

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

00/109/218

OPERATION CINDERS
OCT. - DEC. 1944

527/EO

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Declassified, Authority:
AFHQ LETTER AC. 311.5/031 MVD-0
Dated 18 May 45

E. J. Walker

OPERATION CINDERS

TO BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH
SOURCES ADMIN NW ITALY

167-171
191

THIS FOLDER
CONTAINS PAPERS
FROM OCT - 1944
TO DEC - 1944
CATALOGUE.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785017

Col

49

69

I am in the 123. I shall be the general instruction
 from 123, which is the first way being back with him

10 1/2

179

After and see no more 123.
 as the point is 1/2

11/30

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EXTRACT from AFHQ Operation Instr.
Occupation of NW ITALY 8 1720
dated 21 Dec 44 Copy 52

FOLIO 145 FILE 503/COS

2. CWS TROOPS

2 Para Bde may be employed on Operation "CHURCH" (See separate Operation Instruction) to maintain law and order in TURIN immediately upon withdrawal of the enemy forces. In this case 2 Para Bde will revert to command AFHQ as soon as it can be relieved by other troops.

172

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section. APO 512

CONFIDENTIAL
G-5/TRA/AS

G-5: G14.14-10

4 December 1944.

SUBJECT Administration of Piedmont, Lombardy and Liguria.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
Attn: Brigadier Lush,
APO 394.

94 file 503

file 503

1. Reference is made to your signal 7313 of 30 November.
2. By now you will have received the copy of Log Plans paper P.164 which I sent to you under personal cover on 30 November. In the light of that paper it is felt that you will want to give further consideration to, and probably expand, the plan as submitted in your letter 13 November to HQ ASI. 69 file 503
3. For your information it now appears likely that operation SIRENS, although approved as a plan, will not be put into execution - at any rate for some months.

T. R. HEYD, Colonel,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

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MAJ 22/12

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FILE

Copy No. 1

4 Nov '44.

U.S. AIR FORCE - WASHINGTON, D.C.OPERATION "WINDY"

Continuation, 2 Para 100. Copy No. 1.

INTRODUCTION

1. Operations by 100th and 101st Airborne Divisions in the 10 Valley may force the enemy to withdraw from the 10 Valley while still preventing our troops from advancing to the NW, either along the coast towards 100th or along Highway 9 West of PLACENTA. In that event there may be a period between the time that the enemy withdraws and the arrival of 100th and 101st troops by road in NW 100th. It is during this period that disorder may occur, and certain political parties backed by armed patriots may attempt to seize power.

2. The following information concerning the Patriot Organization including the GIN plan for the occupation of 100th will be forwarded to you at an early date.

3. Detachments from No. 2 District, 100, 101, 102 and 103 of 100th will be under your orders.

PLAN

4. As soon as the G-100-100 is satisfied that the enemy has withdrawn from the 100th area, and in readiness to re-occupy that area, you will lead a force by air in the vicinity of 100th with the object of maintaining law and order in that area until the arrival of 100th and 101st troops by road.

5. You will make the detailed plan for the airborne operation first of all with the Air Force Commander nominated.

6. Your operations will be initiated by 100th and launched at a date to be decided by the G-100-100.

7. Your force will be at 5 days notice from the time at which 2 Para 100 complete concentration in the 100th area.

8. You will give that assistance you can to 100th in carrying out their special task, and to 100th in carrying out their special task in 100th.

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to withdraw from its early hold, still protecting our troops from advancing to the river, with a strong the coast "over the hill" along Highway 3 east of PLOMBA. In that event there may be a period between the time that the enemy withdraws and the arrival of fifth army troops by road in the fall. It is during this period that disorder may occur, and certainly political parties backed by armed patriots may attempt to seize power.

100

40. You will send under command C-123 all on landing and will pass to under command C-123 all at a subsequent time to be determined by this HQ.

