

These are short, particularly bandages, gauze, etc. Drugs are fairly plentiful, and drugs such as prontosil can still be purchased freely.

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SECRET. Copy No. 3 41

Ref: 22/14/20 17th October 1944.

Subject: Report from IA SPEZIA Area.

To: Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
Col. McCarthy, Patriots' Branch, A.C.C.
Col. Feasey, (Liguria), A.C.C.
Lt. Col. Shipp, Chief of Staff Section, A.C.C.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

The following extracts are taken from a report received from a British liaison officer working in the IA SPEZIA area. They give a clear picture of what steps are being taken in this area to conform with MUSTER directives.

1. The 'Division' is organised in four 'brigades'. It has been continually in action since its formation at the beginning of August 1944. Enemy reprisals have been heavy and the area has suffered considerably in the numbers of villages destroyed and populations massacred.

2. In the past few weeks attempts have been made to reorganise the various 'communes' in order to have some form of order and discipline in the civil population for the time when the Allies take over. The general outlines of the scheme are as follows:-

(a) Each 'Commune' has a Committee of National Liberation and a 'civil guard' who will take over control as soon as the enemy departs.

(b) All persons in authority may be recognised by Allied troops by their armbands in the Italian National colours and by their identity cards, which are issued by the P.L.G. from his H.Q. No persons other than those having armbands and identity cards are authorised to carry arms or to represent the

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(c) As many 'Communes' as possible will have an 'Information Service' formed of English speaking persons. These persons will have reliable information as to the serviceability of roads and bridges and the areas still held by the enemy.

(d) The local Committees will have available:-

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(i) Working parties for use, under R.N. supervision, of road and bridge repairs.

(ii) Lists giving the minimum requirements for the feeding of the population in their areas.

3. It is hoped that the 'Communes' north of CASTEL NUOVO will be in the same state of readiness, but the recent murder of one of the leaders in this area and the subsequent loss of many documents has resulted in an increase in the difficulties of organisation.

Butler
Major, S.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Gilbert
Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.E.Y.M.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

27/18

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VERY ROUGH TRANSLATION 59

MESSAGE FROM THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

I transmit the following message from the committee of National Liberation, who request that it be forwarded to Casati, Minister of War, Rome: "The 27th meeting of the C of N L renewed discussions to support the Liberal Party's proposal for the nomination of Commander. I confirm that General Ricci receives the unanimous and enthusiastic consideration of all parties. In vivid contrast was the opposition of the Communist Party based upon its request for the sole support of its own political commissioner. I emphasized the political security for all parties represented by the moral character of the General and also by the regular control by the Committee of National Liberation of Upper Italy. Furthermore the Commander would have the assistance and collaboration of the party delegates in the General Command. I believe there exists sufficient evidence to be able to affirm that the majority of the formations even among the Communists would accept enthusiastically his nomination as Commander. The President of the Committee of National Liberation of Upper Italy and the Christian Democrat Party are in complete agreement. The Socialist and Action representatives look forward to this nomination in a personal way besides consolidating the Committee with Communists. Although they disagree on the constitutional methods of the Command in the case of his nomination as Commander. I believe that the Communist Party is now ready to accept our point of view making a new proposal for nomination of Commander with Communist vice-Commander and Action Chief of Staff. I request you therefore that along with the desire and urgent order of the Government and the Allied Command for the appointment of Commander be summoned directly by Minister Togliatti in the Communist military representative in the formation of his party with conscious discipline and with the enthusiastic reception of this Commander, well accepted by all Parties and all the people. This step is essential in obtaining the consent of the political commissioners of the groups. I believe that General Ricci and his appointment as sole Commander is the only element able to co-ordinate in complete harmony and strengthen the military forces for the struggle of liberation. Signed. Giustino.

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To: H. DAVIA Esq.

No. 0451

October 20th, 1944.

From: Major Page, A.M.
I.S.I.D.

Herewith attached a message, in the original Italian, from the COMITATO NAZIONALE DI LIBERAZIONE, ALTA ITALIA, received from our Source "SAND" on October 10th.

Major A.M.

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MESSAGGIO DEL C.N.L. 7.10.44 57

TRASMETTO SEGUENTE MESSAGGIO DEL C.N.L. CON PREGHIERA INOLTRE, PER CASATI MINISTRO GUERRA ROMA SEDUTA XXVII C.N.L. HA RINOVATA DISCUSSIONE PER SOSTENERE PROPOSTA PARTITO LIBERALE NOMINA COMANDANTE. PRESENTO CHE GENERALE RICCI RICEVUTE UNANIME ENTUSIASTICA CONSIDERAZIONE TUTTI PARTITI. CONTRASTATA VIVACEMENTE OPPOSIZIONE COMUNISTA FONDATA SU RICHIESTA AFFIANCAMENTO UNICO PROPRIO COMMISSARIO POLITICO, HO MESSO IN LUCE GARANZIA POLITICA PER TUTTI PARTITI RAPPRESENTATA DALLA FISIONOMIA MORALE PERSONA GENERALE NOTORIE' DA CONTROLLO NORMALE DEL C.N.L. A.I. INOLTRE IL COMANDANTE AVREBBE ASSISTENZA ET COLLABORAZIONE DA PARTE DEI DELEGATI DEI PARTITI NEL COMANDO GENERALE. RITENGO POTER AFFERMARE PER SICURE TESTIMONIANZE CHE MAGGIORANZA FORMAZIONI ANCHE FRA QUELLI COMUNISTE ACCOGLIEREBBERO ENTUSIASMO NOMINA COMANDANTE. PRESIDENTE "CINAI" ET DEMOCRAZIA CRISTIANA PIENAMENTE CONCORDA. RAPPRESENTANTI SOCIALISTA ET AZIONE AUSPICANO IN VIA PERSONALE TALE NOMINA PUR SOLIDARIZZANDO IN COMITATO CON COMUNISTI DAI QUALI COMUNQUE DISSENTONO SULLE MODALITA' DI COSTITUZIONE DEL COMANDO IN CASO DI NOMINA DEL COMANDANTE. RISULTAMI PARTITO COMUNISTA STA ORA PER ACCEDERE NOSTRO PUNTO DI VISTA FACENDO NUOVA PROPOSTA NOMINA COMANDANTE CON VICE-COMANDANTE COMUNISTA ET CAPO STATO MAGGIORE AZIONE. CHIEDOVI DUNQUE CHE CORRELATIVAMENTE AT AUSPICATO ED URGENTE ORDINE DA PARTE CONSIGLIO ET COMANDO ALLEATO NOMINA COMANDANTE VENGANO RICHIAMATI DIRETTAMENTE DA PARTE MINISTRO TOGLIATTI IN RAPPRESENTANTE MILITARE COMUNISTA ET POPOLAZIONE SUO PARTITO ALLA CONSAPEVOLE DISCIPLINA ET [illegible] ACCOGLIMENTO ENTUSIASTICO DI QUESTO COMANDANTE. DI QUESTO COMANDANTE BENE ACCETTO AT TUTTI PARTITI ET A TUTTA POPOLAZIONE. TALE PASSO EST ESSENZIALE DERIVANDOVI CONSENSO COMMISSARI POLITICI BANDE. RITENGO GENERALE RICCI ET SUA NOMINA AT UNICO COMANDANTE ULTIMO ELEMENTO ATTO AT COORDINARE IN ARMONICO COMPLESSO ET GALVANIZZARE FORZE MILITARI AI FINI DI POTENZIARLI LOTTA LIBERAZIONE. FIRMATO GIUSTINO.

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SECRET

Copy No. 1

Confidential

Ref: LS/7/17

14th October 1944.

Subject: Directive to Missions in Piedmont

To: Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
Copy to: Col. McCarthy.

From: No. 5 Detachment:
No. 1 Special Force.

Appendix "A" is a paraphrase of the directive sent to the B.L.O. on the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier, in reply to a message from him reporting the difficult situation likely to arise in TURIN when the Germans withdraw, and asking for authority to discuss the whole question with the TURIN Committee. It gives an indication of the proposed build-up in PIEDMONT to meet MUSTER conditions.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, RNVR.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

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APPENDIX "A"

SECRET

11 October 1944

Confidential

We agree the situation in TURIN and PIEDMONT will be extremely complicated in the event of a German withdrawal before the arrival of Allied troops. In order to assist the TURIN and local Committees to maintain order until A.M.G. arrives, we propose reorganising and strengthening the British Missions in PIEDMONT. Our ultimate aim is to have a strong central Mission in TURIN working with the Committee of Liberation and sub-Missions in the provincial capitals working with the local Committees. This reorganisation will be carried out in the following three phases, the first two to take place before the German withdrawal:-

Phase 1 (which will be completed as soon as possible).

The infiltration of a Senior British officer (a Lieutenant Colonel) with staff to be senior British Mission in PIEDMONT. They will be dropped to the present senior B.L.O. in the CUNEO area as soon as the weather permits. The latter will then move to TURIN itself with a W/T operator, leaving behind the remainder of his own mission.

Phase 2

The new senior mission will set up a base nearer to TURIN and probably in the CHISONE or SUSA area. Sub-missions will be infiltrated to various receptions to operate for the time being with the partisans in BIELLA and ALESSANDRIA and AOSTA and VERCELLI areas. The opening up of limited W/T communications between sub-missions and the Senior Mission will take place.

Phase 3

To take place during or after general German withdrawal:

The Senior Mission will move into TURIN to join the British Liaison officer there. The sub-missions will move into the provincial capitals. Full W/T intercommunication between sub-missions and TURIN will be opened up. All British missions will complete the change-over from partisan work to liaison with Com-

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[illegible] (which will be completed as soon as possible).

The infiltration of a Senior British officer (a Lieutenant Colonel) with staff to be senior British Mission in PIEDMONT. They will be dropped to the present senior B.L.O. in the CUNEO area as soon as the weather permits. The latter will then move to TURIN itself with a W/T operator, leaving behind the remainder of his own mission.

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In phase one you and the leader of the mission you are working with will continue your present duties, reporting direct to this Headquarters. In Phase two you will continue, but working in close liaison with the Senior Mission. In Phase three you will join this mission as experts on TORINO Province and on the areas you have been working in. The execution of Phases one and two is already held up, however, by prolonged bad weather and may take some time to complete. Pending

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the arrival of this Senior Mission in your area or the British Liaison officer in TURIN, you are therefore authorised, after consultation with the leader of the other British mission, to commence discussions with the TURIN Committee, regarding preparations for a German withdrawal. Amongst many points they must consider urgently are the following:-

1. Protection of public utilities such as electricity, water, telephone exchanges, radio stations.

2. Organisation and control of police forces, both regular and partisan.

3. Food supply and rationing.

4. Movement of bands.

5. Ultimate disbanding and disarming of partisans.

6. Control of distribution of captured enemy and Fascist arms.

7. Treatment and disposal of surrendering German and Fascist troops.

8. Temporary replacement of Fascist officials.

9. Obtaining and hiding petrol and transport.

It must be made clear to the Committee that any arrangements they make will be only provisional and subject to review by A.M.G. when it arrives. Do not commit Allies by making any promises and keep us fully informed of all discussions and plans.

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[illegible] and partisan.

3. Food supply and rationing.

4. Movement of bands.

5. Ultimate disbanding and disarming of partisans.

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SECRET.

Confidential

Ref: 18/12/15

13th October 1944.

No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force.

MUSTER Progress Report for period ending 8th October 1944

The following extracts have been taken from No. 1 Special Force Progress Report dated 8th October 1944.

1. Our operational programme for the moon period ending 10th October has been almost entirely frustrated by the bad weather. The delay in German withdrawal from North West Italy, however, means that our MUSTER programme may now safely be carried forward into the next moon period without any loss of efficiency. The same does not apply to North East Italy where delay in delivering vital stores and missions is a most serious set back to the progress of our "destructive" plans and places all patriot formations in a dangerous situation.

Despite the strength of the enemy opposition it is comforting to know that all missions have so far avoided capture and are in constant communication with this H.Q.

2. The continued bad weather during the past week has again prevented the infiltration of any MUSTER missions.

The extended delay has meant that we have not been able to take advantage of the September - October moon period and we now have to consider the possibilities of dropping the parties during the dark period. This will require a review of the pinpoints previously selected, and consultation with the R.A.F. as to which ones they would be prepared to fly given suitable weather.

3. There are increasing indications from the field that the Committees of Liberation and other resistance

During 10th October we were almost entirely frustrated by the bad weather. The delay in German withdrawal from North West Italy, however, means that our MUSTER programme may now safely be carried forward into the next moon period without any loss of efficiency. The same does not apply to North West Italy where delay in delivering vital stores and missions is a most serious set back to the programme of our "destructive" plans and places all patriot formations in a dangerous situation.

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3. There are increasing indications from the field that the Committees of Liberation and other resistance organisations are becoming "MUSTER conscious" and are planning in some detail the steps they can take in the event of a Saturn withdrawal. The following is a summary of the progress that has so far been made in this direction:

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TUSCIA

BOLOGNA 5th Army have sent a directive through our mission east of SPEZIA to the patriots in the BOLOGNA area, instructing them to move into the town now and to lie low until they receive a signal to block all entrances to the enemy inside the city. The signal for action will be given by an aircraft flying over the town. In view of the present difficulties of communication between the mission and the BOLOGNA Committee and in view of the mission's other

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commitments it is proposed to send in a W/T operator and set to BOLOGNA itself to receive 5th Army directives.

MODENA The MODENA Committee of Liberation has prepared a plan of action which they have referred to the [illegible] mission for approval by A.A.I. This plan envisages coordinated action by clandestine forces within the city of MODENA and by the bands in the neighbouring hills. The city will be taken over and all important buildings occupied and protected. Road blocks will be established on all exits from the city and the Carabinieri, Civic Guards and Finance Guards, under one command, will prevent looting and control the population.

The first phase of the plan requires the movement of some 1,000 patriots now in the hills towards the city. We have sent instructions that although the plan is approved in principle, it must not be implemented without orders from A.A.I. We have also instructed this mission to move with the patriot forces towards the town and to keep in close touch with the military leaders.

PARMA Another mission in this area reports that the Comando Unico of PARMA province is planning the occupation of the PARMA plain by patriots. The following four formations will be used to occupy PARMA itself:

GIULIA Division

GIUSTIZIA e LIBERTA Division

47th and 12th MARIBALDI Brigades

[illegible] have approved in principle the

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[illegible] and protected. Road blocks will be established on all exits from the city and the Carabinieri, Civic Guards and Finance Guards, under one command, will prevent looting and control the population.

The first phase of the plan requires the movement of some 1,900 patriots now in the hills towards the city. We have sent instructions that although the plan is approved in principle, it must not be implemented without orders from A.M.G.I. We have also instructed this mission to move with the patriot forces towards the town and to keep in close touch with the military leaders.

PARMA Another mission in this area reports that the Comando Unico of PARMA province is planning the occupation of the PARMA plain by patriots. The following four formations will be used to occupy PARMA itself:

GIUSTIZIA Division

GIUSTIZIA e LIBERTA Division

47th and 12th GARIBALDI Brigades

5th Army have approved in principle the occupation of PARMA by patriot forces and will send the action signal via the mission.

LIGURIA

SPEZIA The mission in this area, which is with the command of the First LIGURIAN Division, reports that a plan has been made to occupy SPEZIA. 5th Army have also approved this plan and will give the necessary signal for action.

IMPERIA The Second LIGURIAN GARIBALDI Division, which operates in Western Liguria, has sent out a plan for expelling the Germans from the area between the French frontier and

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SAVONA. This plan, however, requires the cooperation of fairly substantial Allied forces from the French Riviera and is not, at the moment, practicable. It is hoped to infiltrate a British mission to this partisan Division to investigate its possibilities of action unassisted by regular Allied troops.

PIEDMONT

TURIN The TURIN Committee is preparing plans for action in the event of a German withdrawal. It is proposed that the bands South of PRILICE will descend to CUNEO, the bands between PRILICE and ASTA to TURIN, the bands of the ASTA valley to CHIVASSO and the bands of LANGHE to ASTI. It is not, however, at all certain that the bands concerned will agree to this plan. It is known, for example, that the LANGHE formations wish to occupy CUNEO, MONDOVI and other towns in Southern PIEDMONT and possibly to send some of their forces to TURIN.

A mission on the French frontier, which is in contact with the TURIN Committee thinks it inadvisable that there should be any mass descents on to TURIN and recommends that only a dozen or so men from each band should be allowed to go into the city and that the present civil police organisations should be responsible for maintenance of order there. It is hoped to clarify the complicated political and military situation by sending the leader of a mission at present in the CUNEO area to TURIN to discuss the whole position with the TURIN Committee.

LOMBARDY

MILAN A plan has been put forward to isolate MILAN by cutting all railway communications simultaneously. This plan would be put into effect either on orders received from Allied Headquarters or, in any case, a few days

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[illegible] to AOSTA to TURIN, the bands of the AOSTA valley to CHIVASSO and the bands of LANGHE to ASTI. It is not, however, at all certain that the bands concerned will agree to this plan. It is known, for example, that the GARIBALDI formations wish to occupy CUNEO, MONDOVI and other towns in Southern PIEDMONT and possibly to send some of their forces to TURIN.

A mission on the French frontier, which is in contact with the TURIN Committee thinks it inevitable that there should be any mass descents on to TURIN and recommends that only a dozen or so men from each band should be allowed to go into the city and that the present civil police organisations should be responsible for maintenance of order there. It is hoped to clarify the complicated political and military situation by sending the leader of a mission at present in the CUNEO area to TURIN to discuss the whole position with the TURIN Committee.

LOMBARDY

MILAN A plan has been put forward to isolate MILAN by cutting all railway communications simultaneously. This plan would be put into effect either on orders received from Allied Headquarters or, in any case, a few days before the German evacuation, so that German materials would be blocked at the railway stations.

VAL D'OSSOLA Partisans are already in occupation of the VAL D'OSSOLA, including the town of DOMODOSSOLA.

RESISTANCE IN THE FIELD

North East Italy

Omitted.

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5. North Italy

The situation continues to be fairly static. The Germans make half-hearted attacks every time the partisans become a nuisance but usually withdraw after a short struggle.

Danger lies in the fact that owing to extremely bad weather no supplies have been dropped to the area, and the partisans are running short of arms and especially ammunition.

The main centres of activity have been East of Lake MAGGIORE and North West of Lake GARDA.

6. North West Italy

The week has also been quiet in the North West. Confused movements of German troops have been reported in Lower PIEDMONT - confused probably owing to the fact that the bands have destroyed most bridges between CUNEO and ASTI and sometimes manage to trap convoys between two blown bridges.

Our missions are now chiefly concerned with making plans for the moment when the Germans evacuate the area. This the Germans are doing very carefully, usually substituting first WOLKS STURMBANN troops for German troops, then replacing the latter with Fascist elements.

A British officer, who was demolition instructor to the bands South of VENDOVI, has returned after crossing the Linea into PIEDMONT. With him came two envoys from the TURIN C.L.N. with a wealth of information regarding the situation there and in the CUNEO - VENDOVI area.

Briefly, the BIELLESE and CUNEESE bands are in control of their areas, and are engaged in active sabotage. Bands in the other Alpine valleys and in LIGURIA are trying to survive until the German withdrawal. In the VENDOVI area the Germans are beginning to treat the partisans with respect, have granted them certain belligerent rights, have ceased to take hostages and even propose an exchange of prisoners.

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The week has also been quiet in the North West. Scattered movements of German troops have been reported in Lower PIEDMONT - confused probably owing to the fact that the Bands have destroyed most bridges between CUNEO and ASTI and sometimes manage to keep convoys between two blown bridges.

Our missions are now actively concerned with making plans for the moment when the Germans evacuate the area. This the Germans are doing very carefully, usually substituting first WEST BATTALION troops for German troops, then replacing the latter with Fascist elements.

A British officer, who was demolition instructor to the bands South of LANDOVI, has returned after crossing the lines into FRANCE. With him came two envoys from the TURIN C.L.N. with a wealth of information regarding the situation there and in the CUNEO - LANDOVI area.

Briefly, the BRIGADE and DIVISIONE Bands are in control of their areas, and are engaged in active sabotage. Bands in the Upper Alpine Valleys and in LIGURIA are trying to survive until the German withdrawal. In the LANDOVI area the Germans are beginning to treat the partisans with respect, have granted them certain belligerent rights, have ceased to take hostages and even proposed an exchange of prisoners.

7. Appendix Area

The week was, on the whole, calm. The partisans are unable to interfere seriously with enemy communications owing to acute shortage of ammunition. On the other hand the enemy is too busy preparing for retreat, repairing roads and bridges, to give trouble to the patriots.

The salient events of the week are:

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The report that containers of [illegible] have arrived in L. SPEZIA area (the question is still being investigated).

The wholesale evacuation of the civilian population from the area south of L. SPEZIA, and the deportation of all men to the PO line, where they were to fortifications.

The increasing number of deserters from Fascist units to the partisans. On 9th October, 300 men from the MONTE ROSA Division deserted to the partisans, taking wireless equipment with them.

On the political side, contacts between our S.I.O.s and the Committees of the various large towns in the area are being maintained.

[illegible]
Major, G.S.
for Commander, A. .V.H.
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution
---

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Holden, .C.S.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, VSUMAL.
4. Mr. Bryant, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. do.
8. Col. Parker, FIGUEL.
9. Col. Terrell, PIEMONTE.
10. Col. Bowen, SUBLE.
11. Col. Ransmire, Economic Section.
12. Lt. Col. Shipo, A.C.C.
13. Major Page, I.S.L.D.

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On the political side, contacts between our B.I.O.s and the Committees of the various large towns in the area are being maintained.

[illegible]
Major, G.S.
for Commander, [illegible]
Commando No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution
---

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Upjohn, [illegible].
3. Brigadier Dunlop, V.C.O.
4. Mr. Bryan, P.T.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.G.
6. Col. McFeeter, [illegible].
7. do.
8. Col. Bowen, [illegible].
9. Col. Crawford, [illegible].
10. Col. Brown, [illegible].
11. Col. Lammers, Security Section.
12. Lt. Col. Shipp, [illegible].
13. Major Pope, I.S.L.D.
14. File.

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SECRET

Copy No. 1.....

Ref: LS/7/13

12th October 1944.

13 OCT Recd

Subject: Supplement to Briefing of RANKIN Missions.

To: Executive Commissioner,
Chief of Staff's Section, A.C.C.

From: No. 1 Special Force.

The attached document has been issued by H.Q., No. 1 Special Force to all RANKIN missions, as their departure to the field has been delayed by the weather.

Comments from the A.C.C. standpoint are requested.

04

M.J.C. HOLGART,
Major, G.S.,
Comd. No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

See minute of 61

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TOP SECRET
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SUPPLEMENT TO OPERATION ORDER TO RANKIN MISSIONS.

1. INTRODUCTION

The delay in the development of the situation in occupied ITALY means it probable that RANKIN missions will be in position for some weeks before the enemy finally withdraws from a particular area. Additional briefing is therefore necessary for all RANKIN missions for the period during which they will, in effect, be operating as normal Allied Liaison Missions to partisan formations.

2. CHAIN OF COMMAND

During the period prior to German and Fascist evacuation of North and North West ITALY all patriot formations will continue to be operationally controlled by H.Q. Allied Armies in ITALY through No.1 Special Force or C.S.S.

The Regional Committees of Liberation will continue to receive policy directives from A.A.I. both through the General Committee at MILAN and through Allied Liaison Missions to the Regional Committee concerned.

It should however be understood that these directives are of an extremely general nature. It is neither desirable, nor possible, for the framework of the Committees of Liberation to be used as the channel for the operational control of the partisan formations. All detailed instructions governing the tasks of each

additional briefing is therefore necessary for all RANKIN missions for the period during which they will, in effect, be operating as part of Allied Liaison Missions to partisan formations.

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The Regional Committees of Liberation will continue to receive policy directives from A.A.I. both through the Central Committee at MILAN and through Allied Liaison Missions to the Regional Committee concerned.

It should however be understood that these directives are of an extremely general nature. It is neither desirable, nor possible, for the framework of the Committees of Liberation to be used as the channel for the operational control of the partisan formations. All detailed instructions concerning the tasks of each partisan formation are therefore issued by A.A.I. direct to the highest formation capable of carrying out the orders, with copy to senior allied missions concerned.

Where the directives of A.A.I. and the wishes of the local Committee of Liberation conflict this becomes the subject of discussion between the A.L.C. to the partisan

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formation and the representative of the local Committee. Should the A.L.O. consider the Committee's case as being a valid one he is entitled to refer back to this H.Q. and to suggest an amendment to the directive. Such cases are however rare since -

a) It has been continually stressed during the past year that General ALEXANDER considers the patriot formations as being part of his command and all directives (both over the BBC and Radio SARI, and over clandestine W/T links) are issued as from General ALEXANDER's H.Q. and the Comando Supremo.

b) The overall policy which General ALEXANDER wishes to be put into effect is passed not only to our A.L.O's but also to the Central Committee at MILAN, who have been categorically informed through General CADORNA (Military Advisor to the MILAN Committee and infiltrated by No.1 Special Force) that detailed operational directives will always be sent direct to our A.L.O. with the partisan formation concerned.

3. SUPPORT TO C.L.N.A.I.

It is desired to retain the framework of the Committee of Liberation for the following reasons :

a) The Committees contain political elements which form the nucleus of resistance to the enemy.

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over [illegible] W/T links) are issued to from General ALEXANDER's H.Q. and the Comando Supremo.

b) The overall policy which General ALEXANDER wishes to be put into effect is passed not only to our A.L.O's but also to the Central Committee at MILAN, who have been authentically informed through General CADORNA (Military Advisor to the MILAN Committee and infiltrated by No.1 Special Force) that detailed operational directives will always be sent direct to our A.L.O. with the partisan formation concerned.

3. SUPPORT TO C.L.N.A.I.

It is desired to retain the framework of the Committee of Liberation for the following reasons :

a) The Committees contain political elements which form the nucleus of resistance to the enemy.

b) The authority of the Central Committee is recognised by the Regional and Provincial Committees, and the authority of the Regional Committees is in turn recognised by nearly all patriot formations despite the fact that no

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official recognition of the Committee of Liberation has been made by the United Nations. (In this connection the status of local Committees of Liberation has been strengthened by the broadening of the Bari Government which now consists of representatives of the six main parties of which the C.L.N.A.I. is composed.)

c) The system of the Committees of Liberation and their prestige in all the main towns of North ITALY make them a convenient framework on which to base the administration of provinces which have been evacuated by the enemy.

4. CONCLUSION

Until the time comes when both Fascist and German forces in occupied ITALY have been withdrawn or annihilated -

a) All missions will be under the direct operational control of A.M.G. through the senior H.Q. in the field capable of carrying out the orders.

b) W/T links between the three main missions and their sub missions will be opened as and when the military situation requires it.

c) Missions at MILAN, TURIN and GENOA will have a double role of -

(i) Co-ordinating the Committee of

all the main zones of North Italy make them a convenient framework on which to base the administration of provinces which have been evacuated by the enemy.

4. CONCLUSION

Until the time comes when both Fascist and German forces in occupied Italy have been withdrawn or annihilated -

a) All relations will be under the direct operational control of A.M.G.I. through the senior H.Q. in the field capable of carrying out the orders.

b) W/T links between the three main missions and their sub-missions will be opened as and when the military situation requires it.

c) Missions at MILAN, TURIN and GENOA will have a double role of -

i) Strengthening the Committee of Liberation in preparation for its effective control of all partisan groups and of the population within the area.

ii) Directing the operations of the patriot formations in their area, so far as possible with the assistance and cooperation of the Regional Committee.

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4.

c) Apart from the [illegible], with no GTCS [illegible] 11 reconnaissance (which will [illegible] from these three main missions) will be [illegible] [illegible] with Bent Special Force. They may be called upon to operate independently (in which case the main missions will be [illegible] in conjunction with the [illegible] [illegible] one of the three [illegible]. Then, however, the [illegible] [illegible] from their [illegible] they will be instructed to open. [illegible] with the operations outlined in their original LINTIP brief, and will be called upon to conform to the administrative instruction issued by the main mission from which they depend.

R. Thomas

Lt.Col., G.S.
for Commander, R.A.F.V.R.
Comd. No. 1 Special Force.

DISTRIBUTION

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

USA

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SECRET
Copy No.....

No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force.

MESSTR Sitrep No. 18 of 10th October 1944

PIEDMONT

1. The SICILIA district command reports via Italian W/T link on 8th October that large amounts of food and other goods leave by rail from MONZA VERCELLI via DOVARA and VARESE to SWITZERLAND. The food situation in the area is bad and there is famine in VAL D'AOSTA.

2. It is reported from IVREA on the 9th that the FOLGORE sabotage organisation, (which has a good reputation), is being formed into a body of at least 200, which would come directly under C.L.N.A.I. for police and security. They would be non-party men chosen from best groups and would be used if crisis arises.

3. It is reported from SUSA on the 8th October that OSSOLA reports itself as already liberated and has set up free administration. Failure to deliver arms to defend its liberty will raise cries of a second WARSAW. Patriots have turned off supplies from EDISON plant at DOMODOSSOLA which supplies a fair percentage of northern Italy including MILAN. Orders have been sent to turn them on again, so as not to invite strong attacks.

4. British liaison officer on the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier reports on the 6th that his Italian engineer is back from TURIN, where he met Committee of Liberation. He reports that public opinion is worried about the internal situation in the event of a German withdrawal. The C.L.O. were whether he is authorised to discuss with the committee urgent measures to be taken to ensure order pending the arrival of A.M.G. He considers this should be started without waiting for more difficulties and delays in getting people.

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Del 55

[illegible] left for Rome [illegible] via NOVARA and VARESE to SWITZERLAND. The food situation in the area is bad and there is famine in VAL D'OSSOLA.

2. It is reported from LONDON on the 4th that the FRANCHI sabotage organization, (which has a good reputation), is being formed into a body of at least 200, which would come directly under C.L.N.A.I. for police and security. They would be non-party men chosen from best groups and would be used if crisis arises.

3. It is reported from SWITZERLAND on the 8th October that OSSOLA regards itself as already liberated and not set up free administration. Failure to deliver means to defend its liberty will entail loss of a second VARESE. Patriots have turned off supplies from SVIZZA plant at DOMODOSSOLA, which supplies a fair percentage of northern Italy including MILAN. Orders have been sent to turn them on again, as is not to invite strong attacks.

4. British liaison officer on the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier reports on the 5th that air British terminal is back from TURIN, where he met Committee of Liberation. He reports that public opinion is worried about the internal situation in the event of a German withdrawal. The A.L.O. made whatever he is authorised to discuss with the committee urgent messages to be taken to ensure order pending the arrival of A.M.G. He considers this should be started almost possible trying to avoid difficulties and delays in contacting people.