11. Your attention is drawn to the Minutes of a meeting held at 407 HC Hall on 27 Oct forwarded under cover of 61/2/21/202 dated 30 Oct. Any further details regarding positions will be discussed at a further meeting to be held at 407 HC Hall in BMS at 1100 hrs 7 Nov, which you or your Deputy Commander are requested to attend.

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1000

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10

Copies to :-

Copy No.

Deputy Commander, 2 Para Bde	2
C/o Lt-Col. D.V. BUEBIS, G-3 AFHQ	3
FIFTH ARMY	4 -
No. 2 DISTRICT	5
No. 4 Special Force	6
No. 1 I.C.U.	7
Regional Commissioner, FLETCRATS REGION,	8
C/o Civil Affairs Sec AAI.	9
PM Unit No. 12, ROME	10 - 12
MAFAP	13 - 14
AFHQ G-3	15
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Mile	31
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Spares	38 - 40

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EXTRACTS FROM MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT
AW HQ AAI 27 OCT 1944.

Operation GINDERS

Extract from Minute 2.

2nd Para Bde will not be available until after 20 Nov from which time it is likely to be located in the ROSE area It will take five days to assemble the necessary aircraft at present employed on other duties.

Extract from Minute 4.

AC consider that they should be represented and that a party of 35 all ranks and 3 jeeps should be provided for. The majority of this detachment will have to be landed in gliders but a proportion may be able to be dropped from DOB's (the above minute was an amendment of the following: 'AC consider that a detachment from 1st Airborne Army comprising 15 all ranks and 3 jeeps should be provided for in gliders'.)

Extract from Minute 6.

No.2 District, AC, PWB, ICU and 1 of C Signals will examine the constitution of their parties in light of the above and be prepared to put in their bid for air transport to Comd 2nd Para Bde when called for. This bid will show number of personnel fully equipped plus 2 days rations, vehicles by types with any special fittings, i.e. wireless sets, broadcasting apparatus etc, and dimensions with weight, and type and weight of additional stores and baggage.

Extract from Minute 10.

No.2 District and AC will pass messages to their respective HQ through 2nd Para Bde to HQ AAI for onward transmission.

Extract from Minute 12.

PWB will consider the desirability of a special leaflet to be dropped on TURIN at the time of landing.

Extract from Minute 14.

As soon as Comd 2nd Para Bde is available a meeting will be called by AAI at which MAYAF, 2nd Para Bde and Air Force Comd detailed for the operation, No.2 District, AC, ICU, PWB and No.1 Special Force will be represented at which the detailed bids for air transport will be examined.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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By authority of

SAC and

Initials: TRC HOC/W

Date: 30 Oct. 44

30 October 1944.

SUBJECT: Operation "CINCINNATI".

TO : GOC-in-C, and.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander directs that plans be prepared for the establishing in the THIN area of an area Command and JAG, as soon as possible after the withdrawal of German Forces from that area. To that end, preliminary meetings have been held at this Headquarters, and the following basic decisions have been reached.

- a. The operation has been assigned the code name "CINCINNATI".
- b. Forces available: 2 Independent Parachute Brigade Group. Upon completion or cancellation of the operation, 2 Independent Parachute Brigade Group reverts to control of AFHQ.
- c. The mounting and re-supply of the operation is the responsibility of AFHQ.
- d. The detailed planning and launching will be done by JAI and MATAF.
- e. The commander of the 2 Independent Parachute Brigade or his representative should be present during the detailed planning. Direct correspondence between JAI and the 2 Independent Parachute Brigade is authorized to arrange for this representation.