In view of the delay in getting LUNGER missions into the field and the need for concrete plans to be worked out as soon as possible, we are instructing two A.L.O.s to commence discussions with the TURIN Committee pending the arrival of a more senior mission in TURIN.

5. The senior representative of A.M.I. reports on the 6th October that the TURIN Committee is worried by the separatist agitation carried on by local elements in collaboration with French elements. The Committee has sent its own representatives to investigate. (B.M.R. represents those who are demanding autonomous administration. Further information on this matter will be sent. (B.M.R. though he does not mention any particular group, he is probably referring to VAL D'OSS.).

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6. The leader of the former ..OTERS' missions to the F.F.I., who is at present handling Italian affairs in France, reports that agreement reached with Italian Partisans at present in French territory that naturally in France they remain under French command, but when Italian soil is liberated they should be allowed to return to Italy.

VENEZIA.

7. In reply to enquiries regarding grain situation an Italian organiser signals the following message on the 8th October:

(a) Official statistics given by the Council of Corporations for R.DEL. province show estimated production of 1,700,000 quintals. 500,000 consigned to state agency.

(b) About 150,000 quintals carried off by Germans but difficult to check this figure.

(c) Proportions expected to be similar in other provinces.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Urquhart, A.G.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, VENEZIA.
4. Mr. Rovner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. do.
8. Col. Ramsay, LIGURIA.
9. Col. Marshall, PIEMONTE.
10. Col. Bowman, SICILY.
11. Col. Densmore Economic Section.
12. Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.

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[illegible] the Council of [illegible] for R.S.L. province show estimated production of 1,200,000 quintals. 500,000 consigned to state granary.

(b) About 150,000 quintals carried off by Germans but difficult to check this figure.

(c) Proportions expected to be similar in other provinces.

[illegible]

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution
---

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Upjohn, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, VENEZIA.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. do.
8. Col. Fenner, LIGURIA.
9. Col. Trenhell, PIEMONTE.
10. Col. Bowman, W.T.I.
11. Col. Donegore Economic Section.
12. Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
13. Major Pope, I.S.L.D.
14. File

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

510 COS

SECRET

Copy No. 1

SS/11

10th October 1944

Subject: Report on PIEDMONT

12 OCT Recd

To: Lt. Col. Shipp, Chief of Staff's Section, A.C.C.
(Copy to: Col. McCarthy, Patriots' Branch, A.C.C.
Col. Feasey, (LIGURIA), A.C.C.
Col. Marshall, (PIEDMONTE), A.C.C.
Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

The following extracts are taken from a report by a British Liaison Officer in the CUNEO area. Some of his information has previously been passed by W/T. (see Muster Sitrep for22nd September), but not at such length.

The date of the report is 26th September.

"We eat excellently and live in hay lofts. There is the usual patriots' telephone system and courier service and down in the valley electric light. The girls are all remarkably well dressed and the houses comparatively clean.

"At the moment there is a considerable and continuous rumbling of Jerry demolitions and I think he is really off this time. We rather thought that there might be a clean-up by the Italian Black Guard to give the Germans time to get out if attack but .....
The Hun troops passing through this area are in an absolute shambles, also they are quite lost because as soon as we see which road they are taking our lads pop on ahead and blow up the bridges. The Huns are poorly armed and clothed and travelling by any means possible, on foot, bicycle or horse cart and as our people

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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"At the moment there is a considerable and continuous rumbling of Jerry demolitions and I think he is really off this time. We rather thought that there might be a clean-up by the Italian Black Guard to give the Germans time to get out if attack <u>but</u> ..... The Hun troops passing through this area are in an absolute shambles, also they are quite lost because as soon as we see which road they are taking our lads pop on ahead and blow up the bridges. The Huns are poorly armed and clothed and travelling by any means possible, on foot, bicycle or horse cart and as our people say, their morale is baessissimo. The general cry is "We don't want to fight the Partisans just let us go through peacefully." They've got a hope. So far though we have had no deserters. Their hopes seem to be based on the fact that Hitler has promised them a new secret weapon due for delivery on October 1st, which will destroy all our guns, planes, tanks, ships in a matter of minutes, then all that will remain will be to clear away the debris and rebuild the German and Italian empire - Lieg Heil!! So far we have had no deserters but our concentration camp is swelling slowly, but surely!

"Major Mauri is very sound and keen and keeping up

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incessant attacks on the Germans and German communication system. Incidentally you might also mention the III Division on the wireless, they get one hell of a kick out of it. COSA, Commandant of III Division, is first class age 35, D of W soldier, intensely keen, runs and controls his own sabotage squad and also goes flat out the whole time.

"The partisan troops themselves give a very favourable impression, although, of course, they have a number of unarmed men who leave a lot to be desired, but those actually engaged in fighting are first class although they insist on looking like a crowd scene from Treasure Island! Will that seem to run in the partisan blood, but they are a delightful crowd to deal with, they are always prepared to listen to suggestions and, if feasible, to put them into operation.

"Now a few general observations.

FOOD. The food situation should not cause any real distress in PIEDMONT although in the towns there may well be serious shortages. This could, however, be to a very large extent met by proper distribution as in the villages there is food wasting.

The main shortages will be:-

1) Milk
2) Fats
3) Flour
4) Meats or Fish
5) Cooking fuel.

In order to effect proper distribution a supply of petrol and tyres will be necessary and I suggest that these are given high priority on your loading lists. The actual distribution can be left to the [illegible] a number of

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

[illegible] will that seem to run in the partisan blood, but they are a delightful crowd to deal with, they are always prepared to listen to suggestions and, if feasible, to put them into operation.

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1) Milk
2) Fats
3) Flour
4) Meats or Fish
5) Cooking fuel.

In order to effect proper distribution a supply of petrol and tyres will be necessary and I suggest that these are given high priority on your loading lists. The actual distribution can be left to the Partisans themselves. There are quite a number of lorries hidden but mostly without tyres - unfortunately I cannot give you a detailed list but they are mostly of the Fiat - Lancia tribe.

Liguria, however, presents a very different problem. It is not agricultural like Piedmont, and even now the partisan supplies of flour, etc. are coming from this area. Incidentally when we are supplied by land, where will supplies come from - France or Italy (the latter I hope)?

MEDICAL. There are no serious illnesses rampant in this area, although of course children have rickets from bad diet. Stocks in chemists shops are quite

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good, you can still buy Prontosil and the various Sulfa drugs here, bandages, thermometers, etc., although the bandages are of poor quality and may even be of crepe paper, so unless there should be a sudden serious outbreak of say typhoid, stocks should last.

POLITICAL. The present political situation is very complex and far more time is spent in arguing about who is going to control what and when, instead of getting on with the present job.

The citizens are very solidly behind the partisans' movement and everywhere do everything they can to help.

You realise, of course, that Piedmont has always been anti-Fascists and this has tended to drive the town works, e.g. Fiat and Lancia works, towards communism, this may well prove a very serious danger and I think it imperative that you take a very firm line right from the beginning.

Can you supply answers to the following questions:-

1. What happens about existing money, rates of exchange and price control?

2. Can partisans volunteer to fight with Allies on other fronts?

3. What happens to existing partisan units where law and order is established?"

It is requested that information may be provided on the currency question in order to send an answer to question (1) above. The answers to

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[illegible] very solidly behind the partisans' movement and everywhere do everything they can to help.

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Can you supply answers to the following questions:-

1. What happens about existing money, rates of exchange and price control?

2. Can partisans volunteer to fight with Allies on other fronts?

3. What happens to existing partisan units where law and order is established?"

It is requested that information may be provided on the currency question in order to send an answer to question (1) above. The answers to questions (2) and (3) are already known and have been communicated to the field.

W.J.C. Hodgart

W.J.C. HODGART,
Major, G.S.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CMF
Office of the Chief of Staff
++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Ref: 510/43/OOS 12 October 44.

SUBJECT: Notes on "RANKIN" Conditions in S.France.

TO : Economic Section.

1. Reference your letter of 3 October on above subject.

2. Would you please say whether the list of 28 strategic and important power plants, mentioned in your letter, has gone out to the Regional Commissioners concerned. It is believed that this information should be in their hands.

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

P/A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Confidential

No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force.

MONTHLY Sitrep No. 17 16th October 1944

GENERAL

1. The following is an additional part of the message to the "Patriots" Committee and the Italian Government received from the C.N.L.A.I. on 7th September, (see Later Sitrep of 3rd October).

(a) The Germans and Fascists have recently burnt 40 farm houses and shot 17 peasants as reprisals (area not stated). They burnt 70 houses and farms and shot 15 peasants as reprisals in the lower MOVASO area.

(b) The Liberal party informs H.S. BONOMI that Professor CLEMENTE RIVONA, after displaying heroic conduct, was shot at ISLANO on 7th September. The C.L.N.A.I. asks for a broadcast exposing this crime.

POLITICAL

2. The following reports have been received from the British Liaison Officer who is in closest touch with the C.N.L.A.I., referring to the status of the senior Italian officer who was infiltrated as the representative of C.A.L. with the Committee. (See Muster Sitreps for 21st and 28th September. He will be referred to as "Colonel X").

(a) An incomplete message, dated 30th September, states that the Military Committee, apart from the Action Party (see to PARRI and the Communist party (see to SALIN), holds the view that the Allies should have appointed Colonel X as commander and that he should have assumed command on his arrival. He was unwilling to do so without the full support of PARRI

[illegible] that [illegible] in [illegible] October.

(a) I - Germans and Tenkists have recently burnt 40 farm houses and shot 17 peasants as reprisals (here not stated). They burnt 70 houses and farms and shot 15 peasants as reprisals in the lower NOVARA area.

(b) The Liberal party informs H.Q. SOAGI that Professor GUSTINI DIVONA, after displaying heroic conduct, was shot at BELAGO on 7th September. The P.L.N.A.I. asks for a broadcast exposing this crime.

POLITICAL
---

3. The following reports have been received from the British Liaison Officer who is in Lecco town with the C.L.N.A.I., referring to the issue of the senior Italian officer who was infiltrated as the representative of A.C.I. with the Committee. (See Master Diary for 21st and 22nd September. He will be referred to as "Colonel X").

(a) An incomplete message, dated 22nd September, states that the Military Council, apart from the Action Party led by PARRI and the Communist party led by SALIO, holds the view that the Allies should have appointed Colonel X as commander and that he should have assumed command on his arrival. He was unwilling to do so without the full support of PARRI and SALIO which was not forthcoming.

(b) A report on the 17th states that the C.L.N.A.I. session lasting for ten hours, on the 27th ended when it began. The Liberals proposed Colonel X as commander with a political council of party representatives. SALIO opposed this violently. The Action Party and Socialists sided with SALIO against the Christian Democrats and Liberals.

(c) The British Liaison officer considers that it is impossible for Colonel X to take command with [illegible]

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from General Alexander and the Italian Government. These orders are indispensable for unity of control, which is and will continue to be totally lacking. The role of the five parties should be political advisers to the Military Commander. He is asking Colonel X in the strongest terms to reconsider assuming command.

(d) General FIORE, the commander of the large PIAZZA VERDI organization in LOMBARDY, is not very popular with the C.L.N.A.I., as he has no political party.

PIEDMONT

3. The above source reports on 22nd September that the COMITATO MILITARE PIEMONTE having been elected locally is not keen to take orders from the C.L.N.A.I. He believed Colonel X's visit to TURIN would improve matters. In a later message of 24th September, he reports that Colonel X has just returned from a successful trip in South Piedmont, where he found the TURIN Committee and Major MATTEI to be sympathetic supporters and was greatly impressed by the patriot bands.

4. Another British mission on the French frontier reports that the Italian organizer of the mission has returned from TURIN where he met the Committee of Liberation. He reports that public opinion is rather worried about the internal situation in the event of a German withdrawal.

5. A senior Italian liaison officer reports on the 7th October that he has returned from ISOLO D'OSSOLA, having succeeded in establishing unified command of all units in this large liberated area. The political set up is being reorganized. The military situation is delicate and arms are urgently required.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

PIEDMONT

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3. The above source reports on 22nd September that the COMITATO NAZIONALE PIEMONTE having been elected locally is not bound to take orders from the C.N.L.A.I. He believed Colonel X's visit to TURIN would improve matters. In a later message of 24th September, he reports that Colonel X has just returned from a successful trip in South Piedmont, where he found the TURIN Committee and Major MARSI to be unmoved by the supporters and was greatly impressed by the patriot troops.

4. Another British mission on the French frontier reports that the Italian organiser of the mission has returned from TURIN where he met the Committee of Liberation. He reports that public opinion is rather worried about the internal situation in the event of a German withdrawal.

5. A senior Italian liaison officer reports on the 7th October that he has returned from DOMO d'OSSOLA, having succeeded in establishing unified command of all units in this large liberated area. The political set up is being reorganised. The military situation is delicate and arms are urgently required.

6. A patriot (reliability probably fair) who has recently arrived from MILAN reports that PARRI (see para 2 above) has gone to the OSSOLA valley to set up C.N.L. or Government in the liberated area.

7. An I.S.S.B. source reports on 27th that the FIAT management has come to an agreement with the German Command on the deportation of workmen. The Germans have arranged a special curfew between 1900 hours and 0600 hours so that they can round up 15,000 workers for GERMANY. Publicity is requested to defect this plan. The Germans are removing machinery from the FIAT works in NOVARESE.

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Page 3

SICILY

8. British mission reports on 7th that LASSA and CARRIMA have been evacuated. 7,000 men have been sent to work on the 80 fortifications and the women to the MONTE ERICE area. Deserters by ALPINI from the MONTE ROSA division are reported.

9. Another mission in this province reports on 8th that 1,000 head of cattle and all horses have been taken by the Germans in the plain.

Major, U.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Sp. Force.

Distribution

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Dalsho, A.C.S.
3. Brigadier Sandes, [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. Mr. Warner, P.W.D.
6. Col. Hancock, A.P.C.
7. Col. McCarthy, A.A.C.
8. do.
9. Col. Tandy, [illegible]
10. Col. Marshall, PIEDMONT.
11. Col. Bowman, SICILY.
12. Col. Somerset, Economic Section.
13. Lt. Col. Dripps, A.C.S.
14. Major Ward, I.S.L.A.
15. File.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

No. 12

SECRET

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No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force

USSTAF Sitrep 9th October 1944

LIGURIA

1. A mission in the SPEZIA area informs us that there seems to be no doubt that the Germans intend using gas in the near future. It appears to be a type of mustard gas called Blue Cross. Brigata Nera and the Militia have already received gas masks and inoculations are being given with a mixture known as Sauerstoff to immunise the people against the gas. This gas can only be launched by air and causes suffocation and paralisation of the nervous system.

2. This mission also reports on the 6th that the enemy is destroying all important installations but the port is still intact.

3. Another mission in this area reports on the 6th that deserters from Carrara Fascist Militia state that only one enemy division including S.S. and demolition engineers is left on the APUANIA front. Civilians, cattle, household goods, etc. are being evacuated to CISARO area from towns south of SPEZIA and AULLA.

4. The CUNEO mission reports that the LIGURIAN coast is now mostly guarded by the Italian San Marco division.

LOMBARDIA

5. The mission with the Fiamme Verdi organisation in the BERGAMO area reports on the 6th that the Fiamme Verdi, as Italian soldiers, remain true to General CADORNA and Italo-Allied command without party interference. Six brigades and one civilian brigade, in BRESCIA are under Fiamme Verdi command. This mission

and the civilians have already received gas masks and inoculations are being given with a mixture known as Sauerstoff to immunise the people against the gas. This gas can only be launched by air and causes suffocation and paralisation of the nervous system.

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4. The CUNEO mission reports that the LIGURIAN coast is now mostly guarded by the Italian San Marco division.

LOMBARDIA
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5. The mission with the Fiamme Verdi organisation in the BERGAMO area reports on the 6th that the Fiamme Verdi, as Italian soldiers, remain true to General CADORNA and Italo-Allied command without party interference. Six brigades and one civilian brigade in BRESCIA are under Fiamme Verdi command. This mission also reports that the committee do not accept CADORNA as sole commander.

PIEDMONT
---

6. A mission in the CUNEO area reports on the 6th that in the VALLE LANZERA there is a continual withdrawal of troops. Most vehicles are marked on the outside with a red cross but carry arms and munitions inside.

7. An I.S.S.D. source reports on the 27th that according to the son-in-law of the General Director of FIAT, the FIAT Turin works are producing 7 - 10 trucks a day for

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(Contd)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

the Germans and also parts of cars which are being hidden. The Germans are taking away from FIAT all materials containing rare metal alloys such as chrome and manganese.

8. A mission on the French frontier reports on 4th October that towards the end of October the bad weather plus lack of arms and equipment will make life impossible for partisans in the region IMPERIA and GENOVESE. Possibly one third of the total can be supported in the mountains and the plain.

W. Gettingan
Major, G.S.
for Commander, RNVR,
Commanding No. 1 Sp. Force.

Distribution
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1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Upjohn, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, VENEZIA.
4. Mr. Renner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. do.
8. Col. Ferney, LIGURIA.
9. Col. Marshall, PIEMONTE.
10. Col. Bowman, EMILIA.
11. Col. Denumore, Economic Section.
12. Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
13. Major Page, I.S.I.D.
14. File.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Major, G.S.
for Commander, RNVR,
Commanding No. 1 Sp. Force.

Distribution
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1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Upjohn, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, VENEZIA.
4. Mr. Bruner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. do.
8. Col. Persey, LIGURIA.
9. Col. Marshall, PIEMONTE.
10. Col. Bowman, MMIT.
11. Col. Densmore, Economic Section.
12. Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
13. Major Page, I.S.I.D.
14. File.

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ECONOMIC SECTION
APO 394

LDD/es

3 October 1945

SUBJECT: Notes on "Rankin" conditions in S. France.

TO : Chief of Staff, Hq. ACC.

1. Ref your attached 86/11/9A 23 Sep.

2. The Public Works and Utilities Subcommission, ACC, furnished a list of 28 strategic and important water sheets in enemy territory in order of priority to AAI, AFHQ and Intrinsic Branch, ADD, with the aim of moving as many of them as possible.

3. The information was furnished to the above mentioned as 28 Aug.

For the Acting Section Head:

L. D. DEMSHORE
Col, Sig C, CSO
Economic Section

Incl - above

Seen by A/Ce.
Sent by Ec Sec to A/Ce on 3/10

Rec 43

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET.

Confidential

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.

Ref: 36/M/Gk.

23rd September 1944.

SUBJECT: Notes on "Rankin" conditions in S.FRANCE.

TO : H. Caccia, Esq.,
Joint Vice President,
Political Section.

I think you should see the extremely interesting report on "Rankin" conditions in the South of France. There are many valuable suggestions made therein which I hope No.1 Special Force will take up with AAI and their own officers for action in Northern Italy. I hope the Economic Section has already given information regarding hydro-electric and other installations which must be saved if possible. Will you please pass to Colonel Demmore.

Yes, I think they have been 25/9

MSL

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

MSL/JG.

510/COS SECRET 34

No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force

MUSTER Daily Sitrep 7th October 1944

Confidential

PIEDMONT

1. A British mission reports that the LANZO bands, having been broken up by Fascist attacks, have arrived from France. They report that the Fascist propaganda on the ill-treatment of the Partisans by the French had the worst of effect, but at the same time request that the pessimism brought about by Churchill's long war in Italy speech be combatted.

2. It is also reported that 100 lesser members of the Committee have been arrested in TURIN and a special tribunal is being instituted for immediate trial.

LIGURIA

3. A mission in the Spezia area has reported on the 3rd that all T.O.D.T. work has been stopped finally, as from the 20th September. Another British mission reports on the 4th that the Germans are removing all live stock from the LAVERNA area.

LOMBARDY

4. It is reported by an Italian mission on the 5th that the harvest is very good this year. It is, however, impossible to know how much is left in store, as the German partisans and peasants are taking the wheat away. It is not clear whether this mission refers to the whole of Northern Italy or just LOMBARDY.

M.J.C. HODGART.
Major, G.S.
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,

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M.J.C. HODGART.
Major, G.S.
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Sp. Force.

Distribution

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy
2. Brigadier Upjohn, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, VENEZIA.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.E.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. do.
8. Col. Fessey; LIGURIA.
9. Col. Marshall, PIEMONTE.
10. Col. Bowman, EMILIA.
11. Col. Denampre, Economic Section.
12. Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
13. Major Page, I.S.L.D.
14. File.

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No.5 Detachment

No.1 Special Force

ROUTER Daily Sitrep 5th October 1944

PIEDMONT and LIGURIA

1. British Mission near CUNEO reports on 1st October meeting the Commandant Commander and Chief of Staff from LIGURIA. They were full of their own importance and their reports which are being sent out by courier should be divided by five. Their ranks were "Major General" and "Colonel".

2. An I.S.L.D. source reports on 17th September that in TURIN the Germans have blown up Air Force Establishments in CORSO FRANCIA after removing the most valuable machines and making the remainder useless. It is expected that the same will be done to the LANCIA establishment. In the FIAT works at CHIERI everything useful is being packed.

3. British Mission on Franco-Italian frontier reports German supply services left TURIN and CARMAGNOLA for BRENNO.

4. The same Mission reports that in most towns the clandestine committee of liberation representing all parties has been formed largely by patriot bands, and will inevitably be influenced by the politics of the bands. This is not, however, serious. Usually the sole force capable of taking action is the police. The Mission has insisted that the police be under the control of the committee in the interval before the arrival of Allied troops. The bands are only to be called in if necessary.

5. The TURIN committee has given orders to all bands to deal summarily with all Fascist organisations except MONTE ROSA. This can only cause disorder and the Mission has insisted on some form of trial.

LOMBARDY

6. An I.S.L.D. source reports on 18th September that the Carabinieri clandestine organisation in MILAN [illegible] officers and 300 other

1. British Mission near CUNEO reports on 1st October meeting the Communist Commander and Chief of Staff from LIGURIA. They were full of their own importance and their reports which are being sent out by courier should be divided by five. Their ranks were "Major General" and "Colonel".

2. An I.S.L.D. source reports on 17th September that in TURIN the Germans have blown up Air Force Establishments in CORSO FRANCIA after removing the most valuable machines and making the remainder useless. It is expected that the same will be done to the LANCIA establishment. In the FIAT works at CHIERI everything useful is being packed.

3. British Mission on Franco-Italian frontier reports German supply services left TURIN and CARMAGNOLA for ASTANO.

4. The same Mission reports that in most towns the clandestine committee of liberation representing all parties has been formed largely by patriot bands, and will inevitably be influenced by the politics of the bands. This is not, however, serious. Usually the sole force capable of taking action is the police. The Mission has insisted that the police be under the control of the committee in the interval before the arrival of Allied troops. The bands are only to be called in if necessary.

5. The TURIN committee has given orders to all bands to deal summarily with all Fascist organisations except MONTE ROSA. This can only cause disorder and the Mission has insisted on some form of trial.

LOMBARDY

6. An I.S.L.D. source reports on 18th September that the Carabinieri clandestine organisation in MILAN already has 11 officers and 900 other ranks, and can be increased at the right moment. They are asking for arms, but have been asked if they cannot get arms from other sources.

EMILIA

7. British Mission reports on 2nd October that the COMANDO UNICO in PARMA province is now constituted as follows: Commandant and Chief of Staff as before (see MESTER Sitrep of 1st October); three vice-Commanders and three political commissars representing Communists, Christian Democrats and "Civilian Party".

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The Council now controls all matters in PIEDMA province, and is rapidly tightening up discipline and getting Garde prepared for attack. It has defined accommodation and defence areas for each Brigade. It has issued orders forbidding cash requisitioning, and over an U.S.S. W/T link has sent a message to the War Minister asking for 3,000,000 lire for the upkeep of 3,200 partisans for one month.

GENERAL ECONOMIC

8. The following has been received via LONDON:

VALERIO Director of EDISON reports:

(a) EDISON supplies between 60% and 70% of the electric requirements in NORTH ITALY, of which 30% comes from their OSSOLA works and 10% from SPLUGA.

(b) SPLUGA produces current working for 42 ~~period~~ cycle system as well as for 50 ~~period~~ cycle; OSSOLA works 42 ~~period~~ cycle only.

(c) In OSSOLA measures are being taken to prevent blowing dams and to protect stations from possible raids by Germans.

(d) An attempt is being made for local patriots to take similar measures in SPLUGA.

(e) 3 plants in para(a) above produce about 500 million kilowatt-hours per annum. Of all the EDISON plants in occupied ITALY these are easily the best to try to save.

for Major, U.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No.1 Special Force.

Distribution:

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Upjohn, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, VINCENZA.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. do.
8. Col. Fossey, LIVORNO.

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as well as for 50 period; OSSOLA works 42 period only.

(c) In OSSOLA measures are being taken to prevent blowing dams and to protect stations from possible raids by Germans.

(d) An attempt is being made for local patriots to take similar measures in SPLUGA.

(e) 3 plants in para(a) above produce about 500 million kilowatt-hours per annum. Of all the SUISSA plants in occupied Italy these are easily the best to try to save.

For Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No.1 Special Force.

Distribution:

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Upjohn, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, VENEZIA.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. do.
8. Col. Peasey, LIGURIA.
9. Col. Marshall, PIEMONTE.
10. Col. Bowman, EMILIA.
11. Col. Denamore, Economic Section.
12. Lt.Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
13. Major Page, I.S.L.I.
14. File

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TOP SECRET. 32

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394.

Office of the Chief of Staff.

Ref: 310/32/GOS. 5th October, 1944.

SUBJECT: Possible use of Aerodromes in Northern Italy.

TO : Major M.J.C. Hodgart,
No.1 Special Force,
c/o Patriots Branch,
HQ. Allied Control Commission.

1. I forward copy of reply received from G-5 to a letter which we wrote to them on 26th September of which you received a copy.

2. It does not look as if we are going to be very successful. Nevertheless, in cases of extreme urgency we shall instruct our Regional Commissioners that they may make such demands and I hope that you will be able to pass them on with such authority as is laid down in this letter.

GWIS/JG.

Lt. Col.
Chief Staff Officer.

Col Murfet to see 32 + 31 on his return

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DECLASSIFIED TOP SECRET BY AUTHORITY OF SHAF

TOP SECRET

Col Lee.

9888

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

3 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Possible use of Aerodromes in Northern Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission, APO 394.

1. Reference is made to your G5/18/C. of 28 September.

2. This matter has been taken up with RAAF to whom a copy of your letter has been supplied.

3. RAAF advise that operational commitments and the number of planes available render it necessary to follow a policy of allowing air transport for delivery of supplies only in cases of extreme urgency, and even then this has to be at the expense of operational requirements.

4. RAAF further advise that application for any such urgent transport requirements should be made as necessity arises through AAI section of No 1 Special Force.

For the Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5:

T. B. JAGGAR,
Lt. Colonel.

See 32

TOP SECRET

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SECRET

Confidential

No.5 Detachment

No.1 Special Force

MISTER Daily Sitrep 3rd October 1944.

GENERAL

1. Many messages from the field report that all organisations in NORTHEAST ITALY are being attacked by enemy who has resorted to the most violent forms of reprisals on the local populations as well as on the patriots. Hanging of patriots and burning of houses are everyday occurrences. This repression has become much more savage in recent months. The C.N.L.A.I. has sent a message requesting intervention by all United Nations through normal diplomatic channels by calling upon Germans and Italian Fascists to respect humanitarian laws and by threatening reprisals, and asking for publicity over the radio. No.1 Special Force is endeavouring to give the widest publicity to actual atrocities and those responsible, giving places and names.

PIEDMONT

2. British Mission on the Franco-Italian frontier reports on the 28th that he has had a meeting with the TURIN Military Committee. A general is a technical member and the remainder are politicians. There is no head of the committee. Their plans are based on the hypothesis of an Allied attack via the ALPS: patriot bands are to assist by attacking enemy communications and occupying towns. Bands SOUTH of PEDLICE will move to CUNEO, those between PEDLICE and AOSTA to TURIN, those in the AOSTA valley to CHIVASSO, and those in LANGHE to ASTI.

3. The AOSTA Committee includes Professor FREDERICO CHABOD, Avvocato ARBAUNE, AMEDEO BERTINOD, Avvocato CATEZI, and Engineer LAEZ. The latter is the head of the COMEL wireless communications.

4. The same mission reports that the Germans are mining the CHISONE valley up to CLAVIERE but not up to SUSA. Nearly all aerodromes in PIEDMONT are reported blown up and with the damage camouflaged.

5. British mission near CUNEO reports that measures have been taken to assure adequate food supplies for the winter.

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5. British mission near CUNEO reports that measures have been taken to assure adequate food supplies for the winter.

LOMBARDY

6. The senior Italian liaison officer in MILAN reports on 30th that the patriots have a plan to isolate MILAN by cutting all railway communications. It is based on the simultaneous sabotage of all signal boxes and underground electric stations. They will act on orders received from No.1 Special Force, or in any case a few days before the German evacuation so that German materials will be blocked in the stations. No.1 Special Force is awaiting A.A.I's decision.

EMILIA /

5000

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EMILIA

7. No further details of the proposed plan for occupying MODENA and PARMA have emerged. The MODENA partisans give as their motive that, unless they take the town, they will not be recognised as true patriots by the Allies.

8. The official military body controlling the PARMA patriots is reported by a British officer to be as follows:

Commander - Capt. CHELLLANTE
Chief of Staff - Lt.Col. CIPRIANI
3 political commissars representing Christian Democrats and Action Party.

ECONOMIC

9. An I.S.L.D. report has been received that according to members of the German High Command there is a very serious shortage in Germany of special corrective alloys for steel. The Germans are endeavouring to send to Germany all available quantities of these alloys in the production areas of COMO, AOSTA, CRESTOTORINESE, VAL D'OSSOLA, BERGAMO and DARFO, VAL CAMONICA, SESTO SAN GIOVANNI, PORTO, MILLA, BRESCIA and TRENTO.

The German Command has negotiated with the Patriots in VAL D'OSSOLA on the lines that they will not interfere with the patriots provided that the latter do not interfere with the transport of these alloys. A great quantity has already been despatched through SWITZERLAND via CHIASO, DOMODOSSOLA and LUINO.

The view has been put forward by the Patriots that it is useless to blow the establishments referred to above, as the Germans will then remove the power plants which they very badly need.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, N.A.V.R.,
Commanding No.1 Special Force.

Distribution:

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Lush, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, V.A.M.M.L.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.

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The view has been put forward by the Patriots that it is useless to bomb the establishments referred to above, as the Germans will then remove the power plants which they very badly need.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.M.V.F.,
Commanding No.1 Special Force.