2. During the preliminary meetings certain aspects affecting the operation were brought out; these are presented below for your information:

- a. Airfields at TAQUINIA and CINCINNATI, have been tentatively selected as departure airfields; in the event that these airfields are to be employed, it also will be necessary to use the PIA airfield. Final selection of departure airfield (s) should emerge from the detailed planning between JAI and MATAF.
- b. Specific selection of arrival airfield (s) in the THIN area is dependent upon a reconnaissance to be made by MATAF and the Special Operations Regiment, reporting under your command.
- c. Approximately 100 C-47 aircraft are likely to be available.
- d. Early days notice must be given to MATAF, to con-

- b. Forces available: 2 Independent Parachute Brigade Group. Upon completion or cancellation of the operation, 2 Independent Parachute Brigade Group reverts to control of AFHQ.
 - c. The mounting and re-supply of the operation is the responsibility of AFHQ.
 - d. The detailed planning and launching will be done by GAI and MATAF.
 - e. The commander of the 2 Independent Parachute Brigade or his representative should be present during the detailed planning. Direct correspondence between GAI and the 2 Independent Parachute Brigade is authorized to arrange for this representation.
2. During the preliminary meetings certain aspects affecting the operation were brought out; these are presented below for your information:
- a. Airfields at TAQUINIA and CLABING, have been tentatively selected as departure airfields; in the event that Horsa gliders are to be employed, it also will be necessary to use the PIF airfield. Final selection of departure airfield(s) should emerge from the detailed planning between GAI and MATAF.
 - b. Specific selection of arrival airfield(s) in the TUBIN area is dependent upon a reconnaissance to be made by MATAF and the Special Operations organization operating under your command.
 - c. Approximately 100 C-47 aircraft are likely to be available.
 - d. Five day's notice prior to 'D' Day must be given to MATAF, to concentrate aircraft. 'D' Day is the day 2 Independent Parachute Brigade Group is planned to land.
 - e. The Special Operations organization operating under your control can provide certain information as to the conditions in the TUBIN area at the time of launching of the operation.
 - f. The air re-supply base of the 2 Independent Parachute Brigade Group will be moved to the COB area as soon as the exact departure airfield has been selected.
 - g. Nine days maintenance for air re-supply will be set up. This 9 days will include 2 days accompanying personnel.

-1-

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Letter to GOC-in-C, A.I., subject: "Operation CINCUS", dated
30 October 1944 - (C. H. H. S.)

3. It is desired that:

a. You proceed forthwith with the detailed planning, keeping this headquarters advised so that forces and supplies can be expeditiously concentrated.

b. Due to the time of year and the strong possibility of unfavorable weather, you will prepare an alternative plan to establish military government in the TILIN area by an overland advance as soon as possible after the withdrawal of German forces from that area. This alternative plan should contemplate the employment of troops now under your command.

By command of General WILSON:

OFFICIAL:

Revised Dec

Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-1 (S)
G-2
G-3 (Sp Ops)
G-3 (Org B)
G-3 (Plans)
G-3 (Ops)(Air)
G-3 (Ops)
G-4 (S)
G-4 (B)
M & Tn
G-5
Log Plans
G (AS)
Air and Advisor

J. A. H. G. GILL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

J. A. H. GIBELL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Amended

DANIEL MOO,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

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G-3 (Ops)
G-4 (A)
G-4 (B)
X-4 In
G-5
Log Plans
Q (A3)
Airborne Advisor
CSC
Petrol Section
British Resident Minister
US POLAD
Liaison
Engineer
Survey
ACC
G-in-C Mod
MOP
MOP

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G-3 SECTION

By authority of
SAL, Maj
Initials: R. C.
Date: 20 Oct 44

COPY NO. 2

MINUTES OF THE 1ST EXECUTIVE PLANNING

SECTION 1. SETTING, OPERATION CENTERS

PARTICIPANTS:

Brigadier Lush	Brigadier HOLBORN, Chairman
Colonel Lawrence	ACC
Colonel Mills	G-3 Ops
Colonel Monfort	MAAF
Colonel Rycroft	SAI
Lt. Col. Pethier	SAI
Lt. Col. Higgins	G-3 Ops
Lt. Col. Haves	G-1 (B)
Lt. Col. Hare	G-3 Plans
Lt. Col. Milne	G-3 Ops-Air
Lt. Col. Boyd	M & In
Lt. Col. Mitchell	G-4 (A)
Lt. Col. Corry	G-5
Lt. Col. Phelps	Q (Maint)
Lt. Col. Shewcross	Airborne Plans
Lt. Col. Birch	G-3
Gp/Capt Knight	SAI
Major Aswell	MAAF
Major Henderson	G-2
Major King	G-3 Op Ops
Major Mathis	G-3 Plans
Major Stapleton	M & In
Major Hunt	Log Plans
Major Beasley	Q (Maint)
Major Gracie	Q (AE)
Major Stewart	Petrol Section
Major Holmes	Liaison
Major Adams	Engineers
J. Wyndham	Survey
G.F. Reinhardt	Rep. Br. Res. Minister
Major Camp, Secretary	U.S. POLAD

1. The Chairman pointed out that the following addition would be made to the minutes of the meeting held on 19 October:

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785017

Colonel Poter
Colonel Bycroft
Lt. Col. Poterier
Lt. Col. Higgins
Lt. Col. Haves
Lt. Col. Hare
Lt. Col. Hilde
Lt. Col. Boyd
Lt. Col. Mitchell
Lt. Col. Corpe
Lt. Col. Phelps
Lt. Col. Shawcross
Lt. Col. Birch
Op/Capt Knight
Major Daveliff
Major Henderson
Major King
Major Hethis
Major Stapleton
Major Hunt
Major Beasley
Major Graetz
Major Stewart
Major Holloway
Major Adams
J. Wyndham
J. E. Reinhardt
Major Camp, Secretary

AAI
AAI
G-2 Ops
G-1 (3)
G-3 Plans
G-3 Ops-Air
1 & 2
G-4 (A)
G-5
Q (Maint)
Airborne Plans
G-6
AAI
MAAP
G-2
G-3 Ops
G-3 Plans
1 & 2
Log Plans
Q (Maint)
Q (AB)
Petrol Section
Liaison
Engineers
Survey
Rep. Br. Res. Minister
D. J. POLAR

1. The Chairman pointed out that the following addition would be made to Para 1 sub-para B-1 of the "OUTLINE PLAN - APO MAFFIN" dated 19 October: "Upon the completion of its task in Operation CIBOLA, the 2 Para Bde will revert to the command of AFM."

2. Following a query from AAI as to the exact area concerned in the operation, the Chairman stated that "TUNIN and its immediate environs is the object." It was explained that AAI personnel would radiate from TUNIN as circumstances dictated.

3. AAI pointed out that the minutes of the preliminary meeting on the operation had not reached them prior to departure, in view of which they were not prepared to furnish detailed replies to any queries which might result from the present meeting.

AAI also stated that the matter of the organization of Northwest ITALY had been the subject of some planning at AAI, and that discussions had been held at which representatives from AAI, ACC, 5 Army and Number Two District were present. At these discussions, TUNIN was not selected as the headquarters for the area, but ALLANWALA was selected, with sub-areas to be located at MILA, TUNIN and GAKO.

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Chairman of the 1st FRS Council (Comm'd)

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4. MAJF requested that Para 1 sub-para 2-2 the "OUTLINE PLAN - EPS MEETING" of 17 October, be changed to read: "Detailed planning and launching will be responsibility of MAJ and MAJF."

5. Reference Para II, sub-para A, "OUTLINE PLAN - EPS MEETING" MAJF stated that in the event Horsa gliders were to be employed it would be necessary to use the first airfield rather than CHOSATO, TANGULIA or CLAMPING field for these troops or supplies to be moved by gliders.

6. MAJF will report to G-3 operations on the available departure and arrival airfields and the characteristics of each as regards varied weather conditions, proximity to ground transportation routes, state of repair, etc. Special Ops will cooperate with MAJF in obtaining data on arrival airfields.

7. It was decided that the mounting of the operation would be done by AFHQ regardless of whether the departure airfield selected was in the MAJ or AFHQ area of responsibility. AFHQ will coordinate with MAJ on the mounting details.