Distribution:

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Lush, ...C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, VANNEL.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, ...C.C.
6. Col. McCarthy, ...C.C.
7. do.
8. Lt.Col. Shipp, ...C.C.
9. Col. Fossey, LIGHRLL.
10. Col. Marshall, PLYMOUTH.
11. Col. Bowman, MILL.
12. Major Page, I.S.L.D.
13. Col. Dengmore, Economic Section.
14. File.

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HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO

Office of the Chief of Staff.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Ref: 510/29/COS. 4.October.1944.

SUBJECT: Master Daily Sitreps.

TO : OC., No.5 Det.,
No.1 Special Force,
c/o Patriots Branch,
HQ. ACC.

In view of the recent organisation it will not now be necessary for two copies of the MASTER daily sitrep to be supplied to this office, i.e, one copy to Brig.Lush and one copy to Lt.Col.Shipp. Will you please in future address one copy only to Lt.Col.Shipp, Chief Staff Officer, Chief of Staff's Section, HQ. ACC.

Lt. Col,
Chief Staff Officer.

/JG.

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No.5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force

MUSTER Daily Sitrep 2nd October 1944.

PIEDMONT.

1. British mission in VAL CHISONE reports on 28th that the Germans continue wholesale stripping of cattle and fodder from the mountain areas, which have already suffered from the feeding of Patriot bands to a greater extent than the plains. The plains can help if transport is guaranteed, but considerable supplies of wheat and possibly meat will be necessary during the winter. The mission is trying to make the larger towns lay in a few days reserve soon.

2. Reference Muster sitrep of 21st September, para 5, referring to a certain SANDRO in VAL D'OSSOLA. The C.L.N.A.I. states that it did not appoint SANDRO, but has instructed our Italian liaison Officer with the Committee to collaborate with MORELLI. (This appears to be the correct version of MONELLA, para 5h).

EMILIA.

3. Reference Muster sitrep of 1st October para 6. British mission reports on 30th that the MODENA representatives arrived on 29th. A modified plan has been decided, but no main changes have been made. The Patriots' move, which they are carrying out without waiting for arms deliveries, will be made in two stages : (1) to SCASSIANO (86/3040) and (2) to MONTECCHIO (86/4553). No.1 Special Force has instructed the mission to move with the patriots

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EMILIA.

3. Reference Muster sitrep of 1st October para 6. British mission reports on 30th that the MODENA representatives arrived on 29th. A modified plan has been decided, but no main changes have been made. The Patriots' move, which they are carrying out without waiting for arms deliveries, will be made in two stages : (1) to SCASSIANO (86/3040) and (2) to MONTECCHIO (86/4553). No.1 Special Force has instructed the mission to move with the patriots and keep us informed of their plans and progress.

VENEZIA.

4. A London report states that MINGHETTI is still head of the Veneto Committee.

5. Major Fielding of the mission in TOLMEZZO area reports that information is constantly being received from civilian sources to the effect that a proportion of the arms dropped to the area of the GARIBALDI Organisation is being buried for use after the war

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785012

"against the Anglo-Americans and to further the Communist cause". He is trying to discover the location of these secret dumps.

N J C Hodgart
Major, C.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution :

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy
2. Brigadier Lush, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, c/o Lt.Col.Shipp, A.C.C.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.W.D.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. } Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. }
8. Lt.Col.Shipp, A.C.C.
9. Col.Peasey, C/o Lt.Col.Shipp A.C.C.
10. Col. Marshall, c/o Lt.Col.Shipp, A.C.C.
11. Major Page, I.S.L.E.
12. Col. Donsmore, Economic Section.
13. File.

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Copy No.....

No.5 Detachment

No.1 Special Force

MESSTER Daily Sitrep 1st October 1944

PIEDMONT

1. A report received through SWITZERLAND states that the new ACSTA Committee has been formed and is accepted by the C.L.N.A.I. The difficulties caused by the C.L.N.A.I's wish to impose leaders on the Committee has now been smoothed over. All band leaders recognise MAZZARD as their head, and the latter works with the ACSTA Committee. They want administrative autonomy within the new Italian state.

2. British mission on frontier reports that TONINO is now the military commander of the partisans in SUSA, GERMANASCA and probably PINEROLO. The leader of the mission will support TONINO as united political command is essential.

3.(a) A report from the FRANCHI organisation dated 23rd quotes a fairly reliable source to the effect that the German headquarters in TURIN is moving to MILAN. If they evacuate PIEDMONT, leaving the Fascists in charge, resistance by the latter should not be underestimated. The patriots require arms and directives.

(b) Col. FRANCHI himself is working between MILAN and BIELLA. Intelligence and sabotage services in PIEDMONT are satisfactory but plans for counterscorching are being hampered by industrialists.

(c) All bridges on roads and railways between TURIN and MILAN have been repaired. Traffic is very heavy.

LIGURIA

4. A Mission reports on 27th that they are in contact with SPEZIA, [illegible]SSA and CARRARA committees. All committees have been given general BERWIN directives.

5. In reply to our questions about the food situation, the principal mission in the SPEZIA area states that the grain harvest has been excellent this year. It has been hoarded by the peasants and very little has been burned by the Germans. (This report probably applies to LIGURIA as well, since this mission has wide

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

All third leaders recognise MAZZEI as their head, and the latter works with the AOSTA Committee. They want administrative autonomy within the new Italian state.

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3.(a) A report from the FRANCHI organisation dated 23rd quotes a fairly reliable source to the effect that the German headquarters in TURIN is moving to MILAN. If they evacuate PIEDMONT, leaving the Fascists in charge, resistance by the latter should not be underestimated. The patriots require arms and directives.

(b) Col. FRANCHI himself is working between MILAN and STRESA. Intelligence and sabotage services in PIEDMONT are satisfactory but plans for counterscorching are being hampered by industrialists.

(c) All bridges on roads and railways between TURIN and MILAN have been repaired. Traffic is very heavy.

LIGURIA

4. A Mission reports on 27th that they are in contact with SPEZIA, MASSA and CARRARA committees. All committees have been given general RAWLIN directives.

5. In reply to our questions about the food situation, the principal mission in the SPEZIA area states that the grain harvest has been excellent this year. It has been hoarded by the peasants and very little has been burned by the Germans. (This report probably applies to LUNIGIANA as well, since this mission has wide contacts).

EMILIA

6. A British mission in the SPEZIA area sends the following report on EMILIA dated 28th September.

(a) The Partisans wish to occupy MODENA. The National Committee of Liberation has ordered Partisans towards town and courier has brought plan of action. MODENA itself has 2 organisations, the "GRUPPI AZIONI PATRIOTI" and the "SQUADRE ARMATE PROVVISORIE" under command of DE FRANCISCO, an ex-Major of Carabinieri.

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6. (contd.)

(b) The plan calls for the city to be taken over and all important buildings such as military academy and barracks, telephone and telegraph exchanges, post office etc. to be occupied by MODENA patriots and reinforced by men from the mountains. The city is divided into 5 zones complete with rendezvous and reinforcement centres. Road blocks are to be established on all exits from the city.

(c) The Carabiniere Civic Guards under new command will prevent looting, control traffic, etc.

(d) This plan calls for reinforcements totalling 1900 mountain men who are to approach city from all roads except GLADIONI on Route 12 at date still to be fixed. This plan has been agreed upon except for a few details. Concentration area for Partisans is approximately SASSUOLO 66/4454 and MARANELLO 86/5052.

(e) The mission leader continues that he also possesses certain Republican defence plans and understands that all important buildings have been mined and Germans intend leaving 250 Black Shirts plus squad of Saboteurs when they retreat. There was a false alarm on 8th September on report that Partisans were about to attack. As a result of this the Germans stated they would take over the defence of the city from the Republicans, but the mission leader considers this unlikely.

7. We have instructed the above mission that the patriots must not march on MODENA without orders from General ALEXANDER transmitted by the mission. For the time being the patriots are to concentrate on organisation, training, and counter-search measures.

8. Another mission in approximately the same area sends the following report dated 21st September from PARMA.

(a) Orders have been given to all ITALIAN military commands to withdraw north of the PO.

(b) A train left PARMA on 21st for PIACENZA loaded with explosives.

(c) Bridges in PARMA have been mined.

(d) German troops and transport are in the Citadel.

9. The same mission reports that COMANDO UNICO PARMA province is the military body for directing patriots. Captain CHEVALIANE is Commandant, Lt.Col. CIPRIANI is Vice-Commandant and Chief of Staff. There are 3 political commissars representing the Communist, Christian Democrat and Action parties. They have a W/T set (believed to be O.S.S.) attached and will work intercommunication with the British mission. The COMANDO is planning the occupation of PARMA, beginning with the mountain towns and working down into the plain.

[illegible] patriots for occupying

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French plans she understands that all important buildings have been mined and Germans intend leaving 250 Black Shirts plus squad of Saboteurs when they retreat. There was a false alarm on 8th September on report that Partisans were about to attack. As a result of this the Germans stated they would take over the defence of the city from the Republicans, but the mission leader considers this unlikely.

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(a) Orders have been given to all ITALIAN military commands to withdraw north of the PO.

(b) A train left PARMA on 21st for PIACENZA loaded with explosives.

(c) Bridges in PARMA have been mined.

(d) German troops and transport are in the Citadel.

9. The same mission reports that COMANDO UNICO PARMA province is the military body for directing patriots. Captain CORNIGLIANZE is Commandant, Lt.Col. CIPRIANI is Vice-Commandant and Chief of Staff. There are 3 political commissars representing the Communist, Christian Democrat and Action parties. They have a W/T set (believed to be O.S.S.) attached and will work intercommunication with the British mission. The COMANDO is planning the occupation of PARMA, beginning with the mountain towns and working down into the plain.

10. This is the third plan received from the APPENINE patriots for occupying large towns (e.g. SPEZIA and MODENA). No.1 Special Force is endeavouring to restrain the patriots as much as possible, but unless clear directives are given by A.A.I. in the near future, there is a grave danger that the patriots will take the law into their own hands.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No.1 Special Force.

Distribution:

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Lush, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, c/o Lt.Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. } Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. }
8. Lt.Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
9. Col. Feaney, c/o Lt.Col. Shipp A.C.C.
10. Col. Marshall, c/o Lt.Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
11. Major Pugo, I.S.L.D.
12. Col. Demmers, Economic Section.
13. File.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET URGENT

26

To: Political Section

30 Sep 44

Confidential

I would be grateful for your comments on the proposal in the telegram sent by HQ of No.1 Special Force in LONDON. (Folio 24).

G.W.I.SHIPP,
Lieut.Col.

Est copy from Hodgson of Sept 1944.

5086

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Confidential

25

TOP SECRET

Copy No.....

No. 5 Detachment

No.1 Special Force

MUSTER Daily Sitrep 29th September 1944.

1. British mission in NORTHERN ITALY reports on 27th that the Germans are removing one complete track and overhead electric equipment from the line UDINE-CORMONS-TRIESTE for transportation to GERMANY.

2. British mission in NORTHWEST ITALY reports on 27th that the Germans and Italians have received orders to defend the Franco-Italian frontier to the last. This is confirmed by report from I.S.L.D. source quoting speech of Col. VON KLAUS to his officers.

3. British mission on Franco-Italian frontier reports on 26th that the landing strips of an airfield (believed to be AIRASCA 68/8513) situated 13 km. from PINEROLO, south of road PINEROLO-TURIN, have been mined. The Germans evacuated this airfield on 15th September.

Patriot organisations in most towns are hiding machines.

4. Another British mission on the Franco-Italian frontier sends report (reliability not stated) that the Germans are mining the dam of the Lake MONT CENIS. Patriot bands in this area have been instructed to guard the dams and lift the mines.

5. The head of an Italian mission states in a delayed message dated 12th September that he has made proposals to the BIELLA committee and patriot leaders to occupy BIELLA area and prevent enemy scorching. It is hoped to send a mission to this area shortly.

6. An organisation in the BERGAMO area reports via LONDON that the evacuation of the German hospitals at GARDONE and SALO begin on 11th September, possibly to make room for the H.Q. of NORTH ITALY.

7. The powerful MAURI organisation in area LA SPEZIA has made plans for the occupation of SAVONA and ALBENGA and landing grounds for C-47 DAKOTAS are being prepared.

8. MUSTER Missions.

No MUSTER missions have yet been despatched to the field owing to bad flying weather. The following missions are completely prepared and are standing by for the first good night.

a) MILAN 12 all ranks

2. British mission in NORTH-WEST ITALY reports on 27th that the Germans and Italians have received orders to defend the Franco-Italian frontier to the last. This is confirmed by report from I.S.S.D. source quoting speech of Gen. VON KLAUS to his officers.

3. British mission on Franco-Italian frontier reports on 26th that the landing strips of an airfield (believed to be AIRASCA 68/B513) situated 13 km. from PINEROLO, south of road PINEROLO-TURIN, have been mined. The Germans evacuated this airfield on 15th September.

Patriot organisations in most towns are hiding machines.

4. Another British mission on the Franco-Italian frontier sends report (reliability not stated) that the Germans are mining the dam of the Lake MONT CENIS. Patriot bands in this area have been instructed to guard the dams and lift the mines.

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8. MUSTER Missions.

No MUSTER missions have yet been despatched to the field owing to bad flying weather. The following missions are completely prepared and are standing by for the first good night.

a)	MILAN	12	all ranks
b)	TURIN	12	do.
c)	GENOA	11	do.
d)	CUNEO	5	do.
e)	ALESSANDRIA	6	do.
f)	WESTERN LIGURIA (IMPERIA)	6	do.

Further parties are being prepared. All missions in the field have been briefed in their tasks after the enemy withdrawal. The aircraft situation has greatly improved with the arrival of the first half of 885 Squadron (U.S.) from NORTH AFRICA and a further allocation of C-47 DAKOTAS for supply dropping to N.W. ITALY.

There are now 33 missions in W/T contact with No.1 Special Force. It is proposed to increase this figure to 50 W/T links during this moon period, which should ensure efficient control of both normal and MUSTER missions.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No.1 Special Force.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Distribution:

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Lush, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, c/o Lt.Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. } Col. McCarthy, A.C.C.
7. }
8. Lt.Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
9. Col. Feaney, c/o Lt.Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
10. Col. Marshall, c/o Lt.Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
11. Major Page, I.S.L.D.
12. Col. Dunmore, Economic Section.
13. File

To: No.5 Detachment,
No.1 Special Force.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

12. Gen. Summers, Donald Soldier.
13. File

To: No.5 Detachment,
No.1 Special Force.

Receipt of MUSTER daily Sitrep Copy No. of 29 Sept. 44 is acknowledged herewith.

Date ..... Signed .....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

SECRET

Ref: LS/1

26th September 1944

29 SEP Recd

Subject; C.L.N.A.I.

To: Lieutenant Colonel Shipp, A.D.C.
Copy to: Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.

Confidential

From: Major Hodgart,
No. 1 Special Force.

The following is the substance of a telegram received from the London headquarters of No. 1 Special Force:

1. Plans for MUSTER missions assume that C.L.N.A.I. and local committees can assume and retain control of their areas or towns. As these committees have no acknowledged authority either from the Italian Government in ROME or from A.A.I., they can take power only through superior force or by the acquiescence of the local population, (a large proportion of whose active elements in the industrial cities is strongly communist).