8. Reference arrival airfields in the TIFIN area: MAJF stated that their preliminary survey of airfields in the TIFIN area was not favorable. The airfields are in poor condition at present and will be worse at a later date, as the Germans will recognize that considerably prior to their departure. In view of this MAJF did not believe it would be possible to land any troops or supplies on airfields in this area initially, but pointed out that gliders could be landed in the immediate vicinity of TIFIN, and that in view of this the MAJF personnel in the first echelon would have to go in via gliders. MAJF pointed out that due to the above, it would not be possible to send in more than a few vehicles by air.

The Chairman pointed out that MAJF would plan to requisition vehicles in the TIFIN area and that details would have to be worked out in advance with representatives of the resistance group there.

9. Reference preliminary reconnaissance: Special Operations stated that they will have a special force working in the TIFIN area in the near future and will at this time have communications set up in order that reports on the situation there may be available to the planners. MAJF also will make a reconnaissance.

10. No decision can be made as to the matter of the air lift required until MAJ, G-5 and the Deputy Commander of the 2nd Para Bde confer. Airborne Plans stated that arrangements would be made to have the representative of the Para Bde report to MAJ without delay. Note:- Arrangements have since been completed.

11. MAJF stated that 100 aircraft were available for the operation and the Chairman stated

8. Reference arrival airfields in the TUM area. WOLF stated that their preliminary survey of airfields in the TUM area was not favorable. The airfields are in poor condition at present and will be worse at a later date, as the Germans will damage them considerably prior to their departure. In view of this WOLF did not believe it would be possible to land any troops or supplies on airfields in this area initially, but pointed out that gliders could be landed in the immediate vicinity of TUM, and that in view of this the 489 personnel in the first echelon would have to go in via gliders. WOLF pointed out that due to the above, it would not be possible to send in more than a few vehicles by air.

The Chicagoer pointed out that CG would plan to requisition vehicles in the Torino area and that details would have to be worked out in advance with representatives of the resistance group there.

9. Referenced preliminary reconnaissance: Special Operations states that they will have a special force working in the T3 area in the near future and will at this time have communications set up in order that reports on the situation there may be available to the planners. Notes also will make a reconnaissance.

10. No decision can be made as to the matter of the air lift required until Maj. G-5 and the Deputy Commander of the 2nd Para Bde confer. Airborne Plans stated that arrangements would be made to have the representative of the Para Bde report to all without delay. Note:- Arrangements have since been completed.

21. NAME stated that 100 aircraft were available for the operation and could be employed without prejudice to other operations. The Chairman, stated that in view of this planning would be based on the employment of 100 aircraft.

12. The Chairman stated that upon the completion of its task in CHINESE-
-area he would return to its old base in the HUNG area.

13. For once re-supply: It was decided that two airfields were suitable, in order of preference: GUAFINO and T.300013. UTAZ and alternate plans to transfer on selection and report to J-3 Operations on decision. In order to bring about coordination with J-3.

The matter of the amount of supplies to be carried initially came up for discussion. It was agreed that Plans would be made for at least 9 days supply to be laid on, with the troops taking 3 days supply with them and the additional 7 days supplies being landed as soon as possible.

whole pointed out that it would be necessary for them to know how

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minutes of the 1st EPS meeting (Cont'd)

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they would be expected to furnish aircraft for re-supply and how many aircraft would be needed. It was decided that this matter would be handled in the detailed plan and that a procedure similar to that followed in Operation Manna would be worked out. HAAF stressed the fact that weather conditions played an extremely important part in the matter of re-supply by air.

The question as to the control of the re-supply base arose, and it was decided that it would continue under AFHQ.

14. Reference informing SHAEF of operation: The Chairman stated that AAI would keep AFHQ informed of the development of the detailed plan in order that AFHQ may inform SHAEF.