2. Civil and Police authority is in the hand of armed Fascists, many of whom may resist.

3. It is not possible to draw examples from towns already overrun, as Allied troops were present.

4. It is suggested that the ground should be prepared by previous broadcasts to the effect that representatives of the Allied Command will deal only with local or regional Liberation Committees containing members of the leading anti-fascist parties; and that each committee, under the guidance and assistance of the Allied representative concerned, will be held responsible for administering its town or region for the interim period.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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5. At present the Committees have no authority and it is appreciated that authority cannot be given in advance either by the Italian Government or A.A.I. Nevertheless acknowledgement of the existence of the Committees and an indication of what is expected of them will help to obviate a period of chaos and assist them to assume authority at the right moment. Unless they do assume authority, the MUSTER missions cannot function.

6. If it is decided to make broadcasts on the lines of Para 4 above, P.W.B. should assure that the B.B.C.

HEADQUARTERS
2 OCT 1944
A. C. C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

receives and puts out the same material. Recent reports from North ITALY state that the "COMBATTE" programme is inaudible.

A policy decision is requested on Para 4 above. If it is decided to proceed on these lines, the necessary broadcasts can be prepared forthwith with R.E.B.

M J Cottrell

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Confidential

Copy No.....

No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force

MUSTER Daily Sitrep 27th September 1944

COUNTER SCORCH ACTIVITIES.

1. Italian W/T in VAL SESIA reports 24th September that the Military Committee of MILAN, together with the FRANCHI organisation (PIEDMONT), is forming citizen saboteur squads and organising both active and passive defence of factories. FRANCHI signals through same W/T that he is attempting to arrange protection of power plants.

2. British liaison officer to C.L.N.A.I. Military Adviser, in delayed messages dated 15th and 17th September, reports that he is in MILAN, which is full of enemy counter-espionage agents. He has discussed the protection of power plants with the Military Adviser, a member of the Interregional Military Committee and the FRANCHI organisation. The latter have asked for the bombing of the BRENNER and TARVISIO lines of communication which they state to be beyond the power of bands to attack and to be used by the enemy for evacuating non-combatants and non-mobile equipment. The enemy is said to have a plan to root out all C.L.N. H.Q.s, resulting in many arrests, bad contacts and loss of control. (It is not clear how far this plan has been carried out).

OTHER PATRIOT ACTIVITIES.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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OTHER PATRIOT ACTIVITIES.

3. British mission near VICENZA (Region XII) reports on 25th September that in the mountains the bands are being split up into patrols of 30 men, each with defined objectives. In the plains, there are sabotage squads of some men to with defined objectives, and bodies of 100 men for work in towns. In addition, civilians are being instructed to form road blocks near their homes by placing large stones or trees across roads.

4. British mission in EMILIA area reports on 24th that "MODENA" Patriot divisions having divided into two parts to march on BOLOGNA and MODENA respectively were attacked by the Germans. Contact is not yet re-established with the first part, but the second part still intends moving towards MODENA on receipt of ammunition and orders from the Committee of Liberation.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785577

ENEMY WITHDRAWAL

5. British mission in VAL CHISONE (Piedmont) sends on 25th September the following unconfirmed report. There are 15,000 Germans in SUSA - Mont Cenis area. VON KLASS, the German Commander in TURIN, and VON LAGEN (identity not stated) left for Germany last week. There are two companies of German saboteurs in TURIN with the task of destruction of factories. German police and signal personnel are reported leaving. The PIAT in TURIN and MINERBIO has been reduced. The mission states that the above should be treated with reserve as German movement is very confused.

6. An I.S.L.D. source reports that artillery, trucks and tanks are moving from LIGURIA towards TURIN. At SAVONA preparations have begun for the destruction of the harbour.

Major, R.E.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Lush, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, C/o Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
4. Mr. Wyner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. and 7. Col. McArthy, A.C.C.
8. Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
9. Col. Pedsey, C/o Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
10. Col. Marshall, C/o Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
11. Major Page, I.S.L.D.
12. Col. Donnmore, Scone-to Section.
13. File.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

the harbour.

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, H.M.Y.N.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution
---

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Lush, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, C/o Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
4. Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. and 7. Col. Hearthy, A.C.C.
8. Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
9. Col. Tersey, C/o Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
10. Col. Marshall, C/o Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
11. Major Page, I.S.L.D.
12. Col. Denumore, Secret Section.
13. File.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

P SECRET

Copy No. 8

No. 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force

MUSTER Daily Sitrep 26th September 1944

1. Liaison Mission with Central Military Committee MILAN reports 21st September:

(a) Republican Government circles maintain Allies will complete occupation of Italy in September.

(b) Mussolini is said to want to unite with Fascist forces in mountains and await German revival.

(c) A great impression was created when HUSSEN was condemned to death despite personal intervention of MUSSOLINI. (Note: We have asked who HUSSEN is).

(d) There are said to be new secret weapons of V.1 type, also flame and grenade throwers already incorporated in new defences.

(e) Source of above is minister who recently visited Republic Headquarters.

2. Latest known structure of Italian Patriot Command (source - SIM):

A. COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE ALTA ITALIA (C.L.N.A.I.) at MILAN, which controls:

B. C.L.N. TORINO
C. C.L.N. MILANO
D. C.L.N. GENOVA
E. C.L.N. VENEZIA
F. C.L.N. BOLOGNA
and G. COMITATO MILITARE [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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C. C.L.N. MILANO
D. C.L.N. GENOVA
E. C.L.N. VENEZIA
F. C.L.N. BOLOGNA
and G. COMITATO MILITARE INTERREGIONALE (Central Military Committee. The latter has under it

H. COMMANDO GENERALE CORPO VOLONTARI DELLA LIBERTA, which is the executive body of the Military Committee
and J. COMMANDO CITTA MILANO

Each regional C.L.N. has a similar structure to the above. It controls:

K. A number of C.L.N. PROVINCIALI (Provincial Political Committees)
L. COMITATO MILITARE REGIONALE, which has under it

M. COMANDO MILITARE REGIONALE.

This command comprises:

N. COMANDI ZONA (varying number in each region)
O. BANDE CONTROLLATE (varying number in each region)

(contd)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

The chain of command is complicated by the fact that the COMITATO MILITARE INTERREGIONALE has direct relationship with each COMITATO MILITARE REGIONALE; and the C.L.N. PROVINCIALI have direct relationship with the COMMANDI ZONA and BANDE CONTROLLATE.

3. Personalities: (source SIM)

A. C.L.N.A.I. 7 members.

Col. PIZZONI	(non-political)
Aw. ARPEIANI	(Liberal)
Dott. CASO	(Christian Democrat)
DUCATTI	(Communist)
OLIVIERI	(Socialist)
Dott. ALBASINI	(Action party)
CECCONI	(Secretary)

B. C.L.N. TORINO. 5 members.

Prof. GRECO	(Liberal)
Aw. LIBOIS	(Christian Democrat)
Dott. BOA	(Action party)
Rag. PASSONI	(Socialist)
Dott. SACCHETTI	(Communist)

C. C.L.N. MILANO. 5 members.

Aw. CODA	(Liberal)
TARONI	(Socialist)
BELTRAMINI	(Communist)
Dott. CASO	(Christian Democrat)
Name unknown	(Action party)

D. C.L.N. GENOVA.

Aw. MARTORELLI	(Socialist) alias PRIMO (is or was arrested)
Col. BALBIS	(Action party)
Comm. dr. MIRO	(Communist)
Aw. TOMMASI	(Action party)
Dott. NEGRI	" " alias RENATO SECUNDO
Aw. FAZIO	(prob. Action party)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

	DUCATTI	(Communist)
	OLIVIERI	(Socialist)
Dott.	ALBASINI	(Action party)
	CECCONI	(Secretary)

B. C.L.N. TORINO. 5 members.

Prof.	GRECO	(Liberal)
Aw.	LIBOIS	(Christian Democrat)
Dott.	ROA	(Action party)
Rag.	PASSONI	(Socialist)
Dott.	SACCHETTI	(Communist)

C. C.L.N. MILANO. 5 members.

Aw.	CODA	(Liberal)
	TARONI	(Socialist)
	BELTRAMINI	(Communist)
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Name unknown		(Action party)

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Aw.	TOMMASI	(Action party)
Dott.	NEGRI	" " alias RENATO SECUNDO
Aw.	FAZIO	(prob. Action party)

Of the above, the first three form E., the Military Committee.

E. C.L.N. VENEZIA. (Names unknown)

F. C.L.N. BOLOGNA. (Names unknown)

G. COMITATO MILITARE INTERREGIONALE. 6 members.

	Prof. PARRI	(Action party)
	"GALLO"	(Communist)
	ARGENTON	(Liberal)
	Aw. PARDINI	(Socialist)
	Name unknown	(Christian Democrat)
plus	Gen. CADORNA	(Military Adviser)

(contd)

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20

L. COMITATO MILITARE REGIONALE.

1. TORINO. 5 members

GONELLA	(Liberal)
FRACASSI	(Christan Democrat)
Dott. PISO	(Action party)
Ten. GAZZERA	(Socialist)
OTELLO	(Communist)

2. MILANO. 5 members.

ALONZI	(Liberal)
CARLI	(Action party)
FEDERICI	(Socialist)
OLIVO	(Communist)
Name unknown	(Christian Democrat)

3. GENOVA (see D.) 3 members.

Other personalities unknown.

Major, G.S.,
For Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution

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3. GENOVA (see D.) 3 members.

Other personalities unknown.

Major, G.S.,
For Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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TOP SECRET

Copy No. 8

No. 5 Detachment

Confidential

No. 1 Special Force

MASTER Sitrep 25th September 1944

1. Our representative in the PINEROLO area reports that the frontier southwards from MONDOVI is held by the Germans. The French appear to be taking no action at present.

2. We have received a reports from the VAL DOSSOLA stating that the Local Commander SUPERTI is accused of corruption, incompetence and of dealings with the enemy. He has been remanded for the Partisan Military Tribunal.

3. Our liaison officer with General CADORNA reports that he is about to start discussions with a view to the unification of command in the VAL DOSSOLA. He states that the situation is extremely favourable to keep the valley free provided that help in arms, trained personnel and W/T is sent and Air Force intervention is given. The possibility exists for landing planes, at least Lysanders, and there is definite possibility for day dropping of both men and material in the area of SANTE MARIA MAGGIORE.

4. We have received a message from the Field stating that the medical situation in TURIN is fair. Bandages of crepe paper are being used. Water is supplied from the LANZO valley; alternative supply VERCELLI.

5. Our mission in the CUNEO area reports that the 1st Brigade "GIUSTIZIA e LIBERTA" has joined MARTI.

2. We have received a report from the [illegible] stating that the Local Commander [illegible] is accused of corruption, incompetence and of dealings with the enemy. He has been remanded for the Partisan Military Tribunal.

3. Our liaison officer with General GARIBALDI reports that he is about to start discussions with a view to the unification of command in the VAL BORBOLA. He states that the situation is extremely favourable to keep the valley free provided that help in arms, trained personnel and S/T in sent and Air Force intervention is given. The possibility exists for landing planes, at least Lysanders, and there is definite possibility for day dropping of both men and material in the area of [illegible].

4. We have received a message from the Field stating that the medical situation in [illegible] is fair. Bandages of crepe paper are being used. Water is supplied from the LAGO valley; alternative supply [illegible].

5. Our mission in the CUNEO area reports that the 1st Brigade "GIUSTIZIA e LIBERTA" has joined [illegible]. Plans are ready for the occupation of [illegible] and ALBENGO, and landing grounds are being prepared.

Major, R.S.
for Commander, [illegible]
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

Distribution

1. High Commissioner, British Embassy.
2. Brigadier Lush, A.C.C.
3. Brigadier Dunlop, C/o Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
4. Mr. Wayner, P.W.B.
5. Col. Hancock, A.C.C.
6. Col. Mahrtly, A.C.C.
7. Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
8. Col. Feaney, C/o Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
9. Col. Marshall, C/o Lt. Col. Shipp, A.C.C.
10. [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND ON UNCLASSIFIED

1086

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Regional Control and Military Government Section.
++

Ref: 86/18/CA. 26th September 1944.

SUBJECT: Possible Use of Aerodromes in NORTHERN ITALY.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. A report has been received by this HQ from Major Hodgart, No.1 Special Force, of his experience on "RANKIN" conditions in Southern France, an extract of which is set out below:-

"3. Airfields.

In many cases the FFI cleared landing strips and even large airfields; after the German retreated but long before regular troops arrived. For example; TOULOUSE airfield was evacuated after the landing after an engagement with the FFI. It was at once put into use with FFI pilots flying operational sorties with machines that had been damaged. Despite regular W/T liaison the Allies were slow to take advantage of this. After about ten days MAAF officers landed to examine enemy material and several days later a Stirling bomber landed with a load of medical stores (which could not be parachuted or at that time sent by road).

Many other airfields were reported clear but were overrun by regular troops before any special sorties could be flown to them. Delay was in part due to the insistence of MAAF that photo cover be obtained before any landing.

There seems to be considerable possibilities in NORTH ITALY for landing operations to partisan held airfields. Dakotas would be most suitable with the following suggested loads:

(a) Medical Supplies.

(b) Air Force ground personnel to improve airfields for subsequent use by combat planes.

(c) Intelligence personnel.

(d) ACC personnel."

Sec 31
32

2. I consider that it would be to the utmost value in the early days of occupation in North Italy to be able to call up small quantities of stores, or a few personnel by air. I understand that MAAF are not directly interested

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in the airfields in this part of North Italy. Nevertheless, I shall be glad if you would take up the possibility of making available to us a few airplanes in emergency for tasks such as Major Hodgart describes. It would not be necessary to have any planes specifically allotted to AMG so long as we knew that they would be made available to us on call up to a certain limit for stores and personnel, and subject to a few hours notice being given.

3. The part of Northern Italy to which I specially refer is the Compartimentos of LOMBARDIA, LIGURIA and PIEMONTE.

(Sgd) M. S. Lush

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner,
for Acting Chief Commissioner.

GWIS/MG.

Copy to: Major Hodgart

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

E.C.

16

Ref p. 15

You wanted this put up to
AFMC at once.

Draft for your approval

Lieutenant Colonel

25 9 84

Issue

SR/2019

DRAFT

TOP SECRET

Confidential

SUBJECT: Possible Use of Aerodromes in NORTHERN ITALY.

TO : AFHQ, G-5 Section.

1. A report has been received by this HQ from Major Hodgart, No.1 Special Force, of his experience on "RANKIN" conditions in South France, an extract of which is set out below :

"3. Airfields.

In many cases the FFI cleared landing strips and even large airfields; after the Germans retreated but long before regular troops arrived. For example; TOULOUSE airfield was evacuated after the landing after an engagement with the FFI. It was at once put into use with FFI pilots flying operational sorties with machines that had been damaged. Despite regular W/T liaison the Allies were slow to take advantage of this. After about ten days MAAF officers landed to examine enemy material and several days later a Stirling bomber landed with a load of medical stores (which could not be parachuted or at that time sent by road).

Many other airfields were reported clear but were overrun by regular troops before any special sorties could be flown to them. Delay was in part due to the insistance of MAAF that photo cover be obtained before any landing.

There seems to be considerable possibilities in NORTH ITALY for landing operations to partisan held airfields. Dakotas would be most suitable with the following suggested loads:

(a) Medical supplies.

(b) Air Force ground personnel to improve airfields for subsequent use by combat planes.

(c) Intelligence personnel.