15. Reference signal communication: AFHQ Signals stated that it was presumed that AAI would provide necessary signal facilities from the facilities which would normally be provided for the area headquarters. AFHQ Signals will coordinate with AAI Signals on this matter prior to completion of detailed plan.

It was pointed out that arrangements will have to be made for signal communications between the various airfields from which the operation will be mounted. AFHQ Signals to confer with AAI and HAAF on this matter.

16. The Chairman stated that "D-Day" would be the day on which the Para Bde is "planned" to be dropped or landed in the TUIW area.

17. HAAF stated that it must be given five days notice of the date of D-Day in order that the necessary aircraft may be concentrated.

18. HAAF again stressed the importance of weather, and it was pointed out that any casualties in the Para Bde will be avoided if arrangements are made through Special Operations to signal the wind velocity on the ground at the time of the dropping. HAAF and Special Operations to confer on the steps necessary to provide this information.

19. Airborne Operations inquired if information was available as to whether the operation would be opposed or unopposed, pointing out that this information would have a definite effect on the amount of ammunition and special equipment the Para Bde would require. It was stated that no definite information is now available as to the opposition to be anticipated, but it will probably be light as the operation will not be launched until the Germans have withdrawn.

20. Special Operations stated that it would be advantageous if ACC personnel could be dropped before the operation, to assist in overcoming political problems. The present policy is that no ACC personnel will be dropped prior to the arrival of troops.

Coordinate with AFM Signals on this matter prior to completion of detailed plan.

It was pointed out that arrangements will have to be made for signal communications between the various airfields from which the operation will be mounted. AFM Signals to confer with AFM and AFM on this matter.

16. The Chairman stated that "D-Day" would be the day on which the Para Bde is "planned" to be dropped or landed in the TIFIN area.

17. MAJF stated that it must be given five days notice of the date of D-Day in order that the necessary aircraft may be concentrated.

18. MAJF again stressed the importance of weather, and it was pointed out that any casualties in the Para Bde will be avoided if arrangements are made through Special Operations to signal the wind velocity on the ground at the time of the dropping. MAJF and Special Operations to confer on the steps necessary to provide this information.

19. Airborne Operations inquired if information was available as to whether the operation would be opposed or unopposed, pointing out that this information would have a definite effect on the amount of ammunition and special equipment the Para Bde would require. It was stated that no definite information is now available as to the opposition to be anticipated, but it will probably be light as the operation will not be launched until the Germans have withdrawn.

20. Special Operations stated that it would be advantageous if ACC personnel could be dropped before the operation, to assist in overcoming political problems. The present policy is that no ACC personnel will be dropped prior to the arrival of troops.

21. ACC and Special Operations to confer on the steps to be taken to prevent the destruction of vital utilities prior to the capture of the area. A detailed list of such installations has already been prepared by ACC.

22. In the event additional EPS meetings are found necessary the members will be notified.

R. J. C.M.F.
Major, Inf.,
Secretary.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

19 October 1944

OUTLINE PLAN - END MEETING

MEETING ON OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

See 48 f. 503

I. INTRODUCTION: (by Chairman)

- A. Mission of proposed operation:- to establish TULIN area Command and AF in TULIN area, as soon as possible after withdrawal of German Forces from that area. This is to be done by dropping elements of 2 Para Bde Group initially, followed by landing successive increments of 1st TULIN area Command, as well as necessary supplies, stores, and the remainder of 2 Para Bde Group for guard duty.
- B. For planning purposes, the following assumptions have been made:
 1. 2 Para Bde will be in ITALY, ready for the operation, by 20 November. Upon the completion of its task in 2 Para Bde, 2 Para Bde will be ordered to land in 1st TULIN area.
 2. Detailed planning and launching will be responsibility of AF.
 3. The mounting of the operation will be the responsibility of AF. 77777777

Chairman's Ref.

See 56

II. SUBMITTAL OF REPORTS:

- A. Departure Airfield(s):- GROSSETO, TAVUINIA, and CHIAIANG AREAS under consideration. JAAF Ops to make final selection. (PISA)

Gloden

General Forces from that area. This is to be done by dropping elements of 2 Para Bde Group initially, followed by landing successive increments of 2 Para Bde Group Command, as well as necessary supplies, stores, and the remainder of 2 Para Bde Group for guard duty.

5. For planning purposes, the following assumptions have been made:

1. 2 Para Bde will be in ITLIL, ready for the operation, by 20 November, upon the completion of its task in the CROSETT, 2 Para Bde and 2 Para Bde Command, as well as 2 Para Bde Group.
2. Detailed planning and launching will be responsibility of AML.
3. The mounting of the operation will be the responsibility of AML.

OF AML. TTTATATAT

II. SCENARIO AT H.S.

- A. Intelligence Airfield(s):- CROSETT, L. VUINH, and CIAMING areas under consideration. AML Ops to make final selection. (PISA)
- B. Arrival Airfield(s):- TTTTH area (G-5). Serviceability of fields? (AML)
- C. Preliminary Reconn: (AML and Sp Ops) Maps?
- D. Personnel & Tonnage to be Lifted:- (G-5 to produce "irreducible minimum" figure, plus breakdown of TOTAL AML force into approximately three increments).
- E. Air Lift Required:- (To be provided by AML, dependent upon 2 subpara).

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F. Air Re Supply:- Traps dropped initially can only be used against

- Airborne troops 7 days re-supply (dropped) - to be held against
requi want, but air transport to be used as soon as possible. (MAD Ops

& Airborne Plans).

G. Further De-Supply:- As follows

1. From period indicated in 12/ above until ground EEs are established,

and 2. Subsequent re-supply. (MAD, E-3, E-4, E-5)

H. Parachute and Equipment Losses:- 2 para Bde -

Should until no prob'ad, as they can be provided at base upon arrival
of Bde (confer with Airborne Plans).

I. Contact with Assistance Groups:- Must be made prior to launching
operation. (E-5, Sp Ops).

J. Coordination with SHAF:- Upon completion of all plans, and prior to
launching, SHAF (and 6 Army Group should be advised of operation. (Ops).

K. Signals:- CSO (Lt. Col. Shawcross) states no signal resources available.

L. Schedule of Events:-

1. Day is the day on which 2 para Bde is dropped (or landed) in TUE IN

res.

2. Time Schedule:-

a. Preliminary move of arrival airfield: 0 - 7

b. Assembly of stores & supplies at departure field: 0 - 7

c. Closing of 2 para Bde at departure field: 0 - 7

d. Closing of 1st para Bde at departure field: 0 - 7

Planned to

Should entail no problem, as they can be provided at base upon arrival of Hqs (confirm with Airborne Plans).

- I. Contact with Assistance Groups:- Must be made prior to launching operation. (C-5, Sp Ops).
- J. Coordination with SWAF:- Upon completion of all plans, and prior to launching, SWAF and 6 Army Group should be advised of operation. (Ops).
- K. Signals:- CSO (Lt. Col. Shawcross) states no signal resources available.

L. Schedule of Events:-

1. Day in the day in which 2 Para Bde is dropped (or landed) in TURIN

can.

2. Time Schedule:-

- | | |
|--|---------|
| a. Preliminary moves of arrival airfield: | 1 - 2 |
| b. Assembly of stores & supplies at departure field: | 3 - 4 |
| c. Closing of 2 Para Bde at departure field: | 5 - 6 |
| d. Closing of JAG Force at departure field: | 7 - 8 |
| e. Loading of stores & supplies: | 9 - 10 |
| f. Loading & take-off of JAG Force: | 11 - 12 |
| g. Loading & take-off of re-supply cargo: | 13 - 14 |

etc.

3. Number of days notice required:- _____ days.

M. Others:-

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III. REMARKS

IV. DECISIONS MADE

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IV. DECISIONS ARE:-

1072/454

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