(d) ACC personnel. "

2. I consider that it would be to the utmost value in the early days of occupation in North Italy to be able to call up small quantities of stores,

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troops arrived. For example; TOULOUSE airfield was evacuated after the landing after an engagement with the FFI. It was at once put into use with FFI pilots flying operational sorties with machines that had been damaged. Despite regular W/T liaison the Allies were slow to take advantage of this. After about ten days MAAF officers landed to examine enemy material and several days later a Stirling bomber landed with a load of medical stores (which could not be parachuted or at that time sent by road).

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(a) Medical supplies.

(b) Air Force ground personnel to improve airfields for subsequent use by combat planes.

(c) Intelligence personnel.

(d) ACC personnel.

2. I consider that it would be to the utmost value in the early days of occupation in North Italy to be able to call up small quantities of stores, or a few personnel by air. I understand that MAAF are not directly interested in the Aerodromes in this part of North Italy. Nevertheless, I shall be glad if you would take up ~~with you~~ the possibility of making available to us a few airplanes in emergency for tasks such as Major Hodgart describes. It would not be necessary to have any planes specifically allotted to ACC so long as we knew that they would be made available to us on call up to a certain limit for stores and personnel, and subject to a few hours notice being given.

3. The part of Northern Italy to which I specially refer is the Compartimentos of LOMBARDIA, LIGURIA and PIEMONTE.

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Copy No. 8

Confidential

No 5 Detachment
No 1 Special Force

MONTHLY Progress Report for week ending 23 Sept 44

1. Owing to the comparatively slow progress of the Allied offensive we have had longer time than was originally anticipated to prepare for BARRIN 'B' and 'C' conditions in North Western ITALY and considerable progress has been made.

The parties which we propose to send to the three regional capitals - MILAN, TURIN, and GENOA are now complete and have finished their training. These three missions are made up as follows:-

a) Head of Mission
b) 2 i/c
c) P.W.B. representative
d) Radio officer
e) Medical officer
f) W/T operator
g) G.D. men, medical orderlies interpreters etc.

The preparation of these missions has been our first priority and it is hoped to infiltrate an advance party from each of them during the coming week. The intention is that the advance parties should establish contact with the Regional Committees of Liberation to discuss future plans, and to organise the protection of public utilities before or during the enemy withdrawal. The remaining members of the mission will follow as soon as it appears desirable.

Missions to the provincial capitals are smaller and will consist of the following:-

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b) 2 i/c
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a) Head of Mission
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c) S/T operator
d) G.D. men

These secondary missions are not all complete as regards personnel, but it is hoped that they will be brought up to strength during the coming week.

Progress has also been made in preparing the field for action in the event of RANKIN 'B' and 'C' conditions arising, and to receive our special missions. General preparatory directives have been passed to the C.L.N.A.I. and to Regional Committees of Liberation and other resistance organisations, instructing them to organise themselves so that they can preserve law and order and safeguard public utilities official records etc., in the event of an enemy withdrawal from their areas before the arrival of Allied troops.

p;t;o;

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785087

A plan for taking SPEZIA has been submitted by one of our missions in the Western Appennines, but this appears to require the delivery of large quantities of arms and material which is not at present possible owing to the extremely difficult aircraft situation.

Contact has been established with the MODENA Committee through another mission in the Western Appennines and it is hoped that a conference will take place in the near future. In PIEDMONT Major TEMPLE has been invited by the TURIN Committee of Liberation to go to TURIN and discuss the situation with the Committee. In addition to the above we have sent instructions for representatives of the GENOA and TURIN Committees, fully briefed on the political, military and economic situation, to come out and give us an up-to-date picture of the situation. It is hoped that these representatives will report to S.O.E. missions in Southern FRANCE during the next few days.

2. Reports from the field

The defence of the Ligurian coast seems to be left more and more to the Fascist Republican Forces. GRAZIANI himself is reported in DUNGO.

The Germans steadily continue to empty Italian factories of all the raw material and machinery they can. Following our directives the partisans are making plans to impede this. They have already begun to "borrow" key men and skilled labour from the factories to prevent their deportation to Germany.

Town commands have been established for MILAN and TURIN. The first coming directly under the C.L.N.A.I., has been given to General BELLOCCHIO. The second coming under the TURIN Regional Committee, has been given to General TRABUCCHI.

It is reported that in TURIN industry has come to a standstill owing to the fact that the partisans control a large number of electrical plants feeding the city. The Germans are now trying to send as much of the industrial equipment as possible to Germany. Patriots and workmen are doing everything in their power, including armed resistance, to impede the enemy.

3. Air Operations

Unfavourable weather conditions over most of ITALY have con-

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3. Air Operations

Unfavourable weather conditions over most of ITALY have rendered this weeks' effort negligible. African and Italian based aircraft together have flown a total of six successful sorties, of which three were to the CUNEO area, one to SPEZIA, and two to the mountains North East of UDINE.

Unfavourable weather is an adverse factor which must be accepted and which will become more frequent in future months. Therefore all the more serious is our complete inability to put into the air more than three or four planes on a night when all factors are in our favour. A proportion of even these few sorties are rendered

/ fruitless

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fruitless by mechanical defects in the aircraft, or by the inexperience of the crews of the targets they are visiting.

As a result the stores situation in many areas has become desperate. For two weeks organisations in the mountains from TOLNGO to VIENG, led by British officers have been meeting heavy enemy attacks. For two weeks there has been only one successful sortie to this area. They have been able to hold out till now, using stores dropped in the plains some weeks ago, but if their resistance is to continue and to be of value to the Allied armies, supplies to partisan formations, as to any other military formation, must be on a regular basis. Missions in the SPRZIL area report that they have not a single round of S.A. ammunition left, and say that it is useless to allot them elaborate RASKIN roles without giving them a round of ammunition with which to carry out their tasks.

However the position will to a certain extent be improved in view of the fact that 885 sqn will shortly be undertaking operati for us from BRINDISI.

Major for
Cmd No. 1 Special Force

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Col. HANCOCK A.C.C.	" "	5
Col. BEATTIE A.C.C.	" "	6 - 7
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Col. FRASER c/o Lt. Col. SHIPP A.C.C.	" "	9
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Major FORD L.O.A.C.	" "	11
File	" "	12

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File	" " 12

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TOP SECRET

APPENDIX 'A' 13

C.L.N. GENERAL Command

1. General CADORNA reports meeting with Political and military representatives who all welcomed him warmly. Committee National Liberation met on 28th to consider following:-

(a) Hastening of general Command plans.

(b) Better intercommunication between regions.

(c) Recognition of direct control of provincial commands over bands.

(d) Coordination information services.

2. Colonel PIERI our Liaison Officer with C.L.N.A.I. reports that commands have been arranged in MILAN and TURIN. The MILAN command which depends directly from the C.L.N. General Command has been given to General BALLONI. TURIN depends from the Regional PIEDMONT Command.

(b) The C.L.N. General Command includes one member from each of the five political parties plus one military adviser. The Command has an Operations Section consisting of representatives of Action Party, Communist Party and the Military Adviser. This section practically controls the Command. The Communists who supply, not only the majority of members but also secretaries and couriers are a preponderant influence.

(c) PIERI states that a commanding officer is not yet appointed. The candidacy of General CADORNA is not considered feasible owing to lack of agreement on other appointments. CADORNA is therefore acting as Military Adviser.

(d) The Central H.Q. controls directly the Milan command and the Regional Command from which depend the bands either directly or through the zone commands. Independent forces still, however, exist.

(e) There are 21 zone commands, i.e. 5 for EMILIA, 2 for LIGURIA, 5 for PIEDMONT, 4 for LOMBARDY, 5 for VENETO.

(f) The General Command acts chiefly in an organising capacity. The work of the operational command has been slowed down by difficulties of communication.

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(g) PIERI adds that this report was drawn up in conjunction with CADORNA.

3. General CADORNA has appointed General BAGLIANO commandant of AOSTA.

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SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394.

Regional Control and Military Government Section.
****

Ref: 86/II/CA.

23rd September 1944.

SUBJECT: Notes on "Rankin" conditions in S.FRANCE.

TO : H. Caccia, Esq.,
Joint Vice President,
Political Section.

I think you should see the extremely interesting report on "Rankin" conditions in the South of France. There are many valuable suggestions made therein which I hope No.1 Special Force will take up with AAI and their own officers for action in Northern Italy. I hope the Economic Section has already given information regarding hydro-electric and other installations which must be saved if possible. Will you please pass to Colonel Dennsore.

MSL/JG.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

MJCH/1

Confidential

Subject: NOTES ON RANKIN CONDITIONS IN SOUTH FRANCE

TO: HQ, No:1 Special Force FROM: No:5 Detachment

21st September 1944

The following suggestions are based on experience in SOUTH FRANCE, and may be partly applicable to NORTH ITALY.

1. C O U N T E R S C O R C H I N G of P O R T S

Three special counterscorch teams were put into the field at TOULON, MARSEILLES and SETE respectively.

They were composed of officers, CPOs and W/T operators from the French Fleet Air Arm and received several months of specialized training. Their training was largely based on a visit to the salvage authorities at NAPLES and was approved by C in C MED.

They were infiltrated about eight weeks before DRAGOON D-DAY. They worked with the clandestine resistance movements in the port and contacted French naval personnel who were still in the ports. They built up an organisation to take counter sabotage action on receipt of BBC messages; and passed high grade intelligence on enemy prepared demolitions; blockships, minefields, etc:

(a) TOULON

On D-3 a party of about twenty French sailors in uniform with one British Naval officer were dropped to the nearest maquis; with the intention of entering the dock area as soon as the general confusion caused by the landings could allow. At about this time one of

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(a) TOULON

On D-3 a party of about twenty French sailors in uniform with one British Naval officer were dropped to the nearest maquis; with the intention of entering the dock area as soon as the general confusion caused by the landing would allow. At about this time one of the original parties was exfiltrated by DAKOTA and arrived back in ALGIERS with a considerable amount of written intelligence. He was flown to CORSICA and taken on board the command ship of the Naval Task Force shortly before H hour.

Intelligence from this party was valuable to the salvage authorities. Results of counter-scorching action were not so considerable owing to the determined stand the enemy put up in the port and the consequent damage caused by our bombing and shelling. The uniformed party was at least able to kill a large number of Kriegsmarine. Full reports have not yet been seen by the writer, but it is known that TOULON was open to French Naval ships about three weeks after it was taken.

(Contd.)

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NOTES ON RANKINS CONDITIONS IN SOUTH FRANCE (Contd)

(b) MARSEILLES

Greater success was achieved by this party. Contact was made with a strong resistance movement of sailors and dockworkers. About 2000 metres of quay were saved by sabotaging the prepared demolitions and the first tanker was able to discharge about ten days after the port had been taken. Before Allied troops arrived the FFI seized and held the area around the entrance to Port de Bouc and were able to prevent this entrance being blocked.

The team remained for several weeks working with the Naval salvage for whom they provided intelligence.

(c) SETE

Almost complete success was achieved. The enemy did very little damage, even to installations such as floating cranes. According to the last reports received, the port could be used at once after the channel had been swept. This success was partly due to a strong organized resistance group which had already begun to plan counterscorch, to contact all port engineer personnel and ~~by~~ successfully subvert satellite troops in the Kriegsmarine. The detonator cavities in the prepared charges in the quays were filled with cement, the electric firing system interfered with, breech mechanism of coastal guns sabotaged; etc. Finally the enemy's retreat from the port, before he had time to attempt complete destruction, was hastened by strong guerilla action in the hinterland of the port.

(d) GENERAL RECOMMENDATION

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(d) GENERAL RECOMMENDATION

It is essential for skilled personnel (navy or port engineers) to be infiltrated or contacted. Members of missions who contact them must have a knowledge of German demolition methods (use of depth-charges and mines as charges, delay action devices, etc.).

Priority tasks are

(i) Sinking blockships before they can be sunk in position by the enemy.

(ii) Saving, at all cost, one length of quay, so that the salvage teams can get one ship in with equipment and start work on the other quays.

(contd.)

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NOTES ON RANKIN CONDITIONS IN SOUTH FRANCE (Contd.)

(iii) Saving floating cranes and tugs.

(iv) Scuttling all ships so that they cannot be used as blockships or obstructions to quays; preferably in shallow water so that the salvage teams can raise them easily.

For other details see Massingham paper on this subject.

2. COUNTER SCORCHING of OTHER INSTALLATIONS

This was taken very seriously, especially by the French, who wished to save something of their national economy. Directives were sent out shortly after the landing in the South to all French and Allied organizers or heads of missions to confine guerilla action to rail cutting, harassing enemy movement by road and destruction of cable, and to attempt to save all industrial installations and public works. Certain priority counterscorch objectives were given to the field; they included hydro-electric stations, sub-stations, mines and the aqueduct of MARSEILLES.

O.S.S. OG teams were despatched from LONDON with specific tasks of seizing and preserving certain dams in the MASSIF CENTRAL.

By obtaining the help of F.F.I., leaders, who put local maquis groups at their disposal, they were able to carry out their tasks. In most cases, however, the F.F.I. carried out counterscorching without the assistance of outside bodies but with the help of technical personnel concerned with each installation.

Although full reports are not available, it is evident that the amount of scorching the Germans carried out was very small, and that the national economy in the South of FRANCE can be reconstructed without great

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Although full reports are not available, it is evident that the amount of scorching the Germans carried out was very small, and that the national economy in the South of FRANCE can be reconstructed without great delay. The main reason was, however, probably the rapid retreat of the enemy during which he was confined to the main lines of communication by patriot action and continually harassed.

Recommendations

(a) Priority targets for counterscorch should be selected and simple technical instructions prepared.

(b) A general directive should be sent to the missions in the field with specific instructions for each area.

(c) If available, paramilitary bodies or regular

(contd.)

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NOTES ON RANKIN CONDITIONS IN SOUTH FRANCE (Contd.)

paratroops should be dropped to partizan receptions near priority targets, with the task of seizing these targets in co-operation with the partizans. This would be particularly valuable in the case of the hydroelectric plant in N. ITALY.

3. A I R F I E L D S

In many cases the FFI cleared landing strips and even large airfields; after the Germans retreated but long before regular troops arrived. For example; TOULOUSE airfield was evacuated after the landing after an engagement with the FFI. It was at once put into use with FFI pilots flying operational sorties with machines that had been damaged. Despite regular W/T liaison the Allies were slow to take advantage of this. After about ten days RAAF officers landed to examine enemy material and several days later a Stirling bomber landed with a load of medical stores (which could not be parachuted or at that time sent by road).

Many other airfields were reported clear but were overrun by regular troops before any special sorties could be flown to them. Delay was in part due to the insistance of RAAF that photo cover be obtained before any landing.

There seem to be considerable possibilities in NORTH ITALY for landing operations to partisan held airfields. Dakotas would be most suitable with the following suggested loads:-

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(c) Intelligence personnel.

(d) AOC personnel.

It might also be necessary to organise food supply by air for the large towns; as in the case of PARIS.

4. ROAD TRANSPORT and FOOD SUPPLY

Rail transport after months of air and partisan attacks practically ceased to exist in FRANCE. Road transport was largely used for transporting food to the main urban centres. It was found that the FFI had fairly large numbers of vehicles which had escaped being

(Contd:)

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NOTES ON RAPPIN CONDITIONS IN SOUTH FRANCE (Contd)

requisitioned and stocks of POL which had either been hidden or captured from the Germans. As the available road transport was quite well organised, the food situation in the large towns (with the exception of PARIS) appeared to have been satisfactory.

It is recommended that a directive be sent to the field that all available vehicles and stocks of POL should be hidden immediately. Missions should regard the organising of transport facilities as one of their main tasks.

Many vehicles in liberated areas were attacked by RATAF aircraft, despite the fact that the Germans were known to be confined to the main lines of communication during their retreat. Latterly the FFI painted white stars on the roofs of their vehicles. Close liaison must be established with the Air Forces and a special instruction issued that attacks on partisans are to be avoided during the German retreat.

5. ARMED PARTISANS

A problem arose in SOUTH WEST FRANCE which the French considered serious. Several thousand well armed men were left in an area completely evacuated by the enemy when there was no prospect of regular troops arriving in the near future. There was a certain amount of political tension, due partly to the high proportion of Spanish Republicans and Russians (deserters from the Wehrmacht) in the maquis. To avoid any incidents the commander of the FFI decided to send a large partisan column NORTH in pursuit of the enemy. Partisans are not usually considered to be mobile but this column was moved about two hundred miles from its base and had a successful engagement with the retreating enemy.

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5. ARMED PARTISANS

A problem arose in SOUTH WEST FRANCE which the French considered serious. Several thousand well armed men were left in an area completely evacuated by the enemy when there was no prospect of regular troops arriving in the near future. There was a certain amount of political tension, due partly to the high proportion of Spanish Republicans and Russians (deserters from the Wehrmacht) in the maquis. To avoid any incidents the commander of the FFI decided to send a large partisan column NORTH in pursuit of the enemy. Partisans are not usually considered to be mobile but this column was moved about two hundred miles from its base and had a successful engagement with the retreating enemy.

It is possible that similar methods might be exployed in NORTH ITALY should a dangerous situation arise.

6. GERMAN PRISONERS

Large numbers of prisoners were taken by the FFI in SOUTH FRANCE (a reasonable estimate is 30,000). Entire garrisons surrendered during the retreat from the South West. Many were not true prisoners but Russian or Polish deserters who at once began fighting in support of the FFI.

(Contd.)

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NOTES ON RANKIN CONDITIONS IN SOUTH FRANCE (Contd.)

Actual Germans usually preferred not to surrender to the French maquis but were only too willing to enter into negotiations with any Allied officer in uniform. Many of the uniformed parachutists and missions were able to make a large haul of prisoners sometimes by pretending that they were the advance guard of regular formations.

It had been feared that

(a) large numbers of prisoners would be shot in reprisal for atrocities; thus producing an embarrassing situation for General EISENHOWER (who had recognised the FFI as an integral part of his command) and

(b) the FFI would not be able to feed their prisoners.

In fact neither of these fears materialised. Only a few hundred prisoners were shot; usually in areas where German atrocities had been particularly severe; and the FFI were able to guard and maintain large bodies of prisoners. They appeared very glad to use prisoners en masse for clearing up bomb damage and restoring public works before Allied services arrived.

Missions should be made aware of the possibility of this situation re-occuring and should be prepared

(a) to prevent excesses against prisoners

(b) to arrange for stockades and their transfer to regular formations.

7. CONCLUSION

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7. C O N C L U S I O N

It is realised that the conditions of SOUTH FRANCE may not obtain in NORTH ITALY but some of these experiences may be of value to missions and staff.

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No; 5 Detachment

No. 1 Special Force

MUSTAR Sitrep 2 Sept 4

Confidential

1. British Mission in CUNEO area reports that the situation in PIEDMONT after the evacuation of the Germans will be serious owing to shortage of milk, fats, meat, fish and fuel. The medical situation is not bad at the moment. The situation could be eased by good distribution to enable full use to be made of supplies from the surrounding agricultural areas. TURIN is considered always to have been self-supporting in time of need. An acute housing situation is likely to develop in TURIN as the present evacuees will return immediately after the Germans leave.

Political Situation: Essentially pro-Allied, but TURIN has always been very pro-communist, and trouble is likely to arise from this at a later date. The rest of PIEDMONT is mostly anti-Communist. The Mission considers it is essential to take very firm action at the beginning of the liberation, since all parties will obey the Mission's advice; whereas they will start inter party action if left to themselves.

2. British Mission in SPEZIA area reports on 19th September that the Germans have put up notices to the effect that if any vehicles are attacked or Germans killed, they will burn the houses and kill 20 people for one German. This has affected the popularity of the patriots.

3. The following has been received from an Italian source in TURIN (reliability good) via LONDON, dated 6 August. The PIEDMONT Committee is composed of one representative of each of the five parties. The following groups are each commanded by a Colonel and represented on the Regional Command by a General: GARIBALDI, MATTEOTTI (Socialist), JUSTICE-LIBERTY (Action), LIBERAL and DEMO-CHRISTIAN. The Regional Command is intended to control action squads in the cities, and the above party groups commanded by their Colonels; but it is uncertain how far the various parties

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2. British Mission in SPEZIA area reports on 19th September that the Germans have put up notices to the effect that if any vehicles are attacked or Germans killed, they will burn the houses and kill 20 people for one German. This has affected the popularity of the patriots.

3. The following has been received from an Italian source in TURIN (reliability good) via LONDON, dated 26 August. The PIEDMONT Committee is composed of one representative of each of the five parties. The following groups are each commanded by a Colonel and represented on the Regional Command by a General: GARIBALDI, MATTEOTTI (Socialist), JUSTICE-LIBERTY (Action), LIBERAL and DEMO-CHRISTIAN. The Regional Command is intended to control action squads in the cities, and the above party groups commanded by their Colonels; but it is uncertain how far the various parties will collaborate. The PIEDMONT Committee functions well.

4. No source has yet been given for the following report:-

Strikes of all railway workers in TURIN began on 10th September The train service was completely suspended on the same day. The TURIN railway federation issued a manifesto stating that this would be followed by a general strike and armed insurrections. The order for the latter has not been given but the people have been called on to deliver no vehicles to the Germans who may be sent to replace the railwaymen; " arm themselves"; to support the activities of the C.L.N.A.I. and S.A.P. (Squadra Fazione Patristici); and to support the strike.

5. British Mission in PINEROLO area reports on 19 Sept that the TURIN Committee has a plan for partisans to descend from the hills and liberate TURIN. The Mission asks for a directive on the subsequent disarming and incorporation of the partisans.

[illegible]

[illegible] Major for [illegible] Force

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Major PAGE ., I.S.L.D.	" "	8

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[illegible] Sitrep 21 Sep 44

1. British Mission [illegible] area (Reliability A) reports 19th September that 10,000 Germans with artillery: mechanical transport and horse pack transport moved night 17/18 September from PARMA to [illegible]. It was rumoured that they were heading for RIMINI.

2. Same source reports German engineers have moved to [illegible] to destroy port installations.

3. Nol Special Force report (reliability not stated) that members of the Gestapo have arrived in MILAN and it is possible that they intend to start deportations. At the first attempt to carry these out, the food syndicates propose to mount a general strike.

4. Mission [illegible] area reports that General CADORNA's position is under discussion. The Liberals and the Christian Democrats favour one command only: Other parties wish to attach CADORNA with [illegible] and [illegible] to operational command. A more detailed directive from the Allied Command and the Italian Government would cut short further detrimental discussion.

5. The following report has been received through [illegible] LONDON from SWITZERLAND:

(a) The situation in [illegible] has been complicated by the unrestricted activities of [illegible]:

(b) [illegible] has come to command valley: He is reported to be honest and will try to keep out of party politics.

(c) In order to strengthen [illegible]'s position and to counter possibility of a communist coup by [illegible], [illegible] (who has been preserved by O.S.S.A.I. as political commissioner) and [illegible], our Swiss representative has instructed Lieutenant PATERSON (British) and TOMALSI to support [illegible].

(d) [illegible]

3. [illegible] Special Force report (reliability not stated) that members of the Gestapo have arrived in [illegible] and it is possible that they intend to start deportations. At the first attempt to carry these out, the food syndicates propose to mount a general strike.

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(c) In order to strengthen [illegible]'s position and to counter possibility of a communist coup by [illegible], [illegible] (who has been preserved by C.L.N.A.I. as political commissioner) and [illegible], our Swiss representative has instructed Lieutenant [illegible] (British) and [illegible] to support [illegible].

(d) [illegible] considers that it is necessary to place effective control of bands immediately in the hands of [illegible], with a high-ranking officer to take charge in [illegible], both of whom would act in strict collaboration with the Allies:

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6. Sec. Special Force are endeavouring to have infiltrated from Switzerland a leading technician to organise counter-search of electric system, at first clandestinely with Committees of Liberation and later openly with [illegible] Missions:

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High Commissioner British Embassy
Brigadier Cosh
Mr. Rayner
Col. McCarthy (2)
Col. Hancock
Lt. Col. [illegible]
Spare

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TOP SECRET

No.1. Special Force.
C.M.F.

20 Sept 44

Copy No. 6

MUSTER SILVER

1. A message has been received from Major MAURI, leader of a patriot organisation in the North West addressed to General ALEXANDER. He states that everything is arranged for reconstruction during period between the evening withdrawal and the Allies' arrival. He is ready to occupy CUNEO, MONDOVI, CUNEO, FOSSANO, BRA and ALBA, and to advance on TURIN. In all the areas in which he is operating he will be able to reestablish public administration.

No.1. Special Force are requesting Major MAURI to coordinate his plans with Major TEMPLE (British mission in CUNEO area).

D J B Fleming

Major for Commander RNVR
Comd. No.1. Special Force

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Lt. Col. SHIPP., A.C.C. " " 7
Major BAGE I.S.L.D.

5662

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. Section
APO 394

Confidential

Ref/06/7/CA.

20 Sept 44

SUBJECT: MUSTER Report.

TO : Major Hodgart, Special Force,
c/o Patriots Branch.

Receipt is acknowledged of MUSTER Report Copy No.7 dated 18 Sep 44.

G.W.I.SHIPP,
Lieut.Col.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. Section
APO 394

Confidential

Ref/86/6/Cl.

20 Sep 44

SUBJECT: MUSTER Report.

TO : Major Hodgart, Special Force,
c/o Patriots Branch.

Receipt is acknowledged of MUSTER Report, reference SF/P 15 dated 17 Sep 44.

G.W.I.SHIPP,
Lieut.Col.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Lieut Col. Shipp,
A.C.C.

COPY NO. 7

TOP SECRET.

No. I Special Force, C.M.F.

Confidential

19 September 1944.

WEEKLY REPORT.

1) Our HQ S.W. of VERIUNO reports that GARIBALDI bands in this area are regarded as Communists by other parties. HQ comments that some commanders are Communist but rank and file are very mixed.
All towns and villages have organised movements known as Lap directed by CLN which assist Partisans and carry out sabotage themselves.

2) Our representative in SWITZERLAND reports that appointment of MAGLIANO as commander of local bands is not popular and may have unfortunate consequences. The locals want MEZARD to remain in command. General CADORNA, who appointed MAGLIANO, has been asked to investigate.

3) The following information has been received from the field. Reliability unknown:-
" On 4th September Germans blew up PADUA airport".

4) Our HQ in the CUNEO area reports:
a) Definite signs of German withdrawal in TURIN.
b) Fascist families are being moved to VENICE from CUNEO.
c) The TAURO Division has left CUNEO for VENICE.
d) The Germans are destroying the airfield at SAVIGLIANO SHEET 80, reference 9882.

5) HUSTLER missions for No. I Sp. Force for TURIN, MILAN, GENOA and Western LIGURIA will be ready to go during the next few days.

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No. 5 Detachment
No.1. Special Force

Ref: SF/P 15

18 Sept 44

Confidential

Lt. Col. SHIPP
A.C.C.

Herewith MUSTER Report Copy No. 7.

Please acknowledge receipt.

D.J.B. Vernon

Major for
Comd No.1. Sp. Force

3

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No.5 Detachment
No.1. Special Force

18 Sept 44

Copy No. 7.....

MUSTER Report

17 Sept 44 . Reported that in Milan and Lombardy there is an independent party representing the opinion of the middle and artisan classes. Party is in no way connected with those engaged in subversive activity and is only theoretically fuzed with the C.L.N. of MILAN. Reported to have considerable following of persons of every class and encludes ex-soldiers and workmen.

2. Existance of organization for preservation of order and avoidance of German Sabotage is already reported to exist in TURIN. Our mission in TURIN area has intimated its intention to reach a working agreement with main Pzan groups for preservation of order and will warn leaders that they will be held responsible for any disorders in their areas.

3. Same source reports that in most circles Italian government and C.L.N. seem to enjoy little confidence possibly because little is known of future policy. Garibaldi Pzan divisions spend most of their time and funds on Communist Propaganda and intend seizing power at first possible opportunity.

4. Major TEMPLE CUNEO area has had talks with Major TOMASSO Aide-de-Camp to General TRABUCCHI who commands TURIN Resistance and is Chief of Staff 4th Italian Army.

Major TEMPLE gained the impression TURIN Committee is more interested in political than military aspect. TRABUCCHI wishes Major TEMPLE to visit TURIN during the next few weeks to boost morale and galvanise Military Committee to some action.

TRABUCCHI thinks it unlikely that when Germans pull out Fascists will surrender. At the moment Fascists are too strong for Partisans to oversome.

5. Major TEMPLE is making arrangements to send out representatives of GENOA and TURIN Committees fully briefed in political and military affairs.

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No.5 Detachment
No.1. Special Force.

Ref: SF/F 10

17 Sept 44

19 Sept Rec

High Commissioner
Brigadier LUSH., A.C.C.
Mr. CACCIA ., A.C.C.
Mr. RAYNER ., P.W.D.
Colonel HANCOCK ., A.C.C.
Colonel McCARTHY ., A.C.C
Lt. Col. SHIFF. , A.C.C.
Major FAUS., I.S.L.D.

It is proposed to issue daily reports on all matters bearing on No.1. Special Force RANKIN operations. These reports, which are signalled to this office, will be circulated to you as rapidly as possible, and will be prefixed MUSTER.

It is requested that any comments you may wish to make be forwarded to this office.

D.J.B. Yeman

Major,
for Comd. No.1. Sp. Force

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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TOP SECRET

No.1. Special Force.,
C.M.F.

Ref: SF/P 15

17 Sept 44

19 Sept Rec

RUSTER Report.

14 Sept 44.

1. British Mission SPEZIA area report telegram 12th that GUIDO BUFARINI has reported to Fascist Council as follows:-

a) General military situation grave but no desertion. Germans to slow the war will use after V.1. secret weapon V.2 V.3. V.4. GOTHIC line will be defended ferociously.

b) BOURGOIS class responsible Fascist downfall.

c) HITLER has declared in case of German defeat he will not hesitate ask Russia for armistice

d) Has failed check Patriot movement which is concentrated mostly in region EMILIA province.

2. Above report was received C.L.N. MILAN.

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15. Sept. 44

1. British Mission South West of MODENA report that MODENA representative has not yet arrived with him but provisional orders have been issued by C.L.N. Emilia Romagna who has ordered Armado and 400 men to prepare march on BOLOGNA and for Barbolini with 1,000 men to march on MODENA. At MODENA the group Fanny will come under Barbolini. If proposed march on these two places and an all out effort is to be a success it is essential stores and ammunition be dropped at earliest

2. Colonel Fiorentini of Fiamme Verdi organisation reports that Cassonica power stations are entirely under Fzan control in full agreement with engineers and their staffs.

3. Giovanni Tonetti a member of the regional C.L.N. in charge of area Venezia Trento Trieste provinces with 400 armed men states plan complete for removing and cutting of under-water demolition fuses at docks and on cause-ways to mainland. Demolitions at arsenal and docks have also been counteracted. 300 police will take possession of Fascist German Headquarters.

